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 - (2) Zakka Khel Afridis: Operations.
 - (3) Mohmands: Operations. V2, L: 1941. 235. N1908. (Cd.4201.) 1908. pp.366-453.
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S 2096

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIERS OF INDIA.

VOL. I.

S 2096

PAPERS

REGARDING

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING TRIBES
ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

OF

INDIA, (1)

AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN
AGAINST THEM DURING THE YEAR

1897-1898.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
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1898.

[C.—8713.] Price 1s. 10½d.

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MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA

PAPERS

REGARDING

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NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF

INDIA,

AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN AGAINST
THEM DURING THE YEAR

1897-1898.

PART I. (WAZIRISTAN).

No. 1.

Letter from Government of India to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 10th July 1894. (Received 31st July 1894.)

SIR,

HAVING received in your telegram, dated the 13th April, approval to the course which we proposed to follow in addressing the Amir of Afghanistan on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan boundary in Waziristan, we caused a letter to be written to His Highness proposing that the work should be undertaken in the middle of October next by Joint-Commissioners who would meet at the junction of the Kundar and Gomal rivers. The Amir was told that, in order to avoid any risk of trouble among the Waziris, it was proposed to place a British force of about the strength of a brigade in or near the Spin valley, and a suggestion was made that His Highness might wish to place a reserve of troops on his side of the border. His Highness replied agreeing to these proposals, and his letter, which reproduces the communication made to him, is enclosed.

2. In order to prepare the tribes upon our side of the border for these operations, we have authorized the Punjab Government to cause an announcement to be forthwith made to them to the following effect:—That the Government of India have concluded a settlement with the Amir, and that the following line of boundary dividing Waziristan from the Afghan dominions has been agreed upon. From the hill marked Charkiaghar on the map illustrating the boundary agreement, the line descends to the Tochi stream, which it crosses at Machaguri. From this point it follows the crest of the ridge between the Birmal and Shawal valleys as far as the point marked Khwaja Khedar, so as to leave Birmal to Afghanistan. From Khwaja Khedar, the line passes to near Shakin, which is also left to Afghanistan. From Shakin it runs nearly due south to the crest of the range crossed by the Nazan Kotal, at a point about six miles south of the Kotal. Thence it follows the crest of the Spera range, to Domandi on the Gomal river. The tribesmen are also to be informed that Joint-Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments will proceed in October next to mark off this line on the ground; and that in the meantime the British Government calls upon the tribes to respect it. They will further be told that the British Government has no desire to interfere in their affairs, but only to secure peace, and that in settling affairs for that end, the co-operation of the tribes will be invited and welcomed.

In the meantime the Punjab Government and military authorities will prepare in detail the necessary measures for carrying the demarcation into effect at the proper time.

3. In the Viceroy's telegram of the 7th April, it was represented that our future relations with the Waziris should be settled simultaneously with the demarcation. We have consequently had this important matter under our serious consideration.

enclose a list of some of the offences committed by the Waziri tribe last year which shows the unsatisfactory condition of Waziristan districts bordering upon it. This list does not profess to be nearly complete, for many offences occur which are not at once reported to us. It is, however, that we have information of 27 persons being killed, and as many as 1000 plundered by Waziri raiders between January and June of this year. The outrages which occurred this year show a peculiar boldness, such as the killing of a sowar near the Zam Pass in Bhittanni country, and the attack on the baggage guard of regular troops near the Gwaleri Kotal, and, therefore, the line of the Punjab posts. We believe, indeed, that the outrages mentioned in the first five months of this year exceed in number and importance those previously reported within a similar period. And out of the 31 outrages mentioned in the enclosed list, partial reparation has been obtained in only seven, the remainder having gone entirely unpunished. In the seven cases above mentioned, the amount of punishment has been limited at the dictation of the Maliks.

The raid which was carried out against the cattle belonging to Powindahs, who were encamped within a mile of the Kajuri Kach post, was one of the most daring attacks perpetrated upon these people. This case and the others mentioned in diaries received from Captain McMahon, C.I.E., the officer who is charged upon the demarcation of the boundary between Afghanistan and the Punjab Agency territories, indicate how systematically the Waziris plunder the traders passing up to Afghanistan from India. So great is the oppression exercised on these trading caravans that the Powindahs have declared their intention of abandoning the Gomal route altogether and taking the naturally more convenient road further south through the Zao Pass and the Zhob Agency. We have received also repeated and urgent complaints from the Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan in regard to the state of insecurity existing in the Agency territories consequent upon the want of control over the movements of Waziri bands of marauders across the Gomal river. The last letter received from Sir James Browne on this subject forcibly describes the situation.

6. The arrangements, as at present existing, afford little protection against these raids and are not effectual in exacting punishment for them. In the Punjab Frontier Administration Report for 1891-92, it is mentioned in writing of the Mahsud Waziris that a large number of the offences committed by them in that year "was committed by the Abdur Rahman Khels, either alone or in conjunction with certain sections of the Darwesh Khels over whom we have little or no control. The thieves belonging to these tribes can, with impunity, return to their homes through Spin, after raiding in Zhob, our levies at Kajuri Kach being powerless to check them."

In 1892-93 special circumstances, connected with intrigues carried on among the Waziris by orders from Kabul, caused so unsatisfactory a state of affairs that the Punjab Government was obliged to advance troops to Kajuri Kach and Jandola, and to take measures for permanently strengthening the Bhittanni tribal service. The expense of keeping troops in those positions, and the unhealthiness of the posts led, however, to their number being reduced in March 1893; but in February last, owing to the murders in Bhittanni country, and near the Gwaleri Kotal, mentioned in paragraph 4, the Lieutenant-Governor again requisitioned for troops, and considerable reinforcements were sent, which were not withdrawn until the tribes had been induced to make some reparation. Up to the conclusion of our agreement with the Amir, the only means of exercising pressure were threats of punitive expeditions, institution of blockades, and imposition of fines. The first are especially to be avoided if we would cultivate friendly relations with the Waziris. A blockade only just falls short of a punitive expedition in its unhappy effect upon our relations of good neighbourhood, while fines fail to reach the guilty persons, being paid by the well disposed in order to avert the further calamity of an expedition. The papers which we have received with the Punjab Government's letter, dated the 7th June 1894, give some instances in which the local officers of the Punjab border have dealt with the jirgas of the different sections of the Waziri tribe in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of some of the more daring of recent outrages. The letter itself shews that though the leading men among almost all sections of the Waziris are not unwilling to deal fairly with us, they are helpless to coerce the turbulent section of the tribe. If we are to bring about by peaceful means an improvement in respect to the conduct of the Waziris on our border, it is advisable to strengthen

the hands of the well disposed and influential men, and to show the tribesmen generally that their interest lies in co-operating with us in bringing offenders to justice.

7. Our new understanding with the Amir affords an opportunity for improvement in this respect which has never before been presented to us. It will be seen from the *jirga* proceedings that the tribesmen have realised that the Amir's interference in their country has now been brought to an end. Understanding, therefore, that we are now free to deal with them, and anticipating that we will not submit longer to the state of lawlessness which has until now been tolerated, they have acquiesced, in two cases, in measures of reparation by the surrender of offenders which mark a distinct advance upon our former means of exacting punishment. The same proceedings shew, however, how slight our hold is upon these tribesmen, and that the frontier officers are only able to obtain the partial reparation which has been made by consenting to deal leniently with the surrendered criminals, and by bargaining beforehand in a manner which is scarcely dignified. Even the limited measure of retribution which has in these cases been brought upon leaders of raids into British districts and murderers of British subjects could not be exacted in future cases of the same sort, if the tribes were to understand that we were going to take no steps to enforce our control when we had caused the Amir's to be withdrawn. No better terms could be obtained in the cases under notice without resorting to threats of punitive action.

8. We conceive that by reason of the agreement made in November 1893 between the Amir of Kabul and Sir Mortimer Durand, by which agreement His Highness has undertaken at no time to exercise interference in the territories lying beyond the boundary line on the side of India, we have assumed a measure of responsibility for the peace of the Afghan border which has not hitherto been ours, and which, under present arrangements, we have no adequate means of discharging. We understand that Her Majesty's Government concur in this view. Lord Kimberley writing on this subject approved of our statement of policy to the effect that, while we emphatically repudiated all intention of annexing tribal territory, we desired to bring the tribes whom this settlement concerns further within our influence.

9. We wish in this despatch to lay before you the manner in which we propose to carry out this policy; and we bear in mind that Lord Kimberley added to the expression of his approval which we have just cited the caution that he trusted that, in carrying our policy into effect, we would carefully abstain from taking any steps to extend our influence which might "tend to bring about a collision with the tribesmen or to the establishment of fresh posts beyond the frontier which may require armed protection."

10. The proposals made in this respect by the local officers and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab are contained in Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated the 24th March 1894. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note which reviews the local proposals, and contains his own, was written before he knew that the Amir's wishes would be met in respect of the demarcation of the Waziri border. Much, therefore, of what His Honour writes with reference to the arguments for and against action in Waziristan is now beside the question. We would direct attention, however, to the following passages in his summing up—"the local officers are right in thinking that, unless we are prepared to make up our minds to some such scheme for the location of troops and the extension of tribal services as as they propose, we should not attempt any detailed settlement of the new boundary on the ground, but should simply fix that boundary as far as we can on maps by reference to natural geographical features which are already known or can be discovered by enquiry;" and, "in the event of our not adopting a scheme of the nature referred to, we shall have to consider a much more limited scheme of tribal service with a view to strengthening our present position in the Gomal."

11. The latter quotation refers to a scheme of granting some further allowances to the tribes whom we already subsidise to a certain extent, which had been prepared by the Commissioner of the Derajat before the question of demarcation arose. This scheme had, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick states, been allowed to stand over only because the whole question of our position in Waziristan was under consideration. It appears, therefore, to be Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's opinion that, under any circumstances, a limited measure for strengthening our position would be necessary.

12. Mr. Bruce's report is that of an officer of long experience in dealing with frontier tribes, who is in a position to know what is deficient in our present arrangements; the report embodying his views is therefore a valuable contribution to the consideration of this question. Mr. Bruce states his opinion that "to open up the belt of tribal country between the Gomal on the south and Kurram and Thal on the north, and to maintain in safety the main lines of communication traversing it efficiently, it will be necessary to station in the country a military force of two regiments of native infantry, one regiment of cavalry and one mountain battery." He recommends one strong head-quarters military station, with an outpost at the next most suitable position, and he indicates that probably Wano would be the best position for the head-quarters station, with the outpost in Upper Dawar or at Sheranna. Mr. Bruce further proposes to undertake from Wano negotiations with the tribes, the officer charged with the operations being given authority to spend on the entertainment of tribal levies and the allotment of service allowances to the leading headmen, up to the limit of a sanctioned amount which he calculates should be one lakh of rupees annually. The officer in question would be provided with a military escort of about half of the force above described, and the remainder would march up by the Tochi route to join him.

13. We are not prepared to recommend this scheme in its entirety. Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve and without which they cannot maintain their position. It is a question whether the wishes and the necessities of the tribesmen in the Tochi and Lower Dawar will not require the establishment of what the Lieutenant Governor calls "a regular system of Government." The circumstances there seem, as he says, to be altogether exceptional. The Darwesh Khel and Dawaris apparently desire and ask for our control as the only means of settling their own feuds and of protecting them from the Mahsuds. What the necessities of the situation in the Tochi and Lower Dawar really are will be ascertained by facts which will come out in the course of negotiating with the tribes, if our proposed negotiations are taken in hand.

14. It is right to notice the question, which has been raised and supported by high authority, that it is desirable that some form of tribute should be taken from the Waziri tribes within our sphere of influence. It must of course be understood that no one puts this forward on fiscal grounds; we should in any case give back in service allowances and the like much more than we received. There can be no doubt that the Amir intends to draw revenue from the people in Birmal, and it might be politically expedient that the tribes on our side of the boundary should not consider their relations with us as fundamentally different from what the Amir demands. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Waziris do not like the idea of tribute, and our frontier officers do not recommend it. Taking these facts into consideration, and in view of the relations which, as we shall explain, we propose to establish with the Waziris, we are not, as at present advised, prepared to recommend that the payment of tribute should be insisted upon.

15. Looking to the whole tenor of the reports to which we have invited attention, we are of opinion that it is necessary to have some strong post so situated as to put an end to Waziri raiding not only into the Zhob Agency, but also upon Powindah Kafilas which use the Gomal route. Our responsibilities also require that our position shall be such as to show the tribes that we can prevent raiding on the Amir's frontier. We are impressed with the fact that the present weak posts, such as that at Kajuri Kuch, are inadequate to deal with the marauding bands of Waziris. They murder and raid under the eyes of that post. The point at which they most frequently cut the Gomal route is Toi Khula, between Gulkach and Kajuri Kach. The Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan has for nearly two years past been urging upon us the necessity of maintaining a post at this spot. No suitable site was to be found on the south side of the river within the Zhob Agency, and while our relations with the

Amir as to the withdrawal of His Highness's influence from the country on the north side remained undetermined, we hesitated to sanction any post on the north bank. We are now, as far as our relations with the Amir are concerned, free to make any arrangements we please for protecting the line of the Gomal from Waziri incursions. It is probable that the best means of doing this is not to place the necessary post on the river itself, but at a spot which is more suitably situated for dominating the paths by which the marauding bands approach the river. As long ago as 1890, Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the Derajat, advocated the establishment of a post at Spin. In 1891 he spoke of such a post as essential to the success of the Gomal arrangements, and added—"I think it is of the utmost importance that no time should be lost in establishing this post." In October 1891, the Punjab Government so far supported the opinions of the frontier officers, that they advocated the establishment of tribal posts in and about Spin. The frontier officers have never varied in their opinion that a post in Spin would be the best guarantee of order; but the Punjab Government has always spoken with an uncertain sound, their opinion being not against the establishment of posts in the Waziri country, but against occupation by regular troops, unless it was considered necessary upon military grounds.

During the past four years, the Punjab Government has had the opportunity of trying the policy of subsidies and tribal levies without any backing of regular troops, except when, as above stated, it has suddenly requisitioned them. It is true that the subsidies have been small, and that the tribal levies have been kept carefully out of the Waziri country itself; but, with these limitations, the policy has been tested, with the result that outrages, instead of diminishing, have increased; and we think the time has come when the policy so long advocated by our most experienced frontier officers should be tried. We are convinced that, unless the tribal levies, backed by regular troops, are employed in the position where they can intercept raiders in the Gomal, it will not be long before we shall be called upon for troops for an expedition against the Waziris; and it is with the object of preventing this risk, that we advocate the establishment of a military post at or near Spin, by the retention of some of the troops there when the Boundary Commission has completed its labours.

It may be found that the position from which watch and ward of the caravan road can best be undertaken is not actually in Spin itself. It may be in the country between Spin and Wano. That is a point of detail for subsequent settlement; Spin has been recommended by those best acquainted with the country on several grounds. It can scarcely be said to be in Waziristan, for it lies at the edge of the Zarmelan plain, which, though a fertile tract, has remained uninhabited, because of the raids of the tribes on one side or the other: it would be a considerable indirect advantage if, by the cultivation of this plain, supplies for the troops could be obtained without the present long carriage. It is also said that a position could here be obtained which would have a good water-supply, notoriously defective in the Gomal, and that in other respects it would be much more healthy than the positions now held by our troops. We ought to add that we do not contemplate any addition to the forces on the frontier, but to provide the garrison for the new post by a re-arrangement of the existing disposition.

16. While, however, we are of opinion that the necessary reinforcement of our posts will be best secured by establishing a post at or near Spin, we do not propose to make any formal announcement without further investigation. The troops for the protection of the Demarcation Commission will be posted in the district in October. We propose at the same time to depute a Political Officer to explain to the Waziris the nature of the relations which we intend to establish with them. It is in every way desirable that these negotiations should be carried on at a time when we are able to make a strong display of force. We are not without hopes that the consent of the tribesmen may be obtained to the establishment of the post proposed. If, however, it should appear that they entertained strong objections to the particular locality selected, we would be ready to consider how far it was possible to meet these objections consistently with securing the advantages which it is sought to gain. We are distinctly of opinion that something must be done to strengthen our

position : if we describe it as the establishment of a strong post at Spin on a permanent footing after the work for which the Commission's escort is provided has been brought to a conclusion, it is because that represents the best information at this moment available to us.

17. In making arrangements with the tribesmen, such as we contemplate, it will be necessary to give increased service allowances to the headmen and to enlist inferior men for service in levy posts. The Mahsuds live by plunder, and our proposals aim at depriving them of that means of livelihood. We do not doubt that, in time when they have abandoned their predatory habits, they will learn to live by peaceful means such as agriculture, rearing stock, and trading. At first, however, many will have no means of subsistence except through the service allowances and pay which we will afford them. Our proposals in this respect are that the officer who will be entrusted with the negotiations which are to be carried out with the tribes should be authorised to draw up a scheme for entertainment of levies and payment of service allowances.

18. Beyond, however, the payment of these levies, we think it unnecessary, for the present, to extend the arrangements already subsisting. We have already referred in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this despatch to the proceedings of the jurgas, and we desire to test fairly the working of this system as a means of dealing with offences which disturb the peace of the country, in the belief that, if successful, it would prevent any interference with the local independence of the tribes. We think there is some reason to hope that the tribes generally might be ready to accept the decision of an assembly of themselves come to with the assistance of a British Officer ; and would see to the enforcement of that decision, and the carrying out of any punishment or restitution which it might involve. But while the jurgas might answer for the tribes as a whole, they would probably not be able to give any adequate assurance against the acts of turbulent individuals. To make the system work, we ought to be in a position to assure the jurgas that by proper police arrangements for the protection of our own territories and of the caravan routes we can and will prevent acts out of which constant and troublesome claims arise. It is evident that this is specially necessary in the Gomal district, and we venture to ask your sanction to our using our discretion as to the best means by which it can be done. We think we have said enough to show that, if we propose a new post, it is only because we wish effectively to carry out the policy defined by Lord Kimberley, *i.e.*, that, while we are to extend our influence over tribes beyond the frontier of British India, we are not to annex the country, but the frontier of British India and the sphere of the local administration of British officials are to remain unaltered.

19. We trust that the statement of policy which we have here laid before you will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government ; and we shall be anxious to receive, by telegram if possible, a general approval to our proposals. The requisite preparations for bringing our arrangements into effect will take some time

20. Our Honourable Colleagues Sir Charles Pritchard, Mr. Westland, and Sir Antony MacDonnell dissent from this despatch. Their joint minute of dissent will be found in enclosure (No. 3). It appears to the majority of us that they consider that the result of the policy which we support will be to make the Government of India responsible for the administration of the Waziri country, and to advance the frontier of British India in that quarter to the boundary of Afghanistan. The majority think it necessary to say that the adoption of the policy set forth in this despatch will not, in their opinion, lead to these results ; and that they hold strongly that the policy of inactivity tempered by punitive expeditions advocated by the dissentients will inevitably bring about the annexation and administration which they desire to avoid

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 C. B. PRITCHARD,
 A. P. MACDONNELL.

Enclosure No. 1.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 24th March 1894.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, the papers marginally noted, which contain the proposals and opinions of the local officers of the Derajat Division in connection with the question of demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary in Waziristan and of our future relations with the Waziris.

Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 28th February 1894, and enclosures.
&c &c.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor has fully expressed his views on the subject in his note* of the 14th instant, summing up his conclusions at the end. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick regrets to have to trouble the Government of India with so lengthy a note, but he desires me to say that the importance of the subject must be his apology for doing so.

Sub-Enclosure A.

Extract of Letter from R. I. Bruce, Esq., C.I.E., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 28th February 1894.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 6th instant on the subject of demarcation of the boundary between India and Afghanistan which adjoins this division.

In this letter I am desired—

- (i) to state fully my reasons for thinking that it would be necessary for Government, in order to secure the objects in view, to take up a position on this frontier different from that which they have taken up in the Khyber ;
- (ii) to state what it would in my opinion be necessary to do in order to secure the objects which I consider we should attain in Waziristan ; and
- (iii) to furnish as full information as I can as to the present feeling of the different clans of the Waziri and other tribes in regard to the settlement recently made by Sir H. M. Durand with His Highness the Amir at Kabul.

I think, taking it all round, it is remarkable with what equanimity the settlement, so far as they are acquainted with it, is regarded by the tribes, and I believe the popular wish among all hill sections, including the Mahsuds, is that the boundary should be marked out, and that each should know who in future to look to as their suzeran and protector.

I do not for a moment say that the hill sections on the Tochi-Thall side are waiting to rush into our arms and say, "Mark out your boundary and our country ; its routes and resources are open to you and we are your submissive subjects." But I do say they are as willing—more willing even—to accept as reasonable terms for measures by which the country comprised within the new boundary would be pacified and opened up, than the Mahsuds and Wano Ahmadzais were for the pacification of the Gomal when they came to Sir Robert Sandeman and myself at Appozai in 1889.

Malik Mani Khan and his faction, for their own personal ends, and believing that they may thereby obtain more advantageous terms, exaggerate the difficulties caused by a portion of Birmal having been allotted to the Amir, and hold back the Waziri sections on that side from inviting our intervention as eagerly as the Wano Ahmadzais do.

The tribes themselves fully recognise that an essential part of the measures would be the establishment of a strong military station in or near Wano. The Jirga of the Ahmadzais of Wano and Shakai would no doubt eagerly welcome

* Sub-Enclosure B.

the establishment of such a military post: the Mahsuds would do the same. The Dauris and hill Darwesh Khels on the Tochi-Thal side—subject to what I have said above about the terms they would expect—would do the same, as all are equally alive to the fact that nothing can prosper amongst themselves, and that they will be constantly in hot water with the British Government and with the Amir unless they are constrained by some controlling authority to maintain peace towards one another.

The Dauris are, I believe, as anxious to have a strong military station in their country as the Wano Ahmadzais are to have one in theirs. I doubt, however, if two such stations between Fort Sandeman and Kurram would be necessary. I think one strong head-quarters military station, either at Wano or Upper Daur or Sheranna, with an outpost at some suitable position under the same command, is all that would be necessary. I will refer to this again when treating of the details of the tribal and levy arrangements.

The Mahsuds, although some of the leading Maliks might not wish to see a military post established in their country, would all rejoice in a more efficient system of control which would afford them sufficient support to enable them to keep their bad characters of the tribe in hand. Thus, I believe they would co-operate in the establishment of a system similar to what exists in the Bozdar, Larcha-Sherani and other hill tracts on this border and in the Marri-Bugti country in Baluchistan by which the main routes Shahur, Khaisara, and others would be opened up with levy posts of their own tribesmen established on them, and we should be able to traverse their country in safety. As matters at present stand, the headmen cannot forcibly coerce the bad characters of the tribe, as the support we can *from outside* afford them is not sufficient to protect them from retaliation. Even our Waziri levies, as has been frequently pointed out, for the same reasons naturally hesitate to act of themselves or even to assist the Maliks. On different occasions they did kill their tribesmen who came to plunder on the Gomal, and on every occasion the relations of the men killed retaliated, and we are powerless even to protect our own levies. The result is that any Waziri who kills a Waziri thief is from that moment an outlaw from his country and in daily peril of his life. The leading men who have the best interests of the tribe at heart are heartily sick and tired of such an arrangement. Being unable to effectually coerce their tribesmen in serious cases, they are obliged to come forward and volunteer to pay their fines; in fact to bear their punishments. Thus, last year they paid the greater part of the Rs 10,000 fine for the Khaisarawals for offences committed in Zhob, while their allowances are now again stopped to the extent of some six thousand rupees owing to the misdoings of the Abdulrahman Khels. As they see no hope of an end to this, except in an increase of their influence through our support, which can only be attained by our making our control over the tribe more practical and effectual than it is at present, they are now in their own interests most anxious to bring this about.

In this connection the question of resigning their independence naturally comes to the front, and so far as their idea of independence means a title to be free of all wholesome controlling authority, with a general license to cut throats, maintaining a state of anarchy in the country, making it useless for all practical purposes and an actual source of danger and weakness in times of trouble, I believe that from the day the Mahsuds and Wano Ahmadzais came in and tendered their submission at Appozai, they completely reconciled themselves to giving up their independence in that sense. Subsequently, the object of opening up their country was steadily kept in view and progressing. Mr. Donald, accompanied by the Maliks, visited Marwatt and several parts of the Mahsud country, and had not our measures been interrupted by the crisis with the Amir, we would probably before now have been able to traverse all parts of it, and the Mahsud "pardah" would have been a thing of the past. The Waziris also looked on this as only an interruption, and now that the Amir is settled with, they expect that we will resume our action at the place where we left off; and if we neglect to do so, the evil-disposed amongst the tribe will quickly get the mischievous notion into their heads that we do not mean to proceed with our intention of doing away with the state of anarchy. They will again get inflated and out of hand, and what Government could now do under the most favourable circumstances, and comparatively little expense, they will have to do in the long run at ten times the trouble and cost.

The causes of irritation and unrest in connection with the recent settlement with the Amir are clearly illustrated in the petitions lately given in to Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, by the Dauris, Kabul Khels, Mahsuds, and Hassan Khels, as well as by the petition presented by the late Kabul faction of the Wano Ahmadzais (Banocha and his party). If these causes of irritation are not now composed, the result will be turmoil all along the new frontier line. The fair and square policy would obviously be for us to control our tribes and for the Amir to control his. The Jadran, Powindah, and other tribes in the Amir's territory adjacent to the new boundary line are not predatory in character like the Mahsuds, and as the Amir has during recent years greatly consolidated his authority over them, he would probably have little trouble in keeping them in order; while, if the proposals I have now made are carried out, I do not apprehend much difficulty would be experienced in controlling the tribes on our side of the line and in preventing them from raiding or plundering in the jurisdiction of His Highness.

The question then comes to this, What are the objects of Government and how can they be best attained? I assume the objects of the Government to be—

- 1st.—To bring the tribes into line with ourselves by the establishment of intimate and friendly relations, identifying their interests with ours, rendering the resources of the country available for our requirements, and thus making our border land and its tribesmen a factor of strength in the great scheme of imperial frontier defence, instead of a source of weakness, as it is while left in the normal condition of anarchy.
- 2nd.—The opening of the Tochi, Gumatti-Thall, and other routes, and the establishment of safe lateral communication between the Gomal and Kurram beyond the Mahsud hills. The latter may be said to be more particularly the local object and follows the first as a matter of course.
- 3rd.—The amelioration of the condition of the frontier tribes by the extension of humanising influences over them, redeeming them from their semi-barbarous condition, and putting them in the way of earning an honest livelihood.

My assumption that what I have described as the first object Government wish to secure is the declared policy of the Government of India, I gather from their letter, dated 17th August 1887, to the Punjab Government, and from the line of policy which has since been followed on this frontier. In that letter, when referring to the then mooted question of the opening of the Gomal Pass, they wrote as follows:—

“On the other hand, it appears to the Government of India that the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under our control, and, if possible, to organise, for purposes of defence against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along our north-western frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves. The opening up of the country can only be effected in two ways—either by the use of military force or by endeavouring to draw the tribes into close and friendly relations with ourselves. The first course would involve a great expenditure of men and means, and is in all respects to be deprecated. The second, although it presents many difficulties, seems to offer a fair prospect of success, and, as at present advised, the Government of India consider that it is well worth a trial. They would therefore propose to make a systematic effort in this direction, and on all accounts it seems desirable to begin by inducing the tribes to keep open, under the supervision of British officers, such important routes as the Gomal and Tochi. By raising paid bodies of armed men for the protection of such routes, we enlist in our favour the interest of the tribes concerned and familiarise them with the presence of our officers in their midst; and it is to be hoped that from the beginning thus made a general improvement in our relations with them may before long result.” In writing on the same subject Sir Frederick (now Lord) Roberts wrote as follows:

“At this time it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that there are strong

reasons for a fresh departure in our policy towards the frontier tribes, in order that, when the time arrives, they may identify themselves with us and assist us not only with supplies and transport, but by sharing in the maintenance of our lines of communication."

In regard to the third object, viz., the amelioration of the condition of the tribes, Her Majesty's Secretary of State in his despatch, dated 30th April 1866, when writing about the pacification of the frontier with reference to the Waziri tribe in particular, wrote as follows :

"When I consider the expense incurred in expeditions for the repression and punishment of tribes concerned in such depredations—a course which we have frequently been compelled to adopt during the last ten or fifteen years, and their unsatisfactory results,—I cannot but think that an experiment, even if, as you believe, of doubtful advantage, can be otherwise than a good application of the public money. The pacification of border tribes by persevering in the exercise of humanising influences is more likely to be permanent than their subjection by military force ; and I always shall therefore receive with satisfaction such proposals as that now before me, recommended by your officers on the spot, which afford a reasonable prospect of rendering the people on the frontier line between our territories and Afghanistan peaceful and friendly neighbours."

In order to secure the objects Government have in view, two alternative lines of policy have been suggested, namely,—

First, the extension of what may be described as the Sandeman policy over Waziristan ; or, secondly, the introduction of the Khyber system.

In my opinion the Khyber system is fundamentally unsuited to the situation, and not only would it be impossible to secure the objects I have assumed Government have in view, but I believe it would not be practicable under such a system even to open up and make safe the principal and important lines of communication which traverse this belt of tribal territory. This is because the surroundings as regards Waziristan differ in the most essential points from the Khyber surroundings. In the Khyber we have only one tribe to deal with, namely, the Afridis. They did not want and do not want us to interfere in feuds and quarrels amongst the various sections of their own tribe. Their interests therefore run in one direction. No other tribe vitally concerns the Khyber, and it has been found possible to identify their interests with our own policy—whether that is the best or not—and to carry them with us in the working of it.

On the other hand, we have in Waziristan on the Tochi-Thall side three tribes to deal with, viz., Darwesh Khels, Dauris, and Mahsuds, who are hereditary enemies, and whose interests are diametrically opposed and in conflict. It is as essential to the success of our Waziristan policy that we should carry these tribes with us as it is to our Khyber policy to carry the Afridis with us. The only price the former would accept for their co-operation is the securing of their own special and several interests. So far as the Darwesh Khels on the Tochi-Thall side are concerned, their main object is to obtain protection from Mahsud depredations.

The Dauris are at deadly feud and suffer severely at the hands both of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels. If we want their co-operation we will have to secure them from these and establish direct relations with them.

The Mahsuds require no protection, but they realise that they can no longer play off the Amir against us ; that their livelihood from plunder will be in a great measure stopped, and that it is essential to the enjoyment of the service and other allowances they may receive as an alternative means of subsistence at our hands, and to the maintenance of their trade and intercourse with us, that the members of the tribe who have hitherto subsisted by plunder should be restrained and kept in hand. They find they have not the power to do this of themselves without more practical support from us, which, as I said before, we are unable to afford them from outside, and consequently they are prepared to allow the country to be opened up in such a way as will give us the necessary power of control, thereby increasing their own influence and authority over their refractory tribesmen.

This would enable an end being put to the crimes which have caused so much anxious trouble in Zhob and elsewhere, and which threaten to undermine the best efforts for the settlement of the frontier, and would sooner or later land Government in complications which costly military operations might fail to remedy.

The situation on the Gomal side is, as described by Mr. King, very similar to what it is on the Tochi-Thall side. The Wano Ahmadzaas, as I said, eagerly invite our intervention, but, besides protection from Mahsud depredations, they require to be assured against the hostility of the Suleman Khels, Dotanis, Kharotis, and Nasirs.

It would be as hopeless a task to try and open the Tochi-Thall routes and establish safe lateral communication with the Gomal without maintaining peace between the Darwesh Khels, Mahsuds, and Dauris, as it would have been to attempt to open the Bolan Pass and the Harnai and Thal-Chotiali routes without preserving the peace between the Marris, Bugtis, Brahois, and Kakars.

Having dwelt so far on the general considerations, I will proceed to describe more in detail the military and tribal arrangements which would be necessary, what their cost would be, and how they can best be carried out. In this I will take the military first.

In my opinion to open up the belt of tribal country between the Gomal on the south and Kurram and Thal on the north and to maintain in safety the main lines of communication traversing it efficiently, it will be necessary to station in the country a military force consisting of

- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry.
- 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry.
- 1 Mountain Battery.

If a Waziri Levy Corps were to be raised as proposed in the correspondence Punjab Government letter, dated 11th marginally noted, and which would on December 1891, to the Government of all considerations be most beneficial, India, Foreign Department, and enclosures. one of the two native infantry regiments might be withdrawn. I have no data on which I could form an estimate as to what would be the cost of a levy corps as compared with regular troops. No doubt Government can do so by referring to the cost of the Khyber Rifles or the Zhob Levy Corps.

The whole of the troops required could, I believe, be spared from the present garrisons of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. If thought preferable not to take the whole from those two stations, a wing of cavalry might be spared from the forces at Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur. The following is a detail of the existing Derajat frontier garrisons :—

BANNU (EDWARDESABAD).	DERA ISMAIL KHAN.
2 Regiments Native Infantry.	2 Regiments Native Infantry.
A wing Native Cavalry.	1 Regiment Native Cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery (6 guns).	2 Mountain Batteries (6 guns each).
DERA GHAZI KHAN.	RAJANPUR.
1 Regiment Native Infantry.	A Regiment Native Cavalry.
1 Regiment Native Cavalry.	

If the force required can in this way be provided from existing garrisons, it would appear that the chief expense entailed on Government by the transfer of the troops would be on account of compensation for dearness of provisions and forage. I have made enquiries of Officers Commanding Regiments here, but have not succeeded in finding out what this would be likely to amount to.

As regards the location of the military force, as I said before, I believe one strong head-quarters military station with an outpost at the next most suitable position would eventually be the best and most advantageous disposition. In proposing this I assume that the Amir is friendly and responsible for the tribes under his own jurisdiction.

The three positions which from our present knowledge seem to offer the greatest advantages from which to select sites are Wano, Upper Daur, and

It would also be the most advanced post Sheranna, but nothing definite should with reference to existing railway connections for an advance westwards. be determined on until the country had been explored. There is, however, one consideration which would appear to give preference to Wano as the site for the head-quarters station, which is, that the Wano plain is situated on the lower slopes of the Marwatti Mountain, on which, no doubt, a very fine site for a sanitarium could be selected.

I will now describe the tribal arrangements which would, I believe, be necessary. The Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, Mr. Anderson, estimates service pay and allowances for the Darwesh Khels and Dauris on his side at R65,000 per annum,—*viz.*, Rs. 50,000 for the Darwesh Khels and Rs. 15,000 for the Dauris.

As you are aware, this agrees with the estimate I submitted to you in 1890, and, judged by the light of the additional experience which the working of the Gomal arrangements since then has thrown on it, I think it may be accepted as being as correct as it would be possible to make under the circumstances. I concur with Mr. Anderson in thinking that to attempt to give a more detailed division according to sections would be mere guess-work.

The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan estimates the cost of the tribal arrangements, which he believes essential on his side, at Rs. 20,340. This also is, I believe, as near the mark as it would be possible to fix it.

The total of both sums amounts to Rs. 85,340 per annum.

Additional charges will also have to be met on account of pay of munshis, shopkeepers, watermen, sweepers, uniform for levies, etc., which may be roughly estimated at Rs. 14,000 or Rs. 15,000 a year. This may appear a large sum to put down on this account, but in carrying out a large measure of this kind on the frontier, incidental charges are certain to crop up, which it is impossible to foresee and which must be provided for, as having frequently to apply for subsequent sanctions of Government for small amounts causes a great deal of inconvenience.

The permanent charges on account of tribal arrangements may therefore, I think, be safely calculated at a lakh of rupees a year. An estimate is already before the Government of India, amounting to Rs. 17,100 per annum for remedying certain serious flaws in the tribal arrangements on the Gomal. If it is intended to place the Gomal arrangements on a secure basis, this sum must be sanctioned, no matter whether the larger scheme is sanctioned or not. The amount would, however, be set off against the lakh of rupees, so the cost of the larger scheme may be put down at Rs. 82,900.

I heartily concur in what Mr. King has written as to the necessity for giving to the leading headmen increased allowances. Garrisons for any new levy posts found necessary can largely be supplied from the existing levies, but allowances must be fixed for the leading headmen commensurate with the status each respectively holds in his tribe. This is more than ever necessary since some of them have enjoyed such liberal allowances from the Amir. If, from the money now applied for, suitable allowances are fixed for the headmen, we shall be enabled to open up the Shahur, and in fact all the other routes, at our own convenience, without any additional cost to Government. I fully concur with Mr. King in the great importance of opening out these routes, especially the Shahur route.

I can only give a very rough estimate of the initial cost of the buildings, such as levy posts, serais, etc., that would be required. Probably it would amount to Rs. 50,000. About Rs. 35,000 have up to the present been spent on posts and serais at Kajuri Kach, Nili Kach, Spinkai Kach, Kashmir Kar, Murtaza, and Jandola.

I could not give an idea of what the cost of the military accommodation for the force I propose would amount to.

It remains to be considered what would be the best plan of operation to adopt, and this is a most important matter. Mr. Anderson now agrees in

what I have urged from the first, that negotiations could best be conducted from Wano. The whole scheme should, I think, be approved by Government and a Commission appointed to carry it out, the officer in charge of the Commission having authority to spend on the entertainment of tribal levies, and service allowances up to the sanctioned amount, as was done in the case of the pacification of the Gomal and Lower Zhob.

It would be necessary to tell the tribal leaders the general objects Government have in view, and that the officer in charge of the Commission had authority to treat with them for bringing these about. This would be done only in a general way, without giving them any precise figures or mentioning any particular time within which the negotiations would be completed. Thus, supposing negotiations were to be commenced immediately, it might be found expedient to confine them to Wano for the present season,—that is, before the great heat sets in,—and next cold season to extend them to the Tochi-Thall tract. It would, however, be essential that the Darwesh Khel and Dauri headmen should receive clear assurances that they are to be included; otherwise they would oppose any settlement, even on the Wano side.

I should therefore recommend that in the very first instance the Commission should proceed to Wano and take up its quarters there, and, for the reasons before given, the sooner this is done the better. The officer in charge of the Commission should be provided with a military escort consisting of

1 Regiment of infantry,
2 Squadrons of cavalry, and
4 guns

It would be most advisable that an agent of the Amir should join the Commission, and this would no doubt prevent any open opposition on the part of the Suleman Khels, Dotanis, Kharotais, or Nasirs, which they might otherwise be inclined to offer. I do not consider it would be expedient to formally summon the headmen of these tribes, especially as they are now admittedly the Amir's subjects. Where their interests are concerned they would appear of themselves as they did at the recent conference at Kajuri Kach. In this connection I may say I concur in the view expressed by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that there should be the least possible flourish of trumpets, such as the summoning of Jurgas and public proclamations. The aim of the officer in charge of the Commission should rather be to work out quietly in co-operation with the agent of His Highness the Amir the declared objects of Government. In this way it would probably be found practicable to complete all arrangements on the Gomal side and to demarcate the boundary as far as the limits of Wano without delay. Communications could simultaneously be opened up with the leading men on the Tochi side. A knowledge of the details of the requirements on that side would be acquired, and when the time for action appeared ripe, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu might march up through the Tochi and join the officer in charge of the Commission. He should be accompanied by Mahk Mani Khan and the other leading men on his side and be provided with a military escort of

A regiment of infantry,
A squadron of cavalry, and
2 guns.

The final arrangements could then be completed.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Extract from note by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (Sir D. Fitzpatrick) on the demarcation of the Waziri boundary, dated March 14th, 1894.

The question of the demarcation along the Waziri border differs entirely from the questions of the demarcation along the Kurram frontier and in the

immediate neighbourhood of the Khaibar with which we have just dealt. The latter questions are little more than questions of merely carrying out in detail an arrangement come to between us and the Amir; whereas along the Waziri border we have to reckon with powerful tribes inhabiting a vast extent of territory, who are, as I anticipated they might be, not altogether happy at the way we have settled matters with the Amir, who are full of anxiety or expectation as to the consequences of our settlement with him, and whose claim to a hearing it would be folly to disregard.

There is, indeed, appended to Mr. Bruce's letter of the 23th ultimo a petition from Banocha, Gulsher and other Waziri Maliks of Wano, in which these men declare that they are anxious for a demarcation; that they are prepared to see us advance into their country and arrange for its management, locating a military force there, and so forth; and that they will be ready to support us. But it must be remembered that these men are the members of what is called the "Kabul faction," that is to say the faction which after accepting service from us and receiving our pay for some time deserted our service. This time twelve months they came down to meet Mr. Bruce and myself at Kajuri Kach and made overtures for reconciliation; but, though we obtained the permission of the Government of India to take them back into our service, they thought better of the matter and returned to the Amir's side. Now that they have been thrown over by the Amir, they, as might be expected, come to us in a profoundly penitent mood and present a petition which, as I observed in writing to Mr. Bruce the other day, is manifestly written with the aid of some one who knows something of our discussions, and in which they say everything that it is supposed we would wish them to say. It may be that if we restore their allowances (as we doubtless shall) and accept them as leaders of their sections of the tribe, they will be ready to make good their offers of assistance; but their petition can obviously not be accepted as any indication of the general feeling among the Waziris.

There are, I may further observe, certain passages in Mr. Bruce's letter which taken by themselves might lead one to imagine that the proposed demarcation, the location of a military force in the country, and other measures of the kind, would be so very popular with the Waziris that we might undertake them with a light heart, but this, as we all know, is merely Mr. Bruce's way of writing. He is an officer on whose judgment I have very great reliance, but he is a man of somewhat sanguine disposition, and when, as in the present instance, he proceeds to write at length about a great scheme the adoption of which he has long been urging, and of the efficiency of which he is absolutely convinced, he is apt here and there to be a little carried away. It will be observed that both in his present communication and in his previous letter dated 26th January 1894, when he comes deliberately to consider the question of the proposed demarcation, he says that we ought not to attempt anything of the kind without first coming to an arrangement with the tribes. This too is the view of the two Deputy Commissioners concerned, and there is in my opinion no doubt whatever that it is the correct view.

The position seems briefly to be this. The great bulk of the Waziris, though they may not be in all respects pleased with the way we have settled matters with the Amir, will be glad to escape falling under his rule, and, though they are very fond of independence, many of them would be prepared to see us set up a certain degree of control over the country so as to keep the peace between them and the Amir, and possibly establish some degree of internal order; but if we want to avoid what might prove a troublesome collision, and to get the tribes as a whole to accept even the minimum of control from us, we must at starting take them into our councils to some extent and offer them some inducement in the way of service and allowances. If we were to proceed to settle the details of the boundary on the ground or to establish any sort of control over the country without doing this, the result might be that we should have large numbers of the tribesmen against us, and that a serious distrust of our intentions would be created in the minds even of those who might be disposed to accept a moderate measure of control.

Thus the understanding or arrangement which we must come to with the

Waziris if we desire to settle the proposed boundary on the ground or establish any sort of control over the country involves two things, namely—

- 1st. That we should make up our own mind as to the main lines on which we propose to deal with Waziristan and give the tribes some definite indication of them; and
- 2ndly. That we should provide service for a certain number of the smaller men and allowances for the leading men.

The scheme proposed by the local officers includes the establishment of tribal services and allowances which will cost one lakh of rupees a year and the transfer from the stations of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu to the line between the Gomal and the Tochi beyond the Mahsud hills of—

- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry,
- 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry,
- 1 Battery of Mountain Artillery.

Of the lakh of rupees proposed for tribal services and allowances, Rs. 65,000 is the cost of the scheme for opening up the Tochi route and the Gumatti Thal route submitted to the Government of India by Sir James Lyall with Mr. Fanshawe's letter dated 28th October 1892, Rs. 20,000 is for certain additional service and allowances in the Mahsud country and in Spin and the Gomal neighbourhood now proposed by Mr. King, and the remaining Rs. 15,000 is intended to cover miscellaneous annual charges. As I shall have presently to explain, I think some further expenditure in tribal allowances will probably be necessary even if we restrict ourselves to our present position on the Gomal, and, without committing myself to any approval of details, I do not think the lakh of rupees proposed is in any way a high estimate if we are to establish any sort of control over Waziristan generally; indeed, my apprehension is that we might have to spend more; but I have sufficient confidence in Mr. Bruce and Messrs. King and Anderson to believe that we could establish a certain sort of control, the precise nature of which I will discuss further on, for the sums named by them.

As to the military force proposed, I should certainly think it the minimum with which, even with the best previous arrangements and understandings with the tribes, we could venture to go into the country to settle the boundary, or could maintain our position there in ordinary times after the boundary was settled. The only extra cost of these troops, as I understand, would be for free rations, but that would be a considerable sum. Then there would be certain initial expenditure for tribal posts, &c., which Mr. Bruce estimates at Rs. 50,000, and there would be the cost of accommodation for the regular troops which we are unable to estimate. There would, moreover, be a civil or political establishment of some sort, and there would be the cost of improving the communications, on which there is room for expenditure up to any amount which we can spare.

Now, looking at the matter only from a financial point of view, a proposal involving such heavy expenditure would call for careful consideration at any time, and with our finances in their present condition the mere question of finding the money is a very serious one. But this is not the only question involved. A proposal of such magnitude and entailing results in the future which it is most difficult to forecast has aspects far more important than any presented by purely financial considerations. Hence it is incumbent on us to consider most carefully the grounds upon which this scheme is recommended for adoption, and in doing this it is impossible to avoid going at some length into the general question of our position and policy with reference to Waziristan.

As I read the agreement between Sir M. Durand and the Amir, it does not necessarily impose upon us or upon the Amir any obligation to establish an efficient system of control over the tribal territory falling respectively at the Indian and Afghan sides of the boundary line.

In a note I wrote at the time Lord Roberts' proposed mission was being discussed I said, speaking of the boundary line then in contemplation: "I think it is of the highest importance that it should be simply understood to be a line

on our side of which the Amir's interference, except when we allow him to chastise a tribe, shall be absolutely excluded, that is to say, I would leave the question as to what our relations with the territory or tribes on our side of the line would be entirely open and untouched in our settlement or agreement with the Amir. I think if the agreement between us and the Amir were treated as amounting to anything like a partition of territory it would have a bad effect, and though I see it must practically involve something like a partition of what Mr. Tupper calls the 'sphere of influence,' I think it would be unwise to put it expressly in that way"; and I gave as one of my reasons for saying this that "anything having the appearance of a partition of territory or of the sphere of influence or sphere of protection * * * might at some points of the line cast on us obligations of a very onerous nature without any commensurate advantage."

Now, as I read Sir M. Durand's agreement, it avoids this danger. It is true it uses the expression "sphere of influence," which I would have preferred to avoid using, but it contains only the negative provision that the Amir shall not interfere on our side of the line or we on his. Hence I say the agreement imposes on us directly no obligation to establish any system of control over Waziristan, and if we are to establish any such system of control it must be either because we have some reason of our own for doing so, or because, as an indirect result of the convention, a state of things may arise in which we should find it difficult to avoid doing so.

Now, as to our having any object of our own to serve by establishing any control over Waziristan generally, I can conceive only one object, of really great importance, namely, the Imperial military object of the defence of our frontier against a foreign invader. It is possible that, having come up as far as the Gomal, we may find it necessary for the safety of our position on that river to establish some sort of control in addition to that which we now possess over some sections of the tribes immediately north of it. That is a small matter to which I shall have to return presently; but it would in my opinion be a complete mistake to suggest that, looking at the matter merely from the Provincial point of view, we should better our position by establishing ourselves along the line of the Tochi and along the line between the Tochi and the Gomal beyond the Mahsud country. It is quite true that establishing ourselves on the flanks and at the rear of a tribe is one of the most effectual means of bringing the tribe to its bearings, but our present difficulties along our true frontier, I mean the frontier of "British India" between the Gomal and Thal, are really very small, and it would be absurd to suggest that to diminish them (if indeed it would diminish them) we should undertake so formidable a task as the occupation of the two exterior lines to which I refer.

Therefore, I say that, if we have an object of our own to serve in establishing our control over Waziristan generally, it must be the Imperial military object.

Of the degree of importance attaching to that object I am not in a position to speak. It is a matter for the military authorities, but if, as I understand to be the case, they hold it to be of high importance for us to establish ourselves in Waziristan in a position such as that referred to, then I think that we should accept the general lines of Mr. Bruce's scheme and proceed to carry it out at once.

I would in this event proceed to carry it out *at once*, because I have sufficient confidence in the judgment of Messrs. Bruce, King and Anderson to accept their opinion that it could be carried out at this moment without any extraordinary difficulty, and it might not be so easy to carry it out some years hence if things went smoothly with the Waziris meanwhile, and they had got accustomed to be at the same time safe against the aggressions of the Amir and free from all control by us. It is, of course, possible that if we did nothing at present, simply letting things take their course for some years, and the Waziris then got into the troubles with the Amir's people across the border line which the local officers anticipate, and to which I shall presently have more particularly to refer, we might have the Waziris at our feet begging of us to assume control, but that could only come to pass after a great deal of trouble to us as well as to the Waziris, which it is desirable to avoid. I say, therefore,

that if from the military point of view the gain from the forward move is worth more than the cost of it, I would proceed on the lines of Mr. Bruce's proposals without further delay.

If, on the other hand, the military advantages of the forward move are less considerable than they have commonly been supposed to be, the question of such a move would require further consideration. The local officers are even in this event decidedly in favour of the forward move, and the chief reason they urge for it is that if we do not establish some sort of efficient control over Waziristan on our side of the new boundary line there will be continual raiding and counter-raiding across the line, which will involve us in serious difficulties both with the Amir, who would expect us to keep the Waziris at our side in order, and with those Waziris, all of whom would look to us for protection, and many of whom hold land in our districts and live there for a good part of the year.

Now, I do not for a moment doubt that this might prove a very serious difficulty. I fully admit that difficulties of the sort referred to may arise,—indeed, having regard to the present state of irritation of the Waziris against the Amir described in this correspondence, I may go further and say that I think they are likely to arise,—but it does not I think necessarily follow from this that we are bound at once to assume the control of Waziristan merely in order to prevent them arising. If there were no other reason for assuming control of the country but that, it might be a question whether we should not defer taking upon ourselves so troublesome and expensive a task until we had first tried other ways of meeting the difficulties in question.

It must be remembered in this connection that it has been most distinctly contemplated from the time the proposed mission of Lord Roberts was first discussed that, in the event of conflicts arising between tribes on the Amir's side and tribes on our side of the intended boundary line, we should in some cases allow the tribes to fight the matter out between them, and that in the event of the tribes on our side being the aggressors we might in some cases deal with the matter in the same way as we have dealt with similar matters in the case of the Afridis, that is to say by permitting the Amir to punish them on the understanding that he does not permanently occupy any portion of their country. This was expressly contemplated in the case of the Waziris in particular.

No doubt there might be cases in which it would be difficult for us to avoid interfering in the quarrel. But, on the other hand, if the difficulty were to present itself in the shape that Mr. Anderson seems most to apprehend, that is to say, if the Waziris on our side of the line were to be the aggressors, and in particular if they were to espouse the quarrels of their brethren in Birmal or of the Tanis or others living across the line with the Amir, I think the case would be clearly one in which we should be quite warranted in giving the Amir permission to punish them, and if Mani Khan or any one else came to me with a warning that his people were likely to be drawn on into taking the aggressive in any affair of that sort, I would not hesitate to tell him plainly that if they did we would allow the Amir to punish them. It is quite true, as Mr. Anderson says that the Amir's method of punishing these people would probably be indiscriminating and ruthless, but in that it would only resemble their style of attack on the Amir's people which it would be intended to punish, and I don't see what they would have to complain of. What we would say to them would be in effect this: "We prevent the Amir establishing his rule over your country. If he or his people are guilty of unprovoked aggression on you, we will interpose in such manner as seems to us best on your behalf; but if you choose to become aggressors after the warning we have given you we shall simply stand aside and leave the matter to be fought out between you and the Amir, only insisting that he shall not permanently occupy your country."

It is however obvious that we might at times have to encounter serious difficulties and much trouble in carrying out such a policy. There would, for example, be at times perplexing controversies as to who were the real aggressors, and so forth, and it might be that we should ultimately find ourselves

forced by all this to establish ourselves in Waziristan on the footing proposed by Mr. Bruce. The question is whether this would afford a sufficient reason for establishing ourselves on such a footing at once. That is a question on which I confess I find some difficulty in making up my mind. If the troubles that are likely to arise were merely troubles between the tribes on each side of the line I should not hesitate to reply in the negative; but there is the danger of our being drawn into frequent and irritating disputes with the Amir, and it may well be argued that having regard to this we ought to take up our position at once. Of course if military opinion is really strong as it probably will be as to the military necessity for an advance, the question to which I am now referring will never arise; but if it should arise I fear I cannot contribute more to its solution than is contained in the foregoing remarks.

I pass now to another point. It may be urged, indeed it seems to be urged, that apart from any imperial military reasons for establishing ourselves in Waziristan, and apart from any difficulties that might arise from raiding and counter-raiding across the new boundary line if we do not so establish ourselves, there are other reasons for the forward move—that our present position along the line of the Gomal is not a satisfactory one, that we are exposed there to have outrages committed upon our people, and that we must extend our sphere of influence if we want to remedy this.

Now, I am afraid there is a certain amount of truth in this. We have had a great deal of trouble in the Gomal and south of it. Most of it has been due to the perturbation caused by intrigues and to the want of caution shown in letting our men go about insufficiently protected; but a certain amount of it is the natural consequence of our taking up such a position in a country like that, and may be expected to continue no matter how good our relations are with the Amir and no matter what precautions we take for the safety of our men. With proper arrangements, however, troubles of this sort may be so far reduced as to become endurable, and we have had before us for some time separate proposals put forward by Mr. Bruce for improving our position in the Gomal by granting certain further allowances to the tribes with which we are there concerned. These proposals, which are included in the more extensive scheme now submitted, were put forward by Mr. Bruce in his letter dated 23rd February 1893. They were of a limited nature, the total annual cost of carrying them out amounting only to Rs. 17,100, and they were allowed to stand over only because the whole question of our position in regard to Waziristan was under consideration. There might be some difficulty in adopting them as an isolated measure just at this moment, because our doing so might create an impression that we had yielded to the pressure put upon us by the recent outrages; but they would be well worth considering after a little time if the larger scheme now put forward by Mr. Bruce is not at once carried out. On the other hand, it seems to me that it would be, as the people of this country say, almost like bringing out an elephant to kill a mouse if we were to undertake the very large scheme of operations now under consideration merely for the sake of getting over our difficulties in the Gomal.

In short, the view that I am inclined to take is that the answer to the question whether we should adopt a scheme of the sort I have described for establishing our control over Waziristan must depend mainly on the imperial military considerations to which I have referred. If with reference to those considerations it is held, as it probably will be, to be worth our while to adopt such a scheme, the other considerations which I have discussed would present additional grounds for adopting it, and we should proceed to carry it out at once, beginning with the delimitation of the boundary between us and the Amir. If, on the other hand, the imperial military considerations are not of the importance that they have commonly been assumed to be, it might be a question whether we should be wise in committing ourselves to so heavy and expensive an undertaking at this moment.

Up to this I have spoken of the scheme propounded by Mr. Bruce and the Deputy Commissioners as if it was merely a scheme for conciliating the tribes, locating certain military forces in the country, establishing certain tribal posts, opening certain roads, and keeping the peace along the border line between us

and the Amir. It will be seen, however, from the correspondence that these officers mean it to be a good deal more. They propose to undertake from the start to establish internal peace and settle the disputes between the numerous divisions and sub-divisions of the Waziri tribes, and indeed Mr. King in the last paragraph of his letter writes as if he hoped that we should before long come to settling disputes between man and man.

Now, it may be that in a portion of the Tochi Valley or Lower Daur we would naturally from the first go even further than that and establish a regular system of government. The circumstances there seem to be altogether exceptional, and if, as is stated, the people there are really anxious for us to do this, I don't see why, if we are to go into Waziristan at all, we should not do it. But elsewhere—generally throughout the country I have grave doubts as to whether in the event of our determining to establish our control we should deliberately take so much on ourselves.

I say "deliberately take" this on ourselves because I quite admit that we may by the force of circumstances be in time drawn on even against our will to undertake not only this, but a great deal more. Indeed, it seems to me that, though we would of course never "annex" the country in the technical sense, that is to say make it part of "British India" within the meaning of our legislative enactments, we might be drawn on into establishing a more or less complete system of government there.

I quite admit that tribal quarrels in the neighbourhood are apt at times to give rise to troubles on our lines of communication. If, for example, one of the contending factions is responsible for the safety of a certain section of our road, the opposite faction may, in order to get the former faction into a scrape, come down and commit a murder or robbery or cut a telegraph wire on that section of the road, and so on. But this after all is not a very serious matter. There is a risk of it in the Khaibar, but still we manage to get on there.*

It is said the case of our roads in the Waziri country would be different from that of the Khaibar road because in the former case we should have a number of different tribes to deal with, whereas in the case of the Khaibar we have only the Afridis to deal with, and the Afridis are spoken of almost as if they were a sort of happy family compared with the Waziris. But as a matter of fact, though it is with the Afridis we have to deal chiefly in the Khaibar, we have to deal with other tribes as well, and the Afridis are broken up into numerous sections which are constantly raiding and counter-raiding upon each other. Notwithstanding this, there has not been, so far as I know, any trouble to the Khaibar road for a long time past except from Amin Khan, whose case is an altogether peculiar one. The reason of this is simply that it is completely understood that we merely desire to maintain our road; that we have no ulterior object, and in particular that we don't want to interfere in the concerns of the Afridis; that, though we are always willing to use our good offices to bring about an amicable settlement of their quarrels, we have no desire to interfere in those quarrels as long as they are not allowed to disturb the peace or affect the safety of the road; but that if any one attempts to carry his quarrel on to the road so as to break the peace or endanger the safety of travellers there, we will deal severely with him.

I don't see why we should despair of establishing a similar understanding regarding our proposed roads in Waziristan. When I visited Dera Ismail Khan two years ago and the subject of the "Toras" or hostile expeditions which are commonly undertaken every year in pursuance of the great feud between the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds was discussed, I found that the distinction between fighting off the Gomal route and fighting on it or using it for the purposes of a Tora was at once understood, and that, though what I said against Toras generally was not likely to have any effect, my warnings and threats against

* I may point to the Kohat Pass, too, as an instance of a route being kept open and so safe that an officer can ride through it with a single orderly, though we make no attempt to keep the peace in the country through which it lies. I may add, with reference to Mr. Anderson's observations, that the road there lies in many places right through the village lands. It must be admitted, however, that this is a very short pass between two of our own districts.

any infraction of the peace or neutrality of the Gomal route were accepted as most reasonable, and as a matter of fact, though our officers there have all along been urging that this great quarrel would effect the peace of the Gomal route, not one of the troubles we have of late had there has been, so far as I remember, attributed to it.

I quite admit that the difficulty of maintaining the position of isolation on our roads which I proposed in the note above quoted to take up is, though not different in kind, somewhat greater in degree in Waziristan than in the Khaibar. I further admit that, as a result of what I have myself seen and of the discussions that have taken place since that note was written, I feel somewhat less hopeful now of maintaining that position than I was in 1892; and I cannot of course pretend that my speculations on such a point are entitled to as much weight as those of officers who have served for many years on the frontier. All I mean to say is that the matter is mainly one of speculation, and that I am still far from being convinced that those officers are right on it; and that being so, I am altogether opposed to committing ourselves at this stage by any declaration of our intention to undertake so formidable a task as that of establishing the *pax Britannica* generally throughout the Waziri country.

I speak of this as a formidable task because it seems to me that to stop all the fighting and raiding, redress all the grievances and compose all the quarrels between the contending tribes and sub-divisions of tribes in a country like Waziristan would be a matter of immense difficulty, and one that would seriously tax our resources. I may observe that the difficulty is aggravated by the circumstance that we have here no powerful Tumandars or Maliks to utilize for the management of the tribes. The Waziri tribes are organised on a strongly democratic basis and their headmen seem to have comparatively little real power of control. During the last few weeks, while all the headmen have been sitting at Tank with our officers to settle the cases of previous outrages, fresh outrages have been committed by their tribesmen a little way off, apparently as a protest against the action of their headmen. Mr. Bruce himself in more than one passage of his present letter dwells on this point. He says, for example, that "As matters at present stand, the headmen cannot forcibly coerce the bad characters of the tribe, as the support we can from outside afford them is not sufficient to protect them from retaliation." Again he says: "Being unable to effectually coerce their tribesmen in serious cases, they (the headmen) are obliged to come forward and volunteer to pay their fines—in fact to bear their punishments."

I see Mr. Bruce in some passages in his letter speaks of the possibility of increasing the influence of these headmen by our support, and I am not quite sure what he means by this. If he means that by systematically treating these headmen as leaders of the tribe we can raise them above their present position, he may be right to some extent; but I scarcely venture to hope that we could do very much in that way. A really powerful headman of a tribe is a natural growth having its roots lying very deep, and if the tribe does not produce such a headman we can scarcely hope to make it produce one by any amount of top-dressing.

If Mr. Bruce means that we could strengthen the position of the headman by bringing physical force or threats of physical force to bear to support his authority, he is no doubt right. We can support a headman of a tribe in this way just as we can support one of our own Magistrates or policemen; but then what does this come to?

Suppose we issue a proclamation forbidding the Mahsuds to raid on the Darwesh Khels and the Darwesh Khels to raid on them by way of retaliation, and suppose in defiance of that proclamation the Mahsuds raid on the Darwesh Khels and then the Darwesh Khels appeal to us to redress their grievance. Suppose we assemble a jirga, and that jirga decides that the Mahsuds are to pay the Darwesh Khels five thousand rupees and the Mahsud headmen cannot realize the amount from the tribe, and having had to pay other large sums out of their own pockets on previous similar occasions are unable to make it good themselves. What are we to do?

We might perhaps, under certain circumstances, try blockades and reprisals, but what we would usually come to in the end would be a punitive expedition.

I put this case, which is one which would be pretty certain to occur from time to time in practice, to Mr. Bruce at our conference the other day, and asked him where we are to get the troops for such expeditions. He said we could carry out such an expedition with the force he proposes to keep in the country. But would we attempt to go into the Mahsud country to inflict punishment even with the whole of that force ?

I doubt it extremely. It might be possible to do it, but I doubt whether any Commander-in-Chief and Government of India nowadays would sanction our attempting it. They might, under the altered circumstances, think a much smaller force necessary than was employed in 1881 (*see pp. 544 and 548 of Paget and Mason*), but they would probably deem it necessary to send a considerable additional force to supplement* the troops we would permanently keep upon our lines of communication. Now, I fear that even if we restrict ourselves to keeping open our lines of communication and maintaining the peace along the new boundary line between us and the Amur, we shall occasionally be compelled to undertake punitive expeditions, but why should we, unless we are actually forced by circumstances to do so, take upon ourselves a task which might entail on us, among other disadvantages, an additional number of such expeditions ?

No doubt if, as might be supposed to be the case on a perusal of some passages in this correspondence, the great bulk of the Waziris, Mahsuds as well as Darwesh Khels would gladly welcome, or at least willingly accept, our intervention for the pacification of the country, that might call for a considerable modification of what I have just said ; but we must be careful not to assume too hastily that that would be the case. On this side of India as on the Assam frontier, and I suppose it is the same wherever there are wild tribes distracted by internal feuds, there are always two sets of people pressing inviting us to interfere, namely, the classes who are for the time being getting the worst of the struggle, and the classes who hope to profit by getting service under us in the event of our interfering. Further, it must be remembered that the leading men with whom chiefly we discuss matters may not be able to carry all their tribesmen with them, especially in a place like Waziristan, where, as already observed, the leaders are weak. Hence we must be careful not to mistake the voice of a small number of men for the voice of the country at large.

On the whole, my view on this question of undertaking the pacification of the whole country is briefly as follows. The local officers may be right in thinking, first, that it would be impossible to maintain a reasonable degree of peace and safety on the proposed lines of communication without pacifying the whole country, and, secondly, that in the work of pacification we should have the people with us to an extent which would make our task comparatively easy ; but, even if it can be said that the probabilities are to a great extent in favour of their being right on both these points, I don't see why we should at starting commit ourselves to the work of pacification by making an announcement from which it would be impossible to recede. If we introduce our military force into the positions proposed, open the lines of communication, and establish tribal posts along them, we shall be brought into much closer contact with the people than we have hitherto been, and will after a little time be in a much better position to judge of what is really necessary and what facilities there are for effecting it, and if we then find that the local officers are right, there will be, so far as I can judge, no greater difficulty in giving effect to their views than there would be on our first entering into the country. If, therefore, we are to establish ourselves in Waziristan I would start with the determination to maintain (except perhaps in a part of the Tochi Valley) the position of isolation to which I have referred, and would stick to that position until I was forced out

* This is, of course, assuming that it was resolved to undertake the expedition, but I should apprehend from all I have seen that it would in most cases be difficult to get the requisite consents to such an expedition. The truth is our Government has, owing to certain alterations in its position of late years, become less suited for carrying out rough work of this sort in the bold and thorough manner in which it needs to be carried out.

of it by circumstances or until it was clear that the mass of the people wished me to abandon it, and that it was for the advantage of all concerned that I should do so.

I have now given my opinion on the main points which present themselves for consideration. There will be doubtless many other subordinate points to be considered, especially if the Government of India should agree entirely with the local officers and should desire to interpose for the settlement of any of the internal affairs of the country. In this latter event there would, for example, be the question touched on in this correspondence, and which the Waziris would be sure to start, as to whether we would engage to abstain from levying land revenue from them; but it would be premature to discuss such matters at this stage.

It may be convenient that I should sum up the conclusions to which I am disposed to come regarding this very difficult and perplexing matter. They are as follows :—

- (1) That the local officers are right in thinking that, unless we are prepared to make up our minds to some such scheme for the location of troops and the extension of tribal services as they propose, we should not attempt any detailed settlement of the new boundary on the ground, but should simply fix that boundary as far as we can on maps by reference to natural geographical features which are already known or can be discovered by enquiry.
- (2) That whether it is worth our while to undertake such a scheme as that referred to must be determined mainly by imperial military considerations on which we civilians are not called upon to pronounce any opinion.
- (3) That, even if the military considerations just referred to were not found to be such as to call for our undertaking any such scheme, it might be a question whether, having regard to the difficulties which are likely to arise in the event of our not undertaking it and which might force us eventually to undertake it, we should not undertake it at once.
- (4) That if we do undertake such a scheme we should endeavour to confine ourselves to holding our military and tribal stations and posts, keeping our lines of communication open and safe, and maintaining peace along the new boundary line, and should not at starting undertake the responsibility of pacifying the whole country, even though we may see reason to apprehend that we shall be ultimately led by circumstances to attempt the pacification of the whole country.
- (5) That in the event of our not adopting a scheme of the nature referred to we shall have to consider a much more limited scheme of tribal service with a view to strengthening our present position in the Gomal.

Sub-Enclosure C.

Translation of a Petition from Banocha Khan, Gul Sher Khan, and other Zalle Khels and Maliks of the Kabul faction, dated the 17th February 1894.

We, the Zalh Khel, Taji Khel, Sirki Khel, Gangi Khel, and Khanjal Khel, Maliks of Wano, who were at first in the service and pay of the British Government, and had been precluded from intercourse on account of having gone to Kabul last year in the month of February, appeared before R. I. Bruce, Esq., Commissioner, and expressed our wish to maintain, as before, communication with the Government. We, the Maliks of the above tribes, however, after this, again went to the Amir. There was at that time a reason for our going there. The British Government knows the nature of the Amir's orders, and we, hillmen, are also fully aware of it. He is guided by no law or book, but acting on the impulse of his heart, is apt, in state of indignation, to bring any one to

ruin. We through fear for ourselves went there, as there is no place where we can live for a single day in safety, being at enmity with the Mahsuds, who would not spare us. When we arrived at Kabul and found that the Amir had changed his views we returned to our country. The Amir had at first long conversations with us, which showed that he had determined to occupy our country at all costs ; we therefore went to Kabul. We have now returned, and have heard that he has abandoned all claim to our country and has surrendered it to the Government. We have now agreed and beseech that our fault, which we admit and for which we are contrite, may be forgiven us. For the future we are ready to serve the Government from the bottom of our hearts and would make ourselves as before loyal servants of the Government. We beg to tender the following supplications and request favourable consideration of them :—

- (1) Though there was a general rumour at Wano that the settlement between the Amir and the British Government had been concluded, yet still some doubt is entertained there about it. Once or twice enquiries were made by letter from Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who was at Wazha Khwah, but his reply was in brief and threw no light on the details of the settlement. Now having arrived in British territory we have learnt for certain that the boundary question between the British Government and the Amir has been settled. We are now convinced that our country is under the control of the Government and that the Amir has no longer any connection with it ; we therefore present ourselves and request forgiveness for the faults committed by us, and if pardoned we shall act as desired by the Government.
- (2) We on coming here have assured ourselves that our country has come under the control of the Government, but the other people of our tribe are not aware of this, nor will they rest satisfied until some boundary marks are fixed. In this connection we wish to request that the Government should, in consultation with us, demarcate the boundary as soon as possible, so that our tribe may be satisfied, and that we may come under the protection of the Government. There are many tribes with whom we are at bitter enmity and with whom we constantly have disputes. This will at the same time be to the advantage of the Government, as it will secure good management for the future.
- (3) We are the residents at Wano, and our intercourse is on this side. Malik Mani Khan, Darwesh Kel, had invited us to Bannu, but we declined his invitation, not wishing to go there as we have no connection with him. We are in our own tribe Maliks and all-powerful and are prepared to give assurances to the Government in any way it may desire, and request that the Government should accept us and take us again under the protection, so that peace may be secured to us under the British rule, and that they may look upon us with favourable eye, that we may pray for the prosperity of the British rule.
- (4) If the Government wish to advance into our country and to adopt any measures for its management, we are prepared to carry them into effect in our respective tribes and boundaries, and shall be responsible for everything. Otherwise should the Government in addition to our responsibility bring its own military force and desire with their aid to make any arrangement, we will agree and raise no objection to it ; it rests with the Government to do as it pleases. We submit this petition with the hope that it will be accepted, and after granting us forgiveness of our fault, we may be received into favour, that each point will be taken into due consideration.

We, the petitioners, are (sealed by) Banocha Khan, Gul Sher, Khalikdad, Sher Khan, Band Khan, Tar Khan (marked by), Ahmir Khan, Shoedad Khan, Said Akbar, Shahzada Hakim, Din Mahummad, Tor Muhammad, Aminuddin Sharki, Sahib Din, Badi Khan, Arsala Khan, Torak, Mir Ali, Pao Shah, Muhammad Afzal, Guladin, Karu, Darakhti Khan (sealed by Awal Khan,

marked by Rabab Gul), Mihar Jang, Gul Akmad, Shahi Khan, Sali Khan, Mehar Khan, Naga Muhammad Khan, Zingji Khan, Topchi Khan (sealed by Mirza Gul, marked by Samadar Khan), Sorak Khan, and Sorawar Khan.

Enclosure No. 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 16th June 1894.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th March 1894, on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan-Waziri boundary.

2. From the correspondence forwarded with the Foreign Department endorsement, dated the 23rd of April, it will have been observed that the Government of India suggested to the Amir that the demarcation of this section of the

Dated the 22nd April 1894.*

boundary should not be commenced until the 15th of October next, and the enclosed translation of his* reply shows that His Highness has approved of this proposal.

3. The Governor-General in Council has given to the subject of your letter the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and a separate communication will be made to you on the general question of our future relations with the Waziri tribe. Meanwhile, I am to convey to you the following instructions as to the action to be taken in regard to the preliminary arrangements for demarcation. I am in the first place to request that the Lieutenant-Governor will be good enough to cause the Waziri tribesmen to be informed forthwith that the Government of India have concluded a settlement with the Amir, and that the following line of boundary dividing Waziristan from the Afghan dominions has been agreed upon :—

From the hill marked Charkiaghar (*vide* map illustrating the boundary agreement), the line descends to the Tochi stream, which it crosses at Machaguri. From this point it follows the crest of the ridge between the Burmal and Shawal valleys as far as the point marked Khwaja Khedar, so as to leave Burmal to Afghanistan. From Khwaja Khedar, the line passes to near Shakin, which is also left to Afghanistan. From Shakin it runs nearly due south to the crest of the range crossed by the Nazan Kotal at a point about six miles south of the Kotal. Thence it follows the crest of the Spera range to Domandi on the Gomal river.

4. The tribesmen should also be informed that Joint-Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments will proceed in October to mark off this line on the ground, and that in the meantime the British Government calls upon the tribes to respect this line. They should be told that the British Government has no desire to interfere in their affairs, but only to secure peace, and that in settling our arrangements for that end the co-operation of the tribes will be invited and welcomed. These announcements may be made in any manner which seems most suitable and convenient. There is no desire on the part of the Government of India to suggest darbars or other formalities.

5. In order to protect the commission party, a brigade of troops will be sent to the most advantageous position in Spin or Wano, as may be hereafter decided.

6. I am to request that detailed proposals for carrying out the demarcation, with an estimate of the expenditure, may be prepared for the consideration of the Government of India, with the least possible delay.

* Not printed.

Enclosure No. 3.

Minute of Dissent by Sir Charles Pritchard, Mr. J. Westland, and Sir Antony MacDonnell, dated 6th July 1894.

We dissent from the despatch. It does not, in our opinion, express distinctly either approval or disapproval of proposals that have been put forward for the military occupation and direct control of the whole of Waziristan. It suggests a middle course, and in some respects, as we conceive, an uncertain course, between proposals for annexation and the policy of dissuasive restraint laid down in 1892 (see paragraph 7 below). But, while suggesting a middle course, the despatch expresses in its final paragraph a decided condemnation of the policy of 1892 that has hitherto been acted upon, and to that extent, we fear, implies a preference for the opposite policy. We advocate the continuance of the policy of 1892. It seems to us that no such middle course as the despatch suggests can be effective as a substantial solution of the question, or can operate otherwise than as a temporary expedient, prefaceing annexation. In our judgment the real choice lies between, on the one hand, a policy that aims at resting on our present frontiers and influencing the Waziris from without; and, on the other hand, a policy that contemplates the assumption of complete responsibility for the administration of Waziristan and the independent tribal territory that intervenes between the present frontiers of British India and of the kingdom of Afghanistan.

We have therefore arrived at the parting of the ways as regards our policy in Waziristan, and the real issue involved in the present discussion is one of grave importance. The decision arrived at in this matter will reach further than Waziristan, and must affect materially the rest of the independent tribal country on the Afghan border and our treatment of it.

We recognize that the demarcation of the British and Afghan spheres of influence introduces a new factor into the consideration of questions connected with our frontier, and should, as time goes on, conduce to the simplification of our policy and its concentration on two objects, namely, the prevention of frontier raids and the weaning of the tribes from internal feuds. These are objects which, with patience and tact, may, we think, be gradually secured, to a substantial extent at all events, by peaceful means, and consistently with maintaining the independence of the Waziris and not projecting forward the existing frontier of British India. But if we push forward our military posts beyond the Gomal, make roads through Waziri territory, establish police arrangements within it, interfere in inter-tribal quarrels, levy tribute from the tribes, and undertake, from the beginning, to prevent the Waziris from raiding into Afghanistan, we shall destroy their independence and be practically assuming the administrative control of their country, in whatever terms we may choose to describe our action. We shall not be able eventually to stop short of establishing and maintaining a line of military posts, or of combined military and levy posts, along the whole length of the Waziri-Afghan border, the possibility of which indeed is foreshadowed in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the despatch. The cost of these operations will be enormous. In carrying them out we shall have to encounter and overcome much stubborn resistance; and when the new line of posts is established along the Afghan border, we shall find ourselves in contact with a fresh set of tribesmen who are likely to prove as troublesome neighbours in the future as the Waziris have proved in the past. Any attempt to subjugate the Waziris and hold their country by military force is eminently calculated to set the whole frontier in a blaze and to involve our ally the Amir as well as ourselves in very serious troubles. We must recognize the fact the Amir's authority is not yet completely established in some of the outlying border tracts that are included in Afghanistan under the recent Kabul agreement, and that he will have considerable difficulties to face in keeping under control the unruly tribesmen who inhabit the tracts within his sphere of influence.

A forward movement and a policy of the nature which inspires the despatch seems to us to transgress alike the declarations of policy made in our despatches to the Secretary of State and the instructions of that authority. On the 16th August 1892, the Government of India wrote as follows:—

“A question may be raised with regard to our relations with the Waziri

tribesmen in those districts from which we propose that the Amir's interference should be excluded. We do not, as we have already said, desire to annex the country. We wish them to regard us as their friends, and to assist us in keeping open and improving the Gomal Pass, which immediately adjoins their territory. In order to secure this object, it may be necessary at some future time to establish posts in the neighbourhood ; but * * * we have decided to avoid, as far as may be possible, any exhibition of activity amongst them at the present time.

"Nor again are we prepared to say that because we have decided that the Amir should not be allowed to annex the independent Waziri tribes, it will be incumbent upon us to protect them upon all occasions, or whatever their conduct may be. It is likely that in a mountainous region inhabited by warlike tribes, such as that under discussion, there may for many years to come be inter-tribal conflicts, sometimes between one section of the Waziris and another, sometimes between the Waziris and the adjoining clans. Such occurrences are regarded as the natural incidents of frontier life ; and we do not contemplate that it need be our duty either to keep the Waziri tribesmen under strict control, or, if their conduct should invite reprisals, to shield them from the consequences of their own acts. The Waziri tribes might for the present be left in the same position as the Afridis, who, if they raid on the Amir's territory, are liable to be punished by the Amir. * * * Such a state of things is no doubt far from ideally perfect, but it is that which obtains on other parts of the border, and it has been found to produce fairly good results.

"We do not, therefore, at present see any necessity for entering into engagements with the Waziris themselves which would bind us to protect them. What is, in our opinion, essential is that we should, subject to what we have said with regard to Wano, make it absolutely clear to the Amir, that we cannot allow him to encroach upon any part of Waziristan."

The Secretary of State's observations on the statement of policy just quoted run as follows :—

"The question of our own future action in regard to Waziristan remains to be considered. You state that your Government are prepared to assure the Amir that you do not regard Waziristan as British territory, and also to renew the assurance given in 1888 that you do not intend building a fort at Wano ; and though, in your opinion, it may be necessary to establish at some future time posts in the neighbourhood of the Gomal, you disclaim any desire to annex the country, and you have decided to avoid any exhibition of activity among the Waziris. The latter decision has my full concurrence. I should see with regret any steps which might lead to interference on our part with the independence of the Waziris, or which might tend to convert your political influence into direct administrative control over the tribe."

The above were the instructions on which Sir M. Durand proceeded in the conduct at Kabul of his negotiations concerning Waziristan. The agreement arrived at with the Amir defines the limits of the kingdom of Afghanistan and stipulates for the demarcation of a boundary line beyond which the Amir on the one side and the British Government on the other is not to advance territorial claims. It forbids the Amir from encroaching upon any portions of Waziristan, but it leaves the border tribes in the same independent position that they occupied before the settlement was made, and it does not impose on the Government of India any obligation in the matter of establishing a system of direct control over Waziristan or over other portions of independent tribal territory. The last-named question does not indeed appear to have been raised in the course of the negotiations.

In addressing the Secretary of State we wrote :—

"We wish it to be clearly understood that nothing is further from our intentions than the annexation of tribal country on our frontier. We believe, however, that without annexation, and without interference in the internal affairs of the tribes, it will be possible to bring them further within our influence, and to induce them to regard themselves as owing allegiance to us."

The Secretary of State's reply on this part of the subject runs as follows :—

"I trust that the tranquillity of the border, especially in the neighbourhood of the Gomal, will now be secured. I observe that your Government emphatically repudiates all intention of annexing tribal territory, but desires to bring the tribes whom this settlement concerns further within your influence. I approve generally of the policy thus described ; but I trust that in carrying it into effect your Government will carefully abstain from taking any steps to extend your influence, which may tend to bring about a collision with the tribesmen, or to the establishment of fresh posts beyond the frontier which may require armed protection."

The steps which the Secretary of State has thus on two occasions deprecated our taking seem to us to be those very steps which the despatch, from which we are dissenting, proposes that we should take.

The further correspondence with the Secretary of State relates to arrangements to be made for the delimitation of the boundary, and does not alter the position regarding the future treatment of Waziristan.

It will be seen then that neither our own declarations of policy, nor the agreement lately concluded with the Amir, nor the instructions of the Secretary of State, impose upon us an obligation to establish any system of direct control over Waziristan. The declarations of the Government of India and the instructions of the Secretary of State, on the contrary, demand that we should abstain, as far as possible, from advancing our military posts beyond the Gomal and from interference with the Waziris that is likely to provoke a collision with the tribes or to prejudice their independence. We strongly advise adherence to the lines indicated in the Government of India's despatch, viz., to restrict our military posts to the present line of the Gomal, to strengthen our position there by a scheme of tribal services, and to treat the Waziris generally in the same manner in which we treat the Afridis.

It must be remembered that any assumption of obligations under this engagement with the Amir to prevent tribes within our influence from raiding into Afghanistan could not be confined to the Waziris alone. If we now undertake responsibilities of that nature as regards the Waziri clans, on what grounds could we hereafter decline similar obligations with respect to the Mohmands and other tribesmen who inhabit the country farther north between British India and Afghanistan? If, in pursuance of the agreement concluded with the Amir, we undertake to control and keep the peace amongst the independent tribes on our side of one portion of the Afghan border, it seems to us that we shall be unable to avoid a recognition of similar responsibilities along the whole length of it. Any attempt to exercise active control amongst the border clansmen, who boast that they have never been subjugated by any foreign ruler and prize their independence above everything, would certainly involve us in long protracted warfare and the expenditure of many crores of rupees, and would land us in endless embarrassments.

We do not consider, as we have already stated, that Sir M. Durand's agreement provides in this connection for anything more than the demarcation of a boundary line beyond which neither the Amir nor the British Government is to encroach ; and we would not admit that it imposes upon us obligations to advance the frontier of British India, or by an exercise of military force to prevent from the outset raiding by the independent border tribes over which we have never pretended to exercise effective control. We should exercise our friendly influence to check raiding on the part of the tribesmen on the British side of the line, and be prepared, as hitherto, to punish them by sending expeditions into their country when they offend grievously. Moreover, there will be in the liberty which is left to the Amir to punish raids on his territory a further restraint on the tribes, which will operate in the direction of their good behaviour. That the Amir considers that he still possesses this liberty of protecting himself and punishing aggressors without the military intervention of the British Government is manifest from correspondence that has lately passed between the Government of India and the Amir. The

correspondence to which we refer relates to an attack made by Umra Khan of Jandol, since the conclusion of the Durand agreement, on certain villages of Afghan Kafiristan.

The proposal put forward in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the despatch to advance to a position in or near Spin, about 25 miles north-west of the existing frontier post at Kajuri Kach, and to locate a new cantonment there, the garrison of which is, we understand, to number about 2,000 men, has for its object the attainment of a good strategical position for overawing the Waziris, the protection of the Gomal caravan route, the prevention of raids into the Zhob district of Baluchistan, and the discharge of responsibilities which, it is stated, require that our position shall be such as to show the tribes that we can prevent raiding on the Amir's frontier. We doubt if the establishment of a single new military post in the extreme south of Waziristan is sufficient in itself for the attainment of all these objects, even admitting them to be necessary and legitimate.

Mention is made in paragraph 13 of the despatch of difficulties that have arisen on the Tochi and in Lower Dawar, which may necessitate the establishment of "a regular system of government in that quarter," or, in other words, may call for the military occupation of the north-eastern portion of Waziristan. The mere presence of a British force in Spin would not obviate those difficulties; nor would it suffice, so far as we can see, to prevent raids on the Amir's boundary to the west of Waziristan.

It cannot be reasonably expected that a force of 2,000 troops cantoned in the wilderness of Spin will remain there in idleness. Circumstances will surely arise that will necessitate the detachment of parties and the establishment of outposts beyond the new cantonment, and the probability is that our troops will soon find themselves embroiled in quarrels with sections of the tribes other than those which have lately been engaged in raids on the Gomal. Judging from what has happened in other similar cases, we cannot doubt that an advance to Spin would eventually be followed by a corresponding advance on the other side of Waziristan, from Bannu along the Tochi to Sheranna, or some other place in that neighbourhood, and would lead to the establishment of a line of posts along the Afghan border, between the positions in Spin and at Sheranna, as has in fact been proposed by Mr. Bruce and other frontier officers.

The Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan, who is the officer chiefly concerned in the protection against Waziri raids of the Zhob district and the Gomal caravan route, has urged the establishment of an additional post on the northern bank of the Gomal and the strengthening of the garrisons on that river and in the neighbourhood of the Gomal pass. We would support Sir James Browne's recommendations in this matter, and give them a fair trial before committing ourselves to an advance to Spin. We would further endeavour, as we have already observed, to strengthen our position on the Gomal by a scheme of tribal service, as suggested in the concluding paragraph of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note of the 14th March 1894. It must not be forgotten that the situation now is very different from what it was before the Durand agreement had been effected. The main cause of the difficulties hitherto experienced in dealing with the Waziris, viz., the Amir's assertion of suzerain rights over part of their country and the disputes arising therefrom, has been removed by that agreement. This is a most important factor in the present situation to which we think the despatch attributes insufficient weight. It is not unreasonable to expect that the Waziris will, in consequence of the removal of this source of difficulty, become more amenable to the influence of our officers. Such military occupation of Waziristan as the despatch proposes will place all our future relations with the Waziris on a military basis, will be interpreted by them as an imminent threat of annexation, will furnish many causes of mutual irritation and quarrelling, and will make amicable approaches a matter of difficulty. If we abstain from show of permanent military occupation, our efforts to establish friendly influence will have a much greater chance of success. The recent proceedings of the Political officers afford much ground for encouragement in this direction.

We would communicate to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab a full explanation of the policy we intend to pursue for the present, and call upon him to submit a detailed scheme of tribal service to meet that policy. We would advise a trial of the scheme that may thus be determined on, and leave to the future the devising of other expedients if that scheme should prove a failure.

We would invite attention to two passages in Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note of the 14th March 1894. In paragraph 9 he remarks :—

“Our present difficulties along our true frontier, *i.e.*, between the Derajat and Waziristan, are really very small, and it would be absurd to suggest that to diminish them (if indeed it would diminish them) we should undertake to occupy the two exterior lines—along the Tochi and between the Tochi and the Gomal beyond the Mahsud country

“Therefore, I say that if we have an object of our own to serve in establishing our control over Waziristan, it must be the imperial military object”

Again in paragraph 19 he says.—“We have had a great deal of trouble in the Gomal and south of it. Most of it has been due to the perturbation caused by intrigues and to the want of caution shown in letting our men go about insufficiently protected; but a certain amount of it is the natural consequence of our taking up such a position in a country like that, and may be expected to continue, no matter how good our relations with the Amir may be, and no matter what precautions we take for the safety of our men. With proper arrangements, however, troubles of this sort may be so reduced as to become endurable; and we have had before us for some time separate proposals put forward by Mr. Bruce for improving our position by granting certain further allowances to the tribes with which we are there concerned.”

Mr. Bruce also makes reference to the absence of proper precautions in the neighbourhood of the Gomal.

It is noteworthy that almost all the Waziri offences enumerated in the list attached to the despatch were committed on or near the portion of the Waziristan border which marches with the Zhob district recently annexed to Baluchistan. If these offences may be regarded—and we think that, to some extent at all events, they may be reasonably regarded—as evidence of irritation felt by the Waziris at the advance of the British frontier in that direction, then the inference is that much greater irritation will be felt at the establishment of military posts inside Waziristan, and still more at an advance to the boundary of Afghanistan.

It is evident that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate any great difficulties if our establishments are kept within our present frontier line, and if, at the same time, due precautions are taken to prevent the provocation of collisions with the tribesmen and to moderate the ardour of those of our civil and military officers who are eager for an advance. To our reading Mr. Bruce's letter conveys the same lesson.

In conclusion, we would urge abstention from aggressive activity on our north-west frontier. We have at last arrived at a satisfactory understanding with the Amir; we have thus and otherwise attained to a strong frontier position. This we should endeavour by all means to consolidate peacefully, and with it we should rest content as long as circumstances may permit. Many important questions of domestic politics now press on the attention of the Government of India, and we believe that conflicts and warfare with the border tribes would add greatly to the difficulties of the present situation. The need for a policy of unaggressive watchfulness on the frontiers is indicated as much by the feeling of unrest which is perceptible in India as by the overwhelming need for economy in all branches of expenditure. No expenditure would be more distasteful to the public in this country, or in our opinion more unjustifiable, than expenditure incurred in attempts to subjugate those independent frontier tribes. We believe that an advance to Spin and the location there of a permanent military cantonment is greatly calculated to lead to such expenditure, and for this, among other reasons, we are compelled to

oppose it. We oppose it with the less hesitation in that we believe there is a reasonable prospect that the legitimate end in view may be attained by more peaceful means.

(Signed) C. B. PRITCHARD,
J. WESTLAND,
A. P. MACDONNELL.

No. 2.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 24th August 1894.

MR LORD,

I HAVE given very careful consideration to the Letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated 10th July 1894, regarding the arrangements to be made for the delimitation of the Amir's boundary on the Waziri frontier, and the consequent arrangements for the protection of our territory to the south of the Gomal from raids, for the safety of commerce and for establishing in the interests of peace a certain amount of control over the Waziri tribes.

2. Your letter dwells on the frequency of raids and outrages, especially during the first five months of the year, subsequent, that is to say, to the arrangement with the Amir, by which Waziristan was definitely brought within your sphere of influence; on the extreme difficulty you have had in obtaining any reparation for these outrages, and on the unsatisfactory and undignified conditions under which even this slight reparation has been obtained; on the necessity more than once imposed on you already of moving troops into the Gomal; and on the absolute inability of the Waziri headmen, in existing conditions, to coerce their recalcitrant tribesmen. You lay stress also on your responsibility, not only for protecting your own territory and the trading caravans that make use of it, but also, under the recent engagement with the Amir for preventing Waziri raids into His Highness's territory, you express your conviction that the policy of controlling these tribes entirely from without by means of tribal subsidies and levy posts without a military backing has failed, and you consider that the time has now come for substituting a policy of more effective protection and of closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes.

3. The present time, you point out, is specially opportune, as the tribes are aware that the Amir has foregone all claim to their allegiance, and as there will be a considerable military force collected for the purpose of escorting the Delimitation Commission.

4. Your proposals, as I understand them, are that a portion of the military force collected for the protection of the delimitation Commission should be left as a permanent garrison either at Spin or in some other suitable locality; that this would not involve an addition to the force already on the frontier, but merely a redistribution of it: that as a preliminary a political officer should be sent to explain the measure to the headmen of the tribes and if possible obtain their consent; that no tribute should be exacted from the Waziris, who will be controlled as at present under a system of tribal *jirgas*, but that increased allowances should be given to headmen and service allowances to the tribes for the employment of levies, the object being, as explained in your 13th paragraph, to discharge your obligations in protecting your borders and posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes who have thrown in their lot with you by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and the punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve, and without which they cannot maintain their position.

5. I have likewise given very careful consideration to the minute recorded by the three members* of your Council who dissent from the policy advocated in your Letter. They are of opinion that the measures proposed, while not going

* Sir C. Pritchard.
Mr. Westland.
Sir A. MacDonnell.

far enough to secure effective control, will inevitably lead to resistance and involve the ultimate destruction of Waziri independence and the assumption of administrative control. They deprecate the assumption of any responsibility towards the Amir to prevent raids across his border, as a consequence of the recent agreement with him, and are of opinion that the existing difficulties may be met by a continuance of the past policy of control from without, supplemented by strengthening our defensive arrangements on the Gomal, and punishing the tribes, when absolutely necessary, by means of hostile expeditions sent into their country. And finally, they draw a strong argument from the present state of the finances against incurring at the present time any avoidable expenditure.

6. I should certainly have preferred to adopt the apparently less costly and less extensive programme which their minute advocates, if it held out any hope, in my opinion, of enabling you adequately to fulfil your obligations in regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and to the Amir and to the well affected among the tribesmen themselves. But your Letter and the correspondence which it encloses convince me that this is not the case, and I concur with you that recourse to punitive expeditions from a distant base would in the long run prove far more expensive, and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Waziristan

7. I consent, therefore, to your adopting the policy of which your Excellency's Letter furnishes the outline. The principle which I desire to lay down for your guidance is that in the execution of this policy your proceedings should be directed exclusively towards the objects stated in paragraph 13 of your Letter and recapitulated in this Despatch, and should be strictly confined to such measures and operations as may be necessary to their fulfilment. I need hardly add that, since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable. As soon as the details of your scheme can be formulated I shall be glad to learn from you what is to be the strength of the proposed post, and the arrangements for additional levy-posts, and to receive an estimate of the expenditure involved.

I have, &c,
HENRY H. FOWLER.

No. 3.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 11th September 1894 (Received 1st October 1894.)

SIR,

WE have the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab lately informed us of the murder in the Mahsud hills of three Mahsud Waziri Maliks, in retaliation for the action taken by them in connection with the surrender of the Abdul Rahman Khel and the Abdullai prisoners, who were convicted, respectively, of the murder of Mr. Kelly on the Moghal Kot road, and of a sepoy in the Zam Pass.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor was of opinion that, having due regard to our own position, we could not abstain from taking up the quarrel commenced by these assassinations. His Honour accordingly recommended that a demand should at once be made for the surrender of the murderers of the three Maliks, combined with the threat of a punitive expedition at a date named, against the guilty sections of the tribe, unless meantime they surrendered the murderers of the Maliks, and of the four sepoys of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, who were killed near Gwaleri in February 1894.

3. We felt unable to authorise the threat of a punitive expedition. We

consider that the Government of India are bound by distinct obligations to the Amir to carry out the demarcation of the Waziristan section of the frontier in October next, our proposals concerning which were approved in your telegram ; and that the action proposed by the Punjab Government would preclude a peaceful settlement and delimitation of Waziristan. The Punjab Government was accordingly requested to instruct Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the Derajat, to continue his communications with the tribal jirgas with the object of procuring, if possible, the punishment of the murderers of the Mahks by the tribes themselves, or their surrender to us for punishment.

4. The Punjab Government was, at the same time, informed that the Political Officer with the force to be sent to Spin or Wano will be entrusted with the duty of making permanent arrangements in accordance with the proposals approved by you ; and that we shall then be better able to consider our position with regard to the recent murders, if it should become necessary to do so.

5. We also requested the Punjab Government to instruct Mr. Bruce to announce to the Waziris, without delay, that, by arrangement with the Amir, a British force will proceed to Spin or Wano in October, with the commission appointed for the demarcation of the frontier, and that, at the same time, a Political Officer will be deputed, who, in communication with the different sections of the tribes themselves, will propose a scheme for the entertainment of levies, the payment of service allowances, and for such other arrangements as may be necessary for establishing permanent relations, in the interests of peace and good order, between them and the Government of India.

6. Affairs in Waziristan are proceeding quietly, and no signs of any combined opposition have yet been manifested.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
A. E. MILLER,
H. BRACKENBURY,
C. B. PRITCHARD,
J. WESTLAND,
A. P. MACDONNELL.

No. 4.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 3rd October 1894. (Received 22nd October 1894.)

SIR,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers showing the further measures taken in connection with the demarcation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary and our future relations with the tribes.

We have, &c.,
ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
A. E. MILLER,
H. BRACKENBURY,
C. B. PRITCHARD,
J. WESTLAND,
A. P. MACDONNELL.

Enclosure 1.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 12th September 1894.

I AM directed to convey the orders of the Government of India upon the proposals submitted with your letter of the 11th August, regarding the composition of the Commission for the delimitation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary.

The Governor-General in Council approves of the Lieutenant-Governor's selection of Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., as the British Joint-Commissioner, and of his being accompanied by Messrs. King, Grant and Anderson and an office establishment costing, in the maximum, Rs. 300 a month. While employed on this duty, each of the officers above-named will receive the pay of his present appointment, *plus* a deputation allowance of 20 per cent. thereon. In addition, Messrs. Bruce and Grant may continue to draw, respectively, their fixed travelling and outpost allowances. It is understood that, as regards these two officers, the only extra charge entailed will be the deputation allowance of 20 per cent. upon their pay.

I am to observe, with reference to the fourth column of the estimate accompanying your letter, that deputation allowance does not come within the definition of salary, and that therefore exchange compensation allowance thereon is not admissible.

As to the proposed allotment of Rs. 35,000 for miscellaneous expenses connected with the demarcation, I am to say that before passing orders the Government of India will await the more detailed statement promised in your letter of the 11th August.

The question of medical and survey arrangements for the Commission and the military considerations referred to in your letter are being separately dealt with; and a further communication will be made to you in due course. You will also be further addressed regarding the instructions to be issued defining the relations between the Commissioner for the demarcation and the Officer Commanding the troops.

Enclosure 2.

Extract from Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 24th September 1894.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 12th September 1894, I am directed to address you regarding the financial arrangements connected with the future relations between the Government of India and the tribes in Waziristan.

I am in the first place to invite the attention of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to the Government of India's Despatch* to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 10th July 1894, containing the following statements of their wishes and intentions regarding subsidies to the tribes :—

“Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve, and without which they cannot maintain their position.

* * * * *

“In making arrangements with the tribesmen, such as we contemplate, it will be necessary to give increased allowances to the headmen and to enlist inferior men for service in levy posts. * * * * * Our proposals in this respect are that the officer who will be entrusted with the negotiations which are to be carried out with the tribes should be authorised to draw up a scheme for entertainment of levies and payment of service allowances.”

The Secretary of State's Despatch, dated the 24th August 1894, approved generally of the measures proposed by the Government of India, and agreed that, in our existing relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes concerned, it is essential that we should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, “an effective control over Waziristan.” The objects towards which our proceedings are to be exclusively directed are recapitulated in the Despatch.

The Government of India are therefore now in a position to consider the estimates of expenditure submitted with your letter, dated the 24th March last. These are understood to contemplate a total outlay of a lakh of rupees annually to be distributed in the following manner :—

- (a) Rs. 50,000 in allowances to the Darwesh Khel, exclusive of those already paid to the Wano sections for Gomal service and of those enjoyed by Maliks in British territory. This sum is intended (i) for the control and maintenance of the Thal-Gumatti route, (ii) to secure immunity from raids by the Darwesh Khel on the Dawaris of the Tochi, and (iii) as protective arrangements for the Darwesh Khel themselves.
- (b) Rs. 15,000 to the Dawaris for the protection of the Tochi route.
- (c) Rs. 20,000 to the Mahsuds, Bhititanis and Wano Darwesh Khel, in redistribution of existing allowances, and for new posts.
- (d) Rs. 15,000 on account of munshis, watermen, shop-keepers, sweepers, uniform for levies, and other incidental charges.

If the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied that, compatibly with the necessities of the case, the expenditure under these heads cannot be reduced, the Government of India will raise no objection to it. As to (b), however, the Governor-General in Council would ask His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to consider what payments are required for the Dawaris, if, as stated in Mr. Anderson's letter of the 25th February, "they are favourably disposed to welcome the arrangements proposed for bringing Waziristan under direct control." The opening up of the Tochi route has not yet been determined upon, and must depend on the negotiations with the tribes. As to (c), it is understood that the sum of Rs. 20,000 is intended to serve the two-fold purpose of removing the present discontent on account of inequalities in the Mahsud allowances, and of opening up communication between the Wano military post and Jandola on one side, and Kajuri Kach on the other. The opening up of the road from Wano to Jandola by the Shuhur valley is to "serve the treble purpose of pacifying the country as a whole, increasing the safety of the Gomal, and securing an alternative line of communication between Jandola and Wano." If the local authorities are able to show that the second of these objects will be attained, and can propose no equally effective and less expensive plan, it may be desirable to endeavour to obtain the consent of the tribes to the placing of posts along the Shuhur route, but here again it is essential to show that we have no intention to interfere in their internal affairs.

In view of the foregoing remarks, of the necessity for strict economy in all branches of expenditure, and of the restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State's despatch above referred to, I am to request that, before any definite decision as to the outlay to be incurred is given, the Government of India may be furnished with the advice of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to whether any modifications in the estimates submitted by the local authorities are practicable, it being remembered that the Government of India have not in all respects adopted the policy for which these estimates were framed.

No. 5.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated, Fort William, 2nd January 1895. (Received 21st January 1895.)

SIR,

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the correspondence regarding the recent proceedings in Waziristan, which have led to the despatch of a punitive expedition into the Mahsud country, under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart.

2. Our despatches have informed you of the position of affairs up to the date of the march of the delimitation escort for Wano, while His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 20th of October announced the arrival of Mr. Bruce and the last detachment of the escort at Kajuri Kach on the 18th of that month. The attitude of the Wano Maliks was described as most friendly, and they

exhibited an eager desire for the British occupation of Wano and for service under Government. We had informed the Amir that our Delimitation Commissioner would probably arrive at Wano on the 25th of October, and had expressed a hope that His Highness's representative would be ready to begin demarcation on the 5th November. On the 19th of October, Mr. Bruce interviewed a very large jirga at Kajuri Kach. He informed them of the intended movements of the escort in view to carrying out the programme of delimitation agreed to by the Amir; he told them that troops would be permanently stationed in the country at Wano or Spin, or such position as Government might deem best; that Spin and Wano and the adjacent tracts, through which the Powindah trade routes run, would in future be considered protected areas; and that strict reparation would be exacted for offences calculated to endanger the safety and peace of the country. He also impressed on them that raids across the boundary into Afghan territory were forbidden, and that should the tribesmen have any complaint against the Amir's subjects, they must lay it before the British officers, and not take the law into their own hands. The jirga gave in a written paper fully acquiescing in the proposals of Government.

3. The escort reached Wano on the 25th of October unopposed. The Mahsuds, having begged to be summoned to Wano, met Mr. Bruce there on the day of his arrival. The attitude of both Mahsuds and Darwesh Kels continued to be generally friendly; but on the 28th of October, one Mullah Powindah was reported to have collected in the Khaisera Valley a thousand men belonging to the Shabi Khels and Abdullais who were discontented on account of the imprisonment of their relatives in connection with the murder of Mr. Kelly and other outrages. The Mullah disclaimed hostile intentions, but demanded the release of the prisoners. As a precautionary measure, an infantry battalion and two guns of the reserve brigade were moved up to Jandola to reinforce the post at that place. Mullah Powindah was advised to disperse his following, but made no attempt to do so, and while the question of despatching a flying column to Khaisera to break up the gathering was under consideration, the British Camp at Wano was attacked at 5.30 A.M. on the 3rd of November. The attacking force, estimated to have numbered from 1,200 to 2,000, consisted entirely of Mahsuds, chiefly Shabi Khels and Abdullais of Makin, with a few Abdul Rahman Khels. Owing to the nature of the ground they were able to approach the camp through ravines, emerging from which the main body rushed past the pickets on to the left flank of the camp. Others attacked the rear. Favoured by the darkness some of the enemy succeeded in effecting an entrance into the camp and did considerable damage. After stubborn hand-to-hand fighting the camp was cleared of the enemy, who fled in the direction of Khaisera and Shakai closely pursued by a force of cavalry, infantry, and guns. The casualties on the British side were 1 British officer, 2 native officers and 18 men killed; 6 British officers (one of whom has since died) and 38 native soldiers wounded. The followers also suffered severely, 23 being killed and 20 wounded. The enemy succeeded in carrying off 36 Martini rifles and carbines, 15 horses and 3,000 rupees in cash, besides killing and wounding numerous transport animals in the lines. The loss on the side of the tribesmen was very severe, being estimated as numbering from 300 to 400 men killed and over 100 wounded.

4. From time to time, since the 3rd of November, reports have been received of large bodies of men collecting to attack Jandola, Kajuri Kach, Wano and even Edwardesabad, but in spite of the efforts of the Mullah and his lieutenants, no fresh organized attacks have occurred. Several outrages by small bands of raiders, such as cutting and carrying away telegraph wire, attacking and looting convoys, firing on the postal horsemen, have, as was to be expected, been reported.

5. The leading Mahsud Mahks arrived at Khaisera the night after the attack on Wano, and sent a message to Mr. Bruce asking to be allowed to come in. Mr. Bruce replied that he could not receive them until the Mullah's gathering had completely dispersed. A few influential Malikis of the former Kabul fiction were believed to have secretly aided the Mullah, but the majority were said to have no sympathy with him, and to have threatened to attack him if he continued his opposition.

6. General Turner's brigade was at once reinforced by a battalion of British infantry, but we impressed on our Commissioner that no aggressive movement was to be undertaken without the sanction of Government. He was informed that he must carry out the spirit of his former instructions, namely, that we had gone to Wano with peaceable intent, and had no wish to conquer or dominate the country, and he was instructed to reopen negotiations, if possible, on the footing that the Mullah's act was disapproved by the majority of the tribal Malikhs. He was to demand the temporary banishment of Mullah Powindah, the surrender of certain leaders of the attack, the immediate return of every horse, rifle and rupee stolen, or five hundred rupees for each horse or rifle; and, if after a reasonable interval there was no sign of submission, he was authorised to name the 1st of December as the date after which Government would take action to enforce their demands. Meanwhile arrangements were made to strengthen the force at Dera Ismail Khan.

7. Nearly all the Mahsud Malikhs came in on the 18th November to Mr. Bruce, who explained to them the Government demands, and gave them till the 26th November within which to comply. The jirga started back forthwith to the hills, promising, in writing, to do everything in their power to enforce the Government terms, and in the event of failure to return to Wano with a full jirga by the 26th, and to co-operate with Government in punishing rebellious sections or individuals. At their own request, the names of five men were added to the list of those whose surrender was to be demanded.

8. A very large meeting of Mahsuds was held in Kanigoram, Mullah Powindah being present: but his party and that of the Malikhs were unable to agree. On the 24th November, the Mahsud deputation returned to Wano, and stated that they could see their way to obtaining restitution of all Government property stolen, but not the surrender of the men demanded, or the banishment of the Mullah. They asked that their hands might be strengthened by allowing them to take back with them to Kanigoram certain Suleiman Khel and Darwesh Khel Malikhs who were with the Commissioner, and Mr. Bruce agreed to this, giving them time up to the 28th November within which to bring their final answer. Mullah Powindah now wrote to the Commissioner making overtures for peace, which he requested should be settled through him. Mr. Bruce replied that he could only treat with him through the Malikhs, and advised him to disperse his hostile gathering. On the 28th of November, there were assembled at Torwam, in Khaibera, between 2,500 and 3,000 men, including Mullah Powindah and representatives of all factions. At the end of the month, the Government terms had not been complied with, but the Malikhs represented that it had been impossible to secure compliance within the time allowed, and engaged to fulfil all demands, if Government would give them up to the 12th of December. This further extension was agreed to, but arrangements were completed for an advance into the Waziri country of the whole force under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart from three separate points, viz., Wano, Jandola and Banna, should the terms be still uncomplished on the date fixed. It was decided, also, that on the forces advancing, Wano should be held by a regiment of infantry, 2 guns and 20 cavalry.

9. During the early part of December, reports received from the British Commissioner indicated the probability of the Malikhs being able to induce the tribesmen to accept the Government terms. The Mullah dispersed his following and retired to Kanigoram; and he was reported to be co-operating with the Malikhs in obtaining fulfilment of the Government demands. The Abdul Rahman Khels restored a number of camels which they had looted from Powindahs in the Gomal during November. The Shakai jirga promised to bring in the prisoners and hostages demanded by Government from their section, and the Mahsud Malikhs sent in frequent messages that they would return all stolen property and hostages by the time fixed. Up to the 10th of December it still seemed possible that the terms would be fulfilled: but the Malikhs now sent in a letter asking for further time, and on this being refused, the friendly Malikhs came in to Mr. Bruce and admitted their inability to coerce the recalcitrant sections. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab recommended that the advance should be no longer delayed, and we accordingly instructed Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart on the 15th of December

to assume the chief military and political charge, to punish those responsible for the attack on Wano, and to enforce the Government terms.

10. The force advancing into Waziristan under Lieutenant-General Lockhart's command is divided as follows:—

(1) Wano brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Turner	(2) Jandola brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Symons	(3) Bannu column, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Egerton
1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry	1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry	3rd Punjab Cavalry
No. 8 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery	1 " 2nd " "	No 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery
2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.	No 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	1st Sikhs
3rd Sikhs	88th Dogras	2nd Punjab Infantry
1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles	4th Punjab Infantry	6th " "
1st Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles	88rd " "	Rough total 2,700 men and 6 guns
No 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles	
Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns.	No 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
	Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns	

The objectives of the three columns will be respectively Kanigoram, Makin and Razmak. Colonel Egerton's instructions, however, are to secure the concurrence and co-operation of the Darwesh Khels in his advance to the last named place.

11. On the 16th of December, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation (*vide* enclosures), announcing that he was authorised to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp at Wano, to enforce the conditions demanded by Government, and any other terms which renewed opposition might necessitate; that it was his intention to secure the carrying out of the boundary demarcation; and that resistance or non-compliance with his demands might compel him to stay in the country longer than the Government had any desire that he should stay.

12. The Bannu column advanced on the 17th and the Wano and Jandola columns on the 18th of December. Arrangements have been made for the safety of well-disposed persons and their belongings, and everything possible will be done to confine the operations to the offending sections, and to prevent the punitive expedition from developing into one against the whole tribe.

13. The commencement of delimitation having thus for a time been postponed, we have informed the Amir of the cause, and that, until recalcitrant sections have made complete submission, Mr. Bruce will not be able to take up the work. With reference to His Highness's decision to leave the demarcation to be carried out by a British officer alone, we have informed the Amir that we understand that the boundary line laid down by our Commissioner will be accepted by His Highness in the same complete way as that of other parts of the frontier upon which British and Afghan officers have worked conjointly.

14. We are glad to be able to report that the attitude of the Darwesh Khel section of the Waziris has been generally satisfactory throughout, and that the main body of the Dauris has remained quiet, although Mullah Powindah made great efforts to induce them to join him. We are uncertain what the attitude of the Kabul Khel of Birmal will be; early in December, a party of them started to join the Mullah Powindah, but returned on finding his gathering dispersed.

15. In conclusion, we would desire to express our regret that the unprovoked attack by malcontent sections of the Mahsuds has forced upon us the necessity of sending a punitive expedition into their country; but we trust that its operations will soon be brought to a conclusion, and that it may shortly be possible to commence delimitation and resume negotiations for settling our future relations with the Waziri tribe, an outline of which was sketched in our Despatch of the 10th July 1894, and accepted in your Despatch dated the 24th August last.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 C. B. PRITCHARD,
 J. WESTLAND,
 A. P. MACDONNELL.

Enclosure 1.

Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 29th November 1894.

In continuation of my letter dated 19th November 1894, I am directed to inform you that the position in Waziristan having received the careful consideration of the Governor-General in Council, he has decided as follows :—

- (1) If the Waziri tribes do not accept by the 1st December the terms explained to the jirga by Mr. Bruce, the political control as well as the military command will be placed in the hands of General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B.
- (2) General Lockhart's instructions will be that he is to enforce compliance with the terms already laid down and such additional resistance may render necessary. On such a settlement being completed, the force will be withdrawn so soon as may be consistent with military safety, and so soon as the demarcation of the frontier with Afghanistan, which is the primary object of the Government of India in entering Waziristan, has been carried out.

2. I am to enclose a proclamation to be issued by General Sir William Lockhart in the event of the measures contemplated in this letter becoming necessary.

Annexure.

DRAFT PROCLAMATION.

Whereas Mr. Bruce, the British Commissioner for the delimitation of the border of the Afghan dominions on the side of Waziristan, advanced to Wano, in accordance with the proclamation which he issued to you in August last :

Whereas some evil-disposed persons of the Waziri tribe made an unprovoked attack upon the camp of the Commissioner at Wano, upon the 3rd November 1894, and plundered certain property therefrom :

Whereas the Sarkar is aware that the Maliks of the Mahsud Waziris did not sympathise with the objects of the evil-disposed persons aforesaid :

And whereas the Sarkar is desirous of living in friendship with its neighbours, the Waziri tribe, and wishes to show the sincerity of its pacific intentions :

Therefore Mr. Bruce called to himself a jirga of the said tribe,* and explained to the Maliks who attended the said jirga that, notwithstanding the unprovoked aggression committed by the evil-disposed persons aforesaid, the Sarkar would not hold the tribe responsible nor inflict punishment upon the tribe generally, provided that, on a given date, the Maliks restored to the British Government every horse and every rifle and every rupee stolen from the British camp, or Rs. 500 instead for each rifle or horse, and also that certain persons named by him were surrendered to the British Government, and that the Mullah Powindah, the leader of the attack on the British camp, retired from the country until the matter was settled.

Now, the said date has passed, and the tribe aforesaid has failed to comply with the above terms : I therefore proclaim to all concerned that I am authorised by the Sarkar to enforce from the Waziri tribe the fulfilment of the terms and conditions which I have detailed above, and of any further terms and conditions which renewed opposition by the said tribe or by any section or individuals thereof may require the Sarkar to impose :

And I inform you that it is my intention to enforce the said conditions, and to occupy and remain in your country, until you have complied with those terms and conditions in every particular, and until the demarcation of the boundary, which the Sarkar has from the beginning intended to carry out, shall have been completed :

And I call upon all who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sarkar, to assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will save the tribe from further punishment and the tribal country from further occupation.

Enclosure 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 6th December 1894.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th November 1894, communicating the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the draft proclamation to be issued by General Sir William Lockhart to the Waziris, in the event of punitive measures becoming necessary.

2. In reply I am to forward, for substitution, a revised draft of the last three paragraphs of the proclamation which are based upon the suggestions made in your letter under reply.

Sub-Enclosure.

Revised draft of the last three paragraphs of the proclamation to be issued by General Sir W. Lockhart.

Now, the said date has passed, and the tribe aforesaid has failed to comply with the above terms; I therefore proclaim to all concerned that I am authorised by the Sarkar to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British Camp as above said and all persons who assist or screen such sections, to enforce from the Waziri tribe the fulfilment of the terms and conditions which I have detailed above, and of any further terms and conditions which renewed opposition by the said tribe or by any section or individuals thereof, may require the Sarkar to impose.

And I inform you that it is my intention to secure the carrying out of the demarcation of the boundary which the Sarkar has from the beginning intended to carry out, to inflict chastisement for the unprovoked attack on the British Camp at Wano, and to enforce the conditions above said. I have no desire to stay in your country longer than is necessary for the attainment of these objects, but if you or any section of you resist me or do not comply with my demands, I may be compelled to remain longer than the Sarkar has any desire that I should stay.

And I call upon all, who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sarkar, to assist to the utmost of their abilities in facilitating the objects with which, as notified to you, I have been sent into your country, by which means they will save the tribe from further punishment, and the tribal country from further occupation.

No. 6.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated, Fort William, the 20th February 1895. (Received 11th March, 1895.)

SIR,

IN continuation of our Despatch, dated the second January 1895, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence regarding the progress of our relations with the Waziri tribe and the demarcation of the Amir's frontier in the Waziristan direction.

2. Our despatch above cited brought the account of our proceedings in Waziristan up to the middle of December, when the tribe having failed to submit to the terms demanded by Government, Sir William Lockhart advanced into the country to enforce them. We do not propose to follow in this letter the military movements of the force, of which you have been informed in the telegrams sent in our Military Department, but to deal with the progress of the political events. Since the attack on the British Camp at Wano, the Waziris have made no organized opposition in strength, and our troops have visited every part of the Mahsud country, even the least accessible valleys, have captured large numbers of cattle, sheep and goats, and have destroyed the towers and defences of hostile villages. We believe that the political settlement of our relations with the Waziris and the demarcation of the boundary have been greatly facilitated by showing the Mahsuds our power to punish, and their helplessness to resist.

3. Early in January, Sir William Lockhart reported the extent to which the * *Vide* paragraph 6 of our Despatch, terms* originally demanded from the dated 2nd January 1895. Waziris had been complied with. Mullah Powindah had left the Mahsud country, two out of eighteen hostages had been surrendered, four of the fifteen Government horses and 25 out of the 36 rifles looted at Wano had been returned. Sir William Lockhart proposed to insist on the surrender of the remaining hostages and stolen property, or, if this proved to be impracticable in any case, to substitute a money payment of a thousand rupees for each hostage, and five hundred rupees for each rifle or horse. Besides the above, in view of the opposition offered by the tribe and the delay in carrying out the Government conditions, he proposed to impose the following conditions: a fine of 50 breech-loading rifles, 200 matchlocks and 200 swords or knives; the actual payment of all outstanding fines amounting to nearly thirteen thousand rupees; the opening up of the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano; the payment of a nominal tribute; and the expulsion of Mullah Powindah until these terms had been carried out and demarcation completed. These proposals were generally approved except the levy of tribute, which the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab considered unwise and we rejected; in regard to the Shahur route, General Lockhart was instructed to impose on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping it open, and we impressed on him that the establishment of a military post on the route was outside our declared policy. We also requested General Lockhart, when making any communication to the tribe, to avoid language committing us to the payment of tribal allowances to those persons from whom fines and penalties were being demanded. We agree with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in considering that the allowances granted to the Mahsuds some years ago must be held to have been cancelled by their recent behaviour, and that the whole question will now have to be reconsidered.

4. On the 21st of January Sir William Lockhart received the Mahsud jirga at Kundiwan. He announced to them the additional Government terms, and gave them to the first of March within which to comply with these, informing them that until they did comply, the troops would continue to occupy Mahsud country. On the 23rd, the Mahks presented a petition urging the impossibility of giving up fifty breech-loading rifles, and objecting to the term which demanded the opening up of the Shahur route. At Sir William Lockhart's suggestion we have agreed to three muzzle-loading rifles being accepted as equivalent to one breech-loader, if necessary. Sir William Lockhart considered the opening of the Shahur route essential for the pacification of the Mahsud country, but he was doubtful whether this could be effectually carried out with levy posts only. We have instructed him to tell the Mahsuds that, if they will establish tribal posts, we will pay them and see how the plan works; we have also authorised him, if, in the course of negotiations, argument is needed, to suggest that, if this plan does not succeed, we may find it necessary to establish military posts. We have, however, cautioned him not to use this as a threat requiring us to act on it if the Mahsuds either refuse to establish levy posts or fail to work them, and we have repeated to General Lockhart that we wish to make it clear beyond dispute to every one that we intend to act fully up to the terms of our proclamation, and do not wish to take possession of the Mahsud country.

5. At the end of January General Lockhart was able to report that considerable progress had been made. All the hostages demanded by Government, except three of minor importance, had been surrendered; Mullah Powindah had fled from Waziri country; almost all the rifles and Government horses and some of the money looted during the attack on Wano had been restored, and the tribesmen were bringing in arms in compliance with the terms demanded. The tribe continues to show every indication of complete submission, and it seems that a real effort is being made to comply with the terms before the date fixed.

6. Heavy snow on the passes rendered it impossible for delimitation to be carried on northwards from Domandi to Charkiaghur without the delimitation party crossing into Afghan limits; we therefore decided to divide the work of demarcation into two sections: (1) from Domandi northwards to Khwaja Khidr; and (2) from Charkiaghur southwards. We informed the Amir of our decision, and the plan is so far working well.

The delimitation of the first section was entrusted to Mr. King; the second will be undertaken by Mr. Anderson, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu.

7. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who is understood to have been entrusted with the duty of superintending, without actually taking part in, the demarcation of the southern portion of the Waziristan boundary, is still at Murgha Chaman, and there was at first some difficulty in getting the Afghan tribal Maliks to meet Mr. King on the border. After some correspondence, however, with Sardar Shirindil Khan and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, and in spite of no little inconvenience caused by the intrigues of one Pahlwan, a leading Suleiman Khel Malik, Mr. King was able to begin demarcation on the 28th January in company with the Suleiman Khel and Kharoti Maliks. Fifteen days later he had the gratification of reporting that his section of the work had been completed; the Afghan representatives, including Darwesh Khel Waziri Maliks from Birmal, expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with the boundary, and Mr. King returned with his escort to Wano.

8. Sir William Lockhart is now preparing to move up the Tochi about the 25th of February with a force consisting of one squadron of cavalry, one mountain battery, a company of sappers, and six infantry regiments in order to commence the delimitation of the northern section. Mr. Anderson summoned the Darwesh Khel and Dawari jirgas to Bannu to explain to them the pacific nature of our intentions, and received agreements from them to provide supplies and render service. Sardar Shirindil Khan, the Amir's Governor of Khost, has been informed that Mr. Anderson will be ready to commence work at the beginning of March, and we trust that before the end of that month we shall be able to report the completion of the demarcation of the Waziristan boundary.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 C. B. PRITCHARD,
 J. WESTLAND,
 A. P. MACDONNELL.

No. 7.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 20th March 1895. (Received 5th April 1895.)

SIR,

In continuation of our Despatch, dated the 20th February 1895, we have the honour to forward a copy of correspondence regarding the temporary establishment of a military post at Barwand in the Shahur Valley.

2. The Mahsud Waziris having complied with the terms imposed by us, as reported in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 5th March 1895, Sir William Lockhart proposed to withdraw the bulk of the troops from their territory and to leave a wing of Native Infantry at Barwand until our negotiations with the Waziri tribes have been concluded.

3. It is essential that while the negotiations are being carried on, our lines of

communication should be efficiently protected. General Lockhart considers that Barwand affords an excellent position for this purpose, and he is of opinion that it would be impossible to keep the existing field telegraph line from Jandola to Wano intact, if the Shahur route were guarded by levy posts only.

4. In these circumstances we have authorised the temporary maintenance of a post at Barwand by a wing of Native Infantry, and have instructed General Lockhart to explain clearly to the tribe the temporary nature of this measure.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 C. B. PRITCHARD,
 J. WESTLAND,
 A. P. MACDONNELL.

No. 8.

Extract from Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble H. H. Fowler, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 15th May 1895. (Received 4th June 1896.)

Our Despatch, dated the 8th May 1895, informed you of the completion of the demarcation of the Waziristan frontier, and of the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops which constituted the Waziristan Field Force. We now have the honour to address you on the subject of the positions to be held by our troops in Waziristan.

In our Despatch, dated the 10th July 1894, in which we placed before Her Majesty's Government our proposals for improving our relations with the Waziri tribe, we wrote—

“Our desire is to carry the tribes with us in whatever we may do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs, provided only that our obligations are discharged in protecting our borders and our posts, and the Gomal caravan route, and in affording to those sections and leading men of the tribes, who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserve and without which they cannot maintain their position.”

We had before us proposals from Mr. Bruce to establish one strong headquarters military station, probably at Wano, with an outpost in upper Dawar or Sheranna. We were unable to recommend Mr. Bruce's scheme in its entirety; and we set aside that part of it which involved the establishment of an outpost at Sheranna, advocating one post only, at Spin or Wano, for the special purpose of protecting the Gomal route.

But we added a special reservation in regard to the Tochi Valley. We were unacquainted with the geography of that part of the country, though we knew that it was inhabited by people different from their neighbours on both sides, and unable to adequately protect themselves. While, therefore, we declared our policy in regard to the Waziris to be one of securing their adhesion and good behaviour by a system of allowances and of non-interference with their local affairs, we felt some apprehension from what we knew of them that the circumstances of the Tochi might raise special difficulties, and that it might be impossible to do justice to the peaceful dwellers in the valley by the grant of allowances alone. We accordingly wrote—

“It is a question whether the wishes and the necessities of the tribesmen in the Tochi and lower Dawar will not require the establishment of what the Lieutenant-Governor calls ‘a regular system of government.’ The circumstances there seem, as he says, to be altogether exceptional. The Darwesh Khel and Dawaris apparently desire and ask for our control as the only means of settling their own feuds and of protecting them from the Mahsuds. What the necessities of the situation in the Tochi and lower Dawar really are will be ascertained by facts which will come out in the course of negotiating with the tribes, if our proposed negotiations are taken in hand.”

In signifying the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of our proposals generally, you added that every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the tribes to the location of the military post in Spin or Wano, and towards keeping interference with them and expenditure within the narrowest limit possible, but that "in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control in Waziristan."

In communicating this decision to the Punjab Government, our Foreign Secretary wrote—

"I am to request that Mr. Bruce may be instructed to at once inform the Waziris that, by arrangement with the Amir, a British force will proceed to Spin or Wano in October with the Commission appointed for the demarcation of the frontier; and that, at the same time, a Political Officer will be deputed who will, in communication with the different sections of the tribes themselves, propose a scheme for entertainment of levies, payment of service allowances, and other arrangements for the permanent relations to be established between them and the Government of India for the preservation of order. It is particularly requested that there may be no delay in making this announcement to the tribes."

The proclamation, issued under the above orders regarding the entertainment of levies, payment of service allowances and other arrangements with both Waziris and Dawaris, was issued to all alike, and we are thus committed to some tribal settlement and to the payment of some tribal allowances in the Tochi. We indeed gave our fullest consent to some such arrangement, when in September and October, last we sanctioned an annual outlay not exceeding Rs. 50,000 for (i) the control and maintenance of the Thal-Gumatti route; (ii) to secure immunity from raids by the Darwesh Khel on the Dawaris of the Tochi; and (iii) as protective arrangements for the Darwesh Khel themselves; and an annual outlay of Rs. 15,000 to the Dawaris for the protection of the Tochi route.

The instructions which were then issued for the guidance of Mr. Bruce in dealing with the tribes in the Tochi valley were that he should endeavour to organise the tribal service allowances, and posts with a view to secure—as far as such means can secure—protection of the Dawaris from Waziri raids. There was no intention that he should go further; indeed Mr. Bruce was instructed to explain that the British Government did not engage to interfere between the tribes. At the same time it was stated that the arrangements should be so explained that we should not be precluded from taking further steps for the safety of the Tochi valley.

We desired, on the one hand, to abstain from assuming any avoidable responsibilities, and to guard the officers on the spot from committing us further than the sanction of Her Majesty's Government permitted; while we wished, on the other hand, not to be precluded from considering afresh the best way of dealing with the tribes in the Tochi if our anticipation that the circumstances of that locality should call for special treatment proved to be correct. We are of opinion that it has, and that it is desirable to extend military protection to the Tochi tribes. It is the unanimous opinion of all the officers who have had an opportunity of judging for themselves on the spot, that circumstances require a more decided measure of protection than could be afforded by militia or levy posts only, and indeed the tribes themselves appear

* Telegram from H. A. Anderson, Esq., dated 7th April 1895.

to be of the same way of thinking. From enclosure* of this despatch, it will be seen that the Dawar Maliks and many Mutabirs, in all 394 persons, and 142 Waziri Maliks and Mutabirs of the Tochi valley and other parts of Waziristan have submitted a written statement expressing their willingness to remain under the British Government. In consequence of their many feuds, and to obtain protection from the Mahsuds, they ask that service and allowances may be granted to them, and they propose certain conditions, which, while they show no mean capacity for looking after their own interests and preserving their autonomy, are only compatible with voluntary cession to the British Government of full power to protect the valley in the way which may seem best to them. We believe that this request for protection is a *bond fide* one from responsible men, who understand the nature of

the request they are making, and we are informed that it may be considered to be an expression of the wishes of all sections of the people in the Tochi valley.

We should not be prepared to regard this concurrence of opinion as decisive, if it stood alone, but there are other considerations which materially affect the case. In the first place, there is an essential difference in the present state of our whole relations to the Waziri tribe as compared with those relations a year ago. At that time the Waziris were comparatively little known, but a general impression undoubtedly prevailed that, while it was essential to maintain an effective control over them, any approach by us would be so greatly resented that the first object was to keep as far off from them as possible. It is clear that this judgment must now be considerably modified. With the recollection of the attack on Wano Camp in our minds, we cannot deny that the Waziris are capable of fierce outbursts of fanaticism, but there was no revival of the feeling subsequently, and they were usually quite friendly. On the other hand, the manner in which our troops traversed their whole country, explored their strongholds, and finally retired, in accordance with our promise, without ill-treating them, will, it may be hoped, have done something to alter the feelings of the people as a whole, towards the British, with whom their past relations had not been such as to inspire feelings of friendship. It is not possible to ignore these considerations which so materially affect the present position in regard to the Tochi tribes. We did not enter their valley, as we did the Mahsud country, as invaders or occupy it as conquerors. When it became necessary to advance our troops we did so under arrangement with the tribes, and with the exception of one small skirmish, which probably arose out of a misunderstanding, no collision occurred. The present moment, when our power and justice have alike been demonstrated, is pre-eminently a favourable opportunity for making satisfactory arrangements with all the Waziri tribes, not least with the Tochi tribes whose friendly relations may be said to be established.

In the second place, the knowledge of the country gained during Sir William Lockhart's recent campaign has put us in a far better position than before for selecting the best site for the posts which it will be desirable for us to hold in order to allow of our carrying out our declared policy of placing ourselves in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control in Waziristan.

In the light of the experience thus gained we have come to the conclusion that, although the establishment of a military post at Wano or in that neighbourhood is necessary in order to protect the Gomal and prevent Waziri raids into the Zhob, its importance is rather of a local character, and that a force in a fortified post or cantonment there would not exercise an effective control over the Waziri tribes as a whole. The road from Wano to Makin is exceedingly difficult, and although at Wano we are in a position to control the Ahmadzais of Wano itself, as well as the Shakarwals, no sufficient influence could be exercised over the Darwesh Khel generally; the post at Wano is only reached by the route *via* the Gomal which is but sparsely furnished with supplies, and upon which the water-supply is very bad. On the other hand, a permanent military post in the Tochi is thoroughly accessible from Bannu through a gently sloping valley; supplies are more easily procurable, and if a permanent military post were established at or in the vicinity of Datta Khel, the Waziris, especially the Darwesh Khel, could be well controlled. In the event of its ever becoming necessary again to enter the Mahsud country, the Tochi Valley affords a better starting point than Wano. From it the Mahsuds and their chief town Makin can be reached with facility, as the road from Datta Khel to Makin is fairly easy and only about 35 miles in length.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Wano by itself would not be sufficient to exert a restraining influence over the Waziris generally, but with a small post at Wano, and a stronger one in upper Dawar, the distance between Wano and Datta Khel being only about four marches, we should be able to dominate effectively the whole of Waziristan, so as to prevent the disturbances which have characterised that part of our frontier for so many years, and fulfil any obligations which our arrangements with Afghanistan may impose upon us.

When we first considered the question of establishing a small cantonment at Wano, we proposed that a fortified post should be constructed for—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 Guns, Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 Battalion Native Infantry.

But the development of the situation since last year has led to a larger force being temporarily stationed at Wano, and for the present we may find it necessary to hold it as follows—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry.

The fortified post was to have been completed at a cost of seven or eight lakhs, including civil buildings, for the smaller force above mentioned; but on the advice of Sir William Lockhart, supported by the Commander-in-Chief, only a portion of the works has been put in hand, and it is probable that so large an expenditure as above indicated will not be necessary. We shall report on the question of the future permanent garrison of Wano hereafter.

For the present, and until the decision of Her Majesty's Government is received, we propose to keep the following garrison in the Tochi :—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 1 Company Sappers and Miners,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry,

so that the force now there can be reduced by one battalion of native infantry, the half company of Sappers being made up to a complete company. As at present advised, we think that the permanent garrison would probably be composed as follows :—

- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry,

with small connecting posts at Shinkai Kotal, Idak, and Muhammad Khel, but that these after a little time might be held by local levies. If this force be maintained in the Tochi valley, we consider that the force at Wano may be reduced to that originally contemplated by us, as above, viz :—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 Guns Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 Battalion Native Infantry.

With these two posts at Wano and in the Tochi, we believe that the Waziri tribes would be completely dominated, that our position on the frontier would be strengthened, the troops being furnished from our present frontier garrisons; and that a far more healthy situation would be available for a portion of the garrison at Bannu, which is an insalubrious station.

As regards the financial effect of the measure we now advocate, we estimate that the extra cost of the post in the Tochi would be Rs. 4,40,000 annually on account of extra expenditure for the troops. If, however, we did not maintain a post in the Tochi, we should probably be obliged to keep up the larger force at present stationed at Wano, so that there would, even in that case, be considerable extra expenditure, and we should also have to provide a larger fortified cantonment. A number of frontier posts near Bannu and in the Gomal can, however, be reduced, and in this way the expense can be diminished. The extra cost of the troops at Kajuri Kach and Jandola is Rs. 1,22,000 per annum, and a great part of this would be saved. Further, there would be a considerable saving in reducing the number of troops at Wano, as practically most of the supplies have to be taken up from Dera Ismail Khan, while in the Tochi supplies are fairly procurable.

In respect to the expenditure on military works, the estimate for the

or eight lakhs, and this was for the force of 1 Battalion Native Infantry 1 Squadron Native Cavalry, and 4 Mountain guns. If a larger force were to be stationed at Wano, the expenditure would be very much more. The establishment of a permanent post in the Tochi to contain a somewhat larger garrison will probably not cost as much as that for the Wano post, as the circumstances in the Tochi are more favourable. Against this extra expenditure there must be put the economy which will be effected by not having to renew the lines of the native infantry at Bannu, which would otherwise have to be maintained as usual by the State. The military importance of both Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu will be diminished, and the expenditure upon them must consequently be reduced. The proposed garrisons can be furnished without in any way increasing the force on the frontier.

It will be seen from the 2nd enclosure that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate that the political expenditure will be much, if at all, in excess of what has been sanctioned for less completely protective arrangements. If, as we hope, the measure which we now advocate will obviate the recurrence of punitive expeditions, the economy resulting from it, though difficult of expression in figures, must be great.

We trust that we have made it clear that our present proposals do not indicate any departure from our declared policy with regard to Waziristan, and should they meet with the approval of her Majesty's Government, we would ask that such approval may be communicated to us by telegraph.

Enclosure 1.

From H. A. Anderson, Esq., Delimitation Officer, Camp Idak, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 7th April 1895.
(Telegraphic.)

In a written statement signed at Miran Shah Camp, which I received yesterday, all Daur Maliks and many Mutabirs, in all 394 persons, and 142 Waziri Maliks and Mutabirs of the Tochi valley and other parts of Waziristan express their willingness to remain under the British Government. In consequence of their many feuds, and to obtain protection from Mahsuds, they ask that services and allowances should be granted to them; local rights and customs be respected; cases should be decided by Muhammadan law and jirga when possible; that they should be exempted from court fees; that revenue, if demanded, should be assessed once for all; their jungles and iron mines should remain in their possession; the jails for their prisoners should be local, and in the event of Powindahs using the Tochi route, Badragga rights and grazing fees should be paid to the people of the valley. These are simply in the form of requests which they ask the Government to consider. I believe that the other Waziri Maliks will readily sign this statement in Bannu. It may now be considered an expression of the wishes of all sections of the Tochi valley.

Enclosure 2.

Extract of letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 12th April 1895.

I am directed to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor on the question of the position we are to occupy with reference to the Tochi Valley.

To clear the ground His Honor considers that it is well to say at starting that, whatever there may be to be said in favour of or against taking up a strong position at Razmak as now proposed by Mr. Bruce, he will not enter upon any discussion of that point unless invited to do so by the Government of India, as Razmak lies some distance outside the Tochi Valley in the country of the Mahsuds, and the question of occupying it is one of considerable difficulty.

and which lies altogether outside any arrangements yet contemplated by the Government of India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will accordingly confine himself to considering what our position is to be with reference to the Tochi Valley.

The question is whether we should in the Tochi Valley confine ourselves to giving allowances and establishing tribal posts as directed in your letter, dated 11th October 1894, or whether we should open and protect the Tochi route in the same manner that we have opened and protected the Gomal route, and perhaps (as it has been all along said we might be led as a consequence of this to do) take possession of, and establish some sort of government in, a strip of country on each side of that route.

The former course would have a certain effect in attaching the people to us and rendering them in some degree dependent on us, but the Lieutenant-Governor has always agreed with what he understands to be the view of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Anderson, namely, that it would not suffice if we desire to open the Tochi route and protect it in a really effectual manner. For this purpose His Honor agrees with Mr. Anderson that it would be absolutely essential to maintain a garrison of regular troops in the valley, and, as he has already said, if we were to set about doing this, we should probably be led immediately or almost immediately into taking possession of and establishing some sort of government over a certain strip of country at both sides of the road throughout a portion at least of its length. Now, this would of course cost money, and as our position along the road or along the narrow strip of country of which we should hold possession would be exposed to raids not merely like the Gomal on one side but on both, we should be prepared for having to face a certain amount of trouble.

The question is thus reduced to this, namely, whether the advantages to be gained by taking up the position described are such as to warrant our incurring the expenditure and facing the trouble which our taking up that position would entail. On this question it is unnecessary for Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick to trouble the Government of India with any lengthy discussion, as he has already on several occasions stated his views as to the considerations which should lead us to accept or reject proposals for forward movements of the sort now under consideration. It is enough for His Honor to say here that, unless our taking up the position in the Tochi Valley here referred to is of great importance with a view to meeting an advance upon India, he sees nothing to warrant our incurring the expense and facing the trouble it would involve. Whether our taking up such a position would be of great importance in that way is a point which depends chiefly on military considerations, and on which accordingly His Honor prefers to offer no opinion until it has been fully discussed by Military authorities.

One thing, however, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick may say without hesitation, and that is that if it is desirable that we should take up such a position in the Tochi Valley, he entirely agrees with those who think that we should not let slip the opportunity of obtaining it which now seems to be presented to us. It appears from Mr. Anderson's telegram, dated 7th instant, that the bulk of the leading men of the valley, representing as he says all sections of the tribes, actually desire that we should take possession of the country, and though it may be that they are influenced to a great extent by the prospect of getting allowances and high positions under us, and though, whatever their motives may be, it would be absurd to suggest that we should take such a heavy burthen upon ourselves merely because they ask us to do so unless we have some important object of our own to gain, still it is clear that if it should be decided that we have an object to gain the importance of which would be commensurate with the burthen we should have to bear, the fact that we could at this moment count on the voluntary submission of the bulk of the people and would not have to use force to gain our position is of high importance. It would, His Honor thinks, be by no means safe to reckon on those people being in the same mood a year or two hence. Something might happen to shake their confidence in us, or the Mullahs might work on their religious prejudices, or they might form some alliance with their neighbours which would make them secure without our aid. There is in fact no saying what might occur to change their feelings regarding this matter.

Another reason for facing this important question now and deciding it at once one way or the other is that, as Mr. Bruce rightly points out, we shall in any event have to arrange for giving the people of the Tochi Valley allowances before Mr. Anderson's present proceedings are brought to a close. It has been decided to do so even if we are only to take up the position with reference to the Tochi prescribed in your letter, dated 11th October 1894, above referred to; further, we have virtually pledged ourselves to give some allowances to these people, and though, if the advantages to be looked for from giving them and establishing tribal posts are likely to be as small as Mr. Anderson now seems to think, we might perhaps pitch them lower than the amounts previously named in official correspondence (no amounts have as yet been named to these tribes), still the annual payments which we should have to promise would doubtless be considerable. The promise of these payments or perhaps a little more would probably satisfy the claim for allowances which the tribal leaders put forward in return for the dominion they offer us over their country, and accordingly if we make up our minds at this moment to accept the offer they make us, we shall probably be able to settle the allowances at the sums already named or a little more; whereas if we postpone the consideration of the question of accepting that offer to some future occasion, we do not know what further allowances we might have to promise when we took it up.

For these reasons Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks that the whole question of the position we are to occupy with reference to the Tochi should be at once taken up and considered, and he agrees with the local officers that the troops should remain in the country until it is settled.

Until His Honor is in possession of the views of the Government of India on the main questions involved it is unnecessary for him to trouble them with the discussions of such details as the position of the military posts (if any) to be established or the conditions set forth in Mr. Anderson's telegram, dated 7th instant, as those on which the Maliks and Mu'atbars offer us dominion over their country.

No. 9.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24th July 1895.
(Telegraphic.)

Tochi. Can you make a temporary settlement with tribes, leaving question of cantonment open until you can send home full estimate of both proposed cantonments? My advisers are opposed to additional cantonment.

No. 10.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27th July 1895.
(Telegraphic.)

Yours of 24th July.

Difficulties in course you propose twofold. Settlement with tribes depends largely on whether post is maintained, as they themselves request, for protection of weaker section. I deprecate temporary settlement, if that means withdrawal of the troops. If troops continue present occupation provisionally, distribution of allowances would be repeated, though this prevents tribes settling down.

Detailed estimates have not been prepared pending the selection of site for cantonments, and we have studiously avoided steps which must commit us still further with tribes. Financial result approximately stated in our Despatch. If more information required, please state specific points.

Am advised initial expenditure on Wano and Tochi together would probably not exceed that already authorised for Wano alone, and extra annual cost of troops largely reduced after first occupation. Reduction on existing posts would be considerable and frontier force not increased.

No. 11.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2nd August 1895.
(Telegraphic.)

I have considered your letter, of 15th May, and telegram of 27th July. On the clear understanding that expenditure on Wano and Tochi together will not exceed that already authorised on Wano alone, I sanction your proposals. No excess to be incurred without full estimate of total expenditure, and fresh sanction.

No. 12.

Extract from Despatch from the Secretary of State (Lord George Hamilton) to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 9th August 1895.

THE Letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 15th May 1895, has received my careful consideration.

I understand your recommendations to be that the permanent post already sanctioned for Wano should consist of—

- 1 squadron Native Cavalry,
- 4 guns Native Mountain Battery,
- 1 battalion Native Infantry ;

and in addition that there should be established in the Tochi valley, for the double purpose of more effectively controlling the Waziri tribes and securing a strategical position, an additional cantonment to be held by—

- 1 Squadron Native Cavalry,
- 1 Mountain Battery,
- 2 Battalions Native Infantry.

The reasons which have led your Excellency's Government to make these recommendations are that Wano is not the best place from which to maintain effective control over the Waziris, that while it is useful and necessary as a post from which to secure the safety of the Gomal route and to control the tribes in its neighbourhood, it fails to give easy access to Makin and to the Darwesh Khel country, and it has moreover the disadvantages of being reached with difficulty, being expensive and badly supplied with water.

From another point of view your letter indicates that the military protection of the tribes in the Dawar and Lower Tochi Valley is necessary, and that this cannot be effected by tribal levies and allowances alone, that the tribes themselves are anxious that we should protect them by a military force, that you are committed to making some settlement with them, and that there is now an opportunity of making the settlement a complete and effective one.

Your letter left me in some doubt as to the financial effects of your proposals, and having regard to the fact that Sir Henry Fowler's sanction to your original proposals for dealing with the Waziri tribes was given on the understanding that your outlay of money on Waziristan would be kept within the narrowest limits that were practicable, I hesitated to sanction your present proposals without some satisfactory assurances on this point.

Your telegram of the 27th July, however, conveys the intimation that, in your opinion, "the initial expenditure on Wano and Tochi together would probably not exceed that already authorised for Wano alone, and the extra annual cost of the troops would be largely reduced after the first occupation ; the reduction on the existing posts would be considerable, and the frontier force not increased." On the clear understanding that expenditure on the Wano and Tochi posts together will not exceed that already authorized on Wano alone, I sanction your proposals, as already telegraphed to you on the 2nd instant. No excess is to be incurred without a full estimate of total expenditure and fresh sanction.

Your Lordship will, I trust, bear in mind the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits that are possible, and I await a detailed statement

of the expenditure to be incurred on the two cantonments and of the political allowances and tribal levies which may be agreed upon in your negotiations with the tribes, alluded to in the 5th and 14th paragraphs of your letter under reply.

No. 13.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 1st January 1896. (Received 20th January 1896.)

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's Despatch of the 9th of August 1895 sanctioned, subject to certain reservations, our proposals for establishing a cantonment in the Tochi Valley, in addition to the one already sanctioned at Wano, and you requested us to submit a detailed statement of the expenditure to be incurred on the two cantonments and on the political allowances and tribal levies, which might be agreed upon in our negotiations with the tribes.

2. The question of the distribution of tribal allowances and the enlistment of levies has now been nearly completed. We await detailed proposals from the Punjab Government in regard to the entertainment of some additional men on the Shahur route between Jandola and Wano, and when these have been disposed of, we shall be able to lay before your Lordship a complete file of the correspondence on the subject. We also hope to be able to shortly furnish an accurate estimate of expenditure in connection with the cantonments in Wano and in the Tochi valley.

3. Meanwhile we forward, for your Lordship's information, correspondence showing the nature of the political arrangements to be adopted both in regard to the Darwesh Khel and the Dawar inhabitants of the Tochi Valley. The proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor, which have received our concurrence, are detailed in the first enclosure of this despatch. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government has been accepted and a light revenue will be taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. A simple form of administration will be introduced in the country of the Dawaris, including any small Darwesh Khel patches that may be found within it. The Darwesh Khel country outside the Tochi will be subject only to the political control extended to Waziristan generally.

4. The distribution of allowances to both the Darwesh Khel and Dawaris has given general satisfaction, and the Dawaris by their readiness to meet the wishes of Government have shown that their offer to remain under the British Government was spontaneous and unanimous. The terms on which the allowances have been granted are in the case of the Darwesh Khel the same* as those attached to the grant to the Mahsuds; and are subject to the further condition that they will refrain from and prevent raids and other offences across the Afghan frontier. The allowances of the Dawaris are subject to the condition of good behaviour on the part of the tribe and of all individual recipients.

5. On the Dawaris being informed of the decision to levy revenue, and that it was proposed to make a summary settlement with them in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter, the tribal jirga willingly offered to pay a lump sum of Rs. 6,000 a year for three years, after which they agreed to their lands being measured and the revenue assessed in kind at the rate of one-tenth of the gross produce. They further, of their own motion, offered to contribute an annual sum of two thousand rupees to provide remuneration to subordinates of the Maliks who will necessarily be employed in collecting the revenue and rendering village service. We have agreed to this proposal, which was supported by Mr. Anderson and the Lieutenant-Governor.

6. We consider that this settlement is highly satisfactory, and that much credit is due to Mr. Anderson for the manner in which he has brought it about.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 C. B. PRITCHARD,
 J. WESTLAND,
 J. WOODBURN.

Enclosure 1.

Extract from a letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th October 1895.

WITH reference to your letter of 12th August last, in which the views of the Lieutenant-Governor were sought regarding the political arrangements considered necessary in the Tochi Valley and the cost thereof, I am directed to convey the opinion of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, as follows :—

It will be convenient, the Lieutenant-Governor considers, to advert in the first place to the question as to the position we are to assume with reference to the tribes, both Dauri and Waziri.

It has been all along recognised that if we are to set about thoroughly opening and protecting the road through the Tochi, as it has now been determined to do, we should not improbably find it necessary to take possession of, and introduce something like a system of administration into, some portion of the country at each side of it, and from the reports received from the local officers from time to time, His Honour thinks it is clear that it will be expedient to adopt this course with reference to the tract of country along the road from Hyder Khel on the east up to Pai Khel near Kanirogha on the west, which is commonly known as Daur Upper and Lower. The road along this portion of its course runs through a compact, comparatively open and well-cultivated valley, occupied by the Dauris, a people who are much at the mercy of their Waziri neighbours, and the bulk of whom, it is reported, are consequently anxious to secure our protection, and are ready in return for our protection to accept our rule and pay us revenue. The circumstances are such that no matter what efforts we might make to isolate ourselves upon our road, as we can do in a narrow and uncultivated defile like the Khaibar, we should inevitably be driven in the very near future to assume the position the Dauris now offer us, and anxious as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick usually is to avoid taking possession of new territory and assuming fresh responsibilities, he thinks that in this particular instance it will simplify matters, and in the long run save trouble, if we at once accept the offer of the Dauris, take possession of their country, and establish some such simple form of administration as we have introduced in the Kurram, and after a year or two levy a light revenue.

To turn now to the five tracts of country occupied by the Darwesh Khel Waziris, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor necessary to distinguish between the first of these tracts, viz., the valley of the Tochi west of Kanirogha through which our road will run, and the remaining four tracts.

These last four tracts lie outside the Tochi Valley and beyond the limits within which it has been contemplated in the correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State that we might have to assume possession and establish something in the way of administration. Over them accordingly, unless we are prepared to make an entirely fresh proposal, we must restrict ourselves to the exercise of what is commonly known as "political control." It is a difficult matter to define precisely at starting the nature or extent of the control which we should exercise over these tracts. That is a thing we can hope to do only gradually as we come to understand our position better.

