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
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Out of My Past
The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov

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COUNT VLADIMIR NIKOLAEVICH KOKOVTSOV

HOOVER WAR LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS—No. 6

OUT OF MY PAST

THE MEMOIRS OF COUNT KOKOVTSOV

Russian Minister of Finance, 1904–1914
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1911–1914

Edited by

H. H. FISHER

Translated by

LAURA MATVEEV

1935

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

IN PREPARING this edition of the *Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov* we have, with the author's consent and collaboration, condensed certain portions of the original manuscript relating largely to personal matters which might be presumed to be of secondary interest to the Western reader. The text here given, therefore, does not correspond exactly with the Russian edition, *Iz moego proshlago, Vospominaniia, 1903-1919* (Izdanie Zhurnala Illustrirovannaia Rossiia, Paris, 1933), published by arrangement with the Hoover War Library, but all changes have been approved by Count Kokovtsov.

Russian reference works do not always agree on dates and such other biographical data as have been included in the editorial notes. In many cases, though unfortunately not all, we have been able to check these data by reference to the persons mentioned or to members of their families, and I wish to thank those who have given this information. Dates of Russian events after July 1918 are new style.

I wish also to acknowledge the very considerable participation of members of the research staff of the Hoover War Library in the preparation of this edition, particularly Mr. J. E. Wallace Sterling, Mrs. Xenia Joukoff, Mrs. Elena Varneck, and Miss Jiřina Markova. Miss Markova has also seen the manuscript through the press and has prepared the index. I am also greatly obliged to Professor George Vernadsky for valuable suggestions regarding the notes. Finally, I desire to make grateful acknowledgment to Count Kokovtsov for his aid, his patience, and his unfailing courtesy during the preparation of this volume.

I am indebted to the following publishers for their kindness in allowing me to include certain illustrations in this volume: to Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., for a photograph of Count Witte from the *Memoirs of Count Witte*, translated by A. Yarmolinsky; to Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd., for a photograph of A. I. Guchkov from *Russia and the Russians* by Harold Williams; and to the proprietors of *L'Illustration* for a photograph, "Voyage de M. Poincaré en Russie," which appeared in that periodical.

H. H. FISHER

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA
March 26, 1935

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I WAS nineteen years of age when I graduated from the Imperial Alexander Lyceum (1)* in December 1872

On the advice of three outstanding legal authorities of the time—A D Gradovsky (2), N. S Tagantsev (3), and S V Pakhman (4)—I had intended to devote myself to an academic career, selecting state law as my special field. To this end I had decided to enter St Petersburg University as a law student, to complete in the shortest time possible the entire course of studies, and to try my luck at getting Master's and Doctor's degrees and the corresponding academic standing. In this decision I was warmly supported by my father, who promised to assure my financial well-being for the entire period of my studies, he also insisted that I abandon the idea of earning my own livelihood meanwhile, as my academic work would be sure to suffer from any additional occupations.

Fate, however, decreed otherwise. Scarcely two months after I graduated from the Lyceum and transferred my Lyceum diploma to the University, where a special resolution was adopted concerning me, my father died suddenly. For some time our entire family found itself in very strained financial circumstances. I was forced to abandon my plans and tread a road common to all Lyceum graduates of that time—to seek government employment.

On March 10, 1873, I was admitted as a candidate for a civil service position in the Department of the Ministry of Justice, at first in the statistical, later in the legislative, finally in the criminal office. And for forty-four years, until March 1917, I continued without interruption in state service.

The February Revolution of 1917 put a stop to my official career. In a simple decree the Provisional Government, which had supplanted the Tsarist régime, abolished the State Council (5), of which I had been a member for more than twelve years, and like many others I found myself cast overboard, wondering what to do. Six months later, again submitting to the general fate, I lost all my modest

* The numbers in parentheses refer to editorial notes at the back of the book. Footnotes are by the author.

savings and all my possessions. Then, in November 1918, in order to save our lives, my wife and I left our country without hope of ever seeing it again.

The road I traveled during my forty-four years of state service had many turnings and not a few ups and downs. The eleven years from 1879 to 1890 I spent as Senior Inspector and Assistant Head of the Central Administration of Prisons. This was the period when this branch of administration was being radically reorganized according to the principles worked out by a most outstanding statesman of that period, State Secretary K. K. Grot (6). I recall this period of my activity with much satisfaction; it gave me an opportunity to acquire a great deal of diverse information as to our civil service. It was thanks to this experience that on many occasions during my subsequent work I found myself better informed than many of my colleagues.

The six years from 1890 to 1896 I served in the Imperial Chancellery, occupying the positions of Assistant State Secretary, State Secretary, and Assistant Imperial Secretary (7). These years gave me an opportunity to study the problems of budget and state economy, thus preparing me for the next six years, 1896 to 1902, when I served as Assistant Minister of Finance, Count Witte (8) being Minister of Finance at that time.

After a short interval of two years, 1902–1904, during which I occupied the position of Imperial Secretary, I returned to the Ministry of Finance to remain there for ten years as Minister; during the years 1911 to 1914 I was also Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The later years of my active work, 1903–1918, have had little light shed upon them. There are but few memoirs giving an accurate and well-founded account of what happened during that period; most of the eyewitnesses and responsible workers have died without having published or probably even written their memoirs. Thus a whole epoch, which merits at least a description, may simply go unrecorded unless an attempt is made to say a truthful word about it.

It seemed to me, therefore, to be my duty to preserve from oblivion and untruth a record of the events of my experience, if for no other reason than that I still retain a clear memory of all that happened and that, by a happy accident, I have preserved all the brief notes I made at the time. These notes are not accompanied by detailed comments, but they are in chronological order and thus form a record of the events which arrested my attention. They have served

as a source from which I have compiled my memoirs, providing me with an almost day-by-day account of that which I saw and felt, and which even now reminds me of my past and prevents sad actuality from blurring, much less obliterating, it

I clearly understand that the conditions of my existence since 1914 have been hardly favorable to my efforts to give my memoirs the scope and character which I had in mind when I first began to systematize my notes and documents. First the World War, then the Bolshevik Revolution, then exile! All these have deprived me perhaps of serenity of mind and even of the possibility of preserving complete detachment in regard to the past, without which even a simple story of what has happened may appear insufficiently well balanced or even insufficiently interesting as compared with the events which have since taken place

Therefore, I have decided to limit the scope of my memoirs to the later period of my life and work in my country, since I not only witnessed but actively participated in public affairs and must bear a certain responsibility for events of that time

I do not intend to write the history of my time. I wish merely to tell of the work in which I participated directly. I want to compile a log of my travels, as it were, stopping to discuss separate phenomena which I met on the way, giving unadorned and accurate snapshots of them

I have tried to avoid all generalizations and broad conclusions. The only thing I have endeavored to keep in view throughout my entire story is to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Therefore, my memoirs are unavoidably tinged with personal coloring. This is their great defect, but also perhaps to a certain extent their virtue

V N KOKOVTSOV

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Part I

**My Work as Minister of Finance during the
Russo-Japanese War**

CHAPTER I

JULY 1903—FEBRUARY 1904

The summer of 1903, like the preceding summer, when I was first appointed Imperial Secretary, found my family and myself at our country house near Verebie station on the Nicholas Railway. I intended to go early in August to Homburg, where my wife was to join me toward the end of my stay; thence we planned to go to Paris for a fortnight before returning to the capital for the winter. In the country time passed peacefully and carelessly as usual. The State Council (1) had been dissolved for the vacation, and nothing troubled the perfect rest which was so precious to me after six years of hard work as Assistant Minister of Finance.

In making preparations to go abroad I went to the capital for a few hours and called on my friend E. D. Pleske (2) at the State Bank, of which he was chief governor, to find out if I might visit Pargolovo in the evening to see his family, with whom I was even more friendly, if that were possible, than with himself. We decided what train it would be most convenient for me to take. Pleske was not able to accompany me, as he had been asked to dinner with the Minister of Finance, S. Y. Witte.

When I was getting ready to go to the Finland station about five o'clock that afternoon the telephone rang. It was Madame Witte speaking from their country house and inviting me to come to their place for dinner, saying that her husband was very anxious to see me and had been overjoyed to learn from Pleske that I had come up from the country. I went, but why I was asked I have never been able to find out, as the conversation was general and dwelt mostly upon a trip which Witte and his family planned to make some time in August to his country house near Sochi on the Black Sea. He kept reproaching me for not having a country house on the seashore where, according to him, "there was real paradise"; it is not at all like "your beloved Western Europe," as he put it, insisting that he hated traveling in Europe. The only part of the conversation that was at all serious concerned certain matters that had been shelved in

the State Council. Witte broached these topics and asked me to help secure their passage early in the session. He hinted at his constant friction with the Minister of the Interior, Plehve (3), but said nothing to indicate that he intended to quit his post as Minister of Finance.

The next morning Pleske telephoned me, expressing his family's regrets at my having been unable to call on them. Then in a different tone he added, "Take care that you are not dragged out of your fair retreats." When I asked him what he meant he merely said, "There are rumors that some great change is impending, and who but you could be placed in your old stamping-ground?" I paid little attention to these rumors, returned to the country, stayed there another three weeks or so, and in the beginning of August went direct to Homburg without stopping at Berlin. One day in the middle of that month I was just approaching the fountain to have my dose of water when I ran into Stolpakov (4), who showed me the third extra edition of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in which there was a dispatch from Petersburg about Witte's appointment as Chairman of the Ministers' Committee (5) and Pleske's succession to the post of Minister of Finance.

I went straight from the fountain to the telegraph office and sent a telegram of congratulation to my friend and childhood companion, most sincerely wishing him success in his difficult post. Two days passed and no answer came. Then on the night of the second day, when everyone was fast asleep in peaceful, cozy Homburg, I was awakened by a terrific banging on the gate of the Fell Villa where I had rented a first-floor room facing the garden. As no one seemed to answer the banging, I got up, slipped on my dressing-gown, and went to investigate. The noise was caused by a telegraph messenger bringing me two telegrams, one ordinary, the other special; the latter was the reason for the night delivery, for according to the existing regulations telegrams were delivered at house addresses only until nine in the evening. The first telegram was from Pleske expressing the warmest thanks for my congratulations and for my offer of help in time of trouble; the second was from my colleague, the Assistant Imperial Secretary, Baron Uxkull (6), apprising me of the fact that the Chairman of the State Council, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich (7), had had a stroke, that his life was despaired of, and that persons who took my interests to heart (I understood this to mean Count Solsky) (8) advised me to come instantly to Petersburg in

order to receive necessary instructions from the proper persons (meaning the Tsar).

I left for home that very evening, having asked Baron Uxkull to apprise my wife of my coming.

I recall vividly that I arrived home on a Sunday; my wife had arrived from the country a few hours previously. We were both in when at about three o'clock in the afternoon Pleske arrived in dress uniform with decorations, making official calls. The day was terribly hot and sultry. When he entered my study both my wife and myself could not help asking him what was the matter with him, his appearance struck us so. His face was pale and covered with perspiration; he could hardly stand, and painfully lowered himself into an armchair, trying to find a more comfortable position. He answered that he was worn out by his calls in the city and suburbs and that it was but a passing weakness which would leave in a minute. Then he told us about the circumstances of his appointment, which was as totally unexpected by him as was Witte's relinquishment of the office. I recall the conversation very clearly and want to reproduce it in complete detail, as it seems to me to be very characteristic. It was as follows:

Pleske had never been in Siberia. About the end of July 1903 he had reported this fact to Witte and said that he considered it would be very useful if he were to visit that region in order to inspect the activities of the Siberian branches of the State Bank, in which there was to be observed a general rise in all active operations owing to the great development of the economic life there. He was especially concerned with the personnel of these branches, which he considered to be poorly suited to the new conditions. Moreover, merchants were complaining that the State Bank reacted but inadequately to the demands of the actual situation and that private banks took advantage of these shortcomings to oppress trade with their heavy rates.

Witte listened to this suggestion with much sympathy and made but two conditions: that the trip be taken at the same time as his own trip to the south, and that it take no longer than one month, as he desired Pleske to be back by the beginning of the grain campaign (9). Witte then reported this suggestion to the Emperor, and since it met with no objections Pleske began to make preparations for his trip, planning to leave about the middle of August. At last everything was ready; he had found a suitable drawing-room car, had selected companions from among his nearest collaborators in the

State Bank, and had applied for traveling expenses; he had only to await the departure of the minister.

Late in the night of August 14, when everyone at the Pargolovo country house was fast asleep, there was a knock at the door. Zhukovsky, the messenger of the Minister of Finance, had brought a note from Witte jotted down in pencil: "Have just received orders from the Emperor to bring you with me to tomorrow's report. Be at the Peterhof pier at 9:00 A.M." The servants had to be awakened, someone had to go to the city to get a dress uniform, and, as it took a considerable time to make the journey by carriage from Pargolovo to the city, it was only toward morning that everything was arranged.

Pleske learned nothing from Witte on their way to Peterhof except that the Tsar, who was leaving for the Crimea in a few days and who was interested in Siberia, evidently wished to see him before his departure. Witte also asked Pleske to keep in constant touch with him by means of code telegrams and said that Putilov (10), Director of the General Office (11), had already been ordered to give him the new code. During Witte's report to the Tsar, Pleske stayed in a little reception room, carrying on a casual conversation with the aide-de-camp on duty. The report lasted a long time, and when, finally, Witte emerged from the Tsar's study, there was a very confused look on his face. He shook Pleske's hand, and with a brief, "I shall wait for you at the steamer," passed on. When Pleske entered the study, the Tsar offered him a seat by a window opposite himself, and immediately addressed him in a very matter-of-fact tone. "Sergei Yulievich has accepted the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Committee, for which I am very grateful to him, and I have decided to appoint you Minister of Finance." This unexpected turn of events rendered Pleske speechless for some time. Then, when he had again found his voice, he expressed his gratitude for His Majesty's confidence in him but said that he was afraid he could not justify it, as his health was very poor, and moreover he lacked many qualities needed to fill the post of Minister of Finance. To this the Tsar said: "Yet you have an advantage others do not possess: my perfect confidence and my promise to assist you in every way. At first I had intended to let you visit Siberia and to appoint you after your return; but I believe this arrangement will be the better one: you will have time to go to Siberia as minister, and can select a suitable time for the journey."

Nothing more was said. The Tsar parted with him saying, "Until next Friday, after which I am leaving for the Crimea."

Pleske found Witte at the pier calmly conversing with a sailor. But after they had boarded the ship and entered their cabin, Witte cast off his restraint and gave free vent to his displeasure. Pleske did not repeat to me Witte's own words and expressions, but I remember well that Witte had impressed him as being completely surprised at being dismissed from the post of Minister of Finance and not in the least prepared for it. He told Pleske that his report had been heard with great attention, that everything had been approved and confirmed, and that he had ended his report by requesting instructions for every branch of his work. He had offered the Tsar a copy of the new code, which His Majesty was to keep during his stay at Livadia (12), and had requested permission to telegraph him on all urgent matters. When he was about to rise and take his leave, the Tsar had said calmly, "You have often told me that you are tired, and it is little to be wondered at after thirteen years of labor. I am very happy to be able to give you a most distinguished appointment; in fact, I have already given orders to have you appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Committee. Thus we shall remain in constant and close touch on all important matters. Furthermore, I wish to show you my perfect confidence in your administration of the Ministry of Finance by appointing Pleske as your successor. I hope this will give you nothing but satisfaction, as I remember that you have often spoken of him in most flattering terms; besides, I hear nothing but good of him. My mother likes him very much, too."

"You perceive," said Witte to Pleske, "that I was simply discharged. I had become tiresome. I was being pushed aside. The thing for me to do is to tender my resignation. Nor shall I fail to do it, although I do not wish to create a scandal just now."

Such was Pleske's account of Witte's retirement. As for myself, I remained in St. Petersburg only four days, during which time I saw the Tsar and received from him orders to prepare a ukase appointing Count Solzky temporary Chairman of the State Council until the recovery of the Grand Duke.

My wife and I left for abroad directly after the Tsar's departure for the Crimea. We returned on October 6 or 7 to find Pleske seriously ill. His health was so poor that he was unable to attend regularly the sessions of the State Council, which were resumed on the first of November. His condition worried him especially because he

could not endure the long hours of the budget sessions, which, as Minister of Finance, he felt bound to attend. After one of these sessions he asked me to visit him at his house to give him a word of friendly advice. He told me that he had it in mind to write frankly to the Tsar stating that his health did not permit him to discharge satisfactorily his duties as minister and suggesting me as a person better qualified to fill this office.

I begged him not to do so, at least not for the time being. "Two months ago," I said, "the Tsar had an opportunity to select a person of his own choice; he selected you and not me." Clearly the Tsar would not give up a man in whom he had such confidence because of a temporary indisposition. (I did not know then that his illness was fatal.) I suggested that for the present Pleske merely discontinue attending the sessions of the Council and utilize my services at the budget sessions to aid his assistant, Romanov (13), who was indeed unfitted for this work. Pleske thanked me for my advice, and after consideration adopted it.

As the budget work in the Department of Economy (14) progressed I became increasingly involved in it. Disregarding formal regulations, the chairman, Count Solsky, asked me to "help Romanov, who is simply being trampled underfoot by the representatives of the ministries." This I did, but the success of my efforts was largely due to the fact that they were supported by Count Solsky, who enjoyed great popularity in the bureaucratic world.

The period until the end of January was uneventful. In the so-called lobbies of the State Council there were persistent rumors of strained relations with Japan. There was increased discussion of the concessions on the Yalu (15) and of Bezobrazov, matters of which I knew nothing. But, in the main, life went on as usual and there was no sign of the storm brewing about us. There were many views, but the predominant one was a contemptuous attitude toward Japan and the Japanese. Self-confident speeches were made by the Minister of War, Kuropatkin (16), who, basing his opinion upon his recent trip to Japan, affirmed: "They will not dare; they are unprepared; they are only putting on airs, thinking that we shall be frightened and shall believe them." Life at the capital went on as always except that there were more festivities than usual. There was even a court reception at the Hermitage (17), the first in a long time, attended by the entire diplomatic corps. It is true that with the arrival of the Japanese the other diplomats began to talk in asides,

and that during the intermission groups were formed and rumors began to circulate of news from Vladivostok telling of a naval conflict at Port Arthur; but no one had any authentic information and the gathering dispersed in the best of humor.

The next morning, however, the state of mind changed. The newspapers announced that Japanese torpedo boats had made an unprovoked attack upon our fleet in the Port Arthur roadstead and that two of our battleships, "Pallada" and "Retvizan," were out of commission. War between Russia and Japan had begun without a formal declaration. The general attitude was one of great indignation at so patent a violation of international custom, but no one was worried. Everybody regarded it as a mere episode; no one attached any importance to it. Contemptuous nicknames, such as "macaques" (18), were applied to the Japanese, and everyone was supremely confident that there would be a speedy termination of the "adventure." Nevertheless, necessary measures were taken right away.

Count Solsky immediately called a special session of all of the departments of the State Council in order to revise the newly balanced budget. This work was done energetically, and in a few days cuts were effected in the budgets of all the ministries. I took an active part in this work without causing serious comment; although the participation of the Imperial Secretary had no legal precedent. Then, a few weeks later, I was appointed Minister of Finance, and my participation became normal and legal.

This appointment was made on February 5, 1904, after the Finance Committee (19) had been obliged to postpone its considerations on how to meet the expenditures of the war, a postponement caused by the fact that the Ministry of Finance had had no time to prepare a plan for meeting such expenditures and was unable to do so since the minister was very ill and the assistant minister was averse to disturbing him with these matters. Finally, on February 3, the Finance Committee, whose members shared the general optimism as to the duration and outcome of the war, petitioned the Tsar to add Schwanebach (20) and me to its membership.

I recall the day well. It was a Tuesday. In the evening Plehve telephoned me and asked what was the meaning of these appointments. I explained everything I had learned from Solsky, and added jokingly: "I fear these battleships of the Finance Committee may suffer the same fate as those in the harbor of Port Arthur. I wonder how useful they will be."

The next evening, Plehve telephoned again and said, "Of the two battleships—'Pallada' and 'Retvizan' (meaning Schwanebach and myself)—one has already been torpedoed, for he has just been appointed to a not too pleasant post. I heartily wish him success but hate to think of the labors he will be called upon to perform." I could not ask for particulars over the telephone; moreover I knew that because of Plehve's disposition I could not expect many details, particularly since it was obvious to me that he referred to the appointment of myself and not of Schwanebach. It was equally evident that Plehve had secured his information from the highest source; later in the day it became known that Plehve had had a special audience in the Winter Palace. By lunch time of the following day I had had no confirmation of this news, and about twelve-thirty o'clock, as was my custom, I walked to the State Council to attend the session of the Department of Economy. No sooner had I entered the session room than I was approached by an attendant, who told me that I was wanted on the telephone on a matter of importance. I went to my study and found out that it was my wife calling; she told me that the *valet de chambre* on duty in the Tsar's suite in the Winter Palace had telephoned to tell me that the Tsar wanted me to see him at fifteen minutes after two. I asked her to send my coachman, my white necktie, and my decoration; and at exactly a quarter past two I was in the Tsar's waiting room, a place I had never been before.



Emperor Nicholas II

Empress Alexandra Fedorovna

CHAPTER II

FEBRUARY-JUNE, 1904

The Tsar received me immediately, with these words: "At another time I should have requested you to do me the great pleasure of exchanging your restful position for another, less pleasant one, that of Minister of Finance; now I shall merely tell you that I have already given orders that you be put in charge of the Ministry of Finance in place of poor Pleske, who for a long time has been asking me to free him from this work which is too onerous for him. Now that we have been visited by this unforeseen calamity he cannot, of course, remain minister even nominally. I have known you for a long time and do not at all suppose that you will refuse this appointment at such a critical moment; I merely wished that you should learn of my decision from myself and not through a ukase which I shall sign immediately." Saying this, the Tsar made the sign of the Cross over me, embraced and kissed me, and added: "I understand full well how difficult the position of Minister of Finance is at all times, and how much more so in time of war, but I am confident that we shall end this war by completely defeating the enemy, and I promise to assist you in everything and to support you in your labors. Go see the Empress (1) at once. She wishes very much to make your acquaintance and is much pleased to know that I have chosen you, as we have often talked about you."

I answered the Tsar that I submitted to his will, as I well understood that under existing conditions no one had the right to decline to do his duty. I asked for one thing only, for help and assistance, since long experience had shown me that the hardest task of a Minister of Finance was to handle the demands of all other ministries for appropriations, while in time of war the main problem was to obtain funds for conducting the war without jeopardizing the future of the country. We parted on the Tsar's remark that I should look about me for a week and come with my first report on the next Friday.

The Empress met me in the drawing-room next to the Malachite hall, congratulated me on my appointment, and added (we were con-

versing in French) that she had been sure I would not refuse to help the Emperor at so difficult a time. She went on: "I have been told that you have been acting for the Minister of Finance for some time—something like three months—so that your new tasks will not be novel to you. I wished to see you to tell you that both the Tsar and I beg you always to be quite frank with us and to tell us the truth, not hesitating lest it be unpleasant for us. Believe me; even if it be so at first, we shall be grateful to you for it later."

I promised to carry out unswervingly these just wishes, and added that even during my work as Assistant Minister of Finance I had had the reputation of being stingy and unyielding just because I had always protected the interests of the state in my conflicts with both strong and weak ministries. I should be obliged to be even more unyielding now, as a war was not a matter with which to trifle. Therefore, I asked Her Majesty to honor me with her confidence and to give me permission truthfully to defend myself before the Tsar and herself against complaints and unfavorable comment. The Empress likewise blessed me, promised not to heed rumors and, in case such should reach her, to call me and let me explain away the trouble.

Who had been instrumental in effecting my appointment?

The Tsar had returned from the Crimea in December. When he learned of Pleske's incurable illness his concern prompted him to discuss with Count Solsky the problem of finding a new Minister of Finance. Solsky warmly recommended me for the position, but the Tsar hesitated. He knew me, for as heir to the throne he had attended the general sessions of the State Council and had spoken kindly to me; but he did not know me well. The beginning of war with Japan, however, forced him to make a definite decision. Directly after the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, Solsky again recommended me as Pleske's successor, but several days went by and no appointment was made.

On Tuesday, February 3, State Comptroller Lobko (2) recommended his assistant, D. A. Filosofov (3), for the position. When the Tsar told him that my name was being considered, Lobko said—as he told me afterwards—that my knowledge of budget problems made me a difficult man for all other ministries to deal with, for I should be sure to cut all new expenditures and carry out uncompromisingly my own views.

The next day, February 4, V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior, was called to the Winter Palace. This visit was a subject for

speculation in the ministries. Many people thought that his visit would finally determine the Tsar's choice of a Minister of Finance. Whether or not this was so, I cannot say: Plehve would never commit himself. Personally, however, I believe that Count Solsky's influence was the determining factor. When I visited him first to announce my appointment, I told him that I believed that his support of my candidacy had had a deciding influence. He would not agree, however. He told me frankly that even when the Tsar had asked him about Pleske's successor, the Emperor's mind was made up, and that all subsequent conversations were merely to test the correctness of his decision.

Directly after my visit to Solsky I called on Plehve. I told him that I was aware of his visit to the Winter Palace on the eve of my appointment and assumed that he had influenced the Tsar's decision. He neither confirmed nor denied it, but did say that he had opposed Lobko's suggestions. I well recall his words: "To be sure if the appointment of the Minister of Finance had depended upon a general vote of the ministers, they would have voted for anyone but you. I can still remember how, when you were assistant to Witte, they all hated to attend the sessions of the Department of Economy with you, preferring to deal with Witte, who might fly into a rage at first but in the end might relent, provided someone said a few flattering words to him."

My meeting with Witte on the same day was a peculiar one. There was almost no end to the embracing and kissing. Avowals of friendship and devotion and the highest appreciation of my knowledge, my character, the firmness of my convictions, and my uprightness poured forth in torrents, together with assurances that I could count on his support in everything, not only in the Ministers' Committee and the Finance Committee but whenever and wherever I should like to hear his voice raised in my interests. "You see," he added, "it took a war with Japan to effect the selection of the only man fitted to occupy the position of Minister of Finance. In ordinary times ministers were appointed not because of their merits but because of their nice manners and their readiness to be agreeable to those in authority. The war will end and you will be pushed aside just as I have been pushed aside, and what you have accomplished will be forgotten and even your name will not be remembered."

My audience with the Tsar and the Empress and my visits to Count Solsky, Plehve, and Witte, all on Wednesday, February 4,

ended the so-called ceremonial visits. That very evening, without awaiting the publication of the ukase concerning my appointment, I invited to my house the Assistant Minister of Finance, Romanov, Director of the Special Credit Office, Maleshevsky (4), his Assistant Director, Vyshnegradsky (5), and the Manager of the State Bank, Timashev (6) and submitted for their consideration my suggestion as to the ways and means to be adopted in order to meet the expenditures of the war. I asked them to remember well our recent work together when, as Assistant Minister of Finance, I had never restrained anyone from expressing his opinion, always treating such expressions with all possible consideration. I begged them to follow this practice now, especially since I was about to assume great responsibility under unusually trying circumstances. Not one of them refused to express his views openly, fully recognizing the importance of the moment. Our decision was unanimous and was the more easily carried out because it met with unanimous approval both in the Finance Committee and among those members of the State Council who were also members of the Department of Economy, in spite of their many conflicts on other matters of finance. Our meeting lasted three hours, and I must say that it left the most gratifying impression. I had no reason to change that impression throughout the entire ten years of our work together, and this gave me strength to perform my duty with comparative ease despite the fact that the conditions of our work were at times far from favorable.

I told my colleagues that what I was about to submit for their consideration had not matured in my mind overnight under the stimulus of my unexpected appointment as Minister of Finance. From the first day of our conflict with Japan, I had followed both the Russian and the French press and had listened to all arguments, especially to those among the members of the State Council, and throughout I had heard the same opinion expressed by all who had made a careful study of the conflict. This was that the war was not particularly dangerous to us, that our forces were infinitely greater than those of Japan even though Japan was better prepared for the war than we—for we had not been preparing for it—that our internal position was stable and could not be shattered by the war because it was being waged far from our centers—in short, that we would bear the calamity easily and end the war victoriously. This opinion was held by the Tsar, who had expressed it to me.

This being so, in selecting ways and means to meet the expendi-

tures of the war we had to be constantly careful not to undermine the foundations of our financial structure which we had erected at the cost of so much hard work and long preparation. In other words, we should not renounce the gold standard introduced by the laws of 1897 and 1899 (7) but should undertake measures to support our gold reserve by every means at our command without infringing upon the strict provisions of the law of issue. My main argument in support of this opinion was that only by so doing should we be able to preserve the stability of our finances, prevent the fluctuations of our currency in the world market, and speedily repair the harm done by the war; by going off the gold standard, on the other hand, we might easily find ourselves unable to return to it for a long time afterwards.

I met with complete agreement among my companions. Not one voice was raised to dispute this principle, and a series of practical considerations were expressed pertaining to ways and means of realizing it. Even the most cautious of us, P. M. Romanov, who knew Japan better than anyone else present, did not object to our decision and insisted on one thing only: that we should abandon the idea of having the treasuries actually issue gold throughout the entire territory of Siberia from the Urals to Manchuria, because of the nearness of the Chinese frontier and the possibility of the gold slipping over it, and that we should make all payments in paper rubles exclusively. This suggestion was adopted, and during the entire course of the war we had no trouble in this regard until the beginning of the revolutionary movement in the second half of 1905.

That same evening we decided to lay the problem in all its details before the Finance Committee. This was done very soon and very satisfactorily by the Assistant Director of the Special Credit Office, Nikiforov (8). I apprised both Count Solsky and Witte of our program, and both accepted it with unconcealed sympathy. The Committee, also, completely agreed to it, empowering me to undertake all necessary measures.

The substance of all these measures was self-evident and may be divided into two parts: (a) to discover ways and means to secure foreign loans to strengthen our gold reserve, thereby increasing our capacity to issue paper currency; (b) to withdraw superfluous paper currency from circulation by effecting domestic loans, the receipts from which would be turned over to meet the obligations of the war.

This measure, so to speak, comprised the first article of the Russian war-finance program. If we were to figure out how much

Russia gained from these war-time credit operations, both foreign and domestic, and if we were to add to this sum the budget surplus created by effecting cuts in the budget of 1904 and the profits from the liquidation loan concluded in France in April 1906, we should have the sum total of our expenditures in our war with Japan. This amounted to two and a quarter billion rubles.

The second principle which I adopted and put into effect was to do everything possible to keep the budget balanced, that is, by curtailing domestic expenditures during the war so as to make them correspond to actual revenues. Practically no new taxation was introduced.

The results of the first eighteen months of the war, from the point of view of revenue, were entirely satisfactory. Up to the beginning of the revolutionary movement of 1905 the revenues came in normally and even provided some surplus beyond what had been anticipated in the budget; the population had received more money, and a part of it had returned to the government through revenue channels. Only in the second half of this year did troubles arise in this regard, but they were caused by reasons of an altogether different nature and could not be ascribed to war-time conditions.

In administering the expenditures of the non-military budget my position was made easier by the support which the Tsar gave me, and in this field I had no appreciable difficulties.

Strange as it may seem, this first period of my work amid the conditions of the war was perhaps the easiest and the pleasantest of the entire ten years of my work as Minister of Finance. I had the support of everybody. The Finance Committee adopted my project for preserving the gold standard and the measures necessary to this end, not only without any objections but in terms flattering to me. The Emperor's comment gave me profound satisfaction. He wrote: "May God grant you strength to carry out this excellent plan which will enable us to emerge from this difficult war victorious and with honor." However, both my project and the records of the Finance Committee, which I preserved for many years, have been lost, together with the few other documents I had in my possession up to the time of my arrest and the search of my apartment on June 30, 1918. What was done with them, I do not know. The Bolsheviks did not publish my project. Evidently it did not fit in with their purpose of depreciating everything relating to the past; or it may simply have perished among the papers of the Special Credit Office when the general debacle started after the October Revolution.

The ministers showed nothing but readiness to assist me; the only exception to this general rule came from a side from which I was least prepared to expect it. My first steps toward finding means to meet the obligations and expenditures of the war were just as successful. Naturally, no one could predict how long the war would last and what sacrifices it would demand. No general plan was made nor could one have been made. Only this was certain, that the war would demand much, that St. Petersburg would not be able to reduce the credits necessary to conduct military operations, and that reserves would have to be built up both at home and abroad—at home in order not to overburden ourselves with foreign financial operations and to forestall criticism for not using our internal credit; abroad in order to assure us that we should be able to meet our obligations without diminishing the gold reserve which I had received from my predecessor, and in order to strengthen our credit abroad.

I began with a foreign loan. Paris had faith in our victory over Japan, and my approach to the French market was met very sympathetically. In some two weeks, without any special effort on my part, I had succeeded in effecting a 5 per-cent short-term loan of 300,000,000 rubles, or 800,000,000 francs, to be redeemed in five years, that is, in 1909. The group of banks with which the loan was negotiated gave semi-official assurance that when the redemption of the loan was due another loan would be granted to consolidate this loan. The success of the negotiation surpassed all our expectations, and I was warmly congratulated for my accomplishment. I must admit, however, that my part was the least deserving, for my success was due to the general belief of the French in our speedy victory over our enemy. This made subsequent disillusionment more painful and the part I later had to play more difficult.

Domestic loans were also effected quite smoothly. During the first year I had no trouble at all in meeting all war-time expenditures, despite many great difficulties. The procedure by which appropriation for military needs was made was quite simple. No complicated preliminary manipulations were necessary. Demands for funds were submitted to a special commission under the chairmanship of Count Solsky, whose prestige among the ministers on the commission was very great, a fact which facilitated my work tremendously. Naturally, large sums were required to meet military needs, yet demands for these sums were presented in the most unsystematic way imaginable. In every session all the ministers, including Adjutant General

Sakharov (9), who had succeeded General Kuropatkin as Minister of War when the latter was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the Far East, were convinced that the demands for appropriations were being made without good cause and at times contrary to the dictates of common sense. Yet, willy-nilly, sums had to be appropriated; all we could do was to take precautions that not all these sums should be spent. Such precautions would leave some funds available should the military situation take a turn for the worse. My sole purpose in not refusing any demands for appropriations, though I showed many of them to be absurd, was that the Commander-in-Chief should be given no cause to say that unsuccessful military operations were due to lack of funds.

Let me give one or two examples of these demands for appropriations. Before our army, defeated at Liaoyang (10), had begun to retreat, General Kuropatkin insisted by telegraph that funds be appropriated for constructing branch lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway in order to facilitate an advance and flanking movement against the Japanese. The appropriation was made, but nothing was actually spent, as the region where the lines were to be built fell into the hands of the enemy. I then suggested that this unexpended sum be utilized in connection with other military appropriations. No one in the Finance Committee objected to this simple proposal, but the Commander-in-Chief protested violently, declaring that he planned soon to undertake an offensive, in which case the branch lines would have to be built. Even the gentle and conciliatory Count Solsky suggested that the Commander-in-Chief be told that money could not be kept like this, in separate little purses as it were, that credits were to be requested only when they could be used to advantage, that unused sums should be employed for some immediate need, and that permission to make other expenditures should be requested later on when circumstances warranted it.

I recall another incident which is typical of General Kuropatkin. This happened only a few days after my appointment. I was residing on the Liteinaia in the house of the Imperial Secretary, as the apartment of the Minister of Finance was in a chaotic state. General Kuropatkin had just been appointed Commander-in-Chief. The press greeted his appointment with great rejoicing. He, too, was full of radiant expectations; he said everywhere that he needed only to assemble the army and that there was not the slightest doubt as to victory over the *macaques*.

One day he called on me at the Liteinaia and said that he wanted to talk frankly to me about a personal matter. He asked me to instruct my representatives in the preliminary commission, which prepared matters to be considered by the special commission, not to cut any credits and not to "place him in a ridiculous position by forcing him to defend before the commission his requests for credits pertaining to his personal affairs." As I did not understand what he meant I asked him to tell me just how the representatives of the Ministry of Finance had been unnecessarily miserly. He explained that on the previous day the commission had discussed the matter of his salary as Commander-in-Chief. The Ministry of War had suggested that the precedent of the Turko-Russian war of 1878 be followed. On that occasion the Commander-in-Chief on the European Front, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (11) the elder, had been granted 100,000 rubles a month and, in addition, forage money for twelve riding and eighteen carriage horses. Now, representatives of the Ministry of Finance thought that a salary of 50,000 would be sufficient for General Kuropatkin, as he could not incur such great expenses representing his country as had the Grand Duke; moreover, the Ministry objected to the payment of any forage money at all, for it considered that horses would hardly be needed, as the military operations would be centered about the railway and even if the Commander-in-Chief were obliged to make side trips these would not be long enough to necessitate the use of riding horses, much less carriage horses.

Kuropatkin and I had a long talk on this subject. I tried to demonstrate that a Commander-in-Chief had to set his entourage an example by accepting a moderate salary, since his salary would be taken as a basis for the salaries of all other military officials. I begged him particularly not to insist on such a large number of horses for his personal needs, as in reality if there were any horses at all they would be few in number; besides, to introduce into the appropriations an item for "forage money" for non-existent horses would not look well and would only be a temptation to his own subordinates. My arguments were in vain; the General was insistent and declared that he would present his point of view before the special commission, which he did. The commission agreed to his wishes. So he went on getting these questionable "forage sums," although he had no carriage horses at all and only one riding horse, which as I recall was presented to him by the city of Moscow at the time of his appoint-

ment. He lived in the cars of the Chinese Eastern Railway and did not leave them at any time.

But the last part of our conversation was most typical. General Kuropatkin again begged me to help him with his difficulties. He said that after his departure he would be left without support but felt that he might need it very much, especially during the early period of necessary retreat and difficult preparations. So saying he took a sheet of paper from my desk, drew a horizontal line across it, and in the upper left corner, high above the line, drew a little star. "Here," he said, "this star above the horizon is myself at the present moment. I am carried in people's arms, I am given war horses, I am offered all sorts of presents, I have to listen to speeches of welcome, I am considered almost the savior of the country—and so it will continue until I reach the troops: my star will rise higher and higher. Then when I reach my destination, issue orders to retreat to the north, and withdraw my troops pending the arrival of reinforcements from Russia, the same papers which are now singing my praises will wonder why I am not busy beating the 'macaques.' My star will fall lower and lower, and when I suffer small but inevitable defeats it will continue to descend until it reaches the horizon. Here is where I want you to assist me, for here it is that I shall begin an offensive in which I shall mercilessly beat the Japanese; here my star will again rise higher and higher above the horizon. Where I shall end and to what heights my star will rise, I myself do not know. As for your help, I shall never forget it."

For a long time I kept this sketch among my papers, but it was lost with everything else when we were compelled to leave our home and country. Nor did poor Kuropatkin live to see the ascendancy of his star, although he did see it drop beyond the horizon. After the consequences of the Japanese War had swiftly passed into the background he sank into general oblivion. He lived to see the World War but was long denied a responsible position; during the later inglorious period of this war he received some appointment, but did not, and probably could not, distinguish himself. He took part in some military operations in Turkestan during the Bolshevik rule, and finally died destitute in the country near his estate in the gubernia of Pskov, carrying out the duties of a village clerk.

During the first days after my appointment as Minister of Finance I was visited by Admiral Abaza (12), whom I was later to know more intimately in connection with another matter. He an-

nounced that he had been ordered by the Tsar to talk with me about the liquidation of an undertaking to exploit the timber on the Yalu. I had heard something of the affair but knew nothing either of its organization or of its participants or of whose money was supporting it. Therefore during this first conversation I merely listened to the Admiral and refrained from giving him any definite answer until I was made familiar with the details of the whole matter.

Admiral Abaza's explanations were childish, confused, and not at all easily understandable. One could gather from his words that, since the victory of our arms over Japan was beyond question, it was impossible to break up such an "enormous" enterprise and that the thing to do was to "abandon it temporarily" until such time as it could be developed in full, at which time "we shall build a strong foundation on the Yalu after the war." In the meantime we should remove to Siberia everything we had moved to the Yalu, find suitable employment for all persons now engaged in this work, and have the Treasury go security for all the sums that private persons had spent on the undertaking "in conformity with the wishes of the Emperor."

I asked just how much would be needed and who the private persons were who had spent their money on the enterprise, but I did not get a definite answer. I was told, "We shall figure it out, but I believe that a few thousand rubles might do for the present; this sum would be returned from the enormous profits of the undertaking." I promised to ask the Tsar for instructions after I had secured some information and was better prepared to deal with this unfamiliar matter. Accordingly I began to study the matter. In the Department of the Treasury I learned nothing; but the head of the Accounting Department, Dementev, told me that there had been a project to use a certain sum from the ten million reserve fund (13) for this purpose but that later this idea had been abandoned and no appropriations had been made. In the State Bank I found Romanov's requisition mentioning the Sovereign order to advance a subsidy of 200,000 rubles to State Secretary Bezobrazov "for a purpose known to His Majesty," but this requisition had been canceled and the subsidy had not been advanced; there was a note, however, to the effect that the subsidy had been advanced from the special reserve fund of the Special Credit Office, that is, from the revenues of its foreign department. But here again all traces vanished.

I approached State Secretary Witte and asked him to tell me what he knew of the matter. In return I received a complete narrative

as to how he had fought the idea of the concession, how he had remonstrated with the Tsar not to permit this "adventure," how he was convinced that our policy in Korea, the occupation of Port Arthur, the construction of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and finally the Yalu concession had been the real causes of our war with Japan. He advised me not to get involved in this affair at all and to find a way to transfer it to someone outside the Ministry of Finance, so as not to get tangled up with it, "because," he added, "the money will have to be paid anyway, but let someone else do it, not you." Witte also reminded me that when I was his Assistant Minister he had spoken to me of the conflict he had had with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Muravev (14) on the subject of Russia's occupation of Port Arthur, of how Kuropatkin had tried to do him a "mean turn" at that time, of how Tyrtoov (15) alone had supported him, and of how the Tsar had decided the matter against him, Witte, and the Minister of the Navy. In my turn, I reminded Witte that at that time I had advised him to carry the matter through to the end, to ask the Emperor to accept his resignation, and that he, Witte, had answered that a minister has no right to place his sovereign in a difficult position unless he hopes, by tendering his resignation, to prevent a great wrong from happening.

After my visit to Witte, V. M. Vonliarliarsky (16), a Lyceum friend of mine, called on me. He made the same request that Admiral Abaza had made, and here I learned for the first time that he, too, was a partner in the Yalu affair, had invested his fortune—a considerable one according to him—and had taken an active part in the business because of his close friendship with a fellow officer in the horse guards, State Secretary A. M. Bezobrazov, "this man of genius," as he called him. He advised me to try to make Bezobrazov's acquaintance if I had a chance.

I had no opportunity to follow this advice, and I met Bezobrazov only once and this much later, during the second half of the war. He had invented some sort of projectile which was to effect a revolution in artillery methods, and invited me to be present during experiments. But I had little time to spare, and from that time on I never met him or talked to him about the business on the Yalu. Nor did I meet him in exile, although he passed his last years in Paris and died in utter poverty in 1931.

I also learned from Vonliarliarsky, briefly and casually, that the Tsar had given a certain sum from his private means, as had Grand

Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich (17) and Count Aleksei Pavlovich Ignatev (18). Exactly what sum each of these persons contributed remained unknown to me, as did all other details of this matter.

The next time I reported to the Emperor, as he did not broach this subject, I had to tell him about Abaza's visit. I took advantage of the fact that the entire situation was not clear to me and said frankly that, being engrossed in the cares of war and the stabilization of our financial position, I could hardly find enough time to devote to the study and liquidation of this affair. I told the Tsar that I should be very grateful indeed if he could find it possible to assign the task of liquidating this enterprise to someone less busy than I, permitting me to express my opinion after the plans for liquidation had been drafted and to see to it that the expenditures for the liquidation were as little as possible. The Tsar accepted my suggestion very willingly and graciously; he even said jokingly that this would be the best way out, as no one would then have reason to complain of my stinginess and that I myself would then be freer to criticize someone else's work than if I had been both spender and purser.

The next day the Emperor sent me a note saying that he had charged Count Ignatev with the task of liquidating the matter, and asked me to help him. Count Ignatev immediately assembled a small conference, which I attended but once. V. P. Cherevansky (19) also attended as representative of the State Comptroller; later he succeeded Count Ignatev as director of this business and settled it swiftly and quietly with the expenditure of a rather small sum. To me it is a matter of deep regret that the Bolsheviks, who rifle state archives and publish all that in their judgment may serve to cast a shadow on the past, have not yet published the documents concerning this incident of our recent past.

During the early part of my administration of the Ministry of Finance, the most strenuous work, outside of finding funds with which to conduct the war and reinforce our credit, was in adapting the Chinese Eastern Railway to war needs and the hurried mass transportation of our troops. This work gave me great moral satisfaction, which was the main reason why I felt so keenly the fate of this really tremendous undertaking. I should like to dwell upon this work at some length in these memoirs if for no other reason than to pay a tribute of respect to those who worked in this field and who deserved gratitude from others as well as from myself.

The Chinese Eastern Railway had been finished and officially

opened for service in July 1903, when Witte was Minister of Finance. Actually, however, it was far from completed, the cost of the work remaining to be done at that time being estimated at forty million rubles. This figure is eloquent of the fact that the Railway was not ready for intense exploitation and that even its modest working schedule, a limited movement of trains during the first period, was not assured by the actual condition of the line. From July 1903 to January 1904 the management of the Railway energetically pushed forward the work of construction; yet when the war began it could accommodate only with difficulty four trains a day in each direction, including the so-called working schedule, which was rather large, owing to the fact that the completion of the work demanded a large number of cars and trains.

It is small wonder, therefore, that immediately after the unexpected opening of hostilities (incidentally the time chosen by Japan was the least convenient to us, as the Amur was frozen and could not be used for the transportation of freight and troops and the Railway was just beginning to function) the greatest efforts were made to increase the transportation and accommodation capacities of the Railway. As was customary with us, this work immediately assumed a rather peculiar character. Two ministries—War, and Ways and Communications—simultaneously proposed to withdraw the Railway from the control of the Ministry of Finance and to transfer it to one of these two ministries. I had to assume an uncompromising position from the first and fight this impractical and illegal project. It was impractical because neither of these ministries was prepared to assume the necessary responsibility and neither had any information whatever about the Railway. It was illegal because according to our treaty with China (20) the Railway was to be under the control of the Ministry of Finance, and any transfer of this control to another ministry would have been contrary both to its charter and to the Chinese treaty.

During the honeymoon period of my administration of the Ministry of Finance, aided by the Tsar's definite kindness to me, I had little trouble in repelling this first attack on my ministry and in introducing a plan of speeding up the work on the Railway, as worked out by the Railway Administration, so as to be able to adapt the Railway to mass transportation. I believed it possible to guarantee the exact realization of this plan provided I was not handicapped and my representatives were given the necessary freedom

of action. The Ministry of Ways and Communications gladly withdrew its proposal, recognizing my argument as both just and practical. The Ministry of War, however, demanded that it be given control of the Railway and, because of General Kuropatkin's particular insistence, there had to be a compromise. We decided to adopt my plan temporarily, dispatching General Petrov (21), a great authority on all matters of railway construction, to study the plan on the spot and give his conclusion on the basic question who was to manage the Railway in the future.

General Petrov left with a firm decision to support my point of view. After a few days of his stay on the Railway he telegraphed to the Tsar, the Minister of War, and myself that the only way to assure order along the Railway, to strengthen it technically, and to assure the transportation of troops and freight would be to leave the Railway under the control of the Ministry of Finance, giving that Ministry free rein in the management and placing on that same Ministry all responsibility for the execution of construction plans on fixed terms. The Emperor desired a joint report by myself and the Minister of War. He announced from the start that he agreed with General Petrov's opinion and asked each one of us to state his views. The Minister of War, Sakharov, made no objections; as for myself, I asked that terms for increasing the transportation capacity of the Railway and the time fixed for the execution of varied work be defined in collaboration with the administration of the Railway and General Petrov. In this way this difficult matter was put on a firm foundation which later served it in good stead.

It would take a whole book to describe in detail how the Ministry of Finance accomplished this task despite all sorts of difficulties, caused not so much by the complicated conditions of war time and the work at the front as by the customary interministerial frictions and intrigues. In five months the Railway increased its four-train schedule to eight trains, in eight months to fourteen trains, and in October 1905 it could handle twenty pairs of trains, which is the highest load a single-track railway can handle. Shortly before his resignation as Commander-in-Chief, General Kuropatkin, who considered himself an exceptional authority on railways, insisted that in order to be victorious over Japan it would be necessary to work up the capacity of the Railway to forty-eight pairs of trains. In answer to this General Petrov, for all his restraint, wrote to the Tsar that such a

demand upon a single-track railway could be made only by a person who did not know that nowhere in the entire world had there yet been constructed a single-track railway which could handle more than twenty pairs of trains a day.

Yet in all justice, I must say that until he left active service after the Treaty of Portsmouth General Kuropatkin continued to support the Chinese Eastern Railway. In the summer of 1905, when Prince Lvov (22) as deputy of the zemstvo organization for the assistance of the disabled made a report containing a series of insinuations about the Railway which were widely repeated by the opposition press, Kuropatkin sent a telegram denying the allegations contained in the report and asserting that the work of the Railway and the devotion of its entire personnel, from its administrative head to the lowliest train-coupler, were beyond praise, for no term of approval was adequate to describe the assistance which the Railway had rendered to the conduct of military operations.

Years later, after I had resumed the duties of Minister of Finance and had come to know intimately the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Motono (23), he often told me that in Japan the work of the Chinese Eastern Railway during that war is cited as an example of unprecedented accomplishment in the field of transportation under trying circumstances. Still later, directly before I retired from the posts of Chairman of the Council and Minister of Finance, I presented to the Tsar the report of the Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the manner and extent of its accomplishments during the war with Japan, what difficulties it had had to surmount, and what should be avoided in the event of a future war if we wished to avert the greatest shortcomings in the matter of railway transportation which might lead to the direst consequences. I requested that this report be distributed to all ministries and made accessible to the members of the State Council and Duma. This request was granted, but I am sure that no one ever read the report, for the example of the World War proved that many things that had happened during the Japanese War were repeated regardless of the example of past events.

I continued to enjoy the confidence of the Tsar and the co-operation of my co-workers as the events of the war pushed domestic problems into the background.

The first thrust at me and my Ministry came from the side from

which under the conditions of the time I least expected it—the Ministry of the Interior.

During one of the routine sessions of the Ministers' Committee, V. K. Plehve said that he would like to talk with me about a matter that was troubling him. When I called on him next day he told me that the revolutionary movement was developing, that unrest among the workers was beginning to assume threatening proportions, and that he was obliged to take immediate steps which would entail a redistribution of certain functions of the ministries of the Interior and of Finance. The Department of Factory Inspection (24) under the latter ministry had been, he said, taking entirely too much the point of view of the workers without considering the subversive influences at work among them. What he proposed was that the Factory Inspection be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior to be administered by the Police Department and gendarme organization. Plehve had reported on this matter to the Emperor, who had apparently approved the proposal to adopt Plehve's plan provisionally, for instance for a six months' trial, but suggested that I first be consulted. Plehve said that he felt sure that I would make no difficulties in the Ministers' Committee and would recognize that it would be undesirable to force the Emperor to make a decision in this delicate matter.

I was obliged to disagree with Plehve very emphatically. I tried to make him see that supervision of the moods of the workers was no affair of the Factory Inspection, which was concerned with the prevention of industrial conflicts and the observance of industrial regulations. I pointed out that his scheme would have disastrous effects on our entire industry for which I could not assume the responsibility. I said that I should oppose this project and should report my objections to the Emperor and ask him to direct the Minister of the Interior to introduce the project under his own name, giving me the ministerial right to criticize the suggestions of another minister.

"I had no idea," said Plehve when we parted, "that after helping you to rise to the head of the finance administration I should be given proof of your intractability, of which many had warned me, and should not find in you the support on which I was entitled to count, having always supported you." From that minute on and almost to the last days preceding his assassination, our relations were all but completely severed. We met weekly in the Ministers' Committee and

in the State Council, but he never again approached me, never once spoke to me; and it was clear to everyone that our erstwhile friendship had come to an end. Soon afterward, however, as the Police Department would not keep quiet, our differences became generally known, and I may state truthfully that the sympathies of the public were on my side. Even Witte loudly denounced Plehve's project, although evil tongues insisted that he had promised Plehve his support in the Ministers' Committee in case I agreed to introduce the project there. In a week I made a written report to the Tsar stating all essential arguments against such a measure. I also enlarged upon them orally, and the Tsar kept my report, promising to read it attentively at his leisure and to discuss it with the Minister of the Interior.

What his ultimate decision was and what was Plehve's reaction, I do not know, but my report was never returned to me. Plehve never spoke of it to me again nor did he introduce this matter before the Ministers' Committee, and with his death it vanished from view, not to reappear until my retirement as Minister of Finance in October 1905. Directly after my retirement, Witte, then raised to the rank of Count, requested in his report to the Tsar the formation of a Ministry of Commerce to include the Factory Inspection.

Of the period up to the middle of the summer of 1904 I recall no events worth relating. My reports to the Tsar were of a very quiet and very confident tenor. Observing my efforts to find means to continue the war and to preserve our credit, the Tsar invariably took pains to reassure and encourage me. He insisted that our enemy "together with their allies shall pay for all we have spent." This was his constant and favorite expression, expressing as it did his firm belief in our victory; nor did this faith leave him even when it was clear that our hopes would remain unfulfilled.

CHAPTER III

JULY 1904—FEBRUARY 1905

One day in the first half of July when I was sitting in my study in my apartment on the Moika the telephone rang. To my great astonishment it was Plehve calling, although for almost two months he had had no communication with me. He said that he wished very much to see me, as he had a personal matter to discuss, and he wanted to know what time would be most convenient for me to receive him. I answered that in a few minutes I was leaving for my country house and that if it would be convenient I would gladly call at his house on Aptekarsky Island. He thanked me and said that he would be expecting me.

As soon as I was seated in his study Plehve brought up the matter of our recent differences over the suggested transfer of the Factory Inspection. We discussed this affair in a frank and friendly fashion. Finally Plehve told me that he had asked the Emperor to make no decision but to let the matter drop. "Which of us is right," said Plehve, "the Lord only knows. My only error was to have changed toward you; I am sorry for this and ask you to forget it. You have acted with absolute frankness and, perhaps, had I been in your place I should have acted in the same way. However, this is not the time for us to break with each other. I have always had the highest regard for you, and now, I beg you as a friend, let us forget what has passed and treat each other as we used to do. The Lord knows how long we shall work together. You do not know much, nor do I perhaps, of what is happening about us."

He embraced me, kissed me affectionately, asked again whether or not I was still angry, followed me quite cheerfully to the hall, and on the threshold asked, "Well, shall it be old times again?"

This was our last private conversation. Three days later—I well remember the date, July 14—we met for the last time at a conference under the chairmanship of the Tsar held at Alexandria (1) and devoted to the problem of effecting cuts in the budget for extraordinary expenditures for 1904. Plehve supported me energetically

against the Minister of Ways and Communications and even against the State Comptroller in urging that all expenses for new railways and work in seaports should be cut to the most modest figure. The conference soon ended, we walked out into the garden together, and as our carriages were long in coming we all stood in the rain, talking most cheerfully. Plehve joked with General Lobko, assuring him that he had reports from the police that he, Lobko, stayed too late at the Agricultural Club, thus depriving of their sleep the policemen detailed to guard him.

On the morning of July 15 at ten o'clock he was no more. He was killed by Sazonov's (2) bomb as he neared the Baltic station on his way to make his usual Thursday report. Everybody knows the details of this fatal event. In passing I wish only to dispel a legend tied up with this occurrence, started, I believe, by St. Petersburg society. It was said that there was at that time in Plehve's brief case a report about exiling Witte to Western Europe, based on certain proofs of Witte's close participation in the revolutionary movement that was spreading all over the country at the time. Actually there was nothing of the kind. Plehve's brief case was found intact in his cab and sent to the Ministry, where it and Plehve's desk were opened at the Tsar's order by Adjutant General Hesse (3) in the presence of the Director of the Police Department, Lopukhin (4), Plehve's son, and some person from the Ministry of the Interior. The brief case did not contain one word relating to Witte; the desk contained a brief report, or rather a covering memorandum, accompanying two excerpts from so-called "perustration," that is, the reading of private correspondence, neither the authors nor the addressees of which were mentioned. One of the letters mentioned the fact that Witte was in very close contact with the Russian and foreign revolutionary circles and all but directed their activities; in the other an anonymous correspondent expressed his amazement at the fact that the government seemed to be unaware of the attitude toward the person of the Tsar of an individual occupying a high administrative post, and that this individual was openly hostile and was close to avowed enemies of the régime; the correspondent wondered how such a state of affairs could be tolerated.

There is no doubt, however, that Plehve had been well informed as to how Witte referred to the Tsar, what sentiments he harbored, and how little restrained he was in entering into communication with circles openly hostile to His Majesty. But evidently Plehve

did not have in his possession any clear proof that Witte had acted in a clearly purposeful manner. Otherwise he would have made use of it, for he was an acknowledged enemy of Witte.

Plehve was succeeded by the Governor-General of Vilna, Prince Petr Dmitrievich Sviatopolk-Mirsky (5), a man close to Witte. I do not know whether or not Witte had any part in selecting Plehve's successor, but I do remember that, as soon as it was known who had been selected to fill the vacant post, Witte, who had been spending his summer at St. Petersburg, wrote me a letter saying that he was happy to hear of this appointment and that he congratulated me on it, as I should be sure to find in Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky a man incapable of creating any trouble for me.

The new minister soon received representatives of the Vilna press, who offered him their congratulations on his high appointment and expressed their sorrow at his leaving the administration of the northwestern region. From then on his personality was clear. Basing himself upon the fine relations which he had maintained with the press since the first days of his work as Governor-General, he announced that his motto would be one of perfect confidence toward the public forces, that he hoped to be able to find support in these forces for his new work, that he expected them to show equal confidence in him and to render him the same assistance he was ready to offer them, and that he did not close his eyes to the axiom that a government not based upon the public is always isolated and weak.

The salons of St. Petersburg, as well as the bureaucracy there, received this declaration with hostility. Comments began to be heard. People spoke of the so-called "springtime" and the "dictatorship of the heart" of the times of Loris-Melikov (6), and, while the press hailed the new appointment with acclaim, in governmental, court, and bureaucratic circles a distrustful attitude became manifest, and soon there appeared a certain cynical watchfulness of the results of the new course.

The personnel of his own ministry was particularly unsympathetic toward Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky. It knew him from his previous activity in Vilna, where he had been known as a man who, possibly because of his poor health, lacked will-power and initiative, who was without administrative experience, and who was totally unsuited to fight the various forces of opposition which were beginning to raise their heads and which finally merged in revolt against the government in the last half of 1905.

Witte, on the other hand, rejoiced openly. He came to the defense of the new minister and on every occasion held him up in contrast to the late Plehve as an example of culture, statesmanship, and that new type of government representative destined to supplant the outlived type of policeman-administrator who did not understand the necessity of bringing together the government and the public and of preparing the way for new forms of administration.

The St. Petersburg government circles, followed by the Court, soon formed their own specific conclusions of Witte's attitude toward the new man, of their mutual relations, of the attention which Witte showed the Prince during the first days of his administration, and of the flattering, at times even unnecessary, marks of attention and protection during the sessions of the Ministers' Committee. These conclusions proved rather harmful to Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky. It was said that he was "Witte's protégé," "the humble servant of Witte's will," and so on. The hoped-for prestige of the new minister failed to materialize. It became known that not a day passed that he did not see Witte, and when there began to appear in the Ministry of the Interior outlines of some new statutes drafted in a spirit showing "confidence in the forces of the public," no one paid heed to the statement that this was the work of the Minister of the Interior. It was the general opinion that the real Minister of the Interior was Witte, although no one seemed to know just what form his influence would assume. The solution of the enigma came on December 12 (7). On that date there was published the ukase ordering an immediate investigation of the regulations worked out by the Chairman of the Ministers' Committee as to the measures for the enforcement of law in the country.

One must bear in mind that at that time there was no co-ordination among the ministers. Each ministry was a closed, self-contained entity, managing all by itself the business within its competence, introducing its projects into the higher bodies—the State Council and the Ministers' Committee—according to the representations of those departments which were concerned with the matter under consideration. There was never any preliminary discussion except when friendly relations existed between separate ministries, and these were used mainly to discover a given ministry's point of view or to win over some stubborn minister who was protesting against some measure.

Thus no one knew for sure what was being prepared in the

secrecy of this or that ministry. Personally, although I saw Witte quite often and was in constant contact with Count Solsky, who enjoyed an exceptionally influential position in the Ministers' Committee, I did not know a thing about the preparation of the ukase of December 12. I saw it for the first time when it was distributed just before the session of the Ministers' Committee. Who its author was and how much Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky had shared in its composition I had no idea. So much has been written about this ukase that there is hardly any need to repeat the details of its study by the Ministers' Committee. Its very importance, so much emphasized by Witte at the time, was essentially trifling. Moreover, it was soon overshadowed by the events that followed and of which I shall speak but briefly, as I, like other ministers who were only chance participants in the discussion of measures which they could not control, was not called upon to play any active part in them.

Outwardly my personal relations with Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky were very agreeable. He had visited me directly after his arrival from Vilna and had said that he did not in the least share the late Plehve's idea of transferring the Factory Inspection to the control of his ministry; in fact, he had spoken of this to the Tsar, who had expressed his pleasure at hearing that this conflict with the Ministry of Finance was thus so happily liquidated. He asked me to consider the matter closed and said that he had even given instructions to the Police Department to advise me of all of the gendarmes' reports pertaining to industrial matters. He offered to stop all ministerial squabbles, and promised me the assistance of his ministry in this difficult undertaking. I called Timiriazev (8), Assistant Minister of Finance and head of the Department of Trade and Industry, and he and I arranged that on our part we should not conceal from the Police Department any of those things which had strained our relations under Plehve; thereafter our interministerial frictions seemed to stop. True, this did not last long.

D. F. Trepov (9), who was appointed at about that time Assistant Minister of the Interior in charge of the gendarme corps and was soon transferred to the post of Governor-General of St. Petersburg, followed the directions of his minister only outwardly. Actually, he took advantage of the vagueness of his prerogatives as administrator of the capital and began to interfere more and more in the conflicts between workers and employers, and in so doing his influence grew.

Trepov's administration was a curious mixture of a Zubatov (10) policy toward the workers and of police pressure upon them; of threats to the employers for inconsiderate treatment of the workers, and of demands upon them which were not only without legal sanction but obviously impossible of realization as well. At the same time his policy definitely terrorized the workers, by attempting to compel them to follow implicitly the orders of the ministry in the matter of industrial conflicts. After the Gapon (11) demonstration of January 9 this contradictory policy took on even more acute forms and involved the Tsar himself in the popular ferment embracing the St. Petersburg district.

The outcome of all these attempts to eliminate industrial friction is well known and needs no elaboration. The end of 1904 was spent in such attempts, and I must admit that they did not lead to anything tangible, nor could they have done so. The central authority was weakened beyond belief. The easy-going and inefficient Minister of the Interior was literally at a loss to know what to do. He was urged on by Witte to all manner of experiments without knowing what he intended to accomplish. Assistant Minister Trepov dashed hither and yon; now favoring the methods of Zubatov in Moscow, which he had advocated openly, thus influencing the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich (12), who had implicit confidence in him; now proclaiming that one had to make a firm show of authority in order to suppress the riots. His expression "Do not spare ammunition" stood strangely side by side with the most demagogical appeals to the workers.

Let me repeat that at this time there were no general conferences of representatives of different ministries. All ministers acted independently, each in his own province; and Witte, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ministers' Committee, did not even see his way clear to direct the activities of individual ministers; he discussed affairs only with those of them who were closest to him personally. With myself, particularly, he discussed nothing but current financial operations, and even these merely in order to be better informed before introducing them to the Finance Committee. As for the labor problem, which in 1904 was unquestionably the pivot of the internal situation of Russia, he never broached this subject to me, although I was chief of the Factory Inspection and sent all noteworthy reports of factory inspectors to him according to his own request.

On the other hand, he was undoubtedly in very close contact with

the opposition circles and with different unofficial representatives of the influential circles of the workingmen. I am supported in this belief by the events of the beginning of 1906 and the appropriation, with the participation of Timiriazev, of 30,000 rubles to be used by one Matiushinsky (13) to influence the workers.

What Witte's program was in this instance I do not know. It may have been the result of some extensive plan, or, as I am rather inclined to think, of a chance influence of all sorts of advisers who boasted of their nearness to the opposition and even to revolutionary circles. Yet my hypothesis is, I believe, supported by the manner in which the Ministry of the Interior was preparing to prevent Gapon's demonstration before the Winter Palace.

Until the evening of January 8, 1905, I had no idea what was being planned in this regard. Nor had I heard of the priest, Gapon. Only later did I learn that, while priest of the women's prison, he had visited either the Minister of Justice or the Chief of the Central Administration of Prisons, Kurlov (14), and had said that since he had a really considerable influence among the workers he could break up the demonstrations in the St. Petersburg district.

On the evening of January 8, I visited for the first time the Minister of the Interior, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, to discuss, at his invitation, some aspects of the labor movement. It was about nine or nine-thirty o'clock. In the minister's reception room I met the following persons: the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, General Fullon (15); Assistant Minister Trepov; and the Chief-of-Staff of the Guards and of the troops of the Petersburg District, General Meshetich. The Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry, V. I. Kovalevsky (16), was also expected, but he was away from home and did not attend the conference. The conference itself was very brief. I had been called to hear the reports of Generals Fullon and Meshetich on the orders given to military patrols in different parts of the city to prevent the movement of the workers from beyond the river and along the Schlüsselburg highway toward the Winter Palace. Here I learned for the first time that the priest, Gapon, was conducting an animated propaganda campaign among the workers and that he had had great success in inducing them to address themselves directly to the Tsar, to present to him their wants, and to place themselves under his direct protection; Gapon taught that the hope of a peaceful liquidation of those matters which had been the cause of the riots among the St. Petersburg workers lay

in the Tsar's personal participation in this affair, as it was alleged that the government was openly supporting the employers and disregarding the interests of the workers.

There was no sign of apprehension or tension in the conference. In the speeches of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior and the explanations of the Chief-of-Staff no trace of worry could be detected. When I asked why the conference met at so late an hour that there was not time for me to report on the Factory Inspection, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky answered that at first he had decided not to "bother" me at all, as the matter was not serious, especially since on the preceding Thursday it had been decided that the Tsar would not stay in the city on that day but would leave for Gatchina (17).

The police would communicate this news to the workers in good time, and in this manner the demonstration would be prevented and there would be no gathering about the Winter Palace. No one at the conference considered it possible that the demonstration would have to be stopped by force, and even less that there would be bloodshed. Witte must have known all about these plans, as Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky asked his advice literally at every turn. Besides, late that evening (January 8), or rather during that night, he was visited by the members of the then organized Provisional Government headed by the attorney Kedrin (18), a member of the Municipal Council, who begged him to take matters into his own hands and to cancel the order of the Minister of the Interior forbidding the workers to approach the Winter Palace. Witte told the delegation decisively that he had not the slightest information about this affair and that he could not interfere in another person's business. This was hardly so, because Witte had a highly organized body of agents who kept him posted on the labor movement. Two days later, on Monday, after all was over, he repeated to me that he had had no inkling of the prepared demonstration or of any measures taken to prevent it; he bitterly denounced the orders of the Minister of the Interior and repeated several times: "To fire at helpless men going to see their Tsar with portraits and ikons in their hands is a monstrous thing. Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky will have to tender his resignation, for he has discredited himself in the eyes of everyone." I remarked that the Prince was in very close relations with him and asked if it were possible that the Prince had not consulted him on the impending events, just as he had, though late, consulted me. To this Witte

answered, loudly enough for those about us to hear, that he had not seen the Minister of the Interior for more than a week before the affair and that he had heard absolutely nothing about it beforehand. Whether or not he spoke the truth or wished, as well he might, to shift the blame for unfortunate consequences on somebody else's shoulders; I cannot say.

On Sunday morning, January 9, 1905, at about ten o'clock, when I was busy with some papers in my study, volleys of firing sounded from near the Politseisky Bridge. In the neighborhood of my house a great crowd rushed along the other side of the Moika toward the Volynkin Drive. I was going to go out and see what was the matter, but my front door was locked and the doorman told me that the police had just called and asked that no one should leave the house until the crowd had been dispersed from the Palace Square and removed from this district. The firing continued. After each volley the crowd retreated to the Volynkin Drive and then rushed again toward the Politseisky Bridge. About noon the firing ceased. After lunch I went out to the Moika and walked along the Morskaja, the Palace Square, and the Moika. These places were deserted; only on the Pevchesky Bridge I saw some cavalry guards. In several places on the Palace Square infantry patrols were stationed, and the police were urging the public to move on. No cabs were visible. From the conversations of those about me and the words of a police officer whom I knew I learned that part of the crowd headed for the Palace Square from the side of the barracks of the cavalry guards had broken through the military and police guard and had been fired upon. Just how many persons had been killed and wounded was uncertain, but the general opinion was that the number was small.

That morning as my wife and I had been watching from a window the movements of the crowd, E. V. German and her sister A. V. Zhigalovsky, two ladies of our acquaintance, had called on us. They told us that at about eleven o'clock they had heard that the crowd was destroying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building and that of the Ministry of Finance. They had driven along the Nevsky to investigate, but on reaching the Koniushennaia had been stopped. A company of the Preobrazhensky regiment was firing from the Politseisky Bridge on the crowd along the Nevsky. Our visitors had escaped the shooting on the Moika only by making a detour. They stayed with us until four in the afternoon, when, as by this time

everything was quiet, they returned peacefully to their home on the Troitskaia.

The details of this fatal day have been related so often that there is simply no point in repeating them over again. For me this day had a particular significance in two respects. First, the impression it created abroad was tremendous, and this just when I was negotiating for two independent loans—one in Paris and one in Berlin. Second, in order to soften the impression of this day upon the factory workers of the Petersburg district and, through them, upon Russia, the Ministry of the Interior, and particularly General Trepov as Governor-General of St. Petersburg, suggested and energetically insisted that the Tsar should personally address the workers; it was intended to pacify the workers by means of a direct announcement of the Tsar to the effect that he did take their interests to heart and that he would extend to them his personal protection. Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, utterly depressed by the events of January 9, was firmly resolved to retire and took no part in this matter. He gave free rein to Trepov, who reported many times on this subject to the Tsar and transmitted to me the Sovereign's orders as far as they touched the Ministry of Finance. Soon afterward Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky retired and was succeeded by Bulygin (19).

The revolutionary press ascribed to me this project of involving the Tsar in the settling of this problem; but this is erroneous, as I did not approve it; the farthest I had gone was to announce in the Tsar's name that he had the interests of the workers at heart and that he had ordered the government to take speedy steps toward satisfying their just demands. Nevertheless, during my reports the Tsar often expressed his sympathy with Trepov's idea, believing that he personally ought to try to pacify the working classes and even to call into his presence representatives of the factory workers of the capital.

I confessed to His Majesty that I could not see how this step would serve any useful purpose. In the first place, there was no legal machinery for the selection of these representatives in such a way as to secure a free expression of opinion. Furthermore, if this representation were limited to St. Petersburg, other districts would justly complain at being excluded. Finally, no lasting effect could be derived from the Emperor's personal address in the face of the strong current of revolutionary propaganda, which would attempt to discredit the persons selected as hand-picked by the authorities.

My objections displeased the Emperor. Evidently he was under the influence of Trepov's opposing arguments and often told me, although in a very tactful way, that he hoped nevertheless to have a good influence upon the representatives of the workers, provided sensible men were selected. I suggested that if such were the case the employers, too, ought to be given an opportunity to see the Tsar in order to hear from him his wishes, especially since, as I had often reported to him, the employers were ready to meet the just demands of the workers, though they found in these demands nothing but very prejudiced and hostile sentiments inspired by revolutionary leaders. But this suggestion was not adopted, although the Tsar always answered that he was confident that it was so and that he wanted me to explain to the employers that he had never doubted their readiness to meet the workers half way.

Preparations began for the selection of workers' representatives to be presented to the Tsar. They were conducted almost solely by General Trepov, and naturally were of an utterly artificial character. Each factory of the St. Petersburg district was allotted a certain number of representatives to the electoral assembly, which was to select thirty persons to be presented to the Tsar. The workers showed no interest whatever in the election, and all the factory inspectors had to do was to see to it that no radical elements were included in the deputation and that the deputation itself did not assume the character of a demonstration. Nor did the radical elements take any part in these elections. The propaganda leaflets of the time were very numerous. Almost daily the factory inspectors informed me and the Ministry of the Interior of them. (They were openly pasted on the walls of factory buildings.) These leaflets criticized and even made fun of the idea of sending a deputation to the Tsar. Trepov and the gendarme police were well aware of what was going on. I reported this state of affairs to the Tsar, and to it he had but one answer: "If this is so, no one can reproach me for being indifferent to the needs of the workers; they are to blame for having refused to come to me with confidence."

The delegates were received at Tsarskoe Selo late in February or early in March. It was a very insignificant occasion. The Tsar made a little speech which he had prepared in advance, in which he expressed several kind sentiments toward the workers; he wished them to believe that he was sympathetic toward their needs and wished to work peacefully for the good of the entire people; and he

added that he had already ordered that a special commission be formed to investigate the working conditions of the northern region. This commission was to ascertain all the needs of the workers and to present directly to him its resolutions as to what should be done to improve the living conditions of the workers. The workers expressed no particular wishes. The Tsar spoke very kindly with nearly every one of them, asking questions as to where they came from, what their former occupation had been before entering factory work, and what their family circumstances were. The delegates were served tea and sandwiches and went home. Trepov was pleased with the audience, declaring that it passed brilliantly and could not fail to leave a lasting impression. The chief factory inspector who attended the audience was happy that everything went off without any "incident," but probably everyone, with the possible exception of Trepov, felt in the bottom of his heart that this effort could have no effect and that developments would continue at a rate determined by our military failures and the increase of the public opposition, which was gradually becoming an open revolutionary movement.

The press did not say one word about the reception of the delegates; even the *Novoe Vremia* (20) merely noted the fact. Witte, too, was silent; never once did he mention the subject to me. When, however, the Tsar's orders began to be carried out and the question arose as to who would be appointed to conduct the investigation and in what way it would be conducted, the matter was entrusted, on Witte's suggestion, to N. V. Shidlovsky (21), a member of the State Council. A worse selection could not have been made. Shidlovsky had a high opinion of his own powers and was very critical of everything and everybody, but was quite ignorant of administrative affairs. He had had no practical business experience, having given himself up, after a long career in the Imperial Chancellery, to the subtleties of the editor's art. He was completely at sea in his new position; he turned for advice to everyone, surrounded himself with very questionable elements of the Factory Inspection, and, from the start, fell under the influence of Litvinov-Falinsky (22). Litvinov-Falinsky was an official of the Factory Inspection and a very able man, but he was inclined to let his imagination run away with him. Consequently in his hands this undertaking was expanded into a grandiose enterprise and the program which he submitted to the Ministers' Committee was very complicated. Meanwhile Shidlovsky

remained undecided as to how his task should be started. He dallied until the summer and then went to his estate in the gubernia of Voronezh for his vacation. To tell the truth he could have done nothing else. The revolutionary movement grew, strikes multiplied and extended, the revolution of the second half of 1905 approached swiftly, and no paper questionnaire could have put out the rising flames.

CHAPTER IV

FEBRUARY-JUNE, 1905

The events of January 9 came at a time when I was negotiating for the conclusion of foreign loans in order to obtain funds with which to conduct the war and support our currency. Fortunately they had hardly any influence upon the conclusion of the 4½ per cent loan in Germany, but they affected very significantly my negotiations in France.

My relations with the German banking house of Mendelssohn and Company (1) dated back to 1904, and to this day I remember with a feeling of the deepest satisfaction how speedily, harmoniously, and easily these negotiations were concluded. They were not affected either by the fall of Port Arthur (2) or by our steadily increasing military failures. In this house I met with a consideration and an eager assistance the like of which I never experienced again while I was Minister of Finance.

At first Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the head of the house, and later Fischel, his close assistant and the cleverest financier I have ever met, tried by every means at their command to facilitate my task not only while they still believed in our victory but also later, when it was clear to everybody that we should not end the war victoriously.

The negotiations for the loan of 1905 were concluded soon after the January events and the loan was realized in the second half of February. It was issued on the German market very early in March in spite of the then unfavorable attitude toward it and the open protest of different public and academic organizations which sharply criticized the actions of the government. The basic terms of the loan had been determined in preliminary dealings with Berlin.

The negotiations in France followed a totally different course. Early in February, Edouard Netzlin, the head of the Russian syndicate in Paris and representative of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, arrived unexpectedly in St. Petersburg. He announced that the unsuccessful military operations and especially the events of Janu-

ary 9 and those taking place in industrial centers were making a very bad impression in the French stock market, that our securities were falling, that there was not the slightest possibility of preventing their catastrophic depreciation, and that a twofold measure had to be adopted:

First, increase considerably the subsidies with which to secure the support of the French press and let the Russian treasury assume this item of expense rather than insist that expenditures in this field be charged to the French bankers.

Second, find some means of reassuring the French public, or rather its financial circles; otherwise suspend for some time negotiations for loans in France.

This last statement seemed very obscure and I asked him to explain it. Netzlin then said quite frankly that he was an unofficial agent of the French government, although he failed to say what member of that government had authorized him to speak in its name. He said also that before his departure he had seen our ambassador, A. I. Nelidov (3), who was going to write to me (I had had no letter from Nelidov whatsoever), that the French government was greatly concerned over the turn our affairs were taking, that it believed the Russian government was unable to cope with its growing revolutionary movement, and that he had noticed in French political circles some doubt as to whether the Russian government would be able to master the situation or would be forced to make some concession to public opinion, for example, to meet the demand for a constitutional form of government. At this point he assured me that he was of course only repeating what he had heard in the public circles of France and was not expressing his own definite opinion. I suggested that he see Witte, the Chairman of the Ministers' Committee, feeling sure he would do so without any advice from me; and immediately he telephoned Witte asking him when he could most conveniently receive M. Netzlin. Witte answered that he would receive him that very day. Netzlin, however, was not satisfied with a visit to Witte and asked me to arrange an audience with the Tsar, as it was most important that on returning to Paris he should be able to report that he had exhausted every means at his command to apprise us of the attitude of French public opinion and the French government.

Count Lamsdorf (4), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declined to arrange the audience, since he had not received word about Netz-

lin's mission from our ambassador in Paris. I therefore wrote the Emperor and was informed that the audience would be granted but that the Tsar desired to see me first.

I repeated to the Emperor what I had written in my letter to him, enlarging only upon the details of my conversation with Netzlin and the ideas which he had expressed. I added that a refusal to see Netzlin would be rather to our disadvantage, as it might be regarded as a manifestation of our unwillingness even to listen to what was being brought to us in the name of our ally. The Emperor agreed. He said that he saw much in favor of the idea of listening to public opinion and that he himself believed that, in view of the present public unrest, it would perhaps be better to consider what could be done in this regard. The audience was set for the next day.

Netzlin came to me directly from Tsarskoe Selo in the most exalted spirits and said that the Tsar had been exceptionally gracious to him and had told him to tell whomsoever it might concern that the revolutionary movement in Russia was much less deep-rooted than Paris seemed to think, that we should be able to cope with it, that he (the Emperor) was expecting the military operations in the Far East to take a turn for the better with the arrival of our fleet in Far Eastern waters, and that he was seriously considering such reforms as would give great satisfaction to public opinion. Netzlin's general conclusion after his visit to Tsarskoe Selo was very rose-colored, and he parted with me announcing that immediately after his return he would take decisive steps toward resuming negotiations for a new loan. He did not conceal the fact that our successful negotiations with Mendelssohn would serve to influence his colleagues in the Russian syndicate.

The news of the Tsar's audience to Netzlin got into the newspapers, evidently through Witte, as, with the exception of myself, Netzlin had talked only with him and I repeated nothing to anyone. The newspapers elaborated the idea that the Tsar, having confidence in the public, sympathized with the idea of reforms. But the next day, February 18, a harsh note was struck in complete variance with this elaboration. This was a rescript to the new Minister of the Interior, Bulygin, who had succeeded Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky. It mentioned the spread of the strike movement throughout the land and the harm it was doing to the progress of the foreign war. It mentioned also the necessity of combating such a movement with every means at the command of the government. Not a word of

confidence in the public was spoken and no reforms were announced. Witte was utterly confused by this rescript. He went to Tsarskoe Selo and spoke about it. I also spoke of it during my report, saying that Paris would be at a loss to comprehend this move after the reception accorded to Netzlin. The Tsar gave no direct answer, but promised to think it over. Shortly another rescript to Bulygin appeared, instructing him to work out suggestions for drawing the population into "an active and constant participation in the work of legislation."

As is well known, this latter rescript was the beginning of the project for the convocation of an advisory State Duma, a project which was finally confirmed on August 6 after a lengthy and painful preliminary stage in which the most active part was played by S. E. Kryzhanovsky (5) from the Ministry of the Interior, and the Director of the General Office, A. I. Putilov, from the Ministry of Finance (Putilov became famous as Chairman of the Board of the Russo-Asiatic Bank). These two men followed diametrically opposite policies in their preliminary work. Kryzhanovsky leaned to the right, while Putilov openly inclined to the left. Hardly a day passed that I did not hear Bulygin's complaints that the work was not advancing because of endless arguments with my representative. (Bulygin and I had been on the very best terms since the 'eighties when we had both worked in the Central Administration of Prisons.) Once he even called to see me and showed me his report to the Tsar enumerating a whole series of arguments between Kryzhanovsky and Putilov, with the Tsar's notes on the margin showing the Tsar's total disagreement with Putilov's views. As a result I had to instruct Putilov to agree with the Tsar's wishes in this respect. We had a great argument; Putilov submitted, but later he insisted that if his advice had been heeded affairs would have taken an altogether different turn and there would have been no need for either the Manifesto of October 17 (6) or the suppression of the armed uprising in Moscow. There is no need to elaborate upon the baselessness of such an assertion, as, given the state of mind of that time, no liberal innovations could have had any effect upon the unchained passions which raged until the suppression of the Moscow riot.

The spring of 1905 passed amid very alarming apprehensions. Affairs at the front went from bad to worse. The hurried preparations for the departure of Rozhestvensky's (7) fleet and its journey around the Cape of Good Hope kept us all in a state of terrible

tension, which numbed us, as it were. Few of us understood what chances of success the unprecedented undertaking had. Everybody wanted passionately to believe in a miracle, while the majority simply closed their eyes to the inconceivable risk of the plan. Few had any idea of the technical aspect of the enterprise. The Ministry of the Navy concealed the fact that the battleships had been overloaded with coal lest they should be unable to secure any on the way. The government was not informed as to details; the general public trusted blindly to luck; only Rozhestvensky seemed to comprehend the possible dangers in store for him on his long journey around Africa to the Far East. Once in 1904 I met Rozhestvensky at the Nevsky navy yard during the inspection of two light cruisers being constructed for his fleet. Coming back to the city on board ship we fell to talking. I wished him success in his difficult undertaking, to which he replied, "What success can there be? We should not have started this hopeless business, and yet, how can I refuse to carry out orders when everybody is so sure of success?" The winter and spring dragged by with exhausting slowness. The news of the fleet was alarming. After the well-known Dogger Bank incident (8) one sensed Japanese spies everywhere. These suspicions, of course, existed only in imagination, as the Japanese did not need to embark upon such a long journey; they were simply lying in wait for our fleet in their own waters.

But the Ministry of the Navy had a number of plans, all of a very fantastic character. One of these plans caused me a lot of trouble.

Admiral A. M. Abaza, who was attached to Admiral General Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich (9) and who, in company with State Secretary Bezobrazov and Vonliarliarsky, was the soul of the Yalu enterprise, had been dashing about ever since the fall of Port Arthur in December 1904 with the idea of strengthening our Vladivostok fleet by acquiring battleships abroad. Many business men and adventurers assailed the doors of the Ministries of War and the Navy with offers of their services for all sorts of military supplies. Among them was an American, one Charles Flint, who suggested that both Chile and Brazil had fine battleships and cruisers which could be bought at a reasonable price, manned by Russian sailors, and sent to Vladivostok. These ships, together with what was left of our own fleet in the Far East, would provide a great battle fleet capable of fighting the Japanese and turning the tables in our

favor. Rumors of this plan reached me, but not in the form of a definite proposal.

However, in the winter of 1904-1905, I was asked to attend a conference at the house of Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich together with General Lobko, the State Comptroller. Here the matter was presented officially by Admiral Abaza, who proved, with much aplomb and assurance, that every battleship that was for sale must be acquired regardless of price. The State Comptroller supported him most decidedly; the Minister of the Navy was more reserved, and pointed out a number of practical obstacles over and above the difficulty of acquiring these ships, namely, manning them with Russian seamen and getting them to Vladivostok.

I centered my objections on the purely financial aspect of the matter. I said that in principle I was not opposed to buying the ships if I were told just what ships were for sale, from whom they were to be purchased and at what price. I inquired of the Ministry of the Navy how and where these ships were to be manned with Russian seamen and what guaranty there was that Japan's ally, England, would not try to seize the battleships on the way to the Far East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not represented. The Admiral General behaved altogether correctly. Many times he supported me in my insistence that the owners of the ships should not be paid until the ships were delivered and manned by our own men. The conference adjourned with the decision that the whole matter should be discussed once more under the personal chairmanship of the Tsar. No minutes were taken, and I asked the Grand Duke to acquaint His Majesty with my point of view, explaining once more that I was not opposed to paying out money but should insist that every possible precaution be taken against needless expenditures. Many adventurers, hoping to gain from the deal, had already sharpened their wolfish appetites, and the gossip of the fashionable restaurants had it that enormous bribes were being promised indiscriminately. The conference had refrained from taking any minutes expressly for the purpose of preventing publicity.

The Tsar's conference took place at Tsarskoe Selo a few days later, toward the end of March. The Admiral General very correctly and cleverly repeated all that had been said at his conference and the Tsar suggested that all participants speak freely. Abaza was insistent and stubborn as before; he referred to my objections as "fault-finding" which would only bring to naught a simple and clear propo-

sition. The Tsar stopped him with the words: "One cannot describe as 'fault-finding' these very natural demands of the Minister of Finance to safeguard us against the machinations of adventurers. We must know just what we are about to buy, from whom we buy it, and who is to guarantee that we get the ships after we pay the money." One incident of this conference evidently made a great impression upon the Tsar. Admiral Abaza said that the battleships were being sold fully equipped with armament and completely equipped with ammunition for every gun. I asked if he knew what sort of guns these were and if we should have ammunition for them after the original supply was gone, but I got no answer. The Minister of the Navy said that this consideration was very important, as we should have to begin to manufacture the ammunition as soon as the ships were purchased. This would naturally take some time, for we should have to study the guns before manufacturing the ammunition. The conference adjourned. The Tsar directed us not to drop the matter and charged me to take all steps necessary to protect the treasury from attempts to secure the money before the battleships were actually in our possession.

The matter dragged on a long time. It spoiled many of my days, and the outcome was almost farcical. After endless parleys and conferences it was decided to buy four Chilean battleships; their names were known, and the purchase price was set at fifty-eight million rubles to be paid over in Paris through the House of Rothschild but only after the reception of a telegram saying that we had taken actual possession of them. Admiral Abaza was sent to Paris to conduct the negotiations, but the financial matters were not entrusted to him. I had insisted on having charge of that and had dispatched to Paris A. I. Vyshnegradsky, who was at that time occupying the post of Assistant Director of the Special Credit Office. Abaza assumed the rôle of conspirator; he even shaved off his long classical beard and appeared in Paris in disguise. But three days later the boulevard press published two pictures of the Admiral: one in his Admiral's uniform with his long classical beard, and the other in civilian clothes and a soft hat and close shaven. Under the pictures there was a short legend explaining the reason for the Admiral's arrival in Paris and the address of the hotel at which he was staying. For quite a time the Admiral stayed there awaiting his agents, but all in vain. Nor was Vyshnegradsky able to effect the payments; their mission was a complete failure.

One wonders if these Chilean battleships ever did exist. In my opinion they did not. The Chilean government, undoubtedly, had no idea of selling anything, and the whole cleverly conceived plan was the invention of some obscure agents attempting to exploit the light-mindedness of our representatives. At any rate I had succeeded in saving our money. Later, however, Admiral Abaza affirmed that the battleships did exist and that, had he been given freedom of action, everything would have been accomplished. He claimed that because of my stubbornness the Japanese government had learned of our plan and had threatened the Chilean government with war if they sold us the ships. All this is, of course, unadulterated nonsense, and the Tsar often told me later that he was firmly convinced that the entire affair had been concocted for the purpose of getting our money without delivering the ships. I must pay my homage to the late Vyshnegradsky, who rendered me great assistance in this business.

As spring approached and we began to receive news of our fleet, the Tsar spoke to me more and more frequently on this subject during my reports. Finally, when the news arrived that the fleet of Admiral Nebogatov (10) had joined forces with Rozhestvensky, the Tsar met me in a happy and cheerful mood. "Well," he said, "won't you smooth out the wrinkles on your brow now and stop looking so gloomy about the fate of our fleet?" This happy anticipation did not last long. On Saturday evening, May 15, I received a code telegram from Mendelssohn saying that that morning in the straits of Tsushima our fleet had had an encounter with the entire Japanese fleet and had been almost entirely destroyed—only a couple of ships had escaped to the north. I called up the Minister of the Navy and asked him if he knew anything about this. He did not, but said that he would call up the Tsar and tell him that I had received this news. Late that night, about midnight, the Minister of the Navy telephoned back and said that he had received the same news from both our Berlin ambassador and naval attachés.

I did not see the Tsar for a whole week, and when I appeared with my report on the following Friday I found him greatly depressed; evidently for the first time he had abandoned his customary hopes for a speedy and glorious termination of the war. He did not mention the catastrophe itself; he only said that he no longer hoped for a speedy victory and was thinking of letting the hostilities drag on so as to exhaust the Japanese and force them to ask for peace on terms honorable for Russia. The Tsar viewed the internal tumult

rather indifferently; he attached no particular importance to it and kept repeating that it had spread over only a very small part of the country and could not be very significant.

In the meantime Bulygin drew up his project on the formation of an advisory State Duma, and with the beginning of summer a conference under the chairmanship of Count Solsky began to consider the plan. After a few insignificant changes in the first draft, the matter was transferred for final examination to a conference under the chairmanship of the Tsar himself. This conference included a number of persons usually never drawn into such matters: Count A. P. Ignatev, Pobedonostsev (11), A. A. Polovtsov (12), Professor Kliuchevsky (13), Stishinsky (14), and many others whose names I no longer recall. Most of those present had a long record of civil service. The debates were mainly very reserved, few fundamental questions were broached, and the consideration of the entire project took only four or five sessions. Certain details, however, provoked some rather curious debates. I remember, for instance, that once an argument arose between Stishinsky and me as to what should be required of candidates for the State Duma. Stishinsky insisted that even a simple knowledge of reading and writing was not necessary. He believed that the best elements were represented by "respectable peasants of a more sedate age" in which class there were many illiterate men who, in spite of their illiteracy, knew well the conditions of country life and could orient themselves in the most complicated problems of village affairs and zemstvo needs; they were, in short, well informed on matters which would constitute the essence of the work of the future State Duma. I objected to this point of view and tried to show that no amount of "respectability" would be of any use if the future legislator, even though he possessed only an advisory vote, could not read whatever he was given to discuss. Some of the participants in the conference supported my point of view, but the Tsar sided with Stishinsky and that particular article of the legislative project was worded in this sense.

During the entire discussion of the project in Count Solsky's conference, Witte, as Chairman of the Ministers' Committee, took the most active part. He never once suggested that the advisory character of the Duma would satisfy no one, but he very energetically objected to the article prohibiting the election of Jews to the Duma. I supported him warmly. The matter occupied two sessions and was not settled before Witte left for the United States. Before his de-

parture he begged me to telegraph him in Washington the outcome of the debates, as he justly attached to it a great fundamental significance, but the determined stand of the Right opposition made him fear for the final decision. However, the majority of the conference adopted our point of view and the matter was settled with general satisfaction. I sent a telegram to Portsmouth and received an answer expressing Witte's thanks, the last I ever received from him, though I sent many subsequent telegrams.

CHAPTER V

JUNE-OCTOBER, 1905

It is a well-known fact that early in June 1905 the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt (1), offered to act as intermediary between Russia and Japan by calling a peace conference to terminate the war (2). Both parties agreed, and we began to get ready for the conference. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested A. I. Nelidov, our ambassador to Paris, as chief delegate, and the Tsar gladly approved. But Nelidov declined on account of his poor health (he really was ill at the time) and because he did not know English. After his refusal the post was offered to our ambassador in Rome, N. V. Muravev (3), who was summoned to Russia. He returned immediately to St. Petersburg and came directly from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to call on me at my country house on Elagin Island. Without mentioning the substance of those tasks imposed upon him, he asked me "not to cut the credits which I am about to request for myself and my companions." He said that life in America was undoubtedly expensive and that he, personally, was without means; he was even perplexed as to how to carry on his work in Rome. We arranged that he should call again the next day and bring along an estimate of his expenses. He also asked permission to take along one of my subordinates, should he decide not to limit himself to the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

From my house Muravev went to see Witte and the next morning was called to Peterhof to the Emperor. What passed between Witte and Muravev and what Muravev told the Tsar I do not know, but the next day, about 4:00 P.M., when I was receiving reports for the ministry, Muravev called on me again. He told me that after thinking matters over all night long he had decided not to assume these heavy responsibilities because he considered himself incapable of discharging them successfully. He said he had told all this frankly to the Tsar, who had been most gracious and had given him permission to return to Rome. In parting, the Tsar had told Muravev that

he was very much perplexed as to whom he should select to head the delegation. Whereupon Muravev said that in his opinion there was a suitable man all ready—Witte. That same day Witte was called to Peterhof. Witte telephoned me directly after his return and asked me to come over to see him. I went, and he told me that the Tsar had "forced" him to go to America. He added, "When a sewer has to be cleaned, they send Witte; but as soon as work of a cleaner and nicer kind appears, plenty of other candidates spring up." Perhaps we shall never know the truth about this appointment (4). Many tales circulated through the city concerning it, but I really do not like to repeat them. Nor is there any purpose in doing so. Regardless of one's personal relation to Witte, justice demands the admission that he came out of his very difficult position most honorably, although few persons are aware how many of the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty which are advantageous to Russia were due to the direct participation of the Emperor. But more of this later!

Witte made his preparations very quickly. A day or two after his appointment he called at my Ministry, stayed a long time, and in the most friendly way asked me to help him keep in constant touch with events in Russia. "From the minute I board ship," he said, "I shall be totally cut off from Russia. But it will be of utmost importance to me to follow everything that happens here, to note everything and to take everything into account. People are sure to lie to me and talk all sorts of nonsense about Russia, and I ought to be better informed than they so as to parry their inventions; as soon as they see that I have more reliable information than they have, my prestige will rise higher than theirs."

I promised to keep him informed and kept my promise scrupulously. There was not an event in the life of Russia of those days of which I did not apprise him in due time and many were the rubles I spent sending him telegrams; yet aside from the telegram about the Jews, mentioned above, I got no answer to any of them. After he returned I asked him whether or not everything had reached him, and his answer was a mere, "I believe so." He never uttered another word, nor did he express one word of thanks for all he had received from me. Witte's companion, Shipov (5), who was, after my retirement in 1905, Minister of Finance for a short time, told me that they had always awaited my telegrams with great impatience, that after the first week Witte had let him announce to foreign correspondents everything important these telegrams con-

tained, and that these correspondents had often asked him what newspapers were informing the Russian delegation of everything so exactly and so swiftly.

After this visit Witte and I did not meet again until his departure, and then we parted on the warmest and most cordial terms. He promised, should the peace treaty be signed, to stop in Paris on his way back to try to prepare the ground for another loan, which, however, was not placed. He even said, "Try to come to Paris yourself about the time of my return and, if everything is all right, we shall do what is necessary then and there." I answered jokingly that Paris would be deserted until October or November and that he would hardly stay that long in America. I mention this purposely as I have not the slightest idea what happened to Witte in America or on his way home to make him quite hostile to me after he returned, a hostility which caused very awkward relations between us and culminated in my retirement at the end of October.

I shall not dwell upon the details of how the Portsmouth Treaty was concluded. These details are well known. I wish rather to make public a few facts which heretofore have been known only to myself and a few others, facts which reveal who deserves the credit for the fact that Russia yielded so little to Japan; for though the Soviet authorities have ravaged the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and published everything that serves their ends, they have not yet published a single telegram or a single letter pertaining to the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty which sheds any light upon the instructions sent to Witte from St. Petersburg, upon his suggestions, or upon the replies to them.

As soon as it was agreed that peace negotiations should be begun, Count Lamsdorf, a cautious man who was in the habit of keeping a written record of his every step, made a report to the Emperor requesting direct instructions on all basic questions in which special insistence was to be expected from Japan. He sent the draft of this report, as he did everything that pertained to the war—our relations with Japan, China, and Persia—to me and requested my opinion. The reason for this was not merely that he had had very close relations with Witte when the latter was Minister of Finance and had simply carried on these relations with me as Witte's successor; it was mainly because all problems of finance, economics, and industry pertaining to Japan, China, and Persia were centered in the Ministry of Finance and it would have been difficult to say which of the two

ministries—Foreign Affairs or Finance—had exercised the greater influence upon our relations with these three countries.

In his report Count Lamsdorf dwelt mainly upon the following subjects which were certain to be broached by Japan and which we were already able to anticipate from the reports of the English press:

a) The question of Korea, which had been the ostensible cause for our war with Japan. Count Lamsdorf stated frankly that we should have to renounce our former attitude and abandon the idea of exercising any influence in Korea if we desired to make peace.

b) The matter of indemnity, which had been rated as most important by the press. It was to be expected that Japan's creditors would insist upon payment, as Japan's financial situation could not fail to worry them. Count Lamsdorf did not state his own views on this matter.

c) The matter of the limitation of our own military and naval forces in our Far East. This was sure to arrest the attention of Japan in view of the advantages which she had gained over us and her possible desire to diminish the danger of another war with us. I do not recall that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed any definite opinion on this subject, but I am positive that it did not offer any definite scheme for its solution.

Count Lamsdorf's report was returned to him with the Emperor's notations which have made on my memory a lasting impression that the events of later days have been unable to efface. At the head of the report the Tsar wrote: "I am ready to terminate by peace a war which I did not start, provided the conditions offered us befit the dignity of Russia. I do not consider that we are beaten; our army is still intact, and I have faith in it."

Over the article on Korea the Tsar wrote: "On this subject I am ready to make concessions; this is not Russian territory."

Over the article on indemnity the Tsar wrote: "Russia has never paid an indemnity; I shall never consent to this." The word "never" was underlined three times.

Over the article on limiting our armed forces in the Far East the Tsar's note read: "This is not to be thought of; we are not beaten; we can continue the war if unacceptable terms should force us to it."

Unquestionably Count Lamsdorf either showed this report and the Tsar's notes to Witte before he left Russia or sent it to him in America. It is to be deplored that neither Witte nor his com-

panions have mentioned this fact in their discussions of the subject.* As for Witte himself the only thing I must say in all conscience, and having in mind the circumstances which surrounded the conclusion of the peace treaty, is that his *Memoirs* do not sufficiently stress the decisive rôle played by Emperor Nicholas II at the most critical stage of the Portsmouth negotiations.

Count Witte indicates in his *Memoirs* (8) that he received from the Emperor at the time of his departure the formal indication that His Majesty would under no circumstances agree to pay an indemnity if Japan specified this as a condition to the making of peace, nor would he give up the smallest piece of Russian territory. Witte says that he followed these instructions faithfully. But at the decisive moment, when he telegraphed the final conditions laid down by the Japanese, including the payment of an indemnity, he did not mention in his cable that he had declared to our adversaries that this condition was inadmissible, thus leaving to the Emperor the refusal of this condition.

As will be seen, His Majesty renewed his declaration of July with the greatest emphasis, and informed his plenipotentiary in a special cable that he would not authorize him to sign the peace treaty if such a condition were insisted upon by Japan.

It is therefore only just—while rendering all honor to Count Witte for the definite result obtained by his efforts on behalf of his country—to say in all conscience that had it not been for the personal intervention of the Emperor at the crucial moment this result would not have been obtained. While emphasizing this point, I do not in any way minimize the beneficial rôle played at the time by the then President of the United States of America in favor of the conclusion of peace.

During the peace negotiations I reported their progress to the Tsar many times. And we discussed this subject even more frequently with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so that I was in a position to answer in very definite terms without any reservation when

* In justice it should be said that most of those who accompanied Witte, like Shipov and Professor Martens (6), left no memoirs, or their writings, as is the case with the memoirs of Baron Rosen (7), have not come to my hand. I. Ya. Korostovets, who wrote a very interesting monograph on what he had seen and participated in, should have made many corrections in his narrative, *Stranitsa iz istorii russkoi diplomatii; Russko-Yaponskie peregovory v Portsmutie v 1905* ("A page from the history of Russian diplomacy; the Russian-Japanese negotiations in Portsmouth in 1905"), Peking, 1923.

the decisive moment arrived and Witte asked for the minimum terms he was empowered to accept in order that, if the Japanese were unwilling to accept these terms, he could break off negotiations and leave, after publishing the reasons for the rupture. When this point was reached I was called upon to express my opinions.

I recollect that this occurred on a Saturday during the first half of August. I had finished my work and was getting ready to go to the country. My wife was waiting for me, all ready to leave. A letter was brought to me from the Minister of Foreign Affairs with a copy of a telegram which Witte had sent to the Emperor. In his letter Count Lamsdorf informed me that the Tsar wished to have a report on Witte's telegram on Tuesday morning and had charged Count Lamsdorf to submit both his own and my written opinions.

I took the letter to the country with me and on the way made the first draft of my reply.* The next day, Sunday, I revised the draft, had it copied, and that evening left for the city, so as to be able, on Monday morning, to revise it once more and send it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I can recall very clearly the arrangement of my letter.

Witte's telegram (9) contained a sentence to the effect that if we desired peace we could secure it only by making concessions to Japan in some of her demands. Consequently, I began my letter with the statement that we had to have peace, that this was my deepest conviction, but the degree to which we could go in making concessions could be judged only by those who were acquainted in detail with our conditions at the front. Although I did not have this knowledge, I could not advise that this information be obtained from the Commander-in-Chief, General Linevich (10), as this would cause undue delay; besides, the Commander-in-Chief could hardly be expected to comprehend all the aspects of our position. My conviction that we had to have peace was based on an awareness of both our financial and our internal conditions, and I believed it necessary to make concessions in all matters which would not offend the dignity of our country. Looking at the matter from this point of view I was especially firm in rejecting the idea of the payment of any indemnity.

* My reply must certainly be in the archives of the Foreign Office. I kept a copy of it up to the time I left Russia, and it is a source of deep regret that I no longer have it in my possession and cannot quote it here, for it would show many differences from Witte's account of how the peace treaty was concluded. Nevertheless, I remember it quite well enough to reproduce the pertinent details.

Russia had never paid an indemnity nor was she at that moment totally crushed under the feet of her enemies. Instead of an indemnity I suggested that the southern part of Sakhalin be relinquished, pointing out that, in addition, Japan might find certain material gain if we compensated her for the maintenance of our prisoners of war (11).

That same evening the Minister of Foreign Affairs telephoned me and said that the contents of my letter corresponded to what the Tsar had said on many occasions and that he believed there would be little trouble in substantiating such a stand, especially since he himself intended to speak in this vein. On Tuesday afternoon Count Lamsdorf telephoned again and said that he had sent a telegram to Witte to this general effect and that the tone of the telegram had been altered by the Tsar so decisively, making clear that all discussion of an indemnity was entirely out of the question, that he was sure that Witte would not return to this subject again. As everybody knows, the treaty was signed a few days later and I consider it my duty to insist that the agreement was reached only because of the unusual firmness which the Tsar displayed on this occasion, a firmness which could not have been inspired by Count Lamsdorf, as he was totally incapable of any firm resistance. Nor was the merit mine, since I did not see the Tsar at the last moment and know that a written exposition of one's views never made a decisive impression upon him. I have no doubt that he would never have abandoned his stand as to the impossibility of an indemnity and would have continued the war if the Japanese had not given in. What the outcome would have been is another matter, but in all justice it must be pointed out that Witte stood his ground only because he was sure that the Tsar would never agree to an indemnity.

During my Friday report the Tsar was in a very happy mood; he said he was happy over the outcome of the whole business and the knowledge that "Witte evidently did understand that I would never agree to an indemnity, even if I had to continue the war for another two years."

The conclusion of the treaty did not make a great impression either in government circles or on public opinion. The hostilities were much too far removed from us, the war was too feebly reflected in everyday life. Everybody was more impressed by the conditions close at hand, especially since these conditions grew more and more menacing and no one knew what would be the outcome. The strike

movement at the factories grew and expanded. Railway service became ever more irregular; frequent interruptions became the rule. The Baltic region was in an uproar, and even at the very threshold of St. Petersburg, so to speak, attacks upon the police and the army became increasingly common. Conditions in Kurland were even worse and necessitated the sending out of the guards on punitive expeditions. I am sure that many still remember the savage treatment meted out to the dragoons at Hasenpot. The burning of soldiers alive obliged the authorities to send troops to suppress the riots. The continual plundering of estates and destruction of castles showed clearly what direction these forerunners of the events of 1917-1918 were taking. All these events affected an aspect of the life of the country which concerned me particularly.

Revenues began to come in but slowly, and a situation began to arise which had been unknown during the year and a half of the war. I had to discard the idea of a domestic loan and to await the return of Witte. I had telegraphed him congratulations on the conclusion of the treaty and had received a very courteous telegram in reply reminding me of his promise and saying that he would stop in Paris; he was sure that our plans would be successful, as the main obstacle had now been removed. Later I received another telegram from him sent from Paris saying that, although he could not get in touch with many persons whom I needed, he had been given very positive assurances and was confident of success.

What happened in the short interval between Witte's visit to Paris and his return to St. Petersburg I do not know. It must have been something extraordinary. At any rate it entailed consequences which I had not expected. Whether his success at Portsmouth had gone to his head; whether he had conceived the idea that he had saved Russia, an idea suggested by his interview with the Emperor William (12) at Rominten (13) and the reception accorded him there, and was therefore called upon to be the sole dictator of her fate; whether he was confirmed in this idea after his reception by the Tsar and his elevation to the rank of Count; whether he had conceived the idea, inspired by all this success, of getting rid of me as one who did not bow to his will—I do not know, but the fact remains that after our first interview upon his return Witte began to treat me with an unwonted sharpness before everybody and was utterly intolerant of every opinion I expressed.

The day he arrived I went to offer him my congratulations. Not

finding him in, I left a few words of warm welcome. He visited me the next day but stayed only a few minutes; he would not even take a chair and kept on walking up and down my study answering my questions in a bored and, as it were, reluctant manner. He did not say one word about the fact that I had kept him posted almost daily since his departure on all events of importance; he behaved as if he had never received a single telegram. He was utterly unwilling to listen to my attempt to tell him in more detail what was taking place at home and interrupted me with the words: "All this is trifling compared with what is going to happen one of these days; and anyway, all these events are silly." I asked him what he meant, but he only answered irritably, "You shall see for yourself." When I asked if he had been able to do anything in Paris, he answered just as sharply: "I have done everything; you may send a telegram to Netzlin to come to St. Petersburg." He continued: "Shipov will tell you. He is informed as to my negotiations." With these words he shook hands and went away, leaving me completely bewildered.

CHAPTER VI

OCTOBER 1905

That evening Shipov visited me. I asked him if he could explain what had happened to Witte and what had caused his displeasure with me. Either because of his natural reserve and evasiveness or because he did not know, Shipov gave me no direct answer, merely suggesting that Witte was probably depressed by conditions. When I asked next what had been done in Paris, Shipov replied briefly that he knew nothing except that Witte had seen Netzlin several times and had advised him to come to St. Petersburg. Netzlin apparently did not favor this plan, and said in Shipov's presence that he would await my invitation and, further, that he would prefer to have the invitation addressed to all the members of the Russian group rather than to him personally. The next day I sent a telegram to Netzlin referring to a conversation I had had with Count Witte and extending an invitation to the representatives of the Russian group to come to St. Petersburg.

In this telegram and in the letter which followed it I could give Netzlin no very real explanations as to the events taking place in Russia at that time, as I was unwilling to shed more light upon the gloomy picture of our revolutionary unrest than was done by the French and especially the German press. The German press, however, did view our situation rather calmly and did not lose hope in the ability of Russia to liquidate the movement quite soon. Nor did I mention what was being done in Count Witte's entourage in connection with proposed changes in our internal organization, as I was very poorly informed as to Witte's plans. Moreover, no one near him informed either me or any other government officials of the proposed Manifesto of October 17, 1905 (1).

I remember that in this long explanatory letter I dwelt mainly on the fact that the conclusion of the peace treaty and the firm resolution of the Emperor to permit the people to participate in the work of legislation, even though only in an advisory capacity, had created a more favorable background for the financial liquidation of the war. This would benefit not only Russia but also all countries which were

bound to her by common interests. I remember well that I added a postscript in my own handwriting to the effect that I had no doubt that Germany, and Mendelssohn's group in particular, would meet half way our endeavor to put our currency on a sound basis and thereby avoid forcing us to adopt a course which we had not resorted to even during our unsuccessful war. I am sorry that the Bolsheviks did not publish this letter along with that excerpt from my correspondence with Netzlin which included letters of much less interest (2). The answer to my telegram came soon. Netzlin answered that he would try to keep the promise he had given Count Witte, that the majority of the members of the Russian group had expressed their agreement, that the only one to hesitate was the Cr dit Lyonnais, but that he was confident of its ultimate agreement; he even mentioned that the probable date of the arrival of the bankers' group would be between the tenth and fifteenth of October. And thus it really happened; they arrived on the eve of the publication of the Manifesto.

Here I must make a short digression in relating the course of events of that period of my life and work to introduce an episode which came to my attention many years later, in September 1931, when Count Witte was no more and I was in exile recalling the distant past. There then appeared the memoirs of the late German Chancellor, Prince von B low (3), Emperor William's assistant of many years' standing. Their revelations created a sensation and provoked an extensive controversy. The many statements from all sides as to the tremendous errors they contained, whether intentionally or unintentionally, do not concern my purpose.

There was also published in German, French, and English a volume containing excerpts from the private correspondence between Prince von B low and the Emperor. In the English edition of this volume there is the following excerpt from the letter of Prince von B low to the Emperor, dated September 25, 1905:

"I have just received Your Majesty's gracious telegram with my most submissive thanks. I had two hours of conversation with Witte this morning. Obviously in a very anti-English mood, at the eleventh hour he had succeeded in blocking an Anglo-French Russian loan in Paris, which Nelidov and Benckendorf (4) had advocated. He had convinced Rouvier (5) that the loan was directed against Germany and was therefore inconsonant with French interests. Loubet (6) had told him that he knew nothing of the scheme, which he would other-

wise have quashed. The President at the same time assured him on his word of honor that there was no secret agreement of any kind between France and England. Witte considers the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to be offensive as against Russia. He was more especially indignant because England, in giving notification of the Treaty, had added an intimation of its readiness to throw open the English market to Russian bonds to the amount of 10,000,000 pounds sterling, a concession which England had a little later stultified by placing the bonds in France and Germany" (7).

When I read this excerpt from an undoubtedly genuine report of a Chancellor to his Emperor and compared it with what had taken place under my very eyes, I asked myself, despite the fact that these events had happened a quarter of a century before, if Prince von Bülow had not strayed from the truth, as he did on so many other occasions; for how could a Russian statesman confess to a foreign statesman that he had acted against the interests of his own country for the advantage of another?

Count Witte caused me a great deal of unpleasantness, but I have always tried to be just toward him and to render due homage to his conspicuous abilities. And I should like on this occasion to say that Prince von Bülow did not keep to the truth and that Count Witte could not have said that which was ascribed to him sixteen years after his death. But in all fairness I cannot state that Prince von Bülow made it all up and reported to his Emperor something that his visitor had not told him.

It was actually impossible to invent such an absurdity, for at that time no one but Count Witte knew that Russia was ready to negotiate another loan in France. It was still less probable that anyone should talk of a loan in England of which there was never any intention; even the project of the conclusion of the French loan had a purely academic character, and my conversation with Count Witte before his departure had had no other purpose than to feel our way about in Paris in case we succeeded in ending the war with a peace treaty. Nor was there even any mention of an intention to harm Germany.

Six months previously Germany had granted us the 4½ per cent loan of 1905, and she knew full well that until the conclusion of the peace treaty it was utterly impossible for us to negotiate another loan in any market. The German banks, through the House of Mendelssohn, were well posted on our every move, and its representative, Fischel, was as close to the Russian Ministry of Finance as he was

to the Russian group of French banks. The entire financial world knew full well that the end of the Russo-Japanese conflict would force Russia to search for new resources in foreign markets for the liquidation of this unfortunate war. Yet it never occurred to anyone that there could be a question of raising such a loan before the peace treaty was concluded and the extent of internal complications suffered by the country were ascertained.

Count Witte knew this better than anyone, for it was he who had suggested that he find out about another loan during his visit to Paris after the conclusion of the peace treaty. He well knew that during his stay at Portsmouth, as well as during his homeward journey, I had had no conferences with anyone and that I was awaiting his return before beginning these negotiations, hoping that he might be successful in preparing the ground for a loan in Paris. He himself, directly after his arrival, in the conversation I have described above, told me that everything was prepared and that I was to summon Netzlin to St. Petersburg. Neither during this conversation nor at any other time, even when I sent the invitation to the French group with his full knowledge and permission, did he ever hint at any difficulties which the French government had created. It is self-evident that I would not have invited them to come had he prepared me for the attitude of Paris towards our loan.

The question which arises is this: At what time did Count Witte fail to tell the truth? Was it when, passing through Berlin and Rominten, he boasted to Prince von Bülow and the Emperor William that he, the Chairman of the Russian Ministers' Committee, had, in the interests of Germany, prevented the realization of the Russian loan in Paris, a loan which he himself had judged necessary? Or was it when, having returned home, he assured me that everything had been done and that I could invite to St. Petersburg the representatives of the bankers' group, and when he reported on this to his Emperor, who thanked him for his assistance and told me about it with much pleasure?

Personally I am convinced that Witte's conversation with the German Chancellor was of a tenor quite different from that ascribed to it by Prince Bülow. It may be that, in order to be as agreeable as possible to his interlocutor, Count Witte laid stress upon the sympathy he felt toward Germany (and which he certainly did feel), while characterizing otherwise his appreciation of the policy followed by England. It is quite likely also that he touched upon the financial

situation of Russia and the urgent necessity of placing a loan on the international market to liquidate the war. Perhaps he also spoke about his recent short stay in Paris and the difficulties he expected to meet with in the accomplishment of his object.

But from such remarks it is a far cry to the confidences which Prince Bülow reported to his Sovereign and which were far from corresponding to the true state of affairs at the time Count Witte passed through Germany on his way back from his triumphant stay in Portsmouth.

Two weeks after this episode the French bankers arrived in St. Petersburg and Witte had a totally different vein of conversation for them. He never hinted at any discontent on the part of the French government and was not in the least troubled by the bankers' statements to the effect that they had great misgivings as to the possibility of concluding a loan and that they had come only because they did not wish to refuse to comply with Witte's wishes. It is not necessary to say that neither Rouvier nor Loubet had the slightest objection to this loan and placed no obstacles in the way of the bankers' trip to Russia when they had been apprised of this plan.

Now let me resume the interrupted tale of how the events of the day were unfolding. After my first meeting with Witte our meetings grew less and less frequent. Witte often tried to avoid seeing me by excusing himself with his many engagements; nor was I anxious to see him. With every meeting it became increasingly evident that our relations were becoming more and more strained.

Then came the sessions of the special commission under the chairmanship of Count Solsky for the working out of a project for co-ordinating the work of the separate ministries. I learned from Count Solsky, who had shown me a note in the Tsar's own handwriting, that Witte had initiated the project, although I have never seen Witte's written report on this subject. The note said that the Tsar had noticed on many occasions that the ministers were not sufficiently co-ordinated in their work, that such a state of affairs could not be tolerated now that the State Duma was about to convene, and that therefore he charged Count Solsky to work out as soon as possible a project for unifying the work of the ministries and to submit it to him for his approval. The note also said that the Chairman of the Ministers' Committee had already drafted such a project which the Tsar considered quite adequate, and it mentioned the persons to be included in the commission, myself among them.

The sessions were held almost daily. From the first my position was a puzzle to me, and later it became insufferable. No sooner would I make an observation than Count Witte would answer it in a very unpardonable manner, something which none of us had heard in our assemblies for a long time, especially since our small group was composed of persons who were so well known to each other and had worked together so long. The first symptoms of this amazing irritation completely perplexed the tactful and courteous Count Solsky. He was afraid that I would flare up and say something to Witte that would irritate him. Accordingly, after the first session he asked me to remain for a few minutes, thanked me for my self-control, and expressed his astonishment at Witte's objections, which puzzled everybody. I told him everything that had taken place between Witte and me since his return; I mentioned the conversation with Shipov and, availing myself of our long friendship, asked his permission, on the first occasion when such conduct was repeated, to address him as chairman with a request to allow me to withdraw from the commission and to report to the Tsar that I was forced to do so because of the utter impossibility of continuing my work in this atmosphere of hostile irritation created by Count Witte. Solsky asked me not to do it, and promised to talk to Witte in private and to prevail upon him to discontinue his unjust attacks on me. I do not know whether or not he kept his promise, but if he did it had no practical results.

At the next session the clash assumed an even more indecorous character. I well remember the cause of it. Count Witte's project contained one clause providing that all reports of ministers to the Tsar should be made in the presence of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council and that every one of these reports should be previously examined and approved by the Chairman.

Before the session I had been approached by Ermolov (8), who had declared that he would very vigorously oppose this clause and wanted to know if I would join him. E. V. Frisch (9), who always endeavored to smooth out Witte's rashness and to draw compromises out of differences of opinion, was also of the opinion that the clause was impossible. Count Solsky believed that its provisions constituted a most hazardous innovation and hoped to be able to persuade Witte not to insist upon it. I also remember that he told Frisch that this clause would introduce into our legislature the unheard-of institution of a "Grand Vizier," to which, he was confident, the Emperor would not agree. To me he said: "This, Vladimir Nikolaevich, is a very

propitious time for you to object to Count Witte, for you will not be in the minority." I said that I was firmly resolved to object and that I was prepared; my only request was that I be protected from attacks of a personal nature which were sure to come. I promised that I would be sure not to provoke such attacks by the manner in which I made my objection.

What actually happened was but a repetition of an event quite common in our meetings. Ermolov raised very weak objections, only to be subdued by Witte's first rebuke. He declared, however, that he would vote against the measure. Frisch kept his promise and answered Witte's sharp address with weighty arguments which irritated Witte all the more. Struggling for self-control, Witte said that he would express his point of view after the others had spoken, adding, "I am sure that the rest of the members of the commission will say enough; the Minister of Finance alone will have a great deal to say."

By way of introduction I touched briefly upon those arguments which had not been advanced by the other speakers. Meanwhile Witte could not even keep his seat; he got up, paced the room, picked up and threw aside one cigarette after another, sat down again, and, when Count Solsky invited him to express his views, began to contradict the preceding speeches in an almost hysterical tone of voice, paying particular attention to me. He said that he had heard many silly things in his life, but those expressed by the Minister of Finance were the grossest of all; he added that he was sorry that no stenographic reports of these sessions were taken so that a record of this historic session might be left to posterity.

Count Solsky, always reserved, and a constant supporter of Witte, could control himself no longer, and asked me to leave Witte's insulting sally unanswered. He said: "I believe that many of those present share the point of view which you have expressed not only in a reserved manner but also very correctly as to substance, since it champions the preservation of the independence of all ministers during their reports to the Tsar; the unity of governmental action would be assured if all ministers were obliged to carry through the Ministers' Council the projects upon which they are to report, provided these projects are of general importance and touch upon another ministry's sphere of activity." Witte did not answer; he only muttered: "Write what you will; as for myself I know what I shall do if I have the pleasure of being Chairman of the future Ministers' Council—I shall

have ministers of my own selection and shall not worry about their individual reports."

Those present exchanged glances. I did not answer Witte, but after the session I remained with Count Solsky for a few moments and told him that as soon as Witte was appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council—of which there could be no doubt—I was firmly resolved to tender my resignation. Solsky asked me not to do it, pointing out that Witte had been known to change his attitude over night, to pass from friendship to hostility as swiftly as from hostility to friendship.

However, Count Solsky's expectations were wrong. After that first clash, Count Witte and I continued to meet in the same strained atmosphere, and every new meeting made matters worse. Finally I refrained from answering Witte orally and instead always suggested that those clauses to which I objected be rewritten. Sometimes I was supported by other members of the commission, then again I was obliged to make concessions. Finally arguments with Witte came to an end and our relations assumed, even outwardly, such a form that everybody saw clearly that our ways had parted. I was firmly resolved to present my resignation directly after Witte's appointment as Chairman of the Ministers' Council. My decision was confirmed on the evening of October 18, when my relations with Witte became utterly impossible.

On the morning of that day the famous Manifesto of October 17 had been published. I had taken no part in its composition; I had even had no idea of its preparation, so secretly had it been carried on. Even those of Count Witte's personal friends who had not been working on it were not informed of it. Solsky, of course, knew of all the incidents which preceded the publication of the Manifesto but evidently was anxious not to let knowledge of the affair go farther than Witte intended; in my case, particularly, he had been bound to silence by Witte's open hostility to me.

On the day of the publication of the Manifesto I received an invitation from the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, D. F. Trepov, to come to his house that evening for a special meeting. The invitation did not state the subject to be discussed at the meeting, but in those troubled times conferences were not infrequent and this invitation was explained by the fact that with the streets teeming with riots it was much easier to get to the Bolshaia Morskaia where Trepov lived than to Witte's house on the Kamenno-Ostrovsky Prospekt. I no

longer recall who attended the meeting; the majority were members of the Ministry of the Interior. I remember clearly, however, that the Ministry of Justice was represented by the late I. G. Shcheglovitov (10); the Minister of Agriculture, A. S. Ermolov, was also present. Count Witte was chairman. He shook hands with me reluctantly, remarking that he was surprised to see that the Ministry of Finance had an interest in discussing the problem of political amnesty. I answered that I had been invited by General Trepov but would be only too glad if I could be freed from discussing a subject not connected directly with my ministry. Trepov and the rest objected energetically to my leaving, and Trepov announced that he had been directly instructed by the Tsar as to the composition of the conference and that I had been particularly mentioned. Thus I had to stay.

The draft of those articles of the Manifesto dealing with amnesty toward criminals had been hurriedly composed in the Ministry of Justice. Count Witte said immediately that in his estimation they were too "commonplace" and inadequate for the needs of the moment. He said that the right thing was to grant a general amnesty, especially to political prisoners, to return everyone from exile, to open the doors of the Schlüsselburg prison (11), and to show everyone who had been persecuted that old Russia was no more, that new Russia was born, and—I remember his words—"called everyone to take part in her new life and to build a new and bright future." Some of those present attempted to object, not to the idea of political pardon, since, according to Count Witte, it had been determined by the Emperor and was therefore not subject to argument, but to its general application and to its application to all convicts without exception, without taking into consideration what part of their prison term they had already served. There was especially strong objection to Witte's idea of opening the doors of Schlüsselburg and freeing all those who were incarcerated there, giving them the unqualified right to reside in the capital. All of us who were against this unprecedented unconditional pardon tried to insist that we must be careful in granting these favors, especially in view of the spreading revolutionary movement. But the more we insisted the more impatient and uncontrolled Witte became. When I added my arguments to those already made, there was no end to his wrath and the sharpness of his rejoinders. His voice was artificially restrained. He breathed heavily and with painful hoarseness, pounded his fist on the table, selected his most biting expressions in order to hurt me, and finally flung into my face a sentence which my

memory has preserved to this day: "With such ideas as professed by the Honorable Minister of Finance one can govern only Zulus, and I shall suggest to His Majesty that he be selected for the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council; but if this cross falls to my lot I shall beg the Emperor to free me from the co-operation of such statesmen." All present exchanged glances. I made no answer. The project of the amnesty was approved in nearly the same form as Count Witte had suggested, the only change being that those who had served a term in jail would not be granted the right to reside in the capital. Then we parted.

Before leaving General Trepov's house I found Count Witte and, referring to his recent words, made the following statement, which I wrote down on arriving home and which I still have: "Allow me to inform you that all that has taken place between us since your return from America has long since convinced me that with the unification of the activities of the government in your person, as future Chairman of the Ministers' Council, there will be no room for me in the new cabinet. Your demonstration of this evening, made in such an insulting manner, gives me the right, as soon as you are appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council, to beg the Emperor to spare you the pain of petitioning His Majesty to free you of such a collaborator; I shall tender my resignation as Minister of Finance of my own free will."

Witte's answer shocked me with its cynicism: "I have had not the slightest doubt of this. There is no pleasure in being minister when one is confronted with danger at every turn. It is so much more agreeable to occupy a quiet chair in the State Council, to make idle speeches and plot against ministers." Hereupon we parted without shaking hands and did not speak again up to the time of my retirement from the ministry exactly one week later.

In this tense atmosphere I had to conduct negotiations with the French bankers. These negotiations went on amid most depressing circumstances. With every new day the city took on a more menacing aspect. The visiting bankers, who had known St. Petersburg under ordinary circumstances, were at a loss to understand what was happening before their very eyes. They had come by train, but on the way the train had been stopped not only at stations but even in open country, and they did not know to what circumstances these stops were to be ascribed. Instead of arriving in the morning, according to schedule, the bankers had arrived late in the afternoon. Hardly had

they had time to make themselves comfortable in the Hotel d'Europe when the electric lights went out and they were obliged to spend the first night thus inconvenienced. They even considered returning to France the next morning, but having reached me by telephone, which was not affected by the strike at that time, they considered themselves obligated to me and came to my house as had been agreed. Netzlin, the head of the mission, came half an hour ahead of the others. He said that he had visited the Embassy, had seen a few French journalists, and had come to the conclusion that the revolutionary movement had already reached its peak and would probably subside, especially under the influence of the forthcoming manifesto "granting political freedom," which, in everybody's opinion, was bound to have very beneficial results. Therefore he was eager to conduct all negotiations as speedily as possible, not to delay over details, and to hasten their return to Paris so as to effect the loan as soon as the general expectation of restored order was fulfilled. He said, however, that the state of mind of his companions was altogether different. Uhlman, the representative of Le Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, had been ready to leave that morning, so much was he impressed by the forbidding aspect of St. Petersburg; but the others had opposed such a move. M. Bonson, representative of the Crédit Lyonnais, had argued that the unfortunate circumstance might even be advantageous to the French holders of Russian commercial papers, as the Minister of Finance would be more amenable. I did not consider myself in a position to dissuade M. Netzlin. I could not tell him of the growing riot at Moscow, news of which came in rather slowly, nor of the events in the Baltic states, nor of the threatening news from Siberia, nor, finally, that I had decided to resign as Minister of Finance. I only supported him in his resolve to lose little time in negotiations, to avoid the necessity of having me fight the extreme pretensions of his colleagues, and to let our agreement be drawn as usual, allowing a somewhat longer period between our signing the conditions of the loan and our final obligation actually to effect the loan, since the French market should naturally be allowed a longer than customary time to float the loan.

Our first official meeting went off very smoothly, none of the bankers questioned the possibility of working out the conditions of the loan, no one objected to the type of the loan—5 per cent interest—no one objected to the amount of the loan—up to six hundred million francs—and all expressed their regrets that circumstances did

not permit the conclusion of a larger loan, say of twelve hundred million francs, of which Witte had spoken early in August. The most difficult details, the face value of the loan and the amount of the bankers' commission, we postponed until the second day. Then, when the visitors announced that they had to have one more day for consultation among themselves, we postponed it till the third day.

Our next meeting was of an altogether different character. Netzlin again arrived before the others and told me, as a great secret, that he had seen Count Witte, who had advised him to break off negotiations as soon as possible under any pretext, and to go home, warning him that in a few days railway transportation would be discontinued. Witte had also told him that I would soon leave the ministry and would be succeeded by a person who would follow implicitly his own instructions, so that he, Witte, would be the actual head of the Finance Ministry. Witte had added that in a few days he would take the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council but would agree to do so only on condition that he be allowed to be the actual leader not only of the domestic but also of the foreign policies of Russia.

I admitted that I was not as well informed as Count Witte on domestic conditions in Russia and on the extent of the revolutionary movement. I admitted also that I was leaving the ministry because of radical differences with Count Witte but that I had no information as to my successor. I had no doubt, however, that it would be a person entirely without a will of his own, since Witte's break with me had no other reason than that he disliked my independence. I added that I did not imagine that this circumstance would influence the progress of our negotiations, since in any event they would reach Witte through the Finance Committee. I therefore begged Netzlin to carry through the matter to the end as had been planned at our first meeting. He promised to do his best but did not wish to conceal the fact that the spirits of his companions had fallen markedly during the day, so that no one except Bonson considered seriously the possibility of carrying the matter through.

And it actually happened so. We did not break up until midnight. We argued about details and discussed various subtleties in the wording of the contract, but everybody perceived the futility of our efforts. The surroundings were very depressing: we were wrapped in darkness; the lights were out; the front door was guarded by a double patrol of police, at the insistence of Governor-General Trepov, under the escort of which the French visitors returned to

the Hotel d'Europe. We parted with the understanding that the following morning M. Jules-Jacques, a member of this delegation, an expert in drawing up contracts, and an employee of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, would prepare the first draft of the contract. We held no more meetings.

The next morning Netzlin telephoned me that he was exhausted and asked that the meeting be postponed till the following day. When the following day arrived I received a letter from him from the Hotel d'Europe announcing that they had succeeded in chartering a Finnish steamship, on board of which they had hurriedly left Russia.

This was the sad end of this period of negotiations for a loan. Later Count Witte repeated many times to those who felt like listening that I had been unsuccessful in my attempts to make the bankers accept our terms and that only my unbounded stubbornness and still greater self-assurance had prevented me from addressing myself to him for help which he would have gladly given me and by which the scandal of having the bankers leave empty-handed would have been avoided.

CHAPTER VII

OCTOBER 1905—*Continued*

Early in the morning of October 19, as I was getting ready to go to the Lyceum to attend a mass on the occasion of its traditional anniversary celebration, my secretary, L. F. Dorliac, called on me and asked me if I knew the contents of the Sovereign's rescript to Count Witte on the occasion of his appointment as Chairman of the Minister's Council. He added that the project of the institution of a Council to replace the Ministers' Committee had already been published in the *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik* (1) and would be issued the next day, the 20th. When I asked how he had learned of these documents, he answered in the most matter of fact way that, as I was no doubt aware, they had been prepared in the office of the Ministry of Finance under the supervision of its director, A. I. Putilov. As a matter of fact, I was totally unaware of it. Putilov had not mentioned the matter to me, no doubt according to Witte's instructions, as on that other occasion when the Department of Railways had been transferred from the Ministry of Finance to that of Commerce and Industry.*

On Thursday morning, October 20, the expected statute on the Ministers' Council appeared and the rescript on Witte's appointment as Chairman. The rescript remarked on the necessity of complete solidarity among the ministers and expressed the Emperor's assurance that this would be accomplished by Witte. I left immediately for Peterhof with my letter of resignation. On my arrival I reported to the Emperor on all current matters, and when I had finished I handed him the last document in my brief case with the request that he read it personally. He took the paper, but before reading it he said calmly: "This must be your request for resignation? I have been expecting it because I have heard from all sides of your strained

* This was the first of the measures carried through by Witte in violation of existing law by means of a report to the Emperor. Four months later Witte made another report asking that the Department of Railways be returned to the Ministry of Finance, admitting that the change had been made without due consideration.

relations with Count Witte. I am at a loss to understand what could have been the beginning of this as, prior to his departure for America, Witte could not find words strong enough to praise you.

"I also know that the reason for this change does not lie in you, but I fully perceive how difficult it would be for you to work as peacefully now as you have done heretofore. You know how hard it is for me to part with you, so accustomed have I grown to you and so fond of you. However, I will not let you go, for I have an opportunity of giving you a very high appointment and so will always avail myself of your knowledge and your devotion to myself. I have decided to appoint you to the vacant post of Chairman of the Department of Economy of the State Council which has been occupied by Count Solsky. I know that he will be most gratified to hear of this. Go to see him and tell him to send me tomorrow the ukase on your appointment." The Emperor arose, embraced and kissed me, and when I began to thank him for such exceptional graciousness he embraced me once more and said: "It is not for you to thank me but for me to thank you. I shall never forget your work during the war and I understand full well the service you rendered to Russia in preserving our financial stability despite our military defeats. I am sure that I am not the only one who understands this. This realization of your merit is more common abroad than here, but the time will come when you will be just as fully appreciated at home."

The Emperor asked me to see the Empress, as she was just as fully aware of the cause of my retirement as he was and would be glad to hear of my new high post. I found the Empress in her side drawing-room, a long narrow room facing St. Petersburg. The piercing autumn chill was scarcely affected by the blazing fire in the grate. When I had explained the reasons for my retirement, she said that she was not surprised, that "when views changed (*quand les idées sont devenues toutes autres*) one could not ask people to submit to such changes and alter their own views accordingly." After a few more words I departed, uncertain whether the Empress was pleased or sorry at my retirement or whether, in the face of the trying conditions of the time, she was altogether indifferent.

From Peterhof I went directly to the Imperial Secretary, Baron Uxkull, who expressed his pleasure at the Emperor's orders and promised to place the ukase of my appointment before Count Solsky within an hour. Baron Uxkull asked me to see Solsky, and then

added anxiously, "I hope Count Witte does not get wind of this before the ukase is signed." Count Solsky also heard my news with unaffected joy but observed that it would be necessary for him to conciliate an adversary whose objection to my appointment would be far more severe than those of the members of the Department of Economy who were my seniors. He promised to see Witte at once and endeavor to persuade him not to oppose the wishes of the Emperor.

That evening I again attended a conference at General Trepov's on the subject of political amnesties. I took no part in the debates, and only after the adjournment did I tell Count Witte that I had tendered my resignation to the Tsar that morning and had received his consent. Witte did not answer, and we parted in silence.

The next morning, Friday the 21st, Baron Uxkull telephoned to say that after Count Solsky's conversation with Count Witte the previous day the latter had decided to send a letter to the Tsar requesting him to cancel my appointment out of respect for deserving members of the State Council who had greater rights than I to be appointed Chairman of the Department of Economy. Witte had promised to inform Baron Uxkull of the Tsar's answer as soon as it was received.

Late that evening Baron Uxkull telephoned that Witte had received his letter back from the Emperor with the Tsar's note that he saw no reason for changing his decision. The Baron said that Witte was in a rage and had ordered him, Uxkull, the very next morning to petition the Tsar to receive him on pressing and urgent matters.

