

The Servant of India

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Topics of the Week.

Situation in Dewas.

WHEN the Maharaja of Dewas left last month, ostensibly on a pilgrimage to holy places in India, rumour credited him with the intention of not being in a hurry to return to his State. The report seemed incredible at the time but has proved substantially true. The Maharaja had not been many days on tour when he suddenly took ill and was removed, of all places, to Pondicherry. The reasons for the selection of this place in non-British territory for his stay have not been explained and are none too clear. Medical assistance cannot have been the only consideration which established its superiority over all others in British India in the eyes of the Maharaja and his advisers, for the kind of medical help required by him at Pondicherry would have been at his disposal at any district town in British India. And when his present illness overtook him it is said he was not very far from Tanjore which would have provided at least equal facilities for medical help with Pondicherry. And his maladies too do not appear to be of a kind which would not have yielded to treatment except by French doctors. Whatever that be, indications point to the Maharaja absenting himself from his State for some time—a contingency of which the Government, to judge from one of their communiqués, could not be said to have been unaware.

What happens to his State in his absence? He was asked by the Government to go back to Dewas by

the 10th inst., failing which, he was warned that the Paramount Power would take charge of the administration. This has been done, an indication, belated though it be, of the realization by the Government of the duty they owe to His Highness's subjects. Both the communiqué issued by the Political and Foreign Department and the Maharaja's lengthy telegram to the Viceroy leave one in no doubt that it was the financially embarrassed condition of the State, which induced the Maharaja thus to extern himself from his State. According to the former, "the treasury is empty, the credit of the State has been exhausted, salaries of officials have been continually in arrears, and His Highness, in order to right the position, has been driven to attempts at permanently alienating portions of his territory." "Recklessness and lack of proper control exercised by His Highness" is said to have made this deplorable state of affairs possible. A ruler endowed even with a moderate measure of a sense of responsibility for the welfare of his State would, instead of running away from his obligations as His Highness of Dewas has done, have stuck to his place and would have made himself useful in finding a way out of the difficult situation in which his actions have landed the State. But he "elected to leave his State, in circumstances which indicate all too plainly his intention of permanently absenting himself without making any satisfactory arrangements for conducting the administration."

While the ruler is primarily responsible for the straits to which he has reduced the State, the Paramount Power too cannot escape responsibility for allowing the situation to develop to the extent of the present impasse. It is difficult to believe that the British Government was not kept continuously *au fait* of the course of events in Dewas culminating in what virtually amounts to the Maharaja's voluntary abdication. The crisis did not come to a head overnight and had apparently been ripening for several years. Did the Paramount Power take any effective steps to avert it? Or did it allow itself to be lulled to sleep to awake only when the situation had got out of hand. If, as is stated in the communiqué, the Maharaja "evaded repeatedly the advice tendered to him by Government", what, we wonder, prevented the suzerain power from intervening in the interests of the subjects of the State the moment it became manifest that the ruler was not disposed to profit by that advice? Why was the Maharaja allowed to go on unimpeded with his squandermania till not a pie was to be found in the State coffers? If the Maharaja has given evidence of a lack of proper appreciation of his responsibilities as a ruler of men, no less has the British Government which generally delays the exercise of its powers of paramountcy till the interests of the State have hopelessly suffered. A stitch in time saves nine is a maxim for which apparently they have no use.

* * *

The Government's failure to prevent a crisis in any State's affairs would be excusable if they had been devoid of the necessary powers of intervention. That is however not the case and want of means for making the will of the Paramount Power felt in any given case cannot be validly pleaded by them. That excuse cannot avail them, especially after the evidence tendered by the Secretary of State before the Joint Select Committee. The point under consideration was: Could a State be compelled to enforce in its own territory legislation affecting federal subjects? Was there any sanction at the disposal of the British Government by which it could be made to do so? Sir Samuel Hoare had admitted that there would be no sanction and that he did not contemplate the Federal Government marching an army into a State to enforce a law. His admission was regarded in certain circles, not sympathetically inclined to the federal plan, as a feather in their cap in that it would enable them to show up the unworkability of the federal plan. Lord Reading however came to Sir Samuel Hoare's rescue, as the following extract from the Committee's proceedings will show:

Lord Reading:—The mere fact of there being paramountty puts great pressure upon any representation that may be made by the Viceroy?

Sir S. Hoare: Certainly.

Question: And consequently it does not become necessary to do anything more?

Answer: That is so.

Question: What I mean by that is that if the Governor-General or Viceroy issues letters of instructions or directions, which ever you may choose to call them, to a State to carry out what it is the obvious duty and obligation of the State to perform, the State will either do it or it becomes in default and then there are various means of putting pressure upon the Ruling Prince and his Government which would bring about what you desire. There is no difficulty in that?

Answer: That is so; yes.

What the Indian public would like to know is why are not such "various means of putting pressure upon the Ruling Prince" availed of in order to prevent a crisis rather than their being made use of after its occurrence. Is not prevention really better than cure?

* * *

Rebuke to Millowners.

IT is interesting to find the Governor of Bombay, in his recent speech on the occasion of the Bombay Millowners' Association dinner, trying to impress upon the millowners the desirability of setting their own house in order before demanding more protection and still more protection. In doing so, he said:

As you know, I and my Government have always done our best to promote your interests and to support your suggestions; but I am not sure that there is not perhaps a tendency to rely too much on tariffs and not enough self-help. Seven years ago the Noyce Committee pointed out defects in organisation and management, all of which have not yet been put right. Then the Fawcett Committee and the Whitley Commission made recommendations in other directions—recommendations which, to some extent, depended upon prosperity—but some of which involve no expenditure and yet they have not been adopted. I would only say in this connection that we cannot rely for ever on protection, and we cannot expect the consumer to continue paying higher prices than those which would obtain in an open market. The consumer, too, is not unlikely to view with some concern cuts in wages and any forcing down of the standard of life of the workers.

He also exhorted them to be "ruthless in the excision of all that is unhealthy and clogging in the life of the industry you represent," as a result of

which, he was sure, the Bombay mill industry, which had fallen upon evil days, would once more begin to look up.

Sir Frederick Sykes also regretted the absence of an expansion of welfare work which he attributed to circumstances. That there is still much scope for expansion in this field will be apparent when it is remembered that some mills have yet no dispensaries attached to them and that quite a number have not yet seen their way to provide creches for their women workers.

May it be hoped that the advice emanating from such influential quarters will not fall on deaf ears?

* * *

A Heartless Sentence.

AN instance of a heartlessly severe punishment under the Ordinance Act is reported from Ahmednagar. Mr. P. H. Patwardhan, a prominent Congress worker of the place, recently delivered a public speech in defiance of the order restraining him from doing so. For this offence he has been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000! It is difficult to account for the severity of the sentence in Mr. Patwardhan's case, especially because since the inauguration of the campaign of individual civil disobedience nearly three months ago far more illustrious Congressmen guilty of like offences have been given what must be characterised as comparatively very much milder punishments. Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. C. Rajagopalachary, e. g., were sentenced to one year and six months respectively with no fine, and similar instances can be easily multiplied by the dozen. Is it any wonder then if one year had come to be regarded as the maximum period of imprisonment which a breach of the restraint order would invite on oneself. Mr. Patwardhan had done nothing that we know of to deserve the exceptionally heavy sentence which has been meted out to him. He may have been a devout, and for that matter even a blind follower of Mahatma Gandhi; but that no way justifies the infliction of such a merciless sentence upon him. We do not know whether an appeal against the sentence would be lodged. But even were it not, the Government owe it to themselves by the exercise of their inherent powers of clemency not to allow this outrageous sentence to stand unmodified.