Mr. Anderson says in effect that, though it would not be worth our while to take revenue in those tracts now, it might, having regard to the possibility

of large extensions of cultivation, be worth our while to do so later on ; that we ought not accordingly to tie our hands by any promise not to take revenue in the future ; and that we ought, therefore, to tell the Darwesh Khel of those tracts merely that we have no intention whatever of taking land revenue from them at present, and that should land revenue hereafter be taken, it will be assessed at a light rate, adding, however, that if they misbehave we shall be at liberty to cancel our promises and impose land revenue at once.

To Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick it seems that to say anything of this kind to these people is altogether inconsistent with the general position which we should take up towards them, and would be calculated to create misapprehension. We levy land revenue only on a country of which we have taken possession, and in which we establish some sort of administration. In the case of people like these, with whom we are only to have political relations, to levy land revenue is altogether out of the question. Hence to tell these people that, though we do not mean to levy land revenue from them at present, we may do so later on if we think fit, is virtually to say that though we do not mean to take possession of their country at present, we may do so later on, and that is a thing which, though we might be forced by the misbehaviour of the tribe to do it, the Lieutenant-Governor understands the Government of India have no desire to do, and which it is therefore unnecessary, and his Honour would say impolitic, to stipulate for a right to do.

And as to threatening that, in the event of the tribes misbehaving, we shall levy revenue from them, it seems to His Honour that the proper threat to utter is the more comprehensive and more intelligible one, viz., that if they misbehave, we may have to take possession of their country.

The Lieutenant-Governor thinks the proper thing to say to the inhabitants of these four tracts is what we have in effect already said to the inhabitants of Waziristan generally, namely : " We do not want to take possession of your country or interfere in your internal affairs, and so long as you behave yourselves and do not force us to do so, we shall not do so." If they should ask for an express promise that we should not levy revenue from them, His Honour would reply by saying, " How can we levy revenue from a country of which we do not take possession, and in the internal affairs of which we do not mean to interfere ? Of course, if you by your misconduct force us to take possession of your country, we must take revenue from it, but we repeat we do not wish to take possession of it."

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick has only to add in this connection that though if we are forced to take possession of any of these four tracts, as in all probability we shall in time be, we should as a matter of course collect what revenue we could from them, it would never be worth our while to take possession of them for the sake of the revenue they would yield, as the additional cost entailed by getting more and more mixed up with the affairs of these people would far exceed any revenue we could collect from them, and thus from any point of view there is no object in making any such reservation as Mr. Anderson proposes.

It remains to consider what our relations are to be with the Waziris occupying the valley of the Tochi from Kanirogha west, through whose country our road will run for about 16 or 17 miles, and this is the only point on which, as it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor, there can be any room for difference of opinion. There is no question of revenue here, the question is merely whether, as this patch of territory may be taken to be part of the strip in which it is contemplated by the correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State we might have to assume possession and establish some sort of administration, as the Maliks are well disposed towards us, we had not better, as in the case of the Dauri tract, arrange to take possession at once. Now there is something to be said in favour of this course, and there would be something more to be said in favour of it if the head-quarters of our Military force were to be located as far west as Datta Khel. His Honour thinks, notwithstanding what may be urged to the contrary, it is wiser to draw the line at the country of the Dauris. The inhabitants of this small fragment of the Waziri country which lies along our road may act in a friendly and loyal manner to us ; indeed they can hardly help doing so, for, as it is said in the East, " Those that live in the

river must make friends with the alligator ;” but the attitude of the great mass of the Waziris towards us is still somewhat doubtful. We have heard a good deal recently of the attempts of Mullah Powindah to establish peace between the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds, obviously with a view to creating difficulties for us, and though these attempts have succeeded only to a very small extent and the Mullah has not got anything that could be called a following, there has been a certain amount of trimming, and the Lieutenant-Governor thinks the mass of the tribes are still far from being inclined to view with satisfaction the prospect of our gradually establishing anything like a system of administrative control over Waziristan. If His Honour is right in this, it is clear that our taking possession of and establishing a system of administration over this small patch of Waziri territory might arouse suspicion and hostility in the minds of the tribes, and it is obviously desirable to avoid doing this just now.

Further, it must be remembered that while in Daur we shall have to deal with one small compact tribe entirely under our control and isolated from their neighbours, and may thus hope to avoid any very serious further entanglements, it might not be so easy to do this if we were to take possession of, and make ourselves fully responsible for the administration of, a small patch of territory like that here in question inhabited by Darwesh Khels, who would be much mixed up with other Darwesh Khels and involved in quarrels with the Mahsuds.

As regards the request made by the tribes, that we should “respect their rights over Hindus,” the Lieutenant-Governor would observe that we are concerned with it only in that portion of the country in which we assume possession and become responsible for the administration, and in that portion of the country there would be much difficulty in assenting to a request of this kind made in such general terms ; but if, as His Honour understands from an unofficial communication received from Mr. Anderson, the rights claimed are only rights to levy customary dues on the occasions of marriages, deaths, sales of gram, &c., such as are levied in many or most parts of the Punjab by village proprietary bodies from shop-keepers, artisans and others who have settled in the village with their permission, His Honour sees no objection whatever to these dues being levied by the tribes as heretofore. The only thing the Lieutenant-Governor would insist on here, as in the case of the tax which has been substituted for the jezia in the Kurram, is that though these taxes might practically fall on Hindus only, they should not be imposed on any ground connected with difference of religion, but should be payable by persons of all denominations, in the same circumstances as they are payable by Hindus, if the Malikis thought fit to demand them.

As regards the proposal to open the Gumatti-Thal route or the alternative route from Lower Daur to Thal, His Honour would propose to say to the Darwesh Khels, regarding the two routes now referred to, what he before proposed to say to them regarding the Gumatti-Thal route alone, viz., that we may desire to open one or both of them, and that if we do, additional Service allowances will be given, but that the present Maliki allowances must be taken to cover any duties required from the leading men in regard to these routes. It may be that in the event of our resolving to open either of these routes we shall have to yield somewhat as regards this last point and give the Malikis something additional, but by making now the declaration His Honour proposes we shall at all events be able to keep it at a low figure. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think it will be altogether matter for regret if the opening of these routes is allowed to stand over for the present, for we shall for some little time to come have quite enough on our hands without it, and from what he has now seen of our negotiations with these tribes, His Honour does not apprehend that, with sums like Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 12,000 per annum to be earned, they will be unwilling to come to terms whenever we may think fit to take the matter up.

It will be seen from the above that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is practically in accord with Mr. Anderson on all important points, and, subject to the modifications in minor points above suggested, he has no hesitation in recommending that officer's proposals to the Government of India as the best that can be made for giving effect to the policy that has been resolved on. His Honour does not mean to say that by adopting these proposals we shall be altogether secure against troubles in that neighbourhood. That is a thing which it would be

unreasonable to expect. Nor does he mean to say that these proposals carry with them anything in the way of finality. It is inevitable in such a case that as time goes on we should be drawn into advancing further and interfering more largely with the tribes. But the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the proposals now made are those best calculated to secure the largest measure of peace and stability attainable under the circumstances, and he submits that the thanks of the Government are due to Mr. Anderson for the great care, skill and knowledge of his subject which he has brought to bear in working them out.

For convenience of consideration Mr. Anderson's detailed proposals regarding the Maliki and Service allowances to be granted to the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi and its neighbourhood and to the people of Daur, and his recommendations regarding the establishment of levy posts, are treated separately. Mr. Anderson's views regarding the most suitable head-quarters for the military garrison in the Tochi have been forwarded to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab for his consideration.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will await the orders of the Government of India upon the present communication before submitting his views regarding the establishment necessary for the administration of the Tochi. I am to solicit orders on this letter at the earliest convenience of the Government of India, as it is inexpedient that the final settlement with these tribes should be longer delayed, and, moreover, it will not be possible to give effect to the wishes of the Government as to the reduction of the military force in the Tochi Valley until the posts are built and all our arrangements have been got into working order.

Enclosure 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 18th October 1895.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th of October 1895, regarding the political arrangements which it is proposed should be adopted in the Tochi valley.

2. The Governor-General in Council accepts the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals for the political control of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, both those inhabiting the valley above Kanirogha and the sections in tracts outside the Tochi valley, and agrees with His Honour that the offer of the Dawaris made in their petition of the 6th April 1895, to remain under the British Government, should be at once accepted.

3. With regard to the question of taking revenue from the Dawaris, the Lieutenant-Governor supports the proposals of Mr. Anderson, and would demand no revenue for the first two years. The Governor-General in Council, however, considers that it is advisable to take some revenue at once in acceptance of the Dawaris' own offers, and I am to request that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick will consider whether a rough summary settlement might not be made in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter.

4. In the 17th paragraph of your letter under reply, it is stated that, until the Lieutenant-Governor receives the decision of the Government of India on the general question of policy, he will defer submitting his views regarding the proposals made by the Commissioner of the Derajat as to the establishment necessary for the administration of the Tochi. His Honour's views will be awaited; but I am to observe that Mr. Anderson's proposals seem to indicate an intention of exercising at once a larger interference and incurring a greater outlay than has been contemplated by the Government of India and sanctioned by the Secretary of State. The Governor-General in Council will trust the Lieutenant-Governor to propose no more elaborate machinery of administration than the position which has been accepted towards the Dawaris and the duties which that will entail must require.

5. Mr. Anderson has suggested the desirability that the Political Officer, North Waziristan, should have the exclusive political control and management of all the Darwesh Khel sections from Dawar to the border of Bannu, Kohat and the Kurram valley. This proposal which, in so far as it affects the Kohat district, has been referred by the Lieutenant-Governor for the consideration

of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, commends itself to the Government of India; and, if supported by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, will be sanctioned.

6. Orders will be communicated to you as early as possible, regarding the grant of tribal allowances and the establishment of levy posts in the Tochi. Meanwhile I am to say that Mr. Anderson's proposal to open up a route direct from Lower Dabar to Thal appears to have much in its favour, especially if the arrangements suggested in the preceding paragraph are to be carried out; and the Governor-General in Council will be prepared to give the proposal his consideration whenever the Lieutenant-Governor thinks the time has arrived for carrying it out.

No. 14.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, 18th March 1896. (Received 4th April 1896.)

MY LORD,

WE hope soon to be able to give Your Lordship the detailed statement for which you asked in the concluding words of Despatch, dated the 9th August 1895, of the political allowances and tribal levies which may be agreed upon in our negotiations with the tribes in Waziristan. There are still certain matters of detail to decide both in the case of the Mahsuds and of the Darwesh Khels. Meanwhile in the course of these negotiations, questions of so great political importance have arisen that we deem it right to lay them before Your Lordship for an expression of your views.

2. The immediate questions which have been referred to us by the Government of the Punjab are the line along which levy posts should be established for the purpose of keeping open what is known as the Shuhur route, and the retention of a military post on that route even after the levy posts have been established.

3. The Shuhur route, from the Jandola post up the stream of the Shuhur, affords the shortest means of communicating with Wano from the Punjab, and the importance of opening it up and rendering it secure was insisted on by the local officers, Messrs. Bruce and King, from the beginning of the discussions as to improving our relations with the Waziris. As explained at the time, however, we did not recommend Mr. Bruce's scheme in its entirety. Our desire was and has always been to carry the tribes with us in whatever we do, and to interfere as little as we can with their internal affairs. It was on this understanding that Sir Henry Fowler accorded sanction† to the policy adopted by us in Waziristan.

† Despatch, dated the 24th August 1894.

4. During the subsequent punitive operations which were undertaken against some sections of the Waziris by the force under command of Sir William Lockhart, the occupation of the Shuhur valley became necessary as a military operation, and Sir William Lockhart proposed that the opening up of the route through this valley should be one of the conditions of the settlement with the tribes at the close of the operations. But while authorising* him to impose on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping open the Shuhur route, we impressed on him that the establishment of a military post on the route was outside our declared policy.

5. We subsequently reported‡ the temporary establishment of a military post at Barwand in the Shuhur valley, pending conclusion of negotiations, and although the allowances and service granted to the Mahsuds have now been fixed, we assented to the request of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the troops should be retained until the levy posts were completed. The military post established in the first place at Barwand has for convenience been shifted to the neighbouring site at Sarwekai.

‡ Despatch, dated the 20th March 1895.

6. We have now received the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals for the location of the levy posts necessary for keeping open the Shuhur route, and they disclose divergence of opinion between His Honour and the local political officers in regard to the location of these posts between the site of the present military post of occupation at Sarwekai and Wano. The local political officers advocate the establishment of levy posts in the Khaisera valley in order to obtain a commanding influence within the country inhabited by the more unruly sections of the Mahsuds, and in order to back up well-disposed Maliks against malcontent factions. From Barwand or Sarwekai, the Lieutenant-Governor advocates the adoption of a line, turning to the left by Karabkot, which, in his opinion without establishing an internal control, will interpose a barrier between the Mahsud country on the one side and the Gomal and Wano on the other, and which will check raiding by the Mahsuds on the Gomal and the caravan routes through Wano.

7. In the meantime, the Lieutenant-Governor had been consulted on a proposed redistribution of the garrisons on the Punjab Frontier, and in the course of His Honour's reply upon that question (which is being dealt with generally in our Military Department), his opinion regarding the Barwand or Sarwekai post has been given in the following words:—"As regards the very strong opinion expressed by Mr. Bruce in favour of the retention of the military garrison (400 native infantry) at Barwand, I am to observe that, Mr. Bruce's desire has all along been to establish a close control over the whole of the Waziri country and to have our officers constantly visiting all parts of it, and so on, and one of the most obvious steps towards this is to substitute the Shuhur valley for the Gomal as the ordinary route. Hence he attaches the greatest possible importance to the retention of Barwand or Sarwekai as a military post. Speaking for himself, all His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor can say is that he is always glad to see tribal arrangements supported by as strong a backing as possible of regular troops; that Barwand or Sarwekai is undoubtedly an important position; that, so far as he can judge, there would be no difficulty raised by the mass of the tribes to our retaining the military garrison there permanently if we desire to do so, and that accordingly, if His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief can spare the troops and the Government of India are prepared to reconsider their decision, he would think it a decided advantage to have Barwand or Sarwekai made a permanent military post."

8. It appears to us that the two questions which are now before us, namely, the location of the levy posts inside or outside the Khaisera valley, and the retention or abolition of a military post in the Shuhur, involve the same question of principle, and should each be decided on the same considerations. We have not been able to agree with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in the view which he has consistently held and frequently expressed that the establishment of posts in tribal country necessarily involves the establishment of something like an administration. It should in our opinion be possible in Waziristan, as it has been found to be possible in tribal country elsewhere, to establish political control, and even to keep military garrisons, without interfering with the customs of the country and its administration by jurgas. Doubtless the ultimate power, and with it the ultimate authority, rest in such cases in the British Government, but the fact that the ultimate power and authority are acknowledged to be so vested is in itself sufficient to uphold the actual tribal administrative customs. The jurga if judiciously handled need never really appeal to physical support. The possibility of doing so is moral support enough to render such appeal unnecessary.

9. Such being the facts and conditions we are ourselves not unanimous as to the best means of dealing with the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendations. There are two points of view from which this question may be approached. On the one hand it is the opinion of some of us that we are bound by the declaration of policy made by us in our despatch of 10th July 1894, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State in his despatch of the 24th August 1894: and that the policy of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of the tribes, and the regulation of our dealings with them in the manner particularly set forth in the first despatch above referred to, have not yet been given a fair trial. Owing to

various circumstances, more especially to the attack on the Wano Camp and the consequent military occupation of the country, it has of necessity followed that ever since our policy was formulated we have exercised a greater measure of control in Waziristan than was then contemplated. But we have done so avowedly as a temporary measure to be continued only while the fortified posts were being constructed, and other arrangements, including those for the enrolment and payment of levies, were being completed : and we have so informed the tribes. The decision in the case of the military post at Barwand is therefore important, because not only is its permanent retention a modification of the military position as now sanctioned, but it is in the view of the case above explained, advocated in order that the policy also may be modified, and a closer control over the turbulent sections of the tribes may be established. The question therefore comes to be whether the reasons which led the Government of India to propose that, so far as external coercion was concerned, the interference with the Mahsud Waziris should be limited to the establishment of one additional military post at or about Spin, are or are not valid now ; and whether anything has occurred to induce us to abandon our preference for the continuance of tribal customs and tribal methods of administration with the minimum of interference from our officers. Some of us desire to abide by the policy originally adopted, and hold that it is premature to garrison Barwand permanently, before it has been demonstrated that the tribal arrangements, which are now only being initiated, will not work, as similar arrangements have done elsewhere, without any addition to the military force already authorised.

10. Some of us on the other hand think that Sarwekai may be maintained as a military post without violating any of the principles we have professed in our dealings with the Waziris and which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State. To those of us who hold this view it seems most desirable to retain troops in Sarwekai as that gives a necessary hold over the sections of the Waziris who took the leading part in committing those outrages which forced us into the occupation of Waziristan and who have been our most active opponents since. We have desired to carry the tribes with us in whatever we do, and the continued occupation of Sarwekai is in accordance with the expressed wish of the law-abiding tribesmen who have petitioned us to retain the military garrison there. We wish to interfere as little as possible with the internal government of the tribes, and the occupation of Sarwekai by a military force is the only sure way of avoiding more direct administration of the internal affairs of Waziristan. Our policy was initiated with the object of protecting our own territories and lines of communication and to afford protection to those sections and leading men of the tribes who have thrown in their lot with us by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters and without which protection they cannot maintain their position. The continued occupation of Sarwekai is the true military disposition to cover our territories and lines of communication and to afford the protection just described. In this view of the case indeed to abandon Sarwekai would be a violation of the principles which have guided our policy because it is in opposition to the expressed wish of the people, calculated to paralyze autonomy, and it would decrease the power which we now possess of protecting our territory and communications and withdraw support from the leading men who have told us that without our protection their position is in peril. Lastly we have been warned that it will probably give a base of operations to Mullah Powindah, who is the one man who can unite the turbulent sections of all the Khel against us.

11. We have endeavoured to place before Your Lordship all the considerations which bear upon the points at issue. A material question of policy is involved which cannot be determined without reference to Your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government. If our relations with Waziristan are to continue to be governed by the principles which are recounted in the 9th paragraph, and our interference with the tribes is to be kept within the strictest limits, then the post at Barwand should now cease to be held by British Indian troops. If, on the contrary, it should appear to Your Lordship that the permanent garrisoning of Barwand or Sarwekai in the Shuhur valley, and the location of levy posts in the Khausera, do not involve an abandonment of any of the essentials of our

policy, or are necessary to give greater chance of success in the protection of our posts and of the caravan routes, we are prepared to make arrangements accordingly.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 A. E. MILLER,
 H. BRACKENBURY,
 J. WESTLAND,
 J. WOODBURN,
 A. CADELI.

No. 15.

Despatch from Secretary of State to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 8th May 1896.

MY LORD,

I HAVE considered your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department dated the 18th March 1896, submitting your remarks upon two questions which have been referred to you by the Government of the Punjab. One of these is the retention of a military post at Burwand or Sarwekai on the Shuhur route in Waziristan, and the other is the location of levy posts inside or outside the Khaibera valley.

2. As regards the first of these questions, I observe that on the 20th March 1895, your Excellency's Government authorised the temporary maintenance of a post at Barwand, in order that your communications with Wano might be efficiently protected during the conduct of negotiations with the Mahsud Waziris. It is now reported that the well disposed tribesmen generally desire to have the military garrison retained, and that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor anticipates that there would be no difficulty raised by the mass of the tribes to the permanent retention of our garrison there if we desired to retain it. Moreover, although the allowances of the Waziri tribes have been re-distributed, there are still several questions which have yet to be settled. As to whether the garrison should be permanently retained in the Shuhur valley on political rather than military grounds, your Excellency has described at length, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your Letter, the different views entertained by your Government. But it appears that so long as a garrison is maintained at Wano the communications with it must be efficiently protected, and further information must be awaited as to the efficiency of the levy posts which are to be established. Until, then, the levy posts have been established, and the arrangements tested by sufficient experience, I am content to leave it to your Government to decide whether the post at Sarwekai should be retained until further orders.

3. As regards the location of the posts either in the Khaibera valley or to the south-west of Sarwekai by Karabkhot, I am disposed to agree with the Lieutenant-Governor in thinking that the principal object aimed at, namely, the protection of the Gomal route and of communications with Wano, will be sufficiently secured without garrisoning the Khaibera valley and thus incurring the risk of political interference with the more troublesome sections of the Mahsuds which the establishments of posts at Narai Raghza or Torwam might involve.

4. At the same time, I would observe that the financial effect of your proposals is not stated, and I desire to receive a report, when your arrangements are completed, of the total cost of the cantonments in Wano, and in the Tochi valley, and of the military post in the Shuhur valley, together with an account of the expenditure on tribal posts and allowances incurred for the purpose of controlling the Waziri tribes. I shall be glad to receive, at the same time, a statement of your conclusions on the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure, and the larger issues of policy raised in your Letter can then be determined.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 16.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 19th May 1896. (Received 8th June 1896.)

MY LORD,

WITH reference to the first paragraph of our Despatch dated the 18th March 1896, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of papers regarding the allowances granted to the Darwesh Khel Waziris and the Dauris, and the arrangements made for the construction of levy posts in Wano and that neighbourhood, and in the Tochi valley.

2. The following is a brief summary of the additional political expenditure incurred annually on account of these allowances, and those for the Mahsud Waziris, details of which were given in the enclosures of our Despatch above cited :—

	Rs
(1) Additional Mahsud service	10,320
(2) Additional Wano Ahmadzai service	6,840
(3) Shakai and Badar service	3,612
(4) Tochi service	63,736
(5) Additional miscellaneous expenditure in the Mahsud country and Wano.	840
(6) Miscellaneous expenditure in the Tochi, including munshis and menial establishments at the principal posts.	3,480

TOTAL / ... 88,828

3. This expenditure will be met from the provision of one lakh of rupees a year which it was anticipated would be needed for carrying out, in regard to the Waziristan tribes, the policy approved in Sir Henry Fowler's Despatch dated the 24th August 1894. We have not yet received from the Punjab Government any proposals for the adjustment of the allowances of the Bhattannis, which it was estimated would cost about Rs 4,500 a year; and, in the event of Her Majesty's Government deciding that the military garrison occupying the Sarwekai (or Barwand) post on the Shahur route should be withdrawn, it would probably be necessary to incur further expenditure, not exceeding Rs. 7,500 a year, on giving service to additional Mahsud levies for the efficient protection of this route. These two last mentioned items would absorb the lakh of rupees within which we proposed to limit our expenditure.

It will be observed that in the distribution of the allowances, as shown above, no provision has been made for the opening of the Thal-Gumatti route from Kurram to Bannu, the cost of which we had hoped to have included within the lakh of rupees. In the

† Enclosure in our Despatch dated the 1st January 1896. letter† from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab dated the

12th October 1895, the Lieutenant-Governor submitted a proposal by Mr. Anderson to open up a direct route from Lower Daur to Thal in preference to the Thal-Gumatti route. We are shortly expecting Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's detailed recommendations on this subject, and will then address Your Lordship. The expenditure involved is not expected to exceed Rs. 12,000 a year

5. We trust that the arrangements made for the distribution of tribal allowances will meet with Your Lordship's approval.

6. A statement of the expenditure to be incurred on the cantonments in Wano and the Tochi valley will be furnished to Your Lordship, as soon as possible.

We have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
J. WESTLAND,
J. WOODBURN,
M. D. CHALMERS,
E. H. H. COLLIEN,
A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 28th January 1896.

I AM directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for formal sanction, two proposition statements showing the financial results of the proposals affecting the tribal arrangements in Southern Waziristan which were approved by the Government of India.

2. There is, it will be observed, an increase of Rs. 38,254 in Imperial Expenditure (statement I) accompanied by a decrease of Rs. 15,168 in Provincial Expenditure on the Border Military Police (statement II), the net increase being Rs. 23,086. The Punjab Government understands that the Provincial Assignment of Land Revenue will be reduced by the amount of the Provincial decrease.

I.
Statement of Proposition for Revision of Establishment.
[Chargeable to Imperial Revenue.]

ORDER SANCTIONING PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.	Office to which the Proposi- tion refers.	NATURE OF CHARGES.												PROPOSITION						Sanctioned by Punjab Government No. 206.F., dated 28th June 1895	Local Government's recom- mendation.
		PRESENT SCALE.						PROPOSED SCALE.						PERMANENT			TEMPORARY				
		No.	Designation.	Pay			Average Cost.	No.	Designation.	Pay			Average Cost.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.				
				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.									
Number and Date.												Amount.	Amount.	Period.	Amount.	Period.	Amount.				
No 1178-E, dated 11th June 1890 Punjab Government No 825, dated 7th July 1890	..	NEW MAHSUD SER- VICE		Rs. a p	Rs.	Rs a p	Rs. a p.	6	MAHSUD REORGA- NIZED SERVICE		Rs. a p	Rs a p.	Rs a p	Rs. a p	Ra.	Rs	Rs				
		11	Jemadars at Rs. 30 each	330 0 0		330 0 0	330 0 0		7	Jemadars at Rs. 30 each	180 0 0		180 0 0	180 0 0							
		8	Daffadars ,, 25 "	200 0 0		200 0 0	200 0 0		15	Daffadars ,, 25 "	175 0 0		175 0 0	175 0 0							
		18	Sowars ,, 20 "	360 0 0		360 0 0	360 0 0		27	Ditto ,, 15 "	225 0 0		225 0 0	225 0 0							
		2	Havildars ,, 15 "	30 0 0		30 0 0	30 0 0		163	Sowars ,, 20 "	540 0 0		540 0 0	540 0 0							
		5	Ditto ,, 12 "	60 0 0		60 0 0	60 0 0			Footmen ,, 10 "	1,630 0 0		1,630 0 0	1,630 0 0							
		76	Footmen ..	725 0 0		725 0 0	725 0 0			Total service	2,750 0 0		2,750 0 0	2,750 0 0							
			Total per mensem	1,705 0 0		1,705 0 0	1,705 0 0			Maliki	2,379 0 0		2,379 0 0	2,379 0 0							
			Total per annum	20,460 0 0		20,460 0 0	20,460 0 0			Total per mensem	5,129 0 0		5,129 0 0	5,129 0 0							
			Total per annum							Total per annum	61,548 0 0		61,548 0 0	61,548 0 0							
No 1850-F, dated 26th August 1892	..	JANDOLA SERVICE.																			
		1	Havildar ..	15 0 0		15 0 0	15 0 0														
		2	Ditto at Rs 12 each	24 0 0		24 0 0	24 0 0														
		30	Footmen ,, 10 "	300 0 0		300 0 0	300 0 0														
			Total per mensem	339 0 0		339 0 0	339 0 0														
	Total per annum...	4,068 0 0		4,068 0 0	4,068 0 0																
No 1178 E, dated 11th June 1890 Punjab Government No 825, dated 7th July 1890	..	ALLOWANCES TO MAHSUD MALIKS.																			
			Allowances . .	833 0 0		833 0 0	833 0 0														
			Total per mensem	833 0 0		833 0 0	833 0 0														
			Total per annum	9,996 0 0		9,996 0 0	9,996 0 0														
	Total Mahsud allow- ances per annum	34,524 0 0		34,524 0 0	34,524 0 0		Total Mahsud allow- ances per annum	61,548 0 0		61,548 0 0	61,548 0 0	27,024 0 0									

Statement of Proposition for Revision of Establishment—cont.
[Chargeable to Imperial Revenue]

ORDER SANCTIONING PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT Number and Date.	Office to which the Proposi- tion refers.	NATURE OF CHARGES												PROPOSITION						Grounds of proposition. Local Government's recom- mendation.									
		PRESENT SCALE.						PROPOSED SCALE.						PERMANENT			TEMPORARY												
		No.	Designation	Pay			Average Cost.	No.	Designation.	Pay			Average Cost.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.	Increase per month.		Decrease per month.											
				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Amount.	Amount.	Period.	Amount.		Period.	Amount.							
No. 1178-E, dated 11th June 1890 Punjab Government No 825, dated 7th July 1890.	...	7	ARMADZAIS OF WANO	Rs. a p	Rs	Rs a p	Rs. a p	3	ARMADZAIS OF WANO.	Rs a p	Rs	Rs a p	Rs. a p	Rs. a p.										Sanctioned by Punjab Govern- ment telegram No. 153-F, dated the 8th November 1895					
			10	Jemadars at Rs 30 each	210 0 0	.	210 0 0	210 0 0	3	Jemadars at Rs 30 each	90 0 0	.	90 0 0	90 0 0			
			1	Sowars at Rs 20 each	200 0 0	.	200 0 0	200 0 0	20	Sowars at Rs 20 each	400 0 0	.	400 0 0	400 0 0			
				Footman	10 0 0	.	10 0 0	10 0 0	8	Havildars at Rs 12 each	86 0 0	.	86 0 0	86 0 0		
									89	Footmen at Rs 10 each	390 0 0	.	390 0 0	390 0 0		
				25	Sowars at Rs. 20 each	500 0 0	...	500 0 0	500 0 0		Total service	916 0 0	.	916 0 0	916 0 0		
					Total per mensem	920 0 0	..	920 0 0	920 0 0		Total per mensem	1,485 0 0	..	1,485 0 0	1,485 0 0		
					Total per annum	11,040 0 0		11,040 0 0	11,040 0 0		Total per annum	17,820 0 0	..	17,820 0 0	17,820 0 0		
											SHAKAI AND BADAR ALLOWANCES																		
			No. 1897-F, dated 7th August 1894, No. 1375-E, dated 22nd June 1891, No. 219-F, dated 21st January 1895	1	Havildar	15 0 0	..	15 0 0	15 0 0	1	Havildar	15 0 0	..	15 0 0	15 0 0	
8	Footmen at Rs 10 each	80 0 0				..	80 0 0	80 0 0	8	Footmen at Rs 10 each	80 0 0	..	80 0 0	80 0 0					
	Maliki	206 0 0				..	206 0 0	206 0 0		Maliki	206 0 0	..	206 0 0	206 0 0					
	Total Darweesh Khel per annum	11,040 0 0				..	11,040 0 0	11,040 0 0		Total Darweesh Khel per annum.	3,612 0 0	..	3,612 0 0	3,612 0 0				
	Moharris and shop- keepers Gomala.	215 0 0				.	215 0 0	215 0 0		Moharris and shop- keepers.	215 0 0	..	215 0 0	215 0 0				
		Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0		Total per annum	2,580 0 0	..	2,580 0 0	2,580 0 0							

			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.		Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
No. 1178-E, dated 11th June 1890. Ditto No. 990-F, dated 30th May 1892.	SHIRANIS					SHIRANIS.								
	Service	885 0 0	885 0 0	885 0 0	Service	885 0 0	885 0 0	885 0 0						
	Mahki	32 0 0	32 0 0	32 0 0	Mahki	32 0 0	32 0 0	32 0 0						
	Ditto	120 0 0	120 0 0	120 0 0	Ditto	120 0 0	120 0 0	120 0 0						
	Total per mensem	1,037 0 0	1,037 0 0	1,037 0 0	Total per mensem	1,037 0 0	1,037 0 0	1,037 0 0						
	Total per annum	12,444 0 0	12,444 0 0	12,444 0 0	Total per annum	12,444 0 0	12,444 0 0	12,444 0 0						
No. 445-E, dated 25th March 1891.	MIANIS				MIANIS									
	Service Kashmir Kar post.	245 0 0	245 0 0	245 0 0	Service Kashmir Kar post.	245 0 0	245 0 0	245 0 0						
	Total per annum	2,940 0 0	2,940 0 0	2,940 0 0	Total per annum	2,940 0 0	2,940 0 0	2,940 0 0						
No. 791-F, dated 10th May 1892	SULEMAN KHELS				SULEMAN KHELS.									
	Mahki	75 0 0	75 0 0	75 0 0	Mahki	75 0 0	75 0 0	75 0 0						
	Total per mensem	75 0 0	75 0 0	75 0 0	Total per mensem	75 0 0	75 0 0	75 0 0						
	Total per annum	900 0 0	900 0 0	900 0 0	Total per annum	900 0 0	900 0 0	900 0 0						
No. 1178-E, dated 11th June 1890	CLOTHING FOR LEVIAS				CLOTHING FOR LEVIAS									
	Clothing for new Mahsud service	1,267 0 0	1,267 0 0	1,267 0 0	Clothing Mahsuds.	1,406 0 0	1,406 0 0	1,406 0 0						
	Contingencies for above	20 0 0	20 0 0	20 0 0	Ditto Wanswalsand Shikarwals	477 0 0	477 0 0	477 0 0						
	Clothing for Shiranis	525 0 0	525 0 0	525 0 0	Shiranis	511 0 0	511 0 0	511 0 0						
	Total per annum	1,812 0 0	1,812 0 0	1,812 0 0	Total per annum	2,650 0 0	2,650 0 0	2,650 0 0	888 0 0					
	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	66,240 0 0	66,240 0 0	66,240 0 0	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	104,494 0 0	104,494 0 0	104,494 0 0	88,254 0 0					

MIRAN SHAH,
The 8th October 1895. }

(Signed) H. A. ANDERSON,
Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent.

Certified that the entries in the column "Present Scale" have been checked and found correct

LAHORE,
The —th October 1895. }

(Signed) R. E. HAMILTON,
Accountant-General, Punjab.

II.
Statement of Proposition for Revision of Establishment.
[Chargeable to Provincial Revenues.]

ORDER SANCTIONING PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.	Office to which the Propo- sition refers.	NATURE OF CHARGES											PROPOSITION						Grounds of proposition.	Local Government's recom- mendation.
		PRESENT SCALE.					PROPOSED SCALE.					PERMANENT		TEMPORARY						
		No	Designation.	Pay			Average Cost.	No	Designation.	Pay			Average Cost.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.	Increase per month.	Decrease per month.			
				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.				Minimum.	Increment.	Maximum.		Amount	Amount	Period.	Amount	Period.		
Number and Date.		Rs a p	Ra.	Rs a p	Rs. a. p.			Rs a p	Rs	Rs a p	Rs. a. p.	Rs a. p.	Rs.		Rs.	Rs.				
Government of India No 1081-F, dated the 8th July 1889		8	OLD MASHUD SER- VICE Jemadars at Rs. 30 each	90 0 0	.	90 0 0	90 0 0		OLD MASHUD SER- VICE	Rs a p	Rs. a. p.							
		9	Duffadars at Rs 25 each	75 0 0	.	75 0 0	75 0 0									
Government of Pun- jab, No 4224.		54	Sowars at Rs 20 each	1,080 0 0	.	1,080 0 0	1,080 0 0			.	.									
		1	Sowar . .	19 0 0	.	19 0 0	19 0 0								
			Total per mensem	1,264 0 0	.	1,264 0 0	1,264 0 0		Included in the Im- perial proposition statement.							
	Total per annum	15,168 0 0	.	15,168 0 0	15,168 0 0		15,168			
Government of India, No 819-F, dated the 13th May 1892 and Government of Pun- jab, No. 1 C, dated the 8th August 1892			Border Military Police establishment proper including special posts.	3,996 0 0	.	3,996 0 0	3,996 0 0		Border Military Police	3,996 0 0	...	3,996 0 0	3,996 0 0							
Government of Pun- jab, No. 23, dated the 12th January 1894			Bhitanni Service	1,017 0 0	.	1,017 0 0	1,017 0 0		Bhitanni Service	1,017 0 0	.	1,017 0 0	1,017 0 0							
Government of India, No. 319 F, dated the 13th May 1892			Shirani at Charwash- kal.	75 0 0	..	75 0 0	75 0 0		Shirani at Charwash- kal.	75 0 0	.	75 0 0	75 0 0							
			Carried over	5,088 0 0	..	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0		Carried over	5,088 0 0	.	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0							

		OLD MAHSUD SERVICE—contd.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	OLD MAHSUD SERVICE—contd.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
		Brought forward	5,088 0 0	.	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0	Brought forward	5,088 0 0	..	5,088 0 0	5,088 0 0
Government of Punjab, No. 662, dated the 11th August 1892.	..	Vehoa Pass post	119 0 0	.	119 0 0	119 0 0	Vehoa Pass post	119 0 0	.	119 0 0	119 0 0
Government of India, No. 819-F, dated the 12th May 1892.	..	Total per mensem	5,207 0 0	.	5,207 0 0	5,207 0 0	Total per mensem	5,207 0 0	..	5,207 0 0	5,207 0 0
		Total per annum	62,484 0 0	.	62,484 0 0	62,484 0 0	Total per annum	62,484 0 0	...	62,484 0 0	62,484 0 0
Government of India, No. 819-F, dated the 12th May 1892.	.	Uniform allowances	3,050 0 0	...	3,050 0 0	3,050 0 0	Uniform allowances	3,050 0 0	..	3,050 0 0	3,050 0 0
Government of Punjab, No. 25, dated the 12th January 1894.																
Government of Punjab, No. 254, dated the 22nd April 1895	..	Compensation for dearness of provision.	1,866 9 0	.	1,866 9 0	1,866 9 0	Compensation for dearness of provision.	1,866 9 0	...	1,866 9 0	1,866 9 0
		GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	82,568 9 0	..	82,568 9 0	82,568 9 0	GRAND TOTAL PER ANNUM	87,400 9 0	..	87,400 9 0	87,400 9 0		15,168

DERA ISMAIL KHAN, }
The 5th December 1895. }

Certified that the entries in the column "Present scale" have been checked and found correct.
LAHORE, }
The —th December 1895. }

(Sd.) R. E. HAMILTON,
Accountant-General, Punjab.

(Sd.) R. I. BRUCE,
Commissioner and Superintendent,

Enclosure 2.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. C. Talbot, K.C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1896.

I am directed to reply to your letter, dated the 28th January 1896, forwarding two proposition statements showing financial results of the proposals affecting the tribal arrangements in Southern Waziristan.

2. I am to convey formal sanction to the expenditure detailed in the proposition statements, and to say that the Provincial Assignment of Land Revenue will be reduced in proportion to the amount by which provincial expenditure has been decreased in consequence of these arrangements.

No. 17.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 19th June 1896.

MY LORD,

I HAVE considered the correspondence forwarded with the letter of your Excellency's Government, in the Foreign Department, dated the 19th May 1896, regarding the allowances granted to the Darwesh Khel Waziris and the Dauris, and the arrangements made for the construction of levy posts in Wano and its neighbourhood, and in the Tochi Valley.

2. The total amount sanctioned, viz., Rs. 88,828, will be met from the provision of one lakh of rupees a year, which it was anticipated would be required for carrying out the policy in respect of Waziristan, approved in my predecessor's Despatch of the 24th August 1894.

3. With regard to your observations on the Sarawekai (or Barwand) post on the Shuhur route, you will have learnt, from my Despatch of the 8th May last, that, until levy posts have been established and their efficiency tested by experience, it will rest with your Government to decide whether the post at Sarawekai should be retained.

4. I understand that the expenditure, not exceeding Rs. 45,000, sanctioned for the construction of 13 levy posts in the Tochi valley is in addition to the above specified lakh of rupees.

5. These arrangements have my approval.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 18.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 9th June 1896. (Received 29th June 1896.)

MY LORD,

THE papers described in the accompanying list give details of the arrangements made for the political control of the Gomal, the Southern Waziri country, and the Tochi valley. The annual expenditure involved is Rs. 69,707, which includes the salaries of the Political officers in Wano and the Tochi valley, and of the establishments employed under them.

2. Pending the introduction of the permanent medical arrangements, we authorised the grant, with effect from the 1st April 1895, of an allowance of Rs. 100 a month to the Medical officer with the troops in Wano for attendance on the civil officials, public followers, tribal levies and others. We trust that our proceedings will be approved and confirmed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
J. WESTLAND,
J. WOODBURN,
M. D. CHALMERS,
E. H. H. COLLEN,
A. C. TREVOR.

No. 19.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 23rd July 1896.

MY LORD,

IN your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, of the 9th June, you report that you have sanctioned establishments for the political managements for the political management of the Gomal and Southern Waziristan country at a total annual cost of Rs. 38,681.

2. You also state that you have sanctioned a political establishment for the Tochi valley, involving a political expenditure of Rs. 31,026 a year.

3. On the understanding that a complete report, including all charges of this kind, will be shortly submitted to me in accordance with the instructions already conveyed to you, I give my provisional assent to these proceedings.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 20.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 14th October 1896. (Received 3rd November 1896.)

MY LORD,

THE enclosed papers relate to the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi valley; to the disturbances which occurred among the Madda Khel Waziris in February 1896; and to subsequent events, resulting in the murder of the muharrir of the Sheranna post.

2. On account of this murder and the riotous behaviour of the Madda Khel in February last, we have sanctioned the imposition of fines amounting to Rs. 3,000. We trust that the establishment of the head-quarters of the troops at Datta Khel will have the effect of restoring order in the Tochi valley.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
J. WESTLAND,
J. WOODBURN,
M. D. CHALMERS,
E. H. H. COLLEN,
A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 25th April 1896

I AM directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of correspondence on the subject of the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley, and to say that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick trusts that the views, in which all local authorities agree, will commend themselves to the Government of India.

Sub-enclosure A.

Extract from Letter from Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Rawalpindi, 9th March 1896.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces to forward, for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and for the favour of an expression of His Honour's opinion, certain proposals for the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley.

The distribution of those posts that is recommended by the Lieutenant-General Commanding is as follows :—

—	Guns.	Sabres.	Rifles.	Remarks.
Datta Khel	4 Guns... 2 Maxims.	20	500(a)	(a) i.e., one battalion at war strength not to be allowed to fall below the minimum strength of 500.
Boya	—	20	100	
Miran Shah	2 Maxims	40	300(b)	(b) Head-quarters and wing of a battalion at war strength. Minimum to be 300.
Idak	—	20	40	
Saidgi	—	20	60	
Total	4 Guns* 4 Maxims.	120*	1,000*	* i.e. the sanctioned garrison of— 1 Squadron ; 4 Guns Mountain Artillery ; 4 Maxims (2 Maxims not yet sanctioned) ; 2 Battalions.

In this distribution the strength of each of the two battalions has been calculated at 500 rifles as it has been found on the frontier that this is practically the number of efficient soldiers who can be maintained throughout the year on permanent outpost garrison duty.

It is necessary to enter into some details to explain the reasons which have led the Lieutenant-General Commanding to decide upon his present recommendations.

A Special Committee, of which the Acting Commissioner of the Deraját (Mr. Anderson) and the Political Officer on duty in the Tochi Valley (Mr. Casson) were members, assembled in September 1895 at Miran Shah for the purpose of formulating proposals regarding distribution of the permanent posts and their garrisons.

This Committee recommended that the main post should be at Miran Shah, with minor military posts at—

Datta Khel,
Boya,
Idak,
Saidgi.

It also recommended that levy posts should be established at—

Muhammad Khel,
Kanirogha,
Sheranni,
Bibi Algad,

and to this distribution of the levy posts the Lieutenant-General has no objection to offer.

In selecting Miran Shah as the principal military post, the Special Committee appears to have been influenced by a belief in the importance of that place as a trading centre, and in the consequent possibility of its eventual expansion into a considerable market and cantonment.

In the recommendations of the Committee the Lieutenant-General concurred provisionally, though his final decision was held in abeyance until the time when a further report on the water-supply at Miran Shah should be received, as the result of that report would, it was anticipated, materially affect the location of the main post of the valley.

The report on the experiments in connection with this water-supply has not yet been received by the Lieutenant-General Commanding from the Public Works Department of the Punjab Government, but recent events have meanwhile led him to decide against the distribution of posts and garrisons recommended by the Committee, so that the question of the water-supply

on the plain $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile north of Miran Shah becomes a secondary one, and further delay in forwarding the Lieutenant-General's recommendation is unnecessary.

The hostile attitude displayed by a section of the Madda Khels at the western end of the valley, as reported to you by the Political Officer in the Tochi, and the probability of further attempts at creating a condition of unrest and discontent, worked by local agitators, or by some agency from outside our sphere of influence, have convinced the Lieutenant-General Commanding that we shall never properly control the Upper Dauris, and tribes up to our border, until we hold the Tochi Valley sufficiently strongly at a convenient site near that border; and as Datta Khel is, in his opinion, the site that will best fulfil these requirements, he considers that the main post should be there.

He is not under any circumstances prepared to recommend that large fortified posts should be built on any site, but that small posts capable of holding 100 men be provided for the larger garrisons of Datta Khel and Miran Shah, the remainder of the garrison in each case being accommodated in an entrenched enclosure adjoining the post, the latter acting as the keep, into which all that remain would move in the event of a flying column being sent out for any purpose.

The distribution of posts in the Tochi Valley, which is now recommended by the Lieutenant-General Commanding, affects the site of the Miran Shah post, which should now, in his opinion, be built on the site of the present entrenched camp, and not on the plain $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile north of Miran Shah, where the Committee recommended that the Miran Shah post should be, and where water-boring experiments have been lately carried out.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Extract from Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, dated Lahore, 25th April 1896.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 9th March 1896, forwarding certain proposals for the establishment of permanent military posts in the Tochi Valley, and in reply to convey the following observations of the Lieutenant-Governor thereon.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick accepts the view of the local officers that the political and military head-quarters of the Tochi should be at Datta Khel. His Honour observes, however, that we shall lose certain advantages in removing the political head-quarters from Miran Shah, but the Political Officer and the Commanding Officer ought, he thinks, to be together, and as the latter ought clearly to be at Datta Khel, the former must be located there also.

As to the strength of the garrison in the valley, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is of opinion that there should be at least 1,500 rifles in the Tochi, of which about 900 should be at Datta Khel. When the garrison was fixed at two regiments it was understood that the regiments would be at full strength, leave being stopped during the short time a regiment would be quartered there. In these circumstances the Lieutenant-Governor would urge that the two Infantry regiments in the Tochi be kept up to their full strength, and that for the present all leave be stopped. We cannot, His Honour considers, afford to run any risks in the Tochi, which we should be doing if the strength of the rifles was less than that recommended by him, because a disturbance there would probably mean a general rising of the tribes all round.

I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor endorses Mr. Anderson's suggestion that the post at Boya should be made as strongly defensive as possible.

Enclosure No. 2.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 3rd June 1896.

SIR,

In continuation of my letter dated 26th February 1896, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of papers containing a full report by Mr. Anderson on the recent Madda Khel agitation in the upper part of the Tochi Valley, and to say that there is still a certain haziness over the whole affair, but that His Honour agrees with Mr. Anderson that it is of no great importance.

There is, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, from all that has come before him since Government set about settling the Tochi, a certain amount of opposition from some quarters to our advance up the valley towards Sherani, but the demonstration of last February seems to His Honour to have been due chiefly to the natural desire to get as much money out of Government as possible, and to Sadda Khan's hope that by exaggerating the agitation, if indeed he did not start it, he would induce us to move up the valley under his auspices and thus strengthen his hands against his rivals. It may be hoped that the death of Ayub Khan will diminish the chance of such things occurring in future.

 Sub-enclosure A.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., Political Officer, Torchi Valley, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Miranshah, 10th April 1896.

In continuation of Mr. Casson's, dated 11th March 1896, regarding the tribal agitation and demonstrations which occurred in the month of February last among the Madda Khels, Khidder Khels, and Manzar Khels of the upper part of the Tochi Valley, I have the honour to submit a further report regarding these events and some occurrences of a similar nature reported in the month of March at the time of the Id festival.

2. The Madda Khels, who are the people chiefly concerned in the occurrences under report, are a large section of the Darwesh Khel, numbering about 1,600 fighting men. Their settlements lie first along the Tochi River, from the neighbourhood of Sheranni westward to the Afghan boundary as recently demarcated, and, secondly, along the Kazha River, which joins the Tochi at Paki Killa and its various tributaries. The former are known collectively as Gor or Ger and the latter as Kazha. The distinction between the two, however, is not one of descent as the same sub-sections are to be found in Kazha as in Gor. By tribal custom Gor and Kazha share equally. Both recognize Sadda Khán as the head Malik and his family as the head family of the Madda Khel.

3. The Madda Khels by tribal custom share equally with the Tori Khels, but of their half share the Manzar Khels take one-third share. In the distribution of allowances and services recently made the Madda Khels, for the reasons which need not here be given, were given a share equal to the Tori Khels and a separate allotment was made for the Manzar Khels. Thus the Madda Khels receive considerably more than they were entitled to receive by tribal custom, and they have no just cause of complaint as to the share allotted to them. In the internal distribution of the allowances 27 Maliks were given allowances for service. A large Sirdári allowance was assigned to Sadda Khán and the Sillahdári of 23 footmen was assigned to Sadda Khán and his uncle, Ayub Khán, on the distinct understanding that they were to divide it among minor Maliks for whom no provision has otherwise been made. At the time when the circumstances under report occurred these two Maliks had not distributed the Sillahdári and are responsible for the consequences.

4. Sadda Khán, to whom reference has been made, takes by descent the first rank among the Darwesh Khels of independent territory. At the time, however, of our entry in the Tochi Valley his uncle, Ayub, was certainly the most capable and popular Malik in the section. There was considerable rivalry between the two. Sadda Khán's position was weakened, and, being naturally

of an intriguing and designing character, he has frequently adopted crooked courses and particularly so in connection with the intrigues which followed the distribution of the allowances.

5. The Khidder Khels are a weak sub-section of the Mohmit Khels, who as a section occupy the Waziri country to the east of Miranshah. The Khidder Khels, being detached from the main body of their section and being settled near the powerful Madda Khels, have fallen very completely under the influence of the latter. Their main settlements are the group of villages in the neighbourhood of Datta Khel. For this reason they were to some extent drawn into the agitation raised by the Madda Khels, but I don't think that they were very actively concerned.

6. The Manzar Khels, the third section concerned, are allied in descent to the Madda Khels. Kanirohga, Paki Killa and Drewasta at the junction of the Kazha and the Tochi are their three villages. They not only took no active part in the agitation, but refused to join in any demonstrations when invited by the Madda Khels.

7. The first distribution of allowances was made to the Madda Khels on 5th November 1895. All the Malikhs accepted their allowances gratefully and returned to their homes. Some of them joined in the large jurga which assembled at Miranshah in November and December 1895, proceedings of which were reported to you in Mr. Casson's, dated 13th December 1895. They quietly dispersed to their homes after receiving their allowances on the 11th December 1895. In January the Surveyor of the Amír appeared in the Kazha and his proceedings were duly reported by Mr. Casson. It was also reported that the Afghán officials were intriguing with the Madda Khels and that the latter had become excited and agitated. The Malikhs made the most of this incident and represented that the excitement was serious.

8. The first riotous demonstration of the Madda Khels occurred on the 9th February. On that date there was a gathering for the purpose of consultation at Sheranni of about 100 Madda Khels, chiefly from the Maisara Valley and the Mastoi and Tochi above their junction at Dotai. The discussion referred to the question of allowances. The leaders were minor Malikhs, to whom allowances have not been allotted, but who would have had little cause for discontent had Sadda Khán and Ayúb satisfied them in the manner stated in paragraph 3. Excitement followed the discussions, and some of the more turbulent spirits threatened to turn the Munshi out of the temporary Sheranni post and also threatened some of the levies. I concur generally with what Mr. Casson has written in paragraph 3 of his letter as to the ringleaders and other persons concerned in the riot. It is difficult, however, to ascertain exactly what part was played by the ringleaders. The Munshi himself gives a very confused statement, stating that it was impossible to identify the rioters and those who assisted him. Sadda Khán states that Piyal and Núr Muhammad were leaders in the discussions which preceded the riot, but that they, together with Sarláí, Jibráíl and Rájá, assisted the Munshi and restrained the mob. I am disposed to believe this story. I believe that the ringleaders did not contemplate violence and assisted in restraining the mob, which dispersed within an hour without doing harm to anybody. It seems to be a reasonable belief that the Munshi writing his first report in the excitement following the riot considerably exaggerated the facts. At the same time it cannot be doubted that the mob behaved in a riotous way and uttered threats regarding the levy posts.

9. The next indication of the agitation is the letter signed by Malik Núr Muhammad and other malcontents, copy of which accompanied Mr. Casson's, dated 14th February 1895. This letter was written by one Jasim Shah, a Gurbaz religious student. It appears to have been dropped into the Political Officer's petition box on the 12th or 13th February. When search was made for the person who brought it he could not be found. It is a significant fact that its arrival coincided with the arrival of Shadam Khán, brother of Sadda Khán, and Jamadár of Sheranni post, where the riot of the 9th February occurred. Some doubts have been entertained as to the genuineness of this letter, but it seems to me probable that the letter was written on behalf of some of the men whose names appear in it. I have no doubt, however, that the extremely aggressive tone of the letter and the character of the demands made

in it may be rightly attributed to the inspiration of the fanatical writer. In my opinion the object of the senders of this letter was to draw attention to the fact that they had not received allowances and to impress the Government with their importance and the advantage of according them allowances also.

10. On the 14th of February the men who had taken part in the previous agitation collected together and went to Kanirogha of the Manzar Khels with the object of inducing the latter to join in the agitation. The Manzar Khels, however, refused to have anything to do with them. A quarrel ensued, one of the Madda Khels was killed, and they returned to their homes. From this time to the date of the Id, the 16th of March, there was no further demonstration though the Malikis represented that a certain amount of agitation prevailed.

11. Before passing to the Id demonstration it is desirable to notice the action taken by Sadda Khan and other Malikis in the events narrated above. Sadda Khan was absent at Miranshah from the 9th to the 16th February. He in the first instance ascribed the demonstrations to be due to insufficient and incorrectly distributed allowances, and he stated that agitation was caused by the Amir's surveyor and by our not assisting the Madda Khels in their quarrels with the Amir's subjects. At a later date he again assigned the first and second reasons for the demonstrations, and what is most significant of all, he persistently represented that the agitation had grown beyond his control, and he asked that troops should be sent up the valley to assist him in suppressing it. Shadam Khan from the first took the same line, and I think that I am not wrong in saying that the leading Khidder Khel Malikis adopted the same course. I believe that the demonstrations were made exclusively by men of Gor; the Kazha Madda Khels stood aloof. On the 23rd of February all their chief men stated that all was quiet in Kazha, and they repudiated any connection with the agitation. Early in March independent messengers sent into the Madda Khel country returned with the report that the agitation was raised by those who have not received allowances in order to put pressure on Government and did not indicate hostility to Government.

12. The festival of Id Fitr was held this year on the 16th of March, and in accordance with the usual custom the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels assembled in large numbers at the ancestral tombs of Malik Shadam Khan's family near Sheranni. Owing to the death of Ayub Khan, who has been mentioned before, the assembly was larger than usual, and a number of malcontents and some of the Mullahs and religious students seized the opportunity of raising an agitation. They attempted to draw the Kazha Madda Khels into their plan, but failed, though certain Kazha Maüda Khel Mullahs are said to have joined the agitation. The Malikis represented that the Mullahs attempted to stir the people up against them, charging them with bringing British troops into their country. Sadda Khan and other leading Malikis took oath that they were not bringing British troops into the county, but at the same time they declared that if the troops did come into the country they not only would not oppose them, but would render every assistance. After this the people dispersed to their homes. Various alarmist reports at this time were received from the Muharrirs, but I attach little credit to them, because it was obvious that the Muharrirs were being utilized by the intriguing Malikis for their own ends, and because Sadda Khan assured me by means of a confidential messenger that these reports should not be believed, and that though the tribesmen were holding discussions there was nothing to be feared and he would break up the assembly.

13. On receipt of the reports regarding the assemblages at Id I at once sent orders to the Malikis warning them that they would be held strictly responsible for preservation of order and for the suppression of the agitation. I made no secret of my belief that the Malikis themselves were at the bottom of the agitation, and while I endeavoured not to make too much of the occurrences, I warned them that the Government would take serious notice if orders were not obeyed. Any representations which the Malikis might wish to make should be made to me. I believe that the Malikis acted in accordance with these orders.

14. On the last day of March the leading Madda Khel and Khidder Khel Malikis came in to see me, and I also interviewed them again on the 7th and 8th April. The Malikis undertake full responsibility of levy posts, dak arrangements and for their sections. They understand at length that as

regards the allowances their sections have been well treated and the allowances will not be increased. They entered into an agreement to settle certain disputes regarding the present distribution—the main one arising from the claim that Kazha should share equally with Gor in the tribal allowances other than Sirdari. Sadda Khan undertook to satisfy the dissatisfied from his own sillahdari, and he asks that he may be allowed to make the necessary arrangements quietly during the next month in order that additional claimants might not be encouraged. I personally paid all the Madda Khel, Khidder Khel and Manzar Khel levies and distributed the allowances to the Malikhs. The Malikhs, however, unanimously pressed me to obtain for them some written assurance for the satisfaction of their tribesmen that the Government will not take revenue from them; they will be exempt from Court Fees; their jungle and grazing grounds will not be interfered with; that their mines will remain their own; that cases regarding women will be decided according to their own customs and offenders will be confined in jails in the Tochi. The question of granting sanads is under discussion in a separate reference, and I will only say with reference to this demand that the Malikhs lay great stress on the necessity of their being provided with some written assurance regarding these matters. They would be satisfied with vernacular parwanahs signed by the Political Officer.

15. I note here that Sadda Khan gave me on the 31st March the following explanation of the agitation described above. He states that in the first place there is discontent because allowances were given to Ahmadzais who have no lands in the Tochi; secondly, the proceedings of the Amir's surveyor raised suspicion that the boundary line fixed in 1895 would not remain, and that a considerable portion of Madda Khel lands will fall on the Afghan side. Lastly, the determination of Government not to take possession and full control of the Waziri country had stimulated a feeling of independence and had excited the tribesmen to throw off the control even of their Malikhs.

16. It would be unreasonable I think not to attach some weight to these causes of the agitation of the past assigned by the leading Malikhs. On the other hand, if it be true that the Malikhs themselves instigated that agitation, one may be justified in accepting their explanations with some doubt and suspicion. My own belief is that the chief motive—in fact the only strong motive at work—was the desire of Malikhs and tribesmen alike to bring pressure to bear upon Government to make a substantial increase to the allowances.

17. I take the case of Sadda Khan as that of the leading man of the tribe. There is direct evidence against him. The Kazha Malikhs openly stated in Jirga that he instigated the agitation for his own ends and to serve the interests of his section. This belief is shared by leading Malikhs of Upper Dawar whom I have consulted and by that shrewd and well-informed observer Gholam Muhammad Khan, Assistant District Superintendent, Police. It is in no way improbable that Sadda Khan should seek to increase his own influence in his section by obtaining large allowances for it, and his neglect to distribute his sillahdari, which was purposely given to him for distribution, demonstrates beyond all doubt that he wished to save his own pocket, and he thought the best way to do this was to induce the Government to grant additional sillahdari while he retained his own. In the beginning he represented that the agitation was beyond his control, and he asked for troops, and it is not until a later stage when he had failed to obtain this assistance that he took the opposite tack, and gave the assurance that the alarmist reports were not to be credited and that he was able single-handed to suppress the agitation. The judgment formed regarding Sadda Khan's participation in the agitation applies to other members of his family and the Khidder Khel Malikhs, Salihdin and Gul Samid, who acted for the Khidder Khels on the same lines as Sadda Khan acted for the Madda Khel.

18. A satisfactory feature of the events under report is that the agitation was practically confined to one-half only of the Madda Khels, those of Gor, and to a few only of the Khidder Khels. None of the other Utmanzai sections, such as Tori Khels and Mohmit Khels, have shown any disposition to side with the agitators.

19. The question remains as to what measures should be adopted to prevent the recurrence of similar agitation and demonstrations. There seem to me

to be three courses open. First, to establish permanently a strong Military post at Datta Khel ; secondly, march troops through the Madda Khel country to punish the offenders and to prove to the Madda Khels that we will not permit them to resort to show of violence to obtain their own ends ; lastly, to treat the occurrence as a matter of no great importance, to hold the Maliks responsible that such agitation should not occur, and to keep matters going on as they are until Government has finally decided the question of the distribution of the troops in the Tochi Valley.

20. I am not in favour of the second plan. No doubt it might be politic to inflict some punishment on the offenders and to demonstrate our strength to the section. On the other hand, the demonstrations were not of a very serious character ; their object was to obtain concessions and not to demonstrate hostility, and though threats were used and a show of violence was made, no actual injury was caused to any one. The great argument against a temporary movement of troops for punitive purposes, however, is that the people always look upon the withdrawal as a sign of weakness, forget the punishment inflicted, and take credit to themselves that troops are unable to remain permanently. These remarks of course do not include a visit paid by a Political Officer with Military escort to choose a site for posts and the like.

21. As regards the last proposal, as far as I can judge it will be possible to maintain the same amount of control that has hitherto been maintained. I see no difficulty in maintaining the levy posts and dak service as before, provided that the Maliks carry out their promises and pressure is maintained on them to do so. The events, however, of the past two months demonstrate that this arrangement cannot be permanent. The Maliks require more support, and owing mainly to the reduction of garrison in the Tochi there are difficulties in the way of assisting them with troops. The only permanent solution of the difficulties is to build a strong post which will dominate the country of the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels. I believe that the Maliks and the majority of the tribe will welcome the establishment of such a post.

22. I will add in conclusion that although I have shown, as I believe, that Malik Sadda Khan and other leading Maliks were engaged in the intrigue which caused agitation and objectionable demonstrations I do not for a moment question their loyalty as a body and individually to their promises made to Government. I do not doubt that Sadda Khan in asking for troops really wishes the support of troops to strengthen his authority over his section. In his last conversation with me he showed his good-will by recommending that a levy post should be built at Dotai, pointing out that the further west we had our post the better control we should have of the Maisarwals and other sub-sections who took prominent part in the demonstrations of the past. There can be no question that the Manzar Khels, Khidder Khels and Kazha Maliks are anxious to have their levy posts built, and have taken or will take contracts for the supply of wood and labour.

23. A copy of this is sent direct to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab for information.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Extract from letter from R. I. Bruce, Esquire, C. I. E., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to The Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Tank, 16th April 1896.

In continuation of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 10th instant, to my address, copy of which has been sent to you direct on the subject of the tribal agitation and demonstration which occurred at Sherrani in February last, I have the honor to forward copy of Mr. Casson's letter,* dated 11th ultimo.

I concur with Mr. Anderson in believing, as I suspected from the first that the agitation was not without the connivance of the leading Maliks. Mr. Anderson now finds out that some of the minor Maliks who had received no allowances or only small in amount had a real grievance, and leading Maliks like Sadda Khan, who was made responsible to satisfy them out of

* Not printed.

the share which was allotted to him for the minor Maliks, had not given them anything. The consequence was that they all clamoured for additional allowances. The encouragement of this agitation by the leading Maliks gave them a *pardah* (screen) with the minor Maliks. Sadda Khan at the same time I think did not really believe that additional allowances would be granted for these men simply on account of the agitation, but he judged that if perchance it might be, all the better, as it would save his pocket. His real object was, I believe, to get the troops up the Tochi again. He knew that he was suspected by his own clansmen, and calculated that if the troops were there it would afford him such support as would enable him to keep what he had got. The explanation which he gave to Mr. Anderson on the 31st ultimo, as given in paragraph 15 of his letter under reference, simply confirms this view.

Even now I venture to doubt that Sadda Khan will willingly surrender much to the minor Maliks as these men are very loath even to give up anything they have once got.

Moreover, I consider Sadda Khan calculated, and rightly I believe, that the presence of troops in the Upper Tochi would save his people from the vexatious interference of Khalifa Nur Muhammad and others of the Amir's officials and also future trouble about their lands.

Notwithstanding the above, I fully concur with Mr. Anderson in his remarks about the loyalty of Sadda Khan and other Maliks who engaged in intrigues which caused an agitation. They did not intend serious hostile opposition to the authority of Government. I have reason to believe that there was a good deal of exaggeration in what was reported to us.

The best course in my opinion is that suggested by Mr. Anderson, namely, to establish permanently a strong military post at Datta Khel, which has, I believe, been already recommended by Government on strong military and political grounds. Sadda Khan is a shrewd man, and the warning conveyed to him and other leading Maliks by Mr. Anderson will, I hope, be sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the agitation.

'Enclosure No. 3.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esquire, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 6th August 1896.

I AM directed to forward, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of correspondence regarding the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna Post, and the general situation in the Upper Tochi Valley, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor desires me to send these papers in continuation of my letter, dated 3rd June 1896, and to do so without delay, because they indicate a recrudescence of the difficulties which, as was stated in that letter, it was hoped might pass away, and because they show the necessity for coming to the earliest possible decision on the proposal for the establishment of the military and political head-quarters of the Tochi in the vicinity of Datta Khel submitted in the correspondence ending with my letter, dated 12th June last, to the Government of India.

2. It seems clear from these papers and from the papers relating to the Mullah Powindah which are being submitted with a separate letter that we are destined both in the Darwesh Khel and the Mahsud country to experience greater difficulties as time goes on from the weakness of the Waziri Maliks. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick referred to the difference in this respect between the Waziri tribes and some of the tribes further south in his note of the 14th March 1894 on the demarcation of the Waziri boundary submitted to the Government of India with this office letter, dated 24th March 1894, and we have had many illustrations of it since. These Waziri tribes, like some of the tribes further north, are organized, in so far as they can be said to have any organization, on an extremely democratic basis; they in their natural state, at least in ordinary times, will submit themselves to their leading members only to a very limited extent, and we can add little to the authority of their natural leaders by giving them the

position we do under us—indeed in some cases it would seem that by becoming our men whatever little influence they would otherwise have had with the tribe is weakened. Even within our own border we find tribes with a similar tendency to resent any artificial enhancement of the position of their most prominent men. In some parts of the Peshawar District we have had to abandon the idea of appointing zaildars, because if we picked out the biggest men as zaildars the men next in degree would resent it and quarrels would arise, and within the last few days the Lieutenant-Governor has had a case before him in which the Commissioner of Peshawar said it would be unsafe to appoint even a lambardar in the Mohmand village of Panjpao as he would probably be murdered.

3. His Honour himself suspects that the Tochi Malikhs referred to in this correspondence and the Mahsud Malikhs referred to in the other are purposely exaggerating the difficulties arising from this cause. In both cases they are a very numerous body, and he believes that in selecting them our officers have left out no man of real importance. Moreover, our service allowances are given not only to them, but also to very large numbers of their dependents. They ought not therefore, even making full allowance for the democratic constitution of the tribes, to be so weak as they pretend to be, and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick believes that their exaggeration of their helplessness is due to the facts that some of them shrink from the unpopularity attaching to the performance of the task we set them, and that others—the biggest men—are anxious to lead us to assume a complete dominion in which they reckon on having a considerable share. The Lieutenant-Governor has sometimes felt doubts as to the genuineness of the invitations which have from time to time been put before us asking us to locate a military force in the heart of some tribal tract and assume complete control, but he has no doubt that the invitations now before us both from the Tochi side and the Gomal side express the wishes of considerable numbers of the leading men. What proportion of the general body of the tribe is with these leading men in either case it would not be easy to ascertain, but that these leading men really desire us to go in and take control is, His Honour thinks, beyond doubt, and that in order to induce us to do so they exaggerate the difficulties of the present position is, he thinks, almost equally certain.

4. It must not be supposed from what the Lieutenant-Governor says above that he means to make light of those difficulties: on the contrary, he believes they are very real and very serious, and that they will force us before long to do much more than we desire to do. In the case of the Mahsud country, if the question were to arise in an acute form, it might prove a very perplexing one, as we cannot afford to lock up another military force there, but, as will be seen from the correspondence relating to it, there is room to hope that it will not so present itself for some time. In the Tochi, on the contrary, the question is much simpler. We already have there a sufficient force to support us in the exercise of any degree of control that we might be called upon to assume, and it may be that the mere fact of the head-quarters being established in the vicinity of Datta Khel as proposed would in itself set everything right.

5. What Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick would therefore suggest is that sanction be at once given to the proposal to establish the head-quarters in the vicinity of Datta Khel. There is, it must be remembered, nothing new in this proposal. It will be seen from this office letter, dated 12th October 1895 and its enclosures, that it was a question whether the head-quarters should be established there or lower down the valley, and the point has not since been settled.

Enclosure 4.

Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 7th September, 1896.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 6th August 1896, forwarding a copy of correspondence, regarding the murder of Honda Ram, muharrir of the Sheranna post, and the general situation in the Upper Tochi Valley, and recommending that sanction be at once given to establish the headquarters of the Tochi force in the vicinity of Datta Khel.

2. The state of affairs disclosed in the correspondence is not satisfactory. The local officers, however, believe that the location of troops in the vicinity of Datta Khel will have the effect of restoring order, and of strengthening the hands of the Malikhs, who have themselves requested that troops may be advanced to that place. Orders have, accordingly, been issued for the establishment of the headquarters of the force at, or in the neighbourhood of Datta Khel.

3. The Government of India approve the fine of Rs. 2,000 on the Madda Khels, which the Lieutenant-Governor has authorised on account of the murder of Honda Ram. As regards the fine of Rs. 1,000 inflicted on account of the Sheranna agitation of February last, the Government of India agree with His Honour that as Mr. Gee announced the fine to the Malikhs, who have accepted and distributed it, his action need not be interfered with. The Government of India also agree that it is not expedient to demand the surrender of Waris Khan, the murderer of Honda Ram, who has fled to Afghan territory.

No. 21.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 11th June, 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram has been received from Gee, Political Officer in Tochi, dated 10th June :—“ I visited Sheranna and Maizar to-day, with escort of 300 rifles, two guns, and 12 cavalry, for the purpose of fixing site for post and realization of fines. About two p.m. we were suddenly attacked while resting under the trees at Maizar, in a most cowardly and treacherous manner. Casualties known at present are Captain Browne, R.A., Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A., Colonel Bunny, 1st Sikhs, killed; Lieutenant Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant Higginson, 1st Sikhs, Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs, wounded severely. Exact number of native officers and sepoy killed and wounded not known at present. We were pursued for about four miles, until reinforced from Datta Khel. I advocate immediate retaliatory measures on Madda Khel. I will send more particulars to-morrow.

No. 22.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th June, 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Gee's visit to Maizar had been pre-arranged, and two Malikhs were sent ahead. One of them brought food for British officers and the Mahomedans; then suddenly fire was opened, without warning, from all sides, and all British officers except Gee himself hit almost immediately. Escort retired over hills to Sheranna, reaching Datta Khel past eleven. Enemy estimated at 500 at first, increasing to 1,000. Supposed to be tribesmen of Sheranna, Maizar and up to Dotoi. Guns brought in; nine rifles, twenty-four mules missing. Estimated Waziri loss, fifty killed and a large number of wounded.

No. 23.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th June, 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

We have authorised the despatch of two brigades to Maizar to destroy the fortified Kots and to remain there for the present. No signs of hostile combination at Maizar or Sheranna, both of which places are said to be deserted. Commissioner believes the outbreak fanatical. Until the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has advised, we will not decide terms.

No. 24.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 17th July, 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Following is summary of terms we are instructing General Bird to impose on Madda Khels:—(1), tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Malik and other ringleaders in attack whom General, after inquiry, thinks fit to demand; (2), all stolen property to be restored, or its value in default; (3), fine of Rs. 1,200 for murder of Sheranna Levy Mohurrir to be paid; (4), a fine of Rs. 10,000 in cash or arms, or by furnishing labour on work approved by Government. Allowances hitherto enjoyed by Madda Khels are forfeited. We leave full discretion to Bird as to manner in which terms should be communicated, suggesting for his consideration assembly of Jirgahs as was done by Bruce and Lockhart in 1895.

No. 25.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 21st July, 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Bird occupied Sheranni on the 20th July, and found the village deserted. On pushing a reconnaissance to Maizar he found that place to be also empty.

No. 26.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to The Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 21st July 1897. (Received 9th August, 1897.)

MY LORD,

Your Lordship has been briefly advised by telegram of the attack made on the 10th June last at Maizar, upon the escort of Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in the Tochi valley, and of the action we have decided to take in the matter. We have now the honour to forward copies of papers which furnish detailed information on the subject.

2. Mr. Gee's escort consisted of two guns, twelve sabres, and 300 rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs; his objects were, firstly, to finally determine the site for a levy post which was to be established between Sheranna and Maizar at the head of the Tochi valley, and, secondly, to settle details in connection with an outstanding fine imposed* in September last for the murder of the moharrir of the Sheranna levy post. Mr. Gee's

* See Despatch, dated the 14th October 1896. The fine was reduced to Rs. 1,200 in May last.

visit was originally fixed for the 9th June, but was postponed till the following day in consequence of rain. His intentions were known to all the Sheranna and Maizar Maliks. On arrival at Maizar, Mr. Gee proceeded to Dotoi with some of the Maliks and the cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe, two of the most influential of the Sheranna Maliks, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, the infantry and guns at Maizar. On Mr. Gee's return, Sadda Khan produced food for the Muhammadans of the party and the British officers. About 2 p.m., without the slightest warning, fire was opened from the buildings close by. The six British military officers were almost immediately hit, and the force withdrew over the hills to Sheranna, followed by a gathering of tribesmen which rapidly increased to over 1,000. The retirement was made with the greatest deliberation and in excellent order. On the arrival of reinforcements from Datta Khel, the tribesmen were finally beaten off. Our casualties were Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant H. A. Cruickshank, R.A., killed; Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton-Browne, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, wounded. Dr. Cassidy has died of his wound. One native officer and 21 rank and file were killed, and 24 rank and file wounded. Several horses and mules were also killed and wounded. The

losses of the tribesmen are estimated at about one hundred killed, including some leading Maliks, and many wounded. The Madda Khels fled to the hills, leaving Sheranna and Maizar deserted. The attack seems clearly to have been pre-arranged, but we are not yet in a position to apportion the responsibility for the plot.

3. At the time of the outbreak the troops in the Tochi Valley were distributed as follows :—

Miran Shah	{	2 Maxim guns.
		{	40 Sabres.
		{	368 Rifles.
		{	4 Mountain guns.
Datta Khel	{	2 Maxim guns.
		{	20 Sabres.
		{	924 Rifles.
Boya	{	20 Sabres
		{	92 Rifles.
Idak	{	20 Sabres.
		{	40 Rifles.
		{	20 Sabres.
Saidgai	{	52 Rifles.

Steps were immediately taken to strengthen the posts in the Tochi and on the Shahur and Gumal lines, though there then seemed little risk of the Mahsuds generally joining in. We decided that an advance in strength should be promptly made to Maizar and Sheranna and that the fortified buildings at those places should be destroyed. A Field Force of two* brigades was assembled under Brigadier-Generals C. C. Egerton, A.D.C., C.B., D.S.O., and W. P. Symons, C.B., Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., took up command of the Force on the 21st June at Bannu, and assumed supreme political control on entering the Tochi Valley on the 8th July. Mr. Gee had been selected as Chief Political Officer under the Major-General, but was unfortunately unable to carry on his duties, as his health broke down. Mr. Younghusband, Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, has been appointed in his stead, and Messrs. Lorimer and Kettlewell have been attached as Political Officers to the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively.

4. On the 13th July Major-General Bird issued a Proclamation announcing his intention to advance to Maizar and destroy the fortified buildings in Maizar and Sheranna, to remain there, or in that neighbourhood, as long as may seem desirable, and to compel obedience to the orders of Government. The Proclamation promised that the terms to be imposed on those responsible for, or concerned in, the affair of the 10th June would be announced in due course, and concluded by warning all others who wished to live in peace with Government to refrain from obstructing the Force, as any further unfriendly acts would be severely dealt with.

5. The following are the terms which we have decided to impose on the Madda Khel :—

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Maliks and other ringleaders in the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as Major-General Bird thinks fit, he may declare must be surrendered; and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.
- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or, in default, the value, as determined by Government, must be paid.

- (3) Payment of the fine of Rs. 1,200 outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, moharrir of the Sheranna levy post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The Madda Khels have, by their misconduct, forfeited the allowances which they received from Government, and this will be made known to them. Whether the allowances should be hereafter regranted will to a great extent depend upon how far they prove amenable in regard to the terms now imposed. No announcement will be made to them on this subject at the present stage.

6. Subject to one exception and to certain slight modifications, the terms are those recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. We have not been able to approve His Honour's proposal to demand land revenue from the Madda Khels. So far as the tribes are concerned, we might be within our rights in demanding revenue, but in taking such a step we should be departing from the policy, approved by Her Majesty's Government, of not undertaking the administration of the Tochi Valley, except in the tract inhabited by the Dauris. Our reasons for not accepting the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendation in this respect have been explained to him in our *Foreign Secretary's* letter, dated the 17th July 1897.

7. There is no reason to suppose that Mulla Powindah was concerned in the attack at Maizar, or that he was even aware it was impending. The Madda Khel, who were the principal offenders, sent a messenger to invite the Mulla's help after the occurrence, and it is rumoured that they also informed the Amir's Governor at Urgan. On the 20th June, the Native Assistant Political Officer at Wano received a letter from the Mulla, in which he offered to arrange peace with the Madda Khels, and asked what terms were to be demanded. No answer has been sent to him. He has since been apparently endeavouring to excite the tribes generally against us, but the reports are of so conflicting a nature that it is impossible to predict at present what opposition is likely to be offered to General Bird's Force. The attitude of the Dauris is satisfactory, and their Maliks have offered every assistance in keeping order in their country; but some cases of firing into camps, attacking convoys, and cutting telegraph wires have occurred within their limits.

8. It was General Bird's intention to advance from Datta Khel on the 20th July.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 J. WESTLAND,
 M. D. CHALMERS,
 E. H. H. COLLEN,
 A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure 1.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 12th June 1897.

With reference to your letter, dated the 11th June 1897, regarding the treacherous attack made by the Madda Khels upon the escort of the Political Officer, Tochi, at Maizar on the 10th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of further telegrams received from Mr. Gee and the Commissioner, Derajat Division, on the subject and on my reply thereto.

Sub-Enclosure A.

From the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 11th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Main facts as follows: As stated in my demi-official, I had originally intended to go to Maizar on 9th, and Sadda Khan and Alambe were sent on the day before to arrange for payment of fine in Honda Ram's case. Our visit was postponed till 10th owing to rain. The attack was undoubtedly planned beforehand, and all Maizar and Sheranna Maliks knew of it, even if they did not plan it. On arrival at Maizar, I visited Dotoi with some Maliks and cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe with Colonel Bunny, and infantry and guns at Maizar. On my return Sadda Khan produced food for all Musalman sepoy and for us. About 2 p.m., when we had finished tiffin, without the slightest warning, fire was opened from all the Kots round on the British officers, all of whom except myself were hit almost at once. We were fired at from all sides and had to retire over the hills towards Sheranna. One Subedar and 22 men were killed and 25 men wounded; nine rifles and 24 mules missing. Enemy numbered possibly 500 at first, but increased to over 1,000 by the time we were opposite Sheranna. All tribesmen of Sheranna, Maizar, and I think up to Dotoi were concerned. Later a number of men arrived from Kazha over the hills, but we had then been re-inforced from Datta Khel. We did not reach camp till past eleven. Gathering was I think partly fanatical, but arranged by Maliks; only thing in favour of latter is that they saved Ghulam Muhammad's life by taking him down to a tower across the Tochi, but none of them attempted to stop the attack. Waziri loss put down at 50 killed, including Sheranna Mulla, 3 Akhunds, and Malik Pyall, and large number wounded. Sheranna and all Maizar Kots deserted; they should be razed to the ground when reinforcements arrive. General has wired direct to me about this and I have asked for rest of 1st Punjab Infantry to be sent up here. No Maliks in at present. I will detain any that appear in custody. We had absolutely no warning of any kind, and a regular trap seems to have been laid.

Sub-Enclosure B.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 11th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

I am starting now for Bannu, which I reach to-morrow morning. So far as I can judge from reports received and from experience of part taken by local Mullas in Sheranna agitation of 1896, the attack was inspired by fanaticism; the action now to be taken will largely depend on the present attitude of the sections concerned, as regards which I am not yet in possession of full details. In any case I consider it is most essential to occupy Maizar with troops for the present, both to maintain prestige in that country and to facilitate compliance with any terms we may demand hereafter. I am enquiring from Political Officer, Tochi, and Commanding Officer, Tochi, as to what strength of garrison will be required with reference to the attitude of tribes, and whether in view to the occupation of Maizar any additional troops will be required.

Sub-Enclosure C.

From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Simla, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated 12th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Very early information is required on the following matters:—

First. Can you account for outbreak? Has it anything to do with coincidence of visit with Mohurram, or with plans of Mulla Powindah and his presence in Shaktu, as reported in Grant's telegrams. Has visit of Sadda Khan to Urgan, as reported in Tochi Diaries, any bearing on the subject?

Second. Do you agree with Gee in considering all the Madda Khels, including Kazha sections, implicated, and have you any reason at present for thinking other tribes implicated?

Third. Is it possible to ascribe origin of outrage to unpremeditated attack on the British officers by a few fanatics, or do you think with Gee that it was a piece of organized treachery and entirely opposed to Pathan code of honour?

Fourth. You should consider possibility of settlement by demand for immediate and unconditional surrender of all Malikhs and ringleaders of sections implicated.

Fifth. If Maizar is occupied at once, as proposed by you and Gee, to what extent do you consider tribal combination against us probable? Estimate of strength of such opposition and of force required to meet it should be given. Will it be necessary to strengthen Shahur and Gumal lines in view of possible complications with Mahsuds?

Sixth. You should give your matured opinion with reference to above considerations, whether advance to Maizar or other position in Upper Tochi should be at once undertaken, or whether it will be necessary to wait for reinforcements.

Seventh. You will no doubt consider what retaliatory measures are called for, and report as soon as possible.

Enclosure No. 2.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 16th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 12th June. I deal with enquiries made therein *seriatim*:—

First—Outbreak was, in my opinion, inspired by fanaticism. Mullas tried to stir up people on Id, but without much success; they took advantage of Moharram to rouse fanatical feelings, and unpalatable demand of the fine in Honda Ram's case gave them desired opportunity of stirring up resistance, and bringing about fanatical outbreak. So far enquiries show Mulla Powindah had nothing to do with present case. While at Bannu, Malik Mani Khan visited me, and on being questioned as to cause of the outbreak, at once expressed his suspicion of instigation by Sardar Gul Muhammad to Sadda Khan on occasion of recent visit. I have heard nothing further on this point since, but considering what happened after the Sardar's visit to Wano and Jandola in 1892-93, the suspicion has very probably foundation.

Second.—I do not consider Madda Khels of Kazha are concerned as a section in this outrage. They have no doubt previously shown fanatical tendencies, as reported in Gee's diaries of March, but since Gee's visit to Kazha they appear to have suppressed these. Gee has changed his opinion in regard to them. He, in his telegram of 14th, says:—"I am satisfied now the Kazhawals were not in it as a tribe; one Kazhawal was killed, Kazhawals came over in the evening and took away his body, but I cannot find out at present that they came over with the intention of fighting. Nur Shah's case appears isolated." I concur in above. Nur Shah, Kazhawal, is a fanatic. If Kazhawals wished to join Maizarwals, there was nothing to prevent them from doing so, and they would have joined at the time. Nur Shah, one of their section, joined. I consider only the Ger Madda Khel of Maizar, Sheranna, and probably hamlets lying west of Sheranna to Dotoi are responsible for the outbreak, and no other sections.

Third—It is represented by one or two Waziri Malikhs here that outbreak was unpremeditated and arose suddenly in consequence of irritation caused by demand of fines due; but I do not credit this, and believe that it was planned for about 24 hours beforehand. In any case, the Malikhs present at the time may have taken no active part, but they are guilty at least of connivance. It is impossible to believe that they were unacquainted with the attitude of their section or the preparations which must have necessarily been made beforehand. They gave no intimation whatever to the Political Officer, nor assisted in stopping the outbreak. It was an act of pure treachery, and is looked upon by every friendly person in the valley as opposed to the code of Afghan honour.

Fourth. Gee stated in his telegram that he had received a letter from Sadda Khan and other Ger Maliks on night 11th, asking whether they should come in. Letter was sealed by Sadda Khan, Alambe and two others, names illegible. They simply enquired whether Government wished them to come in on 12th. My proposal for dealing with case is that Maizar should be occupied with troops as soon as possible, and its fortified Kots demolished. The large fortified village of Sheranna with its 30 towers should be levelled. Following terms to be given to be complied with within a fixed time :—(1) All Maliks concerned, Mulla Ghain-ud-din, who headed Sheranna party, and ringleaders, viz., Namwar, Madi, Shahpur, Azim, Gulbadin, Sayadwali, Khangai, Nur Shah to be surrendered unconditionally. Following ringleaders, Piyali, Butt, Shingai and Wali were killed in the fight. (2) Stolen property to be restored or 500 Government rupees to be paid for each rifle or horse not restored. (3) Consent to be given to payment of land revenue to be fixed for three years now, and assessed afterwards at one-half of the owner's share according to areas. (4) Fine should be imposed. In event of failure to comply with terms, country of offending sections to be under temporary military occupation preventing return of refractory sections to their homes.

Fifth. There is, at present, no combination of any other tribes against us. The Madda Khels are aware of the heinousness of their offence and anticipate certain punishment. They have despatched messengers to ask assistance of Mulla Powindah, Turi Khels, and Mohmit Khels, who are now at Raznak and elsewhere in their summer quarters. There is little chance of their assisting the Madda Khels as sections, but it is yet too early to give a positive opinion. All Waziris are now in their summer quarters in hills, and to reduce the chances of failure to nil I concur with Commanding Officer, Tochi, that not less than a brigade, with another brigade in reserve, will be required to occupy Maizar, and to move about safely with a view to enforce compliance with terms. There is, however, an alternative proposal. Term No. 1 to be slightly modified, and only Sadda Khan with Mulla Ghain-ud-din and ringleaders of the assailing party to be demanded. Sadda Khan and Ghain-ud-din to be kept as hostages during the pleasure of Government, and the ringleaders to stand their trial; and other Maliks to be allowed to come in and make submission, on condition of their making an unreserved and clear statement of all the events connected with the outrage. Statement implicating any of the Maliks so allowed to come in not to be used against him if he makes a true statement. By other Maliks I mean Aki Khan's son, Khan Alam, Ware, Shirin, Khan Habid, Mozamal Khan, &c. They are all minor Ger Maliks. The justification for this proposal lies in the fact that hitherto we dealt with the offending section through Sadda Khan alone, and considered him absolutely responsible for the section; he has misbehaved and may be rightly held responsible for the whole occurrence. The advantage of the policy to single out Sadda Khan is that the Ger Madda Khels will be split and chance for combination will be minimised, and the compliance with terms will become comparatively easier. Sadda Khan is the wealthiest hill Darwesh Khel and has large landed property. All this might be confiscated if he escapes to the Amir's territory, and prospect confiscation may induce him to surrender himself. If we demand the surrender of all the Maliks, the tribe will go with them, and they will all escape to the Amir's territory, obtain asylum with Birmal Kabul Khels, Zadrans and Tanis, become outlaws, and will always be troubling us. This state of things may, I think, be avoided if Sadda Khan alone is selected out of all the Maliks, not being ringleaders in actual attack, as the only responsible person. This alternative proposal can, I think, safely be carried out by sending to the Tochi one additional regiment of infantry, second mountain battery, besides two regiments in reserve in Bannu and the 33rd Punjab Infantry, which has already been ordered to Tochi, and 250 rifles of which have already arrived, and taken over charge of Saidgi, Idak, and Miran Shah. Maizar is only 11 miles from Datta Khel and the valley between is open and treeless. I consider the attitude of the Dauris satisfactory. Their Maliks have expressed to me their contentment with our administration, and have offered every assistance in keeping order in their country. From Kanirogha the farthest end of the Upper Daur to Maizar is a distance of about 17 miles; the Khiddar Khels, who surround the Datta Khel position, are

showing themselves friendly. In view of the above considerations, the force I have proposed will be quite sufficient to maintain their position, hold posts and communications. The present is the worst time for making an advance north of Tochi and undertaking punitive operations. All the Waziris are in their summer quarters, and a comparatively large force will be required to guard against possible combinations. Moreover, our hold on them at this time of the year is not so strong as in winter, and the Waziris, if pursued in their summer quarters, can easily cross the border to the Amir's territory without being put to much inconvenience or suffering from inclemency of weather. Punitive action can be most conveniently and effectively taken in October or November, when return to winter quarters takes place. The reinforcement of the Shahur communicated with your 129 F. is sufficient for present.

Sixth. Included in above.

Seventh. As to the retaliatory measures that may be necessary I have explained under head four.

Enclosure No. 3.

Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 17th June 1897.

WITH reference to the correspondence regarding the attack by Madda Khels on a party of British officers and troops at Maizar, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council decided to-day at a meeting of Council, which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor had been invited to attend, that an advance shall be made to Maizar in order to destroy the Kots as recommended by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division in his telegram of the 16th June 1897.

2. The advance will be in sufficient force to remain at Maizar, or in a convenient place near to it, and hold its own against any possible combination that can be brought against it. On the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, the strength of the force will be two brigades, and the composition will be left to His Excellency.

3. As regards the terms to be offered to the tribes, the Governor-General in Council will await a communication from the Lieutenant-Governor.

Enclosure No. 4.

From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sarwakai, the 17th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

ON 16th Saiad Akbar Shah wrote from Kaniguram that Mulla Powindah with some Sheikhs arrived Kaniguram afternoon sixteenth, and in spite of protests of Saiyids had drums beaten for ghaza, that he has summoned all Mahsuds who should be collected at Kaniguram by nineteenth, when Saiad Akbar Shah thinks it possible Mulla may lead lashkar to do mischief in some direction. I do not think he will be able to induce any considerable number of Mahsuds to give trouble. He is also believed to have sent secret messengers to Wano Ahmadzais to join him, but their decided refusal may be anticipated.

Enclosure No. 5.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 18th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 16th. Gee wires :—"Your telegram. I am submitting my detailed report as to causes of outbreak in a day or two. I do not, however, attribute actual outbreak to preaching of Mullahs, as I think we should have heard of such preaching beforehand. I have obtained no information at present as to whether Gul Muhammad was concerned,

but it is quite possible. All Ger sections appear concerned, except perhaps Machas of Shawal Tangi. Colonel Gray and myself strongly recommend the immediate demolition of Sheranna and Maizar Kots, believing that, if this part of the punishment was postponed till the cold weather, it would lose half its force and would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on our part, but in order to do this, we are of opinion that the two brigades originally mentioned by Colonel Gray are indispensable, first, for the separate occupation of Maizar for so long as may be deemed necessary, and because the smaller force mentioned in your alternative proposals would not be sufficient to enable us to camp out at Maizar or to demolish the kots in the face of any serious opposition. I agree generally with your modification of the first proposal, viz., to keep Sadda Khan and Ghain-ud-Din as hostages, leaving some of the smaller Maliks to make their submission; but what would you do in the case of men like Dande, Alambe and Zarmakhmad, son of Ayub, all of whom are said to have joined in? Khan Habib took no active share in the attack. Reference to second condition. We would insist on return of rifles in any case, and as regards mules and miscellaneous property, of which there is a good deal missing, we recommend that tribe be ordered to restore, all in good condition, or, failing this, to pay whatever we may fix. Colonel Gray suggests double value for everything else and ten-fold for ammunition, of which four boxes are lost. I concur in condition 3. As regards condition 4, we would tell the tribe that they will not be permitted to return to the Tochi till all terms are complied with. We would not accept a fine in lieu of compliance, except as in condition 2. After having occupied Maizar for the purpose of demolishing villages, the Brigade might be kept on there as long as was deemed advisable, Colonel Gray recommending that during this period the Ger country should be under martial law; subsequently the Brigade might be withdrawn to Datta Khel and reduced to the force mentioned in your alternative proposal, viz., one squadron, three infantry battalions, and two mountain batteries. This force would probably be sufficient to keep the Madda Khels quiet and prevent them re-occupying country without permission. We recommend as additional terms the surrender of 50 breech-loaders, including Sadda Khan's Winchester which was used in the fight, also that no kots or towers are to be built without our permission for the future. Colonel Gray also recommends realisation of blood-money, but I am doubtful of their ability to pay this in addition to other terms. The whole terms should be made applicable to all villages that may be proved to have taken part as a whole in the affair. Cases of individuals joining from other tribes, such as Khidder Khels, Khojai Khels or Dauris can be dealt with separately on their merits." Gee would appear to differ from me as to immediate cause of outbreak. In his of 11th, he stated that gathering was partly fanatical: what I have stated in my No. 161 is that Madda Khels have strong fanatical tendencies which displayed themselves on several occasions in the last one and a half years. I have not attributed outbreak to any particular preaching by Mullas. During Moharram Waziris kill sheep, distribute food and hold meetings, and consider the period as most auspicious for martyrdom. I have no doubt that, though no special information may have reached Gee, there was at this time a strong fanatical feeling excited in Maizar, and this was to be expected. I see no reason to change my opinion at present; I however await Gee's detailed report which he has promised to send in a day or two. As regards instigation by Gul Muhammad, I have received following telegram from a well-to-do Saiyid of Bannu, Saiyid Mubarak Shah, who has relations in Urgun:—"Kindly ask Sadda Khan the conversation he had with Gul Muhammad when he went Urgun and got separate tent." I am making enquiries about this. I have not proposed in my 161 that demolition of kots, &c., should be deferred until cold weather. My proposal is that Maizar should be occupied as soon as we have got sufficient troops to do so, and its kots should then be demolished at once; the terms should then be announced. If Sheranna continues to remain deserted by inhabitants as at present, it might possibly be occupied by us as strongly defensive position, or if it be decided it is not required for above purpose, it may be necessary, as a military precaution, to destroy it at once, otherwise this might be carried out gradually and used as a means of pressure for enforcing early

compliance with terms. There would be no object in fixing too early a date for compliance with terms; rather time should be left for inducing compliance. This will enable movements and action necessary in event of non-compliance to be conducted at the most suitable season. In the meanwhile country of offending sections would remain under condition of military occupation. In event of non-compliance with terms demanded, and when we are ready to move troops north of Tochi, I would add to terms some penalties, such as surrender of a number of arms, &c., which I have intentionally reserved for future use. My telegram 166 covers cases of Dande, &c., named by Gee. I have not yet received list of property lost or carried off, and made my proposal in regard to recovery of property, &c., in general terms for sanction of Government. I concur with Colonel Gray in regard to demanding the values suggested by him of ammunition and other property. Fine proposed in term 4 is not intended to be in lieu of compliance with any term, but it will be imposed substantively on account of this and outstanding cases, &c. I do not agree to withdrawal troops from advanced position which will now be occupied at any time before all the terms are complied with to the letter; withdrawal will make tribes doubt our intention to punish them in event of non-compliance, encourage them and delay acceptance of terms.

Enclosure No. 6.

From the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, to the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 19th June 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams dated 16th and 18th June. Your alternative proposal is understood by the Lieutenant-Governor to be framed with object of securing partial satisfaction without despatch of large force. You have been informed in my telegram of 17th June that force, sufficient to hold Upper Tochi against any possible combination, is being sent. There is, therefore, no need for framing terms so as to avoid extensive operations, and Lieutenant-Governor is prepared to consider terms formulated by you under head four, though the terms finally settled will be enforced by military occupation and without any corresponding pledges on part of Government. Alternative proposal would in any case have been impossible as precluding the trial of Sadda Khan whose treachery is *prima facie* conspicuous and constituting him sole hostage for tribe, whereas his influence is understood to be less than Alambe's. Your final proposals as to British demand should now be submitted as soon as possible. Other parts of your telegram will be separately treated.

Enclosure No. 7.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 21st June 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 19th. Alternative under head four, was suggested partly for object you mention and partly for other reasons, one being the consideration that, if we deprive tribe of all Maliks, we must undertake direct administration ourselves, involving lengthened control of country by military force and other departures from previous policy. However, as expediency is not to be considered, I have nothing more to urge, and propose that, in addition to other terms recommended, unconditional surrender of every Malik of the sections concerned, and every ringleader should be demanded. I have accordingly called from Gee exhaustive list persons concerned, and will submit on receipt. Gee's report received and goes Simla to-day. He arrives as regards Sadda Khan at following conclusion:—"The charge of direct complicity against Malik Sadda Khan must, I think, be held not proved, but it is impossible to acquit him, if not of guilty knowledge, at least of gross neglect of his duty towards Government."

Enclosure No. 8.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 23rd June 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

It is reported that Mulla Powindah has summoned Turi Khel and other Waziri and Mahsud Malik, with a view of holding meeting for discussing the attitude towards Government. Ekhlās, his Sheikh, is said to have stated at Momiragha four days ago that Mulla would not interfere so long as troops remained at Datta Khel. No section or tribe is known to have resolved on making combinations against Government up to this time.

Enclosure No. 9.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 25th June 1897.

WITH reference to the scheme of operations for the punishment of the sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris implicated in the attack at Maizar on the 10th June 1897 on the escort of the Political Officer in the Tochi, I am directed to inform you that Major-General G. C. Bird, C B, the Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force, will be vested with supreme political control from the date of his entering the Tochi valley ; and I am to request that the Lieutenant-Governor will be good enough to submit the name of the Punjab Political officer or officers whom His Honour would propose to depute with the force.

2. Major-General Bird will report direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department on all political questions, and will be requested to repeat all telegrams to the Government of the Punjab.

3. I am to forward, for the concurrence of the Lieutenant-Governor or for any observations which His Honour may wish to offer, a draft of a proclamation which it is proposed should be issued by the General Officer Commanding the Field Force ; it might be issued either when Major-General Bird takes over charge—or when he advances from Datta Khel ; the Governor-General in Council is inclined to prefer the earlier date.

PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, on the 10th of June 1897, Mr. Gee, Political Officer in the Tochi, with a small escort of British Indian troops, after friendly pre-arrangement with the Malik concerned, visited Sheranna and Maizar, for the purpose of selecting a site for a post, and for realizing a fine which had been inflicted on the Madda Khels for the murder of Honda Ram, the Mohurrir of the Sheranna post ;

And whereas, while the British party, after receiving hospitality at the hands of Sadda Khan, one of the principal Malik, were resting under the shade of the trees at Maizar, they were attacked in a most treacherous and cowardly manner by a large body of tribesmen, and several officers and men were killed and wounded ;

Now, I proclaim to all concerned that I am ordered by the Sarkar to proceed to Maizar with a force sufficiently strong to hold its own against all comers and to compel obedience to the orders of the Sarkar.

And I inform you that it is my intention to destroy all the fortified kots in Maizar and Sheranna, whether resistance be shown or otherwise, and that I shall remain at Maizar or some convenient spot near to it, for so long as seems to me and the Government of India desirable.

And I further inform you that I shall in due course announce the terms of punishment which the Sarkar may decide to inflict on all those who were in any way responsible for, or who took part in, the treacherous attack on the British troops ; with whom alone it is my business to deal.

And I warn all others who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar to refrain from obstructing my force, for, depend upon it, any further unfriendly acts will be severely dealt with.

Enclosure No. 10.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 25th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

On 23rd, with view of ascertaining intentions of Government, Kippal, the leading Tori Khels, and Ilyas, leading Tori Khel Mahk, went to Gee. They represented that if Government intends troops to punish Madda Khels, they were afraid the bad characters of other sections would join against Government, and thus implicate all Waziri sections. They, therefore, recommended settlement case through agency of tribal Maliks Ahmedzai and Abuwuzi. They reported things were quite quiet at Razmak, and Mulla was making no attempt to collect a large gathering. Maizar still continues to remain deserted, except by a few labourers. Tazhorwals sent message that they all agreed to have nothing to do with Gerwals, would present themselves if summoned, and give assistance. A few Safals are said to have gone to Kazipa and informed Maliks that Birmal subjects of Khalifa Nur Muhammad were ready to assist them secretly. Babruk, Amir's representative among Zadrans, has ordered them not to interfere with Madda Khels if they sought asylum in their country.

Enclosure No. 11.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 26th June 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram 21st June. Gee reports Maizar ringleaders are—

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. Mohar. | 37. Landak. |
| 2. Madal. | 38. Sekandar, Bakhshi Khels, besides about— |
| 3. Miani Khan. | 39. Salo Macha of a village above junction Tochi and Shawal Algad. |
| 4. Azam Din. | 40. Botan, Khoji Khel and |
| 5. Sarwar Khan. | 41. Mohabhat Sardi Khel, Bakka Khel, a Talib living at Maizar. |
| 6. Lazim. | 42. Nur Shah of Kazha. Maliks of five sections of Sheranna and outlying hamlets concerned are— |
| 7. Pyall. | 43. Sadda Khan. |
| 8. Nur Muhammad. | 44. Alambe. |
| 9. Ghazi. | 45. Zer Muhammad. |
| 10. Shinkai. | 46. Khan Habib, Khizar Khels. |
| 11. Salim. | 47. Mulla Ghain-ud-din. |
| 12. Lut. | 48. Sheikh Nur. |
| 13. Wati Dreplaris and | 49. Sayad Wali, Ali Khan Khels. |
| 14. But. | 50. Gula Khan, Bakshi Khel. |
| 15. Mir Hassan. | 51. Pimbal. |
| 16. Botai. | 52. Walaiz. |
| 17. Namwar. | 53. Guri Dreplaris. |
| 18. Kalandar. | 54. Mate Macha. |
| 19. Amin Shah. | 55. Alam, Nazar Khel. |
| 20. Marghat | 56. Jandar, Khoji Khel of Kamkai Sheranna. |
| 21. Shah Morad. | 57. Khunijan of Kotku ; Khunijan, also a ringleader. |
| 22. Kar. | 58. Nur Muhammad. |
| 23. Shah Waz. | 59. Nasir. |
| 24. Awezand. | 60. Kazgul. |
| 25. Buhadar. | 61. Kulamban. |
| 26. Ikhtiyar, Khoji Khels. | 62. Mad Wali ; all five of Turmer. |
| 27. Azim. | |
| 28. Shahper. | |
| 29. Guldin. | |
| 30. Gul Ahmad. | |
| 31. Sadgul, Ali Khan Khels. | |
| 32. Ware Khan. | |
| 33. Mir Badshah. | |
| 34. Sabul. | |
| 35. Shahpir. | |
| 36. Mirlbad, Machas. | |
| 63. Bandai of O. Shira (?) | |

With exception of Nos. 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 28, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, each ringleader possesses his own Kot, named after him, and is a Motabir or Malik in section. Gee adds degree of guilt of Nos. 43 to 46 dealt with in paragraph 14 of his letter dated 19th instant; there is no special information against Nos. 44 to 56 and 58 to 62; latter five belonging to Turmor, in which Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan took refuge, but their station should be held equally guilty of the attack during retreat.

I concur in above and consider 63 men as ringleaders, Maliks and Motabirs of sections concerned of whom Nos. 7, 10, 13 and 14 were killed during action.

Enclosure No. 12.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 27th June 1897.

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 25th instant, with which you forward, for the concurrence of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, or such observations as he may desire to make, a draft proclamation which it is proposed should be issued by the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force, who will be vested with supreme political control from the date of his entering the Tochi Valley, and also ask that the names of the Punjab Political Officers who are to be deputed with the force should be submitted.

2. In reply, I am to state that Sir Mackworth Young accepts the draft proclamation as it stands and has no remarks to offer on it. It is, indeed, very similar to a draft which he has had under consideration. His Honour also considers that it is desirable that the proclamation should be issued at as early a date as possible after Major General Bird has taken over charge.

3. With reference to the deputation of Political Officers, the Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that, as the Field Force consists of two brigades, it will be necessary to appoint one experienced Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to the General Officer Commanding, and two junior Assistant Political Officers to work with the two Brigadier-Generals. He therefore proposes to depute Mr. Gee as Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to Major-General Corrie Bird. Mr. Gee has now been in the Tochi for 14 months, and knows the valley and the clans well. He has, moreover, managed the tribes with tact and skill, at any rate up to the unfortunate occurrence of 10th June, when the treacherous hospitality of the Maliks evidently threw the officers and men off their guard. The Lieutenant-Governor, in short, recommends him on account of his experience, and because he has hitherto carried out the orders of Government in regard to our dealings with the tribes with marked success and ability.

4. As Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to depute Mr. Lorimer, who has served in Bannu and Kohat, and is now in charge of the Yusufzai sub-division. He is an Assistant Commissioner of six years' standing, has passed the High Proficiency Examination in Persian and the Higher Standard in Arabic, is an excellent Pashtu scholar and knows Pathans well.

For the 2nd Brigade Mr. Kettlewell, an Assistant Commissioner of five years' standing, most of which has been passed on the frontier, will be sent. He has held charge of a frontier district and is now District Judge at Peshawar, and is accustomed to deal with Pathan tribesmen.

I am also to intimate that, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Gee may well be left to select, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding, such subordinate agents as he may consider necessary, as he will be responsible for their conduct and efficiency.

Enclosure No. 13.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 30th June 1897.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th June 1897, regarding the Political Officers to be attached to the Tochi Field Force, and the proclamation to be issued by the General Officer Commanding.

2. Instructions will be sent to Major-General Corrie Bird to issue the proclamation at as early a date as he considers suitable.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor's nominations of Political Officers* are approved,

* Chief Political Officer and Political Assistant to the General Officer Commanding : Mr. H. W. Gee, C.S.

Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Egerton : Mr. J. G. Lorimer, C.S.

Assistant Political Officer with Brigadier-General Symons : Mr. A. B. Kettlewell, C.S.

and I am to request that orders may be issued accordingly. The selection of subordinate agents for political work may be left to Mr. Gee, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding.

Enclosure No. 14.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 1st July 1897.

IN continuation of my letter, dated 27th ultimo, I am directed to forward, for the approval of the Government of India, a draft of the terms of punishment of the Madda Khel or such sub-sections of the tribe as may be proved to have been implicated in the recent treacherous outbreak at Maizar, and of the conditions on which they should be allowed to reoccupy their lands and houses. These terms have been referred to Mr. Anderson, Commissioner of the Derajat Division, for opinion, and, as will appear from the copies of the telegrams marginally noted, he has Dated 26th June 1897.

no further suggestions to make in regard to them except as regards the exclusion of the Kazhawals.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that it would be advisable at this stage to exculpate expressly the Kazhawals by confining our demand for the surrender of the Maliks to those of the Ger section. The words in the first term "found to have been directly or indirectly implicated, &c.," leave ample scope for inquiry, and it would, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, be a mistake to exclude the Kazhawals, even though it seemed probable that only one Malik were involved. But besides this Mr. Gee at first distinctly stated in his telegram of 11th ultimo that they came down to join in the attack which, owing to the distance at which their villages lie from Maizar, they could hardly have done had there not been some previous concert. It would therefore not be justifiable at present to assume their innocence, and some further inquiries seem to be necessary before we can exonerate the Kazhawals from complicity in the attack. Moreover, their past misconduct in connection with outrages on the road and fanatical gatherings of a hostile character renders it suitable that a portion of the fine should be recovered from them, while it is obviously desirable that, as regards payment of revenue, &c., the tribe should be dealt with as a whole, more especially as it controls in the Tochi and the Kazha the two main routes to Urgun and Ghazni.

3. For similar reasons the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it will be best not to cite the names of the ringleaders and Maliks implicated, as these can best be determined by General Bird on the spot, though the list given by Mr. Gee in Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 26th ultimo, probably gives a good idea of the number of persons whose surrender we are likely to require. In the event of any of the persons demanded not being given up, it will probably be necessary to impose a fine in lieu, but the Lieutenant-Governor does not think

it desirable to announce this in the terms, and it is of course possible that some of these persons may betake themselves over the border, in which case confiscation of their land may be the only method of realization.

4. The value to be set upon the stolen property not restored in good condition can, His Honor thinks, be best determined by General Bird after full consideration of the case. As regards the tribunal for the trial of the ringleaders and Malikis if surrendered, and the law to be administered, the Government of India will no doubt issue orders. At present no substantive law or procedure has been laid down for the observance of the Political Officer in the Tochi.

5. As to the third term, I am to say that His Honour has given the subject his most anxious consideration lest by making a demand for revenue, or, in other words, placing the Madda Khel country on the same footing as Daur, we may even in appearance be held to have violated any pledge given to the tribes. The history of our dealings with the Tochi Darwesh Khel, and especially with the Madda Khel section of that clan, is detailed in the précis attached, and I am to point out that, in the first instance, the invitation to us to assume control of their country was made by the Darwesh Khel and Dauris in identical terms on 6th April 1895, that the Darwesh Khel, and especially the Madda Khel as represented by their headmen, have repeatedly invited Government to occupy their country, and have offered to pay revenue, that no pledge has ever been given to them that no revenue would be levied from them, and that finally the conduct of the Madda Khel at any rate of late has rendered it necessary, if we are to retain a proper measure of control over the Tochi route, and to prevent trouble across the Durand Line, that we should, as has always been indicated as a probable consequence of the misconduct of any of the tribes, assume direct control of their country and establish some rough form of administration such as has been satisfactorily constituted in the adjoining tract of Daur.

6. If the grievances of the Madda Khel arising out of the distribution of the service allowances or the demarcation of the Durand Line have any real foundation,—and, even allowing for the sudden gusts of feeling to which Pathans are only too prone, it is certainly curious that the attitude of the tribe should have suddenly changed from one of marked cordiality to one of sullen hostility after November 1895 when the allowances were given out—these grievances can be inquired into and remedied, but it does not appear to be desirable after once tightening our hold over this strong tribe, which holds so important a position on the border, to allow our control to relax and the administration of Upper Tochi to again fall into disorder.

7. In regard to the fourth term, I am to say that it is, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, obvious that we must recover the fine of Rs. 1,200 for the murder of Honda Ram after our failure to do so on the 10th June.

8. The Government of India will observe that Mr. Anderson raises no objection to the amount of the fine which it is proposed in the fifth term should be imposed on the whole Madda Khel tribe as a punishment for their recent misconduct, or to the method of realizing this which has been suggested in the event of the clan not being able to pay in cash or arms. If we can succeed in securing the construction by the people themselves of the post, wherever it may be decided after full examination of the country to locate it, this will, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, be indeed an appropriate manner of marking the treacherous conduct of the clan and a standing warning to them in the future of the retribution which must follow on such misdeeds. Whether wages are to be paid or not, and the amount of these, must depend upon the opinion of the General Officer Commanding with reference to the resources of the tribe and the character of the labourers employed upon the work. I am to add that the amount of the fine has been pitched at a reasonable figure, because it is only part of the punishment proposed, and also because it is inadvisable to drive the tribe to desperation and make them permanently forsake their lands. Besides this portion of the penalty will fall upon the subordinate members of the tribe, whose responsibility is far less than that of their leaders.

Sub-enclosure.

Draft of Terms of Punishment of the Madda Khel or such sub-sections of the tribe as may be proved to have been implicated in the attack at Maizar and of the conditions on which they should be allowed to reoccupy their lands and houses.

1. All Maliks of the Madda Khel found to have been directly or indirectly implicated in the attack on the escort at Maizar on 10th June 1897 must be surrendered unconditionally, as well as any ringleaders of that attack who may be demanded by the Government. All persons so surrendered will be tried in such way as Government may determine.
2. All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or in default the value determined by Government must be paid.
3. The tribe must now agree to pay such land revenue as Government may demand, not exceeding half the net profits derived from the land.
4. Payment of the outstanding fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of the murder of Honda Kam, Moharrir.
5. Payment of a fine of Rs. 10,000 (ten thousand) on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe, which may, with the sanction of the British Government, be discharged in whole or in part by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna post or of any other work approved by Government without payment or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

Enclosure No. 15.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd July 1897.

IN continuation of my letter, dated 1st instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a detailed report by Mr. Gee of the events connected with the Madda Khel outbreak at Maizar on the 10th ultimo. A copy of my letter to the Commissioner calling for further particulars in regard to the position and movements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, the Native Assistant Political Officer, during the occurrence is also enclosed.

2. I am to say that on the information before him the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that Mr. Gee's opinion as to the causes of the outbreak is a correct one. Mr. Gee does not mention the Muharram as having affected the question, and there is, His Honour believes, no reason for thinking that it had anything to do with the outbreak. This view is confirmed by Mr. Grant's Wana Diary of the 21st to 24th June, last sentence—copy enclosed. This diary also supports generally Mr. Gee's view of the causes of the outbreak. But His Honour considers that further and fuller enquiry will be necessary before the causes are completely established and the share of responsibility for the outbreak duly apportioned. It is, Sir Mackworth Young thinks, very probable that some of those who pose as quite innocent of any plan for attacking the escort may be more involved than as yet appears, for the workings of the minds of Pathan Maliks are subtle, and it is quite conceivable that Sadda Khan may have connived at, or even arranged, the attack, finding his authority with the tribe weak, and hoping that a display of force by the troops would strengthen his position, provided only he could himself show a loyal front and escape suspicion. Instances of such conduct are not unfrequently to be found in the history of our dealings with frontier tribes—and there are some circumstances which seem specially to point to the probability of a deep-laid plot in the present case.

3. I am to add that Sir Mackworth Young cannot refrain from an expression of admiration at the steadiness and courage displayed by the native officers after their English officers had all been killed or disabled.

Sub Enclosure A.

Extract from Letter from H. W. Gee, Esquire, Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to the Commissioner Derajat Division, dated 19th June 1897.

IN reply to your telegram dated 16th instant, I have the honour to submit a report on the recent attack on my military escort at Maizar which took place on the 10th instant.

Maizar is the name given to a group of Madda Khel villages situated above the junction of the Shawal Algad and the Tochi, and not the name of one single village as shown on the map. It consists of a number of broad cultivated terraces sloping down to the stream, and is occupied by Drepilari, Khoji Khel, Ali Khan Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of the Madda Khel tribe. It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranna, and is about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel camp.

The main road to Birmal and Ghazni, which the tribe is under agreement to keep open, runs through it, and it forms part of that tract of the Upper Tochi in which a more extended influence was contemplated as compared with the hill tracts of Darwesh Khel country. As long ago as September 1896 I had visited Sheranna and Maizar with the view of examining possible sites for the Sheranna levy post, and you had concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between Sheranna and Maizar.

My chief object in making the present visit was to select a final site for this post, as the building season was already far advanced and the sanctioned plan and estimate were expected back from the Public Works Department, and if possible to establish a temporary post there for the Sheranna levies, who since our occupation of Datta Khel have been kept close to camp. I had asked Colonel Bunny to accompany me in order that he might give me his advice in the final selection of the site. In my letter dated 15th June 1897, I have explained the circumstances connected with the realization of the fine in Honda Ram's case, and my intention of discussing the details of distribution with all the Maliks concerned on my visit to Maizar.

This was an additional reason for going up the Valley, though the fact that I asked the jirga to meet me at Maizar was merely due to my intention to halt there as being the most convenient place.

Under ordinary circumstances, with the Valley quite peaceful, as we believed it to be, an escort of sowars and Maliks would have sufficed to visit Maizar, as the road lies through open country, and the Kotal above Maizar is visible from Datta Khel camp. I asked Colonel Bunny if he would mind taking out the same number of men as were employed on my recent visit to the Kazha. That visit had an excellent effect on the Kazhawal, and as I had not visited Maizar for some time, I was of opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect there too, especially in view of the early commencement there of the Levy post. Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed to my proposal.

The following is the detail of the escort that accompanied me :—

- 200 rifles 1st Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant Higginson.
- 100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton Browne.
- 2 guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A.
- 12 sabres 1st (P.A.V.O.) Punjab Cavalry.
- Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs.

The 9th was originally fixed for the visit, but owing to rain it was postponed till the 10th. Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on one day in advance to make what preparations were required and collect the local Maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case.

A start was made from Datta Khel at 5 A.M. and Maizar was reached at 9.30. I was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer. Maliks Nabbi Khan, Sabil and his son Dande and Khanadin of the Kazha, Shadam Khan, brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Mozammil Khan, his nephew, at present officiating as Levy Jamadar, and Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel. At Ziarat village I was joined by

the Khiddar Khel Maliks Salehdin, Gul Samid, Syad Khan and Khan Wazir, and at Sheranna by the Madda Khel Maliks Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sadda Khan and Alambe were already at Maizar and met me there.

Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops to camp and where a number of charpoys had been placed in readiness. This, as will be seen from the sketch which accompanies this report, was under some trees on the topmost terrace, close to a threshing floor and not far from the Drepilari Kot of Modai, a small Mahk. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted there.

I went on at once with most of the Maliks, who had come with me, and the cavalry so as to inspect Dotoi and come back before it was very hot.

Before going, however, I and the Assistant Political Officer saw some of the Maizar Maliks, and they were told with reference to the fine in Honda Ram's case that I would have them all up and discuss the matter on my return. Sadda Khan and Alambe stayed in camp by my order.

Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Higginson accompanied me towards Dotoi and we returned to camp at 11.30, when we all had breakfast.

The people of the villages round at that time appeared perfectly friendly, and talked freely to the Pathan sepoy.

Everything required in the way of grass and wood had been supplied; and about mid-day food which had been cooked in one of the Maizar Kots was brought down for the sepoy, and a special point was made of the British officers partaking of some of it.

I then made enquiries as to whether the local jurga which had been sitting under some trees near for some time were ready to come and see me, and I was told by the Assistant Political Officer that they had come to an amicable agreement by themselves and that all that was necessary was that they should come up later and make a formal statement before me. This was what Malik Sadda Khan had led Ghulam Muhammad Khan to believe; but, if the evidence available is to be trusted, Sadda Khan's statement was a deliberate lie, for at that very time the Maizarwals had refused, as they had the day before, to be bound by Sadda Khan's proposals and must have been preparing for the outbreak.

Had Sadda Khan given us the slightest information of this attitude on the part of the Maizarwals, which he as well as the other Madda Khel Maliks, who had been there all day, must have been perfectly well aware of, there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack.

The attack actually did not take place till a little while after this, about 2 P.M. when we had just finished lunch.

I was preparing to go round with Captain Browne and look at sites for the post.

The pipes had begun to play at the request of the Maliks for the villagers to listen to, and the sepoy and ourselves were seated under the trees as shown in the sketch. The pipes played one tune and had just commenced a second when suddenly all the villagers cleared off towards the Drepilari Kot. It was seen that something was wrong, and the order to fall in was given, but at the same moment a signal shot was fired which was followed by an irregular volley apparently aimed at the officers under the tree. Lieutenant Seton Browne was hit in the thigh at the second or third shot, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy carried him to a place of comparative safety by a small bhusa stack and tied up his wound. Colonel Bunny and myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were, but the Colonel was mortally wounded in the stomach just as he got there, and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the left arm almost at the same minute. The firing had now become general from all the Kots round.

The guns then opened fire with case and did great execution among a body of men who had come out of the Drepilari Kot and attempted to charge them. As they were not protected by any cover, the two Royal Artillery officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting from towers round, and Captain Browne was hit in the arm at about the fifth round from the battery, and Lieutenant Cruickshank was shot very soon after, first in the arm and then in the chest, the second wound being fatal. It is much to be regretted that no medical aid was available for Captain Browne. The bullet had severed the

artery, and had a proper tourniquet been applied, his life would have been saved, but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in the knee while going towards the Kotal and so could give no assistance.

After about five minutes from the commencement of the attack, the guns having expended all their ammunition, limbered up, and Colonel Bunny gave orders for a general retirement towards the Kotal. This was effected along the lane shown in the sketch, which had low walls on either side of it. As far as the Kotal we were exposed to fire on both sides, and practically all the casualties occurred before the Kotal was reached.

A fine stand was made at the corner of the garden by the lane (see sketch) with the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over the Kotal before the position was evacuated. It was here that the greatest loss in men occurred, including Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, and many individual acts of gallantry were performed, which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across the six ridges which extend from the Kotal above Maizar to the sloping plain above Sheranna, which is a part of the Tسرائ plain. A position was taken up on each ridge in succession, and the retirement was conducted in an orderly manner, time being given for all the wounded to get safely out on the plain, a distance of about two miles. Directly Maizar itself was evacuated the tribesmen came on in large numbers, which were constantly being increased by reinforcements from every village round including Sheranna.

They followed up the force closely and persistently and also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement. They were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour of the rear-guard, and they must have lost a good many men themselves. Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the left arm while crossing the hills.

The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge at 5.30 p.m.; and waited there for reinforcements from Datta Khel, which arrived at 6.15 p.m. under Lieutenant DeBrett, R. A. Some sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as possible to fetch them and warn the camp.

These reinforcements covered a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. They consisted of two companies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rifle ammunition.

The tribesmen meanwhile, whose numbers had probably increased to well over 1,000, had been kept thoroughly in check, and as soon as the gun was got to work (the second gun had lost its wheels) the gathering began to disperse. The heights all round, which had been crowded with men, were shelled, and then Sheranna village, from which I had myself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement.

This was continued until I received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, who had escaped *via* the Tochi with a few Maliks, to the effect that he had arrived close to the village and was in danger of being hit.

No further opposition was met with. The Khudder Khels of Ziarat village gave us great assistance in bringing out water for the men and charpoys for the wounded, and though a few of them undoubtedly joined the Madda Khels, the Maliks who had gone straight back from Maizar when the attack began were entirely successful in preventing the tribe from joining.

Captain Browne, R. A., had by this time died from loss of blood, and Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp. The rear-guard reached camp at 12.30 p. m.

Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan also came in the same night.

It appears that when the outbreak occurred Sadda Khan had just come over to him from the jirga with Kotan Khan and stated that the fine had been arranged for and would be paid up in five days, and almost directly afterwards the firing began. Ghulam Muhammad Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions, and he was at once joined by Nabbi Khan, Khangai Macha, Almad Madda Khel, Wadin Saidgi and the Khidder Khel levies and Border Police. His munshi and clerk were also with him. This party was afterwards joined at different times by Sadda Khan, Shadam Khan, Dande his brother, Khan Habib, Zerim and Mozammil Khan, and they went down the

Shawal Algad to the Tochi and took refuge on the other side of the Tochi in Tarmori Kila, the inhabitants of which were just preparing to join the fight. From there Sadda Khan was despatched to Sheranna to keep the people quiet, and he returned after two hours saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. Nothing could have been further from the truth. In consequence of what he stated, Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi and as already stated, arrived at Sheranna when it was being shelled. Mozammil Khan and Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha, were the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political Officer to camp.

The next day I called the Khidder Khel Maliks in and asked them to arrange to bring in the dead, and this they eventually did with the assistance of Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and I think great credit is due to them for the performance of this service, especially as the bodies were much mutilated, Mussalmans and Sikhs alike.

The following is the list of casualties on our side:—

3 British officers killed.

3 Ditto wounded.

Native ranks killed—1 Subadar and 7 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

12 men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs.

1 Havildar and 1 driver No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

It is a significant fact that out of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though the force was composed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussalmans.

Wounded.—1st Punjab Infantry, 2 men severely.

2 men slightly.

1st Punjab Cavalry, 1 man slightly.

1st Sikhs, 12 men severely.

1 mule driver dangerously.

8 men slightly.

No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 men severely.

1 man slightly.

1 Kahar slightly.

N.B.—(Seven of the above were not included in the telegraphic report as the wounds were very slight and not known of at the time.)

The Waziri loss in killed has been put at 100 by the Maliks, from whom enquiries have been made, and as it is probable that a good many have died since of their wounds probably a total of 100 is not very wide of the mark.

This is also the opinion of Native officers who had the best means of judging. A large number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed outside the Drepilari Kot by the case shot, and very nearly as many were killed at the corner of the garden where the stand was made. All along the line of retirement the tribesmen pressed close, and a number of them were shot down. The names of those known at present to have been killed are as follows.*

Grand Total: 100.

The women, I may add, joined in the fight, throwing stones, and I believe firing guns also.

The list of killed is probably not complete. Many men are said to be severely wounded, and will probably die of their wounds. It is possible that there are members of other tribes, such as Khojal Khels, whose presence in the neighbourhood was an accident and who joined in afterwards. The number of wounded I have not yet been able to ascertain, but it is said to be large.

A list of the property (Government and private) which was lost is attached to this report.

The fact that the mules stampeded when the firing began accounts for the large number of articles lost, there being no means of bringing anything away. Some of the mules missing are still alive and in the hands of the Madda Khels, so it is probable that they will eventually be recovered.

I come now to the possible reasons for this act of gross treachery, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel in frontier history, and which was contrary to all the recognized principles of Pathan honour.

* Omitted.

The first reason which has been mentioned in this connection was the alleged dissatisfaction of the Mazarwals and Ali Khan Khels at Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's murder case. In my letter, dated 15th June 1897, I have already given a history of this fine and a copy of evidence recorded bearing on the question is already before you. It is clear from the evidence of Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Havildar, a resident of Urgun, that on the 9th and the morning of the 10th the matter was discussed in Sadda Khan's presence, and that the Maizar Malikhs were extremely dissatisfied with Sadda Khan and had used threatening language towards him.

It appears to me, however, quite impossible that this was the sole cause of the outbreak, for this reason that the Mazar Malikhs knew perfectly well that I wanted to discuss the matter with them, and therefore all they had to do was to come to the Assistant Political Officer or myself and state their objections. Further, it must be remembered that a short time before, these very Malikhs had been present at Datta Khel when the proposed distribution was put before me in jirga, and on that occasion they had made no protest whatever.

It is probable, however, that Sadda Khan's procedure in this matter aggravated the feeling against him already existing in this portion of the tribe and made them ripe for mischief.

There is a second cause, which has since come to light, which accounts in a great measure for the active part taken by Syad Wali and other Ali Khan Khels, and that is the fact that Mozammil Khan, nephew of Sadda Khan, had recently been caught out in an intrigue with Syad Wali's wife, and that his object in taking up the Jamadarship of Sheranna leaves at Datta Khel was to get out of Syad Wali's way.

Malik Salehdin, Khidder Khel, is inclined to give this as the main reason, and it is certain that the Ali Khan Khels took a prominent part in the fight. If this was the main reason, however, it is rather difficult to understand why Pyall and Namwar Khan should have made common cause with them, because the larger the share of the Ali Khan Khels in the fine the smaller their own share would be.

General dissatisfaction at Sadda Khan's management of the tribe may, however, have induced them to combine, and it is possible that there was an element of fanaticism also in existence, which though it did not openly show itself was ready to break out.

Once the attack was commenced, it became a matter of ghaza in which everyone except a few of the Malikhs joined.

There has, however, been none of this fanatical spirit apparent in the Upper Tochi since our advance to Datta Khel, and the fact that Mullah Ghan-ud-din and his talibs, who were suspected in the murder of Honda Ram, the Sheranna Muharrir, had recently come in voluntarily and submitted to an enquiry into their conduct led me to believe that we should have no more trouble from that quarter. There had been some signs of fanaticism at Inzar Kach in the Kazha during the 'Id, but when I recently visited the Kazha with a large escort all this appeared to have quieted down.

The reasons I have given appear quite inadequate to account for this treachery, but no other explanation is forthcoming at present, and unless fresh facts come to light later I can only conclude that it was a combination of all these causes that culminated in the outbreak. That it was planned beforehand, I think, there can be little doubt, and all the circumstances of its commencement point to this, and most of the Malikhs whose evidence I have recorded admit that this must have been the case. All the Military officers are also strongly of this opinion. It is impossible to explain how such a well-directed fire broke out on all sides, if we suppose that the affair began accidentally. It would not be then possible to explain why such a number of men at once appeared from all parts of the Valley. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan states that as he was going down the Shawal Algard to the Tochi he saw a band of armed Waziris coming down from the hills in the Dotoi direction, and though they seem to have been halted for the time at the instance of Sadda Khan and Ghulam Muhammad, there is little doubt that they went on again after the party had passed out of sight.

These men could not possibly have collected in so short a time from their villages, which lie some way up the Tochi, unless they had been warned beforehand to be waiting in the hills close by.

It has been suggested that Malik Sadda Khan's recent visit to Urgun in connection with the return of the Kabul Khel refugees may have had some connection with the outbreak.

Sadda Khan had only just returned from Urgun, and I have not had at present any opportunity of finding out what took place there. It is known, however, that the Maizarwals sent messages to Khalifa Nur Muhammad in Birmal, announcing what they had done and asking for help. So far, however, whether Afghan intrigues had anything to do with the case is a matter of conjecture.

I have enquired as far as possible into the cases of individual Maliks who are under suspicion of having been concerned, but it is not easy to get reliable evidence against individuals. The ringleaders, as already reported in my telegram, dated 15th instant, appear to have been Pyall, Shingai and Wati, Drepilari, and But, Khoji Khel, who were killed, and Namwar and Shawas

Note.—Shawas Khan is a Malik and cousin of Namwar. His name was omitted in the telegram.

H. W. G.

Khan, Khoji Khels; Madai, Drepilari; Shahpir and Azim, brothers, Ali Khan Khels of Maizar; Gul Din (not Gulbadin, as originally reported) Sayad Wali and Khani Jan, Ali Khan Khels of Sheranna, who have escaped.

To these might be added Salo, Macha, resident of Maizar, who recently bought a rifle in Wana, and who is said to have been one of the first to open fire on us.

No doubt in time the names of other men who began the firing from the towers and kots round will come to light.

Other Maliks of any importance who are accused of actually joining in the fight are Malik Nur Shah of the Kazha and his son Pyounir, Dande, the brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Alambe and Zar Mokhmad, son of the late Malik Ayub Khan, but the evidence against them would not be sufficient for a judicial conviction.

To make the position clearer it should be noted that Nur Shah, Sabil and Nabbi Khan, Kazha Maliks, belong to Ayub's faction, which is now represented by his brothers Alambe, as do also all the Ali Khan Khels who were engaged in the attack. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, whose knowledge of Tochi tribal intrigues is unrivalled, is inclined to the view that Alambe and his faction are more concerned in the matter than would at first appear. For some time past the breach between Sadda Khan and Alambe had been widening, and in the matter of the fine, in Honda Ram's case especially, Alambe had been opposed to Sadda Khan all along and was taking the part of the Ali Khan Khels. Alambe's conduct at the time of the outbreak is also suspicious. When the firing began he is said to have been in the Drepilari Kot of Modai (the village most deeply concerned), and he went straight off over the hills to Sheranna where his presence appears to have had the effect of causing the village to rise against us.

Afterwards, when Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan was proceeding down the Tochi to Sheranna, he saw Alambe going off up the Tochi with his household goods, and, when he sent for him, Alambe took no notice and refused to stop.

On the other hand, it may be said that Pyall, who was the leading Malik in Maizar and one of the ringleaders, belonged to Sadda Khan's faction.

The charge of direct complicity against Malik Sadda Khan must, I think, be held not proven, but it is impossible to acquit him of gross neglect of his duty towards Government, if not of guilty knowledge. It must be remembered that the Maizarwals are not separate from the Sheranna people, and that the same sub-sections are found in both places. Any deliberate plot therefore made in Maizar to attack the troops would almost certainly have been known in Sheranna, and it is difficult to conceive how the matter should not have reached the ears of Sadda Khan. The open threats uttered by the Maizarwals, on the 9th, should have put him on his guard, and the very least he could do was to have given us some warning of the attitude of the Maizarwals, in which case a surprise could not have occurred.

Instead of this he led Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan to believe that the distribution of the fine had been amicably settled, when at that very moment the tribesmen were preparing for the attack.

The evidence of Alam Shah, who is Sadda Khan's own Levy Havildar, a Warguni by caste and an old soldier of the Amir's army, seems to me to be given in an unprejudiced way, and there is probably a good deal of truth in it, and it proves clearly that Sadda Khan knew perfectly well what the temper of the tribe was.

It has been alleged that the first two shots were fired at Sadda Khan himself when he went back towards the jirga from the place where the Assistant Political Officer was sitting.

He, no doubt, said so to Ghulam Muhammad Khan afterwards, but the only witness to this effect is Alam Khan, a relation of his, Duffadar of the Kazha levies, who says that Saiyad Wali, the Ali Khan Khel ringleader, fired at Sadda Khan, and Khanijan, another Ali Khan Khel of Sheranna, fired at Shadam Khan.

My own opinion is that he was not fired at. The signal shot was fired close to the village and was fired in the air, and the irregular volley which followed was aimed at the British officers under the trees.

Khan Habib, who belongs to Alambe's faction, does not appear to be deeply implicated. He accompanied us from Sheranna to Maizar, and when the outbreak occurred he and his brother joined the Assistant Political Officer and remained with him until Sheranna was reached.

The case against Dande, brother of Sadda Khan, who is said to have used the Winchester repeater given by Mr. Bruce to Sadda Khan, is perhaps not very strong, though the evidence of Surgeon-Captain Ozzard, who certifies to the best of his ability that one sepoy was wounded by an explosive bullet, and of Surgeon-Captain Cassidy who speaks to hearing the sound of a Winchester rifle, goes to prove that this rifle was used, as there is not another rifle like it in that part of the Tochi Valley.

As regards Maizar, itself, Sherin, Khoji Khel, whose tower is on the top of the Kotal, is the only Malh who is known not to have joined. It was in his kot that the food for the sepoys was prepared, and when the attack commenced, no shots were fired from his tower, but, on the contrary, he was anxious that we should use his kot as a temporary place of refuge.

The Machas of the Shawal tangi above Maizar are also said to have taken no part in attack, and the Machas who were killed all belong to Maizar itself. The Ali Khan Khel Shekhs and talibs both of Maizar and of Sheranna undoubtedly took a leading part and deserve the severest punishment.

Annexure.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esquire, Political Officer, Tochi, to The Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 15th June 1897.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 14th June 1897, on the subject of the causes of the Maizar outbreak, and to reply as follows.

As I have already reported, my chief reason for visiting Maizar was to select finally a site for the Sheranna levy post. A site close to Maizar had been already generally approved of by you, and as the building season was already well advanced I was anxious to settle the matter before the arrival of the sanctioned plan from the Public Works Department.

As it was a good opportunity to discuss the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case with the whole of the Ger section, I told the Maliks I would hold a jirga there and hear all objections. The history of the distribution of this fine is as follows :—

When it was originally recommended the Maliks themselves made up a "bach" which was based on the tribal shares of the whole of the Ger Madda Khels.

When the Mullah of Sheranna and other suspects were brought in, and a recommendation for a reduction of the fine to Rs. 1,200 Kabuli was made by me the Madda Khel jirga produced a new "bach" which was as follows :

	Ra.
Ali Khan Khels	180 Kabuli.
Nazr Khels)	
Khizzar Khels)	120 "
Drepilare	300 "
Khoji Khel	300 "
Macha	300 "

This distribution was only tentative, as I could not formally sanction it until the fine was reduced, but no objection was then made to it. Only one matter was postponed for further consideration, and that was the share that Mirdad, Ali Khan Khel, cousin of Waris Khan, should be called on to pay personally. It was agreed that he ought to pay Rs. 300 (Kabuli) out of the Drepilare and Khoji Khel shares, because these two sections were not personally to blame in the matter. No decision was come to on this point.

After formal sanction had been received to the reduction of the fine, as there was still a dispute about Mirdad's personal share, I told the Maliks that I would take the opportunity of my visit to Maizar to discuss the matter with the whole of the Gerwals and arrange an amicable distribution.

3. Sadda Khan and Alambe Khan went to Maizar on the 8th and remained there till the 10th, when I reached Maizar, and during those two days the question was freely discussed, and, if the evidence collected is true, the Maizarwals told Sadda Khan plainly that they would not be bullied by him into paying a larger share than they were bound to by custom or Shariyat, and that if he attempted anything unjust they would rather fight and abandon their homes. Not a word of this reached the ears of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan or myself.

4. On our arrival at Maizar we saw Sadda Khan, Alambe Khan and Namwar Khan ; and the Assistant Political Officer also had a talk with Sheikh Nur (Ali Khan Khel Malik) and Pyall Khan, Maizar Malik. With reference to the fine Sheikh Nur said, "I am ready to pay my tribal share, but I object to Sadda Khan's demanding more than this" Both Maliks were told that the whole matter would be discussed before me on my return from Dotoi.

On our return about 12 o'clock Sadda Khan, Alambe Khan and Kotan went to Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan and said, "We have held a maraqqa and the Maliks say that they will pay up the fine in five days, as some of the tribe are away in the hills." The question of distribution was not mentioned, and from what the Maliks said it would be naturally implied that they had arranged the distribution amicably.

I may here mention that Kotan Khan went with me to Dotoi and knew nothing personally of the matter. It appears that the question was discussed again while I was away, and, according to Alam Shah, Warguni, the Madda Khel Levy Havildar, the Maizarwals took their stand on Shariyat and said that under no circumstances would they pay more than they were bound to under Shariyat.

If this evidence is correct, and as far as the investigation has gone at present I believe there is a considerable amount of truth in it, it follows that Sadda Khan deliberately misrepresented the matter. According to another story he went further than this and deliberately told the Maizarwals that if they did not pay up Government would realize the money forcibly.

This in the face of what they had said in jirga the day before was a direct incitement to the Maizarwals to break out.

As I already noted in my telegram, the weak point in this evidence is the fact that the Maizarwals had been told by the Assistant Political Officer that I wanted to discuss the question with them, and therefore all they had to do was to come and make their objections.

There is also no doubt from the circumstances of the outbreak that the attack was planned beforehand, and it is my belief at present that the Maizarwals must have decided on it the day before, as the Khidder Khels and Nabbi Khan who came with us from Datta Khel originally stated.

Sub-enclosure B.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab to the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Miran Shah, dated Simla, 2nd July 1897.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 21st June 1897 submitting a detailed report by Mr. Gee of the events connected with the attack made on his escort by the Madda Khels at Maizar on the 10th June.

2. In reply, I am to say that whatever other causes, such as discontent at the distribution of the tribal allowances, the existence of a feud arising out of an intrigue between a relative of Sadda Khan and a woman of the Ali Khan Khel, or mere fanaticism, may have contributed to this unfortunate occurrence, it appears clear that it was mainly and immediately due to the bitter feeling engendered between several of the Maliks and sections of the Madda Khel by the distribution of the fine leviable from them on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir, which had been proposed by the jirga at Datta Khel on 28th February 1897 and was apparently insisted upon by Malik Sadda Khan, before it had finally been approved by the Political Officer. The Political Officer, Mr. Gee, and his Assistant, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, were equally unaware of this feeling. While this is much to be regretted Sir Mackworth Young is glad to recognise that Mr. Gee appears to have acted throughout the engagement with great coolness and self-possession.

3. The part played by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad may have been unavoidable, but it seems necessary to call upon him to explain why from the time of the outbreak he was to be found in the company of Madda Khel and other Maliks instead of being with the Political Officer and the escort. He has left this matter untouched in his own statements, and it is one which demands full explanation. For the space of several hours he was in the company of Sadda Khan, his two brothers Shadam Khan and Dande, and his nephew Muzammil Khan, and under these circumstances one would expect to know what his relations were during that time with these doubtful personages. Regarding this his only remark is: "We were in the hands of the Maliks and were obliged to do what they wanted." But, on the other hand, he states that he sent Sadda Khan and Dande to Sheranna when firing in that direction was heard, which looks as if he still had some control over them. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that it will throw some light upon the position if Ghulam Muhammad's statement is fully recorded regarding this matter and regarding his movements until he rejoined at Datta Khel. Was he treated by these Maliks as a prisoner or as an honored official? Had he no means of making up his mind whether any of them had connived at or joined in the attack? What was the precise time and place at which he was joined by Sadda Khan and his brothers and nephew? Did they communicate nothing to him? Did he form any opinion as to whether Dande Khan had used the Winchester rifle which he had with him when he joined him? I am to request that he may be examined on these and any other points which seem material, and the result reported at an early date, with Mr. Gee's and your opinion. It must be realized that the position and movements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad during the afternoon and evening of the 10th June require to be fully elucidated.

 Enclosure No. 16.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Datta Khel, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 15th July 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Proclamation referred to in your 1866 F. has been published 13th, and is being circulated as widely and as quickly as possible.

Enclosure No. 17.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 17th July 1897.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marked on the margin, regarding the Madda Khel outbreak at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, and the terms of punishment which the Lieutenant-Governor recommends should be imposed.

2. With the exception of the proposal to demand land revenue, the Governor-General in Council approves with slight modifications of the terms proposed by Sir Mackworth Young, and I am to enclose, for His Honour's information, a copy of a letter which has been to-day addressed to the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force, conveying the orders of the Government of India on the subject. It has been pointed out to Major-General Corrie Bird that the Madda Khels have by their conduct forfeited the allowances and service arrangements already made with them, and that these will have to be settled afresh, after their punishment has been completed and their submission received.

Dated the 17th July 1897.

3. Upon the question whether land revenue in any form should be demanded from the Madda Khel, the Governor-General in Council does not deny that, so far as the tribes are concerned, the Government of India might be within their rights, as His Honour contends, in demanding revenue, but in taking such a step they would be departing from the policy which they advocated and Her Majesty's Secretary of State accepted, *viz.*, not to undertake the administration of the Tochi Valley, except the fertile part inhabited by the Dauris. Such a change of policy, as would be involved in demanding revenue from the Madda Khels, could certainly not be adopted without His Lordship's approval, and to justify the proposal it would be necessary to show that some distinct advantage was to be gained.

4. As a fiscal measure the imposition of land revenue on this section of the Darwesh Khels could not for a moment be supported. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated the 6th September 1895, to your predecessor's address, seem to show clearly that little if any revenue could be obtained, and that the whole condition of things in regard to the Darwesh Khels at the head of the Tochi Valley is very different to the condition obtaining in Daur.

The Governor-General in Council agrees with the opinion expressed by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in Mr. Fanshawe's letter cited in the margin above, that the British Government cannot take revenue from a country unless they first take possession of it, and if circumstances compelled the Government to take possession of the whole or a part of the Madda Khel country, it is anticipated that the regular assessment of land revenue as such would cost more than any income to be obtained would justify. It is true that this objection as to expense could be got over by levying a summarily assessed lump sum, or accepting an amount settled in agreement with the tribes themselves; but there would be obvious disadvantage in enforcing any payment of the kind, whether called land revenue or tribute from an isolated tract of territory inhabited by one section of the Darwesh Khel, while the lands of sections all round them remained untaxed. As matters now stand it would be impossible to extend the demand to other sections of the Darwesh Khel, far less to the Waziris generally, and the Governor-General in Council does not, therefore, propose to ask sanction of the Secretary of State to the imposition on the Madda Khel of liability to pay either land revenue or tribute.

Enclosure No. 18.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to Major-General Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated Simla, 17th July 1897.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram reporting that you had issued a proclamation announcing the intention of your advance to Maizar, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has decided to impose the following terms on the Madda Khel for their treacherous attack upon the escort of the Political Officer in the Tochi Valley on the 10th of June last :—

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all Malikhs and other ringleaders in the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as you think fit, you may declare must be surrendered, and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.
- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or, in default, the value, as determined by the Government, must be paid.
- (3) Payment of the fine of Rs. 1,200 outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Moharrir of the Sheranna Levy Post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees, in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranna Post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The Madda Khels have forfeited by their misconduct the allowances which they received from Government, and it is important that they should be made to realise this fact. Whether the allowances should be hereafter regranted will to a great extent depend upon how far the Madda Khels are amenable in regard to the terms now imposed, but there is no occasion to make any announcement to them on this subject at the present stage.

2. The Governor-General in Council desires to leave you full discretion as to the manner in which the terms should be communicated to the sections concerned. After the attack on the British camp at Wano on the 3rd November 1894, both Mr. Bruce and Sir William Lockhart assembled jurgas to hear the Government demands, and there are doubtless many advantages in following this course. The Kazhawals, who maintain that they were not implicated in the attack on the British party, might come in, as might other sections, if in the first place you merely summoned the tribal Malikhs to attend in token of submission, and in order to hear the terms which the Government is ready to grant. The Government of India would not object to your offering a safe conduct to those who respond to this summons, and to your promising them, that after hearing the terms they would be free to depart unmolested. These, however, are merely suggestions for your consideration : the question will have to be decided with due regard to the circumstances of the hour, and the Governor-General in Council has no wish to fetter your judgment in regard to it.

3. You will observe that the fine may be levied in cash or arms. The Government of India attach some importance to disarming the tribesmen who have attacked our troops, and they considered the question of imposing a fine of a definite number of arms in addition to the money fine. On the whole, it has been decided that the amount of the fine assessed at ten thousand rupees is sufficient, but that this opportunity may at the same time be taken to introduce to some degree a policy of partial disarmament. It is, therefore, left to you to fix the value of each description of arm which can be obtained in the valley, and to either demand a definite part of the fine in arms, or to allow arms to be given instead of cash at the valuation fixed.

4. I am to enclose, for your information, copy of the letters cited on the margin, forwarding, with an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's views, correspondence regarding the outbreak at Maizar and the terms of punishment to be demanded. From a perusal of Mr. Gee's letter, dated the 15th June 1897,

From the Punjab Government, dated the 1st July 1897.

From the Punjab Government, dated the 2nd July 1897 and enclosures.

you will see that there is reason to believe that the Maizarwals considered they had a real grievance in regard to the terms of Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of the murder of Honda Ram. There can be no question of further reducing this fine, but if upon enquiry you are satisfied that the distribution which was ordered presses unduly on any particular section or sections, you are authorized to alter the incidence in any way which you think appropriate.

No. 27.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 21st August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Bird announced to the tribes in Darbar, 17th August, terms of punishment fixed for the Madda Khels, and gave them ten days within which to make their submission.

No. 28.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 24th August, 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram of 21st, I have to report that the Madda Khels sent indecisive answer. Bird has warned them to make complete submission by 27th, in their own interests.

No. 29.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 18th August 1897. (Received 4th September 1897.)

MY LORD,

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 21st July 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding the progress of affairs in Waziristan, since the advance of the Tochi Field Force.

2. On the 20th July, all preparations having been completed, the Force marched unopposed to Sheranni, which was found deserted. The cavalry reconnoitred to Maizar, which, save for a few watchmen, who fled to the hills on the approach of the troops, was also deserted. The demolition of the fortified buildings in Sheranni was completed by the 23rd July; those at Maizar by the 5th August. The Madda Khels are reported to have all moved to Lwara. General Bird disbanded their levies on arriving at Datta Khel.

3. On the night of the 19th July, information from what appeared a reliable source was received to the effect that Mulla Powindah had collected 7,000 men near Razani to attack Datta Khel, and every precaution was taken against surprise. The gathering, however, was largely exaggerated, and dispersed the following day. The Tori Khel and Mohmit Khel Maliks, who were present, say that the Mulla urged them to join him in an attack on either Datta Khel or Boya, and that they refused to do so. A letter has since been received from the Mulla by the Political Officer in Southern Waziristan to the effect that, when he moves about in Mahsud or Darwesh Khel country, he does so to benefit Musalmans and to prevent them robbing one another, that if Government builds new posts war will ensue between the Waziris and Government, and that if peace be made and guarantees given to him, it will be of advantage to all tribal Maliks. He has also written to the Commissioner

of the Derajat, offering to mediate between Government and the Madda Khels, adding that up to the present he has had no hostile intentions, and has none now. No answer has been sent to either letter, nor to any of his previous communications offering to mediate between the Government and the Madda Khels. The Mulla's movements have not been without suspicion, but he has not yet been proved to have done any hostile act.

4. Several acts of violence and robbery have been committed on the line of communication; firing into camp at night has been of frequent occurrence, and the telegraph wire has been cut almost nightly.

5. On the 7th July an unfortunate fracas occurred at Saidgai, in which two Bakka Khel Waziri levies were killed and fourteen wounded by the troops. It appears that about 40 levies, seeing a convoy from Idak taking a short cut through some fields close to the post, rushed in a body and attacked the camel-drivers with sticks and stones. The officer in command at Saidgai turned out with a party of Sikhs and dismounted Sowars and ordered his men to arrest the assailants, but not to fire; much unnecessary force was, however, used, the troops not realizing that the Waziris were levies. We have sanctioned the payment of compensation to the injured levies and to the families of those who were killed.

6. Reports that Afghan agents are secretly helping the Madda Khels have been received, but cannot be trusted. It is certain that Tanis, Khostwals and other Afghan subjects have taken part in different raids into the Tochi valley, and that looted camels have been taken across the Durand line into Afghan territory. It is reported, however, that Sardar Sherndil Khan has collected some of the raided camels, and has written to the Amir for orders whether they should be restored or not, and that he has threatened to fine the Tanis if they again raid across the British border. An asylum is said to have been offered to the Madda Khels by the Tanis of Zadran.

7. Full discretion was given to General Bird as to the manner in which the terms of punishment decided upon by Government should be communicated to the sections concerned, but it was suggested to him that there were many advantages in assembling jirgas to hear the Government demands as was done by both Mr. Bruce and Sir William Lockhart after the attack on the British Camp at Wano in November 1894.

