

THE Servant of India

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TOPICS OF THE WEEK.

THE British Foreign Office Note to the League on the Anglo-Chinese relation strengthens the suspicion that Great Britain looks to the League not as an arbitrator, but as a contingent convenience, the 'good offices' of which are to be requisitioned when it suits her interests. The Note makes the grotesque claim that the action of Great Britain in China has been in conformity with the letter and spirit of the League Covenant. For the first time after the Boxer rising British troops are ashore in Shanghai apparently in accordance with the spirit and the letter of Article 10 of the Covenant which says that 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.' Being a member of that "Commonwealth of Free Nations" nicknamed British Empire, India has sent her troops to China 'at the request of His Majesty's Government after consultation with the Government of India and with the latter's concurrence.' So India brushes aside her obligation as a Member of the League at the 'request' of His Majesty's Government. It is a fact, it may be sad, that the League does not evoke excessive enthusiasm in India and unless the League takes action in the present matter which under the Covenant it can, the League's prestige in India will suffer a serious injury—an injury which all the orations and the sweet things said about the League by high officials at the League Union may not repair.

THE session of the Burma Legislative Council just prorogued was marked by much liveliness and was unfortunate in some respects. Contrary to general expectations, the resolution proposing the removal of sex dis-

qualification from the Burma electoral rules was thrown out. Burmese women enjoy greater freedom and are better educated than their Indian sisters. Hence it is an irony that, while the latter have not only secured the right to vote but are even entitled to sit as members in some legislatures of the country, the former should have been denied the franchise. The resolution was stoutly resisted by the Government who maintained that Burma being a stranger to representative institutions, on western lines, the proposed reform was premature. The position of the Government strikes us as illogical. If representative institutions have been conspicuous by their absence in the past in Burma, and if some experience of them is to be regarded as a condition precedent to the conferment of the franchise, how was it that the Government reconciled itself to Burmese men being given such representative institutions as they now have? We think that in fairness to themselves and the women of Burma the Government, following the example of some of the provincial governments in India, should have remained neutral in regard to the proposal, if they could not have supported it. It is a pity they adopted a hostile attitude. Another regrettable feature was the incident leading to the walk-out of a large number of popular representatives as a protest against the Home Member's unbecoming remarks about a popular patriot in jail. The Home Member appears to us to have been unnecessarily offensive and much of the unpleasant bitterness that marked the proceedings could have been avoided if he only knew how to keep his head cool and choose his words carefully. The voting of demands was noticeable for the unsuccessful attempt made to kill dyarchy by refusing the ministers' salaries. That is, however, a happy end to an otherwise unfortunate session.

THE defeat in the Council of State of Mr. Ramdas Pantulu's motion in favour of prohibition is not at all surprising when we consider the constitution and traditions of this house of elders. But the arguments advanced against the motion, especially from the official benches, are, to say the least, out-of-date and unconvincing. The failure of the policy of moderation and gradual reduction in consumption by regulating sale is writ large in most of the excise administration reports of the provinces. The plea of illicit consumption is old and overdone. The Government, it would appear, refuse to take note of the fact that popular opinion in this country—Hindu as well as Muslim—is solidly in favour of prohibition. Sir Sankaran Nair only uttered the truth when he said that the moral conscience of India revolted against drink and that the large mass of the people would not, unlike in western countries, object to any law

prohibiting the sale of liquor. Mr. Khaparde was more quixotic than right in his reading of human nature. His declaration that prohibition was the surest way of increasing consumption sounds good paradox, but is perverted logic. Some members were gushing with sympathy for the poor man's right to relaxation; but the ruin and misery that follow in its wake do not seem to have troubled their minds. The Director-General of the Indian Medical Service should have forgotten his books when he waxed eloquent over the health giving values of alcohol and did the unedifying work of a propagandist of liquor interests. We wonder what exactly he meant when he emphasised the need for educating the people in the use of alcohol. We would rather lay emphasis on the need for educating the Director General himself on the evils of alcoholism.

THE welcome and presidential addresses delivered last week at the fifth Malabar Tenants' Conference echo the deep resentment felt by the people of Malabar at the attitude of the Government towards the question. Both the addresses naturally devote much space to answering the points raised in the Government's communique announcing the veto of Mr. Krishnan Nair's bill. We have before this given our views on the merits of the vexed controversy. That apart, there is another and more important aspect of the question to which the Government of Madras does not seem to have paid sufficient attention. Mr. Tulsiram, the President of the Conference, drew attention to it in the concluding part of his address, where dealing with what he calls the "root of the matter", he says: "Apart from the shifting foundations of the aristocracy, those who are left beyond to cool their heels in the outer courts, wage-earners, tillers of the soil, workers with hand and brain, producers of wealth and crafts are content no longer to wait. They want their share in the good things of the earth and there is a limit to their patience... Those who till, will have the land and no power on earth can keep them from it." From this standpoint, it should be pointed out the centre of gravity of the problem is shifted from the kanamdars to the cultivating tenants who are the actual tillers of the soil. And when the latter come into their own, as they undoubtedly deserve to and inevitably will, it is to be seen how far the kanamdars will retain their present enthusiasm for the economically oppressed and exploited workers on the land. We have no doubt that the tenancy movement, not only in Malabar but in all parts of the country, will gain considerably in volume and irresistible force and even take an entirely new turn, when the real and greater sufferers, the large mass of agricultural workers and farmers are organised and brought to play their part in the movement. The Government cannot, therefore, long afford to continue their present unwise policy of marking time, unwilling or afraid from short-sighted considerations to incur the displeasure of the aristocratic landed interests. The future, assuredly, lies with the masses in India, as elsewhere, and political wisdom, if nothing else, demands the recognition of this simple fact. We would therefore, along with Mr. Tulsiram, urge the Government of Madras "to note the signs of the times and, reading portents, go forward in wisdom, foresight and statesmanship to provide for the inevitable need of the morrow."

THE question of exercising the right of entering in-
to and worshipping in temples by
Temple Entry. the untouchables and other unprivi-

leged classes was raised last week from the plane of propaganda to direct action in two important centres of orthodoxy in the north and south of India. It is a pity that such small questions of social and religious reform should call for the intervention of the police for preserving peace and order. If the conscience of the Hindu Society is awakened and its leaders are alive to the play of the new forces of liberalism working within its fold, it should not be difficult to set up some machinery, as efficient as it is authoritative, to settle these minor questions of social readjustment. Many of these problems which provoke so much noise and bitterness could be solved amicably if the interested parties on either side display some good sense and the spirit of social justice. The orthodox section is doomed to failure, if only because the time spirit is against them. They cannot for all time hope to entrench themselves behind the power of the police and the magistracy, for the State cannot long postpone the recognition of the just rights of the untouchables and other lower orders of the Hindu community.