On Saturday, October 22, Uxkull received notice by telegraph that the Tsar would receive him on Monday morning and that he was going to communicate the results of his report to me directly after his return. In fact, he reached my house about 2:00 P.M. directly from the pier. He said that he had been asked to state every reason why I should not be appointed, that he had done so, mostly repeating someone's else words, that the Tsar had listened quietly and then said: "Tell Count Solsky that I have given the matter serious consideration in appointing Kokovtsov to a post which he richly deserves and that I cannot understand why this appointment displeases Count Witte so much."

That same day Witte decided to write a special report to the Tsar. He wrote it in his own hand, showed it to Count Solsky, who made no changes in it despite its disrespectful tone, and early in the

morning dispatched it by special messenger to Peterhof. On Tuesday afternoon, October 25, the report was returned to Count Sòlsky and with it was a signed ukase appointing me merely a member of the State Council, accompanied by a rescript to me, very flattering in tone. The next day I received from Baron Uxkull a copy of Witte's curious report. This is its exact text:

"The Chairman of the State Council, State Secretary Count Solsky, has apprised me of Your Imperial Majesty's decision to appoint former Minister of Finance, State Secretary Kokovtsov, to the post of Chairman of the Department of Economy. I believe it my duty to bring to the attention of Your Imperial Majesty the fact that both the official status and the personal character of State Secretary Kokovtsov make such an appointment highly undesirable. If Your Majesty decides to leave this appointment in force, neither myself nor my colleagues of the Ministers' Council would find it possible to attend the sessions of the Department of Economy and would be obliged to resort to sending assistants or other members of the ministries. Yet because of the important character of the work of the Department of State Economy prior to the opening of the State Duma, estrangement of the ministers from such an important institution could hardly be permitted. In view of the above and in order to prevent the evident harm to the administration which this event would entail, I believe it my duty to apprise Your Imperial Majesty of the above circumstances."

On Friday, October 28, the day of my usual report, the Tsar received me at his little palace at Alexandria to bid me farewell. I had hardly entered his study when the Tsar, holding in his hand the ukase of my appointment as Chairman of the Department of Economy with his own signature torn through, said to me: "Probably you are not aware of the pain I have suffered in destroying my signature on a ukase written at my special direction and which expressed my own wish. My late father had always told me not to change my signature unless I saw that I had acted rashly and without due consideration. As regards your appointment I was sure that I was acting not only justly but also for the best interests of the state, and yet I have been forced to renounce my decision and to destroy my signature. I shall never forget this, especially since I can see clearly now that there is open hostility toward you and even personal caprice. You must not judge me too severely, and I am sure you understand the state of my feelings." I hastened to assure

the Tsar that I understood in what a difficult position he had been placed by Count Witte's insistence and that I was deeply grateful to him for the decision he had taken, as it gave me a way out of a very painful situation—the necessity of studying the business of the Department of Economy in the absence of ministers and, what was even worse, premeditated hostile treatment at the hands of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council. I said: "This would have undermined my prestige in the State Council and I should have been left no choice but to ask you, Sire, after the very first clash, to let me discontinue my duties, since they would not have furthered the good of the work." The Tsar thanked me warmly, embraced me, and begged me to remember that it would give him sincere pleasure, in case of necessity, to help me and mine. His last words on this subject were, "Remember, Vladimir Nikolaevich, that the doors of this study are always open to you any time you need to come."

This was the end of the first period of my service as Minister of Finance.

I reproduce here the particulars of the events which I experienced at that time not only because they restore the picture of all I passed through but also because in the memoirs of Count Witte, now so well known, there is not a single word about them. Witte's memoirs merely state that my retirement was not necessary and was due to no external cause. They make it seem as if nothing whatever had happened between Count Witte and me, as if he had not forced me to resign, as if he had not assumed the peculiar rôle described here.

Nor did he say one word about the personal clashes with me and the disagreeable episode concerning my appointment as chairman of the Department of State Economy. Nor did he mention his personal letter to the Tsar protesting my appointment. My story serves to expose the lack of veracity and exactness of his memoirs.

The experiences of that period during which I clashed with Count Witte and my forced retirement from the ministry to which I had become so attached during the year and a half of my work there made a painful impression on me. I was in a state of "nerves," suffered from insomnia, and was utterly depressed. To me the future seemed dark and gloomy, especially since I understood full well that the character of the work in the State Council would not give me any moral satisfaction and would not lessen the tediousness of inactivity. Particularly trying were the many assertions of my recent colleagues, who told me how hard it was for them to part with

me and how much they would miss our clearly defined relations, to which they had become accustomed during our hard work together.

Even today, many years later, as I recall my state of mind at that time I am not ashamed to confess that I was deeply grieved and that never again did I feel a pain so sharp as that which I suffered on leaving the Ministry of Finance for the first time. I was eager to leave as speedily as possible the ministry where I suffered most, where everything reminded me of the past, and where at every step I met my recent collaborators, who told me frankly how hard it was for them to work with my successor, a man who did not answer questions definitely and thus left his subordinates puzzled as to what they had to do. I. P. Shipov never asked me any questions, but he was most considerate in his personal relations with me and insisted that I should not move from the ministry building, as he did not intend to occupy the official quarters and as he felt definitely that he would not be able to cope with the work and that I should be obliged to return to my former post.

Part II

**Financial Problems and Loan Negotiations,
1905–1906**

CHAPTER VIII

NOVEMBER 1905—JANUARY 1906

November of 1905 passed rather uneventfully. I attended faithfully all the sessions of the Department of State Economy, but they were unusually dull budget meetings. Witte seldom attended them. Shipov was courteous and taciturn, and made no objections to any of the representatives of other ministries, who, in their turn, seemed to constitute a unified government, evidently having come to some understanding outside the sessions of the Department.

The Finance Committee, of which I was still a member, met often, but in an atmosphere unlike that of the past. A nervous tension had supplanted the customary unhurried calm, the result of the fact that the financial conditions of the country had suffered a marked change for the worse. With every new session the reports made by Shipov and Timashev (from the State Bank) became gloomier. Revenues came in very poorly because of the ever-increasing revolutionary movement and the number of strikes. Savings banks were systematically assailed by depositors, and there were demands, unheard of up to that time, for payment of deposits in gold. Revolutionary propaganda was doing its pernicious work on state credit and money circulation. Our financial situation, which so recently had seemed so secure and had withstood with honor the trials of war-time, began to grow more and more unstable. The State Bank was forced to issue a steady supply of new currency, and presently it reached the limit set by law for such issue. The Minister of Finance, evidently with the knowledge of the Chairman of the Council, introduced a suggestion to stop payment in gold and proposed a project of a ukase to the Senate (1) to that effect. This project was submitted for consideration in the last days of November unaccompanied by any explanations except a simple statement of fact.

Before opening the debates, Count Solsky invited me to his house and asked me to express my frank opinion as to what measures should be taken to prevent the adoption of the proposed measure.

He felt that, since we had coped successfully with our military defeats without going off the gold standard, the present proposal to abandon that standard was unacceptable. I answered that my position in the Finance Committee was a peculiarly delicate one, as past experience had shown me that no matter what I might say I should provoke Count Witte to rudeness and all my suggestions were certain to be rejected; nor did I think that Shipov dared oppose Witte in any way. Moreover, the position of the Finance Committee was such that it could not object to the suggestions of the Chairman of the Council, who alone controlled our internal policies. Finally, the key to the approaching financial catastrophe lay in knowing whether or not the government would be able to control the revolutionary movement. If the Moscow riots (2) were suppressed—and there was every indication that they would be—to my way of thinking the movement could be suppressed in other parts of the Empire also. In that case it would be senseless to ruin what had been preserved during the war; rather, it would be better to play for time, to seek help in reinforcing our gold reserve, and not to fear a temporary increase in paper currency. If, however, the government saw no way of speedily suppressing the movement, there would be no alternative but to inflate the currency, to preserve our gold reserve, and to state frankly in a ukase that we had stopped making payments in gold but all foreign payments would remain unchanged and payment in gold would be resumed at home as soon as the uprisings had been suppressed and regular railroad communications restored.

Solsky asked me to regard our conversation as confidential. On December 3, I received a notice of a new session of the Finance Committee.

Shipov opened this session with a report made in the most pessimistic vein. According to him, during the last week alone, 200,000,000 rubles of gold had been withdrawn from the vaults of the State Bank. Over half of the branches of the State Bank had not presented their usual statements for September and were demanding a reinforcement of paper currency and an increase of the military guard for the treasury in case we officially announced the cessation of payment in gold. It was also pointed out that the gold reserve on hand in these branches was so small that it would last only a few days. The Minister of Finance ended his report by demanding categorically that we discontinue payment in gold, and added that the Minister of War had promised to increase the number of troops detailed to guard

the banks in gubernia centers only, because he had no men for the uyezds.

Witte was silent and depressed and said only that he was not against the proposed measure, although he realized its sad consequences.

Count Solsky turned the discussion to the desirability of learning the real internal conditions; he elaborated upon the idea of the connection between them and the currency and insisted especially on the harm that would result from inflating the currency. Not receiving a direct response to his remarks from Witte he suggested that the session adjourn until the next day in order that the Minister of the Interior, P. N. Durnovo (3), might be invited to express his opinion. As if awakening from a dream, Witte said very sharply: "I am responsible for the government and I do not see any need for inviting anyone. I would like to say, however, that we have almost suppressed the risings in Moscow, and Durnovo assures me that we shall be completely successful everywhere if I let him do as he sees fit; yet one cannot govern with bullets alone."

This remark gave Count Solsky more courage to stand up for his point of view, which was in harmony with what I had said to him, namely, the undesirability of deciding the matter on the spot. He insisted that we should think it over calmly in order to have time to see what effect the suppression of the Moscow revolt would have upon other parts of the Empire which were engulfed by the revolution. Nearly all the members of the Committee supported Count Solsky—Frisch, Ivashchenkov (4), and Cherevansky, in particular. I was silent for a long time, waiting for a chance to state my views after the others had finished. Suddenly Count Witte, who was seated opposite me, pushed a note across the table toward me. To my amazement the note read: "You see what horrors surround us; I am utterly exhausted and lonely, my nerves are in shreds, and my head refuses to work. You are rested, your head is clear; do help us, take the matter into your hands."

I answered him immediately in a penciled note (I kept them both for a long time) that I did not see what help I could render or in what way I could be useful, since I had been out of touch with all such work for more than a month and did not even know the plan of the Minister of Finance regarding the legally permissible issue of paper. Witte did not answer me directly, but he now spoke with more composure. He said that perhaps it would be possible to wait

until domestic conditions were brighter before adopting such an important decision. Yet this could be accomplished only if the Finance Committee gave him more active support in this difficult time, because he absolutely did not have time to attend to everything in person. Moreover, the Minister of Finance and the Manager of the State Bank were asking for help and he, Witte, was too pressed for time to see them often enough. He then suggested that the Finance Committee entrust me with this task, speaking in most flattering terms of my experience, knowledge, and prestige among the members of the ministry. His suggestion was warmly supported by the other members of the Committee, except Shidlovsky, who accepted it indifferently. I tried to refuse, pointing out that an outsider should not be placed in charge of the work of a ministry at such a critical moment. Moreover, I was really very eager to avoid placing myself in a delicate situation which did not promise any practical results. Only because of the special insistence of Count Solsky and Frisch did I agree to go over the figures of the Minister of Finance, to examine the statements of the Department of the Treasury in particular, and to report on my findings as soon as possible. I asked if I might have as my collaborator P. K. Schwanebach, a man entirely free from other work, so that my conclusions would be free from any personal bias. On this we parted, having decided that in six days—on December 9—I should submit all I could accomplish in that short time.

Next morning Shipov and Timashev visited me at my house on Sergievskaja. They both seemed to be perfectly satisfied with the decision that had been made. Shipov was satisfied because, as he himself said, it freed him of all responsibility for a harmful measure; and Timashev, who stayed a few minutes after Shipov had left, was satisfied because "now there is someone with whom to talk and from whom to get advice. Shipov did nothing independently but always went to see the Chairman of the Council, stayed there for hours waiting to be received, and then returned empty-handed."

I learned the next day in an interview with the Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, that the Moscow riot had actually been suppressed, and the minister was confident that there would be no trouble in suppressing the disturbances in other places, "provided" he said, "Witte pays no heed to the tales of our public men (5) and stops fighting the revolution with newspaper articles and endless conferences with idle prattlers."

My examination of the work of the Treasury Department and the State Bank showed me that during the last month and a half practically no reports had been received, owing to the postal and railway strike, and that the conclusions as to our currency; though possibly correct, had been made for all of Russia on the basis of data received from only a few provincial boards of finance. We concluded, therefore, that it would be unreasonable to draw conclusions for the entire territory from conditions in those localities which were touched by panic and revolt. One would have to wait until the skies cleared and in the meantime supply with bank notes those localities that could be reached and provide guards where the danger was more pronounced. We also found out that in the east there was great need of money for the demobilization of troops. We learned also that the paymasters of other troops situated close at hand had at their personal disposal large surplus appropriations which for some reason they were reluctant to return to the local treasuries. All this was, to be sure, far from being an exhaustive review; it was quite impossible to get a complete report in the short six-day period. But the general conclusion—to wait a while before making a definite decision—was apparently sound; the State Bank, as well as the Department of the Treasury, willingly added their approval. Shipov continued personally to think that it would be preferable to cease payment in gold and to increase the issue of paper currency, but he characteristically avoided expressing his point of view definitely, permitting the Chairman of the Council or the Chairman of the Finance Committee to decide as they wished and expressing his perfect willingness to comply with their decision.

On Friday, December 9, the Finance Committee met. I reported on the findings of our preliminary investigation, and Schwanebach supported my arguments. Shipov continued to defend his point of view, and rightly so. In concluding the discussion I repeated my opinion that we should not be in a hurry to decide on the matter of the gold standard but should try in the meantime to replenish our gold reserve as a foundation of our currency by effecting a small foreign loan. This would permit us to increase the issue of paper currency without overstepping the limits of our strict law of issue and would enable us to gain time in which to learn whether or not the government would be able to suppress the revolutionary movement. I said also that a foreign loan was necessary because of the liquidation of the war, which would be sure to leave certain uncanceled

debts. A small loan at that time, therefore, would serve a twofold purpose: it would prevent inflation, that is, it would preserve the foundations of our currency established at such cost; and it would also provide a certain sum as an advance installment of an inevitable and large liquidation loan.

My suggestion was warmly supported by the other members of the Finance Committee without exception. Even Shidlovsky joined the general vote without his usual qualifications. Witte called my idea "brilliant" and said immediately that no one but me would be able to carry out this plan, which at the present time was most difficult, as Europe was very much alarmed by our tribulations and would not be likely to meet us halfway without special efforts on our side. I tried to prove in every possible way that this was not my business as former minister but the business of the present minister exclusively. It was he who would have influence in foreign markets, especially since my prestige had been undermined, first by the unsuccessful negotiations of the beginning of October, and then by my resignation as minister and by my not being included in the newly formed cabinet. The others tried to dissuade me, and we adjourned without coming to any decision.

A few days later, and for the first time since our falling out, Witte telephoned me. He asked me whether I stood on ceremony and would demand that he come to see me or (as it was too risky for him to travel) he could ask me to visit him on a very urgent matter.

I agreed to see him, and on that same day visited his quarters in the guest apartments of the Winter Palace for the first time. He pleaded with me to go abroad in order to help Shipov, who had frankly declared that he would on no account undertake such a task and would rather tender his resignation than tackle a thing which he was certain he could not accomplish. Again I refused, explaining that by agreeing to do this I would give people a chance to say that I had arranged the whole business in order to go abroad at government expense and in case of failure I would be the one accused either of incompetence or, if the worst came, of a desire to wreck the scheme in order to satisfy an injured personal pride. To all my arguments Witte answered: "And suppose the Emperor wished it, would you still refuse?" I answered: "No, I cannot refuse the Emperor anything, but I shall tell him frankly how unjust it would be to impose such a delicate task upon a man who has suffered what I have suffered during these last three months."

The next evening, December 14, Witte again asked me to visit him. He said he had just returned from the Emperor and wished to convey His Majesty's wishes to me.

I found him in a most depressed mood. He was pacing his large study, which faced the Neva, and when I entered he extended his hand to me with the words: "May I speak to you as I used to in former times, as to a man I have always loved and esteemed, or can we have no more sincere conversations?" I answered: "I see no purpose in such a conversation; our ways have parted; you have inflicted upon me a series of insults which I have not deserved. I have stepped aside. I have harmed no one, nor do I harbor hard feelings against anyone; but as for our former relations, they cannot be restored." "So be it," answered Witte. "Yet I wish you knew in what a blind alley I find myself. There are moments when I am ready to commit suicide, and at such moments I recall all my past and perceive how deeply I have wronged you; even today I said to the Emperor how painful and hard these memories are for me. There may be a time, it may even be near, when I shall be released from my bondage; then I shall proclaim for everybody to hear how unjust I have been to you. But now, I beg of you, for my sake, do not refuse to comply with the Emperor's wishes, and do not think that if you do not succeed I shall ascribe your failure to your 'vengefulness'; and if you desire me to repeat in the presence of the Emperor that I repent of my unfairness, I shall be only too happy to do so." I begged him not to involve the Tsar in this unfortunate matter, especially since I was sure that His Majesty was perfectly aware of the truth. I also promised to be, as always, frank with the Tsar. On this we parted and I promised to come to Witte directly from Tsarskoe Selo.

The Emperor received me the next day, December 15, having notified me through his *valet de chambre* to come not in dress uniform but in ordinary dress as had been my custom when making my regular reports.

He received me with his habitual simplicity and kindness in the study I had visited so many times, and his first words were: "Here you are with me again and I am very glad it is so. As you see, I was right when I told you that we should see each other soon, and it so happens that those same persons who were most insistent upon your resignation were the first to beg me to arrange for you to help them and myself in these hard times. I know you will not refuse me, and

I am sure you will do everything I ask." I answered His Majesty that I had never dreamed of refusing to comply with his wishes, but that I was afraid my efforts would not be successful. I begged him not to think that in case I failed I had not applied myself to the task to the best of my ability and still less to suppose that I was getting even with someone to the detriment of the Emperor's interests. I repeated all the arguments I had stated before the Finance Committee, pointed out the difficulty of our position, my personal weakness in the eyes of foreign bankers as a man of no definite official position, and especially our precarious domestic position, which was being considered abroad to our great disadvantage.

The Emperor fell silent and then asked purely for information and not as a personal statement: "Do you think it might help matters if I entrusted you to apprise the French government of the particular importance I attach to the success of your undertaking and that I would be ready on my side to support the French government in whatever form it most desired at the present time? France's present position is by no means an easy one, and it is possible that our help might be particularly welcome to her."

I did not have time to make any reply, as His Majesty continued: "They are about to open the Algeiras conference (6). I believe that the French government might find my support very useful. This would, of course, be expressed very clearly and in addition to the usual statement of our ministry and our ambassador."

I promised to make use of this idea if the course of events should necessitate it, and once more assured the Emperor that I should do all in my power, but asked him not to judge me too severely if I should fail. In dismissing me the Tsar said: "I find your successor very agreeable; he must be a fine man. But I cannot get used to his manner of reporting: he tries to explain every little detail and as soon as I do not agree with a suggestion he abandons it and adopts my idea, although I sometimes express it quite casually just to hear his opinion."

Two days later I set out in company with my secretary, L. F. Dorliac, and we arrived in Paris on New Year's Eve, new style. We were met by our financial agent, Raffalovich (7), and the representative of the Russian group, Netzlin, who conducted us to the apartment prepared for me. It was a tiny place on the lower floor of the Hotel Bristol on the Place Vendôme, where later the American bank, the Banker's Trust Company, was installed until 1933.

Netzlin was in a most depressed mood, and announced that representatives of all banks of the Russian group had received most unfavorably Count Witte's communication as to the purpose of my visit, which had come through the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. He said that they did not trust newspaper reports about the liquidation of the Moscow riots and were sure they would flare up anew, an opinion which was being loudly affirmed by the Russian revolutionary circles abroad. According to Netzlin, only the French government could prevail upon the representatives of the banks to change their decision, and this only if the French government were to give the banks moral assurance that they would not lose their money.

The next day I was visited by the eighty-year-old head of the Crédit Lyonnais, M. Maseras, who arrived in company with M. Fabre-Luce and Baron Brincart, the so-called "two sons-in-law" of the late M. Germain, founder of the Crédit Lyonnais. At that time all business calls of the Crédit Lyonnais were made by this triumvirate, as M. Maseras was very old, though still unwilling to let the management slip out of his hands, and the "sons-in-law" saw to it that their principal did not make any mistakes in the name of the bank.

My conversation with M. Maseras was a very disconcerting one. Having been prepared, evidently, by preceding conferences and the instructions of his companions, he did not give me a chance to explain, but tried to prove that Russia ought not to negotiate any foreign loans in order to keep on the gold standard. He said that only a short while ago he had heard the opinion of such an eminent scholar as the academician Leroy-Beaulieu (8), who had criticized me sharply as Minister of Finance for my policy of preserving the gold standard during the war. M. Maseras argued that the thing to do now was to take advantage of the revolutionary movement in order to rectify the mistake by inflating the currency. Baron Brincart was silent, and Fabre-Luce supported his chief's point of view, endeavoring to prove that Russia would not suffer from such a course and could return to the gold standard as soon as circumstances might warrant.

I spent much time dissuading them, repeating elementary truths to the effect that since Russia had avoided the financial catastrophe of disrupting her monetary system during the war it was unreasonable that she should fail now under the influence of local revolution-

ary riots, which, moreover, were very nearly suppressed. I showed them a telegram which I had received from the Minister of Finance saying that Moscow was definitely pacified and that the movement was abating. I tried to make them see that they would be the first to suffer the consequences of their advice, as our securities would depreciate and holders of Russian bonds would lose more than anyone else, and that after nearly ten years of monetary stability there would arise the same financial anarchy which had reigned in Russia prior to 1897. All my arguments were of no avail. Maseras went so far as to argue most earnestly that Russia's abandonment of the gold standard would have no effect whatever upon foreign markets, as, after all, Russia would pay her foreign obligations in gold. When I asked where Russia would get this gold after disorganizing her monetary system and what country would invest in an unstable paper currency, I received no answer. I saw clearly that all my arguments were useless, as I was confronted by a decision previously adopted.

Raffalovich, who was present during this conversation, agreed with me that I should not expect any favorable results from my conferences with the bankers. He suggested that I should try to find support in the government, which would insist simply that the bankers comply with our demands, especially if I were to ask not for a large consolidation loan but for a comparatively small and short-term loan sufficient to prevent inflation for a brief time until our domestic troubles were ended and times were more propitious for negotiating a long-term liquidation loan. I told Raffalovich that I thought it would be simplest not to invent anything new, but to suggest that the bankers and the government do the same thing that had been done a year previously in the German market, namely, float a loan of not more than 200 million rubles, or 500 million francs, in the form of short-term obligations due in a year or two, at a slightly increased rate of interest, say 5½ per cent, and with a modest bankers' commission.

Raffalovich believed that this scheme was reasonable enough, but expressed his doubts as to the amount of such a short-term loan. He suggested that I limit myself to a lower figure if possible, just enough to satisfy our domestic needs. Before we parted, Raffalovich promised to arrange an audience with Rouvier, President of the Ministers' Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as soon as possible. He said that Rouvier had great influence with the bankers

and whatever he found reasonable was sure to be adopted without any argument.

At that time our ambassador to France, Nelidov, was absent from Paris. He was at the Riviera and asked me by telegram if I wanted him to come back immediately or if he might stay there a few days more, as he was not well. Raffalovich assured me that he would arrange the meeting immediately. Therefore I telegraphed our ambassador not to hurry his return, promising to keep him posted as to the progress of our work. The next day Raffalovich notified me that Rouvier would receive me at five that afternoon. It was my first visit to the splendid building on the Quai d'Orsay which later I visited so often. At first they did not wish to admit me, saying that the President of the Council had gone hunting and would not be at the ministry that day. I waited until seven and was just going to leave when they showed me into the study, where I found myself face to face with a heavy-set person of enormous stature, unfriendly face, and slow-moving, drowsy speech, and dressed in hunting clothes.

He invited me to explain the purpose of my visit to Paris, as the communication from our ambassador had stated only the fact of my arrival and not its purpose. He added that as former Minister of Finance, he, Rouvier, had followed with interest my activity during the war, and said that France would not have done as Russia had done but would have inflated the currency the day war was declared. He pointed to a safe in the corner of his study, saying that it contained a prepared decree on the discontinuance of gold payments signed by the President of the Republic and awaiting only to be countersigned by the President of the Ministers' Council and stamped with the date of its publication.

Then, after I had explained the purpose of my visit, he said: "I am sure that our banks will be most unwilling to comply with your desires, but I hope to be able to persuade them to help you, for there is no sense in having preserved the gold standard with so much difficulty and ability during this unsuccessful war only to abandon it under pressure of domestic troubles now almost suppressed. Our ambassador at St. Petersburg telegraphs every day that your government seems to have the upper hand. Do not be too exacting; be satisfied with a small sum in the form of a short-term loan; and later, when the public is persuaded that your government is stronger than the revolution, our banks and our public which are now

so panicky will consent gladly to a loan which you would be able to negotiate on terms much more favorable than you can now expect."

I repeated to Rouvier all I had said to Raffalovich on the preceding day. He said that he had nothing against it and would be ready to serve as intermediary between myself and the banks. He advised me, however, not to hold any conferences with them until he notified me that he had succeeded in bringing them around.

Then Rouvier told me literally this: "I shall be your solicitor, but you in your turn must help me in a matter which is troubling us very much. Soon we shall open the Algeciras conference. I am confident that Russia will support us, yet it is most important to us that we should be able to count not only upon her friendly attitude but also upon the certainty that her representative will not ask for instructions from his government at some important moment of the conference and will assume from the start a definite stand in our favor, so that the conference may understand clearly that we have the support of Russia and can rely on her word. I am speaking now as Minister President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I beg you to communicate this conversation to your Minister of Foreign Affairs and to ask him so to instruct your representative to the conference."

In answer to this I repeated to Rouvier what the Emperor had told me on his own initiative. I added that I could say frankly and officially that the Tsar's instructions on this matter had already been communicated to Count Lambsdorf and undoubtedly were already known to our representative at the conference, so that there was no need for any further inquiries on my part. I added that, if he insisted, I would have all I had said confirmed in a letter. Rouvier, however, was satisfied with my statement and added by way of a jest: "We have concluded a pact. You have already fulfilled your obligations, and now it is up to me. I am sure I shall fulfill mine as honorably as you have yours. I cannot promise to give you an answer tomorrow without fail, but the day after tomorrow you will no doubt hear from me. When you return home, report to His Majesty that the government of the Republic was deeply touched by his fine understanding of its situation and that it deeply appreciates his help, which, obviously, assures the preservation of peace, as we shall appear at the conference with a united front against our adversaries, who always count on our disagreement."

My audience with M. Loubet, the President of the Republic, was particularly gracious. I stayed with him nearly an hour, and I must say that both with him and with Rouvier I found an attitude directly opposite to that which I found on my first day with the bankers. M. Loubet fully recognized that it was necessary for us to remain on the gold standard and, without much ado, said that since Rouvier had promised to assist me he was confident of success. He said, too, that the readiness of our Emperor to help France at Algeciras would assure France of the preservation of peace and at the same time place France under obligation to assist her ally in every way to overcome the domestic troubles and financial crisis through which she was passing.

I telegraphed Count Witte immediately about my interview with Rouvier and my audience with the President of the Republic.

Rouvier's predictions were fulfilled to the letter.

The next day I saw no bankers. At our Embassy I repeated to Councillor Nekliudov (9) all my conversations with both Rouvier and the President, and asked him to communicate this to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately. I also said that it would not be necessary to call Nelidov from Nice, since Rouvier had taken the matter into his own hands, which was, of course, much more desirable than anything we and our ambassador could do. That evening Netzlin called on me. He said that both he personally and his bank were ready to comply with our wishes, but that the opposition of the Crédit Lyonnais, of Le Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, and of Hottinguer et Cie (usually so compliant) was such that it could be overcome only by the government. I did not tell him of my understanding with Rouvier. (1)

On the next day, the fifth day of my stay in Paris, the atmosphere changed.

In the morning Raffalovich told me that Netzlin, Maseras, Uhlman, Dorizon, and Baron Hottinguer had been invited to appear at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that Netzlin had asked him if he knew the reason for this invitation, though they all felt certain that it was directly connected with my visit. Raffalovich professed complete ignorance both of this matter and also as to whether or not I had had an interview with the President of the Ministers' Council on the previous day.

About three o'clock that afternoon Netzlin visited me again and told me frankly that in the morning Rouvier had told their group

that he wished them to agree to the object of my visit to Paris, especially since he was aware of the amount of the loan and the terms that would be satisfactory to me. Rouvier said also that it would be no risk for them to carry on the banks' books for one year such a tiny sum as 300 million francs of Russian state obligations; just as a year previously Germany, through the House of Mendelssohn, had agreed to carry such obligations for an even larger sum. This sum was either to be included in the next large French loan or to be paid by Russia out of her gold reserve in case circumstances would not permit the negotiation of a consolidation loan.

According to Netzlin the Crédit Lyonnais had attempted to object and to argue that the French banks did not need a gold standard in Russia. Rouvier brushed aside the objection, however, and rebuked the sponsor by saying that a stable monetary system in Russia was necessary to France and her government. His rebuke silenced all opposition, and the representatives of the group announced that they were ready to start negotiations with me provided I did not ask for too large a sum and did not, in view of the present uncertainty as to the outcome of the revolutionary movement in Russia, bind them to an explicit promise to conclude a large loan.

That same day we met in the offices of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, and at seven-thirty the agreement was reached in principle. The banks agreed to float or rather to keep on their accounts short-term obligations to the sum of 267 million francs, payable in one year. The interest rate was established at 5½ per cent, the same rate as for the preceding loan in Germany. Any profits from this loan were to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Russian government, although Russia promised, but not in writing, to leave the entire sum in France as payment on her obligations. I had a hard time fighting the bankers' cavilings and their constant vacillations over details. I reported every step either to Witte or to Shipov by telegraph, and received continued assurances of their entire support. One package of my telegrams and answers to them published in Volumes IV and X of the *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, though far from complete, speaks better than my personal memoirs could of the character of my negotiations and the difficulties I had to overcome. The bankers were satisfied with a commission that was very modest considering the conditions of the times, and we agreed to sign the contract on the next day with the stipulation that it

would become effective directly after my announcement that the Russian government approved it. This was done accordingly.

In the evening I sent a code telegram to Witte, and about noon the next day received from him a most flattering telegram congratulating me on my unexpected success and saying that he would immediately report to the Emperor and that undoubtedly His Majesty would be glad to thank me in person.

Different arguments as to the wording of the contract—a matter of secondary importance—required two additional days, and it was January 9 before I left Paris.

CHAPTER IX

JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1906

I arrived in Berlin on January 10 [n.s.] and stopped for two days to have a talk with Mendelssohn about deferring the redemption of a part of our short-term obligations of 1905 which fell due in the period January-March, 1906, and also to carry out the Emperor's orders to present myself before the German Kaiser and to explain to him the purpose of my visit to Paris in order to forestall false rumors concerning it. Before my departure the Tsar had told me that he was so worried about the strained relations between France and Germany as a result of the Tangier incident that he did not wish to aggravate them by creating the impression that I had been given some political commission. He therefore preferred that I should explain directly and frankly to the Kaiser the true purpose of my trip to Paris and what I had accomplished.

The Kaiser received me on the day of my arrival, but not very graciously. I had to wait for a considerable time for him to return from his walk in the Tiergarten. When I had explained to the Kaiser the mission on which the Tsar had sent me and, in connection with it, what I had been able to accomplish in Paris, he answered rather dryly and indifferently: "I am not much of a financier and do not quite understand why it is that Russia worries so much over her monetary system when she has so many other cares." Then he passed immediately to another question which evidently was constantly on his mind: "Please tell me, Mr. State Secretary, do you not consider it perfectly absurd that, in the general debacle and amid the constant upheavals which may easily sweep away all that is yet conservative in Europe, two monarchies have been unable to join forces so as to form one solid nucleus and protect their existence? Is it not downright folly that, instead of this, and over the head of monarchist Germany, monarchist Russia seeks for the support of republican France and always acts with her against her natural and historical ally?"

Naturally, I was obliged to evade giving a satisfactory answer to this question, and I told the Kaiser that he was better informed than

anyone of those events of the last twenty-five years which had changed the long-established relations between the two empires. Then I passed on to communicate some details of the events which had taken place before I left Russia. Emperor William was especially anxious to learn what I knew of Count Witte's policy respecting the labor problem and what measures he proposed to use to suppress the movement among the Russian workers, a movement really not Russian in spirit but presenting a clearly expressed universal phenomenon of the awakened desire of the socialists to declare merciless war on capital and the entire bourgeois régime. I had to answer that I was not informed of Count Witte's plans and could not answer his question. I said, however, that I believed that the purely revolutionary movement among the factory workers would calm down if the Russian government could suppress the Moscow uprising and quickly demobilize the troops returning from Siberia.

"I am informed," said the Kaiser, "that you have been successful in dealing with Moscow. I also believe that in the Baltic provinces the firmness finally shown by your government is bound to bring desired results. But one thing I cannot understand: how could a man as exceptional in mind and energy as is Witte—whom I received a while ago and from whom I was forced to hear many unpleasant things*—how could he have permitted his own subordinate, Kutler (1), to compose a project so purely revolutionary as that on the forced expropriation of the land of the landed gentry? This is pure folly. How can Germany cope with similar socialistic attempts when the Russian autocratic monarch, of his own free will, is ready to deprive the only trustworthy class of landowners of their historical possessions and transfer them to the peasants, either gratis or for a puny sum, without any regard for consequences? Why, this is the purest Marxism, and who is the first to choose this road so hopeless for the Empire?"

This question was wholly unexpected. I had not heard anything of this matter before my departure, and I told the Kaiser so without any subterfuge, adding that I had not the slightest doubt that the Tsar had no knowledge of it, that the author must have been someone in Count Witte's entourage, and that no matter how great the instability of the new Cabinet might be, such a measure certainly could

* Evidently he referred to the treaty of alliance which was prepared by the Kaiser and signed by the Russian and German Emperors at Björkö and which Witte was influential in having nullified.

not be carried out by a manifesto, that is to say, by the direct will of the Tsar alone.

"You may be right; indeed, my ambassador reported yesterday that in the last few days they have been talking less of this demented project and that it is noticeable that the proposed measure is meeting with strong resistance somewhere." These words ended my audience with the Kaiser, and on the next day I left for home.

A few days later I told Witte what I had heard from the German Kaiser, and got the following answer: "The Kaiser was quite right: that crazy project did exist, but only in the brain of our dear mutual friend, Kutler. But as soon as he presented it to me I destroyed it and asked him never to mention this hideous idea again, as one must indeed be insane to cut off the branch upon which one is sitting."

On January 9 I met Kutler for the first time in the State Council. I had not seen him since his appointment as Minister of Agriculture. I asked him pointblank how he could have come to draw up such a project, especially at such a time. Without any hesitation he replied: "I received orders from Witte and had to comply, especially since we now have a unified government. Now that the project has failed, however, everybody repudiates all responsibility and says that it was entirely Kutler's idea. It is not the first time that a scapegoat has been needed. I was left no choice but to tender my resignation to Count Witte in order to show that I really was the one to blame for everything."*

Although I had returned to St. Petersburg on the eve of our New Year, it was January 2 or 3 [o.s.] before I could see Witte. In the meantime, however, Timashev, Manager of the State Bank, and Shipov, Minister of Finance, visited me. Timashev, sincere, and always friendly toward me, congratulated me on the success of my mission. He said that my success had quite surprised everyone at the ministry but now all agreed that the danger of abandoning the gold standard was past and a return to normal business conditions was assured, especially since the news from the provinces was most reassuring. There was less demand for money than there had been early in the winter; the managers of branch banks were sending calmer reports; and, in localities where there had been a clamor for gold, the announcements that gold was not at hand but

* Actually, Kutler's dismissal did not follow for some time, although he did resign before the rest of Witte's cabinet and for a short time A. P. Nikolsky (2) was in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture.

was expected to arrive in a few days were met with perfect calm. Paper currency was accepted as formerly, and there were no sharp clashes with the depositors.

Shipov, on the other hand, was deep in gloom. According to him, a short-term loan of 267 million francs was insufficient to solve our problems and it would be necessary for him to resubmit to the Finance Committee his previous proposal to go off the gold standard. G. D. Dementev, the chief accountant of the Treasury Department and an experienced and intelligent man, gave me data which tended to support Timashev's rather than Shipov's estimate of the situation. He said, moreover, that he had urged his minister not to be in too much of a hurry with his project, but without success, and he now counted on my influence.

Finally, when I saw Count Witte he received me with every outward courtesy. He thanked me for my help, and did not conceal that he had had little hope for the success of my mission, which, under existing circumstances, he considered phenomenal. At the same time, however, he said that he saw no possibility of preserving our existing monetary system; he felt that everything was hopeless, for the Tsar had lost confidence and did not appear prepared to go farther along the road of reform and to introduce a real, not a "childish," constitution, as he put it, which would transfer the majority of his rights to the people.

The next day I was very graciously received by the Tsar. His expressions of thanks for my successful and speedy work in Paris were so direct and sincere and his entire bearing was so calm, in view of the recent crisis, that I could not help asking him directly if his composure was due to a belief on his part that the Rubicon had been crossed.

I remember well his answer: "Yes, I am perfectly confident of the future and would have been even more so had I the assurance that the government would not waver from side to side as it has been doing." He went on to say that although I had been absent only a little over two weeks in that brief time a number of steps of the most serious consequences had been taken. The electoral law had been so altered that the Emperor had the gravest apprehensions for the consequences on the composition of the Duma. Moreover, without his consent a statute had been drafted expropriating the land of the landed gentry on the theory that such a measure was necessary to check the revolt. On this theory, the Emperor added, he might

be deprived of his own power in order to secure pacification of the country. "I wish to stand honorably by my promise given in the Manifesto of October 17 and shall give the people legislative rights within established limits, but should the Duma demand that I be deprived of my historical authority, am I supposed to grant everything without protest?" He then added that he had appointed me a member of a commission which under his chairmanship would begin in a few days the work of co-ordinating the statute of the State Council with that of the Duma and the Manifesto of October 17, and that then I should observe his willingness to concede all that was reasonable, but that he could not make concessions in every direction without regard for the consequences.

The Emperor dismissed me with a further complimentary reference to my services in Paris and with a warning that when the time came to discuss another liquidation loan he would designate me for the task without asking my consent, since he could count on my willingness to comply with his every wish.

The Finance Committee met in the evening of January 4 at the house of Count Solsky.* Everybody except I. P. Shipov, who was silent, thanked me warmly. Witte, too, was gloomy and silent. Shipov again submitted the project of a ukase to abandon the gold standard, arguing that such a move was necessary because of the insufficiency of the loan and the poor reports from the branch banks and treasuries. Ivashchenkov objected firmly, insisting that it was necessary to take advantage of my success in order to gain time and to see how far the gloomy presentiments of the Minister of Finance would be realized or, on the other hand, to see if the decrease of the revolutionary movement would result in a gradual return to normal in state and bank affairs. Cherevansky supported Ivashchenkov, and the Finance Committee, after much discussion and without putting it to a vote—evidently so as to avoid a possible divergence with the Minister of Finance—decided to meet daily, to follow the march of events, and to postpone the carrying out of the project so

* In order to report the results of my trip to Paris to the Finance Committee I composed for this occasion a detailed memorandum, mentioning in it the conditions and terms of the future liquidation loan (I am glad that the Bolshevik "Gosizdat" found it in the archives of the Ministry of Finance and published it in full in Volume X, pp. 23ff, of *Krasnyi Arkhiv*), and without appending it in full I may refer to it, as it enables me to speak about the loan of 1906 more authoritatively than I could from memory. It also helps me to combat a calumny launched by Count Witte as to my part in this business.

as not to create new disturbances in the already troubled monetary market.

Events supported the correctness of this decision. As the country became pacified under the influence of the liquidation of the Moscow revolt and the pacification of Siberia, the revolutionary movement began to wane rapidly everywhere. The income from revenues began to return to normal, back payments began to come in, demands for the withdrawal of savings nearly stopped, the customary increase in savings deposits for the winter was noticed, the activities of private banks began to revive, and the State Bank not only saw no need of issuing new paper currency but began to accumulate surplus circulating currency in its vaults. Timashev even secured permission to burn a hundred million rubles of paper currency, an act which made the best impression both at home and abroad. A new short-term loan which had been concluded in order to increase our gold reserve abroad remained at first unused, and the conditions on the Paris exchange seemed to have become stabilized. Shipov grew calmer in his silent way, and the problem of abandoning the gold standard no longer excited the Ministry of Finance and the Finance Committee.

January passed rather quietly for me.

Early in February Witte invited me to call on him to discuss something of importance, but he did not say what it was. It turned out to be a grandiose plan of his to negotiate a large international loan, which would include all the countries of Europe and America as well. He said that he had already obtained Germany's virtual consent and very definite promises from Mendelssohn and the American, Morgan (3). Morgan had even invited him to come to Paris late in March, when he would be there also. Witte had no doubt as to the consent of France, as he was in almost daily correspondence with Netzlin and immediately after I left Paris had agreed with him as to the type and amount of such a loan. He thought that it would soon be possible to prevail upon Netzlin to make final arrangements. He added that I should probably be called upon again to go abroad but that this trip would really be more like a holiday, as he would have prepared everything so thoroughly that I should only have to sign a ready contract, co-ordinated in every detail, with the international syndicate headed by Morgan.

As I was about to leave, Witte surprised me by offering me, in his own name and in the name of the Tsar, the office of State Comp-

troller. I declined, and, reminding Witte of the circumstances under which I had left the Ministry of Finance, begged him not to insist and thus make it necessary for me to explain to the Tsar why I refused the office. But Witte did insist, and only when I threatened to go to the Tsar did he let the matter drop. Later, in April, the Tsar told me that he had been certain that I would not accept the appointment and had said as much to Witte, adding that he did not understand how Witte could wish me to become State Comptroller after having so recently insisted on the impossibility of appointing me Chairman of the Department of Economy because of my difficult disposition.

All February was occupied by the conference to revise the statute on the Duma, to consider the changes introduced in the statute on the State Council in relation to the new prerogatives of the Duma, and to co-ordinate these basic statutes with the existing code.

Of all the sessions I recall two most vividly: those of February 14 and 16. During the former session Witte insisted very firmly that the sessions of the Duma and the State Council must not be public. To the stupefaction of everybody he supported his arguments with the assertion that our public was so ignorant that it would be sure to transform the legislative institutions into places of endless scandals and would only make sport of the ministers by throwing "rotten apples and dead cats at them." Everyone attacked him for this statement. Even Pobedonostsev wanted to know what was the use of starting the whole business, of writing manifestoes, of announcing extensive programs of reform, if we had not outgrown scandals and "rotten apples and dead cats."

"Now," he went on to say, "if Sergei Yulievich were to repent of all his former ideas and to desire to return to the former State Council and to renounce altogether the idea of admitting to our work of legislation the mob which is not prepared for such a work, I should have said to you, 'Sire, this is a wise decision.' But no authority can afford to grant the people all sorts of rights and liberties and then tell them: 'Go and read in the papers what the chosen ones do and say.'"

The Emperor put an end to all these debates simply by saying: "Of course, this cannot be tolerated; the sessions must be public."

During this same session Witte broached another, not less serious, problem. We were discussing that article of the statute on the State Council which introduced into our legislative system the principle of the equality of the chambers in our bicameral system.

Count Witte began by saying that the supreme authority should not be made a prisoner of the two legislative chambers and that to make the well-being of a people dependent upon the whim of either one of the chambers was even less to be desired, as it was to be expected in our country, as everywhere else, that the relations between the two chambers would be strained from the start to the extent that whatever the one called white the other would be sure to call black. It was also to be expected that whatever the lower chamber proposed, the upper chamber would reject—which, incidentally, would be a great boon to the state—but, on the other hand, whatever the upper chamber suggested would naturally be thrown out by the lower.

He went on to say that a way out of this situation had to be found "as everything in the country must not stop just because of the wrangles of two hostile chambers." Therefore, he would suggest such a way out in a special article, the wording of which he wanted the Chief Procurator of the Synod (4), Prince Aleksei Dmitrievich Obolensky (5), to read aloud. This article suggested that every project adopted by the Duma must be submitted to the State Council for consideration, and if it were rejected by the latter it must then be returned to the Duma; and if this body adopted it by a two-thirds majority it must then be submitted to the Supreme Authority, who might either reject it, whereupon it would be considered finally rejected, or confirm it, whereupon it would be considered as having been given full legal force without any new examination by the State Council. The same procedure should take place in case a legislative project adopted by the State Council were rejected by the Duma. It must be returned to the Council, examined a second time, and, if it were adopted by the necessary two-thirds majority, it must then be submitted to the Emperor directly, whereupon it becomes law or is rejected according to his direct decision.

His Majesty, totally unprepared for this new idea, waited for someone to make some comment. For a few minutes an oppressive silence reigned. Then Count A. P. Ignatev asked for permission to speak and said that he was extremely perplexed by the suggestion and could not clearly grasp its purpose. He was sure, however, that if this scheme were adopted, it would defeat the purpose of the two chambers, since all legislation would be centered in the Supreme Authority. This was evident because whatever the lower chamber suggested the upper would be sure to reject, and vice versa. More-

over, since a rejected project had to be returned to the chamber which had originated it, this latter, out of pure stubbornness, would be sure to assemble the necessary two-thirds majority and the matter would then be transferred to the decision of the Monarch. Thus, the Monarch would determine the fate of all legislation, and the responsibility for the fate of all legislative projects would be placed upon him alone. If he did not confirm what had been twice adopted by the lower chamber, this would create a conflict between the Supreme Authority and the chamber, which always and everywhere leads to the most deplorable consequences. If he were to agree with the chamber, a conflict between the two chambers would result.

I did not intend to make any comment on Witte's scheme, but when the Tsar asked for my opinion of it I supported the views of Count Ignatev and concluded my remarks by referring to the example of republican France, where for half a century there had been an endless struggle to limit the power of the Senate but so far all such attempts had been in vain, so great was the danger that was believed to be attached to the idea of limiting the importance of one chamber in favor of the other.

Only Prince Obolensky supported Witte, and in ending the debates, the Tsar said, as he did in regard to the majority of the approved articles, "The matter is clear, let us leave the article unchanged and proceed." The session soon adjourned, and the Tsar suggested that we reassemble two days later.

At the next session Witte insisted, in the face of the obvious displeasure of the Emperor, on reopening the discussion of the matter considered at the last meeting. He thereupon repeated the arguments he had previously advanced, until the Emperor, losing patience, interrupted him: "We heard all this before. I do not understand why you want to repeat what we all know already." But Witte was not to be silenced. Rapidly losing his self-control he began to criticize savagely the remarks I had made and concluded by charging me with "tender sympathies and a desire to introduce parliamentary customs." The Emperor signed to me not to reply, and when no one else offered any remarks he observed that since no new arguments had been presented the decision previously reached would remain unchanged. Later the Emperor thanked me for not replying to Count Witte. "Everyone," he added, "sees how clearly out of place was his outburst accusing you of constitutional sympathies."

CHAPTER X

MARCH-APRIL, 1906

I was often visited by my former colleagues from the Ministry of Finance, all telling me that there was great agitation as well as instability to be observed in the government. The few times I met Shipov he was always very reserved and said nothing about preparations for a large consolidation loan. I even concluded that he was not too well informed about the matter, which seemed to be entirely in the hands of Count Witte, as later proved to be correct. Even the Special Credit Office was not informed of all the telegrams and letters exchanged between the Chairman of the Ministers' Council and his foreign correspondents. In fact, later, when I returned to the post of minister to remain for eight years, it was impossible to assemble the complete correspondence concerning the loan, much of it having remained in the personal archives of Count Witte. This also explains why the documentary data published by the Bolsheviks are so poorly organized and incomplete and why in carrying out the commission entrusted to me at a later date I was to meet with many unexpected discoveries.

Early in March, Witte telephoned me and asked me to come to his apartment in the Winter Palace "as soon as possible"—his usual formula. He had not spoken to me since our last meeting at Tsarskoe Selo. Now, however, he announced that he wanted to convey to me the Emperor's order to go again, in the very near future, to Paris to conclude another large loan. He said that he had so thoroughly prepared the ground for this loan that I should need to conduct no negotiations but merely sign a prepared contract, which was being brought by Netzlin, who was expected the following Friday. In order to obviate unnecessary deliberations Witte had arranged for Netzlin to stop at Tsarskoe Selo in the palace of the Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1), in D. A. Benckendorf's (2) apartment, where he was to be met by the Minister of Finance, whose absence from St. Petersburg would cause no comment, since that was his duty to report to the Emperor. Witte went on to say that Shipov

and Netzlin would have all details settled, so that all I should have to do would be to sign the agreement and arrange the date of my arrival at Paris. Then I asked: "Just what are the terms of the loan?"

"Don't let that worry you," Witte answered; "everything has been arranged. You shall be given the entire correspondence, which will show what I have done. Shipov will explain everything. For the present I shall tell you only what is necessary for your conversation with Netzlin, namely, that the loan will be truly international, and will be participated in by the first-class banking houses of Germany, by our entire French group, naturally, by America, which will be represented by the Morgan group and will enter it for the first time, and, of course, by England and the Netherlands, represented by our usual friends. I have also prevailed upon Austria to participate for the first time in this operation through two of her largest banks. I hope to be able to attract Italy also. In a word, I want this to be our triumph in the fullest sense of the word and I am glad that your name will be associated with it."

When I asked what the terms of the loan were and what its actual cost to us would be, Witte said, "You must not worry; it will be a long term loan, at 5 per cent; and as to the face value and the costs of flotation, I have persuaded Netzlin to be modest, for I fully understand that under present conditions our government cannot afford heavy expenses. If I were to agree to unfavorable terms I should be the one who would have to answer to our silly public opinion, shouldn't I?" Witte obviously did not suspect that he would not be at the head of the government when the loan was concluded.

Tea was served, and Witte began quite composedly to calculate how much we had paid for the loans of 1904-1905, when we had hoped to vanquish Japan. He concluded that, under present conditions, with the revolutionary movement still far from being liquidated, with the whole country in an unsettled state, and in the face of rather unsatisfactory election returns to the new Duma, it would be impossible to get a large amount of money for a long term for less than 6 per cent. Still, even if it could be secured at that rate, it would be our greatest financial success, "for which," he added, "you would deserve a statue."

As I left, Witte said that of course the Tsar would receive me before my departure, and as we entered the hall he added laughingly: "I should not want to be dealing with you in these negotiations, as I know you will squeeze the last penny out of these bankers. But I

know that you will be the scapegoat if the terms appear to be too hard, and I personally would not approve a loan at more than 6 per cent net." My last words were that I could see clearly that everything had been arranged to the last detail and that I should only have to take the trip to Paris.

On the appointed day—Friday of that same week—I took the 10:00 A.M. train to Tsarskoë Selo, went to the palace of the Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, where I had never been, and found Netzlin in Benckendorf's apartment. He returned my greeting by saying, "Do not call me Mr. Netzlin; I am Mr. Bernard; I have come under the name of my valet." As a matter of fact his arrival in Russia was so successfully concealed that no newspaper even mentioned it.

From the start our conversation took a turn for which I was not prepared by what Witte had said. While admitting that the international project might contribute to the success of the loan and increase the amount considerably, Netzlin seemed to have misgivings as to Witte's chances of realizing his full program. He was sure that Germany, England, and the Netherlands would agree to participate, but had the greatest doubts about America and about Morgan's group in particular. He said that he knew Morgan's group very well and would believe in their participation only after they had signed the contract. As to the participation of Austria he did not even wish to discuss it, so incomprehensible was the idea that the Austrian banks, everlastingly looking for loans in Paris, could take any serious part in the Russian long-term loan. Altogether, his tone was far from jubilant. He even asked me to warn Count Witte that he was not at all sure that we could secure the sum of 3,000,000,000 francs which he [Witte] had mentioned in his letters. This was the first time I had heard of this figure.

I asked him to share his apprehensions with Shipov, who was expected any minute, and then began to discuss the terms of the loan as understood by the French group. Netzlin's answers were very vague. He said that his friends had not yet formed any definite opinion, as they did not know what part of the loan would be carried by the other banks and what the conditions within Russia would be at the moment the contract was signed. Hence, it was much too early to discuss this matter, which would have to wait for the opening of the negotiations, especially since Count Witte had not discussed the matter to any degree in his correspondence.

This astonished me greatly. I immediately turned the conversation to a purely personal basis, saying to Netzlin that I would not go to Paris if I saw that I was being groomed for the thankless rôle of a man who would not be able to accomplish a task advantageously and who would be obliged to return empty-handed. I said that I was a free man and that the Emperor would never force me to do that which I felt to be beyond my capacity. I told Netzlin then and there that I would not assume so hazardous a task unless he promised to assist me to conclude the loan at a total cost to the Russian treasury of not more than 6 per cent net. I added that I had every reason to think that Count Witte shared this point of view and would not give me permission to conclude a loan on more difficult terms.

My last statement apparently genuinely astonished Netzlin. He answered that evidently I did not know of the entire correspondence between Count Witte and him or I would not have made that last statement, as in no letter did Count Witte set any limit to the actual costs to the Russian government. Witte had mentioned only that he would not like to exceed a 5 per cent rate of interest and would give the French group perfect freedom of action in everything else because he attached particular importance to having the loan concluded as soon as possible, at least before the opening of the sessions of the new legislative chambers, which was proposed for the end of April. Netzlin added that as revealed during the preliminary conferences the banks of the Russian group in Paris were considering a 5 per cent loan at approximately 85 or 86 and, since the costs of flotation would probably be very high, it would be impossible to realize for the government even actually as much as 80 per cent. We argued for a long time over this matter. I insisted that 86 was much too low and a cost of 7 or 8 per cent much too high, and ended by saying that I was almost certain I was correct and that the Chairman of the Ministers' Council would support me. I suggested to Netzlin that he wait and think it over so as to avoid placing both of us in a trying position.

Toward the end of our conversation Shipov arrived, and Netzlin immediately began to complain bitterly of my conduct. But Shipov remained silent, and when Netzlin asked him what he thought of the matter about which we disagreed and whether or not he saw any possibility of arranging matters at once, Shipov simply replied that he had no definite views, that he recognized the necessity of a loan but thought, as I did, that the government would find itself in very

straitened circumstances for a while and that it would not be desirable to negotiate any loan at a total cost of more than 6 per cent. He added that the Emperor had just told him again that the negotiations would be entrusted to me, provided I would agree, and that probably I would be asked to see the Tsar soon. Then Netzlin asked Shipov what Count Witte thought about his, Netzlin's, request to settle the French government's doubt as to whether, in view of the Manifesto of October 17 and the statute on the Duma, the Russian government had the right to negotiate a loan as an administrative measure, without waiting for the confirmation of both chambers.

I knew nothing about this matter. Shipov briefly told me its history and added that Professor Martens had studied it and had prepared a detailed memorandum which held that the government did have the right to negotiate a loan and that the Ministers' Council, having studied it with the aid of outstanding jurists, had found Martens' conclusions sound. Netzlin said that the French Ministry was also busy studying this question and that he had heard that their opinion seemed to agree with that of Martens, although the matter had not yet been definitely settled. He suggested that it would be desirable to send Professor Martens' memorandum to Paris immediately.

The next day I saw Witte. I gave him all my impressions, and he promised me that he would have copies of everything sent over to my house. He assured me, however, that Netzlin's doubts as to the international character of the loan were totally unfounded, as Netzlin himself did not know the details of the matter, of which I would learn as soon as I had the correspondence. Moreover, I would see how far the business had been advanced and how certain was its success.

On the next day I began to receive all sorts of material pertaining to the loan, including Professor Martens' argument, a résumé of the discussions in the Ministers' Council, and odds and ends of unrelated telegrams which said nothing about the technical aspects of the transaction but a great deal about its international character and the certainty of American and German participation through the Morgan and Mendelssohn groups.

These scattered telegrams showed that Netzlin had tried to warn Witte as to the amount of England's participation, pointing out that Lord Revelstoke (3) was pessimistic and had said frankly that he could participate with only a very modest sum and even then

it would depend upon the possibility of quoting the English part of the loan in the Paris market directly after the conclusion of the loan. This study of such an incomplete dossier made it seem very uncertain to me, as I mentioned many times both to Shipov and to Count Witte. I also told Count Solsky of my thoughts and fears. Solsky advised me not to refuse to go, but to explain all my fears to the Tsar beforehand and even to give him a brief written memorandum, in order to protect myself from all criticism in case the negotiations were unsuccessful. I urged Count Solsky to advise Witte to send someone else, but Solsky insisted that it was better to risk failure and accusations of inefficiency than to make trouble for the Tsar at so difficult a time by obliging him to entrust the business to some other person who might be quite unsuitable. Finally I decided to do as Solsky advised, except that I would not give the Tsar any written memoranda dealing with possible difficulties.

A few days later, about March 20, I was invited to Tsarskoe Selo. The Tsar was, as always, most gracious to me. He spoke at some length, mentioning his worries and saying that the elections to the Duma did not promise any good, that he was aware of the constant hesitations and even contradictions in the proposals of his Chairman of the Ministers' Council, but that he hoped common sense would be victorious over the revolutionary confusion and that the members of the Duma, becoming aware of their responsibility to the country, would settle down to work and everything would turn out for the best. As for my trip to Paris, the Tsar told me he was sure I would not refuse to go "on new important business," as he put it, and that he was confident I would do everything in my power.

I told the Tsar my fears, of my interview with Netzlin, of my frequent meetings with Count Witte and my apprehensions. In conclusion I said that I would report my every move to the Chairman of the Ministers' Council. "And if matters turn out too badly," added the Tsar, "do telegraph to me directly, and be assured that I shall be grateful to you for everything, as I can well perceive that you are not going on a picnic."

My apprehensions as to the difficulties in store for me at Paris began to be justified much sooner than I had anticipated. I was getting ready to depart and was only waiting for Count Witte to set a definite date, when, about three days after my audience with the Tsar, Witte telephoned saying that I had to leave immediately. But, since Mendelssohn had sent disagreeable messages I need

not stop in Berlin, as had been first proposed, but should go directly to Paris. When I inquired about the nature of Mendelssohn's message Witte said merely that Mendelssohn refused for himself and his entire group to participate in the loan and gave no explanation. This refusal, however, could have no deciding influence upon the success of the transaction, as the mere fact of America's participation counteracted the unfavorable impression of Germany's withdrawal.

The next day I called on Count Witte and saw Mendelssohn's telegram, which indeed gave no explanation. Both of us saw clearly, however, that this was the answer to the help which we had rendered France a few weeks before at the Algeciras Conference.

Two days later my wife and I left for Paris. We stayed but a few hours in Berlin before our train left for Paris, and had time only to take a walk through the Tiergarten. I remember that the day was particularly warm. There was a crowd of people walking in the park, and great attention was attracted by Emperor William, who appeared on horseback, dressed in a new field uniform of khaki color which he was wearing for the first time. The next day, all the newspapers featured special articles describing the smallest details of this new uniform.

I was met at Paris by the representatives of the Russian group of banks in France. With them were Y. I. Utin (4) and A. I. Vyshnegradsky, who had been dispatched to Paris by our banks to participate in the negotiations as their representatives. Utin told me frankly that the Russian banks had decided to take an active part in the new loan, but warned me that our French friends, as far as he could ascertain, entertained no rosy expectations, having already learned of the refusal of the Germans to participate in the loan. Moreover, the newspapers had stated that America had also refused. The next morning Netzlin called on me at the Hotel Londres, Rue Castiglione, where I was staying. He confirmed this news with a telegram which he had received from Morgan, who said that he would be unable to come to Paris and that he considered the moment altogether unfavorable for any negotiations. Netzlin added that he believed I knew of this.

Whether Count Witte had been apprised of this or had not received Morgan's notification until after my departure, I cannot tell; but I can testify that Count Witte did not advise me of it. In fact, I sent him this first unpleasant news as to the situation in Paris im-

mediately, adding my own first impression of the extremely reluctant attitude of the French bankers.

This impression grew with every new conference. The negotiations began slowly. Lord Revelstoke of the English group had arrived three days previously and had been waiting for me. He began by asking me if I knew the details of his correspondence with our Minister of Finance, as he felt it his duty to say that he, like Morgan, found the moment most inappropriate for the completion of so grandiose an undertaking as the one projected by the Russian government. Still he was not opposed to exploring every detail, provided he would not be called upon to participate to any considerable extent. He even mentioned a sum not to exceed twenty-five or thirty million rubles, and stipulated from the outset that he would have to be sure that the French government would agree that the English part of the loan should be quoted in the French market, since only on this condition could the English loan transaction be prevented from ending in a fiasco. Netzlin told me that he hoped there would be no particular objections from the French side.

On the same morning I met for the first time the Hollanders and the two representatives of the Austrian banks. The former told me that their transactions had always been quite modest but that they thought they could match the sum mentioned by Lord Revelstoke and would not expect any particular advantages except the promise of the Russian government that the proceeds of the loan would remain in Holland, at least until conditions in Russia cleared up. As for the representatives of the Austrian banks—I am very sorry that my memory does not retain the names of these representatives and the names of their institutions except that of the Länderbank—they amazed not only me but also all the prominent representatives of the French group by the clarity and unexpectedness of their announcement, which, moreover, was made in utter seriousness and evidently without any doubts as to their right to make such an announcement. They said that they understood their participation solely as that of representatives of credit institutions of a country invited to participate merely to give an international aspect to the whole operation, and that they did not in the least expect to participate actually by underwriting the loan and floating it among their customers, as Austria was very short of capital and needed loans for herself. They added that Count Witte could have had no doubt of this, as he had made his offers through the German house of Mendelssohn; they

had definitely expected to be taken as partners by the Germans but to get nothing out of it except their share of the profits.

I immediately telegraphed to St. Petersburg the results of my conference with the Austrians. By way of answer I was told that this must not trouble me, as France, Russia, the Netherlands, and England could handle the transaction by themselves and the only thing we might perhaps be obliged to do would be to lower somewhat the originally projected sum of three billions.

This was the beginning of my negotiations at Paris. It did not promise anything good, and it was in a rather pessimistic frame of mind that I appeared at the Ministry of Finance where I was expected to discuss the formal problem of the right of the Russian government to negotiate a loan before the convocation of legislative institutions which had, according to a law already published, been given the privilege either to permit or to prohibit credit transactions. Here I met for the first time the Minister of Finance, Poincaré (5), and I wish to say at this point that it was owing to his assistance that I did not leave Paris empty-handed.

At first he was very reserved. He read attentively the memorandum prepared by Professor Martens and supplemented by the résumé of our Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, and asked for permission to keep it for a few days. He did not conceal the fact that the French Ministry of Finance, on its side, had a detailed statement by one of their best authorities on international law and that he could tell me that his opinion was in perfect accord with the Russian, so that he had hopes of prevailing upon his government to accept this point of view. "Although," he added, "this will not be too easy, as some members of the cabinet entertain diametrically opposite views and will not easily renounce them. They see in this question an excuse for not permitting this credit transaction to be concluded in the French market, especially since Germany and America have refused to participate." Poincaré did not explain what French ministers were opposed to the loan, but, judging by the fact that he mentioned that I must make the acquaintance of the Minister of Justice, Sarrien (6), and especially insisted that I call on the Minister of the Interior, Clémenceau (7), I understood that the latter was the one most likely to oppose the loan.

I followed his suggestion immediately. Sarrien received me most courteously. I turned the conversation to the legal aspect of the matter in hand, mentioning that our point of view was in perfect

accord with the one adopted by the French authorities on international law. Sarrien replied good-naturedly that I could rest assured of his own consent, as he had already learned that the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were exactly the same as those of the Ministry of Finance. He said he would support the desire of the Russian government, as he fully understood that having ended an unsuccessful war the government was anxious to arrange its finances, especially before adopting a constitutional régime. He did not go into a detailed discussion of our new régime, and I had no reason to take more of his time.

My reception by Clémenceau was altogether different. He received me in the Ministry of the Interior, on the Place Beauveau, in the same study where, twenty-six years previously, October 1880, I had been received together with the late Galkin-Vrasskoi (8) by the then Minister of the Interior, Constant (9), on the occasion of the calling of the convention of the International Prison Commission. Clémenceau began his short interview jokingly: "Do you believe, Mr. State Secretary, that your government has chosen an auspicious moment to borrow a large amount of money in the French market?"

I answered that I did not see any unfavorable symptoms in the French market to prevent such an operation, and, besides, the representatives of the French financial circles had advised our government that the time was quite propitious and that, unless something unexpected happened in Russia, they were confident that the French public would accept the Russian financial operation favorably provided the technical terms were sufficiently attractive.

Clémenceau interrupted me, saying: "I do not worry in the slightest over the profitableness of this loan to the public and am sure that our bankers will be able to arrange most attractive terms. Also, I know that you have brought with you a legal opinion of your jurists stating that your government has the right to negotiate such a loan, and that our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the same opinion. All this, however, does not quite persuade me, and I do not yet know whether or not I shall vote in favor of this measure. Besides, I saw a few of your countrymen some days ago and they not only failed to share your views but were very much opposed to them."

I did not have time to ask him to explain who these countrymen were and to what extent they could be considered competent in this matter, living abroad as they did. I even entertained the thought that Clémenceau had merely seen some members of the small Russian

colony in Paris, far removed from affairs of state, or that he was repeating an echo of the illegal agitation of the Russian revolutionary circles in France, when, rising to take his leave, he asked me something which was totally unexpected and a great surprise:

"Tell me, Your Excellency," he said, "why doesn't your Emperor invite Mr. Miliukov (10) to act as head of your government? I believe this would be a good move both from the point of satisfying public opinion and from that of solving many problems."

I answered that I was not informed as to who would be the Emperor's choice for the new government or whether the present ministry would remain unchanged or be supplanted by some new persons. I pointed out to him, however, that according to the scheme of the Russian law the rights of the Crown would not be altered either as regards the right of the Tsar to select his ministers or as regards the responsibility of the ministers, who are not subject to the vote of legislative institutions.

"Too bad," said Clémenceau; "I believe Miliukov's appointment would have been excellent."

The next day I was received by the newly elected President of the Republic, Fallières (11), and his conversation explained all that had not been clear before.

Fallières did not seem anxious to get rid of me, and talked for a long time, very simply, sincerely, and straightforwardly. He began by saying that France, as Russia's ally, must naturally help her out of the difficult situation in which she had been placed by the unfortunate war and especially the internal revolt, particularly since Russia had succeeded in concluding the Japanese War by a treaty which did not offend her national dignity. He also understood the desire of our government to begin the new "constitutional" life with well-organized finances. "France," he added, "has no right to forget the priceless assistance Russia renders her every time she asks for it, and therefore I hope that the government will thoroughly understand this and will render you the necessary assistance. But you must understand that this will cause some friction, as we have here some of your countrymen who are conducting a most energetic campaign against the negotiation of this loan and you are bound to meet in the most influential circles the attitude which they have created and which will have some serious effect, although I hope that in the end you will be successful. You will be supported by the Minister of Finance in a most decisive manner."

Then, speaking quite frankly and without pledging me to respect his confidence, the President of the Republic said: "I have been placed in a very disagreeable position in this matter and, moreover, quite unexpectedly. A prominent French public man (later I learned that this was none other than Anatole France) (12) requested me to receive two of your countrymen who wished to pay me their respects. Quite unsuspectingly, and even supposing that I might learn from their conversation something new about the situation in Russia, I agreed willingly. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when these gentlemen began by saying that they had come to protest against the plan of the Russian government to conclude a loan in France without awaiting the convocation of the legislative institutions and without receiving their permission. They said that such a loan was unquestionably illegal and would probably not be approved of by the people's representatives and that, therefore, I would render a direct service to French capital by saving it from the risk of losing the money invested in the loan. I was so dumbfounded by this visit and this statement that I told these gentlemen that they ought to address themselves to the government, not to me, especially since no credit transaction in France could be effected without its consent."

I gathered from this that these Russians had visited the President after they had failed to secure an interview with the Minister of Finance. Later, the names of these persons became widely known: Prince P. Dolgorukov (13) and Count Nesselrode. During my stay in Paris I did not meet them, but later, in my frequent appearances before the Duma on this matter, whenever I mentioned this unfortunate episode the same cry rang out from the benches of the opposition: "Again the Minister of Finance is telling a story which never happened."*

After the concluding of my official visits, I undertook my diffi-

* Many years later, early in 1919, when I was in Paris as an émigré. I met Count Nesselrode on the Rue d'Astorg. Once I had worked at the same table with him in the criminal department of the Ministry of Justice, but now he was a feeble, sick man, although but a few years my senior. He called at my house merely to learn how I had succeeded in escaping from Russia. When I had finished my story I asked him if he would permit me, now that we could recall the past without any bitterness, to ask about the nature of that episode in which he had participated in the campaign against the loan of 1906. "We are both émigrés," I said, "and may talk now without irritation of that which has passed." He answered that he preferred not to speak of this incident. We did not see each other again. He did not even leave his address, saying that he did not see anyone any more. Soon afterward he passed away.

cult negotiations with the bankers. Day followed day in endless conferences and private discussions with the participants of the now newly formed syndicate. What their outcome might have been without the extensive support of the Minister of Finance, Poincaré, I cannot tell.

In fairness to the French banks I must admit that the task imposed upon them was considerably greater than had been anticipated. Instead of an international loan to be floated in the principal financial centers of the Old and New worlds, it came about that only two markets were involved—the French and the Russian—with small help from Great Britain and the Netherlands.

The Russian banks, represented by Y. I. Utin and A. I. Vyshnegradsky, rendered me great assistance. In all general meetings they gave me firm support and helped me greatly in two main problems: first, in raising the amount of the loan to the sum of two and a quarter billions, in which the participation of the Russian banks was increased, for the Frenchmen had started with a billion and a half and would not go above a billion and three-quarters; secondly, in the basic problem of the offering price of the loan and the amount of the bankers' commission. These two problems merged, in effect, into one: what sum would the Russian government actually realize from the new transaction?

I do not wish to repeat here the details of these painful proceedings when the whole business was on the point of breaking off entirely. The representatives of the French group, who held the negotiations entirely in their own hands, tried their best to make me renounce the attitude I had adopted as early as during my conversation with Netzlin at Tsarskoe Selo and which I had announced on the first day of our negotiations. I told them—and Netzlin very correctly confirmed the reference I made to him—that I would never agree to any terms which yielded to the Russian treasury less than 82.5 per cent, and suggested that they either raise the offering price of the loan or lower their brokerage commission. To the first they, in all fairness as it said, could not very well agree, so unfavorable was the attitude of the market toward an immediate transaction and so varied were the different influences which favored postponement until better times.

The banks had to yield in the matter of their commission, which at first they had set at what they considered to be the lowest possible figure—8 per cent, and later $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Our differences on this

subject were sometimes almost unbelievably sharp. At times we would adjourn until the next day, and during the recess each party sought for support in whatever quarters it could find it. I had to seek it in Poincaré, requesting him to influence the bankers as much as possible, pointing out the necessity of preserving the prestige of the Russian as well as the French government before the beginning of a new form of government in Russia.

Of course, I had no way of learning what passed between the Minister of Finance and Netzlin, the head of the syndicate, but to this day I believe that Poincaré's moral support of Russia at that moment was decisive. With every new day and at each successive meeting, after a nervous preliminary meeting in the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, I could detect the change in the attitude of the men with whom I had to deal, passing as it did from a definitely negative attitude to a more gentle and even conciliatory one. I saw how sincere they were in seeking a way out of the difficult situation, and how, gradually, we reached an agreement in the matters of vital importance to me, which gave me the right to say later on that even at such an unfavorable moment Russia was able to effect this necessary loan at a total cost of 6 per cent.

I am in duty bound to mention the fact that at that time I unexpectedly found indirect support in a man who later showed an entirely different attitude toward me. It was M. de Verneuil, the syndic of the stockbrokers' company. His relations with the banks were unfriendly. He said openly that he believed the banks charged too high a price for their services, thus raising the costs of banking operations in France and consequently limiting the sphere of activity of the French market in advancing credit to young countries. His attacks on the banks for their excessive demands regarding the amount of the bankers' commission at the expense of the Russian treasury had some effect, as the banks heard of his criticisms almost daily and could not remain indifferent to them.

During my conferences with the banks I attached great importance to and was greatly worried by the attitude of the Paris newspaper press toward the loan. Everyone is aware of the influence of the daily press upon French public opinion. I had been well informed of this during the war, when as Minister of Finance I was confronted from the first with the insistent demands of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, based upon telegrams from our Ambassador to Paris, that it was necessary to strengthen our political credit by

establishing a closer contact with the press and by interesting it in a more dispassionate and more friendly exposition of our internal conditions. Nelidov insisted that it was necessary to appropriate certain sums for the press, if for no other reason than that Japan was doing the same on a large scale; yet he very definitely declined to take any part in distributing the money among the publications and insisted that this matter be entrusted entirely to our financial agent, A. G. Raffalovich. Raffalovich, on his side, while not declining to accept this unpleasant mission, often wrote to me quite sincerely that he felt it to be more and more of a burden, as the papers continually raised their demands in proportion to our defeats. He suggested that these sums as well as their distribution be placed once and for all in the hands of the representative of the press, who was at that time Mr. Lenoir, a man who, according to Raffalovich, enjoyed a fine reputation in the newspaper world. Netzlin warmly supported Raffalovich's idea of entrusting the entire matter to Lenoir, and definitely stated that under no consideration would the banks assume the expenses of this enterprise. He said that the Russian treasury must assume them, in addition to the commission to the banks stipulated in the contract. Count Witte attached no importance to this matter, considering it trifling, and empowered me to decide to the best of my discretion.

In Paris I encountered this problem at the very beginning of the negotiations. Netzlin stood firmly on his former ground and demanded that the banks be not responsible for subsidies for the press. On Raffalovich's advice I refused to agree to this, and while insisting that the bankers lower their commission I also insisted that they be responsible for the subsidies. I shall not describe how I labored and how relieved I was when we came to an agreement on this subject. We agreed that the banks would get a commission of 5½ per cent and would distribute it among themselves without any interference from me, assuming also all expenses of subsidizing the press. Lenoir, on his side, now certain that he would not have to deal with the Russian government, had come to an independent understanding with the banks whereby it was agreed that under present conditions it would be best to arrange matters so that the press would simply keep silent on the subject of the loan transaction and conduct no campaign for its support, since such a campaign might provoke hostility from that part of the press not included in the consortium, and so ruin the whole affair. And thus it was

done. How much the banks paid the press I did not hear, nor do I know now. But it was facetiously reported that the press got very little. It is noteworthy, however, that from the moment we arrived at an agreement on the subject of the press I received no more calls from newspapermen, and the entire matter of the loan negotiations disappeared completely from the pages of the more widely distributed papers as if there had been no loan and no one had been conducting negotiations in Paris. To me this was a great boon, and from St. Petersburg I received nothing but compliments on the calm tone of the press in general and open amazement as to the meager news which one could gather from the French newspapers.

Having successfully concluded the discussion of the main points of the loan, the details went by much more smoothly than I could have expected. I was amenable in all matters of wording the contract. My fellow negotiators were particularly insistent in defining the so-called *clause résolutoire* (resolvent clause) freeing the counter-agents from the obligations which they assumed in case political or other events caused a catastrophe in the world market by depreciating fundamental market securities determined by the contract. The work went on peacefully and swiftly. The moment of signing the contract drew near. I had telegraphed its salient articles to Count Witte directly, and in a surprisingly short time I received almost simultaneously three telegrams, one from Witte, one from Shipov, and one from the Tsar.

Witte was brief, but said that he ascribed the success of the loan negotiations, which had surpassed his expectations, to me. Shipov simply congratulated me. The Tsar said much more in his telegram: "You have rendered an immense service both to Russia and to me. I shall never forget it and can clearly see what great things you have accomplished under the trying conditions of the present moment. I shall await impatiently your personal report."

CHAPTER XI

APRIL 1906

I returned to St. Petersburg on April 19, 1906. I had barely had time to unpack and see my family when I received a letter from Ivan Logginovich Goremykin (1) asking me to call on him. While in Paris I had not kept in close touch with developments in Russia and had no idea why he wished to see me. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when he told me that Count Witte had been dismissed and that he, Goremykin, had been appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council and that the Emperor had selected me as Minister of Finance.

I immediately pointed out to Goremykin that I could not possibly accept this post, as it was only a few days till the opening of the State Duma and I was totally unacquainted with the program that had been prepared for its consideration. I said, too, that I believed that a conflict would develop between the government and the new legislative body which would force the ministry to resign, in which event it would have been wiser to retain the ministry which had prepared the elections, keeping new forces intact until the working relationship between the government and the Duma was more definitely established. Moreover, a government which had prepared certain legislative projects should champion them in the Duma, since it was difficult to imagine that a new government would support projects which might not conform to its views; and it would certainly be bad policy for one government to begin the new legislative work by withdrawing projects which its predecessor had introduced.

In reply to this last argument, Goremykin said that I was mistaken in thinking that Count Witte's ministry had prepared anything for the consideration of the new chambers. "I have here on my desk a list of matters to be submitted to the Duma. Look at it." The list was a blank. N. I. Vuich (2), who had "compiled" the "list," had told Goremykin that the ministry had intended to prepare a list after the opening of the Duma, on the assumption that considerable time would be consumed in organizing the new legislative bodies.

But most characteristic of Goremykin was his statement criticizing

me for supposing that there would be any co-operation at all between the government and the Duma. "The Duma," he said, "will do nothing but fight the government and attempt to seize complete power. It will become a question whether the government is strong and skillful enough to retain its authority in the midst of all this incredible nonsense. It will be an attempt to govern a country suffering the ill effects of revolution by a system that is a parody on Western European parliamentarism."

His words were prophetic.

Beyond this he did not object to my arguments, but was indifferent as usual. He said merely that the Tsar had no confidence in the old ministry and that since he, Goremykin, was heartily in favor of my appointment, I myself would have to explain to the Tsar my reasons for declining it. As I left, Goremykin ventured the opinion that, come what might, the Duma would not succeed in overpowering the government. But the interview left me greatly depressed and only strengthened my resolve to decline any share in the government under Goremykin's chairmanship.

On the same day, the 19th, I went to see Count Witte, whom I found sorting papers before leaving the Winter Palace. "You see before you the happiest of mortals," he said. "The Tsar could not have shown me greater mercy than by dismissing me from this prison where I have been languishing. I am going abroad at once to take a cure; I do not want to hear about anything and shall merely imagine what is happening over here. All Russia is one vast madhouse and the renowned intelligentsia is no better than the rest." He did not even ask me about my trip, but merely said: "At another time I should not have known what reward to ask the Tsar to give you for what you have accomplished. You have achieved an incredible success, but in the chaos which now prevails in Russia your work will be forgotten. Ivan Logginovich is not the one to calm these unruly seas."

All my spare time during these two days I spent in going through the recent papers so as to form some superficial idea as to what was happening in Russia and what was the predominating public sentiment on the eve of the opening of the Duma. The impression I received was most depressing. *Russkiiia Vedomosti* (3), *Russkoe Slovo* (4), and especially *Rech* (5) were quite openly conducting that "attack on the government" of which Goremykin had spoken to me, and were preaching that now was the time for the representatives of the

people to take all authority into their own hands, as only in this way could any real legislative work be accomplished—by a government responsible to the chamber and directed by it. *Novoe Vremia* was chiefly engaged in a polemic with *Rech* without quite knowing upon which foot to dance. Its editorials were colorless and contradictory at every turn. Even Menshikov (6), that rock of conservatism, was continually dwelling upon the strength and power of the representatives of the people and at the same time squaring some personal petty accounts, mentioning my name several times in an ironical or unfriendly tone; as he had done a year previously. *Grazhdanin* (7) was indulging in a polemic with Count Witte, criticizing angrily and vehemently his attitude toward the liberal circles and his playing up to the workers, but saying nothing whatever about the new cabinet and expressing no opinion of the situation.

The Tsar received me at Tsarskoe Selo with a kindness that surpassed anything he had shown me previously. After he had embraced and kissed me his first words were: "Words cannot express my thanks to you, but you must know how great a service you have rendered Russia by what you have done in such trying times and under such difficult circumstances. I followed your every report, and both Shipov and Witte sent me copies of all your telegrams. These telegrams have been perhaps the only cheerful event during your entire stay abroad. The rest is so sad and worries me greatly. You have probably kept yourself posted, and I shall not say how uncertain is the future and how many obstacles we shall have to surmount before we gain firm ground. However, I do not wish to dwell on this now, as we shall have a chance to speak of all this again, often and at length; I only wish to tell you first of all that even your principal 'well-wisher,' Count Witte, has at last melted. He never tired of repeating that he never suspected you would attain the success you did and insisted that I must distinguish you by some special reward. Of course, he has always been true to himself—once he even told me that your retirement from the ministry in October had been quite unnecessary and that you had not listened to his request to stay. I was obliged to remind him of the circumstances of your retirement, which had occurred definitely in accordance with his own wishes. Imagine! He pretended that there had been no misunderstanding between him and you. Probably he no longer remembered that it was he, and none other, who prevented me from appointing you chairman of the Department of Economy. But there is no use talking

of this any longer, as I have definitely parted with Count Witte and we shall never meet again."

Then the Tsar turned the conversation to a matter which I was awaiting with much embarrassment. "Let us talk about something else. I have already told Ivan Logginovich that I should like you to occupy again the post of Minister of Finance, and this seemed to give him great pleasure. I asked him to apprise you of this, knowing beforehand that I could always count on you."

Then I presented my case to the Tsar, as I had to Goremykin, but more clearly and in greater detail. But now, as ever, I placed myself at his command. Nevertheless I thought that it was not in his interests to select me at that time. I suggested that it would be better not to use me until we could begin to think of normal work, when we should not have to worry about the inevitable attack of revolutionary minded groups and the necessary dissolution of the Duma at the very beginning of its activity, which was certain to give another impetus and a new foundation to revolutionary activities.

Several times, during our conversation of nearly an hour, the Tsar expressed his hope that the Duma, faced with the responsibility of legislative work, would prove itself less revolutionary than I feared. He was especially hopeful that the zemstvo people (8), who seemed to have acquired a dominant position in the Duma, would not want to take the lead in a new struggle between the government and the representatives of the people. I pointed out that I had been out of Russia for some time, did not have adequate information, and therefore might be mistaken; nevertheless, I believed that if this were true the needs of the moment hardly called for a new chairman of the Ministers' Council. The Tsar asked me to explain myself more clearly, saying why I thought Goremykin so poorly fitted to cope with the present situation, and to feel no restraint because his decision had already been made. Our conversation on this subject became prolonged. I frankly expressed to the Tsar all my fears that Ivan Logginovich's personality, his great indifference toward everything, his utter inability to compromise, and his outspoken unwillingness to meet the new elements of our state life would not only fail to help us get acquainted with them but would serve to increase the opposition. The Tsar listened to me calmly, raised a few objections, and finally said that I might be right but that it could no longer be helped since he had offered Goremykin the office and could not withdraw his offer. He was sure, however, that Goremykin would retire

whenever he saw that his retirement would help to mend the relations with the new Duma. "What is most important to me," said the Emperor, "is that Goremykin will not act behind my back, making concessions and agreements to damage my authority. I can be perfectly confident that I shall not be given any surprises or made to face any *faits accomplis*, as was the case with the electoral laws. And that was not the only case."

I also learned from the Tsar that the composition of the new cabinet had been decided upon except the candidate for the post of Minister of Finance. He named Stolypin (9) Minister of the Interior, Stishinsky Minister of Agriculture, Prince Shirinsky-Shikhmatov (10) Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Schwanebach State Comptroller, Shcheglovitov Minister of Justice, and Izvolsky (11) Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Tsar did not mention the other ministries.

He treated my case calmly and simply. "You know," he said, "how glad I am to have you with me; yet I understand your arguments and do not wish to force you to act against your inclination, although I am perfectly sure you will not refuse me if I tell you that this is my express will. I shall let you rest for a while, but you must be prepared to see me often, and no matter whom I appoint as Minister of Finance I shall call upon you at the slightest sign of trouble."

The Tsar asked me whom I would suggest as Minister of Finance. I suggested Shipov, offering the same reasons as I had offered Goremykin, adding that I found him the most suitable person to be in control during a period of transition: he was modest and extremely civil, would be conciliatory before the Duma, and would certainly not create any complications, as he would not be a target for anyone's displeasure.

As he saw me to the door the Tsar asked me casually if I did not need some money after a long stay abroad. He said that he would be very glad to help me. I was greatly surprised by this offer, as I had never said a word to anyone about my material circumstances. Nor did they worry me, as I was perfectly able to live on what had been set aside for me when I retired. I thanked the Tsar warmly for his graciousness but begged him not to trouble himself about my situation, as my material resources were entirely satisfactory. Thus ended my long audience.

From the Tsar I went directly to see Goremykin, to whom I repeated everything to the last detail of my interview with the Tsar.

Goremykin seemed to submit to the Tsar's desire to free me, for he did not insist any longer. We did not see each other again until the opening of the Duma in the Winter Palace, April 26.

The three days that remained before this event I spent at home with my family and close friends. I saw few outsiders, and those who called already knew that I was free from taking any part in the new cabinet, and all offered their congratulations, some sincerely, some with certain qualifications. Among the latter was Count Witte's close friend, Aleksei Dmitrievich Obolensky, who told me frankly that Witte had asked him to find out whether I had been able to get myself excused. He would not believe me when I told him that the Emperor himself had very graciously freed me from this appointment. Prince Obolensky said that both Count Witte and he had believed that I would only stand upon my dignity a bit, "like another Godunov," being all the time only too pleased to "stick my head into the noose again." Aware of the close relations that existed between Count Witte and Prince Obolensky, I told him also of the offer the Tsar had made to me and asked him to let Witte know that I had refused. I have no doubt that he complied with my request, yet this did not prevent Count Witte from writing in his memoirs at a later date that after I returned from abroad I asked him through Shipov for an appropriation of 80,000 rubles but that he had found such a request unseemly and had refused. To be sure, one could find more than this one untruth about me in Witte's memoirs.

Late in the evening of April 25, as we were sitting at home among a few close friends, the doorbell rang and I was handed a package from Taneev (12). It contained the ukase appointing me Minister of Finance and a program of ceremonies of the opening of the Duma and the State Council by the Emperor in the Winter Palace.

Following my first impulse I called up Goremykin to ask him what was the meaning of this, but no one answered my repeated calls. Consequently, it was in the Winter Palace that I met my new Chairman of the Ministers' Council and all my new colleagues.

Goremykin met me at the entrance to the throne room and said casually, as if nothing had happened: "You are, no doubt, accusing me of having played a trick on you in having promised not to insist on your appointment and yet having done just this. I know well how devoted you are to the Tsar and how ready to comply with his wishes. Two days ago the Tsar told me that he had freed you of the pleasure

of being executed, wishing to save you for the future, and he suggested that Shipov might stay on at his post for a while. I told him I had nothing against Shipov personally, but that I was thoroughly convinced that he would not be able to manage the work; and, moreover, the decision not to retain any one of the preceding cabinet, once adopted, should not be altered. I had no other candidate for this post and, besides, I did not see any reason for letting you occupy a privileged position while I myself would have been only too happy to have stayed where I was. The Tsar said to me, 'Let Vladimir Nikolaevich follow your example, then,' and signed the ukase which I had brought with me. He added that if you should find things too hard you could always realize your desire to return to the State Council."

Further discussion on this subject would have been useless. Anyway I had to take my place on the right of the throne among my new colleagues, who met me now for the first time since my return. There were many familiar faces: Kaufman-Turkestansky (13), Shcheglovitov, Stishinsky, Schaufuss (14). There was one whom I did not know at all, namely, the new Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Prince A. A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. However, Shirinsky-Shikhmatov's political physiognomy was so well established that the new State Comptroller, Schwanebach, who congratulated me on "not having been able to throw off the yoke which would be sure to give all of us big blisters and even break a few necks," remarked that he "did not quite understand the composition of our new cabinet and the presence in it of several elements not too tenderly disposed toward the idea of popular representatives and hardly capable of inspiring great confidence in the latter." I replied that, considering the matter from this point of view, we all belonged to this category, from our chairman down. Just then, the members of the Imperial family began to appear and we had to end our fleeting conversation.

St. George's Room, the throne room, presented a queer spectacle at this moment, and I believe its walls had never before witnessed such a scene. The entire right side of the room was filled with uniformed people, members of the State Council, and, farther on, the Tsar's retinue. The left side was crowded with the members of the Duma, a small number of whom had appeared in full dress, while the overwhelming majority, occupying the first places near the throne, were dressed as if intentionally in workers' blouses and cotton shirts, and behind them was a crowd of peasants in the most varied costumes,

some in national dress, and a multitude of representatives of the clergy. The first place among these representatives of the people was occupied by a man of tall stature, dressed in a worker's blouse and high, oiled boots, who examined the throne and those about it with a derisive and insolent air. It was the famous F. M. Onipko, who later won great renown by his bold statements in the first Duma and who also played a prominent rôle in the Kronstadt insurrection (15). While the Tsar read his speech addressed to the newly elected members of the Duma, I could not take my eyes off Onipko, so much contempt and hate did his insolent face show. I was not the only one who was thus impressed. Near me stood P. A. Stolypin, who turned to me and said: "We both seem to be engrossed in the same spectacle. I even have the feeling that this man might throw a bomb. However, I do not think we need fear that; it would be too unprofitable for these gentlemen and would dictate our conduct too clearly."

There was still another thought that made a deep imprint on my soul: what sentiments must have reigned in the heart of the Dowager Empress (16) during the reading of the speech from the throne. She could hardly fight back the tears, glancing now at the Tsar and now at the crowd that pressed close to the throne, as if she hoped to find among these people familiar faces which could reassure her and dispel her dark thoughts. The Empress Alexandra Fedorovna stood at her side, outwardly calm but inwardly thoughtful, and the Minister of the Court, Baron Frederichs (17), who was standing near me, said to me in French after the end of the speech when everybody was going out: "I wish I knew what thoughts the Empress A. F. was thinking, but none of us will ever know, as she will tell the Tsar alone what was on her mind."

A few days later I presented myself to both Empresses on the occasion of my return to the Ministry of Finance. The Empress Alexandra Fedorovna told me simply that she knew I had asked the Tsar not to appoint me and that she knew I must have had many reasons for it. "But," she said, "everybody is having such a terrible time that one is obliged to make some sacrifice and do what one can."

The Dowager Empress accorded me a totally different reception. She began by saying that she had seen me during that "terrible reception," that she was still unable to calm herself after having seen all these new people filling the rooms of the palace for the first time. "They looked at us," she said, "as upon their enemies, and I could not make myself stop looking at certain faces, so much did they

seem to reflect an incomprehensible hatred for all of us." Then she asked me my opinion as to the possibility of the government's working with a Duma of such a composition. To this I replied briefly, stating my own apprehensions and the general belief that a situation would soon arise in which we should have to decide either to introduce a full-fledged parliamentary system, transferring the authority from the Emperor's tried servants to the representatives of public opinion, or to dissolve the Duma and prepare a new electoral law.

"All this frightens me greatly," she rejoined, "and I ask myself if we would be able to protect ourselves from new revolutionary outbursts, if we have enough strength to suppress another revolt as we did the Moscow one, and if Goremykin is indeed the man to be of use at such a moment?"

I answered that I did not think Goremykin himself believed that he was called upon to play such a part, nor could I understand why he did not decline his appointment.

This ended our conversation. In parting the Empress said, "Now I understand why you have so insistently asked the Tsar not to appoint you; but I also see that my poor son has very few people whom he can trust, while you have always told him the truth."

That same day the Duma held an opening session in its new quarters, and all ministers were invited to attend a solemn *Te Deum* at the Taurida Palace (18) at three o'clock. It was supposed that this would be the first meeting of the people's representatives with the government.

This expectation was realized, but inauspiciously. After the *Te Deum* we stood in a distinctly secluded group, and no one approached us except Count Heyden (19), who had known me during his work in the Office of Applications. He alone gave us a few words of greeting, but did not stop to talk, and after a few minutes all of us departed, each one to go his separate way.

Part III

The Period of the First and Second Dumas

CHAPTER XII

APRIL-JUNE, 1906

I am not writing a history of my time and therefore shall not dwell at any length upon the history of the First Duma except in so far as my own personal activities are concerned.

From the opening of the Duma by the Vice-Chairman of the State Council, E. V. Frisch, and after the election of Muromtsev (1) as President of the Duma, the government was attacked and literally besieged and a desire was manifest to sweep away all that had been accomplished during the half year of Count Witte's administration and to force the government to adopt a purely parliamentary régime as already proposed by the Cadet Party (2). The members of that party in the Duma, representing the leaders of the opposition movement, together with their backstage leaders, represented by the central committee of the party, had arranged Muromtsev's election before the Duma opened and continued to remain masters of the situation until the day the Duma was dissolved. All this has long since been recorded on the pages of our history; my repetition would introduce nothing new and would merely create another occasion, perhaps, for accusing me of bias.

It will suffice to draw the reader's attention to the first session of the Duma, April 27, when, directly after Muromtsev had been almost unanimously elected President, Petrunkevich (3) made a speech advocating the necessity of granting pardon to all political offenders. On April 29 he spoke again on the reply to the Tsar's speech from the throne, describing clearly the principles on which this reply should be based. Zabolotnyi (4) also spoke, insisting on the necessity of including in this reply a demand for the abolition of capital punishment.

A few days later, during the sessions of May 2 and 4, the Duma clearly showed its stand in the matter which is generally termed "the attack on the government." In these two sessions it was definitely shown what the First Duma had chosen as the slogan for all its activity. I shall not quote here the detailed list of all the issues, as

these have been preserved for posterity in the records of the sessions of the First State Duma and were incorporated in the reply to the Tsar in the form of a program. I want to point out, however, that at the same time it was declared necessary that the government, since it did not enjoy the confidence of the people, must be dismissed and replaced with another which would be responsible to the representatives of the people; and that the State Council must be abolished and a one-chamber system must be introduced. The program included forced expropriation of privately owned land, the granting of all sorts of liberties, a radical change "upon a democratic basis" of the organization of all zemstvo and municipal institutions free from all government control and supervision, reform of taxation, measures to satisfy the demands of separate nationalities, changes to be introduced in the popular representation in accordance with the general franchise, pardon to political offenders, and so forth.

An address to the Tsar composed along these lines, and actually prepared a long time previously outside the walls of the Duma, was approved almost unanimously by the Duma. The same majority, amid thunderous applause which made it impossible for any objections to be heard, decided to appoint a delegation to present the reply to the Tsar. Five or six members, including Count Heyden, suggested that a more considerate form of requesting an audience be selected, but their words were drowned by shouts and passionate outcries, and they could do nothing but file a written protest.

On this matter of sending a delegation to present the reply to the Tsar, a conflict with the government flared up immediately. On May 6, Muromtsev presented the Duma's resolution to the Emperor. On the same day, it was sent to Goremykin, who, on May 8, notified Muromtsev by letter that the deputation would not be received and that the reply to the Tsar's speech was to be sent to the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, whose duty it would be to present it to the Tsar. From this day on the conflict between the Duma and the government, and even the Tsar himself, was definitely declared—a conflict which every new day intensified.

One has but to recall the speeches made in the Duma regarding Goremykin's letter, one has but to read what was printed during those days on every conceivable subject, one has but to think of the drafts of laws introduced from every side on the issues mentioned in the reply, of the petitions submitted to the Duma from every corner of Russia, and of the applause with which the most radical of these

projects were greeted to see clearly and without any prejudice that the Duma was becoming with every new day more and more truly a source of open revolutionary propoganda and that the government had no legal means to fight this propoganda except one which had suggested itself from the first moment.

A final manifestation of this revolutionary attitude was given on the historic date of May 13, when the government submitted a declaration of its attitude toward the Duma's demands. This day is particularly memorable to me and all its smallest details stand before my eyes as distinctly as ever. Let me explain how this declaration came to be composed. From the beginning of our ministry together, Stolypin, the Minister of the Interior, and I worked in the very best of relations. We often went together to the sessions of the Ministers' Council, which, beginning late in April, Goremykin held at his house on the Fontanka almost every night. The main subject of my talks with Stolypin and of the discussions in the Council was Stolypin's résumés of the telegrams which he received from provincial governors reporting on the impression the Duma speeches created in the country. All these telegrams sounded the same note: a growing revolutionary spirit and the lack of means of fighting it. There were even direct statements by some governors that they could not guarantee the preservation of order and warning us to expect the gravest consequences. They also mentioned the prevalence of a mutinous spirit among the lower government employees, and nearly all of them reported that the pacification apparent after the suppression of the Moscow revolt was turning into manifestations of a purely revolutionary unrest which could not be suppressed by any measures, since the government had been discredited in the eyes of the population, which was now looking toward no one but the Duma. Local authorities were not informed as to the stand the government would adopt in this openly growing conflict with the representatives of the people. Naturally, these reports of the governors were immediately brought to the attention of the Emperor in the reports of both Stolypin and Goremykin, who sent the Tsar copies of typical reports nearly every day. It could not have been otherwise. The government could not conceal from the Tsar that which had been reported to it by persons of reserved judgment and great experience.

Strange as it may seem, these reports not only did not darken the shadows of existing conditions but more often than not lightened


them, for it often happened that the government would learn of some incident from a governor's report much later than it had learned of it from another source, at times even from the newspapers. Thus it was, for instance, with the well-known incident of the Belostok (5) pogrom, of which the Duma had learned before it was reported by Kister, the newly appointed Governor of Grodno, who either because of a misunderstanding or because of incomprehensible conceit did not at first deem it necessary to report it to the Minister of the Interior. The latter learned of it only through a notification sent to the Duma. The governor did not even go to Belostok until the minister had directed him by telegraph to do so. This made Stolypin's position in the Duma a most unpleasant one.

Despite the varied composition of the new cabinet there was not, and could not be, the slightest disagreement on the subject of what was to be done on the issue raised by these reports. The Council had to choose between two lines of action: either to adopt from the start an attitude of submission to the Duma's demands, or to resist them and to declare definitely the attitude of the government to these demands. I must say here firmly in all truth that neither Goremeykin nor Stolypin ever mentioned what instructions the Tsar gave them regarding these reports from the governors. As for myself, personally, the Tsar never once summoned me during the first days of the Duma. My routine reports were infrequent, and I do not recall any that occurred until the day directly preceding the date on which the Council worked out the text of the governmental declaration.

We were all of one opinion, namely, that any concessions to the pressure exercised by the Duma were out of the question. The most confirmed opponents of the new ideas, like Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, and also Stolypin and myself, who thought the government should fall in line with the new trends providing these did not fundamentally contradict the newly published laws and the prerogatives of the Tsar, perceived that a clash was imminent. We all agreed, moreover, that we must oppose with all our might the three fundamental principles which constituted the goal of the First Duma. These three principles were:

a) The abolition of the right of private ownership of land under the guise of forced expropriation; this land to be transferred to the peasantry.

b) The abolition of the fundamental laws, taking authority



THE STATE DUMA IN SESSION

away from a government responsible before the Monarch and giving it to a government responsible to and chosen from the representatives of the people.

c) The seizing of all authority by the representatives of the people.

Regarding these three fundamental principles there not only was no divergence of opinion among us but they never even constituted the subject of any protracted discussion. No representative of the so-called extreme Right orientation needed to raise his voice in the Council, and none of the partisans of a more moderate trend of thought were obliged to persuade the rest of the correctness of their views. We were all agreed that the Duma's reply to the speech from the throne was utterly unacceptable and should be answered by a declaration by the government which should set forth two principles as points of departure: (a) that the newly established order, including the right of private property, should be steadfastly preserved; and (b) that the government was quite prepared to meet all desires of the representatives of the people in the direction of improving our legislation and enforcing the principle of lawfulness in the work of state administration.

The Council did not deliberate long over the text of the declaration. I do not know who was the author of the first draft, but I believe that two persons played an important part in this work. I think that the substance of the declaration was outlined by Stolypin and that it was edited by Shcheglovitov. I took no active part in it.

Two or three days before this declaration was submitted to the Duma, the Tsar broached the subject during one of my routine reports. In the course of my report I mentioned that the foreign press and foreign exchanges were reacting unfavorably to the news of the first sessions of the Duma. The Emperor then told me that he did not much like the idea of a government declaration to the Duma and that he was wondering if it would not be better for him to reply in person. I objected that such a course was not provided for in the laws, and that it would establish a dangerous precedent, that it would bring him into direct conflict with the popular assembly, whereas his rôle was naturally that of supreme arbiter in conflicts between his government, responsible to himself alone, and the representatives of the people. I contended that the Duma ought to perceive that the government was speaking with the Tsar's knowledge and was carrying out his will; yet the name of the Monarch must not be mixed

up in any conflict, and the government ought to be the one to receive the shock of the clash, which in my estimation was both unavoidable and imminent.

The Emperor agreed with me and said that he had had a long talk on this subject with the Minister of the Interior, whom he was seeing more and more frequently at that time and who, by the clarity of his intelligence, created a very good impression. The Tsar also thought that he had great courage, and, what was extremely valuable, was perfectly frank in expressing his opinions. According to the Tsar, Stolypin's opinion was in accord with mine. "Yet," he added, "not all those around me share this point of view, and there are those who strongly recommend that I appear personally before the Duma." The events of July 9 fully explained the meaning of the Tsar's words.

As to the declaration itself the Emperor told me that he was in agreement with the text yet would have preferred it to be even stronger and more decisive, but that he would not insist upon changes, in order that there should be no occasion to say afterward that the government had not been moderate in dealing with the representatives of the people, although he was sure that the matter would not stop there. "However, let us not run ahead of events. It sometimes happens that a very severe attack of illness leaves a patient as by a miracle, although we should not look for miracles in such matters. I think continually of what you told me when you asked me not to appoint you Minister of Finance."

Then came the day of May 13, when Goremykin read aloud the declaration of the government. I recall it well. The whole cabinet appeared in the Duma and occupied their seats. Baron Frederichs was seated next to Goremykin, then myself, then Stolypin.

Goremykin read the text in a voice that was hardly audible and which betrayed no emotion, even though his hands were shaking with agitation. The reading of the declaration was received in dead silence, but no sooner had Goremykin finished than V. D. Nabokov (6) leaped to the tribune and uttered his famous brief challenge which ended in this well-known sentence greeted by a deafening applause: "Let the executive power bow before the legislative!" Then followed the speeches of Rodichev (7), Aladin (8), Kokoshkin (9), Shchepkin (10), and others, each more stinging than the other, full of violent attacks upon the government, accusing it of all manner of faults. Every word was followed with ever more passionate

applause, which fanned still higher the flaming ardor of the speakers.

Shcheglovitov attempted to reply to the accusations that unchecked lawlessness was rampant in Russia. His tone was most reserved and businesslike, but this only added fuel to the fire of these unrestrained orators, thus showing clearly that any attempt at explanation was doomed to utter failure and would only provoke new clashes. Many times Baron Frederichs asked me whether this would not be a good time for all of us to rise and leave, but I restrained him, pointing out that we should await the departure of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council. We sat it out until intermission time, hardly able to control ourselves under the torrent of invective directed against us, and then left the Duma in a body. I do not know who won the first prize in this contest of insults, whether it was the Cadets or their associates on the left. As for the Duma, after a series of revolting demonstrations against the government and all its representatives, it voted a resolution at that very session to pass on to the consideration of other matters, which only served to widen the now open breach with the government.

Just here I should like to quote the main points of the text of this resolution, which strangely enough has accidentally fallen into my hands in exile:

"Expressing before the entire country complete lack of confidence in a cabinet not responsible to the representatives of the people, and recognizing that, as a necessary condition of the pacification of the country and of the fruitful work of the people's representatives, the present cabinet must immediately resign and be replaced with one which enjoys the confidence of the State Duma:

"The State Duma resolves to resume the consideration of pending matters."

Only seven members of the Duma refused to vote for this and made a separate statement.

On the next day, May 14, Goremykin presented the text of the resolution to the Emperor. On May 16 the Council met for a brief session at the Fontanka, and Goremykin invited all those present to express their views so that he might report to the Tsar what measures it would be advisable to adopt in the existing situation and what attitude should be observed toward the Duma. Everyone saw clearly that there could be no question of the government collaborating with the Duma, and the discussion centered upon one subject: whether to

dissolve the Duma at once or to wait and see what turn the sessions of the Duma would take and whether the resolution which it had just adopted would not serve as a safety valve for the seething spirits of the assembly.

Essentially, we were all of one mind. Only the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolsky, insisted that we must be patient and reserved in regard to the Duma and hope that passions would calm down and that serious work would be undertaken. He expressed the fear that, if we did otherwise, the public opinion of Europe would be definitely against us, thus injuring our foreign standing. He was not worried about the domestic danger of revolution. All of us except Izvolsky knew that the Duma resolution had not been adopted on the spur of the moment but represented deliberate preparation for a definitely organized attack on the government, which aimed either to tear power from its hands and transfer it to the opposition or, should such an attempt fail, to stir up another revolutionary outburst in the country and to place all responsibility for it upon the government as an enemy of the people that had refused to satisfy the demands made by their representatives.

We also clearly understood that the leaders in all this were of the Cadet Party, which made use of all extreme elements and gave a quasi-parliamentary form to all their calls to insurrection. The matter, therefore, boiled down to this: what would be the tactics of the leading party, and would it stop with its first successes or would it continue to advance in the same impetuous way? Naturally, in facing this problem, the leading rôle belonged to the Minister of the Interior, who from the first showed great reserve. He did not conceal from us his conviction that the dissolution of the Duma was unavoidable, yet he declared in favor of an attitude of waiting and watching. But he revealed to us that he had reliable information which showed that the Duma circles were conducting a definite agitation in the provinces under very extreme slogans, and that the day was drawing near when the most experienced and level-headed governors could be expected to announce that they were no longer able to preserve public order.

We parted, having agreed to keep ourselves in readiness for any emergency, to follow watchfully the activity of the Duma, and to obtain from the Emperor the authority to adopt such measures as he would deem necessary to preserve order in the country. Goremykin merely asked us not to mention our views to anyone, adding

that it was our common duty to bear up patiently under our intolerable situation until we should clearly see that there was nothing more to hope for.

The rest of May and all of June flew by. Inquiries on the most varied subjects poured in upon the government from the Duma as if from a horn of plenty. Interspersed with these were disjointed discussions of the most radical projects relating to the agrarian problem, general political amnesty, the abolition of capital punishment, and so forth. The government, and particularly the Ministry of Finance, introduced a number of legislative projects, but they were not discussed beyond being referred to commissions. Infrequently representatives of a ministry, most often of the Ministry of War, appeared in the Duma to explain alleged illegal actions. On such occasions violent resolutions, sometimes utterly nonsensical, were directed against the government representative and were always followed by the familiar shout, "Retire! Retire!"

During this time I appeared once in the Budget Committee and once at a general session of the Duma, the occasion of the former appearance being a joint request by Stolypin and me for the appropriation of a supplementary credit of fifty million rubles for the relief of the population of the drought areas and for the purchase of seeds. The government asked for authority to find the necessary means to meet this emergency, since it was impossible to anticipate a balance in the budget for that year. As a result of the poor crops of 1905 it had become clear early in 1906 that many localities would be unable to handle the situation without large funds from the treasury. Estimates from the Ministers of the Interior and of Agriculture confirmed by reports to the Ministry of Finance placed the need at 100 million rubles for food and seed. Orators in the Duma complained loudly of the desperate situation of certain regions, criticized the government in violent terms, and in the end suggested that the Duma appropriate the needed credits. But when the government submitted a project for the Duma's consideration no one would listen to it. Many times my representatives and those of the Ministry of the Interior urged the Duma to expedite the needed appropriation, but the answer was always the same: the matter is under consideration and the Duma knows the needs of the people better than anyone else.

About June 15 I was invited "to attend in person or send a representative invested with full power" to the Budget Committee

to consider the project of appropriating fifty million rubles for relief. I myself attended in order to give no cause for an accusation that the ministers avoided working with the Duma. Petrunkevich, the Chairman of the Committee, met me and, having introduced me to the meeting with every mark of civility, invited Herzenstein (11) to state his opinion on the matter.

Herzenstein, after saying that he favored the project of the appropriation, asked me to shed some light on the financial condition of the treasury so that the Committee might judge to what extent the proposed expenditure was within the capacity of the treasury at the moment. I began to explain the situation in so far as it related to the project under consideration, but after my first introductory remarks Herzenstein picked up his papers and left the session. At the conclusion of my remarks, a number of members proceeded to cross-examine me on all sorts of matters that had nothing to do with the business in hand. In the end I was informed that the Budget Committee held that the government's project had been only superficially studied and that it was impossible to consider an appropriation of more than fifteen million rubles at that time, the remainder to be appropriated after the ministry had produced unsubmitted data.

I never learned just what was meant by "unsubmitted data," although both the representative of the Ministry of the Interior and I tried to show that our recommendation answered all the questions that had been raised. No one paid the slightest attention to us. "All this is false; we have altogether different information and shall decide according to it," they said. The Committee firmly maintained its stand that only fifteen million could be appropriated until another project supported by the new unspecified data was submitted. Petrunkevich suggested that the fifteen million be appropriated and that the government be not authorized to raise the amount by special measures but that the sum be taken from the surplus of the budget, since, as several members of the Committee claimed: "The government budget in general and that of the Ministry of the Interior in particular include many useless and utterly harmful items of expenditures such as the cost of the upkeep of *uriadniki* (12) and the police. There are in fact too many expenditures of this character for us to give the right to find additional sources of revenue to a government which we do not trust."

On June 23 the Duma in general session considered the project, and here the incidents of the Budget Committee were repeated.

Prince Lvov made a speech in which he said little about the government's project but turned his thunder against the policies of the government which had brought the population to famine. He made ironical references to the government's wish to be given the right to raise additional means as if it could not, if it had the slightest desire to do so, have found such a sum in a budget of two billions! Twice I attempted to take the floor, but each time I was shouted down with cries of "Retire! Retire!" This was the first and only matter I ever heard discussed in this Duma. It was the only one in which I participated, and as soon as it had been settled I left the hall.

This incident was a subject of much comment at the session of the next Ministers' Council. Many of them supported my plan to appeal to the State Council to pass an amendment to the Duma resolution; but to this Goremykin once more showed his customary indifference: "I fully recognize the absurdity of the Duma's decision, but I definitely refused to attempt in any way to correct it. I am positive that the State Council will do nothing to help us, not because we are in the wrong but because it does not want to engage in a conflict with the Duma at the very outset. As for you," he said addressing me, "I beg of you not to pay any attention to the affair. Obviously the Duma does not want to work with us, and we must act in the best interest of the matter in hand. That is, we must accept the appropriation of fifteen million rubles, but since we cannot get it from a surplus which we do not have, we must ask for another appropriation and face the fact that no amount of argument about correct procedure would have any effect. As for the things said about us and the insults heaped upon us, it is useless to discuss them now."

Goremykin's judgment of the attitude of the State Council proved to be correct, for both the chairman and most of the members, though condemning the Duma's decision in private, thought it inadvisable to enter the conflict. Stolypin's efforts to accomplish something through Muromtsev were equally fruitless.

CHAPTER XIII

JUNE-JULY, 1906

During the two weeks that remained before the dissolution of the Duma, the sessions of the Council were both infrequent and brief. Despite the fact that everyone observed that the dissolution of the Duma was becoming more of a necessity every day, we did not discuss this matter but discussed impressions and reports of the effects of the Duma debates on the country. Goremykin let it be understood that we could do nothing until we received direct orders from the Emperor. Stolypin, whom I continued to see quite often, felt that the Tsar was rather dissatisfied with Goremykin's lack of decision and was only waiting for the government to take a definite position.

During this time I did not see the Tsar at all except during my routine reports on Fridays, and on these occasions I did not notice any uncertainty in his estimate of the situation. On the contrary, in connection with every report the Tsar led the conversation to general conditions, invariably repeating the same thing, that what was happening in the Duma was most distressing to him and could not be permitted to go on long. He said that he was only waiting for Ivan Logginovich to say definitely what was to be done, although, he would add, it was really not a question of what was to be done but only of when it was to be done.

After one of these reports, I do not remember which, the Tsar said to me: "I hear from certain sources that matters are not so bad as one might gather from the Duma speeches, and that if we only wait patiently and don't get nervous the Duma is sure to get down to work and see for itself that the state machine is not as simple as it first believed. Personally, however, I think that there is much diletantism in this idea and perhaps even an echo of club discussions, and I have another opinion of it all."

The Tsar did not name those who had given him these ideas, but I advised Stolypin to pay closer attention to two persons—the Court Minister, Baron Frederichs, and the Palace Commandant, D. F. Trepov. The former had no understanding of problems of state and

the Tsar did not ask his advice, but his personal nobility of mind and devotion to His Majesty were so much above suspicion that the Tsar could not help listening to what he said, and the Empress trusted him more than anyone of the court entourage. As for Trepov's position, I did not understand it, but it was clear the Tsar trusted him and that he could be either an active ally or a hidden but dangerous enemy.

Stolypin told me in this connection that he had already tried to talk with Baron Frederichs but that the Baron's ideas were in such a jumble that no one could possibly understand him. As for Trepov he would try to talk to him and discover his opinion of events because he heard from all sides that Trepov had an exceptional influence with the Tsar, who paid more attention to his words than to those of the rest of the court.

At about the same time—I believe between the 15th and 20th of June—the Tsar detained me after one of my reports, as was his custom when he had something special on his mind, gave me a folded paper, and said, "Look at this curious document and let me hear your frank opinion as to the suggested composition of a cabinet to replace the one which is meeting with such decided opposition from the Duma." When I asked whose suggestion this was, the Tsar only said: "Not Goremykin's, to be sure, but that of outside persons who may be rather naïve in their conception of state affairs yet who, nevertheless, sincerely seek a way out of present difficult conditions."

I looked over the list and immediately returned it to the Emperor, and as soon as I got home I wrote down the names. I do not have this paper with me, but I remember perfectly well those who were suggested for the principal offices. Opposite the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council stood the name of Muromtsev; for Minister of the Interior, Miliukov or Petrunkevich; for Minister of Justice, Nabokov or Kuzmin-Karavaev (1); Ministers of War, Navy, and the Imperial Court, "at His Majesty's pleasure"; Foreign Affairs, Miliukov or A. P. Izvolsky; Finance, Herzenstein; Agriculture, N. N. Lvov (2); State Comptroller, D. N. Shipov (3). The names of the other candidates escape me.

When I had read the list, as quickly as my emotion would permit I asked the Emperor if he understood that by accepting this or any other list of a like political complexion he would place the executive power in the hands of groups hostile to existing institutions and pave the way for changing our régime to a monarchy of the English

type, thus radically altering our institutions, with consequences the extent and nature of which no one could foresee.

The Tsar listened to me attentively, then asked: "What should be done, then, to put an end to what is happening in the Duma and to direct its work into a peaceful channel?"

The substance of my answer was briefly as follows:

To place the government in the hands of the party from which most of the names on the list had been taken would not ensure the enactment of that party's program even if the Emperor were to approve it. This party in its efforts to attain power had promised so much to the Left elements that in the end it would be swept aside by them. I could plainly see the approach of the specter of real revolution with the worst results for the monarchy and the country. If the Emperor had any fears, there was nothing to do but prepare to dissolve the Duma and revise the electoral law of December 11 (4) which had flooded that body with a multitude of peasants and lower zemstvo intellectuals. We had also to consider a reorganization of the government by the Emperor in order to eliminate elements obviously unsuited to this new régime.

My last words were: "We are not yet mature enough to have a one-chamber constitutional monarchy of a purely parliamentary type, and I believe it my duty to warn you, Sire, not to attempt this new experiment from which there may be no return."

The Tsar stood facing me in silence, then extended his hand, pressed mine hard, and dismissed me with the words which I can still hear: "Much of what you have just said I have lived through and suffered. I like to hear different opinions and I am not intolerant of what people tell me, although at times it is very painful to see the best dreams of my life shattered. But, believe me, I shall never adopt a decision to which my conscience would not agree and, of course, I shall weigh your every thought and let you know what I decide. Until such time, do not believe it if you hear that I have *already* made this leap into the unknown."

At about 3:00 P.M. of the same day, just after I had returned to my country house, I was greatly surprised to receive a visit from A. F. Trepov (5), brother of the Palace Commandant. He told me that he had reliable information that his brother had quite recently presented to the Tsar a list of candidates for a new cabinet composed of representatives of the Cadet Party, and that he very much feared that, with his brother's insistence and the confidence which he en-

joyed with the Tsar, this "demented" project might slip through unless someone opened the Tsar's eyes to the catastrophic danger of this undertaking. He begged me to take it upon myself to explain to the Emperor the impossibility of this measure and, if it were still possible, to steady Russia on the very brink of the abyss to which she was being led by ignorant men "used to commanding squads but without the slightest understanding of political matters." Bound by my promise to the Emperor, I did not tell Trepov anything of what he had learned and suggested that he talk with Goremykin and Stolypin, who were primarily concerned with these matters, and then, if it was true that his brother had undertaken this dangerous game, try to see what he himself could do with him. He gave me a very direct and frank answer: "I have just come from Goremykin. But what of it? He has but one answer: 'All this is nonsense, and the Emperor will never consent to such a measure, and, even if he did, nothing would come of it.' As for Stolypin, I shall never speak to him in this connection, as I am not at all sure that he has played no part in this scheme. As for my brother, I have been obliged to sever all connection with him because he has either lost his reason or has become the tool of persons who have completely lost their common sense. To all my arguments he has but one answer: 'All is lost, and we must save the Emperor and the dynasty from an inevitable catastrophe,' as if he were not the one that is pushing them into it."

When I appeared with my next report, the Emperor met me with the words: "That which so upset you last Friday need worry you no longer. I can tell you now in perfect composure that I never intended to embark upon that distant and unknown journey which I was so strongly advised to undertake. I did not say so outright to those who had suggested this idea and who were, of course, moved by the best intentions—although they had not, because of their inexperience, weighed its danger—because I wished to verify my own thoughts by asking the advice of those whom I trust. Now I can tell you that your opinion was supported by nearly everybody with whom I talked on this subject. I have no more misgivings nor have I ever really had them, for I have no right to renounce that which was bequeathed to me by my forefathers and which I must hand down unimpaired to my own son."

The Tsar did not mention the names of those in addition to me with whom he had talked, and I still believe, what I believed then, that the Emperor had had no definite intention of allowing power to be

transferred to a Cadet ministry (6), but that the idea had been suggested by some outsider and introduced through General Trepov. Stolypin did not speak to me of this either then or later, and I reject the suggestion that Stolypin was willing to agree to such a cabinet in view of the turn events were taking. He never talked with me on this subject, and I believe—although I have no actual proof of this hypothesis—that the most he proposed was the idea of forming a so-called “cabinet of public confidence” headed by himself. He talked frankly with me shortly after the dissolution of the Duma, but I shall speak of this later.*

In our frequent talks Stolypin and I conversed on all aspects of the situation, the need for action, Goremykin's peculiar theory that all government was centered in the Tsar, our obligation to do what the Tsar told us to do and wait patiently until we received our orders. We discussed the idea of a ministry under Stolypin's chairmanship reorganized to include men who “enjoyed public confidence,” an idea popular at the Yacht Club, where the Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich (7) declared that it was agreeable even to the Emperor. Stolypin asked if I would serve in a ministry with men like Koni (8), D. N. Shipov, Count Heyden, and N. N. Lvov. While doubting the feasibility of joining in one ministry men of the old order, some who favored the present régime, and others with altogether different ideals, I could not see how collaboration was possible among people not bound together either by past experience or by their views of the future. I recommended that we find out beforehand whether or not these divergent elements could agree on a program. Stolypin did not tell me that he had already talked the matter over with Izvolsky, who, as I later learned, was one of the most devoted supporters of

* Many years later, thanks to S. E. Kryzhanovsky, I had the opportunity to read the memoirs of D. N. Shipov (*Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom*, Moskva, 1918, Ch. XIII) wherein he gave a prominent place to this episode of cabinet-making in which he directly participated, and I have also read Miliukov's article (P. Miliukov, *Vtoraia Duma 1907*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 226) dealing with the same matter. It is beyond the scope of this narrative to discuss this affair in detail, but I feel it my duty to state that I decidedly reject every suggestion that Stolypin's personal ambition had any decisive significance in this affair or that he abandoned the idea of a cabinet of public men only because these men did not wish to accept his leadership in the government into which he had invited them. One may think what he likes of Stolypin's political maturity, of the stability of his views, and so forth, but to charge that personal ambition was the mainspring of his actions, to accuse him of having no desire to safeguard the interests of the state, is grossly unfair and is refuted by the evidence of his whole career.

the scheme, nor that he had already had conversations with representatives of the Cadet Party, as leaders of that party, in their later writings, declared that he had. Some days later, after August 12, Stolypin told me with much bitterness that all his attempts to attract public men into the government had failed because of their definite refusal, as it was one thing to criticize the government and quite another to accept responsibility for its actions. "They strive for power as power," Stolypin concluded, "and even more for the applause of their supporters; but to share a common responsibility—that is an entirely different matter."

On Wednesday, July 5, my wife and I dined with Countess Kleinmichel. Among the guests was Count Joseph Potocki (9). As we were about to sit down to dinner he asked me quite openly what day was set for the dissolution of the Duma as he had been informed that it was set for the next Sunday. I answered truthfully that as the Ministers' Council had not discussed this matter I did not know, but he did not believe me.

The next day I told Stolypin what Potocki had said. Stolypin was quite surprised. He wondered where the public got such information, as not only was the date not set but the Tsar had definitely said that he wished to hear the opinion of the government on this matter and had asked Goremykin to discuss it some day that week, asking him to report on Friday, July 7.

Later I learned that Stolypin had already discussed this matter with Goremykin and Shcheglovitov and had even given Goremykin the draft of a ukase dissolving the Duma but without setting any date. When I asked Stolypin why he had not told me of this, he said that he had seen no need for making it a topic of general discussion at that time.

A meeting of the Council had been called for 8:00 p.m., Friday, July 7, at Goremykin's house. I had arranged to go with Stolypin, but on Friday afternoon he telephoned to say that he had been unexpectedly called to another appointment but would come to the meeting as soon as possible.

When we had all assembled at Goremykin's house we learned that the Chairman of the Council had been called to a five o'clock audience at Tsarskoe Selo and that the Minister of the Interior had been called there for the same hour, though not together with Goremykin. We had to wait until nine for Goremykin to return; Stolypin came a little later.

Goremykin was in unusually gay and animated spirits: "Ça y est!" he said, "Congratulate me, gentlemen, for having received the greatest favor the Tsar could confer upon me: I have been released from the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council, and my successor is P. A. Stolypin, who, of course, retains the post of Minister of the Interior."

We asked him for details, whether or not the dissolution of the Duma had been decided upon and, if so, when it would take place; but he answered that we should learn all this from the new Chairman, who would arrive at any minute. He added, however, that the dissolution had been set for the ninth, that the ukase had been signed and was to be published immediately, and that he himself was so worn out by the events of the last two months that he could not talk of anything. He said he felt like a schoolboy on vacation, wished for nothing but rest, and was even then going to get some sleep and wished to see no one until morning; in the morning, however, he would be glad to see any one of us if we wanted to find out anything from him that remained unsettled by Petr Arkadevich. With these words he left as hastily as he had arrived, and we remained to wait for Stolypin.

Stolypin arrived about nine-thirty and told us all that had happened at Tsarskoe Selo. He had been called there about three, the audience being set for five. When he had arrived at the Alexandrovsky Palace about half an hour before his appointment, the courier on duty had told him that before he reported to the Tsar he was requested to see the Court Minister, Baron Frederichs, who was waiting for him at the Palace. Stolypin had found Baron Frederichs greatly agitated. The Baron had poured forth a torrent of incoherent words, the trend of which was that the Tsar had decided to dissolve the Duma, that this decision might entail direst consequences, including the downfall of the monarchy, that it should not be carried out until all other means had been tried, and that Goremykin, with whom he had often spoken, refused to listen to him, so that he wished to address Stolypin, as he had learned that the Tsar had decided to offer him the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

Frederichs' plan, which had obviously been suggested by someone else, was that the Emperor should go in person to the Duma, express his displeasure at its conduct, and warn it that unless its attitude changed he would take those steps which he was privileged to take by the fundamental laws. There was every hope that the Duma would

alter its course rather than appear before the country as a violator of the will of the Monarch to whom the deputies had just taken an oath of allegiance. Stolypin had argued that it would be dangerous to involve the Emperor in a contest with the Duma and that it would be fatal besides, to which the Court Minister had replied that many persons devoted to the Tsar believed the whole trouble lay in the choice of the ministers.

In the Emperor's anteroom Stolypin had met Goremykin, who, in high spirits, had told him that he had been freed from his office, which the Tsar now intended to offer to Stolypin. On being summoned before the Emperor, Goremykin had said that he had informed Stolypin of the decision and had begged permission to return to the city in order to be able to transfer all business to his successor that very day.

According to Stolypin the Tsar had been quite calm and had begun by saying that in his estimation the dissolution of the Duma had become a matter of urgent necessity and could not be postponed any longer. "Otherwise," he said, "we all, and I in the first place, will bear the consequences of our weakness and hesitation." He had gone on to say that no one could tell what would happen to the country unless something were done to remove this source of direct instigation to mutiny and the inspiration of this movement which aimed at nothing less than the abolition of the monarchy. Goremykin himself recognized that he was not the man to handle the present situation and had recommended Stolypin as his successor. The Tsar had said that he was in agreement with Goremykin, and, further, felt that the Minister of the Interior should also be Chairman of the Council: "I am obligated before God, before my country, and before myself to fight, and I would rather perish than hand over without any resistance all power to those who stretch out their hands for it."

Stolypin told us that he had attempted to point out his lack of experience and his unfamiliarity with the crosscurrents of St. Petersburg society, but the Tsar had not let him finish: "No, Petr Arkadevich, here is the ikon before which I often pray. Let us make the sign of the Cross over ourselves and let us ask the Lord to help us both in this difficult, perhaps historic, moment." Then the Tsar made the sign of the Cross over Stolypin, embraced and kissed him, and asked him on what day it would be best to dissolve the Duma and what instructions he proposed to give to insure order chiefly in St. Petersburg and Moscow, because he had little fear for the provinces and

was sure that they would merely reflect whatever happened in the capitals. Stolypin had answered the Tsar that for a long time the Council had clearly recognized the necessity of dissolving the Duma and would undoubtedly take immediate action. According to him the dissolution should take place the next Sunday, that is to say, on the ninth, and should be carried out in such a way that the people would not suspect this move, thus avoiding complications. Then he had offered to the Tsar for signature all documents prepared in advance, so that the ukase dissolving the Duma might be delivered to the Minister of Justice that same evening for publication by the Senate Printing Office. All measures were to be taken to prevent the news from leaking out of the printing office, for which the Minister of Justice had been prepared and could be trusted. Then, on Sunday morning the *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik* would publish the ukase dissolving the Duma and the one dismissing Goremykin. Copies of the ukase would be posted all over the city and on the doors of the Duma; a trustworthy military patrol would be stationed in the Taurida Palace prohibiting entrance to anyone; and, finally, the Minister of War would increase the garrison of St. Petersburg by transferring to it, as inconspicuously as possible, some regiments of mounted guards and would place reinforced military patrols early in the morning at all important places in the city. All these suggestions had been approved, and the ukase had been signed.

After Stolypin had told us all of these details, we stayed for some time, discussing the problem of the convocation of another Duma, and a new electoral law. Regarding the calling of another Duma, the Council agreed that it should convene on February 20, 1907, the date set in the ukase, although Stolypin said that the Tsar had suggested that, should we decide upon a later date, he would sign a ukase to that effect.

The problem of the electoral law, however, detained us for a long time, so clearly did everyone perceive that the root of all evil in regard to the composition of the Duma lay precisely in the law of December 11, 1905. Many varied opinions were expressed then and there, but as it was approaching 3:00 A.M. we separated, having decided to assemble again directly after the dissolution and to begin work under the new chairman.

The next day I called on Stolypin. He began by saying that he was almost sure the dissolution would not be attended by any complications, as no one at the Duma suspected anything. Then he told

me something which he had not told the Council the previous evening. Before leaving Tsarskoe Selo he had told the Tsar that in his opinion those ministers who opposed the idea of popular representation and thereby antagonized public opinion should be dismissed. Their removal, together with Goremykin's dismissal, might pacify at least the more moderate elements of the opposition. Stolypin suggested Stishinsky and Shirinsky-Shikhmatov as the two ministers whose removal was most urgent. The Tsar had agreed and when the Sunday edition of *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik* appeared it contained ukases dismissing these two ministers and appointing B. A. Vasilchikov (10) and P. P. Izvolsky (11) in their stead.

In compliance with Stolypin's request I went to the country as usual on Saturday. Stolypin was anxious to avoid anything that would arouse suspicion of the decision we had taken and wanted the ministers to follow their customary week-end schedules. But, at my insistence, he arranged with the Minister of Ways and Communications that a special train would return me to St. Petersburg should trouble arise. Besides this, I had my friend, P. M. Kaufman, Minister of Education, promise to send me a telegram. This reached me about 1:00 P.M. on Sunday, saying that there was perfect order in the city. Early Monday morning my wife and I returned to St. Petersburg and drove home through deserted and perfectly quiet streets.

About eleven o'clock I went to see Stolypin. He told me that Sunday had been uneventful. The ukase dissolving the Duma had been posted throughout the city at six in the morning, and at the same time it had been posted on the locked doors of the Duma. At about 10:00 A.M. separate individuals began to arrive at the entrance of the Duma, but no crowd gathered about the Taurida Palace, the increased military patrol was never summoned, and individual members of the Duma who arrived departed in a hurry. About midday, however, it was observed that many Duma members were leaving on the Finland railway. Toward evening it became known that a large number of the members had arrived at Viborg, and then there arrived news of the famous session opened by Muromtsev with the announcement: "The sessions of the Duma are hereby resumed."

To round out the story of this event I must tell of a rumor which was circulated during the first days after the dissolution of the Duma. I cannot give it official confirmation, as I have not had any official document in my possession nor was I told of this by Stolypin him-

self; but in the Ministers' Council and among a number of persons closely connected with the Ministers the story was generally believed. Personally, however, I place little confidence in it.

It was said that on Saturday, July 8, Goremykin had been absent from early morning from the house of the Ministry of the Interior near the Tsepnoi Bridge getting ready to move to his own house on Furstadtskaia. He had returned for dinner but had left again, not to return until late that night, when he told the doorman that if anyone telephoned or asked for him he was to be told that Goremykin was tired, had gone to bed, and was not to be disturbed under any circumstances. Later a message had arrived from Tsarskoe Selo. This was left on the table at the doorman's quarters. When it was handed to Goremykin on Sunday morning it proved to contain a short note from the Tsar directing that the execution of the signed ukase dissolving the Duma should be held in abeyance. But, alas, it was too late.

I never gave any credence to this tale, and consider it quite impossible. The Emperor would certainly never have entertained the possibility, after accepting the resignation of Goremykin and on the same day (Friday, July 7) appointing Stolypin Chairman of the Ministers' Council, of giving a countermand of such importance twenty-four hours later (Saturday, July 8) and sending it to the address of the chairman who had just resigned.

CHAPTER XIV

JULY 1906—JANUARY 1907

All that followed is well known to everybody and therefore I shall not dwell on it. I wish to note only those things which gave me extra duties beside my work in the Ministers' Council.

I had scarcely assumed my new duties on April 26 when events developed which consumed much of our time and added to the nervous tension of our work. My reception at the ministry, after a six-months' absence, was a very cordial one, and in a few days my former colleagues had helped me greatly to become acquainted with what the ministry had done in that time. My impressions were far from cheerful. The revenues had begun to return to normal, as order had been restored after the suppression of the Moscow riot, but they had not yet reached their normal level. The budget for 1906, which had been reduced because of the unrest and the poor returns of the end of the year, caused the most serious apprehensions in the matter of revenue. The ordinary budget expenditures were augmented by extra appropriations for relief work among the population, and these could not be decreased, as reports from the country, including those which reached me through my own organizations, left no room for doubt that the work of relief would demand large sums.

Shortly after the opening of the First Duma these worries were increased by a new one: the foreign exchanges received the Duma debates with great alarm. After the first hymns lauding Russia for adopting a constitutional régime there arose with increasing frequency talk of the danger of the conflict between the government and the representatives of the people. It was soon recognized that the slogans adopted by the young government were dangerous and subversive. One is duty bound, however, to give some foreign correspondents their due, for they did sound a warning as to the dangers inherent in the existing political situation. All this was producing the greatest impression upon banking circles, and one heard more and more often statements to the effect that the revolution was by no means ended and that the government was facing a task perhaps

beyond its capacity. The price of our securities, especially on the Paris Bourse, began to fall sharply. Beginning with the end of May this was especially noticeable in our recent loan. Offered at 88, it fell first to 75, then to 70, and, after the dissolution of the Duma, to 68. At one time it was even lower than this. The group underwriting the loan assailed me with insistent demands to support this issue on the market and to appropriate new sums for the French press.

No less insistent were the inquiries as to whether or not Russia would stay on the gold standard. As things went from bad to worse even my recent friends became less and less friendly. I resisted the arguments of my correspondents, giving in to them in details but limiting myself to small advances to the press and assuring them always that the gold standard would be preserved, as was indicated by the increased amount of cash in the treasury and the accumulation of paper currency. I considered it my main task to gain time and to see what would be the effect of the dissolution of the Duma, of which, of course, I made no mention in my correspondence.

After the dissolution the first impression was little short of catastrophic. No one knew just how low our bonds had fallen, so great was the desire of the holders to get rid of them at any price. Heaven knows what low levels they might have reached had not their sale been stopped by lack of purchasers. After the evening of July 10 I was flooded with hysterical telegrams on this subject. I answered them by pointing to the absolute calm with which the country had met the dissolution of the Duma, demonstrating that the country was not composed exclusively of politicians urging a revolution and that it contained a great many persons who saw the necessity of the dissolution as a means of preserving law and order. In all of this Stolypin supported me and gave me authority to say at my own discretion that my statements were backed by the entire government. This was a radical and welcome change from the support I had received from Goremykin. Once more I was the independent manager of my ministry, as I had been during the first year of the war.

After the first week following the dissolving of the Duma the foreign markets regained much of their confidence. The excitement began to calm down, the holders of Russian securities stopped dumping them on the market, and, strange as it may seem, even the renowned Viborg Manifesto (1) tended to stem the panic. As is well known, the people did not subscribe to this manifesto; they continued to pay their taxes and did not resist compulsory military training; yet

the very fact of the appearance of this manifesto showed clearly to the more sensitive and cultured foreign circles that events had undoubtedly been leading to revolution and that the government had been obliged to take some steps in self-defense. At first the foreign press did not express its opinion openly, but my correspondents, especially those in Paris and Berlin, wrote frankly that the public was beginning to understand the correctness of the actions of the Russian government in regard to the Duma. They only demanded—insistently—my assurance that we could handle the situation. As events gave me sounder foundations for my optimistic assurances, there began to appear a strengthening, slight at first, of the Russian securities and particularly of the new 5 per cent loan.