On the 5th August, General Bird sent out messengers with a notice to summon the representative Maliks of the whole Madda Khel clan, with the promise of a safe conduct, to appear before him on the 12th August, and hear the orders of Government. The messengers returned with letters from the leading Ger Maliks stating that they did not wish to send in a large jirga, and asking that the terms might be announced to Shadan, the brother, and Mozammil, a nephew of Sadda Khan. The Kazha Maliks sent no reply: one of them who accompanied the General's messengers, stated that the message had been received, but that the Maliks did not think it applied to them, as they were innocent in the matter of the Maizar attack. To avoid risk of misunderstanding, General Bird has sent for certain leading men and will in their presence announce the terms to Shadan and Mozammil, and send them all to the Madda Khel country to explain the Government demands to all concerned. He reported that, after examining the list of persons whose surrender was to be demanded, he proposed reducing it to seventeen.

8. We await the result of his negotiations. Meanwhile the Field Force has met with no organized opposition, and the recent fighting at the Malakand and Shabkaddar has not apparently had any exciting effect in Waziristan.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 J. WESTLAND,
 J. WOODBURN,
 M. D. CHALMERS.
 E. H. COLLEN,
 A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, Sarwakai, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 19th July 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

On sixteenth Malik Babar, Saifalli, arrived in Wano from Birmal with verbal message from Sadda Khan, saying Madda Khels were in great straits and asking Maliks Banocha, Gulshez, Zorawar, Samandar, Dawe, Zalli Khels, and Maliks Topchi, Sher, Tori, Taji Khels of Wano, to obtain permission from Political Officer, Wano, to visit Madda Khels and act as mediators between them and Government in Tochi. The principal Zalli Khel and Taji Khel Maliks came to Naib Tahsildar, Wano, on seventeenth and informed him of this message, and some Zalli Khels asked permission to go accordingly. Banocha and Taji Khels do not want to go. I directed Naib Tahsildar to inform them that Wano Ahmadzais had no connection with Tochi affairs and should not mix themselves up in them; also that Government would in due course announce in the Tochi the terms it imposes in settlement Maizar outbreak, while no tribal negotiations could be entertained in the matter.

Enclosure No. 2.

List of Maliks to whom the proclamation has been sent.

Serial No	Names of Maliks to whom proclamation sent.	Section and village of the Malik.	Through whom sent.	Date of sending
1	Sadda Khan and Alambe Khan	Khizzer Khels of Sheranna	Malik Nabbi Khan of Kazha	16th July 1897.
2	Sheikh Nur and Saidwali	Ali Khan Khels of Sheranna	Ditto	
3	Mada, Lszam, Nix Muhammad and Azam Din, &c.	Drepilaris of Maizar	Ditto	
4	Namwar, Jebraul, Marmat, Kor and Shah Murad.	Khoji Khels of Maizar	Ditto	
5	Azim and Gul Ahmad	Ali Khan Khel of Maizar	Ditto	
6	Nur Shah and Nabbi Khan	Nazar Khels of Kazha	Ditto	
7	Khadam	Ditto	Ditto	
8	Sabi and Umar Khan	Khizzer Khels of Kazha	Ditto	
9	Wureshmin	Tani of Kazha	Ditto	
10	Made	Ali Khan Khel of Kazha	Ditto	
11	Murza Shah, Shamna and Khangai.	Macha of Kazha	Ditto	
12	Umar	Bahadur Khel of Khaza	Ditto	
13	Zarband and Nazar Khan	Ismail Khel of Khaza	Ditto	
14	Sanam Shah and Juma Khan	Saidgis of Zowe	Malik Saleh Din, Khidder Khel	
15	Lal Khan and Shah Kamran	Saifali and Paipali, Kabul Khel	Ditto	
16	Sur Kamaud and Shandi Bagh	Miyamaus of Shawal	Ditto	
17	Marots and Piao Khan	Malikehanis of Shawal	Ditto	
18	Gulnar	Bakka Khel of Shawal	Ditto	
19	Khan Sahib and Sayad	Gurbuz Saidgis of Shawal	Ditto	
20	Mirbas	Aohar of Kazha	Malik Nabbi Khan of Kazha.	
21	Khalid	Kharsin of Bahramsud	Duffadar Mukhtiyar of Kanirogha levies.	
22	Agha Mir	Saidgi of Dawngar	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah.	
23	Bas Muhammad	Manzar Khel of Kanirogha	Duffadar Mukhtiyar of Kanirogha.	
24	Bahram, Kabul and Muhammad Ayar	Manzar Khel of Mamirogha	Malik Adamzai, Mohmt Khel.	
25	Kotan	Kabul Khel	Tarna, his brother	
26	Daulat and Miraji Khan	Muhammad Khels at Tut Narai	Malik Daulat Khan, Muhammad Khel.	
27	Amin Khan	Khojal Khel Tut Narai	Jamadar, Muhammad Khel Levy post	
28	Kahn Muhammad	Muhammad Khel Daur, now at Tut Narai.	Ditto	
29	Kippat Khan	Mohmt Khel of Bazmak	Adamzai, Mohmt Khel	
30	Niaz Gul, Zalmir, Juma Khan and Kaloni.	Dosallus of Khaysore	Ditto	
31	Saleh Din, Khidder Khel	Khidder Khel, Zurarat Kala	Self	
32	Nur Muhammad	Haider Khel, Khidder Khel of Dageri Kala.	Saleh Din, Khidder Khel	
33	Mannguli and Rahim Shah	Madkhops of Chasami	Ditto	
34	Sadrai and Garrai	Bar Khoja of Chasami	Ditto	
35	Pimbal	Datta Khel	Ditto	
36	Gul Sahib and Sahib Din	Drewasta	Ditto	
37	Piao and Zarmalik, &c.	Hasean Khels	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah.	

List of Maliks—continued.

Serial No.	Name of Maliks to whom proclamation sent.	Section and village of the Malik.	Through whom sent.	Date of sending
38	Ilyas, Khoni and Pir Hassan	Tori Khels of Razmak	Adamzai, Mohmit Khel	15th July 1897
39	Muhammad Akbar, Mian Din, Gulam, Firoz and Mian Dad.	Tori Khels of Sham	Ditto	
40	Firmai and Gulfaraz	Umarzais at Sharik near Sham	Ditto.	
41	Mulla Lukman Shah	Bakka Khel of Razmak	Ditto	
42	Khan Badshah and other	Bakka Khels of Bannu	Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.	
43	Bakka Khel Maliks.			
43	Mian Gul, son of the late	Sirki Khel of Dosali	Adamzai, Mohmit Khel.	
44	Mulla Gulab Din			
44	Zarghon Shah	Jani Khels of Bannu	Deputy Commissioner Bannu	
45	Gulabat	Miyamai of Kurran	Assistant Commissioner, Thal	
46	Samand and Lalo Khan, &c	Lar Daur	Naib Tahsildar Idak	
47	The Maliks of Miran Shah. Darpa Khel, Naggar, Basul Khel, Thal, Tol Khel and Amsoni.	Upper Daur	Assistant Political Officer, Miran Shah	

Memo., dated Datta Khel, 15th July 1897.

Submitted for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

(Sd.) G. CORRIE BIRD, *Major-General,*
Commanding, Tochi Field Force.

Enclosure No. 3.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 18th July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

To day I have been informed purpose of Sadda Khan's journey south of Tochi is to prevent conflict with Government by removing remaining Khoji Khels from Shawal, and urging Bakka Khels and Miamis there to stand aloof. Madda Khels of Kazha said to be migrating from Dadam to Tani country, merely to escape from neighbourhood of operations Maizar and Sheranna continue to be reported almost empty.

Enclosure No. 4.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 18th July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

I propose on 20th to march to Sheranna and to proceed forthwith, in accordance with proclamation, to destroy all fortified kots there and at Maizar. I cannot say at present how long this will take. If no opposition is offered, no further military operations appear admissible, until terms of punishment are imposed on Madda Khels and a reasonable time for compliance has expired. Those terms might, perhaps, now be settled and published. I see little prospect of eliciting further information regarding ringleaders and Maliks implicated. Gee got his list of names from the chief Madda Khel Mulla, and all Ger Madda Khels have now fled. Gee is convinced that Kazhawals were not implicated as a tribe, and that he was mistaken in his first statement to that effect, and is satisfied that the hostile gathering to which he alludes was not composed of Kazhawals. I therefore consider we should demand unconditional surrender of all Maliks and ringleaders now living, who were named in Commissioner's telegram of 26th June, except that the names of Pial Nur, son of Shah Nur, Kazhawal, and Dande, brother of Sadda Khan, and Juma Nur, son of Modai Drepilari, should be added to the list. It might be added that Government reserve the right of demanding the surrender of any person not already mentioned, who may hereafter appear to have been implicated. The value of the stolen property not restored in good condition can be determined later and added to the other fines. I may mention that the fine due in Honda Ram's case is rupees twelve hundred Kabuli. In addition to the terms already

proposed by the Punjab Government in No. 740 of 1st July addressed to Foreign, I would advocate insisting on return of all rifles captured, and demanding surrender of 50 more, and would add a clause that until all the terms are complied with none of the Madda Khels will be permitted to return to the Tochi.

Enclosure No. 5.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated the 21st July 1897. (Telegraphic.)

Most points raised in your telegram, July 18th, are disposed of in the instructions posted 17th July, summary of which was telegraphed to you on same date. Government of India cannot approve clause forbidding return of any Madda Khels to Tochi until all terms are complied with. If after reading instructions you still require orders on any point, please telegraph again. My letter, 17th July, leaves you wide discretion, but Government of India are disposed to consider serious difficulties would be created by publishing an exceptionally long list of offenders to be surrendered, and that we should defeat our own object if we made our terms so severe that the whole tribe would be likely to abscond. If your first demand were for the chief offenders, you could, of course, specifically reserve option of adding others later, and there are very diverse degrees of guilt ascribed to the men named in the Commissioner's telegram of 26th June.

Enclosure No. 6.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, the 20th July 1897. (Telegraphic.)

Occupied Sheranni to-day and found it deserted. Its destruction commences to-morrow. Cavalry reconnoitred to Maizar, a few chowkidars flying to hills on approach of troops; one captured. A few rice fields found under cultivation at Sheranni, but no rice at Maizar, and no autumn crops appear to have been sown.

Enclosure No. 7.

Letter from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab dated the 8th July 1897.

I have the honour to forward, in original, a letter from Mullah Powindah and Hamzullah to my address, together with a translation in English.

Sub-enclosure.

Translation of a Letter from Mullah Powindah and Hamzullah, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent Derajat, Division, dated 1st Safar-ul-Muzaffar, 1315 H. (3rd July 1897).

We, humble servants, beg to bring to the notice of the Commissioner, may he be safe, that if it please you that peace be effected between the Waziri tribe and the Government in a manner unquestionably honourable to Government, we shall, with your permission, hold a consultation with the leading men in the Waziri tribe. We hope that they will comply with the wishes of Government, if this is within their power.

We hope that Government will be kind and not fix too heavy a fine and too hard conditions of peace; and give to them terms which are fair and which it is in their power to comply with, so that the burden and burdened or the spit and roasted meat may not both end in destruction. Let it be known to Government that we have no intention whatever of doing mischief and carrying on

destruction. We shall, therefore, discuss at Razmak with the Madda Khel Waziris, &c., in regard to the wished for and desired peace. If it is accepted by the Waziris, well and good ; if not, your servants shall, with straightforwardness, communicate to you the proceedings of the Waziri jirga. But there is one matter which is talked about by the people, both tribesmen and Maliks, and this is that General Lockhart had acted deceitfully with the Mahsuds and the Mulla of the Mahsuds ; we feel, therefore, somewhat suspicious. If, however, there be no deception and breach of promise, we heartily accept the duty.

Let it be known to the Commissioner, that up to this time we have had no intention of giving trouble, nor have we any intension now. Had I anything to do with the affair, I would not have sat quiet, but I would have decided on one thing.

Enclosure No. 8.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 21st July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday afternoon I received information that Mulla Powindah's gathering had increased to 1,000 or 1,500 men, and included Ilyas and Muhammad Akbar, Tori Khel Maliks, and Kippat, Niaz Gul and Wazir, Momit Khels. Mulla said that, if injury was done to Sheranni, he would attack Datta Khel. Maliks dissuaded him and said do not fight Government until it injures Madda Khels. Drums heard beating at Zargar and neighbouring villages as far as Razmak. Chief Political Officer reports this morning from Datta Khel that Malik Shadamir, Tori Khel, and Kotan, Kabul Khel, have arrived there, and say Darwesh Khel tribes have definitely refused to help Mulla, who has returned to Razmak.

Enclosure No. 9.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Edwardesabad, 24th July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

The Political Officer's report of intention of Mulla Powindah to return home, confirmed by information from two independent sources. He returned to either Makin or Marobi on 22nd, with a following of Talibs estimated to number 100. Information received from Shawal and Zowe that proclamation delivered to Saidgai, Gurbuz and Kabul Khel Maliks there. Kabul Khels profess loyalty. Ger Madda Khels reported to be assembling at Lwara. When all are assembled there, it is said they propose moving to neighbourhood of Gyan in Afghanistan. Tarmor Maliks are moving their property on bullocks from Torsar on Tochi above Dotoi to Maramuli in Afghanistan. Khalifa Nur Muhammad instigating Paipals and Saifals to assist Madda Khels secretly if they mean fighting. Babrak Khan of Zadran has ordered Zadranis to assemble at Spalgin and build a post. All the towers of Sheranni itself were blown up yesterday ; this completes the demolition of its defences. Maizar and Kots of Sheranni hamlets remain to be dealt with.

Enclosure No. 10.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 27th July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

I respectfully ask re-consideration of Government's decision, referred to in your telegram of 21 July disapproving proposal to forbid return of Madda Khels to their villages until terms are complied with. I am examining all existing records and making fresh enquiries, in order to reduce number of ringleaders to be surrendered, but in any case it will be matter of extreme

difficulty to obtain surrender of ringleaders, and the difficulty will be enormously increased, unless we can enforce our demands in some such way as I have proposed by keeping Madda Khels out of valley until their surrender is complied with. If later on they could show that they had honestly done their best to surrender ringleaders, and had failed in producing all demanded, question might be further considered of allowing them to return to country.

Enclosure No. 11.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 29th July 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram July 27th. There is no objection to your enforcing the condition for the present as far as possible, and, as part of your enquiry into the circumstances, provided you make no general announcement, the objection to which is that it will tie our own hands and compel us to maintain a control over the country indefinitely, which would be difficult and very expensive. Any words that would make this necessary must be carefully avoided.

Enclosure No. 12.

From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 1st August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

It is expected that Mulla Powindah will visit Kaniguram to-morrow, proceeding thence to Shakai with small lashkar to coerce Malik Lalo, Khonia Khel, in connection with his feud with Umar Kham, Sperkai, who has sought Mulla's assistance. Mulla started three days ago for Kaniguram with same object, but turned back.

Enclosure No. 13.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated the 1st August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Reported by Assistant Political Officer that about 11.30 A.M., on 31st July, camel-grazing guard had been attacked 5 miles from post, by about 400 Khostwals. Two Sarawans killed; 3 of the raiders were killed and 2 taken prisoners. Further report from Officer Commanding, Miran Shah, and General Officer Commanding, 2nd Brigade, states that 258 out of 299 camels were carried off. News of this raid reached Miran Shah at 12.30 P.M., when all available Cavalry and 2 Companies Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, immediately started in pursuit, but were unable to recover the camels, which were taken in a northerly direction and are believed to be across the border. It was reported to-day from Miran Shah that men from Garbuz, Tani, Khostwal, Jadran, Saidgai, Buk and Ghilzat tribes, living on the Afghan border, were coming down to-day or to-morrow to raid or to attack Miran Shah. As a measure of precaution, Miran Shah ordered to be reinforced by 4 Companies, and No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery to return to Miran Shah; these movements to be completed by Monday evening. Enquiry being conducted into loss of camels at Miran Shah.

Enclosure No. 14.

Letter from the British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 28th July 1897.

With reference to news published in the "Pioneer Mail" of the 15th instant to the effect that Umra Khan of Jandol had fled with 50 horsemen towards Waziristan, and that His Highness the Amr had connived at his escape, I beg to say that the news is totally untrue, and that Umra Khan is still here and is living in the village of Chardeh.

I have also heard that a large number of Waziris with their families, who had taken part in the recent disasters at Maizar, have fled towards Ghazni to hide themselves in the hilly places.

Enclosure No. 15.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 4th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

I shall complete destruction of fortified kots of Sheranni and Maizar to-day, I am sending a notice to summon representative Mahks of the whole Madda Khel clan on safe conduct for 12th instant. On their arrival I will communicate to them the orders of the Government of India, and direct them to explain them to their fellow-tribesmen and to return on a fixed date, and report whether they will obey the order of Government or not. I have carefully examined list of persons whose surrender is to be demanded, and propose reduction of number to 17. Should the tribe accept the terms and surrender these men, the appointment of a Court of Tribunal to try them will be a matter for consideration of Government. As regards the second of the terms to be imposed, it would be impossible to ascertain accurately present value of all articles lost at Maizar without inordinate delay. An estimate of what it would cost to replace them amounts to rupees twenty thousand; I fear it would be hopeless to expect Madda Khels to pay this sum in addition to the fine of rupees ten thousand. I propose to reduce the sum to be demanded on this account to ten thousand rupees, exclusive of fire-arms and ammunition, for which full market value should be demanded if not returned, and to make a further reduction on account of the present actual value of any articles returned in good condition. Some articles may be returned, but the great majority must have been either destroyed or much spoiled.

Enclosure No. 16.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated the 7th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, August 4th Full market value across the border for any lost arms not returned should certainly be demanded, but as a matter of procedure it would be better to tell the Mahks when you get them in what the lost property consists of, and how long time they are given within which to return the articles lost or to make good the loss, but not to fix the price in place of what is not restored until that period is expired. There seems risk that an immediate threat of a possible supplementary fine of Rs. 10,000 might decide tribe against compliance.

Enclosure No. 17.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 6th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Sherindil Khan and Jahandil Khan are reported to have been presented with some camels looted by the Khostwals from us. Definite reports have reached me that Sherindil Khan has now ordered all the camel-looters on the 31st July to be brought in to him.

Enclosure No. 18.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 29th July 1897.

WITH reference to paragraph 1 of my letter, dated 2nd July 1897, I am directed to submit for the information of the Government of India a copy of a letter from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 20th July 1897, and of its enclosures containing a statement by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad, Native

Assistant Political Officer in the Tochi, in which he supplies the further particulars called for as to his movements during the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor suggests that these papers be forwarded to the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force.

2. Sir Mackworth Young considers that Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad has given a satisfactory reply to his enquiries in paragraph 3 of my letter, dated 2nd instant, to the address of the Commissioner, Derajat Division; and His Honour sees no reason for not accepting his version of the affair.

3. As regards the attitude of Sadda Khan, Alambe and the relatives of the former, Ghulam Muhammad's present account confirms the conclusion previously arrived at that Sadda Khan misrepresented the attitude of the Maizarwals to the Political Officers, and throws some light upon his conduct and that of the others mentioned which may be useful in forming conclusions. The Lieutenant-Governor does not consider that there is anything in these papers which confirms the suspicion of a deep-laid plot on the part of Sadda Khan, to which His Honour alluded in paragraph 2 of my letter, dated 2nd instant.

Sub-Enclosure.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esquire, C.S.I., Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Shekh Budin, 20th July 1897.

With reference to your letter dated 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward copy of Mr. Gee's letter*, dated 13th instant, and of the statements of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, and Subadar Nawab Khan of the 1st Sikhs received therewith.

The statement of Ghulam Muhammad Khan is detailed, and explains how he, with his clerk, Mr. Gee's muharrir, and others, was separated from the main body and how he found it impossible to rejoin the Political Officer during the retreat. From what I heard while at Miran Shah, I have no doubt that the clerks, Ahmad Hussain and Muhammad Hayat and others who accompanied him during the retreat and were with him before and during the outbreak, will corroborate his statement fully.

I may mention that Nabi Khan, Khangai, Ali Muhammad are men who are on very friendly terms with Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan, and when they guided him down the Maizar Valley towards the Tochi they were animated by feelings of pure good-will towards him and wished to get him out of certain danger. These men, though Madda Khels, had nothing whatever to do with the attack on the escort.

Enclosure No. 19.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 10th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

To-day messengers sent to summon Madda Khel jirga returned with letters in which leading Ger Maliks state that they do not wish to send a large jirga, and ask that the terms may be announced to Shadan, brother, and Mozammil, nephew, of Sadda Khan. The jirga had been promised a safe conduct, but apparently they feared a trap. Kazha Maliks sent no reply. One of them, who accompanied my messengers, states that they received message, but thought that it did not apply to them as they were innocent of the Maizar affair. I consider that, if terms were announced to two men only, it is possible that they might not be properly explained to all members of tribe concerned. I therefore propose to send for Kippat Khan, Mohmit Khel, Muhammad Akbar, Tori Khel, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and two or three leading Kazha Maliks, and announce terms to Shadan and Mozammil Khan in their presence, and to send them all to Madda Khel country to explain terms.

* Not printed.

Enclosure No. 20.

From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 11th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

A contractor, well known to me, came in this morning. He reports Mulla Powindah started from Badar yesterday after *namaz peshan*, and reached Shakai before dusk with about one thousand men; others having been left behind in Badar, &c. Mira Khan accompanied Mulla's party to Shakai. On the way he heard some men with rifles, whom he did not recognise, propose to Mulla to knock down Narai Oba post at night. Mulla forbade them, as it would lead to him and them being severely punished. Mulla spent night in kot of Namwar, Sathi Khel, is expected to settle case to-day, and may leave Shakai this evening or to-morrow. Yesterday morning Lalo and two of Umar Khan's brothers went to Badar by invitation to see Mulla Powindah. Lalo asked him to settle case in Badar, but Umar Khan's brothers insisted on his seeing disputed land, and Lalo afterwards agreed to his coming to Shakai. Baharam, a nephew of Gulbat, Miyamai, with some following is also present, at Umar Khan's request, to support him. The above information, including rumour of proposed attack on Narai Oba post, which Mulla discountenanced, is corroborated by Wano levy sowar, whom I posted at Narai Oba.

Enclosure No. 21.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 11th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Have received confirmation of previous report of visit of Nur Shah and other Madda Khels to Urgun. Fattah Muhammad Khan, Commandant of Tondai Kila, is said to have taken them to Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who also summoned Khalifa Nur Muhammad Khan. Informant reports that Mulla Powindah received two Martini rifles and a mule-load of ammunition from Kabul ten days ago. With reference to news from Wano, arrangements are being made to watch the Mulla's movements.

Enclosure No. 22

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 12th August 1897.

(Telegraphic)

Reported that the camels stolen from Miran Shah have been divided by the thieves, but are now all at Lalazai, 16 miles south of Matudi, and that Sherindil Khan has ordered them not to be sold until he hears from the Amir to whom he has referred for orders. News was received at Boya late last night of a gathering in Dargai of 350 Ismail Khel Dargai and Mangal Khostwals who were trying to induce Tanis of Dargai to join them in raid on Government camels or convoys, but precautions have been taken, and reconnaissance made under General Symons' order.

Enclosure No. 23.

From the Political Officer, Southern Waziristan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Wano, 13th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Lalo still states willingness to settle with Umar Khan by Shariat. Malik Shahuwas, Badin Khel, came in from Shakai, reports Mulla Powindah left Shakai for Badar yesterday afternoon. Khonia Khel, Shadikai, Badin Khel, Miyamai, Khoja Khel absolutely refused to give food to him and his *lushkar*, and they went without food one evening, eleventh, and morning, twelfth.

Enclosure No. 24.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sherann, dated 14th August 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram August 4th. It appears doubtful at present whether the appointment of any special tribunal will be necessary. Younghusband and his Assistants can probably investigate all cases under your orders, at any rate in preliminary stages. Much will depend on what men and how many are surrendered, and what evidence seems likely to be forthcoming. Government of India prefer to wait till prospects are clearer.

Enclosure No. 25.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 14th August 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Report confirmed that Sherindil Khan has collected the camels taken in the raid of 31st July. He is said to have written to the Amir for orders whether they should be restored or not, and that he has threatened to fine the Tanis if they raid again. Wire was cut last night between Idak and Miran Shah, and three shots were fired at a convoy near Isha Pass this morning.

No. 30.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 1st September 1897. (Received 30th September 1897.)

MY LORD,

In pursuance of the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of Your Lordship's despatch, dated the 8th May 1896, we have had under consideration the question whether the maintenance of the Wano Cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure incurred upon it.

2. Owing to the present position of affairs in Waziristan, we desire to postpone our recommendations on the subject.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) ELGIN,
G S. WHITE,
J. WESTLAND,
J. WOODBURN,
M. D. CHALMERS,
E. H. H. COLLEN,
A. C. TREVOR.

No. 31.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 5th September 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

The Ger Madda Khels have definitely refused to accept the terms imposed.

No. 32.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 15th September 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Tochi. General Officer Commanding reports General Symons with 900 men paid surprise visit to Ger Madda Khel at Dadam, captured 200 cattle and large quantity of arms. Main body halted near Madda Khel.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 30th September 1897. (Received 18th October 1897.)

MY LORD,

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 18th August 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding affairs in Waziristan.

2. On the 21st August, the messengers whom General Bird had sent* to the Madda Khel country, to explain to all concerned the terms demanded

* See paragraph 7 of above despatch
by Government, returned with an indecisive answer. General Bird sent them back with a warning to the Madda Khels in their own interests to make complete submission by the 27th. The messengers again brought back an indecisive reply on the 24th August; they stated that Sadda Khan and others were anxious to come in on safe conduct to represent their case, and General Corrie Bird agreed to receive them on the 31st August. They did not come in, however, and, on the 3rd September, the Ger Madda Khel Maliks sent in letters to General Bird definitely refusing to do so. The pretext for the refusal was that the Maliks could not trust the safe conduct offered to them. General Bird concludes that the tribesmen have been deluded by promises and hopes held out to them by the Afghan officials. Sardar Sherindil Khan is said to be in constant communication with the Madda Khels and to have promised to make them assignments of land in Khost. The Kabul Khels of Birmal are also offering them shelter during the coming winter. A few Machas from Shawal above the junction of the Khina and one Malik with four Machas from a village above Dotoi came in to the camp, but probably only in the hope of saving their autumn crops. General Bird was instructed to deal with the Madda Khel as a whole, and not to treat separately with the Machas. He had, however, accepted the submission of the Kazha Madda Khels, conditionally on the surrender of Nur Shah and Pyal Nur, two of the seventeen men demanded for complicity in the outrage at Maizar. The men not having been surrendered up to the 26th of September, their kots were destroyed and their crops cut on that date. We are considering what further action should be taken. Meanwhile the troops are moving about freely in the Kazha valley, Dotoi and the neighbourhood of Charmna; and, except for the non-submission of the Madda Khels, there is no trouble of any kind in the Upper Tochi. The Madda Khels are said to be feeling the pressure of banishment from their country and to have asked the Kabul Khels to intercede for them with Government.

3. A report is current that Sardar Sherindil Khan, after receiving a letter from the Amir, has informed the Tanis that they need not restore the camels* raided in the Tochi. This report may not improbably have some foundation, for, in reply to a request made by the Viceroy for the restoration of the looted camels, His Highness writes that the camels were stolen by Waziri thieves and sold by them to the inhabitants of Khost, that Sardar Sherindil Khan has ordered the purchasers of the camels to keep them safe, and that if His Excellency considers they should be restored, then the price current in the country should be given to the Khostwals, "so that they may not suffer loss."

4. A letter was received by the Political Officer in the Tochi on the 13th August from Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, asking that the Waziris might be restrained from committing raids on Afghan subjects, and that the question of the demarcation of the boundary might be taken up when the military expedition had completed its work. General Bird replied that Mr. Anderson had already informed the Sardar that the boundary question could not be re-opened by any officer serving under the Government of India, and that as regards the settlement of complaints made by Afghan subjects against Waziris living on the British side of the border, our officers had already suggested a meeting between the officials and Maliks of both sides to adjust the claims of

both parties, and that no doubt, when the present expedition had brought its work to a close, the officer who might then be in charge of the Tochi valley would be ready to meet the Sardar and settle all outstanding disputes.

5. The fanatical outbursts on other parts of the border have apparently not spread to Waziristan. Several offences by individuals and small gangs of raiders have been committed, but there have been no large gatherings or attacks in strength on British posts either in the Tochi or in Mahsud territory.

We have, &c.,
 (Signed) ELGIN,
 G. S. WHITE,
 J. WESTLAND,
 J. WOODBURN,
 M. D. CHALMERS,
 E. H. COLLEN,
 A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure No. 1.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 17th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Reported that Mulla Powindah left Shakai on 14th and arrived Kaniguram 15th. Heavy floods in the Tochi. The ekka carrying the down mail was swept away by the river above Saidgai early this morning, and one mail bag was lost. A search party has been sent to look for it. A party of the 1st Punjab Cavalry riding up Shawal river yesterday was fired upon from Parsha and Suram hamlets of Maizar. Fire was returned by cavalry at long range, enemy having retreated up hill. No casualties on either side. Deputation of Madda Khels will be received in Darbar this afternoon, and terms of punishment announced. Following Maliks have arrived: *Ger Madda Khels*, Mozammil Khan and Shadan, Khaizar Khels; Sherim, Khoji Khel; *Khazha Madda Khels*, Sahib Khan, Nabi Khan and 17 others; also Muhammad Akbar and two other Tori Khel Maliks; Kotan, Kabul Khel; Amir Khan, Khojal Khel; Fazldin, Muhammad Khel.

Enclosure No. 2.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 17th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Owing to Tochi being in flood road interrupted between Saidgai and Idak. General Symons and staff leave Miran Shah to-morrow *en route* to Datta Khel, where they will remain for a few days. Boya reports to-day that Sherindil Khan, Governor of Khost, has called in leaders of parties that started from Zangohrn who have dispersed. While 42 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, were proceeding up the Shawal yesterday in search of raiders, they had six volleys fired at them. Three small columns went out early this morning to capture men who fired on cavalry yesterday evening, but saw nothing.

Enclosure No. 3.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 18th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

In Darbar yesterday I announced the terms of punishments imposed on the Madda Khels to the Maliks mentioned in yesterday's telegram, and instructed them to convey the terms to the whole clan. Bakka Khel and Jani Khel Maliks from the Shawal were also present. Ten days have been allowed to the Madda Khels within which to come and make their submission. Detachment of

cavalry sent out from Boya before daylight on 18th to prevent wire cutting captured and brought in a prisoner, resident of Pai Khel village, who was aiming at a sowar with a matchlock. Similar party from Datta Khel also brought in a prisoner, who was only on a thieving expedition. Reconnoitring party from Sheranni also brought in a prisoner yesterday. He was wearing the belt of a sepoy who was killed at Mazar. He was found with seven donkeys, believed to be stolen from Dawar, and fired upon our party.

Enclosure No. 4.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 20th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Two mail ekkas were stopped near Lak Ghundi between Idak and Miran Shah yesterday by gang, said to consist of 70 men, well armed with rifles. Two sepoys sitting in ekkas as escort were killed; both coachmen and a telegraph signaller were wounded; ekka ponies were killed; mail bags reported safe. Party sent out in pursuit found no trace of gang. Donald, Assistant Political Officer, has gone with military officers to investigate case on spot.

Enclosure No. 5.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 21st August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Reported that 2 parties of Mahsuds, 60 men each, have crossed north side of Tochi. One party has gone to hills north side of Saidgai and the other to Isha. About 30 raiders attacked 2 bunnias yesterday at 8 p.m. about 2 miles Bannu side of Saidgai. Jemadar of Saidgai levies, who was near at the time, fired at the raiders, but was shot dead himself. The Jemadar's rifle and horse and one bag of atta were carried off by raiders. Cavalry and levies of Saidgai on receipt of news went in pursuit, but owing to darkness were unable to track marauders. Saidgai reports that 10 camels strayed from that post yesterday. According to report from Miran Shah the scene of the recent raid on mail ekkas is in full view of Hukunda and Suzkana levy posts, and the ekkas were fired on from a nullah 62 yards distant from road. Eleven Martini-Henry and Snider cartridges dropped by raiders were found. A/2 British Field Hospital arrived at Miran Shah from base yesterday, and remains there as general hospital. I accompany a column proceeding to Kazha valley next Monday, returning about Saturday, 29th instant. Column will be accompanied by Kazha Mahiks.

Enclosure No. 6.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni through Datta Khel, 22nd August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Last night messengers returned from Madda Khel country with indecisive answer. They have been sent back with message warning Madda Khels in their own interests to make complete submission by 27th. Sherindil Khan still intriguing with Madda Khels.

Enclosure No. 7.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated Camp Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 22nd August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Up convoy detained at Miran Shah yesterday owing to heavy rain. An armed Wazari, suspected of camel stealing, was captured by Datta Khel grazing

guard among the camels on 20th. Officer Commanding, Boya, has been informed that news of the Malakand attack has reached Mulla Powindah, who attempted to raise a gathering, but was unsuccessful. General Symons yesterday reconnoitred a path for 10½ mules, said to lead from Datta Khel due south to Makin, *via* the Spina Wunga Malai, which is doubtful. Mules could travel it if a little improved.

Enclosure No. 8.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inzar Kach, through Datta Khel, 25th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Messengers sent to Madda Khel returned last night with Shadam and Kahn Habib, Khizar Khels; Sherim, Khoji Khel; and Mian Khan, Dreplari. The answer is still indecisive, but the messengers say that Sadda Khan and others are now anxious to come in on safe conduct and represent their case. I have accordingly given permission to Sadda Khan and as many other Maliks as wish to come to the Sheranni camp, on 31st. and represent their case. Column will march to-morrow to a camping ground between the Sortoi and Duga streams.

Enclosure No. 9.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, through Datta Khel, dated 26th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram, August 14th. In case of any Maliks or other ringleaders, who may be surrendered as implicated in treacherous attack at Maizar, all that is necessary is to observe principles of natural justice and to secure accused fair trial. If necessity arises, a special tribunal may be convened under your orders upon the authority of the Governor-General in Council hereby conveyed for this purpose. The tribunal might conveniently be composed of three officers, of whom one should be a Political Officer. The proceedings of the tribunal should be submitted with your recommendations for the orders of the Governor-General in Council. If you have reason to desire a court differently constituted, please submit suggestions.

Enclosure No. 10.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp, through Datta Khel, 26th August 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

To-day column marched from Inzar Kach to camp between Surtoi and Duga streams. Road easy the whole way. I went round with detachment of cavalry and infantry down the Kazha to its junction with Surtoi and then up the Surtoi. We march to-morrow down the Duga Algad to the Kazha. This march through the Kazha country has had a most beneficial effect on the Kazha Maliks.

Enclosure No. 11.

Letter from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 19th August 1897.

In continuation of my telegram, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that I held a Darbar on the 17th instant at Sheranni, at which the Maliks, shown in the annexed list, were present, and I announced the terms of punishment imposed by Government upon the Madda Khels for the treacherous attack on British troops at Maizar.

2. As I have already reported by telegram, the Madda Khels, in reply to my invitation to send a representative jirga to hear the terms, wrote to say that they wished the terms to be communicated to Shadam and Mozammil Khan. I considered it desirable, in order to prevent the risk of any possible misunderstanding in regard to the terms, that they should be conveyed to the Madda Khel clan by a larger number of persons than two. I, therefore, sent for Malik Kippat Khan, Mohmit Khel, Muhaammad Akbar, Tori Khel, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel, and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel. All these attended with the exception of Kippat Khan, who was detained by private business. I also summoned the Kazha Malik who had not replied to my first invitation. I desired all these Malik to convey the orders of Government to the whole Madda Khel clan: thus they promised to do. Ten copies of the terms were given them for distribution.

3. In announcing the terms of the punishment, I told the assembled Malik that the Madda Khels were allowed ten days in which to come in and make their submission and undertake to carry out the orders of Government. I added that, if they did not come in within the time specified and make their submission, they would be considered the enemies of Government, which would then be at liberty to adopt any other measures it should think fit.

4. I have allowed the Madda Khels 20 days within which to collect and restore the property lost at Maizar, and told them that full value will be charged for any articles not restored in good condition within that time.

5. The orders requiring prompt payment of the balance of the fine due in Honda Ram's case, and imposing the new fine of Rs. 10,000, were also announced. If the Madda Khels ask for the help of myself or my officers in distributing the balance of the fine in Honda Ram's case, we will take the matter up, but I submit that it would not be desirable to re-open this question except on the application of the Madda Khels.

6. I have carefully considered the question whether the Kazha division of the tribe can be held responsible for the attack at Maizar. It seems to me impossible to hold the Kazhawals as a section guilty of this outrage, although there is no doubt that at least two individuals of this section were present at Maizar. I have, therefore, told the Kazhawals that, before they can be considered to be exonerated from complicity in the offence, they must surrender Mir Shah and his son, Pyall Nur. If they fail to surrender these two men, it will be a question for consideration whether they should not be required to pay a share of the fine. I took the opportunity to warn the Kazha Malik that there are certain cases outstanding against that section of the tribe which they will be expected to settle promptly. They have invited us to visit their country, and I told them that I hoped to take advantage of their invitation shortly.

7. The surrender of the following persons was demanded:—

Sadda Khan, Khizr Khel of Sheranni.		
Dande	ditto	ditto.
Alambe	ditto	ditto.
Sheikh Nur, Ali Khan Khel of	ditto.	
Saiyad Wali	ditto	ditto.
Khanjan	ditto	ditto.
Modai, Dreplare of Maizar.		
Namwar, Khoji Khel of Maizar.		
Marghat	ditto	ditto.
Bohtan	ditto	ditto.
Azim, Ali Khan Khel	ditto (Parsha).	
Ware Khan, Macha of	ditto (Suram).	
Mir Badshah	ditto	ditto.
Mohabbat Khan, Bakka Khel, hamsaya of Shawwaz, Khoji Khel.		
Salo, Dreplare.		
Nur Shah, Macha of the Kazha.		
Pyall Nur, son of Nur Shah, Macha.		

8. The Government of India will observe that the number of persons whose surrender has been demanded is much smaller than the number mentioned in Mr. Gee's letter of the 23rd June and in Mr. Anderson's telegram dated the 26th June. In deference to the opinion of Government, communicated in your telegram dated the 21st July 1897, that serious difficulties would be created by publishing an exceptionally long list of offenders to be surrendered, I have selected 15 names out of the 59 originally proposed. To these I have added two more names, *viz.*, those of Dande (brother of Shadam Khan) and Pyall Nur, son of Nur Shah of the Kazha, against whom there is sufficient evidence to make it desirable that they should be put on their trial. It would have been impossible to enforce the surrender of all the Maliks who took part in the attack, and in making my selection I have been guided partly by the prominent position of some of the persons selected in the tribe or in their own sections, partly by the part which they took in the discussions which ended in the attack on our troops, and partly by the part which they took in the fight itself. The Maliks, whose surrender has not been demanded, will be severely punished by the destruction of their kots and by the heavy fine which has been imposed upon the tribe.

List of Maliks present at the Darbar held by the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force at Sheranni on 17th August 1897.

Shadam Khan, Khizr Khel	} Ger Madda Khels.
Mozammil Khan, Khizr Khel	
Sherin, Khoji Khel	
Sabil Khan, Khizr Khel	} Kazha Madda Khels.
Mirza Shah, Macha	
Nabi Khan, Nazr Khel and 15 others	...	
Muhammad Akbar Khan	} Tori Khels.
Gulam	
Miandin	
Kotan Khan...	...	Kabul Khel.
Amin Khan	Khojal Khel.
Fazldin	Muhammad Khel (Dawar).
Mohabbat Khan	} Bakka Khels.
Akhmadin and 2 others	
Sheikh Majid	} Jani Khels.
Mir Bayand	
Khan Sahib...	...	} Gurbuz of the Shawal.
Paidal	

Enclosure No. 12.

Letter from Major-General G.C. Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 22nd August 1897.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 19th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that Maliks Muhammad Akbar Khan, Gulam and Miandin, Tori Khels, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel. and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel, returned to Sheranni yesterday with an indecisive answer from the Madda Khel Maliks, who wrote to say that they had been hardly treated, and asked to have their case reconsidered. The messengers were sent back and told to urge the Madda Khels for their own sakes to think the matter carefully over and to make their submission to Government within the stipulated time.

2. The Maliks (Muhammad Akbar Khan, &c.) also reported that Maliks Alambe and Ware Khan (Macha) were absent in Khost, having been sent for by Sardar Sherindil Khan, who had promised to give the Madda Khels permission to buy grain in Khost. They further stated that, while they were in the Madda

Khel country, five messengers arrived from Babrak Khan of Zadran, and had a private interview with Sadda Khan, who afterwards said that Sherindil Khan had sent for Madda Khel jirga. It is, of course, to be noticed that this is only the account given by Sadda Khan of the message sent to him.

3. The Maliks also reported that Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan had summoned a jirga of Murgha, Birmal, Zadran, and Ghilzar Maliks, and that Khalifa Nur Muhammad, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Chief of Murgha, and Fattah Muhammad Khan, Commandant of Tande Kila, had gone to Urgan to meet him.

4. The news of the attack on the Malakand has reached the Madda Khel Kurris in a garbled form. The report is that a Mulla has collected an army of 40,000 to attack our troops in Chitral and on the Malakand. There does not appear to be any excitement among the Waziris over the news.

Enclosure No. 13.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni, through Datta Khel, 28th August 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

Column returned to-day to Sheranni. Our march through their country has had a very good effect on the Kazha Madda Khels. According to a recent report by Malik Shahib Khan, Idal Khel Dawar, the conscription in Khost is one man in eight houses, not one man in twenty houses as formerly reported. Zadrans have complied with this demand, but Tams, Gurbaz and Khostwals are raising objections. Sherindil Khan has summoned all these Maliks to Gabar. There are no regular troops in Matun now, only 100 levies. Sherindil Khan has taken all his property to Gabar. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this report

Enclosure No. 14.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 31st August 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

I have extended the time for attendance of Sadda Khan and other Madda Khel Maliks till to-morrow evening, at the request of Mangal, Din Muhammad and other Maliks of Miran Shah, who are on friendly terms with Madda Khels and are confident of their influence over Sadda Khan.

Enclosure No. 15.

Letter from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, 28th August 1897.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that my messengers, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Gulaim, and Miandin, Tori Khels, Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, Amin Khan, Khojal Khel, and Fazaldin, Muhammad Khel, came to me at Inzar Kach on the 24th instant with four envoys from Sadda Khan and other Ger Madda Khels, namely, Shadam and Khan Habib, Khizr Khels, Sherin, Khoji Khel, and Mian Khan, Dreplare.

2. They brought a letter (a translation of which I enclose for information), in which Sadda Khan asks to be allowed to plead his cause either before Messrs. Anderson and Gee or before a jirga of Maliks. Although I am not wholly satisfied that these representations are not made with the view of gaining time, still it seems to me possible that Sadda Khan thinks that he has been judged and condemned unheard, and though he neglected to make use of the previous opportunities which were given him of coming to see me, I have decided to give him one more chance of coming in. I have accordingly replied that I

will permit Sadda Khan and any other Maliks who may wish to accompany him to come to Sheranni on the 31st instant, and make any representation they may wish to make and go away again on safe conduct. I gave Shadam Khan a written reply to this effect, a translation of which is attached to this letter.

3. It is to be regretted that these negotiations of necessity cause some delay in our proceedings, but it has all along been anticipated that considerable difficulty will be found in obtaining compliance with the demand for the surrender of certain persons, and I believe that I am acting in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India in endeavouring to induce the Madda Khels to comply with the terms and in removing any obstacles which seem to prevent them from doing so.

Sub-Enclosure A.

Translation of a letter from the Madda Khel Maliks, to Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated 23rd Rabi-ul-Awal 1315 H.

After due compliments we beg to state that the jirga, consisting of Maliks Kotan Khan, Muhammad Akbar, Fazaldin, Amin Khan, Gulam Khan, Miandin Khan and Sheikh Jamal sent by the British Government, held a meeting on the 23rd Rabiul-Awal with all the Madda Khel Maliks and young and old of the tribe, except Alambe Khan and Ware Khan who had gone to Khost, at Zari in the Babar country. We beg to state that we had expressed our desire and asked you in several letters to send for the old officers who had laid down terms with us in the beginning of the delimitation operations, and who were present in the fight—in which I (Sadda Khan) am charged with a treacherous invitation. It is necessary to send for those officers, so that we may lay and prove our case against them before you. If you are not kind enough to send for those officers, then please send for a jirga of the Ahmadzai and Utmanzai Darwesh Khels, consisting of Maliks Mani Khan, Khan Badshah, Khazan Khan, Zarghon Shah, Niazgul Dosalli, Salehdin, Khidder Khel, Ilyas, Tori Khel, Din Muhammad, Muran Shah Dawari, Yusaf Khan, Tapphi, Lalo, Haider Khel, so that they may assist the Madda Khel tribe in paying up the fine imposed on them by the Government, as the Madda Khels are unable to pay up the fine, owing to their crops, other property (and families) all having been destroyed. We send four Maliks to present themselves before you to make submission to Government for peace. All the Madda Khel Maliks have agreed to send these four Maliks as their representatives. They will converse about the whole matter with you.

Sealed by

SADDA KHAN.
KHAN HABIB.

”

Sub-Enclosure B.

Translation of a letter from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force to the Madda Khel Maliks, dated 25th August 1897.

I have read your letter. I have already twice invited the Madda Khels to send a representative jirga on safe conduct to hear the orders of Government. On the first occasion you sent two men. The second time you have sent three and now you have sent four. I will now give you one more opportunity. As many of you as wish to come may come in on safe conduct on Tuesday, the 31st August, and I will hear all that you have to say, and will allow you to depart on safe conduct. If you (Sadda Khan) have any petition to make, come and make it verbally, and bring as many Maliks of your own tribe as you wish. It is better that you should say what you wish to say instead of writing letters. I will hear all you have to say, but under present conditions I am not prepared to call a jirga of the Darwesh Khels.

I notice that the Machas of the Shawal Tangi have not associated themselves with you in your deliberations. I have directed them to come also on the 31st. One answer should be given by the whole tribe.

Enclosure No. 16.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 2nd September 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

As separately reported no Madda Khel except Machas and Janbi Khels have come in yet to make submission. A column moved out to Landi Khel yesterday for a few days. A dozen shots were fired into the Landi Khel's camp last night doing damage. Inquiries being made. Offenders supposed to be Machas of Dotoi.

Enclosure No. 17.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 2nd September 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

No Madda Khel representatives have arrived except 17 Machas from Shawal above the junction of the Khuna, and one Malik with four Machas from Petarkala, a village above Dotoi. These Machas do not seem to have been seriously involved in the Maizar attack, and none of them are included in my list of Maliks and ringleaders demanded in terms, nor have I destroyed their kots. It therefore appears possible that this portion of the Machas' section of the Madda Khels is ready to make submission, possibly with the view of saving their autumn crops from destruction, from inability to cut and gather them. There appears but little prospect of the other Madda Khel sections, who have already lost their autumn crops from want of water, &c., coming in in the immediate present. I propose to inform all those who have not taken advantage of the safe conduct offered that they cannot now be received until they are prepared to make complete submission to Government, and that for the present all Ger Madda Khels found in the Tochi valley below Dotoi or in the Shawal valley below junction of Khuna will be treated as enemies; but assuming that my surmise as to the submission of the Machas of the Shawal and above Dotoi proves correct, am I authorized by Government to treat with them separately? If so, I would propose to direct them to, firstly, send in five Maliks to be detained as hostages for their good behaviour; secondly, deposit as security, pending distribution of the fine imposed by Government on the whole tribe, Rs 2,000, or any lesser sum that may seem necessary; thirdly, refrain from all hostilities and from harbouring any Machas or other Madda Khels not belonging to their villages; fourthly, restore all Government property in their possession; fifthly, not come below Dotoi or Khuna without permission; sixthly, furnish supplies and guides to any column that may visit their country for the purpose of surveying, &c. I would further propose to inform them that, if they refuse these terms, they will be liable to be treated as enemies to Government and to have their defences destroyed or be punished otherwise.

Enclosure No. 18.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Sheranni (through Datta Khel), 3rd September 1897.
(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of yesterday. Mangal and other Miranshah Mahks having returned from Ger Madda Khels to-day with definite refusal to come in. I further propose to move troops about the Kazha and later to Dotoi country and Charnina to ensure Ger Madda Khels are not harboured by other sections. Should Government have any special line of action it is considered desirable I should pursue, I beg same may be communicated to me.

Enclosure No. 19.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Sheranni, dated 6th September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams, September 2nd and 3rd. It would perhaps be better to refrain from dealing with Madda Khels otherwise than as a whole, and not to treat separately with Machas until you receive instructions on the line to be taken with the Madda Khel generally. No objection to your moving troops as suggested.

Enclosure No. 20.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 7th September 1897.

I am directed to refer to the papers marked in the margin, regarding the refusal of the Ger Madda Khel Maliks to avail themselves of the permission granted to them to come in on safe conduct to Sheranni and represent their case.

2. I am to forward a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, on the subject, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured with the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the action to be taken in dealing with the Madda Khels.

Enclosure No. 21.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 8th September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

I moved to-day to Datta Khel where a column is to be formed to visit Kazha. There is a report that Mulla Powindah visited Shakta, east of Makin, at the beginning of month to settle cross cases between Waziris and Mehshuds. He appears to have been at home at Marobi on night 2nd September. There is an unconfirmed report that he left on 3rd with Kabul Khel escort *via* Makin for unknown destination, possibly Birmal.

Enclosure No. 22.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Datta Khel, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated 10th September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

There is a report that Sherindil Khan, after receiving a letter from the Amir, has informed the Tanis that they need not restore the camels raided near Miran Shah. There are said to be lands belonging to the State in three places in Khost from which Sherindil Khan could make assignments to the Madda Khels as it is said he promises to do. Mullah Powindah appears to have reached Darra on the 5th, and to have remained there till 7th. When Bakka Khel and Jani Khel informers left he was trying to settle a dispute between the Bibizai and Haibat Khel Mahsuds about land at Bujam, and it seemed in a fair way for settlement. The Mulla is offended with Hamzulla, Waziri Mulla, because latter did not support him in the Sperka case.

Enclosure No. 23.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Sheranni, the 6th September 1897.

In continuation of my previous telegrams and letters, I regret to have to report that all my attempts to induce the Ger Madda Khels to make their submission and accept the terms offered by the Government of India have so far failed to attain the desired object.

2. The time allowed them within which to make their submission expired on the 27th August, but, as already reported, I was induced by a deputation from the Madda Khels to believe that Sadda Khan and other Malikhs were anxious to come in and make some representation to me. I accordingly replied that, if they chose to come in on safe conduct on or before the 31st August, I would hear what they had to say, and subsequently (see paragraph 1 of my diary for the period ending the 31st August), on the application of Mangul, Din Muhammad, and certain other Malikhs from Miran Shah, I extended the time to the 1st September. Mangul and the other Miran Shah Malikhs returned from the Madda Khels on the 3rd September with two letters, one from Sadda Khan himself and sealed by him, the other bearing no seal, but purporting to be from the Madda Khel Malikhs generally. I enclose a translation of these letters for the information of Government. In both letters the refusal to come in is based on the allegation that my safe conduct cannot be trusted.

3. I am unable to believe that want of trust in our good faith can be the real reason for the attitude of the Madda Khels; their messengers, Shadam Khan, Khan Habib, Sherin Khan and Miandum, came boldly to my camp at Inzar Kach without any formal promise of safe conduct; they came as messengers, were received as such, and were allowed to depart unmolested. So it is idle for the Madda Khels to pretend that they do not consider my formal promise of safe conduct a sufficient guarantee. The only conclusion to which I can come is that they have been deluded by promises and hopes held out to them by Afghan officials. We know that while Kotan Khan and our other messengers were with the Madda Khels (see my letter, dated the 22nd August 1897) messengers arrived from Babrak Khan, and further Sadda Khan himself told them that he had just received a message from Sardar Sherindil Khan. At that time also Malikhs Alambe Khan and Ware Khan were on a visit to Sardar Sherindil Khan and obtained from him permission to buy grain in Khost, the export of grain from that district having been previously prohibited. Further, Mangul and Din Muhammad state that, while they were with Sadda Khan on the 2nd instant, the latter received a letter from Sardar Sherindil Khan, the contents of which he did not communicate to them. The purport of these messages from Sardar Sherindil Khan I can only guess at, but it seems not improbable, that they were to the effect that the Afridis, Orakzais and other tribes are giving us trouble, and that, if the Madda Khels can wait for a short time, they may find us willing to give them easier terms in order to bring an end to our operations against them.

4. The only villages which were directly concerned in the attack on our troops on the 10th June are Mazar and Sheranni with their numerous outlying hamlets, and it is to these villages that the men whose surrender we have demanded belong. Other villages of the Upper Shawal (above the Khina nulla) and of the Upper Tochi (above its junction with the Shawal), which are not so deeply implicated, have sent in representatives to sue for pardon. With reference to your telegram of to-day's date, I have sent these men back to their homes and told them that I cannot deal with the Ger Madda Khels except as a whole. I have at the same time warned them not to show any hostility to our troops. I have also accepted the submission of the Kazha Madda Khels conditional on the surrender of Nur Shah and Peyall Nur. I now propose to move troops about the Kazha Valley, Dotol and the neighbourhood of Charmina to ensure that the Ger Madda Khels are not harboured in any of these villages. I have warned the Kazha Malikhs that on my next visit to their country I shall require a definite answer in regard to the surrender of the two Kazha outlaws. I think also that we may hope with some confidence that the

movements of strong bodies of troops about the Madda Khel country will tend to dispel any illusions which they may entertain that the misconduct of tribes elsewhere will make the terms offered to them any easier.

Sub-enclosure A.

Translation of a letter from the Madda Khel Maliks, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force.

We inform you that our non-attendance before the Government is due to distrust, as the Government injures and causes loss even on trust. However, if the Government wants us to present ourselves, it should send to us its men and officers, so that we may be satisfied and we will then present ourselves before Government willingly and without hesitation. Secondly, we inform the Government that we are subject and obedient to the Government; we will never oppose the Government wherever we may encamp. Further, that the matter on our part rests with the Government.

Sub-enclosure B.

Translation of a letter from Malik Sadda Khan, Madda Khel, dated 4th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (corresponding to the 2nd September 1897.)

Maliks Din Muhammad, Imangul, Mani Khan, Nakkhar Khan and Rezan Shah, sent by you, reached here, and I was informed of the message that the Government wishes my presence. The reason of my non-attendance and distrust is that during the demarcation of the boundary between the Government of India and the King of Khorasan, the Amir (the pride of Islam), I applied for certain terms from Mr. Anderson, the Commissioner, for the satisfaction of my tribe; the tribe as well demanded the terms from the said officer. But the officers in charge of the Tochi Valley did not allow me to make those demands, and discredited me before my tribe. When the British troops came to Maziar for the realization of the fine in Honda Ram's case, I gave a notice to Mr. Gee and Gholam Muhammad Khan that they should not go to Maizar as the Madda Khels would not pay the fine, because the Ali Khan Khel section only was charged with the offence; the murderer of the Hindu (mohurrir) was also an Ali Khan Khel. The rest of the Madda Khel tribe would not in any case pay the fine, and a fight would surely ensue between the Government and the Madda Khels. Mr. Gee and Gholam Muhammad Khan replied that they will see; and if the Madda Khels are true sons of their mothers, they will fight against Government for a moment. I took Gholam Muhammad Khan's beard and begged him to grant six day's grace so that I may present the tribe at Datta Khel. Gholam Muhammad Khan said that he intended to try the Madda Khels, and that, if they wished to fight against Government, he would give them a chance, and therefore a fine is to be realized from them without any proof. Hearing this I became silent. When the fight between the British troops and the Madda Khels commenced, I with my three brothers, Shadam Khan, son of Adam Khan, and two nephews, named Mozammul Khan and Zerin Khan, accompanied Gholam Muhammad Khan and several other Government servants to a hamlet of Sheranni and remained with them till the fight ceased. Gholam Muhammad Khan forbade me from going towards the troops, saying that the troops will injure me. I therefore did not go towards the troops. My two horses were killed in the fight. The Government officers have charged me with a treacherous invitation of the Government, and discredited and distrusted me on the ground that I had knowledge of the proposal made by the tribe for fight. I was discredited (ru siyah) before the Government. When the General intended to come to our country I sent him my petitions at Bannu praying that the General may not cause me injury without proof of my guilt, but the General did not consider my case, and treated me like the offenders and the enemies of Government. Therefore I have lost my hope and trust upon the Government officers as they trust each other's words and do not believe the words of a foreigner. At the time when General Bird paid his first visit* to Datta Khel, I informed him verbally that the Government officers do not believe my words and acts, but

* In March 1897.

believe the words of other men. At the same time I requested him to report this matter to Government, that if ever Government are displeased with the Madda Khels I may not be injured for it. I paid from my own pocket Rs. 400 fine in order that the Government may not come in contact with the Madda Khels. I inform you that I have not presented myself for want of trust. If you are true to your word, please give me hope and trust so that I may believe it and come in. You should trust on your part the Miran Shah Maliks, so that peace may be effected.

Enclosure No. 24.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 10th September 1897.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 7th instant in which you ask that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will submit, for the information of the Government of India, his opinion as to the action to be taken in dealing with the Madda Khel who have not accepted the terms offered to them. In reply, I am to request that His Honour may be favoured, as early as possible, with a perusal of any communications received from General Bird in regard to the attitude of the tribe beyond those contained in his telegrams which have been regularly repeated to this Government, especially any letters addressed to him by the leading Maliks. Sir Mackworth Young would also deem it a favour if he might at the same time be informed whether General Bird has sent any reports regarding the origin of the outbreak and complicity of individuals and especially regarding the extent to which Sadda Khan and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad were respectively aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals and of the probability of their breaking out; further whether General Bird has arrived at any conclusion regarding the distribution of the fine, in respect of which it was suggested that he should make enquiry in paragraph 4 of Government of India, Foreign Department, letter dated 17th July to his address. I am also to point out that in his telegram, dated 4th August 1897, General Bird intimated that he had demanded the surrender of 17 persons, but the Lieutenant-Governor has not received a list of these persons nor the reasons for demanding their surrender. If any reports on these subjects have been received, it will assist His Honour in forming the opinion desired by the Government of India, if he can be favoured with a perusal of them. If no such information is available it will, he fears, be difficult for him without communicating with General Bird to give an opinion of any value. He would then, however, be in a better position to advise the Government how to promote the chances of a settlement, or in default of submission by the tribe, how to proceed further against them

Enclosure No. 25.

Letter from E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 15th September 1897.

In reply to your letter dated the 10th September 1897, I am directed to forward a copy of a letter* from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi

Field Force, regarding the attitude of the Madda Khels. Previous communications on the subject were forwarded under the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 10th September 1897.

2. The names of the seventeen persons, whose surrender has been demanded are noted in paragraph 7 of Major-General Corrie Bird's letter, dated the 19th August 1897. No report has, however, been received from him regarding the origin of the outbreak, and the complicity of individuals, or the extent to which Sadda Khan and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad may have been respectively, aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals, and of the probability of their breaking out. It will be seen from paragraph 5 of the letter above cited

that it is not proposed to take any steps in the way of redistributing the fine due on account of the murder of Honda Ram unless the Madda Khels themselves ask for assistance in the matter.

Enclosure No. 26.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Pirakai (through Datta Khel), 13th September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

An early visit was paid this morning to Dadam village at head of Sortoi valley with object of capturing Ger Madda Khels, who are understood to resort there, and their property. No prisoners were taken at Dadam except two youths, who were let go. The premises of a blacksmith, who appears to be a gunsmith, were searched and his tools removed, and as, according to information received, Dadam harboured Nur Shah, Kazhawal, and his son after the Maizar affair, all arms found in the village and fields round it were taken away. A committee will report as to the disposal of these arms. At a village close below Dadam a shot is alleged to have been fired at the troops during their advance; the offender was not caught, but some villagers and cattle near the spot were taken into custody. Military commission will investigate the case.

Enclosure No. 27.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 14th September 1897.

In continuation of my letter dated the 10th instant, regarding the action to be taken against the Madda Khel who have not accepted the terms offered to them, I am directed to enquire whether the Government of India have received any reports regarding the property of the Madda Khel still left in the country in the shape of villages, live-stock, stores of gram, or standing crops, and if so, whether the Lieutenant-Governor may be allowed to see them. I am also to ask if the opinion of the Chief Political Officer (Mr. Younghusband) has been obtained on the situation or if any of his diaries have been received, and if so, to say that Sir Mackworth Young would be glad to see them.

2. The list of persons to be surrendered asked for in my letter of the 10th instant has been supplied with your endorsement of the same date, but not the reasons for their surrender, and these should, His Honour thinks, be asked for from the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force.

3. As General Bird has been unsuccessful hitherto in getting a representative jurga of the Madda Khels to attend upon him to hear the Government terms, and has asked for further instructions, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor absolutely necessary to have the further information indicated in this letter and in my previous letter of the 10th instant before deciding on the precise method by which we should proceed to enforce their attendance or to punish them for their recusancy.

4. Sir Mackworth Young would also suggest that His Excellency the Commander-in Chief should be referred to as to the redistribution, after peace is restored, of the Tochi garrison as finally sanctioned after the boundary delimitation in such manner as to occupy the Madda Khel territory without unduly increasing the force required for garrisoning the valley. If it is determined that this object can be attained without a large increase in the permanent expenditure, we might, His Honour thinks, proceed to establish a fort in some healthy position above Sheranni or Maizar, and the commencement of such a project would, he believes, be likely to bring the Madda Khel in.

5. Whether the conduct of the Afghan Governor of Khost should be brought to the notice of His Highness the Amir with a view to his being instructed to refrain from allotting lands in Khost to the Madda Khel or otherwise instigating them to refuse the terms held out to them by the British Government is a matter for the Government of India to determine. Sir Mackworth Young is disposed to think that General Bird should, at any rate, be called upon to carefully verify the information he has received on this head.

Enclosure No. 28.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Ismail Khel (through Datta Khel), 22nd September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Madda Khel, as reports go to show, are feeling pressure of banishment from their country, and have asked Kabul Khels to intercede for them with Government and to give them shelter for winter. Kabul Khels are now considering this request.

No. 34.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

We have decided to retain force in the Tochi for the present. Little progress has been made in settlement with Madda Khel, and we have authorised Bird, if Madda Khel still hold out against unconditional surrender of men demanded, to announce that they will not be punished with death or transportation, but he will let them know that unless their submission is made within a reasonable time, we will take possession of their land and property required for posts without compensation and adopt whatever other punitive measures as may be decided on by Government.

No. 35.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd November 1897,

(Telegraphic.)

Sadda Khan and his brother have surrendered unconditionally to General Bird, on promise that former will not be executed or transported. Other Madda Khel Malikhs have come in.

No. 36.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 4th November 1897. (Received 22nd November 1897.)

MY LORD,

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 30th September 1897, we have the honour to forward copies of further correspondence regarding affairs in Waziristan.

2. Practically no progress was made towards a settlement with the Madda Khel during the past few weeks. Sadda Khan and the other Malikhs did not come in; they sent in letters, giving a statement of what happened both before and at the Maizwar fight, which differs from the statements previously made; but they neither offered to submit to the punishment awarded, nor asked for an interview, though they appeared anxious to make their peace with Government before the approach of winter. General Bird believed that the attitude of the Madda Khel was due to the fact that the surrender of the ring-leaders was a condition which the tribesmen found it impossible to comply with, to the encouragement given to them by the Afghan officials, and to their belief that it was their best policy to play a waiting game in the hope that something might transpire to induce us to offer more favourable terms. General Bird accordingly recommended that no steps should be taken to open negotiations with the Madda Khel, until they had shown some sign of submission, had sued for pardon and had asked to be allowed to return to their country, and that no relaxation of the terms should be allowed until they had made submission and expressed a desire to do all in their power to carry out the orders of Government.

3. The position is admittedly a difficult one. It is now generally considered that the attack at Maizar was the outcome of tribal quarrels in connection with the fine imposed for the murder of the Mohurrir of the Sheranni Post, and that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party, or any preconceived plan on the part of the Maizarwals to entrap the escort. We accordingly accepted General Bird's recommendation and decided to await further developments. We left it to his discretion—if the Madda Khel still held out against the unconditional surrender of the men demanded—to announce that they or any selected individuals would not be punished with death or transportation. He is to let the Madda Khel clearly understand that their submission cannot be indefinitely postponed, and that if it is not made within a reasonable time, the British Government will take possession of such land and property as may be required for posts, without entertaining any claim or appeal for compensation, and will adopt such other punitive measures as may appear desirable.

4. General Egerton started on the 3rd October from Sheranni with a column to visit Dotoi and the slopes of Charmina and Bizha, and to work his way round to the Khina Algad. On the 4th October, the survey party with the column was fired on by a small body from the hills near Charmina and one sepoy was wounded. On the 7th the column marched up the Sindh Nulla and crossed into the Zowe Algad. The baggage guard was fired on near Gurbaz on the Shawal river on the 10th October, but there were no casualties. A reconnoitring party returning to camp on the 13th October was fired at by a party of 12 or 15 men led by a proclaimed Madda Khel outlaw: a sowar of the escort was wounded, and Lieutenant Hingston, R.E., had his horse shot under him and was himself grazed by a bullet. Some shots were afterwards fired into camp and two followers wounded.

5. On the 20th October, a party was sent out to Momirogha and succeeded in arresting Guri, Madda Khel of Sheranni, suspected of being implicated in the Maizar affair, and one Karm Shah, who was harbouring him. On the 23rd, three columns were sent out from Sheranni to reconnoitre Shawal Tangi. A detachment of the 33rd Punjab Infantry, on the high hills west of Gorwashta, was fired on and returned the fire, killing two Madda Khel and one Saifali *hamsaya*. The column in the bed of the nulla penetrated to Tangai, but found no outlaws or Government property. On the 28th October a column left Miran Shah on a ten days' tour to survey the unmapped Mohmit Khel and Turi Khel country, by the Gorwashta river and Spinwam. Several outrages of recent occurrence have been settled by the payment of fine.

6. Notwithstanding the Amir's long silence regarding the demarcated but unratified Waziristan boundary, the Afghans maintain their contention that the line is incorrect and refuse to recognize it. In September, Khalifa Nur Muhammad Khan wrote to General Bird complaining of transgression into Afghan territory near Char Khel. General Bird replied that none of his men had crossed the frontier demarcated by Mr. Anderson. The Khalifa answered (25th September) that no Afghan Commissioner was present at the time the boundary was demarcated, that the British Commissioner had erected wrong pillars and had overlooked the map signed by the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand, and that His Highness had suggested that a joint Commission should be appointed to re-demarcate the line.

7. Several of the boundary pillars between Laram and Char Khel, and between Char Khel and Dotoi, are reported to have been knocked down. The correctness of the boundary between Laram and Char Khel has never been disputed by the Afghan authorities, so the destruction of the pillars on this section of the line may probably be ascribed to mere mischief. General Bird has been authorised to undertake the reconstruction of the pillars, after informing Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of his intention, and a column started for the Kazha valley on the 25th October to rebuild the pillars between No. 6 north of the Mastoi river and No. 10 or 12 east of Char Khel. The rebuilding of the pillars south of Dotoi is now hardly possible, owing to the lateness of the season and forage difficulties.

8. Latest telegraphic* reports from General Bird, announce that Sadda Khan and his brother have come in to surrender unconditionally, on a promise that Sadda Khan shall not be

* Dated the 31st October 1897.
put to death or transported. Other Malikis have also come in and have promised compliance with the orders of Government as far as lays in their power. We reserve for a future despatch any comment on the development of affairs which these surrenders may bring about.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) ELGIN.
G. S. WHITE.
J. WESTLAND.
M. D. CHALMERS.
E. H. H. COLLEN.
A. C. TREVOR.
C. M. RIVAZ.

Enclosure No. 1.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, the 22nd September 1897.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translation of a letter received from Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Murgha with a translation of my reply. It will be seen that the Khalifa tries to revive the claim to a boundary line running down from Char Khel in a south-south-easterly direction, striking the Kazha river to the east of Bibi and then turning slightly to the west and making for Dotoi. The Government of India have informed the Amir that they cannot recognize any boundary line other than that laid down by Mr. Anderson, and I presume that I can move my troops about freely so long as I do not cross that line or do anything which could be construed into a hostile demonstration.

Sub-Enclosure A.

Translation of a letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Birmal, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated the 20th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. (18th September 1897).

After compliments.—I inform you that I have heard that some of your subordinates move about this side of Char Khel hill, Mandrak Khulla and Domandi (where the Murgha and Urgan rivers join). My friend, according to the agreement map, which was prepared by the two Governments and signed by His Highness the Amir and His Excellency the Viceroy and which is still in existence, the above-mentioned places and others where Zowe Saidgis live on this side belonged to the God-granted kingdom of Afghanistan, and the country on that side of the places mentioned above belonged to the British Government. I inform you, my friend, that before the outbreak of the Madda Khels and the punitive expedition against them, two years or more ago His Highness the Amir addressed friendly letters to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, and the Sardar and myself sent letters to Messrs. Anderson and Gee to the effect that, until the question raised about these villages is settled, any movement of your officials would not be becoming according to the rules of friendship. May it not happen that we being neighbours and friendship existing between the two Governments, any improper act take place contrary to the orders of our sovereigns, and that you and I who are the frontier officers incur their displeasure and wrath. Therefore, according to the rules of friendship, I write for your information that, in accordance with the friendship which exists between the two Governments, I trust that the movements of your officials, if this is true, may be deferred till the decision is arrived at about the said places—it would be a good thing. I am waiting for a reply from you.

All is well in every respect.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Translation of a letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to Khalifa Nur Muhammad of Birmal, dated the 22nd September 1897.

My friend, I have received your letter of the 20th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., in which you state that you have heard that my subordinates have moved about on the Afghan side of the Afghan boundary. In reply, I write to say that the information given you is incorrect, and that none of my subordinates have moved about on the Afghan side of the boundary line as marked by the pillars erected by Mr. Anderson, the Commissioner of the British Government, nor have I any intention to visit with my troops any place or land which would be infringing on the agreement you refer to made between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Highness the Amir.

Enclosure No. 2.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Camp Bibi (through Datta Khel), 26th September 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

From information received I am induced to believe Sadda Khan is now sending letter saying if I guarantee that his life be spared and that he will not be transported out of India, he will come in and stand his trial and bring all Madda Khel with him unconditionally. If I receive this letter and may give him this assurance I advocate doing so, and would send Mani Khan and one or two Darwesh Khel Mahks to bring him in. He says nothing of men demanded by name by Government.

Enclosure No. 3.

Letter from Captain H. Daly, C.I.E., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 28th September 1897.

With reference to the correspondence ending with the letter marked in the margin, regarding the Madda Khel tribe, I am directed to forward a copy of a telegram* from the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured,

From the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 20th September 1897.

*Dated the 26th September 1897. as soon as possible, with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion as to the expediency of giving Sadda Khan the assurance suggested in the event of his applying for it.

Enclosure No. 4.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated 3rd October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

If Sadda Khan writes in terms indicated in your telegram of September 26th, you may certainly give him assurance that, if he comes in to stand trial, and brings all Madda Khels unconditionally, his life will be spared, and he will not be transported out of India.

Enclosure No. 5.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, 25th September 1897.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the present state of our dealings with the Madda Khels, and to solicit the instructions of the Government of India as to the course of action which they wish me to take.

As Government is aware, the Ger Madda Khels (with the exception of the Machas of the Shawal Tangi, and of Dotoi and the villages to the west of Dotoi) have taken refuge in Afghan territory ; and have, up to date, in no way expressed their willingness to submit, or to accept the terms offered them by Government ; and the question is whether we are to take any steps to induce their submission, or whether we should wait for them to make the next move. If we are to wait for them to make the next move, the negotiations may be protracted for some considerable time, and it, therefore, seems to me right to explain my view of the matter for the information and orders of the Government.

2. The reasons why so little progress has been made up to date appear to me to be two. In the first place, compliance with the conditions as to the surrender of the ringleaders is to the tribe a practical impossibility, involving as it does the surrender of so many of the most influential men that the remainder of the tribe can hardly be supposed to command the moral and physical force required to arrest them, and hand them over for trial and punishment.

Secondly, it is obvious that the Madda Khels believe that it is their best policy to play a waiting game, in the hope that something or other may turn up to induce us to offer them more favourable terms ; and they are encouraged in this belief by the help and assistance given them by the Afghan officials.

3. Looking at the question from the point of view of our dealings with the Madda Khels, and with the whole Waziri tribe, I am strongly of opinion that our present policy should be one of waiting, and that we should take no steps to open negotiations with the Madda Khels, until they show some signs of submission and sue for pardon, and ask to be allowed to return to their country. To open negotiations with them now, by offering them more lenient terms, would be taken as a sign of weakness, and would not only induce the Madda Khels to think that further delay and hanging back on their part might induce further concessions on ours, but would also involve a loss of prestige throughout Waziristan, which would weaken our hold over the whole of the Waziri race.

I have full confidence that the policy which I advocate must, if steadily followed, be successful in the end, and I think that there is good reason to hope that the Madda Khels will show some sign of submission and make some attempt to be allowed to return to their lands, before the time for sowing the spring crops is over, that is to say, before the end of November. Not only will they be anxious to return to their homes and sow their crops, but they must be well aware that they cannot count on enjoying the hospitality of Afghan officials and subjects indefinitely.

I may add that, in my opinion, the firmer attitude we take up, the more likely they are to offer to submit.

I have already stated that I think that it is practically impossible for the tribe to comply with the order for the surrender of their ringleaders, and I will indicate below the way in which I think this order may eventually be modified ; but I would reiterate here my opinion that any relaxation or modification of the terms must be preceded by the submission of the tribe, and the expression of their desire to do all that lies in their power to carry out the orders of Government.

4. If the policy I advocate is followed, it may take some time before Madda Khel affairs are settled up. I certainly believe that they will offer to submit before the time for sowing their spring crops is past ; but I may be wrong in that belief, and if so, it would certainly take several months before a final settlement can be made with them on these lines.

It may be that Government is anxious for a more speedy settlement of the case, and if this is so, I will state what can, in my opinion, be done to carry out their wishes.

The real difficulty lies in the order for the surrender of the ringleaders. After full consideration, I am inclined to recommend that this term should be modified, and that the tribe should be required to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 (in addition to all other penalties) for each of the persons whose surrender has been demanded, whom it is unable to give up for trial ; these persons

being outlawed until such time as they choose to come in and stand their trial. If the Government of India accepts this suggestion, the total fine on the tribe (assuming that *none* of the persons demanded surrender to their trial) will amount to Rs. 27,000, in addition to the Rs. 900 (=Rs. 1,200 Kabuli) payable to Honda Ram's heirs, and to the compensation payable for Government property not restored; but rich villages like Sheranni and Maizar have large credits which enable them to borrow, and the Madda Khels would no doubt be assisted by surrounding clans. Some portion of the fine might also be accepted in kind, that is to say, in arms, or labour, or materials for building posts. My own view is that the terms might be modified in this way after the Madda Khels proffer submission and sue for pardon. But if, for any reason, Government consider it necessary to bring matters to a settlement as early as possible, it might be thought desirable to open negotiations with the Madda Khels at once on this basis.

5. Malik Sadda Khan's own personalty is one which cannot be left out of consideration in discussing the management of the negotiations. The opinion has been frequently expressed by Maliks of different tribes that if Sadda Khan were to accept our terms and come in, the tribe would assuredly follow him; but that he is afraid to do so, because he does not know what punishment is in store for him. Without wishing to attach undue importance to this opinion, I think that there can be no doubt that our treatment of Sadda Khan is a very important factor in the attitude of the tribe towards us; and that it is well worth the while of Government at this stage to consider how they propose to treat him.

Three alternative courses appear to be open to us:—

- (1) The first alternative is to throw on him, as chief of the tribe, the whole responsibility for the attack on our troops at Maizar, and say that he should never again return to his old position.
- (2) A second alternative is to require him to stand his trial unconditionally, and then, if he is exonerated, allow him to resume his old position. Should Government decide in favour of the first of these alternative proposals, or (if the second alternative is adopted) should Sadda Khan fail to clear himself, the Darwesh Khel tribe would then be called upon to assist the Madda Khel Maliks in selecting a successor, who would be called upon to set up the section again.
- (3) With reference to the accompanying statement of Malik Sadda Khan's services in the past, in the management of his section since we came to the Tochi, and his complicity in the Maizar outrage, I would suggest, for the consideration of Government, as a third alternative, whether they will let him take his old position at once, inflicting on him such punishment as may seem appropriate for his share in the Maizar affair.

6. I have already reported to Government that it is, in my opinion, impossible to hold the Kazha branch of the Madda Khels responsible as a section for the Maizar outrage. At the same time there is no doubt that individuals from the Kazha were present at Maizar, and took part in the fight: and the surrender of two of these, namely, Shekh Nur and Pyall Nur, has been demanded, and the Kazha Maliks were informed that unless these two men were surrendered, they could not be exonerated from the offence. The Kazha Khel Maliks have now represented—and I believe with perfect truth—that it is impossible for them to arrest these two men who are living in Afghan territory under the protection of Afghan officials.

I propose to treat the Kazhawals on the lines suggested in paragraph 4 of this letter, that is to say, I would require them to pay up at once a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default of the surrender of these two men, who should be treated as outlaws, and not allowed to return to the country until they consent to surrender and stand their trial; and I would also inform the Kazhawals that they will be required to pay any share of the fine of Rs. 10,000, and of the value of the property lost at Maizar, to which they may hereafter be held liable by tribal custom.

7. In conclusion, I would reiterate my opinion that the policy, recommended in paragraph 3 of this letter, of keeping the Ger Madda Khels out of

their country until they submit, and express their readiness to comply, as far as in them lies, with the orders of Government, is the right one to follow, even though it may take a long time to carry it to a successful issue.

Except that the object for which the force, at its present strength, was sent, namely, to overawe the Waziris, and to prevent the possibility of a combined fanatical rising still exists, it might be reduced; but I consider that, until the Tirah expedition is over, the present force will be useful in the Tochi; and therefore, until that time, it will be no extra expense to continue the occupation of the Tochi at present strength.

Sub-Enclosure.

An account of Malik Sadda Khan's attitude towards Government, and management of his tribe, during the years 1895—1897, so far as can be gathered from the diaries of Political Officers, and other available records.

Sadda Khan is the most influential Malik in the Upper Tochi, and has steadily kept on good terms not only with the Maliks of other sections of the Darwesh Khel tribe, but also with the Governors of the adjoining Afghan districts. In his own section he had a rival in his cousin, Ayub Khan, but since Ayub Khan's death, in March 1896, Sadda Khan has certainly been the most influential man in his own tribe as well as in this part of the country.

The following notices of Sadda Khan are taken from the diaries for 1895:—

After completing his dehmmation of the Afghan boundary in March 1895, Mr. Anderson recorded that the Maliks had co-operated in the most friendly way, and that Sadda Khan, in particular, had "exerted the influence which he has over his tribe to render our way as smooth as possible."

On the 6th April 1895, the Madda Khel Maliks joined in a petition, expressing their willingness that Government should occupy the Tochi valley.

On the 18th May 1895, Sadda Khan and other Madda Khel Maliks petitioned that they did not want us up the Tochi, and could not provide supplies, &c.

[There was a good deal of uneasiness all down the valley at this time owing to the delay in granting the allowances.]

On the 30th May 1895, the chief Madda Khel Maliks promised the Political Officer to keep order in the tribe, and prevent hostile action against Government.

The diary of 13th August 1895 contains a report that Sadda Khan and the leading Madda Khel Maliks had openly refused to have anything to do with certain intrigues against Government.

In November–December 1895, Sadda Khan and a few Madda Khels joined a jirga which assembled to ask for increased allowances and for sanads to the tribes.

At the end of December 1895, the Political Officer writes that Sadda Khan and other Maliks are anxious for us to move on to the Upper Tochi: also that "Sadda Khan is working very well, and appears to be a sincere well-wisher of Government;" but feels "want of support from within in upholding his own authority and the interests of Government." Mr. Bruce in a marginal note also speaks of the influence of such men as Sadda Khan as being of the utmost value to Government.

The diary of the 8th January 1896 shows that Sadda Khan was doing his best to settle old pending murder cases in his tribe and to maintain order.

We now come to the Madda Khel agitation in February and March 1896. In submitting his report on this agitation, Mr. Anderson came to the conclusion that the real motive of it was the desire of the Maliks (including Sadda Khan) and tribesmen to bring pressure to bear upon Government to make a substantial increase to their allowances. He considered that the Madda Khels had no just cause of complaint as to the share allotted to the tribe, which was more than they were entitled to receive by tribal custom, but he found fault with Sadda Khan and Ayub Khan for not having distributed among the minor Maliks, for whom no provision had otherwise been made, the Silladari of 23 footmen, which had been assigned to them on the distinct understanding that this would be done.

Mr. Anderson added—"Although . . . Malik Sadda Khan and other leading Maliks were engaged in the intrigue which caused agitation and other objectionable demonstrations, I do not for a moment question their loyalty, as a body and individually, to their promises made to Government. I do not doubt that Sadda Khan, in asking for troops, really wishes the support of troops to strengthen his authority over his section . . . He showed his good will by recommending that a post should be built at Dotoi, pointing out that the further west we had our post the better control we should have over the Maizarwals and other sub-sections who took a prominent part in the demonstrations of the past." The Commissioner, Mr. Bruce, expressed his full concurrence in these remarks.

In the diary for the period ending the 31st March 1896, it is stated that Sadda Khan renewed his promise to distribute his Silladari allowance among those Maliks who had received none.

The diaries of April and June 1897 show that Sadda Khan was using his influence with the Khidder Khel Maliks and tribesmen in the preservation of order.

On the 9th June 1896, Honda Ram, the Muharrir of the Sheranni levy post, was murdered by an Ali Khan Khel (Madda Khel), named Waris; the only motive for the murder apparently being that Waris had a grudge against Sadda Khan, who was primarily responsible for the Muharrir's safety. Sadda Khan and the other Maliks again pressed for the advance of our troops up the valley, and it was eventually decided to move a large military force to Datta Khel.

In July 1896, some of the principal Madda Khel Maliks, including Sadda Khan, went to Urgan, and were well received by Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan.

In October 1896, the fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed on the Madda Khels and Khidder Khels for the agitation in the previous March was promptly realized. The Madda Khels were still petitioning about allowances. Mr. Gee recorded that some Maliks had been left out who ought to receive allowances, but that he had refused to consider the matter until all cases against the tribe were settled.

A fine of Rs. 2,000 was at first imposed on the whole Madda Khel section as a punishment for the murder of Honda Ram and for their having allowed the actual murderer to escape. Subsequently the Maliks brought in Mulla Ghain-ud-din and certain others, who were suspected of complicity in the murder. These men were tried and acquitted, and the fine on the tribe was then reduced to Rs. 900 (= Rs. 1,200 Kabuli).

[Mr. Gee considered that Sadda Khan did not do his best to bring these men in in the first instance, hoping that his plea of inability to fully control his tribe would be taken as an additional reason for bringing troops up the valley.]

Sadda Khan's conduct is unfavourably noticed in regard to the shooting of a thief outside the Datta Khel camps on the 7th February 1897. He seems to have tried to prevent our officers from identifying the body, and discovering the true facts of the case.

About this time we first hear of Alambe as heading a faction of the Madda Khels opposed to Sadda Khan. There had been numerous acts of lawlessness on the part of Madda Khels and Manzar Khels during the winter; and the diaries seem to indicate that the opposition to Sadda Khan was due to his attempts to keep his tribe in order, and control the turbulent members of it.

In March 1897, it is noted that the Madda Khels (apparently the Madda Khels of the Kazha are especially referred to) were sulky about the fines recently inflicted upon them, and partly in consequence of this, Mr. Gee, Political Officer, visited the Kazha valley, early in April, with a strong escort.

Sadda Khan's action in promptly bringing in for trial eight Madda Khels of the Kazha, who were accused of the murder of Niaz Muhammad, Shutur sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, deserves notice. These men appear to have been wrongly accused, and were afterwards released by the Political Officer. Sadda Khan certainly appears to have neither discovered nor arrested the real offenders.

The exact part taken by Sadda Khan in the discussions regarding the apportionment of the fine on the tribe in Honda Ram's case, which preceded the attack at Maizar, is difficult to ascertain exactly, but there can be no doubt that he must have taken a very prominent part in them, because he was not

only the chief of the tribe, but he also had a considerable personal interest in the settlement of the case of Honda Ram, who was in a special sense under Sadda Khan's protection, and who was murdered in order to spite Sadda Khan.

Mr. Gee reported that the Maliks had accepted the fine of Rs. 2,000 originally proposed in this case, and had prepared a distribution list. Subsequently, when proposals were made for the reduction of the fine to Rs. 1,200 Kabuli, a fresh distribution list was prepared. To this second list also Mr. Gee records that the Maliks made no objection, and if the evidence of the Khidder Khel Maliks (recorded by Mr. Gee) is to be believed, the responsible Madda Khel Maliks definitely agreed to it. Both of these distribution lists were prepared strictly according to the customary tribal shares, according to which the fine was divided equally between the four main sub-divisions—Ali Khan Khels, Dreplars, Khoji Khels and Machas.

The Nazr Khels and Khizr Khels (the sub-section to which Sadda Khan belongs) are both branches of the Ali Khan Khels, and pay a fixed proportion of the Ali Khan Khel share; though when Ali Khan Khels are spoken of, the word usually refers only to the sub-sections other than the Nazr Khels and Khizr Khels. In an ordinary case, the distribution of the fine according to the customary shares would no doubt have been accepted without more grumbling than is natural in a case where we have to enforce tribal responsibility.

In this case there were various causes at work to stimulate dissatisfaction and to suggest a different distribution. The name of the actual murderer (who had escaped to Afghanistan) was known, and it was urged that his relatives should be required to pay a substantial share of the fine: this suggestion was resisted by his section, the Ali Khan Khels, who were angry with Sadda Khan, on account of a personal quarrel between one of their Maliks, Sheikh Nur, and a member of Sadda Khan's family; then again, the Dreplars, Khoji Khels and Machas, very few of whom live in Sheranni, urged that they were not responsible for any part of the blood-money in this case; and lastly, it would seem that Alambe Khan was ready to take any side in opposition to Sadda Khan.

As pressure was put on the Madda Khels for the payment of the fine these disputes grew hotter. In the discussions which took place on the 8th, 9th, and 10th June 1897, Sadda Khan threatened the other Maliks with the intervention of our troops, and kept up the impression in their minds that the visit of our troops to Mazra was undertaken in order to enforce the payment of the fine.

While thus misrepresenting the action of our officials to the other Maliks, he apparently made no report to our officers of the excited state of mind into which those Maliks had worked themselves. Sadda Khan must, therefore, be held responsible for all that happened eventually. At the same time, there seems little doubt that no one was more taken aback at the attack than he was; he certainly took no part in it, and would have stopped it could he have done so.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these records seems to be that Sadda Khan was really sincere in his professions of loyalty to Government. He was, of course, actuated by self-interest; but he was wise enough to see that it was to his interest to support us, and he did so. He certainly allowed himself to be drawn into an agitation for increased allowances in the end of 1895, and he at first joined in, or instigated, the Madda Khel agitation of February 1896. It must, however, be remembered that even the strongest of these frontier Maliks must, to some extent, yield to pressure from his tribe. Sadda Khan has constantly invited us to build levy posts in his country and to strengthen our hold upon his tribesmen. The whole of the Madda Khel section live beyond our most advanced posts, and this is no doubt the reason why they have not received the supervision and control, without which it is impossible to expect these wild tribesmen to go straight.

Sadda Khan has been constantly blamed for not distributing his large Sildari allowances among the Maliks who had received none; but if you expect an independent Malik to carry out orders of the kind, you must see that he does it, and not be content with accepting his assurances that he will do it.

Lastly, in regard to the Maizar outrage, Sadda must be acquitted of anything like deliberate treachery, but he must (so far as he can be judged without having been heard in his defence) be held guilty of having, on the one hand, misrepresented the intentions of Government to his fellow-tribesmen, and, on the other hand, of having concealed from our officers the strong excitement prevailing in his tribe.

Enclosure No. 6.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ismail Khel, 27th September 1897.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt (to-day) of your letter, dated the 20th instant, and to say that I will send in a day or two a full reply to the questions asked. My letter, which was written before the receipt of your letter and is being despatched to-day, states my views (and those of the Chief Political Officer) on the present political situation.

Enclosure No. 7.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Delta Khel, 28th September 1897.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a subsequent letter received from Khalifa Nur Muhammad on the subject of the British-Afghan boundary and of my reply.

2. In connection with this subject, I would invite the attention of Government to paragraph 12 of the Tochi Diary for the week ending the 22nd September 1897, in which it was reported that several pillars on the Char Khel-Laram line had been thrown down. On the Char Khel-Khwaja Khider line pillar No. 7 is standing, but some (if not all) of the pillars between pillar No. 7 (near Dotoi) and No. 1 have been knocked down. The Maliks say that they reported to the Political Officer in March last that the pillars had been injured, but there is nothing in the office to show whether their statement is correct or not.

3. I find that last year the Government of India suggested that arrangements should be made for the periodical repair of these pillars. It now appears that in the case of some at all events of these pillars reconstruction rather than repair is required. I have the honour to enquire whether the Government of India wish to take the opportunity of the presence of a large force in the Tochi to have these pillars systematically examined and repaired or where necessary reconstructed; in particular, whether in view of the Amir's objection to the boundary line as demarcated between Char Khel and Khwaja Khider, they wish the pillars on this line to be reconstructed, and, if so, whether Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan should be informed of the intention to reconstruct them. When the pillars have been once reconstructed, I would suggest that they should be put in charge of the local Maliks, who should be given a fixed allowance for repairs, and held responsible for the maintenance of the pillars in good order.

Sub-Enclosure A.

Translation of a letter from Khalifa Nur Muhammad, Ruler of Birmal, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, dated the 27th Rabi-us-Sam 1315 Hyri (corresponding to 25th September 1897).

AFTER due compliments.—I inform you that I have received your letter in which you have written to say that none of your officials have reconnoitred and crossed the line of boundary pillars erected by Mr. Anderson into Afghan territory, and that you have no intention of taking troops to lands and places on this side, as it would be against the friendly agreement of the two Governments.

I came to know the contents of your letter, and I write to inform you that no Afghan Commissioner was present at the time of the demarcation of the boundary line from Laram and Char Khel to Domandi, Gumal and Kunder. The British Commission Officer erected wrong boundary pillars and overlooked the map prepared and signed by His Highness the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, and which we have still with us. The Malik and subjects were dissatisfied with it at the time, and they complained about it to the Amir. The Amir referred the matter to the Government of India, and suggested that Commissions should be appointed by the two Governments, so that pillars be erected according to the map, and the claims of the subjects of the two Governments be considered. With respects. Waiting for a reply.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Translation of a letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to Khalefa Nur Muhammad, Ruler of Birmal, dated 26th September 1897.

AFTER due compliments.—I inform you that I have received your letter and read it. In reply I inform you that, at the time of my starting on this expedition, the Government of India gave me a map showing the boundary line between the two countries, and the boundary pillars are all marked on it. I have not crossed the line of boundary pillars into Afghan territory, and I have no intention of doing so. My troops are encamped on this side of the boundary pillars. As regards the suggestion for a fresh demarcation of the boundary, I write to say that I have submitted a report on this matter to the Government of India. His Excellency the Viceroy will doubtless write to His Highness the Amir about the matter, and I have no doubt you will receive orders from the Amir in due course

Enclosure No. 8.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd October 1897.

In reply to your letters, dated 7th and 28th ultimo, in which the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to affairs in the Tochi is called for, I am desired to intimate that Sir Mackworth Young considers that it is established that the reason for the Madda Khel holding out lies simply in the demand for unconditional surrender of the 17 persons mentioned in paragraph 7 of Major-General Bird's letter, dated 19th August 1897.

2. The formulation of such a demand must have appeared to be significant to the tribe, as the utmost we have ordinarily demanded in similar cases has been the surrender of leading men as hostages. The reason for making the demand for unconditional surrender in the present case was simply that the attack on the escort at Maizar on the 10th June was regarded as an act of pure treachery. This was the view taken by Mr. Gee in his telegrams of 10th June and 11th June, and by Mr. Anderson in his telegram, dated 16th June. Unconditional surrender of the ringleaders appeared therefore to be absolutely necessary, and accordingly this was one of the terms recommended in this office letter, dated 1st July, and practically accepted by the Government of India in Foreign Department letter, dated 17th July.

3. Mr. Gee's detailed report of the occurrence, however, which was forwarded with this office letter, dated 2nd July, put a somewhat different complexion on the matter. Instead of the attack being, as was at first supposed, a deliberate plot devised under the semblance of hospitality, it appeared doubtful whether it was premeditated at all. Mr. Gee indeed held that it was, but the only explanation he was able to suggest, though he considered it quite inadequate, was that it was planned in resistance to the treatment of the tribe by Sadda Khan, against whom Mr. Gee held that the charge of direct complicity was not proved. In reviewing this report His Honour observed that the occurrence

appeared to be mainly and immediately due to the bitter feeling engendered between several of the Maliks and sections of the Madda Khel by the distribution of the fine leviable from them on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir ; and he intimated that further and fuller enquiry would be necessary before the causes were completely established and the share of responsibility for the attack duly apportioned. From the Foreign Department letter, dated 15th September, it appears that no report has been received from Major-General Bird on this subject, though the Lieutenant-Governor's views, as above explained, were communicated to him with paragraph 4 of your letter, dated 17th July, and the Government of India there pointed out that there was reason to believe that the Maizarwals considered that they had a real grievance in regard to the terms of Sadda Khan's distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 on account of the murder of Honda Ram. Nor can the Lieutenant-Governor find any expression of opinion by Mr. Younghusband on this subject. In fact Mr. Younghusband appears to have submitted no diaries and expressed no views of his own throughout the campaign, which Sir Mackworth Young thinks is much to be regretted, and contrary, as he understands, to the intentions of the Government of India, by whom the relations between the General Officer invested with supreme political control and the Chief Political Officer were explained to this Government in 1894, while the recent orders contained in your letter of 15th September regarding the Orakzai and Afridi expedition furnish an instance of those intentions.

4. But in default of full information His Honour thinks it safe to conclude from the reports of Mr. Gee above referred to, as well as the report furnished by him with regard to the conduct of Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan and forwarded with this office letter, dated 29th July 1897, that the attack of 10th June was the outcome of tribal quarrels relating to the fine, and that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party and no plan to entrap the escort on the part of the Maizarwals. He is inclined to think that, if the circumstances had been fully known when the terms were announced, it would have been sufficient to have demanded hostages in lieu of requiring the surrender for trial of the 17 persons demanded by Major-General Bird, under the first head of the terms.

5. Sir Mackworth Young has now to reply to the two enquiries made by the Government of India in the letters under reply.

The Lieutenant-Governor has no hesitation in recommending that if Sadda Khan sends the letter to which Major-General Bird alludes in his telegram, dated 26th September, he should be given the assurance he asks for, on the conditions named. He does not apprehend that in view of the aspect of the case, which has been above described, there will be any question of taking Sadda Khan's life or deporting him out of India. And holding, as Sir Mackworth Young does, that the worst fault of which he was guilty was not informing the Political Officers of the attitude of the Madda Khel, he sees no impropriety in treating him as an intermediary for inducing the tribe to comply with the demands of Government. But His Honour is not sanguine of his sending such a letter or of his being able to give effect to his promises, if he does.

6. Assuming that even after the assurance Sadda Khan will be unable or unwilling to ensure compliance with the terms, I am now to submit for the orders of the Government of India, the views of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the further action to be taken in regard to the Madda Khel.

7. His Honour considers that except in the matter above discussed,—*viz.*, of giving an assurance to Sadda Khan that he will not be hanged or deported out of India—there should be no relaxation of the terms announced by Government, but rather that, as proposed by Mr. Anderson, the surrender of a certain number of arms should be demanded in addition ; and that it should be announced that in default of the Madda Khel coming in and complying with all the terms as thus enhanced the British Government will proceed to confiscate the lands of all whom it believes to have been implicated in the outbreak who will thenceforth be regarded as criminals and outlaws. When this has been decided individuals not included in the above number might be allowed to return to their lands, and the confiscated lands might be made over to such persons as Government may appoint on such terms as may seem most desirable.

8. Sir Mackworth Young also thinks that unless Sadda Khan brings in the Madda Khel on getting the assurance above mentioned, the Government of India will be well advised to entrust further negotiations in this matter to Mr. Anderson, and to restore to him the political control of the Tochi Valley whether under the Punjab Government or for the present directly under the Government of India. His confidence in his power to bring in the Mahiks is probably well founded, and so long as the troops are not withdrawn before a final settlement has been arrived at, there is no reason to anticipate any evil results from the reintroduction of the Commissioner's political control.

Enclosure No. 9.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department dated Simla, 14th October 1897.

In continuation of the letter from this office, dated the 2nd October 1897, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the telegram noted in the margin, regarding the question of the submission of the Madda Khels.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 12th October 1897.

Sub-Enclosure.

From the Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, dated 12th October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, dated 2nd instant, to India and General's telegram, dated 26th ultimo, received yesterday. Even if Sadda Khan wrote letter, his object, so far as I can form opinion, would be to throw out a feeler to ascertain what action we contemplate taking now that six weeks have elapsed since he definitely declined to comply with terms. If my surmise be correct, Sadda Khan finding that his non-compliance has brought no additional punishment on him or tribe, but on contrary has secured an assurance, might be encouraged to hope for further concessions and modification of terms, and the General's reply will do more harm than good. I need hardly add that it will make future settlement more difficult. Darwesh Khel sections have now commenced moving to their winter quarters; if Sadda Khan has not written the letter, and it is decided to entrust the case to me, I trust early orders will be obtained to enable me to take advantage of the movement which both isolates Madda Khels and brings other sections within our reach and affords favourable opportunity, if taken at once, of influencing Madda Khels.

Enclosure No. 10.

Letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding Tochi Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Miran Shah, 13th October 1897.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 20th ultimo, with which you forwarded a copy of certain correspondence with the Government of the Punjab, and asked for further information regarding certain points raised in that correspondence.

2. The matters regarding which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor asks for further information appear to be the following:—

- (i) The origin of the outbreak at Maizar.
- (ii) The complicity of individuals in the outbreak.
- (iii) and (iv) The extent to which (iii) Sadda Khan and (iv) Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammed Khan were aware of the attitude of the Maizarwals and the probability of their breaking out.

- (v) The distribution of the fine of Rs. 1,200 in Honda Ram's case.
- (vi) The reason for the selection of the 17 persons whose surrender has been demanded.
- (vii) The property of the Madda Khels left in the country.
- (viii) The Diaries of the Chief Political Officer and his opinion on the situation.
- (ix) The allegation that the Afghan Governor of Khost is offering lands in Khost to the Madda Khels and in other ways instigating them to refuse the terms held out to them by Government.

3. I will now supply what additional information I can on these points.

Points (i) and (iii).—In the memorandum appended to my letter dated the 25th September 1897, a full statement was given of the share taken by Sadda Khan in the discussions which preceded the outbreak at Maizar, and the question of his responsibility for that outbreak was discussed. The reasons for the general dissatisfaction prevailing among the Madda Khels, both of Sheranni and Maizar, were also examined. To the general discontent prevailing was added the annoyance felt by the tribe at the story told them by Sadda Khan that the visit of our troops to Maizar was undertaken in order to enforce payment of the fine, and it seems pretty certain from the evidence recorded by Mr. Gee that it had been decided by the Maliks at the "Marakka" held on the 9th June that, if any attempt was made by our troops to enforce payment by force, they would resist by force. There is, it seems to me, no reason to suppose that they went further than this, and, in fact, everything points to the absence of deliberate treachery on the part of the Maliks. If there had been a deliberate intention to commit a treacherous attack on our troops, it is impossible to believe Sadda Khan and all his own immediate relations (to say nothing of the Khidder Khel Maliks and intelligent men like the Levy Havildar Alam Shah) would not have had some warning of it, and in that case would have conveyed a warning to the Political Officer; again, if they had meant treachery, they could have easily shot down Mr. Gee and his escort of six cavalry sowars on the way to or from Dotoi; thirdly, the inhabitants of remote villages, instead of being ready on the spot to join in the fight, did not come up till they heard the sound of firing; fourthly, the women and children do not appear to have been sent away, as is the custom with Pathan tribes when a fight is coming off; mention is made in the evidence of Pyall's daughter, Mr. Gee speaks of the women joining in the fight and throwing stones, and 4 women are said to have been killed at Maizar, and nine women and children at Sheranni; lastly, it is difficult to believe that, if deliberate treachery had been intended, such experienced officers as Colonel Bunny and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan would have failed to see some indication of it. At the meeting which was held on the 10th under the mulberry trees, it would appear that after a hot discussion Sadda Khan went off to the Assistant Political Officer (who had retired to a terrace below to perform his ablutions) to ask for five days' grace within which to pay the fine. Apparently a similar request had been preferred an hour previously, and (according to the Assistant Political Officer himself) he replied that he would lay the matter before the Political Officer after he had eaten his food. While Sadda Khan was away the second time, there was a general movement of the Maliks to the village marked on the plan as the Dreplare Kot, a shot (or two shots) were fired, the excitement then became uncontrollable and every one joined in the fray. By whom or for what reason the first shot was fired will probably ever remain a mystery; several explanations are given in the papers submitted by Mr. Gee; these differ widely from each other, and are apparently only guesses if not intentionally false suggestions. As probable an explanation as any other seems to me to be that it was fired by some ruffian, who wanted to commit his tribe to the attack at the height of their excitement and knew that this was the surest way to do it. This is only a guess, but it may be nearer the truth than some of the other explanations offered.

4. Points (ii) and (vi).—The case of Sadda Khan has already been sufficiently discussed. The reasons for the selection of the other 16 men whose surrender has been demanded are briefly as follows:—Dande has been selected both because of his position in the tribe, and because of the assertions made that it was notorious that he used against our troops the Winchester rifle which

had been given for good service to Sadda Khan ; these assertions are to some extent supported by the evidence of Surgeon-Captain Cassidy (since dead) and Surgeon-Captain Ozzard ; if Dande joined in the fight, he must have left it very soon after the commencement ; I think the case against him should be placed before a court. Alambe is the rival and opponent of Sadda Khan in the tribe ; he was partly responsible for the agitation which ended in the attack on our troops ; though he took no part in the fight itself, he appears to have failed to prevent his own village of Sheranni from attacking our troops, even if he did not (as Mr. Gee suggests) encourage it to do so ; his nephew Zer Makhmad is said to have remained at Maizar and joined in the fight. Shekh Nur is the chief Malik of the Ali Khan Khels proper ; he and his brother Saryad Wali took a prominent part in fomenting the agitation against the payment of the fine ; they had previously sheltered Honda Ram's murderer and assisted him to escape ; they were present at Maizar and almost certainly took part in the fight ; it is said that Saryad Wali began the fight by firing the first shot, but the evidence on this point is not to be relied on. Khaniyan is another leading Ali Khan Khel, who was suspected of complicity in the murder of Honda Ram ; he took a leading part in the Maizar fight, and is said to have been one of the first to fire. Modai is the chief Malik of the Dreplare village adjoining the ground where our troops were encamped, and from which the first deadly attack on them was made ; he took a prominent part in the agitation, and it is said that the question of fighting was first discussed in his house. Namwar, Azun and Ware Khan are the chief Maliks of the Khoji Khel, Ali Khan Khel and Macha sub-sections in Maizar ; they were present on the 10th June, and doubtless took part in the fight. They appear to have joined in the agitation, though not (except perhaps Azun) to have taken so prominent a part in it as some of the other Maliks. All three are said to have been engaged in the fight. Loot taken at Maizar was found in the hamlets of Azun and Ware Khan. Marghat presumably took an active part in the fight, as two rifles are said to be his share of the spoil ; he is mentioned as one of the ringleaders. Mir Badshah is the brother of Ware Khan, the Macha Malik, and is mentioned as one of the ringleaders ; ten discharged Martini-Henry cartridge cases were found in his house.

Bohtan, Salo and Muhabbat are notorious ruffians who are said to have been in the fight. Salo has a rifle and is said to have been one of the first to fire. Bohtan has (since the Maizar attack) been surprised by a small party of our troops with some stolen donkeys and was wounded by a shot fired at him, but got away. Nur Shah is one of the most important Maliks of the Kazha. It seems to be perfectly clear that he and his son Pyall Nur were present at Maizar and took an active part in the fight.

5. Point (iv).—There is nothing in Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan's own statement or in the other papers on record to suggest that he had any idea of the excited feelings prevailing among the Madda Khels. He does not appear to have been questioned on this point. It seems to me desirable that some inquiry of the kind should now be made from him, as, though the Khidder Khel Maliks will not admit that they had any knowledge of the matter, both the Levy Havildar Alam Shah and Sheikh Jamal of Ipi knew all about it, and it is certainly not to Ghulam Muhammad Khan's credit that he should have been so ignorant of the feelings of the section. Further, Sadda Khan in his petitions directly accuses the Assistant Political Officer of refusing to listen to his warnings both before and on the 10th that there would be trouble if the few days' grace asked for was not granted. I propose going into this matter also, and will submit a separate report before the termination of the expedition.

6. Point (v).—As already stated in paragraph 5 of my letter dated the 19th August 1897, it does not seem to me desirable to re-open the question of the distribution of the fine in Honda Ram's case except on the application of the Madda Khels themselves ; at all events, it is impossible to do so until they are here to discuss it.

7. Point (vi).—The Madda Khels of Sheranni and Maizar with their outlying hamlets (which spread over a distance of some 3 or 4 miles along the Tochi and Shawal rivers, respectively) have no property left in the valley except bare houses, and even these have in many cases suffered a good deal of injury from

the destruction of the towers and walled defences. What was possible has been done to leave some shelter for the women and children during the severe cold of the winter in case the Madda Khels should think fit to submit before the cold weather comes on, but there is no property left of which we can deprive them. The search parties found the houses stripped of everything except a few odds and ends, and a certain quantity of bhoosa which the Madda Khels had not been able to carry away in the interval of 40 days which elapsed between the outrage on the 10th June and the arrival of our troops on 20th July. This was taken possession of and used by the Commissariat. Their flocks and herds were all driven off before our arrival, and the Commissariat mules have eaten down the standing crops, which even if they had been left alone could not have ripened without irrigation and attention. This applies to the hamlets as far west as Landi Khel (or Landi Bahadur Khel) and Kundian, and as far south as Gurgwashta. Beyond these are a few hamlets which have not been molested in any way. On the west there are Dotoi and a few hamlets on the Mastoi and Murgha streams, reported to contain 108 houses in all: on the south there are the Machas and a few Janbi Khels (or Janbeg Khels) of the Shawal Tangi. The crops of all these villages put together would not amount to much. None of these hamlets were in any way concerned in the attack on our troops by the Mazzar and Sheranni people. Representative deputations from all these hamlets came in to Sheranni to sue for peace and make their submission, but in view of the orders contained in your telegram of the 6th ultimo to refrain from dealing with the Madda Khels otherwise than as a whole, and not to treat separately with the Machas until I should receive instructions on the line to be taken with the Madda Khels generally, they were dismissed to their homes (as reported in paragraph 4 of my letter, dated the 6th September 1897).

8. Point (viii).—With reference to the request of the Lieutenant-Governor for the opinion of the Chief Political Officer and for a copy of his diaries, I should explain that all my letters to the Government of India are drafted by the Chief Political Officer after consultation, either verbal or on paper, with myself, and may be taken to represent his views as well as my own. If he should at any time find it impossible to agree in the views expressed in any of my letters, or should for any reason desire to record a separate opinion, opportunity will be given to him to do so, and the opinion will be forwarded for the information of Government. Similarly the weekly diaries have all (except on one occasion during the Chief Political Officer's absence on tour) been drafted by Mr. Younghusband. Of course I make such modifications as I consider necessary, but the diaries are practically the Chief Political Officer's work, accepted and approved by myself. I trust that this explanation will be satisfactory to the Government of India.

9. Point (ix).—I have no definite information which would justify me in asserting that an offer of lands has been made to the Madda Khels either in Khost or elsewhere, and I think it improbable that any such offer has been made. Our reports go to show that the Amur, while not refusing a refuge to the Madda Khels, has gone no further than this, and has caused them to be informed that the refuge is conditional on their good behaviour. On the other hand, the facts stated in paragraph 3 of my letter, dated the 6th September 1897, to your address, appear to me to justify the conviction that Sardar Sherindil Khan and Babrak Khan have encouraged the Madda Khels to persevere in their present attitude of passive resistance.

Enclosure No. 11.

Letter from Sir W. J. Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tchoi Field Force, dated Simla, the 23rd October 1897.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters regarding the present situation in the Madda Khel country.

2. You report that little progress towards a settlement with the Madda Khels has been effected up to date, and you attribute this, in the first place, to the fact that the surrender of the ringleaders of the attack at Mazzar is a

condition which the tribesmen find it practically impossible to comply with, and, secondly, to the encouragement given to the Madda Khels by the Afghan officials and to the tribesmen's belief that it is their best policy to play a waiting game, in the hope that something may transpire to induce us to offer more favourable terms. You accordingly recommend that no steps should be taken to open negotiations with the Madda Khels, until they show some signs of submission and sue for pardon, and ask to be allowed to return to their country; and you consider that no relaxation or modifications of terms should be allowed, until the Madda Khel have made submission and expressed a desire to do all that lies in their power to carry out the orders of Government.

3. The Governor-General in Council accepts your recommendation, and will await further developments. He would be unable, however, to agree to the alternative which you suggest, in view to a more speedy settlement, that a sum of money might be demanded in lieu of the ringleaders whose surrender you have required. If you find that the Madda Khel still hold out against the unconditional surrender of the men demanded, it is left to your discretion to announce that they or any selected individuals of them will not be punished with death or transportation. You should let the Madda Khel clearly understand that their submission cannot be indefinitely postponed, and that if it is not made within a reasonable time, the British Government will take possession of such land and property as may be required for posts, without entertaining any claim or appeal for compensation, and will adopt such other punitive measures as may appear desirable.

Enclosure No. 12.

Letter from Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, 23rd October 1897.

THE Governor-General in Council has had under consideration the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion regarding the present situation in the Madda Khel country, as expressed in your letter, dated the 2nd October 1897, a copy of which has, it is understood, been furnished by the Punjab Government to the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force.

2. His Honour has come to the conclusion that the attack on the British troops at Maizar on the 10th June 1897 was the outcome of tribal quarrels relating to the fine imposed for the murder of Honda Ram, that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party, and no plan to entrap the escort on the part of the Maizarwals. The Lieutenant-Governor is not sanguine of Sadda Khan sending in a letter, offering to come in and stand his trial, and to bring in the Madda Khel unconditionally if guaranteed against punishment by death or transportation, as General Bird reported in his telegram, dated the 26th September 1897, that he was likely to do; and, as a matter of fact, no such letter has yet been received. Had Sadda Khan written, as General Corrie Bird has reason to think it possible he might, the Lieutenant Governor would have had no hesitation in recommending that Sadda Khan should be given an assurance that he would not be hanged, or sent out of India. If, even after receiving this assurance, Sadda Khan still failed to bring in the Madda Khel, His Honour thinks the Government of India would be well advised to entrust further negotiations to Mr. Anderson, and to restore to him political control in the Tochi valley.

The Governor-General in Council considers that, so far as the direct object of the expedition is concerned, it might be held that the time had come to reduce the Tochi force, but that it is preferable not to do much in this direction until General Sir William Lockhart is established in Turah. The force now in the Tochi will accordingly be retained for the present, and the chief

Dated the 23rd October 1897. political control will remain in the hands of Major-General Corrie Bird. A copy of my letter furnishing instructions for his guidance is enclosed.

Enclosure No. 13.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, Camp Datta Khel, dated 23rd October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Correspondence ending with your letter September 28th. You may undertake reconstruction of boundary pillars between Char Khel and Laram, and also those south of Char Khel, informing Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of your intention. If expenditure for which there is no provision will be involved, please report probable amount and how you propose meeting it. About proposal to grant allowances to Maliks for maintenance further instructions will be sent to you.

Enclosure No. 14.

From Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Datta Khel, 24th October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Owing to lateness of season and forage difficulties, reconstruction of boundary pillars south of Dotoi hardly possible now, but will send out to ascertain condition of pillars. A column starts for Kazha valley to-morrow, which will reconstruct from pillar No. 6 west, past Char Khel, along Mazdak ridge, to pillar No. 10 or 12 east. Rest of pillars to Laram can, if injured, be reconstructed later by column from Miran Shah. In addition to Sardar Gul Muhammad, am informing Sardar Sherindil Khan of my intentions. Will address you later regarding cost.

Enclosure No. 15.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tochi Field Force, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Inzar Kach (through Datta Khel), 31st October 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday five Maliks of Tarmor hamlet, representing sixty houses, came in and proffered submission of Tarmor people and promised compliance with orders of Government as far as lay in their power. This morning Khan Habib, cousin of Alambe, and three other influential men of Sheranni, said to represent thirty houses, have come in and wish to make their peace; these have not been interviewed yet. This afternoon Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam have come in to surrender unconditionally on promise that Sadda Khan shall not be put to death or transported. I will see them now and report further to-morrow. Sadda Khan showed much resolution in coming, as women and children turned out of all the villages along his road and besought him not to go on as he would certainly be hanged. I consider this a most important step towards the settlement of the whole Madda Khel question.

No. 37.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 17th November 1897.

(Telegraphic)

General Bird received submission of Madda Khel jirga on 14th November; they agree to his terms, and gave hostages for their fulfilment.

No. 38.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26th November 1897.

(Telegraphic.)

A settlement with Madda Khel has been arrived at by General Bird. They agree to pay fines demanded, and restore, or pay for, Government property. He has five of the Maliks whose surrender is required, and expects to get all of them; hostages for fulfilment of terms are meanwhile retained.

PART II.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE DUTY ON KOHAT SALT.

No. 1

Letter from the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, 30th September, 1897 (Received 25th October, 1897.)

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to report, for your Lordship's approval and sanction, that we have, under the circumstances explained in this despatch, accorded provisional sanction to an increase of the preventive and supervising establishments employed at the Kohat salt mines, involving an increase of expenditure amounting to Rs. 33,038 a year. The necessity for the entertainment of this additional establishment has arisen in consequence of the increase of the duties hitherto levied upon Kohat salt. The correspondence connected with the subject is very voluminous, but the papers appended to the despatch and the following brief recapitulation of the facts will, we trust, sufficiently explain the circumstances under which the additional establishment has been appointed.

2. As your Lordship is aware, political considerations have hitherto necessitated the imposition of a light duty upon the salt produced at certain mines or quarries in the Kohat district. Prior to 1883 the duty upon this salt ranged from 2 to 4 annas per Lahori or Kohat maund (102½ lbs.) at the five mines in use, but in that year it was increased to a uniform rate of eight annas per Kohat maund. In consequence of this low rate of duty we have been obliged to prohibit the transit of Kohat salt from the right to the left bank of the Indus, and to maintain a preventive line costing approximately Rs. 47,000 a year from the northern extremity of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej, in order to prevent the salt from passing across the Indus and competing in the Cis-Indus districts with fully taxed salt produced from other sources. The restrictions upon traffic imposed by the preventive line are necessarily vexatious, and the expenditure which it entails is considerable; while there is not, in our opinion, any sufficient reason for taxing the consumption of salt more lightly in the Trans-Indus than in the Cis-Indus districts of the Punjab. The enhancement therefore of the duty on Kohat salt to a rate approximating so nearly to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt as to admit of the abolition of the Indus line, and of the realisation of an increased revenue from salt in the Trans-Indus districts is a measure which has long been recognised as desirable, and which was at one time, in August 1879, actually ordered.

3. In a report submitted in February 1892 by Major Deane, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, on the subject of tribal service arrangements on the Kohat border, an opinion was expressed to the effect that there was no longer any valid ground for foregoing the revenue that might be realised by raising the duty on Kohat salt to the rate obtaining for Cis-Indus salt. We consulted the Government of the Punjab regarding the suggestion, and on the 1st July 1892, an exhaustive memorandum on the subject was submitted by Major Deane containing definite recommendations for the enhancement of the Kohat salt

duty and the removal of the preventive line. This memorandum remained for more than 2 years under consideration by the officers of the Punjab Government, but Major Deane's proposals with certain modifications of detail, were submitted in December 1894 to the Punjab Government with Mr., now Sir Richard, Udny's support. Mr. Udny did not anticipate any disturbance on the frontier in consequence of the enhancement of the duty; while as regards our Trans-Indus subjects he agreed with Major Deane that although the increase of taxation was not likely to be popular, there was no reason why they should any longer pay less for their salt than the people in other parts of India, as they are, comparatively speaking, well to do and the land revenue assessment in the frontier districts is light. The political effect of the enhancement of duty would, Major Deane considered, be excellent.

4. Mr. Rivaz, the Financial Commissioner, and the Punjab Government concurred in recommending an increase of the duty, and the proposals were submitted for the orders of the Government of India in the letter from the Government of the Punjab dated 12th July 1895. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, it was said, agreed that it was highly desirable to raise the duty to an extent which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for Cis-Indus salt and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished, and that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure which would not after a little time press hardly on any of those concerned, whether as traders or consumers. In a subsequent letter, dated 13th September 1895, the Punjab Government forwarded opinions on the proposed enhancement of the duty by Mr. Cunningham, then Commissioner of Peshawar, by Major Leigh who succeeded Major Deane as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, and by Mr. King, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. These officers also were all agreed that there was no objection on political grounds to the increase of the duty.

5. After careful consideration we decided that the time had arrived to enhance the duty. The subject however required detailed examination. The unanimity of opinion that political considerations need no longer delay the introduction of the measure was complete, but the officers consulted differed considerably in their views as to the manner in which the enhancement should be made, some being in favour of an increase to the necessary extent per saltum, while others considered that it should be effected by degrees. The exact rate of duty which should be adopted was also a difficult matter to determine. The difficulties of the country and of transport, and also a possible difference in the mining arrangements in the Kohat and Cis-Indus mines, had to be taken into consideration, and the rate proposed by the local officers, *viz.*, rupees 2 annas 8 a Kohat maund, involved a very large increase in the existing duty. It appeared to us that the exact rate that would suffice to prevent Kohat salt from invading the Cis-Indus region could only be satisfactorily determined by experience, and we were anxious to avoid increasing the duty any further than might be necessary to render possible the abolition of the preventive line. A protracted correspondence accordingly ensued between the Government of the Punjab and the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab and the local officers in regard to these points, and in regard to the date from which the enhancement was to be made, the concessions to be allowed to the carrying traders so as to reconcile them to the change, the payment of increased Inams to the Khan of Teri and the landowners of villages adjacent to the mines in the Kohat district, the future management of the mines, and the additional establishments required for the collection of the increased revenue and for prevention of the smuggling which the enhancement of the duty would tend to encourage.

6. In the meantime the intention of Government to increase the duty became known, and large quantities of salt were removed from the mines. We agreed with the Government of the Punjab in thinking that it was not a matter of regret that the carriers and others ordinarily engaged in the Kohat salt trade should have had an opportunity of making some profit from the increase on the duty, and in fact it was, to a certain extent, our intention so to manage matters as to give them this opportunity. But the accumulation of stocks was proceeding so rapidly that we were compelled to give immediate effect to our intention of enhancing the duty; and we decided accordingly in June 1896 to raise it

from eight annas to two rupees a Kohat maund, that is approximately Re. 1 annas 8 a British maund, with effect from the 13th July 1896. The Punjab Government at the same time was authorised to increase the yearly Inams paid to the Khan of Teri and other landowners to Rs. 50,000 on the understanding that the increased Inams were to be paid in full satisfaction of all claims, and to entertain provisionally and tentatively, for the management of the mines and the prevention of smuggling, the establishment shown in the statement* which accompanies this despatch. It was, however, requested that the scale of establishment thus temporarily sanctioned might be revised after the expiration of 3 months from the date of the increase of the duty, when, it was presumed, some practical experience would have been acquired of the working of the mines and of the preventive staff required under the new order of things.

7. This anticipation, however, has unfortunately not been realised. The stocks that were accumulated in anticipation of the increase of the duty were so large that the trade was almost entirely suspended during the 12 months following the enhancement, the total quantity of salt removed between the 16th July 1896 and the 15th July 1897 having been 4,468 Kohat maunds only as compared with 967,531 maunds in the corresponding period of 1895-96 and 488,566 maunds the average quantity removed in the corresponding periods of the five preceding years. The trade has now begun to revive, 5,608 maunds having been removed from the mines during the last fortnight of July and the month of August, but sufficient experience has not yet been acquired to enable the Local Government to say what establishment is likely to be permanently required. Several questions regarding the future working of the mines and the number of mines which should be kept open for the supply of salt are still under consideration; and until these questions have been settled, the scale of establishment required cannot be satisfactorily determined. In these circumstances we have the honour to request that the provisional sanction which we accorded to the entertainment of the additional establishment specified in the statement accompanying the despatch may be confirmed. The increased expenditure involved amounts, as already stated, to Rs. 33,038 per annum.

8. It is possible that the scale of establishment provisionally sanctioned may admit of some reduction if it be found practicable to concentrate the mining operations and close some of the outlying and less used mines; but the salt region in the Kohat district is so extensive and the outcrops of salt are so numerous that a strong preventive establishment will certainly be required to prevent smuggling. It is unlikely therefore that it will be possible to effect any material reduction in the scale which has been provisionally sanctioned, and it is possible that the supervising revenue staff may have to be further strengthened. Our final proposals in regard to the establishment will be reported for Your Lordship's sanction when the questions now under consideration have been disposed of.

9. The cessation of the trade in this salt which has followed the enhancement of the duty is to be regretted; but, in our opinion, it is due mainly, if not entirely, to the large accumulation of stocks which took place in the year preceding the announcement of our intentions. It is, however, not improbable that the increase in the price of salt has been utilised by mullahs and other persons desirous of creating disturbances as a means for exciting discontent and disaffection among the tribes across the border; and at the present time the Khyber Afridis and some of the Orakzai clans have included the enhancement of the salt duty with the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand as one of their grievances against the British Government. The enhancement of the salt duty has, however, in our opinion, only been put forward as a pretext after the tribes had committed themselves to hostilities, and the Swat and Mohmand tribes, which were first to rise and which are as much affected as consumers as the Khyber Afridis and the Orakzais, have made no mention of the subject. The tribes most affected by the increase of duty are the Adam Khel and Jowaki Afridis in and near the Kohat Pass, as they are the principal carrier traders in

* Not printed

the salt ; and although one section of the Adam Khels made a verbal representation to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat on the subject of the increase, these tribes have up to the present time behaved well and have made no attempt to close the Pass.

10. The instructions communicated in paragraph 4 of Lord Kimberley's despatch, Revenue, dated the 31st October 1883, requiring us to communicate with Your Lordship before taking any steps to further enhance the duty on Kohat salt were unfortunately overlooked when we arrived at our decision on the subject. We can only express our regret that they were not earlier brought to our notice and that we omitted, in consequence, to apply for Your Lordship's previous approval of our proceedings before issuing orders giving effect to the enhancement.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) ELGIN,
G. S. WHITE,
J. WESTLAND,
J. WOODBURN,
M. D. CHALMERS,
E. H. H. COLLEN,
A. C. TREVOR.

Enclosure 1.

Letter from W. J. Cunningham, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, dated 19th May 1892.

Among the enclosures of Mr. Fanshaw's letter, dated 8th March 1892, regarding the extension of tribal service arrangements on the Kohat border, Dated 15th February. was a report by Captain Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, in the last paragraph of which he expressed an opinion that the price of salt in the Kohat District might now be raised to the rate obtaining for Cis-Indus salt. I am directed to refer to this proposal ; and as the price of salt in Kohat has hitherto been kept down for political reasons, I am to request an expression of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's views upon Captain Deane's proposal.

2. I am to remind you that the statement of present and proposed tribal service expenditure in the Kohat District, which was asked for in this office telegram, dated 2nd April last, is awaited.

Enclosure 2.

Extract from Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 12th July 1895.

With reference to paragraph 1 of your letter, dated 19th May 1892, I am directed to forward a copy of the papers marginally noted containing the proposals of Major Deane for an enhancement of duty on the grey salt which is obtained from the Trans-Indus Mines of the Kohat District and the views of Mr. Udney and the Financial Commissioners thereon, and to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor in connection with this subject.

His Honour entirely agrees that with a view to obtaining the large additional revenue which may be expected and to getting rid of the preventive line it is highly desirable to raise the duty on Kohat salt to a figure which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for the Cis-Indus salt, and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished. He further agrees that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure, and that after a little time

it would not press hardly on any of those concerned whether as traders or consumers; but he fears there can be no doubt that if the duty were enhanced *per saltum* from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 per maund on an article that at the place of production costs less than one anna per maund, the change would be severely felt both by the consumers within and beyond our frontier, and by the traders and carriers, mostly rough tribesmen, within and beyond the frontier, whose business would for a time be to a considerable extent dislocated by such a measure.

Hence, putting aside for the moment all question of the danger of actual disturbance or of trouble such as arose about the small enhancement made in the year 1882, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick is disposed to think that whenever the duty is raised it should be raised to the requisite pitch, not *per saltum*, but by degrees. He quite admits that there is some force in the argument urged in favour of raising the duty *per saltum*, that if we are to introduce an unpopular measure it is better to introduce it straight off at once in its entirety than to break it up into instalments and thus spread the irritation arising from it over a considerable period, but with the choice of evils before him he thinks it is on the whole wiser to elect for the gradual increase. His Honour would be inclined to announce at starting what we meant ultimately to do, and to say that as raising the duty to the full figure at once would be apt to interfere with existing arrangements we had determined to raise it by degrees.

Regarding the many points of detail discussed in these papers, the Lieutenant-Governor does not propose to say anything at this moment, as it seems to him that it would be highly inadvisable to take any step towards raising the duty between this and next October, which month is said to be the most convenient for bringing any enhancement of duty into force.

It will be observed that the letter from Captain Deane, who (*see* paragraph 8 of his memorandum) was for putting aside the susceptibilities and clamourings of the frontier people with somewhat of a high hand, was written so far back as the year 1892, when except for the signs of trouble in the Waziri country of which he knew but little, and in the neighbourhood of the Black Mountain with which we are scarcely concerned in this connection, everything along our frontier was going smoothly enough. Mr. Udny, who kept back Captain Deane's memorandum for nearly 2½ years wrote in December last, when the punitive expedition against the Waziris was about to start, and when the work of delimitation elsewhere was in progress or about to begin, and he (*see* paragraph 17 of his letter) advised that no announcement should be made regarding this enhancement of duty until the work of delimitation was finished. Since then a great deal has happened. At this moment we have, besides the very large force still encamped between the Peshawar border and Chitral, a Military force in Waziristan and another in the Tochi Valley. We have in all three places difficult and complicated settlements to effect, which it will take some months to carry out, and there are in several directions emissaries out who are anxious to seize on everything they can to set the tribes against us, and who would at once hail as something to be turned to account a measure so unpopular as this enhancement of duty. In short, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks if we were to start the preliminaries of this enhancement just now or within the next few months, we should, to use a homely expression, be having "too many irons in the fire," and he would therefore abandon the idea of doing anything about it this year beyond sending the papers confidentially to the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue (as he ventures to suggest should now be done) for the consideration of the detailed measures proposed.

Sub-Enclosure A.

Extract from a letter from R. Udny, Esq., on Special Duty, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government, Punjab, dated 9th December 1894.

In reply to your endorsement, dated 9th June 1892, to the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, forwarding an extract from paragraph 1 of a letter, dated 19th May 1892, from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department, I have the honour to submit a printed copy of a memorandum, dated the 1st July 1892, drawn up by Captain (now Major) Deane who was at that time Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, proposing an enhancement of duty on the grey salt which is obtained from the Trans-Indus mines of the Kohat District. Before stating my own views on the subject I must express my regret at the delay which has occurred in disposing of this reference, owing to the extreme pressure of other work until I made over charge of the Commission-ership of the Peshawar Division last April.

The present price of salt at the Kohat mines is 8 annas per *Kohati* maund of 102½ lb. avoirdupois, and this, without changing the weight of the maund, Major Deane would increase to Rs. 2-8-0, which is the price charged at the Khewra mines Cis-Indus for a *British* maund of 82½ lb. Taking, therefore, the proportion between the standards of weight in use approximately 4 to 5, a British maund of grey salt would cost at the Kohat mines Rs. 2 plus 8 pies for excavation, total Rs. 2-0-8 as compared with Rs. 2-8-9 (including the excavation fee, Rs. 2-9-3 if we also include the fee for consignment by railway on what is called the through-traffic system) either at Khewra or at the Kalabagh quarry on the right bank of the Indus, which is an offshoot of the Khewra mines and produces the same red variety of the mineral. In dealing, however, with ignorant Afghans, like the bulk of the traders in Kohat salt, I agree with Major Deane that it would be unwise to lower the standard of weight to which they have been accustomed simultaneously with a five-fold rise in price, and I think that, if we took certain precautions, to which I shall presently refer, the new rate proposed would be sufficiently high to enable us to do away with the existing legal prohibition against possession of the cheaper grey salt Cis-Indus. The Indus preventive line, which has its *raison d'être* the enforcement of this prohibition, could then be abolished.

For the purposes of a Cis-Indus trade in Kohat salt the only mine we need consider is the one at Malgin, the others being at some distance from the river; and we may assume pretty safely that Khushalgarh, with its boat-bridge and railway station on the left bank of the Indus, and a fairly good road from Malgin, would be the *entrepôt* for the distribution of this salt whether by land or by boat down the river.

As regards traffic by land, Major Deane shows that salt from Malgin could be placed at the Khushalgarh Railway Station for Rs. 2-13-8 per Kohati or Rs. 2-4-6 per British maund, and could be delivered even at Lahore for three or four annas a British maund cheaper than Khewra salt. Unless therefore special measures were taken to prevent it, not only the Northern Punjab, but all the country South of Lahore which at present gets its salt from Khewra, would be flooded with Kohat salt paying a duty of 8 annas per British maund less than the red salt now consumed in this area; and the precaution which Major Deane proposes, to obviate so large a loss of revenue, is that the railway rates for the carriage of grey salt should be regulated so that it could not compete successfully with Khewra salt in the Punjab market. I would rather suggest that State Railways Cis-Indus should refuse to accept Kohat salt for carriage on any terms whatever, and that at Trans-Indus stations no grey salt should be booked for stations across the river.

Let us now see what the effect of such a restriction would be. With the completion of the Railway in course of construction from Attock to Mari the red salt of the Kalabagh quarry, which is on the right bank of the Indus immediately opposite to Mari, could be landed at Khushalgarh for about Rs. 2-10-3, and at Attock for Rs. 2-11-3 per British maund. This would give the Malgin salt an advantage of 5½ annas a maund at Khushalgarh which even if it were debarred

*Assuming railway carriage to be at the rate of ¼ pie per maund per mile, and animal carriage to be 1 pie for the same weight and distance.

from the railway, would enable it to undersell the railway-borne Kalabagh salt for a distance of 92 miles* from Khushalgarh, *i.e.*, along the whole length (79 miles) of the line running east-ward to Rawalpindi, and even to penetrate into the country beyond; but considering the precarious nature of traffic confined to camels and other pack animals as compared with a trade in the same article which can rely upon

railway carriage, I doubt whether the grey salt would cross the main North-Western line in this direction, though it would certainly be found in the bazars at Rawalpindi itself.

At Attock the grey salt, either by road all the way from Malgin, or by road from the Jatta mine through the Kohat Pass to Peshawar and thence by rail to Khairabad, could be delivered for Rs. 2-8 per maund, or 3 annas 3 pies cheaper than Kalabagh salt. Along the Grand Trunk Road therefore between Attock and Rawalpindi Kohat salt could be transported on pack cattle for 52 miles (or within 6 miles of Rawalpindi) before it became as dear as Kalabagh salt travelling on the parallel line of railway.

Southward again from Khushalgarh towards Mari the grey salt would extend for 60 miles, or about 10 miles beyond Mari; and lastly, taking the road which runs south-eastward from Khushalgarh to the Mayo mines at Khewra 110 miles distant, the two kinds of salt, being both alike restricted on this line to animal carriage, would meet on equal terms 80 miles from Khushalgarh and 30 miles from Khewra.

From these approximate data it will be seen that northward of the North-Western Railway from Attock to Rawalpindi grey salt would spread throughout the Hazara district, and perhaps the western part of Kashmir, while southward it would displace the red salt in the greater part of the triangular wedge of country bounded by the river Indus, the North-Western Railway from Attock to Lala Musa, and the Sind Sagar Branch of the same line from Lala Musa to Kundiyan, but that red salt would continue to hold its own in the extreme Southern and South-Eastern portions of this wedge.

As regards the river-borne traffic, Kohat salt, leaving Khushalgarh at Rs. 2-4-6 per British maund, would be very little dearer by the time it reached Kalabagh, 70 miles further down the Indus. From Kalabagh, therefore, grey salt would start down-stream with an advantage of at least 4 annas a maund in price over the local red salt, and, if equal facilities were permitted for the transport of both varieties by boat, this advantage would always be maintained, with the result that the present trade by river in red salt, which extends from Kalabagh as far as the Sind frontier, would be entirely usurped by the grey. It is possible, indeed, that the cheapness of the latter might enable it to penetrate still further south, since I understand that the Government price of Sind (Maurypur) salt at the Sukkur depôt is as much as Rs. 3-1-0 per British maund, and Kohat salt even with the enhanced duty could probably be delivered at Sukkur by river for a lower rate. Moreover, as the railway from Mari through Mahmud Kot, Sher Shah and Bahawalpur to Sukkur for the most part runs parallel to the Indus and at no great distance from it, the river-borne grey salt could be placed on any point of this line at a cheaper price than the red salt carried by railway either from Kalabagh or Khewra.

From this it follows that grey salt would cross the railway and find its way into all the country eastward and southward, viz., the western plains of the Punjab, Bahawalpur, and, perhaps, northern Sind and Rajputana, until it was stopped by coming into competition with the red salt brought down by the North-Western Railway towards Lahore and Mooltan, or with Maurypur (Sind) salt brought up from Karachi by the same line, or with Sambhar and Pachpadra salt carried across the Rajputana desert on camels. How far the grey salt would penetrate in these various directions it is impossible to predict exactly; but where, as along the line between Lahore and Sher Shah, red salt from Khewra would have the railway as a means of conveyance, while grey salt travelling across country from the nearest point of the river would be confined to animal carriage; the latter would be stopped much sooner than in other directions where there are no railways extending from the interior to the Indus, and where the other salts with which the Kohat article would have to compete would, therefore, be more or less equally restricted to carts and pack cattle.

From the foregoing it will be seen that, as far as traffic by *land* is concerned, the Indus preventive line might be safely removed below a point about ten miles south of Mari, but the abolition of the salt customs posts along the river above this point would entail a loss of revenue at the rate of 3 annas a

maund (British) on all salt consumed within the area indicated in paragraph 5 *supra*. What this loss would be it is difficult to estimate without more accurate data than I have by me at present ; but, taking the population affected as one million, and the annual consumption at 8 seers, which is probably a good deal in excess of the actual fact, it would amount to a lakh of rupees. Against this we must set off the saving effected by the abolition of the preventive line northward of the point mentioned above, which costs, I understand, something like Rs. 20,000 a year. The net balance of loss would, therefore, be only Rs. 80,000 per annum, and, considering the largely increased income which Government may expect to derive from the enhancement of the duty Trans-Indus, I think this trifling sacrifice of revenue Cis-Indus might well be tolerated for the sake of doing away with the evils which must always attend the existence of a protective customs line.

On the other hand, the results of a free *river* traffic as described in paragraph 6 *supra* would, it seems to me, be far more serious, and we could not permit grey salt to travel down the Indus without risking a considerable dislocation of the existing trade in red salt and a heavy loss of duty to Government. Fortunately the remedy is a very simple one, viz., to maintain the present prohibition against grey salt leaving the right bank of the Indus or being carried down by boat, but to relax it at Khushalgarh for the purposes of allowing Kohat salt to be taken across either by the boat-bridge, or by the ferry which replaces the boat-bridge for a few months during the hot weather when the river is in flood. In practice the knowledge that this modified prohibition still existed would probably be sufficient without further precautions to prevent any river trade in the grey salt springing up ; but, if necessary, the order could easily be enforced by establishing a small customs post on the Indus bank with power to search all boats passing down the stream. Such a post might be located at Kalabagh, where the river flows between rocky banks in a single well-defined channel of no great breadth ; and if, as is possible though not very likely, traders attempted to evade the Kalabagh post by embarking their salt below it, a second similar post might be placed on the river lower down at such a distance from the nearest Kohat mines at Narri and Karrak that the expense of land carriage to cut in below it would leave no margin of profit on grey salt as compared with the river-borne red salt from Kalabagh itself.

In the preceding paragraphs I have assumed that the Kohat salt is equal in quality to the red variety, and I believe that chemical analysis shows this to be the fact, the percentage of chloride of sodium being about the same in both. There can, however, be no doubt that in popular native opinion five chittaks of the Kohat salt go no farther for seasoning purposes than four of the Khewra or Kalabagh product. So long, therefore, as this idea continues to prevail the grey salt paying a duty of Rs. 2 per British maund would be considered no cheaper than the red assessed at Rs. 2-8-0, and the Indus preventive line might be safely removed without any fear that the former would displace the latter either by land or river except, perhaps, for the consumption of cattle.

As regards the salt "inams," which are calculated at a percentage on the receipts of each mine, and which are paid partly to the Khan of Teri (in the case of the Bahadur Khel and Nari Mines) and partly to the landowners of certain adjoining villages for the assistance they are supposed to afford the salt administration, I agree with Major Deane (paragraph 20) that their amount, instead of varying as hitherto with the briskness of trade, should now be stereotyped once for all at a fixed sum ; but since the recipients are sure to consider it a grievance that they are not permitted to share the income of the mines with Government in the same proportion as formerly, I would treat them in a very liberal spirit. For the three years immediately preceding the date of Major Deane's memorandum the villagers had received an average of Rs. 26,484 per annum, and the Khan an average of Rs. 4,592. These amounts Major Deane would apparently increase by making the Khan's fixed allowance up to the even sum of Rs. 8,000 per annum, and by giving Rs. 10,000 more to the villagers (*i.e.*, a fixed total of Rs. 36,484), of which about half would be reckoned as compensation for the restriction of their grazing and wood-cutting rights on the salt hills. I should prefer to recommend a fixed total of Rs. 50,000 for the villagers, to be divided in the proportion received by each village for the last

five years, and a fixed allowance of Rs. 10,000 (or perhaps even Rs. 15,000 for the Khan) which would give the Khan rather more than double, and the villagers a little less than double, what they enjoyed before; but, unless absolutely necessary—which I can hardly suppose—I would abstain entirely from interference with grazing and wood-cutting rights which, in spite of any pecuniary compensation we might allow, could not fail to irritate the people we are most interested in conciliating.

I now come to the question whether the enhancement of duty proposed could be made with safety from a political point of view. The arguments against an enhancement are stated categorically in paragraph 2 (b) of Major Deane's memorandum, but only two of them viz., (ii), the risk of its giving rise to disturbances on the part of trans-border tribes, and (v) the danger of its throwing out of work present carriers and traders for want of sufficient capital—are worthy of serious consideration. The other objections may be dismissed very briefly.

With regard to (i) and (iv), no doubt increase of taxation in any form must always be unpopular, but I agree with Major Deane (paragraph 10) that our Trans-Indus subjects are in better circumstances than the people in many parts of India who consume the dearer salt, and with their very light land revenue I see no reason why they should continue to pay less for their salt, though it may have been politic to allow them to do so during the early years of annexation, when our position on the frontier was comparatively insecure.

The same answer applies to objection (vii), which is disposed of by Major Deane.

As noted in paragraph 6 of the memorandum, the people who would most resent an enhancement are the Khattaks, who live in the vicinity of the mines, but this I have provided for by recommending (*supra* paragraphs 12 and 13) that they should continue to get their salt on exactly the same terms as before, and that they should also receive largely increased inams, so that the change would be entirely for their benefit.

As regards objection (iii), it has already been shown that enhancement of the duty, instead of curtailing the trade in grey salt, would if anything have the effect of expanding it; and if we found that red salt on account of its reputed superiority showed any tendency to cross the Indus into the Peshawar District, this might be checked by prohibiting its carriage by railway beyond Attock, in the same way as we have proposed that grey salt should be debarred from the railway Cis-Indus.

With regard to objection (vi), Colonel Holdich, R.E., tells me there is an extensive outcrop of rock salt between Panjdeh and Sarrakhs, north of Herat, which now lies within the Russian border, and that there are also lakes of brine in the desert about 140 miles west south-west of Herat; but both these sources are probably too distant to be of much consequence to us, and I am inclined to believe with Major Deane that there are no sources of salt in Central Asia sufficiently near to interfere very seriously with the Kohat mines. It is possible of course that the enhancement of the duty may lead to the extended manufacture of earth-salt in Kandahar, and to the opening up of other sources hitherto unknown because they could not be worked at a profit while cheap Kohat salt was available; but, as Major Deane remarks, even admitting that on this account Kohat salt may no longer penetrate to the most distant points it now reaches, the loss of revenue due to the consequent decrease in the exports from the Kohat District will be small compared with the increased income from the higher tax, and, since salt is a necessary of life, the trade in other directions will soon re-establish itself, though there may be a temporary falling-off at first.

Objection (v), as Major Deane shows, is not applicable in the case of Ghilzaⁱ and POUNDAH traders, and I agree with him that the Afridi carriers—Adam Khel of the Kohat Pass and Jawakis—are so well off that there is no fear of their being unable to raise the required capital. The Bangash traders, who are British subjects, and the Wazirs, who live partly within and partly without our border, are also in fairly easy circumstances; but the Khattaks, who are entirely a cis-border tribe—especially those who reside in the north-east corner of the Kohat District and round Akora in Peshawar—are undoubtedly poor, and,

though Major Deane believes their credit to be good, there is some reason, I think, to fear that with carriers of the class a good many pack animals will be thrown out of work at first for want of money to buy salt enough to load them.

This is one of the reasons (*infra*) why I am opposed to raising the duty, as Major Deane proposes, at a single bound; but with a gradual enhancement I hope we may find that the Khattaks will also be able to adapt themselves to the new arrangements, and eventually of course the increased value of the commodity they trade in will lead to a proportionate increase of their own profits.

Objection (ii), which is discussed by Major Deane, has hitherto been regarded as the principal obstacle to an enhancement of the salt duty, but times have greatly changed during the last 11 years since the last enhancement, and I do not think any disturbance need be apprehended from tribes who are not carriers, but merely consumers. Of the carrying tribes, again, the Ghilzais and Powindahs are not conterminous with our frontier, and we can well afford to disregard their sentiments whether favourable or unfavourable; while the Wazirs, both trans—and cis-border, are not likely to give trouble after the punitive expedition against the Mahsud branch of the tribe which seems at this moment to be inevitable. The Afridis of the Kohat Pass are the only other trans-border carriers who adjoin British territory, and this was the only tribe that showed resentment when the duty was raised in 1883 to the uniform rate of 8 annas per Kohati maund for all the mines; but, apart from the fact that they are becoming more amenable to our influence every year, their carrying trade has, I believe, greatly diminished since then, and they have probably learned by the failure of their agitation on that occasion that it is useless to attempt to turn Government from a measure once decided upon. I do not therefore anticipate any disturbance of the frontier from the enhancement we are now proposing, and the only point I would insist upon is that it should not be announced till we have finished the work of demarcating our new political boundary with Afghanistan all along the line from Chandak to the Persian border, which ought to be completed in the spring or summer of 1895.

It only remains to consider how the enhancement should be introduced, and Major Deane recommends

- (i) That the duty should be increased from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8-0 per Kohati maund at once, without any intermediate gradations.
- (ii) That this enhancement should take effect from the 1st October next following upon the decision to make it.
- (iii) That only one month's notice should be given beforehand.

As regards (i), I cannot agree. The increase is far too large to be made so abruptly, and the inconvenience to traders with small capital would be greatly intensified. At the same time I fully recognise the evils noted by Major Deane of raising the duty by gradual increments when each is popularly supposed to be the last. Undoubtedly such a course would lead to suspicion of our ultimate intentions, besides creating an impression that we were proceeding tentatively for fear of political consequences, and thus encouraging active opposition under the idea that a show of irritation might have the effect of intimidating Government.

The *total* amount of the enhancement should therefore be announced once for all, but it does not follow that we need enforce it at a single blow, and I would proclaim the raising of the duty by one rupee per maund Kohati from a certain date, coupled with a distinct intimation that another rupee will be added from the same date a year later, and that the rate of duty, viz., Rs. 2-8-0 per maund, reached by the second increment, will be final.

The increase of the salt inams and the limits of the new protected area should be announced at the same time, and it should be clearly explained that the change will entail no enhancement in the price of the salt required by Khattaks of the protected area for their own consumption. If this is done we may expect no opposition locally, but I am aware, of course, that my proposal is open to the objection that it would allow a whole year to malcontents in other directions—either beyond or within the border—to stir up agitation and to foster

disturbances in the hope of inducing Government to reconsider the question of the further increase. This, however, cannot be helped, and, as I have said already, I do not apprehend any serious trouble, provided we stand firm and show no signs of vacillation.

Another objection might be brought forward similar to the one urged by Major Deane against giving too long a notice of the enhancement beforehand, viz., that during the first year there would be a rush of traders on the mines to obtain salt at Rs. 1-8-0 per maund which could be sold at a large profit during the second year, when, the duty at the mines would be Rs. 2-8-0, and that the consequent glut in the markets would enable any opposition to the measure to be prolonged. On the other hand, it may be said that the eagerness of traders to avail themselves of this opportunity would leave no room in their minds for ideas of resistance to the first increase, and the hardship which I apprehend in the case of the poorer Khattak carriers (*supra*) would be greatly mitigated by the chance afforded them of amassing capital against the day when the full enhancement will take effect. Moreover, with large stocks on the market, the sudden rise in the bazaar price of salt at the end of the first year would probably be much more moderate than the simultaneous enhancement of duty at the mines, which is a decided advantage, and, then, after the first upward jump, the market rate would only increase gradually till it reached its maximum when the stocks bought at Rs. 1-8-0 a maund had all become exhausted.

No doubt the profits which we should thus allow to fall into the hands of traders would mean a corresponding loss to Government, but this loss would be a transient one, which, in view of the greatly increased revenue, we could well afford to put up with, and the only precaution I have to recommend is that the prohibition against the use of grey salt Cis-Indus should be maintained till the end of the second year, by which time the higher rate of duty would have been in force for one year, and we may assume that the stocks purchased during the first year of the enhancement would have been expended. Meanwhile nothing should be said about the abolition of the Indus preventive line, which can always be removed at a moment's notice. Otherwise we should find traders during the first year buying up salt at Rs. 1-8-0 a maund for exportation Cis-Indus as well as for Trans-Indus consumption, and the loss to Government would be all the larger.

As regards (iii) (*supra*), I have already referred in the preceding paragraph to the reasons urged by Major Deane against giving a long warning of the enhancement. In support of this view he quotes the opinion of Mr. Tucker, who was Deputy Commissioner of Kohat at the time of the last enhancement in 1883, that it was a mistake to proclaim the proposed increase of the duty three months beforehand, and that one month's notice would have been enough; but even admitting that a shorter notice might have sufficed on that occasion, the increase of Rs. 1 per maund, which I have now recommended as a preliminary step to the imposition of another rupee a year later, is a very different thing to the small increment of a few annas which was made in 1883, and, with due regard to our own interests as well as those of the traders, they must be allowed a reasonable time to provide the additional capital which will be required for the purchase of their salt.

I think therefore that the changes proposed on the present occasion should be announced three months before the first rise from 8 annas to Rs. 1-8-0 per maund comes into force, which would be 15 months before the further increase to the final rate of Rs. 2-8-0 would take effect.

As regards (ii), viz., the date from which the preliminary enhancement should be introduced, I agree with Major Deane that the 1st October is a good time of year, for the reason explained in his 15th paragraph, viz., that it "would give the best chance of any ill-feeling created by the change subsiding during the winter months when the trans-border people are most dependent on British territory." Another reason in favour of this date is that the three months' notice proclaiming it would issue on the 1st July, when the salt traffic is slackest. Ghilzai and Powinda caravans from beyond the frontier do not come down till the autumn, and during the hot weather the more well-to-do traders among our own subjects and the Kohat Pass Afridis, who employ camels, are in the habit

of giving their animals a rest and putting them out to graze. The rush on the mines to forestall the first increment would thus be principally confined to poorer traders like the Khattaks, who use bullocks, and, as these are just the people that I fear might suffer from want of capital to meet the rise in price, we need not grudge them the opportunity of earning a few extra rupees beforehand. If, therefore, the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary is completed next spring, the enhancement might be announced on the 1st July and carried into effect from the 1st October 1895.