* * *

Indian Women's University.

THANKS to the action of the executors of the will of the late Sir Vithaldas Thackersey, in withholding payment of the interest on his benefaction of Rs. 15 lakhs, the Indian Women's University has, as is well known, been landed in serious financial difficulties. Efforts are being made to relieve its financial distress to some extent by collecting subscriptions for it in various centres and the University too has placed one of its own professors, Mr. Mydeo, on the special duty of securing financial aid to the University. Organised work to the same end is contemplated in Bombay under the auspices of the Bharat Sneha Samvardhak Mandal which has succeeded in setting up a small committee of prominent Bombay citizens under the leadership of Dr. Mrs. Sukthankar. The collection which the Committee is expected to organise will cover the whole of Bombay and will not be long in starting. The work which the University is doing is too well-known to need any commendation at our hands at this time of the day. It is hoped that the philanthropic spirit for which Bombay City is deservedly reputed will come to the rescue of this useful institution and will enable it to tide over its present financial troubles.

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Articles.

LAND REFORM IN MADRAS.

BY what appears to be an adroit and dramatic manoeuvre the centre of interest in the bill to amend the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 has been shifted from the *zamindar* to the *inamdars*; from the elucidation of the purpose of the Act to the extension of its scope. The Act of 1908 was restricted to the regulation of the rights and obligations of a certain class of landlords, the *zamindars*, and their tenants in the Madras Presidency. It recognised certain rights in the tenants as against the *zamindars*. The working of the Act for the last quarter of a century disclosed some defects and difficulties which needed elucidation and clearing up. Several amending bills were drafted since 1913 onwards, having this particular object in view. But there was no intention to extend the scope of the Act so as to include another class of landholders, the *inamdars*, who have hitherto been exempt from the operations of the Act. The Hon. Sir Archibald Campbell, the Revenue Member of the Madras Government, in introducing the Bill on the 26th January 1932, said, "The Bill only aims at removing certain difficulties which have been found in the working of the Act. It does not aim at conferring any new rights or other powers upon either the *zamindars* or the *ryots*." He made no reference to the *inamdars*, nor did Mr. B. Muniswami Naidu, sometime Chief Minister, who has now successfully moved an amendment to club the *inamdars* with *zamindars*. He, too, repeatedly stated in his speech on the introduction of the Bill on the 26th Jan. 1932 that the Bill was concerned only with elucidation of the purpose of the Act and not the extension of its scope. He said, "I would only say that there are a very large number of outstanding questions in connection with the Estates Land Act which concern the actual working of the Act and which concern the rights claimed by the tenants and the landlord. There are others which are of a very controversial nature and I am sure that this House would not like that such questions should be taken up by the Government themselves either on behalf of the *zamindars* or on behalf of the tenants. Many such contentious questions have been laid aside and this bill is confined to those which may not be said to be very contentious but which would facilitate the proper working of the Act. ... There are bigger questions and it would be open to the representatives of the tenants or the *zamindars* to bring forward their own bills ... The present Bill confines itself merely to those particular points which require elucidation and which require clearing up." He even appealed to the House to see that only non-contentious questions were considered and that "all contentious matters affecting either the landlords or the tenants are postponed." Neither Sir Archibald Campbell nor Mr. Muniswami Naidu can pretend that the extension of the scope of the Act to the *inamdars* for the first time was merely an

elucidation of the purpose of the original enactment or that it was not contentious. On the contentious matters, Mr. Muniswami Naidu had promoted a separate bill, which was however jettisoned by the present Chief Minister, a leading *zamindar*.

An attempt was made in the Select Committee to extend the scope of the Act, but without success. The Select Committee included Sir Archibald Campbell, Mr. Muniswami Naidu and the Raja of Bobbili, the present Chief Minister and the Report was unanimous. None of the three, who have now in open Council carried the amendment, thought it necessary to dissent from the conclusions of the Committee and give notice of his intention to return to the matter in the open Council. Sir Archibald Campbell, in presenting the Report of the Select Committee to the Council, made no reference to the *inamdars* but only repeated, rather textually quoted, his very words uttered on the 26th January 1932 regarding the object of the Bill extracted above. Apparently, none was serious about the innovation. But later, Mr. Muniswami Naidu moved an amendment to the relevant clause under "definitions". It had been agreed to at a private conference of some leading members outside the Council Hall. The debate in the Council was closed and the amendment carried by 74 votes to 18. Sir Archibald Campbell accepted the amendment. When reminded of his earlier assurance, he wriggled out by stating that he stood by his word not to move an amendment of the kind himself but he could not prevent a private member doing so. He did not explain why he accepted the amendment, instead of opposing it or at least remaining neutral. It has been claimed that the Government Bill as originally introduced meant to rope in the *inamdars* but that the Select Committee had turned it down. Not having the texts of the Government Bill and the Bill as amended by the Select Committee before us, we write subject to correction. But it is surprising that this intention was not discovered by the public immediately, and did not then and there evoke the agitation which is now in full blast. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, the Advocate-General, who presided over the sub-committee which drafted the amendments which formed the basis of the Government Bill, could not have failed to notice it. He was so strongly opposed to the innovation that he took the unusual course of opposing it in the open Council, though it was going to be accepted by the Government. Dewan Bahadur M. Ramchandra Rao and Mr. T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, to mention only two eminent lawyers who have since vehemently objected to the move, could not have failed to notice the Government's intention if it had been made clear in the Bill. In making so fundamental a change in the Bill, it is best to give wide and long notice in unequivocal terms and take the bull by the horns, as it were, rather than seem to sneak in by a side door.

II

The dubious procedure is all the more regrettable because the amendment itself is a step in the right direction, whatever be the motives of its promoters.

and stood every chance of success in an open challenge. It must however be recognised that the *inamdars*, who were hitherto outside the Act and who are sought to be brought in under the amendment, have not the same legal obligations towards their tenants as the *zamindars* who came under the purview of the Act. In the case of the *zamindar* and his tenant, it was a case of restoring to the tenant the rights which were postulated for him and which he was dispossessed of by the *zamindar*; in the case of the *inamdar*, it will be a case of conferring for the first time on the tenant a right to which he never had a presumption. In so far as the Estates Land Act of 1908 was based on implied and presumptive legal rights, the inclusion of the *inamdar* is wholly foreign to its purpose. While the former was declaratory of rights, the latter effects a transfer of rights without compensation, and is expropriatory in character.

Such expropriation can be justified only on grounds of social justice and State policy. In the unequal contest between the landlord and the tenant, the weaker tenant must be protected by the State, for in his case freedom of contract has serious limitations. It is also in the interest of agriculture that the tenant should have certain rights, like security of tenure and fair rents. It is surprising that such arguments were hardly advanced in the debate on the amendment. The reasons are obvious. If social justice were the real plea, ryotwari *pattadars* also should be clubbed along with *zamindars* and *inamdars*. There is no proposal to do so. Social justice and agricultural improvement requires that all tenants, cultivating tenants, should be secured certain rights irrespective of the legal status of their landlords. The invidiousness of penalising the *inamdars* is aggravated by the exemption proposed to be given to those *inamdars* whose rights were adjudicated upon by the judicial courts. That is to say, if an *inamdar's* right to full rights in his land had been questioned by his tenants and he won his case in the courts, his tenants are not to get the protection proposed in the amendment. But if his right was never questioned and was even acknowledged by his tenants, the latter

are to get occupancy rights! Invidiousness can go no further.