In the middle of August this upturn became more pronounced and the intention of the Russian government to prosecute the persons who had signed the Viborg Manifesto met with sharp criticisms abroad only in the publications of the radical press, while many papers published rather sympathetic articles affirming the positive duty of the government to fight by legal means any incitement of an uprising.

The attempt on Stolypin's life at Aptekarsky Island on August 12 caused a temporary revival of apprehension and excitement at home and abroad. The service which Stolypin rendered the country at that time was indeed great. This awful blow directed at his own family did not disturb the outward composure and great self-control with which he continued to fight the extreme elements of the revolution.

A few arrests of the leaders of criminal plots and the defeat of these attempts produced a sobering effect upon the public, especially when the government remained unshaken, with the result that not only in the capitals but also in the gubernias there were no pronounced manifestations of mass riots, except in the Baltic region, where the government took steps, based upon Article 87 (2) of the Code, against pogroms and violence. Among these measures the institution of courts-martial, for which later the government was so much criticized in the Second Duma, undoubtedly played the chief part in re-establishing order and confidence in the ruling power. One may have any opinion of this measure in its substance; one may place all responsibility for it, as many of our statesmen have since done, exclusively upon Stolypin and Shcheglovitov; but one should have the courage to admit that at that time all ministers agreed to it, not ex-

cluding even A. P. Izvolsky, who entertained most liberal views and missed no opportunity to apply to our revolutionary situation the pattern of the Western European constitutionalism.

During the first month after the dissolution of the Duma the Ministers' Council did not apply itself to any special work. The new Chairman of the Council was very much occupied by internal conditions and the measures to be undertaken against revolutionary excesses. Much of his attention and care was also directed toward mastering the mechanism of administering the Ministry of the Interior, with which he was unfamiliar. Soon, however, two problems were taken up by the Council, and these constituted a subject of discussion in every session:

a) The necessity of preparing for the Second Duma a series of legislative projects concerning the most vital problems of our domestic existence, so that, from the start, the new Duma might find a number of problems awaiting its consideration and would not lose itself in working out its own different suggestions.

b) The advisability of drafting and carrying out, according to the provisions of Article 87 of the Code, a series of urgent measures without waiting for the convocation of the Duma. Stolypin himself seemed to favor this procedure. The peasant problem was especially urgent, and it was thought that His Majesty's government could show the people that it assumed full responsibility for satisfying their needs by itself framing a project dealing with that problem. Moreover, by allowing the Duma simply to discuss the draft of this project and to make alterations, the government would avoid the delays resulting from the friction which would inevitably arise within the Duma, should that body be left with the framing of the project. From the first, Stolypin emphasized the importance of granting the members of a village commune the right to leave it, and of dealing with those problems of land redistribution which were connected with it. Against all suggestions that it was inadvisable to solve the peasant problem by using the extraordinary power provided by Article 87 or that it was preferable not to undermine the established, centuries-old, peasant institutions, he was adamant, answering that for him the peasant problem would permit of no compromise. Whether this attitude was the result of his conviction, developed during his work as governor, that the revolutionary movement could best be fought by enlisting the support of the peasantry, or whether he had fallen under the influence of some men in the Ministry of the

Interior (as, for instance, V. I. Gurko (3), an ardent expounder of the evils of communal ownership, who had often tried to influence Goremykin), I cannot say. But the fact remains, that beginning shortly after the Duma was dissolved the fundamentals of the law enacted on November 9 were continually discussed by the Ministers' Council. The fact that little more than three months passed between the time the project was first considered and the time it was put into effect shows that the Council had to deal with thoroughly worked-out material. So thoroughly was it worked out that, later, the Third Duma and the State Council, even after a detailed discussion of it, introduced few changes and left its basic principles undisturbed.

Personally, I did not play any prominent rôle in framing this law. I have always opposed communal land-ownership and had expressed my views on this matter as early as 1903 as a member of a Special Conference on Agricultural Problems under the chairmanship of Witte.

The peasant problem concerned me directly, however, because, regardless of the fundamental problem of making it possible for members to leave their commune, Stolypin also raised the problem of extending the functions of the Peasant Bank so that it might take a more active part in satisfying the peasants' needs concerning land. In this connection, one could observe the influence which A. V. Krivoshein (4) exercised upon Stolypin from the first and his desire to play a decisive part in building up village or rather land credit, to remove this matter from the competence of the Ministry of Finance, and to transfer it to the Minister of Agriculture. Much later, in 1910 and 1911, this issue nearly led to a complete break between Stolypin and me, of which more later. At this time both Stolypin and Krivoshein demanded that I be more active in helping to work out mediative agreements between the peasants and the Bank.

I had no reasons whatever to refuse except two which neither Stolypin nor Krivoshein particularly shared. I pointed out that the Peasant Bank was ready to meet liberally the peasant need of land, but that I must warn the Ministers' Council that a twofold difficulty would have to be faced:

First, because of pogroms and a certain tension in the relations between the peasants and the landowners, the number of estates offered for sale to the peasants had become rather great and in some localities far exceeded the local peasants' demand for land. Not only was the Bank creating no obstacles to the effecting of mediative agree-

ments but, on the contrary, lately it often had had no offers whatever concerning the purchase of the land offered for sale, despite the fact that the owners did not ask an exorbitant price for their property. This situation invited the suggestion that the Bank should buy these lands so as to be able to resell them again as the peasants of other localities sought to purchase land. But to this suggestion, immediately approved by both Stolypin and Krivoshein as a most vital and even indispensable measure, there was an obstacle, which I was in no position to remove.

Second, those whose land was sold had to be paid in money; they could not accept as payment the mortgage bonds of the Peasant Bank, for the very simple reason that the domestic market did not absorb them to any noticeable degree, so that every new issue, especially any considerable one, only lowered the value of the bonds, thus causing criticism to the effect that the Bank was ruining the landowners by paying them with worthless securities.

In normal times the usual buyers of these bonds were the state savings banks, for which the purchase of mortgage bonds represented a way of profitably placing their free funds. Now, however, these banks could not be counted on, as savings deposits had fallen off markedly and there was little hope that these banks would recover until conditions returned to normal and deposits exceeded withdrawals.

Naturally all these prosaic explanations of mine did not please many of my audience; even the State Comptroller, Schwanebach, argued against them, suggesting that some agreement might be reached with private banks, by exerting pressure if need be, in order to make them purchase the mortgage bonds of the Peasant Bank. I argued, however, that nothing tangible could be expected of such a measure, for the simple reason that the situation of the private banks was far from bright. The Finance Committee, to which I suggested that the matter be transferred so that Stolypin as Chairman of the Ministers' Council might take part in its discussions, also firmly rejected Schwanebach's idea. This served to chill the speculations of my colleagues.

Then another scheme was brought forward: to try to create a special kind of securities non-salable on the stock exchange and not even subject to quotation. These were to be called "registered bonds," with a rate of interest somewhat higher than that of the mortgage bonds. The landowners, who desired to sell their lands at any price

to the Peasant Bank, were given a chance to receive these securities in exchange for their land. Later these securities were actually placed on sale in the stock exchange, where they were purchased by a certain class of dealers who lowered their price gradually as more of them were dumped on the market. Consequently, after some time, their price fell to 60 per cent of their face value, and the landowners, who had received a far-from-high price for their land from the Peasant Bank, actually lost something like 40 per cent of it. Later, when order was restored in Russia, when the market became stronger, and when the savings banks again began to receive increased deposits of people's savings and the sale of 5 per cent and later 4½ per cent mortgage bonds again became possible, as even the open market began to absorb some of these securities, I discontinued the issue of these "registered bonds" and began to substitute for them ordinary mortgage bonds.

I mention all this because I should like to show how unjust were the attacks made by the opposition even in the Third Duma, and in particular by Bulat (5), a deputy from Kovno or Suvalki, who made them his speciality. These attacks accused the government, and myself in particular, of ruining the peasants by selling them the lands of the gentry at exorbitant prices so as to please the landowners, who wanted to sell the peasants their poor lands at disproportionately high prices. Actually, if anyone suffered, it was precisely these landowners who had been given, in exchange for their land and at a rate that could hardly be called fair, securities from which they could not realize more than 65 to 70 per cent of their face value.

Returning to a brief account of the attempt on Stolypin's life, I learned of it in this way:

August 12 fell on a Saturday. After 1:00 P.M. I was in the city to receive callers, as was customary, in the offices of the Ministry of Finance. It being summer, the callers were comparatively few, so that quite early in the afternoon I had disposed of the last one and was busy with my routine work before leaving for my country house.

Shortly after 3:00 I thought I heard a distant gun; I summoned my secretary, who said that everybody in the office had heard it but that they thought it was routine military practice near the powder magazines. No one seemed worried, and from the street one could hear nothing alarming.

About half an hour later the State Comptroller telephoned and

asked me whether or not I had been informed of the explosion on Aptekarsky Island, where an attempt had been made on Stolypin's life. He said that some reports had it that Stolypin was dead, others that he was unharmed but that a part of his villa had been destroyed and a number of persons around him hurt. We decided to go immediately to Aptekarsky Island.

We reached the scene of the disaster without any difficulty. There were a few people around, also a cordon of policemen surrounding a half-destroyed façade of the villa; the front door was covered with débris. The dead and wounded had already been removed. We walked out into the garden, where we met P. A. Stolypin himself. His face, particularly his forehead, was spotted with ink. It seems that at the time of the explosion Stolypin had been seated at his writing-desk and the explosion had splashed the contents of his ink-pot over him.

Perfectly composed, Stolypin told us about the explosion. His reception room had been full of people, and many of the callers, as well as many servants, were among those killed or wounded. His small son had been hurt while playing on the upper balcony, but probably not seriously, whereas his daughter Natalia had suffered a serious leg wound; both children had already been removed to Kalmeier's Hospital accompanied by their mother. So far the doctors had been unable to determine the seriousness of their condition.

Stolypin was anxious to go to the hospital to reassure his wife of his own safety and to learn the condition of his children, but he felt obliged to remain at the villa to complete the necessary formal reports of the incident. So Schwanebach and I went in his stead. We learned that the boy's wounds were only slight but that Natalia's foot had been badly crushed and it might be necessary to amputate it. Before we could get this news to Stolypin, he himself arrived at the hospital. It must have been a great relief to him to learn a few days later that Natalia's foot would be saved.

A day and a half after the explosion the Ministers' Council resumed its work as if nothing unusual had occurred. Stolypin's calm and self-control won the admiration of everyone. In fact, his conduct at the time unquestionably worked a great change in the way he was treated not only by the court and St. Petersburg society but by his colleagues as well. Theretofore he had been criticized for his provincialism and lack of knowledge of the capital's established bureaucratic customs. After August 12, however, he acquired great

moral prestige. His nobility, courage, and devotion to the state were indisputable. He gained in stature and was unanimously acclaimed master of the situation.

With the coming of autumn the Ministers' Council met regularly. At first the sessions were devoted almost exclusively to the land problem and a discussion of the instruction to be issued to the governors concerning preparations for the elections. From late in October or early in November a third problem was added—that of the necessity of revising the electoral law. Stolypin and most of the ministers, with the possible exception of A. P. Izvolsky, clearly recognized that another election according to the provisions of the law of December 11, 1905, would only lead to the same result and paralyze the normal work of the government, which, after all, was appointed by the Tsar and responsible to him and not to the lower chamber. We also recognized that if the government arbitrarily changed the law we should be accused of illegal actions, but at the same time we knew that it would be impossible to persuade the Duma to revise the law. In this dilemma all of us, with the exception of Izvolsky, agreed that in view of the issues at stake an arbitrary revision of the law was ultimately unavoidable.

I mention all this because I want to relieve Stolypin of the full responsibility for the Council's decision on this subject by saying quite definitely that all the ministers of that time, including myself, were perfectly in accord with the Chairman of the Ministers' Council; we all must bear the same responsibility, just as we all must share the same merit—that of having had enough courage to face the unfortunate situation squarely and of having assured the country of peaceful legislative work until the turbulent period begun by the events of 1914. We must also absolve the late Emperor of responsibility for revising the electoral law, for ever since the dissolution of the Duma he had heard from all of us one thing only: that no better results could be expected from the existing law.

I cannot name the exact moment when the Minister of the Interior began to work on the revision of the electoral law of 1905, or under what circumstances. I believe, however, that it was begun as soon as the composition of the First Duma had become clear, and I have some reason to believe that the idea originated with someone in the Ministry of the Interior, if not with Goremykin. Stolypin, in the beginning of his activity and under the chairmanship of Goremykin, could hardly have had a definite opinion on the matter or have

entertained the idea of publishing a new electoral law by a sovereign ukase. He had arrived at this decision only after much hesitation and many discussions in the Ministers' Council during the winter of 1906-1907. Moreover, during the summer of 1906 when, according to some authorities he was negotiating both with the representatives of the Cadet Party and with persons "vested with public confidence," he could not have thought it would be necessary to revise this law.

The project of the electoral law was submitted to the Ministers' Council late in the fall of 1906 or the beginning of 1907. It had been very carefully drafted so that the Council had only to consider it article by article. Stolypin had studied it in all its details, so that he was as qualified to present it as the author of the project, Kryzhanovsky.

During the consideration of this project I met Kryzhanovsky for the first time. I saw immediately what an agile and quick mind he had, coupled as it was with a thoroughly practical and sound understanding of the most complicated aspects of the electoral procedure. He answered all questions precisely and fully. The new law as it appeared in its final edition was in the form in which Kryzhanovsky had drafted it.

I think it is quite remarkable that while the new electoral law was being formulated and discussed no news of it reached the press, the salon, or even bureaucratic circles. Stolypin had pledged all of us to strictest secrecy lest a rumor of what was afoot lead to dire consequences. Consequently, when the law was published in the form of a ukase, it took everyone completely by surprise.

But the preparation of the new electoral law was not the only worry of the government. It was concerned with the struggle against revolutionary outbursts in various localities of Russia. Stolypin kept every minister posted on the events of the day, so that all of us must share responsibility for the decisions adopted. Also, a series of legislative projects was prepared for submission to the Duma. In preparing these projects, a subject arose which deserves particular mention. I refer to the suggestion to remove some of the restrictions upon the Jews.

This subject was brought up at a session of the Ministers' Council in October 1906. Stolypin asked us for a free statement of our views. He said that the restrictions on the Jews only served to irritate the Jewish population of Russia and, while these restrictions were of no real service to the Russian population, since the Jews were always

finding ways of sidestepping the law, they bred the revolutionary spirit among the Jewish masses and gave a pretext for conducting a most outrageous anti-Russian propaganda in America, the most powerful Jewish center. Here Stolypin referred to the experience of the former Minister of the Interior, Plehve, who, for all his conservatism, had earnestly sought to pacify the Jewish masses by introducing certain concessions in our laws concerning them. Shortly before his death, Plehve had even made certain gestures toward reaching some understanding with the American Jewish organization, but had had little success, having received a very cool response from Mr. Schiff (6), the chief leader of this organization. Stolypin added that he had been informed from all sides that at this moment such an attempt might reasonably meet a much better reception if the privileges which we suggested were conceded, even though they did not grant complete equality for the Jews.

The ministers received the project in a friendly fashion, none raised objections, and it was agreed that each ministry should compile a list of those restrictions on the Jews which fell within its competence. These lists were completed in a very short time; the Council discussed them and agreed that a number of rather important restrictions should be abolished. Although Stolypin had made no mention of having discussed this matter with the Emperor, we all recognized that he would not have raised such a delicate question without having informed himself of the Sovereign's views.

The recommendation of the Ministers' Council remained for a long time in the Tsar's possession. We often asked Stolypin what its fate had been and why it had not been returned, and his replies were always assured and confident. Finally, on December 10, 1906, the recommendation was returned to Stolypin accompanied by a letter from the Tsar, which Stolypin permitted me to copy. Here it is: "I am returning to you without my confirmation the recommendation of the Council on the Jewish problem. Despite most convincing arguments in favor of adopting a positive decision in this matter, an inner voice keeps on insisting more and more that I do not accept responsibility for it. So far my conscience has not deceived me. Therefore I intend in this case also to follow its dictates. I know that you, too, believe that 'A Tsar's heart is in God's hand.' Let it be so. For all laws established by me I bear a great responsibility before God, and I am ready to answer for this decision at any time." None of the documents in my possession shows so clearly the Tsar's mystical attitude

toward the nature of his imperial power as this letter to the Chairman of his Ministers' Council.

At that time I was very busy. It would be quite useless to enumerate all that was accomplished during these months of 1906 and the beginning of 1907. I shall say only that the budget for 1907 gave me much to worry about. All ministries had made enormous new demands upon the treasury, as if they wished to show their zeal before the new Duma by insisting upon the need for all sorts of reforms and improvements.

The Ministry of the Interior led all the others, with Agriculture not far behind. The Ministries of War and Navy had demands nearly as great, and I had almost no arguments with which to oppose them. The estimates of these two ministries for 1906 contained no provisions for the rehabilitation of the army after the Russo-Japanese War and still less for the rebuilding of our lost navy.

Insistent demands pressed on me from all sides, while the condition of the treasury was far from satisfactory; nor were there any reasons for expecting its improvement. The crops of 1906 had been poor. The work of supplying food and relief to the population had consumed tens of millions of rubles and threatened to require extra expenditures for the next year. Stolypin fully recognized this, despite his inexperience in directing the affairs of state, and wherever possible he gave me valuable assistance.

In one matter of principle I disagreed sharply with Stolypin, and our disagreement very nearly led to my resignation. It all happened during December 1906. The Ministry of the Interior submitted for the consideration of the Ministers' Council the draft of a statute on the reform of the gubernia administration. From the first Stolypin gave the matter a special significance and let us all understand that it was just as dear to his heart as the statute permitting the peasants to leave the village communes. This was enough to make the ministers, including myself, tend to view the suggestion sympathetically. During the preliminary examination of these suggestions, I proposed that we pass over all nonessentials and concentrate our attention upon those matters which involved fundamentals in the field of finance and taxation.

There was one basic provision falling entirely within the sphere of my ministry for which I entertained an unshakable opposition. This article, No. 20, provided for an innovation unheard of in the world annals of legislation. It provided that "the Treasury should

bear all expenditures of the zemstvos and municipalities for which their own resources were insufficient." No limits were set. The only qualification was that "the governor, the gubernatorial council, and the supreme central committee for the affairs of local economy should declare that the expenditure was useful and necessary for the local life." Expenditures recognized by these administrative institutions were to be automatically included in the budget. There was no provision for a preliminary legislative sanction. I voiced my definite disapproval of such an impossible principle and advanced a series of what I considered were irrefutable arguments.

All the members of the Council, except D. A. Filosofov, who had succeeded V. I. Timiriachev as Minister of Commerce and Industry, supported Stolypin against me. I attempted to find a compromise, but Stolypin would not compromise. Had the issue been placed before the Emperor he undoubtedly would have approved the majority opinion and my resignation would have followed. But in the end I did not resign. Stolypin came to recognize the impossibility of defending his position, and the Council adopted a compromise, which, however, had no practical significance, as a project of gubernia reform was not submitted to the legislative institutions until after Stolypin's death. Meanwhile our relations continued to be as friendly and cordial as in the beginning of our association.

A new incident arose later from the conflict in the reports on the progress of the elections which Stolypin received from his central administration on elections and those which came to me from the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency which was under the Ministry of Finance. From the optimistic reports which he received Stolypin anticipated a much more satisfactory distribution of political views in the Second than in the First Duma. With his characteristic energy he was loath to admit the possibility of error in questions which seemed to him well established, and he passionately combated the conclusions of the Telegraph Agency. For several days he bore me a grudge, and our disagreement even threatened to take a serious turn. Facts shortly proved I was completely in the right, for the final results of the elections to the Second Duma entirely justified the forecast of the Telegraph Agency. Stolypin was the first to confess he had been wrong in supporting his collaborators with uncalled-for warmth.

CHAPTER XV

FEBRUARY-JUNE, 1907

The Second Duma convened on February 20, 1907. Its opening was much simpler than that of the first. After a short *Te Deum* the Vice-Chairman of the State Council, I. Y. Golubev (1), conducted the necessary formalities, which were unattended by any incident. The government was present in a body. Baron Frederichs sat next to me and repeatedly asked what I thought of the new legislators. He was especially curious about a small group gathered about the seats of the extreme Right and surrounding a short, bald, and extremely animated man, Purishkevich (2), who could not stay a single minute in one place. Later on, this group proved to be quite unified in its composition. Its declarations, often showing a good deal of courage and fortitude, played a definite rôle in forming the extreme opposition which characterized the entire three-and-a-half months' existence of the Second Duma (3).

Only a few days after the opening of the Duma, and when it was not in session, the ceiling in the hall in which it sat caved in, evidently as a result of an insufficient examination of the long-unused building at the time of its adaptation to the needs of the First Duma. The Duma transferred its sessions to the building of the Nobility Club and for a few days all work was suspended. The excitement among the members of the Duma was very great. One of the deputies went so far as to hint from the tribune that the accident was a premeditated affair. He was called to order by the Chairman just in time to avoid a sharp rejoinder from the Right. That small Right group never let slip an occasion to repel the attacks from the Left. And although the bold attacks of this small group excited their adversaries on the Left to more extreme outbursts, it gave much encouragement to those of us who occupied the government seats, showing us that we were not without supporters in that turbulent assembly.

The first contact between the government and the Duma came two weeks after the opening, on March 6, when Stolypin read

the carefully prepared government declaration containing its entire program for the immediate future. Everyone recalled the session of May 15, 1906, when the declaration had been read to the Duma by I. L. Goremykin. Now, as on that day, Baron Frederichs was seated next to me, and seemed surprised not to hear the cry, so usual in the First Duma, "Retire, retire." When the declaration was received with loud applause from the Right, he said: "How strange it all seems; the Duma seems to approve of the government and yet everybody was sure that we should have the same thing as with Goremykin."

Baron Frederichs did not have long to wait, however, until the Duma showed its true attitude toward the government. The excellent manner in which the declaration was read, its sincere expression of the government's desire to work in friendship with the Duma, and an exhaustive statement of all that had already been done by the government and all that was projected for the future could not and should not have produced any but the most favorable effect upon any unprejudiced hearer; yet the Duma gave the declaration a different reception.

Directly after Stolypin had finished, Deputy Tsereteli (4), who later played a prominent part in the Provisional Government, mounted the tribune. Once more the sort of speech was heard to which we had become accustomed in the First Duma. There was the same hatred toward the government, the same wholesale denunciation of all the government had said, the same contempt for all of us, and the same unbounded desire to sweep away authority and to gain the highest place so as to build upon the ruins of the old order something new. During this speech the session turned into a veritable political meeting. The deputies on the Right interrupted the speaker, and the chairman called them to order but made no effort to stop the insulting cries of the Left. Tsereteli was followed by other orators from the Left, who increased the irritation by the heat of their affected eloquence. The Right members attempted to take the floor also, but their very appearance irritated the assembly and their voices were drowned by shouts and loud insults. At last the deputies moved to end the debates. The majority supported the motion, but Stolypin was unwilling, and justly so, to let the last word be a mutinous appeal to overthrow the government. He was even more unwilling to allow anyone to think that the government had been intimidated and silenced. He mounted the tribune, once more risking a torrent of

verbal abuse which he had so often experienced in the First Duma. His speech was very short but breathed such force and such dignity that no disrespectful shout was heard. I can still recall the silence of the assembly, and I believe that from that time on everybody recognized that there was a will in the government, which was now ready to fight for its dignity and would not be easy to overpower. The end of Stolypin's second speech actually became historic, and I believe many persons still remember it. Among other things he said this: "All your attacks are intended to cause a paralysis of will and thought in the government and the executive; all these attacks can be expressed in two words which you address to authority: 'Hands up!' Gentlemen, to these words the government, confident in its right, answers calmly with two other words: 'Not afraid!'"

After this historic session the physiognomy of the Second Duma was straightway as clearly defined as could be expected. Two more weeks passed before I had to appear before the Duma and thus to begin an unbroken chain of appearances which lasted from March 20, 1907, till January 1914. Now, at the end of my days, glancing back, I find myself asking where I found strength for this enormous task as well as for the great task of administering my ministry; how did my nerves stand this strain and where did I find courage and will to carry this fight through to the end, especially since I had not desired the task but had taken it because of conditions over which I had no control?

During the two weeks before my first appearance, the Second Duma launched attack after attack upon the government. They attacked every actual or imaginary violation of law by the authorities. Any pretext was good so long as it served to discredit the government, to ridicule its representatives, to subject them to the most incredible inquiries, deliberately to twist their replies—just to show from the Duma tribune the alleged baseness of the government and the intrepidity of the representatives of the people in exposing its transgressions, often quite nonexistent. A glance at the matters which occupied the Duma at that time, at the inquiries it made of the ministers, and at the way each inquiry was later elaborated in repeated debates would be enough to reveal the impossible position of any government, even the most sympathetic, before the unrestrained hatred of the unchecked, ignorant "representatives of the people," who believed themselves to be masters of the situation in which they had placed themselves. This state of affairs could not last long; it

was bound to end in an irrepressible conflict between the Duma and the government. The only uncertainty was how long it would be until the clash came.

On March 20 the Duma undertook the examination of the budget estimate submitted on the day the Duma opened. Everybody saw that it would not be really examined. The estimate of revenues and expenditures would simply be transferred to the Budget Committee, the composition of which was already known. Still, in order to comply with the parliamentary practice of countries with a constitutional system, there would be some general debates, drawn, of course, to our own national pattern and offering a splendid opportunity to tell the government whatever was handiest at the time.

The Ministers' Council had made its preparations for this occasion. I had asked Stolypin to devote a special session to giving me clear directions as to what the limitations of my introductory speech should be and to remove all reason for possible criticism that I had not been dispassionate enough or had introduced some note of discord into the subsequent debates. I was particularly anxious to have the Council's directions because Izvolsky had repeatedly insisted that we should not irritate the people's representatives but should do everything in our power to pave the way for a satisfactory understanding between them and the Tsar's government. For a long time Izvolsky insisted that the Duma was not really so bad as one might have judged by the awkward speeches made during the first days of its existence. It was only when it was evident that the Duma must be dissolved that he changed his views. But more of this later.

Contrary to my custom I wrote out my entire speech and submitted it to the Ministers' Council for approval. It was not at all arrogant, and if there was anything about which some members of the Council, Schwanebach in particular, could reproach me, it was that the speech was too serious and beyond the grasp of the average intelligence of the Duma representatives. Stolypin, however, supported me most decisively, saying that not one word could be omitted. He even offered to show it to the Tsar. When I had reported to the Tsar before the session of the Duma he had told me to be sure that everything I said was perfectly clear and simple and couched in a very reserved tone. "Even so," he concluded, "you will not escape these outbursts which generally greet all representatives of the government."

The entire ministry with the exception of the Court Minis-

ter was present that day in the Duma. Stolypin and most of the ministers stayed through the entire session, and at the close of the session all of them acclaimed me loudly for the way I had answered the first speaker of the opposition, Kutler.

My explanation of the general principles upon which the budget for 1907 had been drawn up and the severe conditions of 1906 under which it had been worked out seemed to create a good impression. The Right group applauded loudly; no one interrupted my speech, and when I finished there was not a single cry of "Retire, retire." Only a dead silence greeted the ovation which I received from the Right. But when the next speaker, N. N. Kutler, took the floor there was loud applause from the Center to the extreme Left. Evidently Kutler had been chosen by the Duma to annihilate me with his merciless criticism and to counteract the impression created by my speech.

Strange was the fate of this man, essentially not bad by nature, who had so recently passed from the ranks of the government to those of the opposition. He had joined the Cadet Party, whose votes had elected him to the Duma, where he was straightway adjudged a very great authority on all matters of budgeting, finance, and general economics. He had without any misgivings agreed to expose the transgressions of the government in matters of finance, and evidently believed, as did those who sent him forth to battle against me, that no better person could be found. He was so carried away by his political enthusiasm that he did not even perceive how awkward it would be for him to appear against me, his recent chief, who had shown him the most friendly attention. For many years Kutler had worked with me in the Department of Taxation, where he was under obligation to me for his promotions in office, and where we had had no disagreement while I was either Assistant Minister or, later, Minister of Finance. After he had been obliged to leave the post of Minister of Agriculture under the circumstances mentioned above he found it difficult to support his large family on the pension of six thousand rubles, which was large for those times and to which he had no official claim but had secured through Witte's intervention. Kutler asked me to support his candidacy for a directorship in the Loan and Discount Bank, headed by a friend of mine, Y. I. Utin. This I did. Kutler was elected in April 1906 and thanked me warmly for, as he put it, "saving me and my family from starvation."

I knew, of course, that in political matters Kutler was under no obligation to take into consideration our former relations. His lack

of a thorough understanding of the budget allowed him to make a series of the grossest errors in his attacks upon the government and myself, thus exposing himself to my counterthrusts. But he was familiar with the entire system followed by the government in preparing the budget. He had been obliged many times to submit to its regulations, which were always founded upon the strictest observance of the law, and should have known that he would find no violations of the law where budget matters were concerned. Yet he was not ashamed to accuse the government openly of failing to account for certain sums included in the estimate; he even threw in the face of the government the unqualified accusation, accompanied by thunderous applause, that "the government had the audacity to conceal" (he said "purloin" but changed the term in the stenographic record) "a balance amounting to 96,000 rubles from an appropriation under the old law for the needs of public education, or perhaps to put the balance to some still more reprehensible use, so that this sum had become entangled somewhere and slipped into somebody's pocket."

This and all his other statements were very easy to answer. The statement quoted above, however, offended the honor of the government. His listeners supposed that an authority of Kutler's caliber and a man who had just left the ranks of the bureaucracy could not help knowing every bureaucratic secret, so that if he talked openly of direct violation of the law and of theft of money there must be something in it. Besides, if Kutler, with his exceptional bureaucratic experience, said that the Ministry of Finance had the best personnel of all the ministries and was well informed in its field, the conclusion to be drawn was that the entire machinery of the government was full of flaws and abuses and deserved to be exterminated from the face of the earth.

Naturally I considered it my duty to accept the challenge, especially since his speech impressed not only the opposition in the Duma but even some members of the government. Stolypin was positively confused and asked me: "What is the meaning of this accusation, and can I deny it?" I assured him that in the end it would be Kutler and not we who would be confused: for, knowing so little about the budget in general and about the estimate of the Ministry of Public Education in particular, he was simply helpless. A few minutes later the chief accountant of the Ministry of Finance, who was sitting behind me and who knew to a nicety all the items in the budget, handed me a slip of paper informing me that "the sum of

96,000 rubles supposedly stolen by the government was mentioned on page so and so in the estimate which Kutler was discussing, being included in the sum appropriated for pensions of government employees under the provision of the existing law."

I therefore thought it necessary to take advantage of my opportunity and, without waiting for other speeches, asked to be given the floor so as to offset the impression created by Kutler. I cannot judge of my own work, but the general opinion was that my answer was not only successful but even reduced Kutler to such extreme confusion that he turned positively black in the face and could not say one word in support of his assertions. I then read aloud the reference of the chief accountant, Dementev, and enlarged upon its meaning. I said that it was unseemly for so experienced a man as my former collaborator to play upon political passions in order to get a little applause from the Left and to make statements, unsupported by facts, accusing the government of theft. With that, the triumph of the opposition was changed to utter confusion. Stolypin added to their embarrassment by pointing to an error in Kutler's statement concerning the Ministry of the Interior, remarking that the "blow Kutler had aimed at the horse had fallen upon the harness alone."

Two days afterward, March 22, I had to appear again in the Duma to take part in the general debates on the budget, but this subject presented no further interest and was merely transferred to a special Budget Commission, from which it did not return before the dissolution of the Duma. The public in the gallery was apparently very favorably impressed with the conduct of the government. Many callers came to congratulate me, and the Ministers' Council, Stolypin in particular, accorded me a very demonstrative reception when we assembled in the pavilion after the session.

The press was sympathetic, too, except, of course, *Rech* and *Russkii Vedomosti*, which passed over all Kutler's mistakes and fell upon me for having given a personal and polemical tone to the debates. Other events occurred at that time which made the question of dissolving the Duma very pressing.

The sessions of the Ministers' Council became more frequent and the study of the project for changing the electoral law more intense. Late in March, A. P. Izvolsky, who had consistently opposed the dissolution of the Duma, quite unexpectedly announced that he was coming to see the necessity of such an act. Somewhat to our amusement he told us that he had just received a communication from our

ambassador in Portugal reporting that the recent dissolution of the Cortes had been accomplished without any complications. "The Portuguese example" became a standing joke in our discussions in the Council.

After March 22 I did not appear again in the Second Duma until the time of its dissolution. Its sessions continued but were incredibly chaotic, making it clear to everybody that any creative work was impossible. The Duma's time was consumed by vain attempts of the Right group to fight the open demagogy of all other groups and their unconcealed desire to discredit the government at any cost. Actually, there were no "other groups," since the entire Duma represented a thoroughly revolutionary crowd with a slight sprinkling of Right deputies who clearly understood their defenseless position, if for no other reason than having the debates presided over by the President of the Duma, Golovin (5). Reading now, so many years afterward, the stenographic reports of the Duma's sessions, one wonders how the Duma kept on going so many months: Why did its inflammatory speeches create no revolutionary outbursts in the streets? Where did the representatives of the government find strength to endure all the insults heaped daily upon their heads?

During April and May the Ministry of Finance submitted various secondary projects to the Finance Committee and to the Duma. In the latter, despite the fact that only harmless and more or less routine matters were involved, the projects merely provoked new outbursts. Nearly all of these matters were within the sphere of the Department of Taxation, recently headed by N. N. Kutler, who utilized every occasion to oppose the government as if he were seeking to rehabilitate himself in the field of direct taxation after his defeat in the budget debates. Owing to this method of procedure, a majority of these matters were never really examined by the Duma and only a few reached the State Council. After the brief Easter vacation, beginning March 22, the Duma started rolling swiftly downhill toward inevitable dissolution.

One can say without exaggeration that after what took place in the Duma on April 17 and, later, on May 7, its days were numbered. There began that agony which lasted until June 2, when late at night the Ministers' Council received the Tsar's ukase announcing the dissolution of the Duma and a ukase to the Senate with new regulations, confirmed by the extraordinary powers of the Ministers' Council, for the elections to the Third Duma replacing the regulations of Decem-

ber 11, 1905, which had given such deplorable results in the two Dumas elected under their provisions.

These two sessions of the Duma which I have mentioned for some reason attracted little attention from the general public. The true reason for the dissolution became obscured by the biased attitude of the opposition press and the indifference of the public itself. The former believed that the government needlessly opposed the introduction in our country of a true constitutional régime, which was the main objective of the representatives of the people; the latter simply did not take the trouble to study what was happening in the Duma and threatening the country with a new revolutionary upheaval. The public saw only that the Duma was in constant conflict with the government; no one quite understood why the dissolution was so long in coming. This part of public opinion perceived but dimly that the repeated dissolutions of the Duma only increased the discontent in the country and that Stolypin had had a great struggle with his own conscience before he had undertaken the task of revising the electoral law. In making this change without the consent of the Duma he violated the Tsar's earlier decree, but he did so solely in the name of preserving the principle of public representation.

In this respect the position of the government, and of Stolypin in particular, was truly tragic. Personally, he was a confirmed champion not only of popular representation but of the principle of legality. Everyone around him—not merely the personnel of his ministry—advised him to tolerate the demonstrations of the Duma and to lead it gradually to bring its attention to real work. Stolypin still believed, partly on the basis of his experience in Saratov and partly because of his rather liberal principles, that much could be accomplished by changing the composition of the government, and he openly and honestly desired to attract into the government men who had popular support. Yet he also recognized that the Emperor was unsympathetic to this idea, and, further, that such public men as he had in mind were less than frank in their dealings with him and were far from anxious to exchange the freedom of opposition for responsibility. Deep in his heart Stolypin certainly craved power, loved it, and was loath to let it slip from his hands. But he was unquestionably an honorable and honest man, and he perceived that the problem was either to safeguard public order in the form in which it had recently been established or to take the easy road of making concessions which might lead to the destruction of the entire régime. In his mind there was

no choice. He sought to preserve popular representation, but to do it by breaking with those opposition elements which he had been unable to draw into the government. If he was slow in adopting this course, it was only because he wanted to try every legal and constitutional means before starting on the road which he had decided to take only if the Duma refused to help him.

The Tsar's view of the matter was much simpler. He saw that things could not go on much longer in this way. He was told this by everyone, including the members of the government. He read most of the rebellious speeches made in the Duma, and when on April 17 these reached a climax in Zurabov's (6) speech attacking the army, he could not help wondering what would come next. He wondered why the Ministers' Council hesitated to present for his signature a ukase dissolving the Duma. On one occasion he asked me about this. I explained that the ministers felt the need of caution. They thought that if the Duma refused to sever relations with the Social-Democratic group and declined to permit it to be brought before the court of justice, as it undoubtedly would, the occasion could be used as an excuse for dissolution; then everybody would see clearly that the government could do nothing but dissolve the Duma. To this the Tsar replied: "All this is very well, but we must not wait too long. As for criticisms, we shall never be able to avoid them. We must consider not those who cry out against lawlessness while getting ready to break the law themselves, but those who are wondering in silence why the government and myself are so inactive."

I reported this to Stolypin. After this Petr Arkadevich had a talk with the Tsar and assured him that neither he nor the Ministers' Council would hesitate when the time came. The matter concerning the revocation of the immunity of the Social-Democratic deputies was being conducted speedily, and the new electoral law was drafted in the form already known to the Tsar. He begged to be accorded the Tsar's confidence and not to be accused of weakness and still less of connivance with the Duma. The Tsar then seemed to regain his calm, and from that day on never broached the subject again before the dissolving of the Duma.

In my opinion, as I have already suggested, the dissolution of the Second Duma had been decided upon definitely as early as April 18, after the executive session of the Duma on the previous day devoted to the discussion of the quota of military recruits for 1907. All that happened later merely confirmed this decision.

The Ministry of the Interior had introduced into the Duma a tentative quota of military and naval recruits due for service in the fall of 1907. Representatives of the three ministries—War, Navy, and Interior—accompanied by a large number of their collaborators, attended the session. Stolypin himself did not attend, so as to give no reason for thinking that the government attached particular importance to the matter, although the Ministers' Council had been informed through so-called lobby channels that not everything would go smoothly.

From the outset the debates were heated. The first shots were fired by the Cadet deputies, who spent their efforts in generalities. They pointed out the burden of compulsory military service and demanded that the size of the army be reduced. The turn of the Trudoviks (7) came next. Excited by the ardor of their own words, they attempted to prove that military service worked ruin throughout the country by tearing the flower of the population away from productive work to be perverted in army barracks.

The representatives of the government then took the floor. They endeavored to demonstrate the incorrectness of the opinions just expressed and to point out the impossibility of defending the country if these opinions were adopted. They enumerated the measures projected to ease the burden of this service, and presented convincing arguments proving that the population of Russia was burdened by compulsory military service much less than the population of most other countries which used that institution.

Then came Zurabov's speech. In terms sometimes profane and always insulting, he accused the army of being trained exclusively for the extermination of peaceful citizens. He concluded with a direct appeal for an armed uprising, in which the army would join the ruined population in overthrowing the hated government which, in its blindness, did not see that the army was only waiting for an opportunity to settle accounts with the domestic, not the external, enemy. In spite of his abusive language Zurabov was called to order only at the insistence of the Right. Amidst the thunderous applause that followed this speech, the Minister of War, General Roediger (8), mounted the tribune and in a short but extremely forceful speech rebuked the Duma for permitting such a performance, said that he considered it beneath the dignity of the government to answer such a speech, then left the session.

Despite the fact that it had been an executive session, the news of

it spread like wildfire. The public began to express a firm conviction that the dissolution of the Duma was inevitable. The same opinion was shared by the Ministers' Council when, on the next day, we assembled for a special session. Stolypin also agreed, but he felt that the ukase dissolving the Duma should be accompanied by one calling a Third Duma and publishing the new electoral law. Inasmuch as this law was not yet in its final form, it would be necessary to postpone the dissolution a little longer. At the next session Stolypin reported that he had seen the Tsar, who agreed with him on this matter. On the 24th, when I went to report, the Tsar met me with the words: "The session in the Duma of Friday last has left me stunned. What will happen next? Is there need for any further proof that we can no longer tolerate such action unless we are prepared to be swept away by the storm of revolution? I understand why Stolypin insists that simultaneously with the dissolution there must be proclaimed a new electoral law, and I am ready to wait a few more days, but I told him that I considered the dissolution of the Duma as settled and that I hoped I should not be kept waiting longer than necessary for the completion of the work on the new law, which, in my opinion, was proceeding much too slowly."

However, five more weeks elapsed before the Duma was dissolved. In the meantime another session of the Duma rendered its dissolution still more necessary. I believe that the government was in a better position to dissolve the Duma after the session of April 17 than it was after the session of May 7. I argued for dissolution directly after the session of April 17, and many members of the Council were of my opinion; but the final work on the new law was not yet completed. The delay strengthened the conviction of the Duma that it would not be dissolved and that it could continue its nefarious work unchecked.

May 6 was the Tsar's birthday. Among the ministers and courtiers who attended the reception at Tsarskoe Selo there was much discussion about the next day's session of the Duma. The papers had announced that during this session the government would be interpellated concerning a plot against the Tsar which had been exposed. Some, the Grand Marshal Count Benckendorf among them, even asked if the government was behind this inquiry.

Early in the year there had been such a plot, but the plotters had been discovered and apprehended late in March. Stolypin had informed the ministers of this but had counseled them not to make it

known. In some way, however, the news had reached the public. Count Bobrinsky (9), representing the Right group of the Duma, had called on Stolypin and informed him that his group was preparing to make an interpellation on this matter, using it as an occasion for a patriotic demonstration in the Duma. Stolypin had not objected—he had neither the right nor the desire to do so—and had advised the Council of what was to take place.

On May 7 the Duma galleries were filled to overflowing. Many deputies assembled, but when the session was opened, attention was drawn to the fact that not only were the extreme Left seats empty but also there were a great many vacant seats in the Left sector as a whole. Then, as the session opened, many labor deputies quietly left their seats. Approximately one-fourth if not more of the Duma was conspicuously absent.

The session started just as the papers had said it would. Golovin read a petition, signed by thirty members of the Right group, requesting permission to address the Chairman of the Ministers' Council asking him if it was true that a criminal organization had plotted against the Tsar, that this organization had been formed for the express purpose, and that the crime had been prevented only by the vigilance of police organizations. Count Bobrinsky, who had been delegated to support the inquiry, mounted the tribune and stated briefly that the inquiry had been caused exclusively by the alarm of all those who held dear their country and the sacred person of the Emperor. He requested that the inquiry be considered as urgent and requested the Chairman of the Ministers' Council to communicate to the Duma the information he possessed without asking for the month's delay to which he was entitled before answering inquiries made of the government by the Duma.

Stolypin pointed out that the Duma had no right to make this type of inquiry of the government but, since he would be violating no law by answering it, he would do so immediately. He said that the government was aware of the sentiments of Russian patriots on learning of a plot against the Tsar, and that therefore he was ready to answer the inquiry in order to reassure the public. Then he explained briefly that the information which had found its way into the press concerned a society formed in January for the purpose of committing a series of crimes against His Majesty, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and many high executives. But the society's schemes had been discovered and all its members arrested.

Stolypin's explanations were loudly approved by the Right members of the Duma; the opposition was silent, as its main forces were absent. Then the Right group moved that the Duma should proceed to a consideration of current matters. As soon as the motion was carried the absent members of the opposition returned in a body, quite demonstratively.

A scant half-hour afterward there appeared among the interpellations addressed to the government one which served as an official pretext for dissolving the Second Duma on June 3, 1907. Two interpellations on the same subject signed by thirty-one members of the Duma were handed in simultaneously. This subject concerned the so-called Social-Democratic group of the Duma. Two days previously, on May 5, officers of the secret service and police had searched the apartment of Deputy Ozol (10) on the Nevsky Prospekt. This search followed the receipt by the police of information that this apartment served as a meeting-place for members of an organization which had all the characteristics of an army revolutionary society organized for the purpose of conducting propaganda and preparing a revolt in the army. The search implicated several members of the Duma, who were detained until the end of the search. The deputies were released as soon as their status of deputies had been ascertained, but the others were arrested and placed under guard.

The members of the Duma who had signed the inquiry considered the actions of the police unlawful and the appearance of the police in a deputy's apartment "a criminal entry into a residence possessing the privilege of inviolability." They demanded an immediate reply.

In reply Stolypin said that he would not answer in detail, as the time for that had not yet arrived; but he did explain that he assumed responsibility for the actions of the police and that he considered them quite lawful, if for no other reason than because special measures of protection had been introduced in St. Petersburg which gave the police a right to conduct searches once they were informed of a crime. In this case there was irrefutable proof of the existence of an army revolutionary organization, and it was not his fault that some of its members were deputies of the Duma. He said firmly and very courageously that in the future he would insist that such actions of the police were lawful, as he considered that the protection of the state was more important than inviolability of deputies.

In making this announcement Stolypin made inevitable the dissolution of the Duma. Another three weeks were spent in trying to get the Duma to deprive its Social-Democratic members of their immunities and privileges. In the end the Duma refused. Then followed the dissolution, the publication of the new electoral law, the arrest of the majority of the members of the Duma belonging to the Social-Democratic group, and the flight of its other members, including Ozol, leader of the whole affair. Ten years later, that is, in 1917, many of these persons reappeared as prominent Bolsheviks, and in different fields pursued their notorious activity for the undoing of Russia.

After May 7 Stolypin appeared in the Duma only once more before its dissolution, and that was in connection with its project for land reform upon the basis of compulsory expropriation of land. He failed, however, to bring the Duma to reason and to induce it to adopt the governmental project finally realized in the ukase of November 9, 1906 (11). But he did make a very good speech, which contained the historic words: "You want great upheavals—I want a great Russia." These words were inscribed upon his memorial unveiled in the presence of the Ministers' Council, September 1, 1912, in Kiev. This memorial was destroyed in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, and his words are now forgotten, as are many things of that time which we have since lost.

After May 7, our energies were turned from the Duma and the electoral law, which by then had been completed, to preparing for the trial of the criminal organization exposed by the search of Ozol's apartment. It was expected that the Duma would refuse to deprive of their privileges those deputies who were connected with this organization, and it was intended to use this refusal as a pretext for dissolving the Duma. Therefore, the greatest care was taken in preparing the government's case. In its final form it represented the work of the entire Council and not that of Stolypin and Shcheglovitov alone, as was thought by many. The responsibility for the decision to arraign the members of the criminal group must rest therefore upon all the members of the Ministers' Council.*

* When Ozol's apartment was searched, an incriminating document was found in the possession of Ekaterina Shornikova (12), the organization's secretary, who was later proved to be a police agent. The revolutionary press played up this fact, arguing that the entire incident was a government scheme for forcing the Duma to deprive the deputies involved of their privileges. At the time, however, the Council was not aware that Shornikova was a police agent. Anyhow, this phase of

The ministers were puzzled as to how they could put in printed form the arraignment they had prepared and at the same time keep it a secret. The usual channels were not to be trusted. Finally, I arranged it with the commander of the Border Patrol Corps, in whose office was a well-equipped printing plant. The secret was kept perfectly—so much so that even later the revolutionary forces were unable to ascertain who had done the printing.

Meanwhile Stolypin had been carrying on discussions with the President of the Duma but had failed to come to any agreement. Golovin was in sympathy only with the Left wing of the Cadets. Stolypin had set the evening of Saturday, June 2, as the last date upon which the Duma's answer would be received. That night the Ministers' Council assembled.

It was not long before Stolypin was called out by a messenger, who announced the arrival of three members of the Duma. It was half-past twelve when Stolypin returned and said: "Nothing can be done with these gentlemen. They themselves see that the government is in the right, that it cannot concede anything, and that the attitude of the majority of the Duma precludes the possibility of co-operation; yet none of them wishes to assume the responsibility. I told them that they have but themselves to blame, since we cannot retreat and will do our duty. They attempted to intimidate me with threats of a revolution and great riots; but I replied that nothing of the kind would happen, and I have an idea they think so too."

It remained to find out the exact time set for the dissolution and the orders given in this connection. The ukase on the dissolution and on the new electoral law had been dispatched to the Tsar at Peterhof early that morning by special messenger. In submitting these documents Stolypin had informed the Tsar in a special report that he had no hope for the success of the negotiations with the Duma and begged him to sign the ukases but to leave them unpublished in case the Duma submitted to the government's demands.

Stolypin was at a loss to understand why these ukases were so long in arriving. But shortly after 1:00 A.M. an envelope arrived from Peterhof from the Tsar containing the signed documents and also a letter in his own hand. I copied this letter then and there with Stolypin's permission, and am very sorry that it was lost, together with the majority of my documents. However, I recall the


the incident did not affect the merits of the case, for there was abundant evidence on which to arraign the Duma members concerned.

text almost verbatim: "At last I have your final decision. It is high time to put an end to this Duma. I cannot understand how one could wait so long, and when I did not receive the ukases for my signature I began to worry lest some doubts had again arisen. The Lord be praised, this is not so. I am sure that everything is for the best."

We stayed about an hour and a half longer, discussing the details of the situation. Stolypin was perfectly composed, and said with assurance that he was convinced that order would be preserved everywhere and that a demonstration similar to the Viborg Manifesto was improbable. He was only concerned about being able to arrest all members of the Duma involved in the revolutionary organization, for they would certainly try to disappear before they could be arrested on the morning after the publication of the ukase. I asked Stolypin what he would have done if the Duma had formally submitted and the Tsar, having signed the ukases, had insisted that they be carried out. He answered: "This could not have happened. During my personal report two days ago this was discussed. The Tsar told me then that he recognized that in such an event the Duma could not be dissolved and the Ministers' Council be placed in so awkward a situation." I could only remark to Stolypin that this being the case I could not understand the Tsar's expression of reproach to all of us for being slow with the dissolution.



P. A. Stolypin



Count S. Y. Witte

CHAPTER XVI

JUNE-NOVEMBER, 1907

Stolypin's conviction that the dissolution of the Duma would not create any disturbances was wholly justified. It even seemed that the public was relieved to see that the nervous tension under which the country had lived since the previous February was finally relaxed and everyone could engage in his own affairs in peace.

The tone of the opposition press became more moderate. The irate shouts of the *Rech* and the *Russkiiia Vedomosti* were succeeded by cutting criticisms of the new electoral regulations; the "Duma of June 3," "Stolypin's Duma," became a favorite subject of all articles. Appeals to insurrection were discontinued, and with the new election campaign an unusual calm settled upon the country.

I was glad of this state of affairs, for it enabled me to settle down to my own work in the Ministry of Finance, of which there was an enormous amount. During the existence of the Duma the condition of our currency had improved slowly, while the nervous tension within the country had been reflected in the weakening of the foreign markets, especially the French, which was affected by the disturbances in the American market in that year.

Within a month after the dissolution of the Second Duma the condition of our state treasury had improved greatly: revenues exceeded by far the modest estimates in the budget. But at the same time it was necessary to watch carefully the budget estimate of monthly appropriations of credits, and since I met the rather large demands of different ministries my relations with my colleagues became much more pleasant. Better news came from Paris also. Influenced by newspaper reports of the perfect peace in the country, Paris began to pay more heed to my estimate of the situation. Paris saw that I was not exaggerating when I said that there was no danger of another uprising such as the Moscow riots of 1905, as the present government was of a different character and the new electoral law had been published precisely for the purpose of preserving popular representation, which had been distorted by the too extensive electoral rights granted by the law of December 11, 1905.

In this respect a great service was rendered, perhaps unwittingly, by the late correspondent of *Le Matin* (1), M. Heideman (2). He had been dispatched by his paper to study internal conditions in Russia. In his first articles, having fallen under the influence of the opposition circles of the dissolved Duma, he pictured the financial condition of Russia in a very unfavorable light, prophesying a dark future and jumbling beyond recognition all the figures he was given. Paris drew my attention to these articles and I telegraphed that I was sorry to see that so talented a correspondent, whom I had met in 1905, did not see fit to call at the Ministry of Finance to receive a more impartial explanation of the situation instead of depending solely upon unverified information supplied by the opposition.

Two days later M. Heideman requested an interview. I accorded it immediately and supplied him with a number of irrefutable data proving both the greater strength of our currency and the increase of our revenue. And in justice to Heideman I must say that he used all this information conscientiously and cleverly, frankly announcing that he had been misinformed by the political enemies of the government. This article made a great impression. Other articles discussing political conditions in Russia came later. These were not always pleasant from the Russian point of view, but they were always based on facts.

But the Paris Bourse remained weak in regard to Russian securities. During the troubled period of the Second Duma my Paris correspondents had complained of conditions on the Bourse and of the decline of the loan of 1906. They had insisted, too, that the time had come when we were not only obliged to subsidize the press, as we had done before, in order to dispel the pessimistic views of the holders of Russian securities, but we were also obliged directly to influence the market by having the syndicate buy up those securities which were being offered for sale by weak holders. They demanded that I provide the syndicate with funds necessary to purchase these securities, pointing out that the syndicate would not supply these funds because all the profit it had figured on had been spent long ago in previous operations for the support of the loan. As conditions improved in Russia and I began periodically to publish favorable information concerning revenues and currency, the French bankers again insisted that I bolster up the value of Russian securities by purchasing them either through the Russian Treasury or the Russian State Bank.

I suggested to the bankers that we organize what was later called the "Red Cross," that is, a joint account for our group in Paris and for the State Bank, that the syndicate and our Bank should each supply 50 per cent of the capital of the account and work jointly in supporting securities on the market, and that they distribute profits and losses evenly, in proportion to the original amount of capital invested. The Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, represented by M. Netzlin, received my suggestion favorably, but announced that it would give a definite answer only after consulting the other members of the group. The next day he informed me that an agreement had not been reached.

Then I tried to accomplish the same thing by direct order of the State Bank, without the participation of the Paris banks, by placing orders on the Paris Bourse through the State Bank and the Special Credit Office. I did not inform the Ministers' Council of my plan, in order not to furnish a pretext for unnecessary talk and still less for speculation; but I talked the matter over with Stolypin and promised to keep him informed of all developments. Stolypin agreed to the suggestion. It was entirely in harmony with his temperament; he was inclined to fight and to undertake risks in order to reach ends which he considered advantageous to our interests.

I decided to spend a maximum of five million rubles on this enterprise, though not all at once, in order not to raise the value of our securities artificially, but to conduct the operation carefully, using small sums to buy up securities as they were offered for sale.

The results of this scheme surpassed my rosiest expectations. Its success was due mainly to conditions within Russia—the circumstances under which the Duma had been dissolved, the quiet manner in which the country had accepted it, the extremely favorable course of the elections to the Third Duma under the provisions of the new electoral law, and the unanimous reports of the correspondents of foreign papers indicating that the elections would return a majority of moderates who would not embarrass the government or desire to seize power, much less to start a revolution. Public opinion in Western Europe became convinced that the government had gained the upper hand in fighting the revolution and that popular representation would be preserved unattended by unnecessary disturbances. Under the influence of these conditions the markets also changed their attitude toward our credits so that it was necessary to purchase only comparatively few securities in order to raise their value. Later,

I was busy not only purchasing our securities but also selling them as soon as the demand for them arose.

I bought up the 5 per cent securities of 1906 at 69-70, and three or four days later sold them at 72-74. The State Bank never had to expend more than two million at any one time, for the price of the securities rose rather swiftly and I discontinued purchasing them in the first half of 1908, when the value of the securities rose almost to the original price of 87-88 and then passed it, so that in the final analysis the bank made a net gain of more than a million rubles. The Paris bankers did not enjoy recalling this affair, and every time mention was made of it they merely remarked that "the victor cannot be judged," adding in an elegiac tone that if the scheme had failed our bank would have sustained great losses.

The summer of 1907 passed quickly. The elections to the Third Duma resulted in a victory of moderate elements, determined, to be sure, by the provisions of the new electoral law which so irritated the opposition (3). As the returns of the elections came in, Stolypin requested all the ministries to prepare a great number of legislative projects on the most varied subjects. He continually tried to impress upon us the insistent need of introducing in the Duma as many projects as possible so as to remove every chance of reproach that the government had not prepared a great legislative program. This meant little for my particular ministry. The first two Dumas had left a number of projects unexamined, and, besides, many new ones were already being prepared. The list of all subjects to be submitted to the Duma was so large that Stolypin let my ministry alone and urged the other ministries not to fall behind the Ministry of Finance.

In making estimates for the budget my work went off quite smoothly. Revenues continued to come in so satisfactorily that I was able to be more generous to other ministries, especially since they were asking for smaller appropriations. The only exception was the Ministry of Agriculture, which refused to accept the limitations of a normal budget and demanded so-called "extraordinary credits." As Stolypin supported this ministry I was obliged to argue at every step that it was utterly impossible to include in an estimate an item that was not provided for by existing laws and which could only be covered by a new law which it would take a long time to enact. This was particularly difficult for me during the brief period when the post of Minister of Agriculture was occupied by Prince B. A. Vasilchikov with Professor Migulin (4) as his assistant, detailed by the

minister especially for budget work. Attempts were made to apply special methods for the appropriation of credits to this ministry, different from those long since adopted for all ministries. In the end all our arguments ended amicably. However, this additional complication may possibly have influenced the length of time during which Prince Vasilchikov remained at the head of his ministry.

The technicalities of compiling the budget estimate involved a great amount of work. Stolypin gladly accepted my suggestion that I draw up the explanatory memorandum accompanying the estimate in a different manner this time. I proposed to include in it all explanations which might help the new Duma, in case that body justified our expectations and was ready to co-operate with the government and to furnish, as Stolypin put it, a sort of textbook on the art of budgeting, together with a series of references which might help the new chamber to find at once an answer to all issues raised by the opposition in the Second Duma. The memorandum would show also that our budget laws (which we agreed to defend) were not so bad as the opposition press tried to represent them and really gave the representatives of the people great freedom in constructive work.

This task gave me much additional work; on the other hand, it served me well later on, as it helped me to refute the attempts of the opposition to discredit our point of view. I must add here that with the splendid personnel of my ministry and with the help of such outstanding budget workers as the head of the Accounting Department of the State Treasury, Dementev, my assistants N. N. Pokrovsky (5), S. F. Weber (6), and I. I. Novitsky (7), as well as a number of splendid higher officials, the most complicated work was always well done. Many times Stolypin told me enviously during sessions of the Council: "If I had such men, I, too, could work *à*s you do at the Ministry of Finance. But I have had no experience in the field of central administration and somehow my collaborators cannot get used to the altered conditions of legislative work."

As the explanatory memorandum was prepared I submitted it for consideration to the Council, where it was received without objection. I also prepared what I would say in the Duma should it be necessary to give general explanations concerning the budget. Stolypin was so impressed with what I had prepared that he announced openly in the Council that he himself would use it as a reference book. He also toyed with the idea of translating it into French so as to make the foreign press acquainted with our financial position, which did, in all

truth, show a great improvement as the time for the opening of the Third Duma approached.

Of course, I cannot judge of my own work, but on going over as an exile in Paris in 1929 my first speech in the Third Duma I was again stirred with the emotions of that far away day when, for the first time, after the insulting experiences of 1906 and the first days of 1907, I felt that I was not entirely surrounded by enemies and could expound with some hope of success the views which I considered right and useful for my country.

The Tsar kept a text of my budget speech for almost two weeks and returned it to me with a number of notes on the margin. At the top there was the inscription: "God grant that the new Duma may study calmly this splendid explanation and appreciate the improvement we have made in so short a time after all the trials sent to us."

I sent a copy of my projected Duma address to the Department of the State Treasury instructing it to send copies, including the Tsar's comment, to all departments. No documentary publication of the Bolsheviks, however, mentioned it; most likely it did not survive the general destruction.

All newspapers also received my memorandum for the budget estimate for 1908. Two papers, *Novoe Vremia* and *Rech*, accorded it more attention than the rest. The former mentioned most approvingly both the general financial condition of Russia and the manner of presenting the budget material to the people's representatives. The latter, on the contrary, used every weapon against the government, repeating once more the trite generalities about the insufficient rights of the representatives of the Russian people concerning the budget, insisting that those rights be extended, resorting if necessary to open conflict with the authority which "had forgotten everything and learned nothing." A week after the opening of the Duma all these statements were once more repeated and enlarged upon by the leader of the Party of People's Freedom (Cadets), P. N. Miliukov.

Part IV

The Period of the Third Duma to the Death of Stolypin

CHAPTER XVII

NOVEMBER 1907—APRIL 1908

The Third State Duma opened on November 20, 1907. There is no need to speak of its attitude toward the government and the Throne or of the generally co-operative spirit in which it did its work. All this has already been set down. But, from that day on, my work as Minister of Finance and, after September 1911, as Chairman of the Ministers' Council, was inseparably connected with it and its successor, the Fourth Duma. And although this was the *Sturm und Drang* period of my life, I look back upon it with most pleasant memories.

I was anxious that the Duma should undertake the examination of the budget estimate as soon as possible so that it might be sent at an early date to the Budget Committee, thus limiting the rather futile preliminary debates. There would be enough debating when the Budget Committee submitted its report to the Duma. With this in mind, I sought out Khomiakov (1), newly elected Duma President, to solicit his co-operation. He told me that this matter had already been decided in private conferences before the opening of the Duma, that the general debates would probably not take more than a day or two, and that they would be of a purely academic nature. He warned me that P. N. Miliukov, the Cadet leader, would probably be my opponent, and was even now "being trained for speed and ferocity." He said also that Miliukov himself recognized the deficiencies of his own knowledge of financial matters, but, since he was leader of his party, he would be obliged to speak and could be counted upon to argue that the Duma must have the unlimited right to revise all credit appropriations; he would probably attack the budget regulations as well. "But do not let this worry you," Khomiakov said in conclusion, "for they cannot accomplish anything now. Even the Cadets will abuse you merely to ease their consciences."

November 27 was the day appointed for the preliminary debates on the budget. The galleries were filled to overflowing. The diplomatic corps was present in a body, although no one expected any

sensational demonstrations. The press was represented in such numbers that the reporters sat literally in each other's laps and were much too crowded to take any notes. The entire Ministers' Council and almost all superior officials of all ministries were there, filling the aisle seats, which in the first two Dumas had usually been vacant.

I had written out my address beforehand, but when I spoke I referred to it only to quote some figures and calculations. My speech, the complete text of which can be found only in the now quite rare records of the State Duma, lasted for two hours and was well received. The opposition sat silent throughout, whereas the members of the Right groups applauded me warmly. All the ministers, and even many deputies whom I did not know, generously congratulated me upon my success. Stolypin thanked me heartily and told Baron Frederichs to report to His Majesty the well-deserved success the Minister of Finance had achieved, and to say also what a change could be observed as compared with what had so recently happened in the Duma. "For us, the government, it is a real holiday."

After the recess an Octobrist made a short moderate speech pointing out the insufficient rights of the Duma regarding the budget. But when P. N. Miliukov mounted the tribune, everybody was attentive. He announced that he had been delegated by the Cadet group of the Duma to express its attitude toward the budget estimate, toward the explanations of the Minister of Finance, and especially toward the situation in which the Duma was placed by the so-called budget regulations—a situation unworthy of the Duma as a body of representatives of the people. These regulations, he said, had been drawn up by the privy councillors for the sole purpose of creating for the Duma a phantom budget right, behind which the unlimited autocracy of the executive bodies of an uncontrolled government would be preserved in its entirety. His first words were greeted with loud applause from the opposition, by still louder protestations from the majority of the Right wing of the Duma, and by silence from the Left Center.

No one can be a dispassionate judge of his own affairs, but if one were to believe the general impression of those present at the session and the reports of the papers, with the exception of *Rech*, Miliukov's budget speech added no new laurels to his political fame. Yet his position was not an easy one. He had never studied budgeting, and was not at all prepared to fight the government on that ground. He had merely studied with his customary conscientiousness that which

had been prepared for him by his party, which had announced its credo for everybody's information in the newspaper, *Réch*. The Ministers' Council knew of all this and had asked me to answer Miliukov the same day he spoke in the hope that this would create a greater impression than if my answer were deferred till another day. I was prepared to carry out the Council's wishes, and replied to Miliukov immediately.

I divided my answer according to the two aspects of Miliukov's speech against the government. First, he had sharply criticized the government for infringing upon the rights of the people's representatives by negotiating a loan in Paris in April 1906 without awaiting the convocation of the Duma. Here my position was very advantageous. Not only did the loan of 1906 have no connection whatever with the budget estimate for 1908 which was being examined, but the example of the first two Dumas was still in everybody's memory and showed clearly what chance the government had had to obtain their permission for the conclusion of any loan whatever. I also availed myself of the opportunity to state openly for the first time in the Duma just what our fellow countrymen were doing in Paris while I was there negotiating the loan and what they did to prevent the success of my negotiations. I did not mention any names, but it was evident to everyone whence the wind blew and it was said openly in the lobbies after my speech that Miliukov had not counted on my mentioning the matter.

But, judging by his replies, Miliukov's greatest displeasure was caused by my question as to how a self-respecting government could help desiring in 1906 to conclude a loan of 843,000,000 rubles when, in the beginning of that year, it had a deficit of 480,000,000 rubles and had urgent payments of an equal amount to make to its foreign creditors. I asked my opponent how he would have acted if he had been in power then, and whether or not he would have let the state go bankrupt for almost three years until such time as the Duma would have given its consent to negotiate the loan.

Miliukov had next played variations on the already too familiar theme of the insufficiency of the Duma's budget rights. He had said that the time had come to revise the budget regulations, and that the revised provisions should be applied to the examination of the present budget. But this theme had brought him no greater success. The entire Duma recognized that the budget should be examined according to existing regulations, and that the Duma could not reject

credits based on previously published laws (Article 9 of the budget regulations) until new regulations had been published. Miliukov had spoken solely for the benefit of the opposition and had created a certain impression upon it. Afterward the opposition newspapers acclaimed their spokesman, condemned me as a routine thinker, and rejoiced that their main objective had been attained: the speech had been made, the matter had progressed no further than our day of general debates, and everybody saw clearly that it would be transferred to the Budget Committee almost immediately.

As to the second half of Miliukov's speech, I dislike even to mention it. His colleagues had but poorly prepared his materials, and he himself had not mastered them too well. His remarks were shallow and meaningless; one moment he accused the Ministry of Finance of estimating expenditure too low, the next he said that the estimate was extravagant. In this part of his speech he became the victim of his own arguments: he accused the government of having concealed the deficit, and of having by "a certain sleight of hand" artificially transferred to the category of extraordinary expenditures eight millions which were supposed to have been included in ordinary estimates. In other words, he accused me of definite trickery in covering up the deficit. In reply I merely read aloud the text of the law determining the distribution of ordinary and extraordinary expenditures and offered to let the Duma decide which of us was right.

Unquestionably, the first day's work ended in a victory for the government.* But as compared with the first two Dumas the atmosphere was now quite different. Everybody was eager for work, and as we left the session with many deputies we all felt that new times had arrived and everybody could undertake his own work in peace.

Yet for me this peace did not last long. In January the opposition again attacked the government, though not very ferociously. This is how it happened: Soon after the opening of the Duma a legislative project, signed by forty members, was submitted. It called for a revision of the existing budget regulations† in such a way as to

* Perhaps my success on this occasion explains, though I may be wrong, why my subsequent meetings with Miliukov were not more friendly—polite but cold. We never got beyond formalities, and even as émigrés the character of our relations did not change much.

† Confirmed by the Tsar, March 8, 1906.

increase the rights of the Duma, and demanded that the revised regulations be applied to the budget of 1908. This project was quite similar to one introduced in but not discussed by the Second Duma; it bore the same signatures, was sponsored by the same party, and contained even the same typographical errors.

When I pointed out to Stolypin that this project was merely an old one revamped, he had the Council discuss what tactics the government should employ in this matter: whether it should attack the project during its preliminary examination by the Duma, or should fight it in the Committee, to which it would doubtless be referred, and again when the Committee's report was considered by the general session. All the ministers except Izvolsky thought the government should bitterly oppose the project from the outset. Izvolsky suggested that it was unwise to handicap the Duma by doing any more in the preliminary discussion than to point out that the project would certainly have grave consequences; but the weight of opinion against him was such that Izvolsky was obliged to fall in line with the other ministers. I was assigned the task of speaking for the government on this matter.

Discussions of this project occupied two sessions, January 12 and 15, 1908. In the end the matter was transferred to the Budget Committee, where it stayed till shortly before the Third Duma was dissolved, that is, for more than four years. When it was returned to the general session it was again opposed by the government. In fact, when I resigned in January 1914 the project was not yet law, for, although the Duma had worked out a project of its own, the State Council would not approve it. The budget regulations of 1906 were still in force when the revolution of 1917 swept away the old order. But these two sessions, January 12 and 15, deserve further comment. They proved conclusively that the opposition was less concerned with improving our legislation than with limiting the authority of the government by attacking the government in its most sensitive spot—the budget. "Let the executive power submit to the legislative power"; this was the slogan of the opposition.

This particular project was laid before the Duma by the member Adzhemov (2). He was unfamiliar with budgeting, and undertook this task against his will.* But it was the strategy of his party to let

* Adzhemov admitted this many years later when we were both émigrés in Paris. He said that he did it because he felt it his duty to carry out the party's wishes in this matter.

him draw the heavy fire of the government and, when this was exhausted, to send out its real champion, Shingarev,* to do battle with the government.

Adzhemov had been coached by his friends, by Shingarev in particular, and probably by N. N. Kutler, who had not been elected to the Third Duma but continued to harbor sentiments of hostility toward the government for his lack of success in the Second Duma. He began his speech by declaring dogmatically that there were no budget regulations by which the State Duma could be guided, since the regulations referred to by the government had been made for the purely advisory Bulygin Duma and not for a legislative Duma, which could not be restrained by such artificial barriers as an autocratic government might find necessary. He enlarged upon the Cadet theme—so much of the budget was armor-plated that the Duma could exercise its control over only a trifling part of the total, which for that year was two and a half billion rubles. He demanded a revision of the budget regulations, a demand which amounted to the revolutionary principle of giving the Duma unlimited authority in examining each estimate of the entire budget.

In reply I attacked the opposition's basic postulate, that the budget regulations of March 8, 1906, deprived the Duma of the right to alter any considerable part of the budget. I submitted figures which proved that of the total budget only about one-sixth was absolutely fixed by budget regulations, and that this was fixed because not to do so would be tantamount to abolishing the law upon which such credits were based. The opposition had a hard time of it. I replied to its arguments as sharply as I could, and the enthusiastic reception which the Duma accorded my replies proved that victory rested with the government. The opposition itself recognized this, although there were bitter denunciatory articles in its press. Some of these articles were by scientists with Cadet sympathies, who probably repented bitterly the views they then expressed when, later on, they found

* No one in the government knew anything about Shingarev (3). In the early sessions of the Third Duma, the opposition had not considered him formidable enough to battle the government on the question of the budget and had assigned this task to the party leader, Miliukov. But, in the six years that followed, Shingarev was the outstanding exponent of the Cadet credo and my invariable opponent. As early as the first months of 1908, rumors reached us that among the deputies he was acquiring the reputation of being a very gifted man and very much opposed to the government. The deputies from the gubernia of Voronezh, where he had been zemstvo physician, reported that in zemstvo assemblies he had been regarded as a specialist in budget matters and a forceful and clever debater.

themselves in the position of the government. I mean, for example, Professor Friedman (4).

During these two-day debates, the most characteristic and interesting arguments of the opposition centered on Article 9 of the budget regulations. This article established a principle which is indispensable under any régime, reasserting in the field of budgeting the principle that was maintained by our fundamental laws, namely, that a law cannot be repealed except by another law and that until such time as a new law positively repeals the old one the latter retains its full force. Moreover, it stands to reason that expenditures provided for by a carefully drawn law should not be annulled by a vote of the legislative chamber—by the hasty action of a majority. Such procedure would throw the state organism into complete chaos. Yet I had to appear in the Duma three times before I could overcome the objections of our intractable group to this elementary truth.

The result of these two memorable days, which taxed me considerably, fully justified my efforts, and they were followed by a period of more peaceful work in the Budget Committee. Here I spent many days until May. By that time the budget had been examined by the Committee and was submitted to the general session for its consideration. Once more I engaged in hot debates with Shingarev and other representatives of the enemy camp—but of this more later.

Early in April, a short time before the Easter vacations, the government was informed that the Duma was preparing a surprise concerning the estimate of the Ministry of Ways and Communications. Among the members of the subcommittee of the Budget Committee which was examining the estimate of the Ministry of Ways and Communications there were many representatives of the opposition under the leadership of a prominent young Cadet who considered himself a great authority on all matters of railway business, evidently because he was a graduate of the Institute of Railway Engineers and an instructor at the Polytechnic Institute of Tomsk. This was Nekrasov (5), who, in the ministry of Prince Lvov in 1917, was Minister of Ways and Communications. It was he who introduced among railway workers the first symptoms of that great demagoguery and corruption which characterized the entire activity of this department during the first period of the revolution prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power. There were, of course, in the subcommittee as well as in the Budget Committee, other authorities on railways,

such as the elder Markov (6). But their influence was much less pronounced, although none of them was averse to showing the government that his knowledge was superior to that of the government specialists and to attempting to influence the legislative institutions.

The position of our railways was far from bright at that time. The main cause for this was the unfortunate war and the disruption of our transportation as a result of the revolution of 1905-1906. Moreover, the state of our finances did not permit us to furnish all the means necessary for the reorganization of the railways; years of time and steady systematic work were needed to correct the deficiencies of the past. To the Duma, and especially to its opposition, this presented a rich field for criticism in which pretexts for accusing the government of incompetence were only too plentiful.

The Minister of Ways and Communications, Schaffhausen-Schönberg och Schaufuss, was a military engineer and little suited to the new conditions of legislative work. He was a poor speaker, totally unprepared to defend in public the interests of his ministry against the unceremonious attacks of his opponents; every rude criticism of his work threw him into such confusion that he answered it with unconcealed irritation. He was extremely disturbed when Stolypin announced to the Ministers' Council that he had been informed that the Budget Committee had reached a conclusion concerning the estimate of the Ministry of Ways and Communications for state railways, and was about to demand the appointment of a special commission selected from the members of the Duma and the State Council to investigate conditions existing in our state railways. This commission was to be invested with very great powers—it was to investigate the railways locally, to demand explanations from the entire personnel, and even to control the funds appropriated according to the estimate.

But even before Stolypin informed it of this rumor the Ministers' Council had perceived the need for ascertaining why the state and private railways had to be subsidized by the state in order to meet their financial obligations. It had outlined a project instituting a commission, which was to include members of the legislative bodies who had special knowledge of railways, to investigate railway conditions and had selected as chairman of this commission a former Assistant Minister of Ways and Communications, General N. P. Petrov, who was reputed to be a great technician and had great moral

prestige in the ministry.* Therefore, in reporting the projected move of the Budget Committee, Stolypin asked the Council what it proposed to do, and how far the demand of the Budget Committee corresponded to the project which the government had already outlined. He admitted that he was inclined to favor the demand of the Duma.

Our debates were brief and revealed a complete harmony between the members of the Council, with the exception, as usual, of Izvolsky. He did not see any inconvenience in permitting the Duma commission to investigate simultaneously with the governmental commission the condition of the railways. But the rest of us were of the opinion that we had no right to allow the Duma to appoint a commission, because, although the Duma had an inalienable right to appoint commissions for its internal work, any investigation which involved the questioning of officials not connected with the Duma, such as a control over the expenditure of credits and so forth, certainly exceeded its powers. Moreover, were this permitted, the Duma would proceed to seize other privileges not provided for by the principles upon which it was organized; there would follow an inevitable conflict between the Duma and the State Council, which would be certain to consider that the Duma had no legal right to these privileges. Furthermore, if the laws were upheld not by the government but by the upper chamber, the government would be placed in a false position in regard to the sovereign authority. The Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov, in particular, opposed any compromise that was designed simply to gratify a wish of the Duma.

After hearing these opinions, Stolypin had no misgivings in joining us. As for Izvolsky, he had already abandoned his stand, saying that he was not considering the letter of our law but mostly the example furnished by the constitutions of other countries and that eventually we should adopt a constitutional system. The Council decided to protest energetically against the decision of the Budget Committee.†

* As early as 1903, a special commission, under the chairmanship of Assistant State Comptroller Ivashchenkov, had been appointed to carry out just such an investigation, but any success it might have had was precluded by the war with Japan.

† At my suggestion the Council decided to inform the Tsar of its decision in order to bring to his attention the essential importance of the problem and the government's attitude toward it. A week later, in the next session, Stolypin told us that he had acquainted the Tsar with the details of our decision. The Tsar had

The Council having reached its decision to protest, General Schaufuss requested Stolypin to free him of the obligation of appearing in the Duma in order to inform it of the government's views, as he was persuaded that he was incapable of influencing the Duma in complicated and indefinite matters. He suggested that I perform this task, since, "after all, it is a budget matter and no one is better fitted to tackle it."

Stolypin tried to persuade him to withdraw his request, but Schaufuss was adamant. "Do you not see for yourself, Petr Arkadevich, that you need another collaborator in the Ministry of Ways and Communications?" In order to end a rather painful situation, Stolypin asked me if I would care to take upon myself "the work of another." I consented; then Stolypin closed the debates.

I was far from supposing that this seemingly clear-cut and simple matter would assume the proportions of a great incident, an incident which was to be associated with my name, in a derogatory sense, for many years to come and, even when I was an émigré, to be cited as proof of my particularly unsympathetic attitude toward the idea of public representation, for actually this was not so.

April 24 arrived. The Duma began to study the report of the Budget Committee regarding the administration of state railways. This report included the demand mentioned above that the legislature appoint a special superior commission to investigate thoroughly the present economic conditions of the state railways.

The demand was couched in poorly chosen and vague language. It did not make clear even what sort of a commission the Duma proposed to form, what its powers were to be, what composition would best answer the Duma's wishes, et cetera. Nor did the debates that followed throw any additional light upon the report. Finally, P. N. Miliukov, without even waiting for his turn at the tribune, spoke from his seat, clearly articulating every word. "I shall try to express our desire more distinctly: we believe it necessary to appoint a parliamentary commission to ascertain why our state railways do not operate at a profit. Only such a commission can be trusted to solve this complicated problem successfully."

listened very attentively and had said that he was in accord with the resolution and was pleased that we had advised him of the matter, since it was not the Duma's only attempt to widen the scope of its powers. This was by all means to be avoided, as compromises and concessions were not the way to establish order in a country. Stolypin said that he believed the Tsar had been apprised somehow of the Duma project and was pleased to find this attitude in the government.

His words were drowned in applause from the Left. From the Right there were shouts of disapproval. Many deputies cast meaningful glances in my direction as I sat in solitary splendor on the ministerial bench. One of them, Count V. A. Bobrinsky (7) mounted the tribune and hurled at me this challenge: "What is the government's opinion of the demands set forth in the report? Does it find it desirable and expedient to appoint such a commission? If so, with what rights and privileges and according to what mode of procedure?" He also explained that many members of the Duma were concerned as to whether the issue would be settled by the government and the legislative bodies working in accord or whether it would result in complications.

I had not been forewarned of such a challenge, but I answered it immediately by indicating the government's attitude to the report as expressed in the decision of the Ministers' Council mentioned above. Later it was said that I knew Bobrinsky would question me, that it was prearranged. Whether or not it had been prearranged with Stolypin, I do not know, but certainly I had no knowledge of it. It was also said that I hoped to ingratiate myself with the Tsar by thus championing, even against members of the Right, the decision of the Council with which he heartily agreed. This allegation I absolutely deny. Moreover, I do not consider that Bobrinsky's question was necessary to give me an opportunity to state the government's opinion; I was merely waiting until the indecision of the Duma had become so apparent that I could turn it to my advantage.

My remark, "Thank God, we have no parliament as yet," has been cited as proof that I was an irreconcilable enemy of popular government. These words have been misunderstood—they were meant as an answer to Miliukov's demand for a "parliamentary" commission. Perhaps I should not have said "Thank God." I meant merely to point out that we could not have a "parliamentary" commission, as we did not yet have a parliament; and this meaning will be clear to anyone who will take the trouble to read the official stenographic report of my speech.

My answer evoked a storm of applause from the Right benches and whistling from the Left. The whistling, however, was harmless. After the end of the session I had an opportunity to talk with some deputies, A. Shingarev among them, and we quietly exchanged opinions of the matter under consideration. The deputies of the Right acclaimed the stand I had taken, and Shingarev remarked very

calmly that "from the point of view of the constitution you are undoubtedly in the right, as it is evident that the law does not empower the Duma to organize commissions of investigation. Yet it would be to the government's advantage to widen the sphere of the rights granted to the Duma." There was absolutely no ill feeling in his remark.

But the incident raised a point of Duma procedure. The next day as the Duma was again considering whether or not the legislative bodies had the right to appoint the investigation committee, a deputy, Count Uvarov (8), rose to reply to my speech of the day before. The President of the Duma, Khomiakov, considered that what Uvarov had to say would have no bearing on the debates, and called him to order. In doing so Khomiakov said that, although he had had neither the opportunity nor the right to call me to order for my famous remark, he certainly had the right to prevent any further discussion of it; and this right he intended to exercise.

When Stolypin heard what Khomiakov had said he got in touch with him and asked him if he thought it wise to upbraid the ministers of the government for their remarks instead of permitting the deputies to criticize the substance of their speeches. Khomiakov saw Stolypin's point. He admitted that the deputies might follow in his footsteps and start a criticism of the ministers that would result in a breach between the Duma and government such as had existed during the First and Second Dumas. The next day in the Duma he retracted what he had said and came out definitely in favor of preserving good relations between Duma and government.

This closed the incident. Khomiakov seemed to harbor no resentment toward me because of it. It was May 7, the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna's birthday, before we met again, at Tsarskoe Selo. Then Khomiakov jokingly referred to our "tournament of magnanimity."

CHAPTER XVIII

MAY—AUGUST, 1908

Meanwhile I was busy with the Budget Committee and, later, through May and half of June, I worked hard studying its resolutions on the separate estimates of the Ministry of Finance. The work in the Committee went quite smoothly. There were no long speeches, the public being excluded, and there was no prejudiced campaign in the press. The work was conducted in a businesslike manner, there were few criticisms of the government, and everyone behaved considerately toward me; Professor Alekseenko (1), the Chairman of the Budget Committee, who considered himself the only living authority on matters of budget and finance, was especially courteous. The Committee adjourned in the best of humor and left few controversies unsettled.

The reading of its reports in the Duma, however, revealed many undefined points and gave rise to many misunderstandings. There was much criticism, most of which came from the deputies of the Left, among whom was Shingarev, my sworn opponent. He used me, so to speak, as a foundation upon which he tried in vain to build his political career in the Cadet Party and the Third Duma. Also, there was Nekrasov, of whom I have already spoken. He specialized in criticizing the estimates for the Chinese Eastern Railway, and his one aim seemed to be to discredit the government by influencing the press and the public against it. Then there was Adzhemov, who, pushed forward by his own party, would attack the government from time to time but only in vague generalities which were not difficult to refute.

Some criticism came from the Right as well, from Eropkin (2), another who sought to build his career upon opposition to the government in general and the Minister of Finance in particular. Unfortunately, however, he not only failed in this but also speedily lost his standing in Duma circles whose sympathies he had nearly won by promising to use his technical knowledge to expose the "shocking disorganization of the entire provincial apparatus of the Ministry of Finance." I met him for the first time in the Budget Committee,

of which he was secretary, where he seemed moderate and friendly. Great was my surprise, therefore, when, in reporting a resolution of the Committee to the Duma, he attacked and denounced the government in terms that surpassed Shingarev's best efforts.

His speech was a miserable failure, but this apparently taught him nothing. On June 19 the Budget Committee's final report on the entire budget for 1908 was made. Alekseenko, in answering questions on the budget, spoke very favorably of it. The deputies were receiving the report very well. But Eropkin's previous failure was rankling in his breast; he could not remain silent, and when the opportunity presented itself, he resumed his attack upon our entire financial structure and administration. I could not leave his speech unanswered; it was not that his speech offended me, but I was irritated to hear a man speak with such assurance about matters which he did not understand. My speech ended the general debates on the budget.

My work, however, was not confined to the Budget Committee and the Duma; I also attended the sessions of the State Council. The Chairman of the Council's Finance Committee (3), M. D. Dmitriev (4), showed me every attention and supported me loyally, often warning me of objections that were likely to be raised and of whence they would come. The so-called academic group, forming the Left wing of the State Council, said what little it had to say in very moderate and courteous terms. The numerous Center group was always most sympathetic and invariably followed the lead of Dmitriev, who was one of its members. Only when the issue touched the interests of the merchant class directly did the representatives of trade, who also belonged to the Center, have much to say. They usually advanced G. A. Krestovnikov (5) or Tripolitov (6) as their speaker.

The group of moderate Rights, the Neudgardt group, was outwardly sympathetic, but later, when the nationalist sector of the Duma became hostile toward me, its attitude became more unfriendly. Toward the end of my ministry, S. V. Rukhlov (7) and A. B. Neudgardt (8) himself, under the influence of *Novoe Vremia*, joined the extreme Right wing of the Council and opposed me behind the scenes.

In general, however, my work in the State Council was a real relief after the strain of the Duma sessions. Many members of the Council were my personal friends and had been my colleagues in former offices. I should like to mention particularly Y. A. Uxkull, N. E. Schmeman (9), M. D. Dmitriev, N. S. Tagantsev, and P. M. Romanov. There were those who opposed me, of course, though

in varying degrees. Of these the most important were Count Witte, A. F. Koni, A. P. Nikolsky, and Professor Pikhno (10); these men always kept themselves outside the friendly circle. I mention this fact because it concerns one of the first subjects submitted to the Council by the Third Duma and one on which Witte came out for the first time against the Duma—and incidentally against me.

Early in 1908 the Duma examined the report of the Ministry of Ways and Communications on beginning the construction of the Amur Railway. Stolypin and the entire Ministers' Council considered the report as a matter of very great state importance. Everybody remembered the Russo-Japanese War, the consequences of which were still being felt. Everybody recognized the service which the Chinese Eastern Railway had rendered during this war. Everybody understood that, given a new conflict with Japan or China, this railway would be open to blows from the enemy, who would be much better prepared to destroy it than Japan had been in 1904. We recognized this danger because of Japan's insistence in 1906 on discussing the matter of fisheries in our waters of the Ussuri region. Unterberger (11), Governor-General of the Amur region, flooded the government and the Duma with his telegrams, insisting in a panic-stricken tone that a war with Japan in the very near future was inevitable. Moreover, we all perceived the need for the construction of the Amur Railway as a practical measure quite apart from the precariousness of our position in the Far East.

Beginning with construction of the Trans-Siberian railway the problem of the necessity of constructing a line along the left bank of the Amur had been ever present in our press. The Amur region was vast and abounding in lands suitable for agriculture: it was undoubtedly rich in gold and other metals throughout the entire region of the Zeya; it was desirable to direct Russian colonization there; and lastly, it was necessary, regardless of present dangers, to connect by rail the Ussuri region with Eastern Siberia and Russia, independently of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which could be redeemed in 1936 by the Chinese government and which fell to its possession free after the termination of the period of the concession. All these factors made the construction of this railway merely a matter of time.

The Duma also appreciated this fact. It speedily examined the government project, changed in it only the point as to where the proposed railway was to connect with the Transbaikal section, de-

cing to scrap the partially built branch from Nerchinsk and to have Kuenga as the junction point. It agreed to the appropriation of credits necessary for final research and for beginning construction.

The Tsar always showed the greatest interest in everything that pertained to the Siberian railway and considered the subject, as it were, his personal concern, since, as heir to the throne, he had broken the ground for the last stretch of the railway to Vladivostok. He often spoke about the new project to both Stolypin and me, insisting upon the construction of a railway laid entirely upon Russian ground; he repeated again and again that China would certainly avail itself of the first opportunity to redeem its railway, and the center of the state would then be totally cut off from our Far Eastern territory.

When I had announced that I entirely shared this point of view, had always supported the Ministry of Ways and Communications, and wished to see construction begun according to a carefully considered plan that would avoid all errors such as had occurred in selecting the starting-point, the Tsar answered that this set him at perfect ease.

As soon as the legislative project had been approved by the Duma and sent to the State Council, Count Witte called on me and asked me whether or not I sympathized with the project and would support it in the State Council. I stated my point of view frankly, not knowing his attitude. But before he left, Witte said that he believed that the construction of the Amur Railway might lead to a diplomatic conflict and that he was amazed to see that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not objecting. He said he had reliable information that the Japanese ambassador, Baron Motono, was much disturbed by the project and did not conceal the fact that he opposed it.

Not suspecting that Witte would adopt an irreconcilable attitude in this matter, I told him that beginning with 1906 I had maintained friendly relations with the Japanese ambassador and only recently had had a conversation with him on this subject. Baron Motono had questioned me on the most varied matters pertaining to the Far East, saying that he considered that I was far better informed regarding them than the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Regarding our decision to undertake the construction of the Amur Railway he had even said that we should have undertaken this long before and that he failed to understand why we had not done so directly after the Portsmouth Treaty, since Japan was under the impression that Count Witte himself foresaw the need of its construction.



MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES OF COUNT KOKOVTSOV

I. L. Goremykin
V. K. Plehve

S. V. Rukhlov
I. G. Shcheglovitov

Witte did not answer this last remark, nor did he mention the matter again until the day this project was examined by the Finance Committee of the Council. I remember well the details of this session. The new annex to the Mariinsky Palace, which was to house the general sessions, had not yet been completed, and the Finance Committee met in the Ministers' Council room. Besides the members of the State Council who were on the Committee, a number of others arrived who did not have the right to participate in debates. Almost two-thirds of the entire Council were present, and the debates were rather disorderly, I must say.

As soon as the chairman, M. D. Dmitriev, announced the subject of discussion, Count Witte, who was not on the Committee, asked for permission to speak. He began, in his usual way, slowly and incoherently at first and gradually raising his tone, to object categorically to the project. He considered it not only insufficiently worked out, but totally unnecessary, beyond the resources of the treasury, and capable of distracting the attention of Russia from other, more needed railway construction and other urgent needs, such as increasing our army after its defeat in Manchuria. He said that it was an extremely dangerous step for us to take, as both Japan and China were sure to see in this undertaking a new threat to their positions. Gradually warming up to his subject he challenged me by saying that it was much harder to protect the interests of the treasury now that even the Minister of Finance agreed with a chance mood of the Duma, which had approved these expenditures without properly considering them, instead of using his authority to object to these unnecessary expenses. To soften somewhat the sharpness of his outburst he remarked that he did not know whether or not the Minister of Finance had raised objections in the Ministers' Council; perhaps he had, but, if so, more responsibility was to be placed upon the entire government for having permitted him to make such an experiment and for not fighting the people's representatives, whom it ought to educate in the spirit of economy, which was not being practised in Russia, with evident disastrous results. He then criticized the entire project and uttered a series of unexpected alternatives, which proved that he had not acquainted himself with the Duma's report. Consequently it was easy to defend the project which he so violently attacked.

During Witte's long speech, Akimov (12), Chairman of the State Council and no great friend of Witte's, asked me to answer his at-

tacks, as the Minister of Ways and Communications was "altogether too weak in polemics." I assured Akimov that I would certainly answer everything, since not only had I not been forced by the Ministers' Council to submit to its decision but I was firmly convinced of the necessity of constructing the Amur Railway as soon as possible. I had talked the matter over with many influential members of the Committee belonging not only to the Center but also to the Right group, which was in the majority, and was sure that a majority of the Committee would oppose Witte.

So it happened. Only ten members of the Committee joined Witte and openly expressed their ideas; these were Romanov, Pikhno, Nikolsky, and seven others whose names I cannot recall. Twenty members, however, supported the Duma project. Practically the same thing occurred in the general session, where a majority supported the resolution of the Committee. Count Witte spoke again, but was much more reserved than in the Committee. He said that he was speaking solely to ease his own conscience and to have it put on record that he had warned the Committee against this very great error.

This was my first encounter with Witte in the State Council during the work of the Third Duma. After this there was peace between us for a long time, till almost the end of 1912 when our relations again became strained, resulting in the fall of 1913 in open hostility on his part.

Toward the end of June both chambers adjourned for the summer vacation. Beginning with the second half of July I was able to take up my routine work and to prepare the budget for 1909. My colleagues in the Ministers' Council helped me greatly in balancing the new budget by finding it possible not to increase their demands very much as compared with the recently confirmed budget. My collaborators and I hastened the work on the new estimates, so that by the end of July I was able to leave for Homburg for a rest, which, everyone agreed, I needed very badly.

How delightful were those three carefree weeks! Motoring through the country, visiting friends—it was indeed a real rest. My brother, Vasilii Nikolaevich (13), was taking a course of treatment at Nauheim, and we saw each other almost daily.

During my stay at Homburg, I had to receive Netzlin, who came from Paris to see me. We made an agreement as to the main points of a new consolidated Russian loan to be concluded in 1909 for the

cancellation of the short-term (five-year) loan negotiated during the Russo-Japanese War. Later I shall tell the details of this agreement.

The only experience which came to mar my holiday was a visit I made to see the sick daughter of my late friend and comrade, E. D. Pleske. She had been in poor health when her father died in 1904, and had been sent to the Vera-Walde sanatorium on the frontier of Switzerland and the Duchy of Baden. She was young, and the doctors gave her every assurance that she could be cured. But she had not the will to live. I saw the doctors, the nurse, and Nina herself, but could do nothing. Nina had always suffered in silence, and she was no different now. She died early that autumn. I do not know why this incident comes back to me with such vividness, unless it is because as Nina Pleske stands before me in memory she brings back to me so many pleasant pictures of a past that is now far distant and gone forever.

CHAPTER XIX

SEPTEMBER 1908—MAY 1909

I returned from abroad about September 1 and immediately buried myself deep in routine work. I found everything peaceful among the ministers and anticipated that the budget for 1909 would be favorably received in the Ministers' Council. Stolypin was optimistic about the course of the usual autumn work. But this pleasant state of affairs did not last long.

Some two weeks later, following, as I remember, the first session of the Ministers' Council after my return, P. A. Stolypin asked me to remain. When everybody had left, he showed me a clipping from one of the Viennese papers which said that it was rumored that the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aehrenthal (1), and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolsky, during their stay at Buchlau, the estate of Count Berchtold (2), Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had reached an understanding concerning Austro-Hungary's final annexation of the two former Turkish provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, according to the Berlin Treaty of 1878, had been occupied by the Dual Monarchy. The Berlin Treaty, however, made no provision for the final disposition of these two provinces. Everybody recognized that this could not be settled otherwise than by a general European understanding such as the Berlin Treaty had been.

Stolypin told me that that morning he had asked the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charykov (3), who was in charge while Izvolsky was on his vacation, what he knew about the matter. Charykov had answered that Izvolsky had left no instructions about it before his departure and had not written anything about it since, but that before he had left St. Petersburg no preparations on this subject had been made nor had there been any references or memoranda presented to the Tsar, as was customary when the Minister intended to report to the Tsar on some general question or to ask for definite instructions. In conclusion, Charykov had mentioned that probably the newspaper was referring to some rumor persisting from

former times and pertaining to the frequent conversations between Izvolsky and Aehrenthal when the latter was Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. These conversations pertained to Izvolsky's pet scheme by which we would consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria (which was inevitable, anyway, according to him, and of little consequence to us) and in return Austria would consent to support us in Izvolsky's old plan to open the Straits. Izvolsky hoped that the support of Austria would neutralize the attitude of Germany.

I told Stolypin that I was totally ignorant of the affair, that Izvolsky never asked for my opinion or advice on any European question. On the contrary, when I did venture to ask him questions he often replied that he had been instructed by the Tsar not to initiate the Ministers' Council in the affairs of the diplomatic service, as these affairs were centered exclusively in the hands of the Tsar himself and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Izvolsky. The only exceptions to this rule were the affairs of China, Japan, and Persia, regarding which the tradition had been established since the days of Count Witte and Count Lambsdorf that all matters of importance were transacted with the constant participation of the Minister of Finance because of the fact that the Chinese Eastern Railway was within his competence and because in Persia great importance was attached to the Loan and Discount Bank (4). As for Japan, Izvolsky often said jokingly that he would be happy to transfer the entire Japanese department of his ministry to me.

Stolypin said that during his next report to the Tsar, who was ready to leave for the Crimea, he would find out whether or not this matter had been discussed before Izvolsky's departure. Then we parted.

Stolypin did not tell me that he had received a communication from our *Novoe Vremia*, with which publication he was closely connected through his brother, A. A. Stolypin (5), confirming the Vienna rumor; nor did he tell me that he had used much pressure to prevail upon that paper not to publish as yet anything about this and not to start a campaign against Izvolsky, at least until the Tsar's attitude in this matter had been ascertained.

The next morning Charykov, who had been my Lyceum friend, visited me. He told me that he was in a most delicate situation, as he did not know for certain where Izvolsky was but that undoubtedly he had already left Buchlau. He supposed, however, that the rumor

was in accord with the facts. It was his opinion that it was not for us to make things easier for Austria, who had decided long ago to annex the provinces; it was not our business, being, as we were, natural protectors of Slavic nationalities, to assist the House of Habsburg in realizing its dreams. Such action on our part would be badly received by the Slav world and we should be showered with accusations of having participated unnecessarily in some back-stage intrigue. He was firmly persuaded that by taking this step we should get absolutely nowhere as regards the problem of the Straits. He said that Izvolsky was forever returning to this, his favorite scheme, believing that he could trick Aehrenthal and accomplish great things for Russia without sacrificing any of our interests, since no one believed that the Berlin Treaty would ever be revised or that the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina would receive any other solution than the temporary one adopted in 1878. He told me that Suvorin (6) was furious about the willfulness of Austria and did not wish to believe that we had needlessly played such a strange part in this matter. Suvorin had no doubt that when it became known that Izvolsky had been caught in Aehrenthal's trap the position of our Minister of Foreign Affairs would not be an enviable one in the eyes of the rest of Europe. In leaving, Charykov said that he considered his own position to be impossible and hoped to be able to leave his disagreeable post before long. Izvolsky had already reported to the Tsar Charykov's desire to be appointed ambassador at Constantinople, a post which would soon be vacant.*

Two days later Stolypin told me that he had had a long conversation with the Tsar, who, he had learned, had given no special permission to Izvolsky, as the latter had not asked for any. Stolypin's impression was that the Tsar was very indignant over the whole business. He had told Stolypin that he hated to think that Izvolsky could have played such an inexcusable part, placing both himself and the Tsar in such an impossible position; for even if he made our consent conditional upon Austria's support of Russia in the matter of

* Some time afterwards Izvolsky very cleverly killed two birds with one stone: he satisfied Charykov's wish and gave much pleasure to Stolypin by appointing, as Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, his friend and brother-in-law, Sazonov (7), who long before had complained of his idleness as Russian Ambassador to the Vatican. Two years later this move, with Stolypin's support, assisted Izvolsky in obtaining the appointment of Russian Ambassador to Paris, which he desired. First, however, he made certain that his successor as Foreign Minister would be Sazonov.

the Straits, we should still remain in a very unfavorable position. Everybody would say that we had helped Austria to pull her chestnuts from the fire without gaining anything for ourselves, since it was evident that we could receive no tangible help from Austria; moreover, it was not in Austria's power to decide upon such a world-important matter. The Tsar had repeated twice that he especially disliked knowing that everybody would say that the Russian minister had been empowered by his Tsar, quite needlessly, to promise Austria our support in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when by the terms of the Berlin Treaty it was the affair of all those who had signed the treaty, and that we ought to be the last to undertake to play a decisive part in the entire business. Stolypin's impression was that the matter would not end so simply and that the only step worthy of us would be to dismiss Izvolsky (8) and announce publicly that he had acted without the permission of his government and that the entire matter would have to be considered as before. We might suggest to Austria that she address herself to the Powers who had signed the treaty.

The Tsar did not mention the matter to me, and shortly afterward he left for the Crimea. Toward the end of September Austria proclaimed her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izvolsky returned late in September, but had no personal discussions either with me or, as far as I know, with Stolypin. At least I remember perfectly well that during the first session of the Ministers' Council after Izvolsky's return, when all current business had been finished and the clerks of the office sent away, Stolypin asked Izvolsky to tell us just what had passed at Buchlau between him and Count Aehrenthal and if it was true that he had agreed in the name of the Russian government that Austria should annex the two Slavic provinces without the approval of the Powers which had signed the Berlin Treaty.

Izvolsky answered categorically that he had been explicitly instructed by His Majesty not to discuss matters of foreign policy in the Ministers' Council and was therefore not in a position to give any explanations without first receiving special permission from the Tsar, the one supreme directing authority of our entire foreign policy.

Stolypin reddened but said nothing. We all parted in great confusion. It was apparent that Izvolsky had placed himself in a very embarrassing position and was really unwilling to disclose what he had done. In private conversations we all expressed the belief that

Izvolsky must retire; we only waited to see just when and under what circumstances he would do so.

His retirement came about two years later. But instead of being punished for this unauthorized action he was appointed ambassador to Paris in the place of the most worthy A. I. Nelidov. In realizing this pet ambition of his, Izvolsky took advantage of Nelidov's poor health and his casual remark that he was tired and found it hard to keep up with the requirements of his office since the death of his wife. Nelidov did not seriously consider asking to be relieved, and was much shocked when Izvolsky informed him that he had been appointed member of the State Council.

Such was the end of this unfortunate episode from which Izvolsky managed to extricate himself unscathed. Actually, however, he suffered a moral defeat, since the real facts naturally became known and everybody saw clearly that amid the hospitality of Buchlau Izvolsky had played a part in the fable, "The Fox and the Crow."

Some time after the events described above, in the beginning of the fall session of the Duma (1908), and most unexpectedly for myself, there occurred an incident toward which the government was at first perfectly calm and even indifferent, not supposing that it might lead to any complication. It so happened, however, that after a few months this little routine matter, the result mainly of a misunderstanding on the part of junior representatives of the administration, grew into something of rather large dimensions and created a pretext for complications of primary importance.

Toward the end of 1908 or at the beginning of 1909 the post of Assistant Naval Minister had been given to Admiral I. K. Grigorovich (9). Between him and me there existed the best of relations. There never was an important issue concerning the restoration of our fleet after its destruction in 1905 on which we had any differences. His position was always moderate and supported with very weighty data. In all preliminary conferences in which the officials of the Ministry of Finance and the State Control participated, all problems were discussed and decided upon without argument or complication. Thanks to our good relations, differences that arose were never expressed in the form of irreconcilable opinions which could be settled only by the Ministers' Council, but were discussed by us two. It was quite different with the Ministry of War. No session passed but the Council was called upon to solve unpleasant contentions raised by

the Minister of War. This was especially true when the interests of the ministry were defended by the minister himself and not by his assistant, General Polivanov (10).

In the Duma also the position of the Naval Ministry was a privileged one. Admiral Grigorovich, who, after 1909, usually represented the Naval Minister, surrounded himself by a pleiad of collaborators, mainly young naval officers, among whom was a Captain of the First Rank, Kolchak (11). These young officers speedily won for themselves and the ministry they represented the favor of the Duma by their splendid work on all matters submitted to it, by intelligently defending these matters in the Duma committee, and by readily adapting themselves to the moods of the Duma and its prominent representatives in the Committee for National Défense. All affairs pertaining to the Naval Ministry passed unusually smoothly.

Among the matters submitted by this Ministry in 1909 was one which interested the Tsar greatly. This was the matter of credits for the newly projected Naval General Staff.

The project passed the Ministers' Council without any debate. It was considered to be in exact conformity with the provisions of Article 96 of the Code, which stated that the credits for the upkeep of newly formed institutions were to be approved by the legislature whereas the formation of the institutions themselves was a prerogative of the Supreme Power.

This was exactly how the Naval Ministry acted. It requested the Duma to permit the appropriation of a rather modest sum, about 74,000 rubles; it outlined the organization of the General Staff, and in the concluding paragraph of the project it asked to have this sum paid by the state treasury. The organization of the Staff was appended to the project merely as a tentative list of officers for the information of the Duma.

The project evoked no objections in the Duma either; and the Committee for National Defense as well as the Budget Committee showed their favorable attitudes by confirming unconditionally not only the amount of the credit but also the project of the official list of the General Staff and by advising that the matter be submitted to the State Council, to which it was automatically transferred.

Whether the Naval Minister himself or his assistant noticed the incorrectness of this detail, whether his attention was drawn to the nonconformity of the Duma decision to the provisions of Article

96, or whether, because of the Duma's inexperience in the fine points of legislative technique, it paid no attention to this, desiring only that the matter in which the ministry was interested be decided as speedily as possible, I do not know. I only state definitely that there was no discussion of it in the Ministers' Council. Nor did the matter reach Stolypin, who concealed from me none of the misunderstandings relating to the credits of the Naval and War Ministries, knowing how great an importance the Tsar attached to them.

The matter reached the attention of Stolypin and the Ministers' Council only later in 1909 when, after the State Council had resumed its sessions after the Christmas vacation, the project was submitted to the Finance Committee of the Council for consideration. During the Council's first session, representatives of the Right group, through their leader, P. N. Durnovo (who had been in his youth a naval officer and therefore paid particular attention to the affairs of the Naval Ministry and considered himself a great authority on them) announced that the Duma's action was unlawful, as it infringed upon the prerogatives of the Supreme Power: the Duma had confirmed an organization measure pertaining to the administration of the navy, whereas, according to the provisions of Article 96, this was the prerogative of the Supreme Power.

Undoubtedly, the objection Durnovo raised was in accord with the letter of the law. Most members of the Finance Committee, however, took into consideration the relations between the two chambers, which were most harmonious at that time. They began to look for a compromise which would do away with the conflict between the Council and the Duma. But it was impossible to find one. In vain did the Naval Minister attempt to prevail upon the Duma, in non-official communications, to meet him halfway and to change the text of its resolution, limiting itself to a confirmation of the credit. The Duma refused to agree to any compromise, as the majority in both the Budget Committee and the Committee for National Defense had rejected the proposed arrangement and had not concealed the fact that they did not sympathize with the provisions of Article 96 of the Code which restricted the rights of the Duma. It was manifest that there would be a similar majority in the general session of the Duma.

After long and painful negotiations, in which the most prominent part was played by the Assistant Naval Minister, who recognized that the responsibility for negligence lay entirely upon him, the Fi-

nance Committee of the State Council adopted a different sort of compromise. The majority, as against the Right group, agreed to confirm the resolution of the Duma but to state that such violations of the law would not be permitted in the future; it agreed also to recommend to the Naval Minister that in the future he should adhere more closely to the provisions of the article of the Code.

In the two sessions of the Ministers' Council in which the matter was discussed at Stolypin's suggestion, we all were of the opinion that the resolution of the Duma was certainly not in accordance with the provision of the law, but that it was not desirable to create any conflicts between the two chambers. In view of this consideration no effort should be spared to work out a compromise, if for no other reason than because all conflicts would only play into the hands of the opposition in the Duma and would complicate the position of the Naval Ministry.

Stolypin declared that if no agreement were reached he was prepared to appear personally in the general session of the State Council in order to support the decision of the Finance Committee. There was no more discussion on this subject in the Ministers' Council until much later, when the matter was discussed by the general session of the State Council. At that time Stolypin contracted a serious case of gripe and was threatened with pneumonia.

Two days before the meeting of the State Council he invited me to his house and asked me to take his place, as the doctors had positively refused to permit him to leave the room. He said that he felt so badly about it that, should I refuse—which he would understand, knowing the unpleasant consequences that were bound to arise—he had decided to disregard the doctors' orders and to attend the session. He showed me a brief outline of the speech he had decided to make if he were obliged to attend. I consented to take his place, little knowing what would happen. I took the outline of his speech and asked him only to remember that neither he nor the Naval Minister must hold it against me if I failed and the general session adopted a decision other than that of the State Duma.

What had occurred in the Finance Committee was repeated in the general session of the State Council. The Assistant Naval Minister, Grigorovich, in defending the project said he was sorry that, owing to his personal carelessness, the Duma had erred in its decision, and he begged the Council to help him out of the difficulty. He was supported by Dmitriev. The opposition was represented by P. N.

Durnovo, who made a very sharp speech supporting the measure itself but pointing out that the decision of the Duma infringed upon the prerogatives of the Monarch and that we had no right to permit this under any consideration. In conclusion, he said that in siding with the Duma we should create a precedent which we should never get rid of, and probably should very soon be extremely sorry for our inexcusable weakness.

Then I spoke. I said that I was speaking only because of the illness of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, who alone had the right to speak in the name of the government. Using part of his outline and adding but little of my own I supported the opinion of the Finance Committee and took time to refute Durnovo's main argument—that a dangerous precedent would be created—by proving that in legislative matters a precedent could not be created when there was general recognition of the fact that one of the articles of the Code had not been observed and when the ministry responsible for the error promised not to repeat it in the future.

The vote surpassed all expectations. Only those of the Right opposed the project—not all of them at that, but only a small number of them, the so-called Neudgardt group—whereas the majority in favor of accepting the Duma's resolution was quite impressive.

The legislative project was then immediately presented to the Tsar. It was long in returning, however; so long that the Chairman of the State Council, Akimov, inquired in a memorandum as to its fate. The Tsar gave an evasive answer. As soon as he was able, Stolypin went to Tsarskoe Selo, and after he had seen the Tsar he telephoned to say that although the Tsar had been exceptionally gracious to him he had said that he had not come to any definite decision about the Naval General Staff and had been waiting to see Stolypin, as the matter worried him very much and he did not know what course to adopt.

Stolypin told me that he had tried to allay the Tsar's fears of any attempt on the part of the Duma to limit the rights of the Monarch, by explaining to him the opinion of the majority of the State Council; His Majesty, however, could not forget that "Article 96 has been violated, although, of course, one should not exaggerate the danger of such a violation." Stolypin felt that the Tsar would deliberate a little longer but in the end would confirm the legislative project, for his last words had been: "One cannot accuse this Duma of a desire to seize power, and there is no need to fight with it."

A few days later Stolypin telephoned to me and asked me to come to his house. When we were left alone in his study he handed me the Tsar's letter dated "Tsarskoe Selo, April 25, 1909." With Stolypin's permission, I copied this letter then and there and have preserved it to this day. It is as follows:

"PETR ARKADEVICH:

"Since my last conversation with you I have thought continually about the lists of the Naval General Staff.

"Now, having weighed everything, I have decided not to confirm the legislative project submitted to me and that the expenses needed for the official lists are to be included in the ten million credit.

"This is not a question of confidence or lack of it; it is my will.

"Remember that we live in Russia, not abroad or in Finland (Senate) (12) and, therefore, *I shall not consider the possibility of any resignation*. To be sure there will be talk of this at St. Petersburg and at Moscow, but hysterical shouting will soon subside. I charge you, together with the Ministers of War and Navy, to work out in a month's time regulations necessary to clarify the present attitude toward the military and naval legislative projects.

"I warn you that I will reject categorically your petition or that of anyone else for resignation.

"Sincerely,

"NICHOLAS."

Having read the letter I asked Stolypin whether or not during his last interview with the Tsar his own resignation had been mentioned and if the question of resignation was really being considered. Stolypin replied that his own resignation or that of his colleagues had never been mentioned. "It is not impossible," said Stolypin, "that during his report the Naval Minister might have mentioned that his assistant, Grigorovich, recognized that his error was evident, and being a straightforward man unafraid of responsibility, he might have told him that he was ready to tender his resignation, as obviously he was responsible for the situation."

In conversation with Stolypin, Grigorovich had often mentioned this, and each time Stolypin had asked him not to mention it again. Stolypin himself, although he had not mentioned his resignation, thought that the Tsar could see that his whole future was bound up with this affair and that the position of the government was a very delicate one. Undoubtedly, the presentation of the official lists to the

Duma by the Naval Minister had been a mistake, but they had been confirmed by both chambers and nonconfirmation by the Tsar would place all responsibility upon his person. This could not be suffered to happen; the responsibility must be transferred to the government.

However, this had been merely an interchange of opinions, so that Stolypin was at a loss to understand the meaning of the Tsar's letter. "On receiving such a letter I should tender my resignation," he said; "but this I shall not do, as I do not want to pain the Tsar because of his momentary displeasure, which, evidently, was caused by some outside person." In the end, no one tendered his resignation, and soon everybody had forgotten about it.

During the last few months of 1908 I was particularly busy. In addition to the regular office routine there was intensive work on Duma commissions, especially the Budget Committee, which took almost three days a week of my time. Then, early in 1909, there was the task of preparing for and negotiating the new loan in the Paris market.

Although all the commissions went about their work in a friendly spirit, the Agrarian and Budget Committees were the only two that showed any enthusiasm. The Budget Committee was especially active. Now, as in the previous spring, it did its work well. It requested information of all ministries about certain items in their estimates, and the readiness with which all ministries complied with these requests facilitated co-operative work. There was little opposition in this Committee—the Chairman, M. M. Alekseenko, and several others congratulated me upon the budget I had submitted. After two months' hard work, the Committee's report was ready. It was entirely in accord with the government's program, but it remained to be seen how the Duma would receive it.

Nor did my negotiations for the loan give me much trouble. Some unnecessary unpleasantness was created by useless debates in the Duma in connection with which I had to face attacks of the opposition, again represented by Shingarev, who evidently could not miss an opportunity to criticize the government.

As I have already indicated, the negotiations for the loan to consolidate the obligations of the State Treasury floated in 1904 on the Paris market had been begun when I met M. Netzlin at Homburg in August 1908. I had written him before my departure for Homburg, suggesting that we meet there and stating my basic ideas about the loan. I had summed up these ideas by saying that the loan was to be

for a long term, at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and for a sum the net returns of which would equal the entire amount of the retired bonds. I had insistently begged him, before coming to Homburg, to see his colleagues, chiefly on two matters: the offering price of the loan, and the bankers' commission. I had warned him that the position of Russia was not the same as it had been in 1906 and begged him as a friend not to place me in a difficult position by offering Russia terms which I could not accept because of public opinion. I regret that this letter of mine, supposing it remained in the archives of the Ministry of Finance and fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks, has not been published by them, since it would show how well the representatives of the Russian government defended its interests.

In Homburg, Netzlin's attitude toward the points upon which I insisted was on the whole very satisfactory. He said that the Russian group recognized that Russian credit was much more stable now, that the government had been successful in introducing order into the administration, and that between it and the people's representatives normal relations existed; also that the financial position of the country was so stable that if the government met with difficulties in negotiating the new loan it might risk paying the 1904 obligations in gold. But in his estimation the main thing was that this time the entire profit of the loan was to remain in France and was to be placed, mainly, at the disposal of the Russian banking group which would underwrite the new loan, as the bonds of 1904 were placed for the most part with them and only a small part had been disposed of to the public. Netzlin told me that the group had been definitely informed that the consent of the French government was assured, that I should meet with no difficulties from it, and that I could, then and there, authorize him to discuss the matter with his colleagues and to inform me of their decision. I did so. Directly after returning to St. Petersburg I reported this transaction to the Ministers' Council, obtaining permission to present it to the Tsar for preliminary approval, and notified Netzlin of everything; and during October and November all terms were agreed upon without it being necessary to call the bankers to St. Petersburg. In January the loan was concluded without any major inquiry being made in the Duma or the State Council, since this was a conversion loan and therefore according to law could be completed at the will of the Sovereign.

Later, when the budget for 1909 was being examined in the Duma, the opposition tried to prove that the actions of the government

had been illegal. It was forced to abandon this point of view, however, as the overwhelming majority of the Duma loudly acclaimed my arguments that the transaction was profitable and would strengthen Russian credit instead of weakening it, as Shingarev tried to demonstrate. After the debates on the budget I asked Shingarev, in the presence of some members of the Duma, whether or not he really believed that better terms could have been obtained. He admitted frankly that he was not familiar with the technicalities of negotiating loans in foreign markets; that perhaps, under existing conditions, it would have been impossible to do better; and that, of course, the government was wise in deciding not to pay for the bonds out of its gold reserve, which might be needed for something else.

The debates on the budget began on February 16 and lasted till the end of May. Alekseenko opened the debates with a report which was really a hymn of praise of the budget and of my skill in preparing it. But the next speaker, Shingarev, had other things to say. As in the budget debates of the preceding year he avoided all discussion of the budget itself and read a wholesale indictment of the government's entire program. Several lesser luminaries echoed his generalities, revealing their colossal ignorance of all things pertaining to budgets. I intended to let these prattlers have their way before I replied, but Stolypin was loth to leave Shingarev unanswered. Immediately after the luncheon recess, therefore, I mounted the tribune, and judging from the applause with which my speech was received I feel justified in saying that I completely routed my adversaries.

The favorite objects of the opposition's attacks were the estimate of the Credit Department of the Special Credit Office, the estimate of the Peasant Bank, and particularly the estimate of the Foreign Department of the Special Credit Office. These attacks sought to deprive the Minister of Finance of such powers as the right to purchase foreign currency as it was needed by his ministry. Another popular object of attack was the estimate of the Department of Railways. In this connection it was demanded that the regulation of railway rates be put under the control of the legislature and that the activity of the government in matters of private railway construction be limited. Also, the Minister of Finance was criticized for his activity regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was under his jurisdiction. In all this the opposition was led by Shingarev, whose energy in the face of repeated failure was remarkable. It may be that he gained renewed strength for his efforts from the columns of the

paper, *Rech*, which praised him and denounced me through thick and thin.

I regret that space does not permit me to quote here the most important portions of my replies to these attacks, but I can say that I always succeeded in winning the support of the Duma; my adversaries did not have one single victory to their credit. This work in the Duma was very difficult, but the congratulations I received were the best possible reward for the efforts I put forth.

In the midst of the budget debates the opposition questioned the legality of the manner in which the Minister of Ways and Communications and I had dealt with private railway construction. In this, it followed in the footsteps of the opposition in the Second Duma, undeterred by the fact that it had much less support among the members than formerly. It was specifically provided by law that the business of private railway construction was to be dealt with by the Second Department of the State Council. This law, as worked out by a special council under the presidency of the Emperor, had been clearly drafted by the Second Department of the State Council in February 1906 in connection with the revised text of the fundamental laws and at the same time as the adoption of the statute for the organization of the Duma and the State Council in accordance with the Imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905. The law was duly published in legal form, but the motives and the discussions in the special council did not of course enter into the text of the law. Under the pretext that these were of very great importance for the proper interpretation of the law itself, both Shingarev and Nekrasov declared that they could not concede that the law was being properly observed, since they were not in possession of the minutes of the discussions in the special council. Alekseenko and Khomiakov therefore asked me to procure the text of this law for the information of the Budget Committee, which I did, with the permission of the Ministers' Council and the Tsar. Alekseenko and Khomiakov promised that it would not be made public. Great was my surprise, therefore, when, during the next open session of the Duma, Shingarev and Nekrasov accused me of attempting to use this unpublished law to exert undue pressure on the Duma. The aim behind this accusation was to secure the withdrawal of matters pertaining to private railway construction from the control of the government and to place them under the control of the legislature. To achieve this legally the opposition should have demanded a new law replacing the old one,

but instead it accused two ministers of the government of illegal procedure. The members of the Duma soon recognized that there was no ground for this accusation, the injustice of which I tried to point out in my speech of February 25, 1909.

When the opposition saw that it had failed, it sought support in the opposition press and in public circles opposed to the government by declaring that the prerogatives of the Tsar had been used to restrict the freedom of the Duma, thus making it appear that the government, through me, had dragged the name of the Tsar into this dispute. The Tsar, however, saw that this was but another maneuver of the opposition to discredit the government. Yet, in spite of this thorough defeat, the opposition raised this issue again and again simply as a pretext for accusing the government of seizing power which it did not possess in order to limit the rights of the legislature.

CHAPTER XX

MAY-NOVEMBER, 1909

In the midst of all this work in the Duma and the State Council during the first half of 1909, there arose unexpectedly in the Ministry of Finance a problem with which I was not at all eager to deal and which caused unforeseen complications.

A short time previously a new figure had appeared in government circles, the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov (1), who had been transferred from his former post of Commander of the Kiev Army District and Governor-General of the Southwestern Region to that of Chief of the General Staff and, later, to that of Minister of War.

My first meetings with him had been very pleasant. We had met for the first time in the Committee for National Defense under the chairmanship of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich in 1906. In the course of the discussion General Roediger* had suggested that we should abandon the idea of fortifying Vladivostok because it could not be defended against a possible Japanese attack, and, instead, should center our land fortification of the Far East around Nikolsk-Ussuriisk. Stolypin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I had joined those who were decidedly opposed to such a plan. Sukhomlinov had supported me in everything I said, and, after the session, had been particularly complimentary and courteous. But with his appointment as Minister of War and his appearance in the Ministers' Council to discuss the current problems of his ministry our relations speedily acquired a totally different, even a hostile, character. We could not agree as to the amount of credits to be allocated to his ministry, and this official contention soon developed into personal bitterness. Reports of this discord reached the Emperor, who ex-

*I believe that General Roediger's suggestion in the Committee for National Defense caused his dismissal. He had already incurred the Tsar's displeasure by opposing—and rightly—the division of the Ministry of War into two independent parts: the Ministry of War proper, and the Central Administration of the General Staff. His suggestion to abandon the fortification of Vladivostok was merely the last straw. He was succeeded by General Sukhomlinov.

pressed to Stolypin his displeasure at such disagreements in the Council. Stolypin reminded the Tsar that each minister was completely independent in the Council, that the very purpose of the Council was to smooth out differences between ministries, and that if such differences remained unliquidated they were generally submitted to the Tsar for decision. He said also that the Ministry of War often submitted matters to the Council very carelessly prepared and often the Minister of War himself abandoned his former calculations and agreed with those of the Minister of Finance and the State Comptroller. He pointed out that General Sukhomlinov had begun to use unheard-of tactics: he would agree to a thing in the Council, and later would make objections to it, with the result that the Council had to consider matters a second and even a third time, obviously causing much confusion in the ministerial body.

At first when I complained to the Tsar about Sukhomlinov's actions he said that the trouble was all due to the General's inexperience; things would go more smoothly when Sukhomlinov became more familiar with his work, for really he was a capable man. But during the first half of 1909 my relations with the General grew increasingly worse. The issue between us concerned the Far East.

General Unterberger, the Governor-General of the Amur region, was exercised about the threatening conditions in the Far East. He feared that the Japanese were planning to attack us again while our defense along the Vladivostok front was totally unprepared, and sent warning telegrams in great numbers to the Minister of War, to the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Copies of all these telegrams were sent to me because of the interest of the Ministry of Finance in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Stolypin was greatly concerned. With each telegram he invariably invited both Izvolsky and me to his house and inquired what it meant and what protective measures were being taken. Each time we both reassured him that we knew of nothing which might justify General Unterberger's excitement. We told him, also, that our relations with the Japanese ambassador, Baron Motono, led us to believe that Japan had no designs against us.

Then the Minister of War took a hand in the affair. He reported to the Tsar that he shared Unterberger's views about the danger from Japan in the Far East and that he considered it his duty to explain that our unfortunate situation in that region was due solely to the fact that he had been unable to obtain the consent of the Minister of

Finance to the appropriation of the minimum credits needed to improve the Vladivostok fortifications.

I first learned of this from the Tsar himself. Surprised and indignant, for I could recall no instance of having withheld such consent, I told the Emperor that he had been misinformed, and begged his permission to prove my point by documentary evidence. I pointed out that it was unlikely that I should hinder Sukhomlinov in this way when, two years previously, I had argued against the intention of the Ministry of War to abolish this fortress. The Tsar himself admitted that in all likelihood Unterberger had been paying too much attention to information emanating from unreliable sources.

On returning from Peterhof I got in touch with the State Treasury Department, and from the brief report of its Director and Deputy Director I saw clearly that Sukhomlinov had told the Tsar an untruth. During the three years since the peace treaty with Japan the Ministry of Finance had not suggested one single cut in the appropriations for the fortifications at Vladivostok. The demands of the Ministry of War had been accepted as submitted. Nor had the Ministers' Council limited the appropriations, in spite of the fact that, as was pointed out in 1908 and 1909 by the State Comptroller, the appropriations of the previous years had not been used because the army authorities could not agree upon the exact location of the fortification and other technical matters concerning it.

Before I had an opportunity to submit to the Tsar the proofs of Sukhomlinov's misstatements, the Minister of War was put more in the wrong by what transpired at the next session of the Ministers' Council. After all current business of the session had been completed, Stolypin dismissed the clerks of the office and read to us the latest telegram he had received from Unterberger, reporting that, beyond all doubt, Japan was preparing for a new attack upon our Far Eastern border; Unterberger had this on good authority from his agents, whose names he did not mention. Stolypin then asked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Navy, and of War to report on the information they had received from their agents concerning this Japanese menace.

Izvolsky was the first to speak. Speaking sharply, he characterized Unterberger's telegrams as purposeless and groundless, capable only of complicating our relations with Japan, which had been so friendly that in 1907 and 1908 we had been able to make a series of agreements (2) with them concerning the fisheries in our Far East-

ern waters. He said that the Japanese ambassador already knew of and had expressed his consternation at Unterberger's telegrams; also, that our ambassadors in China and Japan steadily reported that our relations with Japan were very reassuring.

The Minister of the Navy confirmed what Izvolsky had said by saying that our naval representatives also sent in the most reassuring information as to our recent adversary's fine attitude toward us—an attitude prompted by Japan's sincere desire for peace. He said that Japan was far from entertaining any militaristic ideas because she recognized that in another conflict with us not only would she have to contend with a disapproving America, who justly considered the Portsmouth Treaty its own handiwork, but also she would not receive financial support from England, which alone had made it possible for Japan to wage war against us.

Then the Minister of War spoke. He said merely that he had no information except that supplied to him by General Unterberger, but that he himself was of the opinion that, for the near future, there was no pressing danger. "We must merely observe the Russian saying that 'The Lord protects him who protects himself.' In this sense we have fallen far behind in our fortification of the Far East; the fortification of Vladivostok is now in very bad condition, for the sole reason that we have not appropriated the necessary funds."

Stolypin expressed his surprise at Sukhomlinov's statement, and said that it was the first time he had heard that the Ministry of Finance disapproved of improving the condition of our main stronghold on the Pacific. Then he asked me to state my opinion.

I felt that the time had come to put all the cards on the table. First, I expressed my agreement with the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Next, I said that the Japanese ambassador was very eager to assure us that our administrators in the Amur region had no just reason for their alarm, and that he had shown me a telegram instructing him to advise our government of this fact and of Japan's friendliness toward Russia. Finally, I submitted my evidence to prove that the Minister of War was entirely wrong when he told the Council—as he had already told the Tsar—that the Ministry of Finance had withheld appropriations for improving the fortifications of Vladivostok. I then stated the amount of the credits that had been appropriated during the last three years but left untouched by the Ministry of War. The session ended in painful silence.

On the following Friday I made my report to the Tsar and sub-

mitted to him my report proving that the statements of the Minister of War had been false. He looked it over in my presence and said that he would speak to the Minister of War. The Emperor said that this incident had bothered him considerably, not because he attached any importance to Unterberger's telegrams—as he was firmly persuaded that no danger threatened us from Japan—but because the government functioned so badly and officials were continually trying to blame someone else for their own errors.

About a month later, when I was reporting to the Tsar on several matters that he was eager to have settled before he went on vacation, he again referred to this incident. He repeated that he did not take much stock in Unterberger's agitation and undue alarm, especially since the General had been unable to give an accurate account of where he got his information. "I am much more concerned about what has come to light regarding the fortification of Vladivostok," he said. "A few days ago, the Japanese Ambassador, for the first time in three years, requested a special audience. We talked for about an hour and a half. Baron Motono persuaded me that his government honestly wished to keep peace with Russia, but he alarmed me by the extent of his information concerning the condition of our national defenses in the Far East. He said, 'If we had wanted to attack Russia, why have we not done so already? Your Far Eastern coast line is entirely unprotected and as for the fortifications at Vladivostok we have the most detailed information that not even the first steps have been taken to improve them—your technicians continue to argue among themselves about proper location. Your Majesty would be perfectly safe in not building any fortifications at all, so little does Japan think of any aggressive action. The entire purpose of my audience is to inform Your Majesty, on my word of honor, that, having received information of the alarming reports that have come from that region, my government wishes to assure Your Majesty that these reports are entirely unfounded.'"

The Tsar had accepted Baron Motono's statement at its face value, but this only increased his worry; for if it were true, why were Unterberger and the Minister of War so alarmed? He was also perplexed by the thought that nothing was being done about the fortifications at Vladivostok and that the credits already advanced for this purpose had been put to no use. He continued: "I am so worried about this that I have decided to ask you to go to the Far East to find out if you can why Unterberger is so alarmed and why the work on

the fortifications is not going ahead. Your interest in the affairs of the Chinese Eastern Railway will afford a convenient pretext for your trip. Moreover, I value your opinion highly."

During the next few weeks I was indeed very busy. In addition to the regular work of my ministry there were the preparations for my departure, which was set for the end of September or early in October. I gathered together all the material concerning the railway and Far Eastern affairs that I thought I should need, and selected a small group of my companions to accompany me.* The commander of the special corps of the border patrol, General N. A. Pykhachev (6), was sent on ahead to have things in order, and in the first week of October we left St. Petersburg.

In spite of the many ceremonies that could not be avoided, the trip, beginning with Moscow† and lasting till we reached Manchuria, was for me a most welcome and enjoyable experience. At Manchuria Station (Manchouli) I entered the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway; I had to leave the Siberian express train and take a special train sent for me and my companions as well as for the railway officials, who, headed by General Horvath (7), had come to meet us. At that station I found also General Pykhachev, who told me that there was a surprise in store for me at Harbin. General Horvath confirmed this remark, and explained it by showing me a telegram he had just received from his assistant. It read as follows: "Leaving to meet the Prince tomorrow. Arrival scheduled for Tuesday, 9:00 A.M., at Harbin."

The Prince referred to was the venerable Japanese statesman, Prince Ito (8). The news that he was coming to Harbin was a complete surprise to me, and requires a few words of explanation.

My projected trip to the Far East had been no secret; preparations for my departure had been conducted quite openly. Baron Motono had known of it, and had asked me if I intended to visit Japan. He had assured me that I would be very cordially received

* E. D. Lvov (3), Director of my office; A. N. Wentzel (4), Chairman of the Chinese Eastern Railway; and Zhadvoin (5), Comptroller of the Railway and Secretary of the Railway Administration.

† I was more than glad to accept the invitation of the Stock Exchange Committee to stop in Moscow, as I had never been able to visit that city in my capacity as Minister of Finance. Moreover, the merchants of Moscow had built a special store in Harbin for the sale of Russian goods, and they were eager to secure special freight rates for the shipment of these goods from Moscow to Harbin. My promise to do what I could to have these privileges granted was greeted with applause.

by his government and by the entire Japanese people. I had told him that although I should have been delighted to visit his country I should be unable to do so because I should have to be back in St. Petersburg for the opening of the Duma and State Council early in November. But Baron Motono had persisted, suggesting that he talk to Izvolsky and ask him to report to the Tsar the wish of the Japanese government to have me visit Japan. I had begged the ambassador not to do so, lest Izvolsky, who was a very jealous guardian of foreign affairs, might take offense; moreover, the press* might interpret such a visit as an effort on my part to interfere in the administration of foreign affairs. I had not told the ambassador, however, the real reason for declining to consider a visit to Japan. It was this: in our conversation the Tsar had not mentioned such a visit, and I was afraid that, should it be suggested to him, he might think that I had inspired the suggestion. Baron Motono had expressed his sorrow that I should not be able to include his country in my itinerary, but had not said one single word which might have led me to think that I should meet a Japanese official in Harbin. Perhaps the mission of Prince Ito had been planned without the ambassador's knowledge—I do not know. No one at St. Petersburg had known anything of it. General Horvath himself had been informed of it orally only as he left Harbin to meet me at Manchuria Station.

Because of all this, I must confess that I was considerably perplexed by the news which the telegram contained. I asked General Horvath to see to it that Prince Ito was accorded every honor and was made as comfortable as possible as he traveled on our railways. I had guards of honor posted at all important points of his journey. With the co-operation and approval of Kawakami (9), the Japanese consul at Harbin, plans were made for the reception of the Prince at Harbin. There was nothing else I could do.

The journey from the Manchurian border to Harbin was most pleasant. We stopped at every station where there was anything to see. The population met me with bread and salt and invited me to

* Baron Motono and I had often discussed the difficulties of the Russian government as regards the press; the government had no mouthpiece of any influence through which to express its ideas. Suvorin's *Novoe Vremia* was even more hostile toward some ministers than were the papers of the opposition. As for *Grashdanin*, Baron Motono himself often said that he could not understand how a paper which boasted such loyalty to the monarch could write such things about his ministers as appeared in its pages every Thursday.

visit their homes and schools. Everything had an air of prosperity; there was no evidence of any hostility between the Russian and the Chinese populations. I was especially gratified by the condition of our troops in the Trans-Amur area. The troops of the Railway Brigade were particularly well housed, both officers and men, and although the other troops of the Trans-Amur district were quartered in barracks somewhat inferior to those of the Railway Brigade, their barracks were superior to those of the guards in St. Petersburg.* I visited, too, all important settlements near the railway and all interesting technical developments. Our schedule was so arranged that on our return journey we should pass in the daytime those places which we passed at night as we traveled eastward.

I reached Harbin on Sunday, October 11. It was a fine, sunny day, and in spite of a considerable chill in the air, the station and the station grounds were filled with people. The reception ceremonies† occupied a good two hours; then I went to the Cathedral of St. Nicholas to attend a solemn *Te Deum*. The streets through which I drove to and from the church were flanked by troops of the Harbin garrison and were crowded with spectators. After the service, I returned to my car for a short breathing-spell, then drove out again to call on the superior officials of Harbin and the consuls who had

* A few of the old "dugout" barracks were still being used, but these were exceptional cases. Credits had already been appropriated for buildings to replace them, and by 1914 even these few were no longer occupied. As a matter of fact, General Chichagov, the Commander of the District, even asked that the worst of these dugouts be preserved in the condition in which the troops left them as records of the past.

† Among those presented to me were the Chinese governors of the provinces of Kirin and Heilungkiang. The governor of the former province, which included Harbin, made a speech in which he conveyed the greetings of his Emperor to the Emperor of Russia and to myself. He said that he was a constant witness of the fact that the Russians were wisely discharging the duties they had assumed at the authorization of the Chinese government, were acting in perfect accord with the provisions of the treaty, and were constantly defending the rights of both the Russian and the Chinese population in the railway territory, introducing everywhere order, prosperity, and justice. The other governor, Li, said little. According to Horvath, he was not favorably disposed to the Russians, and used every opportunity to intrigue with the German and American consuls against the Russians and the railway. I noticed, too, that these two consuls were not at the station to greet me. The American consul had gone to Peking to see his ambassador before it was known when I should arrive. I tried hard to see the German consul, but failed. Apparently he was not in good health, but I was left with the impression that he was deliberately trying to avoid me. What a contrast this was to the conduct of the French consul, who put himself completely at my disposal.

welcomed me at the station. It was after five o'clock when I got back to my car.