In conclusion, a rough estimate may be given of the profit which Government would realize from an enhancement of the salt tax by Rs. 2 per Kohati maund.

During the ten years 1883—1893 the amount of salt paying duty at the Kohat mines has averaged 596,030 maunds (Kohati) per annum, and, if we assume that this would be reduced by one-fourth on account of the extended use in Afghanistan of inferior salt from other sources (*supra* paragraph 15), we should still have a yearly out-turn of 447,000 maunds. From this, again, we must deduct the salt required for their own wants by the Khattaks of the protected area, who, if my recommendation is sanctioned, would continue to get it at the old rate of 8 annas a maund. What the population of this area may be it is difficult to say, but, taking it as 80,000, or nearly half the whole population of the Kohat District, which is probably an excessive estimate, the amount of salt they would consume at 8 seers a head per annum would be 16,000 maunds, leaving a balance of 431,000 maunds liable to an increase of duty by Rs. 2 per maund.

The account would thus stand as follows :—

<i>Profit.</i>		Rs.
(i) By increase of duty at Rs. 2 per maund on 431,000 maunds (Kohati)		8,62,000
(ii) By abolition of the Indus preventive line (<i>supra</i> paragraph 7)		41,600
Total profit ...		9,03,000
<i>Loss.</i>		
(i) By the consumption of grey salt at Rs. 2 per <i>standard</i> maund instead of red salt at Rs. 2-8-0 per <i>standard</i> maund throughout the area described in paragraph 5 (<i>supra</i> paragraph 7) ...		1,00,000
(ii) By increased cost of the Kohat salt establishment (<i>supra</i> paragraph 10)		36,684
Total loss ...		1,36,684
Net annual gain to Government ...		7,66,916

Annexure.

Extract from Memorandum by Captain H. A. Deane, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, dated 1st July 1892.

Reference to the previous enhancement of the salt duty. The question of increasing the excise duty on Kohat salt was raised by the Government of India in 1873.

A variety of opinions were then given for and against it; but it was not until July 1883, after the question had been dropped and re-opened several times, that any special action was taken in regard to the matter.

The reasons appear to have been that at one time the tribes on the border were quiet, and it was not considered advisable to disturb them. At another

time certain of the tribes were refractory, and action in regard to the salt was postponed from fear of its bringing about a coalition of the tribes against Government.

In 1883 the duty on salt, which had varied at the different mines from two to six annas a maund, was raised to a uniform rate of eight annas at all the mines.

I may here refer to the report by Mr. Johnson, Superintendent of Salt, forwarded under this office letter of 25th July 1890, for full particulars regarding the Kohat Salt Mines and the method of working them.

The various opinions in favour of bringing up the price of Kohat salt by such an increase as would equalize it with Cis-Indus salt may be summarised as follows :—

- (a) That it would enable the Preventive Customs line on the Indus to be removed and produce an increase of revenue ;
that there is no valid reason why Government supply Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border tribes with salt at a rate far lower than that at which it is supplied to our Cis-Indus subjects.

Arguments advanced against the above measure (b) And the arguments advanced against the measure have been—

- (i) That such a measure would be unpopular with our Trans-Indus subjects ;
(ii) That it would be unpopular amongst the trans-border tribes and might give rise to disturbances on the border ;
(iii) That it would dislocate the existing trade in salt, and that it would throw out of employment the majority of men and animals engaged in the trade ;
(iv) It would be an additional heavy tax on our Trans-Indus subjects.
(v) The present carriers and traders would not be able to furnish the necessary working capital ;
(vi) It might drive some of the trade to supposed but unspecified mines in independent territory ;
(vii) The salt being much used for cattle, Government would incur much odium should disease break out amongst the cattle owing to their being deprived of salt by the increased price of it.

The question has eventually resolved itself into one of (a) whether the price of salt should be increased once for all or be gradually raised so as to be brought on a par with Cis-Indus salt.

(b) Whether the time at which proposals have been made was a good one for action to be taken.

And in dealing with the matter now these are the questions which will require consideration.

Eight years have now nearly elapsed since the last small increase was made, and the question has not since then been raised.

At the present time Government expenditure on the North-West Frontier is great, and, apart from the question of the advantages of abolishing the Indus Preventive line, it may be well to consider whether Government should any longer consent to forego the increase which it may fairly expect and is entitled to from a valuable possession such as these mines.

I am of opinion that the time has come when Government should do away with the existing anomaly once and for all, and I therefore submit this memorandum with a view to the matter being considered.

Time for doing away with the existing anomaly has come.

As my proposal is that Government should raise the duty to the full amount and not by gradual increments, I submit my views on the objections which have hitherto been put forward against this course.

Views on objections against bringing price of Kohat salt on a par with Cis-Indus salt.

On objection *re* unpopularity of the measure amongst Trans-Indus subjects It has not been considered strong.

I will take the arguments against the increase in the order in which I have put them above.

*(i) The first referring to the unpopularity of the measure amongst our Trans-Indus subjects, has not apparently been considered a strong one by those who used it. The people that would be most affected would be the Khattaks within whose lands the mines are situated, and a small increase to the allowance given them from the Salt Revenue would be all that would be necessary.

Increase to allowance of Khattaks who would be most affected would be necessary.

be most affected would be the Khattaks within whose lands the mines are situated, and a small increase to the allowance given them from the Salt Revenue would be all that would be necessary.

*(ii) The second, that the measure would be unpopular with the trans-border tribes and might give rise to disturbances on the border, is not an argument that I consider is in the present day of much weight.

On objection, *re*, the measure would be unpopular with the trans-border tribes. This argument is not of very much weight.

The measure would be unpopular as any measure undertaken by Government, in regard to which trans-border people can put forward pretentious claims and complaints, however preposterous, would be, and it is a matter of principle with them to put them forward.

Possibly the Pass Afridis and Daulatzais and Tirah Afridis would come forward with complaints, though I see no reason to suppose that any beyond the Pass Afridis, who resented the last increase, would do so.

There does not seem any reason to believe that any of the other tribes would concern themselves in the matter, as individuals would not be much affected.

The consumption of salt by individuals may be taken at four seers per head† per annum, and as consumers for the most part obtain salt for consumption by barter, the increase would be very little felt, and any little feeling of irritation that might be engendered would soon subside.

† Allowing for cattle as well as human beings, I should prefer to put it at 8 seers per head, though this is probably in excess of the actual fact—R. U.

It will probably be admitted that the condition of the border of late years has undergone a change for the better, and the tribes as a rule understand better than they have ever done before the power of Government.

The amount of opposition and trouble to be encountered may be calculated mostly according to the extent to which Government is likely to make concessions to the tribes. Any show of indecision or hesitation in persisting with the measure on account of pretentious claims brought forward by the tribes would meet with a corresponding increase of opposition and trouble.

Against every measure that is proposed there will always be, both within and beyond the border, a certain class ready to try and stir up agitation in the hopes of obtaining something by clamouring, and in a case like this now under consideration, I submit that if Government quietly remains firm, little or no trouble would be encountered.

This treatment produced its natural results with the Pass Afridis in 1883, and there is no reason to suppose it would not be equally efficacious now. It should be noted that through all their opposition in 1883, the Pass Afridis showed very plainly that they did not intend to bring about the forfeiture of their Pass allowances, and it may be safely asserted that they will do nothing now that will bring about their final forfeiture, more especially as they have realised by this time that an increase in price of salt benefits them as traders.

* These figures refer to the objections as I have numbered them in paragraph (2) (b).—R. U.

In regard to this point of political effect the opposite view as to whether the effect, if any, would be good does not appear to have been considered. And why should it not be asserted that the effect of our trans-border neighbours seeing that Government will do as they consider best in regard to their own property, regardless of the clamourings of the trans-border tribes who have no just cause of complaint, would be excellent, and that it would do much towards impressing on them that British rule is firmly established?

After all, the assertion that disturbances would be created on the border has been apparently based only on a fear that this might be the case.

The subject, too, bears on the question of departure from the hitherto purely conciliatory policy that has been practised on the frontier. I am of opinion that the eventual result of firm action in regard to the salt, whether it caused at first a certain amount of disturbance or not, would be good as impressing on our neighbours that the days of Government setting aside all other considerations in deference to their fanciful susceptibilities are a thing of the past.

And further, with the possibility of Government having sooner or later to deal with more important frontier questions, it would seem to be preferable that a question like this should be settled now instead of having to be brought up at a time when Government might find it inconvenient to consider it.

(iii). The third argument that enhancement of duty would dislocate the trade and throw out of employment the men and animals engaged in it calls for consideration.

On argument that enhancement of duty would dislocate trade and throw out of employment men and animals engaged. A certain amount of dislocation would take place; but no reason for supposing that any men or animals would be thrown out of employment.

* Appendix A.

trade, as reference to the annexed statement* will show.

I would point out that since the last rise in duty, the profits of the traders and carriers have increased, and there has also been a large increase in the

It may be assumed that the trade would, with such an increase in price as is further recommended, be affected for a time and a certain amount of dislocation would take place, and to estimate its extent we should first consider the present destination of the trade and those who are employed in it.

† Appendix B

Reference to the statement attached† will show the present sales from the mines and a rough estimate of the destination of the trade.

During the year 1891-92 the following classes are shown as having been engaged in the trade:—

Khattaks	35,214
Ghilzais	13,231
Waziris	7,076
Powindahs	6,355
Bangashes	4,272
Afridis	4,060
Miscellaneous	809

And the carriage employed was:—

85,675 camels.
94,346 bullocks.
49,577 donkeys.

carrying 589,066 maunds of salt, the average load being—

5 maunds per camel.
2½ maunds per bullock.
1 maund per donkey.

The numbers given represent repeated transactions by a certain lot of men.

The majority of the carriers are, as seen, Khattaks, our own subjects.

The trans-border trade taken to Peshawar goes to Swat, Bajaur and the Yusufzai hills, Kashkar and Ningrahar, and is said to find its way as far as Badakhshan and by the Kurram route to Kabul and Hazara.

As already said, a certain amount of dislocation of the present trade is to be expected. Kohat salt will displace Cis-Indus salt in Kashmir, especially should railway communication with Kashmir *viâ* Abbottabad be opened. It will have the monopoly, even allowing for animal carriage alone, of a track extending some 60 miles from the river bank and diminishing as the distance of the river from the mines increases, till stopped by being brought into competition with Cis-Indus salt, and, with railway and river carriage open to Kohat salt, a large portion of the trade carried on at Kalabagh will be displaced. Hence, so far as the traders and carriers are concerned, they will not be losers, and there does not seem to be any valid reason for supposing that any number of men and animals would be thrown out of employment. Any animals that the poorer families might not at once be able to employ in the salt trade would readily find employment in carrying wood, etc.

(iv). In regard to the fourth objection that the enhancement of duty would be additional heavy tax on our Trans-Indus subjects, I can only say that there is no obvious reasons why our Trans-Indus subjects should escape a tax which is paid by all Cis-Indus subjects.

On objection, *i.e.*, enhancement of duty would be additional heavy tax on Trans-Indus subjects.

No reason why Trans-Indus subjects should escape a tax paid by Cis-Indus subjects.

It will possibly be admitted that our Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border neighbours are generally in much better circumstances than the people in many parts of India who consumes salt at the rates prevailing Cis-Indus.

In support of this view it may be considered whether Government has, since taking over the Punjab, spent a rupee on relief works Trans-Indus, and during the same time has there been anything approaching a famine heard of amongst our trans-border neighbours.

It must also be borne in mind that at present about Rs. 23,000 is paid to Khattak villages as "inam" from Salt Revenue, and that the enhancement of the duty will largely increase the income earned by this clan as carriers, hence the argument that the said increase would mean an additional tax on their district is not one of much weight.

On objection as to inability of furnishing capital. There need be no apprehension on this score.

(v). With reference to the fifth objection, that the present carriers and traders would not be able to furnish the necessary capital.

This argument is one which cannot be fairly applied to Ghilzais and Powindahs. The large herds of camels owned by them is a sufficient answer to such an argument, and, if further be necessary, the loads which they bring down on their camels may be considered—rice, tobacco, fruit, nuts, etc., which may fairly be taken as selling at Rs. 15 per maund brought down (and this average is a low estimate). It will be seen that they realize sufficient capital to pay for six consignments of salt at Rs. 2-8-0 per maund.

This refers to carriers who are traders as well, as the class under notice in fact are.

It may safely be assumed that as long as they have a market open to them these men will continue the trade, and that, excepting perhaps in some of the furthest points now reached by the salt, the trade will not be affected. Their present market is, as shown, *viâ* Kurram to Kabul and Hazara and Western Afghanistan as far as Kandahar.

These markets must remain open to them unless some nearer source of supply is opened.

As regards the Afridis, which includes the Pass Afridis and Jowakis, I think we are apt to consider them much worse off than they really are. They are an untaxed people ; they have large herds and flocks, and they always have money for the purchase of arms of all descriptions.

Stolen Government rifles always find ready purchasers at Rs. 250 each, and stolen ammunition at 4 rounds for the rupee.

I cannot trace one single case in the Civil Courts in regard to such dealings, and it would seem therefore that the credit of the Khattaks is good.

Salt is a necessary, and when the demand for a necessary exists capital will come forward, and apprehensions on this ground seemed to be based on ignorance of ordinary trade maxims.

The markets to which these people carry would also remain open to them ; for Kohat salt, as shown later on, would retain the Peshawar market and compete successfully with Khewra salt.

The poorest of the carriers are the Khattaks and Waziris. The Khattaks employ bullocks in the trade and work on their own capital, except the very poorest who work on borrowed capital, settling up their accounts after each trip or annually, as the case may be.

(vi). With reference to the trade being possibly driven to other unused mines or sources, I have made very careful enquiries, and I believe I am right in stating that neither in the Waziri Hills nor in the Kurram do any such mines exist or sources exist, though by Wynne's Memoir of Geo-

logical Survey of India, XI., page 72, it is apparently possible that salt may exist trans-border below the surface.

On objection that the trade would be driven to unused mines or sources. There are no sources Trans-Indus which could interfere with the trade of the Kohat Salt Mines.

logical Survey of India, XI., page 72, it is apparently possible that salt may exist trans-border below the surface.

The only salt deposits that I can hear of are said to exist somewhere in Balkh. The information was obtained from a Ghilzai trader, who stated that when the price of Kohat salt was previously raised a few Ghilzais tried these mines, but gave them up after the first trip as impracticable.

The salt is besides said to be very impure.

These mines, I am informed, furnish a certain supply of salt to Kabul itself and to Chitral.

In the former, however, Kohat salt taken by Ghilzais by the Kurram Valley competes successfully with it.

Were these mines a practicable source, it might be assumed that His Highness the Amir would have taken the matter up ere this.

Kohat salt is said to find its way as far as Badakhshan.

An increase in the price of Kohat salt as proposed might force the opening up of mines in that direction, but the distance is too great for any apprehension to exist that such salt could be smuggled into British territory, though the opening of them successfully would displace a certain amount of our most distant trade.

It is not unlikely, too, that in certain parts where Kohat salt now sells, such as Kandahar, the people may take to manufacturing earth salt (the practice already exists there to a certain extent) so that a certain diminution from the Kohat Salt Mines might be expected ; but this would be very trifling, and I am of opinion that it may be accepted as a fact that there are no sources trans-border which could interfere in any material degree with the regular trade of Kohat Salt Mines.

(vii). The last objection regarding the odium which would be incurred should disease break out amongst the cattle owing to their being deprived of salt by the increased price, I have replied to in some measure, where I have pointed out that all our Cis-Indus subjects pay the higher rate of duty, though in poorer circumstances than our Trans-Indus subjects and trans-border neighbours,

and it is quite certain that notwithstanding their poorer circumstances our Cis-Indus subjects contrive to give their cattle sufficient salt to keep them in health. There is hence no reason why the population Trans-Indus should be considered as having a claim to any special concession in regard to this question.

In the Kohat District and in Yusafzai the people do not give their cattle salt, the cattle getting such as they want at salt licks.

A free allowance to men working in the mines and the establishment might well be given, as is done Cis-Indus, and this would save smuggling by those who have the best opportunities for practising it.

Extent to which enhancement is necessary to place Kohat salt on an equal footing with the Cis-Indus salt.

The next point for consideration is the extent to which enhancement is necessary to place Kohat salt on an equal footing with the salt Cis-Indus.

Kohat salt is admittedly inferior to the Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt, and in previous correspondence this difference has been put forward as being in the proportion of 2 to 3, though by Wynne's Memoir above referred to, page 28, the difference is apparently only 3 per cent.

This report refers only to what is surface salt, and it may be questioned whether when it comes to mining even this difference will not disappear, but consumers put the difference down as much greater than shown, and claim that it is as much as 4 to 5.

The duty on Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt is calculated on a maund of 82½ lbs. avourdupois and on Kohat Salt on a maund of 102¼ lbs. There is therefore a difference of ¼th in weight in favour of Kohat salt.

I would propose that this weight should be maintained and the duty be fixed at Rs. 2-8-0 per maund of 102¼ lbs. for Kohat salt as against Rs. 2-8-0 per maund of 82½ lbs. on Cis-Indus and Kalabagh salt.

I would remark that no natives with whom I have talked the matter over consider that there would eventually be any falling-off whatever in the trade, and in that case the income would be at least Rs. 14,00,000.

Duty should be raised to Rs 2-8-0 per maund now and once for all. The next point for consideration is whether the duty on Kohat salt should be raised to Rs. 2-8-0 per maund now and once for all, or gradually.

An important point in connection with this question is that the last rise having taken place eight years ago and no further mention of the subject having been made, is it not possible that an idea may exist that the last rise was a final one, and that each gradual rise may be regarded as such, a feeling consequently being engendered that Government is not acting fairly in the matter? There is nothing in the correspondence to show that a further rise was not contemplated, and I think that, in order to avoid such misapprehension as to the intentions of Government (which I clearly understand to be that the Kohat salt shall eventually be put on a par with the Cis-Indus salt so as to render the abolition of the Indus preventive line practicable), it would be most advisable to dispose of the matter finally.

Nineteen years have elapsed since the question was first mooted in 1873, and only one small step has been taken towards the object then, and presumably now, in view.

Such misapprehension as to the intentions of Government, raised by gradual increments in the price of salt, seems far more likely to create ill-feeling and disturbances than a definite declaration by Government as to its intentions and definite action in carrying them out.

Each gradual increase will give rise to the belief that it is the last, and possibly call forth opposition with the idea of preventing further increases being made.

I am, therefore, of opinion, as already stated in paragraph 4, that the duty should be raised to the full extent (of Rs. 2-8-0 per maund) once for all.

When the price was last raised three months' notice of the increase in duty was given, and Mr. Tucker, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, remarked in his No 436, dated 14th September 1883, to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, that he thought the three months' notice was a mistake, and that one month's notice would have been sufficient. With so long a notice as three months' there would necessarily be a rush on the mines and the markets would be glutted, and this fact in itself would enable any opposition to the measure to be prolonged.

As my proposals include the simultaneous removal of the Indus line, any long notice that would enable a large stock to be got in hand would be inadvisable. There would be no means of preventing such stock being disposed of at profitable rates across the Indus to the detriment of the Cis-Indus salt trade.

The preventive line I propose should be removed from the date on which the enhanced duty on Kohat salt, if sanctioned, be notified to take effect. This would remove all doubts as to the intention of Government.

I consider that one month's notice, if any at all be given, of the change in price would be sufficient.

I would suggest that the date from which the enhancement should take effect should be 1st October. This would give the best chance of any ill-feeling created by the change subsiding during the winter months, when the trans-border people are most dependent on British territory.

The late Miranzai expeditions and their result are fresh in the minds of the tribes, and may be expected to act as a healthy warning to those who might be disposed to give us trouble.

So far as this border is concerned, I am of opinion that the present time is an opportune one for introducing the change recommended.

As regards the Waziris, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu will know to what extent they are likely to be affected, but, as on the former occasion no disturbance by them was apprehended if the price of the salt had been raised higher than was done, it does not seem likely that they would be disturbed now by a rise in price.

Statement D* shows the allotment of "inams" paid from Salt Revenue, and if the duty on salt be enhanced, I am of opinion that these "inams" should be fixed instead of being calculated by percentages on income.

The average amount paid in inams during the past three years is Rs. 26,484-7-11, and I would propose to make them up to a fixed amount of Rs. 35,000.

The Khan of Teri, who has in previous correspondence been held to be entitled to participate in any increase of Salt Revenue, has received an average of Rs. 4,592 per annum for the last three years made up by Rs. 10 per cent. and Rs. 3 per cent. from the income of the Bahadur Khel and Nari depôts respectively.

I would recommend a fixed allowance of Rs. 8,000 being given him, which is an increase of Rs. 3,408 on his above average.

And I would recommend an increase of Rs. 5,180 to the average paid as village "inams," making up the total of Rs. 35,000. The village "inams" to be increased in proportion to the scale at present awarded, but only those villages to benefit by the increase in whose lands the quarries are situated. If an area round the quarries be protected, this allowance might be increased perhaps to Rs. 10,000, as already suggested in paragraph 16, as compensation for loss of grazing and wood cutting rights within that area.

* Not printed.

APPENDIX A.

(Enclosures of Deputy Commissioner, Kohat's No 56-G, dated 1st July 1892)

Statement showing amount of trade in Salt in 1882-83 (i.e., before the last increase of salt duty) as compared with 1891-92.

YEAR.	JATTA.		MALGIN		NARI		KARRAK.		BAHADAR KHEL.		TOTAL	
	Salt in maunds	Duty.	Salt in maunds	Duty	Salt in maunds	Duty	Salt in maunds	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.	Salt in maunds.	Duty.
		Rs.		Rs		Rs		Rs.		Rs.		Rs.
1882-83... ..	144,972	36,243	108,653	27,163	6,507	1,627	34,700	6,506	70,257	8,782	365,089	80,321
1891-92... ..	217,212	1,08,606	152,416	76,208	26,330	13,165	95,716	47,858	97,390	48,695	589,066	2,94,533
Difference	+72,240	+72,363	+43,763	+49,045	+19,823	+11,538	+61,016	+41,352	+27,133	+39,913	+223,977	+2,14,212

APPENDIX B.

Statement showing the destination of the Trade from the Kohat Salt Mines for the years 1890-91 and 1891-92.

Name of depôt and year	Kohat.		Peshawar.		Kabul.		Swat Boner.		Bajaur.		Darband.		Tirah.		Bannu.		Daman Derajat.		Local consumption in salt region		TOTAL		
	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	Mds.	Seers.	
Jatta .. { 1890-91 ..			157,668	15	6,262	35							5,290	5					69	30	169,291	5	
1891-92 ..			200,112	5	15,621	0							290	15					1,188	25	217,212	5	
Malgin .. { 1890-91 ..	8,644	35	51,709	15	2,649	20	80,499	15	1,560	0	10,389	0			22	5			307	20	103,781	30	
1891-92 ..	22,027	10	27,999	15			102,602	15							44	5			448	30	152,416	85	
Nari ... { 1890-91 ..	275	30	8,832	0	14,844	35							546	20	541	15			419	0	25,459	20	
1891-92 ..	137	0	2,889	35	20,079	30							549	25	1,815	35			888	25	26,330	30	
Karrak ... { 1890-91 ..																	60,360	25	1,970	25	77,008	5	
1891-92 ..																	11,360	15	79,066	5	5,270	5	
Bahadar Khel .. { 1890-91 ..					45,868	10											23,293	30		129	30	70,291	30
1891-92 ..					63,691	0											33,555	10		144	10	97,390	20
Total ... { 1890-91 ..	6,920	25	218,209	30	70,625	20	80,499	15	1,560	0	10,389	0	5,836	25	33,529	5	60,360	25	2,896	25	445,827	10	
1891-92 ..	22,184	10	230,351	10	99,391	20	102,502	15					46,795	25	79,066	5	79,066	5	7,995	15	589,066	25	
Increase or decrease in 1891-92	+15,263	25	+12,141	25	+28,766	0	+72,003	0	-1,560	0	-10,389	0	-4,956	25	+4,266	20	+18,705	20	+5,038	30	+143,239	15	

KOHAT. }
The 1st July 1892.

H. A. DEANE, CAPTAIN,
Deputy Commissioner.

Sub-Enclosure B.

Letter from Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul, M.A., Officiating Junior Secretary to Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 14th March 1895.

I am directed to return the papers which were received unofficially from your office under your endorsement dated the 23rd January last, regarding an enhancement of the present excise duty on Kohat salt and to convey the following remarks of the Financial Commissioner.

2. Mr. Rivaz has found this important case awaiting him on his recent return from furlough, and sees that the report due to the Government of India in the matter was called for nearly three years ago, and that several requisitions have been made for its speedy submission. The case is quite new to him, and he would have liked to give it fuller consideration than circumstances admit, but as matters stand, he thinks it best to pass on the reports of the local officers without further delay.

3. The first point to be considered is whether the time has now come when, from a political point of view, the price of Kohat salt may safely be increased to that of Cis-Indus salt. This question has been fully discussed in all its bearings by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, and as such experienced frontier officers as Major Deane and Mr. Udny express a confident opinion in favour of the measure, the Financial Commissioner thinks that their views may safely be accepted.

4 It will be seen, however, that the enhancement now proposed by Major Deane and supported by Mr. Udny does not amount to an equalization of the price of Kohat with Cis-Indus salt, as appears to have been contemplated in the Government of India letter which has directed the re-opening of the question, for, although the new duty recommended is Rs. 2-8-0 per maund, the same as that in force Cis-Indus, it is proposed to retain the local standard of weight, according to which four Kohati maunds are approximately equal to five British maunds. The new duty on Kohat salt would, therefore, come to about Rs. 2 per British maund. Thus, as is shown in the Deputy Commissioner's and Commissioner's reports, it would still be necessary, after removing the Indus preventive line, to take some special measures for preventing Kohat salt from competing unduly with Cis-Indus salt in the Cis-Indus portions of the Province. It seems desirable, for the reasons given by Major Deane and Mr. Udny, to retain the local standard of weight at the Kohat mines, and, if the new duty is limited to the rate proposed, the measures suggested by Mr. Udny for the prevention of the encroachment of Kohat salt on the Cis-Indus tracts at present served by Cis-Indus salt appear as good as can be devised. All such preventive measures are, however, more or less objectionable and to be avoided, if possible, and the Financial Commissioner is inclined to think that perhaps a solution of the difficulty may be found in fixing the new duty on Kohat salt at Rs. 2-12-0 per Kohati maund. With this duty the price of Kohat salt at the mines would still be appreciably below that of Cis-Indus salt at Khewra or Kalabagh, and some difference in price is justified by the fact that, in native opinion, the Kohat salt is of somewhat inferior quality to the product of the Cis-Indus mines, while the enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt to this extent would, judging from the figures on the subject which are given by Major Deane and Mr. Udny, prove sufficient of itself to prevent the Kohat salt from under-selling the Cis-Indus salt in the Cis-Indus country. At the same time, the advantage in favour of Kohat salt over Cis-Indus salt at a duty of Rs. 2-12-0 per local maund on the former would seem sufficient to enable it to retain its present hold Trans-Indus.

5. As regards the three points noticed in paragraph 18 of Mr. Udny's letter, it will be observed, that, while he is in agreement with Major Deane as to the date from which any enhancement that is decided upon should take effect, he is in favour of giving a longer notice than Major Deane advocates, and would take only half the proposed increase for the first year. On both these points there is much to be said on either side, but on the whole Mr. Rivaz agrees in Mr. Udny's views.

6. It seems also to Mr. Rivaz that Mr. Udny is right in recommending that the Kohat mines should continue to be administered by the Deputy Commissioner.

7. As regards the remaining questions which are discussed by Mr. Udny in paragraphs 10 to 31 of his report, connected with the revision of establishment and future administrative arrangements consequent on the proposed enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt, the increase to Mr. Johnson's salary, the supply of free salt to the inhabitants of the protected area, and the future regulation of the *inams* which are allowed to the Khan of Teri and certain land owners, I am to say that Mr. Udny's proposals on all these points appear to the Financial Commissioner to be carefully considered and suitable.

Enclosure 3.

Letter from H. C. Fanshawe, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 13th September 1895.

In continuation of the letter from this office, dated the 12th July 1895, regarding the proposed enhancement of the duty on the grey salt obtained from the Trans-Indus Mines of the Kohat District, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated 28th August 1895 (and enclosure), from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, and to convey the following remarks.

2. It will be seen that in these letters Mr. Cunningham and Major Leigh agree with Mr. Udny and Mr. Rivaz in thinking that it is on the whole best to raise the duty by two steps, allowing an interval of a year between them, and this is in accordance with the view which Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick has already expressed; but from a communication since received it appears that a rumour that the duty will be raised has been spread, and that the traders are accumulating salt in anticipation of the rise of price. In these circumstances, it becomes a question whether it would not be better to raise the duty to the full extent proposed *per saltum* next year.

3. As regards the point mentioned in paragraph 4 of Mr. King's letter, the Commissioner will be asked to institute enquiries regarding it, and to consider whether, in the event of the new duty being found to have the effect of restricting the export trade at any particular part of our frontier, it might not be possible to meet that by allowing a drawback of part of the duty on salt exported there.

Sub-Enclosure.

Letter from F. D. Cunningham, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 28th August 1895.

In compliance with your No. 330 of the 17th July, I have the honour to forward copies of * letters from the Deputy Commissioners of Kohat and Peshawar, giving their opinions on certain questions connected with the proposal to raise the duty on Kohat salt and abolish the Indus preventive line.

Both officers agree that on political grounds there is no objection to the increase of the tax. Mr. King is in favour of raising it to the maximum at one step, but would defer this till next year. Major Leigh recommends that to meet the requirements of Khattak traders the increase be made by two instalments of one rupee each with an interval of one year.

I am inclined to believe that the duty could be raised at a bound without fear of disturbance or of political complications, and that if there were now time to make the executive or departmental arrangements necessary to work the new

* Not printed.

system, the change could be carried out this autumn ; but to prevent hardship to the Khattaks and because the question of the requisite increase of establishment has to be settled, action must be deferred till next year.

The bulk of the Chitral Field Force will have returned in a month, without actual annexation of independent territory, the stories by which Mullahs and emissaries from Afghanistan have sought to alarm and excite the trans-border clans will have been disproved, and the lesson of the fighting in Swat will be fresh in the memory of every tribe. The Afridis of the Kohat Pass, who are most interested in the matter, are quieter and more under control than ten years ago. On the other hand, the interests of our own subjects deserve consideration, and as the Khattaks, who live by the salt trade, are as a class very poor, a more gradual increase of the duty will give them time to accommodate themselves to the change. As pointed out by Mr. Tucker in 1883, there are obvious objections to long notice of enhancement ; but as the announcement of the first increase can be timed to the season when camels are usually kept out of work, the loss to Government will be lessened, and if the Khattaks rush to drive a brisker trade in anticipation of the rise in duty, there is no reason to grudge them the advantage they may reap.

The whole subject has been so exhaustively treated that I need not attempt to repeat arguments one way or the other. On the whole, the opinion which I venture to give is—

- (1.) The duty may safely be raised to Rs. 2-8 per local maund, or to such figure as the Department concerned may desire, in order to prevent interference with the trade of the Khewra Mines.
- (2.) The rise in duty should be effected by two instalments of one rupee each, three months' notice being given of the first increase, the second to come into force after the lapse of one year more.
- (3.) The enhancement of duty and consequent large increase of revenue, with the abolition of the preventive line, will of course necessitate an increase of establishment to manage these mines. So far as I can judge, the proposals of Mr. Johnson in his report for the year 1891-92, seem appropriate. Of this point the Commissioner, North India Salt Revenue, will be the best judge.

Until the duty has reached its full limit, it will not be possible to abolish the Preventive Service.

- (4.) Simultaneously with the increase of duty the "inams" must be raised. They may, however, be fixed, and need not continue to bear a ratio to revenue. The average paid in the years 1889-90 to 1891-92 to villages was Rs. 26,484, and the share of the Khan of Teri has been Rs. 4,592.

Major Deane recommended that the payment to the Khan be fixed at Rs. 8,000 and the village inams at Rs. 35,000.

Mr. Udny is in favour of more liberal grants, raising the village "inams" to Rs. 50,000 and the Khan's to Rs. 10,000.

It does not appear that the villagers will have any new service laid on them, but it is well to treat them liberally, and the Khan has been held entitled to share the increase of revenue. I would give Rs. 40,000 to the villages as "inams" and Rs. 10,000 to the Khan.

Enclosure No. 4.

Letter from R. M. Dane, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 23rd December 1895.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated 12th July 1895, and 13th September 1895, regarding the enhancement of the duty on salt from the Kohat Salt Mines.

2. The enhancement of the duty on this salt to a rate which will approximate so nearly to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt as to admit of the abolition of the Indus

preventive line, is a measure which has long been contemplated, and which was once, as far back as 1879, actually ordered. The Government of India observe with satisfaction that there appears to be now complete unanimity of opinion among the officers best acquainted with this portion of the North-Western Frontier that political considerations need no longer delay the introduction of the measure. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, it is said, "entirely agrees that, with a view to obtaining the large additional revenue which may be expected and to getting rid of the preventive line, it is highly desirable to raise the duty on Kohat salt to a figure which would be to some extent comparable with that fixed for the Cis-Indus salt, and which would admit of the preventive line being abolished. He further agrees that this would be a perfectly fair and just measure, and that after a little time it would not press hardly on any of those concerned whether as traders or consumers."

3. As to the manner in which the enhancement should be effected, and the rate which should be adopted, there is, however, some difference of opinion. Major Deane, writing as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in July 1892, proposed that the duty should be raised at once from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund. Mr. Udny, the Commissioner of Peshawar, supported Major Deane's proposal as to the rate, but recommended that the duty should be raised first to Re. 1-8 annas a maund only, and that a year later it should be raised by a second enhancement to the full amount proposed, viz., Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund. Both Major Deane and Mr. Udny considered that with a rate of Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund it would be necessary to maintain some restrictions on the traffic in Kohat salt to prevent it from competing with salt from Khewra and Kalabagh in the Cis-Indus districts; and to avoid the necessity for such restrictions Mr. Rivaz, the Financial Commissioner, suggests that the duty may be raised to Rs. 2-12 annas a Lahori maund. Mr. Cunningham, the Officiating Commissioner of Peshawar, considers that "the duty may safely be raised to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund or to such figure as the Department concerned may desire in order to prevent interference with the trade of the Khewra Mines." The Lieutenant-Governor, it is understood, is in general accord with the views expressed by Mr. Cunningham, and is willing to agree to any enhancement that may be found to be necessary to place Kohat and Cis-Indus salt upon equal terms. Mr. Patterson, the Commissioner of the Northern India Salt Department, who has been consulted, thinks that a duty of Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund will permit of the abolition of the preventive line and of the withdrawal of the prohibition against the possession of Kohat salt Cis-Indus without danger to the revenue from Cis-Indus salt, if the existing prohibition against the carriage of Kohat salt by railway across the Indus be maintained and the booking of Kohat salt by rail Cis-Indus be also forbidden. Mr. Udny's view that the enhancement of the duty should be effected by instalments is shared by the Financial Commissioner, Mr. Cunningham, and Major Leigh, the present Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. In your letter of the 12th July 1895, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick expressed himself in favour of an increase in the duty by degrees, but from your letter of September it would seem that he has now modified this view, and thinks that it will be better to raise the duty to the full extent proposed by one bound if the traders continue to accumulate stocks, as they are now doing, in anticipation of a rise in the duty.

4. The question is one of considerable difficulty, and His Excellency the Governor General in Council is disposed to think that the officers who have recommended an increase of the duty from 8 annas to Rs. 2-8 annas a Lahori maund, have hardly made sufficient allowance for the inferiority in quality of the grey Kohat salt to the salt obtainable at the Cis-Indus Mines. It is important that the duty shall not be raised any higher than may be necessary to permit of the abolition of the Indus preventive line and so do away with the vexatious restrictions on trade which the line necessarily imposes. Sir Robert Egerton in 1882 considered that a duty on Kohat salt of Rs. 2 a British maund of 82½ lbs. would be perhaps higher than was absolutely necessary to prevent the Kohat salt from competing with the product of the Cis-Indus Mines, and that a duty of Re. 1-8 annas would probably be sufficient if the carriage of the salt by railway from Khushalgarh and Attock or by boat down the Indus were temporarily prohibited. An increase in the duty now levied on Kohat salt of 400 per cent.

may be severely felt in outlying tracts across the border, and it is important to avoid, if possible, any unnecessary enhancement. From paragraph 3 of your letter of September 1895 it appears that the Commissioner of Peshawar has been asked to consider whether, in the event of the enhanced duty being found to have the effect of restricting the export trade to any particular part of the frontier, it may be possible to allow a drawback of part of the duty on the salt exported there. A system of this kind would, however, inevitably give rise to serious difficulties and complications, and the Government of India are not satisfied as to the necessity for its adoption especially if the rate of the duty be not pitched too high.

5. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council therefore, after careful consideration, has decided to fix the duty for the present at Rs. 2 a Lahori or Kohat maund. This rate may be regarded a compromise between the rate of Re. 1-8 annas a Kohat maund, to which it has been proposed to raise the duty temporarily for one year, and the rate of Rs 2-8 annas which has been recommended for ultimate adoption; and by lowering somewhat the proposed rate of enhancement, the difficulties as to an increase by instalments and the adoption of a differential rate of duty for a portion of the trans-border trade will, it is hoped, be obviated. It is, in the opinion of the Government of India, very desirable that instalments should, if possible, be avoided, and that the enhancement should be effected once for all by a single operation. The Government of India in short agree with what is understood to be now the view of the Lieutenant-Governor "that, if we are to introduce an unpopular measure, it is better to introduce it straight off at once in its entirety than to break it up into instalments and thus spread the irritation arising from it over a considerable period." There seems to be fair reason to believe that a rate of Rs. 2 a Lahori maund will permit of the abolition of the Indus Preventive Line, or at least of its reduction to an establishment sufficient to guard the railways and the Indus ferries only. Should experience show that the rate is insufficient, the question of a further enhancement can be considered; but it is hoped that the necessity for this will not arise. It may be necessary to retain the existing prohibition of the carriage of Kohat salt across and down the Indus and of its possession cis-Indus, and on this point I am directed to ask for an early expression of the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. The duty, it will be observed, is to be Rs. 2 a Lahori or Kohat maund. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council concurs in thinking that the local unit of weight should be retained. The Government has practically nothing to gain by a change, and the prejudices of the local traders and others in such a matter may rightly be respected.

6. The next point for consideration is the date from which the enhancement of duty should be effected, and the notice which should be given of the intention of the Government to make it. The date generally recommended is 1st October on the ground that the salt trade is inactive during the three monsoon months, and that any ill-feeling created by the change would have a better chance of subsiding during the winter, as the trans-border tribesmen are at that time more dependent on British territory. Major Deane, it is observed, recommended that one month's notice only should be given. Mr. Udny, Mr. Cunningham and the Financial Commissioner consider that three months' notice is desirable. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick on this point has expressed no opinion. In the opinion of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council it is unnecessary and undesirable to give any notice of the intention of the Government to raise the duty. To do so means only that a number of capitalists will have an opportunity of making a large profit out of the transaction, and the interests of these men may safely be disregarded. The small traders and carriers have neither the capital nor the means of information to enable them to take advantage of the opportunity and accumulate stocks. The view, therefore, of the Government of India is that, unless the intention to increase the duty leaks out, the enhancement should be made on the 1st September next without any previous notice, and that widespread intimation of the enhancement should then be given. Traders will in this way have practically a month's warning to provide themselves with the requisite funds when they go to the mines for salt in October, but they will not be able to take advantage of an interval of low rate, after publication of notice;

to make money out of the public by speculation. Should, however, it appear that the traders have received information as to the intentions of the Government, and that they are obtaining salt from the mines in specially large quantities in anticipation of a rise of duty, action should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be taken to enhance the duty at once. It is undesirable that the Government should be forestalled in the matter for the benefit of speculative traders.

7. In introducing the new rate it may be necessary to make some concessions at the outset to men in the petty carrying trade and to accept bonds from them in part payment of the enhanced duty. Details of this kind should be worked out by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in consultation with the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue. The farther, it may be observed, that a carrier has to carry his salt, the less is the proportion he will have to add to his price. It is only to the consumers in the immediate vicinity of the mines or quarries that the price of salt will be raised by the enhancement of the duty nearly four-fold; and to many of these men the sting of the enhancement will be largely taken away by the additional allowances they will receive.

8. When the enhanced rate of duty has been established and affairs at the mines have been placed on the new footing, the management of the mines should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be transferred to the Northern India Salt department. The introduction of the new rate of duty had better be carried out by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, as he is in the best position to watch its effects, explain matters to the traders and take any precautionary measures that may be found to be necessary; and he should be instructed to consult and obtain the co-operation of the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue. After the new rate has been introduced and an equilibrium between Kohat salt and cis-Indus salt has been established to a practically sufficient extent, the management of the mines will cease to possess any political importance, and will become a purely revenue business, and should then be transferred, like the management of the other salt sources, to the Salt Department to be worked with the special skill and knowledge that that Department necessarily possesses.

9. Upon the question of the payment of increased inams to the Nawab of Teri and to the landowners of certain villages adjoining the salt mines, the proposals of Mr. Cunningham, the Officiating Commissioner of Peshawar, which it is understood, are accepted by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, appear to the Government of India to be appropriate, but upon this point, as also upon the question of the establishments which should be entertained at the mines when the duty is enhanced, the Government of India will, I am to say, await a further report. The proposals for the additional establishments required, which were submitted by Major Deane, should be revised carefully by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat in consultation with the Commissioner of Northern India Salt Revenue.

Enclosure No. 5.

Extract from letter from R. M. Dane, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, to the Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Revenue Department, dated 12th June 1896.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters* dated 18th May and 26th May 1896, regarding the enhancement of the duty on salt from the Kohat Mines.

The Governor-General in Council agrees with the opinion expressed by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick that no sufficient cause has been shown for modifying the decision which was arrived at in December last in regard to the extent to which the duty should be enhanced. An increase from eight annas to two rupees per Kohat maund is considerable, and any further increase would probably be severely felt across the border and in our own trans-Indus districts. It is observed that, in the opinion of the local officers, it will be necessary, with a rate of Rs. 2 per Kohat maund, to maintain the Indus preventive line and the existing prohibition of the passage of Kohat salt on and across the Indus. The opinions

* Not printed.

of the local officers are of course entitled to much weight, and it is possible that, as was contemplated when the decision to fix the duty at Rs. 2 per Kohat maund was arrived at, it may be necessary hereafter to make a further enhancement of the duty. The exact rate that will prevent the Kohat salt from invading the Cis-Indus region can, however, only be satisfactorily determined by experience, and the Government of India are anxious to avoid increasing the duty any further than may be necessary to render possible the abolition of the Indus line. Mr. Bruce, in his memorandum of the 30th January 1896, says that the wealthier classes in the Derajat have, even under present circumstances, been in the habit of using Kalabagh salt, though its market price is $11\frac{1}{2}$ seers the rupee, equivalent to Rs. 3-8-11 a maund, as compared with $10\frac{1}{2}$ annas a maund for Kohat salt at Bannu and $16\frac{1}{2}$ annas at Dera Ismail Khan; and if these facts are correct, it is not impossible that the rate of duty now adopted may be sufficient to prevent the Kohat salt from crossing the Indus, at any rate, in large quantities. The movements of this salt can easily be watched, and if, when the preventive line has been abolished and other restrictions have been withdrawn, it be found that the Kohat salt is displacing Khewra and Kalabagh salt in the Cis-Indus region, the duty can then be further enhanced. For the present the preventive line will be maintained on its existing footing. When effect has been given to the enhancement of the duty and prices have settled down after disposal of the accumulated stocks of Kohat salt, the question of its removal or of its maintenance at a reduced strength will be taken into consideration.

From the facts now reported, it is clear that the traders have received information of the intention of Government to enhance the duty. The sales from the mines in 1895-96 were 616,055 Kohat maunds as compared with 463,918 maunds in 1894-95 and 589,066 in 1891-92, the year in which the sales were largest on record, and the sales in the current year up to the end of the third week in May amounted to 218,145 Kohat maunds as compared with 29,235 and 98,874 maunds in the corresponding periods of 1895-96 and 1891-92. The Government of India agree with the Lieutenant-Governor that it is not a matter of regret that the carriers and traders ordinarily engaged in the Kohat salt trade should have had an opportunity of accumulating stocks which will enable them to make some profit from the change in the rate of duty, as this will help to reconcile them to the enhancement and will diminish the danger of any trouble arising in connection with it. Large stocks of salt have, however, now been accumulated, and, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick observes, it is certain that before final arrangements for raising the duty can be made, these men will have secured to themselves quite as large a profit as is necessary or desirable.

The Governor-General in Council has therefore decided to give effect to the enhancement with as little delay as possible. In my letter dated 23rd December 1895, it was observed that, unless the intention of Government to increase the duty leaked out the enhancement should, in the opinion of the Government of India, be made on the 1st September next without any previous notice. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, while still of opinion that some notice of the enhancement should be given, is in favour of reducing the notice to the minimum required to prevent the possibility of traders resorting to the mines in the expectation of purchasing salt at the old rates and there finding that the duty has been raised, and considers that for this purpose one month's notice will suffice. During the period of the notice Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick inclines to the opinion that salt should be issued as usual to the carrier-traders ordinarily engaged in this traffic, but that salt should not be supplied to speculating capitalists embarking in the trade with the intention merely of securing a profit out of the enhancement of the duty. The Government of India accept the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion that a month's notice of the enhancement should be given. It appears from paragraph 2 of his letter to the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 13 February 1896, that Major Leigh, as Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, informed trans-border and other enquirers that if an enhancement of the duty were contemplated, due notice would be given; and it is certainly desirable to prevent, as far as possible, the disappointment of legitimate expectations in the case of traders resorting to the mines from a distance. The enhancement of the duty will be effected by a notification under section 7 of

Act XII. of 1882, and a copy of the notification which will appear in the *Gazette of India* of the 13th instant, increasing the duty from eight annas to two rupees per Lahori or Kohat maund, with effect from the 13th July 1896, is appended to this letter. I am directed to request that the Commissioners of Peshawar and the Derajat may be instructed to at once announce the intention of Government to enhance the duty from that date throughout their divisions.

The publication of this notification will stimulate the activity of the traders, and to prevent the possibility of speculation on a large scale, it will, in the opinion of the Government of India, be necessary to limit the output at the mines during the period of the notice to a maximum of 150,000 Kohat maunds. The sales during the month of April in the current year, which were abnormally large, amounted to 121,383 maunds, and the sales during the first three weeks in May amounted to 96,762 maunds and the limit of the output to 150,000 maunds will certainly not therefore involve any real hardship to the salt-traders. The details of the arrangements for limiting the output may, if the Punjab Government has no objection, suitably be left to the Deputy Commissioner's discretion. Carrier-traders *bona fide* engaged in the salt traffic should be allowed to take what salt they may require for their own stock in trade, but capitalists, who have not before the past few months taken any part in the traffic, should not be allowed to remove as a speculation large quantities of salt.

The profits which the carrier-traders have made, and may be expected to make during the period of the notice, will sufficiently compensate them for any temporary inconvenience they may sustain in consequence of the enhancement of the duty, and it will not be necessary to allow them any further concessions. The proposal to accept bonds from them in part payment of the increased duty is apparently unworkable from the reasons given in paragraph 14 of the letter from the Junior Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 9th April 1896, and this proposal may therefore be dropped. The Government of India also agree with the Lieutenant-Governor that Mr. Udny's proposal to allow free salt, or salt at reduced duty, to all people in the vicinity of the mines is impracticable, and that a monthly free issue of salt to the quarrymen, weighment coolies and preventative establishment will be a sufficient concession. Any proposals which the Lieutenant-Governor may submit to save the people living in the salt tract from unnecessary harassment for petty breaches of the salt law will, I am to say, receive the careful consideration of the Government of India.

The Government of India agree with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick that the increases which are to be made to the salt inams now received by the Khan of Teri and the landowners of certain villages in the vicinity of the mines should be announced at the time when notice is given of the enhancement of the duty. The Government of India understand that the grant of these inams is a matter in which the discretion of Government is entirely unfettered, though it is both equitable and expedient to treat the Khan and landowners interested with consideration and liberality. I am directed therefore to say that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is authorised, when giving notice of the enhancement of the duty, to announce the intention of the Government to sanction the annual payment of fixed sums of Rs. 10,000 to the Khan of Teri and of Rs. 40,000 to the village landowners and to the Khan of Shakhdarra, the Naibs of Gumbat and any other persons who may be found to be interested, in full satisfaction of all claims. The conditions upon which these grants should be held, and the manner in which the Rs. 40,000 should be distributed, may be left over for subsequent settlement.

Enclosure 6.

Notification by the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, dated 12th June 1896.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Indian Salt Act, XII. of 1882, and in supersession of the Notification by the Government of India in the Finance and Commerce Department, No. 1931, dated

6th July 1883, the Governor-General in Council imposes a duty of Rs. 2 per Lahori or Kohat maund of $102\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. avoirdupois on salt manufactured

Jatta.
Malgm.
Narri.

Karrak
Bahadur Khel.

in the mines in the district of Kohat,
noted in the margin, with effect from the
13th July 1896.

No. 2.

Despatch from Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, to His Excellency The Right Honourable The Governor-General of India in Council, dated 25th November 1897.

MY LORD,

I have considered in Council the Financial Letter of your Government dated 30th September last, in which you report, for my information and approval, that you have accorded provisional sanction to an increased establishment at the Kohat salt mines (involving additional expenditure of Rs. 33,038 a year), rendered necessary by an enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt to Rs. 2 per Kohati maund. At the same time you express your regret that this enhancement was not, according to the instructions contained in Lord Kimberley's Revenue Despatch, dated 31st October 1883, communicated to me before it was enforced.

2. When the duty on Kohat salt was raised in 1883 to 8 annas, it was understood that the enhancement was not intended to be final, but that further enhancements would be made until trans-Indus salt was put on the same footing with cis-Indus salt, and the Indus customs preventive line thus rendered unnecessary. And I gather from the correspondence enclosed with your letter under reply that the present step is also to be regarded as lacking in finality. For experience is required to show whether, with a duty of Rs. 2 per Kohati maund, the price of salt on either side of the Indus will be so far equalized as to render possible the abolition of the Indus line.

3. I observe that, although the enhancement has recently been utilized as a means for exciting disaffection, you are of opinion that this was only put forward as a pretext after the commencement of hostilities. I shall await a report on the new system when trade is resumed; and, with reference to the 10 paragraph of your letter, I request that the instructions conveyed by Lord Kimberley's despatch of the 31st October 1883 may be understood to be still in force. In the meantime your proceedings are approved.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE HAMILTON.

~~SS R 971~~

EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

S 2096

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO



CHITRAL.

Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

Correspondence relating to Chitral.

No. 1.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 17 of June 11, 1877.

WE have to submit, for your Lordship's approval, an account of the action we have taken for securing an object of importance in the general scheme for the protection of the north-west frontier; that is to say, an efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the north-western frontier of Cashmere.

It appeared to us imperative to take an early opportunity of encouraging our loyal feudatory, the Maharaja of Cashmere, to obtain an effective, but peaceful, control over the countries lying between those passes and the Cashmere frontier, namely, Chitral, Mastuj, Yassin, and their dependencies.

A favourable opportunity for commencing negotiations on this subject presented itself in the arrival at Srinagar, in the middle of 1876, of one Jafar Ali, the bearer of communications from the Chitral Chief to His Highness the Maharaja of Cashmere. Later in the year, in response to a friendly answer from His Highness, another messenger arrived with an important letter. The Chief of Chitral formally tendered his allegiance to the Ruler of Cashmere, adding that his relative, the Chief of Dir, was with him, and that Raja Pahlwan, the Ruler of Yassin and Mastuj, was his dependent, and would likewise accept the suzerainty of the Maharaja.

The offer of the Chitral Chief having been reported to the Viceroy, the subject was reserved by his Excellency for discussion with the Maharaja on the occasion of his interview with His Highness at Madhopore on the 17th and 18th November 1876. What passed on that occasion will be found in the record of our proceedings. It will suffice here to state that, while the Maharaja undertook to endeavour by peaceful negotiation to obtain political control over Chitral and Yassin, his Excellency promised to aid the negotiations by all the means in his power, and assured His Highness that, in the event of his action involving him unexpectedly in military operations, the British Government would, if necessary, afford him countenance and material aid. It was further agreed that an English officer should be appointed to reside permanently in Gilgit for the purpose of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Cashmere frontier; also that a line of telegraph should be constructed by the Maharaja, connecting Gilgit, Srinagar, and Jammu with the British telegraph system, and, lastly, that the agents from Chitral and Yassin, then in the camp of the Maharaja, should accompany that Chief to Delhi, in order to be present at the Imperial assemblage. They did so, and at an interview at Delhi with the Foreign Secretary, in the presence of the Maharaja's Minister, emphatically confirmed the representations previously made as to the anxiety of the Chitral Chief to become the vassal of Cashmere.

After the close of the Imperial assemblage, Barram Shah, one of the Chitral agents, proceeded on his return journey to Chitral by the Peshawar route, accompanied by two representatives from the Maharaja, for the purpose of continuing the friendly negotiations which had been commenced under such good auspices. Meanwhile another letter from Aman-ul-Mulk reached His Highness by the Gilgit route, reporting the unexpected defection of the Chief of Dir to Cabul, but reiterating his tender of allegiance to Cashmere, and promising in the early spring to send his son Nizam-ul-Mulk with Raja Pahlwan to Gilgit to consummate arrangements. Thus matters remained until the 28th of March, when a telegram was received from Major Henderson, the officer on special duty with the Maharaja, reporting receipt by His Highness of another letter from Aman-ul-Mulk to the effect that all the neighbouring Chiefs were submitting to the Amir of Cabul, that he was left isolated and too weak to resist without assistance the pressure he expected from a Cabul agent then on his way to Chitral.

In reply to the above, his Excellency in Council authorised the Maharaja to instruct the Chitral Chief to resist the claims of Cabul, and to furnish him with the means of doing so, relying, if necessary, on the support of the British Government. At the same time, under instructions from his Excellency in Council, a letter was addressed by the

Commissioner of Peshawar to the Amir of Cabul, warning him against any endeavour to assume sovereignty over Bajor, Swat, Dir, or Chitral; and reminding His Highness that, as the British Government had never recognised his claim to allegiance from those States, to enforce it without the assent of that Government would be regarded as an unfriendly act.

What may be the practical result of the above negotiations between the Maharaja of Cashmere and the Chitral Chief it is of course impossible to predict with confidence; but there can be but little doubt that the people of Dardistan, who differ wholly in race, language, and traditions from the Pathans of the west, regard with deep concern the advancing pressure from Afghanistan, and are in sore need of a friendly protector. Thus there is a fair prospect of the Cashmere Ruler, supported as he is by the power and prestige of the British Government, being able to acquire such influence and control in the above-mentioned States as will enable us, in course of time, to make such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush.

We venture to hope that our proceedings may receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, which will learn, we feel sure, with much satisfaction, that the Maharaja of Cashmere has displayed the greatest loyalty and earnestness in support of our policy in this important matter, and is at this moment hastening the construction of a line connecting Gilgit, Srinagar, and Jammu, with our telegraphic system.

No. 2.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 49, of February 28, 1879.

MY LORD,

In our letter No. 17 of 1877, dated 11th June, we submitted an account of the action we had taken with the object of securing efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the north-western frontier of Kashmir.

The diaries and other papers that have been forwarded from time to time will have kept your Lordship informed of the general tenor of our correspondence and proceedings, subsequent to the date of that letter, in furtherance of the views therein explained. The appointment of an officer to Gilgit has much aided the extension of our knowledge of the physical features of the adjacent country, and of the different tribes which inhabit it. And we propose to take this opportunity of stating more definitely the policy which, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we propose gradually to follow out upon that section of our extreme north-western frontier.

The greater part of the territory between Wakhan and the border of India proper is well within the reach of our effective influence. There can be no doubt that the movement of events in this quarter, though at present indeterminate and complicated, is so far significant that it should place us on our guard. The petty Chiefs who own the wild country below Sarikol and around Kashmir are evidently in much perplexity. They have been recently tending, more or less surreptitiously, their allegiance alternately to Kabul, Kashmir, and China—the Chief of Hunza (for example), though disavowing political disloyalty to Kashmir, has undeniably made overtures to Tashkurgan; and the Chief of Chitral endeavours to trim between Kabul and Kashmir. They are all, in fact, doubting to which quarter they should look for the safest barter of their allegiance in return for protection by some paramount power. Meanwhile, to these Chiefs belong the southern openings of the only passes which give direct passage through the mountain ranges up to Sarikol on the Pamir steppes—the district which the dilapidation of the Kashgar dynasty has left politically masterless. And we have to remember that the remarkable depression or break in the great mountain barrier of the Hindu Kush, where it is crossed by the Iskamon and Baroghil passes, occurs just where a section of our frontier with Central Asia is held by a Native Indian State.

All these facts and tendencies, reviewed collectively, have confirmed our impressions of the importance of making out, as definitely as the nature of the country and our knowledge of its condition will permit, the territorial limits up to which we should extend our indirect authority, and within which the encroachments of foreign influence should be anticipated. Throughout the zone of quasi-independent territory which this limit would include it may be sufficient for a long time to come that our political supremacy shall be tacitly accepted, to the exclusion of other similar claims or assertions. We may thus succeed in adjourning, upon the border of India beyond Kashmir, that contact between

the recognised territories of England and Russia in Asia to which some may look forward as ultimately inevitable, but which it is not our concern in India to facilitate or expedite. It is true that upon this section of the Hindu Kush range the whole country is so difficult, remote, and ill-populated, that there is little to attract advance or occupation from the northern side of the mountains, either on political or on military grounds. Nevertheless all our experience in Asia points to the inconvenience of an undefined frontier, and to the expediency of laying down some general political demarcation where, debatable border lands interpose between the necessarily converging forces of two powerful States. The line which we may at first adopt as defining the sphere of our political influence should coincide generally with the geographical outline of the position which, if need be, we may be ready to maintain actively. If we are enabled deliberately and at leisure to examine and select our ground, and by degrees to accustom the people to a political connexion with India, we shall the more certainly avoid committing ourselves to the occupation of any position, military or political, from which we might afterwards find ourselves obliged to withdraw.

Upon these general principles we have examined carefully the strategical features as well as the political aspect of our frontier beyond Kashmir, with the object of settling this line of political demarcation. In this direction the natural boundary of India is formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and of the Hindu Kush which here extend northward up to their junction. The Mustagh range, running up from south-eastward to the Barogil Pass, marks the water-parting between the Tagdunhash Pamir and Sarikol on the north, and the Upper Indus Valleys southward. From the Barogil Pass south-west the Hindu Kush divides the watershed of the Oxus and the Indus. Within the angle thus formed lie the territories of Chitral, Darel, Yassin, Hunza, and other petty dependencies. From Hunza, on the slopes of the Mustagh, westward to Chitral under the Hindu Kush, these States occupy the valleys which run up to the skirts of the ranges, and are drained by the uppermost tributaries of the Indus river system. And the only passes through these ranges from the Pamir are, as we have said, in the hands of these semi-independent Chiefs. If, we extend, and by degrees consolidate, our influence over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains, or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier which is distinct, intelligible, and likely to be respected.

We purpose, therefore, to follow out consistently the policy of which the first steps were reported and explained by our letter of 11th June 1877. Our object, as there stated, is to acquire, through the Ruler of Kashmir, the power of making such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush. With this object, we shall take every opportunity of strengthening our control over the country lying south of the mountain slopes; and of attaching the Chiefs, through Kashmir, to British interests. Major Biddulph has recently visited Yassin and Chitral from Gilgit, and his explorations have added much to our knowledge of the country, and of its people. Our officers in Kashmir will be instructed to discourage and counteract all tendencies of the Kunjod Chiefs towards acknowledgement of any superior authority other than that of the Kashmir Ruler; and the Chitral engagement with Kashmir (which has been concluded and is forwarded herewith) will be drawn as close as possible. We may thus succeed in retaining and settling down within our political system all the country which falls inside our geographical frontier. And although we desire to realise our plans gradually, by pacific means, we shall nevertheless consider it from the first incumbent upon the Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power. Nor do we anticipate that any such interference with our legitimate supremacy will be attempted in earnest; so soon as it shall have become known that we have marked out a clear and consistent frontier, and that we intend to maintain it.

No. 3.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 241, of December 22, 1880.

WE have the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of papers regarding the late disturbances in the neighbourhood of Gilgit.

For some time before the occurrence of the outbreak, which was reported to your Lordship by telegram, disquieting rumours had reached us regarding the attitude of some of the Chiefs on the northern frontiers of Kashmir. The garrison of Chaprot had been strengthened by the Maharaja in accordance with the advice of the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit, and it was hoped that there was no immediate cause for alarm, but Major Biddulph was not free from anxiety as to the intentions of the neighbouring tribes, and there was some reason to apprehend that a general feeling of disaffection existed among them.

The first intimation of any actual trouble reached us on the 6th November, when we received telegraphic news from Srinagar to the effect that the fort of Sher, to the west of Gilgit, had been attacked by the Yassinees.

It seems, from such information as has yet reached us, that, on the 28th October, a force of about 750 men, led by Pehlwan Bahadur, the Chief of Yassin, surprised the frontier fort of Gakuch and marched upon Gilgit. The Kashmir fort at Sher was invested and attacked, and Major Biddulph was informed that more than one of the neighbouring Chiefs only awaited its fall to join the insurgents. He advanced to its relief with his own escort of twenty Native infantry and some Kashmir troops, but the attempt failed, and for a time there was a prospect of his being himself besieged. On the 19th November, however, we received news that Pehlwan Bahadur had broken up the investment of Sher and withdrawn; and it appears from later intelligence that, attacked or threatened in rear by the Chitral Chief, he has been abandoned by his men, and has fled almost alone towards Wakhan. The rising has therefore for the present completely collapsed, and there is reason to hope that no further disturbances may take place.

The causes and objects of the rising are as yet obscure, and a report has been called for on the subject. In the meanwhile, we have sent Major Biddulph instructions to avoid any steps likely to involve him in fresh complications upon the Gilgit border, and we have directed him to come himself to head-quarters as soon as the weather permits, in order that the situation may, if possible, be fully explained. Colonel Tanner, who has a thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, was deputed at the beginning of the affair to accompany the reinforcements sent up by His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, and he will remain temporarily in Gilgit after Major Biddulph's departure.

On receipt of complete information we shall again address your Lordship upon the subject. At present we would only add that the Maharaja of Kashmir seems to have spared no exertions to push forward an effective force for Major Biddulph's relief, and that His Highness has endeavoured in every way to meet our wishes in the matter.

No. 4.

COPY of a DESPATCH from HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 5, dated January 28, 1881.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of Letter, No. 241, of the 22nd December last, from your Excellency's Government regarding the late disturbances in the neighbourhood of Gilgit.

2. I shall reserve any detailed expression of my views on this subject until I am in possession of the complete information promised by your Excellency in Council, but in the meantime I desire to convey my full approval to the instructions you have issued to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir directing Major Biddulph to repair to the head-quarters of your Government, when able to do so, that the situation may be fully explained, and causing that officer to be warned in clear and definite terms against taking or encouraging during the winter any steps likely to involve him directly or indirectly in fresh complications upon the Gilgit border.

HARTINGTON.

No. 5.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 103, of July 15, 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 5 of the 28th January 1881, regarding affairs in Gilgit.

In our letter No. 241 of December 1880, we submitted such information as we then possessed regarding the causes and progress of the rising by which Gilgit was endangered

towards the close of last year. We proposed again to address your Lordship on receipt of complete information; and it was added that in the meanwhile Major Biddulph had been warned to avoid any steps likely to involve him in fresh complications, and had been directed to come to head-quarters as soon as the weather permitted, in order that the situation might be fully explained. Your Lordship approved of these instructions, but reserved any detailed expression of your views upon the subject generally until the complete information promised should have been received.

We have now the honour to forward a copy of further correspondence showing the reports received and the action taken upon them by the Government of India. Your Lordship will see that it has been decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency, and that the Maharaja of Kashmir has been so informed. The reasons for this step are various; but it may be briefly stated that neither the Government of India, nor, apparently, the Maharaja of Kashmir, is at present in a position to answer for the safety of a British officer at Gilgit in the event of a sudden attack upon the place by the independent and unruly tribes of the neighbourhood; while, on the other hand, the expectations formed from the establishment of the Agency have not been fulfilled. Major Biddulph was deputed to Gilgit in 1877 with the object, first, of obtaining trustworthy information in regard to occurrences beyond the border; and, secondly, of gaining influence among the neighbouring tribes. There can be no doubt that Major Biddulph, who is an active and enterprising officer, has during his residence at Gilgit added much to our knowledge of the country round, and of the tribes inhabiting it, the intelligence which he has from time to time obtained of the course of events in Chitral and Badakshan has not been unimportant, and he was well placed for observing, during our recent occupation of Kabul, the general state and tendency of affairs in the countries bordering on North-East Afghanistan. On the other hand, his position in the remote corner of a foreign State obliged him to deal chiefly with these tribes through the medium, not always trustworthy or favourable, of the local officials. Any attempts to exercise direct influence would have been met by suspicion and jealousy; while he was continually hampered by the double-dealing, intrigues, and feuds of the petty Chiefs over whom he had no real control. The late rising of the Yassin Chief, who had previously been friendly, and whose conduct is still unexplained, shows that the Political Agent had failed, probably through the inevitable difficulties of his situation, to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty Chiefships with whom he has had dealings for three years past. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilgit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance. We therefore decided to withdraw it, and to leave altogether in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State.

The Maharaja has not been given to understand that the withdrawal of the Agency is final. On the contrary, the Government of India have reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter seem desirable. His Highness has further been informed that the relations of the Kashmir State with the Chiefships adjoining its northern frontier cannot be otherwise than a matter of permanent concern to the British Government; that the Durbar will be expected to supply early and accurate information of the course of events throughout that region, and that the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir should be consulted on matters affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighbouring States. But Colonel Tanner, who is now carrying on the duties of the Gilgit Agency, has been directed to march down before the end of the summer, with his office establishment, and to inform the Chiefs and others with whom he has relations that the Agency will not remain during the coming winter. He will avoid all appearance of haste, and will conclude any current business or correspondence; but it is expected that he will have left Gilgit by the end of the present month.

It will be seen from the correspondence enclosed that Aman-ul-Mulk, the Ruler of Chitral, by whose action the late invasion of Gilgit territory from Yassin was frustrated, has applied to be admitted into direct political relations with the British Government, and has put in a claim to a substantial reward for his services. His agent has been to Simla, and has presented a letter from his master setting forth certain definite requests. As Aman-ul-Mulk has, with the approval of the Government of India, contracted engagements by which he entered into a condition of subordinate alliance with the Kashmir State, his application to be admitted to direct political relations cannot be entertained. He has, however, been reassured in regard to his expressed apprehensions of encroachment or interference from the direction of Afghanistan, and the Maharaja's attention has been directed to his claims.

It will be observed that the Maharaja proposes to increase the Chitral subsidy, declining the offer that a share of the expense should be borne by the British Government, and that His Highness also agrees, conditionally, to the partition of the Yassin territories desired by Aman-ul-Mulk. We see no reason for demurring to the views of the Maharaja, who is principally interested in these arrangements; and we have instructed Mr. Henvey accordingly. But as there appears to be no advantage in dealing with the Chief of Dir through Kashmir, or in encouraging the Kashmir State to attempt to extend its influence in that quarter, we have instructed Mr. Henvey that the Maharaja's suggestion upon this point need not be further entertained.

No. 6.

COPY of a DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 36, dated September 16, 1881.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

1. I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 103, dated the 15th July last, reporting your decision to withdraw the British Agency from Gilgit, and your orders upon various points affecting the relations between the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Chiefs of Chitral and Dir.

2. The result of the careful consideration which your Excellency in Council has given to the question, consequent on the attack on Gilgit which was made by Pahlwan Khan of Yassin in the autumn of last year, has led you to the conclusion that the Agency there could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassments and anxieties disproportionate to the advantages that might be expected from its maintenance. The Officiating Agent has accordingly been directed to withdraw with his establishment before the end of the summer, and the decision to this effect has been communicated to the Maharajah of Kashmir, although in terms which reserve to Government full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit, should such a measure hereafter appear desirable.

3. Under all the circumstances of the case, I approve of the decision at which you have arrived. The appointment of an Agent at Gilgit appears from the first to have been distasteful to the Maharajah of Kashmir, and, from whatever cause, has failed to realise the expectations with which it was made in 1877. The position in which Major Biddulph was placed by the outbreak of last year, if not one of serious danger, was certainly humiliating, and only some very clear advantage would justify the permanent retention of an officer in a post so isolated, exposed to such attacks. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the effect of the withdrawal of the Agent may possibly be practically to close a valuable channel of information as to the course of events in the countries between Kashmir and Russian Turkestan, at a moment when such information is likely to be of particular interest, as well as to diminish in some degree your knowledge of the intrigues to which that part of the frontier is specially exposed. How far this result may follow must to a very great extent depend upon the good faith of the Maharajah of Kashmir, in which your Excellency in Council is no doubt justified in confiding. In the event, which I should be sorry to anticipate, of that confidence proving to be misplaced, and of the Maharajah failing to keep you fully informed of what is passing on his borders and those of his feudatory, the Mir of Chitral, it might be necessary to reconsider the expediency of deputing an officer to Gilgit, at all events during the summer months.

4. As regards the relations between the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Chiefs of Chitral and Dir, I approve of the orders which you have issued. It is desirable that the dependence of Aman-ul-Mulk on His Highness, which has been recognised by Treaty between the two rulers, should be maintained and confirmed, especially as the result of recent events has been to place the Chief of Chitral in possession of Yassin, which is on the Gilgit side of the watershed. On the other hand, it is not obvious that any advantage would be gained by the extension of Kashmir influence over the contiguous State of Dir, and the views which the Maharajah appears to entertain on that head have properly been discouraged.

HARTINGTON.

EXTRACT from LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 58, dated May 6, 1889.

We have the honour to submit proposals for the re-establishment of a British Agency in Gilgit.

It is unnecessary for us to dwell upon the importance of the country lying to the north and north-west of Kashmir. This has long been recognised, and during the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, as your Lordship is aware, an English officer was sent to Gilgit with the object of establishing our influence among the neighbouring Chiefships, and obtaining information from the districts lying beyond the Kashmir frontier. The attempt was not successful, and in 1881 the Agency was withdrawn. Since then circumstances have greatly changed, and we are convinced that there is now good reason for reverting, with some modifications, to the arrangement made by Lord Lytton, and there are no sufficient grounds for anticipating a second failure. The advance of Russia up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great recent development of her military resources in Asia, have admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening our line of defence, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush, which afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large enough to cause much excitement, if nothing worse, in Kashmir and among the tribes of Bajour, and perhaps at Jalalabad and on the Punjab frontier. We cannot afford to disregard this risk. Further we cannot afford to permit any foreign Power to establish in time of peace its influence in the country. Fortunately the opportunity is a very favourable one. During the past few years we have thoroughly explored the country in question, and have entered into closer relations with the most important of its Chiefs. The Ruler of Chitral, who has established his authority over Yassin also, has more than once received with much cordiality English officers within his State, and his sons have been received as guests in India. A Native Agent of this Government is now residing in Chitral itself. The Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar, recently in revolt against Kashmir, whose country was visited last summer by a Russian officer, and is claimed as feudatory by the Chinese, have of their own accord asked for a visit from an English officer. In the meantime the state of affairs in Kashmir itself has completely changed. The Kashmir army is being reorganised, and we hope before long to have within the State a force of about 4,000 well-disciplined and well-armed troops. Altogether there are many good reasons for making a fresh effort to secure this portion of our strategical frontier, and many circumstances which seem to assure us that we may with reasonable certainty count upon a favourable result.

Having very fully considered the matter, we decided in the autumn of 1887 that some measures ought to be taken to effect our object without much further delay. Colonel Lockhart, who visited the country in 1885, had submitted in 1886 proposals for holding it, but these proposals seemed to us to involve unnecessarily large expenditure. We therefore sent up an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, Captain Durand, with orders to work out a plan on a more moderate scale. The idea was to establish in Gilgit an English Agency backed by a sufficient number of the reorganised troops which Kashmir would furnish under the scheme for the utilisation of the Native armies. The number of English officers was to be as small as possible, and the expenditure to be cut down to the lowest limit. The objects in view were the watching and control of the country lying to the south of the Hindu Kush and the organisation of a force which would be able in time of trouble to prevent any *coup de main* by a small body of troops acting across the passes.

Captain Durand spent the summer in visiting Chitral and other points of interest, and was very well received. His proposals are briefly that the British Agency at Gilgit should consist of four officers, namely, the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a doctor. The force would consist of 1,200 regular infantry, 100 garrison artillery, a battery of screw guns, and 500 irregular troops. This force would be under the control of the English officer in charge, not of the Kashmiri Governor. The telegraph line would be completed to Gilgit and roads opened up. Certain increased subsidies would be granted to the neighbouring Chiefs; the Mehtar of Chitral would be presented with a battery of guns and 1,000 Sniders; and in course of time a considerable force of Chitralis would be organised and armed.

After considering Captain Durand's report, we think that his proposals may be accepted with certain modifications. We would give the Chitral Chief an allowance of Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 12,000. The cost of the non-commissioned officers and men employed in training the Kashmir troops at Gilgit should be borne by the Darbar, and

so in our opinion should the cost of the two junior officers attached to the Agency. They will hardly be in the same position as other officers employed in organising the troops of Native States, because in the present case the troops which they will drill and supervise will be employed in the actual watch and ward of the frontier of Kashmir and the control of her feudatories. The pay of the officer in charge may we consider be fixed at Rs. 1,200 per mensem with a fixed travelling allowance of Rs. 300.

Connected with this scheme is a project for the opening up of a direct road to Chitral from the Peshawar frontier through Dir. When Captain Durand was in Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk offered to send him back to India by this route, and it is evident that the advantage of having such a short and direct road open to us in the same manner as the Khyber is open would be very great. It is not easy to overcome the fears and prejudices of the people of Swat and Bajaur with regard to this point; but we have some reason to hope that in course of time we may succeed in doing so. The Khans of Dir and Jandol, who command the greater part of the road, both seem likely in the end to prove tractable, and even now a regular postal road could be established. For the opening up of the new line of communication a further expenditure of some Rs. 15,000 a year would probably be necessary.

Altogether we desire to expend a total sum of a little more than half a lakh of rupees a year in strengthening our position in this quarter, and we trust that our proposals may be sanctioned. If so we shall have the Upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected against any *coup de main* from the northward. We shall have provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence, and at small cost to ourselves.

The exact position of the officer in charge at Gilgit may require to be further considered hereafter. For the present, we propose merely to stipulate that the Kashmiri Governor of Gilgit will take no important step in dealing with the Kashmir feudatories except by his advice, and that with regard to the organisation and movements of the troops his instructions must be followed. There must apparently be a Kashmiri Native Commandant of the troops as well as a Governor, and the junior English officers must act as adjutants. We propose to call the officer in charge the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit, or perhaps Joint Commissioner at Gilgit, and not to bring him upon our graded political list, his duties being as much military as political.

There are some minor points in Captain Durand's proposals about which we are not yet in a position to offer a confident opinion. For example, we are not altogether certain of the expediency of giving guns and a large number of breech-loading arms to Aman-ul-Mulk. The value of the Chitralis as fighting men seems very doubtful; and there are other reasons for caution in this respect. Such points as these may, however, be left for settlement hereafter.

With these remarks we submit the matter for your Lordship's orders. In the meantime we have sent Captain Durand back to Kashmir. When your Lordship's orders are received he will, if they are in favour of the scheme we have proposed, proceed to Chitral and set the new arrangements on foot. The Amir is reported to be turning his attention to Chitral affairs, and it is desirable that Aman-ul-Mulk should be reassured as soon as possible and brought into close and permanent relations with us.

No. 8.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 22, dated June 28, 1889.

I HAVE given my earnest attention to the proposals submitted with the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 58, dated 6th May 1889, relative to the re-establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit. The grounds on which you solicit the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to this measure are that the advance of Russia up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great recent development of her military power in Asia, have admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in the line of defence of the north-west frontier of India, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush. Further, your Government remark that you could not afford to permit any foreign Power to establish in time of peace its influence in the country lying to the north and north-west of Kashmir. The present position of affairs is also favourable to the adoption of steps calculated to exclude these adverse foreign influences. Friendly relations have been entered into with the Ruler of Chitral, and the

chiefs of Hunza and Nagar have voluntarily asked to be visited by a British officer. he altered condition of the Kashmir State and the reorganisation of its military resources apply additional reasons, in the opinion of your Government, for making fresh efforts to cure this portion of the strategical frontier, and you anticipate a successful result.

The proposals which your Government submit for the acceptance of Her Majesty's Government are based upon a report drawn up by Captain A. Durand, S.C., of the Quartermaster-General's Department, who was deputed to Gilgit and Chitral in 1888 to study the existing military position, and to elaborate a scheme for holding the country without the aid of British troops.

Your recommendations are:—

- (1.) That a British Agency shall be established at Gilgit, to consist of four officers, viz., the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a medical officer.
- (2.) That a brigade of Kashmir troops shall be stationed at Gilgit, to consist of—
 - 1,200 regular infantry,
 - 100 garrison artillery,
 - 1 battery of screw guns,
 - 500 irregular troops,

and be under the control of the British officer in charge. His pay to be fixed at Rs. 1,200 per mensem, with a travelling allowance of Rs. 300. The cost of the non-commissioned officers and men required to train the troops to be borne by the Kashmir Durbar, as also the pay of the two junior officers, the total cost of the Agency being estimated at about Rs. 40,000.

I notice that for the present it is intended to stipulate that the Kashmir Governor shall take no important step in dealing with the Kashmir feudatories except by the vice of the British Agent, and that with regard to the organisation and movements of the troops his instructions must be followed.

- (3.) The telegraph line to be extended to Gilgit, and roads to be opened up. The Kashmir State to be called upon to pay for road-making in its territory, and to expend some Rs. 23,000 a year, on the British medical officer and his subordinates.
- (4.) An allowance of Rs. 6,000 a year to be made to the Ruler of Chitral, and subsidies to neighbouring Chiefs.

The considerations which your Excellency's Government have urged in support of these recommendations appear to me to be sound and well founded, and your proposals, which seem judicious and adequate to the initiation of these defensive measures, have the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

The projected opening of a direct road to Chitral from the Peshawur frontier through Dir is an important feature in connexion with the scheme, and I trust that the States whose countries will be traversed by this route will be induced to co-operate in the execution of this work.

No. 9.

EXTRACT from LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 165, dated December 3, 1889.

We have the honour to forward papers, regarding the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency and the proceedings of Captain Durand, the British Agent, in connexion therewith.

While our Despatch No. 58, of the 6th of May 1889, was under your Lordship's consideration, we received from the Resident in Kashmir, who had confidentially informed the Darbar of the arrangements contemplated, the intelligence that the Kashmir State Council had unanimously accepted the scheme in its entirety, and had moreover expressed a wish to be permitted to bear the entire cost of the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. As your Lordship was informed, we directed Colonel Nisbet to thank the Council for their loyal offer, but we declined to allow the Darbar to bear the whole cost, preferring that expenditure on account of the British Agent and his office establishment, the increased subsidies, and a few other heads, should be borne by the Government of India.

On receipt, in July last, of your Lordship's sanction to our proposals, Captain Durand, who was already in Kashmir, was directed to proceed to Gilgit.

Enclosure No 1 in No. 9.

EXTRACT FROM PROCEEDINGS of a MEETING of the KASHMIR STATE COUNCIL held on June 1, 1889.

READ Resident Kashmir's letter of 29th May 1889, on the subject of the re-establishment of the Agency at Gilgit, the expenses of which it is proposed should be borne partly by the Government of India, and partly by the Kashmir State, the share of the latter, including the pay of the medical officer and his native subordinates and contingencies, and also the pay of two junior military officers (at it is believed Rs. 700 each), besides an outfit allowance of Rs. 1,000 each to the medical officer and the junior military officers, the Council being asked at the present to sanction in addition to the pay of the medical officer (1) the salary at present of one of the junior military officers (viz., Lieutenant Manners-Smith) on Rs. 700 per mensem; (2) the medical officer's outfit allowance; and (3) to report what funds it can allot in the Budget of the present year towards the improvement of the frontier communications, such as the road to Gilgit, &c.

RESOLVED unanimously, that the proposals contained in Resident's letter be accepted and the Resident be informed accordingly.

Resolved further, that the State Council consider it their paramount duty, in view of the importance of defending the northern frontier of Kashmir, to relieve the Government of India of the charge of the Gilgit Agency; and they accordingly offer to defray the entire cost which the scheme proposed by Government is likely to entail, and express a hope that their offer will be accepted.

Resolved further, that the Resident be informed that General de Bourbel has allotted Rs. 30,000 in the current year's Public Works Budget for improvement of the frontier communications, and the Council will be glad to place that amount at his disposal.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

FROM SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated August 5, 1889.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to forward, for your information, copy of the Despatches* cited in the margin on the subject of the re-establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit.

*To Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No 58, dated 6th May 1889.

From Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No 22, dated 28th June 1889

Captain A. Durand, the officer selected for the post of British Agent, has, as you are aware, already started for Gilgit, in anticipation of the sanction of Her Majesty's Secretary of State. He is accompanied by Dr. Robertson and Lieutenant Manners-Smith, whose services have been placed at the disposal of the Kashmir State for employment in connexion with this scheme. The services of an artillery officer will also be placed hereafter at the disposal of the Darbar.

The sanction of Her Majesty's Government having now been received, I am directed to send the following instructions for your guidance and for communication to Captain Durand, who will be styled the British Agent at Gilgit, and will have charge of the Kashmir troops posted there.

The general lines upon which the British Agent should proceed are laid down in the Despatches herewith forwarded, and it is unnecessary to re-state them in this letter. He should go to Chitral, and there set on foot the proposed new arrangements in that direction. He should inform the Mehtar that the Government of India has decided to give him an annual subsidy of Rs. 6,000; and he should inquire in what way the amount can most conveniently be paid. With regard to the proposed gift of a battery of guns and B.L. rifles to Aman-ul-Mulk, instructions will be sent to you hereafter.

The arrangements to be made with the Punyal Rajas are matters of less importance, and Captain Durand can enter upon these arrangements and other subsidiary matters when he finds an opportunity of doing so.

As you are aware, the proposed opening up of a direct road between Peshawar and Chitral is for the present in abeyance, owing to the attitude of the Khan of Jandol. A postal line is about to be introduced as a preliminary measure, and it is hoped that in time the original intention of opening up the road will be carried out. Captain Durand should bear the importance of this in mind and lose no opportunity of pressing it upon the Mehtar and any other of the Chiefs concerned, with whom he may come in contact.

As to the improvement of the road to Gilgit from Kashmir, and the completion of the telegraph, you require no instructions. You are aware of the importance of these measures.

A Native hospital assistant with a compounder, dresser, and a supply of medical requirements, is now on his way to Gilgit to report himself to Captain Durand for employment in Chitral. Captain Durand should arrange to inform the Mehtar and the British news-writer of this, and he should, if possible, take the party with him to Chitral, where he will be able with Dr. Robertson's help to settle details regarding the position and duties of the hospital assistant. It is very desirable that the hospital assistant should not clash with Jamaadar Rah Nawaz Khan. He should be instructed to send through the Agency Surgeon a monthly return of patients treated, and reports on any other subjects which he may consider of interest, and which fall within the legitimate sphere of his duties.

The British Agent in Gilgit will be immediately under your orders, and he will address all official communications to you. In the event, however, of his being in Chitral or other places from which he can communicate more quickly with India *via* Dir or by other routes, there will be no objection to his addressing the Government of India direct on urgent matters and sending copy of his letters to you. For example, he asked last autumn for permission to return to India by way of Peshawar. His letter and the answer were sent by the direct route.

In conclusion, I am to take this opportunity of requesting you to convey to the President of the Council in appropriate terms his Excellency the Viceroy's acknowledgments of the loyal support afforded to this scheme by the Kashmir State.

No. 10.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 43, dated April 28, 1890.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a report by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durand on the work done since the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 1889.

Enclosure in No. 10.

EXTRACT, GILGIT AGENCY REPORT, 1889.

FROM Hunza the British Agent and party returned to Gilgit. The Mehtar's reception was most cordial, and throughout the stay of the party in Chitral every endeavour was made by him and his sons to ingratiate themselves with the British officers.

The Mehtar readily agreed to the Government conditions dependent on the receipt of the increased subsidy, namely, his assistance in opening up the Peshawar-Chitral road, the improvements of the main paths in his country to tracks passable by laden mules, and the fortification of certain selected positions to be afterwards pointed out to him.

As to the first stipulation it is more than doubtful if he is sincere in his professions. He has undoubtedly written to the Chiefs whose territories lie between our borders and those of Chitral, urging them to comply with the wishes of Government, but at the same time he has sent verbal messages, advising them to object to the road being open to the passage of troops. This is mainly due, to his naturally suspicious character; but once the Peshawar authorities succeed in coming to terms with the Chiefs concerned, he will most likely acquiesce in the arrangement. Still he must be carefully watched, for he is a master of intrigue.

The second point, the improvement of the so-called roads in his country to good mule-tracks, there is not much difficulty about. By next year almost the whole road from his border to Chitral will be fit for mule traffic. At certain points blasting will be necessary, and assistance has been promised him. The only danger is that in mistaken zeal to carry out our wishes, the Mehtar and his sons may make themselves and us extremely unpopular. The rule of the Mehtar and his sons is probably not very popular, but it is acquiesced in, and no attempt to upset it seems likely to have

a chance of success. Internally there is no one to lead a rising; externally the knowledge that we are behind the Mehtar will deter any aspirant from making the attempt, which would have little or no support from the leading men who are mostly bound to the Mehtar by all sorts of family ties as well as by other interests. Still this is a point which must be considered, and steps have to be taken to minimise the discontent.

As to the third point, the Mehtar was extremely anxious to commence fortifying the positions at once, under the guidance of the British officers, as a visible sign to all his enemies, the Amir included, of his close alliance with the British Government. But the lateness of the season prevented a careful visit of inspection to the points selected, and the matter was allowed to stand over. It is however extremely important that the subject should have early consideration, and it is for Government to decide whether the suggestion made in a letter to the Resident in Kashmir from the British Agent as to the despatch of an engineer officer to Chitral next year should not be adopted.

Although the sanction of Government had been received to the presentation of 1,000 Snider carbines to the Mehtar, it seemed best, seeing that, according to information received before reaching Chitral, the Mehtar did not in the least expect that his wishes on this point would be gratified, to limit the gift to 500, more especially as there appeared to be a growing inclination on his part to engage in hostilities with Umra Khan in favour of the Khan of Dir, to attack Tangir and possibly Darel, and finally to raid on the Kafirs on a larger scale than usual.

Five hundred carbines were accordingly promised much to the Mehtar's gratification. Fifty will be presented this year, and the remainder will be forwarded next spring. The grant is quite sufficient to strengthen him very materially, and to give him a better chance of holding his own against Umra Khan should they quarrel, and it has been received in Chitral, and doubtless in the surrounding States, as the most effectual guarantee of our trust and friendship. At the same time the possession of an extra 500 rifles is not enough to encourage him to enter heedlessly into hostilities either against Umra Khan or the people of Tangir, or to make him too independent. Steps have been taken to impress upon him that Government would view with disfavour any attempt on Tangir, and that no interference with Darel will for a moment be allowed, also to dissuade him from mixing himself up actively with the Dir-Bajaur quarrels, and from making any move against the Kafirs.

While the party was in Chitral, Dr. Robertson saw to the establishment of the Chitral Dispensary which promises to be of great use in the country and extremely popular. The Native doctor in charge, Hospital Assistant Shekh Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, reported at the end of November that patients at the rate of 100 a day were now coming in.

It had been proposed that Captain Durand should visit the Khans of Dir and Jandol, and after consulting them as to the opening of the Peshawar-Chitral road should proceed, if possible, to India by this route. This scheme had to be abandoned with great regret owing to the fact that the British Agent had not received instructions as to what terms could be offered to the Chiefs, and that Umra Khan of Jandol, though expressing his desire for a meeting did not invite it, unless he could be given definite pledges from Government. As the negotiations relating to the opening of the road are now in the hands of the Peshawar authorities, it is useless to enter here into a discussion of the steps to be taken to ensure the success of the Government project. It is enough to state that Umra Khan is the most important man between Chitral and Peshawar, that he wishes to be treated with direct, without intermediaries, and that a meeting between him and a British officer deputed by Government and able to offer definite terms would probably lead to useful results.

No. 11.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 170, dated October 14, 1891.

WE have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of correspondence regarding the action which we have taken to strengthen the Mehtar of Chitral, and to improve our already friendly relations with him.

Your Lordship will observe that we have increased the subsidy which the Mehtar receives from us by Rs. 6,000 per annum; we have granted small annual allowances to

three of his sons; and we are sending four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces.

The conditions upon which we have made these allowances are set out in the letter to the Resident in Kashmir, dated 1st October 1891; and we trust that our proceedings will meet with your Lordship's approval.

Enclosure in No. 11.

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated October 1, 1891.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters regarding an application from the Mehtar of Chitral for an increase to his subsidy, to allow of his keeping up a standing force of 2,000 men.

Neither the British Agent at Gilgit nor yourself were prepared to support this application; and you were of opinion that it would suffice to present to Aman-ul-Mulk 100 more Snider carbines, and to depute four Muhammadan non-commissioned officers to instruct the men already carrying Sniders in the Mehtar's service.

The Government of India have had an opportunity of personally discussing the situation with Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, and it has been decided—

- (1) to raise the subsidy granted to the Mehtar by the Government of India from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 12,000 per annum;
- (2) to give to Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk an annual present of Rs. 1,500 each;
- (3) to give to Shah-i-Mulk Rs. 1,000 a year.

These allowances will each be made contingent on good behaviour, and on the condition that the Mehtar and his sons accept the advice of the British Agent or his deputy on all matters. It should also be a condition of the grant to the Mehtar that he will agree to the extension of the telegraph line to Chitral next year, or as soon as may be convenient, and that he should consent to the permanent residence of a British officer in his country.

It has been decided to depute four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces, and they will, it is hoped, shortly report themselves to you at Srinagar. They will receive an allowance of 50 per cent. on their ordinary pay, and will be subordinate to Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan, while at the outset, at all events, they will have the advantage of supervision by Lieutenant Manners-Smith, who, as you are aware, will shortly go to Chitral for the winter months.

The proposal to grant the Mehtar 100 more Snider carbines is approved, and the time for making the presentation will be left to the discretion of the British Agent at Gilgit.

I am to request that this decision may be communicated to the Mehtar of Chitral by the British Agent at Gilgit, in the name of the Government of India, in such terms as he may deem appropriate.

No. 12.

COPY OF DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to the GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA, No. 40, dated November 13, 1891.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

FROM your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department No. 170, dated the 14th October 1891, I learn that, in consequence of recent Russian movements on the Pamirs, your Government has decided to strengthen the position of the Mehtar of Chitral; and, in view to the improvement of our relations with him, to increase his

subsidy to Rs. 12,000 a year, and to grant allowances to his sons on conditions which are specified in your Deputy Secretary's letter to the Resident in Kashmir, dated the 1st October 1891.

2. You have also resolved to depute four non-commissioned Muhammadan officers to Chitral for the instruction of the Mehtar's irregular forces, and to issue to him 100 additional Snider carbines.

These several measures have my approval.

I have, &c.
CROSS.

No. 13.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 192, of October 19, 1892.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to submit a copy of papers, regarding measures proposed for establishing our position in Gilgit and the surrounding States.

Her Majesty's Government have been fully informed by our Despatches of the progress of events in Gilgit, and the Chiefships of Chitral, Hunza, and Nagar, and of the general aspects of affairs on this part of our frontier. In the first of these Despatches we gave our reasons for re-establishing the British Agency at Gilgit. The staff was fixed at four English officers; and a small brigade of Kashmir troops, under the control of the British Agent, was to be stationed at Gilgit. Our share of the cost of the scheme was estimated at something less than half a lakh of rupees a year; but the plan was on the most moderate scale; the number of English officers was as small as possible, and the expenditure had been cut down to the lowest limit. The considerations which we urged

* Despatch from Her Majesty's Secretary of State No. 22, dated the 28th June 1889.

in support of these recommendations appeared* to Her Majesty's Government to be sound and well founded, and our proposals were approved as adequate to the initiation of the defensive measures in question.

We have lately had occasion to consider further the question of our future policy in Gilgit and the surrounding States, and the strength at which it would be necessary to maintain the British Agency, in order to carry out that policy effectively. The proposals of Colonel Durand and the Resident in Kashmir on these points have been before us for some months, and we have had the advantage of discussing them with Colonel Durand. The conclusion to which we have come is that it will not be necessary to make any increase in the numbers of troops in the Gilgit Agency, either British or Kashmir. We have relieved the 200 Gurkhas by 205 Sikhs, and we have sent up a small detachment of sappers, but on the other hand we have withdrawn the mountain guns sent up last year.

In a letter addressed by us in the Foreign Department to the Resident on the 26th May last we explained to the Resident that the force to be maintained in the neighbourhood of Gilgit was intended for a two-fold purpose, namely, as an obstacle in the way of an advance against Gilgit through the passes of the Hindu Kush, and to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. In reference to the first of these objects we were of opinion that the scarcity of supplies and the great difficulties which would be encountered by a force advancing against Gilgit from Alai rendered it unnecessary that the garrison should be more than sufficient to hold in check a very small and lightly equipped body of troops emerging from the passes. As regards the second object, it was hoped that the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar would for some time to come have a deterrent effect upon the surrounding tribes. The great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes dividing Gilgit from Kashmir is in itself a reason for not retaining too large a force at Gilgit. Nevertheless,

* British Indian escort	-	200
Kashmir infantry	-	625
British Indian sappers	-	20
Kashmir artillery, 1 battery of 4 guns	-	150

the garrison could not at present be safely reduced below about 1,000 men,* exclusive of the troops stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor, which consist of two battalions (each 625 strong) of Kashmir Imperial service troops. It may eventually be found possible to hold Gilgit with a force comprised mainly of local levies, raised from among the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies.

The decision to keep down the Gilgit garrison to the lowest strength in numbers and to retain within the Agency no more regular troops than will suffice for the escort of the British Agent involves the necessity of rendering the Kashmir Imperial service troops more efficient and trustworthy than they now are. This result cannot be secured without the aid of a competent staff of British officers; and in our opinion it should be at least as strong as that now employed in the Agency.

The establishment of officers fixed in 1889 consisted of the British Agent paid from our political Budget, and three assistants, including a surgeon, paid by the Kashmir Darbar. In 1891, this staff was temporarily augmented by 13 military officers, whose salaries have been met from our military Budget, and their places in their regiments have not been filled up. The number of officers which we now propose to have with the Agency is stated in the margin. Under the arrangements which we now recommend, the charge for all officers at present paid from the military Budget, except the Royal Engineer officers, will be transferred to the political Budget, and the vacancies left by the officers in their regiments will be filled up. In view of the importance of the Agency to Imperial interests, we have determined, as before, not to throw any portion of the extra cost upon the Kashmir State.

† 1 British Agent
 1 Political Assistant, 1st Class
 1 " " 2nd Class.
 1 " " paid by
 the Kashmir State
 1 Military Assistant (Captain)
 1 Surgeon, paid by the Kashmir
 State
 R.E Officers:—
 1 Captain.
 1 Subaltern.
 R.A Officers:—
 1 Captain.
 1 Subaltern
 Staff Corps Officers:—
 1 Major.
 8 Captains.
 8 Subalterns.
 1 Commissariat Officer.

We trust that your Lordship will agree to these arrangements, which, we feel convinced are as economical as they can be under the circumstances. Although they only involve the addition of two political and four military officers to the number already employed in the Agency, they have the appearance of a large increase over the original proposals of 1889. But it will be evident to your Lordship that the situation upon this part of the frontier of the Indian Empire has greatly changed in the last three years, and that the necessity for placing the Gilgit Agency in a condition of thorough efficiency is no longer open to question.

We believe that it has become more than ever necessary for us to exercise constant vigilance in this quarter, and that our position should be one which will enable us to obtain timely information of all events of importance on, or near, the border; to afford a reasonable amount of support to Kashmir and its dependencies, including Gilgit and Chitral; to convince the adjoining tribes that it is for their advantage to depend upon us rather than upon Russia or China, and to resist successfully a *coup de main*.

The difficulty of giving effect to such a policy is exceptionally great, in consequence of the extent of the country with which the Gilgit Agency is concerned. In illustration of our meaning we may mention that the distance between Gilgit itself and Astor, which is included in the military charge, is about 70 miles. The further distances from Gilgit to the outposts at Hunza and Gakuch on the Yasin frontier are over 50 and 40 miles respectively.

The small force in the Gilgit Agency has in fact to guard a long line of communication and to occupy points at a distance of over 100 miles from its base; and it may be called upon at any moment to send out detachments to a much greater distance. The country is, moreover, as your Lordship is aware, one presenting very great physical difficulties, while the attitude of the tribesmen is necessarily uncertain. There have lately been disquieting rumours as to the prevalence of excitement amongst the Chitrali tribes, and in other parts of the Agency. The presence of the Afghan Commander-in-Chief in the Kunar valley, within a short distance of the frontier of Chitral, has naturally had a disturbing effect upon the surrounding country, and has greatly increased the difficulties of the position. We may refer to the state of things

† Establishment fixed in 1889.	Establishment now proposed.
1 British Agent.	1 British Agent.
1 Political Assistant.	3 Political Assistants.
1 Military Assistant.	1 Surgeon.
1 Surgeon.	19 Military Officers.
Temporarily added in 1891.	
13 Military Officers.	
Total existing Staff.	Proposed increase over existing staff.
1 British Agent.	} 8 Political Assistants. } 4 Military Officers.
1 Political Assistant.	
14 Military Officers.	
1 Surgeon.	} permanent and } temporary

which arose in Chitral immediately after the death of the late Mehtar, which occurred while our present proposals were still under discussion. It affords an illustration of the kind of trouble which may at any moment arise within the limits of the Agency. The Mehtar's two sons, one of whom had possessed himself of Chitral, while the other held Yasim, seemed to be on the point of commencing a struggle for the succession,—a struggle which threatened to extend beyond the limits of Chitral itself, and to involve the minor Dard States by which Gilgit is surrounded. These consequences were only averted by the voluntary decision of the elder son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, to place himself in the hands of the British Agent.

As to the political officers, two more are asked for, so that one may be placed in Hunza or Nagar, and the other in Chitral. We may mention that the new Mehtar has within the last few days asked us to send him a British officer. This may not be a permanent arrangement; but, until we have thoroughly established our influence in those States, it will not be safe to leave them to their own devices. We shall address your Lordship separately with regard to our relations with Chitral.

It is, in our opinion, our duty to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in any local disputes arising in the States of the Agency. We have already issued instructions to the Resident in Kashmir in the letter of 26th May, impressing upon him that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers at Gilgit should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities, and we have told him that the efforts of those officers should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes. In a subsequent communication of the 27th September, we have informed the Resident that the altered condition of things in Chitral, which has arisen in consequence of the death of the late Mehtar, does not call for any departure from the policy thus indicated. We desire to invite your Lordship's attention specially to these considerations, because we are anxious that you should be under no misapprehension as to the purpose for which it is proposed to add slightly to the number of officers who are at present employed in the Gilgit Agency. The work of the staff will be closely watched, and should we hereafter find it possible to reduce the number of the officers attached to it, we shall take the first opportunity of doing so.

The season being so far advanced, we have been compelled to order the officers up to Gilgit in anticipation of your Lordship's approval.

Enclosure in No. 13.

From SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the RESIDENT
IN KASHMIR, dated May 26, 1892.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to address you on the subject of our future policy in Gilgit, and the surrounding States.

You were informed that the Government of India had no intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through the territory occupied by the Indus Valley tribes.

It was also pointed out to you that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, and that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. It will be your duty to inform the British Agent in Gilgit of the instructions which you have thus received, and to impress upon him, and the officers of the Agency, the necessity of acting strictly in accordance with them.

The Government of India have now had under their consideration the strength of the force which should be maintained for the future in the neighbourhood of Gilgit. The force in question is obviously intended for a two-fold purpose. It is intended in the first place as an obstacle in the way of a Russian advance against Gilgit through the passes of the Hindu Kush; and, in the second, to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar, and the adjoining States.

In regard to the second object, it is to be hoped that the effect produced upon the surrounding tribes by the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar will, for some time to come, render them unlikely to cause trouble. I am to impress upon you strongly that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers of the Agency should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities.

Their efforts should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes.

Apart from the political objections, which the Government of India entertain, to a policy which might have the effect of involving us in further military operations on this part of the frontier, numerous proofs have lately been afforded of the costliness of maintaining a large force in the neighbourhood of Gilgit. It will, moreover, be obvious to you that, upon general grounds, there are serious objections to keeping considerable portions of the Native Army in so distant and isolated a position.

Under these circumstances, and assuming that the policy which has thus been laid down will be rigidly adhered to, the Government of India see no occasion for adding to the strength of the Gilgit garrison. Considering the great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes by which Gilgit is divided from Kashmir, there would be obviously great advantages in fixing the strength of the garrison at a number which the country itself would be able to support. That number would, it is understood, not exceed about 1,600 men. Upon this point and upon the distribution of the troops in the neighbourhood of Gilgit, and throughout the line of communication, no decision will be come to until Colonel Durand's arrival in Simla.

The Governor-General in Council gathers from your telegram of the 18th instant that you and Colonel Durand are both of opinion that the garrison of Gilgit itself might be safely reduced to the strength of one regiment and a battery, the remainder of the Imperial Service troops being stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor. I may observe that the Government of India, while admitting that it will always be necessary to maintain a small body of British troops as an escort to the Resident, are not without hope that it may eventually be found possible to hold Gilgit with a force consisting mainly of local levies raised from amongst the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies. In this view it is desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the spread of cultivation in the neighbourhood.

The Government of India are satisfied that the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency was undoubtedly necessary, and that the operations against Hunza and Nagar were inevitable. Now that these have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is hoped that it may, in the future, be found possible to secure the passes and to maintain peace in the Dard States without adding materially to the burdens of the Empire.

No. 14.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT FOR INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 193, of October 19, 1892.

WE have the honour to forward papers regarding the death on the 30th of August of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, Ruler of Chitral, and the succession to the *masnud* of his son, Afzal-ul-Mulk.

Aman-ul-Mulk had several sons by different wives, but only five of them appear to have been regarded as of any importance. These are Nizam-ul-Mulk, Afzal-ul-Mulk, Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram, and Murid Dastgir. The first two are full-brothers by a daughter of a late Khan of Dir, and have been generally considered the principal sons. Nizam-ul-Mulk, as the elder, was his father's acknowledged heir, but it was always believed that, on Aman-ul-Mulk's death, Nizam's succession would be contested by at least two of the brothers, Afzal-ul-Mulk and Shah-i-Mulk. Fortune favoured Afzal-ul-Mulk, who, at the moment of his father's death, happened to be present at Chitral, while Nizam-ul-Mulk was absent in Yasin. Afzal-ul-Mulk, who is said to be a man of courage and determination, promptly assumed the reins of government and wrote to the Viceroy announcing his succession, which he described as having taken place "with the unanimous consent of his brothers" and of the "leading men and all the people" of the country. We may add that, according to reports received both in Gilgit and in India, three of the brothers, Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram, and Wazir-ul-Mulk were put to death by Afzal-ul-Mulk.

The question of our future policy in regard to Chitral, the political control of which was one of the original objects of the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, is under consideration, and a further Despatch will be addressed to your Lordship on the subject in due course. Meanwhile we have acknowledged Afzal-ul-Mulk as Mehtar of Chitral, and have congratulated him on his succession.—Nizam-ul-Mulk, finding himself

too weak to hold his own, has come in to Gilgit, where he will be detained for the present, pending the receipt of the proposals of the local officers on the whole situation.

We regard the unopposed succession of Afzal-ul-Mulk as very satisfactory. It puts an end to the probability of a struggle between the two brothers, which might have disturbed the whole Agency; and, moreover, Afzal-ul-Mulk has always shown the strongest goodwill towards the British Government and its officers. His first act now on establishing his authority has been to invite us to send a British officer to Chitral, and we hope that we may find in him a friendly and trustworthy ruler. If so, the position of the Gilgit Agency will be greatly strengthened.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

FROM SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated September 27, 1892.

(EXTRACT.)

THE Government of India has had under consideration the action which should be taken in consequence of the death of the Mehtar of Chitral, an occurrence which has materially altered the condition of affairs in that country.

Communications have been received from Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, the two sons of the Mehtar, who both have claims to the succession. Afzal-ul-Mulk has addressed letters to his Excellency the Viceroy and to the Foreign Secretary, announcing the death of his father, and his own accession to the *masnad*, with the consent of the people and of his brothers. Nizam-ul-Mulk has sent a letter by the hand of his foster-brother to the British Agent at Gilgit, begging that a British officer may be sent to Chitral to divide the country between the brothers, and stop the fighting which must otherwise inevitably ensue. A reply is being sent direct *vid* Peshawar to Afzal-ul-Mulk, expressing regret at the Mehtar's death, and congratulating Afzal-ul-Mulk on his accession, with the consent of the people and of his brothers.

With regard to the communication made by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the British Agent at Gilgit should acknowledge its receipt, and add that he will be prepared to listen to anything that Nizam-ul-Mulk may have to say, with a view to the establishment of an amicable understanding between the two brothers. Should Mr. Robertson have occasion to pass through Yasin on his way to Chitral, he might take the opportunity of giving good advice to Nizam-ul-Mulk.

The general lines, upon which the policy of government in Chitral and its neighbourhood should be based, have been laid down in my letter, dated the 26th of May last, and the Government of India does not consider that the death of the late Mehtar renders necessary any departure from the policy then indicated. It should be our endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in disputes which may arise between Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, or in any tribal quarrels occasioned by them. The main object should be to provide adequately for the safety of the Gilgit Agency, and to adopt such measures as may be indispensable for that purpose. The substance of this letter should be communicated to Colonel Durand for his information and guidance, and for that of the officers under his command. You have already been requested to submit proposals as to the action to be taken consequent on Aman-ul-Mulk's death, and I am to request that you will furnish them, as early as possible, bearing in mind the foregoing observations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated October 5, 1892, from the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR to the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

(EXTRACT.)

Following from Robertson, dated the 30th September:—Rab Nawaz Khan reports that 300 men of Umra Khan's have seized Narsat Fort. Afzal has written to Umra Khan protesting against his action, but Umra Khan will never give up the fort, the Jemadar believes. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief from Asnar has sent to Bailam some men under Jalad Khan to order Umra Khan to evacuate the fort instantly.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

TELEGRAM, dated October 7, 1892, from the COMMISSIONER, Peshawar, to the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

(EXTRACT.)

A letter, dated 29th September, from an agent of Umra Khan's has been received to-day. It states that on 17th idem Umra Khan received a communication from Afzal-ul-Mulk, regretting that Umra Khan had occupied Narsat from which Afzal-ul-Mulk had withdrawn his levies temporarily only to strengthen himself at Chitral, in the expectation that Umra Khan would not interfere with that country, and desiring that Jandol levies may now be recalled. Umra Khan's relation with Afzal-ul-Mulk are strained on account of this communication. On 23rd September Umra Khan received a letter from Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, seeking his friendship, desiring him to send Jandol levies to Ashrit or Drosh, and promising to reward him suitably if Nizam-ul-Mulk succeeds to the rulership of Chitral. Umra Khan has sent assurances of his friendship to Nizam-ul-Mulk.

No. 15.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 45, dated December 2, 1892.

I HAVE considered with great care the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 192, dated the 19th October, together with its enclosures, relating to the affairs of the Political Agency at Gilgit, and asking for sanction to an increase in the political and military establishment attached to it.

Your letter is addressed primarily to the question of the number of officers to be permanently attached to the Agency, but incidentally it covers the whole ground of the policy by which your Agent at Gilgit should in future be guided, and of the duties expected of him and his staff.

The outline of this policy is laid down in Sir Mortimer Durand's letter, dated 26th May, addressed to the Resident in Kashmir. In that letter you repudiate any intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through territory occupied by the Indus valley tribes, and you direct that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, but that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. You point out that the primary duties of the force at Gilgit are to check any small bodies of troops advancing from the north over the passes in the north-east corner of the Hindoo Koosh range, and to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. You assume that this policy will be rigidly adhered to, and conclude that for these purposes the present garrison is sufficient; indeed you express a hope that it may hereafter be reduced and replaced to a great extent by local levies dependent on local supplies. Your instructions contained in that letter have my full approval, and I have no doubt your Excellency will exercise due vigilance to prevent their being exceeded. In your letter under reply, however, you further develop your views of the duties which the garrison and the officers of the Agency respectively have to perform, and you argue that the decision to retain the garrison at as low a figure as possible involves an increase in the number of British officers, in order to render the Kashmir troops more efficient and trustworthy than they are at present. You point out that, on the one hand, recent events on the Pamirs, and, on the other hand, the advance of the Amir's troops up the Kunar Valley (influencing, as it must do, the condition both of Chitral and the Bajaur group of States), have largely increased the necessity for constant vigilance, and for obtaining timely information of events on or near the border, as well as for securing the friendship of the adjoining tribes. At the same time you show that the Gilgit garrison has to occupy posts along a line of over 100 miles in length, and to guard the whole length of communication in a country of great physical difficulties and among tribes of an uncertain attitude.

Therefore, while maintaining emphatically the duty of avoiding any entanglement in the tribal disputes of the neighbouring States, and any action which might bring about hostilities, and while recognising that it should be the constant endeavour of your officers by means of conciliatory measures to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes, you have decided that it is none the less necessary to increase the Agency staff to the extent proposed by the Political Agent.

I observe that the sanctioned establishment as fixed in 1889 consists, besides the Agent and his Political Assistant, of one Military Assistant and one Surgeon. To these were temporarily added, in consequence of the complication with Hunza in 1891, 13 military officers, and to this combined staff (permanent and temporary) you now propose to add two Political Assistants and two Military Officers, so that the whole staff will now stand as shown in the margin,* and the whole annual expenditure, which was given in 1889 as about Rs. 50,000, will now stand at about Rs. 200,000. You add that the season being so far advanced you have been compelled to order the officers up to Gilgit in anticipation of my sanction.

It must be distinctly understood that my assent is given to these arrangements only upon your Excellency's assurances that they are as economical as they can be under the circumstances; that I do not wish their cost or scale to be augmented, and that I shall be glad if any change in the situation enables your Excellency to reduce them.

I do not demur to the arguments and evidence adduced in your letter to prove that the responsibilities and difficulties of the Agent and his staff have been materially increased by recent events in adjoining territories, and that the policy which your Excellency's Government have laid down can only be carried out efficiently by a stronger staff than has hitherto been at the Agent's command. Nevertheless, looking to the rapid expansion, since the Agency was restored in July 1889, of the sphere of our operations around Gilgit, to the difficulty, so constantly proved by experience on our Indian frontiers, of restraining the tendency to multiply political relations and responsibilities, and remembering that our movements may have a disturbing as well as a pacifying effect among the independent tribes and Chiefships of this remote borderland, I attach great importance to the close supervision by your Excellency of the conduct of political affairs in that quarter. I have, indeed, every confidence that your Excellency will strictly confine the action of the Agency within the limits of the policy explained in May 1892 by your Foreign Secretary's letter to the Resident in Kashmir, and that you will prevent any attempts at undue interference with or control of the tribes.

I should have been glad if you had found the temporary addition to the staff, which you sanctioned in view of the Hunza disturbances of 1891, sufficient, but I hesitate to criticise the details of the increase you now recommend.

The allowances which you suggest seem to me generally suitable; I have only to observe that the staff pay should be given in addition, not to regimental, but to Staff Corps pay, though there is no objection to officers of the Royal Engineers drawing regimental pay and pay proper under the rules in the Public Works Department.

No. 16.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 233, dated December 28, 1892.

OUR Despatch No. 193, of the 19th of October 1892, informed your Lordship of the death of Aman-ul-Mulk of Chitral, the succession of his son, Afzal-ul-Mulk, and the flight of Nizam-ul-Mulk to Gilgit. We now have the honour to report upon the more recent progress of events in Chitral.

Up to the beginning of November it seemed that affairs were settling down. Afzal-ul-Mulk appeared to be rapidly establishing his rule throughout the country; and we were considering the desirability of despatching a British Mission to Chitral in accordance with the expressed wishes of the new Mehtar, in order to consolidate our relations with him. Nizam-ul-Mulk was still in Gilgit, and the only source of anxiety was to be found in the proceedings of the Jandol Chief, who, taking advantage of the prevailing confusion, had seized Narsat at the southern end of the Chitral Valley, a place regarding which disputes had for some time existed between him and the late Mehtar. An attempt to bring about an amicable settlement between Umra Khan and the Chitral ruler would have been one of the first aims of the British Mission.

About the middle of November, however, news was received that Sher Afzal, a brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, who had been for many years a refugee in Bajakhshan, and was in receipt of a large allowance from the Amir, had suddenly descended upon Chitral. Accompanied by a small party of horsemen, he crossed by the Dorah Pass; he first seized the Latku Fort, and killed Murid Dastgir, one of Aman-ul-Mulk's numerous sons, and having been joined by the people of Latku, attacked and occupied Shogot. On the night of the 6th November, he surprised the fort of Chitral and killed Afzal-ul-Mulk. The people at once submitted to him, and Afzal-ul-Mulk's principal adherents fled to Dir.

On learning of the change in the state of affairs, Nizam-ul-Mulk wrote to the British Agent that, should he become Mehtar, he would agree to British officers being stationed in Chitral, and to the establishment of a telegraph line, and would carry out all orders of Government. The Sardar also signified his intention of moving against Sher Afzal. Nizam-ul-Mulk having come to Gilgit of his own accord, and being there as our guest, and not under detention, Colonel Durand was unable to refuse him permission to leave Gilgit. He accordingly allowed the Sardar to go, and despatched 250 rifles, two guns, and a hundred levies to Gupis, opposite the mouth of the Yasin Valley, and a few miles beyond the frontier of the Gilgit district, in order to strengthen his own position in the event of its becoming necessary to treat with Sher Afzal, and to preserve order in the western part of the district and in Yasiu.

In taking this measure without the sanction of Government, Colonel Durand acted from a conviction that immediate and decided action in anticipation of orders could alone avert a serious crisis. The course of events justified his decision; a collision was avoided, the danger to which the British news agent and other servants of Government in Chitral were exposed was to some extent diminished, and a general rising among the border tribes was probably averted. The troops were afterwards withdrawn, and the most recent reports show that the condition of the border is much more satisfactory. We have informed the Resident in Kashmir that Colonel Durand's conduct under very trying circumstances has our full approval.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, on crossing the frontier, was joined by the people of Turikho and Murikho, and 1,200 men sent by Sher Afzal to oppose his advance also went over to him. He immediately marched on Mastuj, which he occupied without difficulty. Drasan fell into his hands on the 1st of December, and shortly afterwards Sher Afzal fled to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar.

For some time prior to the flight of Sher Afzal, Umra Khan continued to play an active part in the southern part of Chitral. Ghulam, a son of Aman-ul-Mulk, having taken refuge with him, and sought his assistance, he despatched a force into Chitral territory, excusing himself in a letter to the Government of India on the ground that the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk's sons were his friends, and friends of the British Government, while Sher Afzal was a protégé of the Amir's, and unfriendly to the British Government. His troops arrived before Darosh, but were unable to take the fort, and, after slight skirmishes, were withdrawn to Dir territory, where they engaged in conflict with tribes inhabiting the Kohistan of Dir. Umra Khan has been told that the Government of India never approved of his interference in Chitral affairs, and that his sending a force into the country before the Government of India had received information as to the state of affairs might have very embarrassing results.

Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk has earnestly requested that a British officer may be sent to him, and Colonel Durand has pressed upon us the advisability of acceding to the Sardar's request. There appears to be no doubt that Nizam-ul-Mulk has established himself as Ruler of Chitral, and Colonel Durand has proposed that Captain Younghusband should go to him at once with a small escort, and that troops should again be posted at Gupis to keep Yasin quiet. Your Lordship having sanctioned these proposals on the understanding that Nizam-ul-Mulk is actually in possession of Chitral, we have, on this understanding, directed them to be carried out at once. The question of the mission under Surgeon-Major Robertson will be decided as soon as he returns from Chilas.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 142, dated July 11, 1893.

We have the honour to address your Lordship on the subject of recent affairs in Chitral.

In our Despatch, No. 233, of the 28th of December 1892, we informed your Lordship of the flight of Sher Afzal, of the assumption of the Mehtarship by Nizam-ul-Mulk, of his earnest request that a British officer might be sent to him, and of our decision, with your Lordship's concurrence, to depute Surgeon-Major Robertson on this mission, on the understanding that Nizam-ul-Mulk was actually in possession of Chitral. Dr. Robertson was cautioned not to commit us further than necessary, and we instructed him to avoid formally installing Nizam-ul-Mulk as Mehtar, but to congratulate him on his accession, and to act generally upon the instructions which your Lordship had previously approved in regard to Dr. Robertson's proposed mission to Sardar Afzal-ul-Mulk. These instructions authorised him to promise, on suitable conditions, the same subsidy and support as were given to the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk; and to lay down, if Chitral and Jandol agreed, the boundary between Bajaur and Chitral; and they included a special caution against taking any action likely to impair the position of Kashmir as the suzerain of Chitral. On the 7th of January, Dr. Robertson, accompanied by Captain F. E. Younghusband and Lieutenant the Hon. C. G. Bruce, with an escort of 50 men of the 15th Sikhs under Lieutenant Gordon, left Gakuch for Chitral *via* the Shandur Pass. At the same time 150 rifles were moved up to a position near Gupis to preserve order in Yasin. In spite of severe weather, the mission reached Chitral without mishap on the 25th of January. Its arrival was generally popular with the common people, but Dr. Robertson's reports made it clear that, mainly owing to the personal unpopularity of Nizam-ul-Mulk with the Adamzadas or principal men, it was regarded with considerable suspicion by the upper classes. Nizam-ul-Mulk was profuse in his professions of loyalty, and was evidently convinced that he depended upon our support for his retention of power. At the end of March Dr. Robertson reported that the position of affairs was unsatisfactory; and there were rumours of a threatened combination to attack the English after the Ramzan fast; and that a conspiracy existed against the life of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who appeared at that time to be making no advance in popularity. One of the chief difficulties of the situation was the attitude in Yasin of Muhammad Wali Khan, the representative of the former ruling family. He refused to have any dealings with Nizam-ul-Mulk, and was intriguing for his own hand. He, however, eventually went in to Gilgit, where he still remains; and Nizam-ul-Mulk sent his brother, Ghulam Dastgir, with a strong force, to assume the governorship of Yasin. Muhammad Wali's partisans offered no opposition, and though the situation in Yasin is not altogether free from elements of possible trouble, Ghulam Dastgir is gradually establishing himself there. The success of Ghulam Dastgir and the public recognition of Nizam-ul-Mulk as successor to the Mehtarship, brought about some improvement in the position of affairs at Chitral. Nevertheless, a feeling of unrest prevailed; the people declined to believe that Sher Afzal and his son were under surveillance at Kabul, and many of the leading men expected his early return.

The position was further complicated by the attitude of Umra Khan of Jandol, who was threatening to attack Darosh, nominally in the interests of Amir-ul-Mulk, one of the sons of the late Aman-ul-Mulk, but in reality with a view to seizing that part of the Chitral Valley for himself. On the 3rd of April, Dr. Robertson wrote:—

"We seem to be on a volcano here. . . . Matters are no longer improving; the atmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue. The Baba Sahib (a notorious Mulla in Dir) is feeding 1,800 men daily, we hear—an immensely large number for that furious fanatic to entertain. He prays daily for the utter destruction of the infidels, and declares there is more merit in fighting against the Chitralis than against anyone else, for they have brought the English into their country. . . . Umra Khan has well thrashed Muhammad Sharif (ex-Khan of Dir), and is said to be making peace with Satdar Khan of Nawagai. I hear he is furiously angry with Nizam-ul-Mulk, and tells his friends that Nizam, on fleeing to Gilgit, and subsequently through Waffadar Khan, promised him all the valley below Ghiriat if he would help him against Afzul-ul-Mulk. He swears he will take Chitral as far as Mastuj for Amir-ul-Mulk, whom he now forcibly prevents from returning to Chitral."

It had never been in our contemplation that Dr. Robertson's deputation to Chitral should be more than temporary, and we considered that, after he had in compliance with our instructions recognised Nizam-ul-Mulk as the *de facto* Ruler of the State, it was undesirable that he should remain any longer in Chitral. We accordingly sent instructions on the 21st April for the withdrawal of the mission, authorising Dr. Robertson to endeavour to meet Umra Khan before starting, if he saw any prospect of being able to do so, and leaving it to his discretion to decide whether a British officer and small escort should remain behind at Chitral. Dr. Robertson was unable to bring about a meeting with Umra Khan. He believed that there would be no unreasonable risk in leaving the two officers behind; and accordingly, on the 26th of May, he started for Gilgit, leaving Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gordon at Chitral with the whole of the escort, which he considered it imprudent to reduce.

We have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. We believe that it is essential that it should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence, and we consider that, in order to secure this end, it is indispensable that a British officer should for some time to come remain in the State. There is no doubt that this course involves some risk. Nizam-ul-Mulk is not a strong ruler, and so long as the Afghan troops remain close to his border, above Asmar, and Sher Afzal is believed by the Chitralis to have the support of the Amir, his position cannot be free from difficulty. But we have never concealed from ourselves that there was risk in sending British officers to Chitral, and it does not seem to us that the risk is now any greater than it was when Dr. Robertson's mission started. The latest reports tend, indeed, to show that Nizam-ul-Mulk is beginning to establish his authority, and that his prospects are more hopeful at this moment than they were at the beginning of the year. Writing on the 12th of May, Dr. Robertson reported that the condition of affairs had of late very greatly improved, and was still improving; but that more time was required, and that to withdraw now altogether from the country would be most inexpedient. On the 18th of May, he reported that there was a profound quiet everywhere. Finally, in his report written on his return to Gilgit on the 6th June, Dr. Robertson writes:—

“There is now no reasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority, even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether. . . . An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort, unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country”

It had, moreover, always been in our contemplation that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral for the purpose of watching events on that part of the frontier, and this arrangement has received your Lordship's specific sanction. We consider that after the encouragement which has been given to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the advent of the mission, it would be unjust to him, as well as detrimental to our own interests, to withdraw suddenly and entirely from Chitral at the present moment. We have carefully considered whether a Native Agent would be sufficient for the purposes which we have in view. It may be found possible hereafter to replace Captain Younghusband by a Native official, but we have come to the conclusion that, for the present, such an arrangement would fail to give the Mehtar the necessary support and to secure the adequate protection of our interests. It is, in fact, the arrangement which was in force until the despatch of Dr. Robertson's mission, and we doubt whether it has worked altogether well. We have therefore decided that Captain Younghusband shall remain in the State for the present, though not necessarily at the capital itself. Colonel Durand has proposed that he should take up his head-quarters at Mastuj, which, though within 63 miles of Chitral, which on an emergency Captain Younghusband could reach in a day, would be only 45 miles from our proposed frontier post at Ghizr. We shall make it clearly understood that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of supplying us with trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford.

We recommend that of the 200 rifles of the 16th Sikhs, 100 should form the escort of the British Agent at Gilgit. The remaining 100 would, until further orders, serve as escort to the Assistant British Agent for Chitral. We may explain, in reference to the latter proposal, that it was our intention to replace the Sikh escort now with Captain Younghusband by an escort of Kashmir troops. Colonel Durand and Surgeon-Major Robertson have, however, both born strong testimony to the valuable effects produced upon the minds of the Chitralis by the presence of a small body of Sikh troops, and have expressed their opinion that it would be unadvisable to withdraw the Sikh escort immediately. We propose, therefore, that it should remain for the present, and we believe that the retention of the Sikhs is not likely to be regarded with alarm by the Chitralis. Any apprehension on this account would, we believe, be to a great extent removed if our recommendation that the Assistant British Agent should have his headquarters at Mastuj, instead of at Chitral itself, is accepted. We shall be better able to form an opinion upon this point after a somewhat longer experience.

No. 18.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 188, of August 29, 1893.

MY LORD,

IN our Despatch No. 142, dated the 11th July 1893, reference is made to Surgeon-Major Robertson's final report on Chitral affairs, and an extract is quoted from it. We have now the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the report, together with our reply approving of Dr. Robertson's proceedings and conveying instructions with regard to the future conduct of our relations with Chitral.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

FROM OFFICIATING RESIDENT IN KASHMIR to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, dated June 28, 1893.

(EXTRACT.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a letter dated 17th June 1893, from Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., being his final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of the instructions issued by him for the guidance of Captain Younghusband.

I would submit my opinion that Surgeon-Major Robertson has conducted the duties entrusted to him by the Government of India with much tact and discretion; that the object of the mission to Chitral has been fulfilled; and that it is evident that Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is largely indebted to the support and assistance he received from Surgeon-Major Robertson's mission for the measure of success attained by him in establishing himself as the Ruler of Chitral.

I consider that the instructions framed by Surgeon-Major Robertson for the guidance of Captain Younghusband, who remains as political officer in Chitral, are full and sufficient, and that they have been drawn up with the care, skill, and foresight which have marked all Surgeon-Major Robertson's actions; and with the knowledge and experience of men and measures in Chitral which he possesses to so rare a degree.

I trust that the services of Surgeon-Major Robertson and of the officers* whom he so strongly commends for their cordial assistance will be brought to the favourable notice of the Government of India; and I venture to draw particular attention to the terms in which Surgeon-Major Robertson refers to the excellent work done for the mission by Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim.

*Captain F. E. Younghusband
Lieutenant the Hon. C. G. Bruce
Lieutenant T. L. R. Gordon.

From Surgeon-Major G. S. ROBERTSON, C.S.I., to the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR.

(EXTRACT.)

Gilgit, June 17, 1893.

I HAVE already officially informed you of the return of the Chitral mission to Gilgit, and of its work being now ended. I now forward, for subsequent transmission to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, a final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of instructions left behind for the general guidance of Captain Younghusband; also the mission accounts.

A translation of a letter addressed to me by Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is likewise enclosed. It was handed to me just before my departure from Chitral by the Mehtar himself, who took the opportunity of presenting it to renew his professions of entire devotion to the Government of India, his earnest desire to place himself and the resources of his country at the disposal of the power which had not only seated him on his father's throne, but was still maintaining him there with equal generosity and magnanimity.

Nizam-ul-Mulk does not pretend that all his actions during his father's lifetime gave him an absolute right to expect our whole-hearted support. He rather accepts the position that, in spite of certain doubtful proceedings on his part, justifiable only on the ground that he was acting under the orders of his father and King, he has nevertheless been treated with the utmost kindness by the Government of India.

He fluently proclaims his gratitude for what has been already done for him, while he earnestly confesses his inability at the present time to continue the struggle against his numerous enemies, unless he is still sustained by the same strong hand which has so powerfully aided him in the past. He finds an argument why he should be accorded further help in the future on the broad ground that it is necessary for a great government to be consistent in its policy. It is this conviction which is found underlying all his utterances, although it is usually somewhat obscured by that habitual indirectness of speech which is common to all Orientals.

You are aware that the Government of India left it to me to decide whether Captain Younghusband should remain in Chitral with a small escort, or whether he should return with the mission to Gilgit. I decided that he should stay behind in Chitral, and that the whole of the detachment of the 15th Sikhs, with Lieutenant Gordon of the same regiment, should be left with him also as a personal guard. I formed this determination on the grounds that there is now no unreasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; that any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether. Finally, I considered that, although 50 Sikhs under a trustworthy commander were sufficient to guard the residence and stores of the political officer, yet it would be an act of imprudence to diminish that number. In short, I read my telegraphic instructions about leaving Captain Younghusband at Chitral with a "small escort" as meaning a "sufficient escort," and acted on this assumption.

In now adverting to the work actually accomplished by the Chitral Mission, I think it may be considered good on the whole. My previous report will have shown the nature of many of the difficulties the mission had to contend against. Most of these difficulties were, however, successfully overcome, and consequently they need not be referred to again at any length.

As a means of closely connecting Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk himself with the Kashmir Darbar and with the Government of India, there never was any doubt about the assured success of the mission. But it was quickly discovered that a much wider field of operations lay before the political officers than was contemplated when the mission originally started. The country was in a distracted condition, torn by factions; the Mehtar was highly unpopular; the English were looked upon with suspicion and dislike by the influential classes.

For its own safety, therefore, no less than with the view of maintaining English influence and English prestige, the mission was compelled to actively and energetically support Nizam-ul-Mulk in his government, yet without ever appearing to interfere in the internal affairs of the State.

Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and virile energy, an unnerved terror-stricken Chief who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear left

the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee.

That under such peculiar circumstances any permanence can be expected for the work already successfully accomplished would be unreasonable, unless the same plans which have worked so well in the immediate past be steadily persevered with in the immediate future.

Military force other than that which the Mehtar himself can organise and direct, it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India.

The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler being securely protected from all outside enemies, and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidised ally of his acknowledged suzerain, His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir.

That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral, and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people.

The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. It is especially indicated by the strenuous but futile efforts of one or two of the chief men, notably by one of the Mehtar's uncles, to gain a reputation for fanaticism. But the pretended bigotries displayed are so obviously a threadbare cloak for hiding simple designs for increasing individual self-importance that no one is deceived by so palpable a sham. One man, a cousin of the Mehtar's, at first very friendly in his relations with the mission, went on a visit to the "Baba Sahib" at Dir. On his return it was discovered he had become fanatical. He kept aloof from all communication with the British officers, but yet maintained this uncompromising attitude with so much difficulty, so much doubt and self-consciousness, that it was impossible to feel any resentment at such embarrassed shamefaced proceedings. Another individual, who had been promised a small present, remembered on the day the "khilats" were distributed that, as a "Sof," he could not possibly attend to receive his gift. He nevertheless came to the garden door of my house and openly before all his followers begged that his reward might be sent him there by the hand of his friend.

The impressionability of Chitralis again is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways. If you cannot rely upon unswerving supporters in changeable people, you can at least be happy in the thought that they can rarely become inveterate opponents. When great impressionability is combined with extreme cupidity, for which Chitralis are also remarkable, the power of influencing them lies with the man of most tactful speech, especially if he also possesses the longest purse. Polite attentions, complimentary speeches, have a great, if ephemeral, effect on most Chitralis. When accompanied by a small *douceur*, they not unfrequently have the effect of starting the recipient to his feet with his eyes dimmed by grateful tears, his mouth full of fervid protestations of devotion. It is true his gratitude rapidly cools, but it can be excited again as often as is desirable by a re-employment of the means described.

It follows, therefore, that a political officer in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads, as well as intriguers of other classes, succumbed at once to the not very subtle influences employed against them, while as soon as it became generally known that I preferred expressions of loyalty to their Mehtar to hearing speeches of personal devotion to myself, the alteration I desired was made almost invariably.

Having now indicated what strong support can be afforded the Mehtar by British officers in Chitral in the way of winning over to his cause the influential classes—the villagers and poorer people will always look at the English with favourable eyes—and having in my former report, already referred to, shown how the position of the political agent at Chitral can be easily rendered practically safe against those who from fanaticism or other motives are hostile to the continued residence of British soldiers so

close to their frontiers, it is still necessary to revert to the present weakness of the Mehtar and his absolute dependence on the Government of India.

Nizam-ul-Mulk's lack of popularity can be overcome by time. His miserable poverty will be relieved by the Kashmir and Government of India subsidies he will receive. But the strongest influence against him at present is the doubt in his subjects' minds whether the Government of India really intends to continue its full support to Nizam-ul-Mulk, or whether it will after a time withdraw its officers and leave the country to be scrambled for again by Sher Afzal, Umra Khan, and the Khushwakt Princes.

Intriguers declare, and their words spread like wildfire throughout the land, that Sher Afzal is only biding his time until he has come to terms with the Government of India and with the Amir; also that the fact of Muhammad Wali being treated as a princely guest at Gilgit is significant that Government has not made up its mind what to do. They point their arguments by showing that Sher Afzal is in active correspondence with his supporters in Chitral, and by truly stating that numbers of Yasinis, in response to Muhammad Wali's intrigues, are continually running away to Gilgit.

The people, in fact, are waiting for a sign in which they may place some confidence. They fear to do or leave undone anything which may bring down upon them the vengeance of Sher Afzal or Muhammad Wali, if either of those Princes are in the end triumphant in Chitral or in Yasin. They know the capacity of both Katuris and Khushwaktias for wreaking vengeance on those they bear enmity to.

For this state of things there is a simple and effective remedy. It is for the Government of India to at once assume, and let the fact be widely known that it does assume the protection of both Chitral and Yasin. Foreign enemies will be warned off. The people will be given peace.

The majority of the inhabitants of Chitral would gladly welcome the change. The Adamzadas would soon be brought to acquiesce in it. All but a small minority in Yasin are clamouring to become subjects of the Government of India. At the present moment there are deputations of Tui men in Gilgit, braving Muhammad Wali's resentment, who have come to implore that they may not again be handed over to the cruel oppression of either Khushwakt or Katur. On the road to Gilgit the same petition was continually made to me secretly by those who fear to openly declare their sentiments.

The English were never so popular in Chitral as they are at present. It was discernible everywhere on the return march in the ready smile, the willing service of the men we met. Some Adamzadas at Mustuj, friends of Nizam-ul-Mulk, came to me to pray that Government would not now withhold water from the tree it had planted with its own hand, and so leave it to wither and die—the poorer classes everywhere re-echo the same wish in simpler but equally sincere phrases.

An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country.

With all their weaknesses, foibles, and vices, of which they have their proportionate share, it is impossible not to like Chitralis. I personally should view with sad regret any retrograde step on the part of Government, which would inevitably be followed by a return to confusion and bloodshed in the pleasant country, and in a relapse into sorrow and misery of the happy-faced picturesque people.

I think I have now, in this and in my former report, gone over all the ground of which it seemed necessary or desirable that you should have my opinion. There only remains for me now the grateful task of acknowledging the valuable services and the happy selection of the officers appointed to accompany and assist me:

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MEHTAR NIZAM-UL-MULK, of Chitral, to Surgeon-Major G. S. ROBERTSON, C.S.I., in charge Chitral Mission, dated May 26, 1893.

After compliments.—As I, the sincere well-wisher of Government, suffering from misfortunes of the times, went and appealed to the great Government of India, and by God's grace from there having received royal kindness with the patronage and support

of Government, took possession of my father's country, and again by the coming of your mission with other officers to Chitral I acquired perfect strength and stability, I am consequently extremely pleased (literally, happy, contented) with you and your companions, and extremely thankful to Government for its favours and kindness, and to the limits of possibility with all sincerity and truthfulness both with my life and heart, I shall continue to act sedulously in the performance of services to Government, and I consider that the country under me is just like the countries within the possession of the great Government. Accordingly, since I have great hope of support from Government, my country being identical with countries belonging to Government, and since with truthfulness I have girded up the loins of sincerity. I request that two or three officers of Government, with 100 or more or less number of sepoye compatible with the means and resources of this country, should permanently remain in Chitral, and whichever place in the land of Chitral they select for a cantonment they may make buildings there. And without making a telegraph line, the acquiring of news and information is difficult, and delays may be caused in royal affairs; the telegraph line should be extended from Gilgit to Chitral, so that to all countries and powers it may become known and evident that the country of Chitral is inside the limits of the British Empire, and any other object of Government that there may be in this country I have no objection to offer against it. At the same time I am hopeful that some of my wishes also may be accepted, the advantages of them in reality do not accrue to me especially, but their adoption is advisable for the governance (literally, keeping the country) of the country, the carrying out of the wishes of Government, and the acquiring of peace and prosperity.

1st. The amount of yearly subsidy, which was fixed by the Kashmir Darbar and Gilgit for my father, should as before be continued to me, even I should be entitled to an increase of it since I have been placed (on the throne) by Government in this country, and my father's wealth has all been plundered, and consequently I am in very great straits for want of funds to reward people and to meet the necessary expenditure.

2nd. As my country belongs to Government, anyhow the parganah (district) of Narsat, which from the time of my ancestors having belonged to us, is my hereditary property, should be taken out of the usurping possession of the Khan of Jandol and handed over to me, so that the bad name and blemish on our reputation may get wiped off.

3rd. As through favour of Government all the country possessed by my father has been granted to me, a sanad also should be granted to me, saying that all the countries possessed by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk are granted to his son, Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk, by the Government of India, so that my head may be raised and my position exalted before all high and low people.

4th. As the stay of Sher Afzal in Badakhshan, and also that of the son of Mir Wali in Gilgit, causes refractoriness and wandering amongst the people of Chitral and Warshagam, and as it is quite likely that Mir Wali's son by talking intriguingly with the people of Yaghistan may delude them, it is advisable, even necessary, that Sher Afzal should always be kept at Kabul or Kandahar, and that Mir Wali's son should be sent down to Kashmir.

I trust, my friend, you would pay your attention to the points contained in this letter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated Simla, July 31, 1893.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the correspondence ending with your letter of the 28th of June, on the subject of Surgeon-Major Robertson's mission to Chitral.

2. The enclosures of the letter cited contain a connected account of Dr. Robertson's proceedings from the time of his leaving Gilgit in January last to the date of his return on the 6th of June. They also furnish his recommendations for the future conduct of our relations with Chitral. These papers have been considered by the Government of India with great interest, and I am to convey the following orders and observations of the Governor-General in Council upon them.

I am in the first place to say that you are authorised by the Government of India to convey to Dr. Robertson their general approval of his proceedings. He has had an exceedingly difficult task to perform, and although he may in a few instances have interfered in the internal affairs of the Chitral State to an extent not contemplated by the Government of India, it would probably have been difficult or impossible for him to do otherwise. The weakness of his position was due to the fact that Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk has apparently little strength except what he owes to our countenance, and is, or certainly was at first, far from popular with some of the most influential of his subjects. Dr. Robertson appears to have been remarkably successful, under these unpromising conditions, in enabling Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk to establish himself as ruler, and in bringing about a better understanding between the rival factions. It is satisfactory to observe that he is able to report that "an Englishman may now travel anywhere throughout the "length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear," and that "a district in the "heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet." I am to request you to inform Dr. Robertson that his services are highly appreciated by the Government of India, and that they concur in his commendations of the officers* and men associated with him in his difficult task.

* Captain F. E. Younghusband
Lieutenant the Hon C G Bruce.
" T L R Gordon.
Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim.

3. Dr. Robertson's proposals for the firm establishment of our authority in Chitral are briefly as follows:—

- (i.) The posting of a British officer in Chitral with a guard of 120 men, and the occupation of Yasin.
- (ii.) The consequent strengthening of the Gilgit garrison.
- (iii.) The posting of a British political officer in Yasin, practically controlling the Governor as in Hunza and Nagar.
- (iv.) The raising of a local levy in Yasin.
- (v.) The immediate occupation of Ghizr and Gupis.
- (vi.) The recognition of the *de facto* Mehtar, if he acknowledges the suzerainty of Kashmir; no guarantee of succession being given.
- (vii.) The formal installation of the Mehtar.
- (viii.) The construction of a road and telegraph line to Chitral.
- (ix.) The public assumption by the Government of India of the protection of Chitral and Yasin.

These suggestions are concurred in by Colonel Durand.

4. It has always been in the contemplation of the Government of India that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral, though not necessarily at the capital, for the purpose of watching events on this part of the frontier, and my telegram has already conveyed to you the decision that Captain Younghusband should remain, making his head-quarters at Mastuj, whither he should remove as soon as possible. The instructions given by Dr. Robertson to Captain Younghusband for his guidance are approved. It cannot be too clearly laid down that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of obtaining trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford.

5. The Government of India have decided, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, to strengthen and redistribute the force within the Gilgit Agency, and to occupy Gupis and Ghizr; but on this subject a separate communication will be sent to you.

6. The Government of India have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. It is essential that the State should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence; and sanction has been given to the payment to Nizam-ul-Mulk of the subsidy for the year 1892. Dr. Robertson may promise the Mehtar that this annual payment will continue so long as he conducts himself properly. While, however, the Government of India are prepared to recognise Nizam-ul-Mulk as the *de facto* Ruler of Chitral, and to afford him their countenance as such, care should be taken not to give him a guarantee or a promise of protection against rivals, and his formal installation should be avoided as tending to imply that we have undertaken to keep him in power. A letter may be sent to Sardar Nizam-ul-Mulk, conveying an assurance of the kind indicated above without bestowing a formal sanad of appointment, as in the case of Hunza and Nagar.

No. 19.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 34, of September 1, 1893.

YOUR Excellency's important letter in the Foreign Department, No. 142, dated 11th July 1893, dealing with the affairs of the Gilgit Agency, has received my most careful consideration.

With regard to Chitral, you forward Dr. Robertson's full and instructive report on his mission to the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, the effect of which mission has been to obtain a very useful insight into the affairs of Chitral, and to give Nizam-ul-Mulk an opportunity of strengthening his position and acquiring the goodwill of his subjects. Now that the mission has, in accordance with your original instructions, been withdrawn, you propose to leave an assistant of the Gilgit Agency, with an escort of 100 bayonets, at Mastuj or some other place in Chitral, with instructions not to coerce the Mehtar in any way, nor to interfere with the internal affairs of the State; but to supply you with trustworthy information as to the affairs of that part of the frontier, and to give the Mehtar "that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford."

In my Despatch of 2nd December last, I remarked on the difficulty, so constantly proved by experience on our Indian frontiers, of restraining the tendency to multiply political relations and responsibilities, and I observed that our movements may have a disturbing, as well as a pacifying effect among the independent tribes and chiefships of this remote borderland. From this point of view, I urged on your Excellency a strict adherence to the limits of the policy, explained in your Foreign Secretary's letter of 26th May 1892 to the Resident in Kashmir, and strongly deprecated any undue interference with or control of the tribes, such as might lead to hostilities or to the further extension of our responsibilities.

In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country, not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, render it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral. It would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.

I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral, renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him, but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safe-guarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit.

No. 20.

EXTRACT from LETTER from GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 207, of September 20, 1893.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 188, dated the 29th August 1893, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers regarding affairs in Chitral.

Your Lordship will observe that His Highness the Amir has undertaken to detain Sher Afzal in the Ghazni district, and to prevent him from intriguing in Chitral; and that in consequence of Narsat now being in the hands of the Khan of Jandol, Dr. Robertson has suggested that Nizam-ul-Mulk should not be recognised as "Mehtar of Chitral,

“ including all the countries possessed by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk,” but simply as “ Ruler of the whole of Chitral and Yasin.”

In compliance with Dr. Robertson's suggestion, we have instructed the Resident in Kashmir to make the necessary alterations in the two last paragraphs of the draft letter to the Mehtar. A copy of the draft as altered is enclosed.

Enclosure in No. 20.

FROM THE BRITISH AGENT AT GILGIT TO MEHTAR NIZAM-UL-MULK.

I SENT to the Resident in Kashmir, for submission to the Government of India, your letter of the 26th May 1893, and I have now received the orders of the Viceroy with regard to it. His Excellency desires me to say in the first place that he fully appreciates the sentiment of loyalty and goodwill to which you have given expression, and that he takes the greatest interest in your welfare and that of the Chitral State. With regard to your proposals that some British officers should remain in Chitral, and that the telegraph line should be carried on to Chitral from Gilgit, I am to inform you that his Excellency has decided to leave Captain Youngusband as political officer in Chitral. He will reside at some spot sufficiently near your capital to be of service to you whenever you may wish to consult him. His Excellency has also decided to station a British officer with some troops in Yasin, so as to render that district safe from attack. Telegraph line may possibly be extended hereafter, but at present this seems hardly necessary.

You have made four other requests, and the Viceroy has considered them.—

First, he has authorised me to tell you that, so long as you show goodwill towards the Government of India and the Maharaja of Kashmir, you will continue to receive the subsidy granted to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk,

Secondly, his Excellency wishes me to say that the Khan of Jandol has been warned not to commit aggressions against Chitral.

Thirdly, his Excellency desires me to inform you that the Government of India recognise you as Ruler of the whole of Chitral and Yasin.

Fourthly, I am to let you know that the Amir has given a written assurance that he will keep Sher Afzal under surveillance within Afghanistan, and that he will not be able again to disturb the peace of Chitral; and I am to assure you that Mir Wal's son will not be allowed to disturb your authority in Yasin.

This answer to your letter will no doubt be very satisfactory to you, and will convince you of the goodwill of the Government of India.

No. 21.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 99, of June 12, 1894.

LORD KIMBERLEY stated in his Despatch No. 34, dated the 1st September 1893, regarding the affairs of the Gilgit Agency, that he could only sanction the retention of Captain Youngusband in Chitral as a temporary measure, and drew attention to certain considerations likely to materially affect the permanent political and military arrangements on that frontier.

The Resident in Kashmir was duly informed of the views entertained by your predecessor; and in January last, when it appeared not improbable that the negotiations with Russia might shortly be brought to a successful issue, his Excellency Lord Lansdowne caused Colonel Barr to be instructed that, if no new complications arose, the Political Officer in Chitral should be withdrawn after the winter was over. The Resident was at the same time desired to give his best attention to the possibility of affecting any reductions in the political staff of the Gilgit Agency.

We have since received several reports giving the views of the local officers on matters connected with our policy in and on the borders of Chitral, and the whole question has been again considered. The recommendations of the Officiating British Agent, Colonel Bruce, show that the local officers advocate a policy of activity which we are not prepared to support. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to enter on any examination of the points advanced by Colonel Bruce, but the consideration to which in our opinion much weight must at present be attached is that, as noted by Captain Youngusband, immediate withdrawal from Chitral would deprive us of the best means we possess of watching events on the Hindu Kush frontier. The negotiations with Russia still continue. On the southern frontier of Chitral complications have arisen owing to the action of Umra Khan of Jandol, who has attacked certain Kafirs over whom Chitral claims control, and has threatened Chitral territory. The

attitude of Umra Khan need not be regarded as a matter of the first importance, and we are not without hopes that an understanding may be arrived at with him in the course of the Afghan frontier delimitation; but we are convinced that to withdraw our political officer from Chitral, while the Pamir question is still unsettled, would be premature and unwise. We have accordingly decided that our position as regards Chitral must for another year remain on the present footing. The detailed instructions which we have given to the Resident will be found in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 2nd June 1894, and we trust that our proceedings will meet with your approval.

As regards the regiment of Bengal infantry (pioneers), at present in the Gilgit Agency, our view is that it should not be withdrawn without being relieved, at least until an agreement has been concluded with Russia on the Pamir question.

The papers now forwarded include certain proposals as to the training of Chitral levies. During a recent short visit to the Mehtar's capital, Captain Younghusband made temporary arrangements for giving instruction in musketry to selected bodies of Chitralis. To this we have raised no objection, but we are not at present prepared to go further.

Enclosure in No. 21.

From the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the
RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, dated June 2, 1894.

(EXTRACT.)

I AM directed to address you in respect to the policy to be observed in Chitral in the near future.

When a review of the position on this frontier was placed before the Secretary of State for India nearly a year ago, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region. Those contingencies were—

- (i) the abandonment by the Amir of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control;
- (ii) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and
- (iii) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes.

At the close of 1893, the first of the above conditions had been attained by the agreement concluded between the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand; there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. In these circumstances you were informed that, if no new complications arose, the political officer in Chitral should be withdrawn when the winter was over. In sanctioning the temporary retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral, the Secretary of State had expressed the opinion that the subsidiary measures undertaken should be limited to what was absolutely necessary for the safety of the political officer, and for keeping open his communication with Gilgit. In view of these instructions the abandonment of the posts at Jakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr would have been the corollary of the withdrawal of the political officer.