In the circumstance, it would be the better course to drop the present amendment and bring forward a new bill frankly based on social justice and applicable to all cultivating tenants, under whatever tenure they hold their lands. Speaking on the motion to pass the Estates Land Bill into law in 1908 the Hon. Mr. Forbes, said, "There is a further point to which I must advert and that is the case of the under-ryot, and of the tenant of private land of the *zamindar*. Naturally it must be expected that their case should find a place in this Bill: but we considered that the Bill was sufficiently weighty without adding to the burden. But the next matter which will engage the attention of the Government is the position of the under-ryot and of the actual cultivator of the soil. Enquiries must be made on that point and legislation will sooner or later have to be undertaken to afford the actual cultivator of the soil—whether he cultivates under the *zamindar* or under ryot—some protection." From the point of view of social justice emphasis should be laid on the protection of the cultivating tenants rather than on the limitation of the power of the landlords, for often between the landlords and the cultivating tenants there are middlemen who monopolise the advantages of such legislation and leave the cultivating tenants as bad as, or worse than, ever.

All that can be said for the present amendment is that it is a half-way house between legal and social justice. It is the first, though partial and even mischievously invidious, step in the transition. *Inamdars* and *ryotwari pattadars* had supported the limiting of the rights of the *zamindars* in favour of the tenants in 1908; now *zamindars* and *ryotwari pattadars* have supported the limiting of the rights of *inamdars*. The next step will be for the *zamindars* and the *inamdars* to pay a similar complement to the *ryotwari pattadars*. That is how practical politics moves. Not righteousness but the jealousies of the powerful are often the shield of the weak! It is sad it should be so; but it is.

THE FEDERAL PLAN MUST BE LAID ASIDE.

AMONG the many objections taken to the White Paper scheme there is one which, though it goes down to the first principles and is fatal to the whole scheme, is generally ignored in the current discussions. What is being attempted at present is not merely to readjust in small and somewhat unimportant matters the relations subsisting between British India and the Indian States, or even to form a sort of confederacy between them with a view to carrying out certain purposes, but to create a new federal sovereign State. If it were a question of bringing about a confederation for the purpose of attaining certain specific ends, it would have been a comparatively minor matter, for both British India and the States which would enter into such a loose

union would always retain the right of withdrawing from it at will. If the union turned out ill, it could be dissolved by each party at its own pleasure. Any resulting mischief could thus be easily rectified. But what India has to face up to at the present moment is not a temporary union of this sort, but a regular federation, which is universally recognised to be a permanent and indissoluble union. Sir Samuel Hoare himself has made it clear that, in whatever other ways our federation might depart from the normal type, it would conform to it in this, viz. that no province of British India or Indian State which has once entered the federation would be allowed to secede from it at any time in future. This interminable character of a federal union makes it impera-

tively necessary that the union itself should be entirely voluntary. The covenant of federation must be entered into freely by parties free to act. Is this condition fulfilled in respect to the federal scheme which is now being hammered out? None but superficial observers can answer such a question in the affirmative.

Take first the States. It is true that only those States will be admitted into the federation whose rulers signify their consent to join it, and that in legal theory the rulers are clothed with authority to speak for the States. This position may be juridically unassailable, but surely no one will pretend that morally the Princes, whose autocracy is all but complete in most States, have any manner of right to stampede their subjects into a union from which no escape will ever be possible except by revolutionary means. The subjects even of Indian States may be expected to come into their own some time or other, but when they will do so they will find that the pledges of their past rulers have irrevocably committed them to staying in the federation for all time, even if they should like to secede from it. Other treaties to which they would become heir, would, if found injurious, be capable, by negotiation, of modification and even cancellation. But the federation would be a treaty which from its very nature would be impossible of getting annulled in any circumstances whatever, unless each of the federating States and British India agree, which is impossible. Where a transaction of such far-reaching consequences is in question, it follows that it should be entered into not only by those who happen at the moment to possess the legal right to be a party to it, but also by those who will succeed to their authority in generations yet to come. This is the reason why there has been no instance in history so far of a federation of independent states which were not popularly governed. All the federations known to the world are federations between democracies or republics. It could not be otherwise. If a federation is really to be regarded, as is the case everywhere, as "a perpetual union of indestructible states," no autocratically governed State should be allowed to join it, since, when in course of time a popular regime is established therein, it may desire to get out, and the union may be anything but perpetual. To preserve the union intact for ever, it becomes necessary therefore that the consent to the formation of the union should be obtained, not merely from individuals who find themselves in positions of power at the moment, but from those who will get into those positions in succeeding generations and who can, unlike the present rulers, be trusted to represent the masses of people. If a federation is allowed to be brought about in our country between the rulers of Indian India and the people of British India, ours will be the first instance on record in which a people, viz. the people of the States, will be forced into a federal union and held to it in perpetuity.

Nor would the federal union be a truly voluntary act on the part of the British Indian people. These have no doubt been taken into consultation, unlike

the people of the States, but this consultation has been partial. Apart from the fact that members of the Round Table Conferences were selected by Government and several sections of opinion were given no opportunity of taking part in them, the Indian National Congress which admittedly represents the largest volume of public opinion stayed away from these deliberations except at the second Round Table Conference; and whatever views were expressed by the Congress delegate at this Conference have received no endorsement or confirmation at the hands of the Congress itself. So it happens that even in British India, the largest section of the politically minded people has remained aloof from, and may well be hostile and antagonistic to, the federal scheme that is being formulated. Is it not supreme folly then to foist upon British India a federal union which its people may, when they have the power, desire to overthrow and which they can overthrow only by recourse to means not at all constitutional? To enact a federal constitution at a time when the country is in political turmoil and when the attitude of by far the most influential group of politicians is, to say the least of it, doubtful, is nothing short of inviting a revolution. What would have happened in similar circumstances in other countries? Let us imagine that when negotiations took place among the States of Northern America which led eventually to the formation of the United States republic, the largest of these, viz. New York, was convulsed with political agitation, and the prominent politicians in it either were afforded no opportunity of taking part in the negotiations or stood sullenly aloof from them. Is it at all conceivable in these circumstances that the negotiations for a federation would still have gone forward and culminated in the actual formation of a union? Wherever such negotiations have taken place, the statesmen conducting them have not been content with obtaining a bare majority in favour of federation; they have always insisted upon a preponderating majority or as nearly as possible unanimity. That is why very often in other countries the negotiations had to be dropped when any serious opposition was raised, and the thread was taken up again when the opposition disappeared. Nor was actual federation formed until it appeared that objection would no longer be taken. It is no use the British Government and non-Congress parties saying in this country: "The Congress was given an opportunity of taking a hand in the deliberations, but it chose to non-co-operate. Therefore, we can now with a clear conscience ignore the Congress altogether and build up a federation with the co-operation of such elements as are available." This kind of reasoning would perhaps be justifiable to some extent if it were a question of enacting a unitary constitution which could be revised later with comparative ease so as to meet the wishes of the Congress leaders over whose heads it is to be passed. But there can be no justification whatever for enacting, in spite of active opposition or even passive non-co-operation on the part of the Congress, a federal constitution which is proverbially difficult to amend and which is wholly

impossible to repeal. All plans for an all-India federation must therefore be laid aside so long as all important sections both in British India and the Indian States have not been induced to take part in previous consultations and have not expressed themselves decidedly in favour of federation. The very nature of federation puts this inexorable limitation upon our attempts at creating a federal government in this country.