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THE Report on Public Instruction in Bengal for 1925-26 reveals many of the unsatisfactory features of the Indian education of to-day. The deplorably slow progress of elementary education—due largely to lack of funds,—an increasing demand for literary education in the secondary and collegiate grade, a decline in the number of students under instruction in the technical and professional subjects, except law, unpopularity of vernacular secondary schools, absence of a sufficient number of trained teachers and the unsatisfactory state of students' health—these are some of the outstanding defects which contribute to the top-heavy nature and barrenness of our educational system. And the Government Resolution on the Report under review admits all these defects as much as it deplores them. The Governor-in-Council, we find, regrets that during the year little practical progress has been made towards spreading primary education and observes that large additional resources are required for its further expansion and that "additional funds cannot be availed of without fresh taxation." The present revenue, we hope, is sufficient for putting down "revolution" in the province. The growing unpopularity of secondary schools in which the vernacular is the only medium of instruction and the increasing demand for secondary English education show, for one thing, how secondary education is still regarded by the public more as a preparation for the University course than an independent, self-sufficient preparation for life. It also indicates the up-hill nature of the work awaiting those who stand for whole-sale vernacularisation at a bound. The fact that the Calcutta University has declared itself in favour of vernacularisation and submitted regulations for the matriculation examination proposing that teaching and examination in High Schools should be conducted in the vernacular in subjects other than English, adds only to the strangeness of the phenomenon we are called upon to consider. To alter the outlook of the public and serve the real interests of the students it is not enough to issue a fiat for vernacularisation; it has to be accompanied by corresponding changes in the curriculum and the objective of the system so as to convince the people that vernacular High Schools are really as useful and necessary as the English institutions.

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THE ORIYA PROBLEM.

ON Tuesday of last week (8th inst.) the Legislative Assembly discussed the question of amalgamating all the Oriya-speaking tracts under one administration. This problem is being agitated in the country with greater or less intensity for sixty years, and more than twenty years ago the Government of India agreed to the desirability of bringing the scattered Oriyas under a common government only reserving for consideration the details as to how to give effect to the idea. And yet we seem to be getting no forrader now : the Government of India sympathises with the general principle, but still awaits examination into details. When, one wonders, will this inquiry be undertaken and practical steps taken to reunite all the Oriya-speaking people now distributed over four provinces ?

The bulk of these people are, of course, in the Orissa division in the province of Bihar and Orissa, but there are about a lakh of Oriyas in the Singhbhum district and Seraikela and Kharsawan States in Chota Nagpur in the north. Then on the south some 20 lakhs are to be found in the Ganjam district and Ganjam Agency and Vizagapatam Agency in Madras Presidency. A lakh and a half in the Pampur and other Zamindaris in the Central Provinces on the west and six lakhs in the Contal subdivision of the Midnapore district in the Bengal in the north. Of course, in all these tracts which are sought to be united under one administration there are other people than Oriyas as well, but they are mostly aboriginals, as, e. g. Khonds in Vizagapatam Agency, who are being gradually absorbed by the Oriyas. It is estimated that if all the Oriya-speaking tracts under the four Governments are amalgamated together with the Feudatory States attached to them, they will cover an area of 89,000 sq. miles (British territory 42,000, States 47,000), with a population of 153 lakhs (British territory 103, States 50), and a revenue of Rs. 130 lakhs (British territory 122, States 8.). As against these figures the area of Assam, which is raised to the status of an independent province, is 53,000 sq. miles, its population is 67 lakhs and revenue Rs. 128 lakhs. For a long time all that the Oriyas desired was that they should be brought together under some common administration, as a sub-province under a Chief Commissioner, but recently and particularly after the constitution of Assam as a little province by itself, their original ambitions have expanded and they desire now, not a Chief Commissionerhip but a Governorship, as a separate province, probably with no High Court and University to start with (in which case it will be on a plane with Assam), but with all these appurtenances in course of time. These ambitions are but legitimate, and, moreover, the Oriyas do not demand an independent province all at once, if that is not practicable. They will be content for the time being if Ganjam district, excepting Chicacole taluka, was detached from Madras Presidency and added on to Orissa and

similarly other Oriya-speaking tracts become a part of Orissa, the whole under one government, say that of Bihar and Orissa ; but they will make it clear that this is a stepping-stone to the formation of a full-fledged province giving full scope to the development of their distinct language and age-long culture.

As an off-shoot of the various schemes of territorial redistribution which were set on foot under Lord Curzon's regime, the amalgamation of Orissa with the outlying tracts seemed in 1903 to be only a matter of a few months, when Sir Herbert Risley, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote to the Government of Bengal as follows : "On the grounds above stated, the Government of India are disposed to unite the whole of the Oriya-speaking people, both hill and plain, under one administration. They are disposed to add to Orissa the Oriya-speaking tracts of Sambalpur and its Feudatory States, the Ganjam district and the Ganjam and Vizagapatam Agency tract." Nor was the Bengal Government adverse. It wrote back to the Government of India ; "Probably it may be admitted that geographically and ethnologically the Ganjam district and its Agency tracts ought to have been under one administration with Orissa proper and with the Oriya-speaking tracts of the Central Provinces, the common bond being the identity of race and the long-standing connection of the Oriya districts with the rural tracts of the hills." But, unfortunately, when the matter went up to the Government of India, Lord Curzon was away on leave and Lord Amptill, who had already opposed the scheme in Madras, had become Viceroy for a brief space of time, and he put his veto on it. Since then, some small improvements have taken place : The district of Sambalpur was added to Orissa, Oriya was made the court language in Ganjam and recognised as a medium of instruction in primary schools ; similarly, it was introduced in the Kharsawan and Seraikela States and also in Singhbhum, though in the latter place Oriya had later to give place to Bengali. But, of course, these small reforms could not do duty for the bigger reform on which the Oriyas had set their heart and agitation for it was started with redoubled energy under the aegis of the Utkal Union Conference. The grievance of Orissa was fully recognised in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms Report, which said, "In Orissa and Berar, at all events, it seems to us that the possibility of instituting sub-provinces need not be excluded from consideration at an early date" and the Joint Select Committee laid down a regular procedure for the ventilation of such grievances. Accordingly, in the very first reformed Council of Bihar and Orissa the Oriya members secured the unanimous adoption by the Council of a resolution for the amalgamation of the Oriya-speaking tracts. Of course, in the Councils of the C. P., Madras and Bengal no Oriya member was elected and therefore no resolution to this effect could be passed in any of these provinces. The Bihar and Orissa Government was quite friendly to the resolution in the Bihar

Council, but said that the wishes of the outlying tracts must be ascertained, and that if the latter desired reunion with the tracts comprised in Bihar and Orissa, the Government would further consult the Legislative Council and then apply to the Government of India for orders. This was towards the end of 1921. Five years have since rolled by and the position now is pretty much the same as it was before. The Home Member of the Government of India now says that the views of other districts concerned must be ascertained, and so on and so forth. No explanation is forthcoming as to why nothing was done during the intervening period. The Home Member referred the Oriya members back again to the Local Council, and the Local Government, without initiating the inquiry of which they always speak, will surely refer its Oriya members to the Central Government. The public in India are surely entitled to know how and when this vicious circle is going to be broken and when the Oriya-speaking people, who under the present arrangement are in a minority in every one of the four provinces in which they are distributed, will be placed in a position to realise their destiny in their own way. When is the expression of sympathy to be backed by action?