I had stayed a considerable time with the Japanese consul, who had told me that necessary arrangements for the reception of Prince Ito had been made, thanks to the splendid assistance he had received from General Horvath. The General had decided to repeat virtually the reception that had been accorded me, so successfully had it been carried out. He turned over to the Japanese consul the task of looking after the Japanese from their colony who would be certain to throng the station. Kawakami had accepted and had decided to dispense with special invitations and, instead, to admit to the station platform only those Japanese who were known personally to him and his staff. The Prince was to be presented first to the Russian delegation, and then was to be received by the Japanese at the other end of the platform, close to my car.

With everything thus well arranged I spent the next day trying to complete as much of my work about the railway as I could, so that I should have time to devote to Prince Ito. That night I went for a walk with E. D. Lvov, in order to refresh myself for the events of the morrow. We happened to stop before the third-class waiting-room. Through the windows we could see that there was no one there; the floors had been scrubbed, and the furniture was all in the center of the floor; this trifling circumstance was to be of importance later on.

Prince Ito's train was due at nine o'clock on the morning of October 13. The crowd began to gather on the station platform and in the station grounds as early as seven o'clock. There seemed to be exemplary order among the Japanese, who were being admitted one by one to the platform in accordance with Kawakami's plan.

The train pulled in exactly on time. I immediately entered the Prince's car, where he welcomed me and conveyed to me the greetings of his government. He expressed his government's regret that I was unable to visit Japan, and said that it gave him great personal pleasure, despite his poor health, to undertake this journey in order that he might tell me how well I was thought of in Japan and how eager his government was to maintain good relations with Russia. I heartily thanked Prince Ito, and in reply promised to inform the Tsar of Japan's continued good will toward us.

Then I asked permission to present to him my companions, a few railway officials, the guard of honor, and some other officials, and

then to give the Japanese consul the privilege of presenting him to the Japanese colony. Later, I hoped to receive him in my car to obtain his approval of the program we had drawn up for him.

Everything went well until I had turned Prince Ito over to the care of his consul. He thanked me warmly for my part in the ceremonies, and then, just as I was about to step aside to let him go to his countrymen, I heard three or four muffled shots, and Prince Ito fell against me. My courier, Karasev, rushed to help me support him. Pandemonium broke loose. There were more shots, and the crowd rushed after the assassin, who was caught by General Pykhachev's aide-de-camp and turned over to the officers of the railway police. I happened to notice in the general confusion that the two Chinese governors ran for their lives with their long skirts gathered about them.

Karasev and I carried Prince Ito into his car and summoned a doctor. Presently, Tanaka, one of his suite, was brought in with a severe leg wound. I was told that Kawakami, too, had been seriously wounded. The doctor soon came, but gave us no hope for the Prince's recovery—two bullets had pierced the heart cavity and his pulse beat was hardly noticeable. The Japanese had already called their own doctor. We left the car to await his report. He could do nothing, however, and the Prince soon passed away.

Meanwhile the assassin had been captured and had confessed that he had committed the crime fully understanding what he did. He said he was a Korean, and sought vengeance upon the Prince who, as Governor-General of Korea, had unjustly ordered the conviction and execution of some members of his family.

I returned to Prince Ito's car to pay my respects to the remains of this great man, and at Tanaka's request granted the Japanese permission to remove the body wherever they wished. General Horvath put a special train at their disposal. I sent the best available metal wreath. The special train left that same morning at eleven-thirty o'clock.

As soon as I could I went to the hospital to see the Japanese consul. I found him utterly broken by the tragedy, and feeling that he alone was to blame. This, of course, was not so, because he had taken every possible precaution. He told me that he was writing to his government absolving the railway administration of all responsibility for the crime, and that he would send a copy of his letter to General Horvath.

On returning to my car, I wired my wife, Stolypin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and our ambassador to Japan. Then I received three very aggressive Japanese newspaper correspondents' who had already bothered me in a very impudent manner. These men accused the Russian railway authorities of having done nothing to provide for the safety of the Prince, a virtual accusation of being responsible for the murder. I could not permit such statements. In no uncertain terms, I let them know what the Japanese consul had said and what he was telling his government. After this they were more civil and asked quietly if I would explain how the reception had been organized and what measures of precaution had been taken. This I was glad to do.

After the newspapermen had gone, I was called upon by the Assistant District Attorney, who told me that in answer to the questioning the assassin had said that he had spent the night in the third-class waiting-room and had got on to the platform with a crowd of Japanese through the special gate without having been required to produce any documents. Whereupon I told the attorney that Lvov and I had seen no one in the waiting-room on the previous evening, and offered to make the same statement under oath if he wished. The result was that I went to the inquest and gave my testimony. The criminal was quite different in appearance from the average Japanese. I did not see how he could have entered through the special gate without attracting attention. He did not seem at all disturbed by my testimony, and when asked if he understood what I had said he replied calmly: "I do not know the witness and have never seen him in my life, but I can say he has spoken the absolute truth. I did not spend last night in the station, nor did I reach Harbin yesterday. But when I arrived and where from I will not tell you. Nor will I tell you where I spent the night in Harbin. No one helped me. I had decided to kill the Prince unaided, and I alone must answer for what I have done."

Meanwhile, I was very concerned as to how public opinion in Japan would receive the news of Prince Ito's death. On the fourteenth I received answers to my telegrams to my wife and Stolypin, but no answer came from Tokyo till the fifteenth. Our ambassador there said that my telegram had been delayed. He reported that the Japanese public had received the shocking news calmly, and that the tone of the papers had been reserved; at first it was obvious that they were withholding an expression of opinion until definite news came from Harbin; when this came, the papers absolved Russia of all

responsibility, expressed public gratitude to me for the attention I had shown the Prince and his suite, and advanced the hope that the tragedy might only cement more firmly the friendship between Japan and Russia.

Later that same day the Japanese newspapermen called and apologized for their conduct and explained that they had learned everything from Kawakami. That evening the Harbin newspapers published an account of the incident in which Russia was cleared of all blame for the unfortunate event. This ended the whole matter.

General Unterberger met me at Pogranichnaia in a state bordering closely upon panic. When we had reviewed the guard of honor and were left alone in my car, he told me that he was convinced that as a result of the recent incident Japan would soon attack us. I did my best to bring him to a more collected state of mind, but, for all his outward composure, he kept on insisting: "You must see for yourself our defenselessness and report it to the Tsar." Why did Unterberger insist that I go to Khabarovsk? Why did he show me his Amur flotilla, fit perhaps to fight China but certainly not at all able to resist a Japanese attack? Why did he demand that I go with him on the steamer "Askold" from Vladivostok to the Novo-Kievsky settlement, a point he had selected for the fortification of our coast? All this remains to this day a mystery to me. I profited nothing from these excursions and lost much time.

But I stayed in Vladivostok long enough to ascertain for myself and to convince General Unterberger of the incorrectness of his telegrams accusing the Ministry of Finance of not appropriating the credits necessary for the defense of this port, our best natural base on the Pacific. I learned that General Unterberger's opinion of the Ministry of Finance was based almost entirely upon the information he had received from the Minister of War. Consequently, armed as I was with all sorts of data concerning the credits unused by the Ministry of War, I had little trouble in explaining to him the true state of affairs, and he, being an honest man, soon became my ardent defender before the Minister of War. I left with him an exact statement of the credits that had been appropriated and were still unused. With the permission of the Governor-General his subordinates revealed to me the utterly hopeless condition of the fortress and its defense. This was the result, they said, of the fact that all their representations had lain for years in the Ministry of War without receiving any attention. The fortress commandant gave me a curious

extract of their correspondence with St. Petersburg and a very eloquent list of the problems on which either no reply had been received in several years or the reply given amounted to a revision of previous decisions. In this latter case, the engineering staff of the fortress was obliged to leave unfinished what they had begun and take up the new project. General W. Y. Zhigalkovsky, the military engineer of the fortress, even told me that neither he nor any of his colleagues believed that the work would ever be started in earnest, and that General Roediger had been essentially right when he had proposed, in 1905 or 1906, that the Vladivostok fortress be abandoned, because the entire local engineering staff was drawing salary and doing nothing but carry on a boring and utterly useless correspondence with St. Petersburg.

I returned to Harbin in a very sad frame of mind. I think, however, I persuaded General Unterberger that his alarm concerning an imminent Japanese attack was unfounded, for from that time on there were no more panicky telegrams.

I found the Harbin newspapers full of information about the reports in the newly-arrived Japanese papers concerning Prince Ito's death. It was a relief to learn that Japanese public opinion did not hold the railway authorities responsible for the tragedy. Our ambassador in Tokyo telegraphed me the condolences of the Japanese government for my unhappy implication in the sad incident and personally offered me and the railway officials his sincere thanks for what we had done for Prince Ito.

In accordance with the Mikado's special orders the burial of the Prince was performed according to a particularly solemn ritual. An enormous number of wreaths and emblems were laid upon the bier, but only three were allowed to be placed upon the grave—one from the Mikado, one from the widow of Prince Ito, and the modest metal wreath I had lain on his body at Harbin. Words cannot express my deep emotion at the honor which was thus silently conferred upon me.

During the rest of my stay in Harbin I did considerable work on many different railway problems. I also took advantage of the opportunity to become acquainted with the Chinese situation and to ascertain how far we could be assured of the continuation of that exceptional position which Russia occupied in regard to her concession in Manchuria. I learned that the Chinese government was extremely weak and totally incapable of making trouble for us pro-

vided we adhered to the provisions of our contract. China wished one thing only—that we should not demand any new privileges, since each concession she made in our favor was followed by attempts of other countries to obtain something in their favor.

It was apparent that the railway was practically independent of China's central government. General Horvath, who enjoyed great prestige among the local Chinese officials, was careful to avoid any issues that would have to be taken to Peking for settlement. Everything went smoothly as long as we dealt with local governors, who professed that they were glad to do all they were empowered to do without resorting to Peking. I asked the governor of the province of Tsitsikhar why he was so reluctant to have dealings with his central government. He said that, strange as it may seem, there was no really central authority in China; that since the death of Li Hung Chang, whom he had known well, there had been no one who had known his own mind. This confirmed an opinion expressed by a Chinese general of the new school—minus queue and in a tightly fitting military uniform—whom I had met in Vladivostok. He had used a more forceful expression: "China has no head."

This weakness of the central authority in China was reflected in the loose discipline of the Chinese military units with which we came in contact. Their size varied because the men, lacking funds, turned bandits from time to time and preyed upon the peaceful population. Fortunately, the population of the railway zone, the Russians particularly, was little affected by their depredations. As a result, there was a constant influx of Chinese into the zone. The Chinese governors were displeased at this, but admitted that they were powerless to prevent it. On our part, we explained that we did nothing to attract Chinese into the zone; in fact, we should have been well content to have fewer of them, because their increasing numbers only added to the unemployment and offered competition to Russian labor. But we, too, felt we had no means of preventing them from moving into the zone.

My return journey was spent in preparing, with the assistance of E. D. Lvov, my report of what I had seen and learned in the Far East. When I submitted it to the Tsar he questioned me thoroughly about the unfortunate incident at Harbin. He thanked me for the measures I had taken, and said that the Japanese government bore absolutely no ill will toward Russia because of it. Baron Motono had even requested a special audience in order to express the grati-

tude of his government for what I had done and to assure the Tsar that the railway administration was in no way to blame for Prince Ito's death.

When the Tsar returned my report to me I was flattered to find that it bore many favorable marginal comments. It was well received, also, in the Ministers' Council. Only the Minister of War said nothing. All the ministers were supplied with copies of it, excluding the part concerning the fortifications of Vladivostok, which was for the Tsar, Stolypin, and the Minister of War only.

One incident remains to be told to bring this episode to its conclusion. In the spring of the next year, 1910, Sukhomlinov went to the Far East. I first learned of this through the papers. Three weeks later he returned and resumed attendance at the Ministers' Council without saying a word about his trip. Many ministers received a copy of his report, but he did not send me one. I became acquainted with its contents only because Stolypin gave me his copy for examination. Sukhomlinov's report was an uninterrupted criticism of my report of the previous autumn. What I had called white, he called black. I soon learned, however, from the manager of the railway that Sukhomlinov had hardly left his car during the entire journey and had made no investigation of conditions. His report, therefore, was little more than a polemic against me and my conclusions. Little was known of it publicly; the press either did not know of it or ignored it; the Tsar never once mentioned it to me; and it was not submitted to the Council because of its allegedly confidential nature. Thus, the incident ended. Afterward I never heard Sukhomlinov's report mentioned in any connection whatsoever.

CHAPTER XXI

NOVEMBER 1909—OCTOBER 1910

As soon as I returned from the Far East, I was obliged to plunge into the work of the Budget Committee. This I began on November 15, 1909. I had drafted and signed the budget estimate before my trip. For the first time since the opening of the Third Duma in November 1907, a budget estimate had been balanced without having recourse to loans for the payment of even extraordinary expenditures. The results of the splendid crops of 1909 were most favorably reflected in the income from revenues and because of this the demands of all ministries upon the Ministry of Finance could be more readily satisfied. Therefore, in my explanatory memorandum accompanying the estimate I was able to strike a note of optimism. This influenced considerably my relations with the Budget Committee, as did the fact that, because of information gained on my trip, I was able to dispel the Committee's fears of trouble with Japan. The work went along smoothly, despite the fact that Shingarev and his friends of the extreme Left asked numerous questions, so that before the middle of January the Committee was able to submit its report to the Duma.

The general debates began on February 12. Alekseenko, the chairman of the Budget Committee, spoke first. I followed, and my speech was well received. Immediately afterward, Shingarev mounted the tribune and made the first of the many opposition attacks upon what I had said. It was a bit puzzling to understand why Shingarev and his friends had kept silent during the sessions of the Committee and now attacked its work with such vehemence. Two days later I made my reply, and once more was applauded. The attacks of the members of the opposition were of no avail, and surely these men must have seen this, for the budget had been balanced in a manner above reproach, and our finances were in fine condition.

It is not necessary to discuss the debates on the separate articles of the budget—these were very similar to those in 1908 and 1909—but I should like to mention the debates on the Peasant Bank, since they were the beginning of a matter on which I shall dwell later.

The Peasant Bank had taken up much of the attention of the Budget Committee. In preceding years the usual specialists in bank activities—Shingarev, Kutler, and the Kovno deputy, Bulat—had opposed the activity of the Bank and now, as usual, made a series of inquiries, especially regarding the rise in the prices which the Bank paid the landowners for their land and which it demanded from the peasants who wanted to purchase such land, thus forcing them, so to speak, into unprofitable deals (since they were forced to buy land at prices artificially raised to satisfy the landowners selling the land). Alekseenko pointed out that these problems were not new and were repeated each year despite satisfactory explanations by the Minister of Finance. Therefore, he said, the Committee might pass over them briefly, since, as long as the regulations remained the same, one could hardly hope to effect much change in the activity of the Peasant Bank. In the end the Committee did not adopt any resolutions unfavorable to the Bank.

During the debates in the Duma, however, Kutler and Bulat, supported by a former excise clerk, Dziubinsky (1), a deputy from the gubernia of Enissei, made most caustic comments on the activity of the Peasant Bank, carrying the discussion of its policies to the tribune and then into the columns of the opposition press.

The summer vacation, which to me meant only that there were no legislative chambers to deal with, gave me an opportunity to devote more time to my regular work. I became more and more concerned with the Peasant Bank, not because its affairs were in poor shape but because they were in such fine condition that the Ministry of Agriculture and, to some extent, Stolypin were becoming increasingly interested in the Bank's affairs. With Krivoshein I was outwardly on very good terms; he always expressed his gratitude to me for not permitting any misunderstandings to arise between us either concerning the Bank's purchase of estates offered for sale or as regards determining the purchase price of these lands. This friendly attitude prevailed despite the fact that in the Bank Council Krivoshein's representatives were always in favor of raising this purchasing-price, while the officials of the Bank were inclined to moderate it, because of the tendency prevalent in the Duma to accuse us of complying too much with the wishes of the landowners and of considering too little the interests of the peasants purchasing the land. Just as little cause for any misunderstandings could be found in the Bank's selection of the purchasers of the lands for sale.

I steadily impressed upon my collaborators the necessity of co-operation with the Ministry of Agriculture, which determined the entire policy of land management; our duty was merely to sell the land to dependable peasant elements and to refuse, on general principles, to sell land to too many village communes and peasant associations, which were always a poor risk.

It was easier for me to carry out this policy because Khripunov (2), the Manager of the Peasant Bank, was more sympathetic toward the Ministry of Agriculture than were the majority of the Bank Council, for he himself had emerged from the depths of this ministry. But, I must say that at first I never had occasion to reproach him, for I never noticed in his conduct any unnecessary compliance with Krivoshein's wishes; only later did this appear, and then it gave me many unpleasant moments.

Some time in June, after the adjournment of the Duma, Khripunov told me that the officials of the Peasant Bank, especially those of its provincial branches, desired to express their gratitude to me for my continual defense of their work. He asked me what my personal reaction would be to such a gesture. I requested him to try to find some way of preventing it, because no one would believe in its sincerity and I should probably be accused of having arranged it. Moreover, it would certainly provoke the opposition in the Duma to renewed protests; in short, only harm could come of it. Khripunov saw my point, and undertook to prevent this expression of gratitude, making it clear at the same time that I appreciated such good intentions.

At that same time Khripunov insisted that I make a short trip through Eastern Russia to inspect a few interesting estates which had just been acquired by the Peasant Bank. Two of them were quite interesting as a tangible proof of the unjustness of the Duma's accusations regarding the activity of the Bank. I liked the idea very much, and actually made the trip with Khripunov late in July, gathering much valuable information which gave me added reason for defending even more resolutely the activities of the Bank.

On returning I told Stolypin and Krivoshein of my impressions, and at that time neither of them mentioned by so much as a word that they intended to transfer the Peasant Bank from the control of the Ministry of Finance to that of the Ministry of Agriculture. Nor did I hear anything about this from Khripunov, who should certainly have known of it as a plan projected by the latter ministry.

Later, Krivoshein assured me that this idea had occurred to Stolypin just after his Siberian trip;* that he himself never intended anything of the sort, and had given way to the insistent wishes of Petr Arkadevich only after many conversations with him.

Whether or not this was actually so, I have no way of telling; but I doubt it. I believe that the idea of transferring the Peasant Bank had matured long before in the Ministry of Agriculture, that this ministry had persuaded Stolypin of the soundness of the idea, and that, knowing that I should be opposed to it, it had taken steps to present me with this transfer as a *fait accompli*.

Two facts support me in this belief. In the first place, in the beginning of that year, 1910, a project was submitted to the Duma for transforming the Ministry of Agriculture into the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture. Krivoshein stated in his explanatory memorandum that the Peasant Bank also should be reorganized "in such a way that its activities would be conducted in closer co-operation with the entire policy of land management."

In the second place, Stolypin first told me of his idea late in the autumn of 1910, and when I opposed it he said that in his "decision" he was supported by Krivoshein and that he was almost sure the Tsar would be of the same opinion. "At least," he added, "that is my impression after two conversations with His Majesty on the brief outline which Krivoshein and I submitted in this connection." As I continued to object, he said: "To be sure, the Tsar believes you to be invaluable, and so do I, so that Aleksandr Vasilevich and I will have to bow before the will of His Majesty if he learns that you categorically oppose the idea."

It is clearly shown in these few words that even before the trip to Western Siberia Stolypin and Krivoshein had already formed the plan of transferring the Peasant Bank and had even passed the stage of a preliminary approval by the Tsar; yet the first time they mentioned it to me was the end of October. The details of this conversation and its results will appear later.

Early in October, the estimates had been completed, the budget balanced, and the memorandum submitted to the Ministers' Council.

* Stolypin had gone to Western Siberia late in August and returned in the middle of September. He was delighted with the noticeable prosperity of that region. He complimented me on my share in the work of reconstruction after the revolution and the war with Japan, but he never once hinted at his ideas about the Peasant Bank. Krivoshein was just as secretive; all he would say was that we should try to make the Bank speed up its work.

During one of my visits to Stolypin, he said that I looked tired, and suggested that I take a rest in order to fit myself for the hard work of the Duma sessions. The next time I reported to the Tsar he also urged me to take a rest.

I had planned to go to Paris, anyway, to replenish my wardrobe. So, in a short time, my wife, my sister, and I set out. In Berlin, we learned that, owing to a railway strike in France we could not be certain of transportation beyond Liège. I telegraphed Utin in Paris stating our predicament, and the Mendelssohn Bank sent a similar telegram to Fischel, who was also in Paris. As a result Fischel met us in Liège and arranged for our transportation to Paris by automobile. There we were fortunate in being able to secure the same apartment in the Hotel de Londres, Rue Castiglione, that we had occupied in 1906.

During the week we spent in the French capital I attended a most interesting session of the Chamber of Deputies, which had been specially summoned to deal with the current railway disturbances. Prime Minister Briand (3) explained their causes, but only after he had overcome a disturbance from the Left. The soul of the government's struggle to break the strike, however, was the Minister of Public Works, Millerand (4), later President of the Republic. He proposed to achieve this end by mobilizing all railway workers subject to military conscription and placing them under martial law, and the Chamber approved this measure. But the ways of parliamentary logic are indeed mysterious. Two days later, as we were driving from Paris to Monte Carlo, I read in the papers that Briand's Ministry had been reorganized. The one and only change made was to exclude Millerand, the real author of the measure against the strike.

At Monte Carlo I received very unpleasant news from the ministry—a long telegram in code signed by my assistant, S. F. Weber. It took me the greater part of the night to decode it, and when, about four in the morning, I had finished I was very indignant at the news it contained. It appeared that, during the first session of the Ministers' Council after my departure, P. A. Stolypin asked Weber why the State Bank had not yet sold the securities belonging to one Lazar Poliakov, who had been given enormous credit despite the fact that he had been openly remiss in meeting his obligations to the Bank.

Weber did not know anything about this matter because he did not deal with affairs of credit in the ministry. Therefore, he answered Stolypin that he knew nothing about it and begged that the

matter be postponed until my return or until he could gather some information from the Bank. Stolypin, contrary to his wont, lost his temper, answered Weber very sharply that he did not find it possible to postpone until my return a matter which "had become a byword," and insisted that the securities be sold immediately.

Minister of Commerce and Industry Timashev, who a year previously had been Manager of the State Bank and who knew the Poliakov case in detail, began to explain it, but Stolypin stopped him and continued to insist that the securities be sold. The ministers, seeing his inexplicable irritation, did not oppose him, so that Weber was left no choice but to submit to this insistence or to disagree and thus bring the matter to the Tsar for his decision. Weber considered that his opinion would carry no weight in the eyes of the Tsar and he begged permission to telegraph me about the matter. My answer, he said, would arrive in two days and in this way I should be given a chance to make my own statement. Stolypin granted this permission, but only after several biting remarks—quite unlike Stolypin.

I was surprised that so experienced a man as the State Comptroller, Kharitonov (5), whose opinion Stolypin always valued highly, did not utter a word. I was much less surprised by the evasive behavior of Timashev, who, although he knew well why Poliakov's securities were not sold, did not like to contradict Stolypin in matters which did not concern him directly. Timashev had seen immediately that there was some special reason for such a turn of affairs, and he preferred to let someone else handle the unpleasant matter.

I replied in code and asked Weber to show Stolypin my telegram as soon as it was decoded. I said that I was much surprised at the turn of events in the Ministers' Council in connection with the Poliakov affair. Evidently Stolypin had had incorrect information. Should the Chairman of the Council want to come to some decision before I returned—although this ought not to be the concern of the Council but solely that of the Minister of Finance, since all matters related to the State Bank were in his hands—I begged him to summon the Manager of the Bank, who could explain why Poliakov's securities were not being sold. For my part, I simply wanted to make it known that Poliakov had long ago turned over his securities to the Bank, which could sell its securities only when it found such an operation profitable, and a profitable sale could not be expected at the present time. I added that some two or three weeks before my departure I had given definite instructions to Konshin (6) as to

the lowest price at which the securities were to be sold; this price had not yet been reached, although the securities had risen more than 20 per cent, an increase in value of over half a million. In conclusion I said that I should return before the appointed time because of an injury to my leg, and requested that Petr Arkadevich show more confidence in me than in any chance information he might receive.

I returned within the week. Weber met me and told me that apparently my telegram had carried weight, as Stolypin had not interviewed Konshin but had told him, Weber, that it would be best to await my return, adding that he had not known that the securities no longer belonged to Poliakov.

On the same day I went to see Stolypin, who said simply that he had made a mistake because he had been furnished with wrong information, and that he was very sorry to have caused me unnecessary trouble. He refused to tell me who had given him this information and, obviously, was eager to let the matter drop. Again on this occasion Stolypin did not say one word about the Peasant Bank.

A week later, however, Stolypin broached this subject. He worked up to it very tactfully, paying me several compliments; then said that he and Krivoshein had decided to raise the question of transferring the Peasant Bank to the Ministry of Agriculture. He said he had spoken of it to the Tsar and had told him that I could be counted upon to oppose the plan and that I might consider resignation if it were carried out against my wishes. Stolypin then asked me how I reacted to it, and if we could not reach a compromise.

In reply, I told him that I had heard rumors of this plan and that I thought it was a matter on which compromise was impossible. I explained that I had always co-operated with the Ministry of Agriculture, because I considered it essential to do so; but the plan now proposed touched upon the unity of credit in the state. The Peasant Bank needed capital in order to carry on its work; this capital was affected by the condition of the money market—matters which were properly within the sphere of the Ministry of Finance. Yet now it was proposed to put the Peasant Bank under the management of persons inexperienced in finance and in the working of credit; moreover, the plans for this had been made without the knowledge of the Minister of Finance. No Minister of Finance could permit anyone else to manage a credit institution such as the Peasant Bank while he himself was responsible for floating its mortgage bonds and backing its capital. I pointed out that even the private land banks, for which

the state assumed no responsibility, were under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance precisely because these banks could not be permitted to issue mortgage bonds indiscriminately and without good backing. I also mentioned that, lately, I had succeeded in getting the mortgage bonds of the Peasant Bank quoted on the foreign market for the first time.

Stolypin, however, remained unconvinced. He was determined that things should not be left as they were, and concluded, therefore, that he, Krivoshein, or myself, would have to give way. To this, also, I objected.

I suggested that I submit my arguments to the Tsar, who, if he did not agree with them, would understand that I could not be expected to carry out a plan with which I was not in accord and would therefore accept my resignation. Krivoshein would then be authorized to execute the plan, and I should place no obstacles in his way. After some argument Stolypin agreed to my suggestion.

On parting, I asked Stolypin what he would do if the Tsar was persuaded by my arguments not to make the change. Stolypin replied that he would simply try to enlist my support in reducing the friction between the Peasant Bank and the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture.

I had intended not to mention the Peasant Bank affair in my very next report to the Tsar but to postpone it until a more favorable occasion, particularly since Stolypin had agreed not to hurry the solution of this problem. But as I was about to leave the Tsar he himself raised the matter.

Without any preamble and in a very businesslike tone he told me that some time before both Stolypin and Krivoshein had reported to him as to the pressing need for transferring the Peasant Bank to the control of the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture, which could not develop the Bank's activity on any other conditions. The insistence of both ministers had increased particularly since the return of Petr Arkadevich from his trip to Western Siberia, where the local workers had testified to the difficulties which handicapped their work—not because the Bank had no regard for the needs of land management but because it was an institution of a ministry under whose control the work of land management did not fall and which could not rid itself of its own narrowly financial and jealously guarded point of view. These arguments had persuaded the Tsar to give a definite promise to agree to the

transfer. His Majesty was greatly displeased that I had learned of his decision not from himself but from Stolypin, who "had shown unnecessary haste." He was anxious to hear what I had to say, but for want of time it was decided to postpone my remarks till my next report. He considered that the Minister of Finance should certainly be heard on this matter which concerned so directly the state's welfare.

When, on the next Friday, I reported to the Tsar on the matter of the transfer of the Peasant Bank, I repeated essentially the same arguments that I had offered Stolypin. I endeavored to elaborate on three principles: (a) that there was no reason for friction between the ministries, if there really was any, and that I was doing all in my power to assist the land-managing policy of Stolypin in which I sincerely believed; (b) that it was utterly impossible, without risking the disruption of all that had been so painstakingly organized in matters of state credit, to separate the financial affairs from the close control and direction of the Minister of Finance; and (c) that the plan of transfer placed me in a delicate situation, for it had been initiated and carried forward quite without my knowledge. Therefore I was left no choice but either to submit and to remain a helpless witness of the certain harmful consequences to the state credit, the care of which would still remain my duty, or humbly to beg His Majesty to free me of my duties as Minister of Finance.

The Tsar answered with perfect composure, saying that he believed himself partially responsible for the turn this affair had taken. As soon as Stolypin and Krivoshein had broached the subject he should have appointed a conference in which I should have participated, and then the matter would have been discussed on all sides. As it was it seemed that the discussion had been conducted behind my back. He said, too, that he was disturbed by my opinion that nothing but harm to state credit could come from this transfer; it might be better to postpone the matter. "As for your personal and official conduct in this affair," he said, "it is absolutely beyond reproach." In conclusion he thanked me for the suggestion I had made to Stolypin: to let the project be submitted by the Chief Administration of Land Management and Agriculture (7) while I remained quietly at my post until the transfer of the Peasant Bank to another ministry had been completed.

I gathered from our long conversation that the Tsar considered himself bound by the promise given to Stolypin and Krivoshein and, since he could not quite familiarize himself with a question so special-

ized as the indivisibility of the management of state credit, he would not renounce his decision unless some other circumstances beyond his control gave another direction to the entire affair.

Therefore my resignation seemed to me to be only a matter of time, but I decided to say nothing of it to anyone, chiefly because I did not wish to alarm the ministry. I decided, too, to avoid all work on the project until it was submitted to the Ministers' Council, when I would make it clear that I disagreed with the project on general principles.

I repeated my conversation with the Tsar to Stolypin in all details. He thanked me and said that, even though the project were carried through, he saw no reason why friction should not be avoided. We never mentioned the matter again until June 1911. Krivoshein, too, said nothing and behaved as if he had had nothing to do with the whole affair.

Some time late in July I received a telephone call from the Assistant Minister of War, General Polivanov, who asked me to receive him on some urgent matter. When he arrived he asked me to give him some friendly advice. He told me that that morning he had seen a recently confirmed report of the Minister of War to the Tsar regarding the Central Office of the General Staff. He had previously had not the slightest information about this report, and it had come to his knowledge solely because of the indiscretion of a secondary official. He was surprised that such a subject should even be discussed, much less carried out, without the knowledge of the whole Ministry of War, the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, if not of the entire Ministers' Council.

What Polivanov had learned was this: It was proposed to dismantle secretly in the very near future four fortresses in the Vistula region—Warsaw, Novo-Georgievsk, Ivangorod, and (I think the fourth was) Sgerz. The reason for this measure, according to Polivanov, was the newly adopted mobilization plan, Number 18, which in case of war with Germany provided first for the withdrawal of our armies toward the east into those areas which supplied them with reserves and, later on, for an advance of the armies, now mobilized and supplied with everything necessary.

Regardless of the fact that under present conditions such a plan was perfectly impossible of fulfillment and that Polivanov and many of our best authorities in military science considered it pure folly, the order for moving separate military units had been already given

and even partially carried out, although in the localities into which they were to be moved there were neither barracks prepared for the men nor magazines for supplies and ammunition. Polivanov wanted me to advise him what to do: to limit himself to telling me and letting me undertake whatever measures I deemed necessary, or to report personally to the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, thereby running the risk of being discharged from his post in the Ministry of War.

I suggested that he select the latter course and, then and there, with his permission, I telephoned Stolypin and asked him to receive General Polivanov to discuss an urgent matter. Stolypin consented, and Polivanov left immediately.

An hour afterward Stolypin telephoned and asked me to see him that evening, saying that he had been simply floored by all he had learned. I found him greatly agitated. He confessed that he simply did not know whether or not to go to the Tsar immediately in order to try to dissuade him from this plan or to wait-until he made his regular report two days later, seeing Sukhomlinov in the meantime and prevailing upon him not to hurry the transfer of the military units. I favored the second plan, but asked him to try not to involve Polivanov. Also I asked whether this measure had been adopted with the knowledge of our ally, France, or was just as much a surprise for the French as for us. Stolypin promised to keep me posted.

On the next day we met again after he had conversed with Sukhomlinov. He said: "This man is beyond reason. Imagine! He tried to assure me that no abolition of fortresses was proposed for the present, nor was there any plan of moving the troops to the east; the whole project was a purely theoretical problem as to how we should act when mobilization plan Number 18 had been perfected, which might take five, six, or seven years. He said that for the present everything was to remain as before and only a few artillery brigades, which are now being formed and had no special location in the west, were to be moved to the east." Stolypin said that it was evident that Sukhomlinov did not know anything about his job but merely signed whatever was brought to him. The only remaining hope was that the Tsar might put a stop to his senselessness and make him understand that without the knowledge of our allies we had no right to reshuffle our cards.

Two days later Stolypin told me that the Tsar, too, considered the report as a measure to be realized in the distant future, and had

said that he would permit no fortress to be dismantled, that all such plans would have to be brought to the attention of the French General Staff before being executed, and that all such transactions were to be conducted with the close participation of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This was the end of the matter in its formal aspect. Neither Stolypin nor I ever heard of it again. Nor did General Joffre mention it when he visited Petersburg in 1913.

Actually, however, the fortresses were dismantled during the years 1911 and 1912, although no such information reached me officially. Then, in 1914, I learned that their rearmament had been hurriedly undertaken when, with no plan Number 18 to guide us, we not only failed to draw our troops back from the Vistula front but, in order to save our ally, launched an offensive westward against East Prussia, thus drawing on ourselves a part of the German troops from the French front and saving France. Our offensive ended in August 1914, when Samsonov's (8) army was defeated at Soldau.

CHAPTER XXII

OCTOBER 1910—JULY 1911

While the events described above were going on, I was obliged to give much of my time and effort to combating the epidemic of bubonic plague which had broken out suddenly along the Chinese Eastern Railway.* This epidemic appeared exactly a year after the murder of Prince Ito at Harbin. The first case was noticed on October 13, 1910, in a Chinese village close to Manchuria Station, and the disease straightway spread through a group of dwellings near the station and the Russian settlement.

The danger of the situation was evident at a glance. A few days after the plague was discovered the military reserves who had completed their term of service in the Primorie were to be sent home to the interior gubernias of Russia and replaced by newly recruited troops from Russia. A similar operation was being conducted in the Trans-Amur district of the border patrol and the Railway Brigade. The danger that the plague would be carried from its Chinese breeding-place to Russia was manifest, and the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway had to face a task the seriousness of which was readily recognized by Russian public opinion.

The railway administration spared neither money nor effort in fighting this danger. It mobilized the rather small forces of its medical personnel, whose efforts were directed by the most renowned specialist of that time, Professor Zabolotnyi. The Ministry of War mobilized its medical resources, and the universities and the Army Medical Academy gave whole companies of student volunteers. These efforts showed results much sooner than was to have been expected. Conditions were worse in those regions close to the railway, over which the Russian administration possessed no rights whatsoever, so that in fighting the epidemic it was obliged partly to violate its con-

* A few separate instances of this disease were noticed that autumn at Odessa. The Ministry of the Interior took special measures and the epidemic was liquidated very quickly.

cession. The Chinese authorities did nothing at all to combat the plague, although, to give them their due, they placed no obstacle in the way of the Russians.

Many Chinese houses and a great amount of household furniture had to be destroyed, but there was no resistance, as the railway was most generous in refunding the losses. The plague did not reach Russia, however; all the reserves returned without registering one single case and the new recruits reached their destination safely. Three months later the danger of carrying the plague over the railway to the interior of Russia was past, and life along the railway, except in Harbin, became normal once more.

In Harbin the fight against the plague was particularly arduous because of its proximity to Fuchiatien, a veritable incubator for the disease, and because in some parts of it, such as the commercial district, the so-called Pristan, fine European buildings stood side by side with revolting Chinese hovels in which no hygienic measures could be enforced. Only by destroying these hovels and by building in their stead temporary dwellings in which the inhabitants were subjected to rigid inspection could the epidemic be brought under control. Such efforts, of course, were very expensive for the railway administration.

The railway had other difficulties of its own, also. It employed a great number of Chinese workmen who, under ordinary conditions, lived either at Fuchiatien or in the Pristan or even outside the city in small Chinese settlements. When the plague appeared these could not be discharged, because on such short notice they could not be replaced by Russian laborers from the interior of Russia and in the neighboring Siberian gubernias and districts there were no laborers available. It was equally impossible to let these workers keep their jobs and communicate with the rest of the Chinese population. Therefore the Chinese workmen were completely isolated from all contact with the Chinese population and housed in special barracks hurriedly constructed by the railway. Here, their domestic existence was regulated to the smallest detail. These restrictions were complied with, one must admit, without any murmurs against the administration; a moderate increase in wages contributed to this compliance. The laborers themselves even went so far as to institute a control of their own which made the task of the railway administration much easier. Thanks to all these measures, the number of casualties among the Russian population and the medical personnel was quite negligible.

The presence of such a pestilence led before the Christmas vacation to inquiries in the Duma. One concerned the outbreak of cholera in the south and around Astrakhan, but this epidemic had not been severe and had already been dealt with in government reports. Another, and the most important, had to do with the plague in Manchuria. So far, the spread of the plague into Russia had been prevented, but it was not yet liquidated in Manchuria itself. The inquiry therefore sought information as to the measures that had been and were being taken to fight the plague and as to the expenses involved. The Ministers' Council, at Stolypin's suggestion, delegated me to answer this latter inquiry, which I did on January 19, 1911, pointing out that the total cost of fighting all the epidemics had not been more than one million rubles. It gave me great joy to be able to relate the exceptional courage and energy shown by the entire personnel of the Chinese Eastern Railway Administration in combating this dreadful scourge.

From that day till the middle of March I attended the Duma sessions almost daily. On January 22 I replied to an inquiry concerning the smuggling of spirits across the Manchurian border. On January 24 I spoke on the credits appropriated for the needs of public education. I record this fact deliberately in order to refute the criticism that my attitude toward public education, which the country needed so badly, was not sympathetic or generous enough because of my concern for the treasury, so dear to my heart. On February 4 I crossed swords with the Duma's Left wing on the subject of the Peasant Bank's activities. And on February 21 the Duma began its examination of the budget.

The inquiry concerning the Peasant Bank was dubbed "an inquiry into the Durasov affair" (1). After considerable time in the inquiry commission, it had reached the government just before Christmas, being addressed both to Stolypin as Chairman of the Ministers' Council and to myself as the Bank's chief. It was signed by the Social-Democratic group and by a few deputies further to the Right, and accused the government of unlawful conduct of the Bank's affairs. At the head of the list of signers was the name of Pokrovsky II (2). In private discussions with me this man had often attacked the Bank for having completely ruined the Durasov peasants. After due investigation I had learned that these so-called Durasov peasants were the victims of the agitation of this very Pokrovsky, who, however, had taken care to cover up his tracks and avoid the consequences of his evil work.

I already knew of Stolypin's suggestion to transfer the Peasant Bank to the Ministry of Agriculture, and my first impulse was to ask him to make the government's reply to this inquiry. He absolutely refused to do so, however, saying that I had studied the affair more closely than anyone else and that I knew Pokrovsky, who was certain to lead the attack on the government.

On the day of the hearing the Duma members were present in large numbers. The public galleries were filled to overflowing. A so-called "big Duma day" was expected. Stolypin was not present, although I had asked him very insistently not to leave me alone, since no one could guarantee that the debates would not assume a character that would make it imperative for the Chairman of the Ministers' Council to speak. He had asked me not to think that his attitude was in any way influenced by our recent disagreement on the subject of the Peasant Bank. Krivoshein, however, was present, and remained throughout the entire length of the debates and the voting.

Although Pokrovsky knew my point of view and all the circumstances of the case, he attacked the government very excitedly and sharply, receiving loud manifestations of the approval of his partisans and their neighbors. Since his attack and the inquiry were utterly unfair, based as they were upon data which the authors themselves knew to be false, it required no great effort to refute them. It was evident from the beginning that I was in possession of facts which entirely justified the activities of all organizations of the administration in this matter. I showed that to adopt the point of view of the authors of the inquiry would have been to encourage propaganda advocating land expropriation and to incite the peasants as secret agitators had already done. I said that I was not in a position to expose these agitators, because, to my great sorrow, the Peasant Bank had not the right to expose the men to whom the Durasov peasants really owed their sufferings. Whereupon voices were heard to remark: "Do not worry, it is clear as it is." In the end the Duma voted against the inquiry by a large majority.

Then came the general debates on the budget. These promised to go well, since the position of the government was exceptionally favorable; the especially fine crops of 1909 and 1910 boosted the income of revenues and made possible greater expenditures, thereby enabling the government to satisfy to a great extent the Duma's demands for the cultural development of the country and still to balance the budget. This was the fourth budget examined by the Third Duma and with

the approval of the Ministers' Council. In my speech in the general session I compared this fourth estimate with the one for 1908. The comparison was truly striking as regards Russia's financial condition. Besides, this time the Budget Committee had come to a more optimistic conclusion than ever before, thus supporting the optimism which I tried to convey.

My speech was well applauded and when I descended from the tribune I was surrounded by many deputies, with many of whom I was only slightly acquainted. They heartily expressed their gratitude, approval, and sympathy for all I had said. The chairman of the Duma, Rodzianko (3), did not even lower his sonorous voice, despite the fact that he was standing near Shingarev, when he said: "Still, I am willing to wager that Andrei Ivanovich will explain that your estimate is not worth a cent, that our finances are in a far worse state than before, and that we are on the verge of bankruptcy."

And, sure enough, directly after the recess Shingarev mounted the tribune. Strangely, however, he admitted that "the revenues may not be exaggerated and the expenditures may be a trifle better balanced than they have been previously," but finally he spoke for an hour and a half "apropos of the budget," discussing any subject that came to his mind, regardless of whether or not it concerned the budget. His speech harmonized with an article that appeared in *Réch* the next morning.

Although I did not reply to Shingarev, I was obliged to answer N. N. Lvov, a Saratov deputy, whose speech followed his and who sat among the closest neighbors of the Cadets—the Progressists. Lvov was always reserved in manner, but when he spoke against the government the meaning of his words was clear and forceful. He spoke seldom on matters of finance, but this was for some reason an exception. Now when the condition of our finances was least open to attack he accused not only the government but also the Duma of preferring to appropriate funds for defense instead of using them to raise the cultural level of a country "which is still hoping in vain that its most elementary needs will be satisfied." He was well applauded on the Left, especially when he ended by addressing the Duma majority on the Right: "What will you show to your constituents a year hence and what will you tell them to justify the way in which you have interpreted your duties to the country? You are mistaken in thinking that the country has not yet rightly evaluated what you have accomplished during the four years of your work."

I mounted the tribune directly after N. N. Lvov in defense of the Duma and the government. I explained to him and the opposition why we had been obliged, during the past four years, to devote so much attention and money to the work of defense so thoroughly shaken by our unsuccessful war. I pointed out the injustice of insisting that we had forgotten the needs of the country's cultural development, when actually more money was being spent on such development than on defense. In conclusion I said that the members of the Duma would find it easy to answer to their constituents provided these constituents could evaluate fairly and intelligently the simple truth that "progress and culture can be safe only when a country is not left unprotected before its neighbors."

While the budget was still under discussion in the Duma an incident occurred which was most unexpected and which for many days attracted the attention of the entire government. Its consequences were deeply significant for me.

Among matters which particularly occupied the attention of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council throughout a part of 1909 and all of 1910 was the matter of introducing zemstvo administration in the nine gubernias of the northern and southwestern regions. This was to be done by a special regulation worked out with Stolypin's personal co-operation. I had taken little part in the work on the project, even during its consideration by the Ministers' Council. Stolypin, on the other hand, had given the matter his personal attention from the start, defending the project most energetically, and often stating that after the peasant agrarian reform and the revision of the gubernial administration he attributed great importance to this matter, for—this was his favorite expression—¹"I have nursed the problem in my heart since my early youth and during the period of my first contact with local life in the northwestern region to which I gave my best years." Therefore he listened most attentively to every observation made both in the Duma and in the Council; he attended every session until the Duma expressed its approval of the project's basic principles. In this connection he established close relations with the Duma's Nationalist group, which accorded him the heartiest support, especially in the matter of forming the special Russian bodies of electors as a means to prevent the Polish element from dominating the Russian peasants in the election of zemstvo delegates.

After the project had passed through the Duma and had been

adjusted to existing regulations, it was transferred to the State Council in the middle of 1910 and was considered in the fall of that year. Stolypin invariably attended its preliminary consideration by the commission, and although he met with opposition from the commission's Right members he did not consider this fact particularly important. Nor did he consider important the rising conflict on the subject of Russian electorates; he announced with perfect confidence that all differences would disappear when the project was considered by the general session, which he hoped to carry by defending the project himself. He was so sure of success he did not consider it necessary to have all ministers who were members of the State Council attend the session so as to increase his support, though there were few such ministers. Personally I had not attended the sessions of the Council during the consideration of the matter because I was so pressed with my own work and with attending the sessions of the Duma. Stolypin's optimism in this matter was further strengthened by the attitude of the Chairman of the State Council, M. G. Akimov, who belonged to the Right group and was well informed as to its opinions.

Great, therefore, was Stolypin's surprise and disappointment when, in the beginning of March, on the 7th or 8th, I believe, after an eloquent speech made by Stolypin himself, the article on the Russian bodies of electors and all regulations ensuing from it were rejected by a majority of ten votes. Stolypin immediately left the room, and everybody saw clearly that something momentous had happened. I learned of this later over the telephone, and at first did not pay particular attention to it, since I was only slightly concerned.

The next day I learned that Stolypin had gone to Tsarskoe Selo. That day, also, Timashev, Krivoshein, and Kharitonov called on me. Timashev knew nothing of the affair and wished to hear my opinion. I could only tell him that I had not been in touch with Stolypin. Krivoshein evidently had already had information direct from Stolypin, as he told me frankly that Petr Arkadevich could not accept "this revolting decision," which was undoubtedly an outward manifestation of a personal intrigue against him, and that unless the Tsar consented to the project Stolypin would certainly tender his resignation. He said that probably we should all be invited to a meeting on the Fontanka and there should hear what had been decided. Kharitonov had not seen Stolypin, and merely said that, according to the impressions he had formed in the State Council, one should be ready

for events of no mean proportion, for "one does not leave sessions in this way for nothing."

On that day Stolypin did not telephone to me; nor did I telephone to him, in order not to appear importunate and not to give him reason to suspect me of any personal interest.

On the following day we were summoned to a meeting of the Council to be held in Stolypin's study. With his usual reserve Stolypin announced that he had definite information that the events in the State Council were but the result of an intrigue against him. This could be seen in the fact that long before the matter was heard in the State Council the leader of the Right group of that body, P. N. Durnovo, had submitted a memorandum to the Tsar stating that the segregation of the Russian peasants of the north and south-western regions into special bodies of electors was extremely dangerous politically and would certainly antagonize the Polish landowners, who heretofore had maintained a loyal attitude toward Russia. Such a measure might even increase the already existing anti-Russian tendencies observed among individual persons openly harboring Austrian sympathies, and under its influence the more cultured class of landowners would avoid zemstvo work, which, however, could not be entrusted to the peasants and the few Russian government employees alone.

Stolypin said that Baron Frederichs had informed him that just before the matter was heard in the Council, State Councillor V. F. Trepov (4), after a private meeting at P. N. Durnovo's, had asked for an audience with the Tsar. Baron Frederichs had also told him that, before the audience, Trepov had called on him and endeavored to prove that this part of the Duma project was a revolutionary move pure and simple, eliminating all from zemstvo work who were cultured and educated in the region, and that it was being advanced to please the petty Russian intelligentsia, who were eager to take everything into their own hands and to get a bite of the "zemstvo pie."

Therefore Stolypin had the day before reported to the Tsar that he could no longer perform his duties when a project dear to his heart since his youth was doomed to defeat because of an intrigue against him and when he was accused of something that smacked of connivance in revolutionary plans against which he had fought constantly with no thought for his own safety or that of his children. He had begged the Tsar to accept his resignation and to permit him to retire, since he could not think of sitting in the State Coun-

cil side by side with men who had sponsored such an intrigue against him.

According to Stolypin the Tsar had been quite disturbed by his requests and had promised to use all his influence to have the State Council adopt the project at a second reading. Then Stolypin had made it clear to the Tsar that such a second reading was impossible, since the Duma would never renounce the idea of Russian bodies of electors, which was really the stumbling-block in the State Council, and the latter chamber, because of its stubbornness, would never admit its mistake.

Then the Tsar had said firmly: "I cannot accept your resignation, and I hope that you will not insist on it, for you must perceive that in accepting your resignation I not only should lose you but also should create a precedent. What would become of a government responsible to me if ministers came and went, today because of a conflict with the State Council, tomorrow because of a conflict with the Duma? Think of some other way out and let me hear it."

Stolypin then had thanked the Tsar for his confidence but had explained that the only way to effect this projected zemstvo reform was to proclaim it in a statute under the provisions of Article 87 of the existing Code. To do this it would be necessary to prorogue the two chambers for a brief period in which to proclaim the reform as law, and then to reintroduce it before the Duma in its original form. The Duma would have no reason for not confirming it, and it would again be submitted to the State Council, which would then be left no other choice but to bow before an accomplished fact. Moreover, by the time it was re-submitted to the State Council it would have been proved by the operation of the reform that the objections of the State Council were unfounded and that the Polish landowners would never refuse to work in the zemstvos as the adversaries of the reform affirmed.

The Tsar had listened attentively to this proposal and then had asked Stolypin, "Are you not afraid that such a maneuver might lead to difficulties with the Duma and the State Council?" To this Stolypin had replied that the Duma might show some dissatisfaction outwardly, but really would be glad that His Majesty had preserved a law on which it had spent so much effort. As for the disapproval of the State Council, what did that matter compared with the region that would be brought to new life? This had apparently persuaded the Tsar, for he had said that he was ready to accept the proposal

in order not to lose Stolypin. But Stolypin had been still unsatisfied. He had requested His Majesty that V. F. Trepov and P. N. Durnovo be disciplined so that others might be deterred from following in their footsteps. He had suggested that these two men be instructed to leave St. Petersburg and to discontinue their work in the State Council for a time. The Tsar, however, had reserved his answer to this request.

There was but little discussion upon Stolypin's account of his audience with the Tsar. Those few who spoke supported the stand Stolypin had taken. Krivoshein even went so far as to say that the Tsar had placed himself in a delicate position, in that, by failing to reprimand Trepov and Durnovo for such intrigue, he had made himself to some extent responsible for what had occurred and therefore might find it difficult now to discipline the intriguers. Kharitonov suggested some other disciplinary action in order to save the Tsar such unpleasantness. To this Stolypin rejoined sharply: "Let those look for compromises who value their positions; as for myself, I prefer to step aside rather than retain my position under the circumstances."

At Stolypin's request I remained for a short time after the meeting had adjourned. He wanted to learn my opinion of the whole affair. I said that I sympathized with his personal point of view but thought that the prorogation of the chamber was a political mistake. It was a violation of law, and public opinion would certainly react unfavorably. Nor did I think it would please the Duma, even though it was designed to carry out the Duma's decision. I was also opposed to the proposed disciplining of Trepov and Durnovo. It would be difficult to insist that the Tsar refuse to accept memoranda submitted to him and to see persons whom he knew. Such insistence would make it clear to everyone that pressure was being brought to bear upon his Majesty, who, although he might submit to the pressure, would never forgive it.

I suggested, as an alternative procedure, that the project be again submitted to both chambers. The Duma would approve it, and in the State Council measures should be taken on the Tsar's authority to prevent the intrigue from blocking its acceptance. The loss of time, about a year, would be compensated for by the great advantage of having acted according to law. Stolypin, however, was not inclined to accept this suggestion—it was too slow a process.

As we parted, Stolypin promised to keep me informed of all de-

velopments, but this he failed to do. I did not get in touch with him because it was club gossip that in case of his resignation I should be appointed his successor.

Shortly after this I received an invitation to call upon the Empress Marie Fedorovna. She wanted to know from me the truth of this affair, of which she had heard only rumors. This I told her to the best of my ability. Her comment astonished me by its clarity. She sharply criticized the actions of Durnovo and Trepov. "I can well imagine," she said, "what would have happened if they had dared to present such views to Emperor Alexander III. Stolypin would not have had to ask for punishment; the Emperor himself would have shown them the door and they would not have entered it soon again. Unfortunately, my son is too kind. Why did Durnovo and Trepov not object openly to Stolypin? Why did they have to hide behind the Tsar's back? Now, no one can say what the Tsar told them and what they repeated as his words so as to influence the voting in the Council. It is truly regrettable, and I can well understand that Stolypin is almost in despair and is losing confidence in his ability to conduct the affairs of State."

Then she began to discuss the position of the Tsar, and here her perception was just as keen. "I am perfectly sure," she said, "that the Tsar cannot part with Stolypin, since he must recognize that in what has happened he himself is partly responsible, and in all such matters he is very sensitive and conscientious. If Stolypin were to insist, I have not the slightest doubt that in the end the Tsar would give in. He has not yet given his answer because he is trying to find some other way out of the situation. He seeks advice from no one. He has too much pride and, with the Empress, goes through such crises without letting anyone see that he is agitated. And yet if he were to accept Stolypin's proposal he would be unhappy about it ever afterward, for there would be those who would remind my son that his decision in this matter was forced upon him. Meshchersky (5) alone is worth many others, and you will soon see what sort of articles he will write in his *Grashdanin*, and, as time goes by, the Tsar will become more and more rooted in his displeasure with Stolypin. I feel sure that Stolypin will win for the present, but for a short time only; he will soon be removed, which would be a great pity both for the Tsar and for Russia. Personally, I am little acquainted with Stolypin, but I believe in him, and his loss would be a great misfortune for all of us. My poor son has so little luck with people. Stoly-

pin is a man whom nobody knew but who has proved himself both intelligent and energetic, who has succeeded in establishing order after the horrors of but six years ago; and now he is being pushed into an abyss, and by whom? By those very persons who insist that they love Russia and the Tsar but who nevertheless endanger both him and their country. This is simply terrible. I see nothing comforting ahead."

Two days later the crisis came. Stolypin telephoned me to say that the Tsar would not permit him to retire and had accepted his proposals. The ukases proroguing the Duma and the Council were published on March 12, and on March 14 the statute on the western zemstvo was proclaimed under the provisions of Article 87 of the Code. On March 15 the sessions of the chambers were again resumed. The Chairman of the State Council was summoned to Tsarskoe Selo and received orders to suggest to Durnovo and Trepov, in the name of the Tsar, that they request leave of absence until the opening of the fall session of the Council.

There were no more conversations on this subject in the Ministers' Council, and outwardly everything seemed to have resumed its natural course. P. N. Durnovo complied with the Tsar's orders and absented himself from the sessions of the Council until the fall. V. F. Trepov did not obey, and tendered his resignation from state service altogether. He was dismissed, and at the recommendation of Akimov was granted an annual pension of 6,000 rubles.

Later, Trepov entered private business. Owing to his close friendship with Baron Frederichs, he was given a concession for the exploitation of natural resources in the Altai mining area, which was the property of His Majesty's office. The Kuznetsky district proved to be rich in coal, iron, and other metals. Its development has been carried on by the Bolsheviks, who hope to combine this enterprise with that of the Urals, despite the two thousand miles between the two. In 1913 Trepov was granted the concession to construct the South Siberian Railway. He was arrested by the Bolsheviks in July 1918 and was shot at Kronstadt along with many other hostages.

Although this incident was ended, there was widespread and varied reaction to it. The Rights of the State Council were insulted at the treatment of their leaders, and the Left and Center resented the prorogation of the chambers. As a demonstration of the indignation of the Rights, S. S. Goncharov (6), a prominent member of this group, tendered his resignation and was dismissed.

The Duma, too, expressed its disapproval of the dissolution. Suddenly, Stolypin's prestige seemed to wane. He sensed this immediately in the attitude adopted toward his representatives in the commissions; only the Nationalists remained close to him, recognizing the growth of their prestige in connection with introducing the zemstvos into the western region.

It is not exaggerating, either, to say that almost the entire press was hostile to Stolypin. It commented critically upon the leaders of the intrigue but criticized mercilessly the dissolution of the chambers and the proclamation of a law that had already been rejected. It commented still more sharply upon the measures of punishment selected for persons who, though involved in an intrigue, were disciplined in an unprecedented way. The clubs which were especially close to the court circles also vented their wrath on Stolypin.

What the relations were between Stolypin and the Tsar after this affair I do not know. Stolypin said nothing to me about it. He himself was greatly changed—everyone agreed on this. Something inside him seemed to have snapped; his former assurance had left him as he had perceived the hostility with which he was surrounded.

During March and April the budget was approved by both chambers without much friction. But early in May the Cadets in the Duma attacked the existing budget regulations with the purpose of enlarging the control of the legislative chambers over finance. The State Comptroller and I were delegated to defend the government and the existing regulations; and, although a project for revising the regulations was approved by the Duma, despite the opposition of the Octobrists and the Progressists, it was rejected by the State Council.

A few weeks later Stolypin telephoned to say he was anxious to see me. When I called he gave me a cordial welcome and said that he wished to talk over our respective plans for the summer. I told him that I should be busy on the budget for 1912, and since it would be the last to be submitted to the Third Duma I wanted to include in my statement a résumé of all that had been accomplished since 1907.

Stolypin's plans were for a holiday and rest, which he needed badly after the arduous work of the past six months. The most of his holiday he hoped to spend on his favorite estate near Kovno. In his absence the Tsar had consented that I should act as his deputy in order to expedite the handling of government affairs. He then asked me if I would attend the unveiling of a monument of Alexander III at Kiev late in August. On this occasion, also, the zemstvo

deputies of the nine gubernias of the north and southwestern region were to be presented to the Tsar. Stolypin said he was most anxious that I should be present at these ceremonies, especially because, since I had opposed the method of applying the statute establishing zemstvos in these regions, my absence might be interpreted as lack of sympathy for these western zemstvos. I gladly consented to his request. Early in June Stolypin left for his Kovno estate.

Soon after Stolypin's departure Krivoshein telephoned to me and asked me if he might call on me to discuss an important matter. I suggested that he come to see me in my office at the ministry. He arrived with a brief case full of papers, saying that he wanted to go over once again the whole project about the transfer of the Peasant Bank. He had learned of my attitude toward the project from the Tsar, who had sympathized with my point of view and had begun to doubt the advisability of making the transfer. The Tsar wondered if it were not possible to safeguard the interests of land management without risking the destruction of state credit.

Krivoshein said that he could see now that Stolypin had planned this move too hastily and without taking everything into consideration. He said also that his associates had warned him that if the transfer were made the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture would not be able to float the mortgage bonds of the Bank. Influenced by these misgivings he had decided to ask the Tsar to abandon the plan and to permit him merely to effect a closer cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Peasant Bank, particularly as regards the purchase and sale of land. Krivoshein then proposed that he and I make a joint report to the Tsar advising the action he had just outlined to me.

This I refused to do. I explained to him that the project had been initiated without my knowledge, that the Tsar had been almost persuaded to adopt it, and that I had not once been consulted, although it was a matter that directly concerned my ministry. Now, I certainly should not act behind Stolypin's back by being party to a report which, in his absence and without his knowledge, proposed a new measure. I also reminded Krivoshein that the suggestion for greater co-operation between the Peasant Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture was originally mine.

My attitude, however, did not deter Krivoshein from his intention of reporting his change of mind to the Tsar. He promised to tell me how the Tsar received it and to inform Stolypin of what he had done.

This he did, and was very elated by the Tsar's approval of his suggestion. The Tsar had said that the whole affair must now be forgotten as soon as possible.

Early in July, Stolypin was in St. Petersburg for a few days to arrange the details concerning the Imperial family's journey to Kiev, Chernigov, and Livadia. On learning from Krivoshein how the Peasant Bank affair had been settled he expressed his great satisfaction to me, saying that it freed him of worrying lest I should resign. He thanked me for my open and honorable conduct through it all. After this, the unfortunate affair was never discussed again.

CHAPTER XXIII

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1911

On August 27, 1911, accompanied by my secretary, L. F. Dorliac, I left for Kiev, arriving there the next evening. On the morning of the 29th I secured a program of all the ceremonies, and then went to see Stolypin. I found him in a gloomy mood. During later conversations I learned that he was being almost ignored at court; no court carriage had been assigned to him, nor had room been found for him on the Imperial boat for the trip to Chernigov. He was very gracious to me, however, going out of his way to thank me for the work I had done as Minister of Finance. We were together a great deal during the next two days. We went to the races, and visited the Lavra and the Merchant Park together. Bogrov's (1) attempt might well have been undertaken in the darkness and disorder of the park, where, as was later ascertained, he actually was mingling with the crowd.

On the evening of September 1 at 8:00 o'clock we arrived at the city theater to attend a gala presentation, after which I intended to leave directly for St. Petersburg.* Stolypin and I had seats in the first row, but rather far apart. During the first intermission I went into the foyer to see some friends and, during the second, I made my way to Stolypin to say goodbye, explaining that directly after the following intermission I was going to leave. I asked if there were any messages I might take to St. Petersburg for him. "No," he answered, "there are no messages; but I wish you could take me with you. I envy you for being able to leave."

When I left him I went to bid the Afanasevs adieu and to thank them for their hospitality. But I had scarcely spoken a few words to them when there resounded two muffled detonations like those made by firecrackers.

* The Tsar's program was as follows: On September 2 he was to review the troops; that evening or on the 3d he was to leave for Chernigov, to return to Kiev again early on the morning of the 6th, and the same evening he was to leave for the Crimea by way of Sevastopol. This program was carried out in every detail.

At first I could not understand what it was. A group of men in the left aisle close to the front row were struggling with someone on the floor. There were shouts of "Help," and I ran toward Stolypin, who was still standing near his seat. His face was white, and a small stain of blood was beginning to appear on the lower part of his chest. There was general confusion, but I remember seeing General Dediulin (2) with a drawn sword near the Imperial box. Stolypin turned unsteadily in that direction, made the sign of the Cross over the box, and sank slowly into a chair, in which he was carried toward the entrance. The man with whom I had seen the group of men struggling was led away. And immediately crowds surged into the aisles. The Tsar and his entire family appeared in their box, the curtain was raised, and there sounded the strains of the national anthem sung by the entire ensemble. The audience was strangely silent: no one could grasp what had happened. At the end of the anthem there was a deafening hurrah, and the Tsar, pale and agitated, stood alone near the barrier of the box and bowed to the audience. Then the crowd began to disperse.

As I left the theater I learned that the criminal had been arrested and was being questioned, that the Imperial family had left safely and had been met in the streets with much acclaim, and that Stolypin had been taken to Doctor Makovsky's clinic. I went there immediately. Governor-General F. F. Trepov (3) reached the clinic soon after. He had just seen the Imperial family to the palace. I told him that according to law I was now obliged to take charge of the duties of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, since I had been acting for Stolypin, and begged him to disperse the crowd that had assembled and to place police guards inside and outside the building.

The physicians found that the bullet had lodged in Stolypin's back and decided to wait until morning to remove it. Stolypin was conscious and several times asked to talk to me, but he was in great pain and the doctors insisted on absolute quiet.

I left the clinic at two in the morning and went directly to see Trepov. I found him in utter panic. The chief of police and of the secret service, Colonel Kuliabko (4), who bore the chief responsibility in all this drama, had just reported to him that the population of Kiev was in an uproar. The people had learned that the assassin Bogrov was a Jew, and were preparing a tremendous Jewish pogrom, which he, Trepov, would not be able to prevent, since there were hardly any troops in the city—most of them having left for the

maneuvers set for the next day. I decided to act as best I could. The commander of the troops, General N. I. Ivanov (5), had already left; so I called his assistant, General Baron Zaltsa (6), who agreed to recall the cavalry but only when I requested that he do so on my responsibility and on my order as representing the head of the government. Three Cossack regiments were recalled and these entered Kiev about seven in the morning, occupying the Podol district and other districts inhabited by Jews. Meanwhile the Jews were frantic. All night long they had been packing their belongings, and with the first light of day their carts moved toward the station. All who could squeeze themselves into a railroad car left as early as possible; those less fortunate jammed the square before the station waiting for the next trains. The appearance of the Cossacks, however, quickly restored calm and order. By evening most of the excitement was past, the exodus had stopped, and on the following day (September 3) life resumed its natural course.

Even while these measures to restore order were being carried out, I spent most of the time at the clinic. With Stolypin's permission, I wired his wife, Olga Borisovna, breaking the news as gently as possible. At his request I looked through his portfolio and selected papers on the most urgent matters to be reported to the Tsar.

General Kurlov came to see Stolypin, and, this being impossible, he asked me, as acting head of the government, if I should like him to resign immediately, since he had been entrusted with preserving order in Kiev and might be held responsible for this accident. I told him that such a matter would have to wait until it could be submitted to His Majesty.

At noon a solemn mass was offered at the Mikhailovsky Cathedral for the recovery of Petr Arkadevich. All zemstvo representatives who had come to Kiev and many St. Petersburg officials were present. None of the Imperial family nor any of the Tsar's closest entourage appeared; whether or not they had been informed, I do not know. I had no more than entered the church when I met one of the newly elected representatives whom I knew personally; he addressed me rather freely with the words, "Well, Your High Excellency, by calling in the troops you have missed a fine chance to answer Bogrov's shot with a nice Jewish pogrom." I could not conceal my indignation at such a remark, and reprimanded him in no uncertain terms. His sally, however, suggested to me that the measures I had taken at Kiev were not sufficient. Directly after the mass, therefore,

I sent an open telegram to all governors of this region demanding that they use every possible means—force if necessary—to prevent possible pogroms. When I submitted this telegram to the Tsar, he expressed his approval of it and of the measures I had taken in Kiev itself. I then asked His Majesty's permission to recall Kryzhanovsky, who was Senior Assistant Minister of the Interior and was at that time abroad. I explained that I considered Kryzhanovsky the ablest and most responsible person to direct the ministry temporarily until Stolypin's recovery, which unfortunately was very doubtful, or until a new appointment could be made. The Tsar, however, did not favor my request, choosing to believe that Stolypin would get well and that until then I could handle his official duties.

On the morning of the 3d, however, after another examination and consultation, the doctors agreed that Stolypin had but a slight chance to recover. His condition grew steadily worse. His wife and his brothers-in-law, A. B. and D. B. Neudgardt (7), arrived on the 4th, but by then Stolypin had begun to lose consciousness; he was failing rapidly, and at about five o'clock the following afternoon he passed away.

Meanwhile, the inquest, conducted by Senator Trussevich (8), a former Director of the Police Department, revealed that General Kurlov and his staff had been crassly negligent.

These were trying days for me. I had little time to sleep, and my nerves were under a great strain. In the midst of it all a deputation of Nationalists of the southwestern region came to see me—P. N. Balashev (9), D. N. Chikhachev (10), Potocki, and Professor Chernov (11). Balashev acted as spokesman. He referred to Stolypin's close connection with the Nationalist Party and to his sympathy with its ideals. This party, however, did not look with favor upon my possible appointment as Stolypin's successor: they considered me too much under the influences of Western Europe and international finance. "We cannot support you," Balashev concluded, "unless we are assured that as Stolypin's successor you will carry on his policy."

I reminded Balashev that I had not yet been appointed to succeed Stolypin, nor had I even been approached on the subject, and I confessed that it would be a great relief to me if the Nationalist Party would take steps to see that I was not appointed to such a responsible position.

Evidently I spoke with some heat, for Chernov hastened to say

that the Nationalist Party recognized only too well the necessity of co-operating with the government, but that it could co-operate only with a government for which it had respect. The Nationalists, however, would openly range themselves on my side if I would give them not necessarily assurance but merely hope that I would adhere to Stolypin's policies.

In reply, I told my visitors that they attributed more authority to the Chairman of the Ministers' Council than he actually possessed. Absolute power belonged to the Tsar alone. In times of emergency exceptional powers were given to some ministers, it was true, but only till the crises had passed. Moreover, it often happened that a minister's exercise of these special powers led to his sudden fall, regardless of whether or not he was supported by any one party. As a case in point, I mentioned Stolypin's loss of influence after he had sponsored the introduction of the *zemstvos* into the southwestern regions. In conclusion, I said that should I be obliged to become Chairman of the Ministers' Council there was one principle which I should follow unfailingly: I would never lie to my Emperor, I would never be the tool of any political party, and I would discharge my duties to the best of my ability as long as I felt I was in the right. As for the Nationalist Party, if its motto was the greatness of Russia and her liberation from any domination, then we could effect an understanding. But if its policy was to suppress the non-Russian population, I would oppose it as being dangerous and harmful; for to persecute a Jew today, a Pole tomorrow, and a Finlander the next day was to create enemies of Russia within the Empire itself and thereby to undermine the very greatness so eagerly sought.

This ended the interview.

Immediately after the Nationalist representatives had left I received a call from a deputation from the Jews of Kiev. These were not prominent members of the local Jewry but modest traders from a Podol market. They were terrified lest, in spite of my precautions, a pogrom would be directed against them. I did my best to calm their fears, and the next morning's edition of *Kievskaja Mysl* (12) contained an article which showed that my assurances had been effective—shops had reopened. Interestingly enough, this article was telegraphed to *Novoe Vremia*, which commented caustically on my extraordinary solicitude for the well-being and peace of the Jews.

The Tsar had gone to Chernigov on the 4th. On the morning of

the 6th I went to greet him on his return. From the pier His Majesty went immediately to the clinic to pay his respects to the dead and to offer condolences to Stolypin's widow. Then he drove to the Nikolaevsky Palace to prepare for the Imperial family's departure from Kiev. Quite unexpectedly I was summoned to the palace.

His Majesty received me in his study and, without any delay, said that he wished me to accept the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council, retaining at the same time my duties as Minister of Finance. I expressed my thanks for this honor and for the confidence in me which it implied, and then asked who had been selected as Minister of the Interior. I was amazed to hear the Tsar reply, "The Governor of Nizhni Novgorod, Khvostov" (13).

I knew His Majesty was in a hurry to get away, but I felt duty bound to express my misgivings at this selection. I pointed out that Khvostov enjoyed neither sufficient public respect nor adequate personal ability to fill this position, and requested that my appointment be held in abeyance until the selection of the Minister of the Interior had been finally determined. I promised to submit a list of possible candidates, setting forth what I considered to be their respective qualifications. His Majesty's only comment was, "I still consider that you have accepted your appointment. As for the other, write me everything frankly." Then he bade me a hurried farewell.

I arrived back in St. Petersburg on September 8,* and immediately set to work to prepare my letter to the Tsar. Two days later it was finished and sent to Livadia, together with the ukase on my appointment. In the letter I pledged to His Majesty my devotion and my loyal services and begged him to believe that my opinion as regards the selecting of a new Minister of the Interior was dictated solely by my concern for the welfare of Russia and not by any desire to oppose his will. Then I went on to point out that Khvostov had had no governmental or administrative experience except in provincial affairs, that he was opposed to the existing state system, that he

* General Sukhomlinov returned by the same train. He seemed to be surprised at my appointment. Later, it transpired that he himself had expected to be Stolypin's successor and that he had been urged by his wife to request this post. Who knows but that his request might have been granted, for Sukhomlinov was influential enough to have his brother appointed Governor of Orenburg, and Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, although the consensus of opinion was that this brother was the most insignificant of all brigade commanders. Later, after my resignation, the same brother was appointed Governor-General of the Steppe region, owing to Sukhomlinov's influence upon the Tsar.

was not able to shoulder the great responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior, and finally that he enjoyed no public confidence, so essential to success.

I suggested the appointment of Imperial Secretary Makarov (14) instead of Khvostov. Makarov was well-trained and experienced; he was familiar with police administration and had studied methods of combating political crime. He had, as Assistant Minister of the Interior, appeared in the Duma and creditably represented the government. Finally, as Imperial Secretary he enjoyed a particularly favorable position in the State Council. These considerations convinced me that Makarov was the man to take charge of this important but poorly organized ministry.

I also suggested two other men—the Governor of Chernigov, Maklakov (15); and Count P. N. Ignatev (16), who was then Departmental Director of the Ministry of Agriculture. Maklakov was quite young and evidently energetic, but inexperienced, poorly trained, and susceptible to the influence of irresponsible persons. Count Ignatev was reputed to be very intelligent. Unfortunately, I did not know him well.

In closing my letter I again assured His Majesty that my only concern was that a man should be chosen who was best able to contribute to Russian greatness and well-being.

On the 14th His Majesty telegraphed from Livadia stating that Makarov's appointment was acceptable and that he had summoned him to Yalta. Makarov went immediately. He was back within a week, very jubilant about his new position. Evidently the Tsar, too, was pleased, for he wrote me that he was certain that under its new head the Ministry of the Interior would proceed to solve the internal problems that had been clamoring for attention and that it would no longer dissipate its energies in political squabbles. This was a frank disapproval of Stolypin's policy. Stolypin had never been forgiven for his former sympathies with Guchkov (17) and the Octobrists or for his later connection with the Nationalists, who did not enjoy the confidence of either the Tsar or the public.

In a very real sense, Makarov's appointment* was my first serious

* I soon learned that Kryzhanovsky, whom I had recalled provisionally to the Ministry of the Interior, did not get on with Makarov and desired me to find him some other position. I was able to persuade Akimov, Chairman of the State Council, to accept him as Imperial Secretary. Even though the Tsar did not like Kryzhanovsky, he readily agreed to this appointment.

achievement, for undoubtedly it was the result of my letter.* Even the press greeted the appointment with satisfaction. At first, Meshchersky's *Grashdanin* was even gracious; but this was only an attempt to influence Makarov. It frankly offered to support him if he would sacrifice such heroes as Beletsky (19) and Kharuzin (20). Makarov, however, was not to be influenced; he so far spurned this offer as to appoint Beletsky Director of the Police Department and to place Kharuzin in charge of the elections to the Fourth Duma.

The remainder of the autumn was comparatively uneventful as far as I was concerned, enabling me to complete my work on the budget for 1912. The general inactivity of these months only threw into relief the hostile attitude of *Novoe Vremia* toward me. As early as September 10 this paper had printed a telegram from A. I. Guchkov in Kiev which read: "Russia is mired in a swamp and surely V. N. Kokovtsov is not the man to pull her out." This was soon followed by an article by Meshnikov denouncing me for my protection of the Jews. Meanwhile rumors reached me to the effect that the editorial board of *Novoe Vremia*, of which Guchkov was a member, had held conferences to decide upon a campaign against me. I tried to ascertain the reason for such a campaign, and when two representatives of the papers—Mikhail Suvorin (21) and Mazaev (22)—called on me I asked them what I had done to merit their disapproval, but I received no explanation. They tried to avoid a direct answer to my question by saying that some of the paper's contributors, Meshnikov in particular, were quite beyond control. Later, however, I learned the real causes: first, I had failed to call on the Suvorin brothers, Mikhail and Boris (23); and, second, they knew I was opposed to subsidizing newspapers with government funds or to influencing private banks to make accommodating loans to newspapers.

* This letter was to play an important rôle in September 1917. I was questioned by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government as to my political activities during the last decade, particularly as to my part in securing the appointment of Makarov. Muravev (18), the Chairman of the Commission, checked my answers with this letter. Fortunately my memory served me well. I was told that my letter had been among the documents surrendered by the Tsar to the Commission on Kerensky's demand.

Part V

My Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers

CHAPTER XXIV

OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1911

On October 1, I set out for my first trip to Livadia as Chairman of the Ministers' Council, and on arrival was accorded a most hearty welcome. The members of the court, not yet bored with the monotony of Yalta life, vied with each other in their graciousness to me.

The Tsar received me on the 4th and expressed his pleasure that I had come. He showed me about his new palace, in which he had taken residence for the first time this year. My report and the discussion that followed occupied more than two hours; all my suggestions were approved. One of the most delicate questions we discussed concerned the appointment of new members to the State Council regarding whom I had effected an understanding with Akimov—no mean feat, since the list contained several of Stolypin's candidates (such as S. N. Gerbel) (1), whom I wanted to include out of respect for his memory and according to his wishes, besides my candidates, Polivanov and Timashev, and all of them were men little acceptable to Akimov, who had always been anxious to pass to the State Council men of extreme conservative views. This was not a commendable tendency. Altogether it was not easy to introduce suitable men into the upper chamber, because the existing unpublished Sovereign Order directing that lists of candidates to the membership of the State Council be prepared and presented to the Emperor in agreement with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the State Council had never been followed. Accordingly, both Stolypin and I were able to introduce our candidates only as long as we were in favor and were being indulged. In the majority of cases the appointments were the result of different unofficial influences, such as that exercised by the High Council of the Union of the Nobility, which organization, during the last half-decade, had advanced a number of its members to the State Council: Count Bobrinsky, Strukov (2), Arsenev (3), Kurakin (4), Okhotnikov (5), and many others, not to speak of subsequent appointments, especially during the Council's last days in January 1917. I was especially anxious to have Polivanov appointed to the State Council be-

cause of his excellent work during the past three years; the great obstacle, however, was the fact that his minister had not yet been appointed. I reported this to the Tsar and said that I should like him to appoint Sukhomlinov also. I said I was making this request against my better judgment and only for the purpose of doing away with friction between the minister and his assistant, which would undoubtedly result in some harm to the latter, and would be a great loss for the work of national defense.

"I know that you do not like Sukhomlinov," His Majesty replied, "but I am sure, now that you have become Chairman of the Ministers' Council, he will change his attitude. I shall inform him that you have asked me to appoint him to the State Council; surely he will see in this act your noble character and a total absence of any sentiments of rancor." Subsequent events proved the Tsar to have been too optimistic.

The next day, after lunch, the Empress, who found it painful to stand for any length of time, sat down in an armchair and called me to her side. We talked for more than an hour in a very informal way on all sorts of subjects. But a part of this conversation impressed itself upon my memory because it contained a sharp thrust at myself and showed me the peculiar, mystic nature of this woman who was called to play such an extraordinary part in the history of Russia.

Speaking of events at St. Petersburg, and of the manner in which my appointment had been received by a coterie which was never pleased with anything, the Empress said, "We hope that you will never range yourself with those horrible political parties which only hope to be able to seize power or to subjugate the government."

I answered that even before my appointment I had tried to keep free from allegiance to any party, to stand for the views of the government, and to be as independent as possible. It was my opinion that co-operation with the Duma was an essential factor of our new state life. I could not deny, however, that my position was more difficult than that of Stolypin. He had his parties, first the Octobrists and later the Nationalists, who, although weaker, knew how to ally themselves with the Octobrists or with the Right. As for myself, on the other hand, I could not submit to the dictates of any group, even though in this way I might deprive myself of support. Besides, the position of all parties in the Duma was more difficult than it had been under Stolypin. They had broken up into smaller fractions; they were afraid to stand too close to the government lest they hurt

their chances for success in the elections of 1912; and, finally, there was now no united conservative majority in the Duma which would support my views and which had been so advantageous after the sharply defined revolutionary attitude of the first two Dumas.

Then suddenly the Empress interrupted: "I notice that you keep on making comparisons between yourself and Stolypin. You seem to do much honor to his memory and ascribe too much importance to his activities and his personality. Believe me, one must not feel so sorry for those who are no more. I am sure that everybody does only one's duty and fulfills one's destiny, and when one dies that means that his rôle is ended and that he was bound to go, since his destiny has been fulfilled. Life continually assumes new forms, and you must not try to follow blindly the work of your predecessor. Remain yourself; do not look for support in political parties; they are of so little consequence in Russia. Find your support in the confidence of the Tsar—the Lord will help you. I am sure that Stolypin died to make room for you, and this is all for the good of Russia."

Thus she spoke, but I do not know whether or not her words exactly expressed her thought. Both then and now, however, one thing is clear to me: a month after Stolypin's tragic end he was spoken of with perfect calm; only a few gave themselves the trouble to think of him at all; he was profoundly criticized, and hardly a soul expressed a word of sorrow that he had gone.

When I returned to St. Petersburg on October 8 the members of both chambers were beginning to assemble. Many of them visited me, exploring the ground for a possible exercise of influence; and from these visits I became aware that the parties were absolutely without unity, and that no one of the conservative political groups had any real influence upon the Duma. Each of them gossiped about the others and tried to undermine my confidence in its rivals.

Among the Octobrists there were clearly defined symptoms of decomposition, since, with the removal of Guchkov from the leadership of this heterogeneous party, numerous internal frictions arose. The Nationalists, under the leadership of Balashev, regarded their importance as much greater than it actually was. Besides, the loss of Stolypin was all too fresh in their memory and the expression of lack of confidence in me which they had made at Kiev was still too well remembered to permit the establishment of cordial relations between us, even if I had been so inclined, which I was not. The unfavorable impression they had made on me at Kiev was intensified

by their efforts to discover what attitude I should adopt toward the subsidies which their party had received from Stolypin.

As early as 1910, during the beginning of the campaign for the Duma election of 1912, serious disagreements had arisen between Stolypin and me. Stolypin had pointed out that in no country was the government indifferent toward elections to legislative institutions, and that in Russia, despite the law of July 3, 1907, an indifferent attitude on the part of the government was bound to increase the opposition parties in the Duma, especially the Cadet Party. Therefore, he had demanded—and received, despite my objections—large sums to prepare for the elections. He had wanted to obtain immediately from my department a lump sum of four million rubles; all I could do was to break the payment up into installments and to argue him into accepting a little over three million, the payments to be extended over the period 1910–1912 and distributed through agencies at my command.

Despite all my protests Stolypin had been adamant in his conviction that all these expenditures would not be futile. I had argued that the sums would simply be distributed among the most trifling and useless organizations and provincial publications which no one read, that they would merely constitute tempting means of financing those near to governors and the Department of Police, and that those who got nothing would only bear resentment against the government. But my arguments had been of no avail. What the final destinations of these sums of money actually were I could not learn. My inquiries regarding them had always seemed to offend Stolypin, and once, in the presence of Krivoshein and Kharitonov, he had said that if I had no confidence in the ability of the Minister of the Interior to manage properly the expenditure of this money he would be obliged to ask the Tsar to transfer the whole business to the Minister of Finance and thus to free himself of all responsibility for future developments. There was little I could say, as the other men had supported Stolypin, saying, "Give us money and be confident of success."

It was but natural, therefore, that one of my first endeavors— if not the very first—after my appointment was to familiarize myself with the expenditures upon the Duma elections. S. E. Kryzhanovskiy, who was in charge of this business,* supplied me with all

* Later, in 1917, when questioned by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, headed by Muravev, he definitely denied his participation in this activity.

documents regarding this curious affair, and thus I was able to form a clear picture of the distribution of funds to different organizations, the majority of which were quite unknown except, at best, in the particular uezd or gubernia capital.

Until June 1918 I kept the records of all expenditures on elections made during the period from August 1911 to the actual elections in 1912. During the search made at my house on the night of June 30–July 1, 1918, these records were overlooked, and on returning home from prison I destroyed them, together with the rest of my documents. Now I regret very much that I have not these lists in my possession, for I am unable to quote from memory the more interesting names and figures connected with the relations between the government and the more prominent personages of the different political organizations. I remember only the general facts; but of these I am certain: The Cadets did not figure in the lists at all, which was clearly attributable to their hostility toward Stolypin. The Octobrists were mentioned but seldom and then mostly as an agency for distributing trifling sums designed for charity. On the other hand, the names of the representatives of the Right wing filled the records. There was Markov II (6) with his *Kurskaia Byl* and the *Zemshchina*, which swallowed 200,000 rubles yearly; there was the famed Dr. Dubrovin (7) with the *Russkoe Znamia*; there was Purishkevich with all his enterprises including the "Students' Academic Group"; there were representatives of the Union of the Nationalists, Zamyslovsky (8) and Savenko (9); there were some Bishops with their educational societies; there was a bulletin of the Pochaev Lavra (10); and there were all sorts of unknown and unread newspapers. Finally, to my great amazement, there were the prominent members of the Nationalist Party itself, who up to then had been receiving rather large monthly subsidies, which amounted to a considerable figure, for a period of a little over one year.

This matter of subsidies was one of the first causes of trouble in this session of the Duma. Makarov and I were agreed as to the uselessness of these expenditures, although he did not consider it wise to discontinue them now eight months before elections. Late in November a deputy of the Left accused the representatives of the Union of the Russian People, and all the other extreme elements, of accepting "dark money." This was a new term. Evidently the thrust was aimed at the extreme Right—Purishkevich, Zamyslovsky, Markov II, and others—but it hit the Nationalists also, as was evidenced

by the fact that they soon advised me that they no longer found it possible to avail themselves of the subsidy. I discontinued it that December. There were others, however, who, far from refusing the subsidy, insisted on more and more of it, and if the increase was not forthcoming it was not the Minister of the Interior who was blamed but the Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

Meanwhile, I learned from the so-called "Duma information"—that is, from A. F. Kumanin, who followed most cleverly what was being said among the members of the Duma—that it was being rumored that I intended to reverse Stolypin's policy toward Finland and to adopt a "new course." This rumor utterly disregarded the fact that I had made no objection to Stolypin's law* either when it was discussed in the Ministers' Council or when it was being approved by the Duma. Nevertheless Balashev, the leader of the Nationalists, assured me that he, with the help of the Octobrists and the Rights, was preparing for my "Sedan," after which I would be obliged to retire.

My first appearance in the Duma in my new capacity, however, was on another matter, namely, factory medical funds. This was on October 24, 1911. The special commission of the Duma had disagreed with the governmental project, which I now attempted to defend, and although I did not receive much applause everything went off smoothly.

Four days later the Finnish problem was to be discussed. The Ministers' Council assembled the evening before and insisted that I appear to defend the project, although Shcheglovitov was very eager to assume this task and Kharitonov, a great authority on Finnish affairs, wanted to take part in the debates.

It was to be a "big day." The galleries were crowded, all the ministers were present, and the seats of the deputies were almost all occupied. The general interest in my first appearance had been whetted by Balashev's tales about his preparations for my "Sedan." Contrary to expectations, I was enthusiastically received by the Center and the Right, including the Nationalists. Rukhlov, Minister of Ways and Communications and a prominent Nationalist, congratulated me warmly. This speech assured me a very good position in

* This law was introduced into the Duma on June 17, 1910, and provided that Finland should contribute a share of the military expenses instead of being subject to compulsory military service, and that Russians and Finns should have equal rights in Finland.

the Duma for some time. During the recess, Shubinsky (11) approached Balashev and said, "What is all this you've been saying about Kokovtsov being a renegade? Even you could not refrain from applauding his speech." Whereupon, Balashev explained that my treatment of the Finnish problem was the result of his threats to use the "mailed fist" against me if I ventured on the rumored "new course." I soon learned of this, and later, in Balashev's presence, I accepted the congratulations accorded me by saying, "I am most happy not to have disappointed you and not to have made it necessary for you to apply the 'mailed fist.'" Balashev's discomfiture completely betrayed him.

Two days later the Tsar telegraphed from Livadia congratulating me upon my speech and complimenting me on my sound statesmanship. News of this telegram spread through the city and inspired a new rush of congratulations.

Although the pressure of my new duties compelled me to limit as much as possible my appearances in the Duma, I was obliged to appear again on November 2 and on December 9.

On the first of these occasions I was to reply to an inquiry signed by a great number of Duma members, including others than members of the opposition. It concerned the shortage of crops which had occurred in some localities late the previous spring. Measures had been taken during Stolypin's ministry and had been conducted under his direct control. The necessary funds had been appropriated in the spring and summer in rush order, and the government and the zemstvos worked harmoniously and successfully to relieve the suffering. By winter it was apparent that the evil effects of the poor crops had been overcome, that the planting of new crops had been assured, that relief work had been conducted everywhere on a large scale, and that the work of the Red Cross and the zemstvo had been most successful.

Nevertheless, in the autumn, the opposition press distorted the truth, and the Left deputies from the localities affected by the famine vied with each other in telling all sorts of fancy tales. Despite the fact that these stories were generally refuted immediately by more levelheaded members of the Duma, nevertheless, public opinion began to assume a sharper tone. The Ministry of the Interior was obliged to demand explanations of the governors concerning their reports. A peculiar situation arose: on one side, more than reassuring reports from the governors and the zemstvo institutions; and, on

the other, something resembling the attacks against the government of the First and Second Dumas—attacks which merged into wholesale accusations of inactivity and the suppression of the real facts. The character of this opposition was reflected in the Duma's inquiries, which soon became outright denunciations of the government.

In my reply I was faced with the difficult task of exposing these pernicious and false stories and of relating the real success of the struggle against the famine. The attitude of the opposition in raising this entire issue is characteristic of its efforts to turn public opinion against the government. As I said, my task was a difficult one, but my defense of the government—the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture in particular—and the zemstvos was successful. The Duma dropped this subject and turned to the consideration of other matters.

On the second occasion, I had to defend the government's legislative project for the purchase by the state of the Warsaw-Vienna railway. This project had been introduced by the Ministry of Finance, but the person most interested was the Minister of Ways and Communications, S. V. Rukhlov, who had signed the project with me. Behind Rukhlov stood the Nationalist group of the Duma. Before the project was discussed in the Ministers' Council the Polish element in the Duma and the State Council had carried on a protracted agitation against it, thus causing many a bad night's sleep. It was clear that the purchase of the railway could be of financial advantage to the treasury, and that it could be made legally. The terms offered by the railway administration, however, were too high. On several occasions I had pointed this out to the member of this administration in the State Council, Kronenberg.

All this was clear to the members of the Council, and it was arranged that Rukhlov should handle the matter in the Duma. However, during the session of the Council, Rukhlov requested me to handle it myself, as the Poles had resolved to make their objections purely political, attempting to prove that the government wished to adopt this measure simply in order to combat Polish interests and accusing it of an intention to remove all the railway's Polish employees and to replace them with inferior Russian railway workers. He said also that he would find it most difficult to fight this opposition, as he had but recently belonged to the Nationalist group. Moreover, the Poles insisted that I had no sympathy for the measure and had

been forced to sign the project so as not to be reproached for furthering Polish interests. The other members of the Ministers' Council supported S. V. Rukhlov, and therefore I agreed.

The Poles expressed their dissatisfaction with the measure in sharp terms indeed. Deputy Swętnicki was particularly caustic, as was his colleague Zukowski, who was most thoroughly versed in economic questions and always well prepared whenever he mounted the tribune. In replying to them, however, I disregarded the political side entirely and approached the matter from a purely business, financial, and technical point of view. I guaranteed that the railway employees would be able to work for the government just as well as they had worked for the private concern if they were willing to do so. Nor did I pass over the strategic significance of the railway, which justified the need for connecting it with the Russian network instead of with the Prussian and the Austrian railways.

Once again I enjoyed success. The objections of the Polish group were supported by but a small number of votes. The majority favored the views of the government.

CHAPTER XXV

DECEMBER 1911—FEBRUARY 1912

That year the Tsar stayed at Livadia until the middle of December, and no very important news came from there. But at St. Petersburg the atmosphere grew tense. The newspapers began to mention more and more frequently the name of Rasputin (1), and to make all sorts of hints about his nearness to the court and the influence he exercised on appointments, especially those in the clerical domain. Articles appeared concerning his activities in the gubernia of Tobolsk, and it was insinuated that certain St. Petersburg ladies had accompanied him to the village Pokrovskoe. These articles were especially frequent in *Rech* and *Russkoe Slovo*, the latter giving the greater amount of detail and once going so far as to say that there had been disagreement in the Imperial family over Rasputin. It was rather broadly implied that the Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna (2) would have nothing to do with him and therefore had withdrawn completely from Tsarskoe Selo.

From the pages of the papers this gossip gradually spread to the State Duma. At first it constituted the subject of lobby conversations only, but finally it was taken into the Duma tribune, whence the Left deputies, and on several occasions Miliukov and the Cadets; hinted broadly at certain "dark forces," especially in connection with the activity of the Synod and the appointments to bishoprics.

This matter was rendered especially acute by the activities of Guchkov. Early in December he circulated in the city hectographed copies of four or five letters to Rasputin, one written by the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna and the rest by the Grand Duchesses. All these letters pertained to the year 1908 or 1909, and although they were absolutely impeccable they gave rise to the most revolting comments. More of this later.

Both Makarov and I were deeply concerned about the whole affair. We saw that sooner or later we should meet with Imperial displeasure, yet we also saw that we were powerless to influence the press in this unfortunate situation. At first Makarov tried to pre-

vail upon the editors through Count Tatishchev (3), the Chief of the Bureau of Publications, and finally he tried personally; but his efforts came to nothing. The answer was always the same: "Remove Rasputin to Tiumen and we will stop writing about him." This, however, was not so easy.

My own attempts to influence the press also failed. I made use of a visit of M. Suvorin and Mazaev to try to make them see that the constant mentioning of Rasputin in the papers only gave him so much publicity and, what was infinitely worse, played into the hands of all the revolutionary organizations that were trying to undermine the prestige of the Monarch. Both men agreed with me but insisted that they could do nothing, and that the *Novoe Vremia* was not to blame for the publicity given to the antics of the Rasputin crowd, arguing that the *Rech* and the *Russkoe Slovo* were the main offenders, as indeed they were. But it was clear to me that some evil hand was already at work in the offices of the *Novoe Vremia* and that I could not count upon this paper or its editors to assist me.

The newspaper campaign presaged nothing good. It grew in intensity and, strange as it may seem, the question of Rasputin became the central question of the immediate future; nor did it disappear during my entire term of office as Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

The Tsar returned from Livadia in the second half of December. During my first audience after his return he only once touched upon this matter. He mentioned that he would like to talk with the Minister of the Interior about the press, saying that he believed it necessary to consider issuing a law which would give the government a certain authority over the press, since no such law existed in Russia. I expressed my doubts as to the feasibility of this measure, as the Duma would never consent to invest the government with definite rights regarding the press, would not allow any actual restriction of the freedom of the press lest it be accused of being reactionary, and would even object to the suggestion that papers be required to put up a large bond as pledge of good conduct, this bond to be forfeited, wholly or in part, in case of violations of press regulations. But the Tsar turned the conversation into less troublesome channels.

As yet I had not seen Rasputin. My brother-in-law, Mamontov (4), however, had known him for some time, pronounced him a thorough scoundrel, but admitted that he had great influence in certain quarters. Grigorii Petrovich Sazonov (5) did his utmost to

get me to meet Rasputin, saying that Rasputin's support was necessary for my success; but I declined both the meeting and the support.

In attempting to persuade me of Rasputin's influence, Sazonov told me that in the spring of 1911 he and Rasputin had gone to Nizhni Novgorod on orders from Tsarskoe Selo to interview Khvostov. The purpose of the visit was to see whether or not the latter was suitable for the post of Minister of the Interior (this, of course, at a time when Stolypin did not even suspect that his tenure of office was insecure). Rasputin had actually offered Khvostov the position on condition that Witte would be reappointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council, but Khvostov had refused to work with Witte. When Rasputin returned to the capital he said that Khvostov was a fine, bright fellow, but much too young for the post. This story supports the rumor that Rasputin always supported Witte and that the two of them were close friends. This was always denied by Witte.

The Tsar first clearly expressed his displeasure with the newspaper campaign against Rasputin in the middle of January 1912. At that time I kept in close touch with Makarov in order to co-ordinate our activities regarding the elections to the Duma, and when I called on him to discuss the Rasputin affair I found him in a very depressed mood. He had just received an unpleasant note from the Tsar demanding that he "take firm measures to bring the press to order" and prohibit them from printing anything about Rasputin. To this note was attached one of still sharper tone on the same subject written December 10, 1910, addressed to Stolypin, and accusing him of weakness in regard to the press. Stolypin had, apparently, argued the matter with the Tsar, who had given in and taken back his note.

Makarov was at a loss to know what to do. I advised him to explain to the Tsar during his very first report the impossibility of complying with his wishes, the futility of arguing with the editors, and the still greater futility of administrative reprisals which would only irritate the press and public opinion and give cause for conflict with the government. I also suggested that any law directed against the press—a step which was the dream of our extreme Right—was also ill-advised. Should the Tsar take exception to these views, I advised Makarov to tender his resignation.

We then discussed the letters of the Empress and the Grand Duchesses which Guchkov had distributed. We both believed that the letters were apocryphal and were being circulated for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the Sovereign, but we could do

nothing, as they were not distributed in printed form. The public, of course, greedy for any sensation, was according them a very warm reception.

The next day, January 17, I learned that there had been a clash between Rasputin and some of his friends. It seemed that Hermogen (6), Bishop of Saratov, had summoned Rasputin and, together with the priest Iliodor (7), had reprimanded him for his dissolute life and for his visits to Tsarskoe Selo, which involved the Imperial family in scandal, and had ordered him to retire forever to the village of Pokrovskoe, in Tobolsk Gubernia. This had led to a violent scene, from which, apparently, Rasputin had barely escaped with his life. Hermogen, anticipating that Rasputin would color his report of the incident to suit himself, telegraphed immediately to the Tsar requesting an audience. He intended not only to give his side of the case but also to expose Rasputin for the villain that he was. Apparently, however, the *starets* got his word in first, for the next day the Tsar ordered that Hermogen be removed from St. Petersburg at once. Hermogen, pleading ill health, tried, in a second telegram, to persuade the Tsar to change his order, but in vain. The Bishop left St. Petersburg on Sunday, January 22.* This incident was discussed everywhere—in the newspapers, in high circles of society, in government offices, and in the lobbies of the Duma. It served only to give Rasputin more publicity and further to undermine the prestige of the autocracy. Even so the affair might have died a natural death had it not been for the newspapers which continued to play it up in their columns. The Duma members, too, did their share to keep it

* A few days later my eyes were opened to another instance of the hidden intrigue surrounding me by a rather trifling incident. On going through the summary of outstanding current events supplied to me daily by the Chief of the Central Bureau of Publications through the Ministry of the Interior, I came upon a censored letter from State Councillor D. I. Pikhno to a lady in Kiev, dated January 16. One sentence ran as follows: "Saw Krivoshein today. He told me, among other things, that Kokovtsov was thinking one thing, saying another, and doing yet a third, believing that he is trusted in the Council and can outwit them all."

This is illustrative of Krivoshein's two-facedness, for in his personal and official relations with me he was flattering even to the point of being ingratiating.

Another letter in this summary indicated that it was being rumored in Moscow that one of the printing houses in that city had prepared a large book exposing Rasputin but that the police had confiscated all of it that was printed, mixed the type, and destroyed the manuscript. It said also that the Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna was very vexed at this police action, for she had read the book and hoped that its publication would result in Rasputin's removal from Tsarskoe Selo.

alive by demanding that Rasputin be deported from the capital so as to put an end to the excitement which centered around his doings.

On Sunday, January 29, there was a formal dinner at the Winter Palace to celebrate the visit to St. Petersburg of the King of Montenegro. After dinner the Tsar spoke at length with Makarov about Rasputin and again expressed his displeasure with the conduct of the press, demanding that it be controlled. He told Makarov to discuss means of controlling the press with Sabler (8) and me. Now for the first time I found myself drawn into this unfortunate affair.

Accordingly, on the next evening, Makarov and Sabler met at my house to discuss ways and means to carry out the Tsar's wishes. There was not much to discuss. I feared complications from Sabler, whose appointment as Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod had obviously been to some extent the result of Rasputin's influence; but I was mistaken. From the start Sabler took the stand that this Rasputin affair was a great danger for the Tsar and that the only way to put a stop to it was to have Rasputin removed to Pokrovskoe.

This we decided to attempt, but we all believed that to assure the success of our plan we should have to enlist the support of Baron Frederichs, whose personal nobility, devotion to the Tsar, and aversion to anything that smacked of filth would make it easier to present the situation to the Tsar.

Makarov and I went to see Baron Frederichs that same evening. This man of rather limited ability, though of undisputed nobility and honesty, well understood the danger of Rasputin's influence and expressed himself as perfectly willing to act with us. He promised to speak to the Tsar as soon as possible.

It was not, however, till six days later that Baron Frederichs telephoned to say that he had had a long conversation with the Tsar, who was quite irritated and opposed to our plan. Makarov's report fell on Thursday, but he had no better success. The same fate befell my efforts to clear up the matter on Friday. I did manage, however, to say how the affair was undermining the prestige of the Imperial authority and how easy it would be to end such evil influence if the proper measures were taken. But the Tsar only looked out of the window—one of his ways of registering his displeasure with what he was hearing. Then he interrupted me: "This disgusting affair must be ended and I shall take decisive steps to do so. I shall tell you of them later, but in the meantime let us drop the subject. It pains me extremely."

It was not long before I discovered what the Tsar had meant. Sabler had concealed from me that the Tsar had instructed him to obtain from the Synod the records of the inquiry held by Antonii, Bishop of Tver and formerly of Tobolsk, regarding an accusation that Rasputin belonged to the Khlysty (9) sect. The records were then turned over for examination to Rodzianko, the president of the Duma, who was to report his views on this matter to the Tsar. Rodzianko had apparently been given to understand that the Tsar considered the rumors false and that, when Rodzianko discovered such to be the case, he would find a way of putting a stop to them. At any rate, Rodzianko soon spread the news that the Tsar had done him a great honor. He came to see me and, in the course of our conversation, said that his only worry was lest he should be unable to secure all documents bearing on the case and to summon all witnesses necessary to make his examination a thorough one. I reminded him that he had been asked only to study the matter and not to hold a second inquiry, and warned him that by making too much of his task he might only revive and prolong the scandal and further compromise his Emperor. Apparently my advice had some effect, but not enough to alter Rodzianko's conviction that he had been entrusted with the mission of saving the Tsar and the country from Rasputin. Feeling that he could not cope with his task single-handed, he secured the assistance of the Duma members Shubinsky and Guchkov. Their study of the matter, however, as I had anticipated, only served to let loose new rumors and to revive old ones. Rodzianko narrowly escaped trouble by his handling of the entire business.

The widespread concern as to the effect of Rasputin's influence created an atmosphere of great tension. Early in February, during the sessions of the Budget Committee, his name crept into the debates time and time again. Guchkov, Vladimir Lvov (10) (the Duma candidate for Procurator of the Holy Synod), Miliukov, Sergei Shidlovsky (11), and many others gave vent to their irritation and disgust at the harmful effect this *starets* was having upon Russia. Sabler's honeyed speeches availed little against the sharp remarks of these men.

Then, on February 12, I was invited to an audience with the Empress Marie Fedorovna for the next morning. For an hour and a half we discussed Rasputin. I answered her questions as directly and honestly as I was able. She wept bitterly and promised to speak

to the Tsar, but added: "My poor daughter-in-law does not perceive that she is ruining both the dynasty and herself. She sincerely believes in the holiness of an adventurer, and we are powerless to ward off the misfortune which is sure to come."

On that same day I was amazed to receive a letter from Rasputin. "I am thinking of leaving forever," he wrote, "and would like to see you so as to exchange some ideas; people talk much of me nowadays. Say when. The address is 12 Kirochnaia, at Sazonov's." Of course, I have not retained his peculiar spelling. My first impulse was not to answer, but after some deliberation I decided to receive Rasputin because my position obliged me not to avoid a man who had perturbed all Russia and also because when I next spoke to the Tsar I wanted to be able to give my personal impression of the *starets*. Also I was afraid I might incur the Tsar's displeasure for refusing to see a man who had requested an interview. Finally, I hoped to be able to show Rasputin that he was digging a grave for the Tsar and his authority.

Having resolved to go through with this interview I asked Mamontov to be present as a witness who could testify, in case of need, what actually took place. I fixed on Wednesday evening, February 15.* When Rasputin entered my study I was shocked by the repulsive expression of his eyes, deep-set and close to each other, small, gray in color. Rasputin kept them fixed on me for some time, as if he intended to hypnotize me or as if he were studying me on seeing me for the first time. Next he threw his head sharply back and studied the ceiling; then he lowered his head and stared at the

* Later, in 1915, during the fatal illness of Mamontov, I met Rasputin for the second and last time at my brother-in-law's house, but passed by him in silence. I want to state here that all stories to the effect that Rasputin had known me before this first meeting in my study are either pure invention or malicious calumny. Iliodor's (Sergei Trufanov's) testimony in the *Sviatoi Chort* (Holy Devil), where he said that I had known Rasputin formerly is a lie. I had never seen him before this meeting. It is also my duty to stigmatize as totally false the statement made by the said Iliodor in his English book, *The Mad Monk of Russia*, to the effect that during the lifetime of Stolypin Rasputin had already formed the idea of putting me in his place, treating me as his friend, and that he predicted my nomination as late as the 12th of September 1911; also that he conferred with me for two hours in the month of August before his departure, which he undertook for the sole purpose of hiding all trace of his hand in my nomination as Prime Minister in September 1911. The whole of this statement is untrue. I saw Rasputin for the first time on the 15th of February 1912, and never again spoke a word to him.

floor; all this in silence. As I had no idea how long this would continue, I said, "You wanted to tell me something?"

My words had no effect. Rasputin grinned a silly grin and muttered: "Nothing, nothing, never mind, I was merely seeing how high the ceiling is." And he continued to stare at the ceiling until Mamontov arrived. Mamontov greeted Rasputin and began to ask him whether or not he really wanted to go away. By way of answer Rasputin again fixed his cold, piercing little eyes on me and asked quietly: "Well, shall I go? Life has been hard for me here; people make up stories about me."

"Indeed, you will do well to go away," I replied. "Whether people tell lies or the purest truth about you, you must recognize that this is no place for you; you do harm to the Tsar by appearing at the palace and especially by telling everybody about your nearness to the Imperial family."

"What do I tell? To whom? It is all lies, calumnies! I do not insist on going to the palace—they summon me," Rasputin almost screamed.

Mamontov stopped him quietly: "What is the use of denying, Grigorii Efimovich, that you are the first one to spread tales. But the point is, this is no place for you, and it certainly is not seemly for you to say that you appoint and dismiss ministers. Think carefully and tell me truthfully why generals and high officials have been so nice to you: is it not because you undertake to solicit in their favor? Did you not tell me that you had had Sabler appointed Chief Procurator and did you not offer to speak to the Tsar in order to secure a better position for me? I tell you if you do not leave the palace alone it will be worse not only for yourself but also for the Tsar."

Rasputin listened to this with his eyes closed and his head lowered, and did not answer a word.

"Well," I said, "what are you going to do?"

"All right," he replied, "I shall go. But mind, let them take care not to call me back, since I am so bad that I harm the Tsar."

Such was my first meeting with Rasputin. In my estimation he was a typical Siberian tramp, a clever man who had trained himself for the rôle of a simpleton and a madman and who played his part according to a set formula. He did not believe in his tricks himself, but had trained himself to certain mannerisms of conduct in order to deceive those who sincerely believed in all his oddities. Others,

of course, merely pretended to admire him, hoping to obtain privileges through him which could not be obtained in any other way.

The next day we had a musical soirée at our house. In a favorable moment Mamontov told me that Rasputin had already reported at Tsarskoe Selo that he had seen me and that I had urged him to go to Pokrovskoe. He told me, too, that according to Rasputin the latter's friends at the court were very angry. I determined, therefore, to report to the Tsar on the very next morning and give my version of the interview which I had not sought. This I did. I attempted to persuade the Tsar that only calamity could result if Rasputin were permitted to carry on as he had been doing. His Majesty then asked me if it were true that I had told Rasputin that I would deport him if he refused to leave the capital. I denied having made any such statement. His Majesty then said that he was glad to hear this, as he had been informed that Makarov and I had decided to remove Rasputin on our own authority. When asked for my impression of the "little peasant" I held back nothing. I added, however, that while I condemned Rasputin for his disreputable behavior, I condemned still more those who sought his protection and assistance. This practically concluded the audience. It was obvious that the whole business was distasteful to the Tsar, for he had spent most of the time looking out of the window. I believed it my duty, however, to say what I did. When I mentioned this to the Tsar he expressed his appreciation of my sincere loyalty and devotion to duty.

At about four o'clock that afternoon Mamontov telephoned to say that the substance of my morning's conversation with the Tsar was already known to Rasputin. When I expressed surprise at the quickness with which the latter had obtained the information, Mamontov assured me that the Tsar had had plenty of time to recount at lunch what I had said to him that morning. Madame Vyrubova (12) would thus become informed; telephone communication with Rasputin was then a simple matter.

Rasputin actually did leave St. Petersburg the following week. The press seized upon the news, and *Rech* even published an article approving the orders to deport the man, which I was alleged to have given but which I had not. I was eager to see what influence these events would have upon the Tsar. But during my next report he did not once mention them; he was kind and gracious as usual. Those attached to the court, however, were excited about them. Count

Benckendorf asked me twice during the week where Iliodor was, what had become of Hermogen, if it was true that I had removed Rasputin, and if it was certain that he would not return.

As to Rasputin and Hermogen I could give exact information, but about Iliodor I knew only that after his disappearance from the city he had been found somewhere in open country near the station of Liuban tramping toward Moscow, and that he had been returned to St. Petersburg and had been safely conducted to the monastery of Florishchev.

A few days later I found myself obliged to take part in another extremely delicate incident concerned with the copies of the letters of the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna and the Grand Duchesses to Rasputin hectographed by Guchkov. I never saw the original letters and did not know how Guchkov came into possession of them. Passages of the letters of the Empress could, of course, have been interpreted most objectionably if one were to read them apart from their context, but everybody who knew the Empress knew well that the true meaning of the letters was altogether different. They showed all her love for her sick son and her striving to find in her faith in miracles a means to save his life. They showed the exaltation and religious mysticism of this deeply unhappy woman, who paid such a terrible price for all her errors.

As early as January of that year Makarov had told me that he had traced down one of the original letters of the Empress and four letters of the Grand Duchesses to the same person; that the letters were now in the possession of a man unknown to either of us, he having received them from a woman who in return had received them from Iliodor, who feared they might be found on him during a search. According to Makarov the woman had stated that Iliodor had received the letters directly from Rasputin while visiting him at the village of Pokrovskoe in the summer of 1910 when they had been the best of friends. Iliodor had told the woman that Rasputin had not been flaunting the letters but had simply showed them to him and had even permitted Iliodor to take them because the latter had expressed his skepticism as to their existence, supposing that Rasputin was telling of his nearness to the court in order to dupe simple folk.

Makarov feared that the appearance of photographic reproductions of these letters might create a still greater scandal than the typed copies, and he asked me for help. He agreed that he should try to persuade the holder of the letters not to permit their circulation,

and in case this did not work should try to buy them, for which purpose I agreed to allow a certain credit. In case this, too, failed, we were resolved to find other means.

In a few days Makarov phoned me to say that he had the letters and had had no trouble getting them because the man who had them not only was quite a decent fellow but also was afraid that the possession of the letters might get him into trouble with Rasputin and his crowd. Makarov gave me the letters to read. There were six of them: One long one from the Empress, which had been quite correctly reproduced in Guchkov's copy. One from each of the four Grand Duchesses, the contents of which were perfectly innocent—apparently the Grand Duchesses had written at their mother's insistence; they said merely that they had been to church and that they had looked for Rasputin but could not find him in his usual place. And one, a small sheet of note paper, with a carefully scribbled "A" from the little Tsarevich.

Makarov and I did not know what to do with the letters. His first impulse was to hide them in order to prevent them from falling into anyone's hands, but I firmly advised him not to do so, as he might be suspected of some evil intent. I also opposed his suggestion to give them to the Tsar; this would have placed the Tsar in a very awkward position and would have antagonized the Empress. I advised him to request an audience with the Empress and to offer her the letters, explaining frankly how they had fallen into his hands.

Makarov promised to follow this advice, but did not do so. During his very first report, having the letters handy and seeing that the Tsar was in splendid humor, Makarov told him the story of the letters and placed in his hands the envelope containing them. The Tsar turned pale, nervously took the letters from the envelope, and, glancing at the Empress's handwriting, said: "Yes, this is not a counterfeit letter." Then opened a drawer of his desk and threw the letters inside, with a sharp gesture quite unusual with him.

I had nothing to say to this but to remark to Makarov, "Why did you ask me for advice only to act in the opposite way? Now your dismissal is certain." My prophecy was soon fulfilled.

CHAPTER XXVI

FEBRUARY-JUNE, 1912

In the midst of this excitement and tension came the Duma debates on the budget for 1912. The work in the Budget Committee had gone smoothly, and in its report the Committee endorsed the government's proposals both as to revenue and as to expenditure.

The general debates opened on the last day of February. In my statement attached to the budget, I had devoted much attention to a comparative review of our financial progress during the years 1907-1912, and in introducing the budget the Chairman of the Committee stressed this review of financial conditions. On the second day of the budget debates, N. N. Kutler, my former subordinate, was the first to speak. What he said was mostly incoherent, but as the opposition still regarded him as an authority on financial matters I was obliged to reply to his remarks. Then, of course, there was Shingarev. He could not miss this opportunity to crown his five years of opposition with one last grand effort. He was eager to make this, his last will and testament, a trenchant and merciless criticism of all the co-operative efforts of Duma and government during the last five years. He spoke for four hours, never once quoted a figure, but accused the Duma of having betrayed the people by its connivance with the government. "What can you tell your constituents during the coming election," he shouted to the Duma members; "that will justify your five-year term of office?"

Once more I mounted the tribune to reply to his virulent attacks on the government. As in the past I was able to demonstrate that his accusations were not based on fact and that his statements were grossly unjust. Thus ended my five years of dispute with Shingarev.

Toward the end of February I heard that the Imperial family was planning to leave for the Crimea. There were some urgent matters about to come before the Duma in regard to which I was eager to know the Tsar's wishes. Chief among these matters was the so-called "minor shipbuilding program," that is, the reconstruction of our navy, for which large credits would have to be approved by

the Duma and the State Council. Therefore, at my first opportunity I asked His Majesty if the rumors I had heard were true. He assured me that they were. Then, when I raised the subject of the naval program, he expressed his intense interest in this matter, said that he would approve whatever methods I chose to use in order to carry it through, and told me that Grigorovich, the Naval Minister, was very anxious that I should support him in the Duma. His Majesty, too, was eager that I should do this, as he thought that I had more influence with that body than Grigorovich. He requested to be kept informed of the progress of events and of the naval program in particular, and asked me to feel free to come to see him at Livadia should circumstances make it necessary to do so. Then he brought the interview to a close by saying that he had a number of matters to attend to before his departure, some of which were unpleasant. "The necessity of having a detailed interview with the President of the Duma is a considerable task in itself," he said.

The Tsar did not offer any explanation of these last words, but I knew well what was worrying him. Rodzianko and his two colleagues, after working on the Rasputin affair for three or four weeks, had requested a special audience at which they might submit their report. The whole Duma knew the reason for the audience, and the lobbies buzzed like a beehive as his return was impatiently awaited. Finally he came, but his report to the crowd was very disappointing. As usual he repeated in detail the conversation that had taken place, what a "deep impression his words had made," and how "well the Tsar regarded the Duma, despite the personal unfriendliness and intrigues of the court clique." But on the main subject—the fate of his report on Rasputin—he had little to say: "I submitted my report; the Tsar was amazed at its size; he was surprised that during so short a time I could have accomplished such a huge task; he thanked me and said he would summon me again when he had acquainted himself with the report."

But for several days nothing happened. Rodzianko received no summons to Tsarskoe Selo. Then, one Thursday evening early in March, as I was preparing my report for the next day, he unexpectedly arrived at my house to ask me to help him out of a very difficult situation. He told me that a few days previously he had requested an audience with the Tsar to discuss Duma matters; as yet he had received no reply. If the Tsar's silence indicated an unwillingness to receive him he did not mind personally, but he could not permit such

an "affront" to the President of the Duma, and, thereby, indirectly to the people's representatives; therefore, he had decided to resign as soon as he had definite proof that the Tsar had refused to see him.

I sympathized with Rodzianko's point of view and tried to calm him, asking him not to do anything rash, and saying that after all the Duma's term expired in three months and his resignation would only be exploited by the opposition in the coming elections. Moreover, I felt assured that the Tsar's failure to reply to Rodzianko's request was not intentional, as he was really eager to preserve good relations with the Duma in view of the impending request for naval credits. Great was my astonishment, therefore, when in the midst of our conversation a courier delivered a large envelope from the Tsar, and on opening it I found, among other things, Rodzianko's request for an audience, sharply scored in the Tsar's handwriting.

Rodzianko did not notice my confusion; I quietly laid the reports aside and continued our conversation. He soon left, evidently reassured.

When I returned to my study I read the Tsar's comments more carefully, and could hardly believe my eyes: "I do not wish to receive Rodzianko, especially since I saw him but a few days ago. Let him know this. The conduct of the Duma is deeply revolting, especially Guchkov's speech regarding the Synod estimate. I shall be very glad if my displeasure is made known to these gentlemen; I am tired of always bowing and smiling to them."

I spent the entire night thinking. It was evident that the conflict with the Duma was assuming a form unfortunate and unfavorable for the Tsar which it was my duty to ward off by all means at my command. Should my efforts fail I should be left no choice but to ask the Tsar to let me retire.

In my report the next morning I immediately raised the Rodzianko incident. I begged the Tsar's indulgence and asked him to believe that I was concerned only with his interests. I suggested that to give offense to Rodzianko might precipitate a conflict with the Duma and might antagonize public opinion, which would, therefore, be more inclined to support the opposition in the coming elections. Moreover, it would be impossible to obtain the naval credits from a hostile Duma.

Knowing the Tsar's personal dislike of Guchkov I took the liberty of saying: "Your Majesty, disregard any passing personal feeling against Rodzianko, and any displeasure with the Duma.

Do not thus pave the way to victory for those who would triumph only in case of a break between yourself and the Duma. Grant me a chance to carry on the work I have started in connection with the naval estimate, and I am almost sure that I shall be able to carry out your wishes. Rodzianko will then report to you with self-satisfaction that he has carried through the naval program despite the hidden obstacles in the Duma."

Then, to make it easier for the Tsar to reverse his former decision I asked him to write Rodzianko a personal note saying that he had not a minute to spare before his departure, requesting that all reports be forwarded to Livadia, and promising to receive the President of the Duma as soon as he returned.

The Tsar approved and agreed to write the note. "It is better not to tease those gentlemen," he said. "I shall find another opportunity for telling them what I think of their behavior, and I should particularly dislike to smooth the way for the people opposed to the naval program."

At about five that same afternoon Rodzianko telephoned me and announced in the most cheerful tone that he had received a very gracious note from His Majesty, that he considered the incident liquidated, and that he hoped I had not spent too much effort in presenting the affair to the Tsar. I answered that I had spent no effort, as in the very beginning of my report the Tsar had said that he had written to him that very morning and therefore I had decided not to bother His Majesty with any explanations. This only added to Rodzianko's pleasure, and he concluded with a statement designed to impress his companions who were listening (I could hear voices in his room): "I was sure it was so. The Tsar has always been favorably impressed with me and he would not have wanted to damage his relations with the Duma by showing disregard for its representative." All is well, I said to myself, that ends well.

March 12 the Tsar and his family left for Livadia. Only the following were present at their departure: some of the Grand Dukes, the Ministers of the Navy and of War, and myself. The Tsar was in his usual good humor, and on bidding me farewell said jokingly: "You are probably envious of me, but I am not envious of you; I am only sorry for you who have to remain in this bog." The Empress passed us all without saying goodbye to anyone, and boarded the train with the Dowager Empress.

I supposed that with the Tsar's departure things would go more

easily for me; but a succession of events combined to keep me very busily occupied. First of all there was the problem of making arrangements to insure the granting of the naval estimates by the Duma. Grigorovich, who was not very confident because he knew how bitterly Guchkov was opposed to the program, asked me to help him. I knew well that the technical side of the matter had been well worked out in the Duma by the Naval Ministry with the assistance of a number of young naval officers, among whom was Captain of the First Rank Kolchak. But we expected strong opposition to the financial aspect of the project as more within the understanding of many Duma members.

I recognized that Russia needed a navy and therefore was in sympathy with the naval program, but I knew also that the project could be carried through the Duma only after the removal of all financial obstacles. To do this it would be necessary to prove that Russia possessed sufficient resources to undertake this new expenditure without having recourse to new taxes or loans and without curtailing former expenditures; it would be necessary to demonstrate that we had entered a period of financial prosperity in which our increased revenues had begun to exceed our yearly growing expenditures. I knew that by establishing these facts I could paralyze the truly enormous influence of Guchkov, who, as former Chairman of the Committee for National Defense, still preserved his influence in the Duma. Also I could hope to win the support of the entire Right of the Duma, which would agree with me because it would know that the Tsar was intensely interested in this matter, and a great part of the Cadets and Progressists who inwardly sympathized with the idea of increasing Russia's military forces but feared both new taxes and the curtailing of their beloved "productive" expenditures, which benefited mainly the zemstvo.

It was also clear to me that the key to the situation was the Chairman of the Budget Committee, M. M. Alekseenko, and that I must concentrate all my efforts upon winning his support. To do this I had to sacrifice my pride and adopt a subtle campaign, playing on certain peculiarities of his make-up, and his undoubted patriotism, as well as using the name of the Tsar, who had given me the right to use his name wherever it would help. Even then it was not clear sailing, as I shall point out later.

A few days after the departure of the Imperial family, great was my surprise to learn that Rasputin had reappeared in St. Peters-


burg with all his entourage. Once more the newspapers began to harp upon this man and his influence in a most sensational manner. Makarov was worried. Then, without having any grounds for its statement, *Rech* published an article to the effect that Rasputin, having returned to the capital against orders, was to be deported once more on the orders of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

Knowing full well that this article would bring forth some sharp remonstrance from Livadia, I wired Baron Frederichs in code, asking him to inform the Tsar that the statements in the article were false, that Rasputin had indeed returned, but that no one was planning to deport him. The next day I received a reply conveying the Tsar's thanks for the information I had sent, which prevented any possible misunderstanding. It was not long before the interest of the press was consumed by other matters, and Rasputin appeared less frequently in its columns.

On April 2, with the Tsar's permission, I went to Moscow. The business men of that city considered it incumbent on a newly appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council, who had also retained the post of Minister of Finance, to make his bow to the Belokamennaya (the white-walled city) and the chairman of the Stock Exchange Committee, Krestovnikov, told me many times that the merchants were hurt by my behavior and could not understand why I had delayed so long in making this trip. He refused to believe that since the day of my appointment I had not had one free day.

Krestovnikov had assured me that most of the business men would greet me cordially because they approved of my financial policy and because, with the increased tension in the Balkans, they could depend upon me to support a peaceful foreign policy. He had warned me, however, that I could expect some opposition from P. P. Riabushinsky (1). With this in mind, I had prepared a draft of the speech I should have to make and sent it to the Tsar for his approval. In it I had stressed the importance and need of close co-operation between the people and the government; the Tsar had returned it with the inscription, "No remarks."

The merchants received me kindly indeed. During the reception at the Stock Exchange Club not one unfriendly note was sounded. The entire Moscow press commented on the cordiality of the reception that had been accorded me; one of the papers remarked that I had been welcomed not so much as the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, whose policy was not yet fully outlined but more as the Minister



LEADERS OF THE DUMA

M. V. Rodzianko
P. N. Miliukov

A. I. Shingarev
A. I. Guchkov

of Finance, whose policy had long been known and was dear to Moscow hearts.

Krestovnikov gave a dinner in my honor, and, much to his embarrassment, it was on this occasion that P. P. Riabushinsky chose to launch his attacks against me. He criticized the government for persecuting dissenters, for entertaining militaristic aspirations that were at variance with true national traditions, and for harming national interests by truckling to foreigners. In conclusion he proposed a toast "not to the government, but to the long-suffering Russian people who have long awaited their true liberator."

I attempted to relieve the embarrassment of my host and his other guests by accepting all this in good grace and by essaying a humorous reply. I confessed that I found it difficult to answer for the transgressions of our forefathers but said that I was heartily in accord with the sentiment of the toast to the Russian people whom I invited to increased co-operation with the government in all its spheres of activity. To this my host responded by proposing a toast to me as the servant of the Russian people. As the guests were leaving, Krestovnikov thanked me for having so ably passed over Riabushinsky's speech, which was a gross violation of the simplest rules of hospitality.

On the next day, April 5, I decided to return to St. Petersburg in order to be home on my birthday, the 6th. That day the papers issued extras containing a brief telegram reporting riots at Bodaibo, in the Lena mining district, and many casualties among the workers. I had received no communication from St. Petersburg, and on returning I learned from Makarov that he too had had no information, but that the Left members of the Duma, Kerensky (2) in particular, had already received a telegram reporting a bloody encounter which was caused by the Gendarme Captain Treshchenkov and which had cost the lives of more than two hundred workers.

Excitement rose in the Duma. The Left made a hurried inquiry of the government, which Makarov intended to answer only after the expiration of the month's delay permitted by law. To this, however, I did not agree, but mounted the tribune and announced that the government would be willing to answer as soon as it received a reply to its inquiries. This had a quieting effect, and about a week afterward Makarov made public the information gathered by the Department of Police and by the Governor-General of Irkutsk; but the latter gave a very one-sided explanation of the whole affair.

This information represented the riot as having originated among the workers, who had been excited by the propaganda of three persons exiled for agitation. The purpose of the riot was to seize a magazine of explosives and to overpower the mine administration. The workers, armed with staves and stones, had attacked the military guards, and the troops had had to shoot in self-defense.

Makarov endorsed the actions of the local administration and the military guards and, in conclusion, uttered the well-known words, "Thus it has been, so it always will be," meaning that all attempts at rioting would always be suppressed by every possible means.

These words shocked the Duma and the press. Rasputin was forgotten. The Duma abandoned its current work; the work of the commissions and the general sessions was suspended; the days of the First and Second Dumas were recalled and everybody clamored about the "Lena massacre."

Meanwhile the Governor-General of Irkutsk and the Prosecuting Attorney of the Irkutsk Court of Appeals telegraphed further information which gave a different account of the incident. Minister of Commerce and Industry, Timashev, also received a detailed telegram from the District Mining Supervisor, Tulchinsky (3), which justified the Lena miners, accused the administration of the mining district of permitting poor housing conditions among the workers, and placed all responsibility for the slaughter upon Captain Treshchenkov. The same information began to reach the members of the Duma, thereby increasing the tumult and causing some apprehensions that the nervous excitement might reach the workmen of the capital.

Somehow the affair had to be directed into more peaceful channels, unbiased light had to be shed upon it, and public opinion had to be assured that the government did not rely entirely upon the reports of the Gendarme Office and was about to make an exhaustive and thorough investigation. Anticipating that the Duma would make a new inquiry of the government, Rodzianko and I agreed that Timashev should answer it immediately by making public some information that he had received from the Mining Inspectorate, announcing in my name that in view of the discrepancies between the communications of the Mining Inspectorate and those of the police, and because of the impossibility of ascertaining the truth from a preliminary inquiry conducted by the local authorities, who had at first agreed with the report of the Gendarme Office, the government wished to shed dispassionate light upon the case and intended to dis-

patch to Lena a person whose competence and reputation fitted him to investigate the situation.

Makarov and Shcheglovitov feared that the authority of local administration would be damaged by sending out a special investigator, but they dared not oppose the plan, because it was so well received by public opinion. Both the Duma and the press were favorably impressed by it; even *Novoe Vremia* praised my courage. Passions were quieted as quickly as they had been aroused, and the Duma returned to its work. The next problem was to find a person fitted for the task and to gain the Tsar's consent to both the person and the plan.

Many names were suggested. Many thought that the investigation should be entrusted to someone close to the Tsar. I favored the selection of Manukhin (4), former Minister of Justice and then a member of the State Council. I did not know him well personally, but I knew him by reputation and I was sure that he would carry out the investigation without prejudice or partiality. I was not sure, however, how the Tsar would react to this selection, for Manukhin was well known for his liberal ideas, especially since the events of 1905-1906. At any rate, I decided to go to the Crimea to present my case personally before the Tsar.

The day before I left the capital there occurred an incident which was destined to enter into the conversations I had with the Tsar and which therefore I must relate here. As a rule, the Minister of War did not attend in person the sessions of the Committee for National Defense, but sent his assistant, General Polivanov. Polivanov was a very able man, thoroughly familiar with all the details of his work. One of his outstanding accomplishments was the dexterity with which he could prevail upon the members of the Duma to support his policies. Indisputably he had rare ability in judging personalities and exceptional talent in playing upon the moods of the Duma to produce the desired effect. This was very fortunate for the Ministry of War, for its chief, Sukhomlinov, had none of these qualities.

On this particular day, however, the Minister of War himself attended the session of the Committee for National Defense. The Committee was examining the credits for the so-called secret expenditures, and there were many questions, none of which Sukhomlinov was prepared to answer. He became more and more confused

until, finally, in desperation, he attempted to cover his ignorance by a blanket statement to the effect that he could not answer the inquiries because he did not dare to divulge "military secrets known only to the Commander-in-Chief of the army."

Sukhomlinov's extremity was indeed Guchkov's opportunity. The latter marshaled all the information he had gained from his extensive connection with the Army Command and the officials of the Ministry of War and hurled it at Sukhomlinov. He announced that the secret expenditures were being made to organize a gendarme control over the Army Command, and that this work of organization had been entrusted by the Minister of War to his close friend, Colonel of Gendarmes, Miasoedov (5), whose reputation was very shady. Several years before, a man had been indicted for smuggling revolutionary literature into Russia. In 1906 the Court of the Military District of Vilna had ascertained that this indictment had resulted from an invention of Miasoedov in order to get rid of this man, who had learned that he, Miasoedov, had smuggled arms into Russia from Germany and sold them at a high profit. In consequence of this revelation, Miasoedov had been dismissed by Stolypin.

When confronted with this announcement, Sukhomlinov lost his presence of mind completely, and after utterly disgracing himself, left the session.*

I left for the Crimea on April 19 and reached Yalta in the evening of April 21. In the vestibule of the Hotel Rossiia I met the Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich (6), who later was tortured and executed by the Bolsheviks at St. Petersburg, January 18, 1919. The Grand Duke asked me to tell him about the incident regarding Sukhomlinov, as the Yalta paper had printed only a small article about it. I told him what had happened and mentioned that the late Stolypin had been indignant at the reappointment of Miasoedov and his reinstatement in the Gendarme Corps without any reference to

* The next day, the *Vechnee Vremia*, then edited by Boris Suvorin, reported this incident. Some time later, Miasoedov met Suvorin at the horse races and struck him over the head with his riding-crop. He also challenged Guchkov to a duel. They exchanged shots, but remained unhurt. Later, during the war, Miasoedov was court-martialed and executed as a German spy. Some claim that he was falsely accused of this latter crime. Whether or not this is true, I do not know; I do know, however, that he purchased and sold valuables stolen during our advance into East Prussia. The responsibility for the misdemeanors of this man must rest upon the shoulders of Sukhomlinov, who sponsored his appointment. This is only another of the many blunders that must be laid at Sukhomlinov's door.

the Minister of the Interior, who was responsible for the Gendarmes. Stolypin had wanted to secure Miasoedov's discharge from the Gendarme Corps, and had intended to report this affair personally to the Tsar; but I did not know what had resulted.

The next day I reported to the Tsar, and all my suggestions were approved. The selection of Manukhin to investigate the Lena affair was approved most willingly. "I know Manukhin well," the Tsar said; "he is very radical but a scrupulously honest man, and will not be corrupted. If we were to send some Adjutant General, people would pay little heed to his conclusions and would say that he was protecting local authorities. You have reasoned most cleverly. My only desire is that Manukhin shall leave as soon as possible."

When I spoke about the naval program I did not conceal my apprehensions as to its successful passage through the Duma and begged the Tsar to give me his assistance. I suggested that he could do this in two ways. The first was to persuade Alekseenko to support the project, for his support would neutralize Guchkov's opposition. Alekseenko's influence was especially important because certain of the Left parties in the Duma, especially the Cadets, would not dare to speak openly against the increase of our military forces but would insist that the burden of new expenditures was more than the people could bear. No one could explain with greater authority than Alekseenko that our financial position was very stable and that because of the yearly surplus new expenditures could be undertaken without recourse to new taxation.

I was given permission to try to influence Alekseenko by telling him that the Tsar expected him to support this project in the Duma. His Majesty even offered to talk to Alekseenko personally, but I asked him not to do so, knowing that Alekseenko would not like to have it appear that he had been influenced from above.

The second way concerned the entire Duma. The end of June marked the close of its term, and many members had mentioned to me that they would like very much to be presented to the Tsar; some even went so far as to say that a gracious reception and a word of thanks for their labors would assure many of them a good chance of being re-elected to the Fourth Duma. I asked the Tsar, therefore, to permit me to let the members of the Duma understand that everything would depend upon their attitude toward the naval program; that if the project were approved, the Duma might safely count upon being received. This permission, too, was granted.

I left the Tsar in the best of spirits, with the understanding that on the next day, after lunch, he would receive me once more and return the written reports which I had submitted for his consideration. Among them was a detailed memorandum regarding the military credits, showing that tremendous sums had not been used because of the incredible slowness of preparatory operations. I had submitted this memorandum to counteract the constant troubles with the War Ministry, which insisted that it was not given enough money to accomplish the preparedness of our army.

When I returned to my hotel, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was waiting to invite me to visit him. He was just as eager as Georgii Mikhailovich had been to learn all the details of the conflict between Sukhomlinov and Guchkov, and I was obliged to repeat the whole story, including the stories about Miasoedov. That night I dined at the hotel with Baron Frederichs, and he, too, had to be told all about this same incident.

The next day, the 23d, was the Empress' patron saint's day. As I was leaving the hotel to attend mass at Livadia, I was rather surprised to meet Sukhomlinov. "I have decided to tell the Tsar everything about that scandal with the Duma members," he said. "It was all Polivanov's doing. But didn't I belabor those gentlemen? They will take care not to cross my path again." I assured him that I had left the capital the day after the incident and knew none of the details except those which appeared in *Vechnee Vremia*.

We descended the staircase together, but by the time he reached his automobile Sukhomlinov seemed to have experienced a change of mind. "Please do not say anything to the Tsar," he begged. "I have decided to say nothing about Polivanov. It is quite possible that I have been misinformed about him, for otherwise we are on the very best terms." With this we parted.

The Empress did not appear either at mass or at lunch, and when she came out after the meal was finished it was obvious that she wished to avoid speaking to me. As she passed, she scarcely gave me time to kiss her hand. Her attitude was quite obvious to those about us, and Baron Frederichs hastened to assure me that I must not mind, as the Empress often conducted herself strangely. He drew me aside, saying that he had a message for me. "This morning," he said, "the Tsar asked me to express to you his displeasure at the unfavorable remarks you have been making about the Minister of War, as by so doing you undermine his authority."

I had no time to ask for particulars, as at that moment the Tsar himself beckoned me to follow him and led the way into his study.

He told me he had gone over my reports and confirmed them all, and again requested me to do everything possible to effect the passage of the naval project, as he was particularly interested in it. I assured him that I would do my utmost. Then I asked for permission to speak to him about another affair. I told him that I was disturbed that he should be displeased with me for the first time in the eight years of my ministry. I explained that I had said nothing about the Minister of War except to relate quite impartially the incident that had occurred in the Committee for National Defense, and asked him to explain frankly the reason for his displeasure.