It must not be supposed that the coercion that will be practised on the Indian States' people and on British Indians by their being forced into a federation was not deliberately intended by the authors and supporters of the federal scheme. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to show that these politicians have always been conscious that people in this country can be got to agree to federation only under duress and that they wish of set purpose to apply compulsion. It is well-known how Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru insists that provision should be made in the same enactment for federation and provincial autonomy, and that there should be no interval of time between the commencement of the latter part of the constitution and that of the former. If for some reason federation could not be brought about in the near future, then he would rather have provincial autonomy postponed till federation became possible rather than go ahead with provincial autonomy in the hope that federation would come soon after. Asked specifically about this, he gave it as his opinion at the Royal Society of International Affairs on June 20th last that "it would be preferable to wait for responsibility in the provinces than to have it in the provinces if it was not likely to come at the centre." Indeed, he goes the length of saying that provincial autonomy unaccompanied by central responsibility would be, not merely a very poor advance, but a definitely reactionary step. This opinion would appear to most people very strange and devoid of justification. How can transfer to popular control of those provincial departments which are now under bureaucratic control be a retrograde measure? Is it because Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru thinks that provincial autonomy, if accepted alone, will indefinitely defer the advent of central responsibility, that he opposes the grant of provincial autonomy by itself? Yes, but his reasoning on this point must be carefully noted. It is as follows: Central responsibility is bound up with federation, and federation will come into jeopardy if, on the attainment of provincial autonomy, some of the provincial governments refuse to join the federation. Therefore, he says, federation must become an accomplished fact before the provinces become independent enough to stay out of it. When once federation is established, none of the component parts can get out. Therefore, a federal constitution must be imposed upon the provinces by the British Government before the people in the provinces obtain the power of exercising their own judgment in the matter of joining or not joining the federation. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has openly avowed this intention of bringing British India forcibly under the federation in this

way. In his speech to the Royal Society of International Affairs, referred to above, he said: "Remember the implications of postponing the matter (of the immediate formation of federation) and leaving it to the provinces to determine whether federation shall come about or not. In a country like India it is taking an extraordinary risk to postpone the establishment of federation now, when competent opinion is supporting to it, for another five or ten years, because then one single province may hold up the progress of the whole country." If provincial autonomy is given, then the provinces will have to be consulted as to whether they wish to come into the federation or not. This may wreck federation; therefore Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's advice is to form federation first before it becomes necessary to consult the provinces, so that, even if they are opposed to federation, they may be permanently imprisoned in it. Can there be any better proof of the conscious use of compulsion?

We are always told, whenever we refer to other federations, that the federation that is to be brought into existence in India is *sui generis*, and that the lessons of other countries cannot be applied here without very great qualifications. If we insist upon forming a federation here in circumstances in which a federation would have been impossible in other countries, let our federation be at any rate not of the perpetual variety that exists elsewhere, but one which will admit of secession on the part of every unit that will now join it. The evil consequences of such a hurried or forced federation would then be not so serious or at least irremediable. If in any province or State the politicians who are now excluded from participation in the framing of the constitution get the upper hand and think ill of the federation, they will be enabled to get out of it or have the terms of federation revised to their satisfaction. Under the existing conditions such a peaceful termination of the federal constitution is not possible. Nothing less than resort to lawless force now provides an escape from it. If we have no hesitation in making in our country unheard of departures from the norm of a federal constitution on the plea that the circumstances of India are very abnormal, we should have no hesitation in permitting to its component parts secession from it at will. The conditions in India are really such that the formation of a federation should be put out of the question at present; but if it is to be brought about, it should be of a fluid character, admitting of exits as well as of accretions. To make it rigid as in other countries is to pave the way to revolutionary changes in future by violent means.

OBSERVER.

REJECTION OR ACCEPTANCE ?

IT is difficult to know exactly what rejection of the White Paper means. If it means that we here and now pledge ourselves not to go into the reformed councils on the White Paper becoming law, I think it is unwise to do so. You may decide to do it when the time comes. But that must be for

reasons which then appear cogent and satisfactory. I do not however visualise the likelihood of any such course becoming necessary. It is much more likely that we decide to send in the strongest contingent of nationalists both to minimise the mischiefs of administration by non-nationalists and to work for further constitutional expansion from within.

If by rejection of the White Paper is meant our expression of dissatisfaction with it, we have been doing it; we shall be doing it to the last. The effort to improve the White Paper is being made by a section of our countrymen. Feeling as we do that substantial or tangible improvement is not possible in the present temper of those at the helm of affairs in Westminster, some of us are not bestowing any attention on that side of the work. What we want we can catalogue, but not one of that catalogue has any the smallest chance of insertion in the White Paper.

If by rejection is meant that we should prevent the White Paper proposals becoming law and for this purpose we may and should work with the Churchill-Lloyd group in England it is a wild proposal from every known point of view. How can there be any common point between the Indians discontented with the proposals in the White Paper and the reactionaries in England in whose opinion India is not fit and for a good long time will not be fit to govern herself? All that is probably meant is that we should raise our voice against the White Paper and claim to be left where we are and the Churchills and the Lloyds of England will then say: "India does not want it. You do not want to give more. Do not move forward at all." I shall assume that that is what happens. Then I do not expect Sir Samuel Hoare to drop the White Paper. If every conceivable interest desired it, still Sir Samuel Hoare will go forward, settle the constitution in such a way that it should not be taken up and altered in the near future. Whether he can successfully do so or not, that will be his hope and effort.

There are Indians who will not allow the matter to be dropped by Sir Samuel Hoare. The Muslims will not allow it to be dropped. The Hindu Mahasabha will not agree to have it dropped. I am not sure that even among us there will be unanimity of opinion in favour of rejection. Most will feel the new position an advance on the present position so far as the provinces are concerned, and there is no need to reject the advanced position because the advance is not enough to give us satisfaction. There will be enough confusion and divergence of view in India to justify Sir Samuel Hoare claiming that he must go forward or he will dissatisfy intelligent and responsible Indian opinion. It is quite certain, absolutely certain, that things will move forward and the White Paper will become law with more or less insignificant amendments. I confess to a feeling that in some way we take a gravely inconvenient step, particularly where the centre is concerned, and amendment of it later on might involve retracing of steps not easily executed. The Rt. Hon. Sastriar says that amendment is not

impossible. It may not exactly be impossible, but it is so extremely difficult that the optimists can only say at present that "thanks to Paramountcy, the Princes can be persuaded." I am not sure that the power of persuasion will for long remain or will be exercised for our advantage if it did remain. But it is not very relevant just now for our purpose. It is possibly relevant for my argument that if the central knot could be so tied as to make it not easily united in Indian interests, England will not hesitate to tie that knot just now and for that very reason.

If then the White Paper cannot be prevented becoming law, what possible choice of rejection have we got? It is only a little less futile than to discuss whether we should or should not reject the pressure of the unavoidable atmosphere which encompasses us on all sides.

The cry in favour of rejection is the result of insufficient thought as to what is possible. Some may add that it does not show sufficient thought even as to what is desirable.

T. R. VENKATARAMA SASTRI

[I am again greatly indebted to the Editor for letting me have an advance copy of Mr. T. R. Venkatarama Sastri's article and giving me an opportunity of expressing my views on it at the same time as the article appears.