The course of events since my letter of January last was written has not however tended to facilitate the execution of the policy then projected. The actual demarcation of the Afghan frontier, in accordance with the agreement with the Amir, has yet to be carried out; the settlement of the relations of the tribes on that line is a matter requiring delicate management, and the situation on the southern border of Chitral is complicated by the claims and aspirations of Umra Khan of Jandol, whose recent conduct constitutes a disturbing element. Finally, the Pamir negotiations have not reached a conclusion.

To this last point much weight is attached by the Governor-General in Council. In his opinion the moment is inopportune for taking a step which would not improbably be regarded as a definite withdrawal, and which would deprive us of our look-out post for affairs beyond the Hindu Kush. The decision, therefore, of the Government of India is that, for another year, our position in and towards Chitral must remain upon the

present footing. It appears that Colonel Bruce and Captain Younghusband advocate a policy of activity and extension which is not in accord with the views of the Government of India. You are aware that the Government of India consider that there should be a limit to the period of driving Nizam-ul-Mulk in leading strings, and that he should be taught, as soon as possible, to rely on and act for himself. I am to request that this policy may be impressed on the British Agent, and that he may be clearly informed that it is not intended to maintain permanently a resident officer in Chitral. It will suffice to retain the unquestioned right of sending a political officer into Chitral at all times; and, hereafter, when the resident officer has been withdrawn, it will probably be advisable to make a practice of sending a political officer from time to time into the northern part of the State to watch the progress of affairs in the country, and in the direction of the Hindu Kush Passes.

In accordance with the policy laid down in the preceding paragraph, the Governor-General in Council is unable to accept the suggestion that the head-quarters of the political officer in Chitral should be transferred to the Mehtar's capital, and it should be made generally known that the head-quarters will remain at Mastuj. At the same time it is not intended to discourage occasional visits by the political officer to the Mehtar, for such visits may be useful as paving the way towards the permanent arrangements under which it is probable that no resident officer in Chitral will be maintained.

As regards the deputation of musketry instructors to train selected bodies of Chitralis, I am to say that the Government of India are not at present prepared to sanction the formal deputation of selected non-commissioned officers to Chitral for long periods, but will take no exception to temporary measures of the kind introduced by Captain Younghusband during his recent visit to Chitral, provided it is understood that instruction is only given to such levies as the Mehtar already has, and that no scheme of military organisation, such as that sketched by Captain Younghusband, is attempted.

The attitude of Umra Khan and the complications to which it may lead cannot at present be conveniently discussed. It is in contemplation that, in the course of the demarcation of the Afghan frontier in the Chitral and Bajaur neighbourhood, a meeting should, if possible, be arranged between Umra Khan and the British Joint Commissioner. If this meeting actually takes place, it will probably be easier to judge on what general lines Umra Khan should be dealt with, and in the meantime the Governor-General in Council, as at present advised, considers that no action can with advantage be taken.

No. 22.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 34, of August 3, 1894.

MY LORD,

I HAVE given my careful consideration to the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, No. 99, Secret, dated the 12th June 1894, forwarding recent correspondence on Chitral affairs and enclosing the instructions which you addressed to the Resident in Kashmir on 2nd June 1894, regarding the policy to be pursued by your Agent in that country.

The perusal of Captain Younghusband's interesting reports has satisfied me that the policy adopted last year, under Lord Kimberley's instructions, has so far been successful. The despatch of the mission and the retention of Captain Younghusband as political agent in Chitral have had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of government in that country, and of giving increased stability and popularity to the rule of the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and at the same time have strengthened the ties by which he is bound to the British Government.

The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be "premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier" are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the

regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cuninghame's letter to the Resident in Kashmir.

I approve also of your decided rejection of the proposals for establishing a political officer and an escort in Yasin and for opening up the road between Peshawar and Chitral, but Captain Younghusband's more moderate suggestions for transferring his own headquarters from Mastuj to Chitral, and for removing to Mastuj the detachment now posted at Ghizr, seems to me to be supported by weighty reasons and to deserve consideration. I leave the decision of the matter, however, entirely in the hands of your Excellency's Government.

On the question of local levies, I see no objection to the policy of encouraging and even assisting the Mehtar to give some training on the lines already started by Captain Younghusband to a limited number of his hill levies. It is better that his 400 rifles should be in the hands of men who know something of their use than in those of untrained men who could not prevent their becoming the prey of Pathan raiders, and the value to be attached to our controlling the foreign relations of Chitral seems to depend to a considerable extent on the efficiency of the Mehtar's local levies.

I concur in the retention for the present of the regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers) in the Gilgit Agency.

No. 23.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

If the force available at Robertson's disposal is not sufficient to ensure his safety, the only route by which we can attack Umra Khan is from the Peshawur border. We are making preparations preliminary to arrangements for doing this if it should be necessary, but it is evidently an undertaking of great magnitude.

No. 24.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Military authorities state that one month would be required for collection of transport before a relief expedition could start. Looking to the whole situation in Chitral, we think it essential to be prepared to make a diversion into Bajaur. We have, therefore, authorised immediate orders to issue to commence hiring camels up to 6,000; all other points in connexion with the organisation of expedition to be dependent upon your sanction.

No. 25.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 8, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

I am prepared to approve such action for securing safety of Robertson and party as you may deem necessary.

No. 26.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 15, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Orders have been issued for mobilization of the 1st division of the field army.

No. 27.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 15, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Please let me know, why so large a force is considered necessary for securing safety of Robertson and party.

No. 28.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, March 18, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Large force is required on account of necessity for holding line of communication in great force, and to meet possible hostility of both Mohmands and Swatis and other frontier tribes.

No. 29.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, March 30, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully re-considered in light of recent events. Meantime, our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope therefore that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making new roads or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts.

No. 30.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 66, April 17, 1895.

WE have the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, upon the progress of affairs in Chitral since the murder of Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk in January last, and to give a narrative of events which have led up to the present situation, and the despatch of a force for the relief of Mr. Robertson and the rest of the British officers and troops in the Chitral Fort.

Her Majesty's Government are aware of the circumstances attending the succession of Nizam-ul-Mulk to the Chitral Mehtarship. We had misgivings as to his proving to be a strong ruler, but, during the two years of his rule in the country, he had succeeded in fairly holding his own and had obtained a certain degree of popularity. There were, indeed, no other dangerous opponents left in the field. Sher Afzal, after his sudden descent on Chitral in November 1892, and his flight before Nizam-ul-Mulk in the following month, had been interned in Kabul, and the Amir wrote to our Agent there that he would not again create disturbances in Chitral. Most of the sons of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk had either been murdered or had fled the country. Of the latter, one was Amir-ul-Mulk, a youth of from 18 to 20 years of age, who, on the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk, had fled to Bajaur, and taken refuge with Umra Khan.

In May 1894, Amir-ul-Mulk returned to Chitral professing to have escaped from Umra Khan's hands, and was kindly received by Nizam-ul-Mulk. On the 1st January 1895, while the brothers were out hawking at Broz, a few miles from Chitral, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot by a follower of Amir-ul-Mulk. His death was almost instantaneous. None of the Mehtar's party made any attempt to avenge their ruler's murder, and Amir-ul-Mulk promptly seized the Chitral Fort, and proclaimed himself Mehtar. Two of Nizam-ul-Mulk's leading officials and some of his partisans were murdered at the same time, and others taken prisoners.

The news was quickly brought into Gupis by refugees, and on the 5th of January it was confirmed by Ghulam Dastgir, a half-brother (by a slave-mother) of the murdered Mehtar, who fled to the camp of Mr. Udny, our Commissioner for demarcation in the Kunar Valley. Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Officer, was in Chitral when the murder took place, with an escort of eight Sikhs. The rest of his escort of 100 men were posted at Mastuj, 63 miles north-east of Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk sent a deputation to him asking to be recognised as Mehtar, but was told that the orders of Government must be awaited. Fifty Sikhs from the escort at Mastuj were at once sent to Chitral upon Lieutenant Gurdon's requisition, and Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men. Ghizr was held by Captain Townshend with 200 men, and Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Gilgit, started about the middle of January for Chitral to report on the situation. We cautioned Mr. Robertson not to commit the Government of India to any change of policy in regard to Chitral, and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or conclude any permanent arrangement, without reference to the Government of India.

Until Mr. Robertson arrived, Mr. Gurdon remained in Chitral, acting with admirable coolness and judgment; he occupied a house in an excellent position for defence, if necessary, and commenced quietly laying in supplies. Amir-ul-Mulk sent more than one deputation to him, asking to be recognised as Mehtar, but Lieutenant Gurdon declined to commit himself to any other statement than that the orders of Government must be awaited. He continued to adopt this attitude on all subsequent occasions, when Amir-ul-Mulk personally visited him, and preferred the same request.

Various reports were received by the Government of India regarding the origin of the murder, but there can be little doubt now that it was the result of a conspiracy of the Sher Afzal party and Umra Khan of Jandol, the latter seeing an opportunity for his own aggrandisement in the disturbance which must necessarily follow in Chitral. Umra Khan's relations with Nizam-ul-Mulk had for some time previously been very strained, and at the time of his murder Nizam-ul-Mulk was planning some means of retaliating on Umra Khan for seizing his property on the way up from India, and for closing the road to Chitral against traders from India. Amir-ul-Mulk disclaimed all connexion with Umra Khan, but he was probably acting in collusion with him at the time he was projecting Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder, but afterwards soon realised the danger of Umra Khan's presence and became anxious to get rid of him. Be this as it may, immediately after the murder, Umra Khan advanced into the southern end of the Chitral Valley with a large force. He sent a letter to the Governor of Darosh, in which he announced his intention of starting at the head of a jihad to punish the Kafirs, and requested that Amir-ul-Mulk would come to Ashreth to receive him. Amir-ul-Mulk not falling in with his wishes, Umra Khan's force occupied Ashreth, and proceeded to advance on Kila Darosh.

Mr. Robertson, while *en route* to Chitral, heard of Umra Khan's invasion of Chitral territory. In his opinion this effected a complete change in the situation. Mr. Robertson was then at Mastuj, 158 miles from a line of telegraph, and necessarily acted on his own judgment. He informed us that Lieutenant Gurdon could not withdraw from Chitral without help; and that he had determined to push on to his assistance, but that, if Umra Khan advanced rapidly and in force, he would be unable to return to Mastuj, "the road is so terribly bad." At the same time he wrote to the Khan of Jandol on the 26th of January, demanding an explanation of the presence of his forces in Chitral's territory, and requesting him to at once retire, and so save himself from the consequences of the displeasure of Government. Under our instructions Mr. Udny and Mr. Robertson further addressed Umra Khan early in February, demanding an explanation of his proceedings. Umra Khan replied to Mr. Udny on the 10th February that he came to assist and strengthen Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs. Amir-ul-Mulk had opposed his friendship and acted in a hostile manner, and no alternative was left him but to do the same. He added that he would leave Amir-ul-Mulk alone if he was willing to make peace, and that he hoped his friendship with the British Government would remain unbroken. He replied to Mr. Robertson in similar terms.

Notwithstanding these professions of friendship, Umra Khan's agents at Sao and other places in the Kunar Valley were doing their utmost to prevent communications passing between Mr. Udny's camp and the British officers in Chitral. A sharp look-out was kept for messengers, and one was killed a few hundred yards north of Chanduk, it is believed, by one of Umra Khan's picquets, though the Bajauris declare that the man was murdered under the orders of the Sipah Salar to bring discredit upon Umra Khan.

Mr. Robertson arrived in Chitral on the 1st February, and took up his position in the fort. He had with him 290 men, and sufficient supplies to the end of April had been collected. Besides these there were 200 at Mastuj, and 100 Sikhs of the British Agent's escort had been despatched from Gilgit to Mastuj and 100 Kashmir troops to Ghizr. Mr. Robertson reported that he found the Chitralis of Chitral proper less well affected towards us than they were two years ago. He considered them so hopelessly treacherous and divided and impotent for fighting that he recommended the Sipah Salar should be allowed to occupy all the country he had claimed in his boundary negotiations with Mr. Udny, including the district of Narsat.

The Bajauris, whose force was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 men, remained throughout February in the southern part of the Chitral Valley. The Chitrali force opposing Umra Khan numbered about 3,000 men. On the 25th January the Chitralis were driven from the position which they were holding before Kila Darosh with some loss on both sides; they continued, however, to hold Kila Darosh itself until the 9th February, when it was surrendered to Umra Khan by arrangement, under which the lives of the defenders were spared, and many breech-loading rifles and matchlocks were given up to him.

After the surrender of Kila Darosh, the Chitralis concentrated at Ghairat under Amir-ul-Mulk. In order to stop a general stampede of the inhabitants from Chitral proper, and to neutralise the open revolt of the Kushwakhtis against Amir-ul-Mulk, Mr. Robertson took over the Kushwakht country as a temporary measure, and on his own responsibility, without pledging Government to anything, he promised protection to the Kushwakhti headmen, and appointed Khushwakht Governors to Mastuj and Laspur. At this time Amir-ul-Mulk was with Mr. Robertson in the Chitral Fort, and Mr. Robertson believed that, by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord, he was restoring confidence. He believed that if any rival claimant elected to fight with the help of Umra Khan, many Chitralis would join the British party, and that the Kushwakhtis would certainly stand firmly with us.

The situation in which Mr. Robertson was placed appeared to be one of considerable difficulty. He had, before Kila Darosh was surrendered, reported that efforts were being made by the Chitralis to get him into collision with Umra Khan. He had resisted these, but at the same time he said that the Chitralis had "no fight in them," that they undoubtedly called in Umra Khan, but desired to escape the consequences of their own acts; and that their attitude was so doubtful that if he were to move back one yard he would be mobbed by a crowd of refugees. The whole country would be open to Umra Khan and he would be harassed or permitted to retire according to the humour of Umra Khan and his fanatical following. In these circumstances it was evident that any further success would render Umra Khan a serious danger to the British Representative, and accordingly we authorised Mr. Robertson, on the 19th February, to give the Chitralis such material and moral support in turning him out of Chitral territory as might be consistent with the safety of his own party, and to call up reinforcements from the Kashmir regiment on the Gilgit command, if necessary.

On the 21st February, Mr. Robertson reported that everything was satisfactory, supplies plentiful, the men healthy, and the Chitralis cheerful and helpful. But the situation now became seriously complicated by the arrival on the scene of the refugee Sher Afzal from Kabul. Mr. Robertson did not receive reliable information of his arrival in Chitral territory until the 24th February, when he at once entered into communication with him. On the 27th February, Mr. Robertson received from Sher Afzal, through a confidential messenger, a demand that he should go back to Mastuj at once. Sher Afzal promised to be friends with Government on the same terms as previous Mehtars of Chitral, but his promise was coupled with a threat that, if his terms were not accepted, Umra Khan would at once advance. Mr. Robertson replied that Kashmir was Chitral's suzerain, and neither Umra Khan nor anyone else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission of Government; he added that Sher Afzal's message was wanting in respect to the Government of India, that he was informing Government of Sher Afzal's demands and would communicate their instructions to him, and that, if in the meantime he attempted any overt acts of hostility, he must take the consequences on his own head.

At the end of February the Chitralis were still holding Ghairat, and Umra Khan was rapidly completing his preparations for the defence of Kila Darosh against an attack from the Chitralis which he believed to be imminent. A few Chitralis of the lower class had gone over to Sher Afzal, but the Adamzadas, though suspected of being partisans of

Sher Afzal, had not yet openly defected. Out of the 700 Sniders given to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, it was estimated that only 200 remained in Chitral, most of the others having found their way into Umra Khan's possession.

The strength of the force with Umra Khan at this time is not known. It has been differently assessed at 3,000 and 8,000 men. The former is believed to have been the strength of the force with which he originally advanced into Southern Chitral, but on his circulating in Swat and elsewhere a call to jihad against the British, he is reported to have been joined by 5,000 more, among whom were included many Mullas from Dir and Bajaur.

A report was received at Gilgit, on the 6th March, that the position at Ghairat had been attacked by Sher Afzal and Umra Khan, and that the whole British party had retired into the Chitral Fort, which was being fired into; also that the road from Mastuj to Chitral had been closed and the fort of Drassan occupied by order of Sher Afzal. The Assistant British Agent was then sending forward at Mr. Robertson's request 150 Hunza, Nagar, and Punyal levies from Gilgit to reinforce Chitral; and when he heard the report of Mr. Robertson being forced back to Chitral, he called up 100 Kashmir troops from Chilas for duty in Gilgit, and warned the Officer Commanding the 32nd Pioneers to hold half his battalion in immediate readiness to march, if necessary, to Gilgit on receipt of intimation to do so.

The report as to the attack on Mr. Robertson was contradicted next day, and it was now reported, that the closing of the road from Mastuj to Chitral was due to some malcontents having broken down a bridge. It appears from the communication which was then received in Gilgit that Mr. Robertson, who had gone out with Amir-ul-Mulk to the Chitral position of Aliun, on the river between Chitral and Darosh, returned to Chitral on the 1st March with the whole of his escort. He sent a message to Gilgit that no anxiety need be felt if communication with him were interrupted. This is the last direct communication received from Chitral; it came from Lieutenant Gurdon and was dated the 1st March. Mr. Robertson was believed to have with him in Chitral a strong force and plenty of supplies, while Gupis, Ghizr, and Mastuj were also held by troops with British officers in each. Mr. Robertson wrote on the 13th February that he was holding Chitral Fort with 240 men, and expected an additional 50 men the same day; and on the 25th February he wrote that he had plenty of supplies for three months, owing to Lieutenant Gurdon's successful efforts. We had thus reason to believe that he had supplies for a garrison of 290 men up to the fourth week in May. It was clear, however, that his position, cut off from communication with Gilgit, was full of risk so long as Umra Khan was north of the Lowarai Pass.

The information described in the two preceding paragraphs was received by us on the 7th of March, and after carefully considering the situation, we decided that preliminary arrangements should be undertaken in order to be prepared, if necessary, to operate against Umra Khan from Peshawar. We believed that Mr. Robertson's garrison in Chitral Fort could resist attack from Umra Khan and Sher Afzal's forces, and hold out as long as his ammunition and supplies lasted, but his communications were on all sides interrupted, and his retreat cut off; and it appeared to us to be imperative that no effort should be spared to effect his relief by the end of April, if the investment was not otherwise removed before that date. The time estimated for the advance of a force from the Peshawar border to Chitral necessitated that a start should be made early in April, and there was not a day to spare if we were to be prepared to advance then. We subsequently heard that reinforcements had left Mastuj, numbering, as far as we could ascertain, 120 men; if these had reached Chitral they would, by increasing the number of mouths to feed, reduce the time for which Mr. Robertson had supplies from three months to about nine weeks, or till the end of April only.

On the 14th March, in order that Umra Khan might have distinct notice of the decision to which we had thus come, a final letter of warning, in the name of the Government of India, was ordered to be sent to him through Mr. Udny and the Commissioner of Peshawar, and an attempt was also ordered to be made to send a similar letter through the British officers in Chitral and Mastuj. The letter recounted the warnings given to Umra Khan against interfering with Chitral affairs, mentioned his various acts of aggression, directed him to at once quit Chitral territory, and told him that if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the Government of India would compel him to do so; that they were making preparations to send forward their forces for that purpose, and he would only have himself to blame for any evil results that might fall

upon him. At the same time a Proclamation* was issued to the people of Swat and others on the Peshawar frontier, announcing the intention and object of Government, assuring them that we did not intend to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass or interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all those who did not oppose the march of the troops. Instructions were also sent to Mr. Robertson to inform Sher Afzal that the Government of India could not deal with him so long as he remained in alliance with Umra Khan. These instructions never reached Mr. Robertson owing to Chitral Fort being invested by the enemy. The Amir of Afghanistan was informed of the intentions of the Government of India.

Orders were issued at the same time for the mobilisation of the 1st Division of the Field Army, under Major-General Sir Robert Low, with certain modifications in regard to the artillery and cavalry.

Major Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, Lieutenant Rawlinson, Mr. F. B. Spencer, Mr. Waterfield, Commandant, Peshawar Border Police, and Mr. W. S. Davies were appointed political officers with the force, under the orders of Sir Robert Low, who was given supreme political authority, as well as military command. Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The Assistant British Agent at Gilgit having reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, he was authorised to explain to the people the purport of the Proclamation issued to the Swatis and Bajauris. Native reports say that early in February Umra Khan had sent messengers to the Tangiris urging them to attack Chilas.

Interruption of communication beyond Mastuj continued, and on the 17th March the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, telegraphed that reports circulated by agents of Sher Afzal were causing considerable excitement among the people of the country, and that he was anxious about a small party of 100 Sikhs and 20 sappers with Captain Ross and Lieutenant Fowler, which had left Mastuj recently for Chitral, presumably under Mr. Robertson's orders. He reported that, under the circumstances, he had requested Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half battalion of the 32nd Pioneers held in readiness in Chilas. Two hundred men of this regiment with Colonel Kelly arrived at Gilgit on the 20th March, and 200 more on the 22nd.

On the 21st March, news reached Gilgit from Captain Bretherton at Mastuj of a serious attack on some British Indian troops between Mastuj and Chitral. Complete details have not yet been received, but from the latest information it appears that about

* From the FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to the CHIEF SECRETARY, Punjab Government.

(Telegraphic.)

March 14, 1895.

THE Governor-General in Council has resolved that the following Proclamation be issued, and his Excellency in Council would like his Honour to give directions for having its purport generally communicated upon the border:—To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur who do not side with Umra Khan.

Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned, that—

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected state under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and attacked the Chitrali people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transports will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security.

the beginning of March, under instructions from Mr. Robertson, a Subadar started from Mastuj with 40 men and 60 boxes of ammunition for Chitral. He was compelled to halt at Buni, the road being broken, and wrote in to Mastuj that he expected to be attacked. On receipt of the Subadar's letter, Lieutenant Moberley, special officer with the Kashmir troops at Mastuj, asked Captain C. R. Ross, commanding the British Agent's escort of 14th Sikhs, to make a night march in support of the Subadar. Captain Ross and Lieutenant H. J. Jones, with a company of the 14th Sikhs, started on the evening of the 4th March. Lieutenants J. S. Fowler and S. M. Edwardes, with 20 sappers and miners, who had arrived at Mastuj on the 4th, followed next day, and all three parties appear to have been together at Buni. The ammunition escort and the sappers under Lieutenant Fowler went forward on the 6th March. Captain Ross, hearing, on the 8th, that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were in difficulties at Reshun, went with Lieutenant Jones and 60 Sikhs to their assistance. They reached the Karagh defile about noon, and found it held in strength by a large body of men estimated at 1,000, who fired on them; on their trying to return they found the road closed. As they had by this time lost 20 men they took cover, holding out in caves all the next day. On the 10th, at 2 a.m., they started to cut their way back to Buni, where, however, only Lieutenant Jones and 14 men arrived alive. Captain Ross, 46 fighting men, eight followers, and a hospital assistant were killed. Lieutenant Jones himself and some of the survivors were wounded. Lieutenant Moberley left Mastuj with 150 Kashmir troops and 53 Punyal levies on the 16th March, and reached Buni the next day. Hearing that the enemy were preparing to cut the bridge and hold the defile behind him, and recognising that any further attempt to advance would be uselessly sacrificing life, Lieutenant Moberley, after consultation with Lieutenant Jones, decided to retire at once to Mastuj. According to Lieutenant Jones' information, there were some of Umra Khan's men in Drasan at this time. The fate of the Subadar's party, of the sappers with Lieutenant Fowler and of Lieutenant Edwardes, remained uncertain up to the end of March, but news has since been received that the two British officers were made prisoners and handed over to Umra Khan, along with a Jemadar, eight Muhammadan sepoy, two Dogras, and a Sikh. The loss of the enemy in their attack on Captain Ross's party is said to have been heavy.

This intelligence materially altered the situation again. It was now known to us that, before we had taken the action described above, Umra Khan and Sher Afzal had actually waged war upon British Indian and Kashmir troops. The necessity for relieving Mr. Robertson's force in Chitral was more imminent than had been supposed, while the reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw from Chitral had disappeared. Colonel Kelly, commanding the 32nd Pioneers, the senior military officer in the Gilgit district, was placed in command of operations in the Gilgit district. His orders permitted him to make such dispositions and movements as he might think best, provided he undertook no operations which did not offer reasonable prospects of success. It was, however, felt that the relief of Chitral from that side was probably impossible. Orders were therefore issued for the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force as soon as it could be made ready. Colonel Kelly with 200 Pioneers and four officers left Gilgit for Mastuj on the 23rd March, and reached Gupis on the 25th; 200 more, with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, started for Ghizr on the 24th. Two hundred more Pioneers were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, and the remainder proceeded to Chilas, relieving 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts at Bunar and Ramghat bridge. Unfortunately, just at this time, heavy snow fell on the hills, and there was reported to be 4½ feet on the Shandur Pass. This seriously impeded Colonel Kelly's advance, but he has nevertheless crossed the pass and taken two mountain guns with him. He arrived at Laspur with 200 Pioneers and two guns on the 5th April, and reconnoitred as far as Gasht, finding the enemy in position about three miles beyond. He advanced to Gasht on the 8th. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered from the fact that there had been 30 cases of snow blindness and 26 cases of frost bite among his men.

General Sir Robert Low, with the Divisional Head-quarters and the second and third brigades of the Chitral Relief Force, arrived at Mardan on the 30th March. The first troops crossed the frontier on the 1st April.

Little news has been received of the actual condition of affairs at Chitral itself. The Sipah Salar informed Mr. Udny on the 24th of March that some Kafirs had told him that Umra Khan had started off most of his force from Kila Darosh to Chitral, retaining only 500 men at the former place; but he called up reinforcements from Bajaur, whither other reports say he himself went for the Muhammadan festival, which fell on the 28th

March. Mr. Udny says that, situated as he is, in a camp surrounded by Afghan pickets, it is almost impossible for him to obtain information independently of the Sipah Salar.

The Jemadar, who has been already mentioned as being one of the prisoners with Umra Khan, effected his escape and reached Peshawar on the 10th April, and made a statement to Mr. Cuninghame, the Commissioner. It appears from this that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes, after holding out gallantly for seven days, were seized by treachery. Muhammad Isa Khan, Sher Afzal's foster-brother, induced them to leave the shelter of the village, in which they had been defending themselves, by assuring them that peace had been restored. They were seized along with a few of their party, and sent to Chitral, the remainder of the party being killed. There they learned that an officer, whom the Jemadar believed was Lieutenant Gurdon, and apparently a number of the defenders of the fort, had lost their lives in an engagement outside the town. It would appear from this account that the fort was plentifully stocked with provisions, but Mr. Robertson's party seems to have been hard pressed, for the Jemadar says that a truce having been established, negotiations proceeded for about five days with the view of arranging for Mr. Robertson's retirement.

The parley apparently ended without any agreement being arrived at. Native reports say all was well at Chitral Fort up to the 1st April. But the Chitralis are in force within 5 miles of Mastuj, and have closed all communication between Mastuj and Ghizr.

Everything possible is being done to secure the goodwill of the tribes through whose country the Relief Force will march. Safdar Khan of Nawagai and Muhammad Sharif Khan, the ex-Khan of Dir, are both showing a friendly disposition. The Khan of Nawagai on receipt of the Government Proclamation openly declared himself a friend of Government, and his Agents, who had come in to British territory, produced a letter from the Khan in which he asks for permanent relations with the British Government, and not such unreliable relations as the Amir forms. They have been given a promise of an allowance and arms and ammunition for the Khan, conditional on the latter not being used against the Amir, and on good service, and they have been sent on ahead to arrange for grain and supplies. Safdar Khan is said to be keeping his people back from joining Umra Khan against us. Muhammad Sharif Khan has, it is reported, addressed the Afghan Sipah Salar asking for his consent to attack Umra Khan. He sent a similar communication to the Peshawar authorities. He accompanied our troops to the Swat river, and General Low reports that the Khan has now obtained possession of all the forts on the Panjkora river, and has promised to co-operate against Umra Khan. The attitude of the Mulla of Manki, the most influential Mulla on or within the Peshawar border, has been from the first uncertain. He possesses property within the Peshawar District, and has doubtless been subjected to contrary influences. He professed at first to intend to behave as a loyal subject, but he is reported to have advised the Swat jirga to oppose our force entering Swat. Since the defeat and submission of the Swatis, the Mulla has dismissed all deputations who attended on them with advice that they should not fight. He has declared that the present occasion is not one for a jihad. The Mulla of Adda tried in vain to raise the Mohmands, and the Buner Mullas were directly threatened by the headmen of their tribe with punishment if they did not withdraw from opposition. On the whole it may be said that Mulla influence succeeded in organising opposition to the entry of our troops into Swat, but failed to raise a general tribal gathering against us.

We have the pleasure to record that numerous offers of service have been received from the States which maintain Imperial Service troops, and from other States as well, besides offers made by Chiefs and private persons to render individual services. The Jaipur and Gwalior transport corps have been accepted, and they have already arrived on the frontier, having moved out of their States within 48 hours of receipt of notice—an excellent performance considering that all the carts had to be taken to pieces, and eleven trains were required for the conveyance of the corps. The three Kashmir infantry regiments at Jammu, which would in ordinary course go up to Gilgit in relief this year, were very anxious to join the Relief Force, and the Maharaja of Kashmir and Raja Ram Singh expressed their desire to accompany them. It did not appear to us that the occasion was one in which the Imperial Service troops other than transport corps should be employed. We did not desire to exaggerate the gravity of the occasion. We were mobilising one division only, a force which we deemed to be sufficient for the purpose. It therefore in our opinion was inexpedient to bring into the expedition troops, the intention of whose organisation is that they should be held in reserve for use in an emergency.

The utmost good and loyal feeling has been shown by the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar. They both volunteered to furnish more men for service, and on the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, inquiring through the political officer in Hunza if any more men were willing to enlist temporarily as levies in addition to the 90 now in Ghizr, the Mir of

Hunza, Muhammad Nazim Khan, and Raja Sikundar Khan, the heir of the Khan of Nagar, who owing to his father's age is actually the Ruler of the State, themselves immediately responded by arriving in Gilgit with some 900 men of all ranks, ready to serve Government in any way required. Each man brought a fortnight's supplies, in order to avoid giving trouble. Two hundred have been employed as levies, half to go on to Colonel Kelly to Ghizr, and the remainder to guard the Roshan nullah. Two hundred have gone to Gupis with supplies. Captain Stewart reports that the most enthusiastic spirit was displayed by all; and the effect on Darel and Tangir should be excellent.

Telegraphic communications have already informed Her Majesty's Government of the advance through Swat to the Panjkora river at Sado of the force under Sir Robert Low.

No. 31.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 18, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

We have discussed Chitral policy with reference to your telegram of 30th March, with following conclusions:—

- (1.) Until we have ascertained what has happened in Chitral since Robertson was shut up we cannot arrive at a final conclusion as to policy; but
- (2.) We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road (to the) Peshawur border, is a matter of first importance.
- (3.) If a road is not opened from Peshawur, we have not unanimously come to conclusion in regard to expediency of occupying Chitral; but
- (4.) We are unanimous in asking your permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening up of this road when, in our opinion, the opportunity arises in connexion with General Low's advance, and in thinking it would be serious mistake to lose this opportunity.

No. 32.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 19, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 30th March. The policy accepted by Lord Kimberley in his Despatch of 1st September 1893, and by me in my Despatch of 3rd August 1894 was avowedly provisional. The agreement with Russia on Pamir question and demarcation with Amir of internal boundaries would have made an early decision as to future policy in any case desirable, but events in Chitral and the operations of General Low's forces render it expedient that the question should be taken into immediate consideration by your Government. Recent events show the peril of maintaining a British officer with escort in Chitral, so long as he can be supported only *via* Gilgit. To arrange for his support by the shorter line of the Peshawur-Dir route involves questions financial, political, and military, of serious difficulty and importance. I wish you to consider and advise me whether the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such in your opinion as to render desirable in the face of these difficulties the maintenance of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, which as I understand, were, to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them. Also, whether you can suggest any method of securing these objects less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force. I should be glad to receive an outline of your views by telegram, if possible.

No. 33.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 20, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of yesterday. Our views as to importance of Chitral are expressed in our telegram of 18th, but without entering into negotiations with tribes I cannot answer as to cost of road from Peshawur, or extent of political difficulties

No. 34.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 25, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Chitral. Your telegrams of 18th and 20th April. I have no objection to your sounding the tribes as to the terms and conditions on which they would consent to opening up and maintaining Peshawur-Chitral road, should this road be hereafter decided on; but I do not wish to be committed to the policy of the military occupation of Chitral or maintaining a British officer there permanently, with or without support of this road, till Her Majesty's Government have had an opportunity of fully considering your detailed views and arguments on questions stated in my telegram of 19th April for your consideration.

No. 35.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, April 25, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Chitral. Narrative of events indicates withdrawal under present circumstances impossible, as it would leave country to complete anarchy and would render a settlement more difficult. In our opinion we must also keep open the road from Peshawur for some time, probably three or four months at least, whatever the ultimate decision may be.

No. 36.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 15, April 26, 1895.

I HAVE recently had under my careful consideration the various questions connected with the past and future policy of your Government in regard to the Gilgit Agency, and especially in regard to its dealings with Chitral.

On this subject my predecessor, the Earl of Kimberley, when sanctioning the appointment of a British officer as political Agent in Chitral, wrote, in his Despatch No. 34, Secret, of 1st September 1893, as follows:—

“I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as political agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account, and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. If the Amir could be brought to abandon all idea of bringing Chitral under his control, the danger of a Chief under Afghan influence, such as Sher Afzul, obtaining power over Chitral would be much lessened. Again, should the present negotiations with Russia be brought to a successful issue, and a line of boundary be agreed on and delimited, even though in close propinquity to the Chitral boundary, another danger which you now apprehend would be materially reduced. Thirdly, if the political operations of your frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritation of the frontier tribes, that element of danger will be in a fair way to disappear. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime, I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him, but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safeguarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit.

In my Despatch No. 34, Secret, of 3rd August last, I adhered to the same policy. I said:—

“The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be “premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this

frontier are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cunningham's letter to the Resident in Kashmir."

Since that Despatch was written, the protracted discussion as to the limit of Russian influence in the region of the Upper Oxus has been brought to a close, and an agreement has been arrived at by which the southern boundary of Russia's possessions in these regions will be the Panja and the Pamir rivers, and a line drawn eastward from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier. The effect of this will be, while bringing her in one direction within a very short distance of the Chitral frontier, to maintain in the other an intervening belt of country between her southern outposts and the eastern end of the Hindu Kush. Moreover, the demarcation of the Afghan boundary under the Durand agreement in which the Amir undertakes to abstain from interference in Chitral and the transfer to Afghanistan of the whole of the Kafir country up to Chitral introduces a new element into the problem.

The delimitation of these boundaries would, apart from recent events in Chitral, have introduced changes indicating that the time had arrived for some general survey of the existing situation, in order that the policy which had been provisionally adopted might now be settled on some permanent basis, but these events themselves have brought into strong relief the risk involved in maintaining a British officer in Chitral under existing conditions, a risk not unforeseen by your predecessor but one which, owing to the peculiar combination of a popular claimant to the Chitral throne with the Pathan invaders, has taken a more acute form than was probably present to the minds of the Marquis of Lansdowne and his advisers.

On the one hand it has been made clear that so long as a British Agent and his escort in Chitral can be supported only from Gilgit he may for months be cut off from any support at all, and at best can only be supplied from a small and inaccessible frontier station by means of a road 200 miles in length, and of the worst possible description for military purposes; while to maintain a garrison at Gilgit adequate for such military responsibilities as the existing combination has thrown upon you, would involve an intolerable financial burden, both upon the Kashmir Government and on your own.

On the other hand, to adopt the shorter and more direct line of communication between Peshawar and Chitral involves the gravest responsibilities, both military and financial. The establishment and maintenance of this line of communication has been recognised as an important element in the policy of your Government in Chitral, but it was at first hoped that, by the influence of Umra Khan, an arrangement might be come to with the Pathan tribes, through whose territory the route runs, for effecting this object. As it became clear that the assistance of Umra Khan was not likely to be obtained, the project was laid by; but it has always been urged by the local authorities as essential to the security of the Agency at Chitral.

The question whether such a road running for 150 miles through the territory of Pathan tribes, notorious for their fanaticism and hostility to foreigners, can be maintained at all without constant military pressure, or even military occupation, is one which is open to discussion; but in any case it is certain that it cannot be maintained without heavy expenditure from year to year, and it is possible that if maintained by arrangements with the tribes it might at the most critical time be closed against us, and the whole work of opening it up by military force would in that case have to be undertaken again from the beginning.

With these considerations in view I addressed to your Excellency, on the 30th March,* the telegram quoted in the margin; but I am anxious that your Excellency should lose no time in considering, as soon as circumstances permit, whether any and

* See page 35.

what changes in your existing arrangements with regard to Chitral will be expedient as soon as the expedition has accomplished its immediate objects of relieving Surgeon-Major Robertson and his party, and of vindicating the rights of the Kashmir Durbar against Umra Khan.

The original objects of maintaining a British officer in Chitral were (1) to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests; (2) to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes; and (3) to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes. The question now to be considered is whether, in view of the recent changes in the situation noticed above, the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such as to require that these cardinal points of our past policy should still be maintained even at risk and expense, and whether in that case there is any method of sufficiently safeguarding them, less costly and less hazardous than by placing a British officer there, and maintaining his position by a long line of supports whether to Gilgit or to Peshawar.

It is not my intention to discuss at present other alternatives which have been proposed, or to suggest new ones myself, but I trust that your Excellency's Government will give me the benefit of your deliberations as early as may be convenient, and, if possible, by telegraph, that I may be enabled to come to a final conclusion on the subject, and to make it known without any avoidable delay.

The purport of this Despatch was telegraphed to you on the 19th instant.

No 37.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, April 27, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 25th crossed yours of same date. Pending the final decision of Her Majesty's Government I do not object to the temporary arrangements which you consider necessary.

No. 38.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 210, dated May 8, 1895.

SIR,

In your telegram of the 30th March last, you impressed upon us the necessity of carefully reconsidering in the light of recent events our policy with regard to Chitral and its neighbourhood, and of keeping in the meantime our hands perfectly free. In your telegram of the 19th April you defined more precisely the matters which require consideration, and the new conditions which have arisen to affect them, and in your telegram of the 25th April you asked us to place before you our detailed views and arguments upon these questions.

There are two important factors in the circumstances of the present moment which must exercise a great influence in governing our action in this region. These are the exact sequence of events in Chitral and the attitude which the Amir of Afghanistan may take up with reference to the line to be demarcated on the Pamirs and the crests of the Hindu Kush. We were conscious that, in the absence of information as to the second of these factors and without precise information regarding the first, we could not lay before Her Majesty's Government a final and complete exposition of our opinion as to future policy in Chitral. In considering the question raised by your first telegram cited above, however, we found ourselves able to arrive at certain conclusions which we lost no time in placing before you in the telegram which is given in the margin.

We fully accept the definition of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral contained in your telegram of April 19th, *i.e.*, "to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them." We may further refer to Lord Kimberley's

Despatch No. 34, dated the 1st September 1893, in which our policy and the means to be adopted for the attainment of its objects were thus described :—

“In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march from the Chitral frontier, render it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

“I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral, it would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.”

Two alternatives are placed before us. We must maintain our position in Chitral, or change our policy and abandon the attempt to keep any effective control over the external affairs of that State.

The history of Chitral demonstrates that the State has not for the last 20 years been able to stand alone. Fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty. The precarious rule of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk who have succeeded to the Mehtarship was manifestly less able to maintain the integrity of the State without assistance. The present condition of Chitral, since its invasion by Umra Khan and the investment of Mr. Robertson in the fort by Sher Afzal, is one of anarchy. It is now more clear than ever that the country must lean on some external support.

It has been suggested that we may avoid the dangers consequent on our withdrawal by inviting Afghan control. The objections to giving the Amir suzerainty over Chitral remain in our opinion as valid as when Lord Kimberley's despatch already quoted was written. Even, if the moral effect of giving to Afghanistan the control of Chitral were not so detrimental to the interests of the Indian Empire as we believe, the actual military risk is still in our opinion so great that we should hesitate to depart from the consistent line of policy described in the quotation given above. We would urge further that if, after the occurrences of the last two months, we hand over Chitral to a foreigner, or fail adequately to provide for the interests of those who in this emergency have declared themselves on our side, we shall be looked upon by Chitralis and Kashmiris alike as unfaithful friends. The value of our support now and hereafter will be depreciated, and those who at any future time might feel disposed to assist us will be deterred by the consideration that they have nothing to gain by taking our side. The tribes between Chitral and India will necessarily believe we are afraid to hold that which we have expended so much to grasp, and the Amir of Afghanistan will also ascribe our action to weakness. We have come under certain obligations to the Amir in regard to the tribes on our side of the boundary; and we must not imagine that by handing over Chitral we should be relieved of the difficulties thence arising, for the more turbulent Bajauris, Swatis, and Mohmands would remain ready to create disturbances.

It seems to us to be demonstrated that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral is a matter of first importance; that to abandon Chitral to the possibility of foreign occupation would involve a risk which we ought not to run; that giving the country over to Afghanistan does not guard India, and would increase the difficulty of frontier relations with the Amir; and that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir.

Events have, however, greatly changed the conditions under which we can hope to maintain that influence. Sher Afzal, an aspirant to the Mehtarship, has ostentatiously departed from the policy of his predecessors. Not placing himself under British protection and British guidance, he came trusting to the strength of a foreign invader, Umra Khan of Jandol, perhaps to the power which he believed to be at the invader's back, and ventured to dictate his terms to the British Agent, and to offer his friendship as a favour. Together they raised the country against us, attacked our troops and cut them off in defiles where nature lent strength to their attack, entrapped our officers by treachery and deceit, and laid vigorous siege to the last strongholds in the country where any of our troops maintained themselves. The events which have culminated in the gallant defence of Chitral and the costly measures taken for its relief, both from north

and south, render it in our opinion impossible that we can ever think of maintaining British influence in that country again without the presence of British troops.

What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral Valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilgit and the expense of doing so are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive. If opening a road by Swat and the country to the north of it means subduing the tribes and holding the line by force, not only great cost but many embarrassing complications may be involved. We are not, however, convinced that these difficulties will occur. Our present operations have not aroused that general religious war upon our north-western frontier which was predicted; and this notwithstanding, that the whole influence of Umra Khan and of the Mullahs was thrown into the scale for a jihad. These operations have rather demonstrated that the hostility of the tribes has been exaggerated; that the leading men are amenable to arguments of utility; that the Mullah fanatical influence is less strong than it was believed to be; and that it may be possible to come to arrangements with the intervening tribes which, backed by a sufficient but not extravagant show of force, will be adequate to keep open a route by which troops and supplies can be sent up to Chitral. It is a route by which, until closed by Umra Khan for his own purposes, a considerable trade is believed to have passed; and there is reason to think this trade may be revived. The information we have received regarding the country traversed by the Relief Expedition leads us to expect that our troops in the Chitral Valley would not be wholly dependent upon supplies imported from India. On the contrary, the fertility and state of cultivation of the valleys intervening between Swat and Chitral appear to be such that a considerable proportion of the necessary food and fodder could probably be drawn from them. It will be our endeavour to ascertain with greater precision the extent to which local production may be relied upon. It is reasonable to expect that, if we succeed in establishing relations such as are above indicated, cultivation will increase, and the surplus produce will be made more and more readily available; and it should be borne in mind that any economy thus introduced will not merely affect the cost of the new post at Chitral, but may have a material effect on the expenses of the Gilgit Agency as a whole.

The opportunity which presented itself for negotiating with the tribes along the route held by General Sir R. Low's force was one which, in our opinion, should not be thrown away. Without opening preliminary negotiations, we could not say what chance there really was of making satisfactory and permanent amicable arrangements; but we had reason to hope that they could be made. We therefore made the proposal to which your telegram of the 25th April gave approval. Under the circumstances as they now present themselves, and having regard to your desire that we should submit to you our detailed views and arguments before we take any decisive action, it will be impossible for us to do more than make indirect inquiries, until we are informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the whole policy to be adopted in Chitral.

We are fully conscious that the course which we recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our north-west frontier which we would fain avoid. It may be possible to lessen these objections. If amicable relations can be established with the tribes, not only would it be easier to retain for them the autonomy which we should desire to conserve, but the cost of thus securing the defence of our frontier may be greatly reduced. In any event the interests are so large that it is our plain duty to lay before you the conclusions at which after full consideration we have arrived.

No. 39.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 113, dated June 11, 1895.

OUR Despatch, No. 66, of the 17th April gave a narrative account of affairs in Chitral and connected matters up to the concentration of the relief force under Sir Robert Low at Mardan on the 30th of March, and the crossing of the Shandur Pass

by the small column under Colonel Kelly and his arrival at Gasht on the 8th of April. The present Despatch deals with the progress of the Chitral Relief Force, the relief of the garrison of the Chitral Fort by Colonel Kelly, and the existing situation.

On the 4th April, the day following the forcing of the Malakand Pass, the 1st Brigade of the Relief Force advanced towards Khar, and dispersed a large hostile gathering. The enemy's loss on the 3rd and 4th is estimated at about 1,000 men. The upper Ranizais, who were defeated on the 3rd April, at once submitted and set about collecting supplies. The Khan of Dir, who had joined the British camp on the 2nd April, was dismissed with a promise of reward if he rendered full assistance. He was well received by the people on his return to his country; the forts along the Panjkora river fell into his hands, he captured and disarmed 100 of Umra Khan's men, and seized the family of Muhammad Shah Khan, Umra Khan's brother. Under orders from the political officer, he sent some of his headmen towards Chitral to render assistance to Mr. Robertson, if needed.

Umra Khan left Kila Drosh towards the end of March for Barwa or Jandol, leaving 800 picked men at Kila Drosh and Chitral under his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, and cousin, Abdul Majid Khan, respectively. Umra Khan took with him Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes and 10 sepoy who had been taken prisoners in Chitral. He treated the British officers with kindness, but at the same time was writing letters to all the surrounding tribes calling on them to join in a jihad.

On the 6th April a force visited Thana, where a gathering had been seen the previous day; the village proved submissive, the enemy having retired to a safe distance. The passage of the Swat river was forced on the 7th April, in the face of strong opposition from the enemy who crowned the opposite heights, under the command of Umra Khan's brother, Muhammad Shah Khan. The enemy were dispersed and pursued by the cavalry, who inflicted great loss on them.

On the 8th news was received that Umra Khan had recalled the men he had left behind in Chitral. Up to this time the tribal gatherings had been more or less local, and but few contingents had come in from long distances, thus showing that the prospects of a general jihad were not serious. The Adda Mullah had in a half-hearted manner attempted to raise the Northern Mohmand clans, but though restless, they did not take the field in any numbers, and the Mullah of Manki prudently refrained from active opposition. The Khan of Nawagai, as far as is known, used his influence in preventing the clans from joining Umra Khan. The Bunerwals, who at the instigation of Mullahs and in opposition to the advice of their Maliks, had collected in some strength, were sent back by the Swatis, who had been given to understand that they would be held responsible for any gatherings allowed to enter their limits.

On the 10th April a reconnaissance was made towards Miankali; the troops were fired upon on their return. Six of the sapper sepoy released by Umra Khan arrived in camp at Khar, and brought news of the safety of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

On the 12th of April a bridge was built over the Panjkora river, and the Guides infantry were sent across to burn a village, the inhabitants of which had fired on the troops. During the night the bridge was broken by logs floating down the river. Next morning the Guides carried out the punitive operations which had been ordered, but were subsequently attacked by two large bodies of the enemy, and in withdrawing Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Commanding, was unfortunately killed. The enemy suffered heavily on this occasion, and retired up the valley. The same morning Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in General Low's camp, with a letter from Umra Khan, inquiring what conditions Government intended imposing on him. We instructed Sir Robert Low to insist on the safe delivery of prisoners as an essential preliminary to any discussion of terms. The General wrote to Umra Khan accordingly, on the 15th April. Shortly after the despatch of the General's letter, a letter was received from Lieutenant Fowler, saying that Umra Khan was anxious to parley and wished the construction of the bridge and the advance of the troops stopped. A letter was also received from the Khan practically admitting that, if the troops advanced through Jandol, he could not control the tribesmen. The messenger was dismissed without a reply, and on the 16th of April Lieutenant Fowler and all the other prisoners arrived safely in camp at Sado. The bridge over the river was completed the same day, and the advance was continued on the next.

The gathering in Jandol, which at this time was estimated at several thousands, now began to disperse, and with the exception of slight resistance on the 17th near Miankalai,

no further opposition has been offered to General Low's force. On the 18th of April we ordered General Low to repeat to Umra Khan that the only terms he was authorised to offer were unconditional surrender, with an honourable asylum in India for himself, his family, and a reasonable number of his supporters. Umra Khan, however, fled on the night of the 17th in the direction of the Asmar border.

On the 20th April news reached General Low that on the 16th Mr. Robertson and his party in the Chitral Fort were very hard pressed, and that the enemy's mines had reached within a few yards of the walls. General Gatacre, who had reached Bar Baraul, was ordered to immediately push on with a small force to the relief of the garrison. The details regarding the situation in Chitral were subsequently shown to be correct; but fortune had already changed, and within a few hours of the arrival of the alarming report, news was received that the Chitral Fort had been relieved, and that Sher Afzal had absconded. The relief had been effected by Colonel Kelly's force, an account of whose advance as far as Gasht, under exceptionally difficult circumstances, was given in our Despatch of the 17th April. On the 9th of April, the little force occupied Mastuj after a sharp brush with a well-posted gathering of the enemy, armed with breech-loaders, a few miles out of Gasht. Muhammad Wali, Pakhtun Wali, Muhammad Rafi (who had been appointed Governor of Laspur by Mr. Robertson) and Abdulla Khan of Mastuj are believed to have been with the enemy on this occasion. Colonel Kelly found the garrison at Mastuj all well. On the 12th April, he reconnoitred to Nisagal, where the enemy were found in some strength. The following day he advanced with 640 men, including some from the Mastuj garrison, and, after two hours' fighting, drove out the enemy, inflicting a loss of not less than 50 killed and many wounded. From Nisagal he made for Kila Drasan by a détour through the hills, the regular road having been broken. He found the fort empty and villages deserted. On the 20th of April the force arrived at Chitral.

For a full description of affairs in Chitral from the date of Mr. Robertson's arrival there until the relief of the garrison on the 19th April we have the honour to refer you to Mr. Robertson's report of the 30th April.

The following brief account is taken almost *verbatim* from a telegram, despatched by him immediately communication was restored :—

"Amir-ul-Mulk was merely temporarily and provisionally recognised as Mehtar of Chitral on the revolt of the Khushwaktis. The agreement between us was that he would be responsible for the Katuris, and I personally would be responsible for the Khushwaktis. Government was pledged to nothing. This point was distinctly and repeatedly insisted upon. On 2nd March, Amir-ul-Mulk practically resigned the Mehtarship; at the same time he made overtures to Umra Khan, promising to induce us to retire towards Mastuj and to attack us on the road at the Baitaripari just this side of Kari. He has been in custody ever since. He is wanting in intellect, and was merely the tool of two young unscrupulous advisers who were exploiting him. On March 2nd, Shuja-ul-Mulk was made temporary and provisional Mehtar. It was absolutely necessary to have some nominal, though temporary, Mehtar to dissipate any fear in the minds of the Chitralis that we were annexing the country. Again it was most carefully explained to everyone that the arrangement was temporary and provisional, and that the Government were not pledged to it in any way. Our position though very difficult was not hopeless until after the disaster of 3rd March. After that unfortunate event all Chitralis outside the fort were compelled from fear for their families to join Sher Afzal. They also believed he was supported by the Amir, and that Umra Khan, the Sipah Salar and Mohmands had joined in a religious war against us, and that our position was desperate, while they knew that, if in time we triumphed, they had still nothing to fear from us in the way of vengeance."

A very interesting and full report of the siege of the Chitral Fort has been written by Captain Townshend, who succeeded to the command when Captain Campbell was wounded. To complete this narrative, it will suffice to give the following summary furnished by Mr. Robertson :—"3rd March 1895, reconnaissance found Sher Afzal in strength; lost Captain Baird killed, Captain Campbell, C.I.H., wounded; General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh of the Imperial Service troops killed; 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoy of 4th Kashmir Rifles killed, and 28 wounded. 4th March, siege commenced. 8th March, enemy attempted to fire the water tower; fire extinguished. 14th March, enemy attacked east side of fort, failed. 5th April, enemy occupied summer-house in garden within 50 yards of gun-tower. 6th April, enemy advanced sangar up to 40 yards from the main gate in the

night. 7th April, enemy attacked at 5 a.m. and set fire to gun-tower and made an attack on waterway, failed; fire in tower extinguished. British Agent wounded and several men killed and wounded by enemy's riflemen. 8th April, Enemy attempted to fire the gun-tower for the second time. 11th April, enemy made an attack on all sides of fort, failed. 17th April, sortie, summer-house taken and enemy's mine blown up; our loss 8 killed and 13 wounded, of which Sikhs had 3 killed and 5 wounded, and 4th Kashmir Rifles had 5 killed and 8 wounded; enemy's loss about 60, of whom 35 were bayoneted. Summary of casualties: 101 wounded, 40 fatally. Sher Afzal, Abdul Majid Khan of Shina, Abdul Ghani Khan of Shaha, and large following retreated to Drosch last night (18th) abandoning siege of fort. Much sickness from bad food, excessive work, and exposure; conduct of troops admirable; Campbell doing well as are all other wounded. Townshend, Gurdon, Harley, and Whitchurch all well, in spite of excessive work and unceasing alarms. Our heavy casualty list due to wonderful marksmanship of enemy, to the fort being commanded on all sides, and to enemy's sangars being close up to walls. The discipline, devotion, and fortitude displayed by all ranks, under circumstances which required all those qualities, is beyond all praise. Chitral at present denuded of inhabitants who have fled to the hills from fear of reprisals."

On the news of the relief of the Chitral Fort being confirmed, we decided that the force under General Gatacre should continue to advance over the Lowarai Pass, though there was no longer any necessity for haste, and the troops marched more leisurely and constructed a road over the pass as they proceeded. The pass was crossed on the 26th April, the snow being then at places two feet deep. On the 28th April, news was received from General Low that Sher Afzal and 300 men, including two of Sher Afzal's brothers, and several men of importance, had been captured at Patrak by the Khan of Dir and brought to the British camp. Eighty-one breech-loading rifles were recovered. Sher Afzal's foster-brother, Muhammad Isa, who has been one of the chief leaders in the recent disturbances, has hitherto escaped, and is at present believed to be in hiding in Tangir.

Throughout the month of May, the Chitral Relief Force continued to hold the country between the Malekand and the Chitral Valley. Shots have been frequently fired into the various camps, and several cases of attacks on individuals, principally camp-followers and sentries, and of cutting of the telegraph wire, have occurred. Lieutenant Robertson was wounded by a ghazi on the 27th April, while reconnoitring the Panjkora route. The ghazi escaped, but was captured on the Swat border by the Paindeh Khel Jirga, who brought him to the British camp at Dir, where he was tried summarily and executed on the 1st May. There has apparently been some discussion among the Mamunds, Shamozais, Charmangis, and other tribes as to the desirability of commencing hostilities after they have got in their harvest. Major Deane, chief political officer with Sir Robert Low, considers, however, that it is unlikely there will be any general combination of the tribes against us. On the whole the country is quieter than might have been expected. The Khans of Swat have opened up, on their own responsibility, the Shabkot Pass route for commissariat purposes, an arrangement which will effect a reduction in expenditure. The Mullah of Manki and the Adda Mullah are much discredited, and unlikely to attempt to get together fresh gatherings.

Full and interesting reports have been received from Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler of the events preceding and following their seizure. They do not materially differ from the brief summary recorded in our Despatch of the 17th April. Lieutenant Edwardes writes in terms of the warmest praise of the men and officers of the 4th Kashmir Rifles who were with him; and both officers report that Umra Khan treated them well, and that they believe he never intended to be the direct cause of any injury to them under any circumstances. Lieutenant Jones has also submitted an account of the circumstances in which Captain Ross's detachment of Sikhs was practically annihilated while endeavouring to render assistance to the small party under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

Sher Afzal, Kokand Beg, Yadgar Beg, Muhammad Afzal Beg, Danial Beg, Inayat Shah, Raza Khel, whose arrest by the Khan of Dir is reported above, arrived at Rawalpindi on the 6th of May, and have since been sent to Dharmasala, where for the present they will be detained as prisoners of war. Amir-ul-Mulk, who has now been deported from Chitral by Mr. Robertson, is also being sent there. The rest of the captives brought in with Sher Afzal were sent back to their homes. Sher Afzal has submitted a written representation disclaiming all responsibility for the recent occurrences in Chitral. He states that he was entirely in the power of Umra Khan, and had to obey orders; at the same time he protests that the conflict outside the Chitral Fort on the 3rd of March

was not of his seeking, and that his men did not commence to fight until they were attacked. He says that he was not captured by the Khan of Dir, but submitted voluntarily, using the Khan as a mediator with Government.

Mr. Robertson reports that the state of affairs at Chitral soon after the relief of the garrison was, as might have been expected, unsatisfactory. The people were almost all in sympathy with Sher Afzal, and had acquired an extreme dislike of the British; with the knowledge of the capture of Sher Afzal, however, and his deportation to India, the people soon began to settle down, and many of the Adamzadas came in to do homage to the young Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk. The despatch of British troops to Chitral through Swat has quite cowed the people; they seem to have had no more idea of the power of Government to take such a step than Umra Khan had.

For some time after the relief of the Chitral Fort, the force under Colonel Kelly remained halted at Chitral in an entrenched position on a ridge south of the fort. We did not consider this an adequate assertion of military supremacy, and General Gatacre was ordered to continue his march on Chitral, with one mountain battery, one British and two Native battalions. Subsequently, on a warning from Mr. Robertson that a brigade visiting Chitral would endanger a famine by eating up the spring crops, we decided only to send the 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment, and a mountain battery; and that this force should only stay a few days at Chitral, the rest of General Gatacre's brigade being distributed along the road from Ashreth to Drosh. General Gatacre reached Chitral on the 11th May. Sir Robert Low and the divisional head-quarters arrived five days later, returning after a very brief stay. The troops, belonging to the Gilgit command are on their way back to Mastuj and the Gilgit district, and the Chitral garrison and the escort of the assistant political officer in Chitral are supplied by a wing of the 4th Gurkhas from the Chitral Relief Force.

Disquieting rumours as to impending disturbances along the line between Mastuj and Gilgit were prevalent about the middle of May, but proved exaggerated or unfounded, and there is no reason to anticipate any trouble in this direction.

Towards the end of April, Umra Khan arrived at Asmar, where he was detained, pending orders from the Amr. His brothers, with the exception of Muhammad Shah Khan, are said to have been with him. Some 500 rifles were taken from the men of his party and lodged in the Asmar Fort. Eventually the Sipah Salar sent him under guard to Kabul, where he arrived on the 11th of May. His Highness has not addressed us on the subject of the arrival of the Khan at his capital, probably regarding it, like the flight of Sher Afzal from Kabul, as an incident about which it were better for him to remain silent.

No. 40.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, June 13, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government have given most careful consideration to question of future policy in regard to Chitral, and to your letter of 8th May. They fully appreciate your point of view, and it is with regret that they find themselves unable to concur in the opinions of your Government, to which in all matters they attach great weight. They have decided that no military force or European agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral shall not be fortified, and that no road shall be made between Peshawur and Chitral. It will follow that all positions beyond our frontier, now held in consequence of the recent relief operations, should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allow, but the dates and details are left to your discretion. As regards Chitral State, they request that, in view of decisions above stated, you will telegraph what are the arrangements which you would recommend for the future. Any proposals which you may make will receive most careful attention from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 41.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, June 14, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

We deeply regret, but loyally accept, decision. We are earnestly considering question placed before us.

No. 42.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, June 22, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Possibility of withdrawing Low's force at once, stocking Chitral with a view to temporary occupation and eventual retirement of garrison by Gilgit, after arrangements for future of country had been completed has been considered by us; but Commander-in-Chief reported this plan impracticable. Low's force would have to remain in present position whilst supplies sufficient for an adequate force at Chitral and its transport were being thrown forward, which could not be done under six weeks. It would also prove very difficult to withdraw troops via Gilgit, and expense would be enormous. Force therefore cannot be withdrawn until Chitral is evacuated, and the whole operation should be simultaneous and effected at earliest possible date.

(2.) To invite Amir to occupy any part of Chitral would be reversal of all previous policy, would impose foreign ruler on unwilling people, and could not now be arranged, if at all, without delay and uncertainty, which in present circumstances would lead to dangerous consequences and complications.

(3.) We propose in future arrangements for Chitral to divide Katur from Kushwakt country and restrict Mehtar of Chitral's authority to Katur. This is in accordance with wishes of Kushwaktis as expressed to Robertson.

(4.) Shuja-ul-Mulk's life would not be safe if left. We therefore propose to bring him to India, and to invite headmen of Katur country to elect a Mehtar, but we exclude candidature of Sher Afzul on account of grave suspicion of his complicity in acts of treachery as well as hostility.

(5.) Similarly we propose Kushwaktis should elect separate ruler. Kashmir, failing agreement, might nominate.

(6.) Propose to maintain suzerain rights of Kashmir as at present over both Katur and Kushwakt countries.

(7.) Propose to send Robertson to Chitral to report on doubtful points and to carry out settlement on above lines.

(8.) We shall withdraw Assistant British Agent hitherto deputed to Chitral from Katur country when Chitral is evacuated, and from Kushwakt country as soon as circumstances permit. East of Shandur Pass we shall maintain control of country by Kashmir troops. The question of retaining Kashmir troops in Mastuj is reserved until form of administration has been determined for Kushwakt country.

(9.) It will be necessary to reward Chiefs of tribes who have befriended us in advance from Peshawur to Chitral. Low proposes giving Khan of Dir 500 sniders, some ammunition, 25,000 rupees, and 10,000 rupees a year. We propose to approve, annual allowance being only paid if Khan can without our assistance maintain his position in Dir. We have asked for report with regard to other Chiefs and Jandol.

These proposals, if sanctioned, will admit of our taking immediate action, and we consider delay in every way most undesirable.

No. 43.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 2, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

PRESENT Government must reconsider Chitral question. How long can you wait for decision without grave inconvenience?

No. 44.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 3, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

WHAT is estimate of expenditure on Chitral expedition to 30th June, beyond provision in budget? And what is estimate of monthly expenditure at present?

No. 45.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, July 4, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

We recognise time is necessary for consideration. Any delay must involve great expense and risk of further political entanglement and complications, but country fairly quiet at present, and Commander-in-Chief advises us that if recommendations made to carry out decision of late Government were acted on, Low's force could not be withdrawn till September. It is right also to point out large movement of troops during hot weather must be attended by serious danger of sickness. While, therefore, we should wish to know your views as soon as convenient, there would, apart from financial considerations, be advantage in definite postponement of final move till September or earliest opportunity of cool weather, political and other arrangements consequent on decision being carried out in interval. If this suggestion accepted, we should wish to announce definitely that during hot weather occupation of road will continue.

No. 46.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 5, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government require at least three weeks for review or modification of proposals. In the meantime you can announce that occupation of road will continue during hot weather and September. Whilst making arrangements for probable withdrawal of great part of troops by Dir road, do nothing to prevent occupation of Chitral by garrison of moderate dimensions in case ultimate decision be to that effect. Political arrangements contemplated in proposals 3, 4, 5, and 6 of your telegram of 22nd June may be commenced, and for that purpose Robertson may be sent to Chitral.

No. 47.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, July 5, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

ESTIMATED expenditure to the end of June, including initial and terminal charges, 145 lakhs beyond provision in Budget. Monthly estimated expenditure, 22½ lakhs.

No. 48.

From VICEROY, July 11, 1895

(Telegraphic.)

As decision of Her Majesty's Government may be expected within three weeks, we propose to keep Robertson at Simla, so that before his departure he may receive definite instructions as to Mehtarship, and position of Shuja-ul-Mulk, who in many respects is best candidate if garrison remains, and also on other points consequent on the ultimate decision. Meanwhile we should concert arrangements with him. We have authorised Low to announce that troops occupying Chitral and Dir roads cannot be withdrawn before September, because present season is unfavourable for movement of large bodies of troops, and because time is required to decide details of permanent settlement of Chitral.

No. 49.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, July 22, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 22nd June. If you are waiting for sanction no objection to your proposed rewards for the Khan of Dir.

No. 50.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, August 1, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HAVE you any further information as to possibility of arrangement with tribes for road between Peshawur and Chitral? See Despatch, 8th May. Assuming satisfactory road arrangements and good fortified position what is minimum strength of proposed garrison at Chitral? What is strength of force you would leave at Mastuj, assuming Chitral evacuated?

No. 51.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, August 3, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF has been consulted on points in your telegram of 1st. We have avoided open negotiations with tribes, but reports received from Lowe and Deane warrant confident expectation that peaceful arrangement for road can be made. Road along left bank Panjkora now open, and is considered in every way best. By using it we deal only with Dir and Swat. Khan of Dir's position depends on our support. Swat Khans are quite friendly. Both are said to expect us to remain. Military authorities propose for garrison in Chitral two Native infantry regiments, two guns Mountain Battery, one company of Sappers; but this admits withdrawal of Pioneer regiment from Gilgit, therefore only one additional Native regiment is required for whole district of Gilgit and Chitral. Head-quarters would be placed at Kila Drosh, Chitral itself being held by probably half battalion in strong position, and Robertson thinks it would then be possible to withdraw garrisons from Ghizr and Mastuj, concentrating at Gupis. Commander-in-Chief proposes for first year or two to keep brigade of three Native regiments, one Mountain Battery, and one company of Sappers, on Malakand, one of these battalions being at Chakdara to guard bridge over Swat river. Road from this point to Kila Drosh to be held by levies, probably 250 from Swat and 500 from Dir. Bridges at Chakdara and Chutiatan reported by Lowe sufficient, with minor additions, to last seven years. Commander-in-Chief assures me this scheme drawn up to meet all eventualities, including even necessity of holding road in force next year whilst supplies and reliefs are going up, though he thinks this unlikely. No addition to army is asked. If Chitral evacuated, Commander-in-Chief concurs in objections to permanent garrison at Mastuj. After consultation with Robertson, I think that we could arrange for fort being held by local government during winter, and that this would suffice, our officers visiting it whilst the passes are open.

No. 53.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, August 9, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government assent to proposals contained in your Despatch of 8th May, as explained and defined by telegram of 3rd August—(1.) No increase to Army. (2.) Future garrison for whole district of Gilgit and Chitral to be only one Native regiment in addition to troops previously stationed in Gilgit Agency. (3.) Head-quarters to be placed at Kila Drosh. (4.) Road between Swat River and that place to be held by tribal levies.

Make no permanent arrangement for cantonment on Malakand and neighbourhood until fuller details both of cost and numbers can be sent home. Do nothing in any way to infringe terms of Proclamation. Despatch will follow on whole subject.

No. 54.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, August 10, 1895.

(Telegraphic.)

We have informed General Low of decision of Her Majesty's Government and authorised commencement of negotiations with the Swat Khans and Khan of Dir, assuring them again that all we wish is to open road, to insist on order being maintained along it, but to leave to the people their independence and not annex their country. Pending detailed instructions he is not to conclude any arrangements with either. Robertson will be sent up immediately to Chitral to make arrangements. As soon as practicable Pioneers now in Gilgit district will be withdrawn

No. 55.

COPY OF DESPATCH from SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 30, August 16, 1895.

MY LORD,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the proposals which, in reply to my predecessor's telegram of the 13th June, your Excellency's Government have embodied in your telegram of the 22nd June, for the withdrawal of our troops from Chitral, and for the future control and administration of the country.

2. The objects of our policy in the past have been defined in Sir H. Fowler's Despatch* as—

- “ (1) to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests ;
 “ (2) to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes ;
 and
 “ (3) to keep watch over what goes on beyond those passes.”

* No. 15 of 26th April
1895.

3. The first step in this direction was the treaty which, in 1878, was negotiated under Lord Lytton's auspices between the ruler of Chitral and the Maharajah of Kashmir, whereby the former acknowledged allegiance to the latter and received from him an annual subsidy at the same time that a political agency was established at Gilgit. This agency, though withdrawn in 1881, was re-established in 1889 on the recommendation of Lord Lansdowne's Government, after a careful consideration of the report and suggestions of Colonel Lockhart and Captain Durand, who were specially deputed in 1885 and 1888 respectively to visit the States of the Hindu Kush and study their conditions.

4. The Government of Lord Lansdowne, in recommending* the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, dwelt specially on the importance of Chitral, to which State an allowance in money and assistance in the shape of arms was proposed, and the opening up of the direct road from Peshawar to Chitral by means of the adjacent tribes was recommended. “ Altogether,” they said, “ we desire to expend a total sum of a little more than half a lakh of rupees a year in strengthening our position in this quarter, and we trust that our proposals may be sanctioned. If so, we shall have the Upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected from any *coup de main* from the northward. We shall have provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence, and at small cost to ourselves.”

5. Lord Cross, who was at that time Secretary of State, replying in his Despatch, No. 22, of the 28th June 1889, recognised that recent movements of other Powers on the frontier had “ admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening every point in the line of defence of the north-western frontier of India, and among the points requiring special attention are the northern passes of the Hindu Kush.” Lord Cross accordingly sanctioned the establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit, which was to be garrisoned by Kashmir troops under the training of British officers, the payment of an annual subsidy to the ruler of Chitral, and the endeavour to open up by means of the neighbouring tribes the direct route from Peshawar to Chitral.

6. With a view to carrying out these orders, Dr. Robertson was deputed to Chitral, where he was well received by the Mehtar, who readily agreed, in return for his subsidy and the gift of arms, to assist in opening up the Peshawar-Chitral road, to improve the communications in his own territory, and to fortify certain selected positions, but even at that time Dr. Robertson foresaw the danger of Aman-ul-Mulk's kingdom falling to pieces at his death owing to the hostility among his sons.

7. In 1891, owing to the condition of affairs on the Pamirs, and the agitation among some of the minor States in the Hindu Kush, the Government of Lord Lansdowne proposed to increase the subsidy of the Mehtar from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 12,000 per annum, to give some military instruction to his troops, and a further present of arms, on the condition that he should assent to the extension of the telegraph line to Chitral and to the permanent residence of a British officer in the country.

8. These proposals were approved in Lord Cross's Despatch of the 13th November 1891, No. 40, but before they were fully carried out the Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk died in the summer of 1892, and the struggle for the chiefship began.

9. The policy which Lord Lansdowne's Government then laid down for the * Enclosure in Letter from India, local officers (letter to Resident in Kashmir, of 27th No 198, of 19th October 1892. September 1892*) was as follows :—

“It should be our endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, entangling ourselves in disputes which may arise between Afzul-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk, or in any tribal quarrels occasioned by them. The main object should be to provide adequately for the safety of the Gilgit Agency, and to adopt such measures as may be indispensable for that purpose.”

The quarrels, however, for the chiefship, under these conditions, led first to the elevation of Afzul-ul-Mulk, who put to death all the dangerous competitors in his family that he could lay hands on, then to his murder at the hands of his uncle, Shere Afzul, and they were only brought to a temporary termination by the success of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, with the consent and indeed the co-operation of your Agent, Colonel Durand, successfully attacked his uncle Shere Afzul and drove him as a refugee to Kabul. Your Government justified the action of Colonel Durand as having in all probability averted civil war and a general disturbance among the frontier tribes; but the episode was significant as showing how impossible it was, even at that stage, for the controlling power to avoid interference with the internal affairs at Chitral, except at the cost of anarchy and civil war, which would lead to widespread disturbance in the adjacent territories. Two other events of political importance took place about this time in regard to your relations with Chitral which deserve notice. During the brief tenure of power by Afzul-ul-Mulk, Umrā Khan, the Chief of Jandol, whose borders, by the annexation of Dir, had become coterminous with Chitral, took advantage of the internal disturbances to seize Nari and the surrounding district, which he continued to hold till a few months ago, and so became an important factor in Chitral politics. On the other hand, the condition of affairs on the Pamirs, as well as on the southern borders of Chitral and at Asmar, led Lord Lansdowne's Government to strengthen the staff of the Gilgit Agency on the avowed ground (India Letter, No. 192, of 19th October 1892) “that it has become more than ever necessary for us to exercise constant vigilance in this quarter, and that our position should be one which will enable us to obtain timely information of all events of importance on or near the border, to afford a reasonable amount of support to Kashmir and its dependencies, including Gilgit and Chitral, to convince the adjoining tribes that it is for their advantage to depend upon us rather than upon Russia or China, and to resist successfully a *coup de main*.” One of the additional officers thus asked for was intended for Chitral, and the recent anarchy in that country was adverted to as showing that it was not yet in a condition to be left to its own devices.

10. The assumption of power by Nizam-ul-Mulk was followed, in the winter of 1892-93, by the despatch of a mission under Dr. Robertson to the new Mehtar. Dr. Robertson found the position of Nizam-ul-Mulk to be at first very insecure, though it improved decidedly during his stay in the country. The outcome of Dr. Robertson's reports was the proposal to retain a British officer in Chitral, and the strengthening of the Gilgit garrison to secure an effective control over the State. On this subject Lord Lansdowne's Government wrote (Letter, No. 142, of 11th July 1893):—

"We have come to the conclusion that recent events do not call for any departure from the policy which has hitherto been adopted with regard to Chitral. We believe that it is essential that it should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir, and under British influence, and we consider that, in order to secure this end, it is indispensable that a British officer should for some time to come remain in the State. Nizam-ul-Mulk is not a strong ruler, and so long as the Afghan troops remain close to his border above Asmar, and Shere Afzul is believed by the Chitralis to have the support of the Anir, his position cannot be free from difficulty. But we have never concealed from ourselves that there was risk in sending British officers to Chitral, and it does not seem to us that the risk is now any greater than it was when Dr. Robertson's mission started. The latest reports tend to show that Nizam-ul-Mulk is beginning to establish his authority, and that his prospects are more hopeful at this moment than they were at the beginning of the year. Writing on the 12th of May, Dr. Robertson reported that the condition of affairs had of late very greatly improved, and was still improving, but that more time was required, and that to withdraw now altogether from the country would be most inexpedient. On the 18th of May he reported that there was a profound quiet everywhere. Finally, in his report written on his return to Gilgit, on the 6th June, Dr. Robertson writes:—

"There is now no reasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority, even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether.

"An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night. No suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country."

"It had, moreover, always been in our contemplation that one of the additional officers sanctioned for the Gilgit Agency should be posted in Chitral for the purpose of watching events on that part of the frontier, and this arrangement has received your Lordship's specific sanction.* We consider that after the encouragement which has been given to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the advent of the mission, it would be unjust to him, as well as detrimental to our own interests, to withdraw suddenly and entirely from Chitral at the present moment. We have carefully considered whether a Native Agent would be sufficient for the purposes which we have in view. It may be found possible hereafter to replace Captain Younghusband by a Native official, but we have come to the conclusion that for the present such an arrangement would fail to give the Mehtar the necessary support and secure the adequate protection of our interests. It is, in fact, the arrangement which was in force until the despatch of Dr. Robertson's mission, and we doubt whether it has worked altogether well. We have, therefore, decided that Captain Younghusband shall remain in the State for the present, though not necessarily in the capital itself. Colonel Durand has proposed that he should take up his headquarters at Mastuj, which, though within 63 miles of Chitral, which on an emergency Captain Younghusband could reach in a day, would be only 45 miles from our proposed frontier post at Ghizr. We shall make it clearly understood that Captain Younghusband is not expected to coerce the Mehtar in any way, or to interfere with the internal affairs of the State, but that he is deputed merely for the purpose of supplying us with trustworthy information as to events on that part of the frontier, and of giving to the Mehtar that amount of encouragement which the presence of a British officer within Chitral limits will not fail to afford."

11. Lord Kimberley accepted this policy as a temporary necessity, subject to subsequent alterations when the conditions should be so favourably modified as to admit of them. He said (Despatch, No. 34, of 1st September 1893):—

"In regard to Chitral, it has been the consistent policy of the Government of India to exclude from that country not merely the control, but even the influence, so far as

possible, of the Amir of Afghanistan. But apart from the evils which might result from Chitral falling under Afghan influence or domination, it is obvious that the near prospect of the Russian occupation extending to the north bank of the Panja, which is less than a day's march, from the Chitral frontier, renders it a matter of importance to us to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral.

"I cannot agree that it would be a wise policy to give to the Amir suzerainty over Chitral. Besides the difficulties which your Government experiences in your relations with the Amir, and the improbability that any successor to Abdur Rahman would be able to maintain his authority over Chitral, it would be unjustifiable to deprive Kashmir of her acknowledged right of suzerainty over that State in order to hand it over to an Afghan ruler.

"I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilgit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account, and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilgit Agency, that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal Infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilgit Agency. But, in determining our future policy towards Chitral, a wider view must be taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. If the Amir could be brought to abandon all idea of bringing Chitral under his control, the danger of a Chief under Afghan influence, such as Shere Afzul, obtaining power over Chitral, would be much lessened. Again, should the present negotiations with Russia be brought to a successful issue, and a line of boundary be agreed on and delimited, even though in close propinquity to the Chitral boundary, another danger which you now apprehend would be materially reduced. Thirdly, if the political operations of your frontier officers succeed in dispelling the suspicions and irritation of the frontier tribes, that element of danger will be in a fair way to disappear. It seems to me, therefore, in existing circumstances, premature to decide now on permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier. In the meantime, I can only sanction the retention of Captain Younghusband in that State as a temporary measure. I quite approve of the line of action which you lay down for him but in regard to the subsidiary measures which you propose for safeguarding the line of communication by the maintenance of posts at Gakuch, Gupis, and Ghizr, I think that they should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary for securing the present safety of the British Agent, and keeping open his communications with Gilgit."

12. The question of our relations with Chitral was again raised soon after your Excellency had taken charge of the Government of India. A suggestion had been

made that it might be possible to withdraw our Agent from Chitral after the winter was over on the ground of economy. It was opposed by the local officers, and your Government, after considering the objections of these officers, reported your conclusions in the following terms* :—

"The recommendations of the officiating British Agent, Colonel Bruce, show that the local officers advocate a policy of activity which we are not prepared to support. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to enter on any examination of the points advanced by Colonel Bruce, but the consideration to which, in our opinion, much weight must at present be attached is that, as noted by Captain Younghusband, immediate withdrawal from Chitral would deprive us of the best means we possess of watching events on the Hindu-Kush frontier. The negotiations with Russia still continue. On the southern frontier of Chitral, complications have arisen owing to the action of Umra Khan of Jandol, who has attacked certain Kafirs over whom Chitral claims control, and has threatened Chitral territory. The attitude of Umra Khan need not be regarded as a matter of the first importance, and we are not without hopes that an understanding may be arrived at with him in the course of the Afghan frontier delimitation; but we are convinced that to withdraw our Political Officer from Chitral while the Pamir question is still unsettled would be premature and unwise. We have accordingly decided that our position as regards Chitral must for another year remain on the present footing."

13. To this Mr. Fowler replied in his Despatch of 3rd August 1894, No. 24 :—

"The perusal of Captain Younghusband's interesting reports has satisfied me that the policy adopted last year, under Lord Kimberley's instructions, has so far been successful.

The despatch of the mission and the retention of Captain Younghusband as Political Agent in Chitral have had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of Government in that country, and of giving increased stability and popularity to the rule of the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and at the same time have strengthened the ties by which he is bound to the British Government.

"The reasons, however, which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be 'premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier' are still of weight. It is true that the Amir of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north, the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was, perhaps, premature in these circumstances to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or of continuing those arrangements) within a fixed period such as is indicated in Mr. Cunningham's letter to the Resident in Kashmir."

14. In this recapitulation of the leading events in our connexion with Chitral, two points stand out with special clearness—one is that the policy as laid down in the beginning of this Despatch has been steadily and consistently pursued by successive Viceroys and Secretaries of State; the other is that Chitral is, as a State, too weak and unstable to stand alone. The dread of external aggression on the one hand, or of successful rebellion on the other, has caused each ruler in turn to look to one or other of the more powerful States in the neighbourhood for support, and whenever that support has been withdrawn or temporarily obscured, the result has been anarchy and civil war, and encroachment on the external borders from without.

15. On the 1st January 1895, the Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk, was shot by order of his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, a young man, who had taken refuge two years before with his relative Umra Khan, and the murder is believed to have been inspired by the latter, in conjunction with the party of Shere Afzul, the youth, Amir-ul-Mulk, being a tool in the hands of his ambitious brother-in-law.

16. This state of affairs at the time of the murder was as follows: The two years of Nizam-ul-Mulk's reign had been uneventful. He had proved himself a more popular and more efficient ruler than had been expected, though at no time a strong man. Umra Khan had remained in possession of the Nari or Narsat district, and all proposals of Nizam-ul-Mulk to attempt the recovery of the district by force had been discouraged. The Commission appointed to delimitate the boundary between Afghanistan, Bajaur, and Chitral was at that time, assembled near Asmar, a few miles lower down the valley, and Umra Khan had been asked to attend and lay his claims before them. Shere Afzul, the most popular candidate for the Mehtarship, was interned at Kabul, and the Amir had given a written promise that he should not be again permitted to create disturbances in Chitral. The Amir had moreover undertaken, in the Durand Agreement (signed 12th November 1893), that "he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral."

17. At the date of the murder, Lieutenant Gurdon, who had succeeded Captain Younghusband as political officer, was on a visit to the Mehtar at Chitral with only a few Sikhs as his escort. To him Amir-ul-Mulk applied for recognition as Mehtar, but Lieutenant Gurdon refused to commit himself, saying that the question had been referred to the Government of India and he must await orders. It was in these circumstances that Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent at Gilgit, was deputed to Chitral to report on the situation, but he was "not to commit Government to any change of policy in regard to Chitral and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or conclude any "permanent arrangement" without reference to your Government. He arrived on the 1st February; but by that time the situation had changed for the worse owing to the

invasion of Chitral territory by Umra Khan with a large force of Pathan tribesmen who had succeeded in investing Kila Drosh, which was surrendered to them by arrangement on the 9th February. Dr. Robertson's reasons for not at that time attempting to retire, as explained in your letter of the 17th April 1895, were certainly sound, and such a course would have been consistent neither with honour nor with safety. But the appearance of Shere Afzul on the scene on the 21st February, and his co-operation with Umra Khan, materially altered the aspect of affairs, leading to the desertion of Mr. Robertson by the great majority of the people of Chitral proper, and ultimately to his being besieged in the fort of Chitral, and to the arrangements which, with the approval of the Secretary of State you made for the despatch of a relieving force from Hoti Mardau under General Sir R. Lowe and of Colonel Kelly with his smaller party from Gilgit.

18. The brilliant achievements which marked the advance of the relieving forces and the heroic tenacity of the defenders of Chitral fort, culminating in the flight of the besiegers on the 20th April, are too well known to need further reference in this Despatch, but it is well to advert to the attitude of the tribes generally, as this has an important bearing on the ultimate decision of the problem.

19. Before the relieving forces advanced, you issued a proclamation to the tribes, the essential part of which, for present purposes, is as follows:—“The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and to prevent any further, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards tribesmen, so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops.”

20. It is probable that this proclamation, was not without effect, at all events on the tribes in immediate contact with us. Though in Chitral Mr. Robertson found the people less well-disposed towards us than they had been two years ago, and thought the attitude of non-interference which he was bound at first to take up was of necessity prejudicial to his influence, leading, on Shere Afzul's appearance, to a general rising against us of the people of Chitral proper, yet during all this time there was no sign of hostility from Upper Chitral or Yassin. Further eastward the levies from Hunza and Nagar and from Punyal volunteered to help us, and rendered to Colonel Kelly the most efficient co-operation, nor did the Indus Valley tribes take the opportunity of giving trouble, though this was fully expected. Turning southward we find that the ex-Khan of Dir willingly joined us and gave much assistance, as did the Khan of Nawagai, whose territory is contiguous to Umra Khan's own tribal possession of Jandol. On the west the Mohmunds, who were appealed to by some of their turbulent priests to join Umra Khan's jihad, refused generally to rise, and, to the east, the Bonerwals, who were our great opponents in the Umbeyla campaign of 1862-63, also remained neutral. More than that, their headmen threatened to burn the houses of the priests if they did not desist from opposition. Some of the Swat sections opposed us, but the headmen of the Lower Ranizais, between our territory and the Swat river, offered us free passage, and the opposition in this part of the country appears to have been that of fanatics collected in large numbers by the preaching of the priests rather than that of the tribes acting under their headmen. The hostility shown by the Bajauris when we came into the territory ruled by Umra Khan was to be expected, and the casual firing at night into the camps and isolated attacks on camp-followers and individuals, after open opposition had discontinued, is inseparable from military operations in Pathan tribal countries. Your letters also show that outside influence of an important character have been at work throughout the troubles on the Chitral frontier to maintain and inflame opposition, without which the difficulties we had to contend with might have been much less acute.

21. Before the relief of Chitral was actually achieved, my predecessor telegraphed to you to the following effect:—

“From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19th April 1895.—My telegram of 30th March. The policy accepted by Lord Kimberley in his Despatch of 1st September 1893, and by me in my Despatch of the 3rd August 1894, was avowedly provisional. The agreement with Russia on Pamir question and demarcation with Amir of internal boundaries would

have made an early decision as to future policy in any case desirable, but events in Chitral, and the operations of General Lowe's forces render it expedient that the question should be taken into immediate consideration by your Government. Recent events show the peril of maintaining a British officer with escort in Chitral, so long as he can be supported only *via* Gilgit. To arrange for his support by the shorter line of the Peshawur-Dir route involves questions financial, political, and military, of serious difficulty and importance. I wish you to consider and advise me whether the strategical and political importance of Chitral is such in your opinion as to render desirable in the face of these difficulties the maintenance of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, which, as I understand, were to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes, and to watch what goes on beyond them. Also, whether you can suggest any method of securing these objects less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force. I should be glad to receive an outline of your views by telegram, if possible."

This telegram was further developed in Sir H. Fowler's Despatch, No. 15, of the 26th April 1895, which, while fully indicating the nature and complexity of the problem, left your Government to propose the most favourable solution of it which circumstances would allow.

22. Those communications of my predecessor were, however, crossed by your telegram of the 18th April, in which you reported that—

"We are agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road (to the Peshawur border, is a matter of first importance.

"If a road is not opened from Peshawur, we have not unanimously come to conclusion in regard to expediency of occupying Chitral; but

"We are unanimous in asking your permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening up of this road, when, in our opinion, the opportunity arises in connection with General Lowe's advance, and in thinking it would be serious mistake to lose this opportunity."

23. This permission was given, conditionally on the Government not being committed to the policy of occupation, in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 25th April.

24. Your Excellency's Government reported your views at full length in your letter of the 8th May. In that letter, after adverting to the definition quoted at the beginning of this Despatch, of the objects of your past policy in Chitral, a definition which your Government fully accepts, and after quoting Lord Kimberley's views as to the necessity of excluding Afghan control from Chitral, you point out that there are only two alternatives before you, either to maintain the position in Chitral or to abandon the attempt to retain any effective control over its external affairs. "The history of Chitral," you point out, "demonstrates that the State has not for the last 20 years been able to stand alone. Fear of Afghan aggression threw Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk into the arms of Kashmir, and thus led to British suzerainty. The precarious rule of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk who have succeeded to the Mehtarship was manifestly less able to maintain the integrity of the State without assistance. The present condition of Chitral, since its invasion by Umra Khan and the investment of Mr. Robertson in the fort by Shere Afzul, is one of anarchy. It is now more clear than ever that the country must lean on some external support." You then point out the great danger involved, both politically and strategically, if Chitral should fall under the control of Russia, and the objections to giving it to the Amir, and you conclude that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral is a matter of the first importance; but events, you add, have greatly changed the conditions under which you can hope to exercise that influence. "The events, which have culminated in the gallant defence of Chitral and the costly measures taken for its relief, both from north and south, render it," you say, "impossible that we can ever think of maintaining British influence in that country again without the presence of British troops," and you go on to explain the policy you would adopt, which is to garrison Chitral, and make communication direct between it and Peshawar by the construction of a road. You were not then in a position to estimate what the cost of such an undertaking might entail. It might, in your judgment be prohibitive, it might be very much less than was generally anticipated. Time evidently was necessary for the investigation and decision of the question of cost.

25. Your views were not adopted by Her Majesty's late Government, who sent in reply the telegram, dated 13th June 1895, informing you that they have decided that no military force or European Agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral shall not be fortified, and that no road shall be made between Peshawar and Chitral. All positions beyond the frontier in our occupation were to be evacuated as speedily as circumstances

allowed; and the Government of India were asked to telegraph the arrangements as regards Chitral State, which under these conditions they would recommend for the future.

26. The proposals asked for in Sir H. Fowler's telegram quoted above were formulated in your telegraphic reply of the 22nd June. These proposals involve a division of Chitral into two parts, the western portion, or Chitral proper, being left to itself under the nominal suzerainty of Kashmir, while the eastern would be controlled from Gilgit, and garrisoned by Kashmir troops, and in each part the headmen would be invited to elect their own ruler, the candidature of Shere Afzul being excluded. The proposals were not unanimously approved by your Excellency's colleagues, and they have some very obvious disadvantages. Western Chitral or the Katur country, without Mastuj, would be reduced to complete impotence and would invite aggression, which, while we maintain the suzerainty to Kashmir, we should be bound to repel, though no longer in a position to control the course of events which might lead up to such aggression. The position of Mastuj again as part of the Kushwakt country was one which could not but lead to trouble. If it were garrisoned by us the position of our garrison would be precisely the same as it was at the time of Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder, with the Shandur Pass intervening between it and its supports; if it were not garrisoned from Gilgit, it would inevitably be a source of contention, between the Katur and Kushwakt rulers which could only be settled by force, and must inevitably lead to our intervention. We should thus have incurred all the inconveniences and loss of prestige consequent on abandoning Chitral, without securing the freedom from responsibility for its condition, which was the object of the policy of abandonment. It was, moreover, clear that the policy of abandonment would not cease with the mere evacuation of the territory of Chitral. One of the main objects of the establishments of the Gilgit Agency was the facilities it would afford in watching over and keeping under control the Chitral and Mastuj valleys, which lead to the easiest and most important passes over the Hindu Kush. To abandon these objects would be to deprive the Gilgit Agency of its main value, whilst the cost of its maintenance would be as heavy as before. Gilgit and its Agency would under these conditions cease to be worth maintenance, and the whole country over which it previously had authority would probably lapse into disorder and disturbance. The delimitation of frontiers between the Indian Empire and neighbouring Governments has of recent years been more accurately defined, and it seems more than probable that if your Government had in these districts by its retirement announced its inability to discharge its previous functions, other authorities would step in and undertake the duties then cast off.

27. This was the state of affairs which Her Majesty's Government had to consider on taking office, and the serious objections involved in your alternative proposals, illustrating as they do the difficulties inseparable from giving effect to the policy of abandonment, have led Her Majesty's Government again to examine the proposals contained in your telegram of the 18th April and your letter of the 8th May.

28. It seemed to Her Majesty's Government that the policy which, as explained above, has been continuously pursued by successive Governments in their relations with Chitral, ought not lightly to be abandoned, unless its maintenance had become clearly impossible. Your Government had before said that to abandon Chitral was to forego the advantages of that policy; and that no middle course was possible, and it is certain that the alternative course proposed in your telegram of the 22nd June would not have sufficed to secure those advantages, and, indeed, was open to much of the objection which in your letter of the 8th May you attach to abandonment.

29. Nor did it seem to Her Majesty's Government that recent events had in any way decreased the necessity for adhering to the above line of policy. If it was necessary, owing to the situation on the frontier in 1892, to strengthen the Gilgit Agency for the express purpose of keeping a closer watch on the Chitral frontier, the necessity of maintaining that watch is no less obvious at the present day. The advance of Russia to the line of the Oxus and that of the Amir to the Eastern border of Kafiristan are not likely to diminish the tension which has, in past years, prevailed on this part of the frontier.

30. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government attached considerable importance to the argument that our withdrawal at such a moment could scarcely fail to have a demoralising effect, not only upon the tribes concerned, but throughout the whole frontier, the population of which would ascribe our retirement to inability to maintain the advantage we had gained in recent military operations.

31. It was manifest, therefore, that unless the financial and political reasons against maintaining our occupation were of such gravity as to be insuperable, there should be no change made in the former line of policy, which was already shown to depend for its effectiveness on the presence of a British officer with troops at Chitral. It was also clear that the safety of these could only be secured if the direct route between Peshawar and Chitral could be maintained. It was apparent from your letter of the 8th May that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications, as to render it of doubtful expediency; but, in your opinion, this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that if amicable relations could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive. But when your letter of the 8th May was written, you had not had the opportunity of sounding the tribes and ascertaining how far the scheme was feasible.

32. I accordingly telegraphed on the 1st August, asking if you had any further information as to the possibility of coming to an arrangement with the tribes for maintaining and securing the road from Peshawar to Chitral, such as was contemplated in your letter of the 8th May, and in that case, and with a good fortified position, what would be the minimum strength of the garrison you propose for Chitral? Your reply of the 3rd August is to the effect that, though no regular negotiations have been carried out, the reports of the political officers on the spot warrant a confident expectation that peaceful arrangements can be made. The road you keep open is that along the left bank of the Panjkora River, so that you would have to deal only with the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, who are friendly to us. From the Chitral border to the Swat River the road would be kept open by levies, and only at the crossing of this river near Chakdara, and on the Malakand, would you employ troops, who would be limited to three Native regiments, one mountain battery, and a company of Sappers. For the garrison of Chitral you recommend two native infantry regiments, two mountain guns, and a company of sappers, the headquarters being at Kila Drosh, and a detachment in Chitral itself. This would probably enable you to relieve the garrisons at Mastuj and Ghizer, and certainly to withdraw the pioneer battalion from the Gilgit Agency. The troops thus located would, I gather, be merely transferred from existing frontier garrisons without increasing the numerical strength of the army.

33. The information now conveyed materially alters the position. It removes, if your officers have rightly estimated the conditions, the doubt which was felt as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means, and maintaining it without an intolerable burthen of expenditure being imposed on the Indian revenues. With the removal of this doubt the main obstacle to the acceptance of your unanimous recommendations in your letter of the 8th May was cleared away, and in my telegram of the 9th August I communicated to you the acceptance of your scheme by Her Majesty's Government.

34. But your information is still incomplete as to the exact cost of the scheme, and I felt some doubts as to the absolute necessity of permanently maintaining regular troops on the Malakand Pass, and as to whether the tribes would see in this an infringement of the proclamation. I therefore added to my telegram the injunction that the arrangements for this part of the scheme should be held over pending the receipt of fuller details of expense and a caution for strictly keeping to the conditions of the proclamation.

I now request that in addition to this information you will favour me with a report as to the amount of supplies which the Gilgit garrison may expect to obtain from local sources; what saving will be derived from this cause, and from the shorter route by which stores and supplies locally unobtainable will now be forwarded; what saving and alteration these new dispositions will enable you to effect in the cost and strength of the staff and troops in the Gilgit Agency which will be dependent for protection in future mainly on Kashmir Imperial Service troops.

A statement showing the strength of the combined garrisons of Gilgit and Chitral as compared with the former garrison will be of assistance.

You will also have to consider whether the relations of your political officer at Chitral should in future be with your Agent at Gilgit or whether any change in this respect will be desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

~~1147~~
EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

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PAPERS REGARDING BRITISH RELATIONS

WITH THE

NEIGHBOURING TRIBES

ON

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THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA

AND

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON:
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BY DARLING & SON, LTD., 34-40, BACON STREET, E.

And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
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[Cd. 496.] Price 1s. 4½d.

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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

Papers regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, and Punjab Frontier Administration.

No. 1.

(Printed on page 26 of C. 8714 of 1898.)

(Telegraphic.) From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 13th October, 1897.

My telegram of 6th October. Political settlement should, in my opinion, follow as speedily as possible upon termination of military operations in the field. You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibilities should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of British Indian border. I also think that present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary, but I understand you to be in favour of strictly limiting our interference with independent tribes, and thus avoiding serious eventual responsibilities involved in extension of administrative control over tribal territory. In this I entirely concur. The question of disarmament, so far as it appears to imply protection, should be examined from this point of view. Assuming that our policy is to maintain permanently our position as it existed before these disturbances, you will no doubt consider and let me know what posts and lines of communication you regard as indispensable for this purpose, due regard being had, first, to what is possible with existing military force, second, to financial situation, and third, to great political importance of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent among tribes and consequently recurring disturbances. Local arrangements should be based upon a clear and well-defined general plan which it should be our object to obtain.

No. 2.

(Printed on pages 172, &c., of C. 8714 of 1898.)

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable The Governor General of India in Council, dated 28th January, 1898.

I have received from time to time the various Letters from your Excellency's Government, in which you have reported to me the progress of events on the Punjab frontier, and the success of the military operations which, during the past six months, you have been compelled to undertake against the tribes in arms against the British Government over a long tract of border land, extending from the valley of the Tochi to the country on the northern borders of the Peshawar

district inhabited by the Bunerwals. Now that the active phase of these operations has almost closed, the time has arrived for briefly reviewing the narrative of events, in order to examine the causes of the late widespread outbreak and to indicate the policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue in the future.

2. The first of several violent outbreaks, which have thrown the extreme North-West borderland of India into confusion and disorder, entailing a series of actions that have been fought with the greatest gallantry and attended with heavy casualties, occurred on the 10th June in the Tochi valley. It will be convenient here to give a short account of the circumstances under which Mr. Gee had proceeded from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maizar, when his escort was treacherously attacked. In 1894 Her Majesty's Government sanctioned a policy of more effective protection and closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes; and in his Despatch of the 24th of August, Mr. Fowler wrote: "Since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable." In the following year measures were taken to carry out the delimitation of the Afghan boundary as fixed by the Durand agreement of the 12th of November, 1893. On the 6th of April, 1895, the Maliks, or Chiefs, of the Duwaris and of the Waziri tribes in the Tochi asked to be taken under British protection, and applied for service and allowances; and in reply to your Letter dated the 15th of May, 1895, I sanctioned your detailed proposals for giving effect to the policy laid down, in 1894, by my predecessor, on the clear understanding that your expenditure, both on Wano and Tochi, did not exceed the sum allowed for Wano alone. In my Despatch of the 9th of August, I reiterated the conditions which my predecessor had associated with his sanction of control over these tribes. In 1896 steps were taken to establish permanent military posts in the Tochi valley, and you reported for my information the outbreak of certain disturbances which occurred in February among the Madda Khel Waziris, and the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna post, which happened on the 9th of June of that year. For these outrages you sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs. 3,000, which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 1,200. It was with the intention of collecting this fine, and of choosing a suitable site for a military post, that Mr. Gee proceeded in June last to Sheranna and Maizar, when his party were suddenly attacked as they finished a meal prepared for them by the Madda Khels, and only succeeded in making good their retreat after the loss of all their British officers killed or wounded, and other casualties.

3. At the time of the dastardly attack made by the tribesmen the British force in the Tochi valley consisted of 1,476 rifles and 120 sabres, with four maxim and four mountain guns distributed over five posts of Miran Shah, Datta Khel, Boya, Idak, and Saidga. The retreat of the small escort in the face of a large gathering of hostile tribesmen was conducted with great gallantry, in which the wounded British officers and the Native officers and men highly distinguished themselves. The Madda Khels upon the arrival of succour fled to the hills, and on the 21st of June Major-General Bird assumed command at Bannu of the punitive force which your Government collected for an advance to Maizar. On the 13th of July a proclamation was issued to the tribesmen announcing the terms of submission, and a few days later the British force reached Sheranna, encountering no difficulties other than those caused by the unhealthy season of the year and by the physical nature of the country traversed. It was not, however, until the receipt of your telegram dated 26th November that I learnt that Sudda Khan, his brother, and other headmen of the Madda Khels who were concerned in the attack at Maizar, had surrendered, and that the tribe had finally given in and accepted the terms of submission ultimately demanded from them.

4. On the 26th of July, within a fortnight of the issue of the proclamation to the Madda Khels, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was unexpected, broke the peace of the Swat valley which had been maintained without interruption since the close of the Chitral campaign. One Saidulla, known as "the mad fakir," also called the Sartor or bareheaded fakir, suddenly gained

notoriety as a worker of miracles, and publicly announcing that he had been sent to lead a Jihad or religious war, prophesied that all British troops would be driven out of the country within eight days. His pretensions were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat and by other chiefs of the tribes, but the uncontrollable religious enthusiasm and superstition which his actions excited overbore all opposition on the part of the responsible tribal headmen or Maliks, and in a few hours his supporters increased from a small gathering of boys and men to an army of well-armed fanatics. The tribal levies in the locality fled, and the British positions on the Malakand and at Chakdara, held by about 4,000 men, were attacked with great fury on the night of the 26th July. Fighting continued without intermission, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted upon the tribesmen, who were constantly replaced by fresh adherents to the cause of the mad fakir, until the 31st of July when reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached the Malakand; and on the 2nd of August a relief column detached by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood completed the relief of Chakdara. In the interval between the first attack and the final relief the mad fakir had withdrawn, but his followers were joined by tribesmen from the Utman Khels, the Bunerwals, the Bajauris, Ranizais, Lower and Upper Swatis, and the Adinzais and Dush Khels. As soon as the first excitement subsided, those tribes with whom agreements had been made for the maintenance of the road to Chitral, between the Malakand and Chakdara, a distance of some ten miles, began to send in jurgas and to sue for peace, protesting that their tribesman had been carried away by belief in the miraculous powers of the fakir, and by his call to a religious war. The Ranizais from Khar to the south were among the first to come in, followed by the Alladand jurgas, and by deputations from the Shamozaïs and other sections on the right bank of the Swat river. It is a significant fact that the disturbance did not extend northwards of the Panjokora river or affect the road or posts established on the way to Chitral, and that the Nawab of Dir resisted all pressure put upon him by the Akhundzadas, consistently refusing to break his agreement with the British Government.

5. I do not consider it necessary to follow minutely the course of the various operations which were undertaken by Sir Bindon Blood, who advanced to Saïdu on the 12th of August, and rapidly succeeded in restoring tranquillity and exacting compliance with the terms imposed upon the several tribes for their unprovoked attack upon the British posts established, under tribal agreements, for the maintenance of communication with Chitral. During the operations in Upper Swat, a force was moved to Rustam to threaten Buner in the event of the Bunerwals rendering assistance to the Swatis and repeating the offence which they had committed at Malakand. The Bunerwals were in due course informed of the satisfaction which your Government demanded of them for their participation in the attack on the Malakand, and ample time was allowed to them for compliance. On the 24th of December you instructed the Government of the Punjab to announce the final terms of submission decided upon, and to give the tribe one week within which to comply with them. As they declined to avail themselves of this offer, you despatched a military expedition against them, and I have since been informed by your telegram, dated the 19th of January, that the Bunerwals have complied with your terms. Elsewhere the advance of British troops against the Swatis, Utman Khels and other tribes was uniformly successful, and from your Excellency's letters and telegrams I have learnt that the terms imposed by you in the matter of fines, restitution of property, and surrender of arms have been generally complied with.

6. Five days after the relief of Chakdara, and while all available resources were being hurried to the north, the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, Najam-ud-din, who has for years past been active in intrigues and hostility against the British Government, arrived with a following of 5,000 men on the frontier of the district of Peshawar, and after burning the British village of Shankargarh attacked the frontier post of Shabkadar, which was garrisoned by Border Police, and which, for fifty years, has been incorporated in British territory. It appears that this attack was not so entirely unexpected as that made upon the Malakand, and the Commissioner of Peshawar, as well as the Hindu residents of the village, had been warned to expect it. But by the time that troops arrived from

Peshawar the enemy were found in occupation of the low hills near Shabkadar, from which they were dislodged, with some loss on our part, on the 8th of August. The losses inflicted on the Adda Mulla's followers were very heavy, and these included not merely a number of Mohmands but also several Afghan subjects and levies from the country between Jalalabad and Dakka, as well as from Asmar. The Mulla withdrew to his home at Jarobi, which lies within the sphere of influence which you offered to recognise as belonging to the Amir, and when Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, advancing *viâ* Bajaur, effected a junction with a force advancing from Shabkadar, the Adda Mulla attacked the two forces and sustained a severe defeat. In September a brigade was detached to punish the Mamunds, and after the forcing of the Bedmanai Pass on the 23rd of that month, further resistance collapsed, and the terms imposed upon the various tribes and sections between the Swat valley and the Khaibar pass were in due course exacted. From your telegram of the 7th of October, I learnt that the Mohmand field force had been broken up.

7. It was inevitable that the popular disturbance caused by these events, of which the most exaggerated and erroneous accounts reached the tribes occupying the tract of country intervening between the Tochi valley and the Khaibar pass, should react upon the powerful clans of Afridis and their neighbours the Orakzais. Reports were current, sometimes of an impending Afridi rising and sometimes of a coalition between them and the Orakzais. Sir Richard Udny was, however, not disposed to credit these rumours, and on the 20th of August you informed me by telegram that the reports which you had already transmitted to me appeared to be very much exaggerated. In a later telegram of the same date you reported a gathering of the Orakzais in the hills north of Sadda, but "no disturbance in the Khaibar." Two days after this reassuring news you informed me that a large hostile gathering of the Afridis was then approaching the Khaibar, and on the 23rd August I learnt that Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were being attacked by them. Ali Masjid was captured and burnt on that day, and on the 25th of the same month Lundi Kotal was wrested from its garrison of Khaibar Rifles and the pass was completely closed for traffic. In your Excellency's telegram of the 26th August you referred to this unprovoked aggression as gravely affecting your position on the frontier, and asked my approval to an expedition against Tirah, which I sanctioned in my telegram dated the 1st of September, on the express condition that all questions involving our future policy on the termination of the campaign must be referred for my consideration before any action should be taken. Further information respecting the treacherous attack upon Lundi Kotal only served to increase the gravity of the offence committed by the Afridis. They had entered into an agreement in 1881, undertaking to be responsible for the security of the road and the maintenance of all posts and buildings in the pass, and in particular for, holding the fort of Ali Masjid. Liberal subsidies were paid to the tribesmen for these services, and the levies to which the custody of the Khaibar was entrusted were mainly recruited from them. As observed in your letter dated the 14th October, 1897, "our relations with the Afridis, founded upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal services, had stood the test, almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed." Under such circumstances, I can hardly doubt that the letters which were found on the 17th of November in the house of the Akha Khel Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran Valley, addressed to him by the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, and calling on the Afridis to join in a religious war, supply the real explanation of an attack which you justly describe as "fanatical in its origin."

8. Whilst these events were taking place in the Khaibar, the southern neighbours of the Afridis, the Orakzais, commenced to attack the British posts established on the Samana range for the safeguarding of British territory in the Muranzai valley of Kohat. In your telegram of the 16th of August you informed me of the preparations you were making, "owing to a report of a possible hostile combination of Orakzai and Afridi tribes." I observe that at the very outset the earliest information received by you associated the Adda Mulla with these disquieting rumours, but on the following day you reported that a Mulla, who was preaching a religious war in the Orakzai country, had returned to his

village on receipt of a further letter from the Adda Mulla. On the 18th of August you learnt that the Orakzais were about to attack the forts on the Samana, at the very time that the Afridis were marching on the Khaibar, and Parachinar was simultaneously threatened by the Massuzai section of the Orakzais. On the 20th, however, you were led to believe that these reports were "exaggerated," but on that same night an attack was made upon a village near Sadda in the Kurram, and reports of further disturbances in the Orakzai country reached you simultaneously with the news of the fall of Alī Masjid. The tribes, however, still seemed somewhat half-hearted in their movements, and on the 8th of September you informed me that all was quiet in the Upper Kurram, and that confidence was fully restored. Two days later Fort Lockhart was vigorously attacked, and the gallant Sikh defenders of Saragarū were killed to a man on the 12th of September. No time was lost in expelling the combined forces of the Orakzais and Afridis from the Samana range into the Khanki valley, but their open hostility left you no option but to carry out your preparations for the expedition into Tirah. As you state in your Letter of the 14th of October, "we had given neither tribe any cause of offence. The "Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai valley, have been left undisturbed."

9. I do not propose to dwell at any length upon the details of that campaign, which was carried out with complete success by the 18th of December last as regards the Orakzais, but which has not yet been brought to a final close against the Afridis. But there are a few satisfactory incidents to which I may here advert. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with gratification that the Kohat pass Afridis, who are under an engagement with the Government of India to keep open the road through their country, and upon whom the main weight of the fiscal policy which led to the enhancement of the Kohat salt duty must have fallen, stood true to their engagements with your Government, and resisted the pressure of the Mullas. In Tirah, owing to the inclemency of the season, and to the exceptional difficulties of the country traversed, consisting of a succession of rugged passes, intricate defiles, and swampy valleys, success could only be attained at the cost of severe hardship and numerous casualties. But the conduct of the troops employed has been excellent, and Her Majesty's Government have heard with the highest satisfaction, not only of the alacrity with which loyal offers of help were made by the Native Princes of India, but also of the conspicuous part taken by the Imperial Service troops in the Tirah and other expeditions during the last six months. I desire to record my sympathy with His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala in the unfortunate catastrophe which overtook the Kapurthala infantry in the Kharmana defile on the 7th of November, when the retreat of a party was cut off by a jungle fire.

10. Passing from the narrative of the events which preceded and marked the course of the several risings of the Pathan tribes, to a consideration of their causes, I entirely agree with your Excellency in Council in regarding fanaticism as the principal motive for an outbreak which has been unprecedented alike in the suddenness with which it broke out at each point, in the large extent of country affected, and in the simultaneous action of distinct tribes or sections of tribes. In referring to the outrage which had occurred in Tochi, you informed me on the 17th of June that the Commissioner regarded it as fanatical, and in your Letter of the 21st of July you accepted the view that the attack was prearranged, but fuller information has led you to alter this opinion, and to attribute it to tribal quarrels. That religious excitement was not the predominant incentive in the Madda Khel rising may be inferred from the inaction of the Waziri tribes when the news of the attacks on Malakand and Shabkadar reached them. But elsewhere fanaticism principally accounts for the proceedings of the Swatis, Utman Khels, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, and other Pathan tribes. Indeed there appears to be a remarkable unanimity of opinion on the part of your officers along the whole of the disturbed border that the outbreaks generally were fanatical in their origin. The proceedings of the tribes, the express statements of His Highness the Amir, and the correspondence discovered in the course of the subsequent military operations, all point to the same

conclusion. Although the first attack on the Malakand was unexpected, still several indications of a religious movement had already attracted the serious notice of your Government. You were aware that Mullas were busily engaged in circulating on the country side two books which had been published in Kabul, of a tone and character, that must inevitably have stimulated the fanatical spirit of wild and ignorant tribesmen. From your Letter dated the 14th of July, I learnt that efforts had been persistently made by Mullas, for several months previously, to arouse and combine the tribes, not merely in the Swat country, but also in Tirah and other parts of the Afridi land. Upon ground thus carefully prepared Najam-ud-din, the Adda Mulla, found it easy to work, and the letters addressed by him to the Mianguls of Swat, and to the Afridi Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran valley, show the range of his preparations and intrigues. That he was also the moving spirit in other parts is evident from the reply made by the Khani Khel section of the Chamkannis, when they stated that they could not refuse to obey the Fakir of Swat or the Adda Mulla. His Highness the Amir, in addressing the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 18th of August last, described Mulla Najam-ud-din as the reputed prophet of the Mohmands and the people of Jelalabad and the mountain districts of Jelalabad, and he added :—“What calamities are there that his disciples have not suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed by his senseless commands?” In writing to your Excellency on the following day, His Highness enclosed for your information a proclamation written by the Adda Mulla to the people of Ningrahar, exaggerating the successes of the tribesmen, and calling upon the Afghans to join in a religious war. So late as the 2nd of September last, the Mulla was endeavouring to rekindle the sparks which had died out in Swat, and was impudently promising external assistance in an early renewal of risings in that part of the country. At one time reference was made to the victories achieved by Mahomedans in Europe, and at another the active intervention of the Amir of Afghanistan was promised by this unscrupulous preacher and his fellow-workers. It is evident that in several places the tribal organisation was powerless to oppose this outbreak of fanatical fervour, and the Maliks were reluctantly forced to follow where the Mullas or the fakirs led.

11. From the information which has reached me it is evident that the necessary task of delimiting by marks and pillars, in accordance with the terms of the Durand Convention, the spheres of British and Afghan influence, furnished the religious preachers with material for stirring up alarm and jealousy among the tribes, who were thus persuaded to connect the delimitation with ulterior designs upon their independence that were in no way contemplated by your Government. The work of marking out a frontier line through hundreds of miles of wild tribal country could not fail to arouse such suspicions, notwithstanding the scrupulous observance by you of the conditions laid down by Her Majesty's Government in 1894 with a view to avoiding interference with the tribes. I have every reason to believe that your Government has carefully kept within the scope of the operations sanctioned by my predecessor in his Despatch of 24th August 1894, to enable “you adequately to fulfil your obligations in regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and to the Amir and to the well-affected amongst the tribesmen themselves.” Although it is probable that the steps taken by you to delimitate the frontier under the Kabul Agreement of 1893 gave to the Adda Mulla and others an opportunity for misrepresenting your policy by associating it with an intention of depriving the tribesmen of their existing independence, I do not think that this necessary work could have been carried out with greater circumspection and caution.

12. Amongst other reasons set forth to give some colour of justification for tribal unrest was the recent enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt from 8 annas to Rs. 2 for each Kohati maund. In your letter of the 30th of September last, you explained to me your domestic reasons for raising the duty to a rate nearly approximating to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt, so as to allow of the abolition of the preventive customs line extending from the north of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej. I approved of your action in my Despatch, dated 25th of November 1897, and I have only to add here

that, although the enhancement of the duty was skilfully used to excite disaffection, I consider that, in the interests of your own subjects, it was justified as a measure of internal policy.

13. Having followed the course of the risings and discussed their causes, I proceed now to examine the stage which has been reached in the history of our frontier relations with the Pathan tribes, in order that I may indicate the direction which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, our future policy must take. Our frontier relations assume so many varying phases, and include or touch so many interests, both local and Imperial, that a comprehensive survey of the objects to be attained is a necessary preliminary to any general enunciation of policy. The duties imposed upon your Government by the advance of British influence and by consequent contact with the territory occupied by Pathan tribes may be roughly classified under three heads,—first, the police and administrative protection to be given to British districts in the immediate vicinity of the tribal country; secondly, the strict exclusion of extraneous interference from the tribal area that has been placed by a formal agreement within the British sphere of political influence; and, lastly, the fulfilment of our obligations towards Afghanistan and the safeguarding of the natural frontiers of India.

14. The events of recent years have necessarily enlarged the area of your responsibilities to British subjects, and the chances of collision with the tribes. Commerce and trade between the tribal country and British India have grown to larger dimensions, intercourse for all purposes is more frequent, and the extension of cultivation and prosperity on the immediate border land offers a greater temptation to lawless neighbours and enhances the need for protective measures. A rising which suddenly closes a main artery of commerce, like the Khaibar pass, is not a matter merely affecting your foreign relations; it at once injures the interests of Indian trade. The tribes have learnt in your military service many lessons of war, and they are able to supply themselves with arms of precision and ammunition to a degree quite unknown in former days, when blockades and small punitive expeditions sufficed to bring them to terms. Their Mullas travel in India and proceed through India to Mecca, and on their return they propagate rumours and reports as to what is occurring in Europe and India of the wildest and most inaccurate character, but always appealing to the fanaticism of their entourage. A significant instance of this was afforded by the letter, dated 25th October 1897, which was found in the house of Mulla Sayad Akbar, and which contained the information that "Aden, a seaport which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India." Moreover, the utterances of British statesmen and of members of Parliament upon questions affecting the status and prospects of Islamism and its rulers are reproduced, distorted, and exaggerated. To these and other causes may be largely attributed the recent combination, under the instigation of their Mullas, of trans-frontier tribes which have hitherto acted disunitedly. Their fighting strength and their power to combine have simultaneously increased of late years. It must also be remembered that sections of these tribes have permanently settled down in the adjacent British districts, and as they are always in close intercourse with their fellow tribesmen across the frontier, they are naturally affected, more or less, by the elements of disquietude and disaffection prevailing from time to time among them. Frequency and facilities of intercommunication have thus drawn together all sections, and incitements to Jihad on the common ground of religious favour have gained adherents, not only from distant parts of the border land, but even on both sides of the British frontier. To these influences may be attributed the participation of British subjects in the disturbances on and around the Malakand pass, and even in the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar; and they provide additional and substantial reasons why the state of the tribal country immediately outside our settled territory should have become a matter of much more serious concern than heretofore.

15 The above observations are almost equally applicable to the second branch of your responsibilities.

For the present I would direct my remarks to that section of tribal territory which is between British territory and Afghanistan, commencing with Waziristan and running up northwards to the Swat river. The character and internal government of the Baluchi tribes controlled from Quetta so differ from those of the northern Pathans that the arrangements working satisfactorily there need not now be reviewed, or criticised, as necessarily forming a foundation upon which to base our action elsewhere. The relations of the northern tribes with your Government vary greatly, graduating from those where a tribe has accepted our protection, as in the Dawari section of the Tochi valley, to the case of a tribe undertaking independent responsibility for specified duties, as in the Khaibar pass. In some cases a light assessment is paid by a tribe, and in others it receives subsidies from the Government of India in return for military or police duties. Though the characteristics of the tribes and their normal attitude towards the British Government vary considerably, yet there are certain features in our relations with these which are common to all. In the first place, the fear of encroachment or attack upon their territory from Afghanistan has been removed by the Durand Agreement. The influence of fear which formerly led a threatened tribe to seek our help, is no longer felt. Nevertheless, the arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognized as belonging to the sphere of British influence. Mr. Fowler, in his Despatch, dated the 24th of August, 1894, adverted to this subject, and expressed his opinion that the programme advocated in the minute of dissent appended to the letter from your Government would not meet the necessities of the case, "and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Waziristan." The Waziri frontier was only one part of the line demarcated under the Durand Convention, and now that the sphere of British influence has been traced along almost the whole Afghan border, your responsibilities in connection with the territory thus delimited cannot be ignored or put on one side. Though the agreement made with the Amir of Afghanistan has relieved your Government from the constant friction which the undefined and debateable land lying between Afghanistan and British India produced between their respective Governments, in other respects it has not been an unmixed benefit, from the suspicions and misgivings it has aroused amongst certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of your Government. To gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future action. As communications multiply so the tribes will mix more freely with British subjects; and this intercourse, becoming closer in the course of years, cannot fail to increase our responsibilities on the frontier by drawing the tribesmen out of their highlands into closer contact with their neighbours and with your officers. Whether the risks of collision will have been thereby augmented or diminished, remains to be seen. By care and foresight it may be possible to avoid actual conflict, and the effect of frequent intercourse may be to mitigate the lawless and predatory instincts of the hillmen, without interfering with the tribal system of self-government.

16. If your obligations inside your territories and the sphere of British influence have been increased, the case is not otherwise in respect to the Amir of Afghanistan and his country. The engagement with His Highness in July, 1880,

* See pages 40 and 89 "Afghanistan (1881) No. 1, C. 2776," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1881.

as set forth in the communication* from the Marquis of Ripon, contained this clause:—
 "If any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided

“ that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government “ in regard to your external relations.” These responsibilities were again

† Printed in “ East India (North-West Frontier), C. 8037,” presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1896

confirmed but not extended, when Sir Mortimer Durand concluded the agreement† of the 12th of November, 1893 ; and as a proof of the increased good will existing between the two Governments, the subsidy of the Amir was at the same time increased by six lakhs. To the obligations thus contracted is added the ever present duty of watching over the frontier passes of the mountains into India, so as to maintain sufficient control over the main routes connecting Afghanistan with India, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of any political influence adverse to your Government in the higher plateaux which within Afghanistan dominate these passes.

17. Frontier questions ranging thus from the daily performance of a policeman’s duties to the possible despatch of a large army present so many complications and entanglements that any set of precise instructions would prove to your Government a source of embarrassment rather than an assistance. The call for interference, or even for military help, may arise from different quarters and under conditions wholly distinct. You may be required suddenly to fulfil your duties of protecting your own subjects, as recently at Shankargah when it was attacked by the Mohmands, or perhaps to discharge your obligations to the Amir. In either of these cases the points attacked or threatened may be few or numerous. You may have to insist upon the stipulated performance of tribal service in a pass, or to punish treachery or attack upon your posts. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances you might have to fulfil all these obligations at one and the same time. It is obvious, therefore, that the steps which may have to be taken by your Government cannot be reduced to a formula, or your procedure mapped out on a pre-arranged plan. The extent of the demand made upon your resources, military and financial, cannot be foreseen until the occasion arises and has had time to develop itself. Any attempt to lay down a set of uniform rules for your guidance would be apt to defeat the main object of the general policy which Her Majesty’s Government desire to pursue, namely, to show that we are as determined to respect the rights of others as we are able to enforce our own.

18. At the same time, there are certain leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty’s Government have resolved to adhere, and to which I proceed to invite your attention. The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the fulfilment of the policy just indicated. In my telegram of the 13th of October I addressed your Excellency as follows —“ You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British-Indian border. I also think that the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary.” As a practical instance of the questions to which I desired to invite your attention, I would refer your Excellency to my Despatch of the 9th of August 1895, in which I insisted on “ the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits ;” and to my later Despatch, dated the 8th May, 1896, in which, having regard to the extension of your military posts in the Tochi valley, I asked for a statement of your conclusions on “ the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure.” Your Excellency was unable to supply me with this statement before the recent outburst of fanaticism occurred, but my inquiry in respect of the posts occupied in Waziristan is one which should be extended so as to apply to the whole of the affected frontier. The two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated in my telegram of the 13th October, namely, the best possible concentration of your military force so as to enable you to fulfil the several responsibilities to which I have adverted, and the limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control

over independent tribal territory. I anticipate that the question of the best location of our frontier posts, and the selection of the communications through the border land which it is most necessary to maintain, will require very careful thought, but it is an essential step towards arriving, as far as it is possible to do so, at a clear and well-defined plan upon which to base local arrangements. The experience gained in the past few months has suggested the inference that certain military posts such as Saragari were not sufficiently defensible, and it is probable that, without altering or diminishing the existing lines of communication, you may wish to modify the past arrangements for their maintenance. In any such modification of existing arrangements I wish to impress upon your Excellency the advisability of establishing regular troops nowhere except in such posts or localities and under such conditions as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks upon them, and of making the local or tribal levies assume, as far as is possible, the aspect of a police rather than a military force. It will be necessary, in framing these arrangements, that an estimate of the cost of frontier defence, including charges for tribal services, should be prepared and transmitted to me, since full regard must be had to financial considerations. It is not sufficient that the measures proposed should be desirable; it is necessary that the gain should be commensurate with the expense.

19. The second principle upon which stress must be laid is the avoidance of any interference with the tribes which can be avoided with due regard to the interests already set forth. It was for this latter reason, that, after full consideration, I was unable to give my consent to the imposition of tribute upon the Afridis and Orakzais. I recognise the force of the arguments used in favour of such a visible assertion of the responsibilities which you have incurred under the Durand Convention. It is not improbable that the regular payment of even a nominal tribute might strengthen the hands of the tribal leaders, the Maliks, against the teachings of their Mullas and against fanatical outbursts. The fear of an enhancement of the tribute might at times restrain the evil disposed amongst the tribesmen. But, on the other hand, it is desirable to avoid giving any countenance to the idea that your Government means to administer the tribal country or to inclose it within your provincial limits. Moreover, I apprehend that the imposition of even a nominal tribute might rankle in the minds of the Pathan tribes, furnish disaffected persons with material for imputing to the British Government designs which it does not contemplate, and, above all, might enable the tribes to choose their own time for refusing payment, and thus for openly defying your authority. In such a case the only means of enforcing your demand, besides punitive expeditions and blockades, might be the imposition of direct administrative control, or, in the last resort, annexation of fresh tracts of country. But the extension of your direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities which it has always been our policy to avoid; and annexation would imply a still larger addition to your civil and military establishments, with a very serious and growing burden upon your financial resources. On the other hand, the fear of occupation is undoubtedly a deterrent to the commission of acts of violence, and it may prove an influence on the side of order which should not be wholly thrown aside.

20. The next point to which I adverted in my telegram of the 13th of October, in connection with the subject of protection, was that of disarmament. I approve entirely of the imposition of the terms of peace which require a tribe that has resorted to arms to surrender as large a number of arms as may reasonably be demanded. But any attempt to keep the tribal country, or even one section of it, permanently disarmed, involves serious consequences. In the lawless state of society which prevails across the British administrative frontier, a tribe could not exist without the means of defence. Unless we are prepared to wholly undertake their protection against their neighbours, some limit must necessarily be put on their deprivation of the means of self defence. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government are alive to the importance of the fact disclosed by the recent operations—that the tribes have access to large quantities of arms of precision and ammunition. To control this traffic in arms and munitions of war is an object of the first importance, and I consider that a systematic inquiry as to the sources of supply, whether from your arsenals and factories or by means of illicit importation into India, should be

instituted. I have dealt in a separate communication with one part of this subject. I have only to add here that, whenever the trade routes to Afghanistan are re-opened and the export of arms and ammunition for His Highness the Amir is resumed, special arrangements should be made to keep an account of the class of arms exported, with a view to future identification should occasion arise, and to prevent any of them passing into the hands of the tribes *en route*.

21. The maintenance of the Khaibar pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of your obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. It may be that, as a military route, others may be preferred to this pass, but under any circumstances the retention of an effective control over the Khaibar is essential ; and accordingly, in your letter of the 4th of October, addressed to General Sir William Lockhart, you desired him to announce to the Afridis your intention to re-open the pass in such manner as you might consider most desirable. I approved of this intimation, and on the 3rd of November I authorised your consideration of any scheme for improving or re-aligning the present road, provided that any changes of importance should be reported to me. I have not yet received your report, but whilst I agree that the arrangements which have hitherto subsisted with the tribesmen have been cancelled by their own violent breach of them, I trust that it may still be possible to give the Afridis some share in your new scheme and thus to enlist their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. But I do not consider that your Government is bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis so deliberately broke. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of your arrangements with the tribe.

22. The march of events in Central Asia and Afghanistan and the recent occurrences along our borders have tended to elucidate the problem to be solved. Facts have taken the place of surmise, and successive engagements or assurances have defined the legitimate spheres and responsibilities of the Governments interested. The recent outbreak of fanaticism, in response to the propaganda of the Mullas, has revealed a source of danger deeper-rooted and wider-spread than was suspected, whilst on the other hand the leniency of the terms of submission imposed upon the recalcitrant tribes, and the manifest reluctance of your Government to interfere with their independence or customs of self-government, cannot fail to gradually allay any suspicions they might previously have entertained of the intentions of the Indian Government. The immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehension of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence. Your Excellency will doubtless give full weight to this change in the situation, and devote your foremost attention to that portion of the question which has thus prominently asserted itself.

23. I desire, in conclusion, to express on the part of Her Majesty's Government their high approval of the manner in which your Excellency's Government has met an arduous crisis, and of the success which has attended the various military operations conducted on the North-West frontier under conditions of extreme difficulty, upon which a separate communication will be made to you. Not only was the rising one of unprecedented extent and violence, which, moreover, occurred at the most trying season of the year, but your resources were already taxed to the utmost by the necessity for carrying on at the same time a campaign against widespread famine in India, and for dealing with the plague which had appeared in several parts of the empire. The contingency that frontier disturbances may arise at a time when attention is being devoted to other important affairs, must always have a certain weight in balancing the considerations which should determine your policy in that quarter. It adds weight to the conclusion that no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the Indian border.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 3.

Extract from letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 23rd June, 1898.

In Your Lordship's despatch, dated the 28th January, 1898, you invite our attention to leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government have resolved to adhere. The two main objects to be borne in mind were stated to be the best possible concentration of our military forces, so as to enable us to fulfil the several responsibilities which rest upon us, and the limitation of our interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory.

Your Lordship indicates that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects; and you inform us that, whilst Her Majesty's Government adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the Pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of our arrangements with the tribe.

We have from time to time reported the course of events on the North-West Frontier of India, and the two despatches, marked on the margin, bring up to the present day the account of the situation with the Afridi tribe with which, in this despatch, we propose to deal. We have been in military occupation of the Khyber Pass since the end of December, the whole Afridi tribe have submitted to us and for some time past they have been quiet and peaceful. Even the turbulent and adventurous characters, who can seldom be relied upon in any trans-border tribe, have of late given singularly little annoyance.

In these circumstances, the time has come, in our opinion, to determine and make known the manner in which our relations with the Afridi tribe shall in future be carried on, and the means which shall be employed for keeping open the Khyber Pass. On this subject we have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Lieut-

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nant-General Sir William Lockhart, with whom we have been pressed to make an early announcement to the Afridis to the effect that the allowances which they received under the terms of our agreement

Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. IX., p. 277.

of 1881 shall be restored to them. We do not deny that a period of some months, between the termination of hostilities and the resumption of friendly relations, is a very trying time for those who have to deal locally with the tribesmen. The Afridis themselves are impatient. Some of them have been prevailed upon to turn to the Amir of Afghanistan in the hope of bettering their position with the British Government, and the Mullas and malcontents are too alert not to seize the opportunity for working upon their feelings. It must, however, be remembered that by their own acts the Afridis ruptured their engagements and forfeited their right to receive any allowances, that they have not made good and declare their inability to make good the loss and damage which they caused, not only to buildings in the Khyber, but by carrying off or destroying goods and chattels, and that they were told that the restoration of the latter, or the payment of their value was required of them before we could enter into any new arrangements for the future. In our opinion, therefore, a premature announcement of the restoration of their allowances would have appeared to them to be a bid for their good-will, before we had shown that their submission could be enforced. Besides this, restoration of their allowances in their entirety would anticipate our decision as to the future, while an intimation of our intention to restore them, coupled with exceptions or reservations, would have been apt to tie our own hands without satisfying the tribesmen.

We have therefore decided to withhold for the present any indication of our intentions beyond a general expression to the effect that we would deal sympathetically with their case, and that their behaviour in the interval would not improbably influence the final decision. Of their behaviour we have little to complain. Even in turning, as some of them did, to Kabul they have strengthened rather than weakened our position; for the rebuff which their advances met at the hands of the Amir must have shown them that they have nothing to hope from not accepting our terms.

Sir William Lockhart has stated, in the memorandum embodying his views upon the best way of holding the Khyber Pass in the future, that the more important object we should have in view is to ensure a ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. The plan put forward by Sir William Lockhart for the improvement and extension of the reservoirs and water-works, and for erecting a fort capable of protecting them, is one which has much to commend it, and advantage may be taken of the opportunity which is now presented for carrying out this plan.

In giving to Sir William Lockhart's scheme our support, to the above extent, we do not, however, concur in thinking that the fort at Landi Kotal should be occupied by regular troops of the Indian Army. We agree in the principle that a local tribal corps should be raised, for service in the Pass, and that it should be commanded by British officers. This distinguishes the local corps sharply from the original corps of Jezailchis dependent as it was, under the Agreement of 1881, on the responsibility of the tribal council; and, further developing the "Khyber Rifles" as they came in late years to be constituted, it acknowledges the local force to be British; and the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Pass is accepted as ours. Between a tribal levy and a local militia, there is an essential difference which is not always recognized. By a "levy" we mean a body of men who are dependent on tribal authority, and, strictly speaking, are employed, paid, and summoned for any special duty, by tribal authority. Any contribution which the British Government makes towards their support is made in order to co-operate in the assertion of the right and power of the tribe to restrain the bad characters and "young bloods" of their own and neighbouring territories. Drill and discipline are not wanted, and British officers in command or even as inspectors are out of place. When greater efficiency is desirable, the direct superintendence of British officers becomes essential, but it then equally becomes necessary to recognize the force as a British and not a tribal force. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of the force ceases to rest on the tribe. The proposal to place regular troops of the Indian army at Landi Kotal raises other questions. A battalion in such a position would be capable of no action beyond passive defence, and would constitute a standing temptation to the tribes, while, if a rising did occur, it could do nothing to make the forcing of the Khyber more easy, though it would materially add to our anxieties. Service at Landi Kotal would be unpopular, for the men would have to be practically confined to the limits of the fort, and even with the utmost precautions, there would be constant risk of men being murdered, and rifles stolen. Continual friction would thus be kept up between us and the Afridis. It is, moreover, the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the officers acquainted with the frontier, whom His Honour has consulted, that the Afridis would strongly resent the placing of troops at the further end of the Pass. We believe that we should fail to enlist the good-will of the tribe on our side, and we should certainly excite the suspicion, if not the antagonism of the Amir of Afghanistan. Everyone agrees that the good-will of the Afridi tribe is essential to the smooth working of our arrangements in the Pass, and it seems to follow that the attempt to strengthen them by stationing troops at Landi Kotal would, in fact, prove to be a source of weakness.

The alternative which we propose to adopt is to hold the position at Landi Kotal by means of the local militia to which we have already alluded,

increasing their numbers to a strength sufficient to enable the patrol and convoy work in the Pass itself, as well as the garrison duties at Landi Kotal, to be undertaken by them. The

	Rs.	
1. New works at Fort Maude, Ali Masjid, &c.	4,00,000	cost of building a strong fort on Suffolk Hill, at Landi Kotal, is now estimated at six and a half lakhs of rupees, and about two lakhs for water supply; and it will take two winter seasons to complete the works. The full estimate for the works
2. New works at other places, Zintarra, &c.	2,00,000	
3. Improvements to Landi Kotal Sarai ...	50,000	
4. Suffolk Hill Fort	6,50,000	
5. Water supply	2,00,000	
	<hr/>	
Total	15,00,000	
	<hr/>	

in the Pass is given in the margin.

We have no reason to fear that a corps such as we contemplate would be untrustworthy in the hour of need. The history of our empire in India appears to teach the contrary. The conduct of the Khyber Rifles themselves last year also points to the same conclusion. Had they been organized, officered and supported in the manner which we propose for the future, we have no reason to doubt that they would have remained true to us, as their fellow tribesmen in the regular regiments of the Indian army, with very few exceptions indeed, remained true. It must be borne in mind that it is an essential part of our plan that a moveable column of sufficient force shall be equipped with transport and ready to support the irregular force in the Khyber on the occurrence of any emergency calling for action of the kind. Your Lordship will be separately addressed regarding the details of our proposed military arrangements.

We think that the former management of trade affairs in the Pass has been satisfactory; and that, as far as can be, the future arrangements should reproduce them. The frequent kafilas went up and down the Khyber road in safety, and, if the volume of trade in late years contracted when we would have looked to it to expand, the reasons for that are not to be found in any deficiencies within the Pass, but in the fiscal policy which finds favour in Afghanistan. The Political Officer who directed the local arrangements has been a subordinate of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The control of political relations with the Afridis and their neighbours, as well as the control of the Khyber Rifles themselves, were in the same hands. The majority of us wish to continue this system. We think that it is essential to have one authority in the Pass, and that the only possible authority, under present conditions, is that of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. We therefore think that the control of the Political Officers and of the militia must be in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor. The militia should be officered by British officers, and the conditions of service should be such as to ensure its efficiency for the purposes for which it is intended, but we think that the authority over it should be the same as that which directs the political relations of the Punjab Frontier.

Three other courses are suggested. The officer entrusted with political dealing in the Khyber Pass might, it is suggested, be directly under the Government of India in the Foreign Department, or he might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, but the Commissioner himself be directly under the Government of India, or the Military Officer, who commands the Khyber Militia might also be the Political Officer in the Pass. These plans oust the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from the Khyber Pass, and introduce a special system in a narrow wedge of country bordered on each side by, and having intimate relations with, country with which the Lieutenant-Governor conducts the political relations. The first plan would not be practicable. The organization of the Government of India is not such as is adapted for dealing with local routine work of which the mass of business would consist. We could not afford to station in the Khyber an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is

too small for an expensive staff and too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority. The second plan would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer. The third plan would put the whole direction of affairs, political and military, in the hands of the military authorities over whom the Punjab Government which controls the political relations with the rest of the border would have no power. Our Hon'ble Colleagues, His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne and Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, dissent from our views in desiring to maintain the authority of the Local Government over the militia and the political relations with Afridis of the Khyber. Their Minutes are enclosed.

One most important consideration in dealing with the future arrangements in the Khyber is that of our communications with Landi Kotal. A good road now exists through the Pass, but, in the event of our having to make a military advance in any of the circumstances discussed in the 6th paragraph, we are of opinion that it would be of the highest importance to have the use of a railway to Landi Kotal. A recent survey shows that a light railway on the two-foot gauge can be run from Peshawar to Landi Kotal independently of the present road, at an estimated cost of Rs. 36 lakhs. We think that we ought to secure, in the settlement which is about to be made with the Afridis, the right to construct and work a railway and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction upon it. We do not propose actually to lay the rails beyond Jamrud now, but we would make the railway bed ready for the laying of the permanent way when the time came for doing so. This, however, is a project for which we should desire to obtain an expression that the approval of Her Majesty's Government before we take any steps towards its inception.

In our new arrangement with the Afridis we must make adequate provision for the railway and for the exercise of jurisdiction upon railway lands, the trade road and within the militia posts, as well as for the constitution of the militia as a British force. We think, however, that our terms should be drawn, in some essentials, upon the same lines as the Agreement of 1881 followed, and this is the unanimous opinion of all who have been consulted; that is to say, first;—the Afridi clans who are connected with the Khyber should still be paid allowances for keeping the pass open and safe, and in commutation of their ancient rights in respect of tolls and otherwise; and second;—a local force should be raised from the Afridis themselves for service in the Pass in carrying out the objects with which we dominate it. The circumstances of the uprising against us, in contravention of the agreement under which the Afridis had for many years worked, constituted an absolute rupture of all relations, and the defeat and subjection of the tribe might, if we chose, be held to obliterate all rights. We decide in our own interests to enlist the good-will and the assistance of the Afridis, but we hold that we have a clear right to attain our ends in whatever way we please. We propose, then, to renew our former relations as much on the lines of the old agreement as is compatible with present aims, but where a departure from the old footing seems expedient, we think it should be made in a manner to leave us the utmost freedom in the future. The form itself of the new document may with advantage perhaps approach rather to that of a sanad than take again the appearance of a treaty. This is a matter for future decision, but, if it can be so arranged, we would rather make the document a statement of the terms which we grant to the Afridis with their acceptance recorded upon it. It may be necessary, as was done in our instructions to Sir William Lockhart, to leave a certain amount of discretion to the officer or officers to whom we entrust the duty of entering into communication with the tribe, and to be guided, as to the final form, by the reports we receive.

We have said that Sir William Lockhart required of the Afridis the payment of the value of public and private property looted by them in the

Khyber, and that they have not made good this demand. The property has been valued at Rs. 28,600. We fear it must be accepted that it is impossible to enforce these claims, unless we are prepared to use force to compel compliance. In addition to this, the damage done to buildings in the Khyber has been assessed at two and a half lakhs of rupees. We reserved the question of requiring the Afridis to make good the cost of this damage for consideration when renewing relations with them. It is in our opinion useless to make any demand on that head now. Notwithstanding the terms of Sir William Lockhart's proclamation, we know that the Afridis regard themselves as having complied with what was required of them. We know that they have been put to many shifts and contrivances to enable them to comply to the extent to which they have done so, and that they are unable to pay more now and do not admit their liability to pay more. Any renewed demand or even any deductions from their allowances spread over the future would, we believe, be thought by them to be an injustice, and it will detract much from the value of any settlement, if it is not cordially accepted by the tribe from the outset. We cannot readily agree, however, to wipe out this demand altogether, since it was deliberately made. We propose; therefore, to make the renewal of allowances date from the day on which the Afridis accept our new terms of settlement. The tribesmen might, and they probably will, ask for the allowances to be paid from the date on which we made peace with them. We shall make them understand that we made peace with them without exacting the full terms originally imposed, and that their allowances cannot, therefore, be restored until the date on which a new settlement is arrived at.

In one matter we shall have to forego our demand altogether. The Afridis were told that they must restore the arms taken from troops during the campaign. This they have not done, alleging that it is not the custom of their country to restore arms taken in war, that they told Sir William Lockhart so, and that he gave them no definite reply. As many of these arms have been sold out of their country, they cannot comply in full with this demand, and, after full consideration, we have, with regret, come to the conclusion that we cannot press it.

We propose to reserve for other despatches an expression of our plans for dealing, on the principles stated by Your Lordship in the despatch cited at the beginning of this letter, with other sections of the North-West Frontier, such as the Kohat-Samana-Kurram Frontier, Malakand, the Tochi Valley and Wano; there is, however, one consideration which we may mention here. We concur with Your Lordship in thinking that advanced posts in tribal country, held by regular troops, should be established under such conditions as will enable the garrisons to promptly repel any attacks made upon them. We think, however, that a well organized militia might be a most valuable addition to this system, especially in relieving the regular troops of most, if not all the duty on the lines of communication, and in small and unhealthy posts. Before the transference of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief, there was in existence a force which bore the name of militia and which performed duties somewhat of this character. In the Kurram Militia we have a revival of that system. If the proposed organization of the Afridi Militia in the Khyber is accepted by Your Lordship, we would propose to place at the disposal of the Local Government an officer of experience of the frontier and with Pathans, who could not only act as Commandant of the Khyber Militia, but as an adviser in the matter of organising other corps of militia where required.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Dated Calcutta, the 3rd February, 1898.

With reference to the conference held yesterday at Government House, over which His Excellency the Viceroy presided, I have the honour to forward a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for the holding of the Khyber pass.

2. These proposals, in which I concur, may perhaps be found to offer a reasonable solution of the question which was under discussion yesterday.

Memorandum by Brig.-Gen. W. G. Nicholson, Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

In deciding on the agency by which the Khyber is to be held, there are two points to be kept in view. First, the Khyber is used as the principal trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, in the event of military operations having to be undertaken in Afghanistan, the most direct and easiest road to Kabul lies through the Khyber. To meet trade requirements it would, no doubt, suffice to hold the Khyber by tribal levies drawn mainly from the Afridi sections, whose custom it was in former days to exact tolls from caravans making use of this pass. But to meet military requirements such an arrangement seems hardly appropriate. We ought to have an advanced post capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depôt at the most commanding point in the pass, namely, at Landi Kotal; near that post an adequate supply of water is indispensable; and, in view of recent occurrences, it would appear to be neither prudent nor conducive to our prestige to expose the defensive works and water-supply which the Government of India may order to be constructed to the chance of being wrecked by a tribal outbreak. The importance of the military aspect of this question has, I believe, been fully recognised by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government since the year 1885.

The following proposals are put forward as likely to meet the two requirements indicated above:—

1. The Khyber to be held for trade purposes by the Khyber Rifles, drawn proportionately from the tribal sections concerned, and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia. The men to be armed, clothed, equipped and trained by Government. The Head-quarters of the corps to be as heretofore at Jamrud, with a strong detachment at Landi Kotal, and the remainder distributed in suitable posts between Landi Kotal and Jamrud. The original Landi Kotal Serai to be remodelled so as to provide quarters for the detachment there, and the old posts along the line, including that at Ali Masjid, to be restored with such improvements as regards site and design as may seem necessary.

In the event of Government approving of the continuance of tribal allowances to the Afridi sections living in the Khyber, the pay and allowances of the Khyber Rifles to be taken into account as really constituting a tribal subsidy.

My own view is that Afridis much prefer to be commanded by British officers, and for this reason among others I am inclined to favour the appointment of one or more carefully selected British officers to the Khyber Rifles.

But on this point I hesitate to express a decided opinion, although I doubt whether, if a different policy be adopted, any Native officer well adapted for the command of the corps would be forthcoming. Aslam Khan has done well, but his qualifications are quite exceptional.

2. For military purposes a really strong work, armed with guns, should be constructed at Landi Kotal on a site which, if possible, would protect the water-supply. It is understood that such a site can be found near what is known as "the General's Camp." The normal garrison of this work might be fixed at one battalion of native infantry, with a detachment of gunners, and it may here be noted that Landi Kotal is a much more healthy station for troops than the Peshawar valley. The work should, however, be so designed as to be capable on an emergency of housing a larger garrison, while being thoroughly defensible when occupied by its normal garrison. There should be no difficulty about this, if suitable flanking arrangements are made. The work should provide storage for reserve ammunition and for at least one month's supply of food and water for the normal garrison. The type of work and the armament should be such as to enable the defenders to withstand a powerful tribal combination without needing immediate re-inforcement.

In conclusion, I would observe that the foregoing proposals do not, so far as I can see, involve the annexation or administration by us of the Khyber to any greater extent than has hitherto been the case. The political arrangements and the Khyber Rifles would remain as before under the control of the Political Officer in charge of the pass, and the military garrison of Landi Kotal would be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. The latter would act in concert with the former in all matters in which the presence of the troops might affect the management of the pass and of its inhabitants.

Dated, CALCUTTA, } (Sd.) W. G. NICHOLSON, *Brig.-Genl.*,
 The 3rd February, 1898. } *Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated Fort William, the 1st March, 1898.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd February 1898, in which you forwarded a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, making proposals for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. These proposals, which meet with your concurrence, involve the holding of a strong work at Landi Kotal, with a garrison of one battalion of Native Infantry and a detachment of gunners, while the Khyber Pass itself would be guarded for trade purposes by a Militia recruited from the tribal sections concerned, and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia.

3. The scheme, of which this short description does not purport to be even a sketch, has been examined by the Government of India in the light of what has hitherto been the policy of the British Government, and the instructions of the Secretary of State conveyed in his despatch of January 28th, paragraph 21, bearing particularly on the present subject. The Governor-General in Council is not prepared to accept the plan without further investigation of the whole question of the best way in which to secure the safety of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, wishes you and Sir Richard Udny to put before him, in greater detail, the plan of holding the pass which commends

itself to you, and to discuss at the same time any alternative ways of doing so. It has, for instance, been suggested that a Militia, maintained on the analogy of the Kurram Militia, might guard the pass without the immediate presence and support, in time of peace, of any military force, if a body of troops is kept ready to move to the assistance of the tribal militia,—should they be seriously menaced, and if a definite assurance be given to them that such assistance will be afforded.

4. Some time may yet elapse before the Government of India can arrive at a final decision in this matter. That decision must be influenced by other than purely military considerations, and you may now be in a position to advise the Government of India on the disposition and temper of the Afridis, showing how they would view a military occupation. Sir Richard Udny was understood, when you and he were personally consulted in Calcutta, to favour a system under which the whole responsibility for the administration, as well as the safety of the Khyber, would be taken entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. The Governor-General in Council would desire to know, if this is a correct description of Sir Richard Udny's views, how he would propose such an arrangement would be worked out in detail, and what extent of country on either side of the road through the pass would be included in such arrangement. Still another plan which has been mentioned is to fall back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, relaxing even what amount of British supervision and superimposed authority there has always been in the Khyber arrangements since 1881. The Government of India will await the expression of your views before coming to any conclusion as regards these suggestions.

5. It is in the opinion of the Government of India inevitable that the present military occupation of the Khyber must, at least temporarily, continue, and that, when all the clans submit, they must be told that the Khyber will continue to be occupied for the present. They will be warned at the same time, if they show any disposition to resent this military occupation and a desire to arrive at a state of relations under which they will have complete or considerable freedom from control, that their conduct in the interval between this and the settlement of the future will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision as to the nature of the final arrangements which may be made for the safety of the pass. The sanction of the Secretary of State must be obtained before any announcement of this kind can be made.

6. I am to ask that your best consideration may be given to the several questions which have been put before you in this letter, and that your opinion may be expressed to the Government of India as early as you are able to reply. The points raised in paragraph 5 were referred to you by telegraph.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Trah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Peshawar, the 11th March 1898.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1098 F., dated 1st March 1898, calling for a report by Sir Richard Udny and myself on the method which appears to us to be the best for holding the Khyber Pass in future.

2. My views on the subject are embodied in the accompanying memorandum. In order to save time I submit this at once without waiting for the paper which Sir R. Udny is drawing up on the subject, and which I hope to forward on the 14th instant.