CO-OPERATION IN BIHAR & ORISSA.

THE co-operative movement in Bihar and Orissa has apparently made steady progress during the year 1925. The report of the co-operative department for the year shows that the number of co-operative societies rose by nearly 800 and their total membership by about 18,000. The working capital also went up during the year by over Rs. 61½ lakhs to Rs. 4,10,23,775 and the reserve funds at their disposal increased by about Rs. 4 lakhs and now stand at nearly Rs. 24½ lakhs. Their profits for the year were very nearly Rs. 8 lakhs, which represents an increase of nearly a lakh over the preceding year. The deposits held by them stood at the end of the year at Rs. 1,74,04,307 and were in excess of those for the preceding year by about Rs. 37¼ lakhs. This is a record which will gladden any co-operator's heart. But the movement has done something more than improving the economic condition of the people. It seems to have also taught them the benefits of thrift, self-reliance, and temperance. We are told the members of co-operative societies in a number of cases made up their minds to reduce expenses on ceremonial and festive occasions, to give up drink and to resort to arbitration as a means of settling their disputes. What the movement is doing by way of "fostering the spirit of co-operation and sympathy" amongst co-operators will be seen from a presumably typical instance given in the report. On account of serious illness, we are told a member of a co-operative society in some obscure place found it impossible to plough his field and carry out the transplantation of the paddy crop. His fellow co-operators realised that if his fields

would not be ploughed it would be impossible for him to pay up the *kist* of the society. All the agricultural members therefore engaged themselves in ploughing his fields. In this they were helped also by the zamindar members, which shows that the spirit of co-operation is not confined to one class, but is slowly bringing all classes the poor, as well as the rich, under its sway. It is to be hoped that it will spread much faster so that people coming into the movement will not be drawn to it merely by the facility with which members are able to secure loans, but will be actuated by the genuine cooperative spirit. It is only when this happens that the co-operative movement may be said to have achieved its purpose. And we hope the Departmental officers will do their very best to encourage the growth of this spirit.

The question of rural reform is now a days attracting a good deal of public attention. It must be added, however, that as regards practical action much still remains to be done. The cooperative movement we dare say, can help in the task to a considerable extent. Agriculturists in our villages have to be impressed with the benefits of improved methods of agriculture; they have to be taught the fundamentals of sanitation and social hygiene, and made to realise the value of education. If only cooperative societies could be made to realise how much they can do in the matter of rural reform, and throw themselves heart and soul into the work, the nation would be made to realise its goal earlier than we imagine. The experience of Bihar in this respect is somewhat encouraging. The report gives an instance of a small rural cooperative society whose members were able, by working on the cooperative basis, to provide their village with a school and a well for drinking water.

Illiteracy is a great stumbling block in our advance and Indian leaders are rightly pressing for compulsory primary education. But though Compulsory Education Acts have been placed on the statute book in some of the provinces, compulsory education itself has not succeeded in making much headway, thanks, among other things, to our financial stringency. Here too, the cooperative movement can do much, more than has been found possible so far. In Bihar, we are glad to note, some central banks are doing good work in spreading primary education. During 1925, we note, 75 pathshalas were opened by them, for which they contributed Rs. 7500, the district boards making a contribution of Rs. 14,000. The banks would apparently have been able to do more if the district boards had whole-heartedly continued to co-operate with them. But some of the boards seem to have withdrawn their grants, though Government tried their best to impress upon them the desirability of continuing them. An attempt is made in the report to lay the blame for this on the non-official chairmen of these local bodies. It is also stated that the boards refused to talk the matter over with responsible officers of Government. We cannot

say anything about the truth of these charges, unless we have before us the boards' version of the matter. Apart from this, however, the account of the activities of the central banks in regard to the spread of primary education given in the report shows what could be done in the field of education on the basis of cooperative self-reliance.

OUR PARLIAMENTARY LETTER.

SPECIAL TO THE SERVANT OF INDIA AND THE WEEK.)

Delhi, 11th February.

THE STEEL BILL.

IT was very light work for the Legislative Assembly members this week. It was on account of the report of the Select Committee on the Steel Bill not being ready as was anticipated before. The only business transacted was the passing of supplementary estimates, the discussion of three resolutions, one on the amalgamation of the Oriya-speaking tracts, the second on the removal of the Santal Parganas from the "backward tracts" schedule in the Government of India Act, and the third asking for an inquiry into the methods of promoting banking institutions in the country, and the passing of a censure motion against Government for delaying the further stages of the Ratio Bill. As regards the supplementary estimates the only noteworthy thing was that the Swarajist members could not and did not try the heroic method of rejecting them without consideration. An attempt was made to persuade the Nationalist members to join with them in following the above course, but the two parties being divided principally on their respective attitude towards the budget, it goes without saying that the Swarajists were unable to seduce any of the Nationalists or Independents from the path of constitutionalism, which the latter parties were pledged to follow. Indeed, those of the Swaraj party who made this suggestion received severe rebuffs from all quarters. Thereupon the Swarajists quietly settled down to business along with others. The supplementary demands were matters of routine, from the discussion of which questions of policy were excluded. They did not therefore afford much scope for criticism by members. Still Messrs. A. Rangaswami Aiyangar and Hirdaynath Kunzru made some very good points. The former member, unlike most other Swarajists, makes really useful contributions to the subject. It need not be added that even on these routine questions Messrs. Prakasam, Acharya and one or two others discovered some matter in regard to which they could indulge in declamation to their hearts' content and cause an intolerable boredom to the House.

THE ORIYA PROBLEM.

The debate on the Oriya resolution was participated in only by members from Orissa and Behar—the Ganjam member, Mr. V. V. Jogiah, also took part, to oppose the resolution. Others held aloof and were not even interested in listening to

the debate. The mover, Mr. Nilkantha Das, put the case well, and the Home Member made a sympathetic but non-committal reply. He made much play with the various forms the demand for amalgamation had taken, was doubtful of the attitude of the Oriyas in outlying tracts, and more than doubtful of the attitude of the provinces from which bits were to be taken off and added to Orissa, pleaded that the financial position had to be carefully examined, as it would be affected by amalgamation, and promised that if none of these factors presented any difficulty, he would recommend amalgamation. But if a separate province was desired, as was desired, it would necessitate a far closer inquiry, in regard to which he could give no guarantee. The reply was sympathetic, but did not advance the cause in any respect. The mover did not ask him why he was not able to give now a more concrete reply than used to be given several years ago and withdrew his resolution in accordance with the wishes of Pandit Motilal Nehru and other members of his party.