His Majesty was quick to ask me not to take offense and to assure me that Baron Frederichs had misinterpreted his statements. What he had said was that he was displeased that there was conflict between the Minister of War and myself, because he valued us both highly. Now, however, it would be best to forget his passing displeasure.

Nevertheless I expressed my desire to discuss the matter further, and, having been given his permission to speak frankly, told His Majesty that relations between Sukhomlinov and me were far from good, not because we had any personal accounts to settle but because I could see the harm Sukhomlinov was doing to the Tsar and to Russia by his incredible light-mindedness, his unprincipled conduct, his lack of business honesty, and the way he encouraged fawning, which alone assured success with him and as a result of which he was surrounded by favorites while everybody with business abilities, talents, and capacity for work was suppressed or relegated to inferior positions.

I had decided to put an end once and for all to the intrigue which Sukhomlinov was conducting against me by spreading untruths about me in order to conceal his own inability, insisting that I did not appropriate the funds he needed.

I reminded the Tsar how good my relations with Sukhomlinov had been when he was commander of the troops of Kiev and when he supported me in the Council for National Defense against the Minister of War, Roediger; how during his first years as Minister of War I had asked His Majesty to advance him a subsidy because of the illness of his wife; how our relations had begun to change, owing to his

unfair attitude in the Ministers' Council; how his inconsistent actions had aroused the indignation of the late Stolypin; how shamelessly he had let it be known that he was unable to proceed with the work of defense because the Minister of Finance refused to advance credits; how he had behaved during his trip to the Far East and the means he had used to discredit my conclusions of the previous year; how freely he spent money on official trips, abetting his subordinates in deceiving the Comptroller's office and the Ministry of Finance as to their unlawful traveling expenses; how he perverted truth in describing to the Tsar our political situation in the Far East; how he made obvious misstatements of fact, as when he told the Tsar of the splendid results of the mobilization of horses for the army in the gubernia of Kazan, when as a matter of fact this experiment had proved a complete failure; how indignant the Warsaw Army District had been at his "personal" inspection of the mobilization plan, for he had arrived in his private car at the Praga station, at Warsaw, received the commander of the district, accepted from him an invitation for supper served in the Imperial suite, and left an hour and a half later without ever having received the report of the Chief-of-Staff.

My concluding words linger in my memory even now, undimmed by the events of later years: "If my attitude toward the Minister of War meets with the disapproval of Your Majesty, permit me to retire. . . . But before you make your decision, do not resent it, Sire, if I tell you that Your Majesty may be sure of the future of your country and your dynasty only so long as your finances and your army are sound.

"Your finances are in good shape, and I can surrender them with perfect confidence to my successor, provided he does not ruin what has been organized by your ministers and preserved by me.

"But your army is in a terrible condition. It is ill-organized and badly managed. The Minister of War has won no respect in the country. Some laugh at him, some despise him, and with such a chief one cannot prepare an army for victory.

"God grant that I may be mistaken, but I fear for the future and see signs of danger from which may the Lord preserve you and your Heir. I have told Your Majesty what has been a load upon my heart, and from now on you shall never hear from me one word about my attitude toward General Sukhomlinov. If it is not yet time for me to be dismissed from office, please let me know that Your Majesty has

freed me from the necessity of reporting on a matter which is most painful to me and which worries me with dire forebodings."

The last words I uttered with deep agitation; my eyes were filled with tears. The Tsar was silent for a long time, with averted face. Evidently he, too, was moved. His face was pale, and he seemed to waver between conflicting emotions. Finally he extended his hand and said: "I was wrong in talking to Frederichs before receiving your explanations. Forget it. You have convinced me that you have acted rightly. I see no need for dismissing you even if I could afford to do so. Rest assured that I shall never forget what you have just told me with such dignity; for no matter what happens, I shall always remember it."

I returned to St. Petersburg on April 26; Sukhomlinov returned on the day following. He was met at nine in the morning at the station by Polivanov, who asked for instructions regarding some matters that had occurred in the State Council. Sukhomlinov gave the instructions in his usual hasty way, then said to Polivanov: "Do you know, a strange thing has happened. The Tsar told me that he consents to let you resign from the post of Assistant Minister of War; you are to remain, however, a member of the State Council."

Polivanov was completely taken aback. "What do you mean?" he asked. "I have not even tendered my resignation, nor have I heard anything about it from you." "I can tell you nothing," Sukhomlinov replied. "Possibly the Chairman of the Ministers' Council told His Majesty something. Ask him; I, too, am quite puzzled." When Polivanov telephoned me, what else could I say but that it was another lie? Polivanov knew this perfectly well without my telling him.

The end of April and the entire month of May were quite peaceful. I managed to establish very fine relations with the Duma. Information that the Tsar wished to receive them before the dissolution made a splendid impression upon the Right, which constituted the larger part of the Duma, and it seemed that the naval program would be approved despite the opposition of Guchkov.

Alekseenko was won over by my report of the Tsar's wishes, and when I informed him that the Tsar wanted to speak to him personally and intended to invite him to Livadia, he promised me his personal support but asked me to keep our arrangement secret so as to preclude the possibility of his being accused of being in contact with the government.

The project passed through the Budget Committee under his

chairmanship quite smoothly; even the Shingarev opposition seemed disinclined to open action, saving its strength for the final battle.

The session of the Joint Committees—the Budget and Finance Committees—and the Committee for National Defense was more turbulent. Guchkov and his echo, G. G. Lerche (7), opposed the project and, while not objecting to the idea of increasing our navy, criticized the program worked out by Grigorovich, trying to prove that Russia ought to have only a defensive navy; that is, nothing but submarines, torpedo-boats, torpedo-cruisers, and coast-guard vessels.

But even in this preliminary session, which everyone considered as a dress rehearsal for the general session, it was evident that Guchkov would not win. Two of his most prominent and influential colleagues, Zvegintsev (8) and Savich (9), deserted him. They—and others with them—were won over by the defense of the naval program which had been cleverly worked out by Grigorovich and a group of young naval officers. Guchkov even confided in me that he himself feared defeat.

While the debates in the general session were still going on I left for Moscow, where I was to meet the Tsar. The Tsar, at my request, had agreed to stop there for a few days on his return from Livadia. During the night, at the Okulovka station, I received a telegram that the naval program had been adopted by an overwhelming majority, the opposition having secured a mere hundred votes or thereabouts, including the votes of the entire Left wing.

I expected that this news would greatly please the Tsar, and told him of the results of the vote as soon as I met him. He seemed unenthusiastic, however. "That is fine," he said, "but I have been sure of this all the time; thank you for all you have done."

It was clear to me that the Empress's displeasure had done its work. Such was the opinion of Frederichs also, who told me that he had been curious to know in what form the Tsar would express his gratitude. But he did not learn this at Moscow or even at St. Petersburg when the program was adopted just as decisively by the State Council.

Even the Flag Captain, Admiral Nilov (10), who was not one of my admirers, wrote me a letter saying that he recognized how much effort, knowledge, and energy I had used in securing the adoption of the project, and, as an old seadog he wished to offer me his warm thanks for my service to the Russian navy.

Hardly had the naval credits been granted when the Duma turned again to the Synod estimate and especially the credits for parish schools. Again Rasputin's name was heard; speeches were made against Sabler and the Synod; there was talk of collusion in the appointment of bishops. As a result, the credits for new parish schools and for the improvement of teaching conditions in the old ones were again refused.

Meanwhile, I tried to prevail upon His Majesty to set the day on which he would receive the Duma members. Some of these had already left for their homes; those who remained passed by the hundred the so-called *vermicelli* or small matters, among which, from time to time, important matters slipped through without arousing the passions of the Duma.

Finally, toward the end of the first week in June, all that remained was to take a final vote on the parish-school credits and to celebrate a mass. Still the Tsar did not give me an answer. I was obliged to write him a letter, asking him to fulfill his promise to the Duma members. That evening I received a brief answer, "I have no time to receive the Duma."

Again, as in Rodzianko's case, I was forced to undertake the difficult and thankless task of persuading the Tsar not to take this dangerous step but to overcome his personal irritation for the sake of the common good. I requested a special interview, and the next morning (June 10) at nine o'clock I set about persuading the Tsar to receive the Duma members. To all my arguments, to all representations of the harm that would result from such an unfortunate ending of the five years of the Duma work, I received no reply. I had to have recourse to an argument which I disliked to advance: I reminded the Tsar that he, through me, had definitely promised the Duma members that he would receive them should they adopt the naval program.

The Tsar looked at me with frank irritation: "This would mean that I will deceive the Duma members if I refuse to see them?"

"Yes, Your Majesty," I answered, "you have given your word, which heretofore you have always kept. Or, perhaps I overstepped my authority and permitted myself to make a promise without having received your permission to do so. In this case I must bear the responsibility for having overstepped my authority."

"No, indeed," said the Tsar. "You are right; I have no right to break my promise and I thank you once again for having persuaded

me not to take a wrong step. I shall receive the Duma members the day after tomorrow. I do not know what I shall tell them; their speeches have been very disagreeable and even revolting to me, and it will be difficult for me to refrain from telling them so."

I drafted a speech for the Tsar (I still have the rough draft) and sent it to him that same day. It ran as follows:

"It is with the greatest pleasure, gentlemen, that I have acceded to your desire to be received before the expiration of your term. I have always followed attentively the progress of your work and I cannot refrain from saying that at times I had to remark sorrowfully that this work was not conducted with that composure which alone assures a just and dispassionate fulfillment of legislative duties. But I know, gentlemen, that you have always been motivated by a sincere love for your country and a desire to be as useful to it as possible. It has been particularly pleasing to me to note with what marked attention you have always studied matters of national defense and how willingly you have met the interests of public education. Your recent decision to increase the program of our shipbuilding gave me much satisfaction and I wish to thank you sincerely for your patriotic attitude toward so important an issue. I wish to all of you a safe return home, and I hope that the approaching elections to the new Duma will progress as successfully as those five years ago; I shall be glad to see again those among you who may be honored by re-election."

The reception of the Duma members took place on Friday, June 12, at 11:00 A.M., at the Alexandrovsky Palace. Only myself, Baron Frederichs, and the aide-de-camp on duty were in attendance. The Tsar entered the room along the three walls of which the members stood according to the alphabetical order of their constituencies. He greeted me and the President of the Duma, and walked along in front of the members, speaking at some length with some of them. To Guchkov he limited himself to a remark, "I believe you are from the gubernia of Moscow?" then walked into the center of the room, took a sheet of paper from his hat, and made his address, glancing at the text from time to time. It followed my draft quite closely, but contained a very sharp sentence which mine did not contain. "I was much distressed with your opposition to the matter of parish schools, which is particularly dear to me as having been bequeathed to me by my unforgettable father."

This addition made a great impression upon the majority of the

Duma members. They exchanged glances in silence, and when the Tsar had gone and everybody was invited into an adjoining room where tea and sandwiches were served there were expressions of disappointment and discontent on all sides. On that same day, the Duma by an overwhelming vote declined several remaining credits for these parish schools which had remained undecided from former sessions. Thus ended the work of the Third Duma.

CHAPTER XXVII

JUNE-JULY, 1912

Soon after the dissolution of the Duma on June 20, the Tsar met Emperor William in Baltic Port. Sazonov and I were present at the meeting. By that time the events in the Balkans had assumed a threatening aspect, but I held no conferences on the political situation either with the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg (1), whom I met then for the first time, or with the German ambassador, Count Pourtalès (2), and Sazonov. Of course, I have no way of knowing what passed between the two Emperors privately, but I have every reason to believe that they did not exchange opinions regarding the international situation. The Tsar carefully avoided making any statement, for he feared the expansiveness of the German Emperor, so foreign to his own nature. This belief is confirmed by the Tsar's remark to me after the three-day meeting had come to an end: "Thank heaven! Now one does not have to watch one's every word lest it be construed in a way one had not even dreamed."

I often questioned Sazonov and received from him the same reply: "We may be perfectly reassured: the German government does not wish to allow the Balkan conflagration to start a European fire, and we must only take good care that our own home-made politicians do not involve us in any Slavic adventure."

As far as I myself was concerned Emperor William was exceptionally gracious. On the very first day of our meeting he awarded me the German decoration of the Black Eagle, their highest honor, and when I presented myself with my thanks he showed the same courteousness.

On the second day, after reviewing the Viborg infantry regiment, both Emperors with their entire retinues went on foot to inspect the ruins of Peter's fortifications. The day was incredibly hot. During the inspection Emperor William began talking to me about the necessity of organizing a European oil trust to counterbalance the American Standard Oil by uniting in one organization the countries producing oil—Russia, Austria (Galicia) and Rumania—and by

developing production to an extent which would end Europe's dependence upon America. I had learned that this subject interested Emperor William, as six months before he had had a conversation on this subject with E. L. Nobel (3), who had informed me of it. The conversation became extremely animated and went beyond the limits set by court etiquette.

The sun was scorching. The Tsar did not want to interrupt our conversation, but behind Emperor William's back he made signs of impatience to me. The Kaiser, however, continued to answer my arguments with increasing fervor. Finally the Tsar seemed to lose all patience, approached us, and began to listen to our conversation, whereupon Emperor William turned to him with the following words (in French): "Your Chairman of the Council does not sympathize with my ideas, and I do not want to permit him to remain unconvinced. I want you to allow me to prove my point with data collected at Berlin, and when I am ready I should like to have your permission to resume this conversation with him."

My conversations with the Chancellor were of a totally different nature. I told him frankly that the German armaments program of 1911 and the new military tax voted by the Reichstag had aroused great apprehension in Russia. It was believed that Germany was arming herself at a feverish pace, and I was powerless to combat a desire in Russia for corresponding armaments. As Minister of Finance I was a confirmed enemy of war and considered a constant increase in armaments in any one country extremely dangerous because it persuaded the public opinion of all countries of the inevitability of armed conflict and, in the end, even the most confirmed opponents of such an attitude were engulfed in this wave of general nervous tension and either stepped silently aside or were forced to range themselves with the partisans of the idea.

I pointed out to the Chancellor that Russia had proved to Germany her purely defensive policy by adopting in 1910 the plan which abolished the Polish fortresses and withdrew our advanced Polish front farther to the East. This fact alone showed that Russia had no desire to wage an offensive war in the west and that she was concerned only with defending herself against possible attack. I did not conceal from Bethmann-Hollweg that this withdrawal had been carried out not only without my knowledge but also without that of Stolypin, and that both of us had been very much opposed to it, as it had been accomplished too hastily, without necessary preparations.

I was deliberately frank in my statements because I knew that the Germans were well informed as to everything that happened in Russia and, therefore, that any tricks or denials would be useless. I ended by saying to the Chancellor that Germany's new measures had deprived me of the main weapon with which I had, up to then, fought demands for increased armaments; now I was powerless to object to such demands, since I had no reply for the argument that we must adopt the same tactics as those directed against us.

The German Chancellor, who seemed to me to be an unassuming, sincere, and truthful man, replied by saying that his own position was far from being as influential and independent as it might seem on the outside. He, too, had to consider the personal views of the Emperor and the influence of the court, and especially the peculiar organization of the War Ministry, whose attitude was a very troublesome one. He did not wish to conceal from me that Germany knew of our plans and merely wished to forestall us. Germany was alarmed because she believed it inevitable that the Russian government would be influenced by public opinion and Slavic ideas under the stimulus of the growing Balkan complications, the more so since feeling in France was becoming steadily more apprehensive.

Germany knew full well that Russia would not abandon her alliance; Germany might even be sorry that thirty years previously she had radically changed her traditional policy toward Russia; but now there was nothing left to her but to keep in check the inevitable march of events hoping that all countries would have so many interests in common as to make them view armaments as a measure of prevention without allowing them to be actually applied. The Chancellor added that he was aware of my personal attitude, with which he profoundly sympathized, and that it inclined him to trust me implicitly and gave him hope that I should be successful in converting to my way of thinking those who had another opinion of world events.

In conclusion Bethmann-Hollweg asked me whether or not I anticipated great difficulties in concluding the commercial treaty with Germany as he had been informed that in Russia there was to be feared an increase of "nationalist tendencies" which could already be noticed in the articles of the *Novoe Vremia* and were further supported by the allegedly influential Minister of Agriculture, Krivoshein.

It was time to dress for dinner, and I answered him briefly that



MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES OF COUNT KOKOVTSOV

S. D. Sazonov
A. V. Krivoshein

I. K. Grigorovich
V. A. Sukhomliuov

these tendencies did, indeed, exist, and that this fact ought not to occasion surprise, since the commercial treaty of 1904 had been concluded in circumstances which did not permit Russia much freedom of action; that many articles of the treaty undoubtedly required alteration; and that I wanted to hope that both parties would show sufficient level-headedness and tolerance to see that it would be to their advantage to work for mutual prosperity instead of enriching themselves at the expense of one another. Bethmann-Hollweg asked my permission to return to this subject later, but did not do so. During the remaining day and a half spent at Baltic Port we had no further conversation.

I repeated in detail to the Tsar the conversation I had had with the German Chancellor during my very first report directly after the departure of the "Hohenzollern." The Tsar was in fine spirits, mentioned several times that Emperor William had assured him positively that he would not permit the Balkan complications to become a world conflagration. "Nevertheless," said the Tsar, "we must get ready. It is a good thing that we succeeded in adopting the naval program; besides, we have to prepare our land defense."

I replied with my familiar statement that the difference between Russia and Germany was that Germany, unhampered by her parliament, first took practical measures regarding the increase of her armaments and then sought in every way to obtain necessary funds, while Russia first requested the necessary funds, obtaining them with almost no difficulty from her legislative chambers, and then started to realize her plans for increased defense, never reaching a stage where she made full use of the appropriated credits. In Germany everything was prepared before the money was appropriated; in Russia, only the money was ever in readiness, armaments were always falling behind.

A few weeks after the meeting of the two Emperors at Baltic Port there began the preparations for the elections to the Duma. I shall not dwell upon the incidents of this campaign. They are not of much interest. I shall say only that in the beginning everything went along smoothly. The Ministers' Council had agreed with me that the government ought not to intervene in the election campaign too openly but ought to limit this intervention to what was most urgently necessary, instructing the governors that they must exercise utmost caution in giving instructions and in forming artificial groupings of electors.

Also the Chief Procurator of the Synod had asked for instructions from the Minister of the Interior and me as to what policy the Synod should adopt in giving general election instructions to diocesan bishops. We had agreed that the only thing desirable was to fight the extreme Left tendencies but not to insist on electing members of Right organizations only, since this would cause dissension among the moderate elements, which were more united than those of the Right.

There had also been some friction with myself as Minister of Finance regarding the subsidies for the control of the provincial press. Makarov and his collaborators insisted on more extensive appropriations than I favored. I based my stand on the records of Stolypin's time, which revealed the very slight significance of these appropriations, the lack of influence of the provincial press, and the uselessness of all unskilled attempts to influence public opinion through it, for the public paid no attention to these puny sheets, knowing that they were published at the expense of the state and were useful only to those who had found employment with them.

I was forced to give in, however, for the simple reason that one could not very well refuse in the year of the election to continue that which had been done during the three preceding years. Thus this useless expenditure went on with practically no reduction during the entire year of 1912, and only in 1913 was it considerably cut. This change created very hostile relations between the next Minister of the Interior, Maklakov, and me. Of this more later.

The honeymoon period of election harmony did not last long. Makarov transferred the entire work of election to his assistant, Kharuzin, who, not possessing the cleverness and experience of Kryzhanovsky—Stolypin's collaborator during elections to the Third Duma—had nevertheless adopted the same policy of dividing and artificially separating elective bodies.

I did not know anything about this for a long time, and when I finally did learn of it, it was too late to rectify the mistake. The senselessness of all these manipulations lay in the fact that both Kharuzin and Makarov had let the situation slip out of their hands and fall under the influence of individual governors who followed their particular local policies. Without any means of combating the Left tendencies in separate localities, these governors directed their efforts toward the zemstvos which supported mostly the Octobrist party, and began to settle old political accounts. The Governor of

Chernigov, Maklakov, concentrated on defeating the chairman of the local gubernial Zemstvo Council, Savitsky (4), and the member of the Third Duma, Glebov (5). Savitsky was accused of irregularities in the zemstvo hospital; he was brought to court for the escape of two convicts treated in the hospital. In regard to Glebov the pretext was justifiable—he had compromised his eligibility—but the case was presented in such a brutal and tactless way that the artificial character of the affair could be plainly seen.

The Governor of Ekaterinoslav was even more careless in the way in which he opposed Kamensky (6), who played a prominent rôle in religious affairs. The elective bodies were divided in direct contrast to the manner adopted by Kryzhanovsky during the elections to the Third Duma, and since the former arrangement had given Kamensky great advantage it was now clear to everybody that the new manipulations were aimed precisely at depriving him of the votes of the German settlers who had elected him to the Third Duma.

These manipulations, infrequent though they were, made a very bad impression, irritating the local electors and creating an atmosphere of discontent which surrounded the new deputies on their arrival in St. Petersburg in November. They served also to effect a final break between Makarov and me. Undoubtedly Makarov was honest and sincere in his personal views, but he was of limited intellect and was extremely stubborn. He had fallen under the influence of his collaborators and refused all my requests that he should curb the zeal of the governors; he referred me to the law by which the control of elections and the definition of elective districts was under his control and not subject to any supervision by the Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

I did not wish to inform the Tsar of these strained relations, and on the one occasion on which I tried to present the affair to the Ministers' Council I met with little success, for at that time the Council began to adopt an unfriendly attitude toward me. Experienced persons, such as Krivoshein, were following eagerly the development of the Rasputin affair and estimated justly the attitude of the Empress toward me. Shcheglovitov, Rukhlov, and Sukhomlinov had always acted against me secretly. Honest men, like Grigorovich and Timashev, each of whom sympathized with me in his own way, had little influence in this matter, and the intelligent, cynical, and clever Kharitonov always joined those who he believed had more power, and for all his liberalism he believed that power lay with the

so-called conservative elements protected by the methods of the Minister of the Interior. Briefly, Kharitonov sensed that the honeymoon period of my position had ended and that it was more profitable to range himself against me.

In the midst of my conflict with Makarov regarding the elections, there occurred an incident which, to me at least, was entirely unexpected. One day Sazonov telephoned to ask me if the Tsar had talked to me regarding the appointment of an ambassador to Berlin. He said that he had suggested S. N. Sverbeev (7) for the post, but the Tsar had had another person in mind and would not give a definite answer until he had talked to me about the matter. With the European situation as it was, it was urgently necessary to fill the vacancy at Berlin as soon as possible; so I promised Sazonov to raise the matter during my next report. This I was going to do when the Tsar forestalled me:

"I have decided to part with Makarov," he said. "He has let the press get completely out of hand and has absolutely refused to proclaim a law which would give the government authority to check the excesses in which the newspapers have been indulging. Even now when the Duma is not in session and when we might invoke Article 87, he still refuses. So, I have decided to let him go.

"Since Makarov was appointed at your suggestion, I presume that you will not favor my decision; therefore, I want to offer you the post of ambassador to Germany. It is a responsible post; you are an experienced statesman; and, besides, Emperor William is very favorably disposed toward you."

I thanked the Tsar for his confidence in my ability to represent Russia at Berlin, but pointed out that I did not feel called upon to resign because Makarov was to be dismissed. I confessed that I agreed with Makarov's policy regarding a press law, but I also explained that I had had serious differences with him about the Lena affair and regarding his conduct of the elections to the Duma. I told His Majesty that I was concerned less with Makarov's dismissal than with the appointment of his successor, and suggested that, at any rate, a change of ministers should not be made until after the elections.

I requested that His Majesty permit me to continue my work in the government, if I still enjoyed his confidence. In this work I felt I could best serve my sovereign and country. My experience would make it easier for me than for a new man to meet the new Duma,

and to influence it to approve new measures so urgently needed for our land defense. In the diplomatic circles of Berlin, on the other hand, I should be in strange surroundings. My frankness fitted me poorly to cope with diplomatic subtleties, and my championship of peace at all costs might not harmonize with the "nationalism" that was to be observed in the government. Finally, I expressed the belief that by remaining in St. Petersburg I could do more to bring the negotiations for the commercial treaty to a successful conclusion than I could in Berlin. Our own agrarian party was inclined to demand so much as to antagonize the German government, which also represented large agrarian interests, and only by remaining in St. Petersburg could I hope to moderate these demands. "Of course," I said, "if it is Your Majesty's will that I should go to Berlin, I have but to obey."

But his Majesty did not wish to force his will upon me, and graciously permitted me to continue in the government. He instructed me to ask Sazonov to send in the name of his candidate* for the post at Berlin. He asked me not to discuss our conversation, and it has until now remained a secret except to Sazonov.

Then there was the problem of appointing Makarov's successor. Since Makarov had proved unsuitable, the Tsar decided to select his own candidate and his choice fell upon Maklakov, the Governor of Chernigov. I opposed this selection because Maklakov had had trouble with the zemstvos, had resorted to devious election tricks, and had been for some time under the influence of Prince Meshchersky. But His Majesty did not agree with my opinion of the man and assured me that I should change my mind when I met and talked with Maklakov. I acted on the suggestion and invited the latter to visit me.

I must give Maklakov his due. We talked frankly and I expressed my disapproval of some of his past actions and associations, but throughout the conversation he impressed me as being very sincere and earnestly concerned for Russia's welfare. He confessed his lack of experience, and said that he felt he would be able to meet the

* At the time I did not know S. N. Sverbeev, although I had occasion to know him better in November 1913. It is a reflection upon Sazonov that he could not find a more able person for this important post. Sverbeev was not taken seriously in diplomatic circles at Berlin, and on his departure from the German capital, after the declaration of war, August 1914, he was hissed and otherwise abused by the mob. The idea of appointing me to Berlin probably emanated from the Empress, who was eager to have me removed from St. Petersburg.

Duma and handle public opinion only if I accorded him my support. He made a clean breast of his relations with Prince Meshchersky, saying that he regarded the Prince as a thorough conservative but a man of sincere convictions. Maklakov also denied ever having indulged in any intrigue against me or the government. I reminded him, however, first that he expressed no determination to break his association with Meshchersky, to whose influence I felt he would succumb in the end; and, second, that under no conditions would I join the Meshchersky group, and that some day he would be forced to choose between it and me. This actually happened.

The summer of 1912 was spent chiefly in preparing for the election. One of my main worries was with the many insistences that came to me regarding subsidies for the election campaign. The Octobrists and the Nationalists vied with each other in protesting their unity; given the least financial support, their success in the coming election was assured. The organizations of the Right, however, proved to be the real virtuosos in such protestations: they presented a carefully drawn estimate of the money (964,000 rubles) they needed for campaign purposes and hinted that their attitude toward me would depend upon whether or not this sum was forthcoming. I should like to say just here that Makarov, despite our other differences, supported me in maintaining the needlessness of the campaign expenses for the control of the press. My own opinion on this matter was the chief cause of the hostility of the Right toward me and this had its influence on my dismissal two years later.

Meanwhile, there occurred another incident which I relate if for no other reason than to throw some light upon that enigmatic personality, Count Witte, according to whose memoirs everyone else was either insignificant or mercenary while he alone was both intelligent and incorruptible.

In April, just before I went to Livadia, Countess Witte called on me to solicit my aid for herself and her husband, who had been reduced to circumstances in which they had barely sufficient on which to live. Either they would have to leave state service and accept a high salaried position with some bank, or they would have to go abroad and bury themselves in some out-of-the-way place in Germany. Since the first alternative did not meet with the Tsar's approval, she hoped I would be able to effect an increase in Witte's salary and thereby save from poverty a man who had played such a worthy and prominent part in Russia's recent history. I promised

to speak to the Tsar about such an increase but also expressed a desire to see Witte himself, so that there would be no possibility of a misunderstanding.

The next day I received a letter from the Countess saying that she had told her husband of our conversation and that he had been upset that she had troubled me. She went on to say that the increase in salary would not be sufficient to arrange Witte's affairs; to do this, an appropriation of several hundred thousand rubles would be necessary. She said that Witte would be happy to see me but hesitated to take up so much of my time with his personal affairs. In conclusion she expressed a wish that "all intrigues against the talented and clever Chairman of the Ministers' Council" would come to an end.

Before I could answer this letter Witte telephoned to ask me when I could see him before I left for Livadia. He called that same day just before dinner. He told me that close friends of his had drawn the Tsar's attention to his plight but, evidently, His Majesty had decided to do nothing about it. For that reason, he had come to ask me to take up the matter. He said he had long since forgotten how to live on 24,000 rubles a year.

In reply I told him that although I might have been able to effect an increase in his salary I could not ask the Tsar for a special appropriation, as I had fought the granting of such subsidies throughout my entire ministry. I advised him to speak personally to the Tsar, and this he apparently decided to do.

In July I had to report to the Tsar in the Fjords. After current affairs had been discussed, His Majesty took a blue envelope from the drawer of his small desk and said, "Can you guess what is in this envelope?"

I knew from experience that these envelopes boded me no good, and I voiced my misgivings. But His Majesty handed me the envelope and asked me to read its contents aloud.*

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY:

"A few months ago you deigned to hear favorably my confession as to the painful condition of uncertainty in which I find myself. Having inherited no fortune and having accumulated none—since having devoted myself to state service I had no right to engage in

* I still have a copy of this letter.

profitable enterprise—at the end of my life career I find myself with a yearly salary of 19,000 rubles and with a limited income from the 400,000 rubles you so graciously advanced to me when, having left the post of Minister of Finance, I was appointed Chairman of the Committee, later of the Council, of Ministers, in which capacity I received, including the rents,* almost twice my present salary.

“If I were to rely upon my own resources, I could extricate myself from these circumstances only by leaving state service and engaging in private business. But recently I have definitely rejected this plan.

“Your Majesty has been so gracious in your infinite Imperial kindness as to say to me, ‘You may set your mind at rest; I consider it my duty to see to it that your future and that of your family are provided for.’

“Forgive the remark of a loyal subject, but I recognize that if I am to remain in active state service I can obtain a stable material position only as an ambassador, and, although I have on several occasions given proof that in this capacity I could render my Tsar and my country services not inferior to those rendered by others, nevertheless I have no more hope of receiving such an appointment because of the unfavorable attitude of certain ministers concerned.

“In my present official capacity an increase in salary, to an extent which might assure my existence, would be extremely awkward and therefore painful for me. But I could be helped in my present distressing circumstances with an advance of two hundred thousand rubles. Knowing that during the eleven years of my work as Minister of Finance I, by my labors and efforts, made for the state hundreds of millions and that, therefore, the sum necessary to arrange my affairs is comparatively insignificant, I have courage to submit to Your Imperial Majesty my petition: whether Your Majesty would find it possible to show me your kindness.

* The word “rents” would be more accurately rendered as “an additional sum of 4,000 rubles per annum from the Ministry of Agriculture,” and is derived from the Russian word *arenda* meaning a lease. This was an old custom dating from the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, and consisted of augmenting the salaries of eminent statesmen by “leasing” to them Crown estates together with the peasants living on them and collecting the revenues for their benefit. Later, especially after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, such leases were definitely abolished and replaced, in some comparatively rare cases, by money grants of from 1,200 to a maximum of 4,000 rubles, levied on the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture as a special item among the estimates of the real fiscal revenue from state property. These additional sums were definitely abolished in 1906.



Guests at the farewell dinner given at the French Embassy for M. Poincaré during his visit to Russia in 1912. Front row, left to right: Admiral Grigorovich, Minister of the Navy; P. A. Kharitonov, Comptroller; Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador; S. I. Timashev, Minister of Commerce and Industry; A. A. Makarov, Minister of the Interior; V. N. Kokovtsov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; M. Poincaré; S. D. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Georges Louis, French Ambassador; Baron Korff, Russian Chef du Protocole. A. P. Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, stands behind M. A. Makarov and Kokovtsov.

"In justification of the present letter I must inform Your Majesty that with the advent of the summer vacations and before I leave St. Petersburg I shall be forced to decide whether I shall be able to continue my modest existence as heretofore or shall be obliged to take steps further to limit my budget by effecting some household liquidations.

"Your Majesty's loyal subject,

"COUNT WITTE"

"St. Petersburg, June 1912."

When I had read the letter, His Majesty asked me if I had had any idea that Witte might have made such a request. Whereupon, I related everything I knew, beginning with Countess Witte's call upon me.

"Do you really believe he has nothing to live on?" the Tsar replied. "And what is the explanation of his story about having declined a business offer? I have heard nothing about it, either from him or from anyone else."

The first question placed me in a very awkward position. It is difficult to count money in another man's purse, but it is just as difficult to speak against one's conscience. I remember my answer well, as I wrote it down directly after returning home.

I said that it was not easy for me to judge Count Witte's material position but that rumor had it that people with limited means could not live as the Wittes did and possess such jewels as they possessed. As to the second question, I attempted to explain matters more fully by referring to a conversation I had had with Count Witte in the fall of 1911. At that time V. I. Timiriazev, who later became President of the Board of Directors of the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, had asked me if the Ministers' Council had discussed whether or not Count Witte should be permitted, as an exception to the general rule, to accept the Bank's offer of a position as adviser to the Bank with a salary of 75,000 rubles a year, besides a possible share of the profits. I had been extremely surprised at this question and had professed ignorance, adding that there must be some misunderstanding, since Count Witte, as a member of the State Council, had no right to accept such an offer and his acceptance would be a direct violation of the law. Timiriazev had insisted that an agreement had already been effected. In fact he had shown me a record of the resolution signed by several Directors of the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade and by

Witte.* He had then asked me to submit the matter to the Tsar and to solicit him to grant Witte permission to accept this position, but I had refused to have anything to do with this manifest violation of the law. A few days later Witte had called unexpectedly and had asked me for "a piece of friendly advice." He was disturbed by the current rumors that associated his name with a high position in a bank. He had confessed that a certain bank had made him good offers, which he had promptly declined because he knew his acceptance would be illegal, and "it was not fitting for a former Russian Minister of Finance and Prime Minister to violate the law." In reply I had admitted that I had heard such rumors but had discredited them, knowing the Tsar could not make any such exception to the general rule, for it would be followed by an avalanche of demands for one exception after another. Out of regard for his feelings, however, I had refrained from telling him that I had seen his signature to his agreement with the bank.

When I finished the story, His Majesty asked, "Then shall I refuse Witte's request or simply leave it unanswered?"

Much to the Tsar's surprise, I recommended that he comply with Witte's request, even if only to show everyone that the Tsar did not refuse to help his ministers when they requested it. Then he wrote on the blue envelope, "Advance to State Secretary, Count Witte, 200,000 rubles from the revenues of the Foreign Department; refer to this subsidy as being used for a purpose known to His Majesty." His Majesty gave this to me and then expressed the hope that this incident would not be talked about. If the State Comptroller asked on what authority the appropriation was to be made, I was to show the envelope to State Secretary Kharitonov.†

Then the Tsar turned the conversation into a slightly different channel by asking me what I knew of Witte's desire to be given an ambassadorial post. I could only tell him that I had been told that recently, in the New Club, Witte had complained of his inactivity in

* Evidently the original agreement had been reached between Witte and one of the Bank's directors, Artur Raffalovich I believe, that summer at Salzchlirf, a German watering-place, and had been officially recorded in St. Petersburg.

† I telegraphed Witte the Tsar's decision immediately and he hastened to reply, sending hearty thanks from both himself and his wife. Eighteen months later, he gave evidence of the "heartiness" of these thanks by intriguing against me. I was dismissed from both my posts on January 30, 1914, and Witte chose the tenth anniversary of my appointment as Minister of Finance (February 5) to print, through a third person, slander against me in the newspapers.

the State Council and was casting longing eyes toward the post of ambassador at Rome. He felt, however, that his longing would not be satisfied, for he did not stand well with Sazonov, who had inherited Stolypin's hatred of him.

His Majesty replied with a smile: "I have more definite information than that. Witte wrote me a letter on this matter. It is a curious document and states with great certainty that I ought to make a complete change of Russia's representatives abroad, and to replace them with more businesslike persons who can influence public opinion by managing the press, something the existing old diplomatic corps does not know how to do. Witte himself regrets his comparative ignorance of the English language; otherwise he would have offered himself as ambassador to Washington, although he is certain that even with such a handicap he could win American public opinion sufficiently to open up the American market to Russian loans. In conclusion, he expresses his readiness to accept any ambassadorial post except in China or Japan, posts which should be reserved for younger diplomats."*

The Tsar had not answered Witte's letter, and felt that his silence revealed his opinion.

During the last days of July, Poincaré, the president of the Ministers' Council of France, visited St. Petersburg. I had been looking forward to this visit with much interest and even impatience, for the service Poincaré had rendered Russia, and me personally, in 1906 had been of the kind that one does not forget, since without his assistance Russia would not have liquidated so quickly her financial difficulties which followed the Russo-Japanese War. I had not met him since 1906, but during his stay in St. Petersburg not a day passed that we did not see each other and exchange opinions. We saw each other again during the visit of Poincaré and Viviani (8) in the

* Years later, as an émigré in Paris, I was greatly surprised to read in Prince von Bülow's Memoirs, a letter which Countess Witte had written the Berlin banker, Ernst Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, asking him to influence the German Emperor to persuade the Tsar to appoint Witte ambassador to France in place of A. I. Nelidov. Prince von Bülow does not give the date of this letter, but internal evidence points to the fact that it was written soon after Witte's return from America and after he was made Count, but before October 17, 1905. It is my opinion also that the letter was written with Witte's knowledge—Countess Witte, writing in French uses the plural form "nous" several times. Whatever resulted from this in Germany, I have no doubt that the Kaiser did not speak to the Tsar about the matter, for His Majesty would certainly have informed me of it. (Text of the letter is given in Bülow's, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, II, 174 ff.)

summer of 1914 directly before the war, but then I was no longer in active service and we had no opportunity to talk with each other.

Later, in December 1918, when I arrived in France as an émigré, Poincaré, then President of the Republic, asked my wife and myself to dinner and we spent the entire evening in the most cordial conversation; he was the first person who accorded me, in exile, a friendly reception.

It would be difficult to describe here all our meetings during the ten days he spent in St. Petersburg in 1912, since there were many ceremonies and formal functions which we both attended. Poincaré discussed problems of foreign policy with the Tsar and especially with Sazonov. He knew well that according to our law the Chairman of the Ministers' Council played no decisive rôle in matters of foreign policy, and, moreover, since I was on the best of terms with Sazonov at that time there was no need for me to interfere in his department, because we discussed every issue quite frankly. At that time we were both concerned only with preserving European peace in the face of the menacing and complicated Balkan situation.

Toward the end of his visit, Poincaré called on me to discuss some matters he wanted to clear up. He expressed his satisfaction with the conversations he had had with the Tsar and Sazonov. Then he began to speak of Ambassador Louis (9), the French ambassador at St. Petersburg. Our Foreign Office was not favorably disposed toward Ambassador Louis, and although Sazonov had assured Poincaré that henceforth his relations with Louis would be better, Poincaré was skeptical. He favored recalling both Izvolsky and Louis, but this was inadvisable because of Izvolsky's personal relations with Sazonov. We arrived at no conclusion except an understanding that I should continue to accord Louis the same support as heretofore. The next day Sazonov told me that he was in favor of letting matters stand as they were in order to avoid any friction with the French government. More of this later.

The second matter which Poincaré broached pertained to a field really in my sphere. He asked me to explain to him the true state of our railway network and its development, particularly that of our strategic railways constructed with the purpose of speeding up our mobilization, which could not be effected as quickly as could the concentration of French troops on their western front. Without concealing from me the fact that the French General Staff was much concerned with this matter and that the Chief-of-Staff had often told

him that the explanations given by our General Staff seemed to him very hazy, Poincaré asked me to tell him as many of the facts as I considered proper. I had much information at hand on this subject, and I let him examine the materials accumulated in the Ministry of Finance pertaining to the estimates for 1913 recently examined by the Ministers' Council, and also the schedule of the railway construction I had worked out for the next five years. This latter, of course, was conditional upon being able to float on foreign markets the loans necessary to finance this project.

At this point I mentioned the difficulties I had met in effecting these flotations and the necessity of obtaining the fullest co-operation of the French market, since neither the German nor the English market was very dependable. Then I explained to Poincaré my plan of private railway construction, which provided for the removal of private brokers from the work of raising loans and for the transfer of this business to the direct control of the Ministry of Finance. I also communicated to him the rather recent conversation I had had with the French Minister of Finance, Caillaux (10), who sharply criticized the Russian policy of frequently floating state loans on foreign markets. He had told me, "It would be entirely different if the money you sought were to be invested in productive enterprises, especially in railway construction. You would then meet with my unreserved support and France would let you have all necessary means."

Evidently my explanations made a good impression upon Poincaré, and he assured me that he would leave Russia much more at his ease. In conclusion we agreed that whenever the explanations of our War Ministry were not clear to the French General Staff it was to address me through the French ambassador and I should give all needed explanations.

I believe it fair to assume that this conversation with Poincaré laid the foundation for consolidated loans for the private railway companies of Russia which I effected a year later. An account of this matter is to follow.

Finally I expressed my thanks for French support in letting Russia share, together with the rest of the Great Powers, in the so-called Chinese reorganization loan of 1913.

CHAPTER XXVIII

AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1912

That autumn, instead of going to the Crimea, the Tsar went hunting first at Belovezh and later at Spala, where the Tsarevich fell dangerously ill and nearly died. Until the middle of October the entire country lived under the shadow of a possible catastrophe, and it was not until the second week in October that the reassuring news came that the Tsarevich was out of immediate danger. Only then did I go to Spala to report. A great many pressing matters were awaiting decision, the most important of which concerned the elections to the Duma, which were at that time drawing to a close. The majority of the elected members held moderate views, but they were not united by common convictions, nor were they under any definite general direction.

In this connection I should like to digress to recount an episode in which the differences between Makarov and me were put aside for the moment, and to show what startling methods were then being practised by some prominent administrators.

Early in September a number of governors assembled in St. Petersburg to receive instructions from the Minister of the Interior regarding the methods to be employed by different local election committees. I learned from conversations with the governors that the committees had no general election policy but each acted according to its own ideas.

At my request Makarov granted me permission to have a discussion with the assembled governors in his presence. The majority of them reported that the election was going on rather colorlessly; that the extreme Left organizations were under cover, being careful not to show their cards, but that it was certain that they would not win many votes; and that the Cadets, the Octobrists, and the Nationalists of the Balashev type would get most of the votes, since the extreme Right was not very active, although it could be expected to retain its former strength.

In all of the governors' reports, however, one note sounded quite

distinctly: the chiefs of gubernias had at their command very small means with which to influence the course of the elections. The only organized social group accessible to influence was the rural and the city clergy. The diocesan authorities cared only for the opinion of the Holy Synod, and its Chief Procurator and had little to do with the governors. But even in this group not all bishops were in sympathy with the too moderate instructions of the Synod. They regarded as unsound its instruction to support all conservative parties, beginning with the Octobrists, and to make no distinction between the parties of the Right. The bishops would have preferred to receive more definite instructions for the support of some particular party. Some of the governors implied that many bishops did not quite trust even the sincerity of the Synod's instructions, believing that they were merely the result of pressure exercised upon the Chief Procurator by the Minister of the Interior and the Chairman of the Ministers' Council. Many bishops believed that, personally, V. K. Sabler was in sympathy with only one party—the extreme Right. All the governors were agreed that the *zemskie nachalniki* (1) exercised hardly any influence upon the peasants in the elections, and that no hopes should be built upon this element.

I received an almost unanimous reply also to my question as to the influence exercised upon public opinion and the course of the elections by the local conservative press, which had been generously supported by the government in certain gubernias. This influence, the governors said, was nil, since no one read these publications. Several governors said frankly that it was common knowledge that these papers were published at the government's expense, and since the editors of these papers were generally unfit for their work, and the content was of poor quality for want of well-trained and able collaborators, even those who received the publications free of charge refused to read them.

The one dissenting voice was that of the Governor of Nizhni Novgorod, A. N. Khvostov. He insisted that the governors not only should but could have elected to the Duma the type of person they desired. He said that in his gubernia he had already removed all opposition candidates and had replaced them by persons who were quite reliable in their political views and who would be elected, provided the Minister of the Interior would give him more funds and permit him to enlist the services of the chief of the local Gendarme Office.

In elaborating his theory Khvostov added that there was but one preliminary condition to success: to set a definite goal, and not to hesitate in the choice of means; that is, to disregard the outcries of the press and not fear complaints about election irregularities: "The trouble with us is that we are either incapable or unwilling to govern; we are afraid to make use of the power in our hands and, later, we cry that someone else has taken it from us."

I should also like to relate at this point the circumstances which led to differences between me and the extreme Right and to its campaign against me, beginning with the convocation of the Fourth Duma. I had often argued with Stolypin against subsidizing the local conservative press as a means of combating the influence of the opposition, but I argued in vain. He had felt a little resentfully that I was trying to interfere in his official affairs. Nor did the Tsar support me against Stolypin. I often saw the paper *Zemshchina* on His Majesty's desk and always made bold to point out that the subsidy of this paper—180,000 rubles a year—was utter waste, for the paper was not generally read and many people wondered why it was continued, since it frequently attacked government officials, myself in particular.

After Stolypin's death I made efforts to ascertain the precise allocation of these subsidies, which I regarded as useless expenditures, with the hope that in the future they might at least be reduced. Kryzhanovsky aided me in this by supplying me with essential information. He, too, frankly admitted that this subsidizing was a waste of money. When Makarov assumed office he agreed that these subsidies should be cut but made the very reasonable request that this should not occur until after the elections.

Immediately after the dissolution of the Third Duma, some of its members—Markov II, Novitsky, and Purishkevich—visited me and insisted on the necessity of placing at their disposal for use in the coming elections large sums in addition to the usual subsidies. When I suggested that they present their demands to Makarov, they assured me that he was one with them but felt bound by his promise not to increase election expenses. Therefore, they had come to me, for they regarded my unwillingness to appropriate this additional sum as the barrier to be overcome. They had even prepared an estimate of their needs—960,000 rubles. I asked Markov why they had not asked for the round figure of a million, to which he replied, "We well know that you like exact figures and so we have excluded all superfluous

matters." There were only a few items, the largest of which called for more than 500,000 rubles to be used in conducting "agitation" in the form of provincial conventions, lectures, pamphlets, the press, traveling expenses, and, of course, some "secret" expenses.

I refused these demands. My visitors were very angry, and Markov II rose from his chair and hotly declared: "When Petr Arkadevich was alive, things were different; he would have made you give us what we want; now you will be left to reap the fruit of our failure, since you will get a Duma very different from the one you could have had from us for the paltry sum of 900,000 rubles." He never forgave me for this refusal, and a year later, May 27, 1913, he sought to settle his account with me by his speech in the Duma. But of this, more later. Now to return to my narrative!

I reached Spala on October 18. There was still considerable anxiety about the Tsarevich, but the Tsar was sufficiently assured of his son's recovery to hear my report on the following day. It took almost two hours. The major part of it concerned the budget for 1913 and especially the military expenditures. I did not conceal from the Tsar that I was much more troubled this year than in preceding years. Polivanov, who had always found a way to reconcile the points of view of the Ministries of War and Finance, had been replaced by General Vernander (2), a stubborn military engineering specialist. I perceived that in this new situation, in any conflict between the two ministries, the War Ministry would have the support of the Tsar.

Therefore, that year I was obliged to be particularly amenable to the demands of the War Ministry and to consent to appropriations which exceeded by far those I would have permitted had I been completely independent. Besides, events abroad greatly favored the War Ministry. The Balkan wars were being prolonged. The diplomats seemed powerless to extinguish the spreading fire, and the need for us to increase our military preparations was becoming more and more insistent. It was perfectly clear to me that having spent its increased appropriations and having failed to improve its organization, the Ministry of War had made no actual accomplishment. It had accumulated large monetary appropriations but had not advanced our armaments a step. The delay in placing orders with manufacturers was surpassed only by the delay with which they were filled. My own position was insufferable. I saw the hopelessness of increasing the credits yearly, and I spoke of it openly and frankly wherever I could.

Still, I was deprived of the possibility of carrying out my intentions. The War Minister insinuated against me to the Tsar. The Duma sharply criticized his use of the appropriated money but always favored an increase of military credits. The press continued to cry out for greater preparedness, and the widely heralded "Slavic banquets" (3) ended in most pronounced statements denouncing Russian pacifism. Processions with banners demanding "a cross on St. Sophia," "Skutari to Montenegro," etc., were becoming a common sight. I was obliged to compromise with the War Ministry, and, since I knew that the Ministers' Council would never support me against General Sukhomlinov, and in order to prevent him from complaining to the Tsar, I decided to avoid a definite break with the Minister of War and for the first time to submit without argument to all budget estimates regarding military credits.

I explained my point of view to the Tsar and submitted to him a special estimate enumerating all the superfluous demands of the War Ministry, the rejection of which would not harm our armaments. The sum thus computed was rather considerable—about eighty million rubles. I also submitted an estimate of the unused credits for the preceding year; these totaled more than 180 million rubles.

The Tsar expressed his pleasure both with my report and with my decision regarding military expenditures. "You are quite right," he said, "the money will not be used and our armaments will not improve. In your conflicts with Sukhomlinov you are always right. But I want you to understand my own attitude: I have been supporting Sukhomlinov not because I have no confidence in you but because I cannot refuse to agree to military appropriations. Heaven forbid that we shall not be able to put out the Balkan fire. I should never forgive myself if I refused any military credits, even one ruble. You, too, must find satisfaction in the fact that no one can now say that you stand in the way of our national defense. I know how deeply you love your country and, therefore, that, like myself, you are distressed that everything is not as it should be with our military supplies. Let us hope that from now on things will improve with every new day, and should Sukhomlinov again say that you have refused him credits I shall tell him that I do not wish to hear such statements, that the responsibility is his, not yours."

The remainder of my report had to wait till after lunch. His Majesty was especially interested in the election returns, which showed that in nearly all gubernias a majority of moderates had been

returned. St. Petersburg, it is true, had returned mostly Cadets, but any disappointment the Tsar might have felt at this result was more than offset by the fact that Guchkov had been defeated there. His Majesty earnestly hoped that Guchkov would also be defeated in Moscow, where he was running as a gubernial candidate. His hope was gratified.

As we went to lunch, the Tsar mentioned a matter which I should like to record here. It will be remembered that Senator Trussevich had been appointed to investigate the responsibility for Stolypin's assassination. This investigation had revealed the negligence of four persons: Assistant Minister of the Interior Kurlov, Chief of the Kiev Secret Service Kuliabko, Assistant Director of the Police Department Verigin (4), and Kurlov's assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Spiridovich (5). Makarov had accepted these findings without comment. The Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov, had favored bringing these men to trial. The First Department of the State Council had asked them to explain their negligence, had found their explanations unsatisfactory, and had decided to request the Tsar for permission to arraign them before a criminal court. His Majesty, however, had not confirmed the decision of the State Council's First Department, although he must surely have understood that such an arraignment could not finally establish the guilt of the accused, since they could appeal for a retrial before the Senate and it might reach an entirely different verdict. Moreover, whatever the verdict, it had to be confirmed by the Tsar.

It was not until we went to lunch that I knew the Tsar's decision in this matter, and when I learned it I must confess I was a bit staggered. In order to signalize his son's recovery by some generous act, he had decided to dismiss the case. In fact, he had already sent the Imperial Secretary a memorandum to that effect, and had informed Spiridovich of his decision. "I see him," said the Tsar, "at every turn; he follows me about like a shadow and I simply cannot see this man so crushed with grief; surely he did not want to do any harm and is guilty of nothing except his failure to take every measure of precaution." It was beyond my power to alter the decision, but I felt in duty bound to speak my mind. I pointed out that such negligence as these men had displayed was unpardonable. Bogrov might just as easily have turned his Browning on the occupants of the Imperial Box as on Stolypin. No loyal Russian could ever become reconciled to a decision which permitted men guilty of such a crime

to go unpunished while petty government officials were tried and punished every day for much less serious offenses. "Your generous impulse, Sire, will not be understood. Moreover, your decision precludes the possibility of completely clearing up this 'dark' affair by a final Senate investigation, which, incidentally, might reveal something more serious than criminal negligence, at least as far as General Kurlov was concerned."

The Tsar admitted the force and validity of my arguments, but did not offer to make any change in his decision. He begged me to explain his motives to the Ministers' Council.

On the next morning, just before I returned home, I was handed a telegram from Guchkov announcing that he had been defeated in the elections and had renounced politics forever. I gave the telegram to Baron Frederichs to be reported to the Tsar, and left Spala.

When I reported to the Ministers' Council on the events at Spala, I dwelt particularly on military expenditures, and told Sukhomlinov frankly that I hoped there would now be an end to his continual complaints about insufficient appropriations. State Comptroller Kharitonov gave me sturdy support. He emphasized the important fact that since a new Duma was to be convoked, the Ministry of War should guard against furnishing any grounds for conflict between the new Duma and the government. This could be done only by keeping within the limits of the appropriated credits. Sukhomlinov, as was his wont, uttered some unintelligible words which were understood to mean that he was satisfied with the military appropriations estimated for 1913.

Soon afterward the Tsar and his entire family returned to Tsarskoe Selo. A few days later, on October 28, and quite unexpectedly for the entire Council, the Minister of War gave me something of a surprise. Without a word of warning, he presented me with a special request for a supplementary credit of sixty-three million rubles to be used to increase our defenses on the Austrian frontier. He considered this necessary because of conditions in the Balkans. He based his request upon an old law which had been repealed when the new budget regulations were published, and announced that he was acting on the orders of the Tsar, who had unconditionally approved his request. I was not so much amazed at the incongruous demand—I had long been used to such—as at the fact that only a day previously I had discussed matters of a military nature with the Tsar at some length and he had not said a word about General Sukhomlinov's new demand.

I convoked the Ministers' Council on October 30, and wrote a letter to the Tsar saying that I had no right to comply with this new demand, since, according to law, only the Ministers' Council, and not an individual Minister, was authorized to present to the Tsar a resolution for an appropriation of credits, which had subsequently to be confirmed by the Duma.

My letter was returned to me with a note in the Tsar's hand: "This is not the time to consider such formalities. In any event, I expect the Council's memorandum not later than November 1. The money must be appropriated."

The Council's position was a difficult one. Sukhomlinov smiled innocently, and to all sharp remarks, even of persons like Shcheglovitov, Rukhlov, and Krivoshein, who seldom or never ranged themselves with me, he merely answered that since there was danger of war it was no time for "legal hair-splitting."

A hasty study of his requisition revealed that, of the sixty-three million rubles demanded, not less than thirteen million had already been included in the estimates. Apparently General Sukhomlinov was not aware of this, and when Kharitonov taxed him with it he answered naively: "Well, then, these may be excluded." Of the remaining fifty million only twenty million required urgent appropriation; the other thirty million would not be needed until the middle of 1913 or much later. Finally, it came to light that in endeavoring to fortify our Austrian frontier the War Ministry was not a bit perturbed by placing a large order with Austrian factories, the Skoda Works (6). Under different circumstances this affair might have created a huge scandal, but as the entire Council saw that a part of the demands must be satisfied it resolved to ask the Tsar's authorization for the immediate appropriation of twenty millions, the rest to be appropriated as the payments fell due. I insisted that the resolution include my statement to the effect that these requests for urgent appropriations were utterly unnecessary; that all that was necessary was to give the War Ministry complete authority to place necessary orders; credits for them would be requested of the Duma and the State Council as the orders were filled. I also ventured to predict that the money appropriated on such short order would remain unexpended. Sukhomlinov protested that this would not occur. The Council's memorandum was presented to the Tsar on October 31, a day before the fixed date.

The money was appropriated, and my words proved true. When

I was dismissed fourteen months later, on January 31, 1914, the sum expended from the credits appropriated in such an extraordinary way was not over three million rubles. "Was it worth while to build such a high fence?"

Evidently, the Tsar sincerely thought that he was strengthening the army by complying with the wishes of the Minister of War, for a few days later, when I made my report, he said very sincerely and simply that, having read the Council's memoranda, he believed it better to appropriate the money than to refuse to do so, because it was important to let the army know that it was being remembered, cared for, and prepared for fighting. Again and again I repeated that what the army needed was not the realization that the War Ministry had money at its disposal but the assurance that it had an abundance of guns, ammunition, rifles, machine guns, and shells.

Meanwhile, the war in the Balkans was spreading. The Bulgarians and the Serbians were defeating the Turks, and a new conflict was developing between the Serbians on one side and the Bulgarians on the other. All the sympathies of Sazonov and myself were with the Serbians, for it appeared from their objectionable actions that the Bulgarians had forgotten that we had saved them in the most acute period of their struggle with Turkey. Rumania continued her customary two-faced policy, and the conduct of Austria was becoming more and more arrogant.

In the evening of November 9, Sukhomlinov telephoned to inform me that the Tsar wished to receive me the next morning at ten o'clock. I asked the reason, and he replied that His Majesty had given no explanations. The next morning at the station I met Sukhomlinov, Sazonov, Chief of the General Staff Zhilinsky (7), and Minister of Ways and Communications Rukhlov. No one knew why we had been summoned. Sukhomlinov, prattling away as usual, suggested that it might have something to do with the Balkan war.

The Tsar received us in his large study. He began by saying that since the subject to be discussed was well known to us, he wished each of us, beginning with me as senior, to state his opinion frankly. Three of us answered that we had no idea of the purpose of the conference. Sukhomlinov said that he had not informed us, since he believed it best that we should learn from the Tsar himself what he had in mind. Then the Tsar, opening a map on the table before him, began to explain, calmly and clearly, the ratio of Russian and Austrian military forces on our frontier, the weakness of our in-

fantry, numbering not over 90 rifles to a company while the Austrian infantry numbered 200, the slowness of our transport, and the consequent necessity for considerably increasing the troops stationed near the frontier.

"To accomplish this purpose," said the Tsar, "yesterday, at the conference of the commanders of the Warsaw and Kiev Military Districts, it was decided to mobilize the entire Kiev district and part of the Warsaw district, and to prepare to mobilize the Odessa district.

"I wish to stress particularly the fact that this refers exclusively to our Austrian frontier and that we have no intention whatever of taking any steps against Germany. Our mutual relations leave nothing to be desired, and I have every reason to hope for the support of Emperor William."

The Tsar then invited Sukhomlinov to give supplementary explanations, but the latter answered that he could not add anything to the Tsar's very clear statement and that all telegrams pertaining to the mobilization had been already prepared and would be sent as soon as this conference had ended.

The Tsar, addressing me, added: "The Minister of War wanted to dispatch these orders yesterday, but I asked him to wait another day, since I wanted to discuss the situation with those ministers who ought to be apprised of it before the final orders are given."

We three looked at each other with the greatest amazement, and only the presence of the Tsar restrained us from giving vent to the feelings which animated all of us.

I spoke first, and had to struggle to retain my composure. I stated frankly that the Minister of War and the two commanders apparently did not perceive what danger they were preparing for Russia in planning this mobilization—a danger of war with Austria and Germany, and at a time when in consideration of the state of our national defense every effort should be made to avert this catastrophe.

The Tsar interrupted me, saying literally the following:

"I do not, just as yourself, Vladimir Nikolaevich, allow the thought of an imminent war. We are not ready for it, and you are perfectly correct in terming the very thought of a war as folly. But we have before us not the problem of war but a simple measure of precaution, consisting of augmenting the ranks of our army on the frontier and of moving up the troops now removed too far, in the rear somewhat closer."

I continued my speech, pointing out to the Tsar that no matter what we chose to call the projected measures, a mobilization remained a mobilization, to be countered by our adversaries with actual war, for which Germany was ready and only watching for a chance to begin. The Tsar again interrupted me:

"You exaggerate, Vladimir Nikolaevich. I have no intention of mobilizing our troops against Germany, with whom we are on the best of terms which cause us no apprehensions, but Austria is openly hostile and has taken a series of steps against us including the increased fortifications at Krakow, of which our commander of the troops of the Kiev military district is being constantly informed by our intelligence department."

After this I felt obliged to point out that since Austria and Germany were bound by a treaty which amounted to a subordination of the former to the latter, these two countries could not be considered separately. Moreover, in such a mobilization we assumed a great responsibility not only for Russia but also for France, since under the terms of our military agreement with our ally we had no right to undertake any such measures without coming to an understanding with her. This evidently had been overlooked by the Tsar's advisers, who in adopting this course of action would have destroyed the military covenant and thus permitted France to repudiate her obligations to us. I said that the Minister of War had not even the right to discuss such a matter without a preliminary understanding with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself, and that I was certain that Generals Ivanov and Skalon (8) would share my views.

As an alternative measure, I suggested that the Tsar formulate a ukase to the Senate lengthening by six months the term of service throughout Russia, thus increasing by one-fourth the numbers of our standing army. Such a measure had been discussed in the Ministers' Council some time previously in connection with increasing the War Ministry's credits for munitions. The practical result of this measure would be that, instead of a mobilization, the soldiers whose four-year term ended January 1, 1913, would remain in the ranks until July 1, 1913, while the regular annual class of recruits would enter the service as usual. Thus, at the most dangerous moment—spring—every regiment would have additional manpower and at the same time no one could reproach us with fanning the flame of war.

I ended by an impassioned appeal to the Tsar not to permit the

fatal error the consequences of which were immeasurable, since we were not ready for a war and our adversaries knew it well, and added that only by closing one's eyes to the sad actuality could one bring oneself to play into their hands.

The Tsar listened to me in perfect composure. He seemed to like the suggestion I had made, but he was disturbed by my violence and my sharp thrusts at the Minister of War. Wishing to smooth over this impression and at the same time to reassure me, he said, addressing all those present:

"We all love our country equally, and I believe that we all, including myself, must be grateful to Vladimir Nikolaevich, both for his fine explanations and for the splendid way out of our difficulties."

After me Sazonov and Rukhlöv spoke. Sazonov said that he had been simply overwhelmed when he had learned of the approaching catastrophe and could only confirm the correctness of my statements and especially the fact that even if we were ready for a war, which was by no means the case, we had no right to undertake such steps without first coming to an understanding with our allies.

Rukhlöv was still briefer. Having remarked to the Tsar that no country is ever quite ready for war and that he did not altogether share my gloomy views regarding the state of our defense, he expressed himself, nevertheless, as agreeing with my suggestion, adding that it would facilitate a future mobilization, since it would do away with the necessity of transporting over our railways an entire quarter of our army in two directions at once.

To the Tsar's invitation to speak, Sukhomlinov said merely this:

"I agree with the views expressed by the Chairman of the Council and beg to be permitted to send telegrams to Generals Ivanov and Skalon that no mobilization should be undertaken."

The Tsar answered merely: "Of course." Then addressing himself to me very graciously, he said, "You may be well pleased with such a decision; and, as to myself, I am even happier than you."

Then, shaking Sukhomlinov's hand, he said to him, "You, too, must be grateful to Vladimir Nikolaevich; now you can go abroad in peace."

These last words amazed us all. We went upstairs to lunch. Sazonov remained behind with the Tsar, and when we had reached the room assigned to us, we two—Rukhlöv and I—asked Sukhomlinov to what trip abroad the Tsar referred. Great was our amazement when Sukhomlinov answered in the most unconcerned manner,

"My wife is abroad, on the Riviera, and I am going to visit her for a few days." To my astonished question how he could have planned to go abroad while ordering a mobilization, this flighty gentleman replied without any trace of embarrassment and in utter seriousness, "Why not? A mobilization does not have to be conducted by a Minister of War in person; while all these orders were being carried out I could have gone and returned. I did not intend to stay away for more than two or three weeks."

In the meanwhile Sazonov had rejoined us. Making no attempt to restrain himself any longer, and without mincing words or paying any attention to the palace attendants, he said to Sukhomlinov:

"Don't you understand even yet where you very nearly pushed Russia? Are you not ashamed to make such a game of the fate of the Tsar and your country? Doesn't your conscience tell you that had the Tsar not decided to call us here today and had he not given us a chance to rectify the evil you very nearly brought about, your folly could not have been mended—and you, in the meantime, were about to take a trip abroad!"

In the same indifferent, childish fashion, Sukhomlinov answered:

"Who was it, now, if not I, who suggested that the Tsar call you together in his study? If I had not considered this necessary, the mobilization would have already begun and no harm would have been done. We shall have a war anyway; we cannot avoid it, and it would be more profitable for us to begin it as soon as possible, especially as it is your opinion and that of the Chairman of the Council that we are not ready, while the Tsar and I with him believe in our army and know that a war would bring us nothing but good."

The next day I reported this conference to the Ministers' Council. Then when this body resumed its discussion of the general foreign political situation I raised the problem of revising the commercial treaty with Germany. The Minister of Agriculture, Krivoshein, had sent a circular letter to the zemstvos soliciting their opinions as to desirable changes to be introduced into this treaty. This letter exuded a hostility toward Germany which could result in nothing but harm. Even when Stolypin was Chairman of the Council I had maintained that we were giving too much publicity to our discussions of the revision of this treaty and thereby running the risk of Germany's displeasure. Now I coupled this issue with that which had arisen in the previous day's conference and repeated that since we were unprepared for war and since our military organization was in poor

condition we should be doubly careful to avoid giving offense to Germany.

My words evoked a torrent of replies. Sukhomlinov affirmed the splendid condition of our army and the tremendous progress made in the matter of its equipment. Krivoshein insisted that increased confidence should be placed in the Russian people and its deep-rooted patriotism; he thought that it was high time Russia stopped cringing before the Germans. Rukhlov suggested that since at that time I traveled little in Russia I was not in a position to witness with my own eyes the steady growth of national prosperity and that, above all, I was not in close contact with the peasant masses, which were different from what they had been during the Japanese War and now perceived the need of "freeing ourselves from the Germans, who are virtually ruling Russia." Even Timashev, who generally supported me, advocated that we firmly defend our present-day interests, having no fear of the specter of war, which is more terrifying from afar than near at hand. Sazonov said merely that we must not be arrogant but at the same time must do everything to avoid playing into the hands of our enemies. The other ministers were silent.

No definite conclusion was reached, however. Most of the ministers had an implicit faith in the might of the Russian people to meet any national crisis. I, on the other hand, felt that a war would be a catastrophe for Russia, for by comparison with our enemies our army was ill-equipped and poorly led. Hence, I was dubbed unpatriotic, particularly by Rukhlov, Shcheglovitov, Krivoshein, and Maklakov.

These discussions in the Council always made me unhappy. They demonstrated my isolation and helplessness. By public opinion I was regarded as the head of the government and responsible for its policies. Actually, my power to formulate and direct such policies was undermined by a split within the Cabinet. Moreover, my opponents in the government had the support of the Tsar, who lent a ready ear to their nationalistic schemes and professions. He liked to think with them that Germany would not dare to engage Russia in war and that the might of the Russian people was great enough to put Germany in her place at any time. My policy of caution was represented to him as a proof of my personal cowardice and as the professional ruse of a Minister of Finance to ensure at all costs the financial well-being of his country. Frequently, I suggested that harmony in the government might be increased by ministerial changes,

but these were never made. Apparently the Tsar had paid heed to Meshchersky's hints that it was contrary to the spirit of the Russian régime and suggestive of parliamentarism to make ministerial changes on the advice of the Chairman of the Council. At any rate he would not consider parting with such men as Kasso (9), an advocate of "firm government," or Rukhlov, a self-made minister risen from the bottom of the Russian peasantry; or Shcheglovitov, a guardian of the law who was always ready to subordinate justice to politics; or Krivoshein, a consummate politician who at that time enjoyed the favor of the Tsar, the Duma, the zemstvos, and the press. I often considered requesting His Majesty to accept my resignation, but refrained from doing so because I felt I had a duty to perform in moderating both our domestic and our foreign policy and because I was absolutely unwilling to force upon my gracious and considerate Sovereign the unhappy task of choosing between the other ministers and me. Nor have I ever regretted withholding this request.

The Fourth Duma convened on November 1, 1912, and the remainder of the year was devoted to its business. For some time it was unable to organize and to begin its work. This was due to the fact that although the elections had returned a majority of moderates, there was no common will or settled purpose among their several factions. I was personally acquainted with many of the Duma members, several of whom had been in the Third Duma. These called on me frequently, though furtively, on the pretext of securing some sort of information, and from the hints they dropped I could clearly see that there was chaos among the Duma parties.

My relations with the several parties varied, but in the main they were not happy. I learned from the Moscow deputy Shubinsky that his friend Rodzianko avoided me lest he compromise his chances of being elected President of the new Duma. The opposition parties, of course, had nothing to do with me. The Cadets did not know to what tune they should dance. The Nationalists, through their leader Petr Nikolaevich Balashev, gave me to understand that they were expecting me to work in close contact with them, but that because of their great number, I must take the first step—Mohammed was to go to the mountain. I was even informed that Balashev coveted the presidency of the Duma and was waiting for me to inaugurate his campaign.

In all this, I fear I was not sufficiently pliant. At any rate, I was

later assured that I was not clever enough to handle the Duma as the late Stolypin had done. Nevertheless, I tried to steer a straight course. I solicited favor from no one, shunned all intrigue, and bided my time till the Duma made some order out of its party chaos.

This, I believe, was the wise course to follow, for there was no one in the Duma upon whom to rely; all the groups sought power, influence, and government support; but none had any definite policy. The Left group was out of the question. Side by side with the Cadets there were the Progressists (10), headed by Efremov and Konovalov, both of whom considered it beneath their dignity to have any but purely official relations with the government. The Octobrists feared the predominance of the Nationalists and resented the loss of Guchkov, Kamensky, Glebov, and others. The Nationalists assumed a hostile attitude toward me from the start; they were greatly influenced by the Kiev deputy, Savenko, and his friend, Demchenko (11)—the more level-headed and business-like of the two. The Nationalists immediately established close contact with Rukhlov and Krivoshein and said openly in the Duma lobbies—as I learned immediately—that they would begin a campaign against me. Their first move in this direction came early: they introduced a bill for the purchase by the treasury of the Kiev-Voronezh railway. As for the Rights, they simply forgot the path to me. Their leaders, Markov II and Purishkevich, could not forgive me for refusing to grant them a subsidy of one million rubles for the election campaign. They found a powerful supporter in the person of the former Nizhni Novgorod Governor, Khvostov, who knew perfectly well that I had been responsible for preventing his appointment as Minister of the Interior in September 1911, after Stolypin's death.

Thus my relations with the Fourth Duma were very cool and formal and often hostile, though outwardly most cordial and correct. This was definitely demonstrated in the debates on the so-called government declaration. I had spent much careful effort in its preparation, and it had been difficult to secure agreement in the Council and to manage the Tsar, who thought that the declaration smacked too much of Western-European parliaments.

The tone of the declaration was moderate. I avoided acute problems and pleaded for peace both at home and abroad. I stressed Russia's sincere interest and effort in liquidating the trouble in the Balkans, and made a bid for the co-operation of the people's representatives in all government work.

In general, the press of Western Europe received the declaration sympathetically. Many political leaders sent me messages of congratulation. The Russian press, however, was either indifferent or openly hostile. *Novoe Vremia* made it an occasion to attack me personally.

In the Duma, the Left was unexpectedly reserved. The Octobrists and the Right applauded me. Outwardly it seemed that I had been successful—as one may also judge from the stenographic report of my speech. But when the debates started, it was another story. The Nationalists accused me of not supporting nationalistic policies, and of disregarding the legacy of Stolypin. The Rights also attacked me, seeking to complicate my position. But most astonishing was the fact that half of the ministers—Rukhlov, Krivoshein, Shcheglovitov, and Maklakov, the recently appointed Minister of the Interior—sided with my adversaries. These ministers were reliably reported as being in close contact with my opponents in the Duma.

I felt obliged to point out to the Tsar the anomaly of this situation in which ministers of the Council openly opposed the Council's Chairman. Once more I suggested that I be permitted to resign, or that I be permitted to find colleagues upon whose support I could depend, so that harmony in the Council might be restored. But again the Tsar would not hear of such changes; he thought I attached too great importance to the back-stage activities of my fellow ministers. In complying with his wishes, I may once more have exhibited unpardonable weakness, but I could not find it in my heart to disobey my Monarch. If in his estimation Russia needed my services, it was not for me to shirk my duty. Nor did I wish to abandon my beloved work.

An incident occurred at this time which throws considerable light on those persons involved. For three years the question of effecting a new agreement between the government treasury and the administration of the Kiev-Voronezh railway had been under consideration. This railway company was headed by my brother and best friend, Vasilii Nikolaevich, who had accepted his position at the insistence of Count Witte when the latter was all-powerful. He was irreproachably honest and utterly devoted to his work. The welfare of his beloved railway was his very life. Yet he appreciated the fact that, although I supported private railway construction, I should have to be particularly exacting where his company was concerned in order to avoid being accused of family favoritism.

We had easily reached an understanding, and he honestly endeavored to meet the three general demands which I made: (a) I would limit the renewal of the concession to a term of not more than twelve years, after which the government would have complete freedom of action. (b) The concession would involve the building of new branch lines, which at first might be unprofitable but which were necessary to develop the districts not connected with the existing railway net; it would also involve considerable improvement of the entire net of the company's existing lines. (c) The company would surrender to the government not less than 80 per cent of any net profit it earned in excess of 8 per cent on the capital stock, and all indefinite and controversial provisions of the railway company's statutes would be corrected in favor of the treasury.

These three demands were so advantageous for the government that I felt justified in anticipating a speedy and favorable solution of the problem. But it was not to be so. State Comptroller Kharitonov and I were in agreement, but the same cannot be said of my relations with S. V. Rukhlov, Minister of Ways and Communications. Rukhlov was decidedly opposed to large private railway construction, and was in favor of having the government buy up the lines of all large private companies as their concessions expired, for such large companies could compete with the state railways. He was not so opposed to small weak companies, however, and was ready to permit their organization; in fact he advocated it, even though these small and restricted companies might have conflicting interests. Rukhlov did not perceive the difficulties a weak company would have in obtaining capital; but this was only characteristic of his inability in financial affairs. His desire was finally to get the post of Minister of Finance, so that he might put his ideas into effect—an ambition he was destined not to achieve.

The Moscow-Kazan and the Vladikavkaz railway agreements were also up for discussion: whether to purchase these lines or to renew the old agreements with their companies. The Committee on New Railways struggled with these three problems, but solution was long delayed because of the disagreements between the Ministry of Ways and Communications on the one hand and the State Comptroller and the Ministry of Finance on the other.

These disagreements dated back to my first falling out with Rukhlov in 1910, and it was indeed high time that they should somehow be liquidated. Accordingly I submitted the matter of the Moscow-

Kazan and Vladikavkaz railways to the Council, which voted for the renewal of the old agreements. Only Maklakov, Shcheglovitov, and Kasso supported Rukhlov. The Tsar accepted with satisfaction the decision of the majority of the Council.

Meanwhile the Duma had taken on some semblance of order. It had elected its President and turned to a consideration of legislative projects. One of these projects—initiated by the two Nationalists, Demchenko and Savenko, who were close to Rukhlov, and signed by about one hundred Duma members—concerned the purchase of the Kiev-Voronezh railway. When I learned of this I telephoned Rukhlov to ascertain his attitude. He said that he heartily favored the project but, since he considered the government already committed to renew the old agreement, he would not support the Duma's proposal. I told him that I was going to submit the matter to the Council.

This I did. Rukhlov was silent; but Kharitonov spoke against the project. I stressed the financial side of the problem, pointing out that here was an instance where private capital might well be employed, thus saving government money for other enterprises. The Council unanimously refused the Duma's proposal.

But this did not prevent the Duma from adopting its project by a huge majority three weeks later—this, too, in spite of the fact that Markov I, a competent civil engineer, spoke against the project and in favor of the Council's decision. Rukhlov did not attend this session, because he was in favor of the project and could not speak for the government against it. I also stayed away in order to preclude the possibility of personal attacks. I sent my assistant, S. F. Weber; but no one paid any attention to what he had to say. The Right group and the Nationalists supported the project in order to spite me; they accused me of seeking material gain by advancing my brother's interests. The Octobrists' vote was split. The Cadets voted for the purchase of the railway as a step in furthering their pet plan of placing all railway affairs in the hands of the government.

In June 1913 the matter came before the State Council. Despite the opposition of A. P. Nikolsky, my former subordinate, and Professor Pikhno of Kiev University, this body declined the Duma's project. A week later the Ministers' Council unanimously approved the new agreement with the Kiev-Voronezh Railway Company. This was immediately confirmed by the Tsar, thus ending the intrigues that had occupied my adversaries for four long years. Needless to

say, my brother's happiness knew no bounds. From then until he died two years later he repeatedly expressed his gratitude for the part I had played in this affair.

Early in December 1912 there was another incident which aroused quite a tempest in a tea-cup. On the evening of December 4, Sukhomlinov telephoned to say that the Tsar had just given him a signed ukase to the Senate appointing General Voeikov (12), the commander of a Hussar regiment, as Head of the Department of Physical Culture. Strange as it may seem, no such department or office existed. I gathered that Voeikov was simply seeking a comfortable position for himself in connection with the prevalent fad of "national boy scouts" (*potieshny*) and I refused to countersign the ukase. I upbraided Sukhomlinov for not advising the Tsar against such an action. He replied that he was a soldier and to a soldier his Monarch's wish is law; therefore, he would countersign the ukase and turn it over to me.

This General Voeikov had married Baron Frederichs' daughter. When I told the Court Minister what had happened, he was aghast; and promised to do his utmost to persuade the Tsar at least to postpone the publication of the ukase (publication was set for December 6). In this he was successful, and I was thus given an opportunity to talk to the Tsar before this blunder had been carried through.

Meanwhile I informed the ministers of what had happened, pointing out Sukhomlinov's fault in not preventing the Tsar from taking such a step as quite illegal. The Minister of War then came in for a round of criticism, especially from Rukhlov, who accused Sukhomlinov of not being satisfied with causing discord between the Tsar and the Duma but trying as well to provoke differences between the Tsar and the Senate. He charged him with making trouble for me and thereby adding to the already heavy burden I was bearing. In reply Sukhomlinov could do no more than again take refuge behind his duty as a soldier to execute his Monarch's every wish.

Following this I prepared a letter to the Tsar once more asking to be relieved of my office, explaining that I felt that His Majesty had no confidence in me, since he had taken such action without consulting his Chairman of the Council. But before transmitting my letter to the Emperor I endeavored to show His Majesty a way out of this situation. I suggested that instead of signing the ukase and presenting it for the approval of the Senate, which would probably

refuse its publication, he could effect the same measure in an administrative way by putting General Voikov in charge of a special mission to supervise military and physical training in secondary schools without appointing him to a non-existent post. When I saw the Tsar, I explained to him why I had opposed the ukase, and suggested for his approval the alternative I had formulated. This alternative he accepted, handed me the ukase, and told me to destroy it or keep it as I wished. My purpose thus accomplished, it was not necessary for me to tender my resignation, even though the Tsar was obviously displeased with what I had done. When I asked him the reasons for his displeasure, he confessed that he had at first been irritated but said that now he saw that I was right and had been motivated only by loyalty to him. He asked me to forget his passing displeasure and to believe that he appreciated my frank conduct.

This ended the incident—but despite his words, the Tsar harbored his displeasure with me, and this fact played a part in the events which led to my dismissal in January 1914.

CHAPTER XXIX

DECEMBER 1912—JUNE 1913

On the day before Christmas, 1912, Baron Stahl (1), the Court Marshal of the Grand Duke Petr Nikolaevich, telephoned me that the Grand Duchess Militsa Nikolaevna (2) wished to see me that very day on most urgent business. I suggested that I wait upon her at 4:30 P.M.

She received me in the presence of her husband and, holding in her hand a note from her father, the King of Montenegro, asked me to listen attentively and to inform the Tsar of her father's wishes. After our interview she consented to let me have the note, so that there would be no question of inaccuracy or misunderstanding in my reports to the Tsar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The note contained four clearly formulated wishes of the King of Montenegro which I reproduce here from a copy which I preserved.

1. Russia must definitely instruct her ambassador at London not to sign any treaties or agreements regarding the liquidation of the Balkan conflict that did not recognize Skutari as belonging to Montenegro. This article was accompanied by a marginal note that "if this condition is not recognized Montenegro will attack Austria, preferring rather to perish in battle than to be deprived of the fruit of her victories."

2. The northern boundary of Albania must be defined in such a way that both Ipek and Diakovo will belong to Montenegro.

3. The supply of flour and corn promised by the Tsar to Montenegro must be sent as soon as possible, otherwise it will arrive too late and the population, deprived of food supply, will die of starvation.

4. The Montenegrin artillery is worn out, the guns are unfit for use, the shells have been used up, and it is imperative that Montenegro receive three batteries of six quick-firing guns of new design, with 1,000 shells per gun; also 1,000 shells for every old gun and 20 million cartridges for 3-line rifles (.25 caliber) which Russia has delivered to Montenegro in times past.

Regarding the first article, I tried to persuade the Grand Duchess that to give our ambassador such instructions would be to disregard the agreement the Powers had already reached with so much difficulty, and was, therefore, impossible. She was disappointed and irritated and asked why Russia could not do this for Montenegro when she had agreed to Bulgaria's demand for Adrianople. I pointed out the very essential difference that Adrianople had been surrounded by Bulgarian troops who were in a position to take the city if the Turks had refused to surrender it. Skutari, on the contrary, was not surrounded by Montenegrin troops, and it was doubtful if Montenegro had forces strong enough to capture it.

The Grand Duchess took this statement as a challenge and hastened to assure me that her father was confident his troops could take Skutari if he were willing to sacrifice 8,000 men. He wanted to know if Russia would guarantee Montenegro's possession of the city once it was captured. I replied that this was a matter for the Tsar's decision, but even he would first have to consult France and England. But I asked the Grand Duchess what she meant specifically by "guarantee." Did she mean that Russia was to prevent Austria, by force of arms if necessary, from taking Skutari for herself or from insisting that it be given to Albania? Such a "guarantee," I suggested, might lead to a general European war. But Militsa Nikolaevna objected to such categorical conditions; she argued that if Russia were to make it known that she would stand by Montenegro, Austria would not dare to move.

Regarding the second article I said that Montenegro was not so much concerned with this or that point on the Albanian frontier as with expanding its territory in that region, and to this end Russia was doing and intended to do everything in her power to safeguard the interests of Montenegro. The actual frontier would be determined in the future. To attempt to determine it now would only complicate the general situation and was therefore inadvisable.

Regarding the third article, I promised the Grand Duchess that supplies would be dispatched immediately; the necessary measures had already been taken.

Regarding the fourth article, I said that, at the moment, Russia was certainly not in a position to supply Montenegro with artillery, shells, and cartridges. This would be a patent violation of our neutrality and would involve tremendous consequences, as Austria and Germany would certainly protest. Nor would France and England

favor such action. But more important was the fact that we ourselves lacked artillery, and every day I met new proof of the fact that we were far behind our own requirements in guns and ammunition.

Again the Grand Duchess was irritated. She wanted to know if Russia would pay for artillery and ammunition should her father be able to procure it from some other country. This, I replied, must mean that the King of Montenegro was considering a revision of his agreement with the Tsar. The Grand Duchess knew quite well to what "agreement" I was alluding; it was precisely the one which for many years past had provided for the subsidies granted by the Russian Government to the King of Montenegro for the various requirements of his country. A revision of this arrangement might be prejudicial to Montenegro as conditions then were, and might even make the continuance of financial assistance from Russia difficult, in case of disagreement. It was in the light of these circumstances that I said to the Grand Duchess that I was certainly unable to see any advantage in raising the matter at such an inopportune time. Militsa Nikolaevna made no reply. It remained for me to report this conversation to Sazonov and to the Tsar.

The Grand Duchess never forgave me for not complying with all of her father's requests. Even after the war, as exiles in Paris, where we sometimes met at dinner with the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, she refused to speak to me.

During these months, the events in the Balkans occupied the center of interest. As these events became more complicated, Sazonov came to me more and more for advice. He found in me an ardent advocate of peace. I perceived only too well our unpreparedness for war, the weakness of our military organization, and the consequences of a war for Russia. Therefore, I always championed a policy of moderation and conciliation. The Tsar, however, did not approve of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council being so directly concerned with foreign policy. He considered them his own private concern and was displeased to see that the Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed them with me privately and in the Ministers' Council. His Majesty did not once mention to me directly that I was meddling with affairs not of my concern, but he could not understand why it was that the foreign ambassadors addressed themselves to me and not exclusively to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He made it plain by well directed hints that neither the Ministers' Council nor its Chairman had anything to do with foreign policy. I felt obliged to

carry on, however; but I was careful not to cause any complication, especially since *Grazhdanin* was hinting that the Chairman of the Council was beginning to "usurp the prerogatives of the Supreme Power which alone is supposed to handle foreign affairs."

But events forced me farther and farther into these affairs. Ambassadors began to call on me more and more frequently, looking for support, especially the ambassadors of France, Germany, and Japan. The relations between M. Louis and Sazonov were growing worse, and the former called on me regularly asking for my assistance in their conflicts. Count Pourtalès openly visited me before he went to Sazonov or immediately afterward, and informed me of all he was instructed to convey to our government. Baron Motono also took me into his confidence, and through his position in the diplomatic corps I was able to carry on my policy of peacefully liquidating the Balkan crisis. After the London Conference in the spring of 1913 had ended the first Balkan war, Motono congratulated me, saying that the conflict had been localized thanks to three persons: the Tsar, Sazonov, and myself. During the Slavic banquets of Bashmakov (3), Brianchaninov (4), and others, however, fiery speeches were made and the anti-Slavic conduct of some ministers "who have sold themselves to German influence" was denounced. My name was always mentioned with Sazonov's in this connection, and the demonstrations against him were intended for my windows, too, but were kept away by the police.

The turn of the year was largely taken up with preparations for the festivities celebrating the 300th anniversary of the House of Romanov's accession to the Russian throne. Late in March I was informed by the Chief Court Marshal, Count Benckendorf, that the Tsar wished to be accompanied on these festive journeys only by Maklakov, Rukhlov, and myself—the other ministers were to go directly to Moscow. But even though we three were to accompany the Tsar, we were to provide our own transportation and accommodation, a matter in which I was greatly aided by Rukhlov, who, as Minister of Ways and Communications, had means at his disposal. This, of course, is no reflection on His Majesty, who would gladly have provided for us; it is simply an indication of the regard in which ministers of the government were held by the managers of the Imperial Court.

Evidently the Tsar's journey was to be in the nature of a family celebration. The concepts of state and government were to be pushed

into the background and the personality of the Tsar was to dominate the scene. The current attitude seemed to suggest that the government was a barrier between the people and their Tsar, whom they regarded with blind devotion as anointed by God. This attitude of the people was due, I believe, not to any lack of prestige on the part of government leaders but to the results of the seven years of peace and prosperity that had followed the disturbances of 1905–1906. The Tsar's closest friends at the court became persuaded that the Sovereign could do anything by relying upon the unbounded love and utter loyalty of the people. The ministers of the government, on the other hand, did not hold to this sort of autocracy; nor did the Duma, which steadily sought control of the executive power. Both were of the opinion that the Sovereign should recognize that conditions had changed since the day the Romanovs became Tsars of Moscow and lords of the Russian domain.

Despite the solemnity which pervaded the Romanov celebrations they were rather colorless. Our first stop on the journey was at Vladimir, then, in order, Nizhni Novgorod, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Suzdal, and Rostov. Everywhere I was impressed by the lack of enthusiasm and the smallness of the crowds. At Nizhni Novgorod, Rukhlov gave voice to this same impression: there was nothing in the feeling of the crowd but shallow curiosity. Down the Volga from Nizhni there was a biting cold wind, and the Tsar did not once show himself where stop-overs had been arranged. There were handsomely ornamented descents from the shore to the water where small groups of peasants were gathered apparently waiting to see their Tsar; but in vain, for the steamship went steadily on till it reached Kostroma, where it stopped for the night. Here alone was there anything approaching enthusiasm at the sight of the Tsar and his family. It seemed that the return of warm weather had thawed out the crowd.*

Then there was Moscow with all its splendor. But even in this historic city a smaller crowd than usual thronged the Krasnaia Ploshchad. The Tsarevich was carried along in the arms of a Cossack of the bodyguard, and as the procession paused opposite the Minin and

* At Kostroma Rasputin was seen in one of the churches. I asked General Dzhunkovsky (5), Assistant Minister of the Interior and Commander of the Gendarme Corps, what the "starets" was doing there. He said he didn't know; that he had nothing to do with the issue of permits to places to be visited by the Imperial family. I could not refrain from reminding him that such laxity might easily lead to another Bogrov incident.

Pozharsky monument (6) I clearly heard exclamations of sorrow at the sight of this poor, helpless child, the heir to the throne of the Romanovs. As the days of celebration flew by I felt only the lifelessness and emptiness of what was supposed to be a festive anniversary. There was brilliance and a motley throng but complete unawareness of the dangers which beset Russia both at home and abroad.

As for myself, I was worried over the situation in the Balkans; and, to do Sazonov justice, he too was bothered by developments there. The Turkish problem had been temporarily settled, but now the Serbs and Bulgars were at each others' throats. The Tsar, too, was anxious that these disturbances should not develop into a European war. More than once he expressed his confidence in Emperor William, whose influence on Austria he believed would make for peace. Yet in all this, he never permitted his anxiety to show through his calm and self-control. This quiet confidence was characteristic of the Tsar—not only at the time of which I write but at all times. Even in the anxious days of July 1914, during the World War, and in the face of defeat his faith in the future of Russia never left him. He believed that he was destined to lead his country to greatness, that although he suffered trials and misfortunes these would only make the reign of his beloved son more resplendent and glorious. It was this courageous belief that carried him apparently unperturbed through the Romanov celebration at a time when Europe was shaking from the second Balkan war.

On March 9 the Minister of War telephoned me to say that the Tsar wished to see me at ten o'clock the next morning. At Tsarskoe Selo I was ushered into the Empress' large corner salon, where the Grand Dukes Nikolai Nikolaevich, and Sergei Mikhailovich (7), the Minister of War, Chief of General Staff Zhilinsky, the Naval Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, and the State Comptroller had already assembled. The Tsar entered almost immediately afterwards, and when everyone was seated he addressed himself to me as follows:

"Since the matter which concerns us depends on money first of all, I want the Chairman of the Ministers' Council and Minister of Finance to tell us how he regards the suggestion of the Minister of War?"

This was another surprise. I knew nothing of any suggestion from the Minister of War, and said so to His Majesty.

"How does it happen, Vladimir Aleksandrovich," demanded the

Tsar, "that the Chairman of the Council again knows nothing of your report? It has been printed; I myself read it two weeks ago; and you asked me for permission to distribute it to the members of this conference which has now assembled at your request."

Sukhomlinov was confused. "I cannot understand it, Your Majesty. The report was sent to the Minister of Finance yesterday morning and must be somewhere about his office."

All the other ministers said that they had received the report the previous week. I assured the Tsar that on leaving home at 9:15 I had seen my secretary, who had told me that there had been nothing from the Minister of War. The Tsar suggested that the conference be postponed for a week, but I asked permission to have the report read immediately, hoping to be able to discuss it without any preparation.

This was done. General Zhilinsky read the report. It stated the necessity of speedily increasing our army in view of the increase in the German army, and of appropriating to this end the sum of over 350 million rubles, increasing at the same time the expenditures of the War Ministry 100 million rubles yearly. Statistics were attached to the report.

A hurried glance through the report was enough to show me that it had been hastily prepared. There were many omissions: no mention was made of expenditures for new barracks or supplies that would be needed to provide for the increased number of troops; no mention was made of lengthening the service, a change in which France was particularly interested; no mention was made of transport problems.

The Tsar asked me if I still wanted to discuss the report immediately; I answered in the affirmative and he gave me permission to speak.

I began by referring to Sukhomlinov's continual complaints that I refused to allocate sufficient credits to the Ministry of War. Nearly every issue of *Russkii Invalid* (8) made this the excuse for our slow progress in military preparations as compared with our probable enemies. But what was the real situation, I asked. Germany had, in 1911, passed a law levying additional taxes to meet army needs. That was two years before, but only now did the Minister of War think it necessary to get on even terms, and he was in such a hurry to make up for lost time that he did not even send the Minister of Finance a copy of his report, though all other ministers had received one. Moreover, after having two years in which to work out his report,

the Minister of War presented it full of omissions, which I pointed out. The necessary corrections could not be made at this conference at a moment's notice; therefore all we could do was to charge the Minister of War to correct his errors, then to present his report to the Duma for its consideration. This should be done without delay. I suggested that hereafter the Minister of War might spend his time more profitably than looking for persons to bear the responsibility of his own mistakes.

In conclusion, I opposed increasing the numbers of our army, and advocated increasing the term of service. I based my opposition on the fact that the Duma considered the existing yearly quota of recruits (570,000) a serious burden on the people; an additional 120,000 would only rouse antagonism. General Zhilinsky thought this matter worthy of consideration, but Maklakov argued ardently in favor of making all men pass through the ranks of the army, an experience which, he thought, improved their minds, their bodies, and their morale. I protested, too, that no one was more concerned than I about the defense of our country, and that I should find whatever money was necessary for military needs providing it were put to sound and immediate use. To make this promise more concrete, I said that there was a surplus of 400 million rubles in the Treasury; this I was prepared to appropriate to the needs of defense. If this were done, of course, other ministers would have to forego making extra demands. Besides, the new plan of the Minister of War would necessitate an increase of 150 million rubles in the budget. This also I was prepared to provide out of our increasing revenues. Here again, however, other ministries would have to restrict their demands for money.

The Tsar thanked me for my explanations and assurances, then closed the conference. As the ministers were leaving, the Tsar detained me to ask me to do what I could to hurry Sukhomlinov along with this work. I promised, but expressed my doubts as to the success of my efforts. My doubts were justified, for although Sukhomlinov promised the Tsar that he would have the plan ready by May 1 it was a year before it was submitted to the Duma. Even then, there were still omissions and errors!

My budget speech for 1913 was in every sense of the word my swan song, for when the time for the debates on the budget for 1914 arrived I was no longer Minister of Finance. The budget was presented by my successor, Bark (9), who limited himself to very brief

remarks mainly devoted to praise of the Chairman of the Budget Committee.

The preliminary work of the Budget Committee was especially protracted in 1913, and the debates did not begin till May 10. In my speech, I pointed out that the budget had been balanced by recourse to ordinary revenues only, despite the fact that there had been many extraordinary expenditures. I did my best to avoid any statements that might give rise to the "polemics" which so frequently characterized these debates. As can be seen from the stenographic report, my speech was well received, especially by the Center and the left wing of the Right group.

As might have been expected, Shingarev had something to say. Konovalov also spoke. Both expressed trite liberal sentiments. The main opposition, however, came from the Right, the Nationalist Savenko, and from the extreme Right represented by Markov II. This latter centered his remarks on the Poliakov affair, accusing the Ministry of Finance of connivance with the Jews to the detriment of the state. He said that the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich had been a victim of his war against the Jews, and that he would never have permitted such favoritism as was displayed by the ministry toward Poliakov.

I replied to Markov II on May 12. I said that, during the term of office of State Secretary Witte, Poliakov's interests had been represented by none other than the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, to whose insistence it could be attributed that an exception had been made in Poliakov's favor, not to benefit Poliakov personally but to protect the interests of an enormous number of depositors in his bank who would have been ruined had the government not rendered assistance to Poliakov's firm. In fact, in 1910 Stolypin demanded a speedy settlement of Poliakov's accounts. I opposed this, representing that securities ought to be sold only at a profit; such a sale I had accomplished in 1912, thanks to which the State Bank made a profit of three million rubles (see pp. 188-90). I ended my reply with a comparison, perhaps needlessly sharp, saying that Markov II reminded me of a general of whom it was said that in spelling a word of three letters he managed to make four mistakes.

Two weeks later Markov II answered me in my absence by shouting to the Duma, "And I shall tell the Minister of Finance simply this: 'One should not steal.'" What he meant, no one knows. Such an implicit accusation of the head of the government, however, was

unpardonable. The acting president of the Duma, Prince Volkonsky (10), ought to have reprimanded Markov II, but did nothing. Nor did any member of the Duma raise his voice against the innuendo.

Later Prince Volkonsky apologized for his fault and offered to tender his resignation. When I suggested that the place to make an apology was from the Duma tribune, Volkonsky agreed but said that Rodzianko and the Council of Elders opposed such a course. Rodzianko himself came to see me about the incident to learn what I proposed to do. I explained that it would all depend how the Tsar reacted to this unrebuked insult to his Chairman of the Council. I suggested that he publicly forbid such conduct in the future.

I brought the matter before the ministers. They decided not to ignore it but to request the Tsar's permission to stay away from Duma sessions until amends had been made and assurance given that the offense would not be repeated. In the meantime they would be represented by their assistants. Shcheglovitov and Maklakov would even have gone so far as to recommend the dissolution of the Duma.

The Tsar confirmed the Council's decision, which was soon known in the city. Rodzianko visited me to inform me that the Council of Elders was opposed to his making a statement to the Duma. Shubinsky and N. N. Lvov also called on me; the former favored the government's point of view, as did the latter, although he was a member of the opposition and had had practically no dealings with me. Lvov said that Rodzianko had distorted the truth, saying that the Duma would be dissolved if an apology was not forthcoming. This, of course, was not so and when Lvov had learned the actual truth he was quite ready to endorse the government's decision.

The press, however, was adverse in its criticism. Both *Rech* and *Novoe Vremia* suggested that the government ought not to follow a policy of obstruction; these papers failed to understand that it was the Duma and not the government that refused to effect a reconciliation. The incident was not liquidated till the autumn, in the beginning of a new session. Then Rodzianko did what I had advised him to do in May, and received congratulations for having ended this unfortunate affair.

After the adjournment of the Duma session I was called upon to devote much time and energy to matters of railway construction, as M. de Verneuil, representative of the Paris brokers' corporation, had arrived in St. Petersburg. At that time he played an important part

in the stock exchange and did not always use his influence to further the interests of Russian credit, despite his frequent assurances to the contrary.

Meanwhile, in spite of my sharp differences with Rukhlov, private construction began to develop at a great pace. The old companies sought and were granted extensions of their concessions with permission to build many miles of new roads. A number of smaller railway companies soon sprang up owing to Rukhlov's exceptional support. He intended, for reasons I could not fathom, to create in these smaller companies a sort of counterweight to the large old companies, which, however, were perfectly controlled by the government. His ministry continually solicited my approval of the speedy formation of these companies.

For the most part, persons petitioning for a concession lacked not only capital but also business reputation and credit. I tried to represent to Rukhlov the harmfulness of a system under which the petitioners, having obtained their charter but having no way of putting it into operation, rushed straightway to the different Russian banks to sell their concessions, under the form of subscribing the share capital, thus discrediting Russian business and ruining our credit. My remonstrances, however, remained for the most part useless. To him it was simply one phase of my support of large railway companies. But since he was invariably supported by the ministers of the so-called Right group—Shcheglovitov, Maklakov, Kasso, Sukhomlinov, and later Krivoshein—I was left no choice but to yield; it was purposeless at every step to create conflicts and report them to the Tsar.

Thus, toward the beginning of 1913, a great number of concessions had been granted. The securities for these new undertakings could not be sold in the domestic market; therefore the Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels markets were invaded. The result was exactly what might have been expected. Large foreign banks, not knowing the concessionaires, refused to negotiate with them. They were not prepared to offer the public securities, even to the small extent of twenty or thirty million francs, on railways the names of which the public could not pronounce and the location of which could not be found on a map. The public, of course, required the guaranty of the Russian government.

The concessionaires were left no choice but to turn to small banking houses. These were not interested in the conditions of Russian

credit, nor were they concerned about the interests of their clients and any possible disturbance on the money market. They were interested solely in concluding this deal and in selling the obligations as low as possible, after putting into their own pockets substantial commissions. Never once did the concessionaires consider the fact that no self-respecting Russian Minister of Finance would confirm a deal so obviously harmful to state credit. Therefore, they brought their preliminary contracts back to St. Petersburg and were most naively surprised to see that the obstinate minister, instead of complimenting them on their brilliant financial success, definitely refused to have the results of their efforts confirmed.

This gave rise to a new legend on my preference for large railway companies. New complaints were made to Rukhlov as protector of "the little ones." There were new unpleasant arguments in the Ministers' Council and new attempts to prevail upon me to change my policy. No matter how small the concession, no matter how unacceptable the terms obtained by its holders, there were always a few persons who were willing to support the new concessionaires that I "oppressed." Naturally, this resulted in an increase of Rukhlov's popularity at my expense. It also resulted in an accumulation of charters granted but inoperative.

Many of those close to me tried to make me change my attitude and to confirm some unprofitable deals, letting Rukhlov assume all moral responsibility. This I could not do; I was actually responsible, and I was unwilling to mortgage by such action the results of new railway construction and the general condition of Russian state credit. No one in the Ministers' Council was interested in this aspect of the matter; some did not understand the essence of it; others, such as Timashev or Kharitonov, understood perfectly but were unwilling to support my point of view; still others, like Krivoshein, Shcheglovitov, and especially Rukhlov, had their own theories of paper currency and firmly believed me to be a partisan of the gold standard and of restricted issue of paper money.

Given these conditions M. de Verneuil's arrival in St. Petersburg was most timely. De Verneuil, abrupt, self-confident, and believing his influence upon the Paris money market to be much greater than it actually was, announced to me that the Paris market had been positively confused by the appearance in Paris of a series of unknown Russian business men who literally stormed the doors of the Parisian banks, mostly the small ones, offering to accept the most fantastic

terms so long as they were guaranteed a market for their securities. Moreover, they had assured everyone that the Minister of Finance would confirm their transactions.

Therefore, he informed me that the purpose of his visit was: (a) to find out whether or not I actually intended to confirm these unprofitable transactions and disregard the fall of other Russian securities which would inevitably follow; (b) to explain to me the tremendous harm Russia was doing herself by financing her railway construction by such means; and (c) to inform me that he had been authorized by his Minister of Finance to discuss with me certain changes to be introduced into the general terms of the Russian railway securities to be offered on the French market.

I had had no instructions as to the official character of de Verneuil's mission either from the Minister of Finance, Charles Dumont (11), whom I did not know personally, or from the French Ambassador, Delcassé (12), with whom I was on the most cordial terms. I had every reason for doubting its official character, knowing how little de Verneuil was loved by the representatives of large banks always most influential in the ministry. But after making some inquiries I learned that the French government had indeed authorized him to confer with me and was even expecting a written communication from me as to the result of the conference. I was greatly astonished not to have been advised by the French Ministry of Finance of de Verneuil's mission; nevertheless, we had our conference and agreed upon a new method of financing railway construction. This method was my suggestion, and at first I was bitterly attacked for it in the Duma, although my successor, Bark, adopted it from the start. Finally the Duma pronounced it a very happy solution of this complicated problem.

My plan was as follows: The concessionaires were not to conduct negotiations with the financiers; this task was to be performed solely by the Minister of Finance. The small issues of securities of separate railways were to be merged into one so-called consolidated loan divided into series according to individual railway undertakings.

This accomplished several purposes at the same time: (a) Unskillful agents were removed from the business of negotiating with the banking circles. (b) Such negotiations were entrusted to a responsible minister, so that all doubts as to an ultimate confirmation of the transaction were removed. (c) The international market was freed of the oppressing anxiety that soon after the completion of one

financial agreement another would appear, introducing new instability into stock exchange operations.

State Comptroller Kharitonov played an important part in this business. I introduced him to de Verneuil, with whom he discussed the problem in hand. Later he influenced Rukhlov to see the advantages of the consolidation loan. This meant, of course, that there would be less opposition in the Council when I made my report. I had no intention of making a written report, since I had nothing final in my possession; therefore I made an oral report. I was supported not only by Kharitonov and Rukhlov but even by Krivoshein, whom I had advised of the proposed new plan.

During my next report to the Tsar he authorized me to begin negotiations with Paris and, if I thought it necessary, to go there in person at my first opportunity. I set my trip for the fall. Meanwhile I got in touch with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked him to forewarn the French government of this new project. Through Raffalovich I also advised the Russian banking group of it.

Soon afterward, General Joffre (13), Chief of the French General Staff, arrived in St. Petersburg to interview our Chief of the General Staff. These interviews were annual affairs, held alternately at Paris and St. Petersburg in accord with our new military convention with France. Sukhomlinov had not advised me of Joffre's visit, nor had there been any mention of it in the press. I learned of it only when the French Embassy inquired as to when I could receive the French General and his staff.

They came to see me at my country house on Elagin Island. General Joffre said he had come to solicit my co-operation in the matter of developing the Russian railway net, as the preparation for joint military effort depended upon the railways. I explained that such development depended upon the obtaining of necessary capital, which, as I saw matters, could be found only in France.

I should have preferred to continue the discussion in private with the General, but he assured me that since his staff and our army officials who had accompanied him were all directly concerned we could continue in their presence. Accordingly, I explained in detail the condition of our railway construction, both state and private, what credits had been appropriated in the budget, how many concerns had been granted concessions, how much money was needed, and the time set for the completion of the railways. I offered to give the General a detailed written memorandum with a map appended, show-

ing all these railways, as I believed this would be of interest to the French Staff in considering the conditions of Russian mobilization. He replied, however, that the French Staff had, he believed, all this information; that at least his officers followed closely all changes in the Russian railway net. His staff voiced their assent.

I then asked the General's permission to discuss the more general matter of the condition of our national defense. I expressed my certainty that in France, as well as in Russia, the Minister of War had differences with the Minister of Finance over the appropriation of funds. General Joffre and many of his companions were amused at this but readily admitted that such was the case. In fact they envied the position of the Russian War Minister, who could always prevail upon the Minister of Finance to yield to his demands.

Then I excused myself for a moment, went upstairs to my study, and brought back a memorandum, which I always kept close at hand, of the credits appropriated to the Ministry of War and how much of these were unused. On returning, I announced that at that moment the Minister of War had at his disposal over 200 million gold rubles, that is, over 500 million gold francs in unused credits. The amazement of the Frenchmen at this knew no bounds. Joffre personally accepted my explanations with perfect calm, but many of his companions questioned me as to the reason for this situation, which was to them a remarkable state of affairs, for in France the contrary condition prevailed: expenditures were often made before the credits had been appropriated by the chambers. Not wishing to expose our conditions any further, I merely said that our chambers had much sympathy with the needs of national defense and never refused the Minister of War any of his demands. This often paralyzed the natural efforts of the Minister of Finance to limit these credits, especially when he saw that sums already requested remained unused, a condition due to the fact that, contrary to the French custom, the appropriation of credits ran far ahead of the realization of the projects. In reality, I said, the realization of military projects was noted for its exceptional slowness, negligence of detail, frequent changes of plan, and, in short, an inefficient executive administration.

In conclusion I assured Joffre that more than anyone else I was ready to assist the development of the army and the improvement of national defense. I asked him to become more closely acquainted, during his visit, with the actual state of affairs and to ask the War Minister to show him our actual military plans and preparations and

how far they had been carried out. In particular, I asked him to pay special attention to our orders for heavy artillery, in which field I could observe a great divergence between the actual accomplishments of the ministry and our real needs. I met the General but once more during his visit, at dinner at the French ambassador's, and he made no mention of the subject of our first and only conversation.

A week later I reported to the Tsar the details of my meeting with General Joffre. His Majesty waited till I had finished, then said calmly that the Minister of War had already informed him of it. I suggested that perhaps General Sukhomlinov considered I had acted incorrectly, to which the Tsar replied:

"Of course, you complained to the French General about the Russian Minister of War, and asked for his support. You forgot that 'one should not sweep one's house before strangers.' However, I told Vladimir Aleksandrovich [Sukhomlinov] frankly that we had no right to conceal our lack of preparedness from our allies. They might be able to assist us, and at any rate we must be honest and not afraid to reveal our shortcomings. It would be worse to say that everything was well with us and later on, at a difficult moment, to fail in our promises."

Whether His Majesty was sincere in this statement or merely wished to say nice things to me, while sharing Sukhomlinov's ideas, I cannot tell. One thing only must be recorded. As I learned later at Paris, General Joffre and General Zhilinsky, our Chief of Staff, had on this occasion discussed in detail the construction of a series of strategic railways. They had even worked out a scheme which in the end of August Sukhomlinov took to Livadia, where it was approved by the Tsar, although neither myself nor the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Ways and Communications knew anything of it.

After the departure of General Joffre my relations with Paris became very lively. The French government carried out its promise and informed the most prominent banks of the so-called Russian group (Crédit Lyonnais, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, Comptoir National d'Escompte, Société Générale, and the House of Hottinguer) that it desired them as speedily as possible to complete their negotiations with me regarding a new type of railway loan, so that my written communications through the representative of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, M. Netzlin, from the outset were optimistic. M. de Verneuil also gave me much support. Also V. F. Trepov made

two trips to Paris, and although he followed his own purposes in so doing,* nevertheless he succeeded in preparing the banking circles for my impending trip to Paris.

Thus the first consolidated railway loan was to be negotiated for the sum of 1,250 million rubles, or nearly three and a half billion francs—a sum exceptionally large for those times. The transaction was completely successful. The ground was so thoroughly prepared by correspondence during the summer that when I went to Paris in the autumn—of which more later—all there was to do was to make the formal agreement.

The loan was negotiated in January 1914 directly before my dismissal. Its success was to be enjoyed by my successor, P. L. Bark. Then came the war, and all this carefully erected structure collapsed irrevocably before the storm which swept away the entire Russian state.

* He was making an effort to secure a concession for the construction of the Southern Siberian Railway and I promised to support him in preference to other competitors, but on the same terms, as well as to include his railway in the first group, provided I should be able to effect in France a loan of not less than 250 million rubles a year for five years.

CHAPTER XXX

JUNE-OCTOBER, 1913

Late in July 1913 the Imperial family left for the Fjords. While in these waters the Tsar seldom received personal reports from his ministers. During my ten-year (1904-1914) administration of the Ministry of Finance, only once, in 1912, did I report to him there, and on that occasion my interview with Joffre and with de Verneuil had necessitated a special audience.

Just before my departure the Tsar's aide-de-camp, Naryshkin, left me a formal letter advising me of the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna's wish that I report to her in person regarding the petition of Lieutenant of the Naval Guards, Mochulsky. This requires some explanation.

Mochulsky had petitioned for permission to purchase 300 desiatins of land from a large estate of 16,000 desiatins situated in the Bolgrad Uezd in Bessarabia Gubernia. At that time the Peasant Bank, after prolonged effort, had succeeded in persuading the Rumanian government to permit the estate to be sold for three million rubles. This put an end to an unnatural state of affairs. The Greek monastery of St. Spiridonius, situated in Rumania, had owned this land, which it rented for a trifling sum to different persons in Bessarabia and these in their turn rented the land to Russian peasants at much higher rates. The peasants had tried to purchase this land, but the Rumanian government had urged the monastery not to enter into small deals with them. Large purchases by peasant communities were of course impossible because the peasants lacked the cash which the monastery demanded in payment. Persons interested in this estate took advantage of every opportunity for hindering the deal I was trying to put through, and only after much effort and with the assistance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was I able to obtain the consent of the Rumanian government for the sale of the estate to us. The terms of this complicated operation had been worked out and a plan for the liquidation of the estate through the agency of the Peasant Bank had been arranged. There had been prepared in advance agreements with land-poor peasants who had long been await-

ing the purchase of the estate by the Peasant Bank. Great advantages were envisaged both for the peasants and for the Bank. What happened after I left the Ministry of Finance I do not know. In the summer of 1913 the entire transaction was in full swing, but I doubt if it was completed before the war.

It was in the midst of these events that Lieutenant Mochulsky made his request to the Empress. Naryshkin's letter did not surprise me, for in the winter of 1912-1913 I had been approached by General Komarov (1), who was often present in the Tsar's waiting-room awaiting the arrival of the ministers, to whom he always had some request to submit. He had informed me that Lieutenant Mochulsky's mother had petitioned the Tsar that she or her son be permitted to purchase 300 desiatins from the estate of the monastery of St. Spiridonius being purchased by the Peasant Bank at the Peasant Bank's purchasing price. The Tsar had shown me the petition and asked if it could be granted. I had explained that this was impossible, as all the land was to be sold to the peasants and even then only a small percentage of the land-poor peasants would be accommodated.

Naryshkin's letter showed that the Mochulskys, having failed to gain their ends through the Tsar, had turned to the Empress. Therefore when I reported to His Majesty in the Fjords I read Naryshkin's letter to him and reminded him of what I had already said about such a petition. He delegated me to explain to Her Majesty why the Mochulskys' request could not be granted.

In spite of His Majesty's assurances to the contrary, I still felt that the Empress was not favorably disposed toward me. When she received me I inquired about her health and then proceeded directly to the task in hand, not omitting to mention that the Tsar shared my opinion concerning the petition. Her Majesty listened with ill-concealed displeasure and, when I had finished, said, "I felt positive that you would take this stand; but then I am accustomed to having most of my requests refused." I hastened to assure her of my eagerness to comply with her wishes but that wishes such as these were impossible of fulfillment for reasons of state.

Thus the interview ended. It was the last time I spoke to the Empress. That autumn I went twice to Livadia, but on neither occasion did she leave her apartments. Whether she was indisposed or whether she wished to avoid me, I do not know.*

* In 1924 I met Lieutenant Mochulsky in Paris. He was in straitened circumstances and asked my assistance in getting work. When I recalled the incident

Late in July 1913, when most of the ministers had gone on their vacations, General Dzhunkovsky, Assistant Minister of the Interior, came to my office much perturbed at the reappearance in St. Petersburg of Mme Shornikova (2). This woman had been involved in the trial of the Social-Democrats of the Second Duma, and had been in hiding. As there were many questions about this affair which Dzhunkovsky could not answer, I summoned the Chief of the Police Department, Beletsky. From him I learned that Mme Shornikova had played a prominent part in the trial of the Social-Democrat group, had been secretary of its military section, and directly concerned with the drafting of this section's instructions. She had turned over the document to the police, thus materially assisting the prosecution. For, at the same time, Mme Shornikova had been employed by the Police Department. This department had assisted her to escape after the principal Social-Democrat leaders were arrested and since then had maintained her in one place or another. By 1913, however, the revolutionary organizations were aware of her duplicity. In fact, it was their persecutions that drove her now in 1913 to seek help from the Police Department to which she was no longer of any use.

Mme Shornikova wanted to be sent to America. Beletsky fell in with this idea and suggested that I provide the necessary money. But both Dzhunkovsky and I were disinclined. Such a procedure we thought would only involve the government in an unsavory episode. I recommended that Mme Shornikova simply be taken care of till the Ministers' Council had taken action on her case.

When Shcheglovitov reached the capital in answer to my summons, he came to see me immediately. He was familiar with the whole affair. He knew that Mme Shornikova had been sought by the police, but he believed that she was not guilty of any crime of which the Social-Democratic group had been accused and therefore could not be indicted. She was not even a member of the Social-Democratic party, and the instructions to the party's military section had been dictated to her and she had simply written them down. In his opinion the only thing to do was to liquidate the charge against her, and he commended me for not having agreed to send her to America, a step which would have exposed the government to unpleasant accusations.

narrated above he confessed that he had not grasped the full significance of his action. He had thought that one could petition the Tsar or Empress for anything. He would not divulge, however, the names of his immediate superiors who had permitted him to present such requests.

Shcheglovitov's opinion was confirmed by Korsak (3), Prosecuting Attorney of the Palata, who had again gone over the case, and by the preliminary conference of all the available ministers. The most serious problem confronting the ministers was what to do with Mme. Shornikova. Beletsky repeated his proposal to ship her to America; Maklakov supported him, but added that it would be necessary to maintain her there, and this could be done only if the Minister of Finance would advance the necessary money. I opposed this idea and was supported by Shcheglovitov and Krivoshein. The latter foresaw a situation, if the procedure were adopted, in which the government would have to be prepared to ship every police agent to America and keep him or her at the expense of the Russian State. Beletsky's proposal was rejected.

Korsak and Shcheglovitov then explained that in order to dismiss an indictment for a political crime tried by the Special Court of the Senate the case had to be considered by the Senate, or rather by that same Special Court. During summer vacations another body might perform the function of this court and in this Summer Court the duties of the Prosecuting Attorney might be discharged by the Prosecuting Attorney of the St. Petersburg Palata. The Summer Court would have to be supplied with the data showing that Mme. Shornikova had had no part in the crime for which she was indicted.

The Ministers' Council decided to submit the case, and charged Korsak and Shcheglovitov with calling a summer session of the Special Court. Shcheglovitov was also charged with requesting permission to make a special report to the Tsar informing His Majesty of the case.

This was done. During the next two weeks every technicality was observed, the case was considered by the Senate, which approved of its dismissal. Thus this unfortunate incident was concluded. What the Police Department did with Mme Shornikova later I do not know.

During the last weeks of summer I worked diligently at the budget. I was eager to finish it early so that I should have time to go abroad and to conclude the transactions for the railway consolidation loan. Thanks to improved financial conditions, the prospect of a good harvest and a steady income of revenue, I was better able to meet the demands of the various departments. This lessened arguments and friction, and the budget was balanced early in September, before the time prescribed by law (October 1).

I left for the Crimea on September 12 to report to the Tsar.

Thence I intended to go abroad. I was anxious to avoid political discussions with foreign representatives but recognized that as Chairman of the Ministers' Council this would be difficult. I decided, therefore, to ask the Tsar for instructions as to my official conduct abroad. In view of our financial negotiations with France, and in view of the disturbances in the Balkans—Albania in particular—I anticipated that in Paris particularly attempts would be made to draw me into discussions of political problems.

At Yalta all was calm and peaceful. The Imperial family was happy, relatively free from cares of state; the court, removed from the society of St. Petersburg, was bored. The Tsar walked, rode, and regularly discharged routine duties connected with reports from the capital. There was everywhere an air of leisure and benevolence into which I was always loth to bring controversial political issues and problems of state. I felt that though the ministers were received as guests their hosts were most cordial at the moment of their departure.

Notwithstanding all this, my wife and I were well received and the Tsar showed every attention to my report, especially the part of it concerning the budget. When I asked for instructions regarding my official conduct abroad he said merely that I ought not to worry about France, since my time would probably be taken up with the railway loan. I was to give his regards to Poincaré and to assure him that Russia was greatly pleased to be in such happy accord with France on matters that were disturbing the peace of the world. As for Italy, he cautioned me to have no conversations. He did not trust the Italians, who were so polite but so scheming, courting both France and Germany at the same time in an endeavor to ascertain their most profitable affinity.

Then there was Berlin. I felt obliged to pay my respects to Emperor William in order to thank him once more for the honor he had done me in decorating me with the Black Eagle. Count Pourtalès, German ambassador to Russia, had suggested returning from Berlin to St. Petersburg with me. Besides I had promised to visit Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

Sazonov thought it all right for me to stop over in Berlin. He expected that the Kaiser would not be in Berlin at that time and, therefore, I could easily get out of seeing him. The Tsar was of the same mind, and was eager that I should do everything possible to avoid meeting his imperial cousin. He advised me, of course, to be sure to let Paris know what I intended to do in Berlin.

I digress briefly at this point to relate an incident which occurred while I was at Yalta. I had been sent a copy of the *Grashdanin* from St. Petersburg, a column of which, the "Diary," was written by Meshchersky himself. This column was entirely devoted to me and my proposed trip abroad. He boldly accused the government of "parliamentarism"; he attacked the ministers, especially the Chairman of the Ministers' Council, for lowering the prestige of the Imperial authority; and, finally, airing his pet theory, he expounded the necessity of doing away with this "Western-European innovation," of abolishing the Ministers' Council, and of returning to the former Ministers' Committee headed by a dignitary as worthy and as loyal to his Tsar as were, for example, I. L. Goremykin and A. S. Taneev. Because of my personal antipathy toward "the young and talented Minister of the Interior," the Diary continued, I was continually opposing him in his efforts to carry out the will of the Monarch. Maklakov, it said, had a detailed plan for curbing the "unbridled" freedom of the press, but as I needed "the plaudits of the Duma" his plans were doomed to defeat. It was high time the Tsar learned who was his servant and who was the servant of "the Rodziankos and the Guchkovs."

The "Diary" was read immediately at Yalta. Count Frederichs* was deeply indignant and asked me if I did not intend to show it to the Tsar and request him to put a stop to this baiting, which only served to undermine the prestige of the government. Meshchersky was boasting everywhere, but with absolutely no grounds, that he enjoyed the Tsar's special favor. It could be argued, therefore, that such a campaign against the Chairman of the Ministers' Council was intended to undermine his position at a time when he needed all his prestige for the purposes of his trip. In answering, I told Count Frederichs that the Tsar had probably read the "Diary," as he was in the habit of reading everything Meshchersky wrote. I knew from experience that it would do no good to mention the matter to the Tsar. I expressed my conviction that there was a campaign against me, and after my return I intended to repeat my request for permission to resign. This the Count begged me not to do—especially at a time when Russia needed me so badly and since the Tsar was well-disposed toward me.

To prove he was correct in estimating the Tsar's opinion of me,

* The Minister of the Imperial Court, Baron Frederichs, was raised to the rank of Count during the Romanov celebrations.

he volunteered to drop a hint to His Majesty regarding some court title for me. Such a title would add to my prestige abroad. I told Count Frederichs that I was not anxious to have any title; the only purpose it could serve would be to reveal the Tsar's attitude toward me. I advised him not to broach the subject.

At the same time I decided to write Maklakov and call his attention to the questionable conduct of his protector Meshchersky and to the impression the latter's attacks produced upon the Tsar's entourage. I said I should never bring myself to ask the Tsar to arbitrate any differences between us, but that since he was on very intimate terms with Meshchersky he was bound to assume full moral responsibility for the inevitable consequences of the writer's personal grudge against me. Three weeks later, in Florence, I received Maklakov's answer. He said that he was not very intimate with Prince Meshchersky, nor did he believe himself justified in engaging in private discussions with him regarding his articles, but if I desired the administration to punish the *Grashdanin* he was ready to report to His Majesty, the Tsar, to this effect. Knowing His Majesty's attitude toward the editor of this paper, however, he could not take it upon himself to apply such punishment on his own authority. I replied immediately that I was most sorry he had not had time to read my letter, as I had said plainly that I considered it out of the question to involve the Tsar in a matter pertaining to myself personally; I also informed him that I was instructing my Assistant, P. A. Kharitonov, who was acting in my stead in the Ministers' Council, not to permit the presentation of such a report to the Tsar when it was quite within the power of the Minister of the Interior to act on his own authority.

Naturally, there was no report of any sort. My correspondence with Maklakov fell into the hands of Meshchersky through Maklakov himself, and our relations became even more strained. Hostile articles in the *Grashdanin* became an everyday occurrence, and after my return to St. Petersburg they became so violent that I could plainly see that my fate had been decided, since it was Prince Meshchersky's policy to trample in the mud only those whose days had already been numbered.

Now to return to the account of my trip abroad. We stopped in Berlin only until the express train left for Milan. Thence we motored down the peninsula to Naples, and then returned to Rome. Here I was laid up for three weeks with erysipelas and this made it easy to avoid conversations with anyone. On the eve of my departure the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marquis di San Giuliano (4), called, but stayed only a short time. He intimated that Italy would never relinquish Valona but in all else was ready to work with France in pacifying the Balkans.

We reached Paris on October 22 and were met by a distinguished group. Besides the entire personnel of our Embassy, there was the Minister-President, Barthou (5), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pichon (6), the Minister of Finance, Charles Dumont, the Prefect of Police, and a representative of the President of the Republic.

The two and a half weeks spent in Paris were one solid holiday. I lost count of receptions; my wife and I were shown the greatest consideration; the press was very sympathetic both to myself and to Russia. In accord with the wishes of the French government I gave as much time as possible to the representatives of the press, and accounts of these interviews were continually appearing in the papers. Our ambassador, Izvolsky, who usually recognized no authority but his own and spoke of everybody and everything in a sour way, repeatedly assured me of the favorable impression I was making on public opinion and of the great assistance this would be to him in his official duties.

But all was not receptions and press interviews. I was very busy completing the negotiations for the railway loan. In this I was ably supported and assisted by the President of the Republic, by the Minister of Finance, and by Senator M. Perchot, editor of *Le Radical*. In the end, I arranged for a loan of 500 million francs a year for five years.

A special meeting was arranged in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give a final shape to our railway agreement. All participants in the agreement were present: Barthou, Pichon, Charles Dumont, General Joffre, and myself. The duties of secretary were assumed by the Director of the Political Department, later ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paléologue (7). The minutes of the preceding meetings were read and we were getting ready to affix our signatures, when General Joffre announced that the protocol must be supplemented by a statement to the effect that the Russian government, represented by its Chairman of the Ministers' Council, pledged itself to complete in the shortest period of time the construction of railways designated in the plan which the Tsar had confirmed at Livadia in the beginning of September. This plan was based upon the conclusions of the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the two allied

powers and had been submitted to the Tsar by the Russian Minister of War.

I was completely dumbfounded. I perceived that the Tsar had approved this plan a week before I had reported to him at Yalta yet had not mentioned it to me, even though I was officially concerned with railway construction. Nor had he said anything about it, as I learned later, to Rukhlov, Minister of Ways and Communications. Consequently, I was obliged to inform the meeting that I had not been notified of the plan and should like to see it in order to acquaint myself with it, even though slightly, and to judge how much it corresponded to the suggestions before the legislative institutions and to those to be submitted as soon as their financial aspects had been settled.

Great was the amazement of those present when, instead of a detailed plan, General Joffre produced a small map of Russia such as was generally appended to an official guidebook of Russian railways. On this map the lines of railways were drawn by hand, showing those already built and those to be built. It also showed a few lines which were neither built nor projected and which possessed no military significance, for example, a line connecting the river Ob with Archangel and the Murman Coast.

I was obliged to convince the meeting of the impossibility of making such a positive pledge. I showed that the introduction of this clause into the agreement might even harm the whole transaction, since our legislative bodies, just as sensitive of their rights as were the French chambers, would accuse the government of usurping the prerogatives of the legislative power. The chairman of the meeting, Barthou, liquidated the matter by suggesting that it be recorded in the minutes that the meeting had no doubt that in selecting the course of the projected railways the interests of national defense would be given the most earnest consideration. This met with everyone's satisfaction.

During the latter part of my stay in Paris, Count Witte and his wife arrived from Biarritz. They occupied the apartment above ours in the Hotel Bristol. When I called, Witte was not in, but Countess Witte said how happy they were to see how well Paris was receiving me. Later I learned that Witte himself had said it ought to be a source of great satisfaction to Russia and Europe to have me the Chairman of the Ministers' Council at a time when the peace of Europe was disturbed. He characterized me as a cautious man, an astute finan-

cier, and a confirmed opponent of war. Even the defects of my disposition were of service: I lacked initiative and was not courageous or talented enough to hold people in submission, but was strong enough to prevent them from committing foolish mistakes. This last remark reflected Witte's bitterness at my cordial reception in Paris. I also learned that he thought I should conduct myself more modestly, for after all the Chairman of the Council was not the real head of the government. My informant, M. Bénac (8), assured me, however, that Paris was commenting on my marked modesty, which offered such a contrast to Izvolsky's vanity. I saw Witte before I left Paris and he assured me of his friendship and of his pleasure at my successes, but scarcely six weeks had passed before he gave the lie to all these professions. But of this later!

Before going to Berlin, I had learned that Emperor William was not in his capital. I told both the President of France and M. Pichon of this, and said that as a result I should stop over in Berlin only one day. They expressed their regret that I should not be able to see the Kaiser, for they had hoped our meeting would benefit the general international situation. At this Baron Edgar Uxkull (9), who had accompanied me since my illness in Rome, suggested that he might make confidential inquiries at the German Embassy of Ambassador von Schoen (10), whom I had known slightly at St. Petersburg. I agreed to this and instructed Uxkull not to make the request in my name but merely to mention in conversation that I had intended to stop over at Berlin to thank the Emperor and that since he was absent I should stop for only one day to pay a return visit to the Chancellor.

To my great amazement, I was notified next day that the Emperor would be very glad to see me and would come to Berlin for one day, Wednesday, November 6, for this express purpose; and invited me to have luncheon with him at Potsdam. We left Paris on Sunday, November 3.

CHAPTER XXXI

NOVEMBER 1913

We were met in Berlin by K. K. Müller, the agent of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Embassy Attaché, A. Bronevsky. The latter showed me a telegram from Sazonov and said that the ambassador would wait upon me at my hotel at 9:00 A.M.

Sazonov's telegram, which had been decoded by the Embassy, read as follows: "Inform the Chairman of the Ministers' Council on his arrival in Berlin that the Tsar entrusts him with requesting an explanation from the German government regarding its intentions concerning General Liman von Sanders (1) and with announcing that we shall on no account agree to its plan."

When Sverbeev called, he brought with him another brief communication from Sazonov. This informed us that when Sazonov had been at Livadia he had learned that the German government had decided to recall its former instructor of the Turkish army, von der Goltz Pasha (2), and appoint a former Brigadier General, Liman von Sanders, as his successor. Von Sanders was also to command the 2d Turkish Corps quartered at Constantinople, and to this the Russian government could not agree, since it radically altered the situation in Turkey. Sverbeev was instructed to protest. Sazonov added that he hoped our ally (France) would give us definite support in this, but Sverbeev said that he had not seen the French ambassador, Jules Cambon (3), because of the latter's illness. Now he transferred the entire matter to me.

Thus the entire business fell upon my shoulders. At first I was angry with Sazonov, who knew that for more than two months I had not taken active part in current affairs and yet had not seen fit to supply me with detailed information. He left this to Sverbeev without ascertaining whether or not he was well posted on the matter.

Thus, not altogether sure of my ground, I set out to see the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, having resolved to ask him point-blank about the situation and, if need be, to confront him with Sazonov's telegram.

Our conversation was straightforward and clear, and this made my task much easier. Bethmann-Hollweg guessed the official purpose of my call as our ambassador had not seen him on the Liman von Sanders matter, and he expressed his pleasure that I was to discuss the affair with him, as he had the most pleasant memories of our first meeting. He hoped our conference would be facilitated by the fact that we should not need to await instructions from St. Petersburg for every detail.

I asked him to acquaint me with the problem and especially to explain what had led the German government to entrust one of its generals with the command of a Turkish army corps stationed at Constantinople. Whether or not Bethmann spoke the truth I do not know, but his entire conversation was so frank and sincere that I have preserved the best impression of him, if for nothing else than the assistance he rendered me in my conversation with the Minister of War and, on the next day, with the Emperor himself.

He began by suggesting that we talk as enemies who have the deepest respect for each other. What could be said, he asked, against Germany's decision to replace an old general by a younger one? The agreement with Turkey, he continued, regarding Germany's privilege to have a German officer as instructor of the Turkish army, had come to an end. Since there had been no protest against this privilege, was it surprising that, being on the friendliest terms with Turkey, Germany had endeavored to strengthen her privileged position by means of a special agreement? Moreover, in this connection, he assured me on his word of honor that during the Potsdam interview between our Emperors in May this matter had been broached to the Tsar, and that both Sazonov and Sverbeev were well aware of this fact. Anyway, how could it have been otherwise in Turkey? Turkey herself did not say that she did not need a European instructor. Of course, England would be happy to offer her services, but to this Russia could hardly agree, especially since England had already been given a very marked privilege, by common consent, in having an English admiral as instructor of the Turkish navy. As for having a French general as instructor, Germany could not agree to that, and neither Turkey nor England would consent to having a Russian general as instructor. What then remained? To have looked, say, in Sweden for some neutral instructor for Persian soldiers would have been obvious nonsense; nor was it the time to raise the delicate matter of an Austrian or Italian instructor. One thing only re-

mained: to maintain things as they were and retain a German instructor, thus avoiding a new issue in the far from pacified Balkans.

When the Chancellor had finished I asked him if he could give me his word of honor that at Potsdam my Emperor had given the German Emperor his consent not only to the continuation of Germany's privilege in having a German general as chief instructor of the Turkish army but also the extension of this privilege by having that general command the 2d Corps stationed at Constantinople. I also asked whether or not during subsequent communications the question of the command of the 2d Corps by a German general had been definitely discussed and if an agreement had been reached on that subject.

The Chancellor replied as follows (I wrote down our conversation directly after returning to my hotel in order to have it for my conversation with the Emperor): "I do not know what has been done in this regard, as the matter of command is in the hands of our Minister of War. However, I cannot understand why you ascribe so much importance to the matter of the command of one single corps by our general, for even if he did not hold the actual command he could exercise great influence upon the command of separate military units. Personally, I should not have bothered much over such a clause. To my great regret I cannot take part in this purely technical matter and beg of you to report on it to the Emperor personally. As for myself I shall talk to our Minister of War and do everything in my power to help you carry out the task with which you have been intrusted."

I thanked the Chancellor and urged him to follow up his suggestion: to prevail upon the Minister of War to give up a measure which the Chancellor himself did not consider extremely important, and to persuade the Emperor to adopt a less sharp attitude toward the subject. I assured the Chancellor that our Emperor had not been forewarned of this at Potsdam and that neither the Minister of War nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs was, up to the present time, advised of the new agreement between Germany and Turkey.

When I left the Chancellor I went directly to see the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, whom I had never met. He was still unwell, and since international affairs had quieted down somewhat he was about to leave for Paris for a short rest. I repeated to him in detail my conversation with Bethmann-Hollweg. Cambon was surprised, as none of the reports of the French ambassador at Constantinople had even hinted at these intentions of the German government. He promised to inform Paris immediately and was sure that the

French government would support Russia loyally in preventing the realization of Germany's plan. I promised to keep him informed as to the progress of my conversation with the German authorities, and he, on his side, promised to keep me posted on all the news from Paris. That evening there was a dinner in my honor at our Embassy. Many dignitaries were invited, but only a few could come. After dinner Bethmann-Hollweg and I withdrew to the study, where he told me he had already seen the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff and had formed the opinion that these two were set upon their project and could not be easily moved. He believed, however, that the Emperor might yield to persuasion, especially if I suggested that the German general might retain the command of a corps, but a corps garrisoned somewhere other than Constantinople, say Adrianople. I said that Smyrna would be even more acceptable. Whereupon the Chancellor said that, as he saw it, the place mattered little; the important thing was to put the German general in command of a definite unit so that he could observe at first hand the results of German command and training on Turkish soldiers.

The next morning I was very busy receiving diplomatic officials and representatives of the press. Of the former I remember most vividly the young and elegant Turkish Ambassador, Mukhtar Pasha (4). He informed me that he had been advised of Russian opposition to the new agreement between Germany and Turkey. This agreement he considered purely technical. The corps at Constantinople had been chosen for practical convenience in order to avoid unnecessary railway transportation in inspecting troops located at a distance from the Inspector's headquarters. He assured me, however, that the Turkish government had no aggressive designs against Russia.

I thanked the ambassador for his assurances, and said that of course he understood I must carry out the wishes of my government. I suggested that such acute issues as these might be prevented if there were more open understanding between nations. In this case, for instance, the agreement between Turkey and Germany had apparently been concluded in May, whereas Russia, a nation vitally concerned, had just now learned of it. Nor had our ally, France, been informed. Not only the agreement but also the manner in which it had been concluded demanded Russia's attention.