So far as I am concerned, my suggestion only is that we should now give up all talk about improving the White Paper scheme, because we all know it is moonshine, and instead bend our energies to getting the scheme thrown out, if possible, by the British Parliament. I do not want any politicians to commit themselves to non-co-operation in case the scheme is forced upon us; but I hold that it would be equally unwise and inexpedient to commit ourselves to co-operation either, as the two recently formed parties have done. We are not yet altogether past the stage of making a united effort to retrieve the situation. Our first concern must therefore be to make that effort, preserving the while a common front among all nationalist groups. If we are all defeated in this effort each group may go its own way. Even so men like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta and Mr. Sytamurti, who have made up their minds to co-operationism in all circumstances, will have ample time to canvass their electorates. Their premature electioneering activities at this time only serve to distract attention from the work on which we must all concentrate at present. We should not therefore prejudge the question of our attitude to the working of the reforms either way.

Assuming it is possible, is it desirable to secure the rejection of the White Paper? This is the main question to which all others are subsidiary, and I do not gather from Mr. Venkatarama Sastri's article that he considers rejection *per se* undesirable. For he seems to think that although the White Paper scheme offers an advance in the provinces, it offers no advance worth speaking of at the centre, and, what is far more important, this position will be almost permanent, future amendment of the constitution being, as he says, "extremely difficult," if not impossible. If provincial autonomy or something like it is to be had at the cost of accepting a block on popular progress in future, it does not appear to me to be at all conceivable (and his article only confirms this view) that Mr. Venkatarama Sastri will not rather like the country to be where it stands politically.

I did not know that the Right Hon'ble Sastri challenges the statement of men like Dr. Paranjpye that the introduction of Princes into the constitution would so increase the difficulties of amendment as to shut out for all practical purposes the possibilities of future development towards democratic self-government. But since Mr. Venkatarama Sastri quotes this opinion of the Right Hon'ble Sastri

only to discount it, I need not examine its tenability here. Indeed I cannot do so till I know the reasons on which it is based. But if the Right Hon'ble Sastri relies on the belief that the paramount power can easily wangle the Princes when amendments for the growth of the constitution are proposed, I would like to point out to him that on this supposition he would not be able to defend, as some try to do, the nomination of the States' representatives by the Princes on the ground that the Princes' nomination would in practice be independent and wholly uninfluenced by the agents of the British Government. The paramount power is not likely to be so discriminating in the use of its authority that it will leave the Princes free to appoint staunch nationalists to the federal legislature but compel them to withdraw their veto upon constitutional amendments of a progressive character. If the Viceroy can be trusted so far there is no need to object to his special responsibilities and extraordinary powers, on which our nationalists concentrate the fire of their attack.

To Mr. Venkatarama Sastri rejection of the White Paper appears to be wholly impracticable, however desirable it may be. Even if all sections of Indian politicians cried "Hands off" from India, Sir Samuel Hoare would, according to him, still try to get the White Paper constitution passed by the British Parliament and would succeed in doing so in spite of the die-hard opposition. Neither the Secretary of State, nor the Cabinet, nor Parliament would hesitate to force down the throats of the Indian people a scheme of reforms which is declared by the latter as not even tolerable. As a matter of fact this does not seem to be exactly the position in England. The supporters of the White Paper scheme recommend it, not so much on the ground that it is a good scheme, as on the ground that it is a scheme which will be acceptable to moderate Indian politicians. Conversely, the Churchill scheme is being condemned, not so much on the ground that it is a bad scheme, as on the ground that it will be rejected out of hand by India. The burthen of the song of Sir Charles Innes, Sir John Thompson &c., was that the White Paper and nothing short of it will give reasonable satisfaction to the politically-minded Indians and that it is impossible to keep them disaffected any longer. On the other hand Sir Samuel Hoare's chief objection to the proposals of Mr. Churchill was that they would not be supported by Indian opinion. He asked Mr. Churchill, when the latter claimed that India would recognise that the reforms he proposed were not "poor things" but "great and real and majestic," "Supposing, however, in practice these powers did not appear to be real and majestic, and there was no body of public opinion in the Provinces prepared to work them, would you let them drop, or would you go ahead with them?" Similar questions were asked by Mr. Jayakar and others. To all these questions Mr. Churchill's answer was that his scheme, which was being proposed in order that the political aspirations of India may be satisfied, would in fact be acceptable to Indians and that a contingency of non-co-operation on their part would not arise. But if it proved unacceptable, "and not very much political satisfaction resulted, then I think (Mr. Churchill said) it would be better to stay where you are." That is to say, in that case he would not go on with the scheme. And he twitted Sir Samuel Hoare with being in the same position. For Sir Samuel Hoare too was not prepared to expand the reforms to the extent to which it would be necessary to make them acceptable to India. He would stop at a certain point and if he found that Indian opinion would not work the reforms offered by him he would be content to drop the scheme altogether. And after all, the difference between the White Paper scheme and his own provincial autonomy scheme was not so great (said Mr. Churchill) that if Indian politicians refused co-operation to the latter they would give it to the former. From all this it would appear that a certain minimum amount of political satisfaction is postulated by those who are piloting the reforms, and that in the event of its not being realised, the reforms will not be proceeded with. Some of us say dependently in India that British statesmen will frame their reforms measure and get it passed irrespectively of our wishes. British statesmen however realise that the measure must be acceptable to the bulk of Indian opinion. We must

therefore so raise our voice now as to make it unmistakable that we do not want the reforms. This our attitude is not yet made sufficiently clear. At present only die-hards like Mr. Churchill and Lord Lloyd and radicals like Col. Wedgwood are prepared to vote against a Reforms Bill founded upon the White Paper. But even Labourites like Major Attlee, Mr. Morgan Jones, etc., including even men like Mr. Lansbury, do not appear to be prepared to vote against it because they believe that after a show of opposition Indians would accept the Bill at least as a second best, and that in any case they would not like to go without the White Paper reforms, meagre as they are. If we disabused them of this notion and told them plainly that we are so uncompromisingly opposed to the White Paper that we would rather prefer to be where we are they would themselves vote against the Bill and Mr. Churchill would perhaps manage to detach from the Government a much larger number of Conservatives than we imagine at present. In this way possibly we shall succeed in having the Reforms Bill either dropped or defeated.

Anyway this suggestion is worth trying out; it will at least do no harm if we fail. Mr. Venkatarama Sastri says, to try to secure the rejection of the White Paper is only less futile than to try to avoid the pressure of the atmosphere. I do not believe it is so hopeless. At any rate there is one thing which is more futile than what I am suggesting; and that is to try to improve the White Paper. But our politicians will insist upon meeting solemnly in conferences and passing resolutions giving long lists of the improvements they want (and the lists grow in length as the outlook becomes blacker), but they will do nothing that may possibly influence voting in the British Parliament!—OBSERVER.]

A NEW PRIME MINISTER IN FRANCE.

MORE ephemeral than the leaves of the trees are ministers in France. M. Daladier's government had met with a large measure of approbation, both inside and outside the country, and, generally speaking nothing seemed likely to justify its fall. Yet ever since the government plans of financial redress had become publicly known pessimistic forebodings had cast premonitory shadow on the discussion of the budget. And the budget effectively proved to be the stumbling block for M. Daladier's government, as had already been the case in several previous instances. Regrets at M. Daladier's fall are somewhat mitigated by the fact that the new ministry will carry on the work very much on the same lines and in the same spirit. The change is much slighter than it might have been. M. Daladier himself is occupying a prominent post in the cabinet as minister of war. The ministers of public instruction, aviation, and others have not been altered and the fact that M. Paul-Bancour has been asked to remain at the Quai d'Orsay is a proof that France will not change the orientation of the foreign policy that she has been following for several years.