THE SANTAL PARGANAS

The resolution asking for the district of Santal Parganas—to which were later added the districts of Angul and Sambalpur—to be removed from the backward tracts schedule, bringing them under the operation of special laws, provoked a heated debate. This question, like that of the constitution of a separate Oriya province, is one of long standing and a resolution was adopted on it as on the Orissa question in the first session of the reformed Bihar and Orissa Council. There is a universal feeling that the restrictions on civil and criminal justice that are in force in these tracts, regarded as backward for administrative purposes, are both unnecessary and vexatious and often defeat justice; officials, on the contrary, hold that they are very necessary for the protection of Santals and other inhabitants of the districts from exploitation by foreigners, especially, the landlord, money-lender and lawyer classes. The slur which the appellation of backward tracts casts on the districts roused many members, who had no particular acquaintance with local conditions, to denounce the whole policy of Government. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyengar, who has a tendency to scar into the blue on the slightest provocation, made a thundering speech which had but a faint relation to the subject in hand and many other members took up his clue. Mr. Joshi, however, developed a different line of attack. Before justifying the placing of these districts under a paternal system of government and keeping them under various restrictions for 75 years, it was necessary for Government to tell the Assembly, he said, what progressive measures they had taken calculated to improve the condition of Santals. Had education advanced sufficiently? Could Government show that they were spending more on education in these tracts than in others? Drunkenness was rife among them. Had Government done anything to put an effective check on drinks? A sys-

tant of forced labour bordering upon slavery was in force. Why had not Government stopped it? There were restrictions on alienation of land. Mr. Joshi welcomed them and wished they were more stringent. For revenue purposes, however, Government did not object to the selling of Santals' land, which showed Government was partial. Why was not usury prohibited, Mr. Joshi asked, to save the Santals from the clutches of the money-lenders? At this stage the Home Member pointed out that there was a law restrictive of usury, but he had to admit that it permitted as much as 24 per cent. interest. Why were not usurious loans declared illegal and at the same time cheap credit made available to the Santals by means of co-operative societies and other means? Why did Government always show their solicitude for backward peoples by placing them under a primitive system of administration, instead of giving them the benefits of civilization in a greater measure than to others, so that the backward people could overtake the advanced communities in civilization? Diwan Chaman Lal immediately took up this line and these two speakers created such an atmosphere that they secured the concurrence of the non-official members in measures like non-transferability of land! Other restrictions however, were indefensible and the House had no difficulty in carrying the resolution in spite of the opposition of Government. It may be said, however, that the Bihar and Orissa Government is considering as to how far the Santal Civil Rules can be relaxed and the Home Member of the Government of India itself said that the restrictions placed on the tracts must be considered in the light of experience; all that he was opposing was the total removal of all restrictions forthwith. Mr. Joshi in this debate saved the non-official arguments from going on a wrong track.

THE RATIO BILL

It was however the adjournment motion on the Ratio Bill which aroused the deepest interest and caused the greatest heat in the Assembly. The Home Member who on an earlier occasion had promised to consider the non-official suggestion to bring up the Bill for the fixation of the ratio earlier than the budget announced on Monday that Government had decided to take the Ratio Bill into consideration a week after the introduction of the budget and also gave reasons for this decision. The next day Mr. Srinivasa Aiyengar moved an adjournment of the House to protest against the decision as being intended to influence the Assembly unduly in favour of the 18d. ratio. A lower ratio would naturally necessitate a larger provision in the budget for Home charges and purchases of railway material and such other items, and if the Bill was to be discussed with reference to budget figures, the Finance Member could easily argue that if the 16d. ratio was adopted, more taxation would be required in the event of a deficit, or the pace of further progress towards liquidation of provincial contributions would be slackened in the

event of a surplus. Non-official members were determined not to give the Finance Member the powerful support of such an argument, which, it was feared, would determine many adherents of the lower ratio to accept the Government proposal. On the other hand, the Finance Member made no secret of the fact that the consideration of the Bill was being delayed with the deliberate object of bringing home to the members the far-reaching consequences of the vote they would cast on the subject. Does not this amount, the non-official benches cried, to an attempt to obtain a favourable verdict for the higher rupee under pressure? But is not the effect of the ratio on the Budget one of the elements to be taken into serious consideration in fixing the ratio, answered the official benches. And if, as is obvious, members can better realize this effect by having actual figures of the budget, it is certainly a better course, now that the question has been put off for so many months, to put it off for another month and consider it in connexion with the budget itself. The anxiety of the non-official members to determine the ratio before they know the budget figures only shows, Government members argued, that they are convinced that the budget will expose the untenability of their contentions. Why should the supporters of 16d. abstain so very much, said Sir Basil Blackett in effect. The answer that Sir Purshotamdas and others gave was that it was true the effect of the ratio on the budget could not be ignored, but the ratio was for a long series of years, while the budget was for one year alone, and to consider the ratio question in the light of the present year's figures was to look at it in a wrong perspective. The Finance Member readily conceded the force of this argument, but he said he did not want the Assembly to regard the effect of the ratio on the budget the governing consideration, but only as one of the several considerations to be kept steadily in mind. Another argument on the non-official side was that the budget being framed on the 18d. basis would have to undergo a radical change if the lower ratio was eventually adopted; and that the railway budget which would be passed before the question of ratio came up would prove insufficient and require a larger provision for store purchase in case the 16d. ratio came to be accepted in the end. Again, the Finance Member agreed that these difficulties were serious; but they could not be obviated in any way. For, even if the ratio bill were brought up earlier, the Budget, which had to be got ready by the middle of January, had to be prepared anyhow on the 18d. ratio, and so the difficulties referred to by non-official members were inevitable, whether the ratio question was taken up sooner or later. The difficulties could have been avoided only if the Legislative Assembly had proceeded with the ratio bill in August last, but then the Assembly was not in a position to do so. Mr. Jinnah had gone so far at that time as to doubt whether even a year would be enough to master the bulky volumes of evidence, and Mr. Jayakar had

not even yet got the volumes. In these circumstances the Government could well argue that a month's delay at the present time to enable the House to have a definite idea of the effect the ratio had upon public finances was not unreasonable. Thus ran the argument on both sides. Again, it must be confessed that the non-official members did not come off with flying colours in this debate, though of course they carried the adjournment motion. Each party was manoeuvring to have the best advantage, and the official members certainly made a better show than non-officials. The advocates of 16d. indeed lost the game when they agreed and even pressed to have the debate adjourned in last August.

OUR PARIS LETTER.

[FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.]

Paris, January 26.

THE GERMAN CRISIS.