As for the newspapermen, most of them were satisfied with a repetition of my statements to the French press. A group of Russian reporters were similarly satisfied but resented my refusal to commit

myself on the Turkish problem. But with Theodor Wolff (5), editor and owner of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, it was different. He passed over problems of foreign policy and questioned me on the internal situation in Russia. He was especially eager to learn if I thought Russia's domestic peace could be preserved, since, in his opinion, the Germans had the impression that the revolutionary movement was much more deeply rooted than one could judge from the outside.* I tried to explain that Russia was making rapid progress along the road of economic development, that the people were becoming more prosperous, industry was growing and gaining strength, the cultivation of the land was improved, the use of agricultural machinery and artificial fertilizer was increasing the productivity of the soil so that our most important problem—agriculture—was approaching a satisfactory solution. Wolff asked what importance I attached to the revolutionary outbursts. I answered that no country was free from these, but that in Russia it was localized in large industrial centers and did not spread far beyond them.†

I observed that Russia needed peace more than any other country, if for no other reason than because of the great results attained during the last six or seven years of her economic development; deplorable, indeed, would be any stop in this progress.

And even today, despite what has taken place in Russia with very great assistance from Germany, I still believe that had it not been for the war and attending events, had the intellectual originators of the revolution been capable of exercising the power which they so easily acquired and had they been able to preserve their authority instead of meekly yielding it to the Bolsheviks, my analysis would have been correct: ten years of sensible government would have seen Russia at the summit of her prosperity.

That evening (Tuesday) the Chancellor entertained in our honor. After dinner I talked with the Minister of War, who confessed his difficulties with the Reichstag and inquired as to my relations with

* My answer, which Wolff reproduced quite exactly, later led to attacks against me by Prince Meshchersky, editor of the *Grashdanin*.

† In this connection I made a statement upon which Prince Meshchersky pounced at a later date, making it the butt of his jokes. "Believe me," I said to Wolff, "that your information regarding the dangerous revolutionary movement within the country is grossly exaggerated; undoubtedly it emanates mostly from the revolutionary press. If you were to travel one hundred or two hundred kilometers away from large industrial centers such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, or Saratov, you would not find this revolutionary movement of which your informants speak."

the Duma. We did not finish our discussion, and unfortunately had no opportunity to return to it later.

The next day we went to lunch at Potsdam with the Emperor and the Empress. William II, dressed in a uniform of our Lithuanian regiment, received me in a small room off the larger reception room. He was in high spirits and recalled our previous meetings, saying how much happier things were now than in December 1905 when Russia was at grips with revolution; moreover, now I was head of the government, then I was but an ex-minister. But when I raised the subject of my mission, his mood changed. In sharp tones he asked me to state immediately what I had to say; he was sure it was unpleasant and wanted to have done with it.

I repeated to the Emperor what I had said to the Chancellor, emphasizing my regret that Russia had not been advised of the new agreement until this late date. At this he assured me that he had discussed the affair with the Tsar on May 10 at Potsdam. The Tsar had then offered no objections to replacing von der Goltz Pasha by another general, and his interference now that all details had been arranged was, to say the least, inconsistent.

When the Emperor had finished I reminded him that our Minister of Foreign Affairs had not accompanied the Tsar to Potsdam and did not learn of this arrangement at first hand; nor had he been officially advised of it later. True, we had heard that this change of generals was being made and to that we had no objections whatsoever, as it was entirely within Germany's rights. But we had not known of the general's appointment to the command of the 2d Corps at Constantinople, and to this Russia did object, as it would be tantamount to transferring to Germany command of the Turkish capital and of the Straits. I told him also that France supported Russia in her objection. Some misunderstanding, I said, had evidently grown out of the oral agreement between him and the Tsar, and this could be liquidated only by an exchange of formal notes.

All this irritated William II considerably. He asked me if he was to consider my remarks as an ultimatum from the Tsar or simply as a statement of opinion designed to lead to further discussion. I assured him it was the latter, and urged him to meet my Emperor halfway in settling this issue. This seemed to calm him. He assured me he was not displeased with me or with my presentation of the matter but could not give me a definite answer until he had consulted his Chancellor. This ended the discussion. Jovial once more, the Em-

peror expressed his hope that our dispute had not destroyed my appetite, and led me away to lunch, promising to tell the Empress that I was not to blame for our tardiness.

The luncheon was a merry meal. William II indulged in reminiscences and conversed generally. He asked me about the archeological excavations recently begun near Kerch, and told me that he had read with much interest the newspaper articles concerning the excavated Scythian relics, in which he was always interested. He also asked me how he could get better acquainted with these rare objects. I knew that the excavation had been done under the direction of the special Imperial Archeological Commission, and had seen the objects displayed in one of the rooms of the Winter Palace. I promised to report his interests to the Tsar and assured him that I should be able to send him photographs of the relics. Shortly before my departure I had learned that the Bureau of Printing and Engraving intended to prepare a special album of the more interesting objects in colors and in actual measurements. A month later these photographs, splendidly executed by the Engraving Bureau, were sent to Emperor William by the Tsar, accompanied by a friendly personal letter.

As we were leaving Potsdam, the Director of the Special Credit Office, L. F. Davydov,* who had sat on the Emperor's left at lunch, asked me if he might see me at my hotel after we reached Berlin. I agreed, of course, and when we were together in my rooms I gave instructions that we were not to be disturbed. When Davydov left I wrote down what had been said; later, he checked my account for possible errors; hence, what follows is an accurate though condensed record of our conversation:

At lunch, William II tried to draw out Davydov as to what had happened at Paris. At first he asked general questions which Davydov parried skillfully. Then he asked specifically if our negotiations for the railway loan had been as successful as was reported in the newspapers, which emphasized what this would mean to Russia in the building of strategic railway lines. Davydov replied that, of course, newspaper accounts were not always reliable, but he could assure the Emperor that in my interviews with the press I had never once mentioned the word "strategic." He explained that our loan was for the sole purpose of improving our commercial transportation system in order to keep step with the country's economic develop-

* Davydov had joined me in Paris and accompanied me to Berlin.

ment of the last six or seven years. Such improvement would involve reorganization, expansion, and the introduction of new technical apparatus.

The Emperor interrupted, however, to say that he was concerned not with the development of commercial lines, as he recognized that this was economically necessary, but with the building of strategic lines leading to the German frontier. This he regarded with alarm.

In reply Davydov pointed out that to some extent every railway could be called strategic, as it could, if necessary, be used for military transport. Such might be especially true of the line from St. Petersburg to Moscow. But, considered impartially, the plan of railway building and improvements which Russia presented at Paris was patently motivated not by strategic but by economic interests. What else could be said of the building of lines in the Ural regions, the construction of the South Siberian line, and the development of lines in Turkestan, all of which would absorb the greater part of the railway funds?

Not noticing that the Emperor wished to change the subject, Davydov continued. He said he appreciated the fact that the Emperor was disturbed because Russia went to France for financial assistance. This, however, could be explained by the fact that France was both able and willing to lend such assistance, whereas other countries either were unable or had become unwilling.

This was enough for William II, and in a rather sharp tone he suggested that they discuss something else. He said he was also grieved that the Russian press was so hostile to Germany, repeating as it did the Germanophobia of the British and French press. "Your papers forget," he said, "that at the most critical moment of your war with Japan I suggested that you leave your western frontier unguarded and guaranteed you perfect safety on that border. During the Balkan crisis, at the most critical hour my policy was, as it is now, one of conciliation, supporting you in everything. And in spite of all this the outbursts of your press, like that of France headed by the paper (*Le Matin*) of M. Maurice Bunau-Varilla, have become insufferable; they will lead inevitably to a catastrophe which I shall be powerless to avert. Tell this to your chief." The Emperor nodded in my direction.

Davydov said he would certainly tell me what had been said, but asked permission to say a few words more. The position of the press in Russia, he began, was entirely different from that of the German

press. The German press was sternly disciplined, gladly sought for information from the government, appreciated it highly, and to some extent believed in its patriotic duty to follow the direction of the government and to assist it. The Russian press, on the other hand, was unruly, and included some elements which believed it their foremost duty to criticize the government and to oppose its policies and undertakings. That part of the Russian press which was benevolent toward the government was considered venal, though the suspicion was unfounded. Besides, Russian law did not empower the government to keep the press within the limits of common sense; while the plan to control the press by censorship was obviously impossible in view of conditions existing within the country. Therefore, the Russian press was much more independent than was generally supposed. Nevertheless it continually complained of restrictions, and emphasized this fact in the foreign press, which, in its turn, played up these supposed restrictions. Besides, many publications were owned by persons who were hostile to the government, poorly informed, and disinclined to seek information from the government. These persons did not perceive the harm they were doing to the country, and they regarded as oppression every attempt to explain to them their unfair attitude.

By now the Emperor was noticeably displeased. "Can I help it," he said, "if the situation is as you say? Nevertheless I must tell you frankly that I fear there will be a clash between Slav and German, and I feel it my duty to apprise you of this fact."

Davydov assured him that the Slavic world had no aggressive intentions. Russia herself was anxious for peace above all else in order to catch up with other modern nations and occupy the position to which she is entitled. He ventured to say also that he could not see how Germany would profit by war. In reply, the Emperor said that if war should be inevitable he considered it a matter of secondary importance who would be the first to attack.

Such is the summary of Davydov's conversation with William II.* Late that afternoon I had an appointment with Bethmann-Hollweg. He congratulated me on the degree of my success, for he was

*As an exile in Paris I wrote an article on this conversation for the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The type was set for printing, but the article was never published, even though M. Jules Cambon spoke twice to the editor urging him to publish it. The reason for its non-appearance, I do not know. However, I still have the proof of the article.

positive that a compromise could be worked out. If our government would not object to a German general training one specific Turkish corps, the Chancellor was prepared to do everything in his power to make it a corps garrisoned elsewhere than at Constantinople. I suggested that he exclude Adrianople also and select a corps in Asia Minor. I assured him that France would not object to such an arrangement if the location of the corps selected did not infringe upon her interests. In conclusion I insisted that the German general must not be named the official commander of the corps, but must be given an office that would clearly show that he was merely an instructor. As soon as possible I informed the French ambassador of this conversation and he promised to telegraph Paris immediately. He believed that no objections would be raised there.

In all this I felt, as I still do, that Bethmann-Hollweg was sincerely trying to work for peace. I think he was unsympathetic to the agreement which German military circles had made with Turkey because he thought it would disturb international relations. Undoubtedly he was not his own master: while nominally responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, he had to contend with official forces which he could not control.

Although we left Berlin at seven o'clock the next morning, the Chancellor was at the station to see us off, bringing flowers for my wife. He seized the few minutes at our disposal again to compliment me on my success and to ask if there was no other international problem about which I was anxious. I assured him there were others, and mentioned in addition to the general unrest and Germany's increasing armaments the preliminary work on the revision of our commercial treaty with Germany. He agreed that this was much more important than the Liman von Sanders affair, and was quite optimistic about its being satisfactorily settled. Unfortunately we had not time to discuss it further.

On the way home I dictated to my secretary, Dorliac, a report to the Tsar, revised and corrected it directly after reaching St. Petersburg, showed it to Sazonov, who made no comment, and immediately sent it to the Tsar at Livadia, asking him to acquaint himself with it before my arrival. I also requested Sazonov to present his own conclusions regarding every aspect of it. On the next day the latter told me that he had informed the Tsar that he subscribed to everything that I had done and was only awaiting word from Sverbeev as to Germany's final decision. As is well known, our pro-

test was formally recognized, and General Liman von Sanders was not appointed Commander of the 2d Corps at Constantinople. As to what was done after my dismissal in the end of January 1914 I do not know.

I shall not dwell upon my report to the Tsar. It was published by the Bolsheviks late in 1923* in *Un Livre Noir* (6).

A couple of days after my return, Sazonov received from A. P. Izvolsky a detailed letter dated November 7/20, reporting on my ten days' stay in Paris. This letter contained very flattering references to me from the highest members of the French government regarding my visit. For some reason Sazonov did not consider it necessary to mention the letter to me. I learned of it only as late as April 1932 through the Soviet publication *Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii za 1910-1914 g.g.* (7).

*In July 1924 there appeared in a Brussels newspaper a series of articles devoted to the Russian problem. The author referred to this report and found in it proof that I had deceived the French government. He alleged that I had obtained the railway loan, promising General Joffre that the construction of strategic railways in Poland would be begun immediately, but that I had failed to keep my promise. The author evidently did not know that General Joffre had no detailed plan of the construction of these railways, of which mention was made above; he possessed merely a rough sketch of long trunk lines criss-crossing over nearly the entire territory of Russia. Nor did the author know—nor apparently did he wish to know—that the final agreement on the loan was formally recognized in January 1914 and that at the end of that month I was discharged. He also failed to recognize that because war was declared in July of that year the building of a single meter of the new railways between January and July was impossible. However, such considerations meant nothing at all to newspapers, since the only thing in which they were interested was to affirm that Russia and her representatives had always endeavored to do nothing but borrow money and to refuse to carry out their obligations.

CHAPTER XXXII

DECEMBER 1913

The state of things that greeted me after my seven weeks' absence was much more strained than I had seen in years.

Even putting aside the general political situation which forced one to be on one's guard all the time, my personal position was so difficult that everything indicated the need to clarify it by all means at my command. During my absence abroad the intrigue against me had developed considerably, and I returned to find ministerial relations more strained than in years. State Comptroller P. A. Kharitonov, who had discharged my duties in the Ministers' Council while I was away, was well informed concerning these new developments, but told me little about them. It was not that he took any part in the campaign against me, but simply that he did not want to incur the disfavor of my possible successor, especially in case it was likely to be Krivoshein or Shcheglovitov. He did inform me, however, that the ministers were again attending the Duma sessions, since the differences arising out of the incident in May had been liquidated through the intervention of Shcheglovitov. He told me also that Maklakov had recommended to the Tsar the appointment of State Councillor B. V. Stürmer (1) as Mayor of Moscow. He had not been authorized by the Ministers' Council to make this recommendation, but he had asked Akimov, Chairman of the State Council, if he had any objections to it and Akimov had answered that he had not.

At the first meeting of the ministers, which was held in my study, I reported on my trip abroad and asked each minister to inform me of what had happened in his department in my absence. Sazonov commended me for what I had accomplished in Berlin, and Rukhlov praised my success in Paris; the latter was even quite optimistic about the future of Russia's railways, and confessed he was becoming more fully persuaded of the correctness of my view. The other ministers made mere perfunctory reports.

Then I asked Shcheglovitov to tell me about the settlement of the Duma incident. He said that he had been able to persuade Rodzianko

to make an announcement at the opening of the Duma forbidding the recurrence of such an attack on ministers of the government as had occurred in May. He reminded the ministers that this was the procedure I had suggested at the time. I thanked Shcheglovitov and expressed my satisfaction that the incident was closed.*

Next I asked Maklakov if it were true that he had recommended Stürmer's appointment as Mayor of Moscow. I told him I had read rumors of it in the *Grazhdanin* and had asked Kharitonov as to what the Ministers' Council had done about it; Kharitonov, however, had said that the matter had never been brought before the Council; if it had been, he would have considered it important enough to be postponed till my return. Maklakov tried to evade the issue by saying that he had acted on the Tsar's orders. Thereupon I asked him to lay the matter before the ministers so that they might even now arrive at a decision to be submitted to the Tsar. In reply he said, "I sent my report to His Majesty yesterday."

Nevertheless, I called for an expression of opinion. To begin with, I expressed my own views. I reminded the ministers that the government had already refused to confirm the appointment of any one of the several candidates elected by the city. Now, to force on Moscow a mayor not of their own but of the government's choice might precipitate a conflict between the Supreme Power and that ancient city. This danger was increased by the personality and political beliefs of the man under consideration. Following this, all the ministers but Kasso and Sukhomlinov took part in the general debate. No one of them supported Maklakov. The upshot of it was that I was authorized to submit the Council's decision to the Tsar. I said that I should telegraph the Tsar immediately, requesting an audience and begging him to postpone his decision on this matter until he had learned from me the opinions of the ministers. Nor did I conceal from the Council that if the Tsar disregarded its decision and decided to appoint Stürmer, I should ask him to accept my resignation.

* A few days later, N. P. Shubinsky, a Duma member, came to me with the following story: Soon after Shcheglovitov had seen Rodzianko, the latter had told him, Shubinsky, in the presence of other Duma members, that the Minister of Justice had asked him to liquidate the May incident and had even handed him an outline of what he was to say. Shcheglovitov had added that my days as Chairman of the Ministers' Council were numbered and that probably he would be my successor. Apparently this had impressed Rodzianko, for he had told Shubinsky that he considered it wise to heed the wishes of the probable future Chairman of the Council. Which of these men was telling the truth I do not know.

The next morning I went to see Akimov in order to find out why he had not protested against Maklakov's recommendation. As Chairman of the State Council, of which Stürmer was a member, he was bound to be interested. I told him what had happened the previous evening and showed him a copy of the telegram I had sent to the Tsar. I told him also that I believed Meshchersky was behind the whole affair, but that if Akimov had opposed it Maklakov would have opposed it, fearing the influence of the Chairman of the State Council with the Tsar. Akimov agreed with me about Meshchersky, and said that when the scheme had first been brought to his attention he had paid little attention to it; now, however, he could see the danger.

Two days later Stürmer himself called to express his regrets for having been the cause of differences between Maklakov and me. He declared that he had been ignorant of Maklakov's recommendation and was now ready to do whatever I suggested. I told him of the decision of the ministers, of my conversation with Akimov, and of my telegram to the Tsar. I warned him that I would do everything I could to prevent his appointment. Stürmer assured me that this was news to him, thanked me for my frankness, and asked me to inform the Tsar that he respectfully begged not to be appointed.

Stürmer was, of course, lying; of that I am positive. He was not ignorant of what had happened, as Meshchersky and Maklakov had kept him posted. On the contrary he was elated at the prospect of his new position and, as I learned later from Beletsky, had petitioned to be allowed to occupy the Governor-Général's mansion on the Tverskaia. He had lied to me in order that, if he were not appointed, he could say he himself had requested to be freed from that responsible position.

The Tsar telegraphed permission for me to come to Livadia. It was a great relief to receive, shortly afterwards, a telegram from Count Frederichs saying that the Tsar would postpone his decision regarding "Moscow" till he had heard my report.

My first audience was at eight o'clock in the evening of the day I reached Yalta. The Tsar asked if I had recovered from my illness at Rome, but made no other inquiries about my trip. He approved of what I had done and of the written report I had submitted,* but did not convey his customary expressions of gratitude. I was es-

* The Tsar's memorandum approving my report was published by the Bolsheviks in *Un Livre Noir*, Vol. II, p. 385.

pecially surprised that he had nothing to ask about my interview with William II. And since I considered that my report, for all its accuracy, was not a complete record of my impressions, I asked permission to broach the subject.

When I mentioned what William II had said about his agreement with the Tsar at Potsdam in May, His Majesty flatly denied that any agreement had been reached. Then I told him of Bethmann-Hollweg's parting promises and expressed the opinion that Germany would have to give in to us this time, especially since Sverbeev's reports related what a good impression I had made in Berlin. In my opinion, however, Germany's attitude toward Russia was one of hostility. I stated this opinion to the Tsar, explaining that although Bethmann-Hollweg favored peace he was dominated by the Emperor and the all-powerful military clique. Now if ever it was time to keep our military organization in working order.

Knowing that my complaints of the Ministry of War were unpleasant to the Tsar, I was very careful of what I said on this score. I contented myself with revealing the fact that I had been unable to obtain any information from that ministry since April 1912, and so was uninformed as to what had been done on national defense. From what I had heard indirectly, however, I was inclined to believe that all too little had been accomplished. This was certainly not for lack of funds, because at that time the Minister of War had at his disposal 250,000,000 rubles. His Majesty told me he kept close track of what was going on and could assure me that the 250,000,000 would soon melt away and I should be requisitioned for more funds.

Then I passed on to the most acute problem—regarding Stürmer's appointment. I reported in detail the debates in the Ministers' Council and my discussion with Akimov, and argued that the appointment could only result in conflict with the Municipality of Moscow and, therefore, had better be avoided. According to law the government's duty was to confirm the appointment of a man elected by the city. The Tsar, however, was inclined to favor Maklakov's recommendation. He did not believe there would be much trouble with Moscow; the city would be disappointed, it was true, but would soon get used to its new mayor, especially to a mayor such as Stürmer would make. Nevertheless I pressed my point, and the Tsar agreed to sleep on the matter before making his final decision. He asked me to return the next day at 2:00 P.M.

As I left the Tsar, I met Count Frederichs. He accompanied

me to my hotel and was eager to know what had passed between the Tsar and me. I told him he would have to wait till tomorrow for that—and then proceeded to tell him about my trip abroad:

The next day the Tsar himself opened the conversation. He said he had decided not to appoint Stürmer. He considered it unwise to make any move that might possibly antagonize a city like Moscow, since such a move would merely play into the hands of the enemies of the government. It would be best to let Moscow elect its own mayor as provided for by law, even though it took some time to elect a candidate whom he approved. He had written his decision in blue pencil on Maklakov's recommendation and promised to send it to him immediately. This he did, but Maklakov never showed this document to the Ministers' Council.

Maklakov's recommendation was a good example of the existing dissension among the ministers, and I took the opportunity of speaking to the Tsar on this subject. I asked him for permission to remind the ministers that their co-operation was required not only by law but also in the interests of the Tsar and of Russia, and that this applied to each and every minister. His Majesty gave me the permission I asked but requested me to be as moderate as possible, so that Maklakov would not feel that he had incurred the Tsar's displeasure. His Majesty believed that Maklakov's mistakes were due to inexperience.

It was my contention, however, that Maklakov's mistakes were due to the fact that he was under the influence of Meshchersky. To support my point I produced two recent issues of the *Grashdamin* in which Meshchersky accused Moscow of carrying on a "seditious" campaign against the government, which could be defeated by appointing a mayor of the Tsar's own choice. So salutary would such a measure be that in a few weeks Moscow would thank the Tsar on bended knee for having saved her from committing an act of treason.

I reminded His Majesty, too, of Meshchersky's continual repetition of the theme that the Chairman of the Ministers Council was gradually usurping the Tsar's authority and becoming a veritable Grand Vizier. This, I suggested, encouraged the ministers to intrigue against their Chairman, thus weakening the government. Already the different factions of the Duma were becoming embroiled in the feud. I had two other previous issues of the same paper in which I was portrayed as "not a Tsar's Minister" but a "Duma bootlicker" who schemed night and day to dim the halo surrounding the Sovereign and to exalt the representatives of the people. It was recom-

mended that I be replaced by such a loyal Tsar's minister as Goremykin or Taneev, who would restore the Tsar's authority to its rightful state. I told His Majesty that I had asked Maklakov to use his influence to prevent Meshchersky from continuing these attacks, which really undermined the Tsar's authority, but Maklakov had replied that he had no influence with the Prince.

The Tsar listened patiently, but he was not impressed. He considered that I attached too much importance to these newspaper articles—much more than they deserved. He contended that the influence of newspapers, of *Grazhdanin* especially, was much less than I thought.

There was no more to say. I hinted that someone else might be better able to preserve unity among the ministers, but the Tsar would not hear of any such suggestion. We completed the remaining routine work, His Majesty expressing particular satisfaction with the budget, especially with the fact that I had been able to meet the demands of the Ministry of War; and then I left. We parted on good terms.

That evening I spent with Count Frederichs and told him what been said that afternoon. He said he intended to speak to the Tsar about doing something to mark the success I had achieved abroad. I begged him not to do this, as I felt that the Tsar, despite his assurances to the contrary, was displeased with me because I had opposed Stürmer's appointment. Moreover, I felt certain that my dismissal was imminent. I was anxious, however, that he should keep reminding the Tsar of Germany's hostility toward us; but I do not think the old man was impressed. He regarded William II as arrogant but not aggressive, and had great faith in Bethmann-Hollweg.

On returning to St. Petersburg I reported to the Council what had passed at Livadia. Maklakov admitted that his recommendation had been returned unaccepted, but, as I have already stated, he never presented it to the Council. I went on to discuss something that was weighing heavily upon me. First of all I made it clear that I had no thought for my own fate but was concerned only for the welfare of the state. I stated frankly that the conflicts among the ministers and the love of intrigue with which all of us were consumed were undermining the prestige of the government and doing harm to the Emperor. I said I had felt in duty bound to speak of these things to the Tsar, and had even suggested to him that he might find someone who could lead the government in these critical times better than I.

There was no answer to what I said—the meeting adjourned.

In December, the Liman von Sanders affair again cropped up. Sazonov was confident that the incident had been settled, thanks to my representations at Berlin. He had, however, prepared a memorandum on the Turkish problem which he had presented to the Tsar. As yet it had not been returned. He had asked the Tsar to withhold his final opinion on the memorandum until it had been discussed by a special conference under my chairmanship. Sazonov flattered me by saying I had become a specialist on Turkish affairs.

Just before New Year's day the memorandum* was returned and Sazonov sent it to me together with the Tsar's letter providing for the special conference made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, and the Navy and the Chief of the General Staff, with myself as chairman.

In the beginning of his memorandum Sazonov spoke of the impossibility of agreeing to the German project and the necessity of protesting against its realization; then he dwelt at some length upon the general question of the inevitable dissolution of the Turkish Empire and the advisability for Russia of determining at once the course of action necessary to safeguard our interests at the time when this catastrophe should take place. With very convincing, reserved arguments, he supported his assertion that a weak Turkey was useful for Russia, and that, far from working for her dissolution, we ought to endeavor by all means to retard it, as we could have no idea what might arise upon her ruins and how far we might be able to protect our interests under the altered situation. Sazonov saw two ways of attaining this goal: (a) To begin immediate negotiations with France and England regarding the protection of our interests in the Straits. (b) To outline the concrete measures which we ought to adopt at the time when the fall of Turkey should become a fact.

In the matter of the Straits Sazonov did not express his point of view as a Russian; that is, he did not definitely favor either the scheme for making the Black Sea an open sea but prohibiting all the other powers except Russia from maintaining a navy there, or the scheme for keeping it a "mare clausum" with Russia possessing the key. He expressed great hopes that, under present conditions and in

* I no longer have this memorandum in my possession, but it has been published in an official Soviet publication. Ya. Zakher, "Konstantinopol i proliv" (oчерk iz istorii diplomatii nakanune mirovoi voiny), in *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 6, 1924, pp. 48-76. Cf. also *Un Livre Noir*, Vol. II, pp. 363-72; and S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, New York, 1929, I, 525-28.

view of the confidence inspired by Russia, we could be reasonably certain of concluding an agreement with both France and England, and in this case we had nothing to fear from any protests no matter who might utter them.

He also emphasized the value of special preparedness measures. He attributed a great significance to land fortifications along the Turkish Asiatic frontier and spoke of the advantages of having our troops in the Caucasus occupy, when the occasion demanded it, the two important points in the Turkish frontier, Trebizond and Bayazid.

Before the conference met, Sazonov and I agreed that the Liman von Sanders affair would not be discussed, since its satisfactory liquidation was imminent and any further discussion might disturb our negotiations with Germany. As for Sazonov's proposals in the memorandum, the Naval Minister pointed out the great difficulties entailed in the landing of troops, the time it would take to make the necessary preparations, and the risk involved, all with no guaranty that it would be successfully concluded. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War doubted that Trebizond and Bayazid could be occupied by the available Caucasian troops, and demonstrated that one could consider an occupation of some part of Turkey only on terms of a general mobilization and a large-scale military operation. Sazonov defended his proposals weakly and insisted most of all that we had to effect an understanding with France and England as to the carrying out of our plan should the downfall of Turkey ever take place.

I adopted a more general point of view and suggested that every attempt of ours to solve the Turkish problem at the present time would be interpreted as an attempt to solve the age-old problem of the Straits, and this would lead to complications. The Balkan problem had but recently been liquidated, but there was still much combustible material lying about, so that it was hardly to be expected that our ally, not to speak of England, would commit herself at the moment. I related the impressions I had formed in Berlin that any pretext at all might lead to armed conflict, for Germany would not miss an opportunity to fulfill her long-cherished plans and would use any possible pretext. I expressed my belief that England and France would both advise us to shun everything that might furnish the hostile political groupings a ground for shifting to our shoulders the responsibility for a new world crisis.

In conclusion, I asked bluntly if we wished war and if we were

ready to assume even part of the responsibility for war. Of course the unanimous answer was "No." Thereafter it was unanimously decided that the time was not favorable for discussing a problem of this sort with our allies, even though purely as a matter of general speculation. Our decision, to be presented to the Tsar, was to the effect that consideration of this project should be postponed until such time as it could be discussed not apart from the general political situation but in close correlation with the general course of events in Europe.

Part VI

My Dismissal

CHAPTER XXXIII

DECEMBER 1913—JANUARY 1914

Just before the Duma adjourned for the Christmas vacation, certain measures to combat the use of intoxicants were introduced in the State Council. The project had originated in the Duma but had been considerably altered during the discussions under the influence of the Ministry of Finance. I had no particular objection to the final project, but on one point it was opposed by the government. This point provided for a marked increase in the power of the zemstvos and municipalities to issue permits for the opening of new private restaurants licensed to sell intoxicating beverages. The majority of the Duma members fully understood that such a measure might lead to grave abuses, in that private interests might influence the issue of permits and an illicit liquor trade might develop in districts where zealous temperance workers prevented the desires of the local population from being fulfilled legally. For reasons of so-called parliamentary tactics, however, these Duma members did not wish to show any distrust of the institutions of local self-government. They preferred to come to some understanding with the government after the project had been considered by the State Council. Rodzianko and Alekseenko called on me to assure me that in this matter the Duma must follow the government's lead; otherwise the Duma would have to bear the responsibility for any abuses that might result from the adoption of this project.

The attack on the project in the State Council came from Count Witte. Many months previously we had discussed this project; he had considered it purposeless and had expressed his intention of spending his summer vacation working out a different one. I had been unable to learn how his plan would differ from that of the Duma, but he had promised to keep me informed. He then advised me to be very rigid in combating the use of intoxicants, for the people were suffering from alcoholism. I had protested that I was merely enforcing the laws which he himself had initiated; but, in answer, Witte had showed me the statement in the Duma project regarding the

increasing use of intoxicants. I had then pointed out to him that these figures did not take into account the increase in population, and that actually the per capita consumption of intoxicants was on the decrease and was less in Russia than in almost any other country. This, however, had been to no avail.

This discussion had been in the spring. Since then, however, I had had no word about Witte's new project. To my inquiries he replied that he had changed his mind and would be satisfied simply to criticize the Duma "nonsense." But when he spoke in the State Council not only did he fail to criticize the Duma project but he also failed even to touch upon any of its major points. He began by directly accusing the Ministry of Finance of radically distorting the meaning of the beneficial reform of the Emperor Alexander III, who, he said, had "personally outlined the salient points of the liquor monopoly and was the sole author of this greatest of all the legislative acts of his glorious reign." He, Witte, had been merely the instrument of his Sovereign's will.

"During my entire administration," Witte went on, "my one thought in this connection was to protect the people from the use of intoxicants, and my one consideration was to limit the consumption of spirits. I did not follow the interests of the government alone and did not work to fill the treasury at the expense of reducing the people to drunkenness and poverty."

"After me," he continued, "there has been one mistake after another. The testament of the author of the reforms was forgotten; the doors of a new sort of saloon (*kabak*) were flung wide open with the approval of the Ministry of Finance; the excise inspection was given instructions designed to increase the state revenue; those managers of excise offices who were responsible for the dizzy increases in the sales of this poison were encouraged, and those officials who in my time had been instructed to combat the use of intoxicants as best they could began to boast of having increased the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Even the reports of the ministry itself seem to point with pride to the increase in the use of spirits and in this disgraceful revenue. No one seems to stop for a moment to consider that the sale of liquor in Russia averages a billion rubles a year gross, or an entire third of the Russian budget. I have spoken of this to right and left, but everyone about me is deaf, and now I see myself forced to shout for all of Russia, for the entire world, to hear: 'Help! . . .'"

This word "help" was uttered in such a piercing voice that the entire State Council was literally stunned by the unexpectedness of the sally, the brazenness of the entire speech, its arrogant falsity, and its evident purpose of settling some mysterious account with me. The chairman announced a recess, during which the members present expressed to me their regret that this unpardonable speech had occurred and denounced it as revolting soap-box oratory. I spoke after the recess, and only with great effort was I able to maintain my self-control. But it was gratifying, I must confess, to know that in this new duel with Witte I was victorious. This of course did not end the State Council's deliberations on this project, and in later sessions Witte, supported by A. F. Koni and V. I. Gurko, spoke several times against it. Frequently it was referred to committees for discussion. But before considering it further I wish to relate another incident which occurred at that time.

The Tsar returned from Livadia on December 15. During my next report the Tsar asked me to tell him what had occurred in the State Council, and when I had finished he said: "I hope that this outbreak does not disturb you unduly. I should be the first to rejoice if the excessive use of liquor could be curbed; Witte was absolutely unjustified in saying what he did. Was it not he who administered the liquor monopoly for ten years? Why is it that until now he has always defended you from all attacks? What new circumstances have caused this violent change of attitude?"

I told His Majesty, jokingly, that the new circumstances were that the Minister of Finance had occupied his post too long and it was now the fashionable sport to hunt him. "You may be right," said the Tsar. "Here is a pamphlet I have just received from Count Witte accompanied by a special letter. I have not yet read it. Let me know your opinion of it next Friday." The pamphlet was entitled: "The Circumstances under which the Liquidation Loan of 1906 was Effected." This booklet was some twenty pages long and enumerated the circumstances under which I had negotiated the loan of 1906 in Paris. According to its account everything in connection with this loan had been done by Witte—I had done nothing; in fact it was only at the Tsar's express orders that I was instructed to sign the contract; but since I knew nothing whatever about the matters involved in the loan, A. I. Vyshnegradsky had been sent along with me to prevent me from falling into error or creating complications.

Needless to say this account is quite false. Elsewhere in this work

I have recorded in detail the true story of the negotiations. Surely Witte must have known that men like Vyshnegradsky, Davydov, and Shipov (the latter was in possession of all the pertinent correspondence) to whom he sent the booklet would detect its falseness! But he was eager to push me down, and was quite ready as always to do anything to achieve his purpose. Undoubtedly he had many exceptional talents, but his moral sense was completely atrophied. He was envious of the success I had achieved; probably, too, he resented the fact that I had been able to do him a favor by prevailing upon the Tsar to grant him a subsidy. The hope of seeing me reduced, as he was, to a position of no consequence was the substance of his dearest dreams.

Witte actually sent me a copy of the booklet, suggesting that I should no doubt be happy to have this memento of my mission. I wrote a letter thanking him for not having forgotten to send me a copy but added that I could not accept it as a memorial of my success in Paris, since his pamphlet made it clear that I had taken no part in the affair except that of a fly sitting on the horns of an ox plowing a field.

This was one of the last letters I ever addressed to Witte. He died a year later, and I called at his house to render him my last homage. Thus ended an acquaintance of almost two decades. But even death did not end his hatred of me, for it lives on in his *Memoirs*. What could have been the morals of a man who for no reason wrote such falsehoods as appear therein!

To resume the narrative: The opposition of Witte, Koni, and Gurko to the Duma project charged the atmosphere of the sessions of the State Council. To its chairman, Akimov, the situation was unbearable. It was made worse by rumors that the Tsar shared Witte's views, that Witte knew this, and was hopeful that, were I overthrown, he would be reappointed Minister of Finance. In such an event he was going to play the part of an apostle of temperance. Akimov feared some unforeseen and untoward outcome when the State Council voted, and he came to me for advice. We agreed that I should write the Tsar for myself and Akimov requesting a joint audience to report on the demagogic methods to which the advocates of temperance resorted, not so much to gain their ostensible goal (about which Count Witte was concerned) as to disrupt our financial position.

This letter, a copy of which I still have, was dated January 19, 1914. It reads as follows:

"Your Imperial Majesty: I beg not to be reproached for taking your precious time by this letter and not awaiting my regular report.

"During the last two days the debates in the State Council regarding a campaign to combat the excessive use of intoxicants have assumed a course which, having nothing whatever in common with the true purpose of this campaign, threatens radically to undermine our financial position and thus to prevent the state from satisfying its divers needs, including that of national defense.

"Count Witte has introduced new suggestions which have not even originated in the Duma and which are calculated solely to undermine that which so far has stood on a firm foundation, namely, our finances. A large number of the members of the State Council, made anxious by the press or simply incapable of orienting themselves in the midst of obvious absurdities, have blindly followed these demagogic appeals, and the situation has begun to assume forms which occasion truly serious fears.

"This estimate of the situation is shared by State Secretary Akimov, who has just told me that in his opinion the disorderly progress of the debates in the State Council is assuming dimensions which fill him with grave misgivings.

"I dare not burden Your Imperial Majesty with a further statement of my thoughts called forth by the above situation. In submitting them for Your Majesty's consideration I believe it my duty to petition Your Majesty to be pleased to summon State Secretary Akimov and me some day soon to hear our joint report."

We made our report on January 21, at 4:00 P.M. Akimov spoke first. Quite bluntly he told the Tsar that he had never attended such sessions of the State Council; there were so much clamor, so many insulting remarks, and so much evasion of the issue under discussion that one might almost imagine one were in a session of the First or Second Dumas. When, however, His Majesty reminded him that it was his duty to keep order and to direct the debates, Akimov had little more to say. He added only that Witte was opposing my project simply to make it unpleasant for me and in order to win, if possible, the Tsar's favor by championing temperance. Were His Majesty to make it known that he was disgusted with Witte's demagogy, the latter would quickly change his tune.

It was my turn to speak. Knowing that the Tsar regretted the ineffectiveness of our measures for combating the excessive use of

intoxicants, I explained to him that my objections were not to the proposed measures against drunkenness but to Witte's crazy suggestions. These provided that henceforth the revenue from the sale of liquor should not exceed that of the present year; any surplus was to be transferred to the zemstvos and municipalities to be used in enforcing temperance. I pointed out that such measures would only result in decreased revenue and increased expenditures without achieving the purpose of temperance efforts, for unless it were carefully arranged and supervised the privilege of spending this surplus would be gravely abused. Then, too, there was the danger that the zemstvos would come to regard the state funds as their own, which would lead to a new conflict with the government. I also expressed my surprise that Witte, a confirmed opponent of the zemstvo idea, should now favor increasing the power of these local institutions. In conclusion I argued that only by raising the moral and material level of the people could the evil of drunkenness be overcome, for any artificial means of overcoming it would be circumvented by an illicit trading that would exaggerate the evil.

His Majesty, however, seemed indifferent to my representations, which I asked his permission to continue some other time, especially since I was sure the Duma would not endorse Witte's suggestions. This permission was granted, and we took our leave. On the way home Akimov told me that he had heard that Meshchersky was behind this whole temperance campaign, mainly because he was aware that it was the wish of Rasputin.

The next day Witte resumed his efforts in the State Council, but in vain. His only support came from Gurko. After a three hours' debate everything was left unchanged with the exception of two matters: the opening of *traktirs* in cities and towns, and the right of the zemstvos and municipalities to forbid the opening of government vodka shops in localities selected by the government. On these two points the majority joined me, and Witte again demonstratively left the room. How this whole debate finally ended, I do not know, as three days afterward events showed me that the seeming indifference of the Tsar to the report made by Akimov and me was deceiving. He simply did not wish to argue with me, having resolved to part with me. The rescript published when I was discharged condemned my policies and ordered that steps be taken immediately to limit the sale of intoxicants. This showed that Witte had known of the Tsar's intention to dismiss me and that he was playing safe in working for

my downfall. Unhappily for him, however, he did not profit by it, for the Tsar still did not trust him.

On Friday, January 24, I made my regular report to the Tsar. In accordance with his request of the previous week, however, I reported at the Anichkovsky Palace (1) and not at Tsarskoe Selo. My audience was set for six o'clock in the evening, but it was twenty minutes to seven before I was received. At the time, I wondered what could be causing the delay.*

His Majesty, however, was exceptionally gracious. He mentioned several problems and gave me definite instructions for the future. In my turn I raised the delicate question as to whether commercial treaties with foreign countries should be submitted to the legislative institutions for ratification or should be concluded by the government alone. The Tsar had not thought of this before, and when I expressed my views on the matter he quite agreed with them. He kept my memorandum, however, saying he would tell me of his final decision the following Friday (January 31). I told His Majesty that I had distributed this memorandum to the ministers, that it had been marked "most confidential," and that I had taken pains to keep it secret from the press, for if the latter learned of it a regular tempest would ensue. On this we parted; the Tsar said he hoped he had not spoiled my appetite by making me late for dinner.

During these anxious and painful days I was very much alone. My wife was not with me, having gone abroad, accompanied by my brother-in-law, V. N. Mamontov, to attend the wedding of our daughter. I was unable to go because of my work.

* Later on, after my discharge, when I had time to reflect on the events of these days, I became convinced, as I am today, that the delay in receiving my report was not accidental. Evidently the Tsar had planned to talk to me on this occasion of my dismissal, but was undecided as to how to broach the topic. His indecision had caused the delay. This conclusion is borne out by other facts. Thus, the next night (Saturday, 25th), Vladimir Vestman, who worked in His Majesty's private office (with Taneev), spread the news that the office was printing the rescript for my discharge. Evidently the order had been given on Friday the 24th, if not earlier. Moreover, some ten days previously Goremykin had been summoned to Tsarskoe Selo. Following this he had had a series of secret conferences with Krivoshein. Of this I knew nothing, although nearly everyone else was aware of it. Then, too, on Friday the 24th, V. F. Trepov told me he had heard rumors about my dismissal and asked permission to find out what he could from Count Frederichs. The next night I received another note from Trepov saying that the Court Minister had had a conversation with the Tsar, but since the latter seemed very well disposed toward me, Frederichs could not understand where the rumors could have originated.

My wife returned from abroad on the morning of January 25. On our way home from the station she asked me what I had been doing during the week she had been absent, and I repeated in detail all that had happened—Witte's speeches in the State Council, the campaign conducted against me by *Grazhdanin*, and the persistent rumor that my days were numbered. She advised me to petition the Tsar for retirement, or, if I could not bring myself to this, to force the issue by refusing to continue in the atmosphere of intrigue and animosity created by such persons as Maklakov, Sukhomlinov, Shcheglovitov, and the rest. She assured me that the Tsar would never let me go. I had to spend the day in the Finance Committee of the State Council, but that night we resumed our discussion. I answered my wife's arguments by two statements. First, the Tsar would never keep me in preference to a group of ministers hostile to me, as he was at present intoxicated, as it were, with his own power. Thus all my arguments as to the danger of the policy approved by these hostile ministers would pass unheeded and I should virtually be forcing myself into retirement. Second, were I to leave active service it would mean the collapse of the entire Ministry of Finance which I loved and which had become so vital to me. Without exaggeration I could say that the personnel of the ministry would reproach me for having abandoned my beloved work of my own free will and for having sacrificed their common good to my personal comfort. No longer did I value my own interests, and I was sure that retirement this time would be much less painful than it had been in 1905. "No," I concluded; "I shall not retire; let them 'retire' me." "In that case," she replied, "you will have to wait a long time for a decision, as the Tsar will stand by you."

Sunday, January 26, I spent all day in the Finance Committee of the State Council arguing with Witte and Gurko, whose suggestions were again rejected by the overwhelming majority. In the evening we entertained some friends, among them V. N. Okhotnikov, who was generally well informed as to current gossip. He failed to inform me, however, of the impending collapse of my official career. I am sure that in spite of his nearness to Prince Meshchersky he did not know anything of it; otherwise, because of certain peculiarities of his disposition, he would have hastened to inform me.

Some time after 9:00 P.M. I had a telephone call from Gurland, who told me that he had just learned from Stürmer that the matter of my discharge had been definitely settled and the ukase was ex-

pected any day. I answered that I knew nothing whatever of the matter, and added that the last time I had seen the Tsar, January 24, I had been given no hint as to my impending dismissal.

Monday, January 27, I spent at home receiving callers whom I could not receive on Saturday owing to a meeting of the Finance Committee of the State Council. There was quite a crowd, and the reception lasted until seven. Then my wife and I went to dine at Maklakov's house. We started out with an unpleasant feeling, for since November I had not been on good terms with him and I knew that he was one of the links in the chain of the intrigue surrounding me. We had even thought of declining the invitation, but since the invitation had been made three weeks previously, when our relations were not so strained, to decline at the last moment would have been tantamount to showing that I heeded the town rumors. We preferred to face the music.

Outwardly the dinner was a success; I was seated next to Lady Buchanan (2) and we carried on an animated conversation which Goremeykin, who was seated beside my wife, professed to enjoy.

After dinner Count Frederichs asked me to tell him the meaning of the rumors regarding my retirement. "Last Saturday," he said, "when in accordance with Trepov's request I spoke to the Tsar, he spoke of you in the most gracious terms and I assure you that you enjoy his entire confidence. I know that you are in an unfortunate situation, that people intrigue about you and against you, and as a friend I advise you to talk frankly and sincerely with His Majesty, explain to him that your situation has become insufferable, and ask him to dismiss the ministers with whom you can work no longer. I assure you, you will be successful providing you are firm."

I thanked Frederichs and said I should like nothing better than to have such a talk with His Majesty. I reminded him, however, that I was no Witte and could not force my will upon the Tsar. Nevertheless, I promised to speak out during my next report—even though I felt sure my official days were numbered.

Leaving Frederichs I approached another group of guests, among whom was Count A. A. Bobrinsky. He told me that the Tsar had confirmed the order to make photographic reproductions of the archaeological finds for Emperor William. I answered that I should probably not be in office to receive the completed pictures, as rumor predicted my dismissal. "What of it?" he said. "It will be but a short vacation which you so badly need." These words of a man

who never spoke to the wind and who, moreover, belonged to the extreme Right and had reliable sources of information were the first definite confirmation I had had that it had been decided to remove me.

Under this impression I returned home and stayed up until 2:00 A.M. arranging current matters. One of them worried me a good deal. Wednesday, January 29, was the day on which Witte's suggestions on the liquor revenues were to be heard by the general session of the State Council. Gurko's proposal to compensate the keepers of government vodka shops for any decrease in the sales of liquor was also to be heard. Both of these suggestions had met with dismal failure in the Finance Committee, and I knew that the same would happen to them in the general session, but I also knew that Count Witte would renew his attacks on me. Even so, I could not avoid attending the session, as the acting chairman, Golubev, who was taking the place of the ailing Akimov, had insistently asked me to be present.

On Tuesday, January 28, Gurland again telephoned to say that Stürmer had told him that he and other persons who had been present at Maklakov's dinner were marveling at my astonishing calm and self-control at such a trying moment; any other man would have been sure to reflect in his face and conduct his inward agitation. According to Gurland, Stürmer had said: "If one did not know that his dismissal had already been decided upon, one might believe that once more the rumor of a change of Chairman of the Ministers' Council was merely more idle St. Petersburg gossip." I repeated that I knew nothing about the matter, although the conduct and the words of Count Bobrinsky assured me that I was indeed to be dismissed and that the chain of intrigue surrounding me had been forged into a complete circle.

All that day I received reports, and spent the evening at home getting ready for the next day's session of the State Council. In the middle of the reports I received Krivoshein, who was going abroad and had called to take his leave. Our relations had undergone a certain change of late. We had not seen each other for nearly two weeks. He entered the room with his usual affectation of sincerity and with the words: "I am seriously ill, Vladimir Nikolaevich, and although the doctors assure me that I shall recover I feel that I am quite gone and may never return. I have come to say goodbye, to advise you to spare your health and strength, and to wish you all that is best." Knowing the full value of the sincerity of this utterly in-

sincere and ambitious man, I thanked him for his visit and entreated him to rest well and to return to his work with fresh strength. As to his advice to save my strength and health, I answered that they could hardly be of any use to me now, as I felt that the end of my career was drawing near; however, with the termination of my work my health would surely improve. I added that we might meet abroad, as when I left active service I should probably leave Russia for some time and should like to meet him somewhere under Italian skies.

Rising from his armchair, he said: "Personally, I believe that ten years from now Count Witte will be still plotting against you and you will still be sitting tight. However, if your prophecy were to come true, how could we small fry approach a man bearing one of the most honored titles of our country?" I interpreted these words as his usual practice of sounding the upper "do" and his inclination to adorn his speech with adjectives such as "renowned," "amazing," "exalted," and what not. "I have my name and patronym," I replied, "and these I shall keep for the rest of my days. Titles and ranks do not become me." On this we parted.

CHAPTER XXXIV

JANUARY 1914

The morning of January 29, following a night endless and sleepless because of painful and persistent thoughts, I spent in familiar occupations. My wife went for her usual morning walk, and I occupied myself in my study with my routine work. At exactly eleven o'clock a messenger brought me a short letter written in the Tsar's hand and addressed to the "Chairman of the Ministers' Council," a letter which I still have. Before I opened it I knew that it brought my dismissal. It read as follows:

"TSARSKOE SELO, January 29, 1914.

"VLADIMIR NIKOLAEVICH:

"It is not a feeling of displeasure but a long-standing and deep realization of a state need that now forces me to tell you that we have to part.

"I am doing this in writing, for it is easier to select the right words when putting them on paper than during an unsettling conversation.

"The happenings of the past eight years have persuaded me definitely that the idea of combining in one person the duties of Chairman of the Ministers' Council and those of Minister of Finance or of the Interior is both awkward and wrong in a country such as Russia.

"Moreover, the swift tempo of our domestic life and the striking development of the economic forces of our country both demand the undertaking of most definite and serious measures, a task which should be best entrusted to a man fresh for the work.

"During the last two years, unfortunately, I have not always approved of the policy of the Ministry of Finance, and I perceive that this can go no farther.

"I appreciate highly your devotion to me and the great service you have performed in achieving remarkable improvements in Russia's state credit; I am grateful to you for this from the bottom of my heart. Believe me, I am sorry to part with you who have been

my assistant for ten years. Believe also, that I shall not forget to take suitable care of you and your family. I expect you with your last report on Friday, at 11:00 A.M. as always, and ever as a friend.

"With sincere regards,

"NICHOLAS"

Then as now I could see clearly that the Tsar had written the letter under the influence of that pressure which had been brought to bear upon him for the purpose of removing me. Evidently the Tsar did not trust himself during a conversation with me, fearing that I might advance arguments which would force him to change his mind; on the other hand, the persons enjoying his confidence persisted in their purpose, and therefore he had decided to take a step which made his decision with respect to me irrevocable.

The conviction that the letter was written under the influence of my enemies is supported by evidence within the letter itself. During the past eight years he said he had noted the harmfulness of combining in Russia the duties of Chairman of the Ministers' Council and those of the Minister of Finance or the Interior. Three years previously, after the assassination of Stolypin, when he had deliberately appointed me chairman, he had said: "It goes without saying that I wish you to remain Minister of Finance." Since then, moreover, not only had I never heard from him any remarks on the awkwardness of such a combination but I had on many occasions heard him say that during my term of office there had been much less friction in the Council than ever before.

The letter also mentioned Russia's tremendous economic growth, which created a series of new demands which needed new men for their fulfillment.* Now who had been responsible for this tremendous economic progress? Whose work had it been to preserve Russian finances during the Russo-Japanese War and during the period of domestic strife, thus paving the way for Russia's economic progress? Why was it that this same person was now found inadequate to face the new economic problems? And why had he not been informed as to what these problems were? Still more strange, and, I dislike to say it, still less intelligible, was the statement to the effect that during the last two years the Tsar had not been altogether pleased with the policy of the Ministry of Finance and that this could not go on. At no

* I shall show later just what sort of new men were called upon to perform these tasks.

time during the entire ten years of my administration had I heard any expression of disapproval, nor had I received, either orally or in writing, any implied criticism of my policies and accomplishments in the Ministry of Finance. Always my reports had been received with definite expressions of favor and pleasure. In October 1912, in discussing the project of appointing me ambassador to Berlin, the Tsar had asked me to suggest someone to succeed me as Minister of Finance, and added, "providing, of course, that he will carry on as you have done, for I cannot consider that any change should be made in your splendid policies."

The last words of the letter made a peculiar impression upon me. Instructing me that on Friday next I was to appear with my last report at my usual time, the Tsar seemed to warn me not to try to make him change his decision, as it was irrevocable. As if during these last ten years the Tsar had not learned to know that I should never ask to be left at my post against his will!

My wife, returning from her walk, found me thus engrossed. The Tsar's letter showed her that she had estimated the situation wrongly. In the weeks and months that followed we often talked of this matter, and whether it was in Italy where we went to live down our first feelings of pain or on the Mohovaia where we returned to live quietly my wife always maintained that such turning-points in the fortune of men are fateful and the will of God. "A man cannot fight alone," she said.

At first, however, we did not have time to engage in these reflections. I had to give immediate orders regarding the session of the State Council—I asked my assistant, I. I. Novitsky, to act for me, explaining the situation to him and requesting him to explain it to my nearest collaborators. The news traveled through the Ministry of Finance and the entire city like lightning.

My dismissal—and I say this with all modesty—was a great shock to the Ministry of Finance. On Thursday, the 30th, the doors of my office were open nearly all the time as I received the calls of those who had been near to me in the ministry, all of whom I had to reassure and encourage while preserving an outward composure that was not at all in accord with my real feelings. My three assistants, Novitsky, Weber, and Pokrovsky, implored me most touchingly not to abandon them in the Ministry of Finance but to help them to be transferred to the State Council. If this were not feasible, they would like to be transferred to the Senate, or, if the worst came to the worst,

they were prepared to retire, for they could not work with my successors.

All day Thursday, January 30, until quite late, my wife and I spent in my study sorting out papers, letters, and books—destroying some, arranging others, getting ready to leave our old home. We were about to retire when our doorman, Maksimenko, announced a messenger from Tanéev. This messenger brought me the Sovereign rescript on my dismissal and offered his congratulations on the distinction of my elevation to the rank of Count. My wife was greatly moved and only with difficulty mastered her emotions. She appreciated the exceptional distinction the Tsar had conferred upon me, but she expressed her attitude by saying: "What sort of a Countess could I make?" and then, "What use can you find for the title of Count, you who have borne untarnished the name of Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, and whose past life has been characterized by modesty?"

This award showed me at once who had been in the center of the plot to secure my removal, and who had measured me by his own yardstick. I associated this mark of distinction with the hint Krivoshein had dropped three days previously when he had come to bid me goodbye.

There was another restless night. The impending last audience with the Tsar weighed on my heart. Before leaving for Tsarskoe on the ten o'clock train I read in the *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*, beside the rescript on my discharge, two other rescripts—one to Goremykin, who was appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council, and one to P. L. Bark, who was appointed Minister of Finance. This latter upset me greatly. It made immediately evident the lack of logic in those who had inspired and carried out the intrigue against me. In fact, the document of my dismissal and that of Bark's appointment were contradictory. The former dismissed me from two posts "in consideration of insistent requests motivated by a poor state of health," requests which I had never made either orally or in writing. At the same time, it honored me by elevating me to the rank of Count and expressed the hope that in the future my experience and knowledge would always be used in times of stress. The latter definitely denounced all my activities and policies.

Some of the statements of the rescript on Bark's appointment were really deplorable if one considers that they were made after the Tsar had been reigning for twenty years. It had taken two decades

of rule and some travel through certain districts of Russia—for instance, the journey taken on the occasion of the Romanov celebrations—to convince the Monarch that his domain was filled with roofless peasant houses and showed signs of poverty. These conditions, although they were not apparent along the route of the Imperial journeys, confirmed the Tsar in his belief that the root of the evil was the use of intoxicants; he abhorred the thought that the wealth of the state was built upon a vice of the people. The strange feature of this affair is that it had taken twenty years for the idea to crystallize, and crystallization had come, peculiarly enough, just at a time when ministers were being changed. Why had nothing been done about curbing the liquor evil during Witte's thirteen and my ten years of administration? On many occasions, when the liquor problem was under discussion in the Duma I had broached the subject to His Majesty. Each time he spoke of such measures as police regulation, shortening the number of hours of sale, etc., as being a joke, mere child's play. Of course at that time there was not the deplorable example of the prohibition enforcement in the United States and the rise of the phenomenon of gangsterism. Then, if further evidence is necessary, barely a week after my discharge Ermolov happened to mention to the Tsar Witte's wild conduct in the State Council. This moved His Majesty to say that he recognized that no cries of "Help" could improve the people's plight, for such improvement was dependent on the education of the people in habits of thrift and serious endeavor.

This rescript spoke also of the need of developing the productive forces of the country—a need that had been neglected by the administration. It said that the system of people's credit was ill-organized, that such credit was not accessible to the masses. As a matter of fact, the last eight years, 1906–1914, had seen great progress in this very matter. It was evident that this rescript was simply a denunciation of me and my policies. No good would come of criticizing it. But it was just as evident that it did not reflect the true sentiments and ideas of the Tsar; it was the work of those who sought my downfall.

My interview with His Majesty was indeed painful. Both of us had to struggle against the emotions that surged within us. For some moments neither of us could speak; the Tsar could not hold back the tears. Then I mustered enough self-control to break the silence: "I am distressed, Your Majesty, to be the cause of such agitation. I have always tried to avoid disturbing you, and it is most painful for me to

see that your decision causes you so much distress. I have come, with your permission, to take my leave, and according to the Russian custom I pray you not to remember evil of me. If I have displeased you in anything, forgive me, and believe that I have always served you to the best of my understanding and with all the devotion of which I am capable. Believe, also, that I shall always consider the ten years I spent as your collaborator, sometimes during moments of great stress, the happiest days of my life. My gratitude to you for your unchanging graciousness will never disappear from my heart."

The Tsar embraced me, kissed me twice, and said: "How could I remember evil of you, knowing your great love for me, your warm devotion to Russia! I wished to show my true feelings by giving you proof of my consideration. I hope we part as friends."

In reply I thanked His Majesty for the distinction he had conferred upon me but explained that I did not know how to live up to the social life of a Count. Since the days of the Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, my forefathers had humbly and loyally served their sovereigns in modest and obscure offices outside the capital. I myself had been born into modest circumstances, and had no desire other than to end my days bearing the simple name that was my heritage. But His Majesty insisted that the world must know how highly he valued my services; this was the motive behind his reward.

I went on to say that it was very disturbing to me to receive such high honors and at the same time to have my past policies so roundly condemned. Then I pointed out the contradiction in the rescripts mentioned above. I compared as respectfully as I could their contents, and when I had finished the Tsar was deeply moved. He admitted that he had not anticipated that the simultaneous publication of the two rescripts would evoke comparisons. "It would have been wiser," he said, "simply to appoint Bark, and to give him his instructions at a later date. I should have considered carefully every word in that rescript." This in itself suggests the circumstances under which this rescript was written.

Then we talked of other things. His Majesty advised me to make the most of a rest that was well earned. He seemed amazed when I protested that I did not crave prolonged rest; that I was accustomed to hard work and should be utterly lost with idle time on my hands. Inactivity would be all the more irksome to me because my interest in the affairs of state did not end with my official career.

"Is it indeed so difficult to find something to do?" he said. "You

have experience and ability; I am sure many opportunities will present themselves."

Taking advantage of this opportunity I reminded His Majesty of his former offer of the ambassadorship to Germany. I reminded him also that recent reports stated that Izvolsky's position at Paris was not too pleasant, and said I should be eternally grateful if he could use me as an ambassador. He expressed his eagerness to comply with my wish and suggested that I should talk the matter over with Sazonov.

The future of my three assistants, Novitsky, Weber, and Pokrovsky, was also on my mind, and I respectfully requested His Majesty that some provision might be made for them. I asked that they be appointed to the State Council, for which I already had Akimov's consent. His Majesty questioned the wisdom of leaving Bark without experienced assistants. I suggested that these men might be instructed to stay at their old posts until Bark had decided upon their successors, but insisted that a new policy demanded new men and that Bark would find it to his own advantage to have his own assistants.*

Finally, I asked His Majesty to relieve me of my duties in the Finance Committee. I argued that it would be best for me to retire from all activities in the field of finance, and that I was eager to avoid

* I learned later that my solicitation on behalf of my assistants hurt my standing with the Tsar. Certain persons explained to him that it was my purpose to hamper my successor by depriving the ministry of its ablest and most active workers. This accusation is grossly false and unjust. I considered it my moral duty to help my assistants, especially since they were determined not to work with Bark under any condition. As for the other able workers, I neither enticed them away from the ministry nor invited them to abandon their work. E. D. Lvov decided to leave the ministry because of family and financial considerations; L. F. Davydov had been offered a contract with the Russian Foreign Trade Bank during my visit to Paris in the fall of 1913; A. V. Konshin had planned to leave the ministry two years before my dismissal, and on the day Bark was appointed he told me that he would simply retire, since he could not bring himself to work under a man whose appointment he considered utterly inappropriate. Finally, G. D. Dementev, whom I repeatedly requested not to leave the ministry, answered as Konshin had done, adding that having balanced twenty-six budgets and worked all his life under ministers who knew state accounting and had taught him the same thing he could not accept as his chief a man unprepared for the task entrusted to him. Dementev agreed to stay at his post only until the budget had been approved by the Duma and the State Council, and on visiting me in June 1914 he told me simply: "During the five months after your retirement I have become more tired than during all the former years of my work in the State Treasury put together. Joint work with the new minister is more than I can stand. He has no time to study his new work, and as far as I can judge general conditions now do not favor such a course."

further trouble with Witte, the Chairman of the Committee, and with such men as Rukhlov, Krivoshein, and Nikolsky, whom Bark intended to appoint to the Committee and whose views were diametrically opposed to mine. It would be said that I raised objections simply because I was no longer Minister of Finance. This request His Majesty granted.

I was about to leave, but His Majesty stopped me. "In my letter," he said, "I promised to provide for you and your family. Would you be satisfied with an appropriation of two or three hundred thousand rubles?"

It was a shock to me to think that His Majesty had not learned to know me better during the ten years of our close association. Apparently the Tsar sensed my feelings, for he said: "Think how many millions have passed through your hands, Vladimir Nikolae-vich, and how zealously you have guarded the interests of the treasury! Is there anything in my suggestion to cause you embarrassment?"

I felt called upon to express my inmost thoughts. I thanked His Majesty for his generosity, but begged permission to refuse his offer. Throughout my entire career I had sought no monetary favors either for myself or for my relatives; moreover, I had even opposed on principle the granting of money to private individuals who requested assistance. I reminded him of this, and made it clear that I should leave myself open to charges of gross inconsistency were I now to deviate from the principle I had championed. "I do not want to have it said of me," I concluded, "that while I refused to assist others by grants from the treasury I myself acquired a fortune in the service of the state. Instead of granting me this sum, please be so good as to grant me an adequate pension, when, as is the custom, the Chairman of the State Council makes this request of you."

His Majesty seemed to find it difficult to comprehend that I had actually refused his offer, the contrary being so nearly universal. "Tell me again," he said, "that you bear me no enmity and that we part as friends." I assured him of my undying love for him and my unending gratitude for all his past kindness. Then he embraced me, and I withdrew.

When I returned home I repeated everything to my wife, and was overjoyed to find that she shared my attitude in regard to the money. We agreed to tell no one of this, and the only person who ever learned of it from us was Y. I. Utin, who promised on his honor not to

repeat it to anyone. Yet the very next day it was known to everyone in town. The news was spread by the Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, who had gone to the Yacht Club directly from Tsarskoe Selo, where he had been told of it by the Tsar. I do not know what the Grand Duke said about the matter, but at first general sympathy was on my side and many persons admitted that I could not have acted otherwise. Then gradually other opinions were expressed. Some said that I was after popularity. Others said that I had been insolent to the Tsar and had insulted him. Still others said that I had been simply foolish, for no one refused money and the comforts it could bring. Later I was informed that by my action I had antagonized the Tsar—but whether or not this was so I could never ascertain, but I am sure that the Tsar himself could not have been displeased on this ground.

On Friday, January 31, the same day as my last audience with the Tsar, the new Minister of Finance called on me. He was confused, and announced that he wished to congratulate me on having received the Tsar's favor and to express the deep respect he had felt for me since the time he had been my subordinate as Assistant Manager of the State Bank. He requested me to assist and advise him in his new and unexpected responsibilities.

We sat down at the great desk, and Bark began by saying that the appointment fell upon his head as a bolt from the blue, that he was confused to the last degree, that he was especially disturbed by the inordinate demands of the War Ministry, and that he put his only hope upon my kind assistance. I thanked him for the opinion he held of me and suggested that we speak frankly, as a free discussion would simplify matters. I began by pointing out that contrary to his assertions his appointment was no surprise to him, as it had been in process of preparation since 1910 when he had been appointed Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry. Then everybody had said openly that he had been selected not so much by Timashev as by Krivoshein, who had pointed him out to the late Stolypin as a future Minister of Finance more tractable than I. I went on to say that it was no secret to me that he was continually going to and from Prince Meshchersky since the latter had assisted him at a difficult moment of his life. As for my assisting him, I said: "Why should we play hide and seek? You are too intelligent and young to do so, and I am too old. The rescript of your appointment says plainly that you must follow policies diametrically opposed to mine. Now if you let yourself be governed

by my advice, you will undoubtedly disobey your instructions, and to ask me to protect you from committing my errors, is, after all, a bit thick." I advised him to free himself of my influence as speedily as possible and to select his own assistants. I told him of my petition to the Tsar on behalf of Novitsky, Weber, and Pokrovsky, and that in order completely to remove all possibility of hindering him in any way I had requested the Tsar to be relieved of my duties as a member of the Finance Committee.

Bark then suggested that by leaving the Finance Committee I had deprived him of the chance of learning my views on matters which it discussed. I assured him that he should feel relieved that I had acted as I had, and that had he been in my position he would have done the same thing. I asked him to review Witte's attitude toward me since his return from abroad. In Paris he had eulogized me as a great financier and statesman, as the author of Russia's prosperity and a keeper of European peace. Two weeks later he had accused me of having blocked the sound liquor-control measures he had invented, thereby corrupting Russia. In interviews with the reporters of *Novoe Vremia* he had condemned my railway policy and accused me of playing into the hands of railway magnates in order to make personal profit, of hindering state railway construction, and of introducing complete disorder into the construction of private lines by making these the objects of unrestrained speculation.

It was evident, I added, that even though his main objective had been reached and I had been driven from power, Count Witte would not be content. Whatever I might say in the Finance Committee he would object to it. Controversies would result, and the Tsar would have to arbitrate. I should acquire the reputation of a querulous man; and the Minister of Finance would find himself torn between conflicting loyalties. Last but not least, it would be very painful for me to enter the house of a man who had insulted me so much. 'Anyhow, after all I had been through, I had a right to have some rest, and henceforth this would be my sole aim. On this we parted.

As soon as Bark had gone, I telephoned Sazonov and told him what I had said to the Tsar about an appointment as ambassador. We arranged a meeting at my house, at which we discussed the entire situation. He assured me that my wish was right in line with his plan to introduce into the diplomatic body a new personnel which would better represent the changed conditions in Russian life. He told me frankly that Paris, having heard of my dismissal, was specu-

lating on my appointment as ambassador to France. These speculations had alarmed Izvolsky to such an extent that he had wired Sazonov soliciting him to protect his (Izvolsky's) interests. Sazonov then went on to say that the Tsar knew of Izvolsky's difficulties at Paris and of the splendid esteem in which I was held there and that hence it was quite possible my wish would be gratified. Sazonov promised to speak of it to the Tsar on the following Tuesday and to report to me. Tuesday came and went, however, and Sazonov had no report to make. Thus the matter ended; as for me, I did not choose to broach the subject again.*

As soon as the first days filled with much work connected with my retirement and ensuing formalities were over, I called on the Empress' lady-in-waiting, E. A. Naryshkina, to ask her to arrange for me an audience with the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna so that I might take my leave. I had known the lady-in-waiting since the days of my youth when I had been employed in the Department of Prisons and she had been engaged in welfare work among the criminals. I told her of my conviction that I did not stand well with the Empress, and asked her to handle the matter as delicately as possible.

She telephoned me the next day to say that she had complied with my wish and could not notice any trace of displeasure on the part of the Empress. But since Her Majesty was feeling poorly, she would postpone my audience until she felt better. The appointment was never made, however, and I did not press the matter, for I knew Her Majesty was not well disposed toward me. Thus I did not see the Empress again.

I was dismissed on Friday, January 31. All that day and in the

* Only much later did I learn why the matter had ended at this point. In 1931 there appeared the first volume of a series of documents prepared by Soviet scholars relating to the last days of the Tsarist régime. This work (1) contained two documents. First, a letter from Izvolsky to Sazonov, dated February 12, in which the former thanked the latter for having protected his interests and prevented my appointment as ambassador to France. Second, Maurice Paléologue's report of his meeting on his way to Russia with Prince Vladimir Orlov (2) who told him that the Tsar had long since decided to dismiss me, as I was subordinating Russia's foreign policy too much to considerations of finance. Whether this was actually true, or whether it was Orlov's invention, I do not know. Certainly, the Tsar never by so much as a word indicated that he disapproved of my attitude toward foreign affairs. He was a soldier at heart, but he thoroughly endorsed my policy of doing everything to maintain peace. Moreover, despite my differences with Sukhomlinov, he knew that I was an ardent advocate of national preparedness. It is for these reasons that I believe Orlov's story was his own fabrication or the concoction of Russian military circles.

days immediately following I received many calls from persons wishing to express their sympathies and to say a kind word. All the State Councillors, many members of the Duma, among them my opponent Shingarev, came. My former colleagues in the Cabinet were the least friendly. Most of them merely left their cards. Timashev alone called for a friendly talk. Kharitonov and Rukhlov called when my wife was "at home"; the latter told me that he believed I had known everything long ago and was silent "because of my reserved temperament." However, the unfriendly attitude of the ministers was easy to understand. Many among them had taken an active part in my dismissal; then, too, it was not to their advantage to show much consideration to a man in disfavor.

St. Petersburg society, on the other hand, showed us a consideration that approached being a demonstration. On Sunday, February 2, we had an unusually large number of callers, and their carriages were lined up as far as the Palace Square. This was repeated on my wife's patron Saint's day, February 3. Never had we had so many visitors or so many flowers.

Thursday, February 6, was a particularly sad day for me. It was the anniversary of my first appointment as Minister of Finance. I had hoped to spend that day in office and had even compiled an interesting review of all that had been done in Russia in the fields of economics and finance since that time. I had hoped to present this work to the Tsar in person, but fate had decreed otherwise. Fearing that the impression of such an anniversary, so rare among ministers, might influence the Tsar in my favor, my adversaries had arranged that my dismissal should take place exactly a week before this date.

My colleagues in the Ministry of Finance had planned to celebrate this anniversary, and I had invited them to dinner. I did not wish to cancel the invitation because of what had happened. It was not a very happy occasion, however, for all of us were victims of the emotion we felt. Then, on the next day, Friday the 7th, the personnel of the ministry bade me a formal farewell. I pleaded with the senior officials to be spared this ordeal, but seeing that by insisting I should hurt their feelings I decided to drink the bitter cup. Novitsky read the farewell speech, which he extended into a statistical survey of my administration. He wearied everybody and gave me time to master my feelings. I made only a short speech in reply.

Two days later we moved from the ministry building to a private apartment on the Mohovaia. I disliked to make the change, for I had

become attached to my official home. It was a break which foreshadowed the inactivity I dreaded so much.

Before I left the ministry building, however, I was obliged to suffer another painful experience. In the morning of February 5, about eleven o'clock, Y. I. Utin called and asked if I had read the February 4 edition of *Petersburger Herold* (3), a German paper published in St. Petersburg, which contained a libelous article about me under the heading: "Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, different from other ministers." I had not seen it. It said that St. Petersburg society was much impressed by the current rumor that on dismissing me the Tsar had offered me two or three hundred thousand rubles which I had refused to accept. Evidently, the article went on, in me St. Petersburg had acquired an Aristides who astounded the populace by his demonstrative disinterestedness. Or possibly, it suggested, I was already so rich that I did not need the Tsar's generosity and could afford to make this pretty gesture. Further on, the article commented upon the fact that it was the custom of Russian Sovereigns to reward their faithful servants, a fine historical custom; those ministers who had bowed to this splendid tradition had acted in a praiseworthy manner, whereas Kokovtsov was entirely wrong in attempting to show that he was a better man than they and in boasting of the fact. The article ended with these words: "In this connection an aphorism uttered by one of the most prominent statesmen of the Empire is current in St. Petersburg bureaucratic circles: 'It is much more honorable and praiseworthy to accept the money offered by one's Sovereign than to receive it from Mr. Utin, President of the Discount and Loan Bank at St. Petersburg.'"

I telephoned straightway, in the presence of Utin, to Goremykin, read the article to him, and asked if the government intended to protect my good name by suing the editor, Mr. Pipers, or if I should have to do so as a private citizen. Goremykin said that he would take immediate action, and he was as good as his word. It was really a trifling case, but it was some time before it was over. Not until the end of June did it reach the District Court. Pipers was found guilty, and sentenced to six months in prison. He then appealed to the Palata. More months went by, and only late in the fall was his appeal rejected. Pipers then transferred the case to the Senate, which also rejected his appeal; he had to serve his sentence.

During the trial of the case by the Palata, Pipers' attorney, Bashmakov, submitted, in vindication of his client, a copy of the *Berliner*

Tageblatt in which was the following statement: "The statesman who originated the aphorism about Count Kokovtsov was none other than Count Witte." Bashmakov added that Pipers, having received such a spicy bit of news from a source both most trustworthy and competent, had acted in good faith; therefore, the court ought not to try him for the printing of information which was "patently false and libelous."

Some time later I was visited by Rumanov, the manager of the St. Petersburg office of the *Russkoe Slovo*. He said he had seen Pipers shortly before Count Witte's death, and that Pipers had assured him on his word of honor that Witte had informed him of this filthy piece of gossip. When Pipers remarked that, were he to print it, he would run the risk of being sued for libel, Witte had replied: "Believe me, Kokovtsov will never dare bring suit. And if he does, so much the worse for him, for there will be such a scandal that you will be the first to receive the people's thanks for your revelations." What was the truth of the matter, I do not know; but I have some grounds for believing that Pipers published the information in good faith.

I should not like to end this part of my narrative without expressing that which I still cherish in my heart—the consolation and encouragement I received from the sincere sympathy expressed to me on all sides. Besides the many personal calls, I received a great number of letters. Of these I should like to mention those from a member of the Duma, Shubinsky; State Councillor D. I. Bagalei (4), who was also a professor at Kharkov University; State Councillor A. S. Ermolov; State Councillor N. S. Tagantsev, who was my Lyceum professor and a famous criminal lawyer; State Councillor I. K. Ozerov (5); Minister of Commerce and Industry Sergei Ivanovich Timashev; G. E. Afanasev (6), who was manager of the Kiev branch of the State Bank; and member of the Third Duma, Baron Cherkasov (7). Each of these letters, and many others as well, praised the work I had done and the manner in which it had been performed, and expressed regret that my guiding hand had been removed from the affairs of the Russian State.

I received a number of letters from abroad, but I shall mention only the one from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. It reads as follows: "I have always cherished the deep conviction that you were a mighty factor in the economic and cultural development of Russia, and that the preservation of friendly relations between our two

neighboring countries was in perfect accord with your political program. I could therefore always be sure of finding in you the most sincere sympathy with these views, which I, too, consider necessary and in accord with the interests of my country. I shall, therefore, always preserve a grateful remembrance of all those instances when our mutual work for the good of our countries brought us together to advance the mutual welfare of our states.

"Filled with these thoughts, I wish to express my sincere hope that your withdrawal from the political stage is but temporary, and that in the very near future your exceptional capacity for work will again return you to labor for our mutual advantage.

"I preserve, also, the warmest memories of our meetings both at St. Petersburg and in Berlin."

Finally, I should like to mention the letter I received from Count Witte, dated January 30:

"Accept my heartfelt congratulations for the Sovereign distinction. Now we may exchange a few sincere words, as now we are but two men in no way dependent upon each other. Also, to my sincere gratification you have been fittingly rewarded for your undoubted services to the country.

"Believe me, my dear Vladimir Nikolaevich, not for a moment have I ever had any personal enmity toward you. Lately, especially in the realm of finance, I have disagreed with you somewhat. You avoided speaking with me on any matter of finance, so I avoided all such conversations with you, considering that they would have been unwelcome. I tried to keep myself in the background, to keep silent; but naturally I could not preserve this position long without losing face.

"I therefore began to express my attitude, thereby immediately furnishing you cause to speak of my intrigue and alleged villainy. But in this you are very much mistaken.

"I hope you will compose yourself; rest after your hard labors, and soon become your old self.

"Please offer my regards and congratulations to the Countess."

I answered this letter immediately, thanking him for his congratulations and for his wishes. I told him that, in spite of the difficulties of the moment, I was perfectly composed, as any man should be who had a clear conscience and the knowledge of duty honorably discharged to the end. I begged to be excused for not answering that part of his letter which mentioned our mutual rela-

tions, since to answer it briefly would simply have furnished food for misunderstanding, while an exhaustive answer was precluded by the lack of time and by our former relations. "However," I concluded, "if you would care to throw a dispassionate and honest light upon the events of the last days, I should receive such illumination with all the fairness of which I am capable, and in a manner which would remove all chance of misrepresentation."

This was our last communication. We never met again. Later, in this narrative, however, I shall endeavor to define the part played in my removal by this exceptional man.

CHAPTER XXXV

RETROSPECT

In speaking of my past life, and particularly of the time of my dismissal, I wish to say in the first place that the latter had for a long time been prepared by the influence of a whole group of persons, I will even say a coalition, whose aim was to put an end to my activity as head of the government and as Minister of Finance.

The members of this coalition were bound together not so much by friendship for each other as by enmity toward me. They traveled separate roads to one common goal, and when it had been attained they went their several ways, caring less for any personal advantages they might have won than for the success of their common purpose. Some of them, however, did build temporary political fortunes upon the ruins of mine. Honestly, I bear them no resentment. At that time I grieved much, it is true; but since then I have been thankful that I was not at the helm when the Russian ship of state was launched upon the stormy seas of the World War.

The man who occupied the first place of importance in the intrigue against me was Prince Meshchersky, the editor of *Grazhdanin*. It has always been a puzzle to me how this man was able to exercise the influence he did over metropolitan public opinion. The Empress Dowager openly despised him. Emperor Alexander III, after attaching him closely to his person at the beginning of his reign, later became estranged from him; and this is of special significance, since in most things the views of that great Tsar were laws unto his son. But when Nicholas II ascended the throne, Meshchersky inaugurated an energetic campaign to regain his former position with the Imperial Power. *Grazhdanin* seemed to take on new life. An increasing amount of space was given to discussions of the Russian autocracy. It was represented as being different from the monarchies of Western Europe; it was pointed out that its greatest strength lay in the loyal devotion of the Russian people, all of whom believed that the Tsar was the sole author of Russia's greatness. This understanding and relationship between Tsar and people, it argued, must be preserved in close union, and any forces that tended to threaten this union must

be destroyed. This credo became the battle cry, as it were, of *Grashdanin*, and was sounded forth in varying degrees of loudness depending on the demands of the situation. The reign of Alexander III was exalted as having given the most brilliant expression to these principles, and this had resulted in peace.

These same ideas were used as a standard by which to measure the views and abilities of the different statesmen upon whose shoulders fell from time to time the responsibility of directing Russia's affairs of state. By this measure these statesmen were marked as deserving promotion, guidance, or dismissal. In this sense, *Grashdanin* provided a veritable weekly rating of the entire upper official personnel. It became a record of changes in that personnel, and a close study of its pages would reveal the fact that many such changes corresponded to the advice and prognostications contained in its columns.

Prince Meshchersky's efforts to extend and increase his influence were not confined to his journalistic campaign. Using as a pretext the fact that he had once had ready access to Alexander III, he wrote letters to Nicholas II on all manner of subjects, undeterred by the fact that most of them were unanswered. From time to time he did secure an audience with the Tsar at which he tried to win favors for his friends. He spread the news that these audiences were proof of his exceptional nearness to the Imperial Power, and related in detail, and, I fear, sometimes in fabricated form, his conversations with the Tsar. All this unfortunately seemed to convince some of the high officials that he really had His Majesty's confidence and was therefore a force to be reckoned with.

In 1909 Prince Meshchersky announced the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of his literary career. This was an anniversary of his own invention, but nevertheless his friends and followers spread rumors as to the possible favors to be bestowed "upon the brow of this venerable personage." Even an appointment to the State Council was suggested. As for Meshchersky himself, he was brazen enough to call on Stolypin, enumerate his financial needs, and suggest that he be advanced 200,000 rubles.

When Stolypin, who was never too strict about monetary appropriations when they were connected with politics, informed me of this, he said: "I think the same of Meshchersky as you do, but if one lives with wolves one has to howl like them. We can't afford to have him spiteful toward us, and surely, Vladimir Nikolaevich, you and I are worth more than 200,000 rubles to Russia."

I told Stolypin that by giving Meshchersky 200,000 rubles he would really play into the latter's hands. Meshchersky would fear him no longer, and, no matter what happened, no one could take this money away from the Prince. I argued also—and this seemed to impress Stolypin most—that an appropriation of 200,000 rubles could not be kept secret, and when it became known, his, Stolypin's position would be discredited before the Duma as well as in other important circles of opinion.

Stolypin finally agreed that this sum ought not to be advanced, but he felt something else should be done to mollify Meshchersky. He was resolved to prevent the Prince's appointment to the State Council at any cost, and as an alternative he planned to suggest to the Tsar that Meshchersky be appropriated an unofficial pension of 6,000 rubles a year out of the ten million fund (1).

The Tsar approved this suggestion, and the pension was paid to Meshchersky until his death in the summer of 1914. Stolypin was very much gratified; he told me many times that we had "paid cheaply." He soon saw, however, that he had not won the favor of this "disinterested" subject of his Monarch, for a few months later *Grazhdanin* began a furious campaign against Stolypin himself. Whether or not this campaign slowly but steadily undermined Stolypin's influence, it is difficult to say; but certainly he was attacked, because a clever politician noticed and exploited the fact that the Tsar had begun to be annoyed by and somewhat envious of the popularity of his Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

Of course, Meshchersky knew of my attitude toward the appropriation for which he had asked, but at the time this seemed not to matter. In fact, although he never felt too tenderly toward me, he was indifferent until my appointment as Chairman of the Ministers' Council.

After he had broken with Witte and had begun to attack him from time to time in his editorials, Meshchersky began to mention me rather sympathetically. Then he began to attack Stolypin, especially after the latter's conflict with the State Council on the subject of the western zemstvos. Finally, when I was appointed, the Prince began even to praise me for my caution and my non-allegiance to any party and compared me on this ground with my predecessor, who had allegedly "overshadowed the person of the Tsar" and advanced too ardently the "constitutional principle of a united cabinet, which was utterly incompatible with the autocracy of the Russian Tsar." But he

had no real sympathy for me. It amounted merely to commending me for my "devotion to the Monarch" and my desire and readiness to be led not by the instructions of the "Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress," meaning the State Duma, "but by the will of the Monarch."

But even this did not last. Meshchersky was expecting "advances" from me, too, and when these were not forthcoming he began to criticize me relentlessly.* The first six months of my ministry went by rather smoothly, and then, toward spring, there was a sudden, almost magic, change. I suppose there were many reasons for this sudden change, but I want to mention only one episode, which, although I was not aware of it at the time, greatly influenced my relations with Meshchersky.

At the stock brokers' election in the spring of 1912, a certain Manus (2) was elected to one of the three vacancies in the Stock Exchange. This man had an unsavory reputation as a speculator, and his name was directly connected with the current unsteadiness of the Exchange. In fact, I had proof that he was very active in the fall of the Baku stock. This unsteadiness was commented upon unfavorably by both the public and the press, and it had a most undesirable influence upon the feeling of the Paris Bourse toward Russian securities. When therefore the names of the men elected were submitted to me for confirmation, I paid special attention to the statements of the Stock Exchange Board that because of Manus' reputation his appointment was inadvisable. Acting on my privileges as Minister of Finance, I suggested that another person ought to be elected, thus adopting the recommendation of the Special Credit Office and of the Exchange itself.

Naturally Manus was resentful. But this was not all, for Meshchersky took up his cause and began a campaign against Davydov and me in *Grazhdanin*. Once more he pointed out the danger to the monarchy of the institution of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council. I have already mentioned an editorial to this effect in connection with my report to the Tsar at Livadia.†

* Many years before, I had been witness to a calumny engineered by Meshchersky and directed against State Secretary Grot, an able man to whom I was much indebted for assistance in my career. I undertook to defend Grot, and thereby incurred Meshchersky's extreme displeasure. Some friends advised me not to kick against the pricks in this way, but I refused to become the tool of such a man or to become tainted with his methods. I was quite right in this decision, but it counted against me in the political game in the end.

† See above, p. 399.

The connection between Meshchersky and Manus was explained to me by V. I. Timiriazev. It seems that Manus speculated on the Exchange on Meshchersky's behalf and wrote articles on finance in the latter's paper. Timiriazev assured me, however, that if I would confirm Manus' election the campaign against me would be withdrawn. This, of course, was impossible, and I said so to Timiriazev, in spite of his warnings that these two men were more powerful than I might think. So the campaign against me went on. I even heard it rumored that Manus was willing to wager as much as 200,000 rubles that when February 1914 rolled around, I should no longer be Chairman of the Ministers' Council. My political days were numbered.

The rôle of next importance in my removal was played by Krivoshein. With him, at least until the end of November 1913, I was on very good terms. He himself had liquidated our differences in 1911 about the Peasant Bank, and any annual budget disputes we had were only such as were usual between the Minister of Finance and the other ministers. In the Ministers' Council we worked in good accord and with mutual understanding. At times he even discussed with me the Tsar's pessimism, which, he felt, boded nothing but harm for Russia. If these discussions were simply devices for drawing me out and ascertaining my views, I must say that they failed completely.

Krivoshein was sensitively proud and very ambitious, and craved popularity. He carefully watched the political barometer, inclined toward each rising star, but withdrew himself from its orbit when it began to wane. Thus it was in his relations with Stolypin, and so it was as regards myself. In the summer of 1913, he sensed that my star was waning and made his dispositions accordingly.

Had Krivoshein wished to become Chairman of the Ministers' Council, I feel sure that he could have done so toward the end of 1912. During November and December of that year he suffered a prolonged illness. Every day the Empress inquired about his health, and kept him always supplied with Holy Water from the shrine of St. Seraphim of Sarov. But Krivoshein did not want this high and responsible office. He perceived perhaps better than anyone else in Russia that the Chairman of the Ministers' Council had to stand alone, for as soon as he began to assert a decisive influence upon public affairs he would be conspired against to his political ruin. In the face of such a conspiracy, the Chairman could not count for sup-

port upon the Duma, especially the Fourth Duma; and even though the majority of the State Council was of a Right political tendency, this in itself was not enough to buttress the Chairman's position against the prevailing adverse political winds, for to ally oneself with the majority of the State Council was to incur the opposition of the Duma and the zemstvo circles, as well as of the progressive "salons." Krivoshein was content to sit on the fence so that he might see on which side lay the greater political opportunities. Such a man would certainly have found it difficult to fill the responsible position of Chairman of the Ministers' Council. He was better fitted to play the part he did: to stay back-stage and work the strings which determined the destiny of the puppets on the political stage. He found pleasure in being thought of as the force behind the government.

These considerations are reflected in my dismissal: not only was I a parsimonious Minister of Finance but I was a stubborn one as well. He would have me replaced by a man who was devoid of prestige but who was ready to meet his every wish. Then, by splitting the double position I had held, he would have a second person made Chairman of the Ministers' Council, a person who would be easily handled, who would not exercise too much influence upon the course of events, and who would find favor in the eyes of the Tsar. He found his first man in Bark and his second in Goremykin.

The day after my dismissal Goremykin called on me. I took advantage of the opportunity to wish him success. "What success can I hope for?" he said. "I am like an old fur coat. For many months I have been packed away in camphor. I am being taken out now merely for the occasion; when it is passed I shall be packed away again till I am wanted the next time." I asked him how he could enter office, feeling as he did, when the rescript on Bark's appointment laid down such an ambitious program for the future. To this he replied that it was all so many words; nothing would actually come of it. He said, too, that he was not very familiar with this rescript. This, of course, was a downright untruth. He knew all about the rescript, for he had collaborated with Krivoshein and Meshchersky in drafting it.

I believe also that Krivoshein had a great deal to do with my being awarded the title of Count, despite the current rumor that the Dowager Empress was responsible for it. Krivoshein was very farsighted. He knew that it was within the realm of possibility that in the ever-changing political situation I might again hold an official

position. Should this ever come to pass, he hoped by the award made to me to insure for himself my good will. He must have said to himself, "Who knows when I might be able to use Kokovtsov?" But we were never friends again, for which I accept all responsibility. In February 1915, when Count Witte died and the post of Chairman of the Finance Committee was left vacant, Krivoshein and Rukhlov worked to prevent my appointment to that post. They prevailed upon Goremykin to combine these duties with those of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council in the interests of a greater unification of government. Then, early in the following year, the double post that I had occupied was revived again in the interests of a more united government and the ignorant Stürmer was appointed to it as Goremykin's successor. Krivoshein himself resigned the Ministry of Agriculture in the autumn of 1916. He had been disappointed in Goremykin, for the latter had proved much less pliable than had been anticipated and had not always danced to Krivoshein's piping. Besides, the Empress had changed her attitude toward him; her letters give many proofs of this. In her opinion he was no longer a man who should enjoy the confidence of his Sovereign.

Count Witte also figured prominently in the intrigue against me, and I should like to devote extra space to this extraordinary man, because we were in contact with each other for a period of twenty years. I shall stress, of course, the part he played in the circumstances which led to my retirement, and I shall show why, having at first acted clandestinely, he later ranged himself openly with my enemies. I do this not for any personal reason but because I am convinced that it is essential to an appreciation of the circumstances under which I worked and which, I believe, reflect clearly the conditions of that period.

Witte and I had met, much earlier than the period described in these memoirs, in the old-time State Council in the fall of 1892, soon after Witte, after a brief term as Minister of Ways and Communications, had been appointed Minister of Finance to succeed the ailing I. A. Vyshnegradsky. In the beginning of the same year I had been appointed State Secretary of the Department of State Economy, Bureau of Estimates. Thus the fall of 1892 saw each of us make his début in the world of government finance.

That year the members of the Department of State Economy hoped that, with a new Minister of Finance, the Imperial Chancellery would so revise its methods of computing estimates as to make it

easier to check and verify them. The fact that S. V. Rukhlov* and I were newly appointed to the Bureau of Estimates, of this Office encouraged this hope. However, the desire of the Department of State Economy to take a greater part in the work of examining separate estimates led it into a conflict with the Ministry of Finance. This conflict arose specifically from the consideration of the estimates of revenues from direct taxes and especially from redemption payments.

The Department had gone over, in the presence of Assistant Minister of Finance, A. P. Ivashchenkov, a splendid authority on budget matters, the detailed statistics that had been compiled by the Imperial Chancellery. These statistics were based exclusively on the reports of the State Comptroller's Office and the data of the Ministry of Finance itself. However, the conclusions of the Department were returned by Witte to the Imperial Secretary unsigned. Witte's accompanying letter accused the Imperial Chancellery of having made errors which had undoubtedly caused the Department to commit grave mistakes and which resulted from inaccurate data. Witte expressed the wish to know what data had been used. This was practically tantamount to an accusation that the officials in our Bureau, myself included, had falsified the official reports, an accusation which, of course, reflected upon the entire State Council in which there were then such prominent persons as Adjutant General M. P. Kaufman, V. M. Marcus, and M. S. Kakhanov.

Witte's letter was brought to the attention of the Chairman of the State Council, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, who delegated the Imperial Secretary, Muravev, to investigate the affair. The investigation was entrusted to Nikolai Andrianovich Nekliudov, who in a very short while reached a decision in which he vindicated the work of the Imperial Chancellery. The Grand Duke then instructed the Imperial Secretary N. V. Muravev to write a letter to Witte. Muravev complied and in no uncertain terms told the Minister of Finance that his accusation of the Chancellery was utterly unjustifiable and groundless. Had Witte persisted in his accusation, the matter would probably have gone to the Tsar for settlement. Witte, however, gave way and explained his statements on the ground that he had been misinformed by the Director of the Department of Income Tax, I. D. Slobodchikov. Thus was the poor Director obliged to shoulder the

* Rukhlov was appointed Assistant State Secretary of the Department of State Economy at my recommendation.

blame for his superior's mistake. When Witte and I met for the first time after the episode he bowed in silence, and he never mentioned the incident again. We resumed normal relations in the following year.

On assuming office, Witte had invited his friend A. Y. Antonovich (3) to be second assistant. Antonovich was a professor from Kiev and a fine scholar, but completely new to and quite out of place in government circles in St. Petersburg. Nor was he able to adapt himself to his new situation; and he remained quite unable to handle even routine reports to the State Council. At Witte's request I did what I could to instruct him, but in vain. In presenting cases to the Senate he fared no better, and after he had likewise failed in the regular work of the ministry he was given a prolonged leave of absence and went back to Kiev.

It soon became known that Witte was looking about for another assistant. Early in 1895 Count Solsky told me that Witte was planning to offer me the position but was uncertain if I would accept it considering our differences of 1892. I assured Count Solsky I was happy in my present position, and that although I should have welcomed more active work, I hesitated to subject myself to Witte's changeable and sometimes violent disposition. That autumn Count Solsky again raised this matter and said he could give me Witte's promise not to cause me any trouble. In the meantime I had been unexpectedly appointed Assistant Imperial Secretary and had again declined the offer. But early in 1896 Witte himself made me the offer. He promised to procure me a seat in the Senate if I ever grew dissatisfied with my work because of his interference. A few days later, after consulting State Secretary Grot, I accepted, and never regretted so doing. During the six years I remained at this post there was no misunderstanding between Witte and me. I managed the liquor monopoly* quite independently and never once did Witte suggest that I deviated in any way from the faint lines he had laid down for its direction. During these years I took practically complete charge of budget work also; Witte appeared only at the final sessions of the State Council each year.

In April 1902, Minister of the Interior Sipiagin (4) was assassinated by Balmashov (5) and was succeeded by Plehve. The latter's advancement left vacant his former position as Imperial Secretary.

* At that time in its early stages and applying only to the four gubernias of the East.

At Solsky's suggestion and with Witte's support, I then became Plehve's successor as head of the Imperial Chancellery. Later, evil tongues in St. Petersburg said that Witte was happy to have me leave the Ministry of Finance on this occasion, especially as he had Aleksei Dmitrievich Obolensky groomed to step into my shoes.

Two years later I was appointed Minister of Finance, which office I held until I resigned in the autumn of 1905 following Witte's appointment as Chairman of the Ministers' Council. Then, in 1906, I was reappointed Minister of Finance. But I have already narrated these details in previous chapters.

Except for our differences in October 1905, my relations with Witte had thus far been friendly. As his subordinate I carried out his financial and political policies to the best of my ability and as his successor I continued the former in a large measure, especially as regards currency and the liquor monopoly. I wished also to work within the provisions of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, which was to such a large degree Witte's work. In foreign affairs, too, both of us were advocates of peace.

Thus no divergence as to general principles of government could have led to our estranged relations of a later period. The cause of our hostility was psychological. At first, Witte seemed to resign himself to being out of office; perhaps he felt that some day he would recoup his political fortunes and again direct Russian affairs. But the attitude of the court was against him, and only a few of his former entourage kept in touch with him. Nevertheless, Witte was well informed; he knew what was going on in all government and court circles and was astute enough to use such information to gain his purpose.

Meanwhile he seemed to be very friendly to me. He proclaimed repeatedly that "as long as Kokovtsov is in power we may rest easily, for he will never permit any foolish policies." Even in speeches to the State Council he voiced these sentiments.*

But Witte could not forgive me for not seeking his advice. Really there was nothing about which I needed it, since in matters of finance I continued his policy and in other general matters he could not advise me. Moreover, my freedom of action was much limited by the will of the Tsar and the necessity of fighting intrigues.

* Notably in April 1909, during discussions of the 4½ per cent loan negotiated by me; in the budget sessions of June 8, 1909, and March 27, 1910; on June 5, 1910; and on May 18, 1912.

But as his enforced idleness continued, Witte's mood began to change. A man of strong personality, remarkably active and full of initiative, Count Witte was depressed by his inactivity and his removal from public life. He began to think that I had served too long as Chairman of the Ministers' Council and Minister of Finance. He saw in me, to some extent at least, an obstacle in the path toward his desires, and he believed that by removing me he would again open for himself a way of advancement. For even though he might not be immediately called upon to serve the state, he probably considered that forces powerful enough to remove me would be strong enough to replace me by some favorite of his, who would make a mess of things, thus placing the country in serious difficulties both at home and abroad. At this juncture, he would reappear in the rôle of savior as he had done at the Treaty of Portsmouth.

These plans and moods of Count Witte may explain the seeming contradictions in his attitudes toward me, his alternate friendship and coolness, and, finally, his openly hostile attack late in 1913. I believe he had a good opinion of my work and was sincere when he said so, but as soon as he sensed that my position was uncertain, that I was being attacked from all sides and my attackers were being supported from above, he abandoned me entirely and began openly to criticize and condemn me. It was rumored that he had even been in communication with Rasputin.

As I have related above, Witte chose the liquor monopoly, a project he himself had initiated, as a pretext upon which to attack me. His appearances in the State Council in this connection will always remain in the memory of all participants. His conduct can be simply explained. He knew that some time previously Rasputin had begun to say: "It is unbecoming for a Tsar to deal in vodka and to make drunkards out of honest people," and that "The time has come to lock up the Tsar's saloons." Witte knew also that Rasputin's words were well received by many who saw in his incoherent mumblings the voice of a man arisen from the masses, a man who had lived to feel the burden of this vice. In fighting against it in the Tsar's name Witte saw a possible second emancipation of the peasants, and flattered the Tsar by saying that it had been fated that his reign would see this achievement. Witte saw also, of course, the advantage he himself would derive from fighting me upon this ground; accordingly, he joined battle against me, though with much harm to himself, for everybody recognized his shameless falsehoods designed to undermine

my position. He knew perfectly well that it was folly to try to combat the use of alcohol by the means he proposed—that the state would merely be deprived of a huge revenue, while the evil would remain uncurbed. This, however, was no concern of his. His purpose was to push me down at any cost from my high position and at the same time to appear “a statesman carefully attentive to the nation’s pulse.”

Next in order of importance in the intrigue against me was Sukhomlinov. I have already spoken of my difficulties with him and of his light-mindedness and inability. I want only to say here that Sukhomlinov’s constant complaints to the Tsar regarding me, designed to cover up his inability to cope with the complexities of administration, his exceptional ability to put in “a little word” at the right moment, his hints as to my nearness to the Duma and my alleged connivance with its “antimonarchist” factions, his continual mention of my “friendship” with Polivanov and my participation in an imaginary intrigue against him, Sukhomlinov—all this contributed to create an atmosphere most unfavorable to me. It irritated the Tsar despite his undoubted sympathy for me—not so much that it made him distrustful of me as that it annoyed and bored him so that, sooner or later, he desired to part with a man about whom many “pleasant” persons said so many unpleasant things. The Tsar did not like to hear unpleasant things, and both those of whom these things were said and the persons who said them in all frankness eventually became equally objectionable to him and his intimate entourage. This meant their removal and replacement with pleasanter company.

Next there was Maklakov. His was a double rôle. On the one hand he worked on Meshchersky and pleased him by supplying him with information as to my “Left” tendencies, my “flirtation with the Duma,” my sympathies with the “Young Turk group” as represented by Guchkov, my objections to Maklakov’s policy of “firm authority” and his ideas for combating the press, and my protection of the Jews, which created obstacles to his famous policy of ridding stock companies of the Jewish element. Meshchersky used this material in his messages to the Tsar, pretending to be well informed on current affairs, and worked to undermine my position at the same time that he was pushing his young protégé into the post of Minister of the Interior. With this accomplished Meshchersky himself would be able to determine the fate of Russia by working through his puppet minister.

On the other hand Maklakov ridiculed me before the Tsar, and made a joke of the way in which I allegedly conducted debates in the Ministers' Council. He ridiculed all ministers. He represented Shcheglovitov, Kasso, Rukhlov, Sabler, and himself who belonged to the "Right" as always victorious, while I, with the so-called Left wing of Sazonov, Timashev, Grigorovich, and Kharitonov, was always represented in the most pathetic light. It mattered little that Maklakov himself very often did not understand the problem under discussion; nor did it matter if he misrepresented things to the Tsar. His main purpose was to undermine the position of the Chairman of the Council and Minister of Finance and to find favor for himself before the Tsar and the public.

This list of persons could be extended. Voeikov, Shcheglovitov, and other back-stage actors might be mentioned, but I fear this part of my story is unduly long already. I have gone to such length not because I am eager to settle personal accounts but solely because I want to draw a dispassionate picture of the period and to show who at that time wielded the greatest influence upon the course of events. For without such a picture one cannot properly understand that period of the reign of Nicholas II regarding which little truth has been told so far. The accounts which have been printed have been tinged for the most part with prejudice and have been uttered by persons all too ill informed.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE EMPRESS ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA

I must add one name, however, to the list in the preceding chapter—Empress Alexandra Fedorovna. Remembering her fate* at the hands of the Bolsheviks, it was my resolve for many years not to mention in my memoirs the important part she played in my dismissal and in Russian affairs. I considered it unfair to attempt to justify my own actions when those persons whose names would necessarily be involved were no longer here to speak in their own defense. Yet in all the years since 1917 none of the Russian émigrés has undertaken to explain the personality of the Empress.

In the absence of such accounts from exiled Russians, we have been obliged to depend on the writings of non-Russians, most of whom have been ill informed and most of whose work is characterized by anecdote or calumny or both. Thus the personality of the last Empress of Russia has either remained unrevealed or has been distorted. Maurice Paléologue, French ambassador to Russia at the outbreak of the war, has made the sole attempt to give it a just portrayal, but he has left much unsaid. In view of these facts, I have decided that it would be best for me to say my word, hoping that it will be a contribution to this delicate subject.

I shall not dwell upon the environment in which the Empress grew up and the influences which had conditioned her development and temperament. All this is known. She saw her future husband amidst the glamor of the Russian court when she was but fourteen years old, and fell in love with him with all the impetuosity of a soul foreign to compromise—a love she cherished until death. She never concealed her girlish infatuation from her entourage at Darmstadt, being very proud of it. Later, in her maturity, upon the throne of Russia, she knew but one love—her husband—and had a boundless devotion

* When I learned the news of the crime which ended the lives of the Imperial family, I considered it my duty to make known through the press what I knew of the event and to show who were really responsible for it. This I did in the pages of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* and, later, in my book *Le Bolshevisme à l'oeuvre* (1).

to her children, to whom she gave all of her tenderness and care. She was a blameless wife and mother in the highest sense of the word, and showed by her life a now rare example of the noblest family virtues.

As Emperor Alexander III lay dying at Livadia in the Crimea, she had been obliged, at his summons, to hurry from Darmstadt to receive his blessing upon her marriage and two injunctions: to love her husband and to love her new country. She discharged this double duty sacredly as she understood it.

Influenced by this abrupt change in life, unprepared for the complexities of her new state position and domestic relations, she developed three traits which characterized her entire life in Russia during the twenty-four years of her reign (1894-1918). The first was her intense religious belief. She adopted the Orthodox faith with all the directness and depth of her nature and became a "daughter of the Orthodox church" in the most thorough and absolute sense of the term. She was drawn toward everything that bore a direct or indirect relation to the church. She studied at length the lives of its more renowned members, their works, and their connection with the historic moments of Russia's life. She studied the history of the prominent religious centers of Russia, the monasteries, which in her eyes were not only places where the faithful congregated but also centers of learning and culture attracting people from the most remote corners of this huge country. She never missed an opportunity to visit the more renowned church sanctuaries, or to maintain contacts with the clergy. But she was especially fascinated by the manifestations of the religious mood revealed not so much by persons of the upper classes as by simple folk whom she considered as being closer to God than persons touched by culture. Gradually she became a victim of this fascination.

These convictions and beliefs of hers gradually became known among even those strata of the population far removed from the court. She began to receive presents of ancient ikons and of the different objects used in churches. She began more and more to surround herself with these things and to devote an increasing amount of time to the study of the lives of Russian churchmen. On her initiative and with the money she donated there was built at Tsarskoe Selo, beside the historic buildings of the times of Elizabeth and Catherine, the splendid Fedorovskaia Church (St. Theodore), in pure Russian style and furnished and adorned with objects of her own selection

and according to her taste. In this church she had a solitary chamber made for herself where, hidden from the eyes of the worshippers, she was able to follow the divine services.

She visited this room alone, mostly during mass but sometimes at other hours, and it was there that she gave herself up to her religious moods. It was there that her faith in the miraculous grew within her, and it was to the solace of that room that she turned whenever she felt assailed by the doubts, worries, and cares of life. Those close to her often said that she emerged from her solitude in the Fedorovskaia Church as someone completely changed and transfigured. On several occasions they had heard her say that in her solitude she felt all her doubts dissolved in a way she could not explain; her most poignant sorrows left her, and in their place came calm and peace of heart.

Countess Anastasia Vasilevna Gendrikov,* lady-in-waiting to the Empress and one of her closest friends, often spoke to me of Her Majesty's almost mystic moods. Her favorite subject for discussion in the presence of the Grand Duchesses was the power of prayer and the varied aspects of man's communion with God. The Empress believed that one's whole life should be based upon complete faith in the Almighty and obedience to His will. Nothing was impossible for God, she believed. He would hearken to every prayer of the pure in heart; faith in Him would overcome all obstacles. Even though miracles might not be understood, He worked them none the less, and they were to be accepted with meekness and humility.

It was with these spiritual beliefs that the Empress first met Rasputin. This man was practically unknown in St. Petersburg when he first arrived in that city. In the course of time, however, the Montenegrin princesses, who were married to the Grand Dukes Petr Nikolaevich and Nikolai Nikolaevich, met him and told the Empress about him, his piety and his nearness to God. But the Empress was more impressed by what she learned of him from Bishop Feofan, President of the St. Petersburg Theological Seminary and Her Majesty's confessor for a short time.

Bishop Feofan told her that he had been visited by one Grigoriï Efimovich, a peasant from the gubernia of Tobolsk, district of

* The Countess was utterly devoted to the Empress and her children. She was in the Crimea when the revolution broke out, but returned to Tsarskoe Selo immediately, and thence accompanied the Imperial family through its varying fortunes to the station at Ekaterinburg. Here they parted. The Countess was imprisoned first at Ekaterinburg, then at Perm, at which latter place she was executed in 1918.

Tiumen, who had been given the unflattering surname of Rasputin, "the dissolute one," by his fellow villagers. This peasant had confessed his many sins to the Bishop, repented, asked for guidance in a reformed life, and expressed a desire to become a monk. Gradually, Bishop Feofan had become aware of the fact that Rasputin was a man of strange and transcending religious experiences, one of those unusual Russian peasants certainly worthy of mention to the Empress who was so interested in such persons.

The Empress gave the Bishop permission to bring Rasputin to Tsarskoe Selo, and after a short interview decided she would like to know the man better.*

According to some persons of her entourage she could not quite understand his broken speech, his short, almost unintelligible sentences, his quick shifting of subjects. But Rasputin soon broached a subject near Her Majesty's heart. He began to tell her that she and the Tsar were surrounded with difficulties; that they would never learn the truth, surrounded as they were by flatterers and selfish climbers who would never show how to make the people's lot easier; only by searching their own hearts and by supporting each other could the Imperial couple learn the truth. When in doubt, they must pray and ask God to instruct and enlighten them. If they put faith in God, everything would be right, as God would never abandon those he had set to rule over the people. Here he struck another note, pleasing to the Tsarina's ears. He advised closer contact with and closer study of the people, who deserved to be trusted more, as they would never deceive those they considered almost equal to God himself. The people would tell the real truth, the exact opposite of what was told by ministers and officials, who were not concerned over the tears and wants of the people.

These ideas were, no doubt, gladly received by the Empress, as they corresponded to her own thoughts. At first she saw Rasputin but seldom. He frequently absented himself for long periods, and when he was in St. Petersburg he led a modest life, saw few people, and hardly ever appeared in public. He was seldom mentioned about the city and as yet had not become prominent in the news. He was known merely as a simple man of God who knew everything and could render much spiritual aid and support in sorrow and affliction. Thus, when Stolypin's children were hurt by the explosion of August

* Later Bishop Feofan was deeply disappointed in Rasputin and never ceased repenting the support he had given him.

1906 on Aptekarsky Island, Rasputin appeared soon after they had been removed to Kalmeier's Hospital and asked for permission to see them and to pray for them. On leaving he told the attendants: "It is well; they will recover."

Now the fatal moment drew near. The little Tsarevich had for some time shown symptoms of the incurable disease, haemophilia. The Empress had tried to convince herself that it was not so, but in the end she had had to accept reality. Physicians were helpless not only to cure but even to alleviate the sufferings of the patient. It is easy to understand the mother's state of mind. Having had her hopes for an heir fulfilled in the eleventh year of her marriage and having lavished upon her son all her tenderness, she had finally learned that she herself had transmitted to him the dreaded disease.

What was there left for an Empress with her temperament? One thing only—to turn to God, to prayer, to seek in faith strength to endure, to hope for a miracle which God in His omnipotent mercy was sure to perform. "Nothing is impossible for God. We have but to show ourselves worthy of His mercy, and it will be shown us." Through whom, she did not know; but her faith was strong.

At that moment the Empress again heard from the *starets*, who could pray as no one else, who spoke a language different from everybody, who had a faith different from the faith of those about her. She was told of cases where persons visited by great sorrow had asked the *starets* to pray for them and were given help in their trouble. She was even told of cases when his prayer had arrested mortal illness. Therefore he was summoned more and more frequently, taken more and more into the confidence of their Majesties, and entered into the life of the court; he became an adviser on most knotty problems, and was generally referred to as "friend."

I remember that in 1913, toward the end of the Romanov festivities at Moscow, one of the court ladies known for her hostility to Rasputin, which caused her to lose her position at court, told me that she had been witness to a consultation of doctors during one of the most severe attacks of haemophilia when they had been unable to stop the hemorrhage. Rasputin came, stayed at the child's side for some time, and the hemorrhage stopped. The physicians had been left no choice but to admit the fact, without venturing to say whether it was a coincidence or was due to some other cause.

Soon there were rumors about Rasputin's influence upon the Empress and, through her, upon affairs of state. Such rumors

offended the Tsarina greatly. The more they grew, the greater her indignation became. She became less inclined to believe the reports about Rasputin's conduct and showed more sharply her disfavor toward those who were opposed to Rasputin or dared to deprecate his occasional visits to the Palace.

Rasputin, on his part, knowing that the Empress put no stock in the reports about his conduct, cast all dissimulation aside. His apartment on the Gorohovaia became a gathering-place for all those who sought his protection, and these were indeed many. He indulged in vulgar orgies. Ministers and chiefs of offices began to receive an increasing number of his peculiar letters asking for favors for his protégés. I must say, however, that Rasputin never addressed himself to me except on the occasion already described.

In addition to her intense religious belief, the Empress believed in the stability, infallibility, and unchangeability of the Russian autocracy as it had evolved during the three hundred years of its existence. She believed it to be proof against attack because it had become the very flesh and blood of the Russian people and could not be separated from the very existence of the Russian state. The people, she believed, were bound to their Tsar by ties so strong that they were self-evident and unquestionable except to the opponents of the principles of autocracy. The Russian Tsar must find all his strength in the people's unshakable love for himself; only persons who did not know the people, who stood far removed from them, who refused to see the proofs of their devotion to the basic principles of monarchy—only those persons could doubt the loyalty of the people to their Sovereign.

The Empress was much more absolute in her political beliefs than the Tsar himself. One has but to read the now published letters she wrote to the Emperor at different times to find in them a distinct proof of this. In fact it was due to the tremendous influence which the Empress exerted upon her husband that the idea of absolutism grew in the consciousness of Nicholas II, a growth which kept pace with the increasing calm of Russian life and the decrease of the revolutionary manifestations which had forced him to make concessions to the demands of the public from time to time, as for example in 1905. The Empress was the advocate of strong or, in the term of those days, "firm" authority; and it was she who provided the foundation and justification for the Emperor's own less clear views.

The Tsar clearly understood that the character of his autocracy

had changed since 1905, but he never paused to consider whether or not he was bound by the law which he himself had proclaimed; he simply accepted the accomplished fact. The Empress, however, considered that his prerogatives were not affected by the law: he remained above it; his will was unlimited; his every wish was law. Any criticism of him was unthinkable, and those in charge of the government who could not silence and punish such criticism were not fit for the tasks they tried to discharge and ought to be replaced. Any person who attempted to contradict this belief of the Empress was certain to meet with her displeasure; consequently those closest to her never argued with her on this point, but expressed sympathy with her views. This, of course, had the result of making her more and more convinced that she was right. Thus the circle became more and more vicious.

The third marked trait of the Empress was her disposition: She was reserved, undemonstrative, and inclined to make rather severe demands of herself and others. Only a very few persons were permitted to share her confidence; of all others she was distrustful, almost suspicious. A violation of her confidence or any criticism of her would terminate forever the closest friendship. Thus it was with Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna, the widow of Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, and with Princess Z. N. Yusupov-Sumarokov-Elston (2): These two women objected to Rasputin's presence at court, and said so; this ended their friendship with the Empress.

Her Majesty had no great affection either for the Russian court or for St. Petersburg society, and was totally unfamiliar with Moscow society. She considered that the society of the capital was hostile to her, and discriminated against her in favor of the Dowager Empress. This was neither just nor true. In the first place, the Dowager Empress had been in Russia since 1866, and by her simplicity and gracious behavior had endeared herself to the hearts of all, and there were many, who came in contact with her. She had a great reputation as a welfare worker. The Empress Alexandra Fedorovna, on the other hand, was not widely known; nor was she easy to get to know. She gave herself up almost entirely to her family and was not easily accessible. Besides, she was often ill. But for all this, it was absurd to think that St. Petersburg society was hostile to her. On the contrary, it would have welcomed a chance to know her better and to demonstrate its loyalty to her.

Then, too, the Empress was most unfortunate in her choice of

intimate associates. Although they were devoted to her, none of them had the ability to interpret the trend of events. Some of them, it is true, were completely dominated by the views of the Empress herself, but there were others motivated by selfish interests who colored what information they did impart to Her Majesty in such a way that they themselves would benefit. When there were rumors abroad that were unfavorable to the Emperor, these were attributed to some individual or group that was working to undermine the autocracy and it was suggested that these evil-doers be removed. It was in the midst of these conditions that I spent my last three years in His Majesty's service.

At first I enjoyed Her Majesty's favor; in fact I was appointed Chairman of the Ministers' Council with her knowledge and consent. Hence, when the Duma and the press began a violent campaign against Rasputin, the details of which I have already related, she expected me to put a stop to it. Yet it was not my opposition to the Tsar's proposal to take measures against the press that won me her disfavor; it was my report to His Majesty about Rasputin after the *starets* had visited me. From that time on, although the Tsar continued to show me his favor for another two years, my dismissal was assured. This changed attitude of Her Majesty is not hard to understand if one bears in mind the traits of her character outlined above. In her mind, Rasputin was closely associated with the health of her son and the welfare of the Monarchy. To attack him was to attack the protector of what she held most dear. Moreover, like any righteous person, she was offended to think that the sanctity of her home had been questioned in the press and in the Duma. She thought that I, as head of the government, was responsible for permitting these attacks, and could not understand why I could not stop them simply by giving orders in the name of the Tsar. She considered me, therefore, not a servant of the Tsar but a tool of the enemies of the state and as such deserving dismissal.

The only indication I had of all this at the time was Her Majesty's growing unwillingness to see me, beginning in the spring of 1912. How much she influenced the Tsar in this matter I do not know, for the secrets of the Imperial couple are now forever hidden from the world.

There was really no good reason why I should have been dismissed. I was the victim of intrigue and personal opposition, and the same is true of many other persons who were discharged from high

positions in the Imperial Russian government. The persons who directed the campaign against me made use of the organizations of the Right, notably, the Union of the Nobility. When Stolypin was in office, these organizations worked against him and recommended me as his successor because I was free of any entanglements with the "Young Turk," Guchkov. After I had been appointed, however, they turned against me because I was not "their man" and could not be influenced by them. They could not accuse me of nearness to Guchkov, however, because in the autumn of 1912 he had retired from political life after being defeated in the Duma elections of that year. Nor could I be attacked for my work as Minister of Finance, because the financial situation of the country was excellent. Finally, they hit upon my lack of "firmness" in directing the general policies of the government, my sympathies with the Duma, my opposition to any law that would restrict the freedom of the press, my emphasis upon financial considerations to the detriment of others, my concessions to the Jews, and my "excessive" dependence on the powers of international finance. Thus, because of my "weakness" and cowardice before the alleged enemies of the Monarchy, I was to be dismissed.

In concluding this chapter, let me say that in spite of the trials I had to bear in connection with my dismissal, I never bore my Sovereign any ill will. I was only grieved to think that it distressed him so much to inform me of his decision. I regretted having to leave him in the midst of so many difficulties; but when war broke out six months later I was thankful that I had been spared the responsibility of leading Russia into that great catastrophe. It was difficult, too, for me to be separated from the financial work I had grown to love, but in due time I adjusted myself to my new situation and found happiness therein.

During the war I witnessed the grave deficiencies of our military organization. Of my attempts to have this organization improved in time of peace I have already spoken at some length. My efforts had been unsuccessful, and Russia suffered greatly because of it.

Russia was not responsible for the war. Neither greater skill nor more foresight in the conduct of her foreign policy could have prevented it. When I was in Berlin in November 1913 I saw that preparations were being made (and had been made since 1911) to let loose a war upon Europe. On my return, I reported my observations to the Tsar, which have since been published by the Soviets along with other historical documents, and supplemented my written report by

verbal statements which of course are not on record and therefore have not been published. In these statements I reported my observations which had made me believe in the inevitability and imminence of war. His Majesty never interrupted me during my report and kept looking straight into my eyes as if to probe the sincerity of my words. Later, turning to the window near which we were sitting, he looked for a long time over the spreading sea before us; then, seeming to awaken from a reverie and again looking steadily into my eyes, he said simply: "God's will be done."

It was my last trip to Livadia.

CHAPTER XXXVII

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1904-1914

Before I attempt to narrate the events of my life after my dismissal I should like to review briefly my ten years' work as Minister of Finance and to compare the financial and economic condition of Russia at the end of 1903 with that at the beginning of 1914. If there was any development in that decade, the merit belongs not so much to myself as to the structure of our finance administration; for I was no innovator, I blazed no new trails for the economic progress of my country. Mine was a more modest rôle: I endeavored merely to preserve and develop what had been handed down to me by my predecessors.

Little study has been made of this subject for this period. Perhaps it is because at that time the steady but unspectacular economic development was not noticed in the whirl of political events. Certainly during the war and the revolution there was small opportunity for such a study, and since then the necessary documents have not always been available. This is why I take it upon myself to include in my personal reminiscences some account of my activity in the field of economics and finance of that decade, for I was an active participant in the events of those years.

The figures I quote in this chapter I take from the report I prepared to submit to the Tsar on my tenth anniversary as Minister of Finance. At that time and with His Majesty's permission I distributed copies of this report among periodicals, universities, learned societies, and a few interested individuals; I even sent a few copies abroad, one of which is still to be found in the *Crédit Lyonnais*.

First, let me state the basic principles which underlay my financial policy. I attached the greatest importance to having a balanced budget—that is, a situation in which ordinary revenue, unsupported by loans, was adequate to meet all ordinary expenditures and, as far as possible, all extraordinary expenditures also. In my estimation a balanced budget was the state's very foundation, without which sound economic development was not possible. I enunciated this principle in my speeches before the Duma, and it was always well received by

the Center and Right groups; the Left withheld its approval, not because it was opposed to this principle but simply because it was opposed to the government.

Budget equilibrium could be achieved and maintained only if the state lived within its income. Once a working balance between revenue and expenditure had been attained, any alterations should be introduced only with great caution and after most careful examination as to how they would affect the budget equilibrium. Fortunately, I was able to apply this basic principle to all my budgets; in fact, in the budgets for the years 1910–1913, inclusive, I was able to meet both ordinary and extraordinary expenditures out of ordinary revenue.

I appreciated the fact, however, that many of our state problems were unsolved and that their solution would entail additional expenditures. How were such expenditures to be met? This brings me to my second basic principle. It was my conviction that increased expenditures ought to be met by the natural increase in revenue that would accrue from the development of the productive forces of the land; only as a secondary measure should recourse be had to increased taxation. The development of the country's productive forces could be best advanced by private enterprise and private capital*—not that I was opposed to state enterprise, but only that I believed the state should not monopolize the whole field of economic development. State and private enterprise, I considered, could exist and develop side by side with mutual benefit, although the former might have to be restricted to certain fields of activity. I carried this principle into effect in my policy of railway administration.

The period in which I was Minister of Finance falls into two parts: from 1904 to the middle of 1907; and from the middle of 1907 to the beginning of 1914.

During the strain and stress of the war with Japan and the revolution of 1905–1906 it was out of the question to entertain ideas of remodeling or improving our financial structure. We were too much concerned with holding our own in the face of adversity. The war—and the revolution even more—caused a decrease in revenue, a withdrawal of savings from the banks, and the decline of Russian credit

* In my speech in the Duma, May 10, 1913, I said: "We cannot go on without developing, improving, and enlarging our industry. To this end we must consider capital and its organization not as an enemy but as something essential and necessary which, coupled with our natural resources and the industrious efforts of our population, will speed up our industrial development."

in the world market. These conditions created grave financial difficulties. How these difficulties were met and overcome I have already described in the early chapters of this story. The extraordinary expenditures I had to meet were considerable. I tried to do so by negotiating loans rather than by increasing taxes, and I planned to pay off these loans as the country's productive forces returned increased revenue. I tried to explain to the Duma on November 27, 1907, just what the government had done during the war in matters of finance. "What taxes were increased? Hardly any! We increased the tax on tobacco. We introduced a moderate tax on government officials, raised the price of liquor, and in the limits authorized by existing law we increased the tax on oil. But no new tax was introduced."

Nor did our difficulties end with the conclusion of peace and the liquidation of the revolution. The financial conditions that had existed during the war persisted through the turbulent period of the First and Second Dumas—April 1906 to June 1907—during which time it was necessary for the government to exert its best efforts to maintain its financial stability. The fact that it was able to do so testifies to the soundness of its financial organization and policy.

The second part of the period—that is, from the middle of 1907 to the beginning of 1914—is characterized by measures toward recovery and reconstruction. Only with the Third Duma can the people's representatives be said to have constituted an active and real part of the state organization. The first two Dumas had convened only to attack the government; the Third Duma, owing to a new electoral law, was of such a nature as to work with the government within the limitations provided by law. The government on its side welcomed such an attitude and did what it could to further co-operation. To this end I, as Minister of Finance, rearranged the presentation of budget estimates in such a way as to make it easier for the members of the Duma to grasp the problems and policies of government finance, and always I emphasized the necessity and importance of balancing the budget.

During these years, too, provision had to be made for refitting and reorganizing the army and rebuilding the navy after the disasters of the war with Japan. This made heavy demands upon the Russian budget. At the same time, other departments were eager to secure additional funds to further the work of reconstruction or development in their respective fields. Thanks to steadily increasing revenues that

came from the development of Russia's natural productive forces it was possible to meet all these demands, to balance the budgets of these years, and to put aside a surplus which was used to form a free fund of the state treasury. At the beginning of the World War this fund contained the imposing sum of 518,000,000 rubles. All this was accomplished, moreover, without any great increase in taxation or the introduction of many new taxes. The per capita taxes paid by the population, both direct and indirect, including the revenue from the liquor monopoly, increased only from 10.31 rubles in 1908 to 10.84 rubles in 1912, and the increase in old taxes together with the revenue from new taxes returned only 75,000,000 more rubles to the state treasury in 1913 than in 1908. But additional increases in taxation were inevitable and imminent. Seeing this, I argued in favor of establishing an income tax, thereby taxing the more prosperous classes of society. Such a tax was actually initiated in 1916 on the plans that I had prepared when in office. My suggestions were also followed in reforming the system of direct taxation during the war.

I might take time just to mention some of the fields in which progress was made in these years. In 1910 the government took steps to introduce general education throughout the country and made the necessary financial appropriations. It was estimated that this undertaking would be complete by 1920. Vast sums were appropriated also for land reorganization, for the development of agriculture, including improved methods of cultivation, adequate distribution of proper fertilizers and agricultural machinery, and the manufacture in Russia of such machinery. This work received a great stimulus from the series of splendid crops beginning with 1909, the crops of that year and of 1910 being particularly good. Prosperity in agriculture was reflected, too, in other branches of state life. Steps were taken to make credit available for the lower classes of the population; attention was paid to the whole problem of savings; special forms of credit were created for municipalities and zemstvos. In all this progressive work private enterprise worked hand in hand with the departments of the government. In support of all these general statements, let me now give more specific and detailed information.

RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED DURING MY TEN YEARS AS MINISTER OF FINANCE

1. *In the field of budget.*—In 1903 the ordinary state revenue, with which I deal exclusively here, amounted to 2,032,000,000 rubles.

In 1904, the revenue decreased by 13,500,000 rubles, and although the revenue of 1905 rose to 2,025,000,000 rubles, it was still below that of 1903. Revenues began to increase in 1906. After the disturbances of the revolutionary period of 1905-1906 our finances began to right themselves, and in that year the total revenue amounted to 2,272,000,000 rubles. From then on revenues steadily increased until in 1913 they totaled 3,415,000,000 rubles, a sum which was 309,000,000 rubles more than the revenue of 1912 and 1,383,000,000 rubles more than that of 1903.

Examination of these figures shows that from 1904 to 1908 there was an increase of 386,000,000 rubles and from 1909 to 1913 an increase of 997,000,000 rubles.

A study of the reports of the State Control (a systematic compilation and publication of statements of state revenues and expenditures begun in 1867) would show that it took thirty years, 1867-1897, for ordinary revenue to increase from 415,000,000 rubles to 1,415,000,000, that is, an increase of one billion rubles. A similar increase over the revenue of 1897 had been made by 1908, eleven years afterward; and the revenues of 1913 were a billion more than those of 1908. The third increase of a billion rubles in revenue had been accomplished in five years.

Such a rapid increase of revenue is explained by the fact that in 1897 the Russian budget added to its revenues two extremely productive sources of income—the state railways and the liquor monopoly. But aside from these factors, the rapid increase of revenue was significant proof of the development of the country's economic life. In fact, in order to refute the charge that the financial well-being of the Russian state was founded upon the increase of the liquor revenue, let me submit figures showing the increase of revenue in Russia *excluding the revenues from railways and the liquor monopoly*. From 1904 to 1913 this increase amounted to 577,800,000 rubles and there was *not a single item of the budget that did not show an increase*.

One more observation: During the decade 1904-1913, the surplus revenue reached a sum total of 2,132,000,000 rubles; this amount was used to defray the extraordinary expenses of the state. Even during the years of the war and revolution (1904-1906) there had been a surplus of 418,000,000 rubles, and this alone had enabled the state to meet without the aid of a loan the extraordinary demands it had to face. These extraordinary expenses were due to the construc-

tion of new railways and ports, relief work among the population suffering from droughts or other disasters, and so on.

I consider by themselves all expenditures associated with the war, as most of them were defrayed by money from loans.

Turning now to review briefly the expenditures of this period. The government was often accused by the Duma of being more willing to spend money in the interests of national defense or in the development of administrative institutions than in meeting the cultural needs of the country. In the reports of the State Control and in the budget it was the custom to cite as "cultural" expenditures only certain items, such as expenses for instruction, for the development of the different branches of industry as well as of the productive forces of the Empire, etc., whereas many other items might well have been cited under this general heading, for instance, railway development. Thus, in this broader sense, there was really much more spent to meet "cultural" demands than was indicated in the budget. It should be remarked that for the distribution of the "cultural" expenses, on the one hand, and for the "non-productive or administrative expenses," on the other hand, the former Russian budget was no more open to criticism than the budgets of other countries. Everywhere this question is influenced by historical considerations which admit many conventional usages open to criticism, which may, indeed, be quite justified.

The sum total of ordinary expenditures during 1913 amounted to 3,070,000,000 rubles, as against a total of 1,883,000,000 in 1904. This represents an increase in expenditures of a little more than 63 per cent.

Of the 1913 total of 3,070,000,000 rubles,

a) 503,000,000 were spent on administration as against 327,400,000 in 1904, an increase of almost 54 per cent.

b) 402,800,000 were spent in payment of state debts as against 327,400,000 in 1904, an increase of 39 per cent.

c) 816,500,000 were spent on national defense as against 466,300,000 in 1904, an increase of more than 75 per cent.

d) 519,200,000 were spent on cultural and productive projects as against 213,700,000 in 1904, an increase of 143 per cent.

e) 828,500,000 were spent on state enterprise (liquor monopoly and state railways) as against 586,900,000 in 1904, an increase of more than 41 per cent.

These figures show beyond a doubt that during the decade 1904-

1913 "cultural" expenditures showed an absolute increase of 305,400,000 rubles, and a greater percentage increase than any other appropriations. True, the absolute increase (350,200,000) of expenditures for national defense from 1904 to 1913 is greater than cultural expenditures, but its percentage increase is only 75. The greater absolute increase can be explained by the necessity of rebuilding our fleet after 1905 and of restoring military materials lost in the war with Japan.

2. *Monetary system.*—As is well known, Russia adopted the gold standard in 1897. In 1899 she proclaimed exceptionally strict laws governing the issuance of paper currency backed by the gold reserve of the State Bank. Only 300 millions paper currency could be issued without gold backing; additional issue had to be backed by gold, ruble for ruble. Throughout the trying years of 1904-1906 this law prevailed, and I have already explained how we were able to stay on the gold standard. The right to issue paper currency belonged solely to the State Bank, an institution owned and operated by the state, which had at its disposal all the country's gold, both money and bullion, as backing for the paper currency.

In the beginning of 1904 the gold in the hands of the State Bank in Russia amounted to 900 million rubles. Toward 1906 this sum had decreased to 880 million rubles. Beginning in 1908, as a result of two loans negotiated in France and owing to an improvement of our foreign trade, this fund began to increase, and at the end of 1913 it totaled more than 1,680,000,000 rubles. The total gold reserve of the State Bank and the state treasury, both in Russia and with her foreign agents abroad, was considerably higher: in 1904 it amounted to 1,100,000,000 rubles, and, increasing steadily year by year, in 1913 it reached 2,170,000,000 rubles. At the same time, paper currency had been issued: in 1904, 580,000,000 rubles with a gold reserve of 900,000,000 rubles. Under the influence of the increase in the volume of trade and the improved economic life of the country, the amount of paper money reached 1,670,000,000 rubles in 1913, with a gold reserve in Russia of 1,680,000,000 rubles. Thus the currency had 100 per cent gold backing.

3. *Russian foreign trade.*—The volume of foreign trade increased from 1,682,000,000 rubles in 1904 to 2,690,000,000 rubles in 1913—an increase of more than one billion rubles. It added 3,799,000,000 rubles to the money circulating within the country, thus constituting a very powerful factor in economic progress.

With the exception of the year 1908, following two previous years of poor crops, Russian exports and imports did not diminish during these ten years, even during the years of the Japanese War and the revolution. But with a series of fine crops beginning in 1909 and with great advances in Russian industry and agriculture Russian export trade increased rapidly until the War.

4. *Growth of prosperity.*—The years 1904–1913 showed conclusively a steady and considerable gain in all aspects of public wealth. The disturbances of 1904 and 1905 delayed this progress temporarily, but as early as 1906 increased savings indicated that public wealth was again increasing in amount.

The increase of capital—as represented by money and securities—in banks of different types, in insurance companies, and in state savings banks may be illustrated by the following few figures.

On January 1, 1904, the total amount of money in Russian financial institutions—currency, interest-bearing securities, and mortgages—was 11,300,000,000 rubles. Five years later, January 1, 1909, it was 14,300,000,000; after five more years, on January 1, 1913, it was 19,000,000,000 rubles. Of this total, interest-bearing securities amounted to 8,300,000,000 in 1904, and to 13,300,000,000 in 1913—an increase of over 60 per cent.

Still more deserving of attention are the operations of the state savings banks. In the beginning of 1904 the money and securities deposited in them amounted to 1,022,000,000 rubles; in 1913 the amount was 2,100,000,000—it had more than doubled. The number of savings books had increased from 4,854,000 to 8,597,000. This was partially the result of making savings institutions more accessible to the population by opening new branch offices, simplifying formalities, and according all sorts of privileges to depositors. But no doubt the main reason for this increase was the awakening of the spirit of thrift in the masses and the growth of confidence in these banks that followed the sad experience of mass runs on the savings banks during the revolutionary period of 1904; the people, agitated by anarchistic propaganda, had been the first to suffer from these runs on the banks.

5. *Industry; railways.*—The advent of peace in 1907, the stabilization of the currency, the widening of credit, the growing faith of the Russian and foreign public in the productive forces of the country, the accumulation and increased amount of free capital, as well as increasing demands of the peasants for consumption goods—all these

were reflected in the amazing development of Russian industry during this decade.

The development of agriculture and the increase in peasant purchasing-power had always been the basic factors of Russia's economic progress. Now, from 1904 to 1913, under the influence of the agrarian reform aimed at the development and growth of small peasant properties and of the measures designed to improve and intensify agricultural production, to increase the demand for agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizers, to spread agricultural education, to increase the number of agricultural schools and experimental farms, and so on, the Russian peasantry was becoming stronger. Good crops were becoming more regular and the productivity of the cultivated land was increasing. A foundation for the sound and rational development of all the productive forces of the country was thus laid, improved, and widened.

The progress of Russian industry during the decade was a normal development, based upon the economic and political foundations of the state. And on these firm foundations, had it not been for the Bolshevik catastrophe, it would have continued its swift and powerful development in perfect harmony with other manifest developments in the country's economic life and with the parallel growth of public prosperity.

In the manufacture of staple commodities, cotton-fiber production increased from fifteen million puds in 1905 to twenty-three million in 1913, and the manufacture of cotton goods increased from thirteen to twenty million puds.* Refined-sugar production amounted to fifty million puds in 1905 and to 180 million puds in 1913. Cigarette manufacture yielded twelve billion cigarettes in 1905 and twenty-six billion in 1913. In the field of heavy industry, the amount of coal mined increased from 1,091,000,000 puds in 1903 to 2,214,000,000 puds in 1913. Cast-iron production increased from 152 million puds in 1903 to 283 million puds in 1913. As for the oil industry, the damages done in 1905 had been so great that the output before the World War had not yet reached the 1904 level and only during the War, with the exploitation of the Grozny oil fields, did the oil output almost reach the 1904 level (656 million puds in 1904 and 602 million puds in 1916).

As for railways, no other decade saw such advances as did the

* A pud is forty Russian pounds or thirty-six American pounds.

years 1904–1914. This railway development was absolutely essential to economic progress in other fields. In fact it is not exaggerating to say that without the results achieved in railway development there would have been no tangible progress in the other branches of Russian economic life at that time. On December 31, 1903, the length of the Russian railways, excluding those in Finland and the Chinese Eastern Railway, totaled 55,314 versts.* In January 1914 it had grown to 65,526 versts, two-thirds of which, that is, 43,383 versts, were included in the state railway network: 33,416 versts for European Russia, and 9,969 versts for Asiatic Russia.