Memorandum by Gen. Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

The Khyber Pass has to be kept open by us with two objects, and can be held in one of four ways. The objects are—first, to provide a direct and easy trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, to ensure ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. The latter purpose is undoubtedly the more important of the two, both in connexion with the defence of Afghanistan and India against foreign aggression, and because the trade between those two countries is quite insignificant in amount and value. The temporary closing of such a trade route as the Khyber makes very little difference to the Government or people of India, but from the strategic standpoint it might be essential that the main road into Northern Afghanistan should be kept open in times of excitement and fanaticism on or beyond the frontier. The delay of a week or a fortnight in entering Afghan territory might involve momentous consequences in a political as well as a military sense. It will be seen, therefore, that the measures which would suffice for guarding a trade route might be quite inadequate for keeping open the line of military communication between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan.

The ways in which the Khyber can be held are—first, by regular troops; secondly, by a force consisting partly of regular and partly of irregular troops; thirdly, by irregular troops alone; and fourthly, by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility.

2. As regards the first method of holding the Khyber, it may be objected that, in view of existing military requirements in the Punjab and elsewhere, the Khyber could not be held in adequate strength by troops alone without a proportionate addition to the Indian army; that permanently to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising; that for occupying the heights bordering the pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, local irregular troops or levies are more suitable and likely to be more efficient than regular troops; that during the summer the pass itself (except its highest point at Landi Kotal) is so hot and unhealthy that service therein would be intolerable for British soldiers and extremely distasteful to native soldiers; and, finally, that to exclude the Khyber Afridis from any share in the custody of the pass, and the emoluments attaching thereto, would certainly create ill-feeling among them and incite them to mischief.

With reference to the first objection, I would remark that some increase in the army to meet the needs of an expanding empire seems inevitable. As matters stand, a large proportion of the troops quartered in the Punjab have of late years been almost continually on outpost duty on or across the frontier, or on field service.

With reference to the second objection, it may be urged that it is by no means obligatory to lock up in the valley of the Khyber the whole of the troops that might be required to secure the pass. The Bazar valley would furnish a strong strategical position, and, if a brigade were quartered at or near China, while a smaller force occupied a fort at Landi Kotal, the pass would be as safe as it could be made by purely military means. On the other hand, it is understood that the permanent occupation of Afridi territory in the Bazar valley would be opposed to the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and I am inclined to think that such a step might embitter our relations with some at least of the Afridi sections, and thus lead to their giving trouble whenever they imagined that our troops were fully occupied elsewhere.

However this may be, the last three objections are to my mind unanswerable, and dispose of the idea of holding the Khyber by regular troops alone. Picquet and patrol duties in the pass can best be performed by a local and irregular corps, the employment of which gives the Khyber Afridis their due interest and profit in the custody of the pass, and obviates any necessity for quartering troops between Landi Kotal and Jamrud.

3. As regards the second and third methods of holding the Khyber, which can best be discussed together, it may be said that for the past eighteen years the pass has been guarded by irregular troops alone, inasmuch as the tribal levies which were raised, trained, and paid by us under an agreement with the Afridi sections concerned have by degrees been assimilated more and more closely to an irregular frontier corps. This system has saved much trouble and expense in the past, and might, if properly controlled, have continued to work well in the future, but for the unfortunate occurrences in August last. However loyal and well-disciplined irregular native troops may be, they can hardly be expected to fight against overwhelming odds of their own kinsmen, after their British Commandant has been withdrawn, and they have been warned that no support or assistance is to be looked for. Under such trying conditions, the best mercenary troops in the world might be expected to waver, and I think it highly creditable to the Khyber Rifles that, when left to their own resources, they fought as well as they did.

The Kurram valley is held by the Kurram Militia under a British Commandant, and this force has done excellent service, even during the recent period of disturbance. But the local conditions in the Kurram and in the Khyber are wholly dissimilar. The Kurram Militia is mainly composed of Turis, a tribe of Shiahhs which only flourishes under British protection, and is at continual enmity with the Sunni tribes surrounding it. Moreover, we have provided the necessary support or stiffening to the Militia by the regular garrison quartered in the Para Chinar Fort.

The holding of the Khyber was entrusted to a local force in some respects analogous in constitution to the Kurram Militia, but with these differences: First, the Khyber Riflemen were drawn from the Afridi sections which inhabited and bordered the pass, and consequently they had no traditional feeling of enmity against their neighbours to strengthen their loyalty towards us; and, secondly, the defensible serai at Landi Kotal had no garrison of regular troops like the fort at Para Chinar. It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly re-inforced by regular troops in August last, that with few exceptions, they would have stood to their engagements, that the various posts and the defensible serai and water-supply works at Landi Kotal would have been saved from destruction, and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.

It ought to be an axiom of frontier policy that, in using local levies or irregular corps to hold passes or outposts beyond the limits of British India, the one thing of essential importance is to inspire these levies or irregulars with the fullest confidence that, in time of emergency, they will be as fully and as promptly aided and reinforced by the army behind them as regular troops would be. Up to August last, I believe that the Khyber Rifles possessed that confidence, but for the time it has been weakened, if not destroyed, by their being left to themselves to hold the pass, and to defend the buildings and other public property which had been entrusted to their care. According to the strict letter of the law, it is doubtless the case that our agreement with the Afridis did not oblige us to assist with our troops the representatives of the sections concerned, or the Khyber Rifles, in carrying out the duty for which these sections received allowances, and for which the Khyber Rifles had been organized. But these wild mountaineers are unacquainted with the niceties of political jurisprudence, they had for many years fulfilled their part of the agreement, some of them had been employed by us as irregular troops in frontier warfare elsewhere, and they may reasonably have hoped for the assistance which, technically speaking, they had no right to demand. One of my two

main reasons for supporting the proposals put forward by the Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, is that their adoption will restore the confidence of the Khyber Rifles and the Afridis living in or near the Khyber Pass. These will know that, so long as a strong outpost at Landi Kotal is garrisoned by regular troops, there is no chance of our again leaving them to stem the wave of tribal fanaticism unaided. There is of course the objection that on military grounds it may be hazardous to hold an advanced post with regular troops, while the road between this post and the base remains in the hands of locally-raised irregulars in whose fidelity we cannot place implicit reliance. I do not attach much weight to this objection, for Landi Kotal is at the top of the pass, and is therefore regarded by the Afridis as dominating the road between it and Jamrud. Moreover, as previously stated, the heights bordering the road are so inaccessible, and so devoid of water, that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either British or Native, without involving a strain on our military resources quite out of proportion to any conceivable advantage to be derived from such a measure. The feasibility of covering the pass by means of a cantonment in the Bazar valley has already been discussed in paragraph 2 of this memorandum.

My other reason for supporting Brigadier-General Nicholson's proposals is that, without involving heavy outlay or alienating the sympathies of any section among the tribesmen, they are likely greatly to strengthen our hold over the Khyber, and to enable us to carry out such arrangements in the way of railway extension, water-works, and the like, as may be required to facilitate our access to Northern Afghanistan, should circumstances demand our intervention in that quarter.

4. As regards the fourth method, its practical effect would be that the Government of India would pay blackmail to the Khyber Afridis, instead of the latter imposing blackmail on the kafilas making use of the road. It would mean a reversion to the barbarous system which was condemned as intolerable at the beginning of the last Afghan war. Difficulties would be certain to arise regarding the repair of the road and the maintenance of the posts needed to protect it; the Landi Kotal water-supply would cease to exist; our prestige along the whole of the north-west frontier would suffer; in short, the fourth method of holding the Khyber has nothing to recommend it.

5. From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that I am in favour of the second method. The defile of the Khyber should in any case be guarded by irregular troops raised locally. As regards regular troops, it would no doubt strengthen our hold on the Khyber from a military point of view, if a strong force were permanently quartered in the Bazar valley at or near China, as well as a smaller force in a defensible post at Landi Kotal. From a political point of view, the permanent occupation of China might give rise to tribal ill-feeling, and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that, in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the pass would be secure in any case. If the pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions. I am, therefore, inclined to recommend the scheme sketched out by Brigadier-General Nicholson as offering the best prospect of a satisfactory settlement.

I consider that the organization of the Khyber Rifles might advantageously be strengthened by attaching to the corps three British officers instead of one, namely, a Commandant, 2nd-in-command and Adjutant, possibly also a medical officer. While drawn from the same local sources as heretofore, the corps might gradually be assimilated to one of the infantry regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force in matters of equipment, pay and pension.

6. I see no necessity whatever for instituting a civil administration over the Khyber. What we ought to tell the tribesmen is that, so long as they fulfil their engagements to us, and so long as their attitude towards each other does not bring them into conflict with us or endanger the security of the road, we are perfectly content to leave them to manage their own affairs. The Political

Officer in charge of the Khyber would naturally exercise considerable influence over the tribesmen, but I doubt whether that influence would be increased by investing him with the functions of a civil administrator.

7. As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours.

8. There are two other points to which a brief reference is necessary: First, the advisability or otherwise of constructing an alternative road to Landi Kotal from Peshawar through the Mullagori country. Such a road would be nearly twice as long as the Khyber route, and its cost would be some 9 lakhs, but the alignment is an easy one. If, as laid down by the Secretary of State, the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade is essential; it seems to me that it would be a waste of money to provide a second and much longer roadway which would never be used, unless the Khyber were closed—a condition of things which is not contemplated. Secondly, it may be convenient to mention that the cost of the defensive works, water-supply, &c., needed in the Khyber, if occupied in the manner suggested in Brigadier-General Nicholson's Memorandum, is roughly estimated by the Commanding Royal Engineer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, at 9½ lakhs, namely:—

	Lakhs.
Fort on Suffolk Hill... ..	4
Water-supply	1
New post and tank at General's camp	½
Restoring defensible serai	1
Blockhouses, Upper Khyber... ..	1½
„ Lower „	1½
	9½

The cost of restoring the works which would be required if the Khyber were held by the third method, *i.e.*, without a garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal, may be taken at about 5 lakhs.

9. In conclusion, I would refer to the supreme importance of improving the communications between our frontier outposts and the supporting stations behind them. By this means alone can the due concentration of our forces and the rapid reinforcement of any threatened point be provided for. I advocate the immediate extension of the North-Western Railway system to Kohat and Bannu on the west, and to Landi Kotal and Dargai below Malakand on the north.

(Signed) W. S. A. LOCKHART, *General,*
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Banda, the 19th March, 1898.

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR's views in regard to re-opening of Khyber Pass have been given in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government's letter, dated 21st September, and in two demi-official letters to the Viceroy, dated 18th October

and 6th March, the material parts of which will now be put into official form and letter sent by post. To what he has already said, Lieutenant-Governor would add as follows :—*First*. It is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to Afridia before our objects regarding pass are defined and fully secured ; such attitude would be misinterpreted and would make final settlement extremely difficult. There is no need for haste as pass is open, and military occupation must continue till sufficient guarantee for the permanency of arrangement is secured. *Secondly*. It is desirable, in view of reckless infringement of former agreement, that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 24th September, cost of constructing buildings damaged in outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should be settled before allowances are restored. *Thirdly*. In regard to re-enlistment in Khyber Rifles, Lieutenant-Governor, as already intimated, thinks this desirable, provided Government reserve complete liberty of action in regard to constitution of force and its relation to tribal control. These are questions which, in Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, require full deliberation and discussion with the tribes, and allowances should not be granted until they are settled. Even if Government has framed its policy in regard to the Khyber, the tribes are hardly in a position to enter into definite engagements which must depend for their fulfilment on the concerted action of the several sections.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Letter from General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Peshawar, the 16th March, 1898.

IN continuation of my letter, dated 11th March, 1898, I have the honour to forward a Memorandum, dated 15th idem, embodying Sir Richard Udny's views on the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. The only remarks I have to make on this Memorandum, which I am gratified to find in substantial agreement with my own, are with regard to the following points :—

Paragraph 9.—I would first observe that, although Brigadier-General Elles concurred with the Commissioner of Peshawar in thinking it inexpedient last August to send troops into the Khyber, I am not aware that he represented such a movement to be a military impossibility. But in cases of local disturbance, the responsible military adviser is not the General Officer in local command, but the Lieutenant-General of the Command concerned, and in this instance the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, strongly urged on Army Head-quarters the desirability of re-inforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops.

Secondly.—I am doubtful about the necessity for keeping a full equipped flying column at Peshawat in readiness to reinforce the Khyber. The correct principle to be followed in the military occupation of the frontier is to concentrate the troops needed to support the outlying garrisons in suitable and healthy positions, and to keep up the transport and equipment required to enable these troops to move at a moment's notice. Further, to perfect the means of rapid communication between the outpost and their supports by the construction of railways and the improvement of roads. To hold a long and exposed frontier with a moderate force, it is essential that the communications should be as complete as they can be made by civilized methods.

Thirdly.—I do not agree with Sir R. Udny about the Khyber Rifles being encouraged to provide their own arms. I can see no advantage in such a system, which would offer a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals. I consider, too, that the Khyber Rifles should be as well armed as our Native Infantry Regiments.

Paragraph 10.—Admitting the existence last summer of a strong fanatical feeling along the north-west frontier, I doubt whether this feeling in the first instance took a firm hold on the majority of the Afridi tribesmen. They assembled, possibly in large numbers, to attack the Khyber posts, but their attitude was at first vacillating and half-hearted, and I cannot but think that, after having upheld their religious reputation among their neighbours by a skirmish with our troops, they would have been only too glad of an excuse to disperse to their homes. To me it is inconceivable that the Khyber Rifles would have attempted to hold out against their kinsmen, if the hostility of the latter towards the British Government had been, as bitter and as fanatical as Sir R. Udny supposes. Apart from their Mullas, the Afridis have always been on friendly terms with us. In fact, as a tribe they like us, and many of us like them; and it is well known that the Mullas have less influence over the Afridis than over any other frontier tribe.

Memorandum by Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I.

The management of the Khyber previous to the outbreak of last August

* And the Shinwaris of the Lwargai plateau round Landi Kotal.

R UDNY.

was based upon an agreement made with us in 1881 by the Afridis,* or rather, to speak quite accurately, by the Kuki Khel, Zakka Khel, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai and Sipah clans of that tribe, for the Aka Khel and Tirah Adam Khel clans had no more to do with the Khyber than the sections of the Adam Khel Afridis, who inhabit the Kohat Pass and the wedge of independent territory adjoining the pass to the eastward. To prevent misconceptions as to the terms of this agreement, it should be read through carefully, but for present purposes it may be sufficient to say that the arrangements under it were as follows:—On Tuesdays and Fridays in every week one caravan went up through the Khyber from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, a distance of 20 miles, while another came down from Landi Kotal to Jamrud, and these caravans were accompanied by guards of the Khyber Rifles which exchanged at the half-way post of Ali Masjid, the escort which had come down with the caravan from Landi Kotal returning there with the upward caravan from Jamrud, while the escort from Jamrud retraced its steps with the downward caravan. On these days too the heights which command the road through the defile were picquetted by Khyber Riflemen. On other days of the week the pass was closed to traffic, though special arrangements of the same kind were occasionally made on off-days for distinguished visitors, and special guards used to be provided for parties of coolies employed on the repair of the road or on such duties as the building of the fortified serai at Landi Kotal, the construction of the water-supply works near Landi Khana, &c., &c. Officials too connected with the pass, like the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber and the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, frequently travelled through it with small escorts of the latter corps on other than caravan days, though, according to the strict letter of the agreement (clause 13), they were bound to give sufficient notice of this to the tribesmen beforehand. From this it will be seen that the Khyber cannot be said to have been "held," except in a very modified sense even for purposes of trade, and that in a military sense it was not "held" at all, while the system in force was absolutely different from that prevailing in the Kohat Pass (through the country of the Adam Khel Afridis), which, in return for a comparatively very small subsidy, is open every day of the year and all day long, like any road in British India, for all travellers, whether European or Native, without any precautions of guards or picquets.

2. The question that Government now have to decide is whether we should content ourselves with regaining the same measure of control over the Khyber that we possessed in the past, or whether we should seek to obtain a larger measure not only in order to secure it more effectually for military purposes as our main line of advance into Afghanistan, but also to render it impossible for the Afridis to close the road and to destroy our posts in the pass

as they did last August. I think there can be no doubt that this question must be answered in favour of the second alternative, and, as it seems to me that the objects in view under this alternative could only be completely attained by holding the pass for ourselves in a military sense and by regular troops, I said at the Conference which was held by His Excellency the Viceroy at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo that I should like to see this done in future *if the military authorities considered it practicable*. Although too I am absolutely averse as a general rule to any occupation or quasi-annexation of territory beyond the frontiers of British India when it can possibly be avoided, and I have always been strongly of opinion that we should refrain from interference with the tribes, unless it is necessary for the security of our own subjects and border, I think that in the special case of the Khyber the objects to be attained would justify us in making an exception, and that, however much the Afridis might dislike our occupation of the pass with the consequent forfeiture of their pass allowances,* the trans-border world could not fail to admit that it was a just and appropriate punishment, which they had brought upon themselves by an unprovoked outbreak and by showing us that we could place no lasting reliance on tribal agreements. But even with a military occupation of the Khyber I would have kept up the Khyber Rifles—as an auxiliary irregular corps on the model of the Kurram Militia and entirely under our own control—for two reasons—

* In this connection I may note that, if we continued to pay them their old allowances, the Afridis could not object to our re-occupying the Khyber with troops or regard it as any breach of the 1881 Agreement, since this was specially provided for by clause 5 of that agreement, which seems to have been made while we were still in military occupation of the Khyber.

R. UDNY.

(i) as providing an opening for the Afridis, who would still feel that they retained a considerable interest in the pass arrangements while they had a local levy to enlist in ;

(ii) to escort caravans and to furnish picquets on the hills during their journey through the pass in times of peace, because such duties—particularly hill top picquets—would be harrassing for regular troops, and could be performed satisfactorily by Khyber Riflemen in ordinary times as they have been during the past.

I had no intention, however, of proposing that we should undertake any responsibility for the administration of the Khyber as well as for its safety, and I would simply uphold the existing regulation published in Government of India Notification of the 2nd July 1880 (as amended by Notification of the 15th June 1886), which provides for the trial of

* I should prefer to read this, when the new arrangements have been concluded, as “the road through the Khyber Pass and the lands immediately adjoining this road-way on either side.”

R. UDNY.

criminal offences in “the Khyber Pass and the lands immediately adjoining the pass on either side of the roadway,” without attempting to interfere with the tribesmen elsewhere. It will be observed too that this regulation in its concluding words allows a discretion to the officers empowered under it to refrain from using it unless the parties are all British subjects.

3. Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum on future Khyber arrangements is opposed to a purely military occupation of the pass by regular troops, principally on the grounds—

(a) that irregular troops (*i.e.*, local levies) are more suitable, and likely to be more efficient, than regulars for occupying the heights bordering the pass, which are so inaccessible and devoid of water that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either British or Native, without an undue strain on our military resources ;

(b) that during the summer the pass itself is so hot and unhealthy that service in it would be intolerable for British, and extremely distasteful even for native soldiers ;

(c) that the exclusion of the Afridis from a share in the custody of the pass and the emoluments attaching thereto would create ill-feeling and incite them to predatory action ;

and also more or less because—

(d) a military occupation would involve an increase to the Indian army ; and

(e) to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising.

4. Some of these objections to holding the Khyber entirely by regular troops are so purely military that as a civilian I feel great diffidence in making any remarks upon them at all, but in frontier questions political and military considerations are so inseparably associated that it is impossible to refer to the former without touching upon the latter. Perhaps, therefore, I may be permitted to say that I fully recognise the force of (a), (b), (d) and (e) ; and as regards (a), even if it were safe to allow local levies to hold permanent positions upon the heights which command the pass, the difficulty of water is one which it would still be probably impossible to overcome.

As for (c), I have already said that in my opinion the special objects to be attained by a military occupation of the Khyber would justify us in disregarding the natural dislike of the Afridis to such a measure ; but their resentment might no doubt lead to "predatory action," and, if there is any question whether such action could be adequately met by military precautions, this certainly furnishes an unanswerable argument against attempting to dispense altogether with tribal arrangements. On the whole, therefore, I am quite content to accept the conclusion that, so long as we have only the pass itself to deal with, and are debarred from taking up covering positions in the country on either side of it, a purely military occupation of the Khyber is *not* practicable.

5. The alternative methods of holding the pass are stated by Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum to be—

(i) partly by regular and partly by irregular troops (*i.e.*, local levies) ;

(ii) by irregular troops alone ;

(iii) by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility ;

and Sir William Lockhart thinks that the first and second of these methods can best be discussed together ; but I should prefer to group (ii) with (iii) as in point of fact constituting a single method, for we may take it as certain that, if we are to use only local levies, it must be in combination, as hitherto, with tribal arrangements, while on the other hand in clause (6) of the Khyber Agreement of 1881 the tribesmen themselves said that the maintenance of some kind of Jezailchi Corps was "absolutely necessary to enable them to render the road secure." This method, however, is the system which broke down in August last, and, if we reverted to it without special precautions, although the Afridis have since been taught a lesson which they are not likely to forget in a hurry, we should have no security against the recurrence of similar events in times of excitement on the border.

6. If it be said that this objection might be met by keeping up a permanent flying column at Peshawar of sufficient strength and complete with transport and commissariat, which would always be ready in case of necessity to support the Khyber Rifles, and to assist them in guarding the pass until the excitement had died away, I would reply that the primary object of a special force is always liable to be overlooked, as the events which led to its formation are gradually forgotten, and that in a time of stress elsewhere—the very time it must be remembered when excitement is most likely to spread to the Afridis—it would probably be utilised for other purposes. If, for instance, we had had a Khyber Flying Column in Peshawar when the rising occurred on the Malakand last July, no one, I think, will deny that in all probability it would have been despatched in that direction. While, however, I desire to point out the danger of relying upon a special force of this kind, I trust I may not be misunderstood as arguing against the creation of such a force. The maintenance of a flying column at Peshawar is in fact one of the precautions I would urge upon Government in any case, whether we are to revert to the old system *pur et simple*, or whether we are to strengthen it by a post of regular troops at Landi Kotal, as

suggested by Brigadier-General Nicholson, which remains the only other alternative for discussion. All I would say is that a flying column at Peshawar is not enough alone, and that it should be supplemented by the establishment of a military fort at the further end of the pass, which might at least cover the post of Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal, and would be able to hold out till relieved even if the flying column were not immediately available.

7. I concur, therefore, with Sir William Lockhart in supporting General Nicholson's proposal that "a really strong work armed with guns should be constructed at Landi Kotal," while the Khyber Rifles should be maintained as a local levy to guard the road, and for ordinary escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c. When the question of the Khyber was discussed many years ago (? by the Defence Committee), I believe that the idea of guarding the pass by any mixed system of this kind was summarily dismissed, because it was thought that military principles forbade the location of troops in an advanced position if the line of communication with their base could only be held by levies. Prior, therefore, to the Conference at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo I had put this alternative aside as out of the question, under the impression that it would never be accepted by the military authorities; and when I was asked my opinion about it at the Conference, I rejected it on this account as impracticable. But when General Nicholson propounded the present scheme, and I found that military opinion was not so opposed to it as I had imagined, the case assumed a different aspect, and I now entirely agree in the proposal for a fort at Landi Kotal as a considerable step towards the complete security of the Khyber, which would be obtained by a purely military occupation if that were practicable, while in some respects General Nicholson's solution of the difficulty is preferable as avoiding the danger of Afridi discontent, which would arise if we held the pass for ourselves and deprived the tribesmen of their allowances. At the same time I doubt whether the Afridis would consider a military fort at Landi Kotal to "dominate" the pass, *i.e.*, the twenty miles of road between Landi Kotal and Jamrud, which it is in contemplation to hold as before by posts of local levies, or whether, in other words, such a fort would effectually restrain them from attacking these posts and stopping the road as they did in August, unless its military garrison were large enough to send out a really strong column for operations in the pass itself; and, as I presume that Government would scarcely be prepared to keep up a *permanent* garrison of this size at Landi Kotal, I would insist upon the necessity for maintaining a flying column at Peshawar (which might be called the "Khyber Flying Column"), with every possible precaution to keep in memory the primary object for which it is intended, and to provide against it or its equipment being diverted to other purposes.

8. If the old system of guarding the road between Jamrud and Landi Kotal by a local levy is to be continued, it follows that tribal allowances for the pass must also be renewed, and I observe that Sir William Lockhart is disposed to hold the same view. The only question is whether they should be restored at the old rates, and at first I was inclined to think that, if the Afridis by their unprovoked outbreak compelled us to go to the expense of building a strong fort and maintaining a military garrison at Landi Kotal, it was only equitable that they should suffer some reduction in the amount they received, which, though to some extent a compensation for the tolls they used to realise on the Khyber road when they held it themselves, had originally been fixed on the understanding that they were responsible for guarding the pass without our assistance. On the other hand, though the site of the proposed fort would, as I understand, be in the limits of the Lwargi Shinwari, like the old Landi Kotal fortified serai, I cannot think that the Afridis would welcome its

* But, as pointed out in my marginal note to paragraph 2 *supra*, the Afridis could not regard occupation of a fort at Landi Kotal by regular troops, as any breach of our old agreement with them so long as we paid them their old allowances under that agreement. R. UDNY.

construction. It is more probable that they would regard it as a threat to their independence,* and, if at the same time we reduced their allowances, this would be an additional grievance which might greatly delay their settling down to the new régime. On the whole therefore I think that, if we are to restore the allowances at all, we should do so without

altering them ; but it should be made a condition of their restoration that we reserve to ourselves the right of running a railway through the pass, and of taking up the necessary sites for this purpose, without paying anything for the ground required (unless culturable) or increasing the allowances.

9. As to the Khyber Rifles, it seems advisable for me to note that they are the present form of the Jezailchi Corps, which originally consisted for the most part of men provided by the Maliks under clause (6) of the 1881 Agreement and subject to their control, who were paid Rs. 7 a month if they carried matchlocks or Rs. 8 if they brought rifles. Gradually this corps became more and more "regularised," the men were supplied with Sniders, the property of Government, while they were withdrawn by degrees from the control of the Maliks, and a very material addition was made to the Government posts in their charge by the erection in 1888-89 of the fortified serai at Landi Kotal. From time to time the tribal Maliks still continued to assert their right of control, but these claims were steadily resisted by the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and before the Afridi rising occurred last summer this control had practically disappeared, so that the Khyber Rifles were very similar in organisation to a regiment of the Native army, though until Captain Barton was appointed in 1896 the important element of British officers was entirely wanting. Whether this was a wise policy is, I think, very questionable, as it certainly tended to obscure the real footing upon which the corps subsisted, and if, as Sir William Lockhart believes, but I venture to doubt, it inspired the men with confidence that we should support them by regular troops in case of attack by their own tribesmen, I can only say that it was a great mistake to introduce such a policy without simultaneous arrangements to ensure this support being given, which, as I have explained in my letter of the 3rd October 1897 to the Punjab Government, was judged by the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar on the occasion of the outbreak in August to be a military impossibility. For the future, however, I agree that the Khyber Rifles should be maintained under our own control on the same system as the Kurrum Militia, provided always that we have a properly equipped flying column in Peshawar ready to support them, and that we are holding the Landi Kotal end of the pass with regular troops in a fortified position. In order also, if possible, to reduce the number of Government rifles in their hands, I think a handsome increase of pay (say, Rs. 12 month instead of Rs 9) might be offered to men who brought their own Sniders. I made a similar suggestion in the Conference at Calcutta, but I observe that, in the Notes of that Conference. I am represented by mistake to have said "buy" instead of "bring."

10. There is one passage in paragraph 3 of Sir William Lockhart's Memorandum about which, I must say a word in conclusion, as I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up a matter regarding which it would appear that a good deal of misconception exists. The passage I referred to is as follows :—"It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly reinforced by regular troops in August last, that * * * , and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, *as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.*" The italics in this passage are my own, and, as the words thus italicised seem to allude to the attack made upon the Khyber by Malk Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, in July 1892, I desire to point out the important features in which that attack differed from the outbreak of last August. On the first occasion Amir Khan's "lashkar," probably numbered "four or six hundred men," and did not, I believe, include even the whole clan of the Rajgal Kuki Khels, but was only a gathering of the men of that clan who belonged to Amin Khan's own faction. The Mullas in Tirah combined to try and persuade other Afridi clans to join, but without success, and the direct motive of the attack was Amin Khan's personal resentment at having been deprived of half his "maliki" allowance for previous misconduct. On the last occasion, on the other hand, the strength of the Afridi gathering, when it came down upon the Khyber, was estimated at ten or twelve thousand men, collected from all clans except, curiously enough, the Rajgal Kuki Khels who had supplied the "lashkar" in 1892 ; and the motive swaying this army was the irresistible wave of fanaticism which had spread throughout the tribe. On the first occasion again, Amin Khan's "lashkar" occupied a hill above

Shadi Bagiyar to the south of the entrance of the Khyber on the evening of the 4th July 1892, and during the ensuing night made attacks on the posts of Shadi Bagiyar, Jahangira and Fort Maude just inside the pass; but the gathering retired and dispersed early on the morning of the 5th July, because (it was thought) they had heard of the arrival at Jamrud of re-inforcements from Peshawar, *viz.*, 200 men of the 14th Sikhs, who reached Jamrud on the evening of the 4th July, and 100 of the Royal Scots Fusiliers with 2 field guns, who marched into Jamrud at 2 A.M. on the 5th. Not a man, however, of these reinforcements ever advanced a yard beyond Jamrud. In August last, on the other hand, the Afridi gathering attacked and took the same three forts on the 23rd of that month in spite of a British force of 1,400 infantry and a mountain battery (besides a regiment of British Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery), which had been sent out to Jamrud five days previously, in the hope that it might act as a demonstration to overawe the tribesmen. I will not enter into the question whether or not such a "lashkar" of the whole Afridi tribe would possibly have melted away if the troops at Jamrud (all that were considered to be available from Peshawar) had been pushed forward into the pass; but I may remark that four months later, after we had overrun Tirah and when we had no one but the Zakka Khel left to oppose us in the Khyber, one brigade at Landi Kotal was found insufficient to hold that pass and the line of communication from Jamrud, and a second brigade had to be moved up from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, as stated in paragraph 36 of Sir William Lockhart's Political despatch of the 3rd ultimo.

(Signed) R. UDNY,
 Chief Political Officer,
 Tirah Expeditionary Force.
 Dated PESHAWAR;
 The 15th March 1893.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., dated Fort William, the 25th March 1893.

I AM directed to address you with reference to the 7th paragraph of the memorandum on future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass which you forwarded with your letter, dated the 11th March 1893. For convenience of reference the paragraph in question is here quoted in full:

"As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours."

2. The Government of India have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on this point in advance of inviting His Honour's opinion upon the whole question of the management of the Khyber, as it is put before them by your letter above cited and by your further letter dated the 16th March, and I am to inform you that the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, while the Khyber Rifles may be continued on a temporary footing, the whole question of the restoration of tribal allowances to the Afridis must be reserved at present, as it is inexpedient to renew payment of them until at any rate the permanent arrangements for the Khyber have been discussed and settled. It is necessary in order to arrive at a decision upon this matter of the permanent arrangements, to institute enquiries which will be taken up at once.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Fort William, the 28th March, 1898.

I am directed to forward, for the favour of the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of the correspondence From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 11th March 1898. cited in the margin, on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of From do., dated the 16th March 1898. the Khyber Pass. To do., dated the 25th March 1898.

2. I am further to enclose a copy of a telegram, Confidential, dated the 24th March 1898, from General Sir William Lockhart, suggesting certain reductions in the Tirah Expeditionary Force, in the probable event of a settlement with the Afridis being effected by the end of March. Conditional on the realization of Sir William Lockhart's anticipations, his proposals have been accepted; the force will be reduced to three brigades, and the distribution proposed is approved, subject to the General Officer Commanding explaining the necessity or advantage of retaining a brigade at Mamani. The further reduction of the force to one brigade will be made when practicable.

3. The Government of India have not yet received the official expression of His Honour's opinion the despatch of which is referred to in your telegram, dated the 19th March. If that has been sent before the receipt of these papers, it is possible that a perusal of them may suggest further expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's view.

4. His Honour will see that both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny favour the plan of holding the actual pass by irregular troops or militia raised from the Afridi and other neighbouring tribes, while the western outlet is garrisoned by troops. Sir Mackworth Young's opinion already given on this question is in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility. The primary difficulty, however, which has arisen is to find a Native officer to take the place long filled by Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan. It is essential that a tribal levy in the proper sense of the term should not be commanded by a British officer, and the fact that Captain Barton was in command of the Khyber Rifles last year has done much to complicate the questions involved. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, where it is thought expedient to introduce British officers, it must be recognised that the force ceases to be a mere tribal levy and becomes an irregular force or militia. The distinction is one with which His Honour is well acquainted from the case of the Kurram Militia. Whether the Khyber Rifles will be more acceptable to the Afridis as irregular troops or militia than as a mere tribal force looking for support exclusively to their own tribal headmen is a point on which there is room for difference of opinion, and cannot be settled without careful enquiry into the feeling of the tribesmen themselves. It will be noticed that Sir W. Lockhart is of opinion (paragraph 7) that the establishment of a military post at Landi Kotal and the consciousness that this means our supporting the Khyber Rifles themselves against hostile attack will do much to obviate opposition. Sir R. Udny does not concur in this anticipation, and I am instructed to point out that the establishment of the military post at Landi Kotal in the manner proposed by Sir W. Lockhart is itself still under consideration, and the Government of India have arrived at no conclusion in regard to it. But unless the Pass is to be held throughout by regular troops, the Khyber Rifles must be continued in some form, and I am to invite His Honour to consider whether the difficulties of a purely tribal organisation are not so serious that the time has come for the constitution of the force as a militia under British officers.

If the Afridi Rifles are to be maintained on the footing of irregular troops, the constitution of the corps as regards the proportion to be enlisted from the different clans may nevertheless be subject of tribal agreement.

5. My letter, dated the 25th March, to General Sir William Lockhart, communicates the decision of the Government of India to the effect that the Afridi tribal allowances cannot at present be restored. They cannot be settled until the plan of holding the Khyber is determined. On this must depend not only the amount to be paid, but the purposes for which payment is to be made. The enlistment in the meanwhile of tribesmen in the Khyber Rifles, under temporary conditions, which has been already permitted, puts a considerable sum of money into the hands of the tribe. The Government of India do not think there is any necessity to go further and to restore at the present time payment of any of the Afridis Maliki allowances. The Government of India had formed an intention not only to hold the allowances in reserve until the Afridis accept whatever conditions they are ready to grant, but to confiscate them, in whole or in part, until the cost of repairing the forts and posts in the Pass has been made good. This intention has not been abandoned. Even, however, if this reason did not exist, the Government of India, as a matter of expediency, would prefer not to display undue readiness to restore the allowances.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

Letter from The Hon'ble Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 1st April 1898.

In continuation of my telegram dated 18th March 1898, I am directed to communicate in some detail the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor so far as they are formed up to date in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber.

2. It has already been decided that, pending a complete settlement with the Afridis, the Khyber Pass will continue to be occupied by our troops, and orders have also been recently issued for the re-opening of the pass to trade; but it is understood that, as soon as we are assured of their complete submission, the Government of India are anxious to determine the details of the permanent settlement to be effected with the tribes and the manner in which the future arrangements should be carried out and our political relations with the tribes conducted.

In the first place Sir Mackworth Young would strongly deprecate the hasty acceptance of any cut-and-dried scheme for keeping open the Khyber route, however feasible or simple the proposals might at first sight appear. The measures to be adopted must be carefully thought out and fully discussed by and with the tribes themselves, for the best guarantee for permanence in the new arrangements will be a deliberate estimate of what they are able and willing both to promise and to perform. In a matter of this kind there is the greatest danger in hurrying or patching a settlement, and His Honour thinks we should guard against doing this. Moreover, as the pass is open and it is clear that a military occupation must continue till a sufficient guarantee for the permanence of the arrangements to be made is secured, there does not appear to be any necessity for haste in the matter.

3. In view of these considerations Sir Mackworth Young cannot propound at the present moment, any matured scheme for the future maintenance of the Khyber route, but he has always considered, as intimated in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 21st September 1897, that the re-opening of this route must, for the present at any rate, form one of the main objects of our future policy, and, if possible, that it should be re-opened under

arrangements for which, in the first instance, the tribes themselves should be responsible. He sees no reason for supposing that there will be another breakdown in the arrangements if properly worked out, and he is of opinion that the restoration of the old order will in one respect have a better effect than anything new, in that it will clearly illustrate the hopelessness of attempting to upset our arrangements. He is not in favour of any change in the conditions, which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khyber in times of disturbance on the British Government. It is better that the tribesmen should bind themselves to keep the route open and safe, only looking to us to supply the supervising agency, without which it is impossible for them, owing to their feuds, to co-operate for the common object.

The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it will be desirable that the corps to be raised for watch and ward in the pass should be officered, as far as possible, by members of the tribes responsible for the pass, though one or more British officers will certainly be required to hold command, and to organise and supervise their discipline and distribution much in the same way as British Inspecting Officers do in respect of Imperial Service Troops. At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that we should again provide (as in clause 5 of the Khyber Agreement) that we may at any time send troops into the Khyber and occupy positions there without further payment, and that, having made this provision, we should ensure that a sufficient force is always kept ready mobilised at Peshawar or Nowshera to move into the Khyber on the orders of the responsible political authorities, and that suitable positions for such a force to occupy are worked out and kept in readiness.

4. With reference to the question as to how the future settlement is to be made and who is to be primarily responsible for the conclusion of the agreement with the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the Government of India are in favour of retaining the political work in the Khyber for the present under the direct control of the Foreign Department, and of entrusting the reconstruction of the arrangements to the Brigadier-General in Command, assisted by a civil officer of a standing that would give weight to his advice. Sir Mackworth Young feels bound to say plainly that he does not think this plan would prove a good one. If the Khyber is again to come under the political control of the Punjab Government, His Honour thinks it is very desirable that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be in a position to regulate from the first and in detail the scheme which is laid before the Government of India for orders. To leave the Local Government out during the formation of proposals is to deprive the Government of India of the best experience available just at the time when it is most required. It is not the same thing to refer the proposals after they have been worked out to the Punjab Government for opinion. It may be too late then to give a turn to the proceedings. The same reasons apply against excluding the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, from the negotiations during the early stages. Sir Mackworth Young would therefore recommend that, as contemplated apparently in paragraph 4 of Foreign Department letter, dated 15th September 1897, the reconstruction of the arrangements when the tribes have made submission be made over to the Punjab Government, and that the settlement be carried out by the Commissioner for the time being of the Peshawar Division under its direction. A civil officer would also be required in the Khyber to work out the arrangements under the orders of the Commissioner. In fact, His Honour would employ the same machinery as was employed with marked success when the Khyber Agreement of 1880 was effected, and he foresees serious difficulties if the Punjab officers are called upon to work any scheme for the maintenance of the Khyber route with which they have not been closely associated from the beginning, though he can assure the Government of India of the most loyal co-operation on the part of all officers concerned in any policy which they may decide to adopt.

5. This brings His Honour to the consideration of certain proposals which have apparently been made with the object of re-assuring the tribes and making them more willing to accept any arrangement we may hereafter adopt. Sir William Lockhart proposes in the memorandum forwarded with Foreign Department endorsement, dated 3rd March 1898, that, as soon as the tribes

have assured us of their complete submission, their tribal allowances should be restored, "subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic, and subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction and the acquisition of sites as we may think fit to impose." He also favours the re-enlistment of the Khyber Rifles. As regards the latter, the Lieutenant-Governor has already intimated in my letter, dated 11th September 1897, that he considers the re-enlistment of the Khyber Rifles desirable as a means of giving the men employment and keeping them out of mischief, provided this is expressly done subject to whatever measures are ultimately found necessary in regard to the Khyber, when, if the former constitution of the corps is to be altered, the men could be given the option of leaving or re-engaging. But as regards the renewal of the allowances, Sir Mackworth Young is of opinion that it is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to the Afridis of the Khyber Pass before our objects regarding the pass are defined and fully secured. Such an attitude would be misinterpreted and would make the final settlement extremely difficult. We have other means of inducing the tribe to make complete submission and to set about a future settlement in a reasonable frame of mind. Though the Lieutenant-Governor trusts no further advance of our troops will be necessary, it is still open to us to re-impose the blockade if the tribe is obstructive about the pass question, and it seems neither necessary nor desirable to hold out the prospect of an immediate regrant of their old allowances as an inducement to them to comply with our wishes in this respect. Moreover, in view of the reckless infringement of their former agreement, it seems desirable that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of my letter, dated 24th September 1897, and contemplated in paragraph 11 of Government of India letter, dated 4th October 1897, to the address of Sir William Lockhart, the cost of reconstructing the buildings damaged in the outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be settled before the tribal allowances are restored. The Government of India have just called upon this Government for a report as to the value of these buildings, and the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, has been asked to supply the information, but it will necessarily take some time before the information can be furnished.

6. If the views of the Lieutenant-Governor expressed in this letter meet with the approval of the Government of India, His Honour will endeavour to have a scheme for the future maintenance of the Khyber worked out under his personal direction by the Commissioner; and will submit this for their orders at as early a date as is possible under the circumstances of the case.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 16th April 1898.

WITH reference to the request contained in Foreign Department letter, dated 28th ultimo, that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will favour the Government of India with his opinion on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khaibar Pass, I am desired, in continuation of my letter, dated 2nd instant, to forward a copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated 2nd instant, and a Memorandum in which Sir Mackworth Young has recorded his views on the general question of the control of the Pass, so far as he has been able to arrive at any definite conclusions on the subject.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) L. W. DANE,

Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Annex I.

Letter from W. R. H. Merd, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Peshawar, 2nd April 1898.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement, dated the 18th instant, enclosing for remarks a copy of correspondence on the subject of future arrangements in the Khaibar.

2. So far as I am able to judge there appear to be three distinct systems for consideration, and no more than three, and I will deal with each in succession.

The first plan would be to ourselves accept the whole responsibility for the administration as well as for the safety of the Pass, and to take it entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. This is annexation. Declared or virtual annexation will not matter; the tribes concerned will perfectly understand the drift of the measure. If we annex, whether expressly or by implication, the special consideration, *viz.*, tribal responsibility for the safety of the Khaibar, in return for which we have been paying a part of the late handsome allowances to the Khaibar clans (the other part represents the tolls), disappears, and with it must go the allowances; unless indeed we consented to continue to pay what will then be naked blackmail; such a course would, however, be out of the question. Under these circumstances it is only too probable that we shall be compelled to hold the road with a strong military garrison, and that sooner or later we shall come again into collision with the Afridis. They look upon the Khaibar as their country, which it is, and upon the levy of tolls as their ancient and indefeasible right. It is unlikely that they will surrender either without a further determined struggle.

I have not a copy of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 28th January with me, but I think I am not mistaken in believing that anything like annexation will be directly opposed to the policy therein indicated.

3. At the other end of the scale of systems is the plan of falling back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, and of relaxing even that amount of British supervision which there has been in the Khaibar arrangements from 1881 to 1897. This plan will assuredly fail. It postulates a power of combination, of self-government, and of self-restraint which is utterly wanting among the Afridis. Such a power exists among some other clans and tribes, but (and this is a most important factor in border management) no two tribes are alike in individual character, and it does not follow that because one tribe can do a thing or bear a particular treatment the same will be the case with its neighbour or with another tribe further off. For instance, during all the time that the Khaibar has been shut, from the days of the Emperor Akbar down to 1878-79, the Mohmands were able to keep open the routes through their territory, and to make a large income from the tolls that they imposed; but the Afridis, though anxious enough to secure the tolls, were incapable of uniting for the purpose of keeping the Khaibar open and safe, and consequently it remained closed for centuries. The Afridis have not changed their character, their unreflecting cupidity and their reckless greed; the intestine feuds and jealousies among them are as virulent as ever; cohesion is entirely wanting; and if purely tribal management ever does get a start, it will break down in six months. That is a just deduction from the history of centuries.

4. Neither of the above systems being possible, it seems to me that a partnership of Government and of the Afridis; a mixture of tribal management with such a quantity of outside authority as will be sufficient, and not more than sufficient, to correct the inherent weakness of a tribal system, is the course plainly marked out to us, by the conditions of the case, as the only prudent and economical line to take. There are two phases in this partnership, which completes the list of the three systems. The two phases are: one with troops permanently stationed somewhere in the Khaibar, preferably at Landi Kotal,

and the other without troops quartered in the Pass, but held ready in the background at Peshawar, always prepared to be slipped upon the Afridis. In one case the corrective authority, requisite for the purpose of steadying the tribal machinery, is, or is supposed to be, on the spot; in the other case it exists also, but is kept in reserve.

5. Before discussing the two classes of the system of joint management of the Khaibar, I would point out that first a local corps to work details which cannot admittedly so well be undertaken by any one else, and secondly the grant of allowances, are of the essence of the partnership. Unless the tribes receive allowances they cannot well be asked to assume responsibility for the road. Both these matters, the local corps and their allowances, I will discuss below; it is enough here to say that they are I think indispensable adjuncts to any system of joint management.

6. Reverting now to the question of partnership, I propose to consider it on purely political and administrative grounds, leaving aside military considerations on which I am not competent to submit an opinion except in so far as they are based upon matters which are within the scope of judgment of Civil Officers or of any man with ordinary common sense.

The *crux* of the whole position is this: Shall troops be permanently stationed at Landi Kotal or not? If they are so stationed, then with every intention and the most honest desire to maintain the political independence of the Khaibar (as distinguished from its municipal independence), it is quite certain that this political independence will shortly disappear, and subsequently also (more or less as the case may be) the municipal independence of the Khaibar. I do not mean the independence of Tirah, or of the Bara Valley, but of the Khaibar proper. That is the perfectly inevitable sequence of events trans-frontier, for wherever we plant power, in the shape of British bayonets, across the border among the tribes, one of two things must happen,—either we must withdraw that power or, it must be supreme and must increase and widen as it remains. In connection with this most important consideration I venture to quote an extract from a note which I wrote for Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1896: “It is quite impossible for ourselves or for the tribes to divest British officers of their attributes as the officers of an all-powerful State. All their acts and all their utterances have at their back this power. Unless this power is to be flaunted, what its agents wish and desire must be done; however platonic that wish or desire may be, once that it is expressed, it becomes a clear or veiled command, because it emanates from the source of authority; if it is disregarded then that authority is condemned. A British officer cannot among the tribes act as *amicus curiæ*, being in truth the *curia* himself.” The presence or absence of troops at Landi Kotal will have a most profound effect upon the political situation in the Khaibar hereafter, for with the best will in the world, if there are troops permanently in the country, the situation will from the first day radically differ from what it will be if there are no troop in the Pass; and whatever we may say or wish the facts will be too strong for us, and we shall drift into a position which will, all but in name, be annexation with its attendant difficulties. Take a concrete case: supposing two hostile sub-sections are fighting between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal; if there are no troops at Landi Kotal it does not matter to us what the belligerents do; it is easy to arrange that on the days the Pass is open they abstain from interference with the road and caravans on it, and for the rest they can do what they like for all we care. But if there are troops at Landi Kotal it is intolerable that there should be fighting and the risk of interruption on our line of communications; we must forbid it. If we prohibit an appeal to arms, if we intervene as the supreme authority, it follows that the parties must, when they are not allowed to fight it out, appeal to us to settle their quarrel. We cannot refuse to interfere; if you deprive the people of one tribunal, viz., that of arms, you must substitute another; and we shall find ourselves called upon to undertake the administration of justice. Between that, between administering justice and virtual annexation, the distinction is fine, it is a hair's breadth. This is the difficulty that confronts us everywhere across the border—in Chitral, in Swat, in Waziristan. If we put the magnet among the iron filings, how are we to prevent the

filings from crowding to it? We cannot possibly canton troops beyond the border without sooner or later having to assume the civil administration of the country around them. Whenever we go over the border in force we must I think be prepared to assume an authoritative position; it must, by the nature of things, be authoritative; if not, it will be thrust upon us, not without the penalty which we must always pay for the neglect or disregard of natural laws.

7. Apart from military considerations, the question therefore is this: is this authoritative position necessary and expedient in the Khaibar or not? I venture to consider that it is neither necessary nor expedient. It is not necessary, for the system on which the Khaibar was managed for 17 years without such a position worked admirably, as has been repeatedly and publicly acknowledged in every possible quarter. It broke down, but under circumstances which would have smashed any plan except that of holding the Pass with troops. The authoritative position is not expedient because we have to adopt an arrangement which shall enlist the Afridis on our side and shall induce them to remain willingly in the partnership. That being so, anything that is likely to lead to virtual annexation is certain sooner or later to meet with the opposition of the Afridis and to terminate in a rupture of the partnership. An authoritative position in the Khaibar will assuredly lead to complications, for some day or other it will be resisted and then at all costs it must be asserted. And where are its limits to be drawn? It may be argued that the presence of troops at Landi Kotal does not at all mean the assumption of this authoritative position, but I venture to repeat that it does; that we cannot go there and then decline to be bound by the conditions of the case. Events will be too strong for us.

8. If we are to enter into partnership with the Afridis at all, any basis of the partnership which must end in the eventual absorption of the weaker partner will lead to the violent disruption of the bond. There are no two ways in the matter, for the Afridis will not consent to a peaceful absorption. That is their nature, we cannot change it, and we must reckon with it in our calculations. I therefore strongly recommend the second phase of the partnership, *viz.*, management of the Pass without a permanent garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal. For 17 years a system without troops in the Khaibar worked admirably as I have said. It broke down under unusual stress, but the ship has not been built that will weather every storm. For 17 years the Khaibar road was as safe as any highway in India; for 17 years the Afridis were amenable to our wishes and we were at peace with them. It is not to be supposed that the tremendous punishment they have just received will be without lasting effect, or, if they are not touched in what they prize perhaps more highly than anything on earth, their independence, that they will not be content to remain good friends with us, and to co-operate with us in the task of keeping open the Khaibar. They were content to do so from 1881 to 1897 without any previous punishment to speak of, without our power having been brought home to their very doors, and it is not likely that the case will be different now. If a storm were again to rage such as has recently swept along the frontier, then not even the proposed military garrison at Landi Kotal will avail, for a far stronger garrison on the Malakand did not avail, to keep the country quiet; and if so, because the presence of troops in the Khaibar will assuredly lead to a virtual annexation and to consequent complications, therefore, I say, better avoid these and have no troops which will be there only for the one eventuality when, troops or no troops, we shall have to fight it out.

I consider that all that is wanted for political and trade purposes can be attained by the employment of a local force, coupled with tribal allowances, and without a military garrison at Landi Kotal, provided that this local force is backed up by the presence at Peshawar of a moveable column ever fully equipped to go out at the shortest notice, and provided that the local force and that the Afridis know this.

These provisos are absolutely essential.

With these conditions maintained, it is possible to guarantee, as much as one can guarantee anything, that the Khaibar will not again be disturbed, to any appreciable extent.

9. Whether on grounds of Imperial policy it is necessary to have troops in the Pass it is not for me to say. But I venture to urge that, if it is decided to keep troops in the Khaibar, we be very careful of what we say now, or, since in the course of years the position of the major and of the minor partner in the Khaibar arrangements will have, perhaps imperceptibly but none the less inevitably, altered, an agreement now made may not faithfully reflect the changed conditions of the time, and this will give a handle five or ten years hence to agitators. Nor with Afridis will it be possible to modify agreements from time to time, except at the risk of misunderstandings and a rupture. A definition of the relations of the partners was made in the agreement of 1881. That agreement is abrogated by the recent hostilities, and we ought I think to take advantage of this fact in order to make a fresh start. The Afridis will no doubt clamour for some kind of writing, for without a tangible deed of partnership they will feel themselves insecure in the Khaibar business with so powerful a partner as Government. As His Honour is aware, these men are great lawyers, and sea lawyers to boot, and whatever we record now ought, if troops remain in the Pass, to be very carefully framed so as to be in accord not only with the present situation, but also with the situation as it will have developed in the future out of the beginning that is now made.

10. Assuming that troops are to be permanently stationed at Landi Kotal for military reasons (although with deference I would note that the absence of an advanced post at Landi Kotal, capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depot, did not apparently hamper our advance in November 1878), on general grounds I would strongly suggest a larger garrison than one native regiment with a detachment of gunners. The chances of attack by Afghan troops are very remote. But where troops are permanently located a bazar and habitations invariably spring up; as the recent disturbances fade with the past and a sense of security revives, houses will be built, works undertaken, and gradually a position will be created which will become exceedingly embarrassing when danger threatens. And danger is much less likely to threaten if the visible force on the spot is strong enough to move out instantly on the offensive. Nothing encourages these clansmen more than the sight of troops cooped up in a fort and besieged. Weak outposts unable to hit out mean frontier risings. I am therefore greatly in favour, if an advanced post at Landi Kotal has to be held at all, to hold it in considerable strength. For these reasons I recommend that, if the water-supply permits, a British Regiment, two Native Regiments and a Mountain Battery be placed at Landi Kotal, if troops are to be stationed there. The climate, moreover, is healthy there, although Ali Masjid is a fever hole, and a force at Landi Kotal may enable us to reduce the garrison of Peshawar.

11. But if, as I consider, it is neither necessary nor expedient to retain a permanent military garrison at Landi Kotal, and if it is best to rely upon a moveable column at Peshawar which will give the requisite stiffening to the Khaibar management, and will not commit us eventually to a virtual annexation of the Khaibar and to the risk of complications and collisions of the Afridis, in that case I recommend for consideration the suggestion to keep, all the year round, a brigade of troops and a Mountain Battery at Cherat. No better site can be found for climate, for opportunities to exercise the troops in hill work, for proximity to the Khaibar.

12. Whatever system we take, short of annexation or purely tribal management, a local force is required, which I venture entirely to agree should be on the lines of the Kurram Militia, raised, paid, equipped, controlled and commanded completely by Government, but with this concession that, subject to the condition of loyalty, good discipline, sufficiency of recruits and the pleasure of Government, a fixed proportion of the force (say $\frac{2}{3}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$) shall consist of Khaibar men drawn from the six clans, in numbers to be determined hereafter. This is practically the system of the Kurram Militia, where we have as nearly as possible a fixed number of Turis in the Corps, with their complement of native

officers, enlisted from both factions of the Turis, the Drewandis and the Mian Murids. Owing to the existence of these factions we have not yet been able to appoint a Turi to be a Subedar-Major, but this will come in time. With Afridis most probably a good Subedar-Major could be found as Afridi society is not split into two great camps like the Turis. The Khaibar Militia ought, I think, to have a British Commandant and a British Adjutant. I would not recommend the revival of the *de jure* tribal, *de facto* Government, Corps which began in 1881 as Jezailchis and ended in 1897 as Khaibar Rifles.

13. Coming now to the question of tribal allowances, I have, after much thought, arrived at the conclusion that on the whole it will be best to restore them *en bloc*. To begin, a considerable part of them represents the tolls of which the Afridis in 1881 surrendered the collection to us. No doubt, as an act of State and by way of punishment, we could appropriate the tolls. But compliance with the terms imposed upon the Afridis is intended to wipe out their guilt; they look upon the tolls as their private property; and the appropriation of the tolls would to them be an additional punishment for their past misconduct and be in their eyes tantamount to the annexation of the Khaibar. Of course we can say: "Without us there would be no tolls at all; you Afridis would never be able to levy them,"—to which the retort would naturally be that without Afridi co-operation we should find it an uncommonly expensive business to keep the Khaibar open and collect the tolls.

With respect to that portion of the allowances which represents the tribal subsidies, apart from the tolls, we shall have and shall enforce tribal responsibility, and shall get our *quid pro quo*. If any permanent reduction is made in the allowances, then it should be made rateably all round, and favour shown, or any difference made will probably lead to infinite trouble. But, on the whole, I think it will be best to restore things to their former footing; no particular principle is involved in reduction; we are precluded from adopting the reduction as a punishment; and a reversion to the old order of things in the matter of allowances will go far towards reassuring the Afridis that we mean bygones to be bygones, and that we have no ulterior designs. But I recommend that one condition to the grant of the allowances be that we may, within defined limits, make and keep in repair roads or railways as we please, and that the allowances are not to be increased on account of these roads or railways.

14. To sum up my suggestions: annexation or purely tribal management seem to be out of the case; a mixed system appears to be the only feasible course; whether we have troops at Landi Kotal or not, a local force like the Kurram Militia and the grant of allowances are essential conditions.

We ought, I think, to be most careful to what agreement or agreements we commit ourselves.

Lastly, I am bound to represent that we are much less likely to be entangled in complications if there are no troops at Landi Kotal. The point, therefore, is whether the military considerations outweigh the risk of complications and the certainty, if Landi Kotal has a permanent military garrison, of the absorption of the Khaibar with its attendant consequences. Since this absorption would be opposed to the policy of the Secretary of State's despatch and liable to lead to trouble, and since we get what we want, without risk, by means of a force held in reserve at Peshawar, I recommend a management of the Khaibar without troops in the pass.

Annex II.

Extract from Memorandum, dated 11th April, by Sir Mackworth Young on the subject of the re-opening of the Khaibar.

General Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny are in favour of an advanced military post at Landi Kotal, the pass being guarded by tribal levies. Mr. Merk, who has not seen their opinions, but to whom I sent confidentially a copy

of General Nicholson's memorandum of 3rd February 1898, with which Sir W. Lockhart's recommendations are in accord, is against any military occupation of the pass, which he thinks should be held by a tribal militia backed up by the presence of a moveable column at Peshawar.

I have already on more than one occasion expressed my opinion against a military occupation of the pass, but I have now to reconsider the subject in the light of the weighty opinions which are now before me.

It seems reasonable that after having quelled the disturbances raised almost simultaneously by nearly every frontier tribe on the Peshawar and Kohat borders from the Indus to the Kurram we should strengthen our position by occupying any military vantage ground in the tribal territory overrun by our troops, which is desirable for Imperial defence, or for pacification of the tribes. But the immediate cause for occupation will soon be forgotten, and in judging of its effect we should look forward some years and endeavour to gauge the ultimate position.

Now I have no hesitation in saying that the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal by a military force will never be accepted by the Afridis with complacency. It is true, as pointed out by Sir R. Udny, that in the agreement of 1881 there was a clause (5) which ran as follows: "It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass or to withdraw them and re-occupy at pleasure." But this must be read with the following passage from the Foreign Department letter dated 31st August 1880: "It may be explained to the tribes that, although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khaibar so long as the pass is kept open under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government." This interpretation of the intentions of Government shows that what was reserved was the right to re-occupy the pass with troops for the purpose of restoring order and enforcing the agreement, and also no doubt for an advance to Kabul if necessary; but the tribes distinctly understood that the terms of the agreement involved no permanent military occupation, and notwithstanding that they appear to have been desirous of some assistance in formulating their scheme of watch and ward for the pass (see paragraphs 7 and 8 of Major Conolly's letter, dated 23rd September 1880) there is nothing to show that they contemplated asking for a permanent garrison of British troops. On the contrary, I believe that they were then, as I feel sure they would be now, totally averse to such a garrison. It may be urged that, as Landi Kotal belongs to the Luargi Shinwaris and does not lie within Afridi territory, what reason can the Afridis have for objection to a military force being stationed at that point? To this I would reply that the occupation of Landi Kotal to a great extent dominates the pass and is a standing menace to the integrity of the Afridi territory, and that I believe that the tribe would object as strongly to a military occupation of that point as they would to the location of a force at Ali Masjid or any other similar place within their own limits. They regard the pass as their property. Occupation to them would mean annexation, and with reference to the remarks contained in paragraph 6 of Mr. Merk's letter to which I draw special attention, I doubt if it could result in anything else. It would constitute, as I said in paragraph 5 of this office letter, dated 21st September 1897, a continuing disgrace which might at any future time supply the motive for hostilities. Sir W. Lockhart assumes that whereas the quartering of a strong force in the Bazar Valley would give rise to tribal ill-feeling, the occupation of Landi Kotal would not have this effect. In this I cannot agree. The tribal honour would be seriously affected and a deep-seated resentment would be engendered instead of the friendly attitude which Sir W. Lockhart considers of much greater moment than the absolute safety of the pass.

In support of this view I might appeal to numerous documents in the literature of the frontier from 1876 down to the present time. There can be no doubt whatever that the tribes have the strongest objection to any extension of British authority over their territory. The advances which we have made

during recent years, coupled with the demarcation of a sphere of influence which to the tribal mind means ultimate annexation, must be placed in the forefront of the causes which have contributed to the rising of 1897. This opinion I have arrived at after full consideration, and I may have to enlarge upon it in another connection. My immediate predecessor, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, alluded, in paragraph 46 of his Confidential Memorandum of the 26th October 1896, to the effect on the Orakzais and Afridis of our taking up a position on the Samana. It is significant that in the somewhat insolent communication made by the Afridis just before they pillaged the Khaibar they referred to the occupation of Samana and the Malakand, though both outside their territory, as an offence against the amicable relation of the British Government with the tribes. In their petition to the Amir, which was reported on in this office (letter dated 20th January 1898), the Afridis dropped this grievance, but this was no doubt because it pertained more to the Orakzais than to themselves. The Orakzais referred to the occupation of the Samana in their petition. If the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand was an offence to the Afridis, it will readily be believed that the occupation of Landi Kotal will be bitterly resented by them.

Similarly, I may appeal to previous communications from the Punjab Government in support of the view that an advanced post on the borders of the Amir's territory will greatly irritate and annoy His Highness. It was said in the letter of the Foreign Department, dated 14th August 1896, that the definition in 1893 by the Durand Convention of the boundary of the spheres of influence of the Government of India and the Amir had removed the danger of rousing the jealousy of the Amir of Afghanistan. But I think it must be admitted that recent events have shown that the Amir's jealousy is not removed.

Thirdly, the effect of an advance in the Khaibar on other tribes must not be lost sight of. The demarcation of the spheres of British and Afghan influence has without doubt led to an impression that it is our object ultimately to secure complete control of the trans-border territory up to the Durand line, and this impression will be strengthened by the occupation of Landi Kotal.

I do not say that all this should not be faced in order to secure a substantial advantage, but it is my duty to represent the political drawbacks to the present proposal. And what is of primary importance is this, that the advance, which would possibly not be met by any overt opposition at the outset, would nevertheless constitute a grievance which would be nursed till the season of opportunity. If it is important that we should have the tribes friendly when we may have to march into Kabul, then we should avoid if possible doing that which will inevitably set them all against us.

Of the military aspect of the question I am not competent to speak. But I would venture to make the following remarks. If Sir R. Udny is right in thinking that the idea of guarding the pass by a mixed system, partly military and partly tribal, was rejected by the Defence Committee, no doubt the causes for such rejection will be examined before the proposal is revived. I incline to Mr. Merk's view that a single regiment stationed at Landi Kotal would be a source of anxiety, not of strength, and that a larger force would have to be maintained. Landi Kotal would not I believe be of much use as a base of operations in case of an advance in force to Kabul; there is neither room nor water for a large force. With the tribes friendly we should have no difficulty in pushing troops through the Khaibar, at any time. If they are unfriendly, we should have to move up in overwhelming force, and I question if a fortified post at Landi Kotal on the line of advance will contribute much to our operations. In times of peace we should have a force locked up, 19 miles from Jamrud, in a place where service would be unpalatable to our troops. The expense which will be incurred apart from the 9½ lakhs for buildings would be very considerable, especially if a whole brigade were retained there. Whether any military advantage would be secured by occupying the post with troops appears to me very doubtful, unless a satisfactory reply can be given to the above remarks.

Further, I question whether the proposal harmonizes with the policy of the Secretary of State as enunciated in his Despatch No. 1, dated 28th January

1898. One of the leading principles given in paragraph 18 of that despatch is the following: "The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the policy just indicated." The paragraph goes on to deprecate any new responsibilities not absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. The limitation of our interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory is also enjoined. The military occupation of Landi Kotal means practically the annexation of the whole of the Khaibar Pass with all the administrative responsibilities attaching thereto. I need not enlarge upon this question. I feel that the proposal can hardly be brought within the four corners of the Secretary of State's Despatch, paragraphs 18 and 21, unless for military reasons it is indispensable.

Whether the presence of a military force in the Khaibar is necessary in order to give stability to tribal arrangements is a question which I submit should not be judged by the fact that when in August last it was decided not to send a force up the pass to relieve the Khaibar Rifles the latter only afforded a slight resistance to the tribal *lashkar*. I do not see that anything else could be expected, especially when the European officer in command was withdrawn. I agree with Sir W. Lockhart in laying stress on the fact that the corps without its commandant made some stand, and I should conclude from this that it would be quite possible to make more of their agency in the future by affording them the necessary support. If, however, the experiment is repeated, it must be done on a definite plan, and the true character of the arrangement must not be lost sight of. Moreover, I think that it will be necessary for some little time to keep a military force in the Khaibar until the tribal arrangements are fairly started.

As to what those arrangements should be, the choice lies, if it is decided to abandon the idea of a military occupation, between tribal levies constituted and maintained on the basis of the old agreement and a militia recruited from the tribes and commanded by British officers. I should prefer not to give a final opinion at this stage between these two alternatives. Under sufficient safeguards I should be willing to accept either, and should wish to know what the tribes themselves propose, how effect could be given to their wishes, and what prospect there was of such an arrangement being permanent and satisfactory, before deciding to insist on an arrangement according to our own ideas of what is best. The corps should I think in any case be recruited, as before, mainly from the tribes which own the pass, and the Native officers might usually be similarly selected. If the force consisted of tribal levies as distinguished from a militia, some special agreement would be required as regards the position of the British officers attached to it, for I do not think it would be possible to do without British officers for the reasons given by Mr. Merk in paragraph 3 of his letter. Upon the whole I am inclined to prefer the idea of a militia commanded by European officers, but I would direct the General Officer Commanding and Political Officer to report on this subject after discussing the question with the tribal jirgas, and would await their report before finally deciding. It is above all things desirable that we should carry the tribes with us in any arrangement that is to be made.

If a corps for safeguarding the Khaibar is established on either basis as above sketched, I have no doubt that for some time at all events it will be necessary to hold troops in reserve at Peshawar or Cherat ready to support it, or even possibly to overawe it before it has acquired a status and proved satisfactory. I believe myself that the Afridis will avoid hostilities for at all events a generation, but this cannot be reckoned upon. A force should be kept ready mobilised for some time to come, and Mr. Merk's suggestion that such a force should be stationed at Cherat in preference to Peshawar deserves consideration. The elevation is 4,500 feet and the climate is good; the conditions are similar to those under which the force would operate, if called upon to do so, in the hills. It is 23 miles by cart road and 19 by bridle road from the Pabbi Railway Station, and the troops could be in the Khaibar at two days' notice. There is a good and permanent water-supply at Chapri about 800 feet below the ridge, and the water could easily be pumped up into a service reservoir on the ridge.

In regard to the details of any agreement which may now be made with the tribes, the correspondence which preceded the agreement of 1881 and that agreement itself will doubtless be consulted. The position is different in this respect that we now have to deal with a tribe which has just felt the weight of our hand and submitted to our demands. With those who minimize the result of our recent operations I am unable to agree. I consider that the compliance with our demand, especially in the matter of surrendering breech-loaders, shows conclusively how hard pressed the different sections have been. But for their internal feuds and the difficulty they have in combining for any purpose except fanatical warfare, they would have satisfied our demands at a much earlier date. The lesson they have had will I believe last them for some time, and if they are properly managed they will enter into fresh negotiations with the British Government and be prepared to act up to their engagements at least as readily as in 1881. I would not agree to abandon a single provision of the agreement of that year which can in any way be serviceable. I would make such further demands founded upon our recent experience as may be deemed necessary for maintaining the new arrangements, but I do not think these need include the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal with troops, and I should expect that an arrangement founded on the consent of the tribes, without such occupation, would, if duly safeguarded and carefully worked out, prove efficient and lasting. Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., who has been appointed by the Government of India to advise the General Officer Commanding in his negotiations, has complete knowledge of the Khaibar Afridis and was associated in the previous negotiations of 1881, and, subject to such general instructions as the Government of India may issue, is quite capable of working out the details of a satisfactory scheme.

I would suggest that when the allowances to the Khaibar Afridis are regranted, a condition should be attached to their renewal, *viz.*, that in the event of the British Government making arrangements for opening any other route to Kabul they shall be subject to reconsideration. This would be in addition to the condition already agreed to by the Government of India that the allowances shall be liable to deductions on account of repairs to the forts and posts damaged in the recent outbreak. If the further condition I have now suggested is adopted, it might be well at the same time to give the Afridis the opportunity of engaging that they will improve the road or agree to the opening of a railway, should Government desire this at any time through the Khaibar. It will be to their interest to do so, if they can thereby postpone the opening of an alternative route and the consequent reduction of their allowances.

Enclosure 10 in No. 3.

Letter from Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Peshawar Division, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Peshawar, the 20th April, 1898.

1. Sir W. Lockhart was good enough to give me a copy of his letter with which he forwarded my Khyber Memorandum to you on the 16th March. The only point on which I should like to say another word is his remark "Thirdly" with reference to my paragraph 9. The advantage of the system I suggested is, as I said, that it would tend to reduce the number of Government Sniders in possession of the Khyber Rifles, and therefore the number of breech-loaders that would be liable to fall into the hands of the Afridis in the case of another outbreak like that of August last, for, as I have explained in my memorandum, I do not believe that a fort with a military garrison at Landi Kotal could be relied upon to effectually prevent such an outbreak, unless the garrison were large enough to move out a force for the defence of the whole line of the pass, though I quite admit that, after the lesson the Afridis have now received, it would be very difficult for the Mullas to induce them to break out again.

2. My suggestion, it will be seen, does not include any proposal for *taking away* Sniders from the Afridis, and, if the offer of higher pay to men who, when they enlisted in the Khyber Rifles brought their own Sniders with them, had any practical effect as "a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals," our troops and arsenals must indeed be in a parlous state! If this argument has any force at all against my proposal, surely it applies with ten-fold force to our present demands upon the Afridis and Orakzais for the *surrender* of breech-loaders, and in fact to any attempt to disarm a trans-border tribe. Moreover, it must be remembered that our troops are armed either with the Lee-Metfords or Henry-Martins. If, therefore, my proposal had the effect supposed, the Sniders that Afridis sought to obtain for the purpose of receiving higher pay with the Khyber Rifles would have to be acquired either from the Border Military Police (who, I am glad to say, scarcely ever lose a rifle) or from private sources Cis-Indus, which it should be easy to guard, as the ordinary Police, both Trans and Cis-Indus, have only *short* smooth-bore Sniders which would not be accepted for the Khyber Rifles. As for Sir William Lockhart's view that "the Khyber Rifles should be as well armed as our Native Infantry Regiments," which means, I presume, that they should be given Henry-Martins, I can only say that to my mind such a policy would be simply suicidal. The Khyber Rifles have always performed their escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c., quite satisfactorily, no cause has ever been shown why they should require more perfect arms than Sniders for such duties which are their only legitimate ones, and at present I cannot conceive any possible reason why they should be given better weapons at the risk of these weapons falling on some future occasion into the hands of their fellow-tribesmen. If the Afridis have had their lesson, surely we have had ours too!

3. As regards the expression "military impossibility," to which Sir W. Lockhart takes exception in his first remark on my paragraph 9, perhaps the phrase was a little too strong; but at the same time I referred to my letter No. 3028 of the 3rd October, and I used it as practically summing up in two words what I had explained in full detail in that letter.

I am at a loss to understand what grounds Sir William Lockhart (who was in Europe at the time) has for asserting (*vide* his remarks on my paragraph 10) that the attitude of the Afridis when they attacked the Khyber last August "was at first vacillating and half-hearted." As I myself was on the spot at Peshawar and in receipt of the best information available, I think I am justified in asserting most emphatically that it was neither one nor the other. Again, no one ever doubted the "*desirability* of reinforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops" (*vide* Sir W. Lockhart's first remark on my paragraph 9). The point is that, in the opinion of the military authorities, a sufficient force for this purpose was not available in Peshawar.

Enclosure 11 in No. 3.

Letter from Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., Commanding the Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 29th April, 1898.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you a note by Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force, on the present state of our demands against the Afridis, and a suggestion for their settlement.

2. In all that Mr. Cunningham has written I thoroughly concur. He has stated the position, so far as I know it, clearly and exactly.

I also agree with his proposals for a final settlement.

3. I have made and signed one or two remarks in the margin of the note.

4. There is one other point which I think it well to mention.

On page 2 of his note Mr. Cunningham writes that "the other clans deposited 78 (rifles) on their (Zakka Khel) account, to be redeemed as they could get others out of that section."

All these 78 rifles are good and serviceable weapons. My latest information from Mr. D. Donald at Jamrud is that only 11 rifles out of 51 so far brought in to redeem deposited rifles have been passed by an Armourer Sergeant as serviceable arms.

The remaining 40, some of which I saw, have been returned to the tribesmen as unserviceable weapons, and therefore unacceptable.

I have given strict orders that none but really serviceable arms are to be accepted in place of those pledged.

I think that we shall get all these rifles from the Zakka Khel in time. Mr. Cunningham and I consider it undesirable to fix any near date just now as the latest for the redemption of deposited rifles, but to leave it to the tribes to get the rifles out of the Zakkas when they can.

In the meantime we have good rifles in our possession.

5. I am sending to-day a copy of Mr. Cunningham's note, and of this letter, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government

NOTE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR DEMANDS AGAINST THE AFRIDIS, AND SUGGESTION FOR THEIR SETTLEMENT.

The object of this note is to show—

- (i) the present state of our account with the Afridis based on the demands made in the Proclamation dated 21st November, 1897 ;
- (ii) in respect of unfulfilled demands, what we are likely to realize without a renewal of war ;
- (iii) the present attitude of the clans ;

and to suggest

- (iv) what in my opinion seem the best means of settling outstanding claims.

Up to the date of General Sir W. Lockhart's final report, No. 113 P. of 5th April 1898, the terms complied with were :—

- I.—Payment of a fine of Rs. 47,800
- II.—Surrender of 765 rifles.

The fine in money and arms originally notified was Rs. 50,000 and 800 rifles, but Rs. 2,200 and 35 rifles set down as the share of a section of the Kuki Khel were remitted and the amount realised was as stated above.

Further, at the date mentioned, a small balance was outstanding against the Aka Khel, viz., Rs. 1,011* and 11 rifles, of which up to 25th April they have paid in Rs 550† and 5 rifles. There is some hope of the balance being given in ere long.

* The figure 900 given in General Officer Commanding's letter to Foreign Department, dated 5th April, needs correction

A mistake was made in converting Kabuli to British rupees : this was corrected by Mr. Hasings after the date of that letter, and the sum Rs. 1,011 is admitted by the Aka Khel.

† Two rifles taken at this value—

											Rs.
Martini	350
Snider	200

2. These two terms have been practically fulfilled, but we must not assume that compliance to this extent denotes such complete submission as will ensure early or even deferred fulfilment

of the remaining conditions, and it must be remembered that, since the breaking up of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, the imminent threat of renewed invasion is no longer present to induce further obedience.

The fine has been paid, but in such a way that only part, and probably the smaller part, has been actually collected from the clansmen at large. The Zakka Khel, the most turbulent and troublesome clan, paid nothing; their share, Rs. 9,600, had to be recovered from the sale-proceeds of confiscated property belonging to two individual Maliks in British territory.*

A large sum, generally believed to be Rs. 4,000, portion of the share of the Kambah Khel, was paid by Rahim Shah, Kaka Khel, a man unconnected with the Afridis.

Then when, in spite of the repeated threat of a second advance into Tirah, a large balance remained to be collected, at the last moment as it were, some Afridi Native officers, servants of Government, paid in what was wanted partly from their own pockets and partly by borrowing (Rs. 15,000) from a Hindu Treasurer.† Though the fine was thus completed, the matter is not yet settled even so far as we are concerned, for to procure this payment the authorities had to give written undertakings, which bind us hereafter to arrest any Afridis whom the guarantors may point out as defaulters.

If or when the tribes learn that these individual Native officers have received the rewards for which they have been recommended, aggregating Rs. 5,000, it is not improbable the clansmen will to that extent refuse to recoup them, and we may be left to aid them in recovering what they advanced by arrest and detention of individuals, which will keep alive a certain amount of friction on the Peshawar border.

As to the rifles surrendered only half their share was got out of the Zakka Khel, the other clans deposited 78 on their account to be redeemed as they could get others out of that section.

Similarly Maliks of the other clans deposited their own private family

I did not know this. I will enquire and get particulars. arms to complete the tale due from the men of their sections, to be redeemed as they collect others.

W. P. SYMONS, *Major-Genl.*

The process of redemption goes on slowly and keeps up a certain friction inside the clans, which impedes their working in harmony to do anything for us, though it would not, if occasion arose, prevent their uniting against Government.

These facts are merely stated as a warning against a hasty conclusion, that because terms II and III of the Proclamation of 21st November have been fulfilled, compliance with the others, notably No. I, may be expected to follow automatically, or in a reasonable time, in accordance with arrangements made when the Tirah Expeditionary Force broke up.

If while that force remained in the field intact, and the season for a further movement had not yet passed, if while the threat of a hostile advance and the re-occupation of Tirah was imminent, such difficulties were felt that vicarious

* Paragraph 6 of letter P, dated 5th April 1898, from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Foreign Secretary.

Note.—One section of the Zakka Khel, resident in the Khyber Pass, paid in Rs. 2,000 odd to save their spring crops near Landi Kotal, but the money was refunded to them. See Chief Political Officer's telegram, dated 4th April 1898, to Political Officer, Khyber, and the Political Officer, Khyber's telegram, dated 6th April 1898, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force

† See paragraph 12 of Colonel Warburton's report, dated 2nd April, and No. 11 of the list of proposed rewards.

payment of fines was accepted for good reasons, how much greater are difficulties likely to be now when the fear of renewed measures of coercion is removed to a distance.

3. The demands wholly or partly unsatisfied fall under the first head of the Proclamation of 21st November 1897. Demands outstanding For clearness sake they may be divided

in detail as below :—

I.—Restoration of arms taken from the Khyber Rifles, or taken by deserters of that corps.

II.—Restoration of rifles taken by military deserters.

III.—Restoration of rifles taken before the advance of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

IV.—Restoration of rifles captured in fighting.

V.—Compensation for—

(a) Government property looted, and for

And at Ali Masjid. (b) private property looted at Landi
W. P. SYMONS, *Major-Genl.* Kotal.

I propose to deal with these seriatim, but, as there is a great difference between the feeling of the clans in respect of demands I, II, and III, and their attitude towards the others, in considering prospects of a settlement, the first three claims should be discussed separately from the remainder.

I.—ARMS OF “KHYBER RIFLES.”

Up to the date of Sir W. Lockhart's final report, No. 113 P. of 5th April,

Demands which the clans admit and of which they promise satisfaction. 157 had been surrendered out of 234 outstanding. Since then 12 have come in, and the balance now (25th April) is 65.

II.—RIFLES OF MILITARY DESERTERS.

From a letter from Sir Richard Udny, Chief Political Officer, dated 2nd March 1898, to Colonel Warburton, it appears that 51* rifles were then out, 2 were brought in on 1st April. The number due on Sir William Lockhart's departure was 49. Since then 4 have come in, leaving up to date a balance of 45.

III.—RIFLES TAKEN OR STOLEN BEFORE THE ADVANCE OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

In the letter from the Chief Political Officer to Colonel Warburton, quoted above, No. 69, dated 2nd March, these are given as follows :—

- (a) Taken at Saragarhi on 12th September, 21, out of which 8 were recovered from Orakzais. The balance of 13 is debited to Afridis—one has lately been recovered at Kohat, leaving due 12.
- (b) Stolen from a Native Field Hospital, Peshawar, on 13th October from 28th Bombay Pioneers, 2.
(Afridi section not known, and this is a doubtful case.)
- (c) Robbed from 8th Bombay Infantry at Burj Hari Singh on 26th October, 4.
- (d) Taken from a patrol of 9th Bengal Lancers near Mamani 8 carbines—4 recovered from the Sturi Khel Orakzais, balance due, 4.

In regard to these (Head III), I note here that there has been no regular enquiry and there is no proof that case (b) should be charged to the Afridis.

It is said that the thieves were Mohmands.

* Exact figures are difficult to get, as it is not clear whether one or two rifles brought in at Kohat in February excluded from the 51. But this will be cleared up.

Also some deserters were Orakzais and are not included in the demand against Afridis.

And as to case (d) I put it under this head following Sir R. Udny's classification, but it appears to me that this case might fairly come under the head of rifles captured in war.

They were taken from a patrol of our cavalry within foreign (Orakzai) territory, and are distinctly regarded by the Afridis as taken in fighting.

4. A jirga which was interviewed by General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, at Jamrud on 18th April, admitted tribal responsibility for the restoration of the rifles under Heads I, and II, and for the rifles taken on the Samana (Saragarhi), Head III; and there is reason to hope that these will gradually be brought in.

Again it is necessary to be on our guard lest we assume from their attitude towards these claims a willingness to fulfil the remaining demands.

There are special reasons why the tribe are content to restore these rifles. In the first place the deserters of the "Khyber Rifles" want employment, and can only secure it by returning with their arms.

Secondly, the military deserters wish to be free of British territory, free to come and go and seek service; for though not to be re-enlisted in the army, they may get other employment, and, finally, they have been promised that for every rifle restored a sum of Rs. 150 will be placed to their credit against other demands.*

Thirdly, in respect of these and of rifles taken at Saragarhi, the tribesmen draw a distinction between them and arms captured in the war. They admit these to be "stolen property," and allege that they feel it right they should be surrendered.

Lastly, more potent than this conscientious scruple is the desire of the clans of the Khyber to see the restoration of their allowances, and I have no doubt that they feel rifles carried off by deserters must be brought in before even by their own standard they can ask for their confiscated subsidies.

5. I come now to the greater unsatisfied demands which lie between us and a final settlement; these are—

IV.—RESTORATION OF RIFLES CAPTURED IN THE WAR.

V.—COMPENSATION FOR (a) GOVERNMENT, (b) PRIVATE PROPERTY PLUNDERED.

The captured rifles† consist of 70 Lee-Metfords and 20 Martinis. The jirga of Maliks and the so-called hostages left at Jamrud, when Colonel Warburton departed, at their interview with General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, on 18th April, distinctly said they could not restore these rifles nor pay their value.

Restoration in kind must be admitted to be impossible, because a large number have been sold;‡ and sold at a cheaper rate than the price they now command, because until the Afridis had captured also some boxes of Dum-Dum Ammunition, they did not prize the Lee-Metford as highly as they do now.

At the accepted rates the value is—

				Rs.
70 Lee-Metfords, at Rs. 360§	25,200
20 Martinis, at Rs. 350	7,000
				32,200

* Telegram from Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Colonel Warburton, No. 6251 T., dated 31st March 1898.

† Letter from Sir R. Udny, Chief Political Officer, to Colonel Warburton, No. 69, dated 2nd March 1898, as corrected by his No. 76 P., dated 5th March 1898.

‡ Note—At first in Afghanistan, later to Mohmands.

§ 150 to 500 rupees, Kabul.

The demand for compensation under Head V. comes in all to nearly Rs. 28,600; details will be found in the enclosures to a letter from Commissioner, Peshawar, to Punjab Government, dated 9th November, 1897, and in paragraph 38 of Sir W. Lockhart's despatch, dated 3rd February, 1898.

The estimate of Government property* was Rs. 13,976. The principal item in private compensation is Captain Barton's property, Rs. 12,391; there was also a bill for losses of Khyber Rifles, put at Rs. 10,134, cut down by Sir R. Udny to Rs. 2,000, and it seems clear that only losses of British subjects among the Khyber Rifles need be considered.

Even so, however, the claim comes to Rs. 28,589, and with the value of the captured rifles, the demand under Heads IV. and V. amounts to Rs. 60,789.

These terms—restoration of rifles and compensation for property plundered—are in the proclamation, and have been mentioned in jirgas held since then. But there can be no doubt that the tribe will feel or affect surprise if *present* payment in kind and cash is insisted on, and they are not likely (save under stress of further coercive measures) to attempt fulfilment, partly because they cannot pay, and partly perhaps because they assume that Government has made peace with them.

This is clear from the attitude of the jirga and so-called hostages till lately at Jamrud, and it is the unanimous opinion of the officers † best able to judge who were on the spot when I came to the Khyber.

It is well known that during the proceedings with jirgas at Jamrud from January to April, stress was specially laid upon the second and third terms of the proclamation, and efforts were exclusively directed to securing payment of fine and surrender of the rifles taken as a fine.

For the quicker realisation of these, hostages were taken and were sent to Attock, and a blockade was maintained. As each section or clan complied with these two terms, their hostages were released, and the blockade removed. The other principal terms, for reasons no doubt sufficient, and with which I am not concerned, fell somehow or other into the background.

The tribe say, and from *their* point of view say, with some show of reason, "there is peace now between us and Government, and save for rifles of deserters, &c., which we admit are not lawfully ours, we do not understand more demands.

"Government told us to pay a fine to surrender 800 rifles, and we gave hostages for compliance with those orders; we paid up, Government released our hostages from detention at Attock, made us free of British territory, and removed the blockade; we understood peace was restored."

On the other hand, no doubt we know from Sir R. Udny's telegram of 8th April, to the Foreign Secretary, that he had reminded them of their liability to make good property plundered. On this point I can say no more than this, that these two large unsatisfied conditions seem to have been less constantly, less strongly, and less insistently before the clansmen, than the question of payment of fine in money and arms. Since the 30th December, the actual daily proceedings or negotiations with jirgas were in other hands; and it will be observed that Colonel Warburton's report ‡ of 2nd April is practically silent as to the large demands outstanding, Rs. 28,600 compensation, and restoration of captured rifles, the *money* value of which is Rs. 32,200.

His report covers his proceedings or negotiations; it contains no mention of these demands, it refers only to the fine, to the rifles taken as fine, and to the arms of deserters of the Khyber Corps.

* Excluding buildings.

† Mr Hastings, Mr. Donald and Native Officers.

‡ Enclosure to General Sir W. Lockhart's letter to Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 113F, dated 5th April.

He describes how these were recovered, and then, in conclusion, in paragraph 12 speaks of "the men who have assisted me to carry out the present settlement with the Afridis* of the Khyber Range."

* The italics are mine.

This being the official report of the officer who at Jamrud had all direct dealings in his hands, it is not altogether surprising if the Afridi assumes, or

perhaps I should say, hopes that the other † demands have fallen into the background, if not into abeyance.

Another fact points to the same conclusion, that is, that though the term as to compensation for property looted was mentioned by Sir R. Uday when he saw a jirga, as he notes, in February, yet it seems that the amount of the claim was never stated, its details were never discussed with any deputation, and no proposals were ever made to allot or distribute it among the seven or eight clans concerned.

6. However this may be, I am convinced that the Afridi partly cannot and partly will not pay more money down in cash, and that no measure short of another armed invasion and occupation of Tirah will induce him to surrender the rifles captured, his spoils of war.

As to his ability to pay, I observe Colonel Warburton, who should know, in paragraph 10 of his report, doubted whether the Zakka Khel "have the means of paying up their share, Rs. 9,094, for some time to come."

Paragraph 6 of General Sir W. Lockhart's letter to Government of India, Foreign Dept., No. 113 P., of 5th April. As a matter of fact, they did not pay; the money was recovered from property of two individual Maliks.

Still the point remains if they were too poor to pay their share of Rs. 50,000, while the Tirah Expeditionary Force remained at their doors and threatened to enter, shall we get their share of other demands aggregating Rs. 60,000 when there is no such threat?

It was said by some of the tribesmen at Jamrud, and I believe with truth, that a good deal, if not all, of the money realised by the sale of these rifles, was expended in the purchase of other rifles to make up the number 800 demanded by Government in Term II. of the Proclamation issued in Tirah, on the 21st November last.

W. P. SYMONS, Major-Genl.

As to the captured rifles. Some, as I have said, have been sold in Jalalabad and the Mohmand hills, the remarks above made apply to recovery of their money value, the arms having left the country.

Some remain, and I am convinced from all I have seen and heard that nothing short of a renewal of war will secure their restoration. If we went to war to enforce the surrender of the remaining portion of those 70 Lee-Metfords, even in a campaign as successful as the last, we should not be sure of not losing 70 more.

7. The conclusion I have come to is that the clansmen may gradually bring in the balance—

- (1) of the Sniders of the Khyber Rifle Corps.
- (2) of the arms of military deserters, and
- (3) the rifles taken at Saragarhi, but that we shall get no more, and that they will not pay up any part of the compensation for property looted Rs. 28,600, nor arms captured or their value Rs. 32,200, without being coerced anew.

I might go further and say that the present attitude of the Afridi is rather one of expectation of fresh concessions or favours. It is unnecessary to dwell on this, but it must be mentioned as a right appreciation of their present feeling is necessary to enable Government to judge how much more the tribes are likely to yield under present conditions.

The view here stated was the deliberate opinion of Mr. Hastings and others on the spot, and it is corroborated by the tribesmen's petitions to General Sir W. Lockhart on his departure. They petitioned that the salt-tax be reduced, that their runaway women should be surrendered to them, that a British subject kept as a political detenu in Lahore should be released. These petitions were repeated by the jirga whom General Symons saw on 18th April, and any one accustomed to deal with the clans on this border will recognise at once that these requests go beyond what these or other clans would have put forward before the war. Whatever be the explanation, it is a fact that the Afridis are more interested in and keener to press petitions of this kind than to discuss how he is to fulfil the demands which are still unsatisfied.

As to the salt-tax they seem to expect some concession, though of course without reason. A report recently sent to the Commissioner, Peshawar, from Kohat showed that purchases of salt had stopped, because it was everywhere declared the duty was to be lessened; there is the same expectation in the Kohat Pass and among the Adam Khels, and it can be traced back to an origin in the Khyber.

Mr. Donald writing on the 25th April says of the Aka Khel—

“ Their attitude does not seem very submissive, for they actually had the impertinence to tell Sikahdar Shah that, unless they were in the future to receive a handsome subsidy, they would start hostilities again with Government.”

8. Before leaving the subject of the outstanding demands, it is necessary to advert to the hostages mentioned in paragraph 7 of General Sir W. Lockhart's final report* (a) as being given as security “ for the restoration of all other Government property.”

There seems to have been some misapprehension as to the understanding upon which these men, 144, from all sections †(b) of the Khyber Afridis came in. They and the Afridi Maliks present at the jirga seen by General Symons, Commanding, Khyber Field Force, on 18th April, positively denied that they were hostages in the ordinary sense, that they were personally liable to arrest, detention or to any form of coercion in default of compliance with the terms unfulfilled. They asserted they were a “ hazir jirga,” a friendly deputation present to assist to secure compliance with those conditions which the clansmen at large appear to admit, *i.e.* restoration of rifles of deserters of the Khyber Rifle Corps, &c. They denied personal liability even for these, but were ready to help, and probably will help in the matter, and they totally repudiated any responsibility for “ compensation ” and for surrender of rifles captured in war.

They say with some force “ you had hostages in detention at Attock. You took those for the fine in money and arms; when we paid up those you set free those men who were hostages—if hostages were still needed for other demands, those men would have been detained. We are under different conditions ”

It is not easy to explain here how a misapprehension, if any, arose, but I can refer to telegrams ‡ between Sir R. Udny, late Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Colonel Warburton, which corroborate my view, and show that the former had great doubts whether these men were true hostages.

Telegraphing on the 4th April, the day before the date of the final political report, the Chief Political Officer said—“ You must remember that the term

* (a) Dated 5th April, to Government of India, Foreign Department.

† (b) The Shan Khel, one sub-section of the Zakka Khel, are still unrepresented.

‡ (1) Telegram from Colonel Warburton, Jamrud, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Peshawar, dated 4th April.

(2) Telegram dated 4th April, from Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Colonel Warburton at Jamrud.

(3) Telegram dated 4th April 1898, from Colonel Warburton, Jamrud, to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Peshawar.

hostages can only be applied to men who remain under our control if not under actual detention, and that men sent into independent territory to fetch rifles cannot be called hostages at all, while they are absent across the border."

No distinct reply was given to this.

While at Jamrud these men were free to come and go, and exchanged themselves with fellow-clansmen at their own pleasure.

The hostages who were in detention at Attock for payment of the fine in money and arms were clearly on a very different footing, but they were all released when the fine was made good, except a few, 12 men, of the Aka Khel still detained till the fine on that clan is paid up

So far then as regards the unfulfilled terms which the clan do not admit, these men (144) are not satisfactory hostages, and their presence at Jamrud is no security.

In fact we have no "security" save this—

- (1) the hope of the Khyber Afridis to get their allowances restored,* and
- (2) the desire of all Afridis to avoid another war and the re-occupation of Tirah.

This inducement is probably sufficient to bring about compliance with the demands which the tribesmen admit, that is, restoration of the balance of the Sniders of the Khyber Rifle Corps, and of rifles carried off by deserters from regiments,† but I am convinced it is not sufficient to ensure satisfaction of the other outstanding claims.

9. The great question then remains how we can secure fulfilment of the balance of our demands. I offer an opinion on this point with diffidence, but I do so now because it may be presumed that Government are anxious, if possible, to avoid a renewal of war, and the necessity of sending another expedition to Tirah, because it is desirable to reduce the large force now maintained in the Khyber and at Bara, because with the height of the hot weather rapidly coming on time is short, because the prolongation of a period of what may be called an interruption of peaceful relations is inexpedient, and while it lasts there is more chance of the tribe or some section doing some new act of folly, which may commit them and Government to more active measures, and, lastly, because it is possible now to adopt a means by which Government may settle the whole matter satisfactorily.

The ultimate object is the restoration of permanent friendly relations with the Afridis, and a settlement of the mode in which the Khyber Pass is to be held or kept open in the future. Without anticipating the decision of Government on that point, I observe that the proposals before the Government of India range from a mixed system of tribal responsibility for the police work guarded or secured by a regular military garrison at Landi Kotal on the one hand, to a system of purely tribal management on the other. In all the proposals there is the common factor of tribal responsibility, whether in presence of a military force in the pass or not. This implies and necessitates tribal allowances. The question of allowances has not yet been officially mentioned to the clans, but they certainly expect them, and are always petitioning about them; the hope of their restoration is a principal motive for the present good behaviour of the *Khyber* sections.

If it be granted, as I think it must, that in the end the allowances will have to be restored, I venture to suggest that we should now, without further delay, summon the clansmen, and tell them that the subsidies will be restored hereafter, that Government is meanwhile considering details of the question of the further management of the pass, I would say to them—

"Government has certain demands against you still unsatisfied, demands made in the Proclamation of 21st November, and never authoritatively waived.

* Note.—This operates only on Khyber Afridis, not on Aka Khel or others.
† And of rifles taken at Saragarhi.

"Government accepts your petition that you have suffered heavy loss in the war, by the destruction of your houses and property, and as an act of grace it is content to make a settlement with you without demanding payment of those claims now *in cash*.

"These claims are—

"(1) Compensation for property looted in the Khyber, Rs. 28,600.

"(2) A sum on account of Government buildings burnt or destroyed, say Rs. 21,400.

"These make up a total of Rs. 50,000.

"This Government will recover from you by deducting 10 per cent. from your tribal allowance, so that for About 5 years probably. a few years you will receive Rs. 9 instead of Rs. 10."

I should advise waiving the demand for surrender of rifles captured in war. Many have been sold, and I do not believe the tribe can compel the fortunate possessors of the remainder to give up what they consider spoils of war; I doubt whether the tribe would even attempt the task; it is so difficult they might prefer the risk of another war; and on our part though we should punish them heavily in a second campaign, it seems hardly worth while to undertake it for this object, seeing that in pursuit of these 70 Lee-Metfords we might lose as many more.

Moreover, the clansmen feel they have in this matter the sympathy of most people, whether inside or outside British territory; and I believe this condition might be waived as an act of grace without giving rise to any suspicion of undue weakness on our part.

10. I would as suggested above *now* make the claim (if Government still desire it) on account of Government buildings burnt or destroyed. To put it off until a settlement shall be made, adds to the difficulties of coming to any final understanding.

The reserved claim or liability for damage to Government buildings.
I strongly support this.
W. P. SYMONS, *Major-General*.

The tribe as a whole probably do not thoroughly understand the exact meaning of the last clause of the Proclamation under which, after compliance by them with all other terms, Government reserved to itself discretion to enforce on them liability "to make good all damage done by them to Government buildings."

This damage, I am told, has been estimated at Rs. 3,60,000.

Under present conditions, if they understood this, they would certainly be even less amenable than they are, and would ask what was the use of their attempting to meet other claims if Government had in reserve an *undefined* and possibly very large demand to be brought forward hereafter.

11. In conclusion, I may sum up by saying that my suggestion for a final settlement is based on these premises, viz. :—

Conclusion.

(1) That it is vain to expect the Afridis will or perhaps can satisfy in in cash and kind the large demands outstanding.

(2) That any scheme of "management of the pass" which is likely to be accepted by Government includes tribal responsibility whether associated with troops or not, and that as a consequence in the end the tribal allowances will have to be restored.

If the suggestion is accepted, I think the Khyber Force could soon be reduced and a satisfactory permanent settlement arrived at within a few weeks.

Time is of value, because the longer matters remain unsettled the more chance there is of some misguided section giving trouble and committing both the clans and the Government; and, as the hot weather already begun to be felt, advances, picket duty and what may be called the police work of the pass will be found a heavy burden upon regular troops.

(Signed.) F. D. CUNNINGHAM,
Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force.

The 26th April 1898.

Enclosure 12 in No. 3.

Letter from the General Officer Commanding Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 1st May 1898.

I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a portion of a telegram received by me from Mr. Cunningham, Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force.

2. I forward the telegram, but feel confident that the Government of India is fully alive to this important question in the settlement with the Afridis.

Telegram from F. D. Cunningham, Esq., Chief Political Officer, Khyber Force, to the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Force, Landi Kotal, dated Peshawar, the 29th April, 1898.

With reference to paragraphs 9 and 10 of my note, dated 26th, I suggest your pressing on Government the desirability of an early decision on the question of tribal allowances to Khyber Afridis. If they are to be restored, as I believe is inevitable, the sooner we let clans know the better. Reasons are—first, disaffected men are encouraging them against compliance with even those demands which clans admit, by warning them they will not get their old subsidies. Second, although reports in Colonel Aslam Khan's telegrams of 25th and 26th are exaggerated and misleading, yet no doubt Amir's officials have interviewed deputations of Zakka Khel, and it would not be surprising if such officials did not discourage compliance with wishes of Government, and suggest honours and rewards from Afghan side. If clans lose hope of subsidies from us, they will look elsewhere. Third, at present hope of allowances tends to keep things quiet, but delay in announcement is creating distrust or suspicion. If clans once begin to believe they will not be restored, turbulent spirits among them would be ready to give trouble, and we could not then trust the tribal arrangement, which now holds the pass for some five miles from Gurgarra to Landi Kotal, and to that extent saves troops from burdensome picquet duty. While crops are standing uncut, we have some hold over the Zakka section, who have undertaken to guard that part, but, once crops are cut, that security will be gone. Fourth, if tribe begin to believe subsidies will not be restored, I doubt whether the Khyber Rifles, so far as they are recruited from Afridis, could be trusted. They now guard pass from Jamrud to Fort Maude, and I understand it is desired to make over a further length of road up to Ali Masjid to them. If tribe learn, or begin to believe, subsidies will not be restored, we should have to guard entire pass with troops alone. For reason given in paragraph 9 of my note, I believe in the end restoration of subsidies is inevitable, and, if Government decide on this, early announcement is most desirable. Actual payment could of course begin later when settlement is made, but delay in announcement prolongs period of uncertainty and creates risk of trouble. Sir Richard Udny has authorised me to say that he is strongly of opinion that an early announcement on the question of the subsidies is most desirable. . . .

The remainder of the telegram refers to other and irrelevant matter.

Enclosure 13 in No. 3.

Letter from Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., General Officer Commanding the Khyber Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Peshawar, 7th May, 1898.

I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a proposal connected with the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass, which may be deemed worthy of acceptance.

2. I have already forwarded to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India a memorandum, in which I have given my views regarding the reconstruction of the Khyber Rifles. In this memorandum I stated that I thought that it would be desirable to attach two more British officers, and four selected Native officers, to this corps.

3. My proposal now is that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should also be Political Officer in the Khyber.

4. This arrangement would centralise the control of the pass, and give the Commandant that influence and authority which, in my opinion, he does not at present sufficiently possess.

5. This proposal should not be entertained, unless two other British military officers are sent to do duty with the Khyber Rifles.

6. The present Commandant, Captain Barton of the Guides, might do well, but, from all that I have heard, Captain Roos-Keppel, on special duty, Kurram, would appear to be an officer peculiarly qualified for this new appointment.

7. I have spoken to Mr. Cunningham on this matter. He concurs in my proposal.

Enclosure 14 in No. 3.

Minute of dissent by His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne, K.C.B., dated the 16th June 1898.

The Secretary of State, in his despatch of 28th January 1898, laid down that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade was an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. How such safety is to be achieved appears to me much more a military than a political question, for not only must the protection of the pass be based fundamentally on adequate military precautions, but one of the principal ends to be thereby attained, the power of fulfilling our obligations to the Amir, is essentially military.

Sir William Lockhart has proposed that a fortified post should be built at Landi Kotal, to be garrisoned by a regular regiment of Native Infantry and to be armed with guns, while the rest of the pass should be held by a local militia. While I concur in the construction of a fort, I am opposed to its occupation by regular troops, which I believe would be a source of irritation both to the Afridis and to the Amir, would not overawe the surrounding tribes, but would be a constant source of friction. The expense of maintaining troops in such a locality would be great, and the service would be unpopular with our soldiers, while, in the event of serious friction with the Afridis, their communications would be insecure.

My view is that by suitable measures we can identify the Afridis with ourselves and with our military force to a much greater extent than has yet been attained, and that by so doing we can safely utilise them to hold both

the fort at Landi Kotal and the pass itself, thus not only attaining the end aimed at by the Secretary of State, but arriving at it by the very means on which he lay stress, *viz*, by giving the Afridis the largest possible share in the scheme, and enlisting their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. I lay great stress on the Khyber Rifles (whether they retain that title or are termed militia is immaterial) being kept under the military authorities and being regarded as an essentially military body, the responsibility for their military control, discipline and efficiency being vested in the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District, for not only will their efficiency be thereby greatly increased, but such a step will be highly popular with the men themselves who will feel themselves much more bound to, and identified with, our interests, while their self-esteem and military pride will be gratified and enlisted on our side when considering themselves soldiers of the Queen, as it can never be, while their status is but that of mere civil levies or local police. Nor can we by any other means instil into their minds that full assurance of unflinching support in the event of disturbances which has been rendered necessary by the events of last August.

In the pass itself we cannot have two independent powers, one Civil and the other Military, for such a division of local authority would be fatal to our complete control. It seems to me therefore essential to the completeness of my proposal to make the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles *ex-officio* the Political Officer also. In this capacity he would report to, and act under, the Commissioner of Peshawar. There are many precedents for such a course. For instance, the Commandant of the Guides had always much political work entrusted to him, and also the Commandants of nearly all the Local Corps in Rajputana and Central India.

It is because I feel that the part of this scheme which has not been adopted is essential to its efficacy, that I am reluctantly obliged to dissent from the proposals of my Honourable Colleagues.

Closely connected with the safety of the pass is the much discussed subject of the policy for many years past of the Punjab Government in its dealings with the frontier tribes. Events of the past year add another proof of the failure of that policy, and I venture to record my dissent from reverting to it.

I carry back my memory to the days of Mackeson, Edwardes, Nicholson, James, and other distinguished soldier civilians under Sir John Lawrence. Their vigorous and severe but sympathetic methods were well suited to the turbulent natures of the highland caterans with whom they had to deal, and I venture to think it is to a reversion to these methods we must look for success in our future dealings with the tribes. In conversations I have had with Afridis in the past, they have always expressed the utmost contempt for the fine and blockade system of the past 20 years. If we go among them and let our rule be felt, these frontier tribesmen will soon become, as all the military nations of India have become, our faithful friends, soldiers, and allies; but with such people half-hearted and tender methods of repression lead to nothing but failure and loss of prestige. I therefore deprecate allowing the management of the Afridis and of the Khyber Pass to be assumed by an Agency which has failed in the past, as under such a system it was bound to fail, and which will fail again in the future.

In agreeing to the decision that the road-bed of the railway only should be laid through the pass, the rails being laid to Jamrud only, I wish to say that I consider this only permissible if the pass and Landi Kotal Fort is held by the Khyber Rifles. Should it be decided at any time to garrison Landi Kotal by regular troops, I consider it will be essential to complete the railway to that place at the same time.

(Signed) C. E. NAIRNE.

Enclosure 15 in No. 3.

Extract from Minute by Major-General the Honourable Sir E. H. H. Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B., dated the 17th June 1898.

I am constrained to record my dissent from the proposal that the local corps of Afridis, to be entitled the Khyber Militia, should be under the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of the Government of the Punjab, and not under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. While I concur in the proposal to investigate the question whether we cannot raise similar militia on other parts of the frontier, I consider these corps should be under the frontier military authorities. I am also opposed to the political control of the Khyber Pass remaining in the hands of the Punjab Government.

We have decided that we must provide for the possibility of an advance into Afghanistan to defend that country, and, consequently, we have approved generally of the plan described in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum of the 11th March 1898, with the modification that irregular troops shall form the garrison of Landi Kotal instead of that garrison being composed of an ordinary regiment of the native army of India. Under Sir William Lockhart's plan the Khyber defile itself would be held by the Khyber Rifles. Both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny are in favour of the military occupation of Landi Kotal.

For many reasons I should prefer that two local battalions, instead of militia, should be enlisted from the Afridis, Shinwaris, &c, and should, though officered under the irregular system, form a part of the native army of India, and preferably of the Punjab Frontier Force. One battalion would hold Landi Kotal, and the other would garrison the Khyber itself. I believe that we should in this way utilise more fully the military strength of the Afridis; that they would prefer enlistment in these regiments to enlistment in any corps of inferior status; that we should bind the Afridis to ourselves, that their honour and loyalty would be more fully pledged; that, while making it plain that we intend to hold the Khyber against all comers, we should enlist their good-will and services for its protection; that this would be a great advance in the policy of making the tribe our friends; and that, lastly, by the employment of battalions belonging to the army we should have a guarantee that the safety of the pass would be regarded as a paramount consideration.

It is a significant fact that the Malikhun Khel, who were the first of the sections to come in, had the greatest number of pensioners. The invasion of Tirah tried the loyalty and devotion to our service of the Afridi soldiers in an extraordinary degree, but they stood the strain in a remarkable manner.

There are objections to the employment of regiments of Sikhs or Gurkhas at Landi Kotal, but by the plan I proposed we should have regular troops there, recruited from the tribe we have defeated—as has happened over and over again in the history of India—men who would become soldiers in our army, just as loyal, just as devoted, as those we have already in our ranks.

The two battalions would perform all the garrison, convoy, and picquet duties of the pass in precisely the same way as that in which the militia would carry them out; but other considerations, such as the difficulty of adding to the strength of the Native Army at the present time, the possibility of opening up questions connected with the proportion of British to Native troops, &c., would cause me to waive my views in respect to the raising of two Afridi battalions of the army and to agree that these should be irregular troops raised as militia. I would agree to this on the distinct understanding that these corps should be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District.

The whole of the proposals in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum are based on the military importance of maintaining the security of the Khyber Pass and of the military occupation of Landi Kotal. The construction of a strong fort, the improvement of the water-supply, the construction of block-houses in the upper and lower Khyber, are all integral parts of that plan, and I

cannot see how we can approve generally of the proposals in his memorandum if we take away the essence of the plan—the military control of Landi Kotal and the Khyber.

In my opinion the military question is of higher importance in this case than any question of civil and political policy. There are only two great military highways to Afghanistan—the Khyber and the Bolan. All others are subsidiary and secondary. These two great routes we must have under our effective control. We have secured the Bolan by a military occupation of that route; and if we are to ensure military predominance, in the case of our being forced to advance to the strategic front Kabul-Kandahar; if we are to fulfil the guarantee we have given for the integrity of Afghanistan; if we are to be ready to help the Amir or his successor in the way which has been indicated to us by Her Majesty's Government, we must have the Khyber route under effective control, and that cannot be obtained, in my opinion, by placing that great military highway under civil management.

In 1885–86 the whole question of the defence of the north-west frontier of India was discussed by the Government of India and by Her Majesty's Government. Field Marshall Sir Donald Stewart had pointed out in 1880 that Landi Kotal perfectly commanded the western entrance of the Khyber. Lord Roberts also considered that the main defence must be at the western end, *i.e.*, at Landi Kotal, and at the conclusion of the discussion the Government of India, in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 4th October 1886, admitted the great importance of including the Khyber in the scheme of defence of the north-west frontier. They proposed that an enclosed "serai" should be built at Landi Kotal capable of conversion into a redoubt, and they considered that steps should be taken gradually to familiarise the neighbouring tribes with the idea of an eventual occupation of the western outlet of the Khyber, and that the earliest favourable opportunity should be taken for carrying out this defensive measure in its integrity.

The Secretary of State concurred with the Government of India that a large "serai," capable of defence, would, under the circumstances, suffice "for the present." The favourable opportunity contemplated by the Government of Lord Dufferin has now presented itself, and I am strongly of opinion that a work should be built at Landi Kotal to fulfil the double purpose of resistance against tribal attack, and capable of being heavily armed when necessary, and of forming the centre of larger entrenchments should these eventually be required.

The Khyber route must be occupied and controlled as far as the Durand line, and Landi Kotal is the strategic point which it is *essential to occupy*. We require it as a depôt in case of an advance into Afghanistan; we must protect the water-supply and reservoirs already constructed; the position is a part of the scheme of defence of the north-west frontier as commanding the western entrance of the Khyber; and, bad as it is, the Bori-Kandao route gives us a short line into the Bazar Valley from Landi Kotal; our hold on the Khyber would be immensely strengthened; and, lastly, the position controls the Afridis, and would demonstrate to them and to all the frontier tribes that their outbreak had led to this strengthening of our position.

It is essential, in my opinion, that the irregular troops maintained at Landi Kotal and in the Khyber should be placed under military control, and that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be held absolutely responsible for the security of the pass. If battalions of militia be formed from the Khyber Rifles and officered by British officers as proposed, there is not, I submit, any practical difficulty in placing the force under the military authorities. Up to 1890 the Derajat frontier militia were under the orders of the Officers Commanding the outposts of the Punjab Frontier Force. In 1892 the militia were turned into border military police.

It is quite true that these militia, practically only horse and foot levies, and not organised in battalions, were under the frontier military officers at a time when the frontier force itself was under the Punjab Government, but there are two special points of difference between that time and the present. In the first

place we were dealing then with the old frontier of British India running along at the foot of the hills, and with the "close border" system. Secondly, the militia of those days were always police rather than a military body. At the present time we are dealing with the tribes between our old frontier and the Durand line or frontier of British influence, and we are contemplating the formation of militia so organised as to be military bodies in every essential, with the exception that it is proposed to place them under civil and not under military control, while their officers would be British officers drawn from the army, but would be in "civil employ," and, by regulation, unfit to hold military command. Undoubtedly, in the days of the frontier militia as they were before 1890, the civil officer of the frontier district had a good deal to say to the militia although they were not under his control. But in the Khyber we have no revenue to collect nor any civil district to administer, and we have been expressly told by Her Majesty's Government that interference in the domestic affairs of the Afridis is not desired. The civil power, represented by the Commissioner of Peshawar, could at all times call upon their services, and I cannot think that there are adequate civil or political reasons which would render it necessary to place this corps under civil and not under military control. In my opinion there would be no guarantee for the safety of the pass unless the proper officer, the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, whose head-quarters are only ten miles from the mouth of the pass—Jamrud Fort being actually in his command—is placed in a position of full responsibility.

I am also compelled to differ from the majority of my colleagues in the proposal that the political relations in the Khyber should remain under the Punjab Government. I do not desire, at this moment, to raise the whole question of the management of frontier politics, although I have long held that an improvement in the agency could and should be effected, and have expressed that opinion on various occasions. I would, therefore, simply say that I consider the management of Khyber affairs should be removed from the authority of the Punjab Government, and that they should be controlled by the Commissioner of Peshawar in direct communication with the Foreign Department of the Government of India.

In paragraph 19 of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 28th January 1898, the avoidance of interference with the tribes is impressed on us, and we are told, especially as regards the Khyber, that we should avoid interference with the independent tribal organisations or the domestic affairs of the Afridis. If this policy be strictly followed, our political relations with the Afridis should be very simple. They will be in receipt of allowances which were formerly granted to them from Kabul and of those in commutation of the tolls formerly exacted by them from caravans passing through the Khyber. The trade arrangements of the Khyber can be managed as they always have been, and I do not think there is the slightest fear that were the Khyber under military instead of political or civil control the arrangements could not be carried out precisely as before. The expansion of trade with Afghanistan via the Khyber depends mainly on the fiscal policy of the Amir.

I venture to think, therefore, that when once we have come to an agreement with them, we ought to have no political dealings with the Afridis which cannot be managed by the Political Officer in the pass, unless occasional questions of importance should need a reference to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. The direct system is one which I should prefer, because I believe that any unnecessary link in the administrative chain is a source of weakness, more especially in our relations with the frontier tribes. But in order to meet any objection that the Foreign Department might be overburdened with Khyber political business, I would place the Political Officer in the Khyber under the Commissioner of Peshawar, who for these purposes would be in direct communication with the Government of India, just as he is now in respect to dealings with the Amir.

My proposal, which is also that of General Symons and Mr. Cunningham, lately Political Officer in the Khyber Pass, is that the commandant of the Khyber irregular troops or militia should be the Political Officer of the

Khyber. This arrangement would be exactly that which we adopt during a state of war, when the military and political functions are combined in the General Officer in command, but with this advantage, that the commandant of the Khyber troops would be a selected officer, selected for his knowledge of Pathans in general and of Afridis in particular, selected for his ability to manage Afridis with that firm but sympathetic treatment to which they are susceptible. The control of, and responsibility for, civil and military arrangements would be vested in one man; there would be no artificial distinctions between "military" and "political," no divided counsels and divided responsibility. I am convinced that the Afridis or any other frontier tribe would understand and prefer such a system; every one who knows the frontier knows how easily friendly relations are created and maintained with the tribes by a Commanding Officer of a regiment aided by his officers and native officers; the Afridis would look to one authority with force at his command, for they cannot recognise the nice distinction between civil and military control; they cannot serve two masters, but they can play off one against the other; but if that one authority is a man who likes them, a man of tact as well as strength, no better plan could be created either to fulfil the policy of Her Majesty's Government or to provide for the military security of the pass. I fully recognise the ability, courage, and honesty of purpose of those statesmen who have been at the head of the Punjab Government, but it cannot be denied that the policy of the Punjab Government has not been the policy of the Government of India. Those who have studied frontier politics know very well how wide the differences of opinion have been as to what was the proper line to take.

Regarding this very question of the Khyber, a writer,* supposed by popular report to be a civilian of the highest political ability, experience, and standing, formerly under the Government of India, says:—

"The Afridis and other tribes are said to have been treated by the Punjab Government with such exaggerated deference that they believed we were afraid of them and became intolerably aggressive and defiant. It is to this timidity of action that many attribute the recent risings, and certainly nothing could have been better calculated to foster the conceit of the ever-conceited Pathan than the condition in which the Kohat Pass, between two important military stations, has been allowed to remain for so many years. We did not even remove the stones and boulders which covered the track, and the tribesmen openly jeered about it. The system in the Khyber could hardly fail to have the same effect. 'That immortal demon, the Khyber,' as Alexander Burnes quaintly calls him, was paid a large yearly sum for keeping open the pass, but we had no control over the tribe, our officers being forbidden to go off the road, and the arrangements, though kept from breaking down for some years by the exertions of Colonel Warburton, loyally working on a system he knew to be wrong, ended at last in a sudden collapse under the circumstances described by Sir Lepel Griffin. In connexion with this point we would again draw attention to the agreement of 1881 with the Afridis, and to the correspondence which preceded it. It will be seen that the Afridis headmen then pressed us to exercise a larger measure of interference than we were disposed to exercise, and that the local officers were inclined to some extent to meet their wishes. The Afridis were, in fact, ripe for the application of the Sandeman system, and if it had been applied our hold on the pass would, no doubt, have been much stronger than it was. There is, therefore, some ground for thinking that the loss and expense which we have lately incurred were due rather to a want of boldness in our treatment of the tribes than to the Forward Policy."

In 1896 the Government of India desired to give a wider discretion to the Political Officer of the Khyber. This view was combated by the Lieutenant-Governor of the day, who considered that the officer had already the fullest discretion, and that it would be unwise to extend it; and the opinions held by the present Lieutenant-Governor are well known. He was in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement, and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility (Foreign Department letter, dated 28th March, 1898, paragraph 4). He was not in favour of any change in the conditions, which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khyber in times of disturbance on the British Government (Punjab Government letter, dated 1st April 1898, paragraph 3).

The present and proposed system is fraught with embarrassment and delay; the officers chosen for the work are not, and would not be, the officers of the Government of India, but of the Punjab Government; the procedure is

* "Edinburgh Review," January 1898.

circumlocutory ; while the fact that a moveable or flying column is to be maintained under the orders of the *military* authorities ready to advance up the Khyber, is no guarantee that the local *civil* authorities would ask for its services until too late ; they would refer to the Government of the Punjab at Lahore or Simla, and the latter would refer to the Government of India in the Foreign Department at Simla or Calcutta ; and that department would refer to the Military Department ; and the Military Department would refer to the Commander-in-Chief. If the military security of the pass were to be entrusted to the proper authority, the commandant of the troops, under the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, the responsibility would be fixed and absolute. "Time is everything in military operations," and prompt action would in the future, as has been the case repeatedly in the military history of India, nip any disturbance in the bud, where "fearful commenting, the leaden servitor of dull delay" would but lead to the worst and most disastrous results, however we might subsequently exact retribution or achieve victory. What may have been quite right when Jamrud was the frontier post, when the Khyber was sealed to us, when no officer dared to advance beyond that post, is not applicable now, when the Khyber route is recognised as the great highway to Afghanistan which should at all times be kept open.

The whole object of our frontier policy is to give us peace on the border and military predominance over Russia if a conflict should unhappily occur with that power. As Sir Dennis FitzPatrick said : "All peace and order on the frontier must rest on force ;" and I submit, therefore, that Landi Kotal and the Khyber should be occupied in a military sense, that the military duties should be controlled by the commandant, that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be responsible for the pass, and that the political work should be in the hands of the commandant, with such assistance as may be necessary.

No. 4.

Extract from Letter from Government of India, Military Department, to the Right Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 23rd June, 1898.

WITH reference to our despatch in the Foreign Department of this day's date, we desire to lay before Your Lordship our proposals for the future military arrangements necessary for keeping open the road *via* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral.

In Your Lordship's despatch, dated 16th August, 1895, we received the approval of Her Majesty's Government to the proposals which we had put forward for placing a garrison in Chitral, and maintaining communication with it by a direct road from the Peshawar Valley. In that despatch a reference was made to our expectation of being able to keep open the road by peaceful arrangements with the Khan of Dir and the Swat Khans, so that the only garrisons necessary would be on the Malakand Pass, and at the crossing of the river at Chakdara. Except for a comparatively brief period last year when an unexpected outburst of fanaticism brought together a great gathering from all the tribes to attack our garrisons, the road has been kept open, and we have lately had the satisfaction of seeing the relief of the troops at Chitral pass off, for the third time, in perfect quiet and without a shot being fired.

We do not now desire to enter on the general question of our policy with regard to Chitral. We are of opinion that the reasons which induced us in 1895 to recommend its occupation by a force of regular troops still hold good, and that its occupation must be continued for at least some considerable time to come in the same manner as hitherto. We also consider that our arrangements for maintaining communication with the garrison have been successful, and do not

call for any change in principle. An essential point in those arrangements is the retention of garrisons on the Malakand Pass and at Chakdara. In considering, in the light of recent events, what alterations are desirable with respect to the strength of the garrisons, and in the conditions under which they are maintained, we have been guided by certain principles which we propose to apply generally to all plans of local frontier defence.

Your Lordship has recently drawn our attention to the probable necessity for modifying existing arrangements on the North-West frontier, especially with a view to the concentration of forces, and to the retention of troops only on such communications through the borderland as are most necessary to maintain. It was at the same time pointed out that, from what had occurred during the past year, some of the frontier posts did not appear to have been sufficiently defensible; that regular troops should only be placed in such posts or localities, and under such conditions, as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks made upon them; and that local and tribal levies should be made to assume the aspect of a police rather than a military force. We fully appreciate the value of these observations. We propose that in future the strength of the more advanced garrisons on the North-West frontier shall be kept as low as may be practicable, the troops being placed in strong works which cannot be captured by a tribal enemy so long as the garrisons have food, water, and ammunition; that outposts of regular troops shall be as few and strong as possible; that minor posts, and posts on the line of communications, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by regular troops, which we should prefer to see organised as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons. Further that, in event of serious attacks on the frontier being made or threatened, as in the case of the attacks by the Orakzais and Afridis on the Samana and other posts in August and September last, the garrisons of the weaker posts shall either be reinforced or withdrawn, according to a pre-arranged plan.

[Enclosures not printed.]

No. 5.

Extract from Letter from Government of India, Military Department, to the Right Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 4th August, 1898.

In continuation of our despatches in the Military Department, dated the 23rd June, 1898, and dated the 7th July, 1898, with which we submitted our proposals for the maintenance of the road *via* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral, and for the future holding of the Khyber, we now desire to lay before Your Lordship our views as to the military position to be maintained on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi Valley, and at Wana and the adjacent portion of the frontier.

The general principles which we propose should govern our arrangements for the future defence of the Punjab frontier are stated in our military despatch, dated the 23rd June, 1898, and these principles have been adhered to in the proposals now submitted.

The most difficult portion of the frontier to deal with, after the Khyber, is the Miranzai border extending from Kohat to the Kuram, and comprising the Samana range, the posts on which were attacked in great strength by the Orakzai and Afridi tribes in September last. The position of the Samana has a local military importance in that it protects the Miranzai valley through which the road runs connecting Thal, and the cantonment of Parachinar in the Kuram valley, with Kohat, *via* Hangu. The security of this road and of the inhabitants of the Miranzai valley must be assured, and we are therefore of opinion that the retention of some force of regular troops on the Samana is at present essential

for the protection of this portion of the frontier, and although there is considerable force in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab expressed in the letter which forms one of the enclosures of this despatch, that it would be desirable to withdraw the troops from the Samana if this could be effected without loss of prestige, and without danger to our subjects in Miranzai, there is a general agreement that the time has not yet arrived when this course can be contemplated.

We decided that the question of the defence of the Samana should be considered on the spot by a Committee of experienced officers, including a political officer. A Committee was accordingly assembled in April last under the presidency of Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, C.B., to report generally on this question. In our instructions to the Committee, we stated that the object with which the Samana is to be held is to protect Miranzai against tribal incursions, to afford support to the police posts in resisting such incursions, and to dominate the road from Shinawari to Karappa; and the Committee were desired to consider whether the force of regular troops should be located on the Samana itself, or whether it was desirable that the posts on the crest should be limited to the smallest possible number, and the main defence entrusted to a force posted in rear of the range, the greater portion of which would be equipped as a moveable column.

The report of the Committee, which we enclose, shows that they framed two alternative schemes—

- A. To hold the Samana range in such strength as would admit of a small moveable column being immediately available to support the police posts; the force being dependent on Kohat for its main support.
- B. To hold the Samana range with purely defensive posts, supported by a moveable column located near at hand in Miranzai.

After carefully considering the views of the Committee, and of the Commander-in-Chief, we have decided to accept scheme A, which avoids the formation of a new cantonment on the frontier, a measure to which there are undoubtedly strong objections, and which would probably prove expensive. This scheme also affords a readier means of resisting an incursion by the Ublan Pass, and of securing communication with Peshawar by the Kohat Pass. We have consulted the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who without being very strongly in favour of the scheme, considers it amply provides for the protection of the frontier, and preferable to scheme B. We recommend the proposals generally for Your Lordship's approval and would add that we do not propose to make any material change in existing arrangements in the Kuram Valley. The fort at Parachinar will require improvement, and a project for a new post at Sadda is being prepared by the Punjab Government, but no definite proposals are as yet before us.

Turning to the Tochi Valley, we have considered whether, and to what extent, the withdrawal of the troops now in the Tochi can be effected. In view of the fact that the inhabitants of Daur have been assured of our protection, we are of opinion that the entire withdrawal of troops from the valley would be im-

- * Two battalions of native infantry.
- One squadron of native cavalry.
- Four guns, native mountain battery.
- Four maxims.

practicable under the circumstances now existing. We believe, however, that it may be possible before long to diminish the former garrisons,* and to concentrate the regular troops, placing the principal garrison in a strong post at Miranshah. The question of holding the minor posts by levies, or by militia, should any be organised hereafter, is engaging our attention, and if Your Lordship accepts the general principle on the subject, stated in our despatch regarding the Khyber arrangements, (Foreign Department, dated the 23rd June, 1898), definite proposals will be submitted. As we cannot now abandon the occupation of the Tochi Valley, it appears to us necessary that the construction of the main post should be proceeded with, and if Your Lordship approves our proposal that it should be located at Miranshah, we should be glad to be favoured with a reply on this point by telegram. The

garrison has not yet been finally decided, but it is probable that one, or one and a half battalions of native infantry, with a squadron, and two mountain guns would suffice. Any troops which can be set free from the Tochi would be stationed at Edwardesabad, where a moveable column would be maintained.

With regard to Wana, Your Lordship asked in your despatch, dated 8th May, 1896, for a statement of our conclusions on the question whether the maintenance of the Wana cantonment was so necessary as to justify the expenditure incurred on it. In our despatch in the Foreign Department, dated the 1st September, 1897, we informed Your Lordship that, owing to the existing position of affairs in Waziristan, it was desirable to postpone our recommendations on the subject. We are of opinion that the presence of troops at Wana, together with that of the force in the Tochi Valley, materially contributed to prevent a rising on the part of the Waziris during the recent disturbances on the frontier.

Wana has also considerable local importance as it protects the trade route by which caravans reach the Gumal, and since the cantonment was established Waziri raids into Zhob have been greatly checked. Having regard therefore to the general peace of the country, we think that the withdrawal of the troops from Wana should not at present be undertaken. But here again we would desire to follow out the principle above mentioned, *viz.*, the concentration of regular troops, if, and when, we are able to provide an efficient substitute for holding the subsidiary posts.

We would add that the construction and improvement of roads on the North-West Frontier, also the possible construction of frontier railways, are being considered by us with reference to our requirements as a whole, and we shall if necessary address Your Lordship hereafter on these subjects.

[Enclosures not printed.]

No. 6.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 5th August, 1898.

I HAVE given my most attentive consideration to the various proposals for restoring and maintaining British control over the Khaibar Pass which are contained in your Excellency's Letter (Foreign), dated the 23rd of June, 1898.

2. The scheme which you recommend for the future management of affairs in this important artery of communication and commerce between Peshawar and Afghanistan consists of three main proposals. At Landi Kotal, the further end of the Pass, you contemplate the construction of a fort to be built with emplacements for guns, but not armed with guns, to be supplied with reservoirs and water channels, and to be occupied by a local militia recruited from the Afridi tribes and placed under British officers. The militia will have charge of the Pass as well as of the Fort. The second proposal is the organisation, at the British end of the Pass or in its neighbourhood, of a movable column of sufficient force, and equipped with transport for the express purpose of supporting the militia. Various posts at Ali Masjid, Fort Maude and elsewhere are to be strengthened, and preparations are to be made for extending to Landi Kotal, when necessary, a line of rail, which will be laid as far as Jamrud. Thirdly, you desire to leave with the Government of the Punjab its control over the Pass and the new militia. Besides these three proposals, there are other matters treated of in your letter, namely, the conclusion of a new agreement with the tribes, and the settlement of outstanding claims against them, to which I shall revert presently.

3. As to the first proposal of your Excellency's Government, namely, the construction of a strong defensible post at Landi Kotal, with an adequate water

supply, I observe that military opinions generally concur in its necessity. It must be remembered that the Afridis, in the course of the late disturbances, wrought much havoc in the forts and posts entrusted to their charge, and the reconstruction of these works has been forced upon you. The work, in short, is one of restoration rather than one of fresh construction or advance. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the fort when built should be occupied by regular troops, or left to the care of the Afridi militia supported by a movable column at Peshawar and officered by British officers. That question is not exclusively a military one, it involves also important political issues

- 4. It is convenient here to refer to two considerations which must be borne in mind in dealing with this and all other questions connected with the Khaibar Pass. The Afridis have, as you observe, "by their own acts ruptured their engagements," and in the proclamation addressed to them, and on subsequent occasions, they have been given to understand that the Pass will be re-opened under such terms as the British Government may consider necessary. No considerations of past agreements or of tribal rights stand in the way of the adoption by your Excellency's Government of any military measures necessary for ensuring the permanent safety of the Pass, and for preventing a repetition of the late disturbances. At the same time, while your hands are perfectly free, and should be kept so in any negotiations or communications that you may have to conduct with the Afridis, it has always been an axiom that the good will of the tribesmen affords the best guarantee for the success of a frontier policy. In his memorandum, dated 11th March 1898, General Sir William Lockhart remarked with equal force and truth "from a political point of view, the permanent occupation of Chima might give rise to tribal ill feeling and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the Pass would be secure in any case. If the Pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions."

5. These observations apply equally to the immediate question of the occupation of the fort at Landi Kotal by regular troops. In the opinion of your Excellency's Government, such a measure will necessarily strain the good will of the Afridis. Her Majesty's Government is therefore prepared to accept your view subject to such further consideration as may be needed after fuller experience. At the same time there is no necessity, in communicating to the tribes your intentions, to bind your Government as to its action hereafter. The reconstruction of the works destroyed by the Afridis in breach of their agreements will take some months, and the arguments both for, and against, the occupation of the fort by regular troops will receive additional weight according to the behaviour of the Afridis during the course of the next year. It is sufficient for me at present to convey to your Excellency my general sanction to any expenditure that may be found necessary for the proper accommodation and defence of the garrison which you may eventually determine to place in the Khaibar Pass.

6. I accept also your proposals for establishing a movable column, and I shall await the detailed report referred to at the end of paragraph 9 of your Excellency's Letter. I approve, further, of your measures set forth in paragraph 12 for extending railway communication, but I do not think that it is necessary for you to secure the right of working it and of exercising jurisdiction by means of any agreement with the several sections of the Afridi tribes. The Pass is now in the occupation of your Government, and it will be sufficient to intimate to the tribes your intentions for the future, and to retain the power now actually in your hands of carrying out your intentions.

7. Your third proposal, under which the Government of the Punjab is to retain its control over the Afridi militia and over the Khaibar Pass, raises an important and more difficult question. Under the altered circumstances which have arisen, it is not desirable merely to restore the arrangements which were in force before the recent outbreak. On the other hand, you are evidently impressed with the difficulty of withdrawing entirely the existing jurisdiction

of the Punjab Government on the British side of the frontier. Schemes have at various times been put forward for creating a Frontier Commissionership to hold separate charge of the Trans-Indus districts as well as of our relations with the tribes beyond. They are open to the objection that they would have the effect of breaking up the established administrative units of British India, disturbing the revenue system already introduced, and entailing a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations. There is no part of India where the need of a strong administration, equipped with all the resources of Government and capable of resisting aggressions, is more likely to be felt than on the North-Western Frontier. It may also be inexpedient to deprive the Government of the Punjab, and thus also of the Government of India, of a valuable opportunity of training officers for frontier service, and of gaining a knowledge of the feelings and habits of tribes which are constantly sending settlers into British districts. It is open to question whether it is altogether advisable to place in the hands of a single Commissioner the whole executive power on both sides of this most important section of the Empire's external frontier, without the restraint which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibilities on a large scale imposes upon an authority charged with the government of a first-class province.

8. It is not, however, clear to me that the objections which you raise to the alternative courses indicated in paragraph 11 of your Despatch are entirely unsurmountable. I desire in particular to invite your further consideration to the second of these alternatives :—that, namely, in which it is assumed that the officer entrusted with political matters in the Khaibar Pass might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Commissioner himself being placed under the Government of India. This plan, you observe, “ would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer.” I confess that these objections appear to me to be rather formal than substantial. Your Excellency's Government already exercises direct control over the conduct of relations with Afghanistan, and in the management of the independent tribes upon the Punjab frontier there has always been a certain distribution of powers between the Local and Imperial Governments, with a more immediate supervision than is exercised over the internal administration of the Province. The Commissioner of Peshawar is, in fact, accustomed to this difference and its consequences, and in a large measure he even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India. The policy, therefore, of directing the affairs of the Khaibar Pass from the headquarters of the Government of India, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, is not altogether an untried policy ; and it must be borne in mind that the objects which you set forth in paragraph 6 of your letter are, all of them, matters for which your Excellency's Government is primarily responsible, subject to a reference to Her Majesty's Government. In view, then, of these several considerations, I am inclined to hold that it would be better that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and, through him, his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. In such a case it would, in my opinion, be necessary that the Commissioner should be appointed by the Government of India, with special reference to the responsibility in respect of affairs on the frontier which will be placed upon him under the scheme now proposed. In respect of affairs beyond the frontier, it would suffice that he should send copies of his reports for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

9. I am aware that any such alteration of system may require additional expenditure and some relaxation of the ordinary service regulations, and also that it will involve a change in the status of the office of Commissioner. There is one point, however, which I commend to your particular attention. It seems to me to be of the first importance that the officers who are entrusted with the

delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and should be able to devote much time and patience to these special objects. They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials ; nor will it, I think, be found convenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion. I shall not object to the exercise by your Government of a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to these considerations, which appear to me to be very material to the success of any system introduced for the removal of the disadvantages indicated above.

10. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India. I have indicated, in the two foregoing paragraphs, some of the considerations which should be borne in mind in dealing with this question. But the matter is too important for me to arrive at any final decision in respect to them without giving to them the fullest possible consideration. I shall receive with interest any further observations which your Excellency may desire to make on the suggestions of this Despatch.

11. The remaining portions of your Excellency's letter deal with two subjects which are closely connected with each other, namely, the exaction of the terms of submission already announced to the Afridis, and the grant to them of a sanad declaring their future relations. I accept the conclusion stated, in the 15th paragraph of your Excellency's letter, that no further steps should be taken to enforce the restitution of arms captured by the tribes during the campaign. In regard, however, to the abandonment of the demand for payment by the tribe of the value of property looted by them in the Khaibar, I consider that it would be well to make some further attempt to bring home to the Afridis their responsibility for the consequences of their flagrant breach of engagement in this respect. I desire to be informed whether a portion of the liability could not be realized from the property of Maliks Wali Mahomed and Khwas Khan in British India, and how far it might be possible by other means, such as the threat of a blockade, to enforce the pecuniary satisfaction which was formally demanded by your Excellency's Government from the tribe.

12. I presume that the allowances payable to the clans will not be renewed until you have settled the terms upon which your future relations will be conducted with them. The acceptance of these allowances might suffice as a formal adhesion on their part to the terms which may be arranged. I do not consider that it is necessary to stipulate for their "acceptance recorded upon" a sanad, or to base your reservation of the right to construct and work a railway upon their consent. The conduct of the Afridis has, as you observe, "constituted an absolute rupture of all relations." You have obtained actual and undisputed possession of the Pass, and it is sufficient to announce in clear terms to the tribes the rights which you reserve, and the relations which for the future you intend to maintain. Whether you should include in the announcement a formal declaration of your intention to make a railway and to assume jurisdiction within its limits, appears to me doubtful ; at least until your survey is complete and you are prepared to begin the work. At any rate, I presume that great care will be taken to avoid the use of any language which may limit your powers or give rise to misunderstanding in the future ; and I request that your Excellency will be so good as to send me a summary of the new settlement before you communicate it to the tribes for their guidance.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 7.

Extract from Military Despatch from the Secretary of State for India in Council to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 25th August-1898.

I have considered in Council your Excellency's Despatch, M 6636, of 23rd June, 1898, submitting your proposals for the military arrangements necessary for keeping open the road *viâ* the Malakand to Dir and Chitral.

Dealing first with the principles to be adopted generally for defences on the North-West Frontier, you propose that in future the strength of the more advanced garrisons shall be kept as low as may be practicable, being placed in strong works which cannot be captured by a tribal enemy so long as the garrisons have food, water, and ammunition; that outposts of regular troops shall be as few and strong as possible; that minor posts, and posts on the line of communications, shall generally be held by levies, when the duties to be performed are those devolving on a police force, or by irregular troops, which you would prefer to see organised as a militia; and that risings among the frontier tribes shall be met by moveable columns of sufficient strength, placed where they can readily support and assist the stationary garrisons. You consider that in event of serious attacks on the frontier being made or threatened, as in the case of the attacks by the Orakzais and Afridis on the Samana and other posts in August and September, 1897, the garrisons of the weaker posts shall either be reinforced or withdrawn according to a pre-arranged plan.

I approve of these general principles, which are in accordance with the views expressed in my despatch of the 28th January, 1898. I will merely add that in all cases the garrisons should be amply sufficient not only with regard to the perimeter of the works to be defended, but also to provide some relief for the troops in the contingency of continuous attacks for several nights running, such as occurred during the outbreak of last year.

No. 8.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Dated Simla, the 10th November 1898.

As soon as we received Your Lordship's despatch as marked in the margin, we referred to the Local Government the question of the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border. We have now received the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, but, for reasons stated by His Excellency the Viceroy in a Minute which we enclose, we have been unable to give to the Lieutenant-Governor's memorandum sufficient consideration to enable us to state our views on the question at issue.

2. In the meantime we have the honour to forward, for information, the correspondence alluded to and the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	ELGIN.
"	W. S. A. LOCKHART.
"	J. WESTLAND.
"	M. D. CHALMERS.
"	E. H. H. COLLEN.
"	A. C. TREVOR.
"	C. M. RIVAZ.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 19th September 1898

In my letter dated the 12th September, you were informed that a further communication would be made to you upon the question of the future position of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division and other matters dealt with in the despatch which that letter forwarded.

2. In the 7th and 8th paragraphs Lord George Hamilton discusses alternative ways in which it has been proposed to carry on relations with the tribes on the Punjab border, and his lordship states the decision at which Her Majesty's Government have arrived in these words—"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

3. Of the two plans, one is the creation of a Frontier Commissionership. Any discussion of this scheme could only be undertaken after careful consideration by the Government of India of the various objections indicated by the Secretary of State himself. The Governor-General in Council accordingly in this letter would primarily invite his Honour's attention to the alternative of making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India. The practicability of an arrangement of this nature must largely depend on local circumstances and conditions; and it cannot usefully be discussed without information which the Local Government alone can supply. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, desires to be favoured with the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated.

4. The conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have come may contemplate the extension of this system of controlling tribal relations to the whole Punjab frontier, but as all the remainder of the paragraph from which the passage above is quoted deals exclusively with the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates, it would, in the opinion of the Government of India, be convenient to consider this matter first from the point of view of the Peshawar Commissionership only, and not to provide for re-arrangement of the duties and position of the frontier officers of the Punjab Commission on other parts of the border, further than alterations proposed in the Peshawar Commissionership rendered a reference to others necessary.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Letter from the Hon. Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 23rd October 1898.

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 19th ultimo, in which it is intimated that the Governor-General in Council desires to be favoured with the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the

way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border can be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government as set

Punjab Government endorsements, dated the 29th September 1898, forwarding the papers to the Commissioners of the Peshawar and Derajat Divisions and to Mr. H. A. Anderson.

Letter from the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 7th October 1898.

Letter from Mr H A. Anderson, dated the 17th October, 1898

Note by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, dated the 19th October 1898.

forth in the despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 18, dated 5th August, 1898.

2. In compliance with these orders, I am now to submit copies of the documents noted on the margin, and to intimate that the opinions of Sir Richard Udny and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, who was consulted unofficially, will be forwarded on receipt.

Annex. I.

Government of India letter, dated the 19th September 1898. Endorsed by Punjab Government.

Copy forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for favour of his very early opinion on the measures discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, Secret, dated 5th August 1898, with special reference to the arrangement mentioned by the Government of India in this letter of making the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division directly subordinate to Government of India in regard to his political dealings with the trans-border tribes.

Copy, with copy of Secretary of State's despatch, dated 5th August 1898, forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, for favour of his H. A. Anderson, Esq. opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch from Secretary of State, secret, dated 5th August 1898.

Annex II.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 7th October 1898.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement dated the 29th ultimo, forwarding for opinion a copy of the Government of India, Foreign Department, letter noted in the margin, with its enclosure, on the subject of the future management of the Punjab frontier.

Dated 19th ultimo.

2. The matters discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, dated the 5th August 1898, relate primarily to the frontier management of the Peshawar Division and not to that of the Derajat Division. My excuse for submitting an opinion regarding another Division than the one in which I am just at present holding office is, that my connection with the Peshawar Division commenced 21 years ago, that in the course of that connection I have served in every district of the Division, in the Khaibar and in Kurram, and have occupied every post, from that of Junior Assistant Commissioner in the Division to that of Commissioner.

3. It may serve to explain the position as it at present stands, and help towards appreciating the probable effect of a change in the existing arrangements, if, even at the risk of unduly lengthening this letter, I proceed to give as brief an account as possible of the state of affairs that, with slight and unimportant local

modifications which do not affect the question, obtains along the whole line of the Punjab frontier, from Hazara to the Quetta Agency. It is realized that the populations on either side of the boundary line are as closely interwoven and intermingled, socially, commercially and in all the matters of every day life, as are the inhabitants of Nancy and Metz or for the matter of that the people of Berwickshire and Northumberland. Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap, or gulf difficult to cross, between British and independent territory; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes and disagreements, of business, arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not.

But the discharge of local or Imperial business on the border is not the sole duty that falls upon frontier officers by whom I mean Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners. The internal government of the frontier districts is a matter of great moment, and in some districts of exceptional difficulty. I say it is a matter of moment, because I believe that the prosperity and satisfaction of our trans-Indus subjects reacts strongly upon the men beyond the border, and that discontent within the frontier enhances the dislike of the clans to come under our control and influence and gives a handle to those who preach fanaticism and inculcate hostility. Of the six frontier districts in the Punjab—Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, the district of Peshawar is in some respects pre-eminently the most difficult to manage of all in the Province; the revenue and irrigation systems are exceedingly complex and intricate; crime is of the gravest nature; and the population is exceptionally headstrong, fanatical, excitable and intractable. Next in degree with similar general features, comes Bannu. And, excluding Kohat, I think that the five frontier districts, leaving border matters for the moment out of consideration, call for administrative qualifications and capacity above the average which is requisite for Cis-Indus districts. This is undoubtedly so in the cases of Peshawar, Bannu, Hazara; and I think of Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan also.

4. Turning now to the machinery which works the external and internal business of the frontier divisions and districts, it will be seen that the whole of the Punjab border tribes are already in the immediate and direct charge of officers who have large liberty of action and perfect leisure for personal intercourse with them, who can devote all their time and energy to the specific end of tribal management. To look after one-half of the border clans, special officers exist, appointed *ad hoc*. The tribes of Swat and the Utman Khel are in charge of the Political Agent, Dir and Swat; the Political Officer in the Khaibar attends to nearly the whole of the Afridi tribe, to the Mullagoris and some Mohmands; the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram deals with the Zamusht tribe, with several clans of the Orakzais and with the Chamkannis; the Political Officers of Northern and Southern Waziristan, between them administer the whole trans-frontier population from the Kohat to the Dera Ghazi Khan District. The fact is if we exclude the Biluch tribes of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier who are, as regards border management, in another category altogether from the Pathan tribes, two-thirds to three-fourths of the frontier is already in the hands of special officers who have no other functions, except perhaps the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, than those of tribal management. These officers, excluding the Political Agent on the Malakand who reports direct to the Government of India, are directly subordinate to the Commissioners of their respective Divisions. In matters affecting districts they

correspond with the Deputy Commissioners or with the Commandants of Border Military Police, as may be most convenient in each case. Where we have not crossed the boundary of British India, and consequently have not been obliged to create political charges that are independent of Deputy Commissioners, the maintenance of friendly relations with the border tribes, the exercise of such control over them is feasible and expedient, and the settlement of the business, which I have sketched above, arising out of the daily intercourse and transactions of the people within and without the frontier line, is entrusted to the Commandants of Border Military Police, under the general control and supervision of Deputy Commissioners. These Commandants, one of whom is appointed to each one of the six frontier districts, who are European or Native officers, as the case may be (generally European in the more important districts), have the fullest leisure and opportunity for cultivating relations with the clans and for managing the hill men. That is their *métier*. In the discharge of their duties they are served by, and make every use of, the large establishments of Border Military Police in each district whose work consists quite as much of intercourse with the tribes as of watch and ward on the border.

Important matters and questions which the Commandants cannot dispose of are referred to the Deputy Commissioners, under whose general orders, supervision and control are also the Border Military Police establishments; and similarly, whenever necessary by Deputy Commissioners and by the special Political Officers whom I have mentioned above, to Commissioners. And this is as it should be. I have explained how and why in the districts external cannot be dissociated from internal management, the people are much too closely connected for that; there must be one administrative head for both branches of management; in places where we have crossed the boundary and have undertaken the political or other administration of large trans-frontier tracts the circumstances are entirely different, and there we have officers co-ordinate with and not subordinate to Deputy Commissioners, but within a district there can only be one king in Brentford, viz., the Deputy Commissioner. In other ways also this system is right; it is essential that the officers who are in direct and immediate charge and control of tribes should enjoy the fullest and most unrestrained intercourse with them; but for senior officers it is in my opinion a mistake to see too much of the tribesmen. By the time an officer has reached the rank of Commissioner he is well known to, and has a thorough personal knowledge and acquaintance with, the jirgas and clansmen, acquired during the period when as Assistant Commissioner, or Political Officer, or in charge of the Border Military Police, and as Deputy Commissioner, he has had constant and daily dealings with them. To my mind, the present system ensures the requisite amount of touch between the senior officers and the clans, without sacrificing any of the respect and awe which the hillmen should entertain for relatively high office. On the other hand, the officers actually in charge of them have nothing else to do than to deal with them. I cannot help thinking that the feeling that officers are not now in touch with the clans as they were formerly is based on a misconception. The officers in charge of the tribesmen are very much more in touch with them than they were before or after the Mutiny. It will be remembered that in the early days of the Punjab there were neither special Political Officers nor Commandants of Border Military Police; the Deputy Commissioners had to do everything themselves, and I find as early as 1850 Reynell Taylor, in a note regarding the Derajat frontier which he wrote for the benefit of his successor, Nicholson, lamenting the loss of opportunities for mixing with the tribesmen, owing to increased work. Great as was the task accomplished by those men, they tolerated and perforce had to tolerate a condition of things, insecurity within the border and trouble upon it, at which we, of the present day, would be horrified. This defect in the earlier administration has been recognised and remedied by the appointment of special tribal officers in every district of the two frontier divisions and at five trans-frontier localities (Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi, and Wana); that is to say of eleven officers whose sole duty is frontier management.

5. Before considering the effect of the changes contemplated in the system of frontier management, I would venture to point out, first, that all and every matter, I think I am correct in saying, of Imperial interest on the border, however

ever small it may be, is instantly referred by the Punjab Government for the information and orders of the Government of India ; and that no measure or step whatever which is of general bearing or of any importance in border policy, no organic change of any kind, is undertaken by the Local Government without the previous sanction and concurrence of the Supreme Government. This has been so since 1882, if not from an earlier time. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the Punjab frontier is as already as much under the Government of India as if Commissioners reported on frontier matters direct to that Government. The elimination of the Punjab Government will, however, have a profound effect in other ways, which I will submit further on.