I THINK it would not be inaccurate to say that the crisis in the German Cabinet has paralysed France for the moment. The decision of President von Hindenburg in favour of a Right Coalition Government has confirmed the worst anticipations in the country, and this, coming at a time when the evacuation of the Rhineland is quite within sight and practically beyond the single-handed control of France, has created something like dismay which the French press is unanimous in expressing. Vanquished in war, Germany which has proved victorious in economic peace and proud in the restoration of her finances is the envy of impoverished France whose currency still stands in the delicate balance of good relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and is the subject of rumours ranging from satisfaction at the successful preliminaries towards stabilisation to an alarm as to its impending crash. "Between a Monarchist minority and a minority truly republican" as Mr. Steed points out in the *Observer*, "floats a mass that favours some sort of monarchical system", in Germany. Whatever this uncertain mass may signify, there should be no doubt of its attitude towards France. Quite recently I have heard an Indian visitor from Berlin say that he had seen a Frenchman making an enquiry in French of a German lady, being told off: "yes I know your language, but I shall not speak in that language with you". Britain who has her hands full with China and with disaster to her trade, which Downing Street and Fleet Street are together trying hard to rehabilitate with optimistic New Year messages to the country, and who favours Germany if at all she is inclined to regard herself as having much to do with the European continent, and America—who has nearly never known till very recently what the burden of political complications can be as distinct from economic ones and consequently views with amazement that so much blame and bitterness should be directed towards a creditor—France knows well are not

of much use at this juncture. In his speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber M. Briand seems to have made veiled, but unmistakable, allusion to the possibility of an alliance between Germany, Italy and Russia as the probable alternative to the Locarno policy. Meanwhile news comes from Riga that the Soviet army is being reorganised and Italy's ambitions in the Mediterranean are made more disquieting by a surprising article in the *Observer* by Colonel Wedgwood alluding to a suggested transfer of Egypt to Italy, following reports of the enthusiasm evoked by Mr. Churchill's recent visit to Rome and persistent rumours of the friendship between King Faud and Signor Mussolini. To this list of embarrassments must be added the election of a Socialist President to the Chamber, for the reactionaries have raised the cry that a pariah has entered the temple.

A WAR OF IDEAS.

The fact is that 1927 has brought into Europe a storm, both in the world of actual affairs and in the world of opinions, such as would seem incredible to those not familiar with Europeans. That storm has been gathering strength ever since the war, of course, but it now touches the life of the man in the street. Not the proudest of scoffers of general ideas and devotees of the concrete and actual but pauses to reflect a little today; not the humblest of men but finds himself interested in theory, or has it thrust upon him. There is a feeling that the fundamentals are touched. We are accustomed to being told that 1914 like the Peloponnesian war of old was a war of ideas and the defeat of the Central Powers had decided the issue. But really the battle seems just begun and the most impressive fact in Europe today is that it stands faced with the problem of democracy—or rather, whether civilisation should be built on that basis and if so what it really means. All the great armaments of Europe sink into insignificance before this organic doubt—if so it may be termed—and become mere shell. The society which is the substance they guarded is badly rattled.

Possessed of pompous traditions of power on the one hand and on the other of high republican ideals and a liberal culture mellowed by that clearness, precision, and penetration of the French intellect which has wrung the homage of the world and was long flattered by imitation, this war of ideas is particularly acute in France. The dilemma before this great people today is the choice between power and their cherished ideals. Various influences are deciding the issue, but it is now rare to find in France even young men—not to speak of elders—who are not reactionaries and who do not uphold power, militarism, and nationalism in its fiercest form and who have no use for liberal ideas and conciliatory policies.

A time there was when we of the East drew deeply of the wine of learning from the West; in India of the English poetry of the Romantics such as Shelley and Byron and in politics, of Mill

and Bentham and Burke and such others. French education did much the same for Japan, China, Egypt and Syria. Those times would seem to be going. I think it is Wordsworth who has said somewhere; about the French Revolution that to be young in that dawn was "very heaven" which is certainly not true of the France and Europe of today.

"THE HOWLING MOB."

"The Howling Mob: An indictment of democracy" by A Gentleman with a Duster [Mills and Boon]—such is the title of one of the latest books from England which professes to present a vision of the actual condition of society and its inevitable doom. The analysis is most convincing and even critics would agree with the author that "at its birth this new and idealistic theory of Government (democracy)...rested absolutely on the assumption that a people called upon to govern itself would exercise its political power with serious intelligence, with a profound sense of its moral responsibility, and with the unifying affection of disinterested patriotism." He reminds us that Abraham Lincoln was "careful to warn the American people that the theory of Democracy implies a moral, intelligent and patriotic electorate." Most people might be willing to admit that Democracy has resulted in some important defects and the problems of social justice are as baffling as ever, but what does not seem to be quite clear is whether in a mood of disappointment the gentleman concerned does not after all forget that other systems had their day and ceased to be just because they were weighed and found wanting by the generations that suffered them. We all want to reform democracy and evolve something still better, but we dare not give a familiar name to the ensuing product lest it should inherit familiar sins.

"NATION ET CIVILISATION."

I must confess that it is a little refreshing to turn away from the dust of the English gentleman to a Paris publication on the same subject if only because vague as it is, perhaps inevitably, it is constructive. *Nation et Civilisation* by M. Lucian Romier has recently made its appearance and has attracted considerable attention because first, M. Romier is a well-known man, the editor of the *Figaro*, a friend of Mussolini, an enthusiastic advocate of the theory of blocs such as a Latin bloc to oppose the Anglo-Saxon bloc, and then, he is a politician with something of the creative spirit in him. Perhaps he might be offended and it might injure his reputation if it were suggested that there is a reminiscence of Plato's Republic in his book. It has reminded me of Babu Bhagavan Das's writings, in some places. Two things are facts, are axiomatic for M. Romier: 1. Ours is an age of industry which affects the interests of the masses and therefore we should not deny them the predominance over the individual which they now enjoy. 2. Liberty and Equality are established doctrines against which it is incredible that any violent outrage can be committed

in our time and therefore we should not be bothered with their theoretical values but should bestir ourselves about practical exigencies. The practical necessity is the formation of a new political party of *élites*. What exactly the author means by this term has evidently exercised many minds and so he tells us more about it in the *Nouvelles Littéraires*. "The *elite* in my eyes has no intellectual or wordly significance but is decisively social." Thus the man who has a bank account and does nothing more than sign his cheque to get some money is not an *elite* but his banker is; a pious lady is not an *elite* but her pastor belongs to that order. The main idea seems to be that all those who are in positions of influence and authority, who are leaders of society in one sense or another, should come together, sink their differences which are characterised as "artificial" and agree upon a common executive policy. Such uniformity is urgent and the differences must be "artificial", because, the author does not fail to tell us, there is a crisis which menaces the entire nation.

"MYSTIC DEMOCRACY."