Nevertheless the fact remains that the ministerial crisis has paralysed—momentarily at least—the effort of balancing the budget, and it is impossible as yet to know in what conditions the work can be resumed. However the ministers may change, the fundamental difficulties remain the same, namely the difficulty of finding the necessary resources to balance the budget, when (a) the necessary economies are opposed by an important number of deputies in Parliament who have committed themselves to the defence of various vested interests, (b) fresh taxes are equally unpopular, and tend to definitely strangle trade and industry already crushed by the double weight of the depression and the existing taxes, and (c) any government will experience extreme difficulty in finding a sound and stable majority in Parliament

among all the conflicting currents that circulate there at present.

The new ministry has to face a situation of exceptional gravity. France has staked a great deal on her monetary stability and this will not be secure unless the budgetary equilibrium is made the basis of the financial position. A sound balance of accounts and service of the public debt must also be insured. An important fraction of public opinion condemns in anticipation all novel and half-hazard financial and social experiments, persuaded that the result would be disastrous in the present time, and that State interventions in private concerns can only weaken the authority of public powers and quench the sources of wealth by paralysing the normal play of private initiative.

M. Sarraut has shown promptitude and decision in forming the new cabinet. His opening declaration before Parliament to-day is lively, spirited and hopeful. It also typifies a comprehensive and clear outlook on the situation as a whole. It remains to be seen how the problems shall actually be tackled and whether the new government will succeed in finding a stable majority in Parliament to agree to its financial plans.

M. Bonnet, the previous Finance Minister, has remained in office but although M. Lamoureux, who was the author of the previous restoration plan, has been replaced by M. Gardey, hardly anything more than a change of tactics can be expected. The new process will consist in presenting the reforms by successive slices and stages, with the hope that they will thus prove more acceptable than if they are made to appear simultaneously as an indivisible and formidable block.

The first stage would comprise economies and administrative reforms; the second repression of fraud; the third fresh taxation, under a variety of less unpleasant denominations. At the same time a constructive effort would be pursued in view of economic restoration, including national and colonial equipment. The new ministry's task appears all the more perilous since the international situation is labouring under confused and disquieting influences and rivalries of contradictory factors. Questions such as disarmament, international monetary policy, international economic competitions, etc. cannot fail to take an important place in Parliamentary discussions. It is even permitted to hope that the urgency of certain problems, and factors such as the foreign manoeuvres against the franc, may ease and accelerate the passing of a balanced budget as well as the constitution of a national majority in Parliament, under the pressure of necessity.

"Our desire," said M. Sarraut, "is to prove that France is capable of finding through the free play of republican institutions, the will and the strength to overcome the present difficult stage, after which there is hope that vast horizons will open up before us.... France is calm and strong and wishes to remain free from all passions because her right must be respected.... France's right is identical with that of all those nations who are sincerely attached to the maintenance of peace... We shall pursue our foreign policy in the same spirit of international solidarity and collaboration."

M. Sarraut has a double reputation of authority and cleverness: he will need both to steer the ship of France wisely through the troubled waters of the present situation.

Paris.

L. MORIN.

Our London Letter.

(BY AIR MAIL.)

(From Our Correspondent.)

LONDON, November 3.

THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE.

THERE is very little to report this week regarding the Joint Select Committee. No public sittings have been held, the time of the Committee being occupied until to-day with private discussions on matters relating to the franchise, Provincial and Central, and to the size and composition of the bicameral Federal Legislatures, after which the projected Reserved Bank and the proposed Railway authority were considered. It is understood that certain reactionary proposals, restricting the size of the Central Legislature and affecting the representative character of the electorates and the legislature were advanced, and strongly supported in certain Conservative circles, but it is believed that the strenuous resistance with which they were met on the British Indian side and in other quarters will have succeeded in preventing a mischief that would have gone to the very heart of the Reforms.

To-day the public sittings of the Committee were resumed when representatives of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce were heard on commercial discrimination. On Monday afternoon the Secretary of State will, it is understood, give evidence on the same subject. Tuesday and Wednesday will be devoted to further discussions though an early rising on Tuesday is expected, in view of the resumption of Parliament. On Thursday next week Mr. Douglas Dewar will be heard on the finances of federation and on Friday Sir Henry Gidney will give evidence, on behalf of Anglo-Indian interests. The Bengal Police Association have decided to tender evidence through Mr. J. C. French and Mr. S. H. H. Mills, and November 13 has been set aside for that purpose. It will certainly be of a reactionary character, as is also likely to be that of three retired members of the Indian Medical Service who will give evidence on the 14th instant. It is understood that the British Medical Association is greatly disturbed at the prospects, or lack of them, under the Reforms of British Members of the Indian Medical Service. Final discussions will be held with the Indian delegates on the 15th and 16th, when the meetings of the Committee for the present session of Parliament will come to an end—doubtless to the intense satisfaction of the Indian delegates, several of whom are aching to return home. They have felt extremely uncomfortable since the summer vacation and the resumption of the Committee's work and the discussions that have been held appear to have done little to encourage them to believe that they can render any further useful service.

INDIA OFFICE CONTROL.

In a recent speech Sir Samuel Hoare expressed gratitude for the fact that, as a result of these Round Table Conference proceedings and the meetings of the Joint Select Committee, a different attitude was being adopted by Indian public men, whether from British India or from the States, towards the Secretary of State and the India Office officials. That may very well be so, and it is at any rate a point of view that is worth noting. Nevertheless, whatever may be the opinion in progressive Indian quarters on the White Paper proposals generally and the need for substantial improvement in them, it is notorious that general

Indian opinion, from Moderate to extreme Congress, is unanimous that at the earliest possible stage the control of the Secretary of State, that is of Parliament, over the internal affairs of India should disappear. In a letter to the *Manchester Guardian* Colonel Maunsell spoke of the "necessity for cutting adrift from the shackles of the Secretary of State." Colonel Wedgwood, M. P., is strongly opposed to such a change, which, he thinks, cannot be in the interests of either the British or the Indian people, or in the interests of justice. It is strange how good men who have gone astray can get hold of the wrong end of the stick. Colonel Wedgwood adds in support of his view that he has received from the Central Hindu Society of Great Britain (a body that so far as I am aware exists more as a name than as a fact, and exercises, even if its existence be proved, no influence whatever) a memorandum in which the Society, "speaking for the Indian majority, denounce this responsible government as a fraudulent mixture of mediaeval institutions that will make India a continent of warring creeds in every city and in every rural taluka." It is at least difficult to understand how Colonel Wedgwood can reconcile his concept of democratic institutions with the control of one people's affairs through the Parliamentary institutions of another.

"An Englishman on Leave" replies to Colonel Wedgwood whom with Mr. Churchill he speaks of as honestly defending a system which may be described as follows:—

"A British politician is returned to Parliament by an electorate solely and wholly concerned for the moment with a domestic election issue, and knowing India only as a vague geographical expression of Rajas, snakes, missionaries, tigers, and natives." Having little or no acquaintance with India, he is appointed with the supreme authority on Indian affairs, and is expected to interpose himself between the Government and the several peoples of India with his eye, first and foremost, on voters living some thousands of miles from the subjects of his authority and remote from the atmosphere in which they live. It may be agreed throughout India that there should be, or should not be, some change of policy there; the implementing of that agreement depends on whether the British electorate thinks there should be some change of policy and/or Government at home. There may be need in India for some immediate and swift action to deal with a sudden situation; the promptness of its fulfilment may depend on the Secretary of State's personal engagements of the moment. His political distance between the Governments and peoples of India hardly matters, whether his back be turned to the one or the other or askew to all of them. One of the greatest of the Indian Liberals and a hero of the Round Table Conferences has twice said to me 'abolish the India Office and I drop all my other demands,' and most officials in India would say 'hear, hear.'"