Such were Russia's accomplishments in economic development in the decade 1904–1913. They constitute in truth the

“Events of days long past,
Legends of hoary antiquity.” (Pushkin)

Will Russia ever return to those times?
And if so, when?

* A verst is two-thirds of a mile.

Part VII

War, Revolution, Exile

CHAPTER XXXVIII

FEBRUARY 1914—SEPTEMBER 1917

The period after my dismissal was rather uneventful with respect to my participation in public affairs. We moved to our private apartment on the Mohovaia, and in a very short time were established there and ready to adapt ourselves to our new circumstances in life. Never for one moment did we imagine that in little more than three years the old Russia we loved, the Russia that I had served so devotedly, would be crumbling about us.

The first session of the State Council after my dismissal was held on February 4; I did not attend. After Akimov, the Chairman, had opened the meeting, Professor M. M. Kovalevsky (1), a member of the Academy, asked for permission to speak before the Council proceeded to the business of the day. Then speaking for the academic group and inviting the other members of the Council to agree with his sentiment, Kovalevsky expressed regret that I had been obliged to resign my double post. He spoke in his usual loud voice and would have continued indefinitely but for a word from Akimov. When he had concluded, many members of the Center group expressed their accord with what Kovalevsky had said.

I had never met the professor outside the State Council, and it was not until a week later that I had an opportunity to thank him for his kind words. In complete contradiction to the facts of the case it was later rumored that Kovalevsky's remarks were the result of an agreement with me and were designed as a protest against the Tsar for having dismissed me.

During the next four or five weeks I saw the Tsar on two occasions. The first time I thought he avoided me; but the second time, at a play at the Hermitage and during the supper that followed, he came up to me and asked what I intended to do in addition to my work in the State Council. When I told him that I was going to ask permission to go abroad, especially to southern Italy, he encouraged me to do so. "Stay as long as you can," he said, "and while you are enjoying your well-earned rest, do think of me, for I envy you a

vacation that will take you away from the cares of state." He asked, as a personal favor, that I come to him for assistance any time I was in need.

During these same weeks I was twice summoned by the Dowager Empress Marie Fedorovna. At our first meeting she questioned me closely as to the details of my dismissal. She told me frankly that a few days before this had occurred, on the afternoon when I was waiting at the Anichkov Palace to give my report, the Tsar had spent nearly two hours in conversation with her and the Duchess of Edinburgh (2). He had discussed a number of subjects, had mentioned my name many times, and had even asked the Grand Duchess Mariia Aleksandrovna if she knew me, and when she had answered that she had never met me he had told her that at the first opportunity he would present me. He said that I enjoyed his entire confidence and that he especially valued the fact that I always told him the truth quite openly. After the Duchess had left, the Tsar had again mentioned me with much affection.

Then came January 31. The Dowager Empress said she could hardly believe her eyes when she read of my dismissal. On meeting the Tsar that day at the theater she could not refrain from asking him why he had done it. "Do you think I feel happy about it?" he had replied. "Some other time I shall tell you everything, but in the meantime I have come to understand that it is an easy thing to discharge a minister but very difficult to admit that it should not have been done."

I then explained at length and in detail my own point of view, trying to show the true forces that lay beneath the events about us. The Dowager Empress was silent for some time, and then began to weep. "I know you are an honorable man," she said, "and I know that you bear no ill will toward my son. You must also understand my fears for the future. My daughter-in-law does not like me; she thinks that I am jealous of her power. She does not perceive that my one aspiration is to see my son happy. Yet I see that we are nearing some catastrophe, and the Tsar listens to no one but flatterers, not perceiving or even suspecting what goes on all around him. Why do you not decide to tell the Tsar frankly all you think and know, now that you are at liberty to do so, warning him, if it is not already too late?"

But I could do nothing. I told her that no one would listen to me or believe me. The young Empress thought me her enemy. Her in-

timate associates would easily set at naught any warning of mine, and the only result would be another wound to my self-respect.

Our second conversation was much shorter. The Dowager Empress told me that she had twice tried to talk to the Tsar but could see clearly that nothing would come of these conversations. The Tsar kept repeating the same thing—that he was tired of all these speculations and rumors, the gossip of the St. Petersburg salons. No one else with sense put any faith in them, just as no one doubted the loyalty of the people to their Tsar, whom they regarded as the source of their well-being. The people's only sorrow was that they did not see their Tsar often and close enough.

I did not see the Empress again until I was appointed Honorary Curator of the Lyceum, and this was shortly before the catastrophe, late in February 1917.

Our trip abroad began on March 15. We went through Berlin to Palermo, where we stayed about three weeks, then spent four days with our daughter in Geneva, and returned to St. Petersburg in the middle of April.

In July we attended a dinner at Peterhof given in honor of M. Poincaré, the President of the French Republic. Count Frederichs had insisted that we be present, saying that Poincaré would naturally like to renew his acquaintance with me. But we were practically unnoticed at this function; no one took the trouble to present me to the guest of honor; the Tsar merely bowed to us from a distance. It all went to show how quickly a man is forgotten once he leaves a responsible position. My wife and I were sorry we had not followed our first impulse to decline the invitation.

Then came the war. We studied with feverish interest the progress of hostilities, trying, if possible, to get more information than that contained in official reports. P. N. Durnovo lived in the same building, and we became the nucleus of a sort of information service. Through A. A. Polivanov we obtained news directly from the War Department, and twice a week, on Sundays and Thursdays, a small group of from seven to ten people would assemble to study the reports thus obtained. We were terribly depressed by the Tannenberg (3) catastrophe, but our spirits revived with the news of successes at Lvov, Przemysl, and on the Caucasus front. But the events of April 1915 (4) soon destroyed the short-lived illusions which, despite the disaster to General Samsonov's army, had been created by the events of the first months of the war. I was only too well aware of

our defective preparation for the war, which began against the desire of Russia. I was always waiting for a sudden turn of events against us, not so much on account of the defects in the high command of the different parts of our army—which in fact were also shown in the armies of our allies and our enemies—as on account of our inadequate preparation of war materials, especially of the heavy artillery, of projectiles, and of machine guns.

For this reason, when our advance in Galicia and in the Carpathians encountered, in the spring of 1915, a strong counter-attack from the Austrian army, supported by its German ally, our army, in spite of the courage and even the heroism of the regiments, no longer had the means, especially the artillery of all calibers, with which to oppose effectively the superior force of the enemy. The general retreat commenced, at times without being able to reply by a real defensive action to the terrific attack. It is not for me to introduce my personal reflections on this complicated and painful subject. I shall only say that during the distressing months through which we passed I too often remembered my quarrels with General Sukhomlinov and the numerous reports given to the Emperor.

Meanwhile, the disintegration of authority in our domestic administration began. Much has already been written on this subject and there is no need for me to add anything. In my inactivity I had time to observe and study this gradual breakdown of government. I was only once consulted about anything, and even then I was quite unable to counteract the evil effects of our financial policy early in the war. I knew, of course, all that was happening in the government, as many of my former co-workers in the Ministry of Finance called on me and informed me of the affairs of the department, but I did not consider myself justified in criticizing or, still less, insisting upon my own views, lest I give food to the gossip, now silent, that I was trying to create obstacles in the already difficult work of my successor. Only once, late in October 1914, Goremykin asked my opinion regarding the first war loan of five hundred million rubles, already approved by the Finance Committee. I advised that a loan of two and a half billion rubles be made at once and on terms more attractive to the public, in order to take advantage of the popular war enthusiasm while it was still alive. My advice, however, was not followed. Count Witte was still alive, and on learning what I had suggested he insisted that I was deliberately trying to kill the very idea of a loan. I had also advised Goremykin to raise the taxes im-

mediately and to make an effort to counterbalance the sharp decline in revenues caused by the introduction of prohibition, by providing for a limited sale of liquor and at a higher price.* But this advice also went unheeded.

In 1915, I was called upon to assist in securing the adoption by the State Council of a bill providing for an income tax. State Comptroller N. N. Pokrovsky told me that the Tsar was eager that this measure be adopted. Since it was expected that there would be opposition in the State Council, and since Bark had declared in the Ministers' Council his inability to cope with this opposition, Pokrovsky himself had been appointed to carry through the project, as it had been worked out by a commission under his chairmanship when he was my assistant. Both Pokrovsky and Akimov asked me to support it. This I did. The project had been initiated by me and had since then passed the Duma with few changes. Now, in spite of the opposition of the Right group—of A. A. Bobrinsky and A. S. Stishinsky in particular—Pokrovsky and I, supported by the Center and Left, were able to carry the measure through the State Council. It is interesting to note that when the final vote was taken in this body nearly all the members of the Ministers' Council were absent; thus their votes did not influence the result. It was only right that an income tax should be established, thereby imposing on the wealthy classes a part of the burden which the poorer classes were already bearing.

Some time after the dismissal of Goremykin and the appointment of Stürmer as his successor I was greatly surprised to receive a visit from Stürmer. It was the first time it had happened. He told me he had come to ask my assistance in a matter of finance. The government wanted me to go to France and England to carry on some negotiations that were not proceeding as they ought. He could give me no details at the moment, but asked my consent to the general

* I made this suggestion because it was apparent that prohibition was ineffective. There was almost wholesale illegal brewing of liquor. Goremykin said that the government knew this, but could do nothing because the Tsar believed in the benefits of prohibition. The Duma, too, was under the spell of the temperance idea. When I remonstrated that we could not conduct a war with only three-fourths of our normal revenue, Goremykin said: "What if we do lose eight hundred million rubles in revenue? We shall print that much paper money; it's all the same to the people. In fact, many members of the Finance Committee believe that such an issue of paper currency would only make up for the amount you failed to issue when you were Minister of Finance." I remembered having heard this very idea frequently expressed by Rukhlov and did not press the point further.

idea. This I gave on condition that I be given an opportunity to study the previous course of the negotiations and complete freedom of action. This ended our conversation. Imagine my amazement when, three days later, Pokrovsky told me that Stürmer had given him orders from the Tsar to prepare to go abroad to conduct these very negotiations. An explanation of Stürmer's procedure in this affair is quite beyond me.

In 1915 Akimov died and was succeeded as Chairman of the State Council by Kulomzin (5). Many State Councillors told me they could not understand why I had not been appointed to this post instead of Kulomzin, but, honestly, I was quite content to remain out of office. Anyway, my appointment would have been a mistake because those who had intrigued against me still had influence. This is true despite the fact that Witte and Meshchersky had died.

Late in December 1915 Kulomzin called on me. There was to be a rearrangement of the membership of the Departments of the State Council for 1916 and he wanted to know how I would regard his suggestion to the Tsar that I be appointed head of the Second Department, that in charge of private railway concessions. I replied that I should be glad to accept the post were it not that such action would be unfair to General Petrov, the present incumbent, who was a most worthy and able man. However, Petrov himself urged me to accept, saying he would gladly become simply a member of the Department. Accordingly, on January 1, 1916, I was appointed.

Soon afterward I presented myself to the Tsar to offer my thanks. He was kind and gracious as always and glad that he had been able to show me some mark of consideration. He appeared quite composed; his faith in the favorable outcome of the war seemed unshaken despite our losses. I did not think it fitting to distress him with my pessimistic views of the situation, and merely reminded him that I was always ready to do my utmost in serving him and Russia.

During 1916 my active participation in public affairs was limited to my attendance at meetings of the State Council. The general situation on the front became more and more unfavorable and the situation in the hinterland became more and more strained; the Duma became increasingly articulate; there were many and rapid changes in the government; and the public talked more insistently of "dark forces" and inefficiency in the administration. News of the deliberations of the Ministers' Council leaked out. In this way, and because of my associations with men in office or with men recently discharged,

I was able to keep in touch with what was going on. The only thing not known to me was the progress of underground activities, but in this connection I learned from Polivanov that the Petrograd garrison and the reserve battalions in the vicinity of the capital were completely disorganized, were uncontrolled by their commands, and presented a great danger.

The nervous tension in the Duma seemed to be carried over into the State Council. Professor Tagantsev once went so far as to say outright that the country was being endangered by these "dark forces." There was agitation in favor of greater co-operation between State Council and Duma in order to present a united front against the dangers threatening Russia. This idea was supported by a few appointed members of the Right; I myself took no part in the movement, and was careful not to become involved in it. Prince Vasilchikov and Baron Uxkull belonged to the same party as I and agreed with me in considering useless the participation of appointed members in such a movement.

No one, however, had any apprehension of the coming revolution. Everybody feared new defeats on the front; the seizure of Petrograd by the Germans was considered a possibility, and people sometimes discussed plans of evacuation. My sisters and I often said we might have to move to our ancestral estate of Gorna, which no German could ever reach. But no one suspected the nature of the storm about to burst upon us.

In the middle of the summer of 1916 we learned that the trial of former Minister of War Sukhomlinov would be held very soon. General Polivanov told me that he had been summoned by the Senator in charge of the investigation who had told him that I, too, would be summoned, as during the preliminary trial Sukhomlinov had stated that we had not been ready for the war because the War Ministry could not obtain necessary credits from the Minister of Finance, Kokovtsov. I began to prepare for the inquiry, and asked my former colleague in the State Treasury and later Assistant Minister of Finance, V. V. Kuzminsky (6), to obtain Bark's permission for memoranda regarding the appropriations of credits made in my term of office to the War Ministry and their expenditures to be placed at my disposal. This was done.

I needed these memoranda to show that the reason for our unpreparedness for war lay in the chaos which had existed under Sukhomlinov in all preparatory operations, the delays in the execution

of orders, the endless technical changes, and, finally, the absence of any definite plan. I asked to be given a statement of the credits appropriated to the War Ministry and unused by it. From this I established the fact that at the time of my dismissal, January 31, 1914, these unused credits amounted to the tremendous sum of 250 million rubles.

Having made my preparations and refreshed my memory as to details I could only await my questioning. This did not take place, however, until the memorable day of December 20, 1916.* Nor did it last long. Senator Kuzmin, in charge of the inquiry, told me that he was in possession of all pertinent information from the Ministry of Finance and asked me only to explain to him the procedure of the requisitioning and appropriating of military credits, including in this the rôle played by the Ministry of Finance and legislative institutions. Kuzmin also made a few notes of some figures illustrating my fight with the War Minister. He added that Polivanov's testimony had been extremely favorable to me, as he had stated that the War Ministry had received much more money than it had spent and that although I had been a very parsimonious Minister of Finance, I had always held the interests of national defense close to my heart and knew the affairs of the War Ministry better than many of the chiefs of central offices of this department. Later, in September of 1917, but a month before the Bolshevik Revolution, when I was again questioned in Sukhomlinov's trial, Polivanov spoke much less kindly about me—but of this more later.

Late in the autumn of 1916 Stürmer was dismissed and was succeeded by A. F. Trepov as Chairman of the Ministers' Council. Soon after his appointment Trepov called on me and said that in his estimation the war was almost ended. He based his opinion on the fact that America was on the verge of joining the Allies and with her entry into the war Germany would soon be defeated. In view of this, he considered it would be wise for Russian statesmen to give some thought to the peace that would conclude the conflict. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could not single-handedly undertake preparations for peace negotiations; some person should be appointed to assemble all relevant material, which should then be examined by a

*I remember the date well because it was then that the Minister of Justice, Makarov, informed me that the body of Rasputin had been found under the ice of the Malaia Nevka below the Krestovsky Bridge.

special commission under the chairmanship of the Tsar himself; this person, Trepov thought, should be myself. He wanted to get my consent to act in this capacity before he submitted the matter to the Tsar.

At the time I felt that Trepov had already discussed it with the Tsar, because he would have been most unwise to consider me for this position without first ascertaining how I was regarded by the Sovereign. Nevertheless, I said that I had no reason for refusing to carry out any task that His Majesty saw fit to assign me, but I expressed my doubts as to the soundness of his opinion regarding the effects of America's entry into the war. I suggested, too, that although I would assemble the material according to plan it might be better to have someone else represent Russia at the actual peace conference—someone who enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor and the Court.

A few days later my friend and former colleague, N. N. Pokrovsky, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, called on me to assure me that he was heartily in sympathy with my appointment to this task. As soon as the Tsar's consent had been obtained he would transfer the entire matter to me. To aid me in my work he proposed to place at my disposal the services of Prince P. P. Volkonsky, Assistant Director of the Ministry's Office. In fact, soon afterward, I began to receive packages of documents that were not arranged in any order. These were copies of our government's correspondence with other powers since 1914. Later both Trepov and Pokrovsky told me that the Tsar was pleased that I had consented to assume responsibility for this work.

Weeks passed, however, and nothing further was done about it. Meanwhile, in December 1916, there was a great furor about the assassination of Rasputin; the Tsar returned from the Stavka, but still no word reached me regarding this peace project.

In that same month, I was appointed Honorary Curator of the Lyceum in the place of A. S. Ermolov, who had just died, and on receiving the ukase on my appointment I wrote to the Tsar asking for an audience. At the same time, I telephoned Pokrovsky and asked him if I should remind the Tsar that he had not yet given me instructions regarding the preparation of the material for the peace negotiations. Pokrovsky said that in his last report he had mentioned the matter and had received the impression that it had been definitely settled and that therefore there was no need to remind the Tsar of it. Later he informed me that during his next report the Tsar had ex-

pressed his intention of discussing the matter with me when he gave me my audience.

The Tsar returned my letter very promptly, fixing the audience for January 19, 1917. At the usual morning hour of 11:00 A.M. on January 19 I arrived at Tsarskoe Selo and saw the Tsar for the last time. I shall never forget our last meeting, and my memory will never lose the impression which this interview made.

For a whole year I had not entered the reception room which I had visited so often during the ten years of our close association. Nothing had changed in the Alexandrovsky Palace during the year of my absence: the same doorman at the entrance, evidently glad to see me again; the same courier who conducted me to the reception room; the same guards at the doors; the same books and albums on the table in the reception room; the same pictures and portraits on the walls; the same faces—Count Benckendorf and Dr. Botkin (7), engaged in calm conversation. The former, upon my entrance, approached me and said: "Is today Friday?" and to my answer that for three years now I had not been coming there on Fridays he laughed and said, "We still think of you as Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Council, so used have we become to seeing you here."

The Tsar received me immediately. When I entered his study he was standing by the entrance and remained there without approaching his writing desk as he usually did and without inviting me to sit down. We conversed standing. I thought that the door leading from the study to his dressing-room was half open, which had never occurred before, and that someone was standing just inside. It may have been just an illusion, but this impression stayed with me throughout my brief audience.

The appearance of the Tsar struck me so forcibly that I could not help asking after his health. During the year that I had not seen him he had become almost unrecognizable. His face had become very thin and hollow and covered with small wrinkles. His eyes, usually of a velvety dark brown, had become quite faded, and wandered aimlessly from object to object instead of looking steadily at his interlocutor. The whites were of a decidedly yellow tinge, and the dark retinas had become colorless, gray, and lifeless.

I could hardly master the emotion which seized me, and at once asked about his health: "Your Majesty what has happened to you? You look so tired, so changed since last January when I saw you last, that I permit myself to say that you must seriously think of

your health. Those who see you often probably do not notice the change, but it is so marked that evidently you must be suffering from some serious illness."

The face of the Tsar bore an expression of helplessness. A forced, mirthless smile was fixed upon his lips, and he answered, repeating several times: "I am perfectly well and sound, but I spend too much time without exercise, and I am used to much activity. I repeat to you, Vladimir Nikolaevich, I am perfectly all right. You have not seen me for a long time, and possibly I did not have a good night. Presently I shall go for a walk and shall look better."

I thanked the Tsar for my appointment as Honorary Curator of the Lyceum and expressed to him my happiness at being appointed, adding that exactly forty-five years before, in December 1872, I had graduated from the Lyceum and hardly a year had passed since but I had visited it. The Tsar listened to me with the same sickly smile, glancing nervously about him. Then I asked the Tsar whether he wished to give me instructions regarding the work he had entrusted to me or desired to find some other time for a report. At this question, which seemed to me perfectly simple, since considering the Tsar's fine memory I could not imagine that the matter on which the Minister of Foreign Affairs had reported to him but a few days before had escaped him, the Tsar became reduced to a perfectly incomprehensible state of helplessness. The strange, almost vacant smile remained fixed on his face; he looked at me as if to seek support and to ask me to remind him of a matter that had absolutely slipped his memory. When I told him that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had reported to him on Tuesday regarding Trepov's proposal to charge me with preparing the materials for the future peace negotiations and that the Tsar had wished to give me personal instructions in this very delicate matter, which could hardly be discussed definitely as yet, the Tsar literally lost all self-possession. For a long time he looked at me in silence as if trying to collect his thoughts or to recall what had escaped his memory. After this silence, which seemed to me perfectly endless, and still smiling helplessly, the Tsar said finally: "Oh, yes, I did speak to Pokrovsky and intended to tell you my ideas, but I am not quite ready yet. I shall think about it and write to you, and we shall discuss everything in detail during our next meeting." Still with the same helpless smile, the Tsar extended to me his hand and opened the door to the reception room.

I found the same persons—Count Benckendorf and Botkin—

sitting there. I must confess that tears were now simply suffocating me. I addressed myself to Botkin: "Do you not see the state of the Tsar? He is on the verge of some mental disturbance if not already in its power, and all of you will be responsible if you do not take measures to change his surroundings." Whether they did not see what had so deeply shocked me or simply did not wish to discuss the matter with me, I could not tell; but both of them said as one man that I had simply not seen the Tsar for some time, that his health was not in any danger, and that he was merely tired. However, I retained the impression that the Tsar was seriously ill and that his illness was of a nervous character. I was still under this impression eighteen months afterward when on July 10, 1918, I was questioned in the Petrograd Cheka by Uritsky (8), who asked me point-blank whether or not I considered the Tsar mentally sound and whether or not I believed that since the Japanese defeat he had been a sick man.

And I still believe that when I last saw the Tsar he was profoundly unsettled and hardly knew what was happening about him. Certainly at no other time had I been prey to such anxieties as those which swept over me as I left the Tsar after our last interview. It was only five weeks before the February revolution, which swept away all that I held dear and set in motion that train of events which brought the Tsar to his death on the night of July 16, 1918 (n.s.), at Ekaterinburg. Even now, so many years afterward, I can recall the agitation I felt as I returned to the city and as I repeated my impressions to my wife.

Meanwhile the revolution was about to break out in all its wildness. In this connection, I can say nothing new, and it is useless to repeat what hundreds of persons have already said. I shall say this one thing, however, that when other people say that they foresaw the revolution they are telling an utter untruth. Everybody sensed that something extraordinary was about to happen, but no one had any clear idea what it would be. I think I should not be wrong if I said that everybody expected some political reform that would paralyze the influence of the Empress and set up a new administrative order. No one expected anything so fatal to the old régime; it was thought that even though there would be certain constitutional changes the monarchy and the existing social order would be maintained. For instance, Imperial Secretary Kryzhanovsky, who was both intelligent and well informed, telephoned me on Monday morning, February 27.

All day Sunday, February 26, there had been street clashes between troops and demonstrators. He told me that there would be no session of the State Council, at which I had been scheduled to speak, as a ukase had been issued dissolving the Duma and the Council. This was a complete surprise to me, as the project had been kept secret by the government, and when I told him that in my estimation it was purest folly, Kryzhanovsky answered calmly: "On the contrary, we should have done so long ago, and you will see how well the dissolution will be received, for it will stop this fanning of passions. I believe that the majority in the Duma will be glad to be freed from being imposed upon by a gang of instigators."

That same Monday, about 2:00 P.M., my wife and I, wishing to see what was happening in the streets, went out to take a walk along the Mohovaia toward the Sergievskaja, taking with us our dog "Dzhipik." As we turned to the right on Sergievskaja toward the Liteinaia we were met with a salvo of rifle fire. Bullets began to whiz about us. We ran back toward the Mohovaia, but then stopped to look for our dog, which had hidden in somebody's gateway. Just then Guchkov and M. I. Tereshchenko (9) emerged from the Central Artillery Office, and the former told us that the Duma was forming a provisional government in which Tereshchenko was to be Minister of Finance. At this Tereshchenko asked me to help him with advice, and a day or two later he arrived at our house while we were having dinner, asked to have something to eat, as he had not had anything since morning, and stayed until 2:00 A.M. plying me with the most varied questions about finance and the financial conditions of the country. On March 2, I went to visit my sister, who lived on Baskov Pereulok, in order to learn what was happening in her neighborhood, where the artillery barracks were situated. I had scarcely returned when there was a terrific ringing of our doorbell. A crowd of about twenty armed soldiers burst in shouting that someone had fired from the windows of our flat and a soldier had been killed. They scattered through the rooms demanding that we surrender our firearms, but I possessed none except two unloaded carbines standing by the window which some troops of the Border Patrol, of which I was honorary commander, had sent me from the front. Finally they left, taking along one of the rifles. The man in command of the group was a working-man, and before leaving he said that he remembered me well since the 1905 strike and would advise me to obtain a safe-conduct certificate from the Commandant of the Duma. "They are keeping an eye

on you," he said, "and it will not fare well with you unless you have an order forbidding people to enter and to make searches."

I followed this advice and that very day obtained a certificate prohibiting such searches. But this document served me poorly, for that same evening my chauffeur came running, pale and disheveled, saying that but a few moments before a crowd of soldiers had rushed into the yard, broken the locks of the three garages, and taken away all the automobiles, including mine. This crowd had been shown the way about by our own doorman, who later proved to be a regular Bolshevik.

I cannot recall now whether it was on the next day or the day after, March 3 or 4, that my wife and I walked to the Discount Bank to withdraw from my safe 20,000 rubles in securities which I intended to intrust to my sister Elizaveta Nikolaevna, who had been and still was dependent upon me. I feared that I might be arrested as most of the ministers had been. When we had completed our business and were leaving I was attacked by a short individual of either Jewish or Armenian type, who shouted at the top of his voice, "Here is the former Tsarist Minister of Finance who stole five millions during the Japanese War and who has now come to withdraw a million to spend on overthrowing the rule of the people and restoring the Tsarist régime." He was surrounded by about a dozen armed soldiers, to whom he shouted orders. They did not know what to do. Just then a young man wearing the uniform of a lieutenant of the Guards, adorned with a huge red bow, appeared and began to argue with my accoster, who proved to be a discharged employee of the Discount Bank. His name was Baliev, a relative of the Moscow theatrical producer, owner of the "Chauve Souris." The lieutenant placed me under arrest and said he would take me to the guardhouse of the Municipal Council, whose Commandant he was, there to await the Duma's orders.

The soldiers, half of whom were very drunk, searched me, in the basement, but I had had time to transfer the securities to my wife. Then I was put in a commandeered automobile. Baliev climbed on the running board and, as we drove down the Nevsky, yelled at the top of his voice, "Here goes the former Tsarist Minister, the thief, Count Kokovtsov, caught red handed dragging from the bank a million rubles with which to rescue the Tsar." He ordered a soldier to hold me by the hand so that I could not throw out my loot. The Nevsky was crowded with people; a few of my friends saw the scene

and spread the news through the city. Finally we reached the Commandant's office, where Baliev insisted upon being given a receipt for this delivered "state criminal." After receiving it he calmed down and left the office.

An hour later my wife arrived, bringing the safe-conduct certificate of the Duma, but the Commandant could not bring himself to release me without orders from the Duma. After almost another two hours an order came by telephone to send me to the Duma for examination.

At the Taurida Palace we wandered through many offices on different floors in search of the War Minister, Guchkov, or his aide-de-camp, or the famous room where the arrested were examined and which no one seemed able to find. We met a whole crowd of Duma members, but they only shrugged their shoulders and asked me what I could possibly be doing there. Some of them even said: "Let all this nonsense alone and go home as quickly as possible before Kerensky sees you."

Even the most vivid imagination could not picture what was taking place within the Taurida Palace. Soldiers, sailors, university students of both sexes, nondescript persons by the score, deputations to see someone, anyone, orators perched upon tables and chairs shrieking unintelligibly, people like myself arrested and accompanied by guards, "Frenchies" (a type of army tunic) dashing hither and yon, orderlies, unknown persons issuing orders, a steady hum of voices! It was bedlam. And in the midst of it all wandered members of the Duma, recently so proud, who had been planning to show the world a miraculous revolution which would take place without the "shedding of a drop of blood."

When I was led through the room in which I had sat for eight years as member of the Budget Committee I was surrounded by a crowd of Duma members of the Octobrist Party all asking with amazement how it happened that I was under arrest and whither I was being conducted. One of them undertook to show me and my guards the room for the examination of the arrested, and when we entered this purgatory I beheld a sight indeed strange but edifying.

It was a large room, but it was jammed with persons from all walks of life. Some were standing, some seated, a few fast asleep. There was no guard, but certain individuals circulated through the crowd and forbade us to talk to each other.

I had no one to talk to. I exchanged bows with the returned

officer of the Cavalry Guards, Marquis Pauluchi (10), and noticed that when the former Imperial Secretary, Kryzhanovsky, entered he passed me quickly without speaking and sat at some distance with his back to me. But that was all. Everybody's attention was attracted by a pilgrim whom I had often seen in the streets, bareheaded and barefooted in cold and rainy weather. He was sitting against a wall, singing unintelligible chants, and paying not the slightest attention to anything.

Half an hour later the man in charge of the examination arrived; it was the Duma member, Papadzhanov (11), a Cadet, whom I had met several times. He questioned me regarding the circumstances of my arrest, said he considered my arrest the result of some unauthorized action, begged my pardon, and invited me to dictate to an employee of the Commandant's office a brief report of what had happened. On his part he promised to give immediate orders for my release and safe conduct home escorted by the officer who had guarded me. He telephoned my wife on the spot to reassure her. His treatment of me was indeed just, and I preserve a grateful memory of it. I had an opportunity to tell him so nearly three years later when we met in Paris as refugees.

While this was being done my officer guard asked me to assist him in obtaining a little respite after three days spent in exceptionally trying circumstances. He also suggested that I ask the Duma Commandant for a small guard to be placed at my house to prevent any further violence being done me. He told me that he could arrange everything and that his men would be happy if I could find twenty-five rubles a day for the whole lot of them. They were assured of their rations and he was sure he could rig up some sort of sleeping accommodations for them. Papadzhanov sympathized with this idea and discussed it with the Duma Commandant, and it was arranged that a guard of several men should be stationed at our house. The order for my release was signed, I was given a copy, and it was not long before I was at home. Immediately I arranged with the house manager to have quarters fixed up for the guard. The tenants were delighted with this promise of protection and contributed bedding enough for twelve men. At about seven o'clock that evening, the officer, a sergeant, and men arrived and were installed. I had arranged for separate rooms for the officer and the sergeant. Later we learned that these soldiers had deserted their barracks, taking their arms with them, and obtained their food by "requisitioning" it.

The officer and sergeant had their lunches and dinners with us; the officer spent his evenings too with us. He introduced himself as a lieutenant of the Hussar regiment of the Life Guards, Korný de Bade, a native of Warsaw, who had been transferred to this regiment from an army Hussar regiment after the Life Guards had suffered great losses in the beginning of the war. He had arrived in Petrograd just before the revolution and had been sent to the Nikolaevsky Hospital for treatment of his wounds. He behaved himself most civilly at all times.

So matters stood for three days. On the fourth the lieutenant told me that he and his men were ordered to the Duma; he left two soldiers with us for another two days. Shortly afterward he sent me a letter asking for three hundred rubles, of which he said he was in great need. The messenger who brought it told me that the lieutenant was under arrest at the Commandant's office and was compelled to eat army rations. I immediately got in touch with the Commandant, who was very eager to learn how I had come to know Korný de Badé. When I told him my story he informed me that the lieutenant was simply an adventurer, probably a runaway army clerk of Jewish extraction, who had never been in active service and against whom there were many charges of illegal requisitioning of food and supplies. He advised me to be particularly careful, as he was boasting of his close friendship with me. In case I wished to help the lieutenant, however, the Commandant suggested that I do so through himself in the form of a donation for needy prisoners, which I did. A year later, when I was imprisoned by the Cheka, this "lieutenant" presented himself to my wife as a lawyer attached to the Revolutionary Tribunal and offered to help free me. But when my wife's back was turned he stole the golden head off my cane. Also he got himself a free dinner from my friend, I. A. Turtsevich (12), under the pretext of influencing the Bolsheviks to free me from prison. This was the last time I heard of him.

The spring of 1917 passed. We were more or less dazed by the shooting in the streets and depressed by the daily decrees of the Provisional Government which undermined the structure of our state system and prepared the ground, inadvertently but steadily, for the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks.

In May we went to the country as usual. At first everything went on quietly and peacefully; there was nothing to remind us of the passions seething in the capital: the same lovely garden by the house;

the same peaceful surroundings of a quiet countryside engrossed in its small pursuits; the same concern over the hay, the vegetable garden, and the berry bushes; the same work around the barn and the stables. The only thing that was missing was my favorite horse which I had had to relinquish when the Imperial guardsmen had left and I could not find adequate accommodations for a horse in the city. It was only by paying close attention to the attitude of those about us that one could detect that somehow or other the peasants had become alienated from us. Now only a few of them appeared with their endless requests and troubles, and the village children no longer came with mushrooms and berries. No one wanted to work, although no one refused openly; everyone promised, but no one kept his promise. We had to manage by ourselves, letting the poorer hayfields go unmowed. Thefts also became more frequent and the peasants seemed to become hostile toward me, something that had not occurred even during the revolution of 1905. In a word, although life's outward forms seemed to be the same, life itself had changed.

Travel by railway became unbearable. Officially there still were carriages of the first and second class, but one could not use them. All compartments were filled with soldiers, who paid absolutely no attention to the rest of the passengers. They sang continually and laughed at their own crude jokes. Upper berths were invariably lowered all day, with dirty socks and bare feet dangling from them. Conductors were powerless to handle such disorderly crowds; they hid away in their official compartments, leaving the passengers to the mercy of the mob.

Our country estate was only five or six hours' journey from the capital, but we found it most objectionable to travel back and forth, as we had to do, under such conditions. Our frequent journeys were necessitated by the fact that I had to appear at Sukhomlinov's trial and at the inquiries conducted by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Muravev, a Moscow attorney, as to the activities of Tsarist government officials.

At the trial I was only asked to comment upon Sukhomlinov's statement that Russia's unpreparedness for war was due to the fact that the Ministry of Finance had withheld the necessary appropriations from the Ministry of War. This statement, of course, was false. I proved that it was so simply by submitting the precise data as to the appropriations made for national defense, a great amount of which had not been spent when war broke out. I pointed out also that both

the Duma and the Tsar had been anxious to have these appropriations made to the Ministry of War and that had I been inclined to withhold them, which I was not, I could not have done so contrary to the wishes of His Majesty and the people's representatives.

Sukhomlinov's own reply to my testimony was indeed curious. He said that he had some objections to make, but instead of refuting my statements he simply told how matters had been discussed in the Ministers' Council, how I used to object to all his demands, so that even Stolypin, who was afraid of me and my great powers of speech, and the rest of the ministers stood in awe of me. On hearing all this, the senators merely exchanged glances. Then the prosecution asked him what he could say regarding the substance of my testimony that sums of more than 250 million rubles had remained unexpended because the ministry was not able to handle them. To this Sukhomlinov answered that he had never heard of these surplus sums.

Before I had taken the witness stand, Polivanov, the former Minister of War, had declared to those about him that he considered it his duty to free me from any possible blame for the unpreparedness of the army by testifying that the War Ministry had received more money than it could use, simply because it was not well enough organized to manage large-scale improvements and operations. When Polivanov himself took the stand, however, his testimony was much less categorical, so I was told. He was reported to have said that I was much less favorably disposed to making grants for national defense than my predecessor, Stolypin, had been.

The courtroom scene made a depressing impression on me. There was a large space reserved for the public, but it was practically empty. Only the front rows of seats were occupied. The prisoners were in the custody of a guard of the Preobrazhensky regiment of the most untidy aspect and the guards looked upon the defendants with an expression of such hatred that I sometimes shuddered to see these fiendish faces. Nor was I the only one to fear that the prisoners might meet with violence outside the courtroom. The late Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who was also a witness, expressed his fears that Sukhomlinov and his wife would not leave the courtroom alive. Of course, he could not know that eight months afterward he himself would be brutally murdered in Perm Gubernia, while Sukhomlinov, freed from his heavy sentence, would flee abroad and would later attack the unfortunate Emperor in his memoirs.

Although I still consider Sukhomlinov one of those most guilty

for the catastrophe that befell Russia, I do not believe he was a traitor to his country. He was guilty of a criminal levity, of looking at everything through the eyes of his wife, and, to please her, of surrounding himself with many shady characters who were thus enabled to learn state secrets.

The Tsar loved his country so dearly, was so interested in the army and the navy, that it was easy for the ministers in charge of national defense to get His Majesty's ear. Thus, Sukhomlinov, who had no real understanding of the problems of his ministry, occupied the Tsar's mind with administrative details and non-essentials and glossed over vital issues with jokes and trivialities.

So much for Sukhomlinov's trial. I had to appear before the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry only once. I was to have appeared again, but this never happened. I was asked only two questions:

1. What were the circumstances under which A. A. Makarov was appointed Minister of the Interior, and who suggested his appointment?

2. What were the reasons and under what law was the Duma dissolved before its term expired when I was Chairman of the Ministers' Council?

To the first question I answered that I had suggested Makarov's appointment and, on request, repeated what had passed between the Tsar and me in the Kiev Palace on the day of Stolypin's death. Muravev had a record of this Kiev conversation and from time to time he aided my memory of details. When I had finished he said: "Your account is very accurate. The Commission needs no further explanations in this matter."

As to the second question, the real inquiry was made by former attorney Sokolov (13), the author of the famous order No. 1 and recently made senator. He had just recovered from the beating he had received at the front and wore a black silk skull-cap on his head.

I answered this question briefly by saying that during the entire period when I was Chairman of the Ministers' Council—September 1911 to January 1914—the Duma had not been dissolved before the expiration of its term. But Senator Sokolov was not satisfied and asked me what was the procedure for the prorogation of the Duma for summer and Christmas vacations. I answered that the dates of the beginning and end of those vacations were determined by me in

agreement with the Chairman of the State Council and the President of the Duma and that our decision was based upon the amount of legislative work to be done. Then drafts of ukases were drawn up and submitted to the Tsar either on the day of prorogation or a few days before, according to where the Tsar was at the time, in Crimea or Tsarskoe Selo; it was necessary for me to receive and publish them in due time.

But Sokolov still objected. He said that the Duma and the State Council were to have been prorogued on December 12, whereas the ukase bore December 7 as the date of signature. It seemed to him, therefore, that the chambers had been prorogued five days before their time. This sort of argument got us nowhere. Senator Ivanov, who was present at the inquiry and whom I had known during his work in the State Control, supported me by saying that the Commission of Inquiry would have been much more justified in accusing me of irregular actions if I had recorded the prorogation of the Duma as having occurred on the day the ukase had been signed, even though the Tsar was away at the time, for this would have even created doubt as to the veracity of the record.

The chairman put a stop to our dispute by announcing solemnly that the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry would evaluate the matter in due course and would make its decision known.

Afterward one of the magistrates of the Commission, Golembovsky, who had once been Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of the Moscow Palata, asked me in private about my controversies with Minister of the Interior Maklakov regarding appropriations for the support of the press. When my statement had been recorded, the magistrate handed me a blue envelope containing a report by Stürmer to the Tsar, dated July 1916, saying, "You may be interested." This report was an utter falsehood. It said that there had been formed in the Duma a so-called "Progressive bloc" which aimed to discredit in the eyes of the people the monarchical principle and the person of the Monarch, to reveal to the public the danger which threatened the country unless the misdeeds of the government were speedily checked, and to advance republican ideas. This bloc had already spread from the Duma to the State Council, in which I was its leading light. I was motivated by personal ambition, it said, as I could not become reconciled to having been dismissed from the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council. Stürmer ended the report by saying that having advised the Tsar of this unfortunate situation he wished to be given

instructions. The only marks on the report were the usual ones in blue pencil indicating that it had been read by His Majesty.

When I read this report Stürmer was already incarcerated in the Fortress of Peter and Paul. I said to the magistrate that all this was untrue and that I hoped the Tsar had not paid any attention to it. I was deeply hurt that such fantastic tales were told to the Tsar. Stürmer must have known that not only had I played no part in the formation of the Progressive bloc but that I had kept away from all groups and parties. He must also have known that Durnovo, the leader of the Right, of which Stürmer was a member, often said openly that he was sorry I did not belong to his group, but that my avoidance of party ties was much preferable to the violent attitude of Count Witte, who did not conceal his wrath at having been removed from power.

The correspondence between the Tsar and the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna relating to the year 1916, published by the Soviets in 1926, shows that Stürmer told the Empress about my participation and leadership of the Progressive bloc in the State Council and added that I was intriguing against individual ministers, particularly against Prince Shakhovskoi (14), who strangely enough was at that time almost unknown to me. Stürmer's insinuations and falsehoods may explain Her Majesty's hostility to me as reflected in her letters some two years after my discharge.

The most amazing thing, however, was that at the same time that he was maligning me behind my back Stürmer saw fit to make the overtures to me which I have described above.

CHAPTER XXXIX

OCTOBER 1917—JUNE 1918

In the midst of the events which were sweeping about us, it seemed dangerous to remain in Petrograd. Moreover, the problem of food was becoming more and more complicated. Many people began to discuss going where life seemed calmer and safer. I personally did not wish to go away; moreover, I did not know where to go. Someone suggested that I join my daughter abroad. As yet it was not a problem of lack of means, as I still had some savings and could count upon being allowed to keep them and to transfer a small sum abroad.

My wife liked the idea of going abroad, and V. A. Maklakov (1) encouraged us to do so. He had just been appointed ambassador to Paris and had mentioned to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tereshchenko, that I could be very useful to him at Paris. Tereshchenko telephoned me and offered his services. I received a diplomatic passport and was assured that Minister of Finance Bernatsky (2) would transfer to me whatever I might need for my living. In a word, everything seemed to be going so nicely that all I had to do was, so to speak, swim with the current.

The French government promised to issue immediately a visa permitting entry to that country, and the British military agent in charge of sea transportation from the continent to the west, at the request of his French colleague, immediately had two berths placed at my disposal on one of the steamships plying between Bergen and Newcastle. Almost everything was ready in a very short time for our departure, yet I felt no certainty that we should really go. Something told me that we should not leave. We made no preparations at home; things remained in their usual places; I even said nothing to my sisters.

About the middle of October I read in my morning paper that the train which had left Petrograd for Finland the previous evening with many passengers—among whom were Doctor Badmaev (3), Mme. Vyrubova, and others, all of whom were supplied with foreign pass-

ports—had been stopped by Russian sailors at one of the stations this side of Helsingfors. The passengers named and a few others had been taken off the train, carried away to Sveaborg by the sailors, and thrown into prison.

This piece of news decided the matter for me. I addressed myself to Tereshchenko and learned from him something that was not known in the papers, namely, that things were not going well in Finland, that our sailors and soldiers had seized power in some localities, had removed local authorities, and were giving their own orders, searching trains, and disregarding the orders of our military command. Of course, this information was followed by the assurance that order would be established in a few days; but I was not convinced. When I asked whether my wife and I were not running a great risk in undertaking this journey, we were told merely that I was hardly as objectionable as Mme Vyrubova or Badmaev, whose connection with Rasputin was common knowledge.

We decided, however, to postpone our journey abroad at least until we were sure of conditions in Finland and of a safe journey. Meanwhile my wife's brother arrived from the Caucasus and began to urge my wife and me to go to Kislovodsk, where life was so peaceful and pleasant, where there was plenty of food, and where "the firm Cossacks of the Kuban and the Terek allow no trouble, maintain order, and refuse to obey the ravings of the Provisional Government."

Since we had decided to leave Petrograd, we agreed with his suggestion. We succeeded in obtaining a place in a sleeping-car, and on October 29, only five days after the Bolsheviks seized power, left for the Caucasus.

Before going we went to take our leave of our grandchildren on the Konnogvardeisky Boulevard, and made this trip under rifle fire along the Nevsky and especially at the corner of the Morskaia. Later we learned that this was the moment of the siege of the Hotel Astoria as a "bourgeois" center.

We arrived at Moscow under artillery fire, as there was fighting in different parts of the city. The Kursk terminal was deserted; no one left the train; the public was not allowed on the platform. We attempted to send a telegram to Mme M. N. Utin and her son at Tula, asking them to come to the station to see us, but evidently the telegraph was not working.

At night, near Orel, our car was nearly demolished. A train

that was to meet ours had suffered some small damage, and we were obliged to stop. It was pitch dark, and no one knew just what was happening. Someone began to hammer on the doors of the carriage of our train, to the accompaniment of furious swearing and demands that the doors be opened or our train would be reduced to kindling. The glass on the entrance platform had begun to fly when the doors were opened. Several men broke in and demanded that we take several wounded to Orel. Then, after all the fuss, we took three wounded on board and resumed our journey, later leaving the wounded men at the Orel station. The following day and night passed without any difficulty.

Our first trial was at Rostov. As the train pulled in there was a tremendous crowd on the platform. We had been told that the sleeping-cars would be disconnected at that station, as beginning with November 1 (and it was exactly the first) no more sleeping-cars were to be used—the employees of the Vladikavkaz railway would not allow one to be coupled to their trains; bourgeois gentlemen could take their rides in day cars.

I was chosen to see what I could do about the matter. I went to look for the manager of the railway, whom I knew through my former travels on this line. He expressed his readiness to help us, but said that he had no more authority on the railway, as the employees' committee was openly hostile to him. Meanwhile a crowd had gathered by our car and was demanding that our luggage be unloaded; an engine was puffing on a side track ready to be coupled to the train.

A group of delegates of something or other announced that they would not allow transportation in sleeping-cars because it decreased transportation capacity, to the disadvantage of the people who were thereby obliged to travel in crowded cars while "the lords slumbered peacefully in magnificent compartments." We argued that we were not to blame; we had been sold sleeping accommodations at a high price; we did not intend to rob anyone of anything and certainly should have been warned at the beginning of our journey that the sleeping-cars would be disconnected at Rostov. Surely, we said, such an order could be effective only if it had been made known at the place of departure before the beginning of the journey. Someone asked the delegates who was going to return our money paid for sleeping accommodation to Kislovodsk, adding that the delegates themselves would not have liked it if they had hired a cab and paid the driver

his fare in advance only to be thrown out of the cab in the middle of their trip and be told to get a cabbage cart for the rest of the way.

This simple argument seemed to work. The delegates said nothing. Their spokesman remarked, "At that you may be right, but I do not know whether or not our comrades the engineers will agree to such a course." The engineer who was listening answered: "The people who have seized the authority on the railway must above all be just. If a contract has been concluded providing for transportation by sleeping-car to Kislovodsk and the money has been collected, we must discharge our obligation and, later, settle our account with those who connived with the bourgeoisie." Since he alone could not make a decision, however, we asked him to consult the station delegates, who were at that moment holding a meeting in the boiler-shop. He consented, climbed down from his engine, and a few minutes later returned, accompanied by eight or perhaps ten men, with whom he had evidently discussed the whole situation. One of the delegates announced that they considered our demands just because the passengers had paid their money; they were ready to transport the sleeping-car but would immediately send a telegram of protest to the ministry, as they considered that the ministry had no right anyway to sell tickets for such distances but should ask permission of the different railways concerned.

Finally the delegates shook hands with all of us except the manager of the railway, who was a silent witness to all our debates. Some of the employees reloaded our luggage, and we continued on our way in peace. The passengers thanked me for what I had done for them. We reached Kislovodsk in safety, although we were obliged to leave the train half a verst from the station, as a car had been derailed in front of the station and blocked the way.

After the disturbances of Petrograd and Moscow, Kislovodsk simply enchanted us. There was perfect peace. Among the crowds that filled the streets we saw many Petrograd friends. People were well dressed, and they discussed commonplace topics with no reference to the Bolsheviks. It was believed that the trouble was but a "Petrograd affair" and would be liquidated any day. Since letters and newspapers arrived irregularly and there was lack of news, I was plied with many questions regarding life at Petrograd and Moscow. But no one believed my stories or my gloomy conclusions and forecasts regarding the course of events. They considered my pessimism perfectly groundless; I was nicknamed "Doubting Thomas";

even a new verb was coined: "Vladimar Nikolaevich is 'Thomasing' again."

The remaining two months of the year flew swiftly by, and we thought of returning to Petrograd. The International Bank had offered me the post of President of the Board (after I had spent two unsatisfactory months in the Russian Foreign Trade Bank as member of the Board of Directors), and I had arranged to return about January 1 in order to begin work with the new year. I had even secured our return tickets for the second of January.

Meanwhile, we had little or no news of our friends and acquaintances in the north. There was no mail from the capital; we lived completely isolated and had to rely on Rostov newspapers for any little information we received of the outside world. We were worried, too, because of the now manifest shortage of money. The State Bank had stopped supplying the local banks with currency; prepaid telegrams sent by Kislovodsk banks and private individuals went unanswered. We were faced with the problem of establishing some sort of currency within the amounts of credit accorded by different chief banks of Petrograd and Moscow.

A conference was held in the city hall to discuss this situation and the Mayor, Avanesian, said that although his political views, as a Socialist-Revolutionist of long standing, were very far removed from mine, he was confident that I would place my experience at the disposal of the conference for the good of the city and its people.

The conference decided in favor of an issue of local currency. Later, this practice spread throughout Russia.

I had no active part in the issuing of this currency, partly because I hoped to leave for Petrograd in January but mainly because the business was entrusted to "persons vested with public confidence," whereas I was only an "honorary citizen" of the city. I kept in touch with the undertaking through E. L. Nobel, who later became its actual head.

Late in December, efforts were made to arrange for a special train to Moscow. My attempts to secure accommodation on it were unsuccessful, but we didn't worry, because we were sure regular service would be resumed in January. In fact the local agent of the Wagons-Lits showed me a telegram from the Petrograd office to this effect. But January 2 came and there was no train, and we were obliged to remain in Kislovodsk.

Alarming news came in regarding the railway situation. Agents

of the Vladikavkaz railway told me that all but local service was to be discontinued. The lower ranks of railway employees were rising against the higher officials. With every new day we felt more acutely our isolation from the outside world. Troops recognizing no local authority appeared at Piatigorsk. At Vladikavkaz they summarily deposed their Acting Ataman and elected the Duma member Karaulov (4) ataman. He made a very liberal speech in the spirit of the left Cadet program, and arrived at Kislovodsk under heavy armed escort, but on his way back, just beyond Vladikavkaz, was killed by a band of soldiers.

Figatner (5), who later was an official of the Soviet Embassy at Paris, came to Kislovodsk and delivered a series of lectures on the Socialist-Revolutionist program with a strong leaning toward the Bolshevik movement.

The situation began to be alarming, but one could not say that the public was unduly agitated. It was believed that the Terek regiments would soon be demobilized and return home; then order would be re-established and these fantastic socialist ideas be done away with.

From time to time persons arriving from Rostov and Novocheerkask reported that the Don region was rising, gathering its forces to stand against the Bolshevik storm from the north. Kaledin (6) had taken full power and had been joined by General Alekseev (7) and later by Kornilov (8). The Volunteer Army was being formed, and rumors persisted that the country was to be saved from Bolshevik oppression. It was said that both Cossack territories—the Terek and the Kuban—were sympathetic toward the Don; but all these reports were brief, fragmentary, and often contradictory. Nothing certain was known, and everybody made the most incredible conjectures, such as that the Germans were advancing to save Kislovodsk. The Grand Duchess Mariia Pavlovna (9) told me in all seriousness that she expected a train guarded by Germans to come and take her to Petrograd, where everything was ready for a restoration of the old order.

Other bits of startling news reached us. We were appalled to hear that the Tsar and all his family had been removed to Tobolsk. I was asked my opinion of the significance of this news, and when I suggested that the Imperial family might be near its end I was called a madman. We were just as shocked to hear of the suicide of General Kaledin, and when eyewitnesses related the dramatic circumstances of his death, we began to be convinced that the Don would not be able

to save Russia. Then one fine day we learned of a strange thing that had happened at a Cossack *stanitsa* [village] near Kislovodsk. Two companies of soldiers had arrived from Piatigorsk with machine guns and had disarmed the entire *stanitsa*, the Cossacks themselves revealing where their ammunition was kept. There were about six thousand men in the *stanitsa*, while the disarming party did not exceed a hundred and fifty.

Thus the unrest and uncertainty, from which we had sought escape by leaving the north, had come to worry us in the south. One thought obsessed me: to get away. Early in January State Councillor Krashennikov (10) was arrested and taken to Piatigorsk. At almost the same time the Acting Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, M. P. Babich (11), also was arrested and taken to the same place but was set free a few days later at the demand of some mountaineers who threatened to tear both Piatigorsk and Vladikavkaz stone from stone unless General Babich was freed. At the same time my friend and Lyceum chum, V. I. Safonov (12), died after a brief illness. On the evening before his funeral I was warned by N. N. Fliege that I should be arrested that night. Safonov's sister, A. I. Kabat, said that she had heard the same thing. The consensus, especially among the excited ladies, was that I should leave Kislovodsk immediately. But since I did not know where to go, and since I might only run into worse danger by leaving, I decided to remain.

It was an anxious night, indeed. We did not close our eyes, and at the least noise I got up and looked out of the window. But the street was always deserted and quiet and there was no one at the front door.

We were astir early in the morning. Later in the day we attended the funeral of V. I. Safonov. Then, returning from the funeral with Nobel, I told him of the rumor about my arrest and asked him to find out in a roundabout way from the Mayor just how much truth there was in it. Later in the day he reported that Avanesian, who, because of his relations with the government of the Northern Caucasus, would have been informed, had not heard anything about my arrest. Avanesian thought, however, that I would be wise to leave Kislovodsk altogether, as the number of persons of importance in the old régime might attract attention and bring harm to the city. I asked Nobel to inform the Mayor that I should like nothing better than to leave and would go as soon as I could secure a seat in a train.

The helplessness of our situation was stressed by the fact that some inhabitants of Kislovodsk who had managed to reach Mineral-

nyia Vody junction by local trains with the intention of boarding some through train to Rostov were obliged to return unsuccessful. They were full of stories of the vandalism of the soldiers who filled every freight train, of robberies, of the shooting of defenseless people, and so on. Some brave souls got as far as Armavir or Kavkazskaia, but they also returned with tales of fighting between no-one-knew-what troops. All this showed us that it was both risky and useless to undertake such a journey.

In the beginning of March I received a letter from N. N. Pokrovsky informing me that in accordance with the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk treaty there had been formed at Petrograd a Union for the Protection of Russian Interests in Germany, similar to the one organized by the Germans in the beginning of the war for the protection of their interests in Russia, and that I had been unanimously elected chairman of the Union and its committee with himself as assistant chairman. He begged me to come at my first opportunity, hinting that the election had been announced to certain persons and that there was no objection to my coming.

At the same time he sent me the copy of an order forbidding entrance to Petrograd and Moscow to persons who had not obtained permission from their local Soviets to leave Kislovódk. To get permission I first had to obtain a new residence certificate without mentioning my former position in the government. This certificate stated that I was an honorary citizen of Kislovódk, and armed with it I went to the commissariat. Here it was subjected to a most careful scrutiny, which concluded with the announcement that there were no more honorary citizens, as all distinctions had been abolished. Nevertheless, I was issued a document for my wife and myself which read "citizen of the city of Kislovódk, and wife Anna." Thus equipped I went to the Sovdep, where I spent much time explaining that I wanted to go to Petrograd because of "public business," that I had been elected, with the knowledge of the People's Commissars, chairman of the Union for the Protection of Russian Interests in Germany. One could see, however, that my explanations were not convincing to Comrade Sokolov, Assistant President of the Sovdep, who said finally, "How does all this concern us? Go ahead if you want to; we have nothing to do with this." Then I had to draw his attention to the decree prohibiting entrance to the capital without the permission of the Sovdep of the place of departure. "Who told you this? There never was such a crazy decree, nor could there be."

I pulled out of my pocket the decree sent by Pokrovsky and an entrance permit which could be used provided the local authorities would issue a permit to leave. This convinced Comrade Sokolov. He asked me civilly to lend them the decree, which had not yet reached them and indeed might never arrive, and promised to issue the permit on the morrow. I suggested that he make a copy of the decree and my entrance permit, whereupon he summoned a young lady with a tremendous number of rings on her fingers, and had her write a permit for me. The young lady asked me to write out for her the permit of departure, which she typed on the spot. Meanwhile Comrade Sokolov had left, and it was an hour before he returned; then he signed the permit without reading it, affixed five seals, and collected ten rubles.

But even with these documents it was more than a month before we got away from Kislovodsk. Meanwhile the situation grew steadily worse. The visits of the authorities from Vladikavkaz became more frequent. The railway station began to resemble an armed camp, with railway cars and whole trains filled with soldiers. Searches became more frequent; notices were posted ordering the surrender of weapons and firearms and the registration of army officers and other persons serving in the army. One day there appeared an ordinance of the regional Sovdep (Vladikavkaz) announcing that the citizens of Kislovodsk were to make a "contribution" of five million rubles, which was to be allocated among the "citizens" by order of a special committee formed by the citizens themselves. This committee was to possess discretionary powers in setting the amount to be paid by individual citizens; the committee and its members were responsible to the regional Sovdep for the collection of the whole amount. The next day the members of the Sovdep summoned certain "citizens" to the Grand Hotel, where it was announced: "no explanations will be accepted; the citizens are given two weeks to comply with the order, at the expiration of which term those guilty of contempt will become personally acquainted with the conditions of life in the Vladikavkaz jail, which is amply adequate to house all those unwilling to obey the decrees of the people's government." I was not one of those invited to the Grand Hotel.

Then there began the painful procedure of assessing the wealth of the "citizens" and the allocation of individual contributions. I hate to think of those dark days. When I was asked what cash I possessed I showed them a letter of credit issued by the Azov-Don

Bank for 10,000 rubles which was still unpaid. Of this they took nothing, but announced that I was to make a contribution of three thousand rubles, which I could pay by authorizing the State Bank to pay this sum from my savings account. I complied with this demand, although at that time we did not know of the decree of January 28, 1918, annulling all state loans and securities issued by stockholding companies. On payment of the contribution I was given a certificate saying that I had paid all sums being collected for communal and public needs.

At about this time, I was walking one day around the railway station, now long devoid of trains or cars, and was amazed to see on a side track a shabby-looking car of the International Company of Wagons-Lits. On investigating I found that it was locked. At the office of the station master I was told that it was the "Swedish mission come for Mr. Nobel to take him straight to Sweden at the demand of that government."

I hurried to the Grand Hotel to see E. L. Nobel, but was told that he had heard nothing of any such car. But the next day he told me that it was not a Swedish but a Swiss mission, headed by a Mr. Gut, and that it had come to get not him but his brother Gustav and family.

My next step was to find Mr. Gut, who informed me that there was neither a Swedish nor a Swiss mission and that he and his wife were simply en route to Petrograd from Vladikavkaz. They had been asked by their friends to take from Kislovodsk E. L. Nobel's brother's wife and a Mme Godzinsky, the wife of Gut's business associate.

It developed that Mme Gut had spent the summer at Anapa and after the end of the season had been tempted by the stories of some Terek general about the joys of life at Vladikavkaz under the protection of the Terek Cossacks. She had gone there for a month, had not been able to leave, and had stayed through the winter. Mme Godzinsky had had a similar experience. Therefore Mme Godzinsky's father, G. L. Nobel, and Gut had collected 20,000 rubles and, thanks to Gut's ability and bribes, had obtained a car of the International Company of Wagons-Lits and outfitted Gut for his journey.

A curious person was this Mr. Gut. A Swiss subject, married to a Frenchwoman, speaking many languages poorly, born of a Jewish father and a Polish mother, he embodied all of a Pole's ingratiating nature and a Jew's resourcefulness, and possessed a remarkable talent for outwitting provincial Bolshevik agents. He had concocted for himself a grotesque certificate which stated that he had been author-

ized by the Swiss mission to go to the Caucasus in order to ascertain the conditions of Swiss citizens living there and to transport them to Petrograd. This amazing document, official letterhead and all, was covered with Swiss mission seals of every color and on every page—top, bottom, and margin. When I asked the purpose of these many and variegated seals he answered that it was very effective during inspections by Red soldiers and petty government agents.

After our first meeting, and especially after I had met Madame Gut, who played the chief rôle in solving all sorts of complicated matters, I began the troublesome *démarches* trying to obtain permission to go to Petrograd in this chance car. It would not be worthwhile to relate all the complications, which lasted over two weeks. I received Gut's full collaboration and should like to express to him my whole-hearted gratitude, as I must confess that had he not helped us to leave Kislovodsk we should doubtless have perished there in the whirlpool of events which engulfed this unfortunate city directly after our departure. Here again, as on many other occasions, chance or, as I believe, our lucky stars or, perhaps, the will of God, helped us.

Some persons who had preference over us refused to leave Kislovodsk. E. L. Nobel was one of these, and he transferred his ticket preference to my wife and me. Madame Godzinsky refused to go until the last moment. In general, however, it was a contest in bribing the agent of the Wagons-Lits, who insisted on his right to assign seats, and some railway employees, who protested that unless they got a few seats which they themselves could sell they would not permit the car to be coupled to any train.

Eventually difficulties were smoothed out, and I was given a ticket for our compartment. Then, on the morning of May 15, Gut came to me and said that he had been promised definitely that at Mineralnyia Vody our car would be coupled to the first direct Moscow train. For almost a month there had been no communication with the north.

At 2:00 P.M. on May 16 we were at the station, packed and ready to go. Many came to see us off. Some envied us; others regarded us sorrowfully, not knowing what awaited us on our journey. Then it appeared that there were thirty-two persons for the eighteen regular seats, as well as the three porters who were drafted from among the agents of the Wagons-Lits stranded in the Northern Caucasus. There were the Guts; Mr. and Mrs. Bazilevsky (Moscow Marshal of the

Nobility), who had paid a thousand rubles to the agent in addition to the regular price; the children of the singer Chaliapin (13) with two governesses; Madame Godzinsky, with her children, who had been persuaded to go at the very last moment by the threat that unless she went her husband would refuse to send her money to live on; Madame Lifshitz, with a lady companion; two other families, who never said a word to any of us during the entire nine days of our travels; and, finally, in the last second-class compartment, the family of a wealthy lumberman and grain merchant consisting of ten persons.

As the engine was about to be attached a representative of the local Sovdep arrived and began to examine our permits to leave. When he had seen all these documents he announced that the only persons permitted to go were citizen Kokovtsov and wife and Chaliapin's children; the rest would have to await a new order of the Sovdep. The engine was ordered uncoupled, and we all remained by the car. Gut ran to the Sovdep, and in an hour returned with another representative of the government, who also looked through the documents, collected some back dues, and announced that everybody might go. But now there was no engine, and only after tiresome harangues with the railway authorities were we promised an engine. We were to leave at 8:00 P.M.

We left Kislovodsk almost on time. At Piatigorsk the station was crowded, and as soon as our train stopped the passage of our car was filled with armed soldiers, shouting, "Get your passes ready and do not leave your compartments."

I spread upon a table my three documents: the permit of the Kislovodsk Sovdep to leave Kislovodsk; a certificate of having paid the contribution, with a note that there were no back payments of any dues; and an identification certificate of my wife and me. When these papers had been examined, the examiner turned to the soldiers in the passage and said, "These cannot go; see that their things are taken off the car so as not to delay the train."

"But," I said, "all my documents are in order. The Kislovodsk Sovdep considered that my certificates were even more complete than those of the others." "You have no permit of the Piatigorsk Sovdep," was the reply; "we do not obey the Kislovodsk Sovdep." At that critical juncture, Gut appeared and began to say something that no one could understand. The only intelligible thing was: "I answer for them because I am the Commandant of the train and here is a mandate of the Swiss mission."

This led to a re-examination of my papers. To my surprise and great relief it also led to a different conclusion. "Everything is in order," he said, "they may be passed; let them go." Some friends in Piatigorsk had come to see us; we bade them farewell, and once more were on our way. I asked Gut what argument he had used to prevail upon the soldiers, as I had not been able to understand what was said. "I did not understand it myself," he replied, "but I do know that one must use as many big words as possible. Perhaps, too, they were confused by those seals: they have served me well many times."

We reached Mineralnyia Vody about 1:00 A.M. It was quite dark, and it was drizzling. As soon as the train had stopped, Gut and I went to look for the station master on duty; but he was nowhere to be found. Somewhere far away we saw a lantern bobbing up and down in the dark and found a train coupler, whom we engaged in conversation. We learned that he was the only man in the station and that he was ready to couple our car to a train which was being assembled for Tikhoretskaia. We gave him twenty-five rubles to be on the safe side, and were assured that everything would be fixed up all right. In due time our car was uncoupled from the Kislovodsk train and placed in the middle of a long train made up almost entirely of freight cars. Then the coupler reappeared to say that everything was all right. We gave him another twenty-five rubles. The train soon began to move. My wife had already retired. Now I, too, went to bed and slept soundly until morning.

It was quite light when I awoke. My wife was up and talking to someone in the passage. The train was pulling into a station. We had safely passed dreaded Armavir and were at Kavkazskaia. While we were stopped I observed that there was a very badly damaged first-class car ahead of us and behind us was another car with a sign, "Workshop and telegraph." Out of the car ahead I saw soldiers' heads protruding; the car behind was locked and showed no signs of life. The other cars were freight cars, crammed full of people. In one of them I saw the familiar face of Prince Urusov (14), the Smolensk Marshal of the Nobility and an elected member of the State Council.

About 2:00 P.M. we reached the most dangerous place, Tikhoretskaia, around which there was fighting; just what forces were fighting no one knew. As soon as the train had pulled in Gut ran to learn when it would leave. He soon returned and told me that the station master on duty demanded five hundred rubles to have our car coupled to the

nearest train; if we paid that amount he would let us go in about twenty minutes; otherwise there would be no train until tomorrow and perhaps not even then. We agreed to pay, planning to divide the traveling expenses among the members of our party when we arrived in Petrograd. While the train was being made up I remained on the platform. A short distance away there were a group of soldiers riding in the first-class car and a short-statured individual of a distinctly Jewish type dressed in a sailor's uniform. This latter person approached me, and the following conversation took place. He began.

"We know who you are, citizen."

"I am not in hiding. As you can see I am traveling in my ordinary clothes and even wearing my old hat."

"But why should you disguise yourself? We know perfectly well that Comrade Trotsky (15) has invited you to assist him in organizing the army. However, permit me to tell you that you will not succeed."

I was completely astounded by these words. I didn't know what to say, but my interlocutor helped me out of my predicament.

"We are all army men and we recognize that our army demands discipline and obedience, but who wants to obey nowadays?"

"If you admit that no one wants to obey, does it not follow that those who fail to accomplish anything because their orders are not obeyed cannot justly be held responsible for the failure? Surely, if persons cannot accomplish anything because of the general chaos, they should not be held responsible."

"In this you are right, citizen."

Then turning to his comrades, and calling on them to join us, he went on:

"Citizen Kokovtsov says, and rightly so, that one should not refuse to work for the general cause simply because no one any longer holds anything in reverence. This would mean that those who refuse to obey would be responsible, not those who try to do something and fail."

"True, true," they answered as one man, and the entire company filed past me, each shaking my hand. Imagine my wife's astonishment when she saw me in friendly conversation with a crowd of sailors and soldiers. How they got the idea that I was going north at Trotsky's invitation, I do not know; but future developments seemed to indicate that some unknown and unnamed fate guarded us in our travels.

Toward evening we pulled into Velikokniazheskaia station between a double row of soldiers; on the left they were armed with rifles, and on the right they had not rifles but hand grenades with which they were toying demonstratively. Once more we were to be examined, but once more Gut was equal to the occasion. He spread out his seal-covered certificate and began his unintelligible jabber, repeating after every word: "Swiss legation, I am its representative, I am responsible to the legation for all passengers."

After peering at length at this document, the leading examiner shouted: "No one may leave this car until I say so," then marched on to the next car in which the sailors were traveling. Then there was a shot. It transpired that one of the soldiers, on entering the car, had got his rifle entangled in the doorway, it had fired and the bullet had struck one of the sailors in the abdomen. The examining party were so frightened by the shouts and the curses of the sailors that they took away all the guards and disappeared, and even though we stayed in the station for over an hour no further attempt was made to examine our documents.

That night we had to pay a watchman ten rubles before he would open a semaphore so that we could continue on our way. The next night and forenoon we spent at Tsaritsyn, not knowing whether we should be able to go farther or not, because it was rumored that the tracks had been torn up and there was terrible fighting ahead of us. The station was crowded with thousands of people, most of whom were carrying sacks containing small quantities of flour and grain bought by each man where he could find it. I tried to send telegrams to our friends in Kislovodsk and Piatigorsk and to my sisters in Petrograd. I was having difficulty finding the telegraph office, when a man addressed me: "Your Grace, what can I do for you? I am assistant station master, but I do not make it known because these people will beat me stiff, as some of them have been waiting to leave for over ten days." When I explained my intention, he took me to the second floor of the station building but advised me not to waste money on telegrams. "They will take the money and not send the telegrams," he said. Nevertheless I sent four telegrams, none of which reached its destination. This man knew who I was because he had once attended a session of the Duma and had heard me reply to Shingarev.

As soon as it was known that our train was leaving, the crowd made a rush for it; men stuffed themselves into and climbed on top of cars, hung from bumpers, and fastened their sacks in any place

they could find. Slogans such as "Death to the bourgeoisie" and "To the ditch with them" were chalked on the sides of our car, but we were not disturbed in any way.

That night the train was stopped and robbed by railway workers. The poor people with sacks lost everything; some of them who offered resistance were bound and thrown into the cars. But, thank heaven, no one was killed.

"How was it that no one bothered us?" I asked the porter.

"We were protected by sailors, who stood guard at both ends of your car and permitted no one to enter."

Here again I ask myself if this was just luck that saved us so strangely and inexplicably from another danger?

At Riazan the same sailors, seeing that we had no bread, offered us a part of their own supplies and gratefully accepted two packages of cigarettes for which I had paid forty-eight rubles. Their leader announced that he had never smoked such expensive cigarettes; but, having tried one, he remarked: "The rascal ought to be locked up for such rubbish."

The leader of the sailors showed me a roll of thousand-ruble notes and told me that he was going to Kronstadt to get his back pay, which amounted to 400,000 rubles, and that as soon as he got this money he was going home to Greece and start a shipbuilding business. "Anyway, there is no sense in remaining," he concluded.

We were obliged to stop over several hours in Moscow, and my wife and I took advantage of the occasion and tried to see a friend but did not find her at home. While we were walking along the Sadovaia we met a soldier of very handsome appearance who seemed to freeze stiff on seeing me. He stopped in his tracks and peered into my face for a long time. I stopped, too, and then as I was walking away turned involuntarily to look at him; he turned, too, but finally we lost each other. At nine o'clock that evening we left Moscow on the last part of our journey. Our train was stopped at Klin, and we heard people enter our car and talk in low voices. Nothing came of it, however, and we went on into Petrograd without further interruption. It was May 26 when we arrived. Later I learned that the soldiers who had entered our car at Klin had ordered that I was not to be permitted to leave the train at any time until I reached Petrograd. To me, this incident is directly connected with my subsequent arrest.

No one in the capital knew we were returning, so naturally there was no one at the station to meet us. As Gut offered to take care of

our baggage, we hired a cab immediately, and drove home. We found everything in our apartment as we had left it. What a relief it was to be safely back after the uncertainty of those months at Kislovodsk and the anxiety and excitement of our return journey.

Yet all was not peaceful in Petrograd. Several friends came to see us the day after our return, among them N. N. Pokrovsky. We had so little time to say all that was to be said that I arranged to meet him the next day, May 28. But a few hours before this meeting was to take place his son informed me that the houses of Pokrovsky himself, A. F. Trepov, Tkhorzhevsky (16), and myself would be searched. Pokrovsky had heard this news from Mme Purishkevich.

In the evening of the same day when I was sitting at home with my sisters, I received a letter from Mme von Meck (17). It was brought by a young army officer unknown to me, who told me that the contents of the letter were known to him and confirmed the truth of the information.

The letter informed me that its author had learned from Bolshevik circles that it had been decided to arrest me and that she therefore advised me not to spend the next few nights at home. This information depressed me greatly; I felt a sudden acute headache, and under the first impulse decided to spend the night at my sister's house according to the advice. We even walked out of the house to Mohovaia—my wife and I—but returned immediately, as second thought showed me the utter folly of such a course. If they had indeed decided to arrest me, spending my nights out would only aggravate my position. An ambush would be placed at my house or near it, and I should be arrested as soon as I returned home. The very fact of my hiding would be used to incriminate me on the grounds of conspiracy, while my main weapon had always been my straightforward mode of action, devoid of all political connections and free of all combinations with anyone whatever on political grounds.

For the next few days nothing happened, and I was able to shake off a bad cold I had contracted on the train. I began to think nothing would come of the rumor that I was to be arrested. On Sunday, June 30, I took two rare Chinese vases to Gut as a token of my gratitude for what he had done for us. He denied the truthfulness of the rumor regarding my arrest. I went to bed at the usual hour, and soon fell into a deep sleep. About two o'clock my wife entered my room. "Wake up, they are searching the house." "This means I shall be arrested," I answered.

In the hall I found a commissar, who showed me a warrant issued by the President of the Cheka, Uritsky, the house deputy, Skor-deli, the senior porter, and three men in soldiers' uniforms but unarmed.

The warrant required that a search be made and every adult male be arrested. For almost three hours they searched the house. Every drawer was opened; almost everything in the desk was taken; only a few papers were left unexamined. Every drawer was emptied as though they were looking for hidden compartments, of which, of course, there were none.

In one of the drawers which the commissar examined with a flashlight, he found a locked brief case; he ordered me to open it and found an envelope containing all my important private documents: my last will, our birth certificates, all sorts of receipts. He did not even bother to examine the contents, but simply took the envelope from the brief case and threw it into one box and the brief case into another.

From the study they went on to search the rest of the apartment. They looked under sofas and chairs, opened bureau drawers, looked under the mattress and pillows on my wife's bed, and examined every nook and corner, including the kitchen and pantry. In the latter they discovered a box of laundry soap and a few cakes of dried-out last-year's soap, which the soldiers took along despite the remonstrances of the commissar. They also took from the library the second unloaded Austrian rifle—a souvenir sent to me by the Border Patrol—the other having been taken by the first searching party in March 1917.

Apart from documents, nothing of value was stolen during the search. The commissar found in my desk a metal box containing some cash. He found a few hundred rubles in it but showed no inclination to take it. It is true that there were no soldiers near him at that time.

All this was disgusting and humiliating. When it was over, about 5:00 A.M., I was invited to dress. Then I was put into an open automobile; the commissar seated himself beside me, and the soldier with the box of soap sat with the driver. The morning was fair and cloudless. The city was still asleep and the Nevsky deserted, and through the open doors of the Kazansky Cathedral people were passing one by one.

I was taken to No. 2 Gorohovaia, where the offices of the former

city governor had been taken over by the Cheka. I was quickly registered and passed through the office of the Commandant in charge of the prisoners, and at a quarter to six I was already confined in room 97. It was an enormous room, containing at least sixty persons. They occupied not only all the closely arranged beds, which were covered with ragged mattresses filled with straw and bark, but also all the available space on the dirty floor. This mass of humanity was fast asleep, and mostly undressed. The snores merged into a sort of roar; there was hardly any air. The mingled smell of perspiration, bitter tobacco smoke, and hot bodies reminded one of a sewer. There were no seats. For a time I stood in a daze in the middle of the narrow passage between the beds, still dressed in my overcoat and hat. I was in a semi-conscious state that was free from either fear or anger.

I was aroused from this torpor and daze by the voice of a man seated by a small table under the only window: "Welcome, Vladimir Nikolaevich. We expected you last night, as we were told at ten o'clock yesterday that the warrant for your arrest had been signed and that you would be brought here." This man introduced himself as Ushakov, a former employee of the Bureau of State Engraving and Printing, whom I had known well since the labor movement of 1905 and whom I had met as workers' deputy in 1905-1906. When I expressed my astonishment at seeing him among the arrested, so unkempt and poorly clothed, he answered loudly enough to be heard by the guards seated by the door: "You must know that I have always been a Social-Democrat and have defended the workers, although the scoundrels did not deserve it; but these rascals of Bolsheviks consider me a member of the Black Hundred. They have arrested and released me several times and have ruined me completely. But they will not keep me here long; they will probably send me to the Kresty Prison, or to the prison for those to be transported. I do not care for myself, but for you, this is all very bad. You must not stay here but must try to be transferred to the room where political prisoners are kept. In here it might fare badly with you."

"What do you mean?" I asked.

"This is worse than a tramp lodging-house—it is a veritable sewer; all sorts of people are here. Just look in that corner—there are four stevedores brought here for having participated in a strike. Over there are eight sailors accused of having murdered a boatswain. Over there are some Red soldiers guilty of drinking and of beating up their commissar. In that corner is a fine crowd that everybody

sidesteps, as they are forever ready with a knife. Then there are also several peasants arrested for speculating, when their speculation consisted merely in having come to town to buy some scythes. They were told that they could buy nothing for money, but that sugar was another matter, and that if they had some sugar they could buy two scythes for one pound. During the following winter, their village saved some twenty pounds of sugar and again sent these men to town. The men were arrested at the depot and brought here, where they have been languishing for a week. They dare not show themselves at their village again, because they promised to bring back twenty scythes, and no one will believe that they lost the sugar and were arrested. Over here are three other speculators: they brought eighty pounds of sour cream to sell in Petrograd, tempted by the high prices. They were arrested and brought here, sour cream and all. Some of the sour cream has been taken over by the people here, and some has been used for the cabbage soup which you, too, will eat both today and tomorrow."

In such conversation we spent the time until nine o'clock. At that time a disheveled, unwashed, half-dressed man appeared from a neighboring room. His name was Hugo, and he had been arrested for speculation. I did not know him, but obviously he was a man with a shady past. He addressed me by my name, patronym and title, and invited me to move to the room for political prisoners, saying, as Ushakov had done, that they had been awaiting me since last night and would be glad to make room for me and to offer me a bed.

I found five persons besides Hugo in the small room where he took me. They were: General Rauch (18); General Goldhaur (19); the Vilna Marshal of the Nobility, Krassovsky (20); the wealthy Riga grain merchant, Mukhin; and the president of the National Students' Union, Gariazin. They all showed me the greatest consideration and entered me in their list for dinner, and each offered to be transferred to the general cell so that I might have his bed. This room, too, despite the early hour and the wide open window, was terribly stuffy. A swarm of flies covered the walls and beds. There was no room to move.

Not wishing to discommode my generous fellow prisoners, however, I went to the other political room to find a place for myself. I had to go through a narrow, dark passageway in which were two tables upon which three prisoners were asleep on filthy mattresses, then through a dark, abandoned kitchen where more prisoners were

sleeping upon the stove, a broken bed, and the table; this room opened into the second political cell, in which I spent all the ten days.

This room was smaller than the first one, had one window, was stuffy, swarmed with flies, and had a repulsively dirty floor. There were four beds and two tables, upon which lay some bast-filled mattresses and pillows and a few straw mattresses in filthy, torn covers. There was no room to move about. Here I found General Prince Y. I. Trubetskoi (21), the former Assistant Minister of Commerce of the Provisional Government; the former Governor-General of Petrograd, Palchinsky (22), executed later together with General Velichko and N. K. von Meck; the former War Minister of the Provisional Government, Verkhovsky (23), now in the service of the Bolsheviks; a student, Vasilev; a Mr. Umnov; a railway employee, Chumakov; and a Serbian officer, Matveev-Obrenović. The seventh occupant was a young man in naval uniform, nicknamed "Black Captain," but he was not present when I entered; in fact he was always wandering off, being on close terms with the prison authorities. During the second week he disappeared altogether and his place was taken by a boy of seventeen dressed in a naval uniform and arrested for forging an order for 149,000 rubles. Later we learned that the Black Captain had been simply the leader of a band of gangsters, former sailors, with whose aid he had robbed several houses. He boasted of having made something like eight million rubles in this way, which was probably not true. When apprehended he had given away his associates, all of whom were eventually executed, while he himself seemed to have struck up quite a friendship with the rulers; at any rate when I was released I saw him in the office writing something in some books.

The occupants of the room met me with much consideration. Palchinsky, who played the rôle of senior, offered me the bed of Verkhovsky, who was being transferred to the Kresty, and I established my residence there.

Soon afterward Verkhovsky, Chumakov, and Umnov were transferred to the Kresty. Their places were taken by the rather unattractive Sapper General, Kolenkovsky, who talked to no one, and by a young aviator, Troitsky, who was quite a companion to me during the entire time of my arrest.

Living conditions in our room were almost unbearable. I suffered terribly from the heat and noise. I could not sleep. My companions did everything they could to aid and comfort me, especially when I

was taken with a heart attack. I shall never forget their attention and kindness.

On Tuesday we were photographed, so that my picture is now side by side with those of pickpockets, housebreakers, robbers, and such.

On the third day, Wednesday, about 1 : 00 P. M., I was summoned, supposedly to be questioned. Everybody prophesied my speedy deliverance. In the office of the provisional chairman of the Commission, Mr. Bokii (24), I found my friend Gut, who, in the name of the Swiss legation, asked why I had been imprisoned and whether or not some help could be rendered me. He assured me that there was no specific accusation against me and that therefore he believed I ought to be perfectly composed. Mr. Bokii confirmed Gut's statement, but added something which filled my heart with great misgivings; "You have been arrested," he said, "in accordance with a direct order from Moscow and not because you are accused of something, since all of us know that there is nothing to be used against you. You have been arrested as a former Minister of the Tsar, because the Soviet power, which has decided the fate of the Imperial House of Romanov, considers it necessary to decide the fate of the Tsarist ministers as well." When I asked why I was the only minister arrested, Bokii added: "Yes, that is true. We have received instructions from Moscow, and next week you will be transported there to be placed at the disposal of the Sovnarkom; we shall not examine you here, as we have nothing about which to question you." I was stunned. I visualized the horror of being sent to Moscow, of an indefinite stay in prison, of probable execution. Thoughts of my wife and her predicament and memories of loved ones and of past happiness surged through my brain.

When I returned to my cell and told Trubetskoi and Palchinsky my fears, the latter refused to put any faith in what Bokii had said; but his words did not reassure me. Painful meditation did its work, and toward evening I had a severe heart attack. My family had already sent me a pillow, bedclothes, and a blanket; but I spent a sleepless night. On Thursday I was allowed an interview with my wife. It was a joy to see her, but it caused me pain to see her worry over my exhausted condition. The following six days were one unbearable nightmare. I could hardly get out of my bed; the closeness of the room made breathing almost impossible; nor did night bring relief, as the red-hot roof did not have time to cool off after sundown.

My companions called in a doctor, who insisted that I be trans-

ferred to the prison hospital; but I refused, knowing that once in a hospital my imprisonment would only be protracted. I hoped by remaining where I was to force the Cheka to decide my fate sooner, for I still believed I might be released.

I was gradually falling under the spell of an indifference so typical of prisoners; I stopped counting the days, having become reconciled to the idea that I should have to spend many of them here. I was only worried by thoughts of my family, of their sufferings and their realization of their helplessness to do anything. These thoughts were much more distressing than my own humiliating and painful position.

During the last five days no one in authority came to see us; but during the last three or four days we received evening calls from the Assistant Commandant, Kuzmin, the most decent of our guardians, who nevertheless bored us greatly by the incoherent chatter of a man who did not know what he was talking about. On Saturday, we were greatly excited by the startling rumor that the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach (25), had been murdered at Moscow. We began to speculate on the possibility of a German occupation of Petrograd and our subsequent liberation. On Sunday I again felt worse; the doctor came and announced that I was suffering from myocarditis—which I did not think was the case—and said that he had decided to risk the anger of the Bolsheviki by sending a written report stating that any further incarceration would endanger my life. That Sunday, as news came of the siege of the Page Corps barracks from which the Reds were trying to expel the Socialist-Revolutionists, a panic spread among the prisoners, who feared that since there was trouble in the city our building also might be attacked. The guards declared that as soon as they noticed any possibility of an attack they would throw down their arms and run from the building; they advised the prisoners to do likewise. Manus was in the next cell and was terribly alarmed. We advised him to compose himself, as we could do nothing. Even in prison I could not forget the part this man had played in the intrigue against me. I refused to speak to him. Palchinsky, who also knew him well, told him that there was no room for him in our cell.

I want to mention another peculiarity of my imprisonment. The place of our incarceration where I spent more than a week was so filthy that for three days I could not enter the primitive toilet; after the first few cases of cholera, the political prisoners were obliged to take special measures for cleaning up, and we were about to wash

this terrible sewer with our own hands when two of the prisoners from the common cell, who were most guilty of dirtying the place, suggested that the "politicals" collect fifteen rubles to pay them for cleaning things up. We willingly agreed to this small contribution.

Sunday when the other inmates of the room had gone "for a walk" in a large vacant room on the second floor, while I remained lying alone, a repulsive-looking Lett, the second Assistant Commandant, came in and addressed me: "Why do you stay in bed? You had better take a walk, too; you will be released soon." I did not pay any attention to his words, as prison rumor ascribed all the evils in our living conditions to this man.

CHAPTER XL

ESCAPE

On Tuesday, July 9, at eleven o'clock in the morning I was called from the cell to be questioned by Uritsky. This was a great surprise, but can be explained by the fact that Uritsky had just arrived from Moscow. The hour was surprising, too, because this Soviet dignitary generally attended to affairs of state at night, seldom before 2:00 A.M. When I entered his study under the escort of an armed ragamuffin—who stretched himself upon a sofa in the same room—I was invited to take a chair by the desk. Uritsky asked me to write my statement in my own hand; but I refused, since, because of my weakness and my nerves, I was barely able to hold the pen in my fingers. Uritsky was obliged to do the writing himself. After the customary questions as to my name, patronym and family name, my age, and residence, the questioning continued in this way (I have a stenographic copy):

Uritsky: You appear to have just arrived from Kislovodsk. When was it?

V. N. K.: Friday, May 26, old style.

U.: Why do you stress "old style"?

V. N. K.: Because I am not used to the new style and may make a mistake in calculating it, and every error or inexactitude may be used to incriminate me.

U.: When did you leave Kislovodsk?

V. N. K.: Wednesday, May 16, at 8:00 P.M.

U.: Did you leave Petrograd for Kislovodsk because of your state of health or for some other reason?

V. N. K.: I simply wished to spend two fall months at Kislovodsk to cure my heart, which needed treatment.

U.: When you left Petrograd did you plan to stay away until spring?

V. N. K.: No, I left for two months only; I planned to return after New Year's. I even had return tickets for the beginning of January. But railway communications were discontinued and I was

forced to stay for five more months, leaving Kislovodsk on May 16 on the first train that I hoped would take me to my destination.

U.: We know, however, of instances of people arriving from the Caucasus before the month of May.

V. N. K.: I know of a few cases, too; but those journeys were made in conditions impossible for me. At my age I could not ride in box cars, stay at stations for days on end and suffer all sorts of violence; nor could I subject my wife to such conditions.

U.: So that you had no special reason for arriving here in the end of May?

V. N. K.: Permit me to alter your question so that I may answer it more accurately. I understand that you wish to learn if I expected some event to take place at Petrograd which prompted me to be there?

U.: Yes, that would be a more exact formulation of my idea.

V. N. K.: In that case I can say that neither at the end of May nor in the beginning or end of any other month could any event have taken place at Petrograd or any other place in Russia which could have prompted me to be in the thick of it.

U.: I understand from your categorical reply that you have made up your mind to take no part in politics.

V. N. K.: Quite so.

U.: What is the meaning of such a decision after you have played a prominent rôle in politics?

V. N. K.: Only this, that four years ago I was obliged to abandon my political activities against my will and under circumstances which made me promise myself on my honor never to return to political activity.

U.: What were the main reasons which forced you to adopt such a decision?

V. N. K.: There were three: first, having to abandon active work left me with a feeling of deep disillusionment and a conviction that men of my disposition, or rather, men suffering from my shortcomings, should not appear in the political arena. Secondly, my health was poor, and is in a still worse state now, and I may say in truth that I have given all my strength to my country. Thirdly, old men like myself must not repeat the great mistakes of those who believe that they can do their work until they die. I believe that new conditions demand new songs and those songs need new birds to sing them.

U.: What were the main reasons for your dismissal?

V. N. K.: They were many, but to state them would take up too much of your time and, besides, would be a purely subjective analysis, as formal reasons are one thing and actual reasons and causes are another.

U.: Briefly enumerate the principal ones.

V. N. K.: The liberals considered me too conservative, and the conservatives considered me too liberal and insufficiently opposed to foreign elements. The court circles gave me no support, while among representatives of the higher bureaucracy there were always those who were hostile generally toward incumbents of high positions.

U.: You mention the parties of the Right. What was their objection to you?

V. N. K.: Some denounced me for not belonging to the Union of the Russian People, others, because they considered that I was too much in sympathy with the Jews. At Kiev, after Stolypin's assassination, as you may remember, I was openly accused of having warded off the Jewish pogrom and having taken steps to stop such possibilities throughout the region of Jewish settlement. *Novoe Vremia* and *Grashdanin* seized upon this event, and after my appointment to the post of Chairman of the Ministers' Council I was openly accused by these papers of an anti-national policy.

U.: Your interrogation is ended, and I shall probably issue an order to release you. But I have two more questions to ask you and these bear no relation whatsoever to your arrest. I count upon your giving me a frank answer; you may trust that these answers will in no way influence your release—it will take place.

V. N. K.: May I inquire as to the cause of my arrest and the reasons for a night search of my house as if I were a criminal, and for my incarceration of more than a week in humiliating surroundings and in conditions which nearly cost me my life?

U.: We got hold of some letters which connected your name with plans to fight the rule of the Soviets. In these letters, it was asserted that you, as an experienced statesman, should be placed at the head of the future government, since your moderate views made it possible to hope for the support of wide masses of the public. One letter even said it was advisable to go to Kislovodsk and to obtain your consent. That, naturally, you would refuse, but that insistence would probably persuade you.

V. N. K.: Did these letters mention my participation in such plans, and were they addressed to me?

U.: No, they were not, and we have no proof of your participation.

V. N. K.: Then why did you arrest me and not the authors of these letters? From the Soviet point of view, they were the men who were plotting against Soviet rule, while at that time I was far away from Petrograd.

U.: It is difficult to reason in this way in time of revolution. The persons who wrote the letters are of no particular interest to us, while you have always been a man of note.

V. N. K.: But I have not stopped being a "man of note" just because of my arrest. Suppose that tomorrow you read another letter of which I am in perfect ignorance, mentioning my name; would you again order me arrested?

U.: As far as this Commission can answer you may feel perfectly safe, but for others I cannot answer. I want to tell you that should I receive from Moscow an order to arrest you again, I shall do so immediately. But my two questions! They concern two different matters. Did you know the former Emperor well?

V. N. K.: I assisted him for ten years and believe that I had time to know him well.

U.: Do you think he perceived the wrong he was doing the country?

V. N. K.: I find it difficult to answer, as I do not know what you mean by the phrase "the wrong he was doing the country."

U.: Everybody knows what it means—the persecution of all that was fair, of every striving toward liberty, the encouragement of nonentities, hundreds of ruined champions of freedom, continual exiles, persecutions for every word that displeased him, and, finally, this terrible war. What is the sense of talking about this? You just pretend that you do not know what I mean.

V. N. K.: Not at all. I simply wish to know exactly what you want to learn. I was the Tsar's assistant for ten years; I know his nature well, and I say in all truth that he did not harm a single person intentionally. As for his country and his people, he wished for them only grandeur, happiness, peace, and prosperity. Like every other man he may have made mistakes; he may have been mistaken in his choice of men who surrounded him; but during the entire ten years of my service in most varied conditions and during the most difficult period of his reign I do not recall one instance when he did not answer most sincerely to everything good and fair that he met along the way. He

believed in Russia, in the Russians, and in their loyalty to him, and he expressed his faith with the deepest conviction. I am sure that there was no sacrifice he would not have made for the good of his country provided he had known it to be necessary. Perhaps he was not always well served, his choice was not always fortunate; but even granting that there were mistakes, the fault was not his but that of his entourage. I know that in my own case there were many instances when I said to the Tsar things which he did not like to hear from me. Yet I do not recall ever being prevented from doing what I believed best, and the Tsar always thanked me for frankly telling him the truth. The others were not forbidden to do so either, but whether they did it or not is another matter.

U.: But do you not think that the Tsar was merely demented?

V. N. K.: Up to my dismissal in January 1914 I saw the Tsar continually. He was perfectly well. He grasped every subject quickly. He possessed a splendid memory, although his faculties were rather superficial and he lacked the ability to analyze separate events carefully. But his mind was alert and quick, always. After I was dismissed I saw him only twice, the last time on January 19, 1917, and then only for a few minutes. I had not seen him for a whole year and was shocked by the change he had undergone. He was thin, haggard, and wrinkled to the point of being unrecognizable. His eyes were faded, and the whites were dull yellow. His smile was forced and sickly, and his broken speech impressed me as proof of deep mental anguish and suffering. After I returned home I was for a long time under the spell of this painful impression and told my relatives that I considered the Tsar seriously ill.

U.: I shall not dwell upon this subject. The Soviet Government has decided to have the actions of the former Emperor examined by the people's court, and you will no doubt be questioned as witness. As for my other question, it concerns a certain financier, Manus. Do you know him? If so, what can you say about him?

V. N. K.: I have never visited Manus, nor has he visited me; but he called twice at the ministry when I was Minister of Finance. I understand that he is a speculator on the stock exchange and a financier. I must say that I have always entertained the worst opinion of him and therefore shall be particularly reserved now when he is a prisoner like myself. He has a right to bear ill-will toward me, as on two occasions I used my authority as Minister of Finance against him: first, when I did not permit him to be elected member of the Board

of Directors of the Vladikavkaz railway; and, second, when I did not confirm his election as broker on the exchange. In both cases I was motivated by the reputation he had at the time.

U. : When was that?

V. N. K. : In 1909 or 1910. Manus avenged himself by taking part in the intrigue against me, boasting that he had taken an active part in it. Whether or not it was so, I cannot tell.

U. : If one were to tell you that Manus was engaged in speculative operations, how would you regard it: as an activity of purely a speculative sort for the purpose of making money at all costs or as a scheme somehow tied up with politics, that is, to gain the support of some party or to effect some political combination?

V. N. K. : As I do not know in what Manus' speculative activity consisted, I find it difficult to express an opinion, but I should say that Manus is hardly concerned with politics and that now as ever he may be interested solely in making money.

This ended my questioning. Uritsky showed me my statement, written down in brief and with many omissions, but essentially correct, and made me sign it. Then he gave me a pass for my release.

When I asked him to have my papers returned, and especially four powers of attorney issued to me by different persons at Kislovodsk, Uritsky summoned his secretary, Yoselevich, a boy of nineteen, and ordered him to do as I had requested, and I went upstairs again to gather together my possessions and hasten home.

My companions were genuinely happy at my good fortune and helped me to pack my things, which I was allowed to leave behind until I could send a messenger for them. I left this horrible prison carrying nothing but my overcoat.

My wife had come to the prison hoping to see me but not dreaming that I should be set free. Our meeting was unexpected, but our joy knew no bounds.

Thus did this terrible nightmare end. Later, when I was safe, I often went over the humiliation I had been through, and asked myself: why did they free me when so many people were done away with? And every time I answered myself: the Lord had protected me and did not permit an evil deed to be done. Then I began to think that perhaps this arrest had saved me from a worse fate. Two weeks later a wholesale arrest was conducted in Petrograd when many of those I knew were arrested: Trepov, Sukovkin, Zinovev (1), Buturlin, Lazarev. Some of them stayed in prison for many months in

circumstances even worse than mine had been; others were executed without a trial. Until July 21 there was a period of relative quiet, but after this date there were more wholesale arrests. Every day one heard of nothing but the arrest of this or that friend. The people of our house became more and more panic-stricken. Ermoloy, married to Countess Mordvinov, who lived in the same part of the house, ceased to sleep at home and visited it only at odd hours. All who came to see me asked the same thing: "Why do you stay here? Why don't you go away somewhere? You will surely be arrested and then nothing will save you."

In the meantime no one bothered me and I continued to live openly, being, however, deeply disturbed. I disliked to think of going away and taking any steps in this direction, disliked to leave my dear ones whom I had just seen again after an absence of seven months; I dared not plunge again into the uncertainties of a wandering existence, abandoning my home and the familiar surroundings which reminded me of my former life. But an inner voice kept telling me that I ought to go, and it sounded louder and louder as the horrors about us increased. The Bolsheviks executed the eighty-three-year-old senior deacon, Stavrovsky; they drowned a number of officers in the sea between Petrograd and Kronstadt; they shot V. F. Trepov; a list of hostages was published filled with familiar names; the English Embassy was ransacked, and Captain Cromie (2) was murdered and his body thrown upon the quay.

But it was difficult to know what means to employ for an escape. To request a passport would be fatal—the experience of Prince P. P. Volkonsky was proof of this. He remained quietly at home, when the idea came to him—or perhaps it was the suggestion of those about him—to ask officially for authorization to leave for Finland, on account of his health. He was at once arrested and spent many months in prison, and only the energy of his wife rescued him from his sad lot. There was also the problem of disguise. The majority of my business associates—Pokrovsky, Lopukhin, Eliashevich, and others—considered that to shave off my beard, to make myself up like a tramp, would be undignified and unworthy. Moreover, if my disguise were discovered I should be executed on the spot.

It was in July, too, about the 20th (n.s.), that the official Bolshevik papers published the news of the Tsar's assassination at Ekaterinburg on the night of July 16–17 (n.s.). He had been sentenced to death by the local Soviet of Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies, which was presided

over by Beloborodov (3). The report said that only the Tsar had been killed, that the rest of the Imperial family were safe.

This news did not come to me altogether unexpectedly. I had feared some such happening when, in the south, I had learned of the transfer of the Imperial family to Tobolsk and of the advance of the Czechoslovaks upon Ekaterinburg. Those of my friends and acquaintances whom I saw were terribly shocked, however. Some refused to believe it; others wept in silence. But there was no sign of grief or sympathy among the people. The day after the news appeared, I went for a long street-car ride. The report of the Tsar's death was read aloud with smiles, mockeries, and base comments. From the younger people were heard such remarks as "High time!" "Go on, reign some more!" "All over with Nikolashka!" "Hey, brother Romanov, so this is where your dancing has brought you!" The elder people were silent; obviously they were afraid of being beaten or sent to jail.

Then on August 17 Uritsky was assassinated and in revenge there were mass executions and more arrests. My wife was sure that I should not be bothered, as I had been released by Uritsky, and his temporary successor, Bokii, openly announced that there were no charges against me.

We continued to live as before. Gradually we sold everything of any value, not for the purpose of getting money for flight but merely to enable us to live. We saw clearly that, expenses being about seven thousand rubles a month, it required a large sum to avoid starvation. During the summer and up to the middle of October my wife and I sold about 60,000 rubles' worth of furniture (I received 40,000 for the rugs alone, and about 5,000 for the carriages). I withdrew about 15,000 from my account and borrowed 10,000 from the Third Mutual Credit Company. This together with the 8,000 rubles I had brought from the Caucasus made a sum of about 90,000 rubles. By the end of October we had spent 35,000, leaving us 55,000 besides the 5,000 my wife had saved on household expenses, so that in round figures we had 60,000 rubles.

During this period of constant worry and indecision I received three offers regarding my escape. The first was made late in August by the German consul, von Breiter; the second at about the same time by an officer of the Austrian mission who lived in the same house with us; the third early in October by a Jew unknown to me but with recommendations from Zalshupin and Krilichevsky in Kiev.

The two latter offers were so fantastic and were planned so childishly that I simply could not consider them seriously. But the offer of the German consul was different. The German government, said Consul von Breiter, in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty the Emperor, wanted to do its best to save me. It had instructed him to offer to do for me what he had already done for A. F. Trepov. My wife and I were to move to the German Consulate for a few days; I was to shave off my beard and dress in a shabby suit of working clothes, and we should be transported safely either to Finland or to Pskov, whichever was considered safer at the moment.

But I could not bring myself to leave Petrograd. When von Breiter asked why I did not wish to avail myself of this offer, I answered that I did not see how I should be able to exist once I reached Germany. I possessed no means abroad, and could not hope to find work in Germany. If I managed to reach my daughter in Switzerland I should be no better off, since my daughter had so far lived at my expense and possessed no means of her own. Going to France, where I had a few connections remaining from old times, would presumably not be possible, as obviously the French authorities would know of the assistance I had received from the German government in leaving Russia. Finally, I hoped no one would molest me in Russia and that I should be able to exist.

Von Breiter listened in silence and on taking leave said: "I believe you do not wish to state your main objection, which is that you do not wish to accept a service from the German government which you may consider, like so many others, the cause not only of the war but also of all that is now happening in Russia." I begged him to permit me not to reply. On this we parted, after I had thanked him once more.

The main reason why I refused the offer of the German consul was, however, the hope that I should be left alone as heretofore.

In the midst of these worries and fears our friends and relatives insisted that, since I was bound to remain in Petrograd, we should move to some less conspicuous place. In view of the rumors that the Germans would occupy Petrograd and the certainty that the occupation would be preceded by street disorders and the looting of the larger houses, the Austrian, Haar, a representative of the Red Cross delegation, insisted that we should find some refuge where we could stay for several days. My former assistant in the office of the Ministers' Council, A. S. Putilov, later executed together with many Lyceum alumni on July 3, 1925, even had a place ready for us and

said that we could use it at any time. It was a huge new apartment house at the end of the Kirochnaia.

One of the members of the diplomatic corps with whom I had become well acquainted had agreed to take care of my money and a package of documents. During one of our conversations we fell to talking of my position. He agreed that it was precarious, but he also appreciated the danger of attempting to escape; certainly, he thought, it would be the height of folly to attempt to get a passport. He was also of the opinion that it was unwise for us to remain at our old lodgings, especially in view of the possibility of the German occupation, and he offered us the use of his apartment at any time.

During all this time we had made but one attempt to leave, and this was not successful. My wife had been advised to address herself to the common-law wife of Maxim Gorky, the former actress Andreeva (4), who now occupied the post of some commissar or other, with the request to help us go to Finland. My wife underwent even this humiliation; she was received rather graciously but was told: "You must wait: just now I can do nothing, I have my hands full with Gavriil Konstantinovich (5) whom I must ship somewhere in those parts. I may think up something later."

One day about October 20, N. N. Stolypin came to warn us that my arrest was scheduled for one of the next few days. He had heard the news through the German war-prisoners' bureau. I immediately went to see the German consul, but after an investigation he expressed his belief that the rumor was false. Events proved he was right, for nothing happened for several days.

Then, on Tuesday, the 29th, at exactly 7:30, just as I was beginning my dinner, the telephone rang. It was V. K. Kister. "Can you come over to my house directly?" he said. "It is very important." When I told him I was feeling poorly, he agreed to call on me. In about half an hour the doorbell rang; I opened the door, but instead of Kister there was a young lady with a letter from him. She told us the following story: An hour before, Madame Herman, a friend of Kister and herself, had arrived at Kister's house for dinner, having come directly from the Gorohovaia, where she was wont to go almost daily, using her connections with the Bolsheviks to help the prisoners and to secure the release of many. Madame Herman said that a little after five, being in the office of the Cheka, she was a chance witness of the following scene between two Red soldiers and the clerk with whom she was having a business conversation: One of the soldiers

interrupted her and addressed the clerk in a very rude way with the words: "Well, do we have to wait much longer while you talk?" To the clerk's question, "Why do you shout? I am not keeping you," the soldier answered, raising his voice still more, "We were sent to get an order for the former Minister Kokovtsov and we were told that we should get it at five; it is now nearly six and no one has given us anything. We are not going to wait any longer; let them send someone else."

The clerk answered, "I have no order; when I get it I shall give it to you without delay."

The soldiers retired and began to talk among themselves, and Madame Herman asked the clerk just what he knew. Without making any secret of it he answered calmly: "The Commission has resolved to arrest Count Kokovtsov as hostage; the order has been signed but not dated yet, so I do not have it. It may come at any moment or it may be delayed a day or two—we have all kinds of procedure." To Madame Herman's remark that according to the papers Count Kokovtsov had already been arrested but released by Uritsky himself, the clerk had answered, "That does not signify anything; this time he will not be released; it is time to put an end to him." All that time the soldiers were in the room waiting. Madame Herman approached them, and since they had not taken part in the conversation and had not even heard it, she asked them once more whom they were going to arrest. They answered, "How should we know? We were told that many will be arrested, but we heard the name of the former Tsarist Minister, Kokovtsov."

Knowing that Kister was close to me Madame Herman ran to warn him, and thus I learned of the plan which later was confirmed by the German consul. There was not a moment to lose. We decided to leave the house immediately and to conceal ourselves at the place offered us by the member of the diplomatic corps, there to determine our future course of action. I went alone to make sure that our rooms were prepared; my wife was to follow and, with the aid of our laundress, to bring the few things we needed. I arranged to meet the street car on which my wife would have to come. Everything went off safely enough, but in the face of such danger we spent a sleepless night. Obviously we must flee from Petrograd, but how, and to what place?

The next morning, October 30, with our host's permission, I invited the Finnish consul, the German consul, and some other friends

to discuss plans for our projected flight. They all arrived at about 2:00 P.M. The idea of fleeing through the Ukraine was rejected. I was glad of this, for I had no sympathy for the separatist movement of that region. The Finnish consul, having assured me that the Finnish authorities would do everything they could to assist me, offered to get in touch with a fisherman who had recently transported Sukhomlinov and his wife from Lakhta to Terijoki in a sailboat. This plan also was rejected as too risky. Then Assessor B., the assistant of the German consul, suggested that he approach a man who had transported A. F. Trepov to Beloostrov two months previously. He promised merely to send the man to me, to let me judge for myself if I wanted to trust him, and if so, to make my own arrangements. Any plan was fraught with danger, and as this one seemed as practical as any it was agreed that the man should be sent to me. Our host, my diplomatic friend, promised to do his best to send our baggage after us through channels at his disposal, providing that there was not too much of it.

The next day we learned by telephone that our own house was not being watched, and my wife returned to get a few things together and to tidy up. I waited for my man to appear. Our host came at exactly two and said that a man who gave his name as Antonov was asking for me. He showed him into the room. The first impression was most unpleasant; the thought flashed through my mind—this is the man who holds in his power the lives of my wife and me; if he were to betray us to the Bolsheviks, we are lost. The Bolsheviks would surely be able to pay him much more for giving me up as a fugitive than I could pay him for helping us to escape. His appearance did not inspire confidence, and where he had come from I did not know.

"What do you wish?" he asked imperturbably. I answered that probably he had been told the reasons for my wishing to see him. He, however, denied it emphatically, saying that he had not seen Mr. B. face to face, that he had been informed through other persons that a man who lived at such and such an address wished to see him.

I was forced to explain our situation, and then I said, "Tell me frankly and plainly whether or not you can assist us in leaving Petrograd; if you cannot or find it too dangerous, you may say so outright without endangering your position. In that case I shall free our host of our presence, which is dangerous for him, and return home to await my fate."

Having heard me out, Antonov answered: "Do you plan to go

alone or with your wife? I can undertake to take you over alone, but it is absolutely impossible to go with a lady." In that case, I told him, I was obliged to renounce my plans, as I would not leave my wife and would prefer to come to my end quickly. Antonov began to urge me to go alone just as Trepov had done, promising to bring my wife to Finland in a few days. I refused point-blank, explaining that the arrest of my wife would be more than certain to follow my flight. I should perish with anxiety and should undoubtedly return in order to try to free my wife and to submit to my fate. Then Antonov, having sat there in silence for a few endless minutes, fixed his eyes upon me and, addressing me as "Your Grace," asked me a startling question: "You were friendly with your brother-in-law V. N., and helped him all his life, did you not? I saw you in passing several times at his house in the suburbs of Petrograd. I was a very young man then. Now I must tell you that V. N. has been my true benefactor; he raised me from the mire, he placed me upon my own feet, he taught me honest work, he married me off, he was the godfather of my child. In memory of him I now must save you and your wife, even if I perish myself: I shall take you over to Finland. But we must act quickly."

I was surprised at this revelation, but relieved and grateful. It did indeed seem that a kind fate was watching over me. I could not but recall my lucky escape from the assassin's bullets that day at Harbin, in 1909, when Prince Ito was killed; then the remarkable events of our return from the Caucasus. Would good fortune continue to attend us?

Antonov's plan was simple. I was to clip my beard, and to wear an old cap instead of my hat. His brother-in-law would call for me and his wife would call for my wife. Then each couple would go by separate routes to board the Finland train. We were to take only one small grip wrapped in sacking. His fee was four thousand rubles and I was to pay him on reaching the Finnish border. The date fixed for our departure was November 2.

We spent the few days that remained making final preparations and saying farewell to our friends. On the morning of the second we were up early and soon ready to go. My sister arrived, and we waited for Antonov. We waited and waited, prey to the most nerve-racking thoughts. The hours dragged by with painful slowness. All day we waited; then at about five in the afternoon Antonov telephoned to say that there had been unexpected complications and that he would be around that evening to explain. When at last he

came he told us that his trusted agent on the Finnish border, without whose aid he could do nothing, had been "dispatched on business" to another part of the frontier and had asked that we postpone our departure until Monday. I understood from Antonov's words that our escape had to be accomplished with the direct participation of Bolshevik agents on the frontier and this naturally added to the hazards of the journey. In addition, we had to forego taking along the grip we had planned. We had to content ourselves with our night clothing, two toothbrushes, a cake of soap, and a comb.

At last Monday arrived. Early in the morning my wife went to the nearest church to pray. At about eleven o'clock my sister came, and we had lunch together, then sat down to wait for our guides. They were late again, but beyond that everything worked out according to plan. Antonov's wife got my wife to the train without misadventure. My guide and I met Antonov at the appointed place, but since we had been followed by two men whose looks Antonov did not like he judged that it would be better for us to walk on to Lanskaia station, a distance of about five versts. This we did. The road was familiar to me, but it was the first time I had ever measured its distance with my legs. We arrived in time and when the train pulled in boarded it and located my wife. At Dibuny, the last station before Beloostrov, all cars were locked. Passengers were to be let out one by one at the end of the journey so that their papers might be examined. Then, as the train entered Beloostrov station, Antonov looked out the window, and on sighting the man on duty, whispered to me, "Lord be praised, it's our man!"

We got off the train holding our passports in readiness, but no one even glanced at them. We walked through the turnstile to the highway and started on toward the Finnish border. The Sestra River which marked the boundary was clearly in sight. To me it seemed that all we had to do was to walk across the intervening fields to the stream, and make our way across it to safety. Antonov assured me, however, that it was not so simple as that. "The border patrol is on guard," he said, "and would shoot us down like so many partridges." We had to wait three long hours till dark.

We trudged along the highway for about a verst and a half. There Antonov's wife left us, and Antonov, his brother-in-law, and we two retraced our steps toward the station. Soon, however, we left the main road and made our way to a small house. According to the woman of the place, who was the wife of Antonov's trusted agent, her

husband had gone to the station but would return shortly. There was an Englishman there who was also fleeing from the Bolsheviks. Later two more Englishmen, officers, joined us.

A moment later the master of the house appeared. This was the chief organizer and help in our flight, whose absence had detained us for two days. I felt quite assured; I felt that all danger had been left behind. We fortified ourselves with bread and butter we had taken along, and I asked the host whether or not everything was in order and if we could consider ourselves safe. His answer did not reassure me much. "Well, it's hard to tell," he began; "three-fourths of the danger you have left behind, but a fourth still lies ahead."

To my question as to what the danger was he gave the following frank answer: "Just this: if your departure has been detected and they should wish to stop you, they would no doubt telephone to our commandant here; he would summon me or even send someone over here, and if they should give a detailed description of you I should have no other choice but to take you to the commandant, who no doubt would send you to the Gorohovaia in no time. Or it may turn out thus: Our soldiers may be passing back and forth on the highway preparing your way while other soldiers may be going to their posts for the night; they may drop in at my house on the way seeing the light, and if they should come in and ask who you are I shall answer that you have dropped in to warm yourselves. But if they should decide to take you over to the commandant, what could I do?"

I cannot say in all truth that this reasoning did not trouble me. However, there was no sense in pondering over it, nor any time for doing so.

The time until eight dragged horribly. Our situation was not too attractive, but I felt no fear. A sort of dumb indifference seemed to have enveloped me. I kept track of the time by my repeater. It grew quite dark.

At exactly eight Antonov entered and said, "Now everything is ready; let us go." Antonov took me aside and said that his associates demanded their money in advance, refusing to go otherwise. I had to comply without argument, because I had no choice anyway, and since he had told us before, in connection with his former plans, that he would see us only as far as the river but would not cross the border for fear of not being able to return, I told him in the presence of his associates: "Take your share, too. If everything turns out well, so much the better; if we fail, I shall not need any money."

I paid him a thousand rubles above the agreed amount. After this the three of us left the house together, while the two officers were left behind for the second party. First came a tall soldier with a big black beard; then I came holding to the flap of his coat; then my wife supported by Antonov. The Englishman brought up the rear. It was pitch-dark. With the utmost caution, making no noise, we reached the highway over a plank-paved path, crossed it, and began to cross the meadow and a ditch. I lost my footing on a board flung over the ditch and had much trouble in extricating myself from the slimy mud but by some miracle did not lose my goloshes. The crossing of the meadow was better; our eyes began to get used to darkness and we began to see the glimmer of the river. Soon we approached the place where a boat from the Finnish shore was supposed to wait for us. There was no boat. Our guides seemed to lose heart, especially the one who was leading. He whistled softly; there was no answer. He revealed his thoughts when he said, "You cannot swim across the river, and there is no sense in going back." We stood thinking, for a short time, of course, though it seemed endless to us, when all of a sudden I thought that I heard a splash near by and soon I saw from the high bank a small boat approaching with a man at the oars. He struck the bank awkwardly, nosing into it instead of drawing up alongside. We had to climb down the steep bank unable to see where we stepped in the dark. First went my wife; she stood up in the boat and naturally shook it. I nearly lost my footing again, and slipped into the water; on getting into the boat I nearly overturned it. My wife moved up by the oarsman; I crawled toward her, while the Englishman remained in the bow. We said goodbye to Antonov, and the boat began slowly to cross the narrow river. We made a bad landing, striking the bank stern on, so that it was utterly impossible to climb from the swaying craft to the land. The oarsman, who later proved to be the Finnish officer S., somehow managed to push the boat sidewise; my wife got out much more adroitly than I; an unseen hand was stretched toward her from above and she clambered up the steep bank. As for myself, I tried several times and nearly fell into the water. Gathering every ounce of strength I had I finally reached the top of the bank, ran my head into a mass of brambles, and finally climbed up almost on all fours. Here I was also assisted by someone, who proved to be a Finnish soldier by the name of Papanen, who said to me in good Russian: "We have been watching for you for three days now, and thought that you were lost."

The Englishman now emerged from the darkness and we began to talk loudly, not concealing our happiness at being safe, but were immediately silenced by our companions, who said:

"What are you doing! Your soldiers are over on the other bank. They will shoot in the direction of your voices, and what then?"

We fell silent, stood there for a few minutes, rounded the corner of a barn, drew our breath, and started to walk through a forest clearing directly to where an electric lantern was burning at the Rajajoki station.

Our weariness seemed to leave us. We did not notice the two or three versts through mud puddles and over swampy ground to the station, where the station agent said he knew me well, as he had often seen me at the house of the late Plehve when the latter was State Secretary for Finland. He immediately began to make out our identification certificates. Then, thanks to the efforts of Commandant Montel, arrangements were made to transport us by train directly to Viborg. By that time, the two English officers—who had been left behind—put in an appearance, and in a surprisingly short time we all were on our way. Exhausted as we were from our anxieties and efforts, it was no wonder that my wife slept away the two and a half hours to Viborg. Here we were met by a gentleman in a top hat, the city commandant, M. Rantakari, who took us to the Hotel Andrea. As we entered the brilliantly lighted vestibule, the music of my favorite old romance by Glinka floated in from the dining-room. Then, after a hasty supper, we went to bed—a clean one—to have our first good rest in many nights. Our life in exile had begun.

Three days we spent in that city. Great kindness was shown us by a Jew, Gurevitz, who recognized me and voluntarily offered to assist me in any way he could. This he did in aiding us to arrange for our passports, in exchanging some Russian money at the bank; and in sending telegrams to all my business acquaintances in Finland. This, the first man I met at Viborg, who had never addressed himself to me with any sort of request and who had never received any favor from me, showed us such kindness and even affection that even now I feel like sending him a word of sincere and deep gratitude.

I was greatly surprised and quite overjoyed to encounter Y. I. Savich, a member of the Board of Directors of the International Bank, and a relative of Vyshnegradsky. We met on the street, and our greetings were so effusive as to attract the attention of the passers-by.

In the evening of November 7 we left Viborg for Helsingfors. Here we received some of our baggage that had been forwarded to us. This enabled us to change our clothing and present a more respectable appearance. The next five days flew by rapidly, and on the 14th we left for Stockholm. Here we were met by General Brändström, former Swedish ambassador to Russia, who had reached Stockholm just two days ahead of us. He saved us the inconvenient formalities of the customs, took us to his hotel, and lodged us in his rooms. He himself took smaller accommodation. Here we remained for three weeks, during which the world saw the military collapse of Germany and the beginnings of the German revolution. It seemed to us that the Allies would quickly proceed to make an honorable and stable peace with the Central Powers and then turn to exterminate that plague which Germany had set upon Russia—Bolshevism. It was with these thoughts that we left Stockholm on December 5. At the station we received a telegram saying that our daughter's papers had reached Paris in order. This was a great relief to both of us.

Early the next morning we had to change trains at the Norwegian border. Our section in the Norwegian train was shared by an Englishman, a clergyman from near Liverpool. On learning that we were Russian he asked us if we had read the account of the interview that Count Kokovtsov had given while in Sweden. The entire Swedish press except the socialist papers reported it very favorably. I said that I had read it, but I did not reveal to him my identity. Later, when we exchanged cards, he was greatly surprised to discover who I was. He was a friend of Mr. Kristi, the Russian consul at Christiania (Oslo), and telegraphed to him advising him of our arrival. Thanks to this, Kristi met us and showed us the city. At Kristi's house that evening we met M. I. Tereshchenko.

From Christiania we went by rail to Bergen. Thence we had a very rough passage on the small, second-rate steamship "Irma" to Newcastle. This seacoast town had a very depressing appearance. The Russian consul, de Colong, who met us, took us to a hotel that was grimy with smoke. The rooms were unheated and the fireplace in the dining-room was smoky. Then we wandered through the streets till bedtime; everywhere we saw undisciplined and untidy looking soldiers who reminded us of the "beauty and pride" of the Russian revolutionary armies. At nine we went to bed, having first warmed it with a hot-water bottle. It was a wonder that neither of us caught cold in such conditions.

The next day, December 10, we went by fast train to London. The two weeks spent in London, up to December 22, were the beginning of that political disillusionment which with every new day assumed more definite form, and which finally brought me to a state of dull, hopeless resignation and to the conviction that the world was now governed, with few exceptions, by hopeless egotists sunk in the interests of their own backyards, by insignificant nonentities, by frank political adventurers, or by petty cowards devoid of all capacity for independent action, merely complying with the desires of the mob. The day after our arrival, I went to see the acting Russian Ambassador, K. D. Nabokov. After expressing his joy at seeing me alive, he showed me a telegram he had just received from Maklakov informing him that in three weeks a peace conference would convene in Paris. In anticipation of Russian participation in this conference, Maklakov was maintaining constant communication with the three administrations: that of Archangel (6), that of General Denikin (7) in South Russia, and that of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia. The latter had informed Maklakov that he desired to have as his representatives at such a conference Kokovtsov, Sazonov, Maklakov, Nabokov, de Giers (8), Prince Lvov, Avksentev (9), Izvolsky, and, I believe, a few "S. R.'s" (10). I was astonished at this selection, and said as much to Nabokov. I doubted the importance of having representatives at the conference, no matter who they were, for there was no legal backing for anything they might say or do. What was more important, to my mind, was to have Germany, under the supervision of the Allies, intervene in Russia to abolish the Bolsheviks and restore order. Evidently my reasoning did not please Nabokov, although he hastened to agree with me that unless the Allies would permit us to participate openly in the conference, any form of participation—either advisory or preparatory, or, as I put it, sitting in the ante-room—was perfectly impossible and he would never agree to it.

My second visit was to the French ambassador to London, M. Paul Cambon (11). He told me frankly that we would not get his country to intervene. France was tired of the struggle, and weak from loss of blood; her only interest now was to give her many and severe wounds a chance to heal. Pleas to intervene in Russia would only fall on deaf ears. As for England, he said, the success of Lloyd George (12) at the recent elections was to be attributed to the fact that he had promised the workers that that country would not fight against Russia. The English workers, according to Cambon,

thought that the Bolsheviks were socialists, the friends and protectors of the proletariat, against whom they refused to fight.

In America, he continued, there was still less chance of stirring up any enthusiasm for intervention. The Americans had no wish to meddle in Russian affairs which they did not understand. Because some of their fellow-citizens had been victims of German submarine warfare they accepted the statement that German militarism was endangering the world. They supported Wilson's (13) democratic dreams because he promised to spread peace all over the world as soon as Prussianism was crushed forever. These thoughts occupied their minds. They would not believe anything we might tell them about Russia and the Bolsheviks. In fact, they preferred to insist that as socialists the Bolsheviks should perhaps be fought, but through the press, at elections, and at meetings, not by force of arms. In addition to this there was the influence of the Jewish press in America. This press contradicted the stories of Bolshevik atrocities and tried to persuade its readers that the Bolsheviks were fighting and working for the benefit of the people. They did not believe and refused to believe that the Bolsheviks killed people and lived by robbery and violence.

Finally, Cambon concluded, at the peace conference differences between the Allies would appear, each of the victorious Powers would seek advantages for itself. France at any rate would be obliged to devote all her energies to protecting her own interests. Intervention in Russia would be out of the question.

During the remainder of my stay in London I was fully occupied with social engagements, interviews with newspapermen, and discussions with men in public positions. I should like to mention here the generous offer of Lord Revelstoke, the head of Baring Brothers, with whom I had formed a friendship while I was Minister of Finance. He insisted that I draw upon his wealth in order to improve my own straitened circumstances. Of course I could not accept such kindness, but his generous thought will always be one of my most precious memories.

We reached Paris on December 22. We were met by representatives of the Russian Embassy, who escorted us to the apartment which the Embassy had reserved for us in the Hotel Lutecia on the left bank of the Seine. Here we settled down to our life of exile, which has continued for a long succession of years and will continue, as I believe, until the end of our days. There is hardly any public interest

in describing this period. I have been living under everybody's eyes, and perhaps some day some witness of this life among the émigrés will say a kind word about the little I have been able to do for those who together with me have spent long years in exile.

I have but one more duty to perform—to thank all those who have contributed so much to make our new life much more endurable than it might otherwise have been. Especially do I want to thank M. Raymond Poincaré. This man has not only been kind to my wife and me but he has also done much to improve the conditions of many Russian émigrés in France. Another to whom I and all Russian émigrés are indebted is the late President Paul Doumer (14). In him we always found a sympathetic friend. But not these two alone have helped us. France and her official representatives have at all times done what they could to ameliorate the conditions of our life in emigration. I want to believe that these words of gratitude will evoke a wide response among the Russian émigrés who should recognize how much our sometimes difficult conditions have been relieved and made more pleasant by the sympathetic attitude of the French government.

Editor's Notes

EDITOR'S NOTES

NOTES TO AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Page vii, note 1. **Imperial Alexander Lyceum.** Founded in August 1810 by Emperor Alexander I "for the purpose of preparing youth for important government service." Admission was restricted to the sons of the nobility.

2. **Aleksandr Dmitrievich Gradovsky (1841-1889).** Lawyer and writer on legal subjects; Professor of Law, St. Petersburg University.

3. **Nikolai Stepanovich Tagantsev (1843-1923).** A learned and widely known criminologist; principal author of the new Russian Penal Code of 1903; Senator in 1887; President of the Senate, 1897; member of the State Council, 1906.

4. **Semen Vikentevich Pakhman (1825-1910).** Well-known jurist and professor in St. Petersburg University, 1866-1876; Senator, 1882.

5. **The State Council (*Gosudarstvennyi Sovet*).** Established by Alexander I in 1801 and reorganized by imperial ukase in 1901, consisted of a president and an unlimited number of members appointed by the Emperor. There were four departments of the Council: (1) Legislative; (2) Civil and Ecclesiastical Administration; (3) State Economy; and (4) Industry, Science, and Commerce. Each section had its own presiding officer and met separately. There were also plenary sessions. The Council examined projects of laws proposed by the ministers who were members *ex-officio*, discussed the budget and all state expenditures, but had no authority to propose modification of the laws. In 1906 the State Council was reorganized as the second chamber of the bicameral legislative system set up after the revolution of 1905. Half the members were appointed and half elected by certain public bodies, including the *zemstvos* (local councils), the Synod of the Orthodox Church, the Academy of Sciences, Chambers of Commerce, the nobility, et cetera.

Attached to the State Council was the Imperial Chancellery (*Gosudarstvennaia Kantseliaria*) likewise consisting of four departments. At the head of the Chancellery was the *Gosudarstvennyi Sekretar*, assisted by a *Tovarishch Gosudarstvennago Sekretaria*, translated in the text as "Imperial Secretary" and "Assistant Imperial Secretary" to avoid confusion with the heads of the four departments who held the title of State Secretary (*Stats-Sekretar*). Assisting the last-named officers were assistant state secretaries (*Pomoshchnik Stats-Sekretaria*).

Page viii, note 6. **Konstantin Karlovich Grot (1815-1897).** Responsible for one of the principal economic measures of the reign of Alexander II, the adoption in 1861-63 of the excise system of taxation of liquor in place of the *otkup* which dated from the seventeenth century and resembled the system of *fermiers-généraux* of pre-revolutionary France; appointed State Secretary, 1863; member of the State Council, 1870; in 1875 became active in prison reform and the organization of the support of the blind and indigent; head of the Fourth Department of the Tsar's Private Office, 1882-1884.

7. See note 5, above.

8. **Count Sergei Yulievich Witte** (1849–1915). Born at Tiflis; attended Odessa University; entered the service of the Odessa State Railway in 1877; became general traffic manager of the Southwestern Railway of Russia and member of an imperial commission to study railway questions, and later head of the railway department in the Ministry of Finance under Vyshnegradsky; in 1892, became Minister of Ways and Communications and in 1893 succeeded Vyshnegradsky as Minister of Finance; succeeded by drastic measures in putting a stop to the great fluctuations in the value of paper currency and in resuming specie payments; introduced the gold standard in Russia on the basis of the laws of 1897 and 1899; organized government monopoly of the sale of alcohol; in 1903 was transferred from his post as Minister of Finance to that of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers; chief of the Russian delegation at Portsmouth; on his return to Russia made a Count and Chairman of the first Council of Ministers under the new constitutional régime set up under the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, for the drafting of which Witte was largely responsible; dismissed from office in 1906; died in St. Petersburg.

CHAPTER I

Page 3, note 1. See note 5 to Author's Preface.

2. **Eduard Dmitrievich Pleske** (1852–1904). Educated at the Alexander Lyceum; assistant manager and manager of the Special Credit Office (see note 11 below) and manager of the State Bank; in 1903 appointed Minister of Finance; in 1904 member of the State Council.

Page 4, note 3. **Viacheslav Konstantinovich Plehve** (1846–1904). Of Lithuanian family; educated at Warsaw and St. Petersburg University; entered the Department of Justice, becoming successively Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Warsaw Court of Appeal, Public Prosecutor of the St. Petersburg Court of Appeal, Director of the State Police, and Assistant Minister of the Interior; in 1902 succeeded Sipiagin as Minister of the Interior; as a promoter of the "Russification" of national minorities he was bitterly hated in Poland, in Lithuania, and especially in Finland; credited by the opposition press with being accessory to the Kishinev massacres, an accusation held by others to be unjust and unsupported by fact; a determined opponent of Witte's policies; escaped an attempt made on his life early in 1904; assassinated on July 15 of the same year by Sazonov, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionist party. (Boris Savinkov tells how this assassination was accomplished in *Memoirs of a Terrorist* [New York, 1931], pp. 58–70.)

4. **A. N. Stolpakov**. Member of the Tver Zemstvo; director of one of the departments and member of the Council of the Ministry of Ways and Communications.

5. **Committee of Ministers** (*Komitet Ministrov*). Established in 1802 by Alexander I, who in the previous year had reorganized the government departments as ministries on the Western European model. In addition to the ministers, the Committee included the Imperial Secretary and the heads of

the departments of the State Council. The Committee was merely an advisory body, in which the ministers had an opportunity to discuss measures within their competence and to co-ordinate them in the interests of the state before presenting them for the sanction of the Emperor. The chairman was not a prime minister but merely the presiding officer.

There was also a Council of Ministers (*Sovet Ministrov*), established in 1861 at the suggestion of Prince Gorchakov, for the purpose of considering questions which required not only the approval but also the presence of the Sovereign in council. It included the ministers and other officials enjoying ministerial prerogatives and two others specially appointed by the Emperor. The Imperial Secretary also attended the meetings, which were called at the pleasure of the Sovereign.

On October 19, 1905, the work of the various ministries was unified under the Council of Ministers, and on April 26, 1906, the Committee of Ministers was abolished.

6. **Baron Yulii Aleksandrovich Uxkull-Gyllenband** (1852-1918). Graduate in law, St. Petersburg University, 1875; spent greater part of his life in the service of the state, in the Chancellery of the State Council as Chief Clerk, Assistant State Secretary, State Secretary in the Legislative Department, and Assistant Imperial Secretary; succeeded Count Kokovtsov as Imperial Secretary, February 1904; appointed member of the State Council, January 1908; died of privation in Petrograd in September 1918.

7. **Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich**. Brother of Emperor Alexander II and father of Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich; a viceroy of the Caucasus; Chairman of the State Council.

8. **Count Dmitrii Martynovich Solsky** (1833-1910). State Comptroller, 1878-1889; created a Count, 1902; Acting Chairman and Chairman of the State Council, 1903-1906.

Page 5, note 9. **The grain campaign**. The financial measures undertaken with respect to the marketing of the grain crop, i.e., the opening of credits by the State Bank in favor of private banks and big exporting firms and merchants with a view to facilitating grain exports.

Page 6, note 10. **Aleksei Ivanovich Putilov** (1867-). Graduate, St. Petersburg University; entered state service in 1889 and in 1890 entered the Ministry of Finance; in 1903 appointed Director of the General Office (see note 11, below) and in October 1905 Assistant to the Minister; resigned from the Ministry of Finance in April 1906, became director of several financial and industrial enterprises, including the Russo-Asiatic Bank, of which he remained chairman until the Bolshevik Revolution; in emigration.

11. **General Office** (*Obshchaia Kantseliaria*). A department of the Ministry of Finance, made up of a committee of specialists for the consideration of financial projects. Another department, the Special Credit Office (*Osobennaia Kantseliaria po kreditnoi chasti*) was concerned with credit matters.

Page 7, note 12. **Livadia**. On the Crimean coast near Yalta, a favorite resort of Nicholas II.

Page 8, note 13. **Petr Mikhailovich Romanov** (1859-1911). Assistant Minister of Finance under Witte in 1903 and 1904, under whose instructions he worked out the concession for the construction of the Chinese Eastern

Railway; Acting Minister of Finance, October 1903 to February 1904, during Pleske's illness; after the appointment of Kokovtsov in February 1904 became a member of the State Council.

14. See note 5 to the Preface, above.

15. **Concessions on the Yalu.** A. M. Bezobrazov, a retired officer of the Guards, together with his cousin, Rear Admiral Abaza, and others, planned to advance their own and Russia's interests in the Far East by the exploitation of a concession granted by Korea in 1896 for cutting timber on the Yalu and Tumen rivers, on the northern border of Korea. This group succeeded in interesting the Tsar in the enterprise, and Bezobrazov with considerable sums at his disposal was sent to the Far East to initiate the work. Lumbering operations were started on both the Korean and Manchurian sides of the Yalu and an attempt was made to secure a concession for a railway from Seoul to the Yalu. Bezobrazov, who became a member of a Special Commission on affairs of the Far East, and his group were actively opposed to making concessions to the Japanese during the negotiations which preceded the Russo-Japanese War.

16. **Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin (1848-1925).** Entered the army in 1864; in 1875 engaged in diplomatic work in Kashgaria and in 1876 took part in military operations in Turkestan, Kokand, and Samarkand; served with distinction as Chief of Staff to Skobelev in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78; in 1882 became a Major General, and in 1898 Minister of War; in 1904 he was given command of the Russian Army then mobilizing in Manchuria for the contest with Japan; after the defeat of Mukden and the retirement of the Army to Tieling, resigned the command to General Linevich, taking the latter's place as commander of one of the armies in Manchuria; served in the World War on the Russian western front and in 1916 became Governor-General of Turkestan; after the Bolshevik Revolution became a village clerk near his former estate in Pskov Gubernia; died at Shemshupino (Pskov).

17. **The Hermitage.** Erected in 1765 by Catherine II beside the Winter Palace; known at first as the "Small Winter Palace" but later as the First Hermitage of Empress Catherine II or the Pavilion Hermitage. It contained three picture galleries. In 1775 the enlargement of the so-called Old Hermitage was completed, and the Loggia Gallery (the Raphael Gallery) was added in 1778-1787. In 1840 Tsar Nicholas I completely reconstructed the whole building.

Page 9, note 18. **Macaque.** Monkey, i.e., imitator.

19. **The Finance Committee.** Established by Alexander I as a part of the general reorganization of the central legislative and administrative institutions of Russia. In view of the fact that most of the members of the recently formed Committee of Ministers were not in direct contact with the affairs of the Ministry of Finance, Alexander I, at the suggestion of Count Vasilev, then Minister of Finance, decreed on October 13, 1806, the formation of a Finance Committee, entirely independent of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers. The chief duty of the Committee was to discuss questions concerning the raising of state loans and other matters relating to the credit of the state. It was of a consultative nature and its deliberations and conclusions came into force only after receiving Imperial sanction. The chairman

of the Committee and its members were chosen by the Emperor himself from among the highest state dignitaries. The Minister of Finance was always a member and the management of the affairs of the Committee was incumbent upon the Ministry of Finance. The Committee continued without interruption until the Revolution of 1917, when it, like the State Council, was suppressed.

20. **Petr Khristianovich Schwanebach (1846-1908)**. Appointed Assistant Minister of Agriculture in 1903 and Minister of Agriculture in 1905; a member of the State Council, October 1906; State Comptroller, April 1906 to June 1907.

CHAPTER II

Page 11, note 1. **Empress Alexandra Fedorovna (1872-1918)**. Last Empress of Russia; born Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt; granddaughter of Queen Victoria; murdered with her family in Ekaterinburg by the Bolsheviks.