Evidently, all "good Europeans" must believe that all that is bad comes from Asia. We have always been told that Democracy is the boon of the West, but now that it has fallen into disfavour the evil has been credited to Asia. M. Louis Rougier tells us in the pages of *Revue de Paris* that the young "Asianised" Russian Mystics are attacking the ancient wisdom of the West, and oddly enough he quotes the authority of the sciences to prove that Democracy should be interpreted as a political ideal and not as a sort of "social mysticism." The philosophers of New Italy have also warned against the danger of succumbing to Asian mysteries. But to seek justification in the sciences against Socialism is, to say the least, *maladroit* for it is to attack it on its least vulnerable side. The economic interpretation of history which Karl Marx originated found a suitable ally in the naturalistic interpretation of religion which was the inevitable result of the tendency of the sciences to treat *description* as ultimate and to make light of all attempts at *explanation*. With religion and theology in disrepute, treated at least pragmatically as a sort of police check on society like in the philosophy of Fascism and at worst, regarded as the last of the fetters of the man triumphant, there is no reason why the doctrine of Democracy should not become ultimate. It is western sciences, not Asian influences which have made a social mysticism of Democracy. M. Rougier warns that Western society has an architecture and if all sorts of wild experiments—like those of the Socialists—were tried with it, the resultant will be the "ironies of God," violation, abomination and desecration while looking for reason, justice, and peace.

"LES IRONIES DE DIEU"

But what the "ironies of God" really consist of is the nature of things which brings ruin on one, if one were untrue to one's own principles. Not

so long ago President Coolidge made the sage observation that the principle of self-government was the only antidote against excessive centralisation to which decline was inevitable. And, that to apply the principle of self-government in any real sense in large imperialistic enterprises is impossible, the ancient history of Europe had proved. For the present *impasse* the European peoples have to thank themselves. It is a lesson for us, and as M. Rougier points out, while the idea of Democracy has gained in countries which the impregnable feudalism of Oriental despotism seemed to possess, this gain has coincided with a general weakening of the faith in it as illustrated by the "minority governments" in Russia, Spain, and Italy. That also is an irony of God.

REVIEWS.

MODERN TURKEY.

MODERN TURKEY. By E. G. MEARS. (The Macmillan Co., New York.) 1926. pp. 779. 9 x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$. 25s.

TURKEY. By ARNOLD TOYNBEE AND P. E. KIRKWOOD (Ernest Benn Ltd. London.) 1926. pp. 329. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. 15s.

THESE two books usefully supplement each other. The one describes while the other narrates, the one forms the background against which the drama of the other is staged. The book of Mr. Mears is a description by various hands of the several aspects of modern Turkey, social, religious, agricultural, industrial, financial and cultural with a short historical summary of the Young Turk movement at the end. It is essentially a valuable book of reference containing information about modern Turkey rather than recording the development of the new Turkey from the old. Appended is a valuable section of diplomatic documents, including the famous Pact of London of 1915, the Turkish National Pact, the abortive Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne, which greatly enhances the historical value of the book. The book loses something in the value, for the numerous statistics it contains are largely of pre-war or pre-Kemalist date, and are therefore affected by the rapidly changing modern conditions, but this can be corrected by reference to the later chapters of Mr. Toynbee's work. The reader will notice one or two Americanisms such as the news that "Earl Montague" resigned from the India Office in 1922, (p. 602) and one or two chronological errors such as a reference to the "Kerensky Government" in April 1917, (p. 593) and the postponement of "Premier Lloyd George's" resignation by a month on p. 605, but apart from a few such slips the book is soundly informative. In Messrs. Toynbee and Kirkwood's book the former method is reversed, and the treatment is historical and political. After an introductory chapter on the Sultanate, the first part deals with modern Turkey from 1774 to 1919, the second with the War of Independence from 1919 to 1922, and the third with the new Turkey of Mustafa Kemal. It is on the whole a fascinating and at times brilliant survey, and should prove of the greatest service to all students of the modern world.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Mr. Toynbee had neither the time nor the knowledge of post-Lausanne Turkey to complete the book alone. This

we say not in any spirit of criticism of Mr. Kirkwood, his collaborator, but because the book inevitably suffers from the defects as well as the merits of joint-authorship. It gains in wideness of outlook, depth of knowledge, and probably in sobriety of judgement, but it loses in consistency and clarity. Mr. Kirkwood is perhaps also unfortunate in working with so distinguished a collaborator, for it is only too easy to attribute the merits of a jointly written book to the writer of fame and to excuse its defects as the blundering of his coadjutor. The book appears to us to be brilliant in parts, particularly in the introductory chapter on the principles of the Imperial Ottoman Government and the description of the War of Independence, but elsewhere there is a tendency to repetition and diffuseness which detracts from the freshness if it does not injure the clarity of the book. The tendency to repetition is seen in the wearisome reiteration of such phrases as the "Men of Angora" on page after page, or the repetition of such facts as the contempt of the Nationalists for Constantinople, or the Turkish lack of technical skill. The anti-Greek bias of the book has also been criticised, but this is not a very serious fault. It chiefly takes the form of an almost lyrical account of the Turkish efforts for independence after the war, and it really goes no further than any sympathetic historian of a national movement would do, from Mr. G. M. Trevelyan's studies of the *Risorgimento* downwards. The moral side of the Turkish national case is perhaps a little over-stressed, for a nation which gave freedom to none of its subject peoples without a war of independence, cannot logically complain if one of those peoples attempts to partition its quondam oppressor in its turn. At any rate the facts are easily separable from the *emotion* in the book and the enthusiasm of the authors increases its attraction without seriously diminishing its accuracy. Their account is of absorbing interest, and the solid fare of facts is relished the more for a judicious admixture of the spices of imagination and controversy.

The significance of the last few years for Turkey has been her transformation from an empire organised on the principle of the Central Asian herd, with the different communities or millets treated as so many sorts of stock to be fostered or destroyed as it suited the master's purpose, to the modern homogeneous nation state. The old Ottoman system had a certain superficial resemblance to the modern syndicalist theory, with the different communities governing themselves and subject only to the personal authority of the Sultan. But though the different sections were not divided geographically, their characteristic marks were race and religion rather than occupation, and they were not only mutually exclusive in their interests but mutually exclusive in their membership. The result of this was that the various subject peoples were passively, but not actively, loyal to the Sultan; they would only submit to his authority so long as they remained mutually jealous of each other, and had no hope of help from outside. Nationalism provided the necessary hope and the period 1774-1919 is a record of the gradual collapse of the system because the subject peoples had begun to desire something else than prosperity and security—an ideal of independence which made the supremacy of the Sultan a matter of shame instead of indifference and nerved them to sacrifice and loss.

The 19th century efforts at westernisation failed because the Sultan only adopted European methods in order to combat the principle of nationalism. The young Turks tried to replace

the old 'estate' idea of the empire with the international pan-Islamic idea, but nationalism in the war proved too strong for this also, as in Europe it was too strong for international socialism. It was left for Mustafa Kemal to accept the new principle as well as the new methods, and to act on it even at the cost of abandoning all claims to non-Turkish ex-imperial lands, of abandoning the Khilafat and of losing the support of the Indian Muslims.