The writer of this pungent letter asks whether Colonel Wedgwood applauded the manner of the control by Parliament and the Secretary of State when Lord Birkenhead was at the India Office, and whether Mr. Churchill fully approved of this system and principle when Mr. Benn introduced his "bewildering changes". He adds in conclusion that since his return from India recently he has been "daily appalled at the extent to which popular ignorance and baseless suspicions about India have grown and allowed themselves to be calculated and exploited by the kind of dihardism that lost us the United States. If these be our masters in India then 'Parliamentary responsibility' is going to be fatal to India and the British connection in India." It is good that such warnings should come from Britishers as well as from Indians.

POLITICAL MEETING IN LONDON.

Mr. Bhulabhai Desai is announced to preside at a meeting of the New Indian Political Group (London) which all Indian organisations and residents in London are requested to attend in respectful memory of the late Mr. Vithalbai Patel, at Essex Hall, to-morrow. It is to be hoped that those present will remember the nature of the occasion, and will refrain, so far as possible, from converting the meeting into a hostile demonstration. No doubt Mr. Bhulabhai Desai will exercise all his authority to preserve the dignity of the proceedings. Mr. Desai has had already some experience in handling an Essex Hall meeting last Saturday, when he spoke on the Indian situation and used with considerable skill the many Congress arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Congress is still very much alive, and that the proceedings of the Round Table Conference and of the Joint Parliamentary Committee being utterly useless and misconceived, the Moderate leaders, who participated in them and who are totally unrepresentative in character, have not only rendered no useful service to India, but have merely befooled themselves. There is of course another point of view, but it need not be stated here. Incidentally, it may be mentioned, that the *Evening Standard* publishes a cartoon by Low, commenting upon Mr. Churchill's evidence given before the Select Committee, showing Mr. Churchill offering his panacea to the hind-quarters of an elephant upon the supposition that the occupants of the howdah in front are not interested in the White Paper proposals. Upon a closer examination of the picture, it is observed that every one of the occupants of the howdah is sedulously reading a copy of the White Paper. It does not require much imagination to draw the conclusion that Low does not think much of Mr. Churchill and his mental gymnastics, however much they may be appreciated editorially by the paper in which the cartoonist's work appears.

Returning to Mr. Desai, he had no difficulty at last Saturday's meeting in dealing very faithfully with the Communists' attack upon the Congress and its prominent personalities, led by the ubiquitous Mr. Saklatvala. The Communist group has for some time begun to suspect that neither Mr. Vithalbai Patel nor Mr. Bose had the desiderated ideology needed for the fresh leadership in the Indian political struggle that both of them had postulated sometime ago as being necessary to meet the new situation there developing. One sometimes wonders what the young Communists would do if they did not have words like "ideology" and phrases like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" to play with. Doubtless, however, they would report that they are in no worse state than their predecessors who used words like "democracy" and phrases like "the will of the people" without necessarily understanding their implications.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN MALTA.

There was the sort of diarchy in Malta under the Constitution granting self-government in respect of internal affairs, reserving Imperial affairs and matters affecting the peace and security of the Colony to the Imperial authority. The people of Malta are of Semetic origin, both as to ethnological descent and as to language. For a very long time the cultural language of the islands has been Italian. Since the British connection, over a century ago, English has been increasingly used. Some years ago, after the inauguration of the Constitution, the then responsible government by general agreement passed an enactment through the local Legislature whereby the equal teaching of English and Italian, in addition to Maltese, was undertaken in the elementary public schools. Under Lord Strickland's strongly pro-

British regime attempts were made to undermine this arrangement, and as a result, during the suspension of the Constitution, about four years ago, the language question became acute. This and other matters came up for consideration by the Royal Commission appointed to investigate Maltese affairs and which recommended the restoration of the Constitution, subject to certain other recommendations on specific issues, all of which were accepted and adopted by the British Government. On the language question the Commission was of opinion that from a purely educational point of view it was unwise to teach children in elementary schools two other languages in addition to their mother-tongue, but recognised the need of both languages at later stages of Maltese education. They held, however, that before taking any steps to alter the statutory position on this question a special enquiry should be held as they themselves were not in possession of all the evidence. In the face of this recommendation for a further enquiry, without making it or causing it to be made and entirely arbitrarily, and without any consultation with the popular leaders in Malta, the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, inserted in the Order-in-Council restoring the Constitution a provision prohibiting the teaching of Italian in the public elementary schools of Malta, whilst permitting the teaching therein of English.

Now it happens that just as there are jingo patriots like Lord Strickland and Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, so there are cultural fanatics in Malta like Dr. E. Mizzi, the Minister of Education. The Nationalist Party of which he is co-leader with Sir Ugo Mifsud, who became Head of the Ministry after that Party had badly defeated the Strickland Party at the election that followed the restoration of the Constitution, made the prohibition of the teaching of Italian in public elementary schools a most powerful election cry, and upon their return to power claimed to be authorised by the electorate to do everything in their power to get the prohibition removed from the Constitution, and their whole administration has since centred upon getting round, by every legal means, the formal legal constitutional prohibition. They had succeeded to such a considerable extent that the British Colonial Office took alarm and demanded the reversal of the Malta Government's policy under threat of dismissal of the Ministry and the suspension once more of the constitution. Sir Ugo Mifsud, believing that he had a mandate from the electorate to carry through the education policy of the Ministry, refused to be browbeaten by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and declined to resign. Accordingly yesterday his Ministry was dismissed from office and by an Order in Council the constitution has once again been suspended, a political crisis has reached its climax and all the powers of the administration have been resumed by the Governor. No one quite knows what the outcome will be, but a certain amount of tension between Britain and Italy is bound to result, for whilst Italy has no real desire to acquire Malta she is certainly very much interested, both from a commercial and a cultural point of view, in promoting the use of Italian abroad. So far as the Maltese are concerned, many of them find it convenient to earn their livelihood or carry on their trade with Italy and her North African Colonies. In all of these things one would have supposed that whether rightly or wrongly the Maltese people, having been granted internal autonomy, should have been left free to conduct or to mismanage their own affairs, and that the reserved powers held in the constitution should have been kept in cold storage until some really first-class crisis in which the foundations of law and order or the security of the Colony as a key point in the Im-

perial structure was affected. As it is, an act of despotism has taken place against which the Maltese people can, in the midst of the many vast matters pressing heavily upon the British people, but feebly protest. In the result the Colonial Office action can only produce grievous discontent and dissatisfaction among a hitherto loyal population, nearly all of whose leaders, notwithstanding insinuations to the contrary by designing or ignorant people, have been and still are very friendly to the British connection. I am assured by one of the most prominent of them that if a fresh election were to be held to-day the Nationalist would secure an increased majority and would almost wipe out the Opposition.

Reviews.

ALL ABOUT THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.

LENINISM, VOL. II. By JOSEPH STALIN. (Allen & Unwin.) 1933. 22cm. 468p. 12/6.