The other point to which I would invite attention is that, save in matters of the purest routine, the Commissioner of Peshawar can hardly be said to correspond direct with the Government of India. So far as I know the affairs of the Khaibar Pass have never been directed by the Government of India through the Commissioner omitting the Punjab Government. Since 1881, and I think practically for the past 20 years, the duties of the Commissioner in connection with the Government of India have consisted of reporting to that Government (generally by the same telegram in which the Commissioner reports to the Punjab Government) the occurrence of any serious border event ; and of transmitting to Kabul urgent communications intended for the Amir and telegraphed to Peshawar, and similarly of telegraphing to the Government of India the contents of urgent letters from the Amir. He also occasionally arranges for the transit of employes or goods belonging to the Amir. In fact, so purely ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the Deputy Commissioner performs them. His present position therefore in respect of serving two masters, if it can be so described, is utterly different from that which is contemplated for the future. I do not think he can be said ever to have been under two masters. In the early days of the Punjab, the medium for the execution of the Imperial policy in regard to Afghanistan was the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who naturally employed the Commissioner of Peshawar, *e.g.*, in the negotiations and correspondence which preceded the Afghan treaty of 1856, concluded by Sir J. Lawrence. Subsequently, the work of the Commissioner in connection with the Government of India was confined to translating and transmitting the Kabul correspondence and supplying news ; I remember just before the Afghan war that this work devolved upon Sir L. Cavagnari, then Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar ; and since then, the Commissioner's duty direct under the Supreme Government has been always purely ministerial it appears, and in no way administrative.

6. At first sight the proposed alterations in the system of frontier management seem to affect no appreciable change in the present arrangements ; there are the special tribal officers already at hand : the frontier is already practically under the Government of India, the elimination of the Punjab Government will accelerate the transit of orders and the receipt of reports, and the whole difference in the conduct of affairs apparently will be almost nominal. But if we go into the matter, it seems to me that there are very great difficulties in the way ; in practice if not in theory. These I will now submit :

7. It is not a question on which I can venture to offer an opinion, whether the Government of India ought or ought not to deprive itself of the weight, the experience, the knowledge, the long training, of the Punjab Government in matters concerning the border tribes. It is suggested that the Commissioner of Peshawar will send copies of his reports to the Local Government, and no doubt copies of letters from the Government of India to the Commissioner would similarly be communicated to the Local Government. But this is a very different thing from what obtains now ; from the beginning the Lieutenant-Governor has personal knowledge of a case, if it is of any importance he has probably discussed it with the local officers, he has gathered information on all points which are obscure or have been neglected, in short he is in a position to form a full and carefully-weighed judgment. Precluded from personal discussion with officers on the spot and from eliciting information, and confined to an opinion upon papers drawn up without the Lieutenant-Governor's intervention, it is inevitable that the views of the Local Government will not possibly

have the great intrinsic value that they now possess, and that the Lieutenant-Governor will drift farther and farther from touch with the border. Yet, seeing that local officers cannot avoid as a rule dealing with matters solely from a local point of view, that they are in the heat and dust of the battle so to speak, the opinion and judgment of a high officer of State who approaches the consideration of a question with a dispassionate mind and yet with local knowledge, who looks at it from a broad standpoint that embraces the whole frontier and yet is not wholly centred in the frontier, and who moreover has full leisure and opportunity for going into these matters, on the spot, must be of inestimable value to the Supreme Government. Moreover, it is unavoidable that the local officers will be deprived of the benefit of personal communications with their Government. To this benefit I think due weight is not always given, it is a factor of great importance in administration. It is of course practicable for a Commissioner to visit Simla or Calcutta, but of necessity the occasions for doing so must be far more rare, and the meetings will be of a different character from those that take place when the Lieutenant-Governor marches along the frontier, or officers go to Lahore. The element of personal supervision on the spot and of personal influence on part of the governing authority must disappear, unless the Commissioner is raised to, or almost to, the position of the Lieutenant-Governor. But even then the Commissioner's views will necessarily be narrower and more circumscribed than those of the Local Government, possibly also less prudent and circumspect.

8. If the Commissioner of Peshawar is appointed by the Government of India, it is almost impossible that there should not be difficulty arising from the then divergent interests of the Supreme and of the Local Government. The Government of India will then want the best frontier officer it can get ; on the other hand the Lieutenant-Governor must think of the internal administration of the frontier divisions of revenue, police, crime, &c., &c. ; it does not follow that a good Political Officer has good administrative abilities, or *vice versa* ; and it will not be easy for both Governments to unite upon the same choice. Moreover, the Commissioner is only one man, he can not work without his subordinate staff in each district, and the dual control will and must run through the whole administrative establishment. The Commissioner will emphatically serve two masters (which he does not do now) and where the head of the administration is under dual control, the body must necessarily follow. I do not see how under those circumstances, men being what they are, a break down can be escaped.

9. I have explained that there is a mass of daily business transacted in connection with the border management of districts, with the political charges and their administrations, with the border establishments, &c., this is all disposed of by the local officers under the orders of the Local Government. What that amounts to, a glance at the printed and manuscript Foreign Proceedings of the Punjab Government will show. The whole, or very nearly the whole of this, never reaches the Government of India. If the Punjab Government is dissociated from frontier management, it is plain that the Commissioner must be raised to the position and powers of a Local Government, on the analogy of the Agent Governor-General at Quetta, otherwise this burden of detail will devolve upon the Supreme Government, which would obviously be undesirable.

10. This brings me to the last difficulty. It is suggested that the tribal officers should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion, it is evidently anticipated that the rank and pay of the Commissioner may have to be raised (and if my conclusions in the preceding paragraph are correct, they will have to be raised very considerably), and concessions made to his subordinates. As a frontier officer myself, I should welcome anything that adds to the inducements and attractions of service on the frontier. Compared with what I remember 20 years ago, there is a reluctance to cross the Indus among the junior officers. The reasons are not far to seek. In former days rapid promotion compensated for the responsibilities, hardships, discomfort, unhealthiness, solitude and actual danger of frontier service, which conditions still remain ; but Mackeson, Ross, Edwardes, Reynell Taylor, James, Becher, Pollock, Macnab, Monro, were all substantive

Commissioners within 20 years of entering the Punjab Commission and often in advance of their contemporaries Cis-Indus. Of later years, however, promotion has gone in due course, and men weighing their future, naturally, prefer to remain where life is easier and where their chances of a Commissionership are equal, and some of them may moreover rise to the higher appointments from which frontier officers are in practice debarred; at any rate to which only two officers from the frontier have obtained in 50 years. But I am afraid nothing will reconcile officers to spending their whole service at Wana, in the Tochi, in several of the worst districts trans-Indus, or even in Kurram and on the Malakand, if that is what is meant by men not being subjected to removal. They are willing enough to spend some years under arduous and trying conditions, but I do not think any prospects we could hold out would tempt the stamp of man we want, to serve permanently in some of these frontier charges. In the interests of Government, it is not advisable to keep men too long in any particular post. The majority of the frontier stations are far too unhealthy for prolonged residence, save in cases of exceptional physique or adaptability to the climate. A change from time to time is healthy to all concerned.

With a minute service, such as the proposed class of officers will be, it is difficult to understand how it will be feasible to arrange for proper promotion. If the Commissioner of Peshawar in future has higher pay and rank than other Commissioners, say than the Financial Commissioner also, where is he to go to? Unless the Government of India are prepared to open high political appointments for him, he must remain where he is till he retires, since there is no further place for him in the Punjab and a transfer to another Division will operate as a penalty. It may so happen that an officer obtains the post at a comparatively early stage in his career; if so, his juniors will be hopelessly blocked. Or the man next to him may be a relatively young officer, in that case all below him must stagnate. Each in regulating promotion varies in proportion to the size of a service, and with the dozen or at the most two dozen officers who will compose this special frontier service, it is certain that very soon insuperable difficulties of promotion will arise. Additions to pay will not suffice, for men want variety of work after a time. Nor will it be possible to utilize them elsewhere, since after a man has spent 10 to 15 of the best years of his life on special work, he becomes an expert in that particular line, and experts are rarely fit for other duty than in their own sphere. Altogether, however desirable it is to attract and to retain the best type of officer for the difficult task of tribal management, on the principal that the best system of administration that can be devised is made or marred by its *personnel*, I fear the specialization of the frontier service will result in grave difficulties, unless indeed all frontier officers are included in the political service, but this is apparently not intended and would be going far beyond the scope of the present scheme which is to place officers of the Punjab Commission jointly under the Supreme and Punjab Government.

11. On the whole, I venture to conclude, that the scheme discussed in the Secretary of State's despatch virtually is already in existence, but without those obstacles to the successful working of the frontier administration which I apprehend from the modifications suggested. The frontier tribes are already under the Government of India and eleven special tribal officers are already at work everywhere. The recent frontier troubles were not, I submit, the consequence of the present arrangements. One might otherwise argue with equal justice that because they started in the Tochi and culminated on the Malakand and in the Khaibar, all of which are distinct political units under special officers, therefore it is a mistake to place officers in exclusive political charge of trans-frontier tribes, whereas the contrary is the case.

Annex III.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., Officiating Commissioner, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th October, 1898.

I have the honour to submit the opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8

of the despatch of the Secretary of State, Secret, dated August 5th, 1898, called for in your endorsement, dated September 29th, 1898. The proposal contained in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch is that the Commissioner, Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. The Government of India in forwarding the despatch ask for information as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme proposed by the Secretary of State.

2. I apprehend that practical suggestions for carrying the Secretary of State's proposal into effect are what is asked for in this reference. At the same time as the question is admittedly one of considerable practical difficulty, and as it is not easy to make suggestions for carrying the new scheme into effect without pointing out and considering the difficulties which are involved in the change in system, I consider myself justified in briefly indicating some of these difficulties. As a Punjab frontier officer who has spent his service under the old system, it is difficult to approach the question without prejudice, but I shall attempt to examine the question with impartiality.

3. The first point calling for remark in the Secretary of State's statement of the scheme contained in paragraph 8 of his despatch is the assumption that something similar to what is now proposed is already in existence, namely, that the Commissioner of Peshawar in a large measure serves two masters in times of peace. That the Commissioner of Peshawar discharges any administrative functions under the orders of the Government of India direct, is, I believe, not the fact. He is the servant exclusively of the Punjab Government, through whom he receives the orders of the Government of India. He is the medium no doubt through whom a certain amount of urgent communications between the Government of India and the Amir of Kabul passes, but in this connection he is a translator and conveyor of letters only. The system which it is now proposed to introduce is an entirely new one. It has not been tried before, and it is not correct to claim for it the prestige of a tried and proved success.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, as things now are, frequently visits and tours along the frontier. He is in close contact with frontier affairs and frontier officers. He is able to acquaint himself personally on the spot with what is passing on the frontier. At the same time he is by his experience, training and position as the head of the Punjab administration, able to form dispassionate judgments on difficult questions, and give invaluable advice on all questions of policy. There can be no doubt, I think, that one effect of the proposed change of system will be that the matured judgment and advice of the Lieutenant-Governor will not be so available on trans-frontier questions as it now is. This, I should think, will be a loss to the Government of India: it will certainly be a severe loss to the Commissioner of Peshawar.

5. A strong objection has been taken to the scheme under discussion on the ground that the Commissioner of Peshawar would be in the position of serving two masters, and the control of affairs on the British side of the border would be divorced from the control of affairs on the further side. No doubt it is difficult for one man to serve two masters of equal status and authority, and the difficulty would be enormously enhanced if these two masters followed opposite or divergent policies. In the present case, however, the two masters stand in the relation of supreme and subordinate, and the policy of the latter must subordinate itself to the policy of the former. The proposed arrangement would no doubt give rise to difficulties, but it does not appear to me to be impracticable. As regards the divorce of control mentioned above, it is no doubt true that the population in parts of the border is homogeneous within and without, relations between cis-border and trans-border tribes are intimate and the spheres of control must cross at points. It is practicable, however, in most matters to draw a fixed line between trans-border and cis-

border affairs and cases, and as one officer will have direct control of both, it is my opinion, though I state it with all deference, that the Commissioner of Peshawar being an officer of the Punjab Commission could, without serious difficulty, exercise his control over trans-border tribes under the direct orders of the Government of India, while at the same time administering cis-border tribes and districts under the direct orders of the Punjab Government.

6. It is suggested in connection with the new scheme that arrangements should be made, whereby officers who are entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes should have ample leisure for personal intercourse with them. This is no doubt most desirable, but there are now special Political Officers along the whole frontier who have the desired leisure for full and free intercourse with the tribes, and who are little encumbered with the regular work of district officials. So far as my experience goes, there is little left to be done now in this direction.

7. It is also suggested that the political staff which has to deal with trans-border tribes should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution. It has been the practice of the Punjab Government of recent years to keep its frontier staff on or across the frontier, to restrict the frontier Commissionerships to frontier officers, and to discourage transfers to non-frontier districts. Service, however, on and across the frontier is not generally popular for various reasons. It is difficult now to induce officers to serve for any length of time across the border. They will be still less willing to so serve if they experience stagnation in promotion which will surely follow the introduction of the proposal now suggested. I do not think that the Government could go much further in this direction than the Punjab Government have gone in the past.

8. I pass now to the consideration of the advantages of the new scheme. The Commissioner of Peshawar in the first place as the only intermediate authority between the tribesmen and the Supreme Government will under the scheme gain a greatly enhanced status in the eyes of the former, and this will increase his power and influence with them and will render them more amenable to his control. The Pathans have an intimate acquaintance with our administrative grades, and will fully understand the difference between an officer who is in direct communication with and who acts directly under the orders of the Government of India, and an officer of the Provincial Government. They will have more respect for the former in virtue of his superior authority and more independent position. This seems to me a very important consideration when weighing the merits and demerits of the new scheme.

9. There can be no doubt, I think, that the new system will save much correspondence, as the Commissioner of Peshawar will correspond direct with the Government of India. It will also reduce discussion in the disposal of questions which are not of first rate importance and accelerate the introduction of any changes which the Government of India may consider it desirable to introduce in prosecution of its present policy of extending our influence over the trans-border tribes. Moreover, it is obvious that under the proposed arrangement the Government of India will exercise a more direct control over the external relations of the trans-frontier tribes than it has hitherto exercised. On the Peshawar border these relations are intimately involved with our relations with the Amir of Kabul and other Chiefs; it is an argument in favour of the new scheme that it will bring all these relations more directly under one Imperial control.

10. It will also be an advantage, I think, for the Commissioner to be directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other departments such, for example, as the Military Department. It will strengthen his hands in dealing with matters, such as the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order. At present all such matters have to follow a very circuitous channel before anything is done, and it is desirable to shorten this channel.

11. It will be seen from the views expressed above that while the new scheme seems to me open to serious objections, it at the same time has certain

advantages. The Secretary of State points out that, in giving practical effect to the scheme, it will be necessary to make a change in the status of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It will be necessary, I consider, to considerably enhance the status of the Commissioner as regards trans-frontier affairs. He must be empowered to dispose of many matters which he has now to refer for orders to the Punjab Government. To enable him to have as wide a view as possible of what is passing across the frontier of the division, it will be advisable to place under his control the Chitral and Dir Agency and the relations with the tribes under that Agency. His status would be advantageously raised to something like that of the Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan as regards trans-frontier affairs. This arrangement need not, I think, interfere with his status as Commissioner under the Punjab Government as regards the districts and tribes of the Peshawar Division which may remain as it is. The position of the Commissioner of Peshawar will thus become one of great responsibility, and much additional work will be thrown on his shoulders. A considerable increase in his salary must accompany the enhancement of his status, and no doubt he will require the assistance of a Personal Assistant to assist him in the disposal of much of his routine work.

Annex IV.

Note by Sir Mackworth Young, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

I am asked for my opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 5th August, 1898, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme therein indicated. The scheme is thus described in the despatch: "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." And in directing my attention to this scheme, the Government of India further define it to consist in "making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India."

2. The objection to such an arrangement put forward by the Government of India, viz., that it "would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer," is held to be formal rather than substantial, and it is argued that the Commissioner of Peshawar even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India.

3. The main ground of dissatisfaction with the present system appears from the passages above quoted to be that the Punjab Government is interposed between the authority of the Government of India and that of the Political Officers on the Punjab frontier. Further grounds for this dissatisfaction appear to be based upon the opinion that the officers entrusted with the delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes have not sufficient liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and cannot devote much time and patience to these special objects; and that they can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials, and that it is inconvenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion.

4. It is above all things necessary in a question involving such important issues that the facts should be correctly understood, and before going any

further I find it necessary to state, with the utmost deference, that the passages above quoted seem to me to indicate several misconceptions as to the facts. I may draw attention, with reference to this subject, to the opinions stated in an article of "The Times" of 23rd August last, for which high authority was claimed, but which have been shown to be based upon similar misconceptions. The most important of these opinions were traversed in an excellent letter signed "Expertus" which appeared in a later issue about 13th September. I regret that, owing to the necessity for replying at an early date to the reference from the Government of India, it has been impossible for me to obtain in time the opinions of several officers of extended frontier experience, but I have received an able letter from Mr. Merk, C.S.I., well known to the Government of India as a distinguished frontier officer who, though at present officiating as Commissioner of the Derajat Division, has been for 21 years almost continuously employed in the Peshawar Division, and who is intimately acquainted with the administration of that frontier and with the races, customs, languages and locations of its various inhabitants. I invite a careful perusal of his excellent paper, which also brings out several of the misconceptions to which I have alluded.

5. I shall now, in order to be as brief as possible, make definite statements relating to the matters on which, as it seems to me, misconception exists—

First.—*The position which the Commissioner of Peshawar occupies or has from time to time occupied bears no resemblance to that which he would occupy under the present proposal.* It is true that the Government of India communicate direct with the Commissioner of Peshawar in regard to matters relating to the Amir. I draw attention, however, to Mr. Merk's remark that "so purely ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the Deputy Commissioner performs them." To this I may add that, except in regard to the collection and formulating of information regarding the affairs of Afghanistan—in fact, compiling his weekly diary—the duty performed by the Commissioner in this respect consists mainly of translating and forwarding letters between the Government of India and the Amir. But the most noteworthy fact in connection with this subject is that these duties have very little connection with the administration of the border, and do not involve the employment of the services of any other officer under the orders of the Punjab Government. The orders communicated direct to the Commissioner of Peshawar with reference to the Amir do not, as a matter of fact, relate to any questions with which the Punjab Government and the officers serving under it are directly concerned, and no possibility of conflict can arise so long as the Commissioner corresponds with the Government of India direct only on such matters. I shall show later on how different would be the effect of placing the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates in direct relation with the Government of India in respect of border management. For the present it is sufficient to state that there is no analogy between the two cases, and that the employment of the Commissioner of Peshawar in the manner above described affords no precedent for the success of the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes through officers under the orders of the Punjab Government without the intervention of that Government, unless it can be shown that the management of the trans-frontier tribes has no connection with the management of the British border. I deal with this question further on—(paragraphs 10–11).

6. Second.—*It is not the fact that on various occasions of frontier disturbances the Commissioner of Peshawar has corresponded direct with the Government of India.* I cannot find any instance of this. The Commissioner of Peshawar, as will be explained hereafter (paragraph 14), has to submit certain information on urgent matters direct to the Government of India; but I cannot discover that he has ever corresponded direct with the Government of India, otherwise than as provided in the orders on that subject.

7. Third.—*Speaking generally, it is a fact that the frontier officers who are entrusted with the duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and are able to devote much time and patience to these*

special objects. It is notorious that the two frontier Commissionerships of Peshawar and the Derajat are far the lightest worked in the province. In the reorganisation scheme of 1884, when the number of cis-Indus Commissionerships was reduced, and the number of districts included in them increased, the Peshawar Commissionership, notwithstanding that the Commissioner was relieved of sessions work, was not enlarged, and only one district was added to the Derajat charge. The number of districts in each Commissionership is now as follows :—

Delhi	7 districts.
Jullundur	5 "
Lahore	6 "
Rawalpindi	6 "
Peshawar	3 "
Derajat	4 "

Since 1884 the following outlying political charges have been added ; Kurram in 1892 to Peshawar, and Tochi and Wano in 1895 to the Derajat, but this does not seriously affect the propositions that the two frontier Commissioners have ample leisure for political work. Their communications on the questions which arise in connection with border politics have always been full and well considered. From long experience of the subject, I maintain that no branch of work entrusted to Commissioners is more efficiently performed. Whenever their personal presence or supervision has been required for interviewing jirgas on special occasions or for watching the development of trans-frontier events, their services have been freely available. There is absolutely no ground for the idea that they have insufficient leisure for patient dealing with trans-frontier tribes, though it is by no means always desirable that an officer of the standing of a Commissioner should personally interview the jirgas. I am not sure that I understand the desire of the Secretary of State that Political Officers on the frontier should have large liberty of action, but I apprehend that what is meant is that they should not be hampered by other duties, not that their power of independent action should be increased. The latter would be quite inconsistent with the centralisation of authority implied in the present proposals. In the earlier days of Punjab Administration, Frontier Commissioners undoubtedly enjoyed large liberty of action, but trans-border politics having become matters of Imperial concern, this liberty has of necessity been curtailed.

8. Passing from Commissioners to Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, there is perhaps something, though still very little, to be said for the position that local Political Officers have not always sufficient leisure for tribal management. As pointed out by Mr. Merk, two-thirds to three-fourths of the Punjab frontier is in the hands of officers who have nothing else to do. The Political Agent, Dir and Swat, already under the direct orders of the Government of India, is of course an instance of the system desired by the Secretary of State, and the remarks regarding want of leisure, &c., do not apply to him. But apart from him the Political Officer in the Khyber, and the Political Officers in the Tochi and at Wano are solely engaged in tribal management, while the administrative duties of the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram are not so onerous as to hamper him in his discharge of the same duty. The creation of these appointments, all within the last 18 years and most of them within the last eight years, has had the effect of reducing the responsibilities for tribal management attaching to the Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The power to appoint an additional District Magistrate for districts to which the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1887, applies, conferred upon the Local Government by Section 5 of that Regulation, was designed to lighten the work of the Deputy Commissioner and set him more free for political duties. With the same object the strength of the staff in frontier districts has from time to time been carefully revised by the Local Government, and special officers have been appointed to the command of the Border Military Police in several frontier districts. The Deputy Commissioners of Hazara and Kohat have ample leisure for their political duties. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar has an onerous charge, but he has few political duties left. Buner, the Khudu Khel and

Gaduns are managed by the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the subdivision of Yusufzai; Swat and the Utman Khel, except the Laman Utman Khel, a small section, are in the hands of the Political Agent for Dir and Swat; the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber corresponds direct with the Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner is not concerned with its political management; and the tribes of the Kohat Pass are managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. The only tribes which remain under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar are the Mohmands on the north-west, and on the south-west the Aka Khel Afridis and the Hassan Khel section and two other small sub-sections of the Adam Khel. As regards the Mohmands proposals have been made for transferring them to the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and probably this should be done when the Khyber settlement is completed. During recent years, while the settlement with the Mohmands was in progress, the work was largely done by the Commissioner in person. The charge of the Peshawar district is undoubtedly quite enough for one officer, and the attention of the Punjab Government has long been directed to the necessity for relieving him of political work or of strengthening his hands in the district administration, so as to permit of his giving more time to such work. The measures taken have been to a great extent effectual. What remains to be done is only a matter of time and thought. It is possible that, if the political management of the Mohmands had last year been in the hands of an officer with more leisure than the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, he might have succeeded in persuading the Commissioner of Peshawar that a raid on Shabkadar was imminent, though I am not inclined to attribute our unpreparedness to his being overworked. Be this as it may, I am prepared to admit that the political management of the Mohmands is a matter which requires further consideration in connection with the settlement of the Khyber Pass, and any redistribution of political functions which may result from the present correspondence. And if the Secretary of State or the Government of India consider that the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar or any other frontier Deputy Commissioner requires further relief to enable him to bestow more time upon the management of the tribes on his border, I shall be quite prepared to make proposals with this object, but such proposals would necessarily involve considerable extra expense, which the Provincial Government would not be in a position to meet without assistance.

9. I do not enter into details regarding the districts of the Derajat, as this is not desired by the Government of India, but in regard to the Peshawar Commissionership I am decidedly of opinion that, with the exception perhaps of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar whose onerous duties have long engaged and will continue to engage the attention of the Punjab Government, there is no foundation for the conclusion that the local Political Officers have not ample leisure for tribal management.

10. The fourth statement that I make is this—

The duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes is inseparable from that of managing the tracts within the British border. The grounds for this statement are so well put by Mr. Merk that I reproduce his words:—

“Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap or gulf, difficult to cross, between British and independent territory; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes, and disagreements of business arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not.”

11. There are tracts in regard to which separate political charges have been framed to which the above remarks apply only to a minor degree. But

they apply with special force to the whole of the Peshawar and Kohat border from the Malakand to the Kurram, including the Khyber Pass and the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. The political management of the last-named tribes is closely bound up with the management of the British border. And, although there are tracts in regard to which the position is less clear, this is more or less true all along the border. And Mr. Merk touches the point when he says that the business which arises in consequence of the close connection between the people on either side of the border is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests are arrayed against each other. There are numerous references in regard to such matters in which a decision of the Local Government may be called for, but a pronouncement of the Foreign Department of the Government of India would be unnecessary and out of place. In short, a great deal of our management of the trans-border tribes is carried on in the daily course of border administration, and it is not expedient that it should be magnified into a Foreign Office question. On the other hand, the separation of the trans-frontier from the cis-frontier aspect of many questions now disposed of by our frontier officers is impossible. This was fully realised by Lord Lytton when proposing the

* Minute of 22nd April 1877

creation of a Frontier Chief Commissionership, in the words :* "Mixed up as are the tribes within and beyond our border, he (the Chief Commissioner) must evidently have charge of the immediate frontier districts as well as of all our trans-frontier relations. I confidently affirm the inseparable connection of portions of British territory with trans-frontier tracts and the necessity of entrusting the control of both to the same local officer."

12. My fifth statement is—

That frontier officers in the Punjab have been much less liable to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion than other officers of the Punjab Commission; and that a special service constituted with the object of furnishing officers solely for controlling the trans-frontier tribes would be a failure I do not suppose that the above proposition will be seriously challenged. The writer of the article in "The Times" of 23rd August, in support of his assertions that frontier officers are now frequently changed, that they are no longer specially selected for frontier work, and that the ablest of them look upon such work as a stepping-stone to pleasanter posts, alluded to the fact that between 1st April 1894 and August 1898 there had been 13 changes in the office of Commissioner of Peshawar. But as he was obliged to record, though there were 13 changes, there were only four officers, and the changes were in no single case brought about by the removal of any of those to pleasanter posts, while each of the four officers was a thoroughly experienced frontier officer. It is sufficient to mention their names, and record their total service and the length of their frontier service :—

	Years	
	Total Service.	Service on Frontier.
Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I	29	21½
Mr. Cunningham, C.I.E	26	15½
Mr. Merk, C.S.I.	23	15½
Mr. King, C.S.I	20	9½

These officers, all of them bearing the marks of approved service in the decorations they have earned, are undoubtedly the best men that the Punjab had to give for the office of Commissioner of Peshawar. That their names should have been cited by "The Times" writer in support of his extraordinary

assertions seems to me singularly unfortunate for his argument. I should not have gone out of my way to deal with this instance, but that I am at a loss to find any ground for what is implied in the suggestion contained in the Secretary of State's despatch that it will not be found convenient that the officers entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should be "subject to the removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion." The officers employed on the Punjab frontier are very rarely moved to charges in the interior of the province when they have once established their reputation as frontier officers. I think I may say that the only circumstances under which such transfers have been made are those which relate to the health of the officer or some other disqualification for frontier service. On the other hand, it will, I think, be readily admitted that a small service is difficult to man properly; that the pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists, and that a small corps of Punjab frontier politicals would not be in any respect a success. I am not arguing here against a Frontier Commission large enough to deal with a considerable tract of British territory added to the control of trans-frontier tribes, nor against a Department of the Foreign Office with a political contingent forming part of the political service; but a limited service of a dozen or even two dozen politicals recruited *ad hoc* to be retained *ad hoc*, and to be precluded from transfer otherwise than on promotion to higher spheres under the orders of the Government of India, would be a thorn in the side of the latter, and is doomed to failure. And it may, I think, be confidently asserted that the best field for selecting Punjab frontier officers is the Punjab Commission, and that, while as hitherto it is desirable that transfers from the interior of the province to the frontier and *vice versa* in the higher grades of the Commission should be sparingly made, it would be undesirable to separate the two services in such a manner as to preclude transfers, where they are manifestly for the advantage of the public service.

13. I have thus endeavoured to clear away what I cannot but regard as misconceptions in respect of the existing state of affairs, and I now crave permission to say a few words regarding the Secretary of State's proposals. The first and most prominent feature of those proposals is the elimination of the Punjab Government in the chain of correspondence in regard to trans-frontier management between the Punjab local frontier officers and the Government of India. It is proposed to put the subordinates of the Local Government into direct communication with the Supreme Government on this subject. The advantage of this change is not stated, but I think I may assume that the main object is to get rid of what is rightly or wrongly held to be the Punjab view in regard to our trans-frontier management. What that view is has been well described by "Expertus" in the letter above quoted, and I cannot do better than give an extract from his remarks:—

"I think I may claim for the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers that they have always been most loyal to the Government of India and have done their utmost to carry out the policy of that Government as if it was their own. What has from time to time occurred has been simply this—that when the Government of India has directed some forward move, the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers being in immediate contact with the tribes have felt more impressed than the Government of India seemed to be with the difficulties and risks, with the amount of force required at starting and to be permanently locked up, and so forth, and have represented this to the Government of India."

I need not say much on the value of the opinion of an officer in the position of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on questions relating to the control of the trans-frontier tribes. It is for the Government of India to estimate the value of such an opinion. As remarked by "Expertus," "the exclusion of the Punjab Government from all share in the frontier administration would undoubtedly simplify matters in two ways, viz., by abridging discussion and removing opposition to forward movements, and by doing away with the supervision and control which the Lieutenant-Governor, who spends a good deal of time on the frontier and is in close contact with frontier affairs, now exercises. Whether the results of this simplification would be good or bad, I leave others to say." Although these remarks were directed to the

proposal to separate the frontier entirely from the Punjab Government, they deserve, I submit, respectful consideration with reference to the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes without the advice of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

14. The second objection to the proposal is that as above stated the management of trans-frontier tribes is so much mixed up with that of the adjoining British frontier, that, their complete separation is impossible. Thus many matters will be reported direct to the Government of India which affect the responsibility of the Local Government, but in regard to which the Local Government will have no voice. This is to my mind absolutely fatal to the scheme. I do not think the inconvenience and impossibility of the arrangement would be fully apparent for some time, as the frontier officers of experience would retain for some time their old ideas of subordination to the Local Government, but a few years would, I feel sure, be sufficient to reveal its impossibility. The Lieutenant-Governor will find his authority over the frontier districts impaired and will be of little assistance to the Government of India in the task which will have devolved upon it. In support of this view I appeal to opinions held on previous occasions with reference to the same

* Foreign Department, dated 20th July 1870.

class to the Government of India direct

† Punjab Government, dated the 22nd August 1870, paragraph 6

subject. The orders* of the Government of India directing the submission by all officers in the Punjab exercising political functions of information of a certain nature were regarded by the late Sir Henry Durand as involving a radical change in the position and powers of the Local Government. He represented† that :

“ a very little consideration of practical working must convince any one acquainted with the system of the administration hitherto in force that subordinate officers, when they shall cease to be confined to direct communication with the Local Government, and shall acquire the practice of direct correspondence, both written and telegraphic, with the Government of India, will *ipso facto* be invested with a power of initiating through the superior Government their own views. These may or may not be consonant with those of the Local Government, and when opposed to them there will be no corrective. The superior Government, acting on first impressions, may find itself committed to the issue of instructions from which it may be difficult to recede, however little in harmony with the deliberate views of the Local Government, which can only reach subsequently. The latter would thus be fettered by the action of its nominal subordinates and be placed in a very false position.

“ Besides the above element of weakness, there is the fact which obtrudes itself upon general observation, and is already the subject of comment, namely that there is no announcement that similar orders have been promulgated to the Bombay Government with regard to its officers on the Sind or Rajputana frontiers; nor to the Bengal Government with regard to its Assam and Arracan frontiers; nor to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma with regard to the Burmese, Karan, Shan, and Siamese frontiers. The contrast is held to indicate a change of policy reflecting distrust of, and want of confidence in, the Punjab Government and its officers.”

It will be observed that Sir Henry Durand's apprehensions were based merely upon the direct transmission of information. A division of responsibility in the actual management of frontier affairs was not contemplated by him as a possibility.

Punjab Government, dated the 9th November 1880.

Government of India, dated the 3rd February 1881.

An instance of the effect of the orders regarding direct reports to the Government of India will be found in the correspondence marginally noted. Sir Robert Egerton represented that direct communications not of the urgent character

mentioned in the correspondence of 1870 between the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Government of India had resulted in different orders being communicated to the former by the latter, and by the Punjab Government. He represented that such procedure was anomalous and might lead to confusion; that he knew “ of no reason why the Commissioner of Peshawar should hold a position in regard to the Government of India independent of the Punjab Government.” The Government of India entirely shared Sir R. Egerton's views “ that the correspondence in question should be strictly limited to matters regarding which it is important that the Government of India should receive the earliest information,” though it held the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar to be

exceptional, as he was the sole agent of the Government of India for very important and usually urgent correspondence across the frontier, and that as regarded that correspondence it was unavoidable that he should continue to communicate direct with the Foreign Office. The correspondence for which the Commissioner of Peshawar was sole agent to the Government of India was, of course, correspondence with Kabul. It may, I think, be concluded that the Government of India on this occasion realised the justice of Sir Robert Egerton's contention that divided responsibility in the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar would result in confusion.

In 1892 there was some talk of separating off the political work of the Punjab Frontier Districts and placing it in the hands of officers who would be directly under the Government of India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick denounced the proposal in very strong terms, and pronounced it simply out of the question. I appeal to universal experience in support of the view that the authority of the Punjab Government would be dangerously weakened by such a measure. Punjab frontier officers have larger opportunities of attracting the notice of the Government of India under existing conditions than other officers—these opportunities would be greatly increased by a definite portion of their work being specially controlled by the Government of India to the exclusion of the Local Government, and, human nature being what it is, the tendency to play to the superior gallery would be irresistible.

15. The third objection to the proposal is that it will throw upon the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India a mass of work with which the Local Government is competent to deal, and the submission of which to the Government of India is quite unnecessary. How would the distribution of work be made in practice? I imagine by some such order as this, "All matters affecting our relations with trans-frontier tribes which Commissioners are unable to dispose of will be referred by them to the Government of India direct and not to the Local Government." I cannot suggest any other distribution. It would not do to say that all matters of importance should be so referred. The Local Government might pass an order in the initial stage which would hamper the Government of India later on. Nor would it do to say that all matters affecting the peace of the border should be so referred. Many matters occur in frontier administration which are unimportant at first, but assume importance as they develop. There are numberless possibilities of the peace of the border being affected by matters which are apparently totally unconnected with trans-border tribes, and which at first sight ought not to produce such an effect. Half the causes of trans-frontier unrest might be embodied in correspondence with the Local Government, and that part of the correspondence which was sent direct to the Government of India might be quite incomplete without it. I am really quite unable to make any suggestion for defining what matters should be referred to the Government of India which would not be open to one of two serious objections, viz., that it would either swamp the Foreign Office or afford insufficient material for forming an opinion. The only possible method is that the reporting officer should be responsible for communicating intelligence of importance in sufficient detail to enable the Government of India to form an opinion. This is what the Local Government now does, and I do not understand what advantage is gained by placing the responsibility on a subordinate of the Local Government.

16. I have not been able to do what I was asked to do, viz., to give an opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, or to discuss the changes of system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated. I do not think those relations can be regulated in the precise manner indicated, without introducing chaos into the frontier administration. If what is desired is to eliminate the Punjab Government from trans-frontier control, this can only be done by removing the frontier districts, or such portions of them as are closely connected with trans-frontier tribes, from the control of the Punjab Government, and forming this tract into a separate administration under the direct orders of the Government of India. I am not called upon to say anything on this subject, as it has been

negated after the fullest consideration both by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government, and I entirely concur in the reasons which have led to this conclusion. At the same time, it would, in my opinion, be far better to encounter all the objections urged to that scheme than to disintegrate the existing administration and introduce confusion where there is, at all events, order and discipline.

17. As I am concluding these remarks, I have received a telegram from Sir R. Udney and a letter from Mr. Anderson, both of which give a partial assent to the Secretary of State's scheme. Sir R. Udney approves of the elimination of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government, but adds that there are minor points which have required a good deal of consideration. His opinion will be forwarded when received. Mr. Anderson, while expressing his opinion that the new scheme is open to serious objections, thinks that it has certain advantages. I need not notice his objections, as they have been fully stated in this note. The advantages he considers to be—

- (1) That the status of the Commissioner will be enhanced in the eyes of the tribesmen, and they will thus be more amenable to his control.
- (2) That correspondence will be saved and discussion reduced.
- (3) That the relations of the trans-frontier tribes with the Amir of Kabul will thereby be brought under more direct control of the Government of India.
- (4) It will be an advantage for Commissioners to be more directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other Departments, such, for example, as the Military Department.

I do not think the tribes will know the difference between a Commissioner who gets his orders direct from the Government of India or intermediately from the Local Government. But no doubt the status of the Commissioner would have to be raised if he were entrusted with more authority than at present. The question is whether the Government of India is prepared largely to raise his status and make him practically a Chief Commissioner. If so, I am afraid he will be difficult to control in regard to his other duties. The Financial Commissioner who is his superior officer in revenue matters holds a position only a little higher than that of Commissioner as it is. I have dealt with (2) above. I think (3) is already fully provided for. Every item of news regarding Kabul is already sent to the Government of India, and the Local Government never attempts to decide questions affecting the Amir. No. 4 shows, I think, what complications are likely to arise. It is not contemplated, I presume, to allow Commissioners to correspond with the Military Department of the Government of India direct in regard to "the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order."

18. In conclusion, I can only state my conviction that, unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner or other officer in direct subordination to the Government of India, the existing machinery cannot with any advantage be altered. The Local Government at present works in loyal subordination to the Government of India, and while, on the one hand, submitting for its orders, together with the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, all matters of importance with regard to trans-frontier matters as well as matters arising in other Departments, stems the tide of correspondence by assuming responsibility in regard to matters within its competence. Though the views of the Local Government have not always been in accord with those of the Government of India, I confidently assert that it has never failed in loyal co-operation with the declared policy of the latter. I am not aware that the Government of India has made any complaint in regard to this matter, and I appeal to the present correspondence to show that, as regards the former management of trade affairs in the pass, the Government of India considered the Punjab management satisfactory and desired that it should be reproduced. If the Punjab Government has in the past practically acted as

a drag on the suggestions or proposals of the forward school, of frontier politicians, the most strenuous advocates of which will be found in military ranks, I venture to suggest that the elimination of its counsels will not strengthen the position of the Government of India with whom rests the responsibility of deciding between conflicting views according to the best interests of the Empire, and to whom the views of the head of the local administration can hardly be a matter of indifference. But the view which under a strong sense of duty I feel bound to urge in connection with the present case, is that to place the Commissioner of Peshawar and District Officers in the Peshawar Division in respect of trans-frontier matters under the direct control of the Government of India would indicate a want of confidence in the Government of the Punjab and would introduce confusion into its administration.

19th October 1898.

(Sd.) W. M. YOUNG.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esquire, Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 7th November 1898.

IN continuation of my letter, dated 23rd October (Confidential), I am

Letter, dated 20th October 1898, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

Letter, dated 21st October 1898, from Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., on Special Duty.

remarks.

desired to submit the letters noted on the margin, which contain the opinions of Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., on the question of the future administration of the Punjab Frontier, and to convey the following

2. As regards the first four paragraphs of Sir R. Udny's letter the Lieutenant-Governor has nothing to add. He proposes a distribution of the work, but does not deal with any of the objections to a dual system of frontier management which Sir Mackworth Young has endeavoured to explain in his memorandum dated 19th October 1898.

The remainder of his letter is a plea for—

- (a) A specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border.
- (b) A largely increased staff of European assistants in the same districts.

3. Sir R. Udny's scheme for (a) is practically what has for some years been accepted by the Punjab Government, with the exception (1) that the inducements for frontier service in the shape of extra emoluments consist in the extra allowances for political charges, for the outposts of Mardan, Thal, Tank, Rajanpur, Mianwali, and Bhakkar, and the Pashtu and Bluchi allowances, and it has not been found necessary to ask for salaries graduated with reference to contemporaries Cis-Indus; (2) that the demarcation between service Trans-Indus and Cis-Indus has not been quite so final or distinct as Sir R. Udny wishes, for the reason that officers sometimes develop special aptitude or the reverse for frontier service after a longer period than three years, and, as in the case of the judicial and executive separation, it is better for the service that there should not be such finality at an early stage of an officer's career. Sir R. Udny's list of officers serving on the frontier does not include the names of several officers who have served on the frontier, and who might serve there again. Their removal has been due to various causes. Sometimes to health, sometimes to

the desirability of giving the officer a training in the more regulated procedure of a Cis-Indus district, sometimes to the fact that an officer has been proved not sufficiently equipped for special work on the frontier, sometimes to the requirements of the Government of India, as in the case of Major Deane, C.S.I., and Major MacMahon, C.I.E., C.S.I., but rarely or never has the transfer been made in the interest of the Cis-Indus as contrasted with the Trans-Indus administration. Speaking generally, however, His Honour entirely concurs in the principles which Sir R. Udny advocates for regulating service on the frontier.

4. But the great difficulty with which we have had to contend of late, a difficulty which lies beneath all Sir R. Udny's strictures and the removal of which must be a work of time, is the paucity of officers of a certain standing in the Commission. The circumstances which led to this depletion have frequently been brought to the notice of the Government of India, and I am now to enclose for facility of reference a copy of paragraphs 13 to 15 of Mr. Tupper's letter, dated 1st July 1889, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, which will explain the state of affairs then existing. Up to 1878 the recruitment was fairly regular, but thereafter it fell off seriously. No less than seven junior civilians, who had been recruited under the new system by which candidates of the ages of 17 to 19 were admitted to the open competition, died also shortly after their arrival in the country, and some of the Statutory civilians did not prove a success and left the service. The result is that between 1880 and 1884, a period five years, there are now only nine officers in the Commission instead of about 31 which under the normal scheme of recruitment we should have obtained. A proposal to mend matters by drafting in competent men from other branches of the Government service was not accepted by the Government of India, and in consequence for the past ten years the greatest difficulty has been experienced in manning the posts in the Province. The frontier has suffered least as it has always been recognised to be a matter of vital necessity to keep competent officers there, but elsewhere all sorts of expedients have been resorted to, and the districts have been filled temporarily by Provincial Service men and officers of two and three years' service. Since 1893, however, the number of recruits has risen to, 11 and 13 a year, and many of these are officers of great promise, so that in the near future it will be a simpler matter to adequately fill all the posts in the Province.

5. I am to point out that Sir R. Udny's second proposition in favour of a largely increased European staff on the frontier is nothing new. The question engrossed the attention of the Government of India and this Government in 1891, and the measures then taken are detailed in the despatch, dated 23rd June 1891, from the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, to the Secretary of State. The following extract, paragraph 3, of Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated 17th November 1891, to the Frontier Commissioners clearly explains the aims which the Punjab Government then held in view. These are almost identical with those of Sir R. Udny, and Sir Mackworth Young considers that they still embody all that is really necessary, and that when they are attained a fully efficient frontier staff will always be available :—

3. The strength of the staff of the districts of your division will be in future as shown in the accompanying statements, in which also the *personnel* of the staff for the present cold weather is entered. For the reasons given in the notes annexed to my letter No. 129 of 20th March last, Sir James Lyall considers that this staff will be found sufficient in all cases, and will enable Deputy commissioners to devote a proper share of their time to political and frontier work without detriment to their control and share of the general work of district administration. Deputy Commissioners will doubtless bear in mind that it is a necessary part of the revised scheme of frontier administration that they should trust all their subordinates specially appointed for this work with a good deal of responsibility and power. Unless this is done the relief which it is desired to give to District Officers themselves will be less than it should be. In particular the officers in charge of the Border Military Police should, if proper use is made of their services, be able to relieve the Deputy Commissioners of much unimportant work connected with border offences and tribal administration, and proposals should be submitted for investing them with the necessary magisterial powers for this work. A European assistant will be attached to the headquarters of all frontier districts whose staff does not include one at present so soon as the recruitment of the Commission will permit of this, and it is to be hoped that this will be arranged for by the commencement of next hot weather at latest. Similarly, all outposts will as far as possible be held by a European officer in future.

6. That these results have not been fully realized up to the present is entirely due to the general depletion of the Commission explained above. When the Commission is properly manned it will be a comparatively easy thing to provide suitable officers for frontier service, and to increase the staff of European Assistants in Frontier districts. Meanwhile the Punjab Government has done its best to provide substitutes from other Branches of the service, and the names of Messrs. Hastings, Donald, Waterfield, are not unknown to the Government of India as efficient Frontier officers. A scheme for securing the full training of Frontier Political Officers in the management of the Border tribes by placing junior officers of the Commission in command of the Border Military Police in Frontier districts is under consideration, and its submission to the Government of India is only delayed pending the development of the scheme for a Frontier Militia which has been referred to the Punjab Government for consideration. If so desired, a proposal to throw open the command of the Border Military Police to Assistant Commissioners as well as to the Assistant District Superintendents of Police and Tahsildars, noted in the Government of India despatch above quoted, can be submitted for sanction at once.

7. In conclusion, I am to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor has no remarks to offer on Mr. Cunningham's letter, as all the subjects therein discussed have been already dealt with in this letter or in Sir Mackworth Young's note dated 19th October 1898.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) L. W. DANE,

Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Annex A.

Letter from Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Nuthiagali, 20th October 1898.

IN reply to your endorsement of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to say that I am strongly in favour of the proposal "to make the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate in such matters to the Government of India"; and after much consideration I am unable to see why the carrying out of this proposal should entail any change in the existing system.

2. As far as *purely external* relations with the trans-frontier tribes are concerned, I think it would be a distinct advantage for the Commissioner to be in direct communication with the Government of India, and it seems to me that, on the border of the Peshawar Division at any rate, the elimination of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government would give rise to no practical inconvenience, provided that copies of the correspondence were furnished simultaneously to the Lieutenant-Governor in the few cases which might appear to affect the interests of our cis-border subjects, *e.g.*, where residents of British India had been maltreated in independent territory. The sending of such copies might safely be left to the discretion of the Commissioner, and the Government of India would doubtless note the omission to send them in any case in which they considered it necessary that His Honour should have an opportunity of offering his opinion.

3. Our other relations with the tribesmen, which are not purely external, are generally in respect of one or other of the following matters:—

- (i) Raids or other offences committed in British territory either by trans-border tribesmen themselves or by British outlaws residing with them;

- (ii) Difficulties, which occasionally arise in consequence of men who have homes on both sides of the border mixing themselves up with trans-frontier affairs or going across the border to commit offences there while residing in British territory, e.g., in the case of the Mohmands on the Shabkadar frontier and Wazirs in the Bannu District ;
- (iii) Offences committed upon trans-border men in independent territory by purely British subjects who return to our side of the border afterwards ;
- (iv) Disputes between cis and trans-border men about the boundary of British India ; and
- (v) Disputes arising out of civil transactions between men of independent territory which are not taken into the ordinary Civil Courts, but decided by jirga under Section 10 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

4. In serious offences of class (i), which under existing orders are already reported both to the Local and Supreme Governments, all correspondence should go in duplicate to both Governments, though the cases would be settled under the directions of the Government of India alone. Minor offences of this class are ordinarily disposed of by the local officers without any report to Government at all, but any periodical statements of such cases which at present go to the Punjab Government would, I presume, in future be submitted to the Government of India.

In cases under class (ii) it would generally be unnecessary to send the Punjab Government copies of the correspondence, as the men concerned, though sometimes resident in British territory, are in respect of such matters practically trans-border tribesmen.

Cases of classes (iii) and (iv) are very rare, but it would probably be advisable that any correspondence about them should be in duplicate, the final decision under class (iii) being left to the Local Government, and under class (iv) to the Government of India in communication with the Local Government, as would be done in disputes of the same kind between a Native State under the Foreign Department and the conterminous Local Administration in British India.

Statements of cases under class (v) might, if desired, go to the Government of India, though there seems no reason why they should not be submitted, as they have been hitherto, to the Local Government along with the other quarterly statements under the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

I have not referred to cases of male or female refugees from independent territory because the only notice we take of them is to require such refugees under Section 35 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation to reside at a distance from the border if any attempt upon their lives is apprehended from across the frontier, and this is a matter of internal administration.

5. As the whole question of frontier management is now under discussion, there are two other points upon which I should like to take this opportunity of saying a word, *viz.*—

- (a) The necessity of a specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border ; and
- (b) the necessity of largely increasing the staff of European Assistants in the same districts.

6. As regards (a), I have always held the strongest opinion, and my views are still the same as I expressed demi-officially in 1891 or 1892, *viz.*, that no officer should be sent to the frontier till he has received his full ordinary training—*i.e.*, until he has passed all his Departmental Examinations and gone through the usual course of Settlement instructions—that all officers thus qualified should be allowed to volunteer for the frontier provided that they must do so while still under three years' service, and that only those volunteers

should be accepted who appear likely, from their physique, strength of character, and power of associating with natives, to prove adapted for the work before them. Such volunteers should be enrolled on a special register, and warned that they are electing for *permanent* service on the frontier, where promotion must necessarily be slow because the body of officers will always be comparatively small, and because they will not be considered eligible for transfer to promotion cis-Indus ; but I would make up for this to some extent by allowing Assistant Commissioners in border districts to draw higher pay when officers of their own standing in the Commission or junior to them were officiating as Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab, and this, with the knowledge that they belonged to a "*corps d'elite*" with more interesting and responsible work and with greater possibilities of advancement and distinction than ordinarily fall to the lot of the cis-Indus official, should be sufficient to keep men who have voluntarily chosen this line of service fairly contented. Hitherto I believe junior officers have not unfrequently been sent trans-Indus, and again withdrawn to the Punjab, without regard to their own inclinations. The result has been in some cases that they have managed to return cis-Indus on the first opportunity, while in other cases men who would gladly have remained on the frontier have been recalled either for the Secretariat or because their turn had come for promotion to charge of districts elsewhere ; but according to my idea no officer once selected for the frontier should ever be withdrawn except for proved unfitness or for neglect to pass the Pashtu Examination within a reasonable time.

7. In this connection I append a statement* of all Civil Officers who are either serving on the Afghan frontier at present or who may be reckoned upon as available for work on this border though absent on furlough or (as in the case of Colonel Leigh) posted temporarily to a cis-Indus district ; and by Afghan frontier I mean the five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, where the trans-border tribesmen are of Afghan race, as distinguished from Dera Ghazi Khan, where the people are Biluch and the conditions are very different. From this statement it will be seen at once how irregularly the supply of frontier officers has been maintained, and that, if the six men of longest border experience (not counting myself as I am returning immediately) were removed, we should have no one left of much more than six years' frontier training, while the great majority are very junior. In the period of 13 years from February 1878 to February 1891 only five men were sent to the frontier who still remain there. From 1891 to 1895 we have one officer per year, and eight in 1896-1898, but under the existing system most of the latter would probably be recalled cis-Indus before long.

8. As regards the second point (*b*), it must be understood, as in the preceding paragraph, that I am speaking only of what (to use the old expression) may be called Covenanted Officers, i.e., Covenanted Civilians or Military Officers in Civil employ, for Uncovenanted Officers can never, save under very exceptional circumstances, be promoted to the charge of districts or divisions, and, however able they may be, their frontier experience can rarely be utilised in these higher posts. Except therefore for purely judicial work or the charge of treasuries, Uncovenanted Officers on the frontier fill positions which might otherwise be more usefully occupied by Covenanted men in training for higher service, and no Uncovenanted Officer (European or Native) should ever be placed in charge of a frontier sub-division, or in posts like those of the Political Officers in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi or Wana, which also afford excellent training for the political duties of a Deputy Commissioner. Yet at the present moment we find a European Extra Judicial Assistant (Mr. Homan) officiating as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, while a Native Extra Assistant Commissioner (Sardar Mahsud) is at Tank, the frontier sub-division of the same district, and a European Police Officer, Mr. Donald (though this is probably only a temporary arrangement), is in the Khaibar. Not long ago, too, we had Mr. Hastings (another Police Officer) in the Kurram, and at the time of the outbreak last year the Political Officer of the Khaibar was a Native. Lastly, there have been occasions within my recollection when the important sub-divisions of Mardan

* Not printed.

and Thal were held either by a European or Native Extra Assistant Commissioner, and all these instances have been due to the impossibility of providing officers of sufficient standing and experience from the Covenanted line. Even the posts of the Commandants of Border Police, who usually act as Political Assistant to their Deputy Commissioners, are valuable for frontier training, and I think that in future these two might be held with advantage by regular officers of the Commission; but such officers ought never to be left long enough in them to forget, or acquire a distaste for, the ordinary work of interior district administration, and this, I may add, is a remark which applies equally to the Political charges in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana.

9. If these views are accepted, it is evident that the number of Covenanted Assistants in the Afghan border districts must be largely increased. Even as it is the number is too small to allow of a fair proportion being always absent on furlough or leave. The result is that at the present moment three of the five districts are temporarily in charge of officers of less than two years' frontier standing (Messrs. Mant, Down and Grant), while in another—Dera Ismail Khan—the Deputy Commissioner, as I have said already, is not a Covenanted officer at all. As regards Assistant Commissioners the case is still worse, for in four of the five districts there is no such officer at head-quarters, and in Peshawar, so notorious for its crime and lawlessness, there is but one (Mr. Gracey) who came up from cis-Indus two or three weeks ago. To remedy this state of things, and to secure a properly graduated service of trained men, there ought to be at least two Covenanted Assistants (or three, if one is to be Commandant of Border Police) at the head-quarters of every district, and four in Peshawar, a corresponding diminution of course being made in the number of European and Native Extra Assistant Commissioners. The permanent Covenanted staff on the Afghan frontier would then be constituted as follows:—

Commissioners	2
Deputy Commissioners	5
Political Officers in Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana...	4
Assistant Commissioners in charge of the Mardan, Thal and Tank Sub-Divisions	3
Commandants of Border Police in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan	4
Assistant Commissioners at head-quarters	12
Total	30

and this would allow of a reasonable number of officers being absent on furlough or leave without necessitating the constant bringing up of new and untrained men from cis-Indus, which is at present unavoidable.

It may be urged that, if the number of subordinate officers is so much increased, and they are debarred from advancement cis-Indus, promotion to Officiating Deputy Commissionerships will be so slow that we shall have no men offering themselves for the frontier. This would no doubt be true if no steps were taken to remedy such a grievance, and it is therefore essential, as I have already pointed out, that a sliding scale of pay should be introduced giving an Assistant Commissioner the pay of a Deputy Commissioner whenever an officer junior to him is officiating in charge of a district cis-Indus.

It may also be said that to keep men out of the charge of districts and in subordinate positions for 7 or 8 years would tend to disgust them, and to dwarf their power of accepting responsibility; but, though they would take some time to rise to Deputy Commissionerships, they would not be all this time mere Assistants; and it is a point of great importance to have men of a certain standing for Political charges like Kurram, &c., which on this account it has often been very difficult to fill from the Covenanted line. In the ordinary course an officer on first coming to the frontier should have two years of the usual work in Cutchery, which is the best of all schools for learning the language, and after that he might be put for a year in command of the Border Police. Then would

come a term of two or three years in charge of a sub-division, followed by perhaps a year or two in an independent charge like the Khaibar or Kurram, by which time, if not before, a permanent district vacancy would probably be available. All this would give such ample variety of experience and responsibility that I think no man with a liking for border service would find it compare unfavourably with the life even of a Deputy Commissioner cis-Indus, and still less so with the duties of an Assistant Commissioner who is often little better than a Cutchery drudge.

Extract paragraphs 13 to 15 of a letter dated Simla, 1st July, 1889, from C. L. Tupper, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

13. Enclosed will be found a statement (Enclosure III.*) from which it will be perceived that, whereas according to the prescribed figure of recruitment, viz., 6·21 per annum, the Commission should have received 68 31 recruits in these years, the actual number of recruits was 52 only, and of these, owing to resignations, transfers to other Provinces and employments, and to deaths, only 32 remain. In the years 1885-1888, as will be perceived from the same statement, the recruitment has been sufficient or fairly so.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor would take this opportunity to beg that the services of the following officers now employed away from the Punjab may be restored to this Province when practicable, viz. :—

- (1) Mr. R. G. Thomson, Officiating Postmaster-General, Punjab.
- (2) and (3) Messrs. Drew and Cappel, transferred to Bombay in 1882.
- (4) Mr. L. W. King, now serving under the Government of India in the Political Department and just at present on furlough.

The Lieutenant-Governor would like to add to this list the names of Mr. Hurry and Lieutenant Martindale, now serving in Burma, but he does not wish to be pressing upon this point as he believes that it would be very difficult for the Chief Commissioner of Burma to spare their services. I am to add as additional reasons for this request that the European strength of the Punjab Commission is at a dangerously low ebb, and that undoubtedly one of the reasons for the defects in the criminal administration which are under discussion is the want of a sufficient number of European Magistrates.

15. It remains to consider the measures which should be adopted to keep the future strength of the Punjab Commission up to the mark. This matter has been very fully discussed in personal consultation with yourself, and the result is that it is now proposed to raise the number of charges to which recruitment should be adjusted from 104 to 119. The reasons for this change are very fully explained in the annexed memorandum (Enclosure IV.*) by the Secretary to this Government, showing in detail the results of the recent conference with yourself. In accordance with those proposals the figure of recruitment should be raised from 6·21 to 7·105. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that this proposal will be sanctioned. He has also requested that the next supply of Covenanted Civilians may be five instead of four, the number previously intimated to you; and he thinks it would be an excellent thing if two Military recruits could be given to the Punjab as soon as possible.

Annex B.

Letter from F. D. Cunningham, Esq, C.I.E., Commissioner (on Special Duty), to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Peshawar, the 21st October, 1898.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of a copy of a letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 19th September, about alterations proposed in the present system of managing relations with tribes beyond the Peshawar border, so as to bring the conduct of these affairs more directly under the control of the Government of India.

* Not printed.

2. The despatch of the Secretary of State announces that generally "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory," and that, with special reference to the Khyber, it is "not desirable merely to restore arrangements which were in force before the outbreak." Some change is, therefore, called for. There can be no question that of late, and especially in the year 1897, the fruits of the present system have not been all that could be wished; how far this is due to defects in the administrative system, and how far to difficulties inherent in recent frontier policy and to deep-rooted antagonism between feeling beyond the border and the aims of government is a question well worthy of consideration, though its discussion here would be out of place.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government calls for a change in the administrative machine, and the immediate question is whether as regards the Peshawar border that direct control, which is desired, can be secured by removing the Commissioner and the officers below him from subordination to the Punjab Government in respect of political matters, and by placing them to that extent under the direct orders of the Government of India.

The proposal has the obvious objection of weakening the control of the Local Government over its principal Revenue Officers and Magistrates in the Division. I should be sorry to say it would be unworkable; Indian officials are accustomed to serve many masters; the Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab is controlled in some Departments by the Commissioner, in other by the Sessions Judge and Chief Court, and he is answerable to a variety of other authorities. It is said this dependence on many masters is practicable because all are under one head, the Local Government; so that the Deputy Commissioner cannot excuse deficiencies on one side by pleading press of work on another. To this it may be replied that, whatever other changes are introduced, assuming that the Deputy Commissioner is left in charge of the clans on his own border, as I hope to show he must and ought to be, he would still for both internal and external work be under the Commissioner; and though the Commissioner would serve two masters, yet ultimately all are under one supreme authority, the Government of India.

At the same time, though I think the proposal is not wholly unworkable, it has in it many tendencies to produce friction, and from the point of view of the Local Government may well be thought impracticable.

The Lieutenant-Governor would no longer look on officials in Peshawar as his servants, and it might happen that a transfer desired by him in the interest of the Revenue or Judicial administration would be vetoed by the Government of India. This again does not seem to me an insuperable objection, for analogous cases arise under the Provincial Government where Revenue and Judicial authorities take different views of the efficiency of the individual.

Nevertheless it is impossible to deny that the proposal has in it certain seeds of friction and will put the Local Government in a very difficult position. Moreover, it will not be easy in practice to define the two spheres. To distinguish on paper relations with border clans from district work is easy, but many questions affecting directly the ryots within our border may indirectly concern their trans-frontier cousins.

To go no further back than the last year the Kohat salt duty, the Agror Border Regulation, and matters connected with the Border Police are cases in point.

3. But from the concluding part of paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, I gather that, coupled with this change in the position of the Commissioner, it is suggested that the District Officer should be divorced from the management of political business on his own border.

I do not know whether this is an essential part of the proposal under discussion; if it be, I venture to think the scheme needs careful reconsideration. Speaking with a long experience—nearly a quarter of a century—of frontier work, I make bold to say that, whatever changes may be introduced above, the fundamental principle of Border administration should be to retain in one hand

executive control within, and the management of relations with clans on the fringe of hills beyond the frontier. Any other system must involve immense loss of influence and waste of power

The geographical line which marks the boundary is no barrier ; in many parts the men beyond are of the same clan and race as our subjects within the border ; in some they live on both sides, migrating with the seasons ; in all parts foreigner and subject, whose villages and grazing-grounds adjoin, are closely connected by ties of interest, business, tenancy or marriage. Many trans-border clans have "jagirs" in our districts ; all down the frontier the great families have assignments or pensions representing allowances granted by former Rulers—Moghal, Durrani or Sikh—to secure their loyalty and assistance. Though the heads of these families are no longer regularly employed as middlemen, yet they still have influence, and take care to maintain it ; in every frontier trouble they are called in to assist, and often do most valuable work.

All these and many similar conditions give to the officer who is Magistrate and Collector, who is locally supreme in matters connected with Police, Criminal Justice and the administration of the Land Revenue system, a power to get work out of Chiefs and Khans within our border, to check intrigues starting in our territory, and to influence clansmen on the immediate "hinterland" of his district, such as no other official can exert

Leisure to sit all day and every day with jirgas and men from across the border will not make up for want of power to decide their petitions about assessment of wells, suspension of revenue demand on lands owned by them in Peshawar, or to take action under the Frontier Crimes Regulation on their claims about debts due or broken engagements of betrothal and marriage

These remarks refer to the clans who march with British territory ; the further you go from our border the less does this argument apply. The fact that there are Political Agents in charge of Wano, Tochi, Dir and Swat, &c., and that they can manage those tracts successfully without having jurisdiction within our districts does not prove the contrary, as their charges include clans far removed from the border line, and in any case the Khans of Dera Ismail Khan or Bannu understand that they may some day see the officer who is now Political Agent in Wano or Tochi come back to be Deputy Commissioner in the adjoining district.

4. It seems, however, to be anticipated that, with the creation of a set of Political Agents, separate from the District Officers, there will be less change of *personnel* due to "removal or transfer to other appointments under the exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion." This is possible ; but at the same time it is probable that there is no part of any Indian province in which men have been kept longer within narrow limits than on the Punjab frontier. It is notorious that once on the frontier, always there. I have known men who did not wish to stay purposely neglect to learn Pashtu, on the ground that, if they once passed the examination, they would be kept for life in a part of the province from which they wished to escape. Take the Peshawar Division as an instance : the three officers* who have last held charge have been practically all their service on or beyond the frontier, and have at least as much knowledge as the experience of a quarter of a century can give.

* { Sir R. Udny
Myself.
Mr. W. Merk

Of the changes of tenure of this office since 1891, when Sir R. Udny became Commissioner, not one has been due to "exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion ;" they have been caused solely by the removal of an officer to special political work outside, to furloughs, ill-health, or privilege leave. And under no system can changes for these causes be avoided.

5. It seems to me, however, very doubtful whether the control of the Government of India will be increased to the extent expected merely by eliminating the Punjab Government and by drawing the Commissioner, Peshawar, into direct relations. If the Punjab Government had any frontier

policy of its own, or, having one, if it had authority to pursue it, if it had power to give orders in any but the most trivial matter, I could understand that by removing it from the chain the control of the Government of India would be increased in reality as well as in name. But I venture to think that, whatever their position in constitutional theory may be, the Lahore Government have not for many years past given orders in any but the most petty matter, affecting trans-border clans or politics.

With the exception of a few years in the Secretariat, the whole of my service of 26 years has been passed on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and for the past 13 years in the Peshawar Division. Speaking of that part of the border, I cannot remember any question sufficiently important to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta. Under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner as the local Political Officer disposes of many claims against trans-border men by reprisals or arrests in British territory, or by his influence with clans outside, and he settles these cases without report to the great advantage of Government. But when he thinks action on his part will not summarily dispose of a case, he may report it for orders, and in cases of this description I think that in practice the Commissioner and the Local Government give advice and not decisions; the final order even now comes from Calcutta.

The charge proposed will certainly eliminate one office, the function of which in these matters has become advisory rather than administrative, will so far tend to quicken despatch of business and the issue of orders, and will bring the Government of India nearer to the work to be done.

It is, however, clear that between the local officer on the spot and the Supreme Government there must be some authority interposed high enough to pass orders in small matters disposed of on general principles or in accordance with the declared policy of Government, and of experience and knowledge sufficient to give weight to his advice and conclusions.

If between the Deputy Commissioner and Government there is to be only the Commissioner, clearly his responsibility will be largely enhanced, and if the change is to work to advantage, his position must be raised, and he must be invested with powers beyond what he now ventures to assume.

6. To sum up, I am of opinion that the proposal to remove the Commissioner and his subordinates in political matters from the control of the Punjab Government and to place them directly under the Government of India is practicable and not unworkable, but that it has the grave disadvantages of risk of friction, and of impairing that control which is a condition of discipline and efficiency.

But I have no hesitation in saying that it would be a grievous mistake to divorce the Deputy Commissioner from the management of the border clans who march with his district.

Assuming that the reasons given in paragraph 3 are accepted, and that authority within and without the border is kept in one hand, it remains to be considered how the local Political Officer himself is to be directed and controlled. That between him and the Supreme Government some authority must be interposed is evident, otherwise the Foreign Department of the Government of India which should deal with large questions, and with cases likely to cause complications, will be inundated with trivial business.

I venture to think that there are two solutions, and that either of them would in effect be better than that of making the Commissioner of Peshawar an official Janus with one face to Calcutta and one towards Lahore.

These are either—

- (1) to give the Punjab Government real authority and power to issue final orders in respect to affairs with clans on the immediate border fringe, and in all but matters likely to lead to serious results or to hostilities on a large scale; or

- (ii) to remove the frontier districts* from the Punjab Government, and to place in charge of them an officer with the powers of Chief Commissioner for the interior, and the position of Agent to the Governor-General for the clans and countries beyond.
- * Excluding of course the cis-Indus parts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and the whole of Dera Ghazi-Khan.

The first of these two plans would work, but at this date it seems useless to suggest what would at once be ruled out of court as "retrograde," and, moreover, it does not fulfil the condition laid down by the Secretary of State, and is therefore out of the question.

The second would bring the management of the border under the Government of India in the most direct manner practicable. The population, revenue, trade and wealth of the province have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionership was mooted some 20 years ago under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, and a strip of the Derajat, is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.

Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and, what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough cis-Indus to occupy the full energies of a great administration.

I am writing without access to an office, and therefore do not attempt to give figures, but a comparison of the chief statistics of the province for 1878 with those of to-day would, I think, show that no "territorial rectifications or compensations" would be required, and that this supposed objection to the radical and effectual remedy does not in reality exist.

If, then, a strong administration directly under the Government of India is desired, in which frontier questions can be fully taken up on one consistent line without detriment to the needs and requirements of the greater part of a large province, this can best be secured by placing the frontier districts under a separate Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. The Punjab Government would benefit by being relieved of an incubus, by the gain of time and power to devote to the administration of a rapidly growing province, and it would be rescued from what to many has appeared the invidious position into which it has been relegated by the course of events in the past ten or twenty years in regard to affairs on the North-West Frontier.

7. While I believe that this would be the better alternative, I am not prepared to say that the other proposal put forward, to split the Commissioner of Peshawar into two persons, responsible to the Local Government in things internal, and to the Government of India in external matters, is unworkable. But there can be no doubt that it would make the position of the Punjab Government very difficult, and probably within a short time they would be constrained to ask the Government of India to take over the entire responsibility for the frontier districts, and for officials over whom the Lieutenant-Governor would no longer have that full control which alone can secure discipline and efficiency.

Even if the other alternative be ultimately accepted, and the border districts be separated from the Punjab, there remains the question whether the unsatisfactory position of to-day on the North-West Frontier is wholly the result of the administrative system, and how far it may be caused in part at least by the natural opposition of tribesmen of independent territory to the policy of these later years. It is the duty of servants of Government to carry out the policy of Government whatever it be, not to criticise unless their views are asked, and I have no intention of suggesting criticism, for Government best

knows its business and its ultimate aim. After all, if difficulties exist, they must be overcome; it is constant advance in spite of opposition which has created an Empire:

"Et dubitamus adhuc virtutem extendere factis"
"Aut metus Ausoniâ prohibet consistere terrâ"?

But when it is a question of condemning and altering an existing administrative system, it will surely not be out of place to note with proper deference that, in the policy which has led to the occupation and, as the tribesmen view it, to the practical annexation of Wano, Tochi and Malakand, there are elements so contrary to the feelings, traditions, and aspirations of the clans thus conciliated, so likely to arouse their fear of loss of independence, that this alone would account for some at least of the difficulties experienced in carrying out the aims of Government on the North-West Frontier, besides any that may have been created by the machinery of administration, which no doubt is capable of reform and improvement.

As the discussion has arisen out of a despatch upon the management of the Khyber, it is specially appropriate to remember that the arrangements started under the Punjab Government, when I had the honour to be the first Political Officer in charge of the Pass, worked with success for nearly twenty years.

They broke down in the end, but under stress of a storm whose origin was unconnected with the Punjab or its Government. But twenty years is a long time in the history of any political system; the map of Europe rarely outlasts it unchanged; and the system to be reformed has at least this to its credit that during that time the Khyber Pass was kept as safe as any part of the Grand Trunk Road from Peshawar to Calcutta.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

*Minute by the Viceroy on the Management of the Punjab Frontier
dated November 6th, 1898.*

1. At the end of August we received from the Secretary of State his reply to the despatch in which we communicated our proposals for the final settlement of outstanding questions with the Afridis, and for the future management of the Khyber Pass. The nature of the decision arrived at by Her Majesty's Government made it necessary for us to differentiate even more than before in our treatment of these two branches of the subject. So far as concerned the communication of the terms on which peaceful relations with the tribes might be re-established, we were authorised to act so soon as our definition of the terms had been approved by the Secretary of State. On the other hand, so far as future management was concerned, Her Majesty's Government came to no determination, but forwarded to us certain suggestions on which they invited our opinion.

2. Naturally the first branch of the subject, as the more pressing, first engaged our attention; but I am not dealing with it in this Minute, and it will suffice to record that on September 12th we were able to inform the Punjab Government of the nature of the terms, and of the manner in which we proposed to communicate them to the tribes. It was impossible to refer to future arrangements until this letter had gone; but a week later, *i.e.*, on September 19th, it was followed by another in which we requested the Local Government to supply us with the information necessary to determine how far the suggested alterations in existing arrangements were practicable. I mention these dates to show that there was no delay on our part in taking action along both the lines indicated in the Despatch from the Secretary of State. Nor, in my opinion, has there been any undue delay on the part of the Local Government. It was essential that the Lieutenant-Governor should consult his officers who were actually in charge, or were well acquainted with the

circumstances, of the frontier districts. He warned me at once that this must take time, and I am indebted to him for pressing his enquiries so energetically as to be able to submit his report within little more than a month. The propositions which he had to consider were calculated to affect the Province for which he is responsible in many ways, and it would have been unreasonable to expect an opinion upon them without full time for consultation and deliberation. It is not, therefore, on account of any delay, which could have been avoided, that a difficulty has arisen in our determining before we leave Simla the conclusions on which the further observations desired by the Secretary of State might be founded. It was only on one supposition that the short time at our disposal might have sufficed. If the Lieutenant-Governor had seen his way to make proposals by which the objects aimed at in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch might be attained, it would, perhaps, have been just possible for the Government of India to consider those proposals and forward them with observations to the Secretary of State. But the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor is that he cannot suggest any alterations in the directions indicated; on the contrary, that, in his opinion, they would introduce chaos into the frontier administration.

Under these circumstances we have nothing to work upon. The Government of India will now have to decide on one of two courses: either to endorse the verdict of the Lieutenant-Governor, or to formulate proposals of its own. It can do neither hastily, and any attempt to arrive at a premature pronouncement without careful sifting of the information already available, or which may be collected, would be unfair to hon. members, and could not be expected to yield results of any value.

4. This, however, leaves me in a position which differs in one essential respect from that of my colleagues. When the case comes before them hereafter, as it is bound to come, I shall not be in a position to offer any opinion. It appears to me that, while it is my duty to abstain from inviting any formal or final discussion at this moment, it is equally my duty not to shirk my responsibility, but to submit to the Government of India and the Secretary of State, in a form which can be used officially, a statement of the reasons which in my judgment justify the policy which I have advised, and which on my present information I should still recommend. But I desire to speak for myself alone, and to make it clearly understood that the transmission of this Minute, and of the documents necessary to explain its argument to the Secretary of State, implies no approval by the Government of India of either it or them, but expressly reserves the whole case until it can be maturely and deliberately considered and determined.

5. Her Majesty's Government have affirmed that in their opinion "the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." Unfortunately very little is said of the grounds on which this opinion is based. When, after defining the duties of frontier officers in terms to which no exception can be taken, the Despatch proceeds to say, "They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials," the assumption of course is that under present arrangements this combination is the rule. The Lieutenant-Governor challenges this assertion, and shows (1) that on a large portion of the frontier the combination does not exist at all, there being political officers for the political work, separate and distinct from, indeed not even subordinate to, the district official, *i.e.*, the Deputy Commissioner; (2) that where the combination does exist it is in parts of the country where the interests of the residents on the two sides of the border are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to deal with them separately; and (3) that where under the circumstances aforesaid the work becomes too heavy for the district official, assistance has been given, and can be given, and at any rate the political work is not allowed to suffer. In connection with this subject the Lieutenant-Governor has examined in detail the statements found in an article in *The Times* newspaper, an avowed and, so far as I know, the only formulated indictment of the present system

which has yet appeared. I do not propose to follow him, and will content myself with saying that, so far as my own experience goes, it corroborates his presentation of the facts of the case, and that I feel bound to perform the authority of the responsible head of the Province writing officially to that of any anonymous correspondent.

6. A similar argument might be used with regard to the sentence in the despatch following next to that already quoted. The Lieutenant-Governor denies, and gives chapter and verse to show that it is not true, that frontier officials are transferred to other appointments in a manner that interferes with efficiency. There is nothing on the other side but assertion, and assertion by itself is not proof. Until therefore evidence to the contrary is adduced, it is but reasonable to believe that of the Lieutenant-Governor. But one is tempted to go a step further. Is it not possible to rate too highly the absence of removal or transfer? On the contrary, is there any worse evil in a service than stagnation? Mr. Anderson's remarks on this subject deserve consideration. Even Sir R. Udny, who avows himself a strong supporter of a special service for the frontier, clearly recognises that there would be difficulties, and proposes to meet them by arrangements, of which one thing is quite certain, *i.e.*, that they will be very costly. This paper has come in late, and there has been no time to examine it in detail; but it must be remembered that a similar state of affairs to that brought out by the statement annexed is by no means unknown elsewhere in India, and that one of the causes which contributes to it is a block in promotion, or, in other words, one of the phases of the stagnation to which I take objection; and one which would be still more likely to arise in a small special service. What is wanted on the frontier is personal influence, but not necessarily the influence of the individual. No doubt instances could easily be quoted where a strong and sympathetic individuality has dominated the ruder natures with which it has been brought in contact. But we cannot predicate characteristics like these for all frontier officers, and it is only too probable that an officer, set down in a remote district for the best years of his life, will imbibe prejudices from his surroundings, or perhaps tend to fossilize, at any rate lose the versatility of resource and promptitude of action on which success in dealing with Native races so much depends. We escape from much of this difficulty if we look to the service rather than the individual officer, and aim at a service so organised as to receive a constant supply of officers well equipped for the duties they have to perform, rather than the mere selection of special officers for special posts. People sometimes talk as if all we had to do was to find the man to fill the post. It is by no means to under-rate the initial difficulty to point out that it is often the smallest of the series; for once the post is established on certain lines, specially if the first incumbent is a man with special characteristics, the field of selection is still further limited in the case of his deputy or successor. Apart altogether from casualties or resignations, temporary vacancies must be comparatively numerous in an arduous service like that on the frontier, for it is impossible to deny men so placed opportunities of rest and relaxation. The difficulty therefore of replacing specially selected officers is no remote one, but may occur immediately, and recur constantly.

7. Leaving out of sight for the moment all questions of the official who is to control the whole system, two classes of officers are required for frontier work. For the actual dealings with the tribes young men are wanted whose activity of mind and body predisposes them to a life which, if *isolated and monotonous*, has a spice of adventure and of danger, and who are free from the ties which, *e.g.*, for a married man, render residence in the wilds irksome and expensive. But as it is impossible to combine these qualities with a mature experience, it is necessary also to provide local supervision, or in other words, the presence at local centres of officers of sufficient standing and knowledge to be able to direct the junior officers on the spot in cases of difficulty, especially in those which must be disposed of promptly, and where reference to a distant authority is impracticable. In the long narrow strip of tribal country stretching along the Punjab frontier from the Gomal northwards, it would not be easy to find an agency so effective for

this kind of local supervision as the men who attain to Commissionerships under the Punjab Government. The younger men might be recruited from the Staff Corps or elsewhere, though when that is advocated it is fair to remember that the Punjab Commission is already largely recruited from Staff Corps officers, the rule being that one Staff Corps officer is appointed to the Commission to every three of the Indian Civil Service. Two things seem perfectly evident—(1) that if a new Staff, separate and distinct from the Punjab Commission, is to be established, it must at the outset consist principally, if not entirely, of officers drawn from that Commission, because in no other way can the local experience be obtained; and (2) that, even if hereafter it is sought to cut adrift from Punjab influences, the ultimate source of supply must be practically the same for the new service as for the old.

8. The geographical configuration of the tribal country to which reference has been made above has no doubt contributed to the formation of an administration such as that just described, and makes it difficult to suggest any workable alternative. In a compact tract of comparatively open country like Baluchistan, inhabited by a number of tribes which, though differing from each other in some respects, are neither fanatical nor strong, it is possible to prescribe a general policy for the country as a whole. But that is not so with the tribes along the Punjab frontier, and the fact was very clearly brought out in the correspondence between the Government of India and the Local Government in 1896. The attitude of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick was that there ought to be no attempt to generalize where there is no room for generalisation, but that the circumstances of each bit of the frontier must be separately considered with reference to its peculiar circumstances. The Government of India fully accepted the proposition that different parts of the frontier were in different states of development,—*vide* paragraph 6 of Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, 1896,—but Sir D. Fitzpatrick thought it so important that he dealt with the whole subject in great elaboration and detail in his reply dated October 26th, 1896.

9. If it be argued that, admitting the necessity of different treatment in different tracts, some of the sub-division of the executive staff might be avoided by making each tract self-contained, the answer is to be found in paragraph 11 of the Khyber Despatch of June 23rd. Of each one of the districts into which the tribal country would divide itself could it be said, as of the Khyber, that "we could not afford to station there an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is too small for an expensive staff, and too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority." We cannot dispense with any of our outposts, Wano, Tochi, Kurram, Kohat, Khyber, and so on; each must be in charge of a British officer; doubling up is impracticable, and without it the cost of senior officers is prohibitive. It may be said that the conclusions of Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily involve the displacement of the subordinate machinery, but only the transfer of the control to the Government of India. That may or may not be so; much depends on the working out of details. But it seemed necessary to examine present arrangements from the foundations, and to show that the guiding principles are intelligible and practical; for, as pointed out, the language of the Despatch is vague and general, and it is impossible from it to say for certain how far their retention in whole or in part in a new system is contemplated, and the area of controversy thereby restricted.

10. Proceeding now to the question of the transfer of control, it cannot be said that the reasons which have influenced Her Majesty's Government here are much more distinctly defined than their reasons for condemning the present system. The objections stated in our Despatch to placing the Commissioner of Peshawar

under the Government of India are quoted,* and the comment is that these objections appear more formal than real. But from what follows it is evident that there is some misapprehension as to the true position of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The Secretary of State maintains that the policy he suggests is not

an untried one, because the Commissioner of Peshawar even now serves two-

masters in time of peace and corresponds direct with the Government of India on the occurrence of disturbances. The Lieutenant-Governor does not admit the correctness of this allegation, and he is strongly supported by Mr. Merk. The events of the last five years have again and again drawn my attention to the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar, and it is right that I should record my personal opinion that it is a mistake to suppose that the Government of India has exercised over him any control which could differentiate him from other officers under the Punjab Government. By arrangement they have made use of him for certain purposes, *e.g.*, in their correspondence with the Amir, but it would be most misleading to represent him as in consequence in charge directly or indirectly of any part of our relations with Afghanistan. It is true that at present the Commissioner of Peshawar is the channel through whom certain communications go to the Amir. He corresponds on local matters on his own responsibility, and he forwards by messenger certain communications which we send to him by telegraph. But in the latter case he is not consulted, unless we see fit to do so, on the nature of the message; and we only use him at all to secure secrecy and despatch. It cannot be intended to give this officer, however much his importance may be increased, a right of corresponding independently with the Amir. We have never allowed the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to do so, and it would be most dangerous not to keep this correspondence entirely in the hands of the Foreign Department.

11. So, again, in regard to direct correspondence on the outbreak of disturbance. The object then is that stated in the letter from the Government of India of February 3rd, 1881, quoted by the Lieutenant-Governor, *i.e.*, that the Government of India should receive the earliest information. It has always been recognised that so soon as military operations are undertaken or are even in prospect, it is necessary that the Government of India should obtain all important information direct, and the dual relation is then by no means confined to the Commissioner of Peshawar. It has been customary of late in the larger expeditions to entrust the chief political control to the General Officer Commanding, who thereupon corresponds with the Foreign Department as well as with his own military superiors, and the Chief Political Officer attached to the expedition acts under the orders of the General, though with a right reserved to him of submitting a statement of his individual opinion to the Government of India, should he think fit to do so on any special point. But the case of Mr. Bruce, who was Political Officer in Waziristan in 1894-95, is perhaps the best illustration. As an officer of the Punjab Government he began by sending information through the Local Government in the ordinary manner. The acute stage was reached while the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were on tour, and Mr. Bruce was then instructed to correspond direct with the Foreign Department. Here, as in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the object was that in urgent matters information should reach the Government of India by the speediest channel, and early information is so essential that the Government of India must reserve to itself the power of employing any officers of Government to supply it. But it is a wholly different matter to assume control of an official under a Local Government in his administrative action—or to consult him without reference to the Local Government on questions of policy. That has not been the practice with the Commissioner of Peshawar, and I can best show how strongly it was impressed on my mind by mentioning an incident which occurred last year. I deemed it expedient on a certain question of policy to make a communication to the officers on the frontier on whom we chiefly relied for political information. I had no difficulty in acting on my own initiative except in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, but in his case I thought it right to confer first with the Lieutenant-Governor, and explain what it was that I proposed to say. It need scarcely be added that the Lieutenant-Governor took no objection, and I addressed Sir R. Udny accordingly; but in my judgment to obtain the previous concurrence of the Lieutenant-Governor was both technically correct and in itself advantageous.

12. It does not of course necessarily follow that because the Commissioner of Peshawar has not hitherto been under the control of two masters he might not be so placed for the future. It would be more of an experiment

than the Secretary of State seems to imagine, but the experiment might be worth trying. Before, however, it is tried we must examine carefully its chances of success. And I confess it is a plan which has had attractions for me. In 1896, when we had the management of the frontier under consideration, I myself put forward the proposal for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Peshawar, which was suggested to the Lieutenant-Governor in paragraph 7 of Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, with the addition, which was not adopted, that "this Commissioner might perhaps correspond direct with the Government of India on tribal affairs within his jurisdiction;" but I did so because I thought that thus 'we should have secured most of the advantages of a separate province while avoiding the difficulties inseparable from dividing the tribes from the settled districts that adjoin them.' In the course of the discussion various arguments were adduced against the division between the different functions of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It was pointed out with great force that the idea of separating the ordinary civil administration of a district from the political charge would inevitably lead to friction amongst the officers themselves, as they would have to treat the people from different standpoints. It would also cause a want of finality in settlements of cases. Suitors would go backwards and forwards from the civil authority to the political authority, hoping that a later interview or petition might bring about a ruling more acceptable to them. The theory is that the political officer would be the medium of influence, and that, divorced from more routine civil duties, he would have leisure to push that influence. But influence over border men is not an abstract political entity; it is closely concentered with the incidents and conditions of their daily life, such as the settlement of their quarrels, the management of their land, disputed rights to water, grazing claims, love intrigues, and the numerous domestic incidents that make up life on the frontier, and which, when settled under normal conditions, lead to violence and blood feuds; and it is in the settlement of disputes that would result in bloodshed if left to tribal custom that our frontier officers, if of the right sort, get openings for spreading their influence. If a frontier man wants to describe his model of a frontier officer, he says of him—"He knows all our affairs." Such influence and such knowledge will not bear breaking up into different elements of paternal government—one political and the other civil. Arguments such as these seemed fatal to the idea of placing the Commissioner in direct correspondence with the Government of India on tribal affairs only.

13. Now, again, the method which is suggested for bringing about a change is that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, *in respect of such matters*, act directly under the Government of India.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor in his Note shows, I think, so clearly that it would be vain to go over the ground again, that the Commissioner and the Government of India cannot deal thoroughly and conclusively with external relations with the tribes without including some administrative work within our border. What the extent of that must necessarily be has not been defined, because the Lieutenant-Governor pronounces against the practicability of the system proposed; but whatever its extent, administrative work dealt with directly between the Government of India and a Commissioner of Division would be something different from what is done in any part of India. In all India there is between the Government of India and the administration of the country a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Chief Commissioner, and if this is necessary elsewhere, no reason has been advanced for thinking that it will not be necessary on the frontier.

15. It is difficult to give instances of the sort of work which is referred to the Local Government in frontier matters, but which with a Local Government need not come to the Government of India; but, in order to give it as

far as may be in detail,* an examination has been made of the Proceedings of the Punjab Government in the Foreign branch or section for the year 1896, that year being selected as an ordinary one, undisturbed by any special frontier rising.

16. It is more than doubtful whether the Secretary of State, in entrusting to the Government of India "a wide discretion in framing the arrangements,

* On the very first page of the B papers (Frontier) for January, 1896, will be found five cases, dealt with by the Punjab Government, which, if frontier management were removed from the Lieutenant-Governor's control, would presumably have come to the Government of India. The subjects of these cases were—

Complaints to Colonel Warburton against the Sartip of Dhakka.

Portion of land acquired for military purposes at Para Chinar allotted for building sites and other purposes.

Proposal to call one of the gates of the "City" of Para Chinar the Fitzpatrick Gate.

Petition to the Lieutenant-Governor from prisoners in the Kohat Jail

Sanction granted to a Kurram Militia Drill Instructor to return to his regiment.

A further examination of the Frontier Proceedings shows numerous references disposed of by the Punjab Government. To cite a few of the different subjects of such references —

Details connected with Khyber tolls.

Border Military Police establishment. Questions of their equipment, pay, allowances, &c.

Same class of questions as regards Kurram Militia and Khyber Rifles.

Reports on British military officers with such corps.

Correspondence between the Amir and Commissioner, Peshawar, on *unimportant* local matters. (There are occasionally such cases which the Punjab Government dispose of.)

Permits for rifles imported by British officers on the frontier.

Numerous petitions from tribesmen and Frontier Chiefs; also miscellaneous petitions relating to the frontier tracts, not one in twenty of which now comes before the Foreign Department.

Statements of cases decided under the Frontier Tribes Regulations.

Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Khyber, and Kurram monthly political contingent bills.

Expenditure from District Funds.

Reports of death of leading men in the frontier districts.

All questions of the grant of pensions to families of deserving jagirdars and such like. (At present the Foreign Department only gets these when the Local Government supports them. Under the proposed arrangement the Foreign Department would have to get all applications which the Commissioner supported.)

Questions relating to expenditure by frontier officers of an unusual nature. (Many such are within the competence of the Local Government to dispose of.)

Permission to Afghan refugees to visit Peshawar.

Payment of compensation to persons (other than Government servants) who suffer loss from petty tribal offences in cases where fine money is levied from offenders. At present Punjab Government has discretion.

Disputes between British and Afghan subjects at Peshawar.

Appeals from prisoners under sentence of death. The disposal of these has just been transferred to the Home Department. Would not these have to come back to the Foreign Department as local Government under the new arrangement?

Questions relating to leave, promotion, &c., of local native officers, such as Tahsildars, &c.

The Commissioner's budget for frontier expenditure would have to be taken up in this Department, and all questions connected with it. (This would mean a lot of trouble.)

All matters connected with the Mohmands, the Black Mountain, Buner, the Nawab of Amb, Kohat Pass Afridis, Orakzais, Afridis, Kurram.

Grant of *khilats*.

The above headings have been taken from the Punjab Foreign Proceedings volumes for three months. The Home, Financial, and Revenue Proceedings have not been examined; but it is clear that all questions now referred to the Lieutenant-Governor under those heads would also have to come up to the Foreign Department unless the Commissioner's status were altered.

financial and executive, which may be found necessary," contemplated the separation from the Punjab Government of so much administrative work, or, that the Commissioner should have the financial powers of a Local Government. Granted that this is necessary, the question must sooner or later resolve itself into one whether it is better to have as an intermediate Local Government the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or a Commissioner who will be a Chief Commissioner on the frontier.

17. Mr. Anderson thinks it possible for the Commissioner to be a Chief Commissioner as far as his duty lies directly under the Government of India and, to remain a Commissioner of Division in his relations with the Punjab. To my mind his position has only to be so stated in order to show the impossibility of it. Sir R. Udny seems to contemplate an elaborate system of duplicate reports which would certainly end in confusion.

18. The Lieutenant-Governor, as the responsible head of the Province, declares that the changes suggested would introduce chaos into the administration. Having been for five years in charge of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, I think I am entitled to speak for it, and I do not hesitate to say that the consequences there would be equally serious. The Foreign Department, as things stand, has no reason to fear attack; it will bear comparison with any similar department in the ability and diligence of the officers by whom it is manned, the accuracy of its information, or the promptitude and prudence with which the varied and complicated mass of business is despatched; but the staff, from the Viceroy and Foreign Secretary downwards, are not chosen for knowledge of administrative details, and to employ them to deal with business of the kind described above would be a useless waste of their time. This is no theoretical opinion, for we have gained a considerable experience in Baluchistan. Matters are now on a more sound and regular footing in that Agency, and since the revenues have been in a manner provincialised the detailed work has decreased. But the Foreign Department used to be greatly occupied with details of revenue, police, and levy establishments, and I assert emphatically that the result was not satisfactory. If the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to suggest how the necessary changes can be effected on the frontier, I am equally unable to make any proposals for so reinforcing the Foreign Department as to enable it to cope with this addition to its labours. It is not merely a question of amount of work, for that might be overcome, but it is a class of work for which the organisation is absolutely unfitted. Recognising as I do the supreme importance of an efficient Foreign Department, I feel bound to deprecate any step that would overweight it, as I am sure the allotting of administrative work to it would do.

19. Sir Mackworth Young, in paragraph 16 of his note, states that, while he entirely concurs in the reasons for rejecting the proposal to form a separate administration for the frontier districts, he would prefer even that scheme with all its disadvantages to the disintegration of the Punjab administration. Any support, therefore, which he gives to the idea of a separate administration is given from a consideration of provincial interests, and is given only if these interests cannot be preserved otherwise. But for the purposes of this Minute it is necessary to examine the question from the point of view of Imperial interests. No one of course can deny that occasions have arisen, and may arise again, when the formation of a new charge, or agency, or province, either becomes a necessity or has overwhelming advantages. It may be necessitated by the increasing development or opening up of the country, which has made the burden too heavy for the shoulders on which it has hitherto rested, or by the adoption of a new and energetic policy which it is desired to push by the undivided attention of a special officer. It may be justified by the fact that the tract in question marks itself for separation by the physical features of the country, or by characteristics of its inhabitants which distinguish them from their neighbours and facilitate their collective treatment. It may come about by one of those accidents which bring us face to face with the hour and the man. Reasons like these could be found for placing Assam under a Chief Commissioner or Baluchistan under an

Agent to the Governor-General; I can find none in the circumstances of the tribal country on the Punjab frontier. The Punjab Government is a busy Government, as all Governments are in India, but it is not true that it is overburdened, and, if necessary, it could be strengthened by methods adopted elsewhere. There is no question of opening up the country, or inaugurating an active policy therein; such things are excluded by the despatch of January 28th. As already pointed out, geographical conditions and the tribal characteristics and animosities unite to make combination impossible. I hesitate to say much of individuals, but with a full sense of responsibility I affirm that, having watched closely the events on the frontier during the last five years and the actors in them, I can select no one who in my judgment has by his experience, natural ability, standing, or performance approved himself beyond dispute the right man in the right place if this difficult task has to be undertaken.

20. But it will be said that there is here a special reason in the traditional policy of the Punjab, the "close border" system of which so much has been written. It is not necessary to stir the embers of an ancient controversy, and to debate whether the cautious policy of former Lieutenant-Governors was right or wrong in the circumstances as they then existed. It should not be forgotten that those circumstances were not the circumstances of to-day, that our knowledge of the tribes, and their knowledge of us, was very different, and, above all, that the sphere of the Amir's interference was undefined and his attitude aggressive. It is perhaps not surprising to find that those who chafed at what they deemed a timid and ineffectual policy should have rooted in their minds the belief that officers under the Punjab Government must pursue the course and maintain the attitude which that policy imposed upon them, but it is none the less a mistaken belief. The officers serving under the Punjab Government are drawn from the same classes as other officers in India, and those from amongst them who rise to positions of authority, and the men who fill the post of Lieutenant-Governor, do so by the same process of selection which is in force throughout India, and which has made the British rule in India what it is. There is in reality one difference only between the training of a Punjab officer and that of his brethren elsewhere, and that is that he can, if he will, acquire a knowledge of the tribes living on the borders of his province. I could give numerous instances from my own experience of Punjab officers who had no inclination to hang back, and I am prepared to endorse most emphatically the claim that the Local Government has loyally co-operated in the declared policy of the Government of India. The late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab once said to me, when discussing this subject, "You have only to lift your finger and the break will be taken off in any place you think this desirable." That remark is more than an expression of personal loyalty; it contains in a few words a correct exposition of the only principle on which we can rest our arrangements, *i.e.*, that it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India. People sometimes talk as if it was for the Lieutenant-Governor, the Agent to the Governor-General, the Commissioner, the Political Agent, to manage the district assigned to him, and that he must be "given a free hand." Statements of this kind cannot be accepted without qualification. It is possible to limit too strictly the intercourse of political officers with the tribes, and our letter of 1896 was designed to show how more intimate relations were perfectly consistent with management by the Punjab Government. It is also very desirable to give each political officer full opportunities of expounding his views, which are the result of his local knowledge, and to follow his advice so far as that can be safely done. But it is essential that over all there should be the general control and the general policy of the Government of India, to which all officers alike must conform, whether they agree with it or not.

21. This seems so self-evident a proposition that when Her Majesty's Government declare "that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India," it is reasonable to suppose that there is no suggestion that the control is not now supervised by

the Government of India, though it is exercised indirectly and through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. I pass therefore to the consideration of the comparison between a control exercised indirectly through the Lieutenant-Governor and a similar control exercised through an Agent to the Governor-General. It may be admitted that in both cases the Foreign Department is relieved from a mass of administrative detail ; but, as already stated, the relief is by no means as complete in the case of the Agent to the Governor-General as in that of the Lieutenant-Governor, for the simple reason that the full machinery of a Local Government is not available. The Baluchistan agency was fairly on its legs before I knew it, and is still more firmly established now, and yet it affords overwhelming proof of this proposition. If so, one can only conjecture what would be the result of a new agency on the Punjab frontier. But besides this there are two other matters on which it is my duty to speak frankly ; and if it be thought that I magnify my office I can only say that I describe circumstances as I myself have found them. The closer supervision and control desired by Her Majesty's Government must be largely exercised by the Viceroy himself, both in his capacity as head of the Government and as having charge of the Foreign Department. It is of the highest importance that the relations between the Viceroy and the officer who, under his supervision, directs the control of their external relations should be close and personal. The Agent to the Governor-General from the mere fact of his appointment is expected to reside in his district ; he may be called to Simla or Calcutta, or the Viceroy may, during his five years, meet him once, perhaps twice, on tour, and that is all. The Lieutenant-Governor resides several months every year at Simla, and is in constant communication with the Viceroy. The Agent to the Governor-General of a district, such as that now under contemplation, would of course be a selected officer, deserving the fullest confidence, but the Lieutenant-Governor is an officer in the very highest grade, both by seniority and position. Now it is at the point where Imperial interests must override local considerations that the Viceroy's hand must be felt upon the reins. A certain course of action may be proposed which, looking to local circumstances, is beyond doubt the best ; and yet Imperial policy may require that it should be abandoned. If at that moment the officer who must be overruled is one with whom there are opportunities of personal conference and consultation, the chances of friction and misunderstanding are infinitely less than if he is one with whom there can only be communication from a distance by letter, and who must on that account, and perhaps by reason of his standing, be addressed rather as a subordinate than as a colleague and friend.

22. It is probably only practical experience that can enable any one to realise the full advantage that can be secured, or the loss of influence that may result, from differences such as this in the arrangements whereby control is exercised. But there is one more difference between the Agent to the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor which is fundamental, and which vitally affects the question, which of them is to be preferred for the present purpose ? It has been objected that the Lieutenant-Governor has too many interests inside his province, and that it cannot be expected that he will be able to devote sufficient attention to affairs on and across the border. But is there not another side to that question ? If we create this new post, choosing for it, as we are bound to do, a man of energy and ambition, what outlet is he to find for his activity ? The career of a Sandeman, the creation of a new Baluchistan, is debarred to him ; for the policy which he must carry out is essentially one of *quieta non movere*. It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch of January 28th, and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and the future Viceroy. It is a policy of which I heartily approve, and which I claim has been pursued during my administration. Expeditions have been undertaken, and our advanced posts have been still further advanced, the former having been sent, and the latter established, in consequence of obligations which, so far as I am concerned, were inherited. We have assumed the protection of the Dauris in the Tochi valley against their turbulent neighbours, at their own request long and urgently preferred, but no tribe or section of a tribe

has been compelled against their will to surrender the local self-government which they formerly possessed, and which it is their desire to retain. It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which from the nature of things must, in my judgment, endanger its continuance, and that I still prefer to rely on such an adaptation of the machinery we already possess as we proposed in our despatch, believing that by so doing we can with less risk and greater efficiency secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view.

(Signed) ELGIN.

November 6th, 1898.

No. 9.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 24th November, 1898.

I have received and considered your Excellency's military despatch* of the 4th August last, in which you submit your views as to the military position to be maintained on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi valley, and at Wana, and the adjacent portion of the frontier.

2. I may assume generally that the proposals contained in this letter are concerned, not immediately with ulterior strategical necessities, but with the protection and pacification of the Punjab frontier; and from this standpoint I proceed to pass some observations upon them. In regard to the Miranzai border, you are of opinion that the retention of some regular troops is at present essential for the protection of this part of the border, and that though their eventual withdrawal may be on some grounds desirable, it cannot now be considered. You therefore appointed a Committee to report upon the question of the defence of the Samana range, with the objects of protecting the Miranzai valley against tribal incursions, and of supporting the police posts in that region. Of the two schemes submitted by the Committee, your Government adopted one (A), which contemplates holding the range in such strength (concentrated at Fort Lockhart) as would admit of a small moveable column being at once available to support the police posts, the force being dependent on Kohat for its main support. You recommend this scheme generally for my approval, leaving the details to be further examined, and reserving for submission hereafter any point that may need my sanction, with exact estimates of the cost.

3. In the Tochi valley you are of opinion that the entire withdrawal of troops would be impracticable in the existing circumstances; but you believe that it may be possible before long to diminish the garrisons, and to concentrate the regular troops, placing the main garrison at Miranshah. In my telegram of the 14th September I informed your Excellency that I approved the selection of Miranshah for that purpose.

4. Having regard to the general peace of the country in the vicinity of Wana, you think that the withdrawal of the troops from that post should not at present be undertaken; although you desire to follow out the principle of the concentration of regular troops, if and when you are able to provide an efficient substitute in the subsidiary posts.

5. I have, therefore now before me, in outline and in anticipation of details and estimates, a sketch of the military position which your Government are prepared to establish for the protection of a very large area of tribal territory. The general purport of your letter is to recommend the retention for the present

* See above, page 66.

of strong garrisons in fortified posts on the Samana range, in the Tochu valley, and at Wana. The important question of holding the minor posts by levies, or by militia, is engaging your attention, with the object of organising them, if necessary, in the future.

6. In regard to the general principles which should govern these military arrangements for frontier defence, your Excellency refers to a statement made in paragraph 4 of your Military Letter of 23rd June, 1898, which affirms and accepts the leading principles laid down in my Despatch of the 28th January, 1898, as underlying the frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government are determined to adhere. The first of these principles, as given in paragraph 18 of the Despatch, was that no new responsibility should be undertaken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. And the two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated to be the best possible concentration of your military force that would enable you to fulfil your responsibilities and the limitation of your interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. With the question of concentrating your troops your Excellency's letter now under reply has dealt carefully and comprehensively; but the second of the two objects which I have just mentioned is not of such a nature as to bring it adequately within the scope of a scheme for military defence. The measures which you submit for my approval must be regarded as a part of the arrangements necessary for the control and protection of the frontier, while these again must depend mainly upon the general policy of your Government towards the tribes, which, as you are aware, is now under consideration; and I wish to be assured that this side of the whole question has been thoroughly examined. Accordingly, before deciding finally upon proposals which, if approved, might bring a large extent of trans-frontier country under the permanent protection of the British Government—a step which can hardly be taken without some material increase of our responsibilities—I think it best to remit the case again to your Excellency for full consideration, upon the political and military principles laid down in my Despatch of the 28th January last

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 10.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 10th August, 1899.

IN our Military despatch of the 4th May, 1899,* we informed Your Lordship that we had finally decided that the force holding Landi Kotal and controlling the Khyber should be, as heretofore, a local force, and that it should have a strength of 1,200 men in two battalions under a single Commandant and Adjutant, with two other British officers to each battalion. It was added that Your Lordship would be separately addressed as to the organisation of this force, and as to the political arrangements for keeping open the Khyber route. Subsequently, in our telegram of the 14th July, we asked Your Lordship's sanction to proceed at once to raise the Khyber Rifles to the strength proposed, and this was accorded in your telegram of the 2nd August.

2. We now have the honour to enclose copies of the correspondence cited in the accompanying list, showing in detail the arrangements sanctioned for the reorganisation of the corps, and the cost entailed.

* Not printed.

3. We have decided to maintain the existing arrangements for the kafilas traffic, *viz.*, that there shall be two kafilas a week each way in the cold weather, and one a week each way in the hot weather. While, however, in practice the Pass will be open for kafilas only on stated days, we retain the right to use it on any or every day of the week for any other purpose for which it may be required.

4. We invite your Lordship's attention to our Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 22nd June 1899, to the Officer Commanding the Khyber Force and Mr. F. D. Cunningham. We have in this letter laid down the principle that, in the Khyber and elsewhere along the frontier, the various corps of tribal militia or rifles, or military police, though semi-military in organization, are more than semi-political in functions and object, and, as such, must necessarily (except in time of active warfare) be under civil authority and control. While, therefore, we have reserved full discretion to invest the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, or any other officer displaying special aptitude for the work, with political authority in the Khyber Pass, we have decided that ordinarily there will be a separate Political Officer in the Pass, to whom in all political matters the commandant of the Khyber Rifles will be subordinate.

5. Measures will be taken at once to raise the corps to sanctioned strength, and we anticipate that it may be possible to withdraw the military garrison from Landi Kotal before the end of the year.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
„	W. S. A. LOCKHART.
„	E. H. H. COLLEN.
„	C. M. RIVAZ.
„	C. E. DAWKINS.
„	T. RALEIGH.
„	R. GARDINER.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Colonel N. F. Fitz G. Chamberlain, Colonel on the Staff Commanding Khyber Force, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., dated Simla, the 22nd June, 1899.

In the third paragraph of my letter, dated 1st June, you were informed that the question of the political control of the Khyber Pass was still under consideration, and that orders on this point and also on the question of the relations between the Political Officer and the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles would be communicated hereafter.

2. In the fourth paragraph of the same letter, it is stated that the *raison d'être* of the Khyber Rifles is political rather than military, and that it was considered important not to deprive them of their tribal character. This view is admitted throughout the correspondence, and the only point, on which there appears to have been some difference of opinion between General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham, was the question whether the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles under the new organization should be *ex-officio* the political authority in the Pass, or whether there should be a separate Political Officer to whom the Commandant would be subordinate.

3. The Government of India, after full consideration, desire to take this opportunity to lay down the principle that, in the Khyber and elsewhere along the frontier, the Corps of tribal militia, or rifles, or military police, by whatsoever name they may be called, though semi-military in organization, are more than semi-political in functions and object, and that as such they must necessarily (except in time of active warfare) be under civil authority and control. Sometimes this authority is exercised by a military officer in civil employ (who may also on occasion be in command of the Militia or Rifle Corps as well). Sometimes it is exercised through an officer of the Civil Service. In either case, the principle is the same. In the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, there can be no doubt that the principle is a correct one, and it should be adopted and acted upon along the entire length of the North-West border.

4. In these circumstances, the principle being admitted, the selection of the officer by whom the civil control is to be exercised is a matter of personal fitness. I am therefore to say that, while retaining full discretion to invest the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, or any other officer displaying special aptitude for the work, with political authority in the Khyber Pass, the Government of India have decided that ordinarily there will be a separate Political Officer in the Pass, to whom the Commandant will be subordinate. As regards the relations between the Commandant and the Political Officer, I am to add that the Government of India are of opinion that the rules suggested in paragraph 5 of General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham's letter of the 14th March are suitable and may be adopted.

5. I am to remind you that no time should be lost in submitting the proposition statement called for in paragraph 6 of my letter of 1st June. As soon as the additional defence works which are to be constructed at Landi Kotal and in the Pass are completed, the regular troops now in the Pass will be withdrawn. It is, therefore, important that there should be as little delay as possible in passing the final orders to raise the Khyber Rifles to the strength now desired.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. S. BARNES,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 11.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Dated Simla, the 26th October, 1899.

Your Lordship's despatch, dated 25th November 1898, acknowledged the receipt of the letter from Lord Elgin's Government, of the 4th August 1898, containing proposals in regard to the military position on the Miranzai border, in the Tochi valley, at Wana, and in the adjacent parts of the frontier. In commenting on the plans submitted, Your Lordship referred to the leading principles of policy laid down in your despatch, dated 28th January 1898, and pointed out that, while the proposals made dealt carefully and comprehensively with one of the main objects which Your Lordship desired us to bear in mind, *viz.*, the best possible concentration of our military force that would enable us to fulfil our responsibilities, the measures to be undertaken must also be devised with due attention to the principle that our administrative control over tribal territory was not to be extended, and must harmonise with the general policy that it is decided to pursue towards the frontier tribes. Your Lordship, therefore, remitted the case to us for full consideration in connection with this general question.

2. We have lately, as desired by Your Lordship, discussed the position on this part of the frontier in connection with, and as part of, the definite policy which we have already initiated in the Chitral Valley and in the Khyber Pass, and which has received Your Lordship's sanction. In the course of this discussion, we have arrived at certain conclusions which have been briefly communicated to Your Lordship in the Viceroy's telegram of the 2nd July, and which have met with Your Lordship's general approval. We now propose to set forth in greater detail the scheme which we recommend, and to explain the principles by which we have been guided.

3. The first principle laid down by Her Majesty's Government in Your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd January 1898 was that no new responsibility should be undertaken on the frontier, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. At the same time, as already stated, our attention was more especially directed by Your Lordship to the concentration of our military forces, and to the avoidance of unnecessary interference with the tribes. On the other hand, by their previous recommendations, the Government of India at the end of last year were more or less committed to a policy, which involved the construction of fortifications and the retention of the existing garrison in Chitral, the expenditure of several lakhs of rupees on a new fort at Landi Kotal, and on other fortified works in the Khyber, the construction of the bed for a light railway from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, the maintenance of a military garrison on the Samana range and in the Kurram valley, and an expenditure on forts and posts in these two places which under the scheme A recommended in the despatch of 4th August, 1898, and including the additional lines required at Kohat, amounted to Rs. 6,89,958. Certain additions to this scheme since recommended by the present Commander-in-Chief would have raised this expenditure to over eleven lakhs of rupees. In the Tochu valley it was considered necessary to maintain a considerable, though diminished, garrison, and it was proposed to establish a central cantonment at Miran Shah which could only have been constructed at a heavy cost. Similarly it was proposed to maintain a military garrison at Wana in Southern Waziristan for the protection of the Gomal route from Afghanistan. It is true that it was proposed in time to withdraw the regular troops from Landi Kotal in the Khyber, but with this exception there was to be little reduction in the number of troops cantoned beyond our administrative border. The principle of the concentration of our regular forces would, in these circumstances, have been imperfectly applied, and there was the further risk that the maintenance of regular garrisons in tribal territory would inevitably tend to increase, rather than to diminish, the extent of our interference.

4. Upon the reconsideration of the whole position to which we were invited by Your Lordship, we came to the conclusion that the recommendations previously submitted were susceptible of some modification in order to bring them into greater harmony with the principles that had been laid down. Accordingly, early in the present year, we prepared and forwarded revised proposals in regard to Chitral and the Khyber Pass, which, with Your Lordship's approval, are now in process of being carried out. These proposals were not made without due regard to our position and our impending arrangements elsewhere on the frontier. We endeavoured in framing them to make them conform to a definite and preconceived plan of general application, and they may be regarded as initiating a positive course of policy and action on the North-West Frontier, which, we hope, will be continuous and which rests on principles applicable in our opinion along the entire border. These principles are in accordance with the general axioms laid down in Your Lordship's despatch of 23rd January, and they may be specifically defined as follows :—

- (i) We desire to avoid locking up regular garrisons in costly fortified positions, at a distance from our base, where the troops themselves are practically lost to the offensive strength of India, and in time of emergency, would probably require additional forces to be detached from the Indian army to their assistance. It is for this reason that we proposed to withdraw or reduce our

existing garrisons in Chitral and Landi Kotal, and have decided not to proceed with the fortifications at those places on the large scale at first proposed.

- (ii) Inasmuch as after withdrawing or reducing our garrisons we cannot leave these positions or districts—all of which have been taken in a greater or less degree under our control—without military protection, we propose in each of them, as far as possible, to interest the inhabitants of the locality in their own defence, at the same time that we establish a lien upon their loyalty, by enrolling them as a tribal force to supply the local garrisons. In different parts of the frontier, according to the state of development of our relations with the tribes, or to the character of defence required, different methods will be adopted. Thus for instance in Chitral, we have decided to utilise native levies, already existing under a system of feudal service, and to pay them a salary for holding small posts, in our interests, on the road between the Lowarai Pass and Chitral. Their organisation and equipment are entirely native. This is the most primitive and rudimentary system, and is only supplementary to a military occupation in which it has been resolved on wider grounds to persist. In the Khyber Pass, we have reached a more advanced stage. Here the Khyber Rifles will replace the troops, and, as recently reorganised, they will consist of a body of men, recruited in certain proportions from the tribes, disciplined and equipped on more military lines, and commanded by British military officers. Nevertheless they are not a purely military body, and they are under the control of the civil power.

In all these cases the principle is the same, and is, we think, one of general application along the frontier, as well as of practical wisdom. By relieving the Indian army from the task of garrisoning and defending these outlying positions, it will be possible, when war breaks out on or beyond the frontier, to concentrate the majority of our troops upon the principal lines of advance. By enrolling the local garrisons as levies, or militia, or police, we reduce the publicity and exaggeration inseparable from proceedings of the regular army upon the frontier, while in the event of any contretemps, we escape the commotion and reproach that are apt to be excited by military disaster. Finally, we take into our pay, and thereby acquire a hold upon the allegiance of the tribesmen, who, while their local patriotism is conciliated by employment as the guardians of their native hills, develop at the same time under the influence of a quasi-military discipline an ever increasing loyalty to the British Government.

- (iii) Having withdrawn our regular garrisons from these advanced posts, and having substituted for them tribal forces, we cannot allow the latter to be imperilled or destroyed by local risings or by external attack. Accordingly at bases within or contiguous to the administrative frontier of India, we propose to maintain moveable columns ready to march to the relief or defence of the advanced positions, and, where possible, to connect the frontier cantonments with the military resources of India by light railways pushed forward from already existing railway systems. Thus for the support of the Chitral position, we keep a garrison at the Malakand and for the present a moveable column at Khar. It has also been decided to construct a light railway from Nowshera to Dargai. In support of the Khyber there is a movable column at Peshawar, and we have decided, with Your Lordship's sanction, to extend the railway on the standard gauge as far as Jamrud.

We have stated these principles at some length, because, if they are approved, their record may be of use for future guidance. It is also desirable that Your

Lordship should clearly apprehend the objects at which we desire to aim, and the unity of plan which underlies both our past and present recommendations.

5. We now propose to apply these considerations to that part of the frontier which is dealt with in Your Lordship's despatch of the 25th November 1898. We have carefully re-examined the proposals made by Lord Elgin's Government, and we see no reason why this part of the border should be dealt with on different principles from those which we have adopted in the sections of the frontier which have already come under our notice. There are also indications in the despatch of 4th August 1898 that a policy of progressive withdrawal and the substitution of tribal militia for regular troops had already been in the background of the intentions of our predecessors. We have therefore, after full discussion, come to the following conclusions :—

- (i) That it is possible and will be safe at an early period to withdraw the military garrisons from the forts on the Samana range.
- (ii) That the troops shall be replaced by a battalion of military police about 460 strong, to be called the Samana Rifles, and to be commanded by police officers. This form of tribal militia or military police will be intermediary between the native levies of Chitral and the more military organization of the Khyber Rifles. In our view precise uniformity of system is not essential on a frontier, so long and with such varying conditions both of local population and the degree of British control as the North-West border, and we think it far from undesirable that different experiments should be made in different parts. This police battalion will be largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen, who will thus be enlisted on our side in guarding their own border.
- (iii) That similarly there will be no serious difficulty or risk in withdrawing the regular troops from the Kurram valley, where we have a loyal population to deal with; their place being taken by an increase to the existing Kurram Militia. It is proposed that this increase should take the form of a second battalion, 400 strong, under police officers, the existing battalion being given a more military organisation, and being provided with additional officers.
- (iv) That for the support both of the Samana position and the Kurram valley a new cantonment be established in Miranzai, the position which has been recommended as most suitable being the open plain at an elevation of over 3,000 feet, which lies between Doaba and Torawari. The establishment of this cantonment is, we consider, a necessary condition of the withdrawal of the regular troops from these two advanced positions. Indeed, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considers that such a cantonment would have been necessary even if we had decided to adhere to the scheme A which was recommended in our despatch of the 4th August last. Its construction will have the further advantage of obviating the demand for the additional Native Infantry lines which it would otherwise have been necessary to build at Kohat.
- (v) That while the obligations into which we have entered render it impracticable to consider the question of a total withdrawal from either the Tochi valley in Northern Waziristan, or from Wana or the other obligatory positions in the Gomal and Shahur valley in Southern Waziristan, a prolonged or permanent military occupation of these places by the troops of the Indian army is not necessitated by political or strategical considerations.
- (vi) That, in pursuance of the policy initiated elsewhere on the frontier, the troops may be gradually withdrawn from all these places at as early a date as is consistent with safety and expediency.

- (vii) That to replace the troops, two new Militia Corps, similar to the Khyber Rifles and the Kurram Militia, shall be raised under British officers and largely recruited from the local tribes. One of these corps will hold the Tochi valley, the other will have its head-quarters at Wana, and will hold the necessary posts on the Gomal and Shahur routes. It is proposed not to maintain the present system of Sillahdari levies, but to absorb into the militia most of the men who are now engaged, employing a small portion of the new corps for civil and political duties, and continuing only such allowances to the local Malikhs as the Local Government may think necessary, in order to enable us to count on their support and good-will in maintaining the peace of the country.
- (viii) That in consequence of these arrangements, it will not be necessary to proceed with the proposed fortified cantonment at Miran Shah, but for the support of the Tochi position a moveable column will be maintained at Bannu.

6. We have been in communication with the Government of the Punjab in connection with these proposals, and they have on the whole met with the concurrence of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. We enclose, for Your Lordship's information, copies of the correspondence as detailed in the accompanying list. In the case of the militia for the Samana and the Kurram, we have not yet received the final conclusions of the Local Government, in the form of the necessary proposition statements, though the arrangements are in an advanced state of preparation. Our Foreign Secretary's letters to the Punjab Government of the 14th and 18th July explain the points on which we still await information. The estimated net cost of the Samana Battalion is Rs. 78,507, and of the additions to the Kurram Militia Rs. 1,29,126 a year. These totals may be slightly increased in the final proposals which we shall receive, but the net cost of the two schemes will not, we think, exceed Rs. 2,20,000 a year. In accordance with the general sanction given in Your Lordship's telegram of 25th July, and as soon as we receive the replies of the Punjab Government, we propose to sanction these two schemes, and to proceed without delay with the enlistment of the Samana Rifles and of the additional militia for the Kurram valley. We anticipate that it may be possible to withdraw the troops from the Samana range and the Kurram in about nine months from the date of sanction to these two schemes. As regards the new cantonment which it is proposed to place at Torawari, we think it desirable to test the suitability of the site before incurring a large expenditure on buildings and other works. We have decided, therefore, to place there in camp a moderate force consisting of not less than one regiment of Native Cavalry, one Native Infantry regiment, and a Mountain Battery. These troops will be provided later on with adequate shelter during the hot weather, and, if the site proves to be satisfactory, we will proceed gradually to construct permanent barracks and other buildings.

7. Our proposals in regard to Waziristan are in a less advanced state, and will take a longer time to complete. Our Foreign Secretary's letter to the Government of the Punjab, of 7th August, explains our views in detail, and before we can furnish Your Lordship with more precise and detailed proposals, it will be necessary to await the report of the Committee which we have directed the Local Government to convene. But the information given in the papers which we forward will, we think, be sufficient to enable Your Lordship to form an approximate estimate of the cost of the scheme when completed. Assuming the absorption in the new corps of the greater number of the existing Sillahdari levies, the nett cost of a militia corps in the Tochi of a strength of 700 rifles and 50 cavalry is estimated at Rs. 87,452 a year. The nett cost of the larger scheme of 1,000 rifles and 60 cavalry suggested by the Commissioner of the Derajat would be about Rs. 1,35,000. We must await the proposals of the Committee and the Local Government as to the exact strength which may be required, but assuming the strength of each of the two corps in Waziristan to be not less than 800 or more than

1,000 rifles, the nett cost for both will be from 2 to 2½ lakhs per annum. We would ask Your Lordship's permission to sanction such a strength for each corps, as in communication with the Local Government we may find to be necessary, within a limit of 3 lakhs a year nett increase of expenditure. The initial expenditure in connection with these corps cannot be large, as it is assumed they will take over the buildings now occupied by the troops.

8. It will be convenient at this stage to furnish Your Lordship with some estimate of the difference in cost of the arrangements now proposed, and of those which were in existence or were contemplated in January of this year. Such an estimate can, from the nature of the case, be only approximate, but the figures which we have been able to collect, and which are given in the three statements* herewith enclosed, are sufficient to demonstrate that the policy now

* Enclosures not printed.

contemplated must result at once in a very considerable, and in the long run in a permanent, relief to the Indian exchequer. Excluding the cost of the new cantonment in Miranzai, which will be dealt with hereafter when we are satisfied as to the most suitable site, and also the cost of the temporary camp, which it is impossible at present to estimate, but which should not be large, the difference in the initial expenditure on posts and fortifications, which we now propose, and that of the larger programme of military works contemplated last year, is no less than 26½ lakhs of rupees.

The saving in the recurring expenditure will also be substantial. If we find it possible to carry out to the full all our present proposals, the withdrawal of troops from the advanced positions which they now hold, and the substitution of militia corps and levies will result in the end in an annual saving of 2½ lakhs. A large portion of this saving will accrue at once, or within a very short interval, inasmuch as one regiment is now being withdrawn from Chitral, the troops at Landi Kotal will, we anticipate, return to India before the end of the year, and as already stated the withdrawal of the Kurram and Samana garrisons will, we hope, be possible within about nine months from the present time. We have already referred to the other obvious advantages of the present proposals, viz., the addition to our defensive strength on the border by the enlistment of the tribesmen in local corps for the police of their own hills, and the increase to our offensive power by the recall and concentration of the troops of the regular army. The extent of the relief which will be thus afforded may be measured by the fact that, without counting the two battalions which would in any case have been withdrawn from Landi Kotal, they will set free for service elsewhere about five battalions of native infantry.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
"	W. S. A. LOCKHART.
"	E. H. H. COLLEN.
"	A. C. TREVOR.
"	C. M. RIVAZ.
"	C. E. DAWKINS.
"	T. RALEIGH.

[Enclosure not printed.]

No. 12.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 4th January 1900.

I have considered in Council your Excellency's Letter No. 208, of the 26th October last, in which you explain the principles by which you have been guided in formulating your recommendations for the concentration of your military forces on the North-western Frontier, and set forth in detail the measures which you propose to adopt.

North-western Frontier. Military arrangements for Samana, Kurram, and Waziristan.

2. In my telegram of the 13th October, 1897, I expressed the view that "the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy"; and in the 18th paragraph of my Despatch of the 28th January 1898, I pointed out that one of the main objects to be kept in view should be the "limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to "avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory."

3. Subsequently, in reply to your predecessor's *Military Letter of the 4th August 1898*, I again referred to the question of the limitation of interference with the tribes as having an important bearing on your military proposals, and remitted the recommendations of the Government of India for further consideration upon the political as well as the military principles laid down in my Despatch of January 1898.

4. In your letter now under reply you report the military arrangements made upon an important section of the North-western Frontier, and you explain that they have been framed upon a definite plan intended for general application, which you desire to carry out as representing the continuous policy to be followed in dealing with questions of the protection of our own territory and the police of the border. The main object of these arrangements is the withdrawal of garrisons of regular troops from fortified positions beyond the frontier, or their reduction as circumstances may allow; and the substitution of militia recruited from the tribes of the country, disciplined and equipped to a certain extent upon military models, and usually commanded by British officers. In some cases untrained native levies are to be employed in maintaining posts of communication.

5. These measures, and the policy upon which they are based, appear to me to be in accordance with the principles laid down in my Despatches to you on the subject, particularly in the 18th and 19th paragraphs of my Despatch, dated 28th January 1893, in regard to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon the British Government in its relations with the frontier tribes.

6. I sanction the proposals submitted to me, and the expenditure which is estimated to be necessary, and I have pleasure in conveying to you, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, their recognition of the judgment, ability, and promptitude with which your Government has taken up and dealt with these important questions.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 13.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 13th September, 1900.

In your despatch of August 5th, 1898, in which you discussed the future administration of the North-West Frontier of India, as affected by the war of the preceding year, Your Lordship used these words: "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." Your Lordship, in inviting the attention of Lord Elgin's administration to certain suggestions for the attainment of this object, went on to remark: "The matter is too important for me to arrive at any final decision without giving to it the fullest consideration. I shall receive with interest any further observations which Your Excellency may desire to make on the suggestions of this despatch."

2. The proposals alluded to, relating to a change in the political control of the tribes on the Peshawar Border, by an alteration in the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar, were referred to the Punjab Government in the autumn of 1898. The replies of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the principal Frontier officers of the Local Administration, together with a Minute by the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, were forwarded to Your Lordship in a despatch dated the 10th November, 1898. Lord Elgin explained in his Minute that, while anxious before leaving India to submit his own opinions in an official form, he desired to speak for himself alone, and not in any way to pledge the Government of India, for whose mature and deliberate consideration the whole case must be expressly reserved.

3. This consideration we have now, in the light of further experience, and of a most careful examination of all the factors of the problem, given to it; and we submit to Your Lordship the conclusions at which we have arrived.

4. We are even more profoundly convinced than was Your Lordship of the unsatisfactory nature of the present position. It is as unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Punjab Government as it can be from that of the Government of India. The former is called upon to carry out a Frontier policy for which it is not in the last resort responsible, and with which it is not specially qualified to deal. The latter is responsible for a Frontier policy which is not carried out by its own agents, and is to a large extent removed from its direct supervision. Labour without responsibility is the experience of the Local Government; responsibility without control is that of the Government of India. This situation, which is equally invidious for both parties, has been aggravated in recent years by the circumstances that have brought a larger number of the Frontier tribes under the influence of the Government of India, and have compelled the institution of political relations with them, not always or easily to be adjusted to the scope and capabilities of a Provincial Administration. Some radical change in the existing system of Frontier management appears to us to be required, if there is to be either firmness, promptitude, or continuity of Frontier policy in the future.

5. The entire question has for some time engaged the close attention of His Excellency the Viceroy, who has personally visited the Frontier in order to examine the situation upon the spot. He has now submitted his views and proposals in an exhaustive Minute, which has been considered by us, and which we forward to Your Lordship with an expression of our unanimous and hearty agreement with its main propositions.

6. The problem is one which is capable of being dealt with in one of three fashions. It might be possible to reduce the difficulties and dangers of the present situation by conferring a considerably larger measure of independent authority and control over the Frontier administration upon the Punjab Government. We could not ourselves recommend such a proposal, for the reason that any addition to the powers of the Local Government must involve a corresponding subtraction from those of the Government of India; and that to increase the responsibility of the former at the expense of the latter would defeat the entire object that we have in view. But in any case we are precluded from even considering this alternative by the express injunction of Your Lordship, already quoted, which postulates a closer and not a more perfunctory control by the Government of India in the future.

7. Of the various compromises that are capable of being suggested between such a scheme, and that of the creation of a new administration, we will only observe that we are in complete agreement with the Lieutenant-Governor and the officers of the Punjab Government, in their rejection of the particular proposal that was indicated in Your Lordship's despatch of August 5th, 1898, and with His Excellency the Viceroy in the criticism that he has passed upon other and cognate suggestions in his Minute.

8. There remains only the third alternative; that of the construction of a new Agency or province, to be under the immediate control of the Government of India, and to be created out of those Trans-Indus districts of the Punjab, in which British officers are brought into direct contact with, and become

responsible for, the management of the Frontier tribes. We are convinced that our duties, whether towards them, or to our own subjects on this side of the border, are more likely to be discharged with the resolution, despatch, and freedom of personal discretion that are essential to success in dealing with such questions, by an Agent to the Governor-General, acting in direct touch with the local officials on the one hand and the Government of India on the other, than will be possible so long as the more complex mechanism and the stereotyped procedure of a first class Provincial Government continue to be interposed between the Frontier and ourselves

9. His Excellency the Viceroy has worked out with much care the suggested scope and character of the new administration. We concur with him in thinking that the main desideratum to be borne in mind, consistently with the root principle of our policy, is the least possible disturbance of existing arrangements. His scheme appears to us to have been devised with this object, and to be capable of execution not only without detriment, but even with advantage, to the interests of the existing province and its officers.

10. Should the project, in its general outlines, meet with the approval of Your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government, we would not propose to carry it into effect without the fullest consultation with the Punjab Government. It might be susceptible of modification and improvement at their hands. It should not be regarded, even from our own point of view, as fixed or finite, until it has been subjected to the scrutiny of those who, from their local knowledge, will be better able than ourselves to advise upon details, both administrative and geographical. The exact boundaries and sub-division of the detached districts, the constitution of the political, civil, and judicial service of the new Agency, and the effect produced upon the Punjab Commission, are all matters upon which we should desire to enter into friendly discussion with the Lieutenant-Governor. Should we receive your Lordship's permission to do so, we entertain little doubt of being able to submit to you, with no great delay, the full and final details of the projected reform.

11. As regards its financial cost, we call to mind that your Lordship, in your despatch of August 5th, 1898, conceded to the Government of India "a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to the considerations" to which you had invited our attention. It is too early at the present stage to pronounce with any definiteness as to the outlay that is likely to be entailed by still inchoate proposals. We are not without hopes, however, that, even when they are fully developed, we shall not be called upon to profit by the latitude which has been so generously allowed to us, but shall be able to commend our scheme as consistent with the interests of economical as well as efficient administration.

12. Finally, in submitting these proposals, we desire to impress upon Her Majesty's Government that we regard them as essential to the prosecution of the larger scheme of Frontier policy upon which, with their approval, we have lately embarked: that they are put forward, not in any experimental interests, but with the firm conviction that they will be conducive to a consistent and peaceable continuance of our present harmonious relations with the majority of the border tribes; and that, while, if accepted, they will emphasise the due responsibility of the Government of India for Frontier policy and concerns, they will also be the means of investing the officers who conduct those affairs on the spot with that wider liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with the Pathan peoples, which have long been recognised as an indispensable condition of Frontier success.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
"	E. H. H. COLLEN.
"	A. C. TREVOR.
"	C. M. RIVAZ.
"	T. RALEIGH.
"	E. F.-G. LAW.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Minute by the Viceroy on Frontier Administration.

During the year and-a-half that have elapsed since January, 1899, the Government of India have matured, and are now carrying into execution a new policy for the military charge and control of the North-West Frontier. We have reduced the regular garrison in Chitral, have concentrated our troops at Drosh, in close proximity to the British end of the Dir-Chitral line of communication, and have supplemented our military strength in the country by native levies, raised from the Mehtar's subjects. We have at the same time strengthened the Malakand position by the construction of a rail-road from Nowshera to Dargai.

2. In the Khyber we have successfully withdrawn the whole of the regular troops, both British and Native, from all positions in the Pass; and have replaced them by two battalions (1,250 in all) of the reorganised and enlarged Khyber Rifles, with an increased number of British officers, and an improved scale of pay. We have abandoned the costly and extensive fortifications which it was at one time proposed to build in the Pass and at its further extremity; and have, at a greatly reduced outlay, constructed the additional or improved defences that are required for the Afridi garrison. We have desisted from the plan of laying either the bed of a railway or a railway itself up the Khyber Pass, and have contented ourselves with a modest extension of the existing North-West Railway for the distance of 10 miles that separates Peshawar from Jamrud. Flying columns, maintained beyond the Malakand and at Peshawar, provide for the rapid reinforcement of these two sections of the frontier.

3. Between Peshawar and Kohat we have arranged peaceably for the construction of the long desired cart-road through Kohat Pass, a work which is about to be undertaken with the consent and co-operation of the Pass tribes. We further contemplate, at as early a date as our resources will bear the outlay, the linking of Kohat by railway with Kushalgarh upon the Indus, at which point connection by rail already exists with the military base of Rawalpindi.

4. South of Kohat a force of tribal militia, 450 strong, largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen and entitled the Samana Rifles, has been raised under British officers as an extra battalion of the Border Military Police, and is intended, as soon as the conditions permit, to replace our regular garrisons now maintained on the Samana Range.

5. In the Kurram valley, the Kurram Militia have been augmented in numbers and reorganised in two battalions (1,250 strong) under British officers. It is believed that the high state of efficiency which they have already attained will very shortly admit of the withdrawal of the regular garrison which has been maintained in the Kurram valley since it was taken over in 1892. Both the Samana and the Kurram positions will be supported by the light railway which it is in contemplation to build from Kohat to Thal.

6. Further to the south measures are now being taken for the realisation of a similar policy. Two battalions of Waziristan Militia of 800 each are in course of being raised, the one for the Tochi valley or Northern Waziristan, the other for the Gomal valley or Southern Waziristan. They are intended, as soon as the requisite degree of discipline and efficiency has been attained, to replace the large garrisons of regular troops which have been kept in those valleys since 1895.

7. The principle that underlies all these dispositions is the same. While entailing no abdication of the responsibilities, military or political, which have been assumed by the Government of India at an earlier date, and which could not, either with safety or in honour, be now repudiated, they are intended to extricate from advanced positions the large numbers of regular troops who have for some years been stationed there; to consolidate instead of diffusing our military strength upon the border; and to promote a spirit of local harmony and co-operation by the enlistment, in the service of the British Government, but in the defence of their own country, of the wild but not intractable inhabitants of these regions. It is hoped, if the scheme be given a fair start, that its

possible risks may be more than compensated by its unquestioned advantages, of reduced outlay, of increased tactical mobility, and of tribal contentment. Above all, the scheme which I have sketched, which has been inspired, not by a Local Government, but by the Supreme Government, and which is under the control not of the military authorities, but of the Foreign Department, *i.e.*, of the Viceroy, is intended to emphasize the responsibility, which the Government of India has assumed and of which it cannot ever safely divest itself, for the pacification and control of regions, which lie upon the borders of the Empire, and which, if any part of the Indian frontier be at any time exposed to attack, will in all probability be the immediate focus of military and political danger.

8. I now desire to supplement these plans, which have so far been attended by consequences as favourable as could possibly have been hoped for (though I shrink from any dogmatism as to the future), by submitting the proposal, which is their natural complement and climax, and upon which they are in my judgment dependent for the prospect of continuing success, *viz.*, the constitution of a form of administration in the tracts in question which shall bring to bear upon them the authority and influence of the Government of India in a manner more prompt, more imperative, and more direct, than will ever be found possible, so long as the elaborate organisation of a Local Government of the first class intervenes between it and them. I have not brought forward this scheme until I have satisfied myself, by more than a year and a half of patient enquiry and observation in this country and in the Departments of Government, of the complexities, the anomalies, and, as they appear to me, the ineradicable flaws of the existing system; nor have I ventured to indicate what in my opinion should be the keystone of the frontier arch, until I have endeavoured securely to lay the foundations upon which its piers must rest.

9. This is by no means the first time that the proposal has been made to create a new and separate administration for the North-West Frontier. On the contrary, schemes of varying character and magnitude have been submitted to and debated by the Government of India throughout the last quarter of a century; and it may safely be said that there is no frontier authority of any

* Among those who have at different times held these views, I may mention Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Durand, Lord Roberts, Sir James Browne, Sir Robert Warburton, Sir Robert Sandeman, Sir William Lockhart. I exclude those whose views have been formed independently of Frontier experience, such as Lord Lytton, Sir Charles Aitchison, Sir George Chesney, Lord Lansdowne.

eminence during that period who has not discussed, while there are but few who have not approved the principle of, such a change. This remarkable unanimity* testifies to the depth and range of the conviction upon which the desire for reform has been based and effectively relieves any fresh disputant from the charge either of rashness or of innovation. On the other hand, the fact that all previous endeavours have proved abortive, and that the existing system, though so widely and authoritatively condemned, has continued to survive, suggests that the problem itself is far from easy of solution, and that before it be again approached a brief survey of earlier efforts, and, if possible, an analysis of the causes of their failure, may be helpful to the present argument.

HISTORY OF PAST ATTEMPTS.

10. From the date of the Mutiny until 1899 the discussion of a separate Frontier province and administration was invariably mixed up with, and arose in the first place out of, the proposal to incorporate Sind with the Punjab. Sind had been conquered in 1843, when—the Punjab not having as yet been annexed, and Bengal, which embraced administratively the whole of the north of India, being too remote—it was added, in spite of the distance and the intervening sea, to the Government of Bombay. Even when the Punjab was annexed in 1849, and when, after the Mutiny, it was constituted a Lieutenant-Governorship, it was decided by the Secretary of State not to attach Sind to it, owing to the excellent administration which the latter province was at the time receiving from its Commissioner, Mr. Bartle Frere, under the Government of Bombay. In later years, in 1863 and in 1876,

Sir Bartle Frere himself became one of the strongest advocates of the union which his own abilities had successfully averted to postpone. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook the incorporation of Sind with the Punjab was, in April 1876, formerly recommended to the Secretary of State, and was accepted in principle by him, though a final expression of opinion was deferred until the newly-appointed Viceroy, Lord Lytton, had visited the frontier.

11. The result of this visit was the appearance of Lord Lytton's well-known Minute of April 22nd, 1877, which at once raised the question on to a different level by suggesting the creation of a separate Trans-Indus District, under a representative of the Viceroy, as the sole exponent of Imperial policy in India. The anomalies and drawbacks of the existing situation were vigorously delineated, and the outlines of the new administration were clearly sketched. The province was to consist of the six Frontier Districts of the Punjab, viz., Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception), and Dera Ghazi Khan, and also Trans-Indus Sind (with the exception of Karachi). At the head was to be a Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier and Agent to the Governor-General, to reside at Peshawar, with the powers of a Local Government, and with a Judicial Commissioner possessing the powers of a Chief Court. Under him were to be two Commissioners, one for the Punjab Frontier Districts, except Dera Ghazi Khan (*i.e.*, for the Pathan population of the border); the other for Baluchistan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Trans-Indus Sind (*i.e.*, for the Baluch population). Into the constitution of the lower grades of the administrative hierarchy, which was to be furnished, with an increased scale of pay, from the Punjab Commission, I need not enter. The covering despatch which was sent with this Minute to the Secretary of State, dated May 17th, 1877, recommended the adoption of its proposals, and the compensation of Bombay for the loss of Sind by the administrative absorption of the whole or part of the Central Provinces—thereby introducing an element of discord which effectually ruined this and all similar proposals for many years to come.

12. The Secretary of State in replying, on November 29th, 1877, accepted the main proposals of Lord Lytton's Government, remarking that the conditions under which the Frontier had been given to the Punjab were obsolete, and that the proposals themselves were "measures of defence and security, not of aggression." Nevertheless, looking to the heavy financial cost of Lord Lytton's complete scheme and to the desirability of not embarking upon too large a change, he recommended, as a smaller and less ambitious proposal, the elimination of the Chief Commissioner or single supreme authority, and the creation of two Commissionerships for the Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab and Sind (the one for the Pathan, the other for the Baluch tribes). The incumbents of both posts were to be appointed by the Viceroy, but in respect of all internal affairs were to take their orders from the Punjab Government. The Northern or Pathan Districts Commissioner was to be the superior in status, with the rank of Agent to the Governor-General and Frontier Commissioner, and with the right to correspond directly with the Viceroy. The Southern Commissioner was to be subordinate to, and to correspond with, his northern colleague.

13. I call special attention to this proposal, as to which it was admitted that it involved "a duplicate responsibility which is in theory objectionable and may be attended with occasional inconvenience," because it was the first suggestion of a form of compromise which has re-appeared at intervals since, which possesses undoubted superficial attractions, but which has invariably been condemned by those enjoying the closest practical acquaintance with the Frontier. Sir C. Aitchison, who was at that time Foreign Secretary, and who subsequently became Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, noted that "it would probably be difficult to devise a scheme more full of the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion, and divided responsibility." Sir R. Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, remarked—"It is almost impossible to exaggerate the inconvenience which might arise from this division of authority. It would have the worse effect upon the internal administration of the Frontier Districts." Other members of the Government described it as quite unworkable and as radically bad.

14. Lord Lytton, however, thinking that half a loaf was better than no bread, was prepared, with certain re-adjustments, to accept the modified scheme. A correspondence ensued with the Punjab Government as to the best methods of carrying it out. The arrangements were nearly completed, and Sir F. (now Lord) Roberts had even been designated as the first Northern or Chief Commissioner of the Frontier when, in the winter of 1878, war broke out with Afghanistan.

15. In the ensuing year, when the war was apparently ended, the project was revived. Then came the Cavagnari massacre and the second Afghan expedition. When peace had been re-established, and the future administrative dispositions required to be made, Lord Lytton had left India. His successor, Lord Ripon, recommended to Her Majesty's Government the abandonment of the entire scheme, both for the separation of the Trans-Indus Districts from the Punjab Government and for the transfer of Sind; and both projects accordingly disappeared from view.

16. Some years elapsed before, in the concluding year of Lord Dufferin's and in the opening year of Lord Lansdowne's administration, either project was revived. The transference of Sind to the Punjab was then again proposed. Matters had, however, changed in the interim. With the creation of the Baluchistan Agency under Sir Robert Sandeman Sind had ceased to be a Frontier, and had become an internal province. Willing as Bombay might be to consider the exchange of Sind for the Central Provinces, the Chief Commissioner of the latter submitted an argument which, in the altered condition of circumstances, was fatal to any such proposal. Early in 1889, accordingly, this scheme, which for over 30 years had at fitful intervals re-appeared upon the scene, finally vanished from view. I do not propose, and I cannot imagine that any of my successors will ever propose, to revive it. The interests of Sind, now that it is no longer a Frontier Province, if they have no special connection other than a historical one, which is not to be despised, with Bombay, have, on the other hand, no connection with the Punjab other than that of geographical contiguity with the outskirts of that province. Sind is, I believe, content with its present, and rather peculiar, administration, the foundations of which were laid by Sir Bartle Frere, and I see no reason for disturbing it. Still less ground would there be for either partitioning or for handing over to another Government, the Central Provinces. That administration has, since its constitution, greatly increased in size, in numbers of population, and in importance. It has no natural connection with Bombay. It requires the undivided services of a single Governor. A series of capable administrators have established its indisputable right to an independent existence.

17. The discussion, which had been resumed in the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne, as to the desirability of creating a new Frontier Province, terminated in a decision not at present to proceed further with any such scheme, but to leave to the Punjab Government the responsibility of carrying out, in the middle or Pathan section of the Frontier, a more active policy than had hitherto been in vogue, with the view of establishing friendly relations with the tribes upon this part of the border, similar to those which were alleged already to exist in Dardistan and Baluchistan. Twelve years earlier Lord Lytton had written in his Minute:—

“I believe that our North-West Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the world; at least I know of no other spot where, after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little knowledge of them, that the country within a day's ride of its most important garrison is an absolute *terra incognita*, and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border.”

18. How little change had been effected in the interim may be illustrated by the almost exact reproduction of the same complaint in the same language in the letter, dated 17th October 1889, in which Lord Lansdowne's Government laid down its new injunctions for the guidance of the Local Government:—

“The Government of India cannot consider its present relations with the trans-frontier tribes on the Punjab border as either suitable or satisfactory, and the absence of any friendly understanding between them and the neighbouring British officers may at any time prove a source of serious danger and anxiety. The country within a day's ride

of one of our most important garrisons is indeed almost a *terra incognita*, and there is no security for British life a few miles beyond the border. Punitive expeditions have been frequent, but have been attended with very few permanent results, and there is probably no other spot in the world where, after 35 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours or has acquired so little knowledge of them."

19. This correspondence was not attended by any appreciable results. It was an attempt to recommend to the Punjab Government methods other than those to which it had been accustomed, and did not accordingly meet with an effusive welcome at its hands. From a perusal of many such discussions, of which this is only one, I derive the impression that any attempt, in the case either of the Punjab or Baluchistan Administrations, to indicate to the one a preference for the system followed by the other foredooms the discussion to practical sterility. It is so easy to demonstrate a difference of conditions that any argument as to similarity of treatment is capable of being hotly contested and is certain to be fruitless. Much of the failure to devise any better method in the past has been due to the unconscious affront to local susceptibilities, caused by the suggestion of an analogy, which is thought to be, and perhaps sometimes is, misleading.

20. In the concluding months of Lord Lansdowne's administration a great change was introduced in the entire circumstances of the Frontier, and notably in the question which I am here discussing, by the conclusion of the Durand Agreement at Kabul in November 1893, whereby a line of division, subsequently demarcated through the greater part of its extent, was drawn between the British and Afghan possessions, from Chitral to the borders of Seistan. On the British side of the line was left, notably in Waziristan, a great block of tribal territory, with which the Amir henceforward had no right of interference, and which, without being thereby either absorbed or annexed by the Government of India, passed into its indisputable sphere of influence. The establishment of control over its people, or even of friendly relations with them, may be rapid or slow, complete, imperfect, or illusory. But the territory so demarcated has ceased to belong to any other political system and has fallen within the Protectorate of a Power which, while it may not be anxious to assume, cannot in the last resort repudiate, its paramount responsibility. So clearly was the entire change in the conditions produced by this agreement seen by Lord Lansdowne that, on leaving India, he left the following opinion on record:—

"I hold that irrespective of the objections to a system of dual control (*i.e.*, by the two Local Governments of the Punjab and Baluchistan) it is not desirable that the great Frontier region for which we have become responsible to the north of the Gomal should be administered by an already overworked Local Government, only a few of whose officers are really familiar with Frontier affairs, while all of them are overladen with routine work. All the circumstances seem to me to point to the creation of a single Frontier charge entrusted to the management of a single officer under the immediate direction of the Government of India."

21. In the early years of Lord Elgin's administration an attempt was once more made to escape from the necessities of a radical change by again suggesting to the Punjab Government the initiation of a policy of friendly intercourse with the tribes for whom we had thus assumed political responsibility, and for the strengthening of the political service on the border. Into the discussion that followed with the Punjab Government I need not enter. Suffice it to say that it was not followed, so far as I can ascertain, by any practical changes, either in the principles or in the form of administration. Then ensued the Frontier risings of 1897, and the Frontier war culminating in the Tirah Campaign.

22. At the conclusion of the war the Secretary of State, in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, summing up the situation as it then stood, used these remarkable words:—

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory; and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations, with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

23. In order to secure this end, the Secretary of State then invited the attention of the Government of India to the suggestion that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and the officers employed in conducting external relations with the tribes under him, should act directly under the Government of India. The Commissioner should be appointed by the Viceroy with special reference to these responsibilities, and should send copies of his reports to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. In all other respects, *i.e.*, in all matters of civil administration, he and his officers would continue as now to be under the Local Government.

24. It will be observed that this proposal was an almost exact reproduction of the scheme that had been put forward by another Secretary of State 21 years before, and that had perished at the outbreak of the Afghan war.

25. The 1877 scheme contemplated the appointment of two Commissioners, the one for Baluchistan, the other at Peshawar. Both were to be appointed by the Viceroy, but in respect of all internal affairs were to take orders from the Punjab Government. The Northern Commissioner was to correspond directly with the Government of India. I have already quoted the severe criticisms which were passed in India upon the earlier scheme, even though it was accepted, *faute de mieux*, by Lord Lytton. The only material difference in the 1898 scheme was that the Southern Commissioner having already been created in the interim in the person of the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner for Baluchistan, the proposal was restricted to the Northern or Pathan section of the border. The reception which was accorded to it may be judged from the correspondence that was sent home to the Secretary of State by Lord Elgin's Government in November 1898, shortly before I came out to India, and that contained the opinions of the Viceroy, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and the leading Frontier officers of that Government. The whole of these authorities, with one exception, were opposed to the scheme on grounds which may be inferred from the previous discussion. It was held (1) that by such a system friction would be developed between the Supreme and the Local Governments, since the former would desire, as Commissioner of Peshawar, a man skilled in Frontier politics, while the latter might prefer an administrator trained to deal with revenue, police, and crime; (2) that it would be found impossible in practice to sever the political or trans-frontier duties of such an officer from his administrative or cis-frontier work, and that in fact his influence with the tribes in their political aspect was inseparable from his administrative control over them, or their friends and neighbours, on the British side of the border; (3) that great difficulties would be encountered (in respect of recruitment, promotion, and replacement) in so small a political service as would require to be constituted in order to carry out the plan; (4) that the authority of the Punjab Government would be impaired by the inevitable tendency of those of its officers who served two masters, to play to the superior gallery; (5) that the Foreign Department of the Government of India would be swamped with work; (6) that it would be difficult to find a man for the place. With all of these arguments I do not agree, or at least not to the same extent; but I regard their cumulative effect as overwhelming; whilst after visiting the Frontier, and making special enquiries about the matter on the spot, I entertain little doubt that the first objection, *viz.*, the impossibility of severing the external relations of the tribes from their internal administration, and of placing the former under one Government, while the latter remains under another—or, as I have heard it put, of separating hill politics from plain politics—is alone sufficient to condemn the proposal.

26. Since these replies were sent home to the Secretary of State, nothing further has transpired, and we are now at liberty to make to him any proposals that we please for the removal of blemishes or the reform of abuses in the present system, and for the carrying out of his instructions to bring more directly under our own control and supervision the conduct of external relations with the border tribes.