The inspiration of the Turkish Nationalists is the French Revolution and it is to this that we may perhaps attribute some of the features of modern Turkish policy—a vigorous anti-clericalism evidenced in the closing of the monasteries and the secularising of the schools, a determination to break completely with the past, even to the abolition of the time-honoured Fez, and an attempt to secure rigorous uniformity. Like the French they have not only abolished widely acknowledged abuses such as clerical influence and polygamy, but have proceeded to apparently ridiculous lengths in the compulsory wearing of European or "Christian hats" and the "purging" of the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian words. As in the French revolution it is the psychological reaction from the old regime with the Turkish mind its long record of defeat and national degradation which leads to such measures, and as with the French, time will doubtless bring more balanced and charitable views. It is a determination to set up a homogeneous national Turkish State which has been the motive of all the Nationalists' recent actions from the deposition of the Sultan to the exchange of populations and the abolition of the Caliphate.

The reliance of the Turks on their own resources for the development of their country, their distrust of the foreign concessionaire from which they have grievously suffered in the past, and their preference to heavy taxation rather than foreign loans are all signs of a healthy and exuberant nationalism. Yet there is more than one cloud on the horizon which prevents us from prophesying a long spell of fair weather for the Turkish State. The first is the Kurds, who with their obstinate separatism, their demand for autonomy, and their recent rebellion, seem likely to prove the Achilles heel of the new Turkey. They are the only non-Turks now left in Turkey, and the Turks are determined to assimilate them. But the position is complicated by the Mosul award, which includes in Iraq the largely Kurdish province of Mosul under a system of local autonomy and leaves the bulk of the Kurds under a rigorous system of Turkification. There seems a distinct danger either that the Turkish Kurds look to Iraq for deliverance from oppression, or that the Turks may be compelled to abandon their policy of assimilation in order to conciliate them. Other dangers are opposition of Constantinople to the new regime, the growing despotism of the President, as evidenced in the treason trial of last summer, the possibility of an attack by an Italy anxious for elbow room before the Turks are strong enough to resist, the possibility of reaction, and the danger that the reforms may fail through apathy or lack of new leaders. The chief hope for the new regime of taking root is perhaps in the vigorous education policy of the Government, which, if steadily pursued, will soon produce a generation to whom the mental outlook as well as the external conditions of the new Turkey are natural, and who will feel no temptation to reaction. Turkey is not yet out of the wood, but provided her leaders remain true to their ideals, there seems every hope that with such energy, determi-

nation and vigour, the new Turkey will surmount her present difficulties, and triumphantly reasserted her national independence.

T. G. P. SPEAR.

CHINESE TRADE.

FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA. By C. F. REMER.
(Commercial Press Ltd., Shanghai.) 1926.
8 x 5½. pp. 289. \$ 4.

IN China international trade and international politics have been inseparably bound up from the earliest times. The older Chinese statesmen were apprehensive that any extension of western commerce in China would mean an extension of western political influence and therefore, rigidly confined the area of the commercial operations of the early European companies. All attempts at enlarging their privileges proved fruitless and in these early times even the ambassadors of western powers found it difficult to gain an audience at Peking. The conditions under which trade was then carried on are best seen in the recently published chronicles of the East India Company in China. The first decades of the 19th century saw a continuous worsening of the relations between the western traders and Chinese officials and then came the infamous opium war claimed by the British as a war for the recognition of equality. After this war the process of economic penetration into China by the European Powers began and for the rest of the 19th century each Power in succession extorted from that country, commercial privileges, concessions, low tariff and the right of extraterritoriality.

Mr. Remer presents in this volume a careful study of the foreign trade of China from the year 1871 to 1921. He begins with the year 1871 because it marks a new phase in the Chinese trade, the effect of the opening of the Suez Canal being now visible and also because comparatively reliable statistics of Chinese foreign trade are available only from that date. Mr. Remer divides the period with which he deals into four sections and considers in detail the changes in each. It is instructive to note that Mr. Remer has to devote a considerable portion of the book to a study of the foreign political relations of China. During the latter half of the 19th century the policy of the western Powers towards China was one of what has been euphemistically termed "strenuous insistence." This meant applying the utmost diplomatic pressure to extort concessions. Towards the end of the 19th century this concession-hunting became most flagrant and gave rise to serious rivalries among the competing powers; when at last U. S. A. stepped in with the formulation of the "Open Door" policy. Of recent years especially since the establishment of the republic—the old policy of isolation has been given up and outside influences welcomed to a certain extent. But concurrently, there has also grown up among the Chinese a feeling of keen resentment at the concessions and privileges enjoyed by the foreigners which has led to a considerable friction with the European community in China, as evidenced by the notorious Shanghai affair and the recent boycott at Hong-Kong. It is obvious then that conditions have not been very favourable to a growth of foreign trade. No doubt between 1870 and 1923 there foreign trade of China has risen more than the times in value in Chinese currency, yet, as the author points out, the volume of trade is extremely small in relation to either the population or the resources of the country. Restrictions on commerce and the paucity of the means of communication

have been chiefly responsible for this. The vast "Interior China" is yet almost entirely untapped.

There has been little that is remarkable in the course of Chinese foreign trade. For the major portion of the 19th century it was chiefly a trade in tea, silk goods and raw silk, paid for by the imports of opium and silver. The taste for foreign goods developed very slowly in China and opium remained the most important import till 1885, when its place was taken by cotton goods. During the last three decades of the 19th century tea, silk goods and raw silk still remained the dominant exports, Indian tea, however, was steadily undermining the position of China tea in the world market and Japan was coming to the fore as a supplier of raw silk and silk goods. Cotton goods and opium formed the chief bulk of the imports, though such articles as kerosene and metals were also becoming important. During the 20th century the change that had already been working in Chinese exports during the last decades of the 19th century became distinctly pronounced. China now turned more and more into an exporter of raw products. This is a movement similar to that which came over Indian foreign trade during the period 1850-1875. Silk, especially raw silk—and tea declined and beans, oil-seeds, raw cotton, raw hides and also some food products assumed increasing importance. Correspondingly the imports of a variety of miscellaneous manufactured articles increased. All these changes find many parallels in the history of Indian foreign trade.

Incidentally, Mr. Remer has given some account of the growth of modern forms of industry in China which shows how meagre such a growth is yet in that country, in how small a measure the economic structure is affected by the impact of western industry. The enormous difference between the positions of India and China seems to be this that while we already know most that is to be known about Indian resources, while the whole country is now opened up to foreign trade, while its economic organization is already undergoing an industrial revolution, the major part of China is still where India was before 1850. Its resources are still largely unknown, the old economic structure still intact and the industrial revolution still distant. This result has been chiefly due to the policy of restriction of trade and the lack of means of communication having prevented that commercial revolution from taking place which must precede an industrial revolution.

D. R. GADGIL.

COLONIAL POLICY.