Page 12, note 2. **Pavel Lvovich Lobko (1838-1905)**. General of Infantry; graduate of the General Staff Academy, 1861; in the Chancellery of the Ministry of War, 1867; professor in the General Staff Academy in 1870; appointed tutor to the future Emperor Nicholas II, 1885; member of State Council, 1898; State Comptroller, 1899-1905.

3. **Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Filosofov (1861-1909)**. Graduate of St. Petersburg University in mathematics, 1883; in law, 1885; entered the Ministry of Education, 1886; in the Imperial Chancellery, 1887; appointed Assistant State Secretary of the Department of State Economy, 1899; State Secretary of the Department of Industry, Science, and Commerce, 1900; Assistant State Comptroller, 1901; State Comptroller, 1905; member of the State Council, 1906; in the same year became Minister of Commerce and Industry in Stolypin's cabinet.

Page 14, note 4. **Boleslav Fomich Maleshevsky (1849-1909)**. Of Polish family; comptroller of revenues of the Southwestern Railway; on Witte's recommendation appointed Director of the Special Credit Office, 1894; Professor of Economics, St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute.

5. **Aleksandr Ivanovich Vyshnegradsky (1867-1925)**. Son of I. A. Vyshnegradsky, Minister of Finance; entered the Imperial Chancellery, 1892; transferred, 1893, to the Special Credit Office, where he remained until 1905; left state service in 1905 and became a member of the board of the St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank, on which he sat until the end of 1917, when all banks were nationalized by the Bolsheviks; emigrated to Paris, 1919.

6. **Sergei Ivanovich Timashev (1858-1920)**. Graduate of the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; after serving in the Imperial Chancellery joined the Ministry of Finance in 1884; became Chief of the Department of Industry, Science, and Commerce, 1886, and later Assistant Manager of the State Bank; appointed member of the Finance Committee, of the Committee on Land Organization, and of the Council on Insurance of Income and Capital, 1909; resigned in November 1909; Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1909-1915; member of the State Council, 1911; imprisoned by the Bolsheviks; died in Petrograd.

Page 15, note 7. **Decree of 1897.** In 1896 Witte proposed that Russia adopt the gold standard, but there was such strong opposition in the State Council that the project was withdrawn. However, an extraordinary session of the Finance Committee accepted the project in January 1897, and a decree enacting the reform was immediately promulgated. The basic principles of all legislation concerning the initiation and the maintenance of the new monetary system, as well as the regulations for the issue of currency and of rubles backed by gold, were established by the law of 1899.

8. **D. I. Nikiforov.** Assistant Director of the Special Credit Office, 1904.

Page 18, note 9. **Viktor Viktorovich Sakharov** (? -1905). Lieutenant General; Minister of War, 1904-1905; killed November 1905 in Saratov Gubernia, where he had been sent to restore order during agrarian disturbances.

10. **Battle of Liaoyang** (late August 1904). Took place near the town of that name, south of Mukden in Manchuria. The Japanese under Oyama defeated the Russians, but Kuropatkin was able to withdraw his forces without complete disaster.

Page 19, note 11. **Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the elder** (1831-1891). General Field Marshal; third son of Emperor Nicholas I; served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878; popular among the troops, and a recognized authority on military matters.

Page 20, note 12. **Admiral Aleksei Mikhailovich Abaza.** Head of a special board on Far Eastern affairs; together with A. M. Bezobrazov was engaged in the enterprise of timber exploitation on the Yalu.

Page 21, note 13. **Ten million reserve fund.** The Russian budgets since the inception of State Accounts, reorganized in 1862, included a special item "for expenditure not provided for in the budget." Originally the item totaled three million rubles; later the amount was increased to ten millions, hence the appellation. It formed part of the budget estimates of the Ministry of Finance, Treasury Department. The fund was used to cover unforeseen expenditure in all the ministries. Such disbursements required the authority of the Emperor on the report of the Minister of Finance after examination by the State Comptroller. The fund was among those exempted by the Budget Act of March 6, 1906, from free debate in the legislative chambers. Any sums unemployed during the financial year reverted to the Treasury.

Page 22, note 14. **Count Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravev** (1845-1900). Son of General Count Nikolai Muravev, Governor of Grodno; entered the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1864; served in various European capitals and was appointed Minister at Copenhagen; on the death of Prince Lobanov in 1897 became Minister of Foreign Affairs; represented Russia at the Conference at The Hague in 1898.

15. **Pavel Petrovich Tyrtov** (1836-1903). Adjutant General; Vice-Admiral; in charge of the Department of Navy, 1896-1903.

16. **V. M. Vonliarliarsky.** Retired colonel; a participant in the Yalu concessions.

Page 23, note 17. **Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich** (1866-1933). Son of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, brother of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich.

18. **Count Aleksei Pavlovich Ignatev (1842-1906)**. Graduate of the General Staff Academy, 1862; Commander of the Horse Guards Regiment, 1873; Chief of Staff of the Guards Corps, 1881; Governor-General of Irkutsk, 1885; appointed Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1889, but en route to St. Petersburg was ordered to Kiev as Governor-General where he served from 1889 to 1896; in 1896 appointed member of State Council; killed by a Socialist-Revolutionist in Tver.

19. **Vladimir Pavlovich Cherevansky (1836-?)**. Assistant State Comptroller, 1889-1897; member of the State Council, 1898.

Page 24, note 20. **Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1896**. Signed in Moscow, May 22 (June 4, n.s.), of that year by Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, Witte, and Li Hung Chang. Among other things the treaty gave Russia the right to build a railway across the Manchurian provinces of Amur and Kirin to Vladivostok. The Chinese Eastern Railway Corporation, formed to build and operate the railway, was nominally a private corporation and hence under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

Page 25, note 21. **Nikolai Pavlovich Petrov (1836-1918)**. General; military engineer; professor in Nicholas Military Engineering Academy, 1868; in St. Petersburg Technological Institute, 1871; Assistant Minister of Ways and Communications, 1892-1900; member of the State Council, 1900; Chairman of the Second Department of the State Council, 1907-1915; chairman of the special commission to investigate the acts of Sukhomlinov as Minister of War, 1915.

Page 26, note 22. **Prince Georgii Evgenevich Lvov (1861-1925)**. For many years an active leader in zemstvo work; member of the executive board of the Tula Zemstvo from 1888 and president, 1903-1906; elected to the First State Duma, 1905, and joined the Right Wing of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) party; active in the organization of relief for sick and wounded soldiers during the Russo-Japanese and World War; president of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos during the World War; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of the first and second Provisional Governments, March to July, 1917; arrested after the Bolshevik Revolution and imprisoned in Ekaterinburg, but escaped to Siberia and spent the remainder of his life in Paris; member of the Russian Political Conference in Paris, 1918.

23. **Baron Ichiro Motono (1862-1919)**. Japanese diplomat; graduate of the University of Lyons; translator in the Japanese Foreign Office, 1890; Councillor in 1893; private secretary to the Foreign Minister, 1895; First Secretary of the Legation at St. Petersburg, 1896; Minister to Belgium, 1898; Minister to France, 1901; Ambassador to Russia, 1906; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1916; member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Page 27, note 24. **Department of Factory Inspection**. An Imperial Commission on factory conditions had been appointed as early as 1859, but nothing practical came of its deliberations until 1882, when legislative measures were taken for the protection of women and children in factories. The Department of Factory Inspection was established in 1882, under the ministry of Bunge; primarily with a view to seeing that the law passed in the same year concerning the work of children was obeyed. A little later (1886) other grievances were dealt with and partly removed by regulating contracts for hire and by

providing that the money derived from deductions and fines should not be appropriated by the employers. The Department of Factory Inspection was established in order to see that the benevolent intentions of the government were duly carried out. The Department of Factory Inspection was responsible to the Minister of Finance until October 1905 and after this date to the newly formed Ministry of Commerce and Industry established by the ukase of October 27, 1905.

CHAPTER III

Page 29, note 1. **Alexandria**. Summer residence of the Imperial family near Peterhof about twenty-five miles from St. Petersburg.

Page 30, note 2. **Egor Sergeevich Sazonov** (1879-1910). Expelled from his university for participating in radical student demonstrations; with another revolutionist, Sikorsky, he assassinated Plehve at the order of the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionists, and for this crime was sentenced to hard labor for life; committed suicide as a protest against the corporal punishment of political prisoners.

3. **Petr Pavlovich Hesse** (1846-1905). Adjutant General; appointed Palace Commandant, 1896.

4. **Aleksei Aleksandrovich Lopukhin** (1864-1927). Director of the Department of Police, 1902-1905; in 1908 revealed to Burtsev, a Socialist-Revolutionist, that Azef, a prominent member of the Socialist-Revolutionist Combat Organization, was an *agent provocateur*; sentenced to five years' exile, 1909, but granted amnesty and restoration of civil rights, 1912; assistant director, Moscow branch, St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank, 1913.

Page 31, note 5. **Prince Petr Dmitrievich Sviatopolk-Mirsky** (1857-1914). Assistant Minister of the Interior and commander of a special corps of gendarmes, 1900; later became Governor-General of the Vilna area until the assassination of Plehve in 1904, when he was appointed Minister of the Interior; dismissed in January 1905 and succeeded by A. G. Bulygin.

6. **Count Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov** (1825-1888). Served with distinction in the Caucasus and in the War of 1877-1878; Minister of the Interior, 1880-1881, and trusted adviser of Alexander II; author of the so-called "Constitution" which the Tsar was about to promulgate when he was assassinated; dismissed, May 1881, and his project, which was attacked by Pobedonostsev and others, was abandoned by Alexander III.

Page 32, note 7. **The ukase of December 12, 1904**. Directed the Committee of Ministers to work out measures which should reduce the restrictions in the regulation of the press, provide state insurance for factory workers, provide for greater religious toleration, define the scope of local self-government, reduce the degree of disfranchisement of the national minorities, and do away with all manner of exceptional laws. The Committee was to consider each point separately, work out the best method of putting the measures into effect, and inform His Majesty of the progress of this work. Witte states (*The Memoirs of Count Witte* [Garden City, 1921], pp. 220-22) that Mirsky opened his campaign for reform by submitting a report to the Tsar, append-

ing to it the draft of a ukase which included the measures to be enacted. The Prince's report was discussed by a conference presided over by the Emperor. No decision was reached and the Tsar ordered Baron Noide to draft under Witte's supervision a decree reflecting the views of the conference. This draft was then to be considered by the Committee of Ministers. At a second conference on December 6 or 7 there was a discussion of a definitive text which included a rather vaguely worded provision for the admission of elected representatives to participate in the legislative activity of the government. The Tsar changed this article in the sense that these representatives were selected by the government rather than elected by the people. Witte advised the Emperor to strike out the article altogether, and this was done.

Page 33, note 8. **Vasilii Ivanovich Timiriazev** (1849-1921). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; entered the Ministry of Finance, 1873; served as commissioner to the Paris and Philadelphia World's Fairs and later took part in the organization of the all-Russian industrial exposition in Moscow; Assistant Minister of Finance and head of the Department of Industry, Science, and Commerce, 1902; Minister of Commerce and Industry after that Ministry was established in 1905; resigned in 1906 and entered private business; member of State Council, 1906; again appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry, January 1909; resigned at the end of the year.

9. **Dmitrii Fedorovich Trepov** (1855-1906). General "à la suite"; second son of General F. F. Trepov and brother of A. F., V. F., and F. F. Trepov, Jr.; head of police, Moscow, 1896-1905, and close collaborator of the Governor-General, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich; Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Assistant Minister of the Interior and head of the police, 1905; Commandant at the Imperial Court, October 1905.

Page 34, note 10. **Sergei Vasilevich Zubatov** (1863-1917). Active in radical and revolutionary circles in the 'eighties in Moscow, and soon began to report them to the police; in 1889, became assistant chief and later chief of the Moscow Secret Police Department; as the inspirer and organizer of the "Zubatovshchina," or "police socialism," in 1902 promoted workers' unions in Moscow and Petersburg for the purpose of diverting the workers from revolutionary activity; resigned, 1903, and was later exiled to Vladimir; again connected with the Department of Police during Trepov's administration, 1905; committed suicide shortly after the February (March) Revolution of 1917.

11. **Georgii Apollonovich Gapon** (1870-1906). Ukrainian priest; with the advice of Zubatov began to organize workers' circles, 1902; leader in the organization of a society of St. Petersburg workers, formed with the approval of Plehve and supported by funds from the Secret Police Department; conceived the plan of a workers' petition to the Tsar and on January 9, 1905, led the procession to the Winter Palace, when many of the marchers were killed and wounded by the fire of the troops; escaped from Russia and attempted to approach Plekhanov, Lenin, and other revolutionists abroad; returned to Russia and renewed his contacts with the police; killed by the revolutionists.

12. **Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich**. Son of Emperor Alexander II and uncle of Nicholas II; Governor-General of Moscow; assassinated, February 1905, by Koliaev, a Socialist-Revolutionist.

Page 35, note 13. **Matiushinsky**. In 1905 on the staff of *Novosti*; a moderate liberal.

14. **Pavel Grigorevich Kurlov** (1860–1923). Assistant Minister of the Interior and commander, Special Corps of Gendarmes, 1909; dismissed from his post after the assassination of P. A. Stolypin in 1911; later Assistant Minister of the Interior under Protopopov; left Russia after the Revolution.

15. **Ivan Aleksandrovich Fullon** (1844–1918). Adjutant General and General of Infantry; Chief of Gendarme Corps in Poland; succeeded General Kleigels as Governor-General of St. Petersburg, 1904; Commander of 11th Army Corps, from January 1905 to 1911.

16. **Vladimir Ivanovich Kovalevsky** (1848– ?). Graduate, St. Petersburg Institute of Agriculture; imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress, 1875–1877, for his connection with the Nechaev affair; entered the Ministry of State Domains, 1879; Assistant Minister of Finance under Witte; later Chairman of the Imperial Technological Society; Chairman of the Scientific Agricultural Committee, 1920; since 1923 honorary Chairman of the State Institute of Applied Agriculture.

Page 36, note 17. **Gatchina**. A town in Tsarskoe Selo Uezd, of the St. Petersburg Gubernia. Peter the Great presented the land with several villages to the Princess Nataliia Alekseevna, after whose death Gatchina became an imperial estate. Catherine the Great gave Gatchina to Prince Orlov, who erected the present palace, and from whose heirs Catherine repossessed the estate. During the reign of Nicholas I it served as the autumn residence of the Imperial family.

18. **E. I. Kedrin** (1852–). A liberal lawyer and counsel for the defense in several important political trials; 1889–1904, councillor of the Petersburg City Duma; member of the State Duma, 1906, and of the Constitutional Democratic party. He was a member of the deputation which approached Witte and Sviatopolk-Mirsky to ask them to have the troops kept in barracks on the day of the demonstration and to induce the Emperor to receive or send someone to receive a delegation of workers. In searching Kedrin the police found a draft address to the public which had been prepared for the deputation by Maxim Gorky. Gorky has also acknowledged that he initiated the idea of sending this deputation to the minister. The police subsequently charged that this deputation was in reality a "provisional government" which had begun to function on the eve of the "Bloody Sunday" and which later agitated for an armed uprising and sent a delegation abroad to establish connections with foreign sympathizers. Gorky also was arrested in Riga and was imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress.

Page 38, note 19. **Aleksandr Grigorevich Bulygin** (1851–1919). After holding various provincial administrative offices, he was appointed assistant to the Governor-General of Moscow, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, in 1902; appointed to the State Council, 1902; Minister of the Interior, succeeding Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, January–October, 1905; later Chief of the Fourth Department of the Tsar's Private Chancellery (supervision of the institutions of Empress Marie).

Page 40, note 20. *Novoe Vremia*. Founded by A. S. Suvorin, Sr., and published in St. Petersburg after 1865 five times a week and after 1869 daily;

represented conservative tendencies; during the pre-war years it was edited by M. A. Suvorin and controlled by a board which included Menshikov, Guchkov, P. L. Bark, Mazaev, and others; ceased to appear after the October (November) Revolution, 1917.

21. **Nikolai Vladimirovich Shidlovsky (1843-1907)**. Specialist in financial and economic questions; State Secretary in the Imperial Chancellery, 1865-1892; later member of the Senate, the State Council, and the Finance Committee.

22. **Vladimir Petrovich Litvinov-Falinsky (1868-1928)**. Inspector of factories, St. Petersburg district, 1895; recognized for his technical knowledge and his skill in handling industrial disputes; appointed Director of the Special Committee presided over by N. V. Shidlovsky; left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution.

CHAPTER IV

Page 42, note 1. **Mendelssohn and Company**. A banking house, established in 1805 in Berlin by Joseph and Abraham Mendelssohn, the two sons of the philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn. It remained in the control of the family through four generations of successful bankers, of whom Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was one of the ablest and most influential.

2. **The fall of Port Arthur**. The surrender of this city by the Russians took place on December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905, n.s.), after a siege of many months.

Page 43, note 3. **Aleksandr Ivanovich Nelidov (1838-1910)**. Studied law and Oriental languages at St. Petersburg University; entered diplomatic service, 1855; secretary successively to the Russian embassies at Athens, Munich, and Vienna; Counsellor to the Embassy in Constantinople, 1872; directed the diplomatic office at the headquarters of the Russian Army during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and took an active part in the negotiations which led to the Peace of San Stefano, and later the Treaty of Berlin; Ambassador to Saxony, 1879; between 1883 and 1897 took a prominent part in the settlement of the Armenian question and in the adjustment of the Balkan difficulties, and contributed to the strengthening of Russian influence in Constantinople; Ambassador at Rome, 1897-1903; Ambassador to France, 1903-1910.

4. **Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamsdorf (1845-1907)**. Of a Westphalian family, one branch of which in 1817 received the title of Count in Russia; accompanied Gorchakov to the Congress of Berlin in 1878; assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muravev, 1897; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1901-1906.

Page 45, note 5. **Sergei Efimovich Kryzhanovsky (1862-1934)**. Graduate of St. Petersburg University, Faculty of Law; entered state service in 1885; examining magistrate and Assistant Public Prosecutor, 1885-1896; transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where he occupied various posts, 1896-1911; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1906; Imperial Secretary, 1911; member of the State Council, January 1917; played an important part

in preparing the drafts of the law of August 6, 1905, on the consultative Duma, and of that of June 3, 1907, revising the electoral law of December 11, 1905.

6. **The Manifesto of October 17, 1905.** Guaranteed to the Russian nation the fundamental principles of civil liberty—inviolability of person, and freedom of thought, speech, assembly, and organization; democratic franchise; the principle that no law could henceforth be made without the consent of the State Duma, which had been created, with consultative power only, by the Manifesto of August 6.

7. **Zinovii Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848–1909).** Admiral; selected in 1904 for the difficult command of the Baltic Fleet on its voyage to the Far East; wounded and captured by the Japanese in the battle of Tsushima, in May 1905, in which 194 officers and 4,634 men perished; on his return to Russia tried by a naval court-martial in which the prosecution demanded the death penalty; acquitted and retired.

Page 46, note 8. **Dogger Bank incident.** On October 21, 1904 (n.s.), off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, some British trawlers were fired upon by the Russian Baltic Fleet on its way to the Far East. The Russians explained that they thought the trawlers were Japanese submarines. Public opinion was greatly excited in both Russia and Great Britain, but the affair was amicably settled by reference to an international commission which reported on February 25, 1905 (n.s.), holding the Russian government liable for compensation.

9. **Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich (1850–1908).** Fourth son of Alexander II and uncle of Nicholas II; entered naval service in his youth; succeeded Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich as head of the Ministry of the Navy with the rank of General Admiral, 1882; relieved of his post in 1905, when the rank of General Admiral was abolished.

Page 49, note 10. **Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849–1912).** Rear Admiral; commander of Third Squadron of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima; as commander of four surviving ships endeavored to escape but, on being surrounded by twenty-eight Japanese ships, surrendered; tried by a naval court-martial, 1906, and sentenced to death; the sentence later commuted to ten years' imprisonment, deprivation of all rank, and exclusion from the service.

Page 50, note 11. **Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev (1827–1907).** Professor of Russian Civil Law, Moscow University, and tutor of the sons of Alexander II, 1860–1865; Senator, 1868; member of the State Council, 1872; Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, 1880; as an uncompromising reactionary opposed the application of Western institutions in Russia and advocated repressive policies against national and religious minorities.

12. **Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Polovtsov (1832–1912).** A graduate of the Imperial School of Law, St. Petersburg; Senator, member of the State Council and Imperial Secretary, 1883–1892; one of the founders of the Imperial Russian Historical Society.

13. **Vasilli Osipovich Kliuchevsky (1841–1911).** Professor at the University of Moscow, 1879–1911, and one of the most eminent of Russian historians; closely connected with liberal circles.

14. **Aleksandr Semenovich Stishinsky (1851-1920)**. Graduate of Moscow University; Assistant State Secretary, 1873-1886; later transferred to the Ministry of the Interior; Assistant Imperial Secretary, 1896-1899; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1900-1904; member of State Council, 1904; Minister of Agriculture, April-June, 1906.

CHAPTER V

Page 52, note 1. **Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919)**. Twenty-sixth President of the United States, 1901-1909.

2. **Terminate the war**. During April and May both Russia and Japan were putting out peace feelers. Late in May, the Japanese Foreign Minister suggested that President Roosevelt invite the belligerents to discuss peace. After inquiries at St. Petersburg, Roosevelt made a formal proposal on June 8 (n.s.). After some further negotiations, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was chosen as the place of the conference.

3. **Nikolai Valerianovich Muravev (1850-1908)**. Nephew of the famous Count Muravev-Amursky, Governor-General of the Far East; graduate of St. Petersburg and Moscow universities; lecturer in criminal law at Moscow University; occupied various positions in the judiciary; Imperial Secretary, 1892; Minister of Justice, 1894-1905; Ambassador to Rome, 1905.

Page 53, note 4. **This appointment**. A. P. Izvolsky writes of this incident: "It appears that, after these refusals [of Nelidov and Muravev] the Emperor had fixed his choice upon me, and that, for forty-eight hours, I had been considered as the chief of the mission which was to be sent to America; but my candidature was vigorously opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorff, who advocated the appointment of M. Witte, with whom he was closely allied, not only personally but politically" (*Recollections of a Foreign Minister: Memoirs of Alexander Izvolsky* [Garden City, 1921], p. 7). Izvolsky, who was not in Petersburg at the time but in Copenhagen, says further that he urged the appointment of Witte (*ibid.*, p. 8).

5. **Ivan Pavlovich Shipov (1865-1919)**. Educated at the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; became Assistant Director of the Special Credit Office of the Ministry of Finance and then Director of the General Office of the same Ministry; was a member of the Board of the State Bank, 1902-1905; Minister of Finance, October 1905 to April 1906.

Page 56, note 6. **Fedor Fedorovich Martens (Frederick Frommhold de Martens) (1845-1909)**. Russian jurist, born in Livonia; entered the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1868; Professor of Public Law in the Imperial School of Law and the Imperial Alexander Lyceum, 1872; undertook special juristic work for the Russian government, 1874; author of many books on international law; participated in a number of well-known international arbitration cases, including controversies between Mexico and the United States and between Great Britain and France; employed by the Russian government in the preparatory work for the first Hague Conference; one of the Russian plenipotentiaries at this first Conference, and President of the Fourth Com-

mittee (on maritime law) at the second Conference; judge of the Russian Supreme Prize Court, set up to handle cases which had arisen during the war with Japan.

7. **Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen** (1847–1922). After studying at Reval, Dorpat, and St. Petersburg, entered the Department of Justice, from which he was transferred to that of Foreign Affairs; Consul General in New York, 1886–1894, and Chargé d'Affaires at Washington during Cleveland's administration; Secretary of Legation at Tokyo and Minister until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War; was appointed Ambassador to the United States in 1905 and was Second Plenipotentiary at the peace negotiations at Portsmouth.

8. *Memoirs*. Witte states in his memoirs that the Emperor told him in his last interview that he sincerely desired that the pourparlers should result in peace. "He added, however, that he would not pay a kopeck of indemnity or cede an inch of Russian territory" (*The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 135). In his *Forty Years of Diplomacy* ([New York, 1922, 2 vols.], I, 263), Baron Rosen writes of his conversation with Witte on the latter's arrival in America: "It was necessary, therefore, to establish between us a complete agreement on all points detailed in our instructions. The rest being easily disposed of, two of these points demanded most serious attention. They concerned the Island of Sakhalin and the question of the payment of a war indemnity. On both these points the Emperor's instructions were explicit and categorical. We were not to consent to the cession of even the smallest particle of Russian territory, nor to the payment of a war indemnity in any shape or form."

Page 57, note 9. *Witte's telegram*. Regarding this, Dillon writes: "When I was with Witte at Portsmouth . . . the statesman sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorff, suggesting that Japan's claim to retain half of the Island of Sakhalin and to receive a certain money compensation for the other half should be seriously considered. This telegram was laid before the Emperor who, as I afterward learned, wrote upon it: 'Neither a rood of land nor a rouble shall Japan receive. From this position nothing will ever make me recede'" (*The Eclipse of Russia* [London, 1918], p. 186).

10. **Nikolai Petrovich Linevich** (1838–1908). General; entered military service at seventeen; served in the Russo-Turkish War and in Turkestan; Major General, 1891; in August 1900 assumed command of the Russian detachment in the Allied expedition for the relief of the legations at Peking during the Boxer troubles; Governor-General of the Amur Province, 1904; later, in command at Vladivostok, and in November 1904 became commander of the Russian First Army under Kuropatkin; after the battle of Mukden (March, 1905), succeeded Kuropatkin as Commander in Chief of the Russian land forces in the East.

Page 58, note 11. *Compensation for prisoners of war*. This was provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty of Portsmouth, August 23, 1905 (September 5, n.s.). Of the outcome of the negotiations Witte wrote: "I carried out the instructions given to me by my Monarch fully and strictly. The cession of Southern Sakhalin was the only infringement upon the principle of no territorial cessions—but for that step His Majesty alone is responsible. It was

a correct step, for otherwise we would have failed to obtain peace, but I would probably not have taken it on my own initiative.

"As for President Roosevelt, at first he tried to scare me into making considerable concessions by pointing out to me that otherwise the treaty would not be concluded. But he met with a firm determination on my part not to make any such concessions. At that time, there were two clashing parties within the body of the Tokio Government. One, headed by Ito, advocated the acceptance of my conditions; the other insisted on an indemnity and was ready to continue the war, should we fail to accede to that demand. Then Roosevelt, seeing that American public opinion was becoming favourable toward Russia and fearing that the unsuccessful end of the parley might turn the sympathies of the people away from him and from the Japanese, telegraphed to the Mikado, describing the trend of public opinion in America and advising him to accept my conditions. Komura was instructed to yield . . ." (*The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 153).

Page 59, note 12. William II (1858-). German Emperor and King of Prussia, from 1888 until his abdication, November 28, 1918.

13. Rominten. The interview with the Emperor William took place after Witte's return from the United States at the Prussian hunting castle at Rominten, situated near the Russian frontier. Witte, in his *Memoirs* (pp. 417-23), states that after his return from the United States he learned that King Edward, as well as Emperor William, desired to see him. He replied that he could not visit Their Majesties before reporting to his Monarch. Afterward, however, he was instructed to visit the German Emperor. The treaty of Björkö, which the Kaiser had inveigled the Tsar into signing, was one of the topics of discussion. Concerning this treaty Witte says that the Kaiser was "reticent . . . about the substance of the Björkö understanding and clearly would not let me read the instrument." The Emperor, however, gave his version of the document and asked Witte whether or not he was satisfied with this development. "In my innocence," Witte writes, "I replied that his words had filled my heart with joy." On this occasion Witte received two presents from the Kaiser: his portrait, with an inscription "Portsmouth—Björkö—Rominten Wilhelm rex," and a chain of the Order of the Red Eagle, which, according to Witte, is given only to sovereigns or members of their families. Eulenburg, who was present at Rominten, wrote Bülow that Witte seemed to be quite fascinated by the Kaiser, to whom he said: "Björkö est le plus grand soulagement de ma vie!—le seul moyen d'arriver à une politique stable" (*Memoirs of Prince von Bülow* [Boston, 1931-32, 4 vols.], II, 190).

CHAPTER VI

Page 61, note 1. **Manifesto of October 17, 1905.** See note 6, chapter iv, above.

Page 62, note 2. **Correspondence with Netzlin.** The *Krasnyi Arkhiv* (IV [1923], 129-56) contains correspondence between Kokovtsov and Netzlin relating to financial matters in the years 1906-1909.

3. **Bernhard, Heinrich Martin Karl, Prince von Bülow (1849-1929).** Studied in Lausanne, Leipzig, and Berlin; after serving in the Franco-Prussian War, entered the German Foreign Office, 1874; diplomatic service at Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Athens, Paris; Secretary at the Berlin Congress; Minister to Rumania in 1888; Ambassador to Italy, 1893; Foreign Secretary, 1897; Chancellor of the German Empire and Prime Minister of Prussia, 1900-1909; in December 1914 sent to Rome as Ambassador in order to attempt to bring Italy to the side of the Central Powers.

4. **Count Pavel Stepan Konstantinovich Benckendorf (1853-1921).** Aide-de-Camp General of the Emperor; First Chamberlain of the Court.

5. **Maurice Rouvier (1842-1911).** Elected to French National Assembly, 1871; Minister of Commerce, 1881; Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 1887; Minister of Finance, 1889-1892 and 1902; Minister-President, and temporarily Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1905.

6. **Emile Loubet (1838-1929).** French Senator, 1885; Minister of Public Works, 1887-1888; Minister-President, 1892; President of the Senate, 1896; succeeded Faure as President of the Republic, 1899; retired from political life, 1906.

Page 63, note 7. **Bonds in France and Germany.** *Prince Bülow and the Kaiser: With Excerpts from Their Private Correspondence Preserved in the Records of the German Foreign Office*, by Spectator [London, 1931], pp. 198-99.

Page 66, note 8. **Aleksei Sergeevich Ermolov (1847-1916).** Graduate of the Imperial Alexander Lyceum and the St. Petersburg Agricultural Institute; entered the Ministry of Finance, 1871; Director of the Department of Indirect Revenues, 1883; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1892; in charge of the Ministry of State Domains, 1893, and commissioned by Alexander III to reconstruct this ministry into the Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains; Minister of Agriculture, 1894-1906; member of the State Council, 1905; member of the International Agricultural Institute in Rome, and an honorary member of the Academy of Science, 1899.

9. **Eduard Vasilevich Frisch (1833-1907).** Assistant Minister of Justice, 1876-1883; member of State Council, 1883; Chairman of the State Council, 1906.

Page 69, note 10. **Ivan Grigorevich Shcheglovitov (1861-1918).** Held various posts in the Senate and the Ministry of Justice between 1890 and 1905; Assistant Minister of Justice, January 1906; Minister of Justice, April 1906-1915; member of the State Council, 1907; Chairman of the State Council, 1916; after the February (March) 1917 Revolution, imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress; he was later transferred to Moscow and was put to death by the Bolsheviks in August 1918.

11. **Schlüsselburg prison.** A fortress on a small island of the Neva River, near Lake Ladoga, taken from the Swedes by Peter the Great in 1702. After 1884, and at the suggestion of Alexander III, it became exclusively a prison for serious political offenders. From 1908 to 1917 it was used for both criminal and political prisoners.

CHAPTER VII

Page 74, note 1. *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*. Official daily newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from 1869 to 1917 in accordance with the Imperial order of October 27, 1869; continued as *Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva* from March 5 to October 27, 1917; in addition to official government communiqués it included scientific, historical, and bibliographical information and news.

CHAPTER VIII

Page 83, note 1. **The Ruling Senate** (*Pravitelstvuiushchii Senat*) was established by Peter the Great in 1711 with extensive administrative and judicial powers. During subsequent reigns its functions were considerably altered, its administrative activities were curtailed, and it became primarily concerned with the promulgation and execution of laws. There were six departments of the Senate, two of which were Courts of Cassation; an *Ober Prokuror* presided over each department. The Minister of Justice, as *General Prokuror* and the highest officer of the body, presided over plenary sessions. Members of the Senate were appointed by the Emperor. The Senate was abolished by the Soviet Government by decree December 7, 1917 (n.s.).

Page 84, note 2. **The Moscow riots**. Riots and strikes broke out in Moscow on December 7; barricades were thrown up and fighting broke out. All business except baking was suspended. The authorities, doubtful of the loyalty of the Moscow garrison, confined the troops to barracks. On the 14th, the Semenovskiy regiment arrived from St. Petersburg, and four days later the uprising was suppressed.

Page 85, note 3. **Petr Nikolaevich Durnovo** (1845-1915). Graduate of naval school and military and law academies; entered the Ministry of the Interior, 1881; Director of Police, 1884-1893; Assistant Minister of the Interior under Sipiagin, Plehve, Sviatopolk-Mirsky, and Bulygin, 1900-1905; Minister of the Interior in Witte's cabinet, 1905-1906; Durnovo believed that Russia's interests would be best served by close and friendly relations with Germany, and in February 1914 warned the Emperor of the dangers to the monarchical principle and the autocratic régime of a conflict with Germany. (A translation of this warning is given in F. A. Golder, *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917* [New York, 1927], pp. 3-23.)

4. **Anatolii Pavlovich Ivashchenkov**. Assistant Minister of Ways and Communications for half a year in 1892; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1892-1897; Assistant State Comptroller, 1897; member of State Council, 1899.

Page 86, note 5. **Public men**. The term *obshchestvennye deiateli* has no exact parallel in English. It refers to persons who were not state officials but were active in public service and were for the most part liberals.

Page 90, note 6. **The Algeciras Conference**. Met on January 16 (n.s.), 1906, to work out an adjustment of the conflicting interests and claims of the powers in Morocco.

7. Artur Germanovich Raffalovich (1853-1921). Russian economist; educated in France; member of the Institut de France; representative in France of the Russian Ministry of Finance under Vyshegradsky, Witte, and Kokovtsov; author of many works, including *Russia, Its Trade and Commerce*, *Les coalitions de producteurs et le protectionnisme*, and *Mémoire sur la conférence de la paix*.

Page 91, note 8. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (1842-1912). French publicist, author of *L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes* and *Un homme d'état russe*; Professor of Contemporary History and Eastern Affairs at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques, 1881; Director of this institution, 1906; member Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 1887.

Page 95, note 9. Anatolii Vasilevich Nekliudov (1856- ?). Minister to Bulgaria, 1911-1913; Ambassador to Sweden, 1914-June 1917; appointed Ambassador to Spain in April 1917 by the Provisional Government; resigned in September 1917.

CHAPTER IX

Page 99, note 1. Nikolai Nikolaevich Kutler (1859-1924). Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1904-1905; Assistant Minister of Finance and Manager of the Bank of the Nobility and Peasant Bank, 1905; Minister of Agriculture, 1905; dismissed for the project of compulsory alienation of private estates, 1906; joined the Cadets; member of the Second and Third Dumas; after the Bolshevik Revolution worked in People's Commissariat of Finance; member of the Board of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., 1922-1924.

Page 100, note 2. Aleksandr Petrovich Nikolsky (1851-1919). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; in 1866 entered the Ministry of Finance, where he remained for twenty years, serving as a director of the State Bank, manager of the Savings Bank, and director of the State Savings Bank, etc.; Minister of Agriculture, 1906; appointed to the Senate, 1906, and later to the State Council, where he joined the Right group; member of the Finance Committee, 1914; State Secretary, 1916.

Page 103, note 3. John Pierpont Morgan, Sr. (1837-1913). After studying at the University of Göttingen, began his business career in the banking house of Duncan, Sherman & Co., of New York; became junior partner in Dabney, Morgan & Co., in 1864, later in Drexel, Morgan & Co., which subsequently became J. P. Morgan & Co.

Page 105, note 4. The Synod. The Holy All-Russian Ruling Synod (*Śviatēishii Vserossiiskii Pravitel'stvennshchii Sinod*). After the death of the Patriarch Adrian in 1700, Peter the Great did not permit the election of a successor. Instead he abolished the Patriarchate and in 1721 established a collegiate body, the Holy Synod, as the supreme institution for the administration of ecclesiastical affairs. The executive of the Synod, the *Ober Prokuror*, in later times held the rank of minister and reported on church affairs to the Emperor who appointed the members of the Synod. The Provisional Government reorganized the Synod, abolished the office of *Ober Prokuror*, and set up a Ministry of Confessions. Later, after the Bolshevik

Revolution, the Patriarchate was restored for a short time but was subsequently abolished in the Soviet Union.

5. **Prince Aleksei Dmitrievich Obolensky (1855-1933)**. Marshal of the Nobility of Kaluga Gubernia; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1900; manager of the Bank of the Nobility and the Peasant Bank; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1902; drafted the historic manifesto of October 17, 1905; member of State Council, 1905; Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod; 1905-1906.

CHAPTER X

Page 107, note 1. **Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1847-1909)**. Third son of Alexander II; Commander of the 12th Army during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; from 1876 president of the Academy of Art.

2. **D. A. Benckendorf**. An intimate of the Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, but holding no official position.

Page 111, note 3. **John Baring, Baron Revelstoke (1863-1929)**. Son of the first Lord Revelstoke of England and nephew of Lord Cromer; attended Eton and Cambridge; junior partner in Baring Brothers, 1890; succeeded to the title, 1897; Privy Councillor, 1902; member of the Council of the Prince of Wales, 1907; Receiver General, Duchy of Cornwall, 1908; Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex, 1926; resigned partnership in Baring Brothers and directorship in Bank of England, 1929, to act on Committee of Experts on Reparations.

Page 113, note 4. **Yakov Isaakovich Utin**. Chairman of the Board, St. Petersburg Loan and Discount Bank, and of the Rossiia Insurance Co.; engaged in many other important financial undertakings.

Page 115, note 5. **Raymond Nicolas Landry Poincaré (1860-1934)**. Lawyer of France; elected deputy, 1887; Minister of Public Instruction and Minister of Finance, 1893-1895; engaged in legal practice for several years; Senator, 1903; Minister-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1912, supporting the Russian alliance and the entente with Great Britain and a strong national policy; succeeded Fallières as President of the Republic, 1913; criticized the Versailles Treaty as too lenient; Minister-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1922-1924, during which period he carried out the occupation of the Ruhr; Minister-President, 1926-1929, as head of a national coalition which reorganized state finances and stabilized the franc; resigned because of illness.

6. **Jean Marie Ferdinand Sarrien (1840-1915)**. French Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, 1885; Minister of the Interior, 1886, 1888, and 1896; Minister of Justice, 1898; Minister-President and Minister of Justice, 1906; Senator, 1908.

7. **Georges Clémenceau (1841-1929)**. Studied medicine at Nantes and Paris; spent four years in America, returning to Paris to practice his profession; deputy for Paris during the War of 1870; re-entered the Chamber, 1876; opponent of the monarchists, of Boulanger, and of imperialism, and hostile to the Russian alliance; Senator, 1902; Minister of the Interior and Minister-President, 1906-1909; bitter critic of the French conduct of the

War; Minister-President, 1917-1920; President of the Peace Conference and member of the Council of Four, 1918; his candidacy for the Presidency of the French Republic strongly opposed; resigned as Minister-President, January 1920.

Page 116, note 8. **Mikhail Nikolaevich Galkin-Vrasskoi** (1834-1909). Served on an expedition to Khiva and Bokhara, 1858; appointed Secretary of the Committee of Ministers, 1866; two years later made Governor-General of Estliandskaia and later Governor-General of Saratov gubernias; student of penology and advocate of reforms; Chief of Penal Administration, 1879-1895; member of the State Council.

9. **Jean Antoine Constant** (1833-1913). Professor of Law; deputy, 1876; Minister of the Interior, 1880 and 1889-1892; French Ambassador at Constantinople, 1898-1907.

Page 117, note 10. **Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov** (1859-). Historian; professor at Moscow University; leader of Russian liberalism and of the "Cadet" party (see note 2, chapter xii, below); participant in the liberal conferences, 1905; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; Minister of Foreign Affairs in the First Provisional Government, March-May, 1917; active in the anti-Bolshevik movement after the Bolshevik Revolution; in emigration; editor of *Posledniia Novosti*.

11. **Clément Armand Fallières** (1841-1931). Minister of the Interior, France, 1882-1883; Minister-President, 1883; Minister of Public Instruction, 1883-1885; Minister of the Interior, later Minister of Justice, 1887; Minister of the Interior, 1889; Minister of Justice, 1890-1892; elected to the Senate, 1890; President of the Senate, 1899; President of the Republic, 1906-1913.

Page 118, note 12. **Anatole France** (1844-1924). One of the most distinguished of French men of letters of his time; a supporter of the progressive and later the revolutionary movements of the early years of the present century.

13. **Prince Pavel Dmitrievich Dolgorukov** (1866-1927). Active in zemstvo work; one of the founders of the Union for Liberation (*Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia*) and chairman at the conference of this Union, 1904; participated in zemstvo conferences, 1904-1905; one of the founders of the Cadet party and chairman of its Central Committee, 1905-1911; member of the Second State Duma; after the October (November) Revolution, active in the anti-Soviet organizations; arrested by the Soviet OGPU and shot.

CHAPTER XI

Page 123, note 1. **Ivan Logginovich Goremykin** (1839-1918). After serving in the Department of Justice, 1891, and in the Ministry of the Interior, became Minister of the Interior, 1895-1899; addressed a memorial to the Tsar urging administrative reform, 1897; resigned because of Witte's opposition to his plan to extend zemstvo representation; Chairman of the Ministers' Council, May-July, 1906, and 1914-1916.

2. **Nikolai Ivanovich Vuich**. Senator; Secretary of the Ministers' Committee.

Page 124, note 3. *Russkiiia Vedomosti*. Daily paper, organ of Russian liberals; founded in Moscow in 1863 by N. F. Pavlov; edited by N. S. Skvortsov, 1866-1882, and by V. M. Sobolevsky, 1882-1912; later the organ of the Right Cadets; closed by the Bolsheviks, 1918.

4. *Russkoe Slovo*. A daily paper of moderate liberal tendencies with a considerable circulation and influence; published in Moscow, from 1894 to 1917; from 1906 to 1917 reflected opinions close to those of the Cadet party; closed by the Bolsheviks in 1917; continued as *Novoe Slovo*.

5. *Rech*. Daily paper, organ of the Central Committee of Cadets; published from 1906 to 1917 in St. Petersburg; edited by Miliukov and Hessen; after the October (November) Revolution took definitely anti-Bolshevik attitude and was closed almost immediately; reappeared successively as *Nasha Rech*, *Svobodnaia Rech*, *Vek*, *Novaiia Rech*, and *Nash Vek*; finally closed late in 1918.

Page 125, note 6. **M. O. Menshikov** (? -1918). Journalist; for many years a leading contributor to the *Novoe Vremia*; executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918.

7. *Grazhdanin*. Weekly (up to 1887), daily, and then semi-weekly; published by Prince V. P. Meshchersky, 1872-1914; among its early editors were G. K. Gradovsky, F. M. Dostoevsky, and V. F. Putsykevich. At first moderately conservative, it became under Meshchersky's editorship more conservative, reflecting the views of conservative nobility and bureaucracy. The paper received a government subsidy of about eighty thousand rubles.

Page 126, note 8. *Zemstvo* people. The zemstvo provincial and county councils were created in 1864 as local institutions responsible for the maintenance of public works, hospitals, medical and veterinary services, education, and public welfare agencies in general. The prerogatives of the zemstvos were restricted and their composition altered in 1889, but during the following years their influence and popularity developed. From about 1902 to the issuance of the October Manifesto, the zemstvo workers were actively involved in a campaign to secure the establishment of representative institutions.

Page 127, note 9. Petr Arkadevich Stolypin (1862-1911). Graduate in physics and mathematics, St. Petersburg University; entered the Ministry of Agriculture, 1885; Marshal of Nobility, Kovno, 1899; Governor of Grodno, 1901; Governor of Saratov, 1903, where he acted with great firmness and tact during the disturbances of 1905; Minister of the Interior, May 1906, succeeding Goremykin as Chairman of the Ministers' Council the same year; assassinated in Kiev, 1911.

10. Prince Aleksei Aleksandrovich Shirinsky-Shikhmatov (1862-1929). Procurator of the Moscow office of the Holy Synod, 1894; Governor of Tver, 1903; Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, 1906; in July of the same year was made a member of the State Council, where he joined the Right group.

11. Aleksandr Petrovich Izvolsky (1856-1919). Graduate of the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; entered the diplomatic service, holding junior appointments at Bucharest, Washington, and the Vatican; subsequently became Minister Plenipotentiary at Belgrade, Munich, Tokyo, and Copenhagen; in 1906 succeeded Count Lamsdorf as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and from 1910 to 1917 was Russian Ambassador at Paris.

Page 128, note 12. **Aleksandr Sergeevich Taneev** (1850–1917). Musician and composer; functionary of the Russian Court; State Secretary and Director of the Private Chancellery of the Emperor from 1896 to 1917; member of the State Council.

Page 129, note 13. **Petr Mikhailovich Kaufman-Turkestan** (1857–1926). Served in the secretariat of the Committee of Ministers and later in the Ministry of the Interior under Loris-Melikov; Assistant State Secretary in the Imperial Chancellery, 1886–1892; in charge of the Red Cross during the Russo-Japanese War; after the conclusion of peace appointed member of the State Council; Minister of Education, 1906–1908; on the staff of the Commander in Chief, in charge of the Red Cross, 1915.

14. **Nikolai Konstantinovich Schaffhausen-Schönberg och Schaufuss** (1846–1912). Educated in Nicholas Military Engineering Academy; military engineer; Lieutenant General; supervisor of the Moscow-Kursk railway line, later of the Nicholas railway line, and Chief of the Department of Railways; Minister of Ways and Communications, 1906.

Page 130, note 15. **The Kronstadt insurrection**. At the instigation of Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionists, a mutiny occurred on July 19–20, 1906, in certain units of the garrison at Kronstadt. Loyal troops put down the rebellion without difficulty, and a court-martial sentenced thirty-six of those involved to be shot and many others to long terms at hard labor.

16. **Marie Sophia Frederika Dagmar Fedorovna** (1847–1928). Second daughter of King Christian IX of Denmark; first engaged to the heir to the throne, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (eldest son of Emperor Alexander II), who died in April 1865; later Princess Dagmar became engaged to the heir to the throne, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, who became Alexander III; after the February (March) Revolution, she was permitted to live with other members of the royal family in Crimea, under close guard; in 1919 left the Crimea for England, and spent the last years of her life in Copenhagen.

17. **Baron Vladimir Borisovich Frederichs** (1838–1922). Lieutenant General and later Aide-de-Camp General to the Tsar; Assistant Minister of the Imperial Court, 1893, and Minister of the Imperial Court, 1897–1917; in 1913 received the title of Count. His private palace was pillaged and set on fire on the first day of the February (March) Revolution; after the Bolshevik Revolution lived on in Petrograd, a complete invalid; obtained permission in 1920–21 to leave for his estate in Finland, where he died soon after.

Page 131, note 18. **The Taurida Palace**. Built in 1783 by Catherine II and presented after the conquest of Crimea to Potemkin, "Prince of Taurida." After his death the palace was repossessed by the Crown. After 1906 it was the meeting place of the State Duma.

19. **Count Petr Aleksandrovich Heyden** (1840–1907). Active participant in zemstvo movement in 1904–1905, representing moderate liberal tendencies of the nobility; presided over a zemstvo and township congress in defiance of the government, 1905; after the October Manifesto he joined the Union of October 17; later when this party became more conservative he left it and organized a new group called the Party of Peaceful Reconstruction (*Mirnoe Obnovlenie*).

CHAPTER XII

Page 135, note 1. Sergei Andreevich Muromtsev (1850-1910). Professor in Moscow University; one of the founders and leaders of the Cadet party; President of the First Duma, April 1906.

2. The Cadet party. Or the Constitutional Democratic party, also known as the Party of the People's Freedom, organized in October 1905 by Russian liberals under the leadership of Professor P. N. Miliukov and I. I. Petrunkevich. The party program included, among other things, equal and universal suffrage, civil liberties, equality before the law, and the allotment to peasants of lands of the Imperial family, of the state, and of private proprietors, who were to be fairly compensated.

The statements as to the party composition of the first Duma vary considerably, but it is agreed that the Cadets, who had carried on a vigorous election campaign, had the largest representations, variously estimated at from 150 to 179. Next in strength was the peasant Labor (*Trudovik*) group, with from 90 to 100 deputies. The Marxian Social Democrats (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks), who had boycotted the elections, had only 17 or 18 representatives.

3. Ivan Ilich Petrunkevich (1844-1928). Active in zemstvo work; organizer of the Union of Liberation (*Soiuz Osvobodheniia*), and later one of the organizers of the Cadet party; participated in the township and zemstvo congresses as a member of the Left wing, 1904-1906; member of the First Duma; floor leader of the Cadet party in the First Duma; signed the Viborg Manifesto; after 1920 in emigration.

4. Daniil Kirillovich Zabolotnyi (1866-1929). Professor; member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Page 138, note 5. Belostok pogrom. On June 1-3, 1906, peasant mobs attacked the Jewish quarter in Belostok, killed a great number of the inhabitants, and demolished their shops. The opposition press disclosed that a false report had been circulated by officials that Jews had fired on a Corpus Christi procession and that two priests and several children had been killed by a bomb. It was even alleged that police and gendarmes had distributed proclamations inciting the Christians to exterminate the Jewish population and that the troops quartered in the town contributed to the disorders by firing indiscriminately on Jewish houses. Many Jews were killed and wounded during the three days of the pogrom. In any case, no confirmed and absolutely reliable data in respect to this affair are available.

Page 140, note 6. Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov (1870-1922). One of the leaders of the Cadet party; one of the editors of *Rech*, and member of the First Duma; member of the Provisional Government, 1917; during the civil war a member of the Crimean government; editor of *Rul* in Berlin; killed in Berlin by a Russian reactionary who was attempting to assassinate Miliukov.

7. Fedor Izmailovich Rodichev (1854-1933). Zemstvo and political worker; member of the Union of Liberation; one of the founders of the Cadet party and a member of its Central Committee; member of all four Dumas; after the February (March) Revolution, member of the Provisional

Committee of the Duma, and later Commissar of the Provisional Government for Finland; after the Bolshevik Revolution, in emigration.

8. **Aleksei Fedorovich Aladin** (1873-). Expelled from his university for connection with illegal political groups; lived in London until 1905, and on his return to Russia was elected to the First Duma, where he was a member of the Labor Group (*Trudovaiia gruppai*); again emigrated and returned to Russia, 1917; involved in the Kornilov affair, 1917; after the Bolshevik Revolution served the armies of Alekseev, Denikin, and Wrangel in their negotiations with the Entente governments; in emigration.

9. **Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin** (1871-1918). Professor of Constitutional Law in Moscow University and collaborator in the *Russkiiia Vedomosti*; a Cadet; State Comptroller in the Provisional Government, August-September, 1917; arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned with the other Cadet leaders in December 1917; murdered by sailors while ill in a hospital.

10. **Evgenii Nikolaevich Shchepkin** (1860-1920). Graduate of Moscow University; Professor of History; a Cadet; member of the First Duma.

Page 144, note 11. **Mikhail Yakovlevich Herzenstein** (1859-1906). Professor in Moscow University and College of Agriculture; a Cadet; member of the First Duma; contributor to *Russkiiia Vedomosti* and other papers; sharp critic of the government's agrarian policy in the Duma; assassinated in Finland, soon after the dispersal of the Duma.

12. **Uriadniki**. Village policemen.

CHAPTER XIII

Page 147, note 1. **Vladimir Dmitrievich Kuzmin-Karavaev** (1859-1928). Military jurist; literary man of moderate liberal tendencies; professor in Military Law School and later in St. Petersburg University; one of the founders of the Party of Democratic Reform (*Partiia demokraticheskikh reform*); member of the First and Second Dumas; during the civil war, member of Yudenich's political conference; died in emigration in Paris.

2. **Nikolai Nikolaevich Lvov** (1867-). Zemstvo worker and member of the First, Third, and Fourth Dumas; member of the Cadet party and later one of the organizers of the Party of Peaceful Reconstruction (*Mirnoe Obnovlenie*); after the Bolshevik Revolution a supporter of Denikin.

3. **Dmitrii Nikolaevich Shipov** (1851-1920). Moderate liberal, active in zemstvo movement; one of the leaders of the Union of October 17; in the autumn of 1908 joined the Party of Peaceful Reconstruction (*Mirnoe Obnovlenie*); after the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917, member of the National Center.

Page 148, note 4. **The electoral law of December 11, 1905**. The Manifesto of October 17 laid down the general principle that those classes of the population which had previously been deprived of electoral rights should be drawn into participation in the work of the Duma. On December 11, 1905, while the Moscow riots were still going on, the government, as a concession to popular feeling, issued an electoral law which gave the suffrage to a majority of the people. This suffrage, however, was neither equal nor direct.

5. **Aleksandr Fedorovich Trepov** (1862-1926). Educated in His Majesty's School of Pages; after service in the army entered the Ministry of the Interior in 1889; Assistant State Secretary, 1899; member of special commission to draft a project for the Duma according to the rescript of February 18, 1905, and the Manifesto of October 17, 1905; later sent abroad to study the legislative institutions of Western Europe; Senator, 1906; member of the State Council, 1914, where he belonged to the Right group; Minister of Ways and Communications, 1915; Chairman of the Ministers' Council for six weeks in 1916; died in emigration in France.

Page 150, note 6. **Cadet ministry.** In respect to this scheme for a Cadet ministry, A. P. Izvolsky tells of a plan evolved by himself and others, even before D. F. Trepov advanced his project (*Recollections of a Foreign Minister: Memoirs of Alexander Isvolsky*, pp. 183-201, 215-19; see also Sir Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memoirs* [London, 1931], p. 122).

7. **Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich** (1859-1919). Nephew of Alexander II; historian; chairman of the Imperial Geographical and Historical Society, 1914; shot by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, January 1919.

8. **Anatolii Fedorovich Koni** (1844-1927). Liberal lawyer and writer; honorary member of the Academy of Sciences; presided at the trial of Vera Zasulich when she was acquitted; later Senator and member of the State Council.

Page 151, note 9. **Count Joseph Potocki** (1862-1920). Wealthy landowner in Warsaw and Podolia; Master of the Horse at the Russian Imperial Court.

Page 155, note 10. **Prince Boris Aleksandrovich Vasilchikov** (1863-1931). Governor of Pskov, 1899; held a responsible position in the Red Cross during the Russo-Japanese War; member of the State Council, 1906; Minister of Agriculture, July 1906-May 1908; died in emigration.

11. **Petr Petrovich Izvolsky** (1863-1927). Brother of A. P. Izvolsky; graduate of St. Petersburg University; served successively in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Education; Assistant Minister of Education, 1905; Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, 1906

CHAPTER XIV

Page 158, note 1. **Viborg Manifesto.** Drafted by P. N. Miliukov, issued after two days of deliberation (July 9 and 10, 1906) in the name of two hundred deputies of the First Duma who had gathered in Viborg after the dissolution. The Manifesto urged the population to refuse to pay taxes and supply recruits for the army. This measure of "passive resistance" was, however, to be of a temporary nature, until the convocation of the Second Duma. The Cadets, who were in the majority (120 deputies), emphasized the constitutional nature of their demand and condemned the revolt in Kronstadt and Sveaborg. On July 16, 1906, the members of the Duma who signed the Manifesto were indicted, and on December 18, 1907, were sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The prosecution undertaken by the government had

the result of preventing those who signed the manifesto from active participation in the elections for the Second Duma.

Page 159, note 2. Article 87 of the Code (*Code of Laws of the Russian Empire*, Vol. I, Part I, 1906 edition): Provided that if measures requiring legislative sanction were urgently required when the State Duma was not in session, the Council of Ministers might recommend action directly to the Emperor. Measures adopted under these circumstances might not affect the fundamental laws, the regulations of the State Council or the State Duma, or the electoral procedure of either chamber. If after the opening of a new Duma a new bill dealing with the measure thus adopted was not introduced within two months, or if the bill was not accepted by the State Duma or the State Council, the measure was invalidated.

The courts-martial mentioned in the text were set up in regions declared to be under "extraordinary protection" or under martial law. These courts consisted of military or naval officers, who were required to complete, if possible, the investigation in one day and to execute the sentence within twenty-four hours. The trials were secret.

Page 161, note 3. Vladimir Iosifovich Gurko (1862–1927). Son of Field-Marshal Iosif Vladimirovich Gurko; graduate of Moscow University, 1885; served as a commissioner for rural affairs in Poland, later as Assistant Governor-General of Warsaw; at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II transferred to the Imperial Chancellery, where he remained until 1902; upon Plehve's appointment as Minister of the Interior, Gurko became Director of the Land Department; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1906, and resigned the same year; elected to the State Council, 1912; active in the anti-Bolshevik movement after 1917, and a member of Wrangel's political conference.

4. Aleksandr Vasilevich Krivoshein (1858–1923). Entered state service, 1884, at first in the Ministry of Justice, later in the Ministry of the Interior; Director of the Department of Peasant Colonization, 1902; Assistant Minister of Agriculture, 1905; Acting Minister of Agriculture, 1906, and Minister, 1908–1915; participated in the organization of the anti-Bolshevik Right Center and the Council of National Union of Russia, 1918; an important member of Baron Wrangel's anti-Bolshevik government in South Russia, 1920.

Page 163, note 5. Andrei Andreevich Bulat (1873–). Of Lithuanian family; graduate in law of St. Petersburg University; defense attorney in many political trials; member of Second and Third Dumas and a leader of the Labor (*Trudovik*) group.

Page 167, note 6. Jacob Henry Schiff (1847–1920). Born in Germany; emigrated to New York, 1868, where he entered a banking house and became in a few years head of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company; a leading member of the "Committee of 70" which effected the overthrow of the Tweed Ring, and later a member also of the "Committee of 15" and "Committee of 9," all organizations for the reform of New York City politics; refused to participate in any financial relations with Tsarist Russia and during the Russo-Japanese War aided Japan in financial matters; offered his services to the new régime after the February (March) Revolution in 1917; a leader and benefactor of Jewish educational and philanthropic institutions throughout his life.

CHAPTER XV

Page 170, note 1. **Ivan Yakovlevich Golubev (1841-1918)**. Senator and member of the State Council; after the reorganization of the State Council in 1906 became its vice-president; opened the Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas as the Tsar's representative.

2. **Vladimir Mitrofanovich Purishkevich (1870-1920)**. Member of the Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas; founder of the Union of Russian People and the Union of Archangel Mikhail; participated in the assassination of Rasputin; active in Denikin's camp during the civil war.

3. **Second Duma**. In the Second Duma the number of Cadets had fallen from over 150 to about 100. The Trudoviks (see note 7 below) remained at about 100. The Social-Democrats (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks) increased their representation from 17 to 65. Of the more conservative groups there were between 40 and 50 in the extreme Right, and about 30 Octobrists. The latter party (the Union of October 17) based its program on the acceptance of the Manifesto of October 17 and favored a strong government representing a union of the monarchy and the people. It also favored an allotment to the peasants of Imperial and state lands and, in certain contingencies, of private lands with compensation to the owners.

Page 171, note 4. **Iraklii Georgievich Tsereteli (1882-)**. Georgian; Social-Democrat, Menshevik; member of the Second Duma; member of the Executive Committee of the First Petrograd Soviet; Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and later Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government, 1917; after the October (November) Revolution, a member of the Menshevik Government of the Georgian Republic; member of the Executive Committee of the Second International; in emigration.

Page 177, note 5. **Fedor Aleksandrovich Golovin (1867-)**. One of the founders of "The Union of Liberation" and a member of the Cadet party; Chairman of the Second Duma; elected to the Third Duma, but resigned in October 1910, being a participant in a large railway concession; active member of the Union of Towns during the World War; Commissar of the Provisional Government, March 1917; has worked in Soviet institutions since the Bolshevik Revolution.

Page 179, note 6. **Arshak Gerasimovich Zurabov (1873-1919)**. Served in the army during the Russo-Japanese War; member of the Social-Democratic party, at first Bolshevik, later Menshevik; elected to the Second Duma, 1907; after the dissolution of the Duma escaped abroad; on his return to Russia was arrested, but again escaped abroad; returned to Russia in April 1917, and soon went to the Caucasus; remained in Tiflis after the establishment of the Georgian Republic, though out of sympathy with the local Social-Democrats, by whom he was arrested in 1919 for his Bolshevik connections; expelled from Georgia, and shortly after died of typhus.

Page 180, note 7. **Trudoviks (*Trudovaia gruppy*)**. This group was organized in 1906 in the First Duma, chiefly by the peasant deputies headed by the intelligentsia of the "Narodnik" group and included members of the Peasant Union, the Socialist-Revolutionists, radically inclined intelligentsia, and others who took a position to the left of the Cadets and to the right of the

Social-Democrats. The Trudoviks had a definite program as far as the agricultural problem was concerned. A bill, No. 104, was introduced by them in the First Duma, demanding the alienation of privately owned land (with compensation), the establishment of a labor norm in the distribution of land, etc. After the dissolution of the Duma, the Trudoviks took part in the drafting of the Viborg Manifesto, and at the same time, together with the Social-Democrats, they issued an appeal to the peasantry, the army, and the fleet calling them to an armed rising. The Trudoviks had 104 delegates in the Second Duma, where their policy had somewhat modified. In the Third and Fourth Dumas they had only 14 and 10 delegates, respectively. During the World War the Trudoviks took a "defensist" position. Among their leaders were: A. F. Aladin, S. V. Anikin, I. V. Zhilkin, T. I. Sedelnikov (First Duma), N. E. Berzin (vice-president of the Second Duma), V. I. Dziubinsky, and A. F. Kerensky (Third and Fourth Dumas).

8. **Aleksandr Fedorovich Roediger (1853-1917)**. General; graduate of His Majesty's School of Pages and student of the Nicholas Military Academy of the General Staff; served in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; in 1882 was appointed Assistant Minister and later Minister of War of Bulgaria; on his return to Russia became professor in the Nicholas Military Academy; Assistant Minister of War, 1898; Minister of War, June 1905-March 1909; appointed to the State Council, 1905.

Page 182, note 9. **Count Aleksei Aleksandrovich Bobrinsky (1852-1927)**. Graduate of St. Petersburg University; for over thirty years chairman of the Imperial Archeological Commission; marshal of the nobility of St. Petersburg Gubernia; Senator, 1905; chairman of the Council of the United Nobility; member of the Third Duma and of the Right group until 1912, when he was appointed to the State Council, where he also joined the Right group; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1916; Minister of Agriculture, 1916; left Russia, 1918.

Page 183, note 10. **Ivan Petrovich Ozol (1878-)**. Graduate of Riga Polytechnic Institute; member of Second Duma from Riga; Social-Democrat (Menshevik).

Page 184, note 11. **The Ukase of November 9, 1906**. Relating to the tenure and re-allocation of the peasant allotment lands, giving the householder the right to receive a separate and permanent title to all or a certain part of the plow land held by him. This ukase was supplementary to the law of November 3, 1905, according to which the peasants were released, as from January 1907, from payment of "redemption dues."

12. **Ekaterina Nikolaevna Shornikova (Kazanskaia) née Golovina (1883-)**. Joined the Kazan Social-Democratic organization, 1904; arrested, 1905; became an agent of the secret police; technical secretary of the military organization of the Petersburg Committee of the Social-Democratic party and member of the Bolshevik group; played an active part in establishing connections between the Social-Democratic deputies of the Second Duma and the military organization, and in the organization of a special deputation of soldiers of the Petersburg garrison. See also text, pp. 376-77.

CHAPTER XVI

Page 188, note 1. *Le Matin*. A political daily, founded in 1884 in Paris by Alfred Edwards. Generally regarded as one of the "official" journals reflecting the attitude of the government in power.

2. M. Heideman. Correspondent of *Le Matin* in Portsmouth during the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan.

Page 190, note 3. The opposition. In the Third Duma the Octobrists with 154 deputies were the largest party. Of the other conservative groups, the party of the Right had 51; the Nationalists had 26; and the Cadets had fallen to 54, the Trudoviks to 14, and the Social-Democrats to 19.

4. Petr Petrovich Migulin (1870-). Graduate of Kharkov University; studied abroad, 1893-1897; in 1899 lecturer, and after 1901 professor, in Kharkov University; Assistant Minister of Agriculture, 1907; in emigration.

Page 191, note 5. Nikolai Nikolaevich Pokrovsky (1865-1930). Educated for the bar, but entered the civil service; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1906; member of the State Council, 1914; State Comptroller, 1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1916-1917; emigrated after the October (November) Revolution; lecturer at the University of Kovno.

6. Sergei Fedorovich Weber (1857-1924). Graduate of Kharkov University; served in the Kharkov branch of the Treasury; Assistant Director of the Department of the State Treasury in the Ministry of Finance, 1895; Director of the same department, 1905; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1909; member of the State Council, 1914; died in emigration.

7. I. I. Novitsky (1848-1917). Graduate of the Technological Institute in St. Petersburg; entered the Ministry of Ways and Communications in 1870, but transferred to the Ministry of Finance under State Secretary K. K. Grot, where he remained until 1914, in the Excise Department; in 1892 took an active part in the preparatory measures, for introducing the alcohol monopoly into Russia, which was inaugurated in 1894 and was extended to the entire territory of the Empire in 1898; head of the Excise Department, 1904; appointed Assistant Minister of Finance while retaining the post of head of the Excise Department, 1907; on Count Kokovtsov's dismissal left the Ministry and was appointed member of the State Council, 1914.

CHAPTER XVII

Page 195, note 1. Nikolai Alekseevich Khomiakov (1850-1925). Served in the Ministry of Agriculture; active in zemstvo work; elected to Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas as Left Octobrist; member of State Council, 1906; Chairman of Third Duma, resigned, 1910; member of Progressive Bloc in Fourth Duma; in Red Cross work with Denikin's forces; emigrated to Jugoslavia, where he died.

Page 199, note 2. Moisei Sergeevich Adzhemov (1878-). Graduate of Moscow University; attorney and physician; Cadet; member of Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas from the Don Cossack Voisko; member of judicial conference of the Provisional Government.

Page 200, note 3. **Andrei Ivanovich Shingarev** (1869–1918). Zemstvo leader; physician; Cadet; member of Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas; Minister of Agriculture of the first coalition cabinet of the Provisional Government and later Minister of Finance, 1917; after the Bolshevik Revolution was arrested, and while in the hospital was murdered by sailors.

Page 201, note 4. **Mikhail Isidorovich Friedman** (? –1921). Professor of Financial Law at the Petersburg Polytechnic Institute.

5. **Nikolai Vissarionovich Nekrasov** (1879–). Mayor of Tomsk and professor of the Tomsk Technological Institute; member of the Third and Vice-Chairman of the Fourth Duma; Minister of Ways and Communications, Minister without portfolio and Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government, 1917; remained in Soviet Russia and worked in the Tsentsosoiuz, 1929.

Page 202, note 6. **Nikolai Lvovich Markov** (Markov I) (1841–1920). Engineer; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; representative from the Tambov Gubernia; an Octobrist.

Page 205, note 7. **Count Vladimir Alekseevich Bobrinsky** (1867–1927). Member of the Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas; Vice-Chairman of the Fourth Duma, member of the Nationalist group and exponent of the liberation of the Slavs of the Habsburg Empire; cousin of Count G. A. Bobrinsky, Russian Governor-General of Galicia during the early part of the World War; left Russia in 1919.

Page 206, note 8. **Count Aleksei Alekseevich Uvarov** (1859– ?). Graduate of Moscow University; member of the Third Duma; Octobrist.

CHAPTER XVIII

Page 207, note 1. **Mikhail Martynovich Alekseenko** (1847–1917). Octobrist; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; chairman of the Budget Committee, 1908.

2. **Apollon Vasilevich Eropkin** (1865–). Inspector of Finance in Central Russia and head of a section in one of the Central Russian Direct Taxation and Treasury Administrations; member of the First and Third Dumas; Octobrist; secretary of the Budget Committee and opponent of his former chief, Count Kokovtsov; in emigration in Jugoslavia.

Page 208, note 3. **Finance Committee of the State Council**. Under the regulations establishing the legislative institutions the State Council and the State Duma were permitted to set up standing committees of their members. The Finance Committee of the State Council here referred to was one of these standing committees and an entirely different body than the Finance Committee described in chapter i, note 19.

4. **Mikhail Dmitrievich Dmitriev** (1846–1912). Secretary of the Office of the State Comptroller, 1882; Assistant Director of the Office of the Ministry of Ways and Communications, 1886; Assistant Director, 1892, and later Director of the State Treasury; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1902–1905; member of the State Council, 1905, where he joined the Center group.

5. **Grigorii Aleksandrovich Krestovnikov**. Prominent Moscow manufacturer, and for many years chairman of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce.

6. **Mikhail Nikolaevich Tripolitov (1854-1919)**. Graduate of Moscow Imperial Technical School; one of the active members of the Imperial Russian Technical Society and editor of its periodical; member of the State Council, 1909, where he joined the Center group.

7. **Sergei Vasilevich Rukhlov (1853-1918)**. Graduate of St. Petersburg University; served in the Ministry of the Interior and later in the Imperial Chancellery as State Secretary; appointed Assistant Manager of Navigation, 1903; member of the State Council, 1905; one of the founders of the All-Russian National Union, 1908, and its first chairman; Minister of Ways and Communications, 1909-1915.

8. **Aleksei Borisovich Neudgardt (1863-1918)**. Graduate of the School of Pages, after which he served in the army; in 1887 left military service and for nine years devoted his time to the management of his estate and zemstvo work; elected Marshal of Nobility, 1896, for the Nizhnii Novgorod Gubernia; elected to the State Council in 1906; organized the group of moderate Rights known as the "Neudgardtovtsy," which, together with the conservative group headed by Durnovo, had nearly a majority in the State Council; his sister, Olga Borisovna, was the wife of Stolypin.

9. **Nikolai Eduardovich Schmeman (1850-1928)**. Graduate of St. Petersburg University; entered the Ministry of Justice, but in 1883 transferred to the Imperial Chancellery and in 1885 was appointed Assistant State Secretary; was appointed State Secretary in the Legislative Department of the State Council, 1891; Director of the Second Department of the Ministry of Justice, 1893; Director of the First Department of the same ministry, 1894; Senator, 1900; member of the State Council, 1905, where he joined the Center group.

Page 209, note 10. **Dmitrii Ivanovich Pikhno (1853-1913)**. Professor in the University of Kiev; appointed member of the State Council before its reorganization, and retained the same post after 1906; member of the extreme Right group; after the death of V. Y. Shulgin, founder of *Kievlia*nin, became its editor in 1879.

11. **Pavel Fedorovich Unterberger (1842-1921)**. Graduate of the Nicholas Military Engineering School and Academy; held a number of important positions in Eastern Siberia; commander of the troops of the Amur region, 1895; Governor-General of Nizhni Novgorod, 1897; Senator, 1905; in the same year appointed Governor-General of the Amur region, and in 1906 Voisko Ataman of the Amur and Ussuriisk Cossacks.

Page 211, note 12. **Mikhail Grigorevich Akimov (1847-1915)**. Graduate of Moscow University; Assistant Public Prosecutor in Kiev, 1881; in December 1905, after the resignation of Minister of Justice S. S. Manukhin, appointed Minister of Justice; in April 1906 appointed to the State Council, of which he became chairman a year later.

Page 212, note 13. **Vasilii Nikolaevich Kokovtsov (1849-1915)**. Graduate from the Institute of Engineers of Ways and Communications, 1872; in the service of different private and state railways for over 43 years; manager of several important lines, and chairman, 1915, of the Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh Railway Company.

CHAPTER XIX

Page 214, note 1. **Count Aloys Lexa von Aehrenthal** (1854–1912). Entered the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service in 1877, and after serving in St. Petersburg, at the Foreign Office in Vienna and Bucharest, became, in 1899, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, where he remained until his appointment as Foreign Minister, in October 1906.

2. **Count Leopold Berchtold, von und zu Ungarschitz** (1863–). Entered the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office in 1893; Councillor of Legation, St. Petersburg, 1903; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1906–1911; succeeded Aehrenthal as Foreign Minister, 1912–1915; appointed Obersthofmeister to the heir to the throne, 1916, and later Oberstkämmerer; took no further part in politics after the fall of the dynasty.

3. **Nikolai Valerievich Charykov** (1855–1930). Entered the Foreign Office, 1875; on diplomatic service in Central Asia, Constantinople, Cairo, Berlin, and Sofia; Minister Resident in Rome, 1897; Minister to Serbia, 1900; Minister to The Hague, 1905; and in 1907 took part in the Second Hague Conference; Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1908; Ambassador to Turkey, 1909–1912; retired from diplomatic service and appointed Senator; member of the Crimean Provisional Government, 1918.

Page 215, note 4. **The Loan and Discount Bank of Persia** (*Uchetnyi i Ssudnyi Bank v Persii*). A Russian institution with very small participation of foreign capital. Its share capital was furnished by the State Bank and its administrative board was located in the building of the State Bank. The local administration was in Teheran.

5. **Aleksandr Arkadevich Stolypin** (1863–). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; journalist; on the staff of *Peterburgskiiia Vedomosti*; forced by Plehve to give up his position because of his "undesirable views"; after 1904 on the staff of *Novoe Vremia*; one of the active supporters of the Union of October 17; in emigration.

Page 216, note 6. **Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin** (1834–1912). Journalist and publisher; founder of *Novoe Vremia* and a large publishing office; in his youth a moderate liberal, later of more conservative views.

7. **Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov** (1861–1927). Educated at the Alexander Lyceum at St. Petersburg; entered diplomatic service, 1883; after serving in Rome and in the Russian Embassy in London, became Minister Resident at the Vatican, 1906; in 1909 entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as assistant to Izvolsky, whom he succeeded as Minister in 1910; dismissed in 1916 and appointed Ambassador in London, but before he reached his post the Revolution of February (March) 1917 occurred; member of the Russian Political Conference in Paris and Foreign Minister of Kolchak's Government during the Russian Civil War; died in emigration.

Page 217, note 8. **Dismiss Izvolsky**. Charykov gives his recollections of the incident, described by Count Kokovtsov in "Reminiscences of Nicholas II" in *The Contemporary Review*, September 1928, CXXXIV, 445–53. He says that Izvolsky had obtained the Emperor's consent to negotiate with Austria-Hungary, Italy, France, and Great Britain about compensation for Russia in case Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, but Izvolsky had not informed Stolypin or any of the ministers or even the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of his intended discussions at Buchlau. Charykov says further that ". . . Stolypin declared that he refused absolutely to agree with Isvolsky's plan. He said, with great force and eloquence, that Russia should not give her consent to the annexation of a Slavonic land by a Germanic state, whatever political advantages this might bring to Russia, and added that if Isvolsky's plan was persevered in, he, Stolypin, would resign. Kokovtzeff fully supported the Premier's opinion." Stolypin and Charykov then had an audience with the Emperor, who "listened in silence" to Stolypin's arguments and then agreed that new instructions should be sent to Izvolsky. Stolypin did not, therefore, raise the question of his resignation. See also N. V. Tcharykov, *Glimpses of High Politics through War and Peace, 1855-1929* (New York, 1931), pp. 269-70.

Page 218, note 9. **Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich (1853-1930)**. Admiral; served in the Russo-Turkish War and during the Russo-Japanese War was commandant of Port Arthur until its fall; appointed commander of Kronstadt Port and Military Governor of the town of Kronstadt, 1908; Assistant Minister of the Navy, 1909; Minister of the Navy, 1911-1917; member of the State Council.

Page 219, note 10. **Aleksei Andreevich Polivanov (1855-1922)**. Graduate of Nicholas Military Engineering Academy and of the Nicholas Military Academy of General Staff; participated in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; later edited *Voennyi Sbornik* and *Russkii Invalid*; appointed Second Quartermaster General of the General Staff in 1905, and in the same year Chief of the General Staff; Assistant Minister of War, 1906; member of the State Council, 1912; appointed Minister of War, 1915, and dismissed in the same year; member of a special conference attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armies, 1920; Soviet military expert in Soviet-Polish negotiations, 1920.

11. **Aleksandr Vasilevich Kolchak (1874-1920)**. Served in the Russo-Japanese War and later took a leading part in the reorganization of the Russian navy; during the World War carried out successful operations in the Baltic, and in 1916 became Rear Admiral and Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, resigning in the summer of 1917; on a mission to the United States, 1917; went to the Far East and became head, November 18 (n.s.), 1918, of the anti-Bolshevik Government in Omsk; after some early successes his forces were defeated in 1919; was surrendered by the Czechoslovaks to the Revolutionary Government in Irkutsk and shot by the Bolsheviks, February 7 (n.s.), 1920.

Page 223, note 12. **Finland (Senate) (*Imperatorskii finliandskii Senat*)**. The Senate was the executive branch of the Finnish government. It was appointed by the Tsar as Grand Duke of Finland, but it reflected the party composition of the Finnish Diet.

CHAPTER XX

Page 229, note 1. **Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov** (1848-1926). Graduate, Nicholas Military Academy of General Staff, 1874; served in the Turkish War on staff of General Skobelev, 1877-1878; became General, 1890; commander of troops and later Governor-General at Kiev, 1904-1908; Chief of the General Staff, 1908; Minister of War, 1909; dismissed, June 1915, and imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress on the charge of treasonable negligence, but as a result of various intercessions was released and placed under house arrest; again arrested by the Provisional Government, tried, and sentenced to hard labor for life; released by the Bolsheviks, 1918, and fled to Finland; died in Germany.

Page 231, note 2. **Agreements fisheries**. In addition to conventions regarding fisheries, railways, and commercial relations, the two powers had agreed in 1907 to respect the status quo and the territorial integrity of China. They had also concluded a secret convention recognizing their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and the special interests of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Outer Mongolia.

Page 234, note 3. **Evgenii Dmitrievich Lvov** (1868-). Director of the General Office of the Ministry of Finance, 1906-1914; employed on special duties in the Ministry of Finance, and member of the Board of the Azov-Don Commercial Bank, 1914-1917; in emigration.

4. **A. N. Wentzel**. An engineer, specializing in the construction and operation of railways; vice-chairman of the Managing Board of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the chairman being, in accordance with the by-laws, a Chinese resident in Peking. During the Boxer Rising in 1901, the chairman, an eminent mandarin, was killed by the rioters and his post remained vacant until 1919. As a consequence, Wentzel, as the head of the Managing Board in St. Petersburg, was virtually chairman of the Board in its relations with the Russian Ministry of Finance until the Revolution in 1917.

5. **Zhadvoïn**. Chief Comptroller of the Chinese Eastern Railway, attached to the Central Managing Board in St. Petersburg. All the accounts of the railway passed before the management in St. Petersburg and were audited by the department under his direction.

6. **Nikolai Apollonovich Pykhachev** (1851-1932). General; an officer in the Imperial Guards; commanded the Moscow Regiment, and later the 23d Infantry Division; in 1907 was selected by the Minister of Finance to command the Special Corps of Frontier Guards, which was under the Ministry of Finance. The Frontier Guards formed a special body whose duty it was to protect all the frontiers of Russia against smuggling. The Corps of Frontier Guards included a special section for guarding the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, composed of 35,000 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. Like the rest of the Frontier Guards, it was a purely military organization, recruited by conscription, and composed of detachments of infantry and cavalry and several battalions of railway workers. The numerical strength of the Frontier Guards was fixed by the Treaty of Portsmouth.

7. **Dmitrii Leonidovich Horvath** (1858-). Lieutenant General; entered government service as cadet of the Nicholas Military Engineering

School; after participating in the war against Turkey in 1877-1878, assigned to the Trans-Caspian Military Railway; in 1895 appointed chief of the Ussuri Railway, the eastern section of the Siberian Railway, the construction of which he completed; later became manager of the Central Asian Railway (formerly the Trans-Caspian Military Railway), from Krasnovodsk to Tashkent; in 1902 appointed general manager and administrator of the leased territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which position he held for about seventeen years; retained in his position under the Provisional Government, and was appointed general Commissar of the Chinese Eastern Railway; after the October (November) Revolution, became active in the anti-Bolshevik movement, assuming the title of Temporary Ruler; later became Supreme Plenipotentiary Representative of the Kolchak Government in the Far East, until the end of 1919, when he resumed his duties as general manager and administrator of the Chinese Eastern Railway; after the conclusion of a supplementary agreement between the Chinese government and the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1921, appointed high councillor of the company, which he held until the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924; now living in Peking.

8. Prince Hirobumi Ito (1841-1909). Japanese statesman; went to England as a student, 1861; Minister of the Interior, 1878; became Minister-President, 1886; in 1888 engaged in preparing a written constitution which was promulgated February 1889; as Premier carried his nation through, the Sino-Japanese War, resigning in 1896; again Premier from January to June, 1898, and from October 1900 to June 1901; President of the Privy Council, 1903; in 1905 negotiated convention with Korea by which the foreign affairs of that country were placed under control of a Japanese resident general, to which office Ito was appointed in 1906.

Page 235, note 9. Toshitsune Kawakami (1861-). Japanese commercial agent at Vladivostok, 1900; Secretary of Legation, 1904; attached to army headquarters in Liaotung, 1904; commercial agent in Vladivostok, 1906; Consul General at Harbin, 1907.

CHAPTER XXI

Page 245, note 1. Vladimir Ivanovich Dziubinsky' (1860- ?). Member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; a Trudovik.

Page 246, note 2. Stepan Stepanovich Khripunov (1870-). After several years in the service of the state in the Ministry of Agriculture, he occupied in 1909 the post of manager of the Bank of the Nobility and of the Peasant Bank, which he retained until the Revolution; adapted the activity of these two banks to the conditions created by the agrarian policy of Stolypin; remained in Russia after the October (November) Revolution.

Page 248, note 3. Aristide Briand (1862-1932). Elected to the French Chamber of Deputies as a Radical Socialist, 1902; Minister of Public Instruction and Worship, 1906; Minister-President, 1909; Minister of Justice, 1912; Minister-President in January-March, 1913; Minister of Justice, 1914; Minister-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1915-1917 and 1921-1922;

head of French Delegation to the League of Nations from 1925 until his death; Minister of Foreign Affairs in every government except that of Herriot in 1926.

4. **Alexandre Millerand** (1859-). Socialist Deputy from Paris, 1885; resigned from Socialist party; Minister of Commerce, 1899-1902; Minister of Public Works, 1909-1910; Minister of War, 1913 and 1914-1915; General Commissioner in Alsace, 1919; Minister-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1920; President of the Republic, September 1920-June 1924; Senator, 1925.

Page 249, note 5. **Petr Alekseevich Kharitonov** (1852-1916). Graduate of the Imperial School of Law; in charge of the State Printing Office, 1891-1893; in 1893 appointed Assistant State Secretary of the Department of Law in the State Council, and in 1897 Acting State Secretary of the Department for Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs of the State Council; appointed Assistant Imperial Secretary, 1904; State Comptroller, 1907-1916; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1913.

6. **Aleksei Vladimirovich Konshin** (1858-1925). Entered the Ministry of Finance, 1883; Assistant Manager of the State Bank under the Ministry of Count Kokovtsov, 1909-1914; Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, 1914, and later Chairman of the Board of the Russian Bank for Trade and Industry; left Russia after the October (November) Revolution for Japan and died there.

Page 252, note 7. **The Chief Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture** had been so designated by the ukase of May 6, 1905; its earlier designations were: Ministry of State Domains, 1837-1894; Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains, 1894-1905.

Page 255, note 8. **Aleksandr Vasilevich Samsonov** (1859-1914). General; graduate of the Cavalry School in St. Petersburg and served in the war with Turkey in 1877-1878; appointed to the General Staff, 1884; Commandant of the Cavalry School at Elizavetgrad, 1896-1904; promoted to the rank of General, 1902; he commanded the Ussuri mounted brigade and the Siberian Cossack Division in the war with Japan; Governor-General and commander of troops in Turkestan, 1909; was appointed Commander of the 2d Army concentrated on the Narev, August 1914, which was destroyed in the Battle of Soldau (Tannenberg); committed suicide.

CHAPTER XXII

Page 258, note 1. **The Durasov affair.** Some 760 peasant families in Kiev Gubernia had negotiated for the purchase of the Durasov estate in Kuban oblast and applied to the Peasant Bank for a loan. The bank valued the estate at 1,078,000 rubles and advanced 875,000 rubles to the purchasers. Subsequently the peasants were unable to meet their payments to the bank and the bank in the end foreclosed.

2. **Ivan Mikhailovich Pokrovsky** (1872-). Doctor of medicine; Social-Democrat; arrested in 1902, imprisoned, and exiled to Eastern Sibe-

ria; served in Russo-Japanese War; member of the Third Duma, where he became well known for his activities in connection with the Durasov affair.

Page 260, note 3. **Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko** (1859-1924). President of Ekaterinoslav Gubernia Zemstvo Council, 1900; elected to the First Duma and all subsequent Dumas; Octobrist; in March 1911 elected Chairman of the Third Duma; Chairman of the Fourth Duma; Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the Duma after the Revolution; participated in the counter-revolutionary movement after the October (November) Revolution, and later emigrated.

Page 263, note 4. **Vladimir Fedorovich Trepov** (1860-1918). Educated at the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; held various posts in the state service; member of State Council, 1908-1911; Chairman, Supervisory Council of the International Commercial Bank of Petersburg, until 1917; arrested by the Bolsheviks in July 1918 and shot in August of the same year.

Page 266, note 5. **Prince Vladimir Petrovich Meshchersky** (1839-1914). Editor of *Grazhdanin*, 1872; collaborator of *Russkii Vestnik* and *Moskovskia Vedomosti*; author of several novels and his memoirs.

Page 267, note 6. **S. S. Goncharov** (1842-1913). Well-known jurist with long service in various judicial institutions; Senator, 1891; member, 1900-1911, of State Council, where he belonged to the extreme Right:

CHAPTER XXIII

Page 271, note 1. **Dmitrii Grigorevich Bogrov**. Graduate of Kiev University; Socialist-Revolutionist; employed by the Kiev Secret Police as *agent provocateur*; hanged in 1911 for the murder of Stolypin.

Page 272, note 2. **Vladimir Aleksandrovich Dediulin** (1858-1913). Chief of Staff and later Commander of the Corps of Gendarmes, 1903-1905; Governor of St. Petersburg, January-December, 1905; Adjutant General; Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor and Palace Commandant, 1906.

3. **F. F. Trepov** (1854-). General Aide-de-Camp; member of the State Council and Governor-General of Kiev at the time of Stolypin's assassination; Military Governor-General of the Austro-Hungarian territories occupied during the war, 1916-1917; in emigration.

4. **Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuliabko** (1873-1920). Colonel, Special Corps of Gendarmes, 1907-1911, and chief of Kiev Secret Police; with General Kurlov responsible for police measures during the stay of the Emperor and his family at Kiev in 1911 when Stolypin was assassinated; tried with Kurlov and released; later dismissed for embezzlement; still later, a salesman of sewing-machines.

Page 273, note 5. **Nikolai Iudovich Ivanov** (1851-1919). Adjutant General; held responsible posts during the Russo-Japanese War; Governor-General of Kronstadt, November 1906-April 1907; appointed commander of troops of Kiev military district, December 1908; Commander of the Armies on the Southwestern Front against Austria during first months of the World War; on the eve of the February (March) 1917 Revolution ordered by the Tsar to Petrograd at head of a detachment of picked troops, but unable to

reach the capital because of the revolutionary measures taken by the railway employees.

6. **Baron Anton Egorovich Zaltsa** (1843–1918). General; took part in the Russo-Turkish War; appointed assistant commander of troops of Kiev military district, 1908; commander of troops of Kazan military district, 1911.

Page 274, note 7. **Dmitrii Borisovich Neudgardt** (1861–). Served in the ranks of the Preobrazhensky Regiment of the Imperial Guards at the same time as Emperor Nicholas II, who, as heir to the throne, served his term of military instruction; Prefect of Odessa, 1903–1905; member of the State Council until the February (March) Revolution of 1917; in emigration.

8. **M. I. Trusevich** (1863–). Director of the Department of the Police, 1906–1909; Senator; member of the State Council, 1917.

9. **Petr Nikolaevich Balashev** (1870–). Marshal of Nobility in Bratslavsky Uezd, Podolsk Gubernia, 1900; member of Third and Fourth Dumas; Chairman of the All-Russian Union of Nationalists; leader of the group of "Russian Nationalists and Moderate Rights" in the Third and Fourth Dumas.

10. **Dmitrii Nikolaevich Chikhachev** (1876–1919). Graduate of Imperial Alexander Lyceum; Chairman of Podolsk Association of Landowners; member of Third and Fourth Dumas; moderate Right.

11. **Vasilii Egorovich Chernov** (1852–). Doctor of medicine; professor in the University of St. Vladimir in Kiev from 1889.

Page 275, note 12. *Kievskaja Mysl*. Published in Kiev, 1900–1918; after 1905 directed by the Mensheviks; defeatist tendencies during the War and the Revolution; Trotsky was its military correspondent in the Balkans in 1912 and in 1914; closed down by Petliura in 1918.

Page 276, note 13. **Aleksei Nikolaevich Khvostov** (1872–1918). Student in the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; served in the Ministry of Justice; later Vice-Governor and Governor of Nizhnii Novgorod; member of the Fourth Duma in the extreme Right group; Minister of the Interior, 1915–1916; arrested and imprisoned by the Provisional Government; shot by the Bolsheviks in Moscow, August 1918.

Page 277, note 14. **Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Makarov** (1857–1919). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; entered the Ministry of Justice; served as public prosecutor and chairman of various district courts; in 1906 Chairman of Kharkov Court of Appeals and some time later appointed Assistant Minister of the Interior; Imperial Secretary, 1909; after the death of Stolypin became Minister of the Interior, and in December 1912 was appointed member of State Council, where he joined the Right group; late in 1916 appointed Minister of Justice; executed by the Bolsheviks.

15. **Nikolai Alekseevich Maklakov** (1871–1918). Brother of Vasilii Alekseevich Maklakov; in the Ministry of Finance, 1894–1909; Governor of Chernigov, 1909–1912; Minister of the Interior, 1912–1915; member of State Council, 1915; shot by the Bolsheviks.

16. **Count Pavel Nikolaevich Ignatev** (1870–). Graduate of Kiev University; Director of one of the departments in the Ministry of Agriculture, 1909; Assistant Minister of Agriculture, 1912; Minister of Education, 1915–1916.

17. Aleksandr Ivanovich Guchkov (1862-). One of the founders of the Octobrist party; Chairman of the Third Duma, March 1910, succeeding Khomiakov; resigned, March 1911; Chairman of the Central War Industries Committee during the World War and member of the State Council; with Shulgin, March 15 (n.s.), 1917, he received the act of abdication from Tsar Nicholas II at Pskov; first Minister of War and Navy in the Provisional Government, 1917; active in the counter-revolutionary movements of 1917-1921; emigrated soon after the October (November) Revolution.

Page 278, note 18. Nikolai Konstantinovich Muravev. Well-known Moscow lawyer, active in defense of political prisoners; Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government.

19. Stepan Petrovich Beletsky (1873-1918). Assistant Director of the Department of Police, 1909-1912; Director of the Department of Police, 1912-1915; Senator, 1914; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1915-1916; executed by the Bolsheviks. Beletsky's testimony given before the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional Government is published in *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima* (Leningrad-Moscow, 1924-1927, 7 vols.), III, 384-432; IV, 117-533.

20. Aleksei Nikolaevich Kharuzin (1864-). Specialist in questions of provincial administration and high official in the Central Administration of the Ministry of the Interior; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1911; his efforts to manage the elections to the Fourth Duma aroused great criticism; Senator, 1913.

21. Mikhail Alekseevich Suvorin (1860-). One of the three sons of Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin, Sr., founder of the paper *Novoe Vremia*; after the death of his father, he became the nominal head of the journal, but had little influence on its management; in emigration.

22. Mazaev. Another director of the *Novoe Vremia*, who attended chiefly to the administrative and business side.

23. Boris Alekseevich Suvorin. Journalist; son of Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin; in emigration.

CHAPTER XXIV

Page 281, note 1. Sergei Nikolaevich Gerbel (1858-). Active in Kherson zemstvo institutions; appointed Vice-Governor of Kharkov, 1902; Chief of the Department for the Affairs of Local Economy, 1904-1912; member of the State Council, 1912; head of the Commissariat of the South-western Army, 1915-1917; Ukrainian Minister of Food Supply, and later Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers under Skoropadsky, 1918; emigrated to Germany after the fall of Skoropadsky in December 1918.

2. Ananii Petrovich Strukov (1851- ?). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; in the Legislative Department of the Imperial Chancellery; in 1882 transferred to the Ministry of the Interior; elected Marshal of Nobility of Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, 1882; elected member of the State Council, 1906; appointed member of same, 1912.

3. **Dmitrii Sergeevich Arsenev** (1832–1906). Graduate of Moscow Naval School, 1850; appointed Adjutant to the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, 1860; commanded squadron on a voyage to China, Japan, Kamchatka, California, Vancouver, and Sitka; appointed tutor to Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, 1864, and a year later to Grand Duke Pavel Aleksandrovich; Rear Admiral, 1877, and took part in the Russo-Turkish War; Director of Naval School and Chief of Nicholas Naval Academy, 1882–1896; promoted to Admiral, 1900; appointed member of State Council, 1901.

4. **Prince Anatolii Aleksandrovich Kurakin** (1845–). From 1868 to 1872 held various honorary positions in the provinces; after 1872 occupied different government offices, serving in the Ministry of State Domains; in 1909 appointed member of the State Council, where he joined the Right group.

5. **Vladimir Nikolaevich Okhotnikov** (1847–1921). Graduate of the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; held honorary positions in Penza Gubernia, where he lived on his estate; served in Russo-Turkish War, after which he returned to his work in Penza Gubernia; after 1887 worked in the Ministry of Education; appointed member of the Council of the Ministry of Finance, 1892; member of the State Council, 1902.

Page 285, note 6. **Nikolai Evgenevich Markov** (Markov II) (1866–). Engineer; until 1908 held various posts in large private railway companies; member of Third and Fourth Dumas, where he was a leader of the Right group; member of the Union of Russian People.

7. **Dr. Aleksandr Ivanovich Dubrovin** (1855–1918). One of the founders and Chairman of the Union of Russian People; editor of the *Russkoe Znamia*, published in St. Petersburg, 1905; accused of having instigated and organized the murder of Dr. Iolloss and M. Hertenstein, two Jewish members of the Duma, in 1906; had to resign his post as Chairman of the Union of Russian People in 1910; by 1911 the influence of his paper considerably diminished and Dubrovin was fined by the court several times for slandering government officials and members of the Duma; shot by the Bolsheviks.

8. **Georgii Georgievich Zamyslovsky** (1872–). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Vilna Court of Appeals; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; belonged to the Right group.

9. **Anatolii Ivanovich Savenko** (1874–). Member of the Fourth Duma and of the "Progressive bloc" during the war; in emigration.

10. **Pochaev Lavra (Monastery)**. Famous place of pilgrimage, eight versts from the former Russo-Austrian boundary line in the Volyn Gubernia; supposed to have been founded in the thirteenth century during the Tartar invasion. The monastery is now in Polish territory.

Page 287, note 11. **Nikolai Petrovich Shubinsky** (1853–1920). Graduate of Moscow University; well-known Moscow barrister; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; Octobrist.

CHAPTER XXV

Page 290, note 1. **Grigorii Efimovich Rasputin (Novykh)** (1871-1916). Son of a poor Siberian peasant, uneducated, and to the end of his life unable to write correctly; acquired a lasting reputation for dissolute behavior; in 1904 he left his family and devoted himself to religious exercises, declaring to his people that he was inspired by God; adopted the views of the Khlysty sect, made various religious pilgrimages to holy places, and spent some time in different monasteries, but did not become a monk or a priest; in 1907 became acquainted with Archimandrite Feofan, confessor of the Empress, and through him, and with the assistance of Grand Duchesses Militisa and Anastasia, was introduced at the Court; acquired great influence with the Empress and thereby exercised an increasing influence on political appointments; an unsuccessful attempt on his life was made by Guseva in 1914. A small group of men, including Grand Duke Dmitrii Pavlovich, Prince Yusupov, and Purishkevich, determined to get rid of Rasputin, and he was killed in the Yusupov Palace, December 15, 1916.

2. **Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna** (1864-1918). Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt; sister to the late Empress of Russia; married to Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, 1884; murdered in Alapaevsk, Perm Gubernia, in the summer of 1918 by Bolsheviks, together with other members of the Imperial family.

Page 291, note 3. **Count Sergei Sergeevich Tatishchev** (1872-1915). Received a military education and served in one of the Guards Regiments; entered the Ministry of the Interior and succeeded Stolypin as Governor of Saratov, 1906-1910; Chief of the Bureau of Publications, 1912-1915.

4. **Valerii Nikolaevich Mamontov** (1850-1915). Educated at St. Petersburg University; married the elder sister of Count Kokovtsov; a barrister, specializing in civil law cases; later in the Ministry of the Interior and for the greater part of his life in the Ministry of Education as an expert in primary education; Senator, 1907.

5. **Grigorii Petrovich Sazonov**. Publicist, specializing in economic questions; an admirer and later critic of Witte's policies as Minister of Finance; at the beginning of Kokovtsov's ministry attempted, without success, to interest himself in railway concessions; later became friendly with Rasputin and his clique.

Page 293, note 6. **Georgii Efremovich Dolganov (Hermogen)**. (1858-1918). Bishop of Saratov, and after 1917 of Tobolsk; first friendly to Rasputin, then opposed him; shot by the Bolsheviks allegedly for preparing for the escape of the Emperor and his family.

7. **Sergei Mikhailovich Trufanov (Iliodor)**. A monk; graduate of St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy, 1905; popular preacher; banished, imprisoned, and later unfrocked by the Holy Synod; escaped abroad in 1914.

Page 294, note 8. **Vladimir Karlovich Sabler (Desiatovskiy)** (1845-1923). Graduate of Moscow University; member of the State Council, 1905; Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, 1911-1915; died in Moscow in privation.

Page 295, note 9. **Khlysty**. A sect supposed to have been formed in the seventeenth century. Its name is derived from one of its religious ceremonies at which the believers beat themselves with a *khlyst* (whip) and perform other acts of self-torture. This sect grew in number, particularly in the 'forties of the last century, and especially in the Caucasus. It was not sanctioned by the Russian government.

10. **Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov** (1872-). Member of Third and Fourth Dumas, where he was Chairman of the Center group; after the February (March) Revolution, member of the Provisional Government as Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod; after the October (November) Revolution, found employment in Soviet institutions.

11. **Sergei Iliodorovich Shidlovsky** (1861-1922). Graduate of Imperial Alexander Lyceum; known for his liberal policies as a large landowner; active in zemstvo work; member of the Board of the Peasant Bank, 1899-1905; departmental director in Ministry of Agriculture, 1905; elected to Third Duma, 1907, as a Left Octobrist; a leader of the Progressive bloc in the Fourth Duma; member of Provisional Committee of the Duma from which the First Provisional Government was formed, 1917; member of the Pre-Parliament, 1917; after living in great privation emigrated to Reval, 1920, where he died.

Page 298, note 12. **Anna Aleksandrovna Vyrubova (née Taneeva)** (1884-). Friend of the late Empress, Alexandra Fedorovna, and of Rasputin.

CHAPTER XXVI

Page 306, note 1. **Pavel Pavlovich Riabushinsky** (1871-1927). Publisher of *Utro Rossii*, a non-party, democratic daily paper published in Moscow from 1907 to 1917.

Page 307, note 2. **Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerensky** (1881-). Socialist-Revolutionist; first became known as a defense attorney in political trials; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; leader of the Trudovik group; Vice-Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, 1917; Minister of Justice, of War and the Navy, and Prime Minister in the Provisional Government, 1917; in emigration.

Page 308, note 3. **Konstantin N. Tulchinsky**. District Mining Supervisor of the Lena Goldfields at the time of the 1912 events; the most popular member of the administration with the workers; during the strike and its consequences actively tried to prevent disaster and protect the workers; having failed in this, after the events he was often classed by revolutionary critics with the "exploiters."

Page 309, note 4. **Sergei Sergeevich Manukhin** (1856-1922). Graduate in law, St. Petersburg University; Director of the First Department of Ministry of Justice; Assistant Minister of Justice; Minister of Justice and member of State Council, 1905.

Page 310, note 5. **Sergei Nikolaevich Miasoedov** (1867-1915). Commander of the Gendarmerie of Verzhbolovo; guest of Emperor William at

Rominten on several occasions; suspected of being German agent and put on reserve list, 1907; through his friendship with Sukhomlinov, returned to active service in 1909 with the Minister of War, as an agent in counter-espionage and intelligence work; dismissed in 1912; in 1914 returned to 10th Army as interpreter; again fell under suspicion, and was court-martialed and hanged.

6. **Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich** (—1919). Son of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich and brother of Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich, nephew of Alexander II; special representative of the Tsar on various fronts during the World War; shot by the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg, 1919.

Page 316, note 7. **German Germanovich Lerche** (1868—). Educated at the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; member of the St. Petersburg City Duma and of the Third and Fourth State Dumas; an Octobrist; at one time Chief Inspector of the State Bank; in emigration.

8. **Aleksandr Ivanovich Zvegintsev** (1869–1915). Educated at the General Staff Academy; active in the Voronezh Zemstvo; member of Duma Committee of National Defense; an Octobrist; Chief of Intelligence, 3d Army, 1914–1915; shot down in an airplane by his own batteries thirty miles behind the front.

9. **Nikanor Vasilevich Savich** (1869—). Educated at St. Petersburg University; active in zemstvo work; member of the Third and Fourth Dumas; Octobrist; now member of the Committee for the Protection of Russian Emigrants in France.

10. **Konstantin Dmitrievich Nilov** (1856–1918). Admiral; Aide-de-Camp-General of Emperor Nicholas II; occupied the honorary post of Flag Captain, which made him a member of the personal suite of His Majesty, his sole duty being to accompany the Tsar on his visits to the Imperial Fleet; on such occasions his duty was to supervise navigation and to serve as intermediary between the Emperor and the officers in command of the different vessels.

CHAPTER XXVII

Page 320, note 1. **Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg** (1856–1921). Prussian Minister of the Interior, 1905; Secretary of State for the Imperial Home Office and Vice-President of Prussian Ministry, 1907; Imperial Chancellor, 1909–1917.

2. **Count Friedrich von Pourtalès** (1853–1928). Prussian Minister at Munich, 1902–1907; German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1907–1914.

Page 321, note 3. **E. L. Nobel**. Swedish industrialist; eldest of four sons of the organizer of the oil industry at Baku, whose family controlled the firm of Nobel Brothers; nephew of the founder of the Nobel Prizes.

Page 325, note 4. **Nikolai Petrovich Savitsky** (1867—). Elected chairman of the Chernigov Gubernia Zemstvo Board, 1907; elected to the State Council, 1915, where he was a member of the Center group. The cause

of Savitsky's difficulties with Maklakov was his opposition to the latter's policies as governor of Chernigov. According to the later testimony of Makarov, Savitsky's charges were justified and Maklakov had been summoned to Petersburg to be instructed accordingly (*Padenie Tsarskogo Reshima*, II, 131). But instead of being censured, Maklakov was appointed to succeed Makarov as minister.

5. **Yurii Nikolaevich Glebov** (1873–). Graduate of the Nicholas Cavalry School; member of the Third Duma from Chernigov Gubernia; Octobrist.

6. **Petr Valerievich Kamensky**. Graduate of Kharkov University; member of Third Duma; Octobrist.

Page 326, note 7. **S. N. Sverbeev** (–1920). Minister to Greece, 1910–1912; Ambassador to Germany, 1912 to the outbreak of the World War.

Page 333, note 8. **René Viviani** (1863–1925). Lawyer; Socialist deputy from Paris, 1893; Minister of Labor, 1906–1910; Minister of Public Instruction, 1913; Minister-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1914–1915; Minister of Justice, 1915–1917.

Page 334, note 9. **Georges Louis** (1847–1917). French mobilization officer, 1870–1871; Assistant Director of Commercial Affairs, 1881–1893; French delegate to the Debt Commission in Egypt, 1893–1902; Director of the Consulate, 1902–1904; Political Director in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1904–1909; Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1909–1913.

Page 335, note 10. **Joseph Marie Auguste Caillaux** (1863–). French Minister of Finance, 1899–1902, 1906–1909, March–June, 1911; Minister-President, 1911–1912; Minister of Finance, 1913; Paymaster General, 1914; charged with plotting against the government and for a premature peace; arrested, 1918, convicted and imprisoned; political and civil rights restored, 1924; Minister of Finance, 1925 and 1926.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Page 337, note 1. **Zemskie nachalniki** (land captains). An office created in 1889, giving appointees from the nobility administrative and judicial power in the local affairs of the peasantry.

Page 339, note 2. **Aleksandr Petrovich Vernander** (1844–1923). Military engineer; during the greater part of his military career he occupied posts in the Central Administration of Military Engineering (*Glavnoe Inzhenernoe Upravlenie*), of which he was chief for several years; succeeded General Polivanov as Assistant Minister of War, 1912; dismissed, 1915; member of the State Council.

Page 340, note 3. **Slavic banquets**. During the Balkan wars there was a wave of Pan-Slavist sentiment in Russia. Societies were formed to arouse public sentiment, and contributions of money and medical aid were sent to the states of the Balkan League. In St. Petersburg "Slavonic banquets" were organized as a means of arousing general sympathy for the Balkan Slavs and of bringing pressure on the government to take a more aggressive policy as the leader and protector of the Slavic people.

Page 341, note 4. **Mitrofan Nikolaevich Verigin** (1878–1920). Secretary of the Department of Police, 1906–1911; Assistant Director of the Department of Police, 1911; late in 1911 accompanied General Kurlov to Kiev, and after the assassination of Stolypin was arraigned together with Kurlov and others for negligence; dismissed from his post and deprived of his court titles.

5. **Aleksandr Ivanovich Spiridovich** (1873–). Colonel of Gendarmes; worked under Zubatov in Moscow, 1900–1902; later transferred to St. Petersburg; at the time when Stolypin was assassinated in Kiev, he was at the disposal of General Kurlov for different supervisory tasks necessitated by the stay of the Imperial family in that city; in emigration.

Page 343, note 6. **Skoda Works**. Munitions factory in Pilsen, now Plzeň, Czechoslovakia.

Page 344, note 7. **Yakov Grigorevich Zhilinsky** (1853–1919). General; delegate of the Russian Ministry of War to the Conference at The Hague, 1899; Chief of General Staff, 1911; Commander of Northwestern Front, 1914; representative, with the Allies, of the Russian Supreme Command.

Page 346, note 8. **Georgii Antonovich Skalon** (1848–1914). General Aide-de-Camp of His Imperial Majesty; served in the Imperial Guards in many high posts; Governor-General of Warsaw, 1905–1914.

Page 350, note 9. **Lev Aristidovich Kasso** (1865–1914). Minister of Education, 1910–1914; Professor of Civil Law.

Page 351, note 10. **Progressists**. Liberal-Monarchist party, organized in 1908, standing between the Octobrists and the Cadets. Among the leaders were Efremov, V. Rzhëvsky, and Konovalov.

11. **Vsevolod Yakovlevich Demchenko** (1875–). Graduate of Institute of Engineers of Ways and Communications, St. Petersburg; member of the Fourth Duma; Nationalist.

Page 355, note 12. **Vladimir Nikolaevich Voeikov** (1868–). General; attached to the suite of His Imperial Majesty; married to the eldest daughter of Count Frederichs; in command of the regiment of Imperial Hussars at Tsarskoe Selo; appointed Commandant of the Imperial Palace, 1913, in which capacity he accompanied the Tsar in all his movements until his abdication in March 1917; in emigration.

CHAPTER XXIX

Page 357, note 1. **Baron Stahl**. Court Marshal of the Grand Duke Petr Nikolaevich; accompanied the Grand Duke and his brother, Nikolai Nikolaevich, the former Russian Commander-in-Chief, into exile; now in emigration in attendance on the widows of the two Grand Dukes.

2. **Grand Duchess Militisa Nikolaevna** (1866–). Daughter of King Nicholas of Montenegro; married in 1889 to Grand Duke Petr Nikolaevich, uncle of Tsar Nicholas II.

Page 360, note 3. **Bashmakov**. A conservative publicist; appointed by Stolypin about 1911 editor of the *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*; took active part in the Pan-Slavic revival in St. Petersburg during the Balkan wars, attacking

the government for its moderation, and was obliged to resign his post as editor of the official paper; in emigration.

4. **Nikolai Brianchaninov.** Publicist; interested in the problem of Russia's relationship to the other Slavic peoples; in emigration.

Page 361, note 5. **Vladimir Fedorovich Dzhunkovsky (1865-)**. Major-General; appointed Vice-Governor of Moscow, August 1905; Governor of Moscow, November 1905; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1913, and commander of the Corps of Gendarmes; dismissed from both of these posts and given a position on the Western Front, 1915; remained in Russia after the Revolution and underwent long terms of imprisonment.

Page 362, note 6. **Minin and Pozharsky monument.** On the Krasnaia Ploshchad in Moscow, in honor of K. Minin, a Nizhnii Novgorod merchant, who mobilized, and Prince Pozharsky, who commanded, an army to drive the Poles out of Moscow in 1612.

7. **Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich (1869-1918).** Fifth son of the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich and uncle of Tsar Nicholas II; killed by the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1918 in Alapaevsk, Perm Gubernia.

Page 363, note 8. **Russkii Invalid.** Military paper founded in St. Petersburg, 1813, enjoying a wide circulation throughout the nineteenth century.

Page 364, note 9. **Petr Lvovich Bark (1858-)**. Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1913; became Minister of Finance, 1914; during the February (March) Revolution was arrested together with other ministers; soon released, after which he emigrated; Managing Director of the Anglo-International Bank (London); knighted by King George, 1935.

Page 366, note 10. **Prince Vladimir Mikhailovich Volkonsky (1868-)**. Vice-Chairman of the Third and Fourth Dumas; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1915-1916; emigrated to Finland, 1918; active in the anti-Bolshevik campaign of Yudenich; in emigration.

Page 369, note 11. **Charles Emile Etienne Dumont (1867-)**. Deputy of the Department of Jura; Professor of Philosophy at the Lycée de Lons-le-Saunier; officer of the French Academy; Minister of Public Works, 1911; Minister of Finance in 1913-1914.

12. **Théophile Delcassé (1852-1924).** Elected to the French Chamber in 1889; Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1893; Minister of Colonies, 1894-1895; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1898-1905; Minister of Marine, 1911-1913; Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1913-1914.

Page 370, note 13. **Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre (1852-1931).** Educated at École Polytechnique; served in Franco-Prussian War, 1870; Brigadier General, 1900; Major General, 1905; Chief of Lines of Communications, 1910; Commander-in-Chief of the Armies in the Field, 1911-1915; Supreme Commander of all French armies, December 1915-December 1916; Marshal of France, December 26, 1916; member of the French Academy.

CHAPTER XXX

Page 375, note 1. **Komarov**. General; commanded a regiment of picked officers and men whose special duty it was to guard the Imperial palaces when the Emperor and his family were in residence. This command gave him a place in the Imperial suite in close contact with the Tsar and he followed the Imperial family in all its movements. Through him the officers as well as the men of his regiment had freer access to the Tsar and Tsarina, who were personally acquainted with a great many of the men and all the officers. When in 1917 the Revolution broke out, the regiment was immediately turned out of the Palace and other troops, which had gone over to the new régime, took its place. This change was effected without any conflict.

Page 376, note 2. **Mme Shornikova**. See note 12, chapter xv, p. 566.

Page 377, note 3. **Vladimir Evstafevich Korsak (1861-1918)**. Began work in judicial institutions, 1891; became Assistant Public Prosecutor in St. Petersburg Court of Appeals (*S. Peterburgskaia Sudebnaia Palata*), 1906; Public Prosecutor, 1909; Senator; sat on Court of Cassation for criminal suits, 1915.

Page 381, note 4. **Antonino Paterno-Castelli, Marquis di San Giuliano (1852-1914)**. Mayor of Catania, 1879-1882; member of Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1882-1904; member of the Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, 1892-1893; Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, 1899-1900; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1905-1906; Ambassador at London, 1906-1910; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1914.

5. **Louis Barthou (1862-1934)**. Elected to the French Chamber, 1889; Minister of Public Works, 1894-1895, 1906-1909; Minister of the Interior, 1896-1898; Minister of Justice, 1909-1910; Minister-President and Minister of Education, 1913; Minister without Portfolio, 1917; Minister of War, 1921-1922; Minister of Justice and for Alsace Lorraine, 1922-1924; Minister of Justice, 1926; Deputy-President of the Council and Minister of Justice, 1928; Minister-President, 1930; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1934; member of the French Academy; assassinated in Marseilles, October 1934.

6. **Stephen Pichon (1857-1933)**. French Deputy, 1885; Senator, 1906; Minister of Foreign Affairs, with brief intervals, from 1906 to 1920.

7. **Maurice Georges Paléologue (1859-)**. French Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General (after 1909 Minister) at Sofia, 1907-1912; political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1912-1914; Ambassador at Petrograd, 1914-1917.

Page 383, note 8. **André Jean Bénac (1858-)**. French financier; Director of the Personnel Cabinet and of the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior, 1894; Honorary Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, 1904; Administrator of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and Vice-President of the Orléans Railroad Company, and an important figure in many other enterprises.

9. **Baron Edgar Uxkull**. In 1913 attaché at the Russian Embassy in Rome, from where he went to Paris for some months in 1914 and returned to Russia when the war broke out; employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

in Petrograd and left Russia shortly before the Revolution; now in emigration in Germany, where he is engaged in business.

10. **Baron Wilhelm Eduard von Schoen** (1851–1933). German Ambassador in Copenhagen, 1900–1906; Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1906–1907; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1907–1910; Ambassador at Paris, 1910–1914.

CHAPTER XXXI

Page 384, note 1. **Otto Viktor Karl Liman von Sanders** (1855–1929). German General and Turkish Marshal; Chief of German military mission in Turkey, 1913; Chief of Dardanelles defense, 1915–1916; Commander of an army corps in Palestine, 1918.

2. **Colmar von der Goltz Pasha** (1843–1916). German and Turkish Field Marshal; entered Turkish service, 1883, and became Chief of German military mission, which reorganized the Turkish army; in 1914 Governor-General in Belgium, later commander of the 1st Turkish Army of Constantinople; commander in Mesopotamia and Iraq, 1915; died in Bagdad.

3. **Jules Martin Cambon** (1845–). Governor-General of Algeria, 1891; Ambassador at Washington, 1897; Ambassador at Madrid, 1901; Ambassador at Berlin, 1907; Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1915; President of the Ambassadors' Conference, 1920.

Page 387, note 4. **Mahmut Mukhtar Pasha** (1867–). Son of Ahmed Mukhtar, Turkish Grand Vizier; Minister of Marine; Ambassador in Berlin, 1913–1915.

Page 388, note 5. **Theodor Wolff** (1868–). On staff of *Berliner Tageblatt* since 1887; editor-in-chief since 1906.

Page 394, note 6. *Un Livre Noir. Diplomatie d'avant-guerre d'après les documents des archives russes, novembre 1910–juillet 1914* (Paris [n.d.]), II, 385–417.

7. *Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii za 1910–1914 g.g. Sbornik sekretnykh diplomaticheskikh dokumentov byvsh. imperatorskogo rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del* published by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Moscow, 1922), pp. 445–46.

CHAPTER XXXII

Page 395, note 1. **Boris Vladimirovich Stürmer** (1848–1917). Graduate of St. Petersburg University; entered the Ministry of Justice, 1875; Governor of Novgorod, 1894; departmental director in the Ministry of the Interior, 1902; member of State Council, 1904; Chairman, Ministers' Council, February–November, 1916; Minister of the Interior, March–July, 1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs, July–November, 1916.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Page 413, note 1. **Anichkovsky Palace.** Built in St. Petersburg by Empress Elizabeth and presented to Count A. G. Razumovsky. Last occupied by the Dowager Empress, wife of Alexander III.

Page 415, note 2. **Lady Georgiana Meriel Buchanan** (1863-). Daughter of Sixth Earl of Bathurst; married, 1885, to Rt. Hon. Sir George William Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1910-1918.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Page 428, note 1. **This work.** *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus; Dokumenté aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der Provisorischen Regierung*, published by Kommission beim Zentralexekutivkomitee der Sowjetregierung (Berlin, 1931-1934, Ser. I, 5 vols.), I, 241-42, 330-31.

2. **Prince Vladimir Nikolaevich Orlov** (1868-1928). Assistant Chief of the Military Secretariat of the Emperor, 1906-1915; Secretary for Civil Affairs to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, former Commander-in-Chief, 1915; after the Bolshevik Revolution escaped from Russia and died in emigration.

Page 430, note 3. *Petersburger Herold.* A daily published primarily for the Germans residing in the capital and other large towns. The paper followed no particular political program, but concerned itself chiefly with current events and the financial and economic situation in Russia. It had no great influence, as its circulation was limited to German readers and a few private banks with connections in Germany.

Page 431, note 4. **Dmitrii Ivanovich Bagalei** (1857-1932?). Professor of History at the University of Kharkov; member of the State Council, 1914; member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

5. **Ivan Khristoforovich Ozerov** (1869-). Professor of Economics in Moscow and St. Petersburg universities; member of State Council, 1909.

6. **Georgii Emelianovich Afanasev** (1848-1924). Historian; manager of Kiev branch of the State Bank, 1896.

7. **Baron Nikolai Gavrilovich Cherkasov** (1861-). Graduate of Moscow University; chairman of uezd zemstvo board; member of Third Duma; Octobrist.

CHAPTER XXXV

Page 436, note 1. **Ten million fund.** See note 13, chapter ii, p. 544.

Page 437, note 2. **Manus.** Of Manus, Maurice Paléologue wrote: ". . . I should say that the evil course for which the Empress and her coterie will be responsible to History is inspired by four individuals; Stcheglovitov, the

leader of the Extreme Right in the Council of Empire; Monsignor Pitirim, the Metropolitan of Petrograd; Bielezky, the ex-Director of the Police Department, and the banker, Manus. . . . In this quartet I assign a special position to the banker Manus: it is he who keeps in touch with Berlin, and through him that Germany plans and fosters her intrigues among Russian society. He is the distributor of the German subsidies" (*An Ambassador's Memoirs* [London, 1923-1925, 3 vols.], III, 115).

Page 442, note 3. **Afinogen Yakovlevich Antonovich** (1848-1915). Graduate of Kiev University; Professor of Economics at Kiev University; editor of *Kievskoe Slovo*, 1887-1892; Assistant Minister of Finance, 1893-1895.

4. **Dmitrii Sergeevich Sipiagin** (1853-1902). Governor of Kurland, 1888-1891; Assistant Minister of State Domains, 1893; Assistant Minister of the Interior, 1894; Minister of the Interior, 1900-1902; assassinated by Balmashov.

5. **Stepan Balmashov** (1881-1902). Born in Pinega, Archangel, where his father was in exile; entered University of Kiev, 1900; organized the Povolzhskoe Zemliachestvo, an underground university for the preparation of revolutionary workers; in 1901 organized Kiev Socialist Union, which became part of the Kiev committee of the Socialist-Revolutionists; assassinated Sipiagin, April 1902; executed May 5, 1902.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Page 447, note 1. **Le Bolshevisme à l'œuvre**. "La vérité sur la tragédie d'Ekaterinbourg," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 53, October 1 and 15, 1929, pp. 506-31, 847-65. *Le bolshevisme à l'œuvre, la ruine morale et économique dans le pays des soviets* (Paris, 1931), pp. 9-70.

Page 453, note 2. **Princess Zinaida Nikolaevna Yusupova, Countess Sumarokova-Elston**. Daughter of Prince Nicholas Yusupov, wife of an officer of the Chevalier Guards, Count Felix Sumarokov-Elston; mother of Felix Yusupov, who took part in the assassination of Rasputin.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Page 469, note 1. **Maksim Maksimovich Kovalevsky** (1851-1919). Graduate of Kharkov University, after which he studied abroad; professor at Moscow University, 1877-1887; member of the Academy of Sciences; author of many works in Russian and other languages.

Page 470, note 2. **Duchess of Edinburgh**. Grand Duchess Mariia Aleksandrovna (1853-1920); daughter of Emperor Alexander II; wife of Alfred Ernest Albert, Prince of Saxe Coburg Gotha, who in 1866 was created Duke of Edinburgh.

Page 471, note 3. **Battle of Tannenberg.** Tannenberg (Soldau). In East Prussia, August 22-30, 1914 (n.s.), where the Germans under Hindenburg and Ludendorff decisively defeated the Russians under Samsonov.

4. **April 1915.** The massed German-Austrian attack at Gorlice-Tarnow. This battle began on May 1 (n.s.), 1915.

Page 474, note 5. **Anatolii Nikolaevich Kulomzin** (1838-1925). Graduate of Moscow University; studied in Heidelberg and Leipzig; entered the Imperial Chancellery in 1864; Assistant Secretary of the Committee of Ministers, 1873; Assistant Minister of State Domains, 1880; Secretary of the Committee of Ministers, 1883-1902; Secretary and member of the Committee to supervise the construction of the Siberian Railway, 1893; appointed member of the State Council in 1902 and Chairman of the State Council in 1915.

Page 475, note 6. **V. V. Kuzminsky.** This official passed his whole career in the state service at the Ministry of Finance, under Count Witte, Count Kokovtsov, and P. L. Bark, occupying successively the positions of Office Superintendent, Assistant Director, and Director in the Treasury Department; in 1914 appointed as assistant to the Minister (Bark) and remained in this position until the Bolshevik Revolution; after the Bolshevik coup d'état accepted minor positions under the Soviets in the administration of finance of Petrograd and remained in Russia.

Page 478, note 7. **Evgenii Sergeevich Botkin** (1865-1918). Physician attending the Imperial family, which he followed into exile to Tobolsk and later to Ekaterinburg, where he was murdered together with the Imperial family in July 1918.

Page 480, note 8. **Mikhail Solomonovich Uritsky** (1873-1918). Active revolutionist since the 'nineties; Menshevik; later a Bolshevik; member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee; President of Petrograd Cheka, 1918; assassinated by a young student, Kannegiesser.

Page 481, note 9. **Mikhail Ivanovich Tereshchenko.** Industrialist; President of Kiev Regional War Industries Committee during the World War; Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government, March-May, 1917; Minister of Foreign Affairs, May-October, 1917; in emigration.

Page 484, note 10. **Marquis Pauluchi.** Man of wealth, with no political position in Russia; as an officer of the Chevalier Guards, from which he resigned with the rank of Colonel, was a member of the Russian aristocracy.

11. **Mikhail Ivanovich Papadzhanov** (1868-1928). Lawyer; member of the Fourth Duma; Cadet.

Page 485, note 12. **Ivan Antonovich Turtsevich.** Related to the author of these memoirs through his brother, an engineer, Iosif Turtsevich, who married the second sister of Count Kokovtsov; employed for the greater part of his life at the Ministry of the Navy, partly in the fleet as technical officer, and for the last half of his career in the Central Administration, for the verification of the expenses of the fleet; resigned before the Bolshevik Revolution and died in 1929 in Petrograd.

Page 488, note 13. **Nikolai Dmitrievich Sokolov** (1870-1928). A Bolshevik, later a Menshevik; well-known defense attorney in political trials; after the February (March) Revolution one of the organizers of Petrograd Soviet

and a member of its Executive Committee; after the October (November) Revolution worked in Soviet judicial institutions.

Page 490, note 14. **Prince Vsevolod Nikolaevich Shakhovskoi** (1868-). Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1915, to February (March), 1917; in emigration.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Page 491, note 1. **Vasilii Alekseevich Maklakov** (1870-). Graduate of Moscow University; well-known Moscow and St. Petersburg attorney; member of Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas; Cadet; Ambassador of the Provisional Government at Paris, 1917; member of Russian Political Conference, Paris, 1919; President of the Russian Emigrants' Committee in France.

2. **Mikhail Vasilevich Bernatsky** (1876-). Professor of Economics; Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government, September-October, 1917; member of governments of Denikin and Wrangel; in emigration.

3. **Petr Alekseevich Badmaev** (1849-1920). A Buriat physician, who treated his patients with medicines which he made from herbs; worked in the Asiatic Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1875-1893; advocated a grandiose project of a railway line from Siberia across China; friend of Rasputin.

Page 496, note 4. **Mikhail Aleksandrovich Karaulov** (1878-1917). Member of Second and Fourth Dumas; Ataman of Terek Cossacks, 1917; killed by soldiers.

5. **Yurii Petrovich Figatner** (1889-). Metal worker; active in Bolshevik party affairs since 1903; occupied important posts in the provinces during the civil war; in 1929, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy of U.S.S.R.; member of the party Central Committee.

6. **Aleksei Maksimovich Kaledin** (1861-1918). Participated in Galician campaign, 1914-1915; Commander, Russian 8th Army; resigned, May 1917; elected Ataman of the Don Cossacks, 1917; committed suicide, February 1918.

7. **Mikhail Vasilevich Alekseev** (1857-1918). Served in Turkish War, 1877-1878; Chief of Operations of 3d Army, Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Chief of Staff of Nicholas II, 1915-1917; Commander-in-Chief, 1917; founder of the Volunteer Army, 1918.

8. **Lavr Georgievich Kornilov** (1870-1918). Son of Siberian Cossack; captured by the Austrians in the offensive of May 1915, but escaped to Russia, 1916; Commander, Russian Southwestern Front, July 1917; Commander-in-Chief, Russian Armies, July-September, 1917; with Alekseev organized the Volunteer Army; killed by a shell, April 1918.

9. **Grand Duchess Mariia Pavlovna** (1854-1923). German princess, wife of the Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, third son of Emperor Alexander II, uncle of Nicholas II; died in France.

Page 497, note 10. **Mikhail Nikitich Krasheninnikov (1865-1918)**. An eminent jurist, who occupied important positions in the Russian magistracy; at different times presided over the Supreme Court, for the judgment of political cases; as he was well known to those convicted of political crimes who had passed through the Supreme Court and had returned from exile under the Provisional Government and under the Soviet Government, he was chosen as the object of their revenge. They discovered him at Kislovodsk, where he was arrested, and after exceptional humiliations he was shot in August 1918 together with other arrested persons, at Piatigorsk. Among these victims, some thirty or forty in number, were the Minister of Ways and Communications Rukhlov, the three Princes Urusov, General Radko-Dmitriev, General Babich, General Ushakov, and others.

11. **Mikhail Pavlovich Babich (-1918)**. Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks until the Revolution of February (March), 1917; lived at Kislovodsk as a simple citizen after the February Revolution; arrested in January 1918, but set free at the demands of the mountaineers; again arrested in July, and shot at Piatigorsk; his family escaped after his death and are now in France and in England.

12. **Vasilii Ilich Safonov (1852-1918)**. Pianist and composer; teacher of music in St. Petersburg Conservatory; Director of Moscow Conservatory and a well-known conductor.

Page 502, note 13. **Fedor Ivanovich Chaliapin (1873-)**. Made operatic debut at Tiflis in *A Life for the Tsar*, 1892; first great success in the private opera company of Mamontov in Moscow, 1896; then engaged by the Imperial Opera Company, 1899; sang in Paris, Monte Carlo, Buenos Aires, and New York, 1908; appeared at Drury Lane, 1913-1914; in Russia, 1914-1921; on the operatic and concert stage in Europe and the Americas.

Page 503, note 14. **Prince Vladimir Mikhailovich Urusov (-1918)**. Graduate of the Imperial Alexander Lyceum; entered His Majesty's Office, 1878, and later served in one of the departments of the State Council; in 1890 elected Marshal of Nobility for Dorogobuzh Uezd, and twelve years later as Marshal of Nobility of Smolensk Gubernia; elected by the nobility to the State Council, 1909.

Page 504, note 15. **Lev Davidovich (Bronstein) Trotsky (1879-)**. Active revolutionist since 1898; member of the Iskra group; Vice-Chairman of St. Petersburg Soviet, 1905; joined Bolsheviks, July 1917; Chairman of Petrograd Soviet, 1917; Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 1917-1918; Commissar of War, 1918-1924; exiled to Central Asia by the Soviet Government, 1928; banished from Russia, 1929; organizer of the Fourth International.

Page 507, note 16. **Ivan Ivanovich Tkhorzhevsky (1870-)**. Manager of the office of the Ministry of Agriculture under Krivoshein, 1913-1916; well-known writer and translator into Russian of poetical works; in emigration in France since 1921.

17. **Mme von Meck (-1926)**. Sister-in-law of N. K. von Meck, who was shot by the Bolsheviks in 1929, together with Generals Velichko and Palchinsky, for alleged sabotage; well known for her musical talents; killed in Paris in 1926 in a street-car accident.

Page 510, note 18. **General Rauch**. Graduate of the Nicholas Military Academy of General Staff; Chief of Staff of the Guards and of the St. Petersburg military district under the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich; resigned after the Revolution; imprisoned in July 1918 and later released; left Russia with his family through the aid of the Germans.

19. **General Goldhaur**. An officer of the Imperial Guard, with long service in the Preobrazhensky regiment; imprisoned after the Revolution; later set free and left Russia for Finland.

20. **Krassovsky**. A landowner in the Vilna district, where he was appointed Marshal of the Nobility; expelled from his property during the German advance, and lived at Petrograd, where he was arrested as a member of the nobility.

Page 511, note 21. **Prince Y. I. Trubetskoï (1866–1929)**. An officer of the Horse Guards, in which he served for many years; appointed, shortly before the war, to the coveted position of commander of the personal guard of the Emperor, consisting exclusively of Terek and Kuban Cossacks; commanded a cavalry division during the war, and returned to Petrograd after the collapse of the Russian Army in 1917–1918; arrested, but released by the Petrograd Cheka in August 1918, and succeeded in emigrating to France, where he died.

22. **P. Palchinsky (—1929)**. Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry under the Provisional Government; active in the defense of the Winter Palace, November 7 (n.s.); arrested by the Bolsheviks during the civil war; released and served in Soviet institutions; executed in 1929 by the Bolsheviks for alleged sabotage.

23. **Aleksandr Ivanovich Verkhovsky (1866–)**. Colonel during the World War; Minister of War under the Provisional Government, September–October, 1917; joined the Red Army, 1919; Professor of Military Academy, 1927; in Bolshevik service.

Page 512, note 24. **Gleb Ivanovich Bokii (1879–)**. Bolshevik; joined the Right Social-Democratic Labor party in 1900; arrested and exiled; member of the Military Revolutionary Committee, October 1917; after the assassination of Uritsky became provisional chairman of the Petrograd Cheka.

Page 513, note 25. **Count Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff (1871–1918)**. Counsellor in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1911; plenipotentiary in Athens, 1915; diplomatic representative of the Reich in Moscow, 1918; assassinated, July 1918.

CHAPTER XL

Page 520, note 1. **Aleksandr Dmitrievich Zinovev (1854–1929)**. Graduate of Petersburg University; served in the army, and in 1879 retired and lived for some years in Narva, where he was elected member of uezd and then gubernia zemstvo; appointed Governor of St. Petersburg, 1903; member of the State Council, 1911; died in emigration in London.

Page 521, note 2. **George Lendrum Cromie** (1881–1918). Captain; British Naval Attaché in Russia; shot by Bolsheviks, August 1918, while resisting an invasion of the British Embassy by agents of the Cheka.

Page 522, note 3. **Aleksandr Grigorevich Beloborodov** (1891–). Joined the Perm Social-Democratic organization in 1907; arrested in 1908 and sent to the school for juvenile delinquents; member of the Social-Democratic group, Perm Gubernia, 1917; Chairman of Ural Regional Executive Committee, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 9th Army, 1918–1921; elected member of the Central Committee of Russian Communist party, 1919; in 1921 appointed Acting People's Commissar of the Interior for Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics and in 1923 People's Commissar of Interior.

Page 524, note 4. **Mariia Fedorovna Andreeva**. Actress at the Moscow Art Theatre; second wife of Maxim Gorky.

5. **Prince Gavriil Konstantinovich**. Son of the Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich and grandson of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, brother of the Emperor Alexander II; a young officer of the Hussars of the Imperial Guard, and Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor Nicholas II; took no interest in state affairs, and at this time (October 1918) was ill and under treatment at a hospital at Petrograd.

Page 533, note 6. **Archangel**. In the autumn of 1918, under the protection of Allied troops an anti-Bolshevik government of the Northern Region had been established at Archangel under the nominal leadership of N. V. Chaikovsky (1850–1926), an old revolutionist and member of the Socialist-Populist party. Allied forces withdrew late in 1919, and Soviet control was established early the following year.

7. **Anton Ivanovich Denikin** (1872–). Lieutenant General; graduate of the Nicholas Military Academy of General Staff; participated in Russo-Japanese War; Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at the Stavka, April–June, 1917; Commander, Western Front, June–August, 1917; Commander, Southwestern Front, August–September, 1917; participated in formation of the Volunteer Army, and after the deaths of Kornilov and Alekseev in 1918, became Commander-in-Chief of the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia, 1918–1920; in emigration.

8. **Mikhail Nikolaevich de Giers** (1856–1933). Minister to Brazil, 1895; Minister to Peking, 1898; Minister to Munich, 1901; Minister to Bucharest, 1902; Ambassador at Constantinople, 1912; Ambassador at Rome, 1915–1917; chief diplomatic representative of the Wrangel Government, 1920.

9. **Nikolai Dmitrievich Avksentev** (1878–). Prominent Socialist-Revolutionist leader; member of the First Soviet, 1905; Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government, August–September, 1917; Chairman of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, of the Democratic Conference, and of the Pre-Parliament; member of Ufa Directorate; expelled from Siberia by the Whites, 1918; in emigration.

10. **The Russian Political Conference**. The Russian Political Conference was organized in Paris, in January 1919, as the representative of the various anti-Bolshevik Russian governments and groups. It included Prince G. E. Lvov, chairman; the Russian diplomatic representatives accredited at Paris,

Rome; London, Washington, Bern, Madrid, Stockholm; S. D. Sazonov, representing Kolchak and Denikin; N. V. Chaikovsky, President of the Government of North Russia; and various public men representing conservative, liberal, and radical points of view. The Conference communicated with the Peace Conference through the Russian Political Delegation, composed of Prince Lvov, Sazonov, Chaikovsky, and V. A. Maklakov. The Political Conference by its own decision ceased its activities in October or November, 1919, but the Political Delegation, to which Kolchak appointed B. V. Savinkov, continued to exist until March 1920.

11. **Paul Cambon (1846-1924)**. French Minister Plenipotentiary resident in Tunis, 1882; Ambassador at Madrid, 1886; Ambassador at Constantinople, 1891; Ambassador at London, 1898-1920.

12. **Right Honorable David Lloyd George (1863-)**. Liberal member of British Parliament since 1890; President of the Board of Trade, 1905-1908; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-1915; Minister of Munitions, 1915-1916; Secretary of State for War, 1916; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 1916-1922.

Page 534, note 13. **Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924)**. Twenty-eighth President of the United States, 1913-1921.

Page 535, note 14. **Paul Doumer (1856-1932)**. Elected to the French Chamber of Deputies, 1888; Minister of Finance, 1895; Governor-General of Indo-China, 1897; President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1903; entered the Senate, 1912; Minister of Finance, 1925; President of Chamber of Deputies, 1927; President of the French Republic, 1931; assassinated by a political fanatic.

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