LENIN: TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER. THE REVOLUTION 1917. BOOKS 1 & 2. (Martin Lawrence, London.) 1933. 23cm. 272p., 304p. 6/- & 10/6.

THE output of literature on Bolshevik Russia is so uncommonly voluminous that even those who devour such books with avidity will find it difficult to keep abreast of the publishing firms. Before one book is read, ten more are published. No wonder, the reader is bewildered about the choice of books. But it is refreshing to read books like those under review.

The first of these is by Joseph Stalin "the most prominent continuer of Lenin's cause and his most orthodox disciple, the inspirer of all the most important measures taken by the Communist party in its struggle for building up socialism, the greatest theoretician of Marxism—Leninism and the Leader of the party and of the Communist International since Lenin's death." The book contains his speeches, writings and interviews with foreign delegations, supported in appropriate places with quotations from Marx and Lenin. This also contains his answers to questions raised by his own colleagues on the theory and practice of Communism. They are all to the point and convincing, but are full of ridicule, biting sarcasm, reminding us of the schoolmaster exercising authority with his ferula over his students that dare doubt and question. Even while answering the questions of foreign delegates he takes them roundly to task for their views on Communism which are at variance with his, expounds to them Communist ideals and exhorts them to do propaganda in their own country in favour of Communism. His articles deal with the situations that arose from time to time in Russia since the establishment of the Communist state, expounding the Communist ideals as conceived by Marx, Engels and Lenin. His speeches were all made to Communist leaders in Russia at their meetings or conferences. His writings and speeches are characterised by a thorough grasp of the principles of Communism, a very clever marshalling of facts regarding the Communist experiment and a clear understanding of the attitude of foreign powers and their opposition to Communism. There is not one aspect of Communism which has not been explained by him. He makes no secret of the aims of the Communist party to spread its gospel all over the world and the methods adopted by Bolshevik Russia towards its consummation. The book bears the impress of Stalin's sturdy faith in Communism. It is an able exposition of Communism with its collective forms,

state capitalism and industrial programme. We can put it in the front rank of books so far written about Russia.

The other two books are English translations of the speeches and writings of Lenin. They cover the period from July to October 1917, when Lenin was at the helm of affairs which later culminated in the Bolshevik Revolution. All his writings and speeches of importance have been included in the two books besides some public documents. The explanatory notes in Part I and appendices, the calendar of events and a diary of Lenin's life in Part II of the volume greatly add to the value of the book inasmuch as they all help us in the understanding of the contemporary political life of Russia.

The writings of Lenin himself are, many of them, addressed to his own comrades, during the days of his exile when the Kerensky Government was in power. They all make very interesting reading. Part II of the Volume includes his famous article on "State and Revolution." This deals with the Marxist teaching about the theory of the State and the tasks of the proletariat in the Revolution. In this article Lenin restates the theory of the State as propounded by Marx and Engels and analyses the distorted views of 'renegade' Karl Kautsky of the Second International. The experiences of the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 are told in an interesting manner. He concludes his articles by saying that it is of paramount importance for the establishment of a Communistic state that there should be a proletarian socialist revolution by which alone the masses will be able to liberate themselves from the yoke of capitalism.

S. R. VENKATARAMAN.

A WORLD TOURIST'S EXPERIENCES.

ROUND THE WORLD IN A BABY AUSTIN.

By HECTOR MACQUARRIE. (Hodder & Stoughton.) 1933. 20cm. 383p. 7/6.

FOR the first time there is here a book of travel round the world, of great significance as an international advertisement of the Baby Austin Car. As a piece of commercialised book-writing, it represents a type of literature which threatens to become fashionable. Ignoring the shop side of the book which is tactfully disguised, there is a panoramic view of the world and its mankind that Mr. Macquarrie reveals in all its fascinating wealth of wayside comedies, tragedies and scenery. Beginning with an actual experience of a shipwreck involving no loss of "souls", we follow Macquarrie's trial seeing the Tabitians, "a dying race" and the Nara-tongans who are imbued with "a missionary piety." In the United States, there is the hundred per cent. American who will do anything to escape being born an Englishman. Macquarrie relates a story by way of illustration of the American distaste of a British birth-mark. "I was nearly an Englishman myself," said the Yankee. "Three days before I was born, my mother was in Canada. "Pat," she said to my dad, "get me across the border for the love o' Mike or we will have an Englishman in the family." The Dad rushed her across the border and I was born five miles from it—on the American side! A close shave!" At first the Americanisms give our traveller an uncomfortable feeling, but soon he gets used to being addressed as "boys" which is just American for "blokes, fellows, men, old tops and septuagena-

rians." Even nature hereabouts wears a solemn and at times uncanny aspect. Surviving a horrid massacre of "r", "we motored from the Grand Canyon (where as the reviewer feels, saints can thrive on sheer spiritual uplift) to the edge of the Painted Desert and across the Petrified forest." At this end, as in a sense all over the United States, there are formalities of speech which convey meanings other than what they imply. "Come again or hurry back." It is synonymous for "Thank you."

After describing his experiences in many other lands, the author turns to India. Unlike other countries where the policeman does not treat the white man with any especial respect, the heart of Mr. Macquarrie warms to the cheerful courtesy of Indians. Macquarrie must take note that but for British prestige which has tamed the whole nation of Indians into humble orderlies born to salute the Europeans, he would have found a stiffer kind of an Indian to greet him. The sharp eyes of Mr. Macquarrie single out for scrutiny that unassimilable human being in India—"the Anglo-Indian, the official name now for Eurasian, although pure Indians rather comically persist in calling them Europeans." As the car drives along the Indian road Macquarrie sees clearly, as he who runs may, that "the Mohammedans detest and despise the Hindus." Regarding the Indian Nationalists, Amir, the wayside Muslim acquaintance of Macquarrie, says: "The whole movement was backed by wealthy Hindus. These men are like the sower of seed. They throw on the Earth what they have; they lose it; but they do not expect a harvest." Vitally important to Macquarrie however are the reflections of Amir and Gigi on matrimony which deserve to be read in order to be appreciated. Well-meaning friends of Macquarrie sound the panicky warning that in India he might become "the target for brickbats;" but here is what he says: "We were always treated courteously by the natives. We were never conscious of the slightest hostility. We left India with the impression that the situation is exceedingly complex and packed with difficulty, but that is not nearly so bad as the newspapers would lead us to think." Many irritants go to create the political heart-burning in India, but not the least of them owes its contribution to "the Wogs." 'Wog,' in Anglo-Indian parlance means Westernised Oriental Gentleman—the young Indians home from British Universities. "Young officers use that term", said Colonel Grieg; "a pity rather. It does not solve the problem created by the return of these young Indians from England." Westernised Oriental Gentlemen know that a little too poignantly, as Macquarrie observes. Indian States, please take note of this passing commentary: "Burdwan is a Native State which may explain the filthy Dak bungalow."

One feels infinitely the wiser for reading this travel book of such cheery and sparkling contents as bristle with serious intentions.

K. VENUGOPAL RAO.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- THE SOCIALISATION OF BANKING. By OSCAR SACHSE. (Macmillan, London.) 1933. 20cm. 137p. 3/6.
- THE SHI'ITE RELIGION. By DEWIGHT M. DONALDSON. (Luzac's Oriental Religious Series, Vol. VI.) (Luzac, London.) 1933. 25cm. 393p. 15/-
- INDIAN SPIRITUALITY. The Travels and Teachings of Sivanarayan. By MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI. (Dent, London.) 1933. 20cm. 253p. 5/-