"COMPARATIVE COLONIAL POLICY. By PROF. V. SHIV RAM, M. A., Ph. D. (Harvard) F. R. Hist. S. (Longman, Green & Co. Ltd., Calcutta). 1926. 7¼ x 4¾. pp. 297. Rs. 5

THIS very interesting book is a compilation of a series of lectures delivered by the author at the Patna University in 1925. It is the result of an exhaustive study of the problem relating to the history and development of the colonial policies of the European and American nations and the establishment of the League of Nations.

The earlier motives for colonisation were either of adventure or commercial enterprise, but the missionary motive has played a prominent part in "stimulating imperialism". We are told that "the methods of utilising the missionary work for political purpose has been nowhere employed with less reserve than in China." American missionaries won Hawaii for America. In 1887, the Church

Missionary Society of England paid the British African Co. £ 15,000 when the Company was about to abandon its unprofitable territory in the region of Lake Victoria Nyanza. (The C. M. S. must have been enormously rich during those days!)

The author explains with great skill the different systems of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and English for colonisation. The chief cause of the downfall of the Portuguese as a colonial power was the "participation of officials in trade" and their three-fold policy of "Commerce, Conquest and Conversion"; while "the admission of the Church to an exaggerated share in the public affairs and enormous taxation saw the end of Spanish Colonial Empire". As a result of the Seven Years' War France lost to England Canada and India, but she emerged from the Great War as a great Colonial Power again. Most of the countries in the East are either a dependency of a European nation or within her "Sphere of Influence". It is only the rivalry of France and Great Britain that prevents the partition and annexation of Siam.

Some of the older French colonies have direct representation in the French Parliament. Algeria is regarded as a "Department of France" and Tunis and Morocco are attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The recently acquired colonies are represented on the *Conseil Supérieur des Colonies*. The average Frenchman is too much attached to France to go out and settle down in the colonies. In consequence the French colonies are inhabited by Spaniards, Italians and Jews from the slums of the European capitals, but they are regarded by the mother country as "military reservoirs". As the Latin race does not share the Anglo-Saxon prejudice against the coloured races, the African and Asian soldiers are recruited in the French Colonial Army on equal basis with the Frenchman to protect the "French Territory" anywhere in the world. This declaration of France is in contravention of Article XXII of the League of Nations.

The Dutch as colonists were never known for humanitarian laws for the uplift of the native races in their colonies. The Dutch law requires the budget of all the colonies to be presented to the Dutch Parliament.

The British Empire was built in a "fit of absent-mindedness" and "India is the best instance of possession acquired by the sole initiative of commerce". The British brains and energy which adapted the steam power to industry and transportation were chiefly responsible for the creation of the mighty British Empire. But more important were the facts that "they were willing to expatriate themselves not only to fight and die for their country, but to settle and develop the overseas territories.

The history of the Suez Canal and the passing of Egypt into the hands of the British are vividly described. References are also made to the unequal treatment of Indians in self-governing colonies like Canada and South Africa, in the mandated territory of Tanganyika, and in the Crown Colony of Kenya. The author pleads for the speedy fulfilment of the legitimate demands of the Indian people, such as the spread of free and compulsory education, curtailment of the ruinous military expenditure, Indianisation of services and the adjustment of Indian tariff in the interest of India. "If the Indian people" says the author, "are forced to bear their share of the burden of defending and maintaining the British Empire they ought to receive in return privileges within the Empire enjoyed by British subjects of European origin."

Out of twelve chapters, five chapters covering about 150 pages are devoted entirely to the American Colonial policy, which indicates that the author attaches a great importance to America as a colonising power. He has taken great pains in describing at length how far the Americans have trained the Filipinos in the art of self-government. It is said that the degree of literacy has increased from 5% to 40% in 1923 and over 50% of the children of school-going age are enrolled in schools. Philippines to-day is the most literate country in the Orient, second only to Japan. So far so good. But the fact remains that in spite of solemn pledges given by America, the islands of the Philippines are not yet free. "The whole world is watching anxiously to see whether America will put the principle of 'Self-determination' and the 'Consent of the governed' in a land within the confine of her own possession." The last chapter on the League of Nations deals with the origin of Mandates. The machinery of the League will break down if the European nations do not create good will and trust by their conduct in the so called backward races.

Such are some of the salient features of the book under review. All over the world the colonies are struggling for either complete independence or self-government or new international status. The Union of South Africa with General Hertzog as its Premier emerged from the last Imperial Conference as a more or less independent State. Canada has its own representation at Washington. All the self-governing colonies in the British Empire have restrictive Asiatic immigration legislation. India is dissatisfied with the amount of freedom that she is asked to be content with. Egypt is angry. The Riffs in Morocco are temporarily subdued by the defeat and deportation of their brave chief Abdul Krim. Syria's fight for freedom has already cost her immensely in the destruction by the French of her ancient city, Damascus. Javanese are bidding for complete independence. China is no more tolerating the interference of Western nations in her domestic affairs. The history of America in the Philippines is an illustration of America's dishonesty, treachery and selfishness. As the author mildly puts it, "The American who was quite certain of the necessity of conferring the benefits of American civilisation upon unwilling Filipinos was inspired by the same patriotic egotism which convinced the German of Germany's world mission and moved the Englishman to talk of the "white man's burden."

Whatever the original motive of colonisation, the present day policies of all the European, American, and Japanese nations are identically the same, namely the exploitation of the backward races. The missionaries, it must be admitted, are no longer agencies for imperialism, but I have my serious doubts whether the Y. M. C. A. is not filling in some parts of the world the place of the missionaries of the earliest type; otherwise the recent sack of the Y. M. C. A. Headquarters at Foochow is inexplicable.

The League of Nations has so far been a colossal failure. It has made itself the laughing stock of the Orientals by its incapacity to checkmate the growing colonial greed of Italy, by refusing to repudiate France for her inhuman atrocities in Syria and by being unwilling to question Britain on her attitude towards Egypt. The admission of Germany may be a step forward, but that is yet to be seen. China is being exploited by all the members of the

League. Is it too much to hope that America will help China? But Britain is more sympathetic than the other nations. Britain by virtue of experience in the East is by far the best colonial power and America is the worst, for she is the most hypocritical. It was high time that these white races realised that the Easterns no longer believe in good government as a substitute for Self-Government. This excellent treatise will be invaluable to all those who wish to study the problem of comparative colonial policy. They will find it a mine of information.

S. A. WAIZ

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- EARLY LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN MORLEY. Vols. I & II. By F. W. HIRST. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London.) 1927. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. pp. 327 and 285. 28s.
- THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.) 1927. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. pp. 133. 5s.
- THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS. By A. H. SNOW. (Department of State, Washington.) 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{4}$. p. 218.
- REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON INHERITANCE TAXATION. (New Orleans, Louisiana.) 1926. 9 x 6. pp. 118.
- HAND-SPINNING AND HAND-WEAVING: AN ESSAY. By S. V. PUNTAMBEKAR and N. S. VARADACHARI. (All-India, Spinners' Association, Ahmedabad.) 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. pp. 235. Re. 1.

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