27. The historical recapitulation in which I have indulged will, I think, have established the following propositions, as a starting point from which we may safely proceed :—

- (1) Throughout the past quarter of a century there has been a steadily growing feeling that the affairs of the Frontier, which are in a peculiar degree the province of the Government of India, are not best managed by a Local Government, neither specially recruited nor exceptionally qualified for the purpose.
- (2) These general considerations have been greatly enhanced in urgency and value by the political changes, which have resulted in recent years in the addition of great territorial and tribal responsibilities to the Punjab Government, and in the concentration of the main external anxieties of the Viceroy in particular, and of the Government of India in general, upon that section of the Indian Frontier, which is administered by the Punjab Government.
- (3) The desired changes are not capable of being brought about by the issue of instructions to the Punjab Government to carry out the policy of the Government of India on its behalf. In no country in the world is administrative loyalty more sincere or more profound than in India ; but it is from the nature of things impossible for a Local Government to carry out a foreign policy which it neither originates in the first place, nor is responsible for in the last, with the same influence, zeal, or despatch as would the authors of the policy itself. The comparative futility of the admonitions which have at various times been addressed to the Punjab Government in this context, confirms the necessity of a wider and more organic change.
- (4) Such a change, if brought about, should, in view of previous experience, aim at the minimum rather than the maximum disturbance of the *status quo*.
- (5) It should not be handicapped at the outset by questions of territorial or political compensation to injured parties. For this purpose such injury must itself, as far as possible, be avoided or minimised. In other words, Sind, Baluchistan, Kashmir—all of which it has at different times been proposed to throw into the crucible from which the new province was to emerge—should be treated as possessing fixed destinies, and as lying outside the present discussion.

With this prelude I will now proceed to discuss, firstly, the reasons which lead me, individually, to think that the time has now arrived when the constitution of a new Frontier administration can no longer wisely be delayed ; secondly, the form which that administration should take ; and, thirdly, the merits or demerits of the proposal.

REASONS FOR CREATION OF A NEW FRONTIER PROVINCE.

28 The first objection that I take to the present system is one which in theory must be obvious, but the full force of which in practice no one can adequately realise who has not had direct experience of it. Under the methods of Indian Government, the conduct of foreign affairs in India is vested in the Viceroy. He is the head of the *Foreign Department* : or, if the Indian analogy be pursued, the Member of Council for that Department ; if the home analogy be followed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Now in India foreign affairs—while they embrace many intricate and important questions concerning Native States, and while, in the sphere of external policy, they include our relations with China in Yunnan, with Tibet, with Afghanistan, with Maskat, with the Arab tribes in the Aden Protectorate, and with the Persian Gulf—in the main arise out of, or are connected with, the Frontier tribes and problems ; whilst, if we take the whole of the land frontiers of India from the Shan States on the extreme east to the borders of Persian Baluchistan on the extreme west, the most critical, most anxious, and most explosive section of the entire Frontier, is that between the Swat river and the Gomal

valley, or precisely the section which is handed over to the Punjab Government. Upon this stretch of boundary, inhabited by the most numerous, fanatical, and turbulent of the Pathan tribes, the Foreign Minister of India, who is also the Viceroy, cannot issue an order, or make an appointment except through the medium of the Punjab Government, nay he cannot—with certain exceptions, hereafter to be noted—make an appointment at all. The Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, the Political Officers, and Commandants of Border Police, in whose hands rests the entire local responsibility upon the Frontier, are nominated not by him but by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, who is the principal adviser of the Lieutenant-Governor, is selected, without reference to the Viceroy, by the latter. The Viceroy cannot even remove an indifferent or unsuitable official; since promotion in the Punjab is regulated by the conditions of a service of, which not he, but the Lieutenant-Governor, is the efficient head. If a debate arises in Parliament as to a Frontier outbreak, or a tribal expedition, it will be the Viceroy, and the Viceroy alone who will be held accountable. Public opinion censures him for failure, or congratulates him upon success. To a certain extent public opinion is right; since, owing to circumstances to which I shall presently allude, the Local Government ventures upon few steps of any importance without reference to the higher authority. But among those who hold up the head of the Government of India to praise or to blame, how many are there who know that he has been working throughout, not through his own agents but through those of another Government, that at each stage he has required to carry the assent of a subordinate, but withal most influential authority, and that in all probability in the early stages (for most frontier disturbances spring from small beginnings) he has had neither responsibility, knowledge, nor information? I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action—a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the Local Governments are both located at the same spot, Simla.

29. Now there might be some excuse, perhaps even some solid ground, for such an arrangement, if the Local Government and its officials, who are the intermediaries through whom the Government of India are compelled to act, were themselves deeply versed in Frontier knowledge and experience. It might not unreasonably be argued that a Viceroy and Council, recruited partly from England, partly from the different provinces of India, must know less of the Frontier than a Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Secretary who have probably been brought up in the Punjab, and have been familiar with the tribes from early manhood. But is this the case? Quite the reverse. In practice it is found that as a rule neither the Lieutenant-Governor nor his Chief Secretary knows anything of the Frontier at all; and that they are selected for their high offices, the former by the Viceroy, the latter by the Lieutenant-Governor himself, on account of their general administrative capacity, and ability to do justice to the many aspects of a singularly complex civil administration. Thus, if I take the list of the Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Secretaries of the Punjab who have held those offices during the past 23 years, since Lord Lytton first mooted his scheme of a Trans-Indus province, I find that their Frontier record has been as follows:—

Lieutenant-Governors.

Sir Robert Egerton (1877—1882) had never been in a Frontier District throughout his service, except as Additional Commissioner of Peshawar from November 1863 to March 1864.

Sir Charles Aitchison (1882—1887) had never been in a Frontier District throughout his service.

Sir James Lyall (1887—1892) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick (1892—1897) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Mackworth Young (1897—1900) had never served upon the Frontier except for 16 months as a 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner of one year's service in 1865-66.

30. Thus the entire cumulative period of Frontier service which can be claimed by a succession of five Lieutenant-Governors has been 20 months, out of a total cumulative service enjoyed by these officers, at the period of their appointments to the rule of the Province, of 151 years.*

* This total is made up as follows : Length of service (upon appointment as Lieutenant-Governor) of Sir R. Egerton, 21 years ; Sir C. Aitchison, 26 years ; Sir J. Lyall, 29 years ; Sir D. Fitzpatrick, 34 years ; Sir M. Young, 35 years ; or a total of 151 years.

31. If I take the Chief Secretaries during the same period, I find the following :—

Sir Lepel Griffin (1878—1880) had never served upon the Frontier.

Sir Mackworth Young (1880—1886) as above stated.

Mr. C. L. Tupper (1890—1895), previously officiating, had spent 16 months as 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner, engaged in settlement work, at Dera Ghazi Khan.

Mr. H. C. Fanshawe (1895—96) had spent 7 months, as Settlement Officer, at Dera Ismail Khan.

Mr. L. Dane (1896—1899) had been for 1 month 3rd grade Assistant Commissioner at Dera Ghazi Khan and Settlement Collector of Peshawar (1893—1896).

32. It will thus be seen that not one of the Chief Secretaries of the Punjab Government during the same period had, at the time of his appointment, enjoyed any political service upon the Frontier whatsoever. All without exception have been selected for their administrative or other abilities. It is manifest, therefore, that the plea that, in committing the charge of the Frontier to the Punjab Government, the Government of India is making up for any ignorance on its own part by special aptitudes or knowledge on the part of the principal agents whom it employs, is one that cannot be sustained. There are probably at any one moment in the Foreign Department of the Government of India men with a wider knowledge of the Frontier and its tribes than are to be found in the Punjab Secretariat in an entire decade. Moreover, even were such local knowledge forthcoming at Lahore, it would surely be open to argument that a Lieutenant-Governor or a Chief Secretary or a combination of the two, so endowed, would not necessarily be qualified to deal with the larger problems of foreign policy upon which all tribal issues in the last resort depend, and which must inevitably be more accurately gauged by the Government of India and its head, than they can be by the officers of a provincial administration. Some of the officers of the Punjab Government, in commenting upon the Secretary of State's suggested compromise, have enlarged upon the advantage to them of consulting the personal knowledge and authority of the Lieutenant-Governor when he is on tour upon the Frontier. I do not desire for one moment to disparage the results or benefits of such consultations. But from what I have said, I should imagine the advantage to be quite as often communicated to the Lieutenant-Governor as derived from him ; whilst, assessing it at the maximum, how much more valuable, I feel inclined to say, would it be, were it the result of the presence of an Agent to the Governor-General, not paying an occasional visit to the Frontier, but permanently resident upon it, not ignorant of the tribes before he attained his high office, but possessing a long and intimate acquaintance with them. If, however, it be said that any lack of knowledge on the part of the superiors is compensated by the intelligent abilities of their subordinates on the Frontier itself, it may be pointed out that the services of the latter would equally be at the disposal of the Government of India, under a reformed system, without the intervening stratum of experienced but not expert authority ; whilst it is unfortunately the case that, owing to the wider scope of promotion that is open to members of the Punjab Commission, who are engaged in revenue and financial work, there is an inclination among ambitious men to devote themselves to these fields of service rather than to the more irksome and less remunerative conditions of Trans-Indus existence. It was further shown by Sir R. Udny (Commissioner of Peshawar) in his letter

of 20th October, 1898, that while, under the Punjab system, the theory is that the Frontier is administered, in the lower grades, by officers of Frontier experience, in practice this is very far from being the case. Between 1878 and 1891, only five men were sent to the Frontier who still remained upon it (not having been reverted) in 1898. It was a constant occurrence that no Covenanted Officers were forthcoming for the Frontier; and that Uncovenanted Officers and even natives had to be sent in their place. The charge, therefore, of insufficient experience, which has been shown to apply in the highest quarters, is not without substance in the lower grades also.

33. I have not paused to discuss the cynical suggestion that may occur to some students of British administration, that there may be some deliberation in the policy, that constitutes as the Viceroy's chief adviser in Frontier policy, an officer who in the majority of cases has had no practical experience of the Frontier himself. If there is a case in which the conclusions of the uninformed are perilous, it is that of tribal policy. It is impossible to imagine a field of political action in which the capable outsider, relying upon general *savoir faire*, or experience of men, is likely to come to more disastrous grief. A collateral illustration of this truth may be found in the fact that all the men who have attained the greatest celebrity by their successful handling of the tribes have been men who have not come fresh to the task, but have devoted years of their life to the study and assimilation of tribal ideas and ways. I may instance Sir John Lawrence, General John Jacob, John Nicholson, Sir Herbert Edwardes, Colonel Mackeson, Sir R. Warburton, Reynell Taylor, Sir R. Sandeman.

34. Such being the character of the agency through which the Government of India is at present required to carry out its Frontier policy, I next ask what are the main features and results of this system as a working scheme. I do not hesitate to say that they are departmental irresolution, the dissipation instead of the concentration of responsibility, and long and injurious delays. Some of these consequences are inseparable from the system. Others have grown up as accretions upon it.

35. It will be admitted that in any administration the longer the official chain—and the more numerous the obligatory links of reference—the less likelihood is there of prompt and efficacious action. It will also be conceded that, if there is a field of policy in which rapidity of decision and swiftness of execution are essential, it is that of the Frontier. And yet in practice, before the pettiest affair, arising, *e.g.*, out of a border raid, can be settled, the following are the stages, and their probable duration, through which the matter must pass. The local Political Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, where the latter is the local Political Officer, reports the case in the first place to the Commissioner, who is probably at some distance, and who, if it be summer time, may be away in the hills. In former days the Political Officer was obliged to report to the Deputy Commissioner and the latter to the Commissioner. But this intervening link has, except in certain cases, been abolished. The Commissioner, upon receipt of the report, has to consider the case, to look up the recent history of the tribe, or to investigate precedents. He then sends up the original report, with his own report upon it (as a rule proposing something rather different from his subordinate), to the Punjab Government. Before it reaches the latter, in all likelihood a fortnight will have elapsed. The case then passes through the Punjab Secretariat. Precedents and policies are again examined; in a department which, as I have shown, is not as a rule rich in Frontier experience, there is an inevitable tendency to become the slaves of formulæ and of precedents; finally, after the probable lapse of another fortnight, the case, with some fresh or alternative suggestion, may reach the Government of India. If a reference has been required in the interim, as is frequently the case, to the military authorities, another three or four weeks may have been spent in a reduplication of the same chain. An enquiry will have been addressed in the first place to the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces in the Punjab. He must refer the case to the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, and the latter to the Officer Commanding in the locality concerned. The answers must be returned through the same compulsory stages. The case having reached the Government of India, all the various papers and proposals, which have by now attained somewhat bulky

dimensions, must pass through the Foreign Department in the normal course for analysis, illustration, and annotation. Finally, orders are issued upon it by the Viceroy to the Local Government, these having to be transmitted back through the familiar chain; until many weeks, and too often many months, after the commission of the original offence, a decision arrives upon a matter which ought in all probability to have been composed on the spot in a few days. If it be said that such a history must be the exception and not the rule, I reply by admitting the charge; since in the majority of cases the delay entailed will undoubtedly be not less, but much greater, than that which I have depicted. I have dealt above with simple cases only. In the event of a complicated case, such as an increase of establishment, the raising of a new body of levies, or the shifting of a military post, what with the numerous references and cross-references, and the inseparable departmental delays, it will be surprising if the matter can be carried through in less than a year. I may instance my own scheme for a Tribal Militia in Waziristan. The original orders of the Government of India were issued to the Punjab Government on August 7th, 1899. A Committee was to be constituted to draw out the details of the scheme. Its report left matters in a state of considerably greater confusion. A mass of undigested papers, proposing something entirely different from what the Government of India had laid down, reached us in March 1900. I had to proceed myself to the Frontier in April, in order to extricate the case, by personal conference with the officials concerned, from the tangle in which it had become involved; and only now, one year, after inception, is the scheme of the Government of India beginning to take rudimentary shape.

36. That the description which I have given is applicable not to rare or isolated instances, but to the vast majority of Frontier cases may be demonstrated by a passage from the letter, dated October 21st, 1898, in which Mr. F. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, and himself one of the senior Punjab officials, expressed his opinions upon the suggestion made by the present Secretary of State for altering the status of that office. He said:—

“If the Punjab Government had any Frontier policy of its own, or having one, if it had authority to pursue it, if it had power to give orders in any but the most trivial matter, I could understand that by removing it from the chain the control of the Government of India would be increased in reality as well as in name. But I venture to think that, whatever their position in constitutional theory may be, the Lahore Government have not for many years past given orders in any but the most petty matter, affecting trans-border clans or politics.

“With the exception of a few years in the Secretariat, the whole of my service of 26 years has been passed on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and for the past 13 years in the Peshawar Division. Speaking of that part of the border, I cannot remember any question sufficiently important to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta. Under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner as the local Political Officer disposes of many claims against trans-border men by reprisals or arrests in British territory, or by his influence with clans outside, and he settles these cases without report to the great advantage of Government. But when he thinks action on his part will not summarily dispose of a case, he may report it for orders, and in cases of this description I think that in practice the Commissioner and the Local Government give advice and not decisions—the final order even now comes from Calcutta.”

37. This extract brings me to a secondary feature of the existing system. It might have been supposed, and it has frequently been argued, that the intervention of a Local Government between the Government of India and the frontier, involves a wise and necessary decentralisation. I have shown, on the contrary, that it results in excessive centralisation. The Local Government is apprehensive as to the issues of a policy for which, while the initial responsibility may perhaps be placed upon its own shoulders, it is not unnaturally anxious to shift the ulterior responsibility to those of the Government of India. And this apprehension is reflected in its attitude towards its own officers, to whose independence of action but slender scope is apt to be given, and who, particularly if they happen to be new to the Frontier, having perhaps been transferred thither from the charge of an inland district, are loth to assume an initiative which is certain to be discountenanced by the superior, and may bring them into trouble with the supreme authority. Thus the first merit of a well-

ordered decentralisation, namely the graduated diffusion as opposed to the rigid concentration of responsibility, is sacrificed.

38. There is another consideration which in practice has a disturbing and in the long run a sinister influence upon the promptitude and continuity of Frontier policy. Minute and incessant as are the references from the Punjab to the Supreme Government, averse though the former be from independent initiative or responsibility, there must yet in the nature of things be a great number of cases in which the Government of India are reluctant, at any rate in the earlier stages, to intervene, partly because they have little practical alternative but to accept the advice of the Local Government, through whose officers—and through them alone—their information is derived; still more from an indisposition to be constantly overruling or dictating to so powerful and highly-placed a subordinate. If the Local Government be interfered with at each stage, it is open to it to turn round later on, and to complain that it has never been given a free hand; that it has not been trusted; and that any failure or misfortune that may have ensued has been due not to any fault on its own part, but to the fact that it has been overridden. My predecessor, in his Minute of November 6th, 1898, laid stress upon the arguments, in defence of the existing system, that it is a great advantage that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be resident for several months in every year at Simla, where the Viceroy can enjoy opportunities of private conference with him; and that it is less easy to overrule a subordinate than a colleague and a friend. Without dissenting from the great advantages of such consultation, I yet venture to disagree *in toto* with both propositions. It seems to me an indefensible duplication of labour and delay, that for several months in every year, the Government of India, which is the real arbiter of Frontier policy, should be compelled to issue its orders respecting the Frontier not to the officials on the spot, but to another Government, whose officers are separated by only three miles from its own; while I cannot conceive it to be open to question that, if the advice of the inferior authority be not taken, such a course of action is at once more easily adopted, and more ungrudgingly obeyed, if that authority be in direct subordination to the Government of India and to the Viceroy, than if he be a Lieutenant-Governor, and the head of a quasi-independent administration. I do not see how any Governor-General could deny that, if he desires a policy to be pursued or a step to be taken in Baluchistan, which is under the administration of an Agent to the Governor-General, directly subordinate to himself, however unpalatable such a policy or step might be to the Agent to the Governor-General, it will be carried out with incomparably less friction and delay than in a similar case in the Punjab, where the dignity and susceptibilities of a Local Government and of its head demand the most scrupulous and respectful consideration.

39. For the reasons, therefore, which have been given, I hold the existing system by which the Frontier is managed through the medium of the Punjab Government to stand condemned. It has been reprobated by all the greatest Frontier authorities for the last quarter of a century. It attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a Local Government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant Governor. If this is an influential, I have yet shown it in practice to be not an expert medium. Worked as the system has been with unflinching loyalty and with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralisation, of interminable delay. Whether it has presented to the Government of India a cautious and continuous Frontier policy, whether it has saved India from Frontier expeditions and wars, whether, however imperfect as an administrative machine, it has produced meritorious political results, are questions which an appeal to history will easily settle, and which will be touched upon before the close of this memorandum.

POSSIBLE FORMS OF NEW ADMINISTRATION.

40. Having thus argued the inefficacy of the present system, I proceed to consider how best it may be replaced, always bearing in mind my earlier

dictum as to the desirability of producing the minimum dislocation in long established methods and traditions. It has sometimes been suggested that the existing organisation of the Punjab Government might still be retained for Frontier purposes with certain improvements or alterations. The Lieutenant-Governor might, it has been urged, be specially chosen for Frontier knowledge. The answer is simple. Even if a single such officer were forthcoming in the Punjab Commission, a succession could not possibly be found. Such a system would moreover be most unfair upon the remainder of the service, and upon the interest of the province as a whole, of which the Frontier constitutes a relatively small part. The same arguments apply to the choice of a Chief Secretary, endowed with the knowledge in which his chief might be lacking. If he were useful for the Frontier, he would be less useful for the remainder, *i.e.*, for the bulk of the work. Again, if a Special Secretary or Commissioner were appointed for Frontier business, he would not diminish by a single link the existing chain. Neither would the suggestion, which has also been made, of granting much greater financial latitude and a larger staff to the Punjab Government meet the case. It might enable the Local Government to cope more rapidly and successfully with Frontier work. But it would not make it any the more faithful an exponent of the policy of the Government of India. I regard all these proposals as illusory and deceptive. They are open to the common objection that the more they give to the Punjab Government, the more they take away from the Government of India, and that they conflict with the initial proposition laid down by the Secretary of State and already quoted, namely, "that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Frontier shall in the future be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

41. I next pass to a number of possible compromises, which have at various times been suggested or which admit of being discussed, between the present system and that of a new and independent administration. One of these proposals, *viz.*, that which was suggested by the present Secretary of State in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, I have already examined in my review of the earlier history of the Frontier problem. It was the suggestion that the Commissioner of Peshawar and his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the Frontier tribes, should, in respect of such matters, act under the Government of India, and that the Commissioner should be appointed by the latter, remaining, in other respects, as hitherto, under the Punjab Government. I have shown that this scheme was condemned by the almost unanimous opinion of the Frontier officers who were invited to report upon it, in the main on account of the impracticability of separating trans-frontier from cis-frontier work, amid communities who may be described as living perpetually astride of the border. I concur in these views, and I may add that the scheme possessed the further drawbacks, in my judgment (1) that it would introduce two different systems, with two different sets of officers, upon the Pathan Frontier; since it was only proposed that the Commissioner of Peshawar should be appointed by and should act under the Government of India; the Commissioner of the Derajat, under whose charge are the whole of the Waziri tribes, by far the most restless denizens of the border, being apparently left as now a servant of the Punjab Government, appointed by and reporting only to it; (2) that with the single exception of the Commissioner of Peshawar the Frontier policy of the Government of India would still be conducted by agents not its own; (3) that unless the status of the Commissioner were raised, and he were given some of the powers of a local administration, an insupportable amount of detail would (in the difficulty of deciding between the external and the internal relations of the tribes) be thrown upon the Government of India. It may be noted that any such scheme had been condemned by the Government of India as long ago as May 17th, 1877, the despatch of which date, covering Lord Lytton's Minute, contained the following emphatic declaration:—

"We are of opinion that the separation of political from administrative duties is practically impossible when these two classes of duties are interwoven as closely as they now are in the government of the Frontier. To place the Frontier officers under the local Government *quoad* their administrative duties, and under the Government of India *quoad* their political duties, is a system fraught with inconvenience and one which has already proved the source of serious embarrassment to this Government."

The allusion in the last sentence was, I apprehend, to the system that prevailed in the third quarter of the century in Sind, the Commissioner of which received his administrative orders from the Bombay Government, and his orders as to foreign policy from the Government of India. This system having hopelessly broken down, the Commissioner of Sind (Sir W. Merewether) was in 1876 relieved of all responsibility for Kalat, *i.e.*, Frontier affairs; which were handed over to Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat.

42. A second compromise which has been suggested is that the Frontier, or the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab, should be treated somewhat as Sind now is, being placed under a single Commissioner who might even be appointed by the Government of India, and who should remain under the Punjab Government, as the Commissioner of Sind is under the Bombay Government, but should enjoy some of the administrative and financial powers of a Local Government, being assisted by a Judicial Commissioner. He would refer to the Government of India for Frontier matters, and to the Local Government for internal and district affairs. The objections to such a scheme are the familiar and, as I think, insuperable difficulties of serving two masters, and of discriminating between external and internal affairs. There would be the further drawback that a Commissioner selected by the Government of India for his political abilities might not satisfy the standards of the Local Government in respect of capacity for local administration, revenue, and finance. Above all it must be patent that such a compromise would satisfy neither party, that it could possess no permanent vitality, and that it would only be a stepping-stone to some larger change.

43. There is a third compromise, which, in the course of my study of the present question since I have been in India, at one time possessed attractions for myself. It was to take all the trans-frontier charges, from Chitral to the Gomal, now under the control either of the Government of India or of the Punjab Government, *viz.*, (1) Dir, Swat, and Chitral, (2) the Khyber, (3) Samana, (4) the Kurram, (5) the Tochi, (6) Wana, and to place the Political Officers for all these districts under a single high officer, who equally with them should be appointed by the Government of India, and should report exclusively to the latter upon all political and external affairs, the civil and administrative organisation of the Punjab Government remaining untouched, and the conduct of cis-border affairs continuing to be vested in the hands of its Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners. In my conversations, however, with Frontier officials, both last year and this, I could not discover a single supporter of this scheme. It was pointed out to me in the unanswerable words of Sir Alfred Lyall, written nearly 20 years ago, that "it is an established principle from Peshawar to Karachi that the Frontier can only be managed properly if both sides of it are in the hands of the same British authority;" it was said that the tribes themselves would not understand the system of two co-ordinate groups of officials, the one dealing with their external, the other with their internal relations, and that they would be disposed to play off the one against the other; and it was asserted that the result could not fail to be friction, and perhaps even worse, between the officers who served the Supreme and those who served the Local Government.

44. I have also heard it suggested that the six Frontier charges, which I have mentioned above, might be placed under Political Officers nominated by, and reporting to, the Government of India, but subordinate to no local official of superior rank. I could not recommend such a scheme. In addition to the drawbacks of possible disagreement with the Punjab officials, which were regarded as fatal to the compromise last examined, it would, by breaking up the Frontier into separate districts, under no single or common head, introduce discord, instead of homogeneousness or unity, into our Frontier policy, and would enormously increase the work that devolves upon the Government of India. It is, I think, a *sine qua non* of any new system that it should interpose between the Supreme Government and its local agents some authority possessed of high status and influence.

45. The examination to which I have subjected the various possible forms of compromise will, I think, have shown that the remedy is not to be found in

any such direction. It is of no use to attempt a patchwork reorganisation, or to dovetail into each other the features and methods of two administrations with such essentially different characteristics and objects. No natural respect for the susceptibilities of the Local Government, nor even the desire, which I have myself avowed, to pursue the line of least resistance in making the contemplated change, should deter us from looking facts in the face, or from recognising that it can only be by an organic change that evils, which are themselves not accidental but organic, can be cured. I hope, therefore, to have established the presumption that the reform which we have in view can only be effected by the creation of some new administrative unit, independent of and separated from the Punjab Government. It remains to be discussed what shape such a new administration should take.

FORM OF ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDED.

46. Lord Lytton's scheme in 1877 contemplated an immense new Trans-Indus province, stretching from Hazara to the Indian Ocean, and including the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab, Baluchistan, and Sind. The Resident in Kashmir, though under the Government of India, was also to correspond with the Chief Commissioner upon Frontier matters relating to Chitral, Badakhshan (*sic*), &c. Such a charge would, had it then been created, before long have proved too much for the shoulders of any single man. The idea has since been rendered obsolete by the remarkable change in the conditions of the problem. No one now proposes the severance of Sind from Bombay. Baluchistan has its own administration, which is important and self-sufficient. Moreover, its developments and aspirations lie rather on the western border, and in the direction of Afghanistan and Seistan, than on the Punjab side. The incorporation of Baluchistan with a Trans-Indus charge would be of no advantage to the former province, and would associate the latter with a partner, whose earlier start in the world would overshadow and stunt the growth of the more youthful administration. Kashmir is separately provided for; and its own Frontier problems, which extend from Ladakh in the north-east to the Shandur Pass on the north-west, are sufficient to engross the attention of the British Resident at Srinagar. It is, therefore, unnecessary to contemplate, even for a moment, any revival of the idea of a great Frontier administration, which should gather up into a single skein the many and complex threads of the whole of the North-West and West Frontier of the Indian Empire. Such an idea might still appeal to the imagination of the enthusiast, but it is not practicable in fact.

47. Even eliminating Baluchistan and Sind, I have heard recommended the creation of a great Frontier Province which should include the whole of the Trans-Indus Districts as far south as Dera Ghazi Khan, and, crossing to the left bank of the Indus, should further embrace the districts of Rawalpindi (as the military base of Peshawar and Kohat) and Jhelum. I could not endorse any such proposal. It would involve a needless dismemberment of the Punjab, would create a new province by which the older one would be completely overshadowed, and would involve the organisation of a new and extensive Commission.

48. The province which I would propose to constitute would consist, with a slight exception, of the whole of the Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab as far south as, and including Dera Ismail Khan. The exception (subject to the approval of the Punjab Government) would be the Mianwali Sub-division of the Bannu District which is astride the Indus, the trans-riverain *tahsil* of Isa Khel being inhabited by non-Pushtu speaking Pathans and having little or no connection with the Frontier. The Cis-Indus portions of Dera Ismail Khan, which exceed in size, and are approximately equal in population to, the Trans-Indus Districts, would be left to the Punjab Government. It might also be a matter of discussion with that Government, whether any, and if so what, portions of the Trans-Indus *tahsils* of Dera Ismail Khan should similarly be excluded from my scheme. There are three such *tahsils*, those of Tank, Kulachi, and Dera Ismail Khan. The first of these is a purely Frontier district, and

must in any case be detached. The two others contain a mixed population ; and it is possible that some division of them between the old and the new administrations may be found desirable or necessary, although a sentimental value may attach to the inclusion of the capital city, Dera Ismail Khan, in the new agency. I would also leave Dera Ghazi Khan to the Punjab—it could be grouped in a single charge with Multan—in the main because its Frontier relations arise out of contact not with Pathans but with Baluchis, and because I should prefer that the new administration should as far as possible be concerned with the former. It has sometimes been argued that Dera Ghazi Khan should preferably, by reason of its Baluchi connections, be handed over to Baluchistan. This may, perhaps, be its ultimate destination. But for the present, and as long as there is no Trans-Indus railway communication in this part, I think that Quetta and the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan are too far away, and that it would be better not to sever the old established connection with the Punjab.

49. Passing to the northern confines of the proposed province, I would make it strictly Trans-Indus, *i.e.*, I would not take away from the Punjab the Hazara District, with its administrative centre of Abbottabad, even though this be a Frontier District. Its interests are very different from those of the north-west border, as commonly understood ; its inhabitants are of different origin ; and the Kaghan valley, which is its main northern prolongation, is now thoroughly pacified.

50. It would be a matter for consideration whether the Black Mountain tribes, which are Cis-Indus, should continue as now to be managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, under the Punjab Government, or should pass with their Trans-Indus neighbours, the Bunerwals and the tribes of the Mahabun, to the charge of the Political Officer at the Malakand. Expediency should be the test of this decision.

51. The Mohmands and any other tribes who are now under the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar should probably, with the exception of those who may be handed over to the Political Officer at the Malakand, be added to the charge of the Political Officer in the Khyber.

52. The new Frontier Province would then consist of the following Trans-Indus Districts of the Punjab : (1) Peshawar, (2) Kohat, (3) Bannu, (4) Dera Ismail Khan ; and of the following Political Agencies, at present either directly under the Government of India or under the Punjab Government : (1) Dir, Swat, and Chitral, with headquarters at the Malakand, (2) Khyber, (3) Kurram, (4) Tochi, (5) Wana.

53. The chief of this administration would be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, who should be appointed by, and should be directly subordinate to, the Government of India. His position would be closely analogous to that of the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, *i.e.*, he would possess some of the powers of a local administration, and his pay should probably be on the same scale, *i.e.*, Rs. 4,000 a month. He would reside at Peshawar, where he would take over the office of the present Commissioner. He would probably require the services of two assistants. The judicial and revenue work of so populous, and in some respects highly organised, a province would doubtless render it impossible to combine the supreme charge of both functions, as in Baluchistan, in the hands of a single Revenue and Judicial Commissioner. A Judicial Commissioner and a Revenue Commissioner would both be required. If the former is to take the place of the Chief Court as the supreme appellate tribunal for the new province, he should clearly be a man of high legal attainments and independent position. There are some who may deprecate the substitution of a more simple system for the complex paraphernalia of the Chief Court and the amenities of facile litigation. I am not in agreement with them. I know of no vice which is more fatal in a Frontier district than litigiousness, and I should prefer summarily to arrest, rather than to foster, its growth. The new staff at

Peshawar, if thus organised, would, therefore, exceed in numbers and probable cost the present higher ranks of the Punjab Commission who are there employed, by the following totals :—

<i>Present Administration.</i>		<i>Proposed Administration.</i>	
	<i>Rs. per mensem.</i>		<i>Rs. per mensem.</i>
Commissioner of Peshawar	2,750	Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General.	4,000
Commissioner of the Dera-jat.	2,750	Two Assistants . . .	1,600
Divisional Judge	2,250	Judicial Commissioner ..	3,000
		Revenue Commissioner ..	2,750
Total	Rs. 7,750	Total	Rs. 11,350

54. On the other hand, while there would be some such increase in the head-quarters establishment, I entertain every hope that, in other branches of the administration, a material reduction would be capable of being effected. I will indicate three directions in which this might be possible: (1) Inasmuch as the new arrangement contemplates the substitution of a Judicial Commissioner, as the supreme tribunal, for the Chief Court at Lahore, some simplification of judicial procedure ought, in my opinion, to follow upon the general reduction in the judicial scale; and if this be achieved, then there should follow upon it a corresponding reduction of the judicial staff. (2) In a Frontier Agency, where successful administration will depend chiefly upon the character and influence of the British officers employed, and where a wider discretion will, I hope, be given to them in the future than has hitherto been permitted, it should be possible to abolish the mischievous practice of dealing with the tribes through native officials, and to effect some reduction in the number of native subordinates, which has a tendency to grow under the ordinary provincial system. (3) From the figures which will presently be given, it will be seen that the portions of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts, which I propose to withdraw from the Punjab, are considerably less, both in size and population, than the single District of Dera Ismail Khan (as administered by the Punjab) is at present. It is conceivable, therefore, that some re-arrangement may be feasible by which the number of districts taken over might be reduced from four to three. I do not say that Bannu, without the Mianwali Sub-division, and Dera Ismail Khan, without its Cis-Indus tracts, can be grouped together in a single district. It would be premature to make any such suggestion at present. If, however, any portion of the Trans-Indus tahsils of Dera Ismail Khan were left to the Punjab, such a concentration would be more easy. In any case, a reduction of the number of administrative units will be worthy of serious consideration, and, if feasible, would certainly carry with it a marked reduction both in establishment and in cost.

55. I had contemplated drawing up a Proposition Statement to accompany this Minute, showing the existing strength and salaries of the superior ranks of the Punjab administration at present engaged in those portions of the province which it is proposed to subtract, and comparing with them the probable corresponding totals for the new agency. I feel, however, after several attempts in this direction, that such a statement would, at the present stage, only be a misleading guide. My reasons are these: It is as yet unsettled what are the precise districts or tracts, if the principle of my proposals be accepted, that will be detached from the Punjab. It is unsettled how, when detached, they will be grouped. It is also uncertain in what manner the Punjab Government would regroup the Cis-Indus tracts left to it, or what change or increase of establishment such re-adjustment might require. Further, it is too early, for the reasons already given, to give figures as to the possible reductions in the new province. Lastly, a statement of the existing position would be a not altogether reliable test, from the facts that the pay and allowances of the actual incumbents of posts upon the Frontier are liable to continual variation with changes of *personnel*; and that the list of officers so employed is apt to contain some, who may, as in the case of Settlement Officers, only be engaged upon temporary work.

56. From a careful comparison, however, of the probable requirements of the new Agency with the existing establishment maintained by the Punjab, I feel in a position to say that the total cost of civil administration at the start is not likely to be greater than under present conditions, while, if my anticipations (in paragraph 54) are realised, there is even reason to hope that a saving may be effected.

57. I now proceed to state how I would propose to officer the new province. Lord Lytton, in his scheme of 1877, contemplated a list, separate from that of the Punjab, but with facilities for interchange between the two; *i.e.*, he advocated the creation of a fresh or branch Commission. Such a scheme might be practicable and even necessary, if a very extensive province were being called into being. But a small Commission, such as a relatively small province might require, would be attended by patent drawbacks, the recognition of which has in practice helped to kill the various proposals for a new Frontier administration that have previously been made. These drawbacks would arise in connection with recruitment, replacement, and promotion. With a small Civil list, an occasional failure is very serious, and is not easily redressed by transfer or removal. Further, as Sir M. Young has observed—"The pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists."

58. I propose to escape all these difficulties, and at the same time to ensure for the administration of the new province the best ability that the Civil Service can produce, by relieving the Punjab Commission of the duty of providing its establishment and by bringing the latter upon the graded list of the Political Department of the Government of India. This would involve a reduction of the present numbers of the Punjab Commission and a proportionate increase to the Political list. My proposals would of course apply only to the higher or *cadre* posts, and not necessarily to all of these. It would perhaps be found wise in the first instance to borrow the Divisional and District Judges for the new Agency from the Punjab, and afterwards from the Punjab or from other provinces, since we could offer no prospects to such officers in the Political Department. Indeed, if a Judicial Commissioner be appointed, it is not certain that any Divisional Judges would be necessary. Similarly we might borrow officers from the same source, when required for settlement work. Finally, as regards miscellaneous departments, such as Police, Jails, Medical, Educational, Irrigation, and Public Works, and the subordinate establishments of all Departments, the best plan would probably be to take over temporarily the whole or the greater part of the existing staff of the Punjab Government now employed in the area of the new province, and gradually to work out such changes as experience might dictate. *Per contra* if in this way we were to provide appointments for members of the Punjab Commission, the Local Government might be willing in return to continue to find places for educated Pathans of good family, a certain number of whom, under the existing system, rise to high positions in the Civil Service of the Punjab.

59. The effect of these changes upon the Punjab Commission and upon the Political Department, respectively, would be somewhat as follows. At the present time there are in the area covered by the new Agency 16 superior posts (including District and Divisional Judges), *i.e.*, posts carrying a substantive pay of more than Rs. 1,000 a month. To fill these posts (allowing for the percentage of incumbents who would ordinarily be absent on leave and for those in training) there are required 31 officers. The monthly cost of these officers under the Punjab system has been worked out at Rs. 46,300. If this area be brought directly under the Government of India, and if the necessary appointments, graded as nearly as possible on the corresponding scale, be added to the Political Department, the same number (31) of officers will be required, and the monthly cost will amount to Rs. 46,600, or a difference of only Rs. 300. These calculations are of course, in the present stage, only approximate. Both tables would be affected if the judicial appointments were to remain upon the Punjab list. Enough has been said, however, to show that, in so far as officers are concerned, the change of system could be made without involving any injury. The pay and prospects of the officers in the Punjab Commission

would, it can be shown, be left approximately as they are. On the other hand, the prospects of the officers of the new administration, and of the Political Department generally, would be vastly improved; since there would be open to the former a far wider field of employment and promotion under the Foreign Department of the Government of India than is at present possible within the confines of a single province and a restricted Commission; while service on the Frontier, which is now, with a few exceptions, closed to the officers on the political list, should become an object of ambition for the most promising young men whom the Political Department can attract to its ranks.

MERITS OR DEMERITS OF THE PROPOSAL.

60. Having thus not merely sketched the outlines but filled in the principal administrative details of the new province, I now pass to my last subject of enquiry, namely, the objections that may be taken to its creation, and the compensating advantages.

61. The Secretary of State, in his despatch of August 5th, 1898, indicated four possible objections to the project of a separate Trans-Indus charge. The first of these was that by breaking up the established administrative units of British India, the revenue system already introduced would be disturbed. This is not an objection to be despised. The Peshawar District, for instance, contains some of the richest and most highly assessed land in the Punjab, covered in parts by a network of canals, the working of which is no simple matter. The whole District has been surveyed on a scale of 24 ins. to the mile, and the maps are accompanied by elaborate land records which must be kept up to date. Neglect of these would produce insecurity of tenures and rights, and might soon result in chaos. Specially trained officers would be required for this work, such as are not ordinarily found in the Political Department. I concede this difficulty, which will also apply, though in a less degree, to the Districts of Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. But I hope to have provided against it. I do not propose the handing over of technical work to unskilled hands. In these respects we must still look to the parent province. The revenue system of the new Agency would not merely be that of the larger administration of which it at present forms a part, but it would be administered, at any rate to begin with, and possibly continuously, by the same men. No one would propose to inaugurate a new province by disorganising or revolutionising the old revenue system. Continuity in this respect is prudent, and has been provided for.

62. The second objection mentioned by the Secretary of State to a Frontier province was that it would entail a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations. This objection also I have shown not to apply. No other province beyond the Punjab is touched by my scheme; and it remains only to be considered whether the Punjab itself will be mutilated or dismembered by it to a serious or unreasonable degree.

63. The following table will show the approximate extent of the area and population, as calculated from the Census returns of 1891, and of the land revenue, of the districts which it is proposed to withdraw:—

	Area, square miles.	Population.	Revenue
Peshawar District	2,444	703,768	<i>Rs</i> 11,02,626
Kohat „	2,771	203,175	1,90,849
Bannu (excluding Mianwah Sub-division)	1,664	204,469	2,58,000
Dera Ismail Khan (excluding Cis-Indus Tahsils).	3,812	254,163	3,24,372
Total	10,691	1,365,575	18,75,847

In connection with the above figures, I may mention that the Cis-Indus *tahsils* of the above named districts and the Trans-Indus tracts, which I do not propose to subtract from the Punjab, are of the following dimensions :—

	Area, square miles	Population	Revenue.
Mianwali Sub-division of Bannu	2,183	167,807	Rs. 1,93,000
Cis-Indus Tahsils of Dera Ismail Khan . .	5,628	232,038	3,24,372
Dera Ghazi Khan District	5,606	404,031	5,15,697
Total	13,417	803,876	10,33,069

Out of the total area, either Trans-Indus, or connected administratively with the Trans-Indus Districts, which is at present administered by the Punjab Government, I therefore leave to the latter more than one-half, with rather more than a third of the revenue, and one-third of the total population. Comparing the subtracted area with the figures for the entire province, which were in 1891 :—

Area, in Square Miles	Population	Revenue
148,966	25,130,127	Rs 2,75,32,972

it will be seen that I propose to take away from the Punjab Government, if the maximum of my proposals is accepted, and if no restitution, partial or otherwise, is made to the Punjab of the Trans-Indus *tahsils* of Dera Ismail Khan, only $\frac{1}{4}$ th of its total area, $\frac{1}{5}$ th of its total revenue, and a little less than $\frac{1}{8}$ th of its entire population.

64. Now of these districts it should be remembered that they do not belong either geographically, ethnologically, or historically to the Punjab. They are inhabited by entirely different peoples. They exhibit a different mode and standards of life. They were only conquered and annexed to the Punjab by Runjit Singh. So detached are they in reality from the remainder of the Province that in 1857 during the Mutiny, when our general position in that part of India was in some doubt, Sir John Lawrence was prepared to surrender Peshawar to the Afghans; while in the following year, he proposed the rendition of Kohat also, on the grounds of economy and of the unhealthy climate. In other words the first and most famous Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, himself proposed, though in different circumstances, a portion of that dismemberment of his province which I now advocate.

65. Still more do these considerations apply in the case of those parts of the present Punjab administration lying outside the administrative border of British India, which have in recent years, and notably since the Durand Agreement of 1893, been added to the jurisdiction of that Government. It should be remembered that the conditions under which the Punjab Government was placed in charge of the Frontier at all were widely different from those which now obtain. They were clearly explained by Lord Salisbury when Secretary of State for India, in his despatch to Lord Lytton's Government of November 29th, 1877.

"The Punjab Government was interposed between the Governor-General and the Frontier officers at a time when communication between Calcutta and the Punjab was tedious and difficult, when the state of affairs beyond our territory caused little solicitude, and when the duties imposed upon the Government of Lahore, were not such as to prevent the Frontier from receiving a large share of its attention."

66. When this Despatch was penned, great changes had already taken place. The telegraph and the railway had brought the Frontier into close and

rapid connection with the head-quarters of the Supreme Government. The Punjab had itself, since its original constitution, as a Chief Commissionership, received the notable addition of the Delhi District from the North-Western Provinces. Frontier questions had gained greatly in number and importance; and the advance of Russia across the regions that previously separated her from the Afghan border had been continuous and alarming. If this was the metamorphosis of conditions that could be recorded in 1877, how unmeasurably greater is it now. It may truly be said that every subsequent change in the frontiers of India has been a change dictated, not by considerations arising out of or directly affecting the interests of the Punjab Government, but by imperial considerations, and by them alone. The consolidation of Baluchistan into a separate administration, the inclusion of Chitral and Dir within the British sphere, the signature of the Durand Agreement and the consequent political protectorate over Waziristan, have revolutionised the position on the Frontier. Moreover, while they are the results of a policy, with which the Local Government has only incidentally been concerned, they have themselves created a further group of problems with which a Local Government is ill qualified to deal. To such an extent is this the case that a considerable part of these territorial acquisitions has already been withdrawn from, or has not been incorporated with, the Punjab Government. The Agency for Dir, Swat and Chitral is directly under the Government of India. So is the Khyber. In the tribal territory further to the south, so strongly has the necessity of severing tribal management from administrative preoccupations, and of putting the political work into the hands of Political Officers, specially appointed for the purpose, forced itself even upon the Punjab Government that already, as pointed out by Sir M. Young in his note of 19th October 1898, "two-thirds to three-fourths of the Punjab Frontier is in the hands of officers who have nothing else to do." There could not be a clearer admission of the extent to which the Frontier work has ceased to be administrative, *i.e.*, to fall within the necessary sphere of a Local Government, and has become political, *i.e.*, has entered the legitimate sphere of the Supreme Government. It is indeed only the logical expansion of the present system (in itself illogical) by which the Frontier work is in part now performed by Political Officers under the Punjab Government, and the logical completion of the system by which the remainder of the Frontier is already under the direct charge of the Government of India, that the whole of it should be transferred to the latter, *i.e.*, to the real controller of its destinies.

67. There is another respect in which the situation has greatly changed since 1877, and which renders the question of any compensation to the Punjab Government for the proposed losses superfluous. Not merely have the administrative problems demanding the attention of the Local Government grown in number and complexity—to such an extent that complaints have frequently to be made of the degree to which the Punjab Secretariat is overworked, and that the work of the Lieutenant-Governor is probably nearly double what it was 25 years ago—but the population of the province is rapidly increasing, and must continue to increase, not alone by the normal increment arising from natural causes, but by the reclamation of immense new tracts of habitable country. It is estimated that the great scheme of canalisation, connected with the Chenab River, has, during the last few years, brought under cultivation for the first time an area of over 1,000,000 acres, with a population of 700,000 persons,—figures which are expected to rise, within a few years, to 1,500,000 acres, and 1,500,000 persons. The Jhelum scheme, now in course of execution, will similarly augment the area of cultivation by over 500,000 acres, and should accommodate an increased population of about 400,000 persons. These two increments alone will far more than balance the loss of population which my scheme entails upon the Punjab. The Lower Bari-Doab scheme, which is next on the list, and the surveys for which are about to be commenced, will add another 500,000 acres, and the same number of population.

68. Finally, it is hoped that before very long the immense Sind-Sagar scheme may be undertaken, which is intended to irrigate the staring blank space on the map on the left bank of the Indus between Kalabagh and Multan, and which is expected to reclaim an area of 1,750,000 acres. The realisation of this project, as of its predecessors, will add enormously not merely to the population

of the province, but to the revenue and settlement work devolving upon the local officers, and to the responsibilities of the Punjab Secretariat. They will more than compensate for what it is now proposed to take away. They will probably, before any great length of time has elapsed, demand the replenishment of the Punjab Commission by as many officers as it is now under suggestion to withdraw.

69. So well known are these considerations in the Punjab itself that the necessity for territorial rectifications or compensations would probably no longer be urged by its own officers. One of the foremost of these, Mr. F. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, has indeed, in his letter of 21st October 1898, already quoted, gone so far as to argue in the opposite sense. Coming as they do from the senior Frontier officer of the Punjab Commission, these views are worthy of quotation here—

“The population, revenue, trade, and wealth of the province have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionship was mooted some 20 years ago, under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, and a strip of the Derajat, is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class

“Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and, what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word, development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough *cis-Indus* to occupy the full energies of a great administration.

“I am writing without access to an office, and therefore do not attempt to give figures, but a comparison of the chief statistics of the province for 1878 with those of to-day would, I think, show that no ‘territorial rectifications or compensations’ would be required, and that this supposed objection to the radical and effectual remedy does not in reality exist”

70. I hope, therefore, to have shown conclusively that the time-honoured objection to a new Frontier province which I have been discussing is one that has become obsolete in the lapse of time, and that need not deter us for a moment from the acceptance of the proposed change.

71. Should it be said, however, that, though not detrimental to the prestige or interests of the Punjab, such a change cannot but be condemned by the officers of the administration which it is proposed to supersede, it is easy to show from their recorded opinions (as I might do from more private sources of information) that, so far from this being the case, the erection of a new Frontier province is a solution, which, if there is to be any alteration in the *status quo*, is not only contemplated but is even heartily approved by all. Mr. Merk, Commissioner of the Derajat, said in his letter of 7th October 1898 (paragraph 9)—

“If the Punjab Government is dissociated from Frontier management, it is plain that the Commissioner must be raised to the position and powers of a Local Government on the analogy of the Agent of the Governor-General at Quetta.”

72. Mr. Anderson, Officiating Commissioner of the Derajat, said in his letter of 17th October 1898—

“It will be necessary, I consider, to considerably enhance the status of the Commissioner of Peshawar as regards trans-frontier affairs. He must be empowered to dispose of many matters which he has now to refer for orders to the Punjab Government. To enable him to have as wide a view as possible of what is passing across the frontier of the division, it will be advisable to place under his control the Chitral and Dir Agency and the relations with the tribes under that Agency. His status would advantageously be raised to something like that of the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan as regards trans-frontier affairs.”

73. Sir R. Udny's (Commissioner of Peshawar) letter of 20th October 1898, paragraphs 5—9, which criticised the Punjab system, was also in reality an argument for the creation of a separate Frontier Commission.

74. Mr. Cunningham (Commissioner of Peshawar) went further and laid down clearly that there could be only two solutions to the problem: either to

give the Punjab real and final authority in respect of Frontier matters (reducing *pro tanto* the power of the Government of India), a solution which he admitted to be "out of the question"; or

"To remove the Frontier districts (excluding the Cis-Indus parts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and the whole of Dera Ghazi Khan) from the Punjab Government, and to place in charge of them an officer with the power of Chief Commissioner for the interior and the position of Agent to the Governor-General for the clans and countries beyond If a strong administration directly under the Government of India is desired, in which Frontier questions can be fully taken up on one consistent line without detriment to the needs and requirements of the greater part of a large province, this can best be secured by such a plan. The Punjab Government would benefit by being relieved of an incubus, by the gain of time and power to devote to the administration of a rapidly growing province; and it would be rescued from what to many has appeared the invidious position into which it has been relegated by the course of events in the past 10 or 20 years on the North-West Frontier."

75. Sir M. Young himself also saw clearly that the object desired by the Secretary of State could not be gained by any compromise, but was only feasible in one way. In his note of 19th October 1898, he wrote (paragraph 16):—

"If what is desired is to eliminate the Punjab Government from trans-frontier control, this can only be done by removing the Frontier districts or such portions of them as are closely connected with trans-frontier tribes from the control of the Punjab Government, and forming this tract into a separate administration under the direct orders of the Government of India."

And again (paragraph 18)—

"I can only state my conviction that, unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the Frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner or other officer in direct subordination to the Government of India, the existing machinery cannot with any advantage be altered."

76. Similarly Lord Elgin, though, like the Lieutenant-Governor, he was opposed to such a solution, admitted in his Minute of 6th November 1898 that, granted the necessity for a considerable devolution of powers, "the question must sooner or later resolve itself into one whether it is better to have as an intermediate Local Government, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or a Commissioner who will be a Chief Commissioner on the Frontier."

77. These various quotations indicate that, in the opinion of the majority of the Punjab Frontier officers of the highest standing and even of those authorities who are opposed to the principle of the suggested change, there is but one mind as to the fact, that if the Local Government is to be deprived, for whatever reasons, of the principal functions which it now discharges with reference to the Frontier, there is only one method by which such a change can be satisfactorily carried out, *viz.*, by the institution of the new administration which it is the object of this Minute to advocate.

78. I now pass to the third objection that was indicated by the Secretary of State in the following words:—

"It may also be inexpedient to deprive the Government of the Punjab, and thus also the Government of India, of a valuable opportunity of training officers for Frontier service, and of gaining a knowledge of the feelings and habits of tribes which are constantly sending settlers into British districts."

It will, I think, be obvious from the scheme that I have submitted that the opportunity which the Secretary of State desires, so far from being diminished, will be immensely enhanced by placing the officers of the new province upon the Political List of the Government of India. There will henceforward be no risk either of an officer being sent to the Frontier who has hitherto been engrossed in civil work, or of an officer being withdrawn from it, because the exigencies either of the public service or of grade promotion demand his return to the interior parts of the province. On the contrary, an officer who displays exceptional aptitudes for tribal politics and management will be under no risk of being withdrawn, unless it be to some more responsible post, of a similar character, either in Baluchistan, or under the Foreign Department in other parts of India. On the other hand, if an individual be found deficient in the special talents that are required for the Frontier, it will be much easier to find work for him elsewhere than it is at present. To the officers of the entire Department will be given a fresh goal of ambition. To

those who attain it will be given a wider field of reward. I anticipate that in a few years' time the new Frontier province will draw towards itself the very best ability that the civil and military services in India can produce, and that it will be the nursery of a new school of Political Officers, who will revive both the memories and the credit of an earlier time.

79. With regard to the fourth objection cited by the Secretary of State in the following terms :—

“It is open to question whether it is altogether advisable to place in the hands of a single Commissioner the whole executive power on both sides of this most important section of the Empire's external frontier, without the restraint, which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibilities on a large scale imposes upon an authority charged with the Government of a first-class province.”

I may say that exactly the same objection was raised when Baluchistan was converted into a separate administration, and that it proved to be entirely groundless ; and that I would not myself propose for one moment to appoint as head of the new province any officer who was destitute of financial and administrative experience. This is a commodity that is fortunately procurable without recourse to the Government of a first class province. It is as frequently forthcoming in our second class as in our first class administrations. Moreover, as I have shown in the case of the Punjab, its present advantages are apt to be somewhat dearly purchased at the cost of inexperience in other and not less vital concerns.

80. There remains the fifth objection of the Secretary of State, touched upon rather than emphasized in the following paragraph :—

“There is no part of India where the need of a strong administration, equipped with all the resources of Government and capable of resisting aggression is more likely to be felt than on the North-West Frontier.”

81. There can be no doubt that the phrase of the Secretary of State indicates an objection to the scheme of a new Frontier province, which has been widely entertained in the past, and, more than any other argument, has hitherto availed to defeat its adoption. I refer to the belief that such a scheme would, in some way or other, favour a forward and aggressive policy, and that the Government of India would exercise less control over the activity of its Frontier officers than under a system which interposes the buffer of a Local Government between itself and them. I can only say that I regard such a belief as an entire illusion ; and that if I held it, I should not now be composing this Minute. Twenty-three years ago Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State, foresaw the same objection to Lord Lytton's scheme (which was, I think, by reason of its magnitude, far more exposed to such a charge than is mine) and emphatically repudiated it. The proposed formation of a new Frontier charge was, he said, “a measure of defence and security, not of aggression.” I cannot better explain or defend the proposals which I now submit.

82. If the intervention of the Punjab Government acts as a barrier against aggressive schemes, I would ask how it has come about that the 50 years that have elapsed between the annexation of the Punjab and the present day, during the whole of which time the Frontier has been under the control of the Punjab Government, there have been no fewer than 40 military expeditions against the tribes of that frontier, or one expedition for every 15 months of the entire period ; how, notwithstanding the pacific dispositions of the Punjab Government, there has nevertheless taken place, under its patronage and eye, the series of military advances upon the border which have carried us forward on to the Samana, into the Kurram, and far into Northern and Southern Waziristan ; and how above all it came about that the Government of India were involved, only three years ago, in the greatest Frontier conflagration that has ever been known. I am not saying for one moment that the Punjab Government ought to be held solely, or even mainly, responsible for all these events. The Government of India cannot evade or disown its share. All that I do say is that the plea that we are saved by the intervention of the Local Government from a forward policy, from punitive expeditions, or from Frontier war, is one that will not stand the test of a moment's examination.

83. I will even go further and say that whereas an Agent to the Governor-General for the Frontier could without difficulty be controlled, by reason of his subordinate position, by the Government of India, and whereas a forward or aggressive policy, if initiated under his rule, would rightly be laid not at his door but at that of the Government of India, I can conceive that an ambitious Lieutenant-Governor, if such a phenomenon were to occur, might be very difficult to control. The Punjab has fortunately hitherto been free from any such source of danger. But the fact that a succession of cautious and prudent Lieutenant-Governors have been quite powerless to save the Frontier from the disturbances which I have mentioned, is a proof that there must be something unsound, not in the men but in the system.

84. To me it seems absurd to argue that, if a local administration be brought more strictly under the influence of the supreme authority, it will therefore become more mischievous and unruly. I should infer that precisely the opposite will be the case. If an avoidable war now breaks out upon the Frontier, the Government of India cannot censure or recall the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. It divides the responsibility with him, though very likely innocent of any complicity in its earlier stages. If, however, an Agent to the Governor-General were to compromise the Supreme Government by any rash or bellicose action, I cannot conceive that there would be any hesitation in bringing him smartly to account.

85. I am not aware that since the Dir-Swat-Chitral Agency has been under the direct control of the Government of India there has been any development of aggressive tendencies in that quarter. On the contrary, we have enjoyed peace, on what is by far the most critical section of the Frontier, for three years. Similarly, it is under the control of the Government of India that we have re-pacified the Khyber, which the earlier system had not saved from the fatal convulsion of 1897. Neither does the creation of Baluchistan into an independent administration appear to me to have been attended by the martial expansion which might, according to the plea that I am examining, have followed upon so hazardous a step.

86. I will not further pursue this argument than to say that it is in the most confident belief that the future Frontier administration of the Government of India will, under the change that I advocate, be more, and not less under control; that disputes, culminating in wars, with the tribes will be less, and not more frequent; and that India will thereby escape the perils of a policy of bisected responsibility, of vacillation, of drift, and of delay, that I urge the separation from the Punjab Government of the Frontier districts and peoples.

87. There remain three further arguments which have sometimes been employed against the proposed reform. The first is that the more direct control of the Government of India signifies greater centralisation. I have shown in an earlier part of this Minute that the very reverse will be the case. I regard the present administration of the Frontier by the Local Government, with its suppression of local responsibility, and its perpetual reference to the Punjab Secretariat, as centralisation in a most aggravated and pernicious form. What more mischievous evidence of centralisation could be afforded than the ladder of compulsory and dilatory reference, which I have before described, whose foot is across the Frontier, but whose head is at Simla or Lahore? Under a separate administration, I believe that one-half of the references which now pass up and down this ladder of delay will be settled promptly upon the spot by a superior officer of sufficient authority to decide, and sufficient local knowledge to do so without risk; while in the case of such matters as still require reference to the Government of India, the process will be by so much accelerated as the number of intervening rungs will have been reduced.

88. The second argument is the allegation that with a new province under the Government of India, the Foreign Department of the latter will be swamped with a mass of work which it will be incapable of digesting, and which will cripple its capacity in other quarters. Sir M. Young laid stress in his Note upon the number of references which we are spared by the intervention of the

Local Government. Perhaps the best test that I can apply is the number of receipts and issues that pass through the Foreign Department from the Punjab Government—I take those which relate to the Frontier alone—as compared with the whole number relating to internal administration as well as to Frontier affairs, with which we deal from the entire province of Baluchistan. In the year 1899 they were as follows:—

—					Receipts.	Issues
<i>Punjab Frontier—</i>						
Political	720	316
Administrative	115	119
Total	835	435
—					Receipts	Issues
<i>Baluchistan—</i>						
Political	301	186
Administrative	326	357
Total	627	543

89. It, therefore, appears that the entire business, internal and external, devolving upon the Foreign Department for the province of Baluchistan is less than the external business alone, which comes up to it from the Punjab Government. It is, of course, true that Baluchistan is a by far less populous and less advanced province than the Trans-Indus portions of the Punjab would be ; and that no strict analogy can be drawn between the political or administrative business of the two Governments. I quote the figures, however, to show to what moderate and reasonable dimensions the work that is entailed upon the Foreign Department by the Baluchistan Agency has shrunk, in the face of the argument that was so freely employed at the time of its constitution, viz., that the Foreign Department would not be equal to the additional strain. The figures also show how slender in practice the devolution upon the Punjab Government has become. I do not, of course, argue that the Frontier business of the Foreign Department will not, if a new administration be created, be increased. Such will, at any rate for a time at the beginning, in all probability be the case. We may require for a short period the assistance of an extra hand in the Foreign Office. But this transitional epoch will not be of long duration. As the Local Government becomes consolidated so will the references on administrative and internal affairs rapidly diminish, as they have done in Baluchistan. The Frontier and political references may also be expected to dwindle as local responsibility is developed ; and in a few years time I entertain little doubt that the Foreign Department will be less hampered and besieged by Frontier affairs than it is at the present moment.

90. Finally, if the question of financial cost be raised, I might point out that we already possess the authority of the Secretary of State for the submission of proposals that may entail an increase in our charges for administration. In his despatch of the 5th August 1898 he wrote, with reference to his own proposal, already discussed : “ I am aware that any such alteration of system may require additional expenditure ” ; and “ I shall not object to the exercise by your Government of a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to these considerations.” But, as a matter of fact, we have no occasion at present to

profit by this latitude, since I have shown good reason for believing that the scheme which I have proposed, so far from increasing, may possibly even diminish our annual outlay. The financial objection which has impeded the realisation of earlier projects need not, therefore, be considered at the present time.

91. I have now examined and argued the various objections that have been raised in times past to proposals similar to that which I now make, or that may be raised to mine. I trust that I have shown them to be not only much less formidable than has hitherto been believed to be the case, but for the most part destitute of serious foundation. On the other hand, I hope also to have shown that the scheme for the constitution of a new Frontier Province, that I have put forward, possesses these positive merits. It will express and enforce the direct responsibility of the Government of India for Frontier affairs. It will enable the Viceroy to conduct the most important business of the Department of which he is the personal chief. It will free the management of Frontier politics from the delays that are inseparable from a chain of reference, whose strength is sacrificed to its length. It will promote greater rapidity and consequently greater freedom of action. Its tendency should be not towards aggression, but towards peace: since war with the tribes is commonly the result of ignorance or indecision at earlier stages. It will entrust tribal management exclusively to those who know the tribes. It should train up a school of officers, worthy of the most critical but splendid duty that is imposed upon any of the officers of the Queen's Government in India. For myself I will only add that, having initiated a definite policy on the North-West Frontiers of India, which I believe to contain the germs of possible success, I ask to be relieved of the conditions which appear to me to jeopardise its operation at every turn, and to be presented with those by which alone, in my opinion, its future can be reasonably assured.

August 27th, 1900.

(Signed) CURZON.

No. 14.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated India Office, London, 20th December 1900.

I have received and given my attentive consideration in Council to the despatch of Your Excellency's Government, dated the 13th of September 1900.

2. Your Excellency in Council records your conviction that the present system of Frontier control is entirely unsatisfactory, interposing as it does hesitation, delay, and difficulties in the execution of a policy for which the Supreme Government is directly responsible, subject to the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but the execution of which is entrusted to the Local Government of the Punjab. You consider, upon a careful review of the past history of the Frontier, that if firmness, promptitude, or continuity of policy in the future are to be secured, a radical change in the present procedure is needed, and you draw attention to the additional burden which the Durand Agreement has put upon the Frontier administration by rendering it to a large extent responsible for the conduct and misdeeds of those living inside the line of demarcation settled by that agreement. Your Excellency sketches in outline a scheme for the construction of a new agency immediately under the control of the Government of India, which seems to you desirable, and which, after a full consideration, your Government endorses as the only scheme that in principle will avoid the evils of the present system. This scheme, regarding the details of which you propose to consult the Government of the Punjab, is described with some fulness of outline in a Minute written by your Excellency, and dated the 27th of August 1900. It contemplates the creation of a Frontier

Province under the direct control of a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, who would have charge not only of the four districts now under the Punjab Government, namely, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, with the tribal country that lies beyond their limits, but also of the Political Agencies of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, and Wana. The area detached from the Punjab Province would approximate to $\frac{1}{4}$ th of its total area, with $\frac{1}{7}$ th of its total revenue, and $\frac{1}{8}$ th of its entire population. Your proposals differ from those which have at former times been discussed, in their avoidance of several dislocations of the existing provincial systems, but there are a few details, such as the possible transfer of the control over the Black Mountain Tribes from the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, which are expressly reserved for final consideration. Although the cost of the new staff which would be required at Peshawar would exceed that of the present establishment by 3,600 rupees a month, it is expected that the total cost of the civil administration will not exceed, and may, perhaps, be less than, that which is now incurred. While the holders of the subordinate administrative posts would be drawn from the Punjab or other provinces, you propose to provide for the wants of the higher posts and the political appointments by an increase to the strength of your Foreign Department, and you have discussed the probable effect of these changes upon the prospects of the Punjab Commission.

3. Her Majesty's Government recognise that the adoption of the policy of concentration inculcated in my telegram, dated 13th October 1897, and more fully set forth in my despatch of the 28th of January 1898, paragraph 18, has modified the previous situation, and may require organic changes in administration. The Government of India, in pursuance of the two objects specified by me in that despatch, namely, concentration of your military force, and the limitation of interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control, has carried out a series of changes along the Frontier, which have received the approval of Her Majesty's Government. In my despatch, dated the 5th of August 1898, I anticipated that the alteration of system introduced into the Khyber Pass would involve further arrangements, both financial and executive, in order to ensure their success, and I indicated certain transfers of authority which might deserve consideration, especially as they would reduce to a minimum any disturbance of the provincial administration in the Punjab. I learn, however, that the Government of the Punjab is strongly opposed to these limited re-arrangements, and the larger scheme proposed by Your Excellency is based upon this conclusion.

4. Your Excellency has referred to the objections which, as I pointed out in my despatch of 5th August 1898, may be raised against the severance of settled districts from the Government of the Punjab, and against the direct control of the Government of India which it is proposed to substitute for that of the Local Government over them and the neighbouring Frontier. To a considerable extent the second and the third of the objections indicated in my despatch of the 5th of August 1898 are provided against in Your Excellency's scheme. I recognise that, in avoiding any alteration of the position of Sind, and in limiting the transfer of districts from the Punjab to those mentioned, your Government will avoid an undesirable series of territorial rectifications and compensations; and that, when the control of the Government of the Punjab is for the most part confined to Cis-Indus districts, the advantage of training its officers in tribal tracts beyond, but adjoining, the administrative Frontier of the Punjab will cease to be of much practicable value. But there are certain unavoidable drawbacks associated with the proposed scheme which will require very careful consideration in order that they may be minimised, and to which the first and fourth of the objections above mentioned were intended to refer.

5. The staff of the new Frontier Province will not be large, and the Governor-General's Agent at its head will have two very different sets of duties to perform and supervise. In respect of the Frontier tribes his duties will be political, and his policy will be under the direct control of your Government. But, in the case of the settled districts, which you propose to detach from the Punjab, it is clearly undesirable that the people having already enjoyed the benefit of a highly organised administration with its careful land

settlements, its laws and regulations, and the various institutions of a progressive Civil Government, should be thrown back from the stage which they have already reached. The Governor of a large province not only possesses a special and large experience of British administration, but can summon to his aid and counsels heads of Departments and Commissioners of Divisions whose advice may be of the utmost value. The Governor-General's Agent will not, without special arrangements, be able to count upon such assistance. I have not overlooked the fact that your Excellency intends to draw upon the Punjab for skilled officers in the subordinate branches or in the technical departments, but I am not satisfied that this will meet the whole case; for the important question of superior direction remains to be dealt with. Nor does recent experience in Baluchistan appear to me to be altogether relevant, since no part of that agency can claim to have a district, or part of a district, in any respect so advanced and settled as the Trans-Indus British districts which you propose to detach from the Punjab.

6. The question of the recruitment of officers for the new agency, to which I have referred above, will obviously be one of very great importance. The nature of the duties to be performed, and the necessarily limited numbers of the staff, make it essential that a very high standard of individual efficiency should be attained and preserved in administrative as well as in political duties. It seems to be probable that in so small a province it will not be easy to keep the staff at the requisite level of efficiency, unless picked officers are largely imported from other provinces; a measure which can hardly fail to produce discouragement among the regular staff of the province by retarding promotion in the lower grades. I should be glad to be more fully informed as to the measures by which Your Excellency proposes to deal with this difficulty, and to be assured that you are satisfied as to their probable effect.

7. There is another point to which I wish to draw Your Excellency's attention. In remarking that the need of a strong administration equipped with all the resources of Government would be felt on the Frontier, I did not refer to the political administration. I referred to the advantages that must accrue to the Frontier districts of British India from the application to them of the ways and means at the command of a first-class administrative unit. The construction of roads, bridges, rest-houses, and hospitals, and generally the assignment of provincial resources to a particular district, may be of the utmost value, and are best secured if the district is an integral part of a large province. In times of disturbance or threatened danger a large province can draft in additional police, procure transport, change local officers, and do much to prepare for trouble before they arise or assume the form of military operations. If it is necessary to transfer settled districts from the control of the Punjab Government, and to place them under the same administration as the adjoining tribal country, it is important that the possible results of such a policy should be fully considered and provided for.

8. Your Excellency in Council will, no doubt, weigh these points carefully in working out the details of your scheme. If, on close examination of the various changes and adaptations inseparable from the constitution of a new Commission, apart from the Punjab Government, it is found that they do in fact involve no additional expense, the result will be undoubtedly satisfactory. But I can hardly anticipate, judging from general experience, that Your Excellency's preliminary estimate will not have to be modified in this respect; and although I do not desire to lay down any fixed limit in the matter, I trust that no pains will be spared to prevent the imposition of any unnecessary burden on the revenues. In the meanwhile Her Majesty's Government approve generally of your proposal, as tending to express and enforce the direct responsibility of your Government for Frontier affairs, and to free the management of Frontier politics from the delay inseparable from the present system. So far as the details of your project, which I shall await, appear likely to secure these objects, they will receive my favourable consideration.

9. In the 29th paragraph of Your Excellency's Minute the argument is pressed that the transfer of the Frontier administration from the Punjab Government to the Government of India will involve no diminution of special

aptitude for and knowledge of Frontier affairs. I am convinced that your remarks were in no way intended to depreciate the eminent abilities of the Lieutenant-Governors who are named in that paragraph, or to undervalue the substantial services which all Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab, beginning with Sir John Lawrence, have rendered in the discharge of the difficult duties connected with these affairs, although none of them had any previous personal experience of political work on the North-Western Frontier. I gather that the general object of Your Excellency's Minute is to prove the present system to be unworkable, and not to reflect unfavourably upon the manner in which the Punjab Government has attempted to work it; and I desire it to be understood that my approval of Your Excellency's proposals is based on my acceptance of the main conclusions which I find that Your Excellency in Council has adopted, that the present system of Frontier management, however worked, is unsatisfactory, that some radical change in that system is required, and that this change should take the form described at length in Your Excellency's Minute.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 15.

Opinion recorded by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., Member of the Council of India, dated 17th January 1901.

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.

Having at the meeting of the Council, held on the 18th December 1900, dissented from the resolution regarding my proposal to insert an additional paragraph in the draft Despatch relating to the scheme for constituting a Chief Commissionership of the North-Western Frontier, I desire that my opinion may be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, together with the following reasons for it which I laid before the Council on the occasion referred to.

1. I find myself in a somewhat peculiar position with reference to this draft Despatch to India. I agree in the conclusion at which Lord Curzon has arrived, that the Punjab Frontier administration must be placed directly under the Government of India, indeed I have long foreseen that that would one day be necessary. Further I agree with Lord Curzon in thinking that the only

* I ought to state that I was absent from here at the time the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 5th August 1898, proposing the alternative arrangement now dropped, was prepared and issued.

workable arrangement* is to separate off the Punjab Frontier districts bodily and make them into a Chief Commissionership. But I at the same time see a certain danger attending the change proposed, and I should have thought that a word of caution as to that danger ought to have been inserted in the Despatch. Moreover, when I look into the arguments and observations contained in Lord Curzon's Minute, I find that, while some of them are sound and sufficient to establish his point, others are of such a nature as to convey an erroneous or distorted impression as to the positions occupied for many years past by the Government of the Punjab and the Government of India respectively with reference to frontier questions, and as to the relations between them so far as concerns those questions. I feel some hesitation about discussing these matters, for, having myself held the office of Lieutenant-Governor down to not quite three years ago, I am liable to be suspected of prejudice; but, on the other hand, if, possessing the knowledge I do, I hold my tongue, I may be supposed to have accepted and endorsed all Lord Curzon's arguments and observations as well as his conclusions. It is impossible for me to allow this to be supposed, and for

this reason, as also because it will serve to make the whole position clearer, I am anxious to place before the Secretary of State and my colleagues a statement of the condition of things that, so far as my knowledge extends, has actually and as a matter of fact prevailed under the system which we are all now agreed should be abolished.

2. To begin with, it must be admitted that in spite of the anxiety of the Punjab Government to carry out the policy of the Government of India and of the consideration shown to the Lieutenant-Governor by successive Viceroys, differences of opinion have from time to time prevailed, which, though they seemed at one time on the point of being thrashed out in a friendly spirit, have evidently not as yet been cleared up. But in order that an exaggerated importance may not be attached to those differences of opinion, it is necessary to explain that the Punjab Government has had nothing to do with the discussion of the great general question as to the merits of what is called the "forward policy." So far as I know, no Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has ever been consulted on that great question, and I doubt whether any one of them has ever quite understood what the "forward policy," when taken in its full extent and as advocated by various authorities from time to time, exactly means. All that it concerns the Lieutenant-Governor to know is the fact that the Government of India desire to establish some amount of control over the trans-border tribes, up to a certain geographical limit, and that since the Durand line has been laid down, and so long as it may continue to have any meaning, that line is understood to be the limit.

3. As to the nature and extent of the control so to be established, the views of the Government of India seem to have expanded considerably after the Durand delimitation agreement. As shown in the dissent appended by Sir C. Pritchard, Sir J. Westland, and Sir A. MacDonnell to the Government of India Despatch of the 31st July 1894 (Parliamentary Paper C. 8713, Vol. I., pp. 25-27), the Government of India had by the time that Despatch was written come to take a far wider view of our responsibilities than was required by anything in the Durand agreement, or than was contemplated either by those who in 1892 proposed to the Secretary of State that such an agreement should be negotiated, or by the Secretary of State in accepting their proposals. Later on the views of the Government of India seem to have expanded still further. They appear to have got as far as this, that we were bound to establish over the tribes not merely such control as was needed for our own protection and to enable us to check raids against the Ameer on certain parts of the Durand line, but further, such control as might be necessary in order to stop the internal quarrels of the tribesmen among themselves, and authoritatively settle their disputes; and that the Government of India, notwithstanding the emphatic warnings against interference and extensions of administrative control given by the Secretary of State after the disastrous events of 1897; still hold that view, is clear from certain recent discussions. I mention all this not for the purpose of casting any reflection on the wisdom of the general policy adopted by the Government of India, which it would be out of place to discuss here, but simply to make the position with which I have to deal intelligible. Whatever the policy of the Government of India might be, it was, of course, the bounden duty of the Government of the Punjab, as the subordinate, to carry it out loyally and to the best of its ability, and it would be only as to the *modus operandi* and the rate at which particular portions of the work should be pushed on that it would be permissible for the Lieutenant-Governor to raise any questions.

4. As a matter of fact, it was only in regard to these subordinate, though by no means unimportant, matters that questions arose between the Punjab Government and the Government of India, and it is necessary to note the position in which those two authorities have generally stood towards each other when they have been inclined to differ. We have all known cases of a subordinate administration with a hinterland on its border over which it has been burning to expand, while its superior has been endeavouring to restrain its ardour. We need not look beyond the limits of Her Majesty's Indian Empire to find a case which is, to a certain extent, an illustration of this. The Beloochistan Agency has pushed on, drawing the Government of India after it, at

times in spite of the resistance of that Government, until it has got right up to the Gomal on one side and right up to the Durand line on another ; further, it has recently extended its posts out along the Nushki Seistan line to the border of Persia. On the Punjab Frontier it has been the reverse. It is the Government of India that has been pushing the local administration forward, and that administration, though it has always loyally obeyed the call, has sometimes done so under a sort of protest.

The main reason of this is simple enough. The Government of India looks at the whole North-Western Frontier line from the Black Mountain round to the neighbourhood of Kurrachee from a remote point of view, and like a person looking at a long coast line from a great distance out at sea, has been at times apt to suppose that there is a greater uniformity about it than there really is ; and in particular it has sometimes found it difficult to understand why methods which have been so successful along the line from the neighbourhood of the Gomal southwards, should not be employed with equal success to the north of that river, and especially in the Waziri country. The Punjab Government is in a very different position. In paragraph 29 of his Minute, Lord Curzon gives a list of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab from Sir Robert Egerton down to Sir Mackworth Young, showing that none of them had in the earlier part of their service been employed on the North-Western Frontier. He might have gone further, and said that no Lieutenant-Governor from and including Lord Lawrence down had ever been so employed. It may be supposed, from what he says in his 33rd paragraph, that Lord Lawrence was an exception, but that is not so. No one of us would presume to compare himself with Lord Lawrence in other respects, but in this particular we were all in the same predicament. It does not, however, follow from this that Lord Curzon is right when he says that in practice it is found, as a rule, that no Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab knows anything of the frontier at all. A Lieutenant-Governor has not, of course, the sort of knowledge of the frontier that you find in an officer who has spent much of his service on the frontier, and talks Pushtoo fluently, as all our best officers nowadays do—the sort of knowledge that we may hope to find in the new Chief Commissioner now to be appointed ; but, to say nothing of what he soon learns in the ordinary course of his daily work, and on the many occasions on which the frontier officers come to him to discuss matters personally, the Lieutenant-Governor commonly spends the whole cold weather, with the exception of a short period at Christmas, in camp, and he gives the frontier a good deal more than its share of his camping time. He has the frontier officers living in his camp, it may be for several weeks at a time, riding the march with him every morning, in and out of his tent all day, bringing up the leading men to interview him in the afternoon, and probably renewing the discussion of pending questions round the table after dinner. It is these officers, and not, as Lord Curzon seems to suppose, the members of the Secretariat Staff, however able these latter may be, that are the Lieutenant-Governor's advisers on frontier affairs, and from them, or in their company, he before long succeeds in learning a not inconsiderable amount about frontier affairs. A great deal, no doubt, is second-hand knowledge, but a certain amount he acquires for himself, especially when, as often happens, some of the important men understand Hindostani. His knowledge is exactly the same sort of knowledge that all of us who have held the post of Chief Commissioner of Assam have had of the numerous tribes that surround that province on all sides but one, and are under our control.

5. Now, having thus at least a considerable knowledge of the position, the Lieutenant-Governor has had on certain occasions, as, *e.g.*, when some of the forward moves mentioned by Lord Curzon were proposed, and also when the advance to the Malakund and the Chitral road and certain demarcations of the Durand line on the ground were under discussion, to represent to the Government of India that such measures would present certain difficulties and be attended with a considerable amount of risk. It is always an ungrateful task for a subordinate to have to suggest difficulties about carrying out the orders of his superior, and it is one from which a subordinate of lower rank

than a Lieutenant-Governor might sometimes shrink ; but about the duty of a subordinate, of whatever rank, in such a position, there can be no room for doubt. It was thus the duty of the Lieutenant-Governor to point out that the tribes we had to deal with, unlike the Pathans who fell under our sway on the annexation of the Punjab, had never been brought under the control of any ruler, and that, owing to various causes, they were far more difficult to control than those further south. One of these causes, I may mention, was the great strength of those tribes, and the bitter hostility against any interference on our part felt by the tribesmen generally as distinguished from the limited number of them who could hope to rise on our shoulders, or receive allowances from us. This after a little time came to be better understood. Another of these causes was the democratic constitution of those tribes, and the absence of powerful tumandars or maliks (leading men) through whom they could be controlled. It took longer to get this understood. An idea got started that you could make maliks (tribal leaders) out of almost anything, and it thus became necessary to explain that a strong malik was a natural product of the tribe, and that it was very difficult to make one grow strong by artificial cultivation. In 1896 the Government of India returned to the point and insisted that "experience has shown that in every Pathan tribe, however democratic, there are responsible head men who are capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported." This proposition had to be combated by giving detailed explanations and illustrations. Reference was made to a report received not long before, showing that the maliks we had subvented in the upper Tochi declared they could do nothing unless we placed a military force at their very elbow, and to petitions received from our Mahsood maliks, declaring that our countenance and support, far from strengthening them, had led to their being placed under a ban, and begging us to occupy Kanigoram and Makin, in the heart of their hills—places which we could not even visit except with a very large military force. It was further explained that, even in our own district of Peshawar, many of the Pathan zemindars would not stand any one of their number being raised above his natural position over them by our authority. What was then said was simply borne out by what subsequently occurred.

It was exemplified in the case of the Mohmunds in a most striking manner within a month or two later. We had, under the orders of the Government of India, to conclude an arrangement with those Mohmunds who had fallen on our side of the Durand line. When Mr. Merk proceeded to arrange preliminaries with them, they started by declaring that there were no maliks among them, that there might be seniors and juniors, but that, for the purpose of concluding an arrangement of that sort, they were all the same. I was marching along the Peshawar Frontier, and it was arranged that Mr. Merk, who had with infinite labour settled all preliminaries, should bring them before me at Shabkadr. About 900 of them claimed to come down to meet me and discuss the matter, and when they arrived they absolutely refused to put forward any men to represent them, even to the extent of being allowed to sit in front at the meeting. Almost the whole number sat down before us just as they managed to find room, and such of them as got near enough all tried to talk together. Thanks to Mr. Merk's skill an arrangement was somehow concluded, but I felt bound to express some doubt as to its being effectual. What happened at that very place, Shabkadr, in less than a year after we all know.

It was, I may mention, chiefly with reference to the Waziris that this discussion as to the constitution of the tribes and the position of the headmen arose between the Punjab Government and the Government of India, and if anyone still thinks that the Government of India would be right in holding that in the case of a tribe like the Mahsood Waziris "there are responsible headmen who are capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported," I would refer him to Mr. Merk's note of the 24th of July last, received here the other day with the Government of India's Despatch, No. 145, dated 18th October 1900, from which it will be seen that there are really no persons who can be called maliks among the Mahsoods, and that we must deal with the "ulus," *i.e.*, with the tribesmen *en masse*, merely making such use as we can of

any men who seem to have gained an influential position at the moment—a mode of procedure which, though it may answer for some purposes, will for others, I fear, prove altogether hopeless.

I have thought it well to mention all this about the maliks because it affords a good illustration of the sort of discussion that is apt to arise between the Local Government and the Government of India, and it is only by getting down from vague generalities to details that it is possible to make the position intelligible.

6. So much as to the nature of the position to be dealt with on the parts of the frontier to which I refer. Now as to the policy from time to time enjoined on the Punjab Government towards the tribes there. Apart from the correspondences relating to particular cases, there were two correspondences, one in 1888-89 in Sir James Lyall's time and another in 1896 in my time, in which the general question of our policy towards these tribes was discussed, and in each instance the correspondence was started by a letter from the Government of India urging the Lieutenant-Governor to greater efforts to extend our control over them. Both these correspondences are worth referring to in this connection, but the second of them has a more direct bearing on the present position because, at the time it passed, the important change effected by the Durand demarcation had taken place, and, moreover, the intermediate discussions that had occurred in particular cases had brought out clearly the points on which the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab were at one, and the points which had still to be cleared up between them.

7. In the 21st paragraph of his Minute Lord Curzon, apparently referring to this latter correspondence, writes as follows:—"In the early years of Lord Elgin's administration an attempt was once more made to escape from the necessities of a radical change by again suggesting to the Punjab Government the initiation of a policy of friendly intercourse with the tribes for whom we had thus assumed political responsibility, and of the strengthening of the political service of the border. Into the discussion that followed with the Punjab Government I need not enter, suffice it to say that it was not followed, so far as I can ascertain, by any practical changes either in the principles or in the form of administration." Now, if Lord Curzon is here referring to the correspondence I have just mentioned—and I do not know to what else he can be referring—I must point out that, while his remarks are verbally accurate, they are likely to convey a wholly erroneous impression to his readers. Anyone reading his Minute would be led to suppose that the Government of India had, on the occasion referred to, made an attempt to induce the Punjab Government to initiate a change of policy, and had failed to get it to move. What actually occurred was this: The Government of India, in Mr. Barnes' letter, No. 2197, dated 14th August 1896, to the Government of the Punjab, set forth certain general principles which, in their opinion, should be followed in dealing with the tribes on the North-Western Frontier of the Punjab, and asked for an expression of opinion as to how those principles could be best applied, and what modifications, if any, of the existing system were required. The Punjab Government complied with this request by forwarding a note, in which the whole position on various sections of the frontier was fully reviewed, and definite proposals for carrying out, on certain of those sections, the policy indicated in the Government of India letter were submitted for the approval and orders of the Government of India. The Punjab proposals were forwarded to the Government of India with the Punjab Chief Secretary's letter, No. 14, dated 28th October 1896, and the reason why they were not "followed," to use Lord Curzon's words, "by any practical changes" was a very simple one, namely, that the Government of India never answered that letter. I understand they, at first, deferred answering it as they preferred to wait for certain additional proposals which were promised, and which were not ready for submission until a couple of months later. This brought the matter down to the beginning of 1897, and then the time of my vacating office was so near that I suppose they thought it well to wait and see whether my successor approved of my scheme. Then a few months later

came the great rising of the tribes, and after that rising was suppressed the Government of India made a completely new departure. The whole thing is dead and gone now so far as any question of taking direct official action on it is concerned, but as that correspondence affords, within a short compass, a clearer and more detailed view than can be got elsewhere of the respective positions of the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab, of their relations (their very amicable relations) to one another, and of the opinions held by them respectively, I cannot help regretting that it has never been made public.

8. It would be out of the question for me to give anything like an abstract of that correspondence, but I think it well to refer to two or three points brought out in it in order to make the position as it then existed clearer.

The first of these points is that as to the rate at which the policy should be pushed on.

The view of the Government of India, as expressed in their letter of August 1896, appeared to be that we should endeavour to extend our control generally over the tribes up to the Durand line, and that we should everywhere exert ourselves more actively than we had previously been doing. As to this, after referring to the feeling of the tribes and the probability of opposition from them, the Lieutenant-Governor, while submitting definite proposals for extending our influence and establishing closer control in certain tracts, ventured to represent (in the note above mentioned) that the moment was not a favourable one for urging our frontier officers generally to greater activity. He wrote as follows:—
“ I should be averse to issuing any orders which might seem to our officers to sound the advance along the whole line at a moment like this, when we are not yet out of the wood in Waziristan and on the Chitral road, when we have the great Mohmund business impending, and when the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab is already crying out that the force under his command is not sufficient to meet the demands made on it by the forward movements we have already made. At the same time I feel bound to acknowledge the very full manner in which the Government of India, in their present letter, recognise the wide difference between the conditions that prevail on different parts of our frontier and the anxiety displayed throughout to enjoin moderation and caution, and I have in consequence every hope that, when we come to discussing matters in detail, it will turn out that there is really far less difference between my view and theirs than might at first sight be supposed. I have only to add that, however this may be, I shall, during the short time that remains to me here, exert myself to give effect to the views of the Government of India, whatever they may be, exactly as if they were my own.”

9. Another question, and one of the first magnitude, was started by the Government of India letter of August 1896, and, as it seems to be still under discussion, I think it well to refer to it, I mean the question as to what instructions we should give our officers regarding quarrels and fighting among the tribesmen themselves in a tribal tract where we have not assumed any sort of administrative control, and where such quarrels and fighting in no way whatever affect us or any interests which we are bound to protect. It was admitted on all hands that our officers, whenever they saw an opportunity of doing so, should interpose in a friendly manner, and use their good offices to promote peace; but it was also admitted on all hands that the effect of this sort of interposition would in most tracts be limited, and that if peace was really to be established among the tribesmen themselves it could only be done by a political officer interposing authoritatively, *i.e.*, as the Government of India expressed it, “ *by forbidding bloodshed and insisting on a peaceful settlement.*” The question was how far we were to direct or allow our officers to interpose in the class of cases referred to in this latter way. The Government of India seemed to treat this question with a somewhat light heart, and to be prepared to give political officers a free hand to do in regard to it as they might think fit under all the circumstances in which they might find themselves placed. It therefore became necessary to point out that we were, in the class of cases

referred to, under no obligation of any sort to interpose authoritatively; that the suggestion that we should do so was an entirely new departure; that wherever we attempted to do so we should be drawn into a sort of interference with the internal affairs of the tribes, which, when once started, must from its very nature soon become of all others the most close and systematic, and would land us in responsibilities which we could not discharge without having a strong backing of military force, and perhaps entering into occupation of the country. The root of the whole matter I may explain lies in this:—That if you take upon yourself authoritatively to forbid certain persons or certain sections of a tribe from attacking others not only must you, in order to prevent your face being blackened before the whole countryside, insist upon your order being obeyed and compel obedience to it if necessary by force, but further, as you have prevented those to whom it is addressed from redressing their wrongs in the only way open to them, you are bound, as a matter of common justice, to arrange that they shall have effective redress in some other way, and thus you will have all their quarrels with their many ramifications on your hands. If you interfere authoritatively at all you must be prepared to do justice all round. Having regard to considerations of this kind, it was recommended by the Punjab Government on the occasion referred to that a political officer should be authorised to interfere authoritatively to prevent fighting only in tracts where the Local Government and the Government of India, after considering our position, should decide that it was expedient that we should so interfere. Elsewhere what we sometimes call the “Khyber System” (as distinguished from the “Sandeman System”) would prevail; that is to say, the system so successfully carried out for many years by Sir R. Warburton in the Khyber, under which it was not considered our business to interfere authoritatively with the fighting of the tribesmen among themselves, even within sight of Jumrood, so long as such fighting did not give rise to any danger to the peace of the road or any other interest which we were bound to protect. It should be added that at the same time, in order to meet as far as possible the views of the Government of India, proposals were submitted for at once giving the power of interfering authoritatively in certain tracts.

I had an opportunity of discussing this point with Lord Elgin when I went to bid him farewell at Delhi towards the end of 1896, and I gathered that he was disposed to accept the above view, but, as I have said, the fates were against our correspondence being brought to an issue, and I gather that on this all important point the Government of India and the Local Government are still at variance; indeed, from the recent correspondence regarding the internal feuds between the Mahsood and Darwesh Khel Waziris, it would seem that the Government of India regard the distinction between authoritative and merely friendly interposition which has been long observed in the Punjab, and the momentary neglect of which has on some occasions led to embarrassing results, as a mere figment of some theorist's imagination.

10. I have only one more point to refer to in this connection. There were some passages in the Government of India letter of August 1896 calculated to create an impression that the Government of the Punjab was given to holding its political officers with a tightness which was altogether unnecessary, allowing them little discretion, and requiring them to refer every individual case for orders; and I see Lord Curzon now, in more than one passage of his Minute, makes the same charge. Now I may mention that when this charge was made in 1896 it was explained that it was based on a certain misapprehension, and I see in paragraph 36 of Lord Curzon's Minute a quotation from a note by Mr. Frederick Cunningham, in which a very similar explanation is given. That explanation is, that, except in particular classes of cases, the Punjab Government allows its political officers a very free hand indeed, and that when it requires them to refer to it for instructions this is, as a rule, not because it wants to deal with the case itself but because the Government of India expects such cases to be referred to it for orders. Mr. Cunningham, no doubt somewhat overstating the point, speaks in the passage quoted by Lord Curzon of the Punjab Government as not having “power to give orders in any but the most trivial matters,” and adds, that he “cannot remember any question sufficiently important

to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta," and winds up in his epigrammatic way by saying that "under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India." Now I may observe in passing that even after allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, by which Mr. Cunningham seems to reduce, not only the Local Government but also himself and the other very able men who have held the office of Commissioner, to the position of mere ciphers, there is enough left in this statement to supply a strong additional argument in favour of the change now proposed by Lord Curzon; but I am not at this moment concerned with that. At the period to which I am now referring there was no proposal for such a change. The question was one merely of decentralising, of giving a wider discretion to the local officers, and I think it well to mention what was then suggested to the Government of India on this point, because it holds good still and will hold good after the change now proposed. One of the chief causes which compel the Government of India, and as a necessary consequence the Punjab Government, to keep such a tight hold has always been that the general lines of the policy to be pursued are not sufficiently settled—that we are to a great extent drifting without a plan. So long as that is so you cannot safely allow a local officer any large measure of discretion. Hence it was suggested, and not for the first time, by the Punjab Government, that we should consider each section of the frontier separately, that we should determine what objects we should aim at there, what sacrifices we would be prepared to make, and what risks we would be prepared to run, in order to attain those objects, and what methods of action we should adopt, and that we should issue to the officers concerned general instructions of a certain degree of definiteness in accordance with the conclusions at which we might arrive. Our officers would thus have some idea of what they were at liberty to do on their own authority and what they should refer for orders. It was, indeed, admitted that there might be cases, though they would be very rare and exceptional cases, where we might dispense with anything of this kind. What was said on this last point was as follows:—
 "There may now and again be a frontier tract over which it is manifestly desirable to establish a close control rapidly at whatever cost, and in the case of which we may consider that the simplest plan is to appoint a strong and reliable officer, and leave him to take his own course, without hampering him with any definite instructions, merely throwing the reins on his neck and letting him carry us along as seems best to him; but these would be rare and exceptional cases, and for any Government to take such a course generally along an extensive line of frontier or to any large extent would be simply to abdicate its most important functions and to incur risks, the extent of which it would be impossible to estimate."

11. Having thus given an idea of the sort of matters on which the Punjab Government ventured to express an opinion different to that which the Government of India was disposed to take, I have next to consider how far such expression of opinion by the Government of the Punjab did any harm and how far it did any good.

As to the harm, I think it may safely be said that until recently there were no complaints of its leading to any undue delay or to any friction in dealing with particular cases. The Government of India and the Government of the Punjab knew their respective places in the system perfectly well. When any course of action was proposed the Government of the Punjab stated its opinion, sometimes adding that that opinion was one formed from the limited point of view of local considerations, and leaving the Government of India, who had to look at matters from the broader point of view of military and Imperial considerations, to decide.* Upon this the Government of India commonly decided, as it was perfectly in its right in doing, without entering into further discussion.

* I suspect it is to this Lord Curzon alludes when, in the 37th paragraph of his Minute, he speaks of the Punjab Government as "anxious to shift the ulterior responsibility to the shoulders of the Government of India"; but it is hard to see how the Punjab Government could have taken any other course than that I have described. They rarely had a sufficient opportunity of fully learning the considerations that influenced the Government of India.

In this connection I cannot do better than quote the description of the position Lord Elgin gives in paragraph 20 of his Minute of 6th November 1898 :—“ I am prepared,” he says, “ to endorse most emphatically the claim that the Local Government has loyally co-operated in the declared policy of the Government of India. The late Lieutenant-Government of the Punjab once said to me when discussing this subject, ‘ You have only to lift your finger, and the brake will be taken off in any place you think desirable.’ That remark is more than an expression of personal loyalty, it contains in a few words a correct exposition of the only principle on which we can rest our arrangements, *i.e.*, that it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India.”

Lord Curzon in paragraph 38 of his Minute writes in a different tone. He says “ I do not see how any Governor-General could deny that if he desires a policy to be pursued or a step to be taken in Baluchistan, which is under the administration of an Agent to the Governor-General, directly subordinate to himself, however unpalatable such a policy or step might be to the Agent to the Governor-General, it will be carried out with incomparably less friction and delay than in a similar case in the Punjab, where the dignity and susceptibilities of a Local Government and of its head demand the most scrupulous and respectful consideration.”

Now how far there is good ground for this change of tone it is difficult for us to judge, especially as we do not know what there may be to be said on the Punjab side of the question by the present Lieutenant-Governor, who, strange to say, does not appear to have been consulted regarding the proposals now under consideration ; but however this may be, I think that the mere fact that Lord Curzon takes the view of the present position that he does, and expresses that view in the way he does in various passages of his Minute, affords a considerable argument in favour of the change he proposes, unless, indeed, it can be clearly shown that the retention of the Local Government in the management of the frontier serves some highly important purpose, and I must say I doubt whether any argument against the change can be founded on this latter ground.

12. No doubt the Punjab Government has, in the past, played an important part, and I hope generally a useful part, in moulding the details of a scheme after that scheme has been determined on, but that is a thing a Chief Commissioner could do equally well and possibly better. The real question is whether the Punjab Government has been able to do more than that, and this question is discussed by Lord Curzon in paragraphs 82 and 83 of his Minute. In these paragraphs, after referring to the matter of punitive expeditions, which I must reserve for separate notice presently, he goes on to speak of the military advances over the border which have carried us forward on to the Samana, into the Kurram, and far into North and South Waziristan, and of what came later, namely, that the Government of India were involved only three years ago in the greatest frontier conflagration that has ever been known. I may observe that the advance into the Kurram cannot properly be mentioned in this connection, as it stands on a totally different footing from the other forward movements, and on the other hand that the advance to the Malakand and the Chitral road ought to have been mentioned ; but, however that may be, Lord Curzon asks how it is that, notwithstanding the peaceful disposition of the Punjab Government, things of that sort occurred, and his conclusion is that the plea that we are saved by the intervention of the Local Government from such things is one that will not stand a moment's examination. Now I do not know whether anyone would, at the present day, raise such a plea. Lord Elgin has indeed expressed an apprehension that a frontier Chief Commissioner, such as it is now proposed to appoint, might force the pace, but that is a totally different thing. It is a case of *facilis descensus*. Either of the two parties that are coupled together may easily drag the other down ; but it is not so easy for either to hold the other back. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue this. It is enough to say that I entirely agree with Lord Curzon's conclusion, and I may add that even if the Punjab Government were able to hold back the Government of India

in its forward progress, I do not think it could be decently argued that the Punjab Government should be retained in the system for that purpose. If it is desirable to exercise any control over the Government of India for this or any other purpose, such control should be exercised from above and not by a subordinate.

It is chiefly for these reasons, namely, that the relations of the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab in regard to frontier affairs have now become strained, and that the part the Punjab Government can nowadays take in the management of those affairs is far from being one of first rate importance, that I accept Lord Curzon's proposal for the separation of the frontier.

13. I desire to add only one word more as to the general position in the past; and I do so in order to prevent misapprehension. I trust it will not be supposed from anything I have said that I mean to claim for the Punjab Government the position of a sort of Cassandra—"Des jussu non unquam credula Teucris." I have, indeed, endeavoured to show that the discussions that arose between the Government of India and the Government of the Punjab were to a considerable extent the result of the estimate formed by the latter of the local difficulties and risks of the forward policy; and, that that estimate erred only by being a good deal below the mark, is amply proved by all that has since happened. But it by no means follows from this that the Government of India were not wise in facing those difficulties and risks. Whether they were or not depends on the merits of the forward policy and the rate at which it is thought necessary to push it on in order that it may accomplish its objects in due time, and these are matters which it would be altogether beside my present purpose to discuss.

14. I now desire to say a few words on certain passages in Lord Curzon's Minute, which seem to me to reflect unfairly on the present system, or on the way in which it has been worked by the Punjab Government or its officers. To begin with, Lord Curzon, not content with showing that the Punjab Government failed to stop the forward movement, seeks, towards the end of paragraph 82 of his Minute, to saddle that Government with some share, though not the main share, of the responsibility for those movements, and a little higher up he speaks of those movements as carried out under the "patronage" of the Punjab Government. What he means by this I altogether fail to understand. You might almost as well say that, if I ordered my servant to brush my hat and he proceeded to do so, that the hat was being brushed "under his patronage." The fact is notorious that the forward moves in question were carried out in the execution of a vast system of policy established long before by the highest powers that be, and that, with the exception of the move to the Malakand and the Chitral road, on which the great political parties in England split, they had one way or another the sanction of both those parties. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab had little to do but obey orders, except in so far as it may have been his duty to aid in settling details, and, as already explained, sometimes to point out the difficulties and risks involved.

15. Then as regards the great frontier conflagration of three years ago, for which also Lord Curzon holds the Government of the Punjab in some degree responsible—I think that, in spite of all the eloquence displayed on both sides in the debates in Parliament two years ago, most persons have come to the conclusion that that conflagration was not due to any particular forward movement, or to any defect in the detailed arrangements for carrying it out, but to so many forward movements having been compressed into so short a space of time, which was more than the mass of the tribes could stand; in other words, that the case was simply one in which the cup was filled up and overflowed.

We are not, however, called upon now to discuss at large the question of the proper apportionment of the responsibility for the events of 1897. We have to deal only with the merits of the present system as compared with those of the proposed system, under which the management of the whole frontier would be under the Government of India; and, if it is meant to suggest that the outbreaks that occurred in 1897 in the frontier tracts under the control of the Government of the Punjab would probably not have occurred if the work of taking over and

managing those tracts had been kept by the Government of India in its own hands, the observation at once suggests itself that one of the earliest and most serious of the outbreaks that occurred in 1897, occurred not in a tract under the control of the Government of the Punjab, but in the country around and beyond the Malakand, a tract which had been from the start under the control of the Government of India itself.

16. Possibly what Lord Curzon means to suggest is that the conflagration of 1897 was the result of our taking regular troops with us to hold the positions into which we advanced, and that if, instead of doing that, we had organised militia corps recruited to a large extent from the people of the country, as he is now doing for North and South Waziristan, all would have gone smoothly. If this is his idea, I must say it is a very questionable one. I do not desire to express any opinion on the great experiment he is now about to try, and which, if it stands the test of times of trouble in a country like Waziristan, will do him infinite credit. It is enough for the purposes of the present discussion to say that there is not, so far as I know, the smallest reason to suppose that, if the administration of the frontier had been entirely in the hands of the Government of India at the time the forward moves were made, any such experiment would have been attempted. I am not aware that anyone connected with the Government of India or the Headquarters Staff of the army in those days ever thought of trying anything of the kind. The truth is that the idea of holding tracts like those of North and South Waziristan by militia corps of the sort referred to, was never, so far as I know, taken up by any of the powers that be until it was found that our new acquisitions were of much less value, especially from a military point of view, than had been imagined; that we could not spare regular troops to garrison them without increasing the regular army, and that service in them was highly unpopular, both with the officers and men of that army. Lord Curzon seems, in paragraph 7 of his Minute, to make it a reproach to the Government of the Punjab that they never proposed to adopt any such scheme. Why they did not, it would be easy enough to explain if doing so would now serve any useful object; but it is enough for our present purpose to say that the matter was one of quite sufficient magnitude to engage the attention of Lord Curzon's predecessors and their advisers, and that they, too, did not propose anything of the sort.

17. I have only one matter more to refer to in connection with Lord Curzon's Minute, and that is the question put in paragraph 82, regarding what are commonly called punitive expeditions. He says:—"If the intervention of the Punjab Government acts as a barrier against aggressive schemes, I would ask how has it come about that in the 50 years that have elapsed between the annexation of the Punjab and the present day, during the whole of which time the frontier has been under the control of the Punjab Government, there have been no fewer than 40 military expeditions against the tribes of that frontier?" I have kept this question separate from the other questions asked in that paragraph of the Minute, because it has to be answered in a totally different way, and in a way in which it has been repeatedly answered before. Lord Curzon does not give a list of the expeditions to which he refers, or of the dates at which they took place. He treats the whole thing in a lump, but I have no doubt he is right in saying that there were from first to last forty expeditions, great and small. Further, I have no doubt, that, as regards the great majority in number of them, it is chiefly for the Punjab Government and not the Government of India to explain how they came to be necessary, for the great majority of them took place in the days when the Government of India left the management of the frontier to a very much larger extent than it has done recently in the hands of the Punjab Government. But the explanation of the Punjab Government, which, as I have said, is not now given for the first time, is this, that when we first took over the Punjab the frontier tribes had been in the habit of raiding pretty much at their good will and pleasure. They had to be taught what our strength was, and one of the most effectual ways of teaching them was by punitive expeditions. They took a long period to learn their lesson, and during that period punitive expeditions were numerous, but, as time went on, the necessity for them diminished; and, to refer to the condition of things ultimately arrived at, I find that speaking of raids and punitive expeditions, in a not

which I wrote in 1896, I said "raids in any force to speak of across the frontier of British India* which were formerly so common, are now practically unknown, and we have to deal only with crime of the type which always does and must prevail even in British India, where we have to do with turbulent people. Punitive expeditions properly so called have . . . practically done their work, and have now almost ceased to be necessary." I added, "The only punitive expeditions properly so called, that have been undertaken within the last 15 years, *i.e.*, since we settled down after the second Kabul war, are the first Samana expedition and the first Black Mountain expedition. That is to say these were the only two expeditions that were necessitated by spontaneous aggressiveness on the part of the tribes. The other expeditions that have taken place during the period referred to have been connected with some forward movement or demonstration on our part."

18. It remains to speak of the addition proposed by me to the draft Despatch. I have already (paragraph 12 *supra*) referred to a certain apprehension expressed by Lord Elgin, in paragraph 22 of his Minute of the 6th November 1898, as to the possible effect of establishing on the North-Western Frontier a special authority of the sort now proposed. What he said was as follows:—"If we create this new post, choosing for it, as we are bound to do, a man of energy and ambition, what outlet is he to find for his activity? The career of a Sandeman, the creation of a new Biluchistan is debarred to him; for the policy which he must carry out is essentially one of *quieta non movere*. It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the Despatch of 28th January (1898), and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and the future Viceroy . . . It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which, from the nature of things, must, in my judgment, endanger its continuance." Now, I myself do not think that, at the point we have now reached, we can allow any apprehension of that kind to stand in the way of what is proposed; but, at the same time, I feel bound to state that, in my opinion, the danger referred to is real, and that it is one against which we have to be on our guard. Lord Curzon, it will be seen (in paragraphs 80 *et seq.* of his Minute) utterly scouts the idea of there being any such danger, but, though he has dealt with the matter at considerable length, he has not, I think, seen where the danger really lies. I do not myself think that there is any danger for a long time to come of any authority, high or low, deliberately planning and proposing an advance into any fresh tract beyond the frontier. We may, indeed, be forced to advance into fresh tracts. Having, for example, occupied the Goomal and Tochi valleys, we may be forced into occupying the great Mahsood hill tract which lies between them, as, indeed, the Mahsood maliks told us some years ago we should eventually be compelled to do; or again, having advanced to the Malakund and opened the Chitral road, we may be forced into occupying the surrounding country; but such things would now be looked upon by all responsible persons as most serious misfortunes, which we should strain every nerve to avert. Indeed, I see, from some papers recently received regarding the establishment of the Northern Waziristan Militia, that it is proposed by Lord Curzon to restrict our area of effective occupation in the Tochi valley within narrower limits than many of us would think practicable, having regard to the responsibilities we have taken upon ourselves there.

But though we are not likely to see any fresh forward moves deliberately planned for some time to come, there is another danger against which we have to be on our guard, namely, the danger that the local authorities might, especially by over-interference in the internal affairs of the tribes of the sort referred to above (paragraph 9), draw us gradually into responsibilities which it would be found impossible to fulfil, except by

* It will be observed that I spoke only of raids across the frontier of British India. Since we have advanced into the Goomal and into the Tochi, we have had three additional frontiers exposed to raiding, and the raids on them have been very numerous. In fact, on these three new frontiers we are now very much in the position in which we were fifty years ago on the frontier of British India.

occupying some additional tract, or establishing administrative control over it with the support of a military force of some sort. Now, whatever may be the shortcomings of the present system, it has at least been free from any danger of that sort. Lord Curzon himself evidently believes that, whatever a Lieutenant-Governor may be in other respects, he is at least pretty certain to be above, or

* He says, in paragraph 83, evidently dealing with the point as one of curious speculation, "I can conceive that an ambitious Lieutenant-General, if such a phenomenon were to occur, &c."

perhaps I should say below, being ambitious.* But with a Chief Commissioner, specially appointed to administer the border, it would be apt to be somewhat different. I do not mean to suggest that he would be influenced by

mere personal ambition or a desire to distinguish himself—we could all name men of that stamp, but they are happily the exceptions—what I mean is, that he would be apt to feel that his chief *raison d'être* was to establish a firmer grip over the tribes than the Punjab Government had succeeded in doing, and that he would be inclined to better his instructions—that he might, to use frontier expressions, be over-anxious to "run the show," "to lift the purdah of the tribes," "to get well in among them," and "to wheel them into line"; and he would know, as we all know, that the most effectual way to do this, provided you can manage it without causing an explosion, is to get your hand well into their internal affairs. No doubt the official instructions to him would continue to be that he should abstain from all unnecessary interference, that he should exercise his control from without, that he should merely teach the tribesmen to govern themselves and manage their own affairs according to our views, and so on. But it is difficult to teach people like the tribesmen in question to do these things, and there would be always a tendency for the work to fall substantially into the only hands able to do it, and for the responsibility to be thrown on to the only shoulders strong enough to bear it, that is to say, into the hands and on to the shoulders of our officials. This would not so much matter if we had only a small tract of tribal territory to deal with; but the transborder tract which will be placed under the new Chief Commissioner is about 500 miles in length, and, even limited as it is at present by the Durand line, is of considerable, and in some places of formidable, breadth. It is, moreover, almost everywhere a country of extraordinary difficulty from a physical point of view, and the numerous tribes inhabiting it are about as hard to manage as any you would find on the face of the earth. No doubt, having started on the lines we have, it may be our ultimate destiny to occupy all that country up to the Durand line, and even that line can not be counted on as a limit for all times and circumstances. But the rate of progress is to a large extent under our control, and if we let ourselves be drawn on too rapidly, we may before long find ourselves on various sections of the frontier with more on our hands at one and the same time than we can well manage; moreover, even taking the most sanguine view of the experiment now being tried in North and South Waziristan, we may find ourselves in places and in circumstances where it would be impossible to rely on levies raised to any considerable extent from the tribes, and where we should need the support of regular troops. This being the position, I should have thought it desirable on the eve of this new departure to reiterate the injunctions contained in the Despatch of January 1898; and I should have thought this the more desirable because it seems to me, as I have already stated, that the Government of India are on the one hand inclined to take a somewhat exaggerated view of the obligations thrown on us by the Durand Convention, and on the other hand are not sufficiently alive to the difficulties of the position. I should further, with reference to what I have said above, at the end of paragraph 10, have thought it well to say that while the Secretary of State concurred with Lord Curzon in thinking that any minute interference of the Government in the details of frontier work was objectionable, he at the same time thought it necessary to bear in mind the observations made by Lord Elgin in paragraph 20 of his Minute of 6th November 1898, and to be on our guard against pushing too far the theory that the local authority should be "given a free hand."

(Signed) D. FITZPATRICK.

17 January, 1901.

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
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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST
FRONTIER). S2096



MAHSUD-WAZIRI OPERATIONS.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON:
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EAST INDIA.

(NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.)

MAHSUD-WAZIRI OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 26th October, 1899. Received 13th November, 1899.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of the letters marked in the margin, regarding raids committed by Mahsud and Waziri tribesmen.

From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th October, 1898, with enclosure
From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 5th May, 1899 with enclosures
From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 20th September, 1899, with enclosures
To the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 6th October, 1899, with enclosures.

(Signed)

”
”
”
”
”
”

We have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
W S A. LOCKHART.
E H. H COLLEN
A. C. TREVOR.
C. M RIVAZ.
C E DAWKINS
T. RALEIGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 17th October, 1898.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 28th September, 1898, regarding the raid committed by Mahsuds on Jani Khel flocks on the 3rd September, 1898, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted correspondence, from which it will be seen that the Commissioner, Derajat Division, recommends that the following terms be demanded from the Guri Khels, who, it has been established, planned the raid and furnished the largest number of

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 22nd September, 1898, and enclosures.
Commissioner, Derajat's, dated 23rd September, 1898.
Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 1st October, 1898.
Punjab Government, dated 5th October, 1898.

offenders, the others accompanying as assistants:—

- (1) Payment of customary blood-money and compensation for men killed and wounded, the raiders being allowed to set off any sum on account of blood-money owing to them;

- (2) Restitution of all animals carried off and of any ransom paid for them, and of the value of animals killed, dead or permanently injured; and
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs. 800, half to be remitted if terms (1) and (2) are completed within one month of the date of their announcement.

2. Commissioner further recommends that the present garrison of the Jani Khel post be relieved by the 12 sabres recently withdrawn from the Tochi post, as they are infantry sepoy and practically useless for purposes of pursuit, since the post is 10 miles from the border and raiders have ample time to get away.

3. It will be seen from the enclosures of this letter that the kidnapped shepherds and children were released almost immediately by the raiders. The Lieutenant-Governor has, therefore, approved of the terms recommended by Mr Merk, and trusts that his action will be confirmed by the Government of India.

4. As to the alteration of the Jani Khel garrison, the Commissioner has been authorised to ascertain the views of the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, and to report them with his own

5. With reference to the remark contained in paragraph 3 of your letter, dated 7th October, 1898, I am to add that the whole question of the best way of bringing the Mahsuds to account for the repeated outrages committed by them in British India, Tochi and Zhob has been referred by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, and is now under the separate consideration of the Lieutenant-Governor

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 22nd September, 1898.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram, dated the 15th instant, on the subject of the Jani Khel raid on the 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of the letter and telegrams noted in the margin.

Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, dated the 20th instant.

Telegram from Political Officer, Wana, dated the 20th instant.

Telegram from Political Officer, Tochi, dated the 15th instant.

2. The persons kidnapped by the raiders were, it seems, released soon after capture at the intercession of the guardian of a shrine, to which the raiders had presented sheep as a thank-offering for the success of their attack.

3. There appears to be no special motive for the raid, the robbing propensities of the Mahsuds and their hereditary enmity with the Jani Khel (who are Darwesh Khel) are the probable causes.

4. The *personnel* of the raiders is established by the Political Officer to have been Guri Khel, Garerai, Jalal Khels and others; the Guri Khel, with Asal Khan and Dabbas Khan as their ringleaders, having apparently planned the raid and furnished the largest number of offenders, the others accompanying as assistants.

5. The Jani Khel post, as at present constituted, seems to me to be useless. It lies 10 miles from the actual line of the border, its garrison are infantry whom it would take two-and-a-half hours to reach the frontier, and

for purposes of repelling raids and following up raiders the sepoy might as well not be there. With the permission of His Honour, I propose to suggest to the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, that cavalry be substituted for infantry here

6. The introduction of the breech-loader has, in the matter of the Frontier Grazing Regulation of 1874, as in many other matters on the border, brought about a complete revolution. So long as our troops had breech-loaders and the hillmen had none, our protective agency was so infinitely superior to the offensive power of raiders that the effective line of safety was pushed right up to the foot of the hills, far beyond the "frontier road" mentioned in the Regulation. Here the distance is nine miles. Now that the hillmen are obtaining breech-loaders, the conditions of the case will be reversed unless we either arm our villagers with similar weapons or place our troops practically on the actual border itself. The former alternative is for several reasons impossible, and my proposal to put cavalry in Jani Khel practically adopts the second alternative. It would be obviously unfair to enforce the Regulation when half-a-dozen raiders armed with breech-loaders are superior to three times that number of villagers who have only jezails or even Enfields; and, as the Deputy Commissioner says, the Regulation is becoming obsolete. I would not recommend its repeal, for it may be useful on occasion, but in view of the greatly altered circumstances of the present day, as compared with 1874, in the vital point of armament, we cannot, I think, look to that Regulation as affording much in the way of the protection of border graziers and their animals.

7. It is satisfactory that the Jani Khel acted fully up to their responsibility for the Shakta Pass.

8. There can be no further doubt that the raid occurred in British territory, that the men killed and wounded are British subjects, and that the owners of at least half of the animals that have been lifted are British subjects. The owners of the other half are not British subjects, but as their property was carried off from British territory, we are bound to take up their case as well as that of our subjects. Even if the raid had not actually crossed our border, we should, I think, for the considerations stated in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated the 1st February, 1892, to this office, have been under the obligation to exact redress from the Mahsuds. In connection with this letter the Deputy Commissioner has properly warned the Jani Khel not to retaliate.

9. Now as to this redress the raid having been made in British territory, two British subjects having been killed and three wounded, and all the animals having been carried off from within our limits, the case seems to me far more serious than if the affair had happened in the grazing lands adjacent to our border, and if no British subjects had been killed, wounded and injured. In the latter event we should probably have been content to merely enforce reparation. But the present case appears to me to be one calling for more than mere reparation. There has been a good deal of raiding lately by the Mahsuds, witness the recent correspondence about Zhob and the various diaries and reports of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and the time has come, I think, for making a stand and for showing to the Mahsuds that British interests must be scrupulously respected. In this case there has been a gross offence committed, for which, if any raiders had been caught in our territory, they could have been hanged under the law. I understand from the Political Officer, Wana, that in a similar case the Garerais were fined Rs. 500, which fine was subsequently remitted. I do not know the circumstances of this remission, but I venture to hold that, if a punishment is inflicted at all, it ought always to be one that will be felt and remembered, and, secondly, that, although in individual instances it may have sometimes a good effect to forego a penalty which has been unconditionally announced, yet unconditional remissions are dangerously apt to create the impression that we are making idle threats.

10. I have discussed the following terms with the Political Officer, Wana.—

- (1) Payment of customary blood-money and compensation for the men killed and wounded.
- (2) Restitution of all the animals carried off and of any ransom paid for them, and payment of market value of any animals killed, dead or permanently injured.
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs. 1,500, one-half to be remitted if terms (1) and (2) are completed within one month after date of notice given of the terms

Details as to (1) and (2) will be settled direct by the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.

Mr. Kettlewell states that the first and second terms are already fully understood by the Guri Khel, but that as regards (1) they plead a set-off on account of blood-money owing to them. To this, I think, there is no strong objection, although it is not usual to admit such set-offs for the death of British subjects, but here the circumstances are peculiar in that there is an old feud between the parties.

11. With regard to the fine, Mr. Kettlewell thinks it too high, and in deference to his opinion I have reduced my proposal to Rs. 800, to which he does not demur on the score of its being excessive, but he would postpone altogether the question of a fine until we see what the Guri Khels are doing and have done already in the matter of reparation. As to this, I differ. The condition under which half the fine will be remitted is intended to meet the case of fairly prompt restoration. Whatever the attitude of sections may be, we must, I think, mark what has happened, and considering the nature of the raid, a fine of Rs. 400 or Rs. 800, as the case may be, spread over three sections, can scarcely be called harsh. If the Malikhs have to pay up, then all I can say is that they must be weak and powerless. The usual course where an independent clan is fined, is either for the whole clan to subscribe according to hereditary shares (thus, if they sympathise with the individual offenders and take up their case as a clan question), or the jirga pays and recovers from the individual offenders by prompt and drastic methods of its own. If it comes to this that we are prevented from punishing an offending clan, because the punishment will fall not upon the offenders or upon the whole clan (in the latter case, because the clan voluntarily takes upon its shoulders the offence of the individuals), but upon the Malikhs who help us, then we are in a grave dilemma: the clans can go on raiding as much as they like, secure in the knowledge that nothing more disagreeable is likely to happen than a more or less complete restoration, as chance will have it, and we are in the position of being unable to strike for fear of hitting our friends! There is a limit to the policy of consideration; to my mind it is incumbent upon all tribes to whom we extend the privilege of friendly relations with us, whose members we protect when in our own limits, and whose interests we respect, that they shall reciprocate, and that, if any members of tribes injure us, those tribes shall do us reparation without delay. That is of the essence of friendly relation, it is an obligation upon the clans whether they receive allowances from us or not, but this obligation is greatly enhanced in the case of those that draw our money. Under any circumstances, it is the duty of the clans to make immediate restitution; it is no particular merit to them if they do their plain duty, and for the reasons given above, I am of opinion that, if any consideration is required owing to the special conditions of the case, it is sufficiently expressed in the lenient amount of the fine and in the remission which depends upon the conduct of the sections at fault. I therefore adhere to my proposals and recommend for the orders of Government terms (1) and (2) and a fine of Rs. 800, of which one-half is conditional, as stated above. If the Malikhs have, after all, to pay, it is an internal question between them and their clansmen, with which we have nothing to do: and these very Malikhs are to blame for not having restrained and controlled

their clansmen. If they plead inability to do so, then there seems no particular good in their being Malikhs, nor do they appear to deserve much consideration. I would ask for the favour of early orders, in view of the facts stated in the telegram of the Political Officer, Tochi.

Annexure 2.

Letter from A. H. Gunter, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 20th September, 1898.

In reply to your letter of the 11th instant, on the subject of the Mahsud raid on the Bannu border at Jani Khel, I have the honour to report that I have ascertained that the kidnapped shepherds and children were released almost immediately by the raiders. The robbers paused at a Ziarat in the Shaktu valley belonging to one Dina, a Bibzai Mahsud, and presented five sheep to the shrine as a thank-offering for the success of their expedition, and Dina then begged and obtained the release of their captives.

2. I have been unable to discover any special motive for this raid, though I have questioned the Jani Khel Malikhs and other persons who would be likely to know about the matter. I do not myself believe there is any to be looked for save such as lay in the opportunity. The Mahsuds on the one hand, and the Jani Khel and Bakka Khel Waziris of this district on the other, have a long-standing enmity and have raided one another time and again, though the scene of their operations has been generally across the border and the scale a smaller one.

3. As to the *personnel* of the raiders, my latest information is that the band consisted of—

- (1) *Asal Khan, Guri Khel*, with a hundred men. There seems to be no doubt that this man was at the bottom of the whole business, the organizer and leader of the raid, and I am told that the herds were all driven straight to his village and there divided.
- (2) *Muhabbat Khan, Guri Khel*
- (3) *Shergand of Kamir Khan, Shabi Khel Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (4) *Shahpir Khan, son of Majhak Khan, Shaman Khel Mahsud*, with 1 man.
- (5) *Fatteh Khan, Lamanai*, with 12 men.
- (6) *A Gudi Khel*, with 2 men.
- (7) *Shadi Nur Khan, Garera Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (8) *Fatteh Khan, Marsai Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (9) *Khan, Biland Khel Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (10) *Jamaroz Khan, son of Muhammad Khan, Abid Ali*, with 6 men.
- (11) *Makin, son of Gulaband, Bizai*, with 6 men.
- (12) *A Jalal Khel*, with 7 men.

I will not vouch for the completeness or accuracy of this list, which has been brought by spies sent up after the raiders, and which I see differs materially from the list sent by the Political Officer, Wana, but that officer will doubtless be able to check it.

4. I was given a very natural explanation as to why the news of the raid was not at once sent to the Jani Khel post by the Jani Khels themselves. "There were only sepoy's there," they said, "and what we then wanted was sowars." The sepoy's from the Jani Khel Fort would probably have never even caught up the *chigha*. Our posts are so far from the border at this portion of it that we cannot hope to strike effectively in cases of this sort unless indeed we returned to the old system of having cavalry instead of infantry at Jani Khel and keeping our roads out to Khaisora and Shaktu from the post in condition for galloping. If we had had the Khaisora post built which was proposed a few years ago, the raiders might not have found matters quite so easy, but what is really required is one post at the Khaisora mouth and another at the Shaktu mouth. Then Jani Khel and Burji might be done away with.

5. I find that section 3 of the Punjab Frontier Grazing Regulation has been practically a dead-letter for years, and after seeing the ground I think you would agree that it is unsuitable. The frontier road is here about nine miles from the border. All the good grazing lies across the road, and for the greater part of this strip owing to the proximity to villages and posts there is no serious danger from exterior foes. The most that we should do is, I think, to mark off, say, a three-mile strip and insist on armed escorts within that. The people's own opinion about the matter is that it is better that they should lose an occasional flock rather than that their men should have the trouble of a close watch and ward of this sort. They also say—"If you insist on our turning out as an armed escort, we must have a weapon with which we can meet our attackers on equal terms. The raiders came with twelve breech-loaders. We have only two amongst the whole tribe. In any case what could we have done?" We at present supply them with no weapons for border defence either of their homes or of their flocks. The Jani Khels say the men who were shot were shot with breech-loaders.

6. The Jani Khels who were responsible for the pass turned out in great force after the raiders, and with great promptitude, but the distance was against them, and some of the hamlets were 10 miles off the scene of the raid, and a mistake was made in going to that scene instead of heading straight for the mouth of the Shaktu. The men of Khar and Khui avoided that mistake and came up with the raiders, but met with repulse as has been already described.

7. I have visited the scene of the occurrence of the raid and ridden along the border. The place whence the animals were carried off is undoubtedly British territory. Revenue-paying land and the survey boundary pillars are beyond in towards independent territory. The owners of about half the sheep and donkeys are Waruka Jani Khels who permanently reside beyond the border line and are not British subjects. The owners of the other half and of all the cows are permanently resident in British territory who pay revenue and are British subjects in every sense of the word. I append a detailed list of owners and property claimed to be lost, given me by Mr. Wilkin, District Superintendent of Police. He says he is inclined to think that the numbers have been exaggerated. The Jani Khels, on the other hand, tell me they are prepared to take oath on the "Koran" that their numbers are correct. The difference between these numbers and those given by the Political Officer, Wana, is not a very great one, and this detail might be settled according to the custom of the country.

8. I am now told that the man Kokar, who was mortally wounded by the raiders, was not a man from *Khui*, but is a British subject from Bitannai, a village situated within the border near Khui. Also that one of the wounded men, Ghazal (a British subject too), has died of his wounds.

9. I have told the Jani Khels that Government are taking up this case, and that retaliation on their own part is absolutely prohibited.

List of stolen Cattle with Owners and numbers raved by the Māhsuds

Serial No	Name of Owner.	Father's Name	Tribe	Sub-section	Number of Head of Cattle
1	Sheikh Majid ..	Sheikh Farid .	Warika .	Jani Khel ...	} Lost 200 sheep.
2	Basam .	Massalla	Lohar Warika	Do ..	
3	Khovjak	Do. ..	Do	Do ..	
4	Safiyd Rahim .	Mer Mon	Do	Do ..	
5	Jamal Din . . .	Shamal Khan	Warika	Do ...	} Lost 180 sheep
6	Shamal Khan	Bangi Khan .	Do .	Do	
7	Zai Gai	Kaim Khan ..	Do	Do	} 220 sheep and goats and 3 donkeys 200 sheep
8	Ahmad Khan ..	Shal Khan	Do	Do. .	
9	Tor Khan	Karai Khan	Khnjada Khel	Do	} 200 goats and sneep.
10	Pir Ssiyd .	Karar Khan	Do	Do ..	
11	Niyaz Khan	Karai Khan	Do	Do	} 110 sheep, 13 goats, 2 donkeys, 2 cows.
12	Tar Gul,	Utman Shan	Mallu Khel	Do	
13	Pir Azam	Almari	Do	Do .	} 4 cows, 1 donkey, 14 sheep 25 sheep.
14	Zargon Shah ..	Ahmad Shah .	Do ..	Do .	
15	Tapuzai ..	Isat Khan	Do .	Do ..	4 cows.
16	Dablar .	Pushai	Do "	Do .	4 do.
17	Zamak	Muhammad	Do	Do	2 do.
18	Shatai	Mehr Gul .	Do.	Do	1 cow
19	Nazar Khan . .	Daduki	Do ...	Do .	4 cows.
20	Kulai	Hakim Khan	Do .	Do	4 do
21	Shana Gul	Azam Khan	Sardi Khel . .	Bakka Khel	5 do.
22	Anga Mal .	Jungai .	Mallu Khel .	Jani Khel	6 do
23	Kadi .	Teral ? ..	Ali Khel	Do	2 do
24	Mahk Din	Salam Din	Bacha Kat .	Do	2 do
25	Zaromat Khan	Dangar <i>alias</i> Merat Khan	Do ..	Do	6 do
26	Jamak Khan .	Trippal ..	Do ...	Do.	2 do
27	Komal Khan	Dodai	Do.	Do	3 cows and 4 sheep
28	Mussammat Gulami	Widow of Badon	Do	Do	4 cows

Annexure 3

Telegram from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 15th September, 1898.

Difficult to get reliable information about Mahsuds in Tochi, but raid in Bannu appears to have been committed chiefly by Guri Khels. Ringleaders said to be Asal Khan and Karar Khan. One account implicates Jalal Khels and Shabi Khels. Also a gang of Guri Khels headed by Kamal, son of Karar, is said to be now in Sheratala, which means they have crossed lower Tochi. Another gang of Jalal Khel and another of Kikarai Mahsuds are reported to be hanging about near lower Tochi. Unless strong action taken in Bannu raid case soon, effects will be felt in Tochi where Mahsud raids were already more frequent and serious than usual.

Annexure 4.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 20th September, 1898.

Your No 238. I would defer question of fine and terms for a short time, until we see what the Guri Khels have done already and are doing in matter of reparation. The men I have in the hills watching matters should return in about four days and we shall then know definitely what attitude of section is. If prompt restitution is made, we can deal with section accordingly. With regard to blood-money the Guri Khels stated that a Galeshahi whose father had been killed by Wali Khels had committed the murder, and that they themselves have blood claims against the Wali Khels. Truth or falsity of this can only be ascertained in jirga. A year ago, however, Dabbas, Guri Khel, stated before Grant that he had claims against Wali Khels and was referred to Tochi for restitution. It must be remembered that in cases of this kind fine imposed generally falls on Maliks, who, if they work well, are entitled to consideration. In this case I would announce no fine at present. If Maliks do nothing, Rs. 800 is not too high.

Annexure 5

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikh Budin, the 23rd September, 1898.

With reference to the remark in my letter, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 22nd instant, on the subject of the Jani Khel raid, that "there has been a good deal of raiding lately by the Mahsuds," I ought to say in explanation that out of a total of 97 offences charged against the hill tribes of Southern Waziristan, as having been committed since the 1st of January to the 1st September this year, in British territory or in the protected area including the Gomal route, 53 are put down to Mahsuds.

Annexure 6.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Bannu, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Simla, dated the 1st October, 1898.

If convenient, kindly send me telegraphic orders on my letter of 22nd ultimo, Guri Khel raid.

Annexure 7.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Simla, to the Commissioner, Derajat, Bannu, dated the 5th October, 1898.

Yours of 1st instant. Lieutenant-Governor approves of terms proposed by you in your letter, dated 22nd September, in connection with raid near Jani Khel. As to alteration of constitution of garrison of Jani Khel post, you may ascertain the views of the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, and report them with your own.

Enclosure 2 in No 1

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 5th May, 1899.

I am directed to invite attention to paragraph 5 of Mr Dane's letter, dated the 17th of October, 1898, and to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters marginally noted relating to the settlement of cases against the Mahsuds which were decided at the joint jurgas held at Tank by the Political Officers of Tochi and Wana.

Letters, dated the 27th and 30th January, 1899, respectively, from the Commissioner, Derajat, and enclosures.

Punjab Government's letters, dated the 19th April, 1899, and enclosures

2. As regards the cases relating to offences committed by Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District reported on in Commissioner's letter, it will be seen that 49 cases were instituted against the Mahsuds, that in 14 of these cases there was no evidence to show that the Mahsuds were the offenders, and that the disposal of 6 cases was postponed in consequence of the absence of complainants or parties. Out of the remaining 29 cases, 22 were of simple theft, house-breaking, &c, in which the property stolen was valued at Rs 1,512 in all, the remaining two cases were one of dacoity and one of murder, and, as a matter of fact, formed one case only. These have been fully described by the Political Officer in paragraph 3 of his letter of the 28th November, 1898, which forms an enclosure to Mr Anderson's letter of the 27th January, 1899. The Commissioner has approved of the orders passed, and has authorized the Political Officer to take action to enforce the orders, and his action has been confirmed by the Lieutenant-Governor in my letter of the 19th April, 1899.

3. As regards the settlement of cases against Mahsuds relating to the Tochi Valley in which Government or travellers were the complainants, the details of these are contained in the enclosures of Commissioner's letter of the 30th January, 1899. Mr Anderson has approved of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, submitted in their letter dated the 10th January, 1899, and has authorized the latter to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. These orders have been approved by His Honour in my letter, and Sir Mackworth Young has also sanctioned the recommendations of the Political Officers in cases in which Government servants or property were injured, and has directed that steps be taken to realize the fines and compensation awarded in all these cases.

 Annèxure 1.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 27th January, 1899.

In continuation of this office endorsement, dated the 19th October, 1898, I have the honour to forward a copy of letter, dated the 28th November last, and its enclosure, from the Political Officer, Wana, reporting the result of the cases relating to offences committed by the Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District, and decided at the joint jurga held at Tank.

2. There are altogether 49 such cases instituted against the Mahsuds. With the exception of 4, all of these occurred after the attack at Mazar in June, 1897. It is the fact that much pressure was not brought to bear on the Mahsuds to obtain redress in these cases until the Tochi Expedition was over, and the disturbance on the Peshawar border subsided. There were

strong political reasons for adopting temporarily this cautious line of policy as regards the settlement of these cases. In fact, my greatest anxiety during the crisis was to keep things going smoothly on the Derajat border and to avoid any action likely to raise disturbances. I make this remark as Mr Merk's remark in his letter, dated the 6th October, 1898, seems to indicate that cases on the Derajat border are not dealt with promptly as they arise, which is not the case.

3. In 14 out of the 49 cases instituted there was no evidence that the Mahsuds were the offenders, and the disposal of 6 cases was postponed in consequence of the absence of complainants or parties.

Out of the remaining 29 cases, 22 are cases of simple theft, house-breaking and lurking house-trespass, in which the property stolen was valued at—

Rs	50 and below	in	11	cases
"	100	"	in	7
"	200	"	in	3
"	300	"	in	1

In 5 cases the offence committed was robbery, and the loss sustained was less than—

Rs	50	in	3	cases.
"	300	in	1	case.
"	512	in	1	"

The remaining 2 cases are one of dacoity and one of murder. They, as a matter of fact, form one case, and have been fully described by the Political Officer in paragraph 3 of his letter which forms an enclosure to this letter.

4 I approve of the orders passed on the awards of the jurga by the Political Officer and the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, unaniously, and have, therefore, authorized the Political Officer to take action to enforce the orders.

5. Mr. Merk, in his letter, dated the 6th October, 1898, a copy of which was forwarded to you, under the cover of his letter of the same date, writes that "the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan has represented to me that the depredations of Mahsud Wazir, robbers and thieves on the border of his district have of late been passing endurance, and that it is time that the consequent insecurity to life and property were put an end to." Before going on leave in August, I was aware that the Mahsuds had, partly no doubt in consequence of the excitement which prevailed along the north-west border, committed petty offences, in which strong action was not taken at the time for political reasons, but I had not been informed that the state of things was as bad as is described in the above extract. I accordingly wrote a letter of enquiry to Mr. Homan, copies of which and of his reply are attached for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

Mr. Homan, it will be seen, denies that he made the strong representation which is attributed to him, and states that the words used by Mr. Merk were not justified by the situation.

Annexure 2.

Letter from A. B. Kettlewell, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 28th November, 1898.

I have the honour to forward herewith a statement showing the cases decided by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and myself, at the recent joint jurga just held at Tank.

2. The cases consisted entirely of outstanding claims against the Mahsud tribe for thefts and raids committed in British territory. The jirga awards in each case, together with our joint opinion and orders, will be found in columns 6 and 7

3. Cases Nos 32 and 33, both of which form part of one offence, call for special notice, and a brief capitulation of the facts will be useful. On April 14th last a Hindu marriage procession, while proceeding along the road between Kulachi and Draband, was attacked by a gang of Mahsuds, who robbed them of a quantity of jewels and other property and then decamped. On the way back (case No. 33) the gang came suddenly on a party of Zarkannis, who were laying water on to their fields. Mistaking them for a pursuit party sent to intercept them, the raiders opened fire, and the Zarkannis, who were also armed, rejoined, with the result that one raider and two Zarkannis were shot dead. The remainder of the gang succeeded in making good their escape to the hills. Enquiries elicited the fact that the Mahsud killed was Mehr Dad, a Shaman Khel, and eventually the names of seven other members of the gang were ascertained. The jirga appointed to try the case found the accused guilty of both offences, but recommended that the amount to be awarded for the property stolen should be reduced from Rs 1,600, the amount at which it was valued in the first report, to Rs. 1,312. As a matter of fact, however, subsequent enquiries by the police proved that the Rs 1,600 originally reported was an under-estimate of the value of the property actually carried away, and the Deputy Commissioner and I decided to award Rs 2,000 to complainants as a fair estimate of their loss

Rupees 360 each has been fixed at the usual rate awarded in cases of this kind as blood-money for the two Zarkannis killed, and, in addition, we recommend, owing to the serious nature of the case, that a Government fine of Rs 280 be imposed, making a total of Rs. 3,000 in all. The accused are Haidrai Shaman Khels

4. As soon as the joint jurgas, which I am about to hold with the Political Officer, Tochi, and the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, are over, I propose to submit a statement showing the total amount of compensation and fines due from the Mahsud tribe, together with the sections to which the various sums are chargeable, and I therefore defer, for the present, drawing up a separate account for Dera Ismail Khan cases alone. The matter of realization of fines for offences committed against Government and compensation for thefts committed in British territory (including Zhob) will, I understand, be dealt with first before those cases which have either occurred in protected area or involve an intertribal settlement. When the account is complete, therefore, I shall be in a position to show exactly the amounts outstanding against the tribe, the sections mainly responsible, and also the class of cases for which the compensation and fines are due.

Annexure 3.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898

No in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No 478, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant	Name of Accused	Nature of the Offence	Finding of Jirga	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer
49, 1st April, 1897	Begi Khan, son of Saado, Suleman Khel, of Kirri Wazar Kundezai	Aspin, Abdul Rahman Khel	Theft of two donkeys valued at Rs. 18	Rs 12 should be decreed	Decree for Rs 12 passed against accused in accordance with jirga finding
53, 5th May, 1897	Kasi n Khan, son of Karim Khan, Kharoti, of Kirri Ghulam Rasul, Kharoti	1 Jumma Khan, Shingi 2 Sadamir, Garera 3 Muhammad Amin, son of Gulpir Shingi 4 Yargai, Shingi 5 Sher Khan, Shingi 6 Ahmad Khan, Mal Khel	Theft of a bundle of piece goods valued at Rs 480 Recovered Rs 380.	Decree as below should be given against— Rs. A P 1 Jumma Khan, Shingi 27 0 0 2 Sadamir, Garera 27 0 0 3 Muhammad Amin, Shingi 9 3 0 4 Yargai, Shingi 9 3 3 5 Sher Khan, Shingi 9 3 3 6 Ahmad Khan, Mal Mhel 18 6 6 Total ... 100 0 0	Award of jirga approved, and decrees passed accordingly
54, 5th May, 1897	1 Ahmad Khan, son of Karam Khan, Gandapur 2 Ranzau Khah, son of Bahadur Khan, of Garra Pather	1. Mir Afzal, Wastirgai 2 Pir Muhammad, Goldsmith	Robbery of a ohadar valued at Rs 3-12 0	Decree for Rs 3-12-0 should be given Fine also recommended	Decree approved and passed We recommend a fine of Rs 80 in this case in addition to the amount decreed by the jirga, because the thieves assaaulted two ohankidars in the course of the offence
60, 2nd April, 1897	Mr. Chief, Commsariat Officer, Tank.	1 Nazar Din, 2 Bikhtamir, 3 Nazar Gul, Aspukai Shings	Theft of a camel valued at Rs 60	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds.	Case dismissed in accordance with jirga finding
63, 5th July, 1897	Saleh, son of Ahmad, caste Kasrani, of Zariganni	1 Asad Khan, Shingi 2 Mohabbat Khan, Shaman Khel	Theft of 14 cows	There being no sufficient proof against the accused, the decree should be passed against persons responsible for Kuram Pass	Case filed for want of evidence Pass responsibility cannot be enforced in this case.
64, 27th October, 1897	Ghulam Rasul, son of Pand, caste Nasir Fowandah, of Kirri Janna Khan.	Sumak, Abdul Rahman Khel	Murder of Shah Muhammad, Nasir.	Parties being absent, deferred till next Mahsud jirga meets.	This course approved.

7	65, 3rd August, 1897	Nandu Ram, son of Tikaya Ram, caste Mutreja, of Uttar	1 Lanuri, 2 Muhammad Alam,	Caste Wazirga Alizai	House-breaking with theft of jewels valued at Rs 694-6-0.	Claim against Lanuri, and Muhammad Alam should be dismissed, being unproved against Mahsuds.	Case not proved, and claim dismissed
8	72, 19th January, 1898	Kadir, son of Bakhtawar, caste Bhattanni, of Dabra.	1 Nasar Din, 2 Gula Khan,	Shingis	Theft of a bullock valued at Rs 20.	Decree for Rs. 15 should be given.	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding
9	74, 15th January, 1898	Muhammad Kai Khela, wife of Fazul, caste Waraki Bhattanni, of Kirri Waraki.	1 Gangi, Shingis 2 Gulzari, Hamsaya of Shingis		Theft of a she camel, with a young camel, valued at Rs 70.	Decree for Rs 65 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly
10	75, 16th January, 1898	Mr. Mercer, Assistant District Superintendent of Police	Theft of a revolver	..	Struck off, no proof against hill tribes
11	77, 24th January, 1898	Jasu Ram, son of Parma Ram, caste Junji Khel, of Tank	1 Sultan, Koth Khel 2 Lal Khan, Malkidina 3 Turki, son of Zalin, caste Malkidina		House-breaking with theft	..	Case struck off, no proof against hill tribes
12	78; 1st February, 1898	1 Ahmad Yar, son of Lashkar, caste Kaulza 2 Shamshta Khan, chauhkidar of Sheikh Sultan.	1 Ali Khan, 2 Kamar Din, 3 Gul Sher,	Chund Khel Alizai	House-breaking and causing a wound to complainant No 2	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds.	Case dismissed for want of evidence.
13	79, 17th February, 1898	Sher Dil, son of Muhammad, caste Miani, of Kot Nawaz	1 Mirza, 2 Gulzada,	Abdul Rahman Khels	Theft of two bullocks	Rs 90 should be decreed	Decree in accordance with jirga finding approved
14	81, 16th February, 1898	Bhoja Ram, son of Balik Ram, caste Khatri of Tank.	1 Charkha, 2 Mirza, 3 Nephew of Khoudad,	Caste Shaman Khels	House-breaking with theft of articles of food valued at Rs 84	Rs. 34 should be decreed	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding
15	82, 27th February, 1898	Guldad, son of Azad, caste Dbeda Jat, of Turan Nan	Azak, son of Sarwari Khan, Bhattanni, of Kirri Khucha Jandola		Theft of a bullock valued at Rs 45.	Rs. 25 against accused should be decreed	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding
16	83, 27th February, 1898	Jasu Ram, son of Kanhya Ram, caste Taneja, of Uttar	1 Abdulla Khan, Powinda Nasir 2 Daulat Khan, Shaman Khel 3 Zari Khel 4 Ashik Khan, Shaman Khel.		House-breaking and inflicting a wound on Lorinda Ram	Claim should be dismissed, it not being proved against Mahsuds.	Claim dismissed Case filed
17	84, 27th February, 1898	Lekhu Ram, son of Jhangri Ram, caste Sachdeo, of Katawaz.	1 Guldad, 2 Asperlau, 3 Nek Muhammad, 4 Mirza Khan,	Abdul Rahman Khels	Theft of piece goods valued at Rs 108-9-0	Should be dismissed, there being no proof.	Case dismissed.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No.	No in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No 478, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer
18	87, 3rd March, 1898	Zafar, son of Ladjji, caste Atman Khel Bhitanni.	1. Gulaida, brother of Gandapur, Abdul Rahman Khel 2. Shastam, Shingi. 3. Shahwarang, Abdul Rahman Khel	Robbery of two bullocks and clothes valued at Rs 53-8-0	Accused absent A clear case Decree for Rs 80 passed against accused
19	86, 20th March, 1898	Ustrana, son of Mitha, caste Bhitanni, of Kirri Ahmari.	1. Nazar Gul, Urbukai 2. Umar Khan, son of Bahadar Khan caste Haji Khel Shingi 3. Unknown	Theft of 15 sheep valued at Rs. 60	Decree for Rs 45 should be given.	Decree approved and passed.
20	87, 20th May, 1898	Gulzar, Chaukidar, for— Sultan. Mihir Khan Shah Kalim Rahmati of Dabra	Asad and Gangi, Shingra	Theft of 11 cows	Decree for Rs 100 should be passed against accused	Decree for Rs 100 approved.
21	88, 23rd March, 1898	Mohana, son of Mirba, caste Sheikh, resident of Kalsahi.	1. Asal Khan, } Abdul Rahman 2. Isparlai, } Khels	Robbery of a she camel with saddle and kajawa valued at Rs 55 Recovered Rs 5	Decree for Rs. 30 should be given	Decree for Rs 30 against accused approved.
22	89, 21st December, 1897	Lieutenant Brown, 6th Punjab Infantry.	1. Khalu, } 2. Shah Gul, } Caste Abdul 3. Shahtara, } Rahman Khels. 4. Isparlai, 5. Majid,	Theft of clothing, &c., from Murtaza dak bungalow	Accused absent. Decree for Rs. 284-10-0 passed against Khalu, Abdul Rahman Khal, without being placed before a jirga.
23	90, 15th February, 1898	Akhtar, son of AN Khan caste Tatta Bhitanni, of Cheshan Kach.	Asad Khan and Pao, Shingra	Lurking house-trespass with theft of five cows valued at Rs. 85	Decree for Rs 75 against accused should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
24	92, 1st March, 1898	Resuldad, Tator	Theft of six cows	Case filed for want of evidence
25	93; 21st March, 1898	1. Wadha, son of Muhammad Yar, Jat. 2. Mithrad, son of Asad, caste Jat, of Turan Nan	1. Juma Gul, } Jalal Khels. 2. Isparlai, 3. Zafar, nephew of Dinak, Bhitani	Theft of a she camel with a young camel valued at Rs. 220.	Case struck out, no proof against hill tribes

26	94; 26th March, 1898	Muzammam Tulai, wife of Jangi Ram, of Tator.			Theft of sugar, oil and a cock valued at 10 annas		Case struck out; no proof of any kind
27	95, 2nd April, 1898	Mr. Kettlewell and servants	1 Bahadur, } Abdul Bah- 2 Ahmad Khan, } man Khel, 3 Daulat Khan and another, } Shaman Khel.		Theft of certain goods, Rs 129	Decree recommended for Rs. 127.	Decree for Rs 127 passed against accused.
28	96, 16th April, 1898	1 Nur Muhammad, } son of Khudai } Caste In- Rahm, } dar, of 2 M u h s m a d } Khorasan Hayat, son of } Khudai Rahm, }	1. Hajim, } 2. Murghas, } Shabi Khel 3. Budrudin, }		Robbery of piece goods, &c, valued at Rs 52-8 0	Should be deferred till the next Mahsud jurga meets, complainant being absent.	This course agreed to.
29	97, 16th April, 1898	Sarwar, son of Yaran, caste Gahkori Biloch, of Kirani Mal Cart Chauki	1 Salim, } Abdur Rahman 2. Almar, } Khels		Theft of a camel valued at Rs 60	Decree should be passed against brother of Kapip, Abdul Rahman Khel, for Rs 60, Kapip being dead.	Jurga's award approved
30	98, 21st April, 1898	Zumma, son of Bira, caste Tomsari, of Keth (Bhakhar).	1 Nadir Khan, } Shingis 2 Ekam Khan, }		Theft of a camel valued at Rs 70	Decree for Rs 50 should be given	Jurga award approved, and decree passed accordingly
31	No. 99, 7th April, 1898	1 Lawarg, son of Guldad } Sons of } 2 Kirndai Rahm, } Khasor, 3 Sher, } caste Zar- kanni } 4 Hakim, son of Muhammad, } Gundapur. } 5 Kamar Din, son of Naar Din, } Baghba } 6 Dur Muhammad. } 7 Ibrahim. }	1 Asal Khan, } 2 Kapir, } Caste Malik- 3 Aya Khan, } dina 4 Sadamir, } 5 Abdulla Khan, } 6 Namat, } 7. Bakhta Mir, }		Robbery of 24 cows, a rifle, a chappi and Rs 40 in cash.	Decree for Rs 510 against Darre Khan, Nekzan Khel, should be given	Do. do.
32	100, 14th April, 1898	Jas Ram, son of Gila Ram, caste Khanduja, resident of Kulachi.	1. Muhammad Yar, } 2 Charkha, } 3 Asal Khan, } Shaman 4 Mirdad, } Khels, 5. Nezam, } 6. Saleh Mir, } 7. Mirza Khan, } 8. Zardam and } others, }		Dacoity of jewels and wearing apparel valued at Rs 3,738 8-0	Decree for Rs 1,312 should be given	Cases Nos. 32 and 33 below were part of the same raid. The jurga unaniously found that both offences were committed by the accused, but recommend that a decree for Rs 1,312 should be given instead of the sum claimed. We consider this sum an extremely low estimate of the value of the property stolen, and think that property of the value of at least Rs 2,000 was taken. Our orders are that a decree for Rs 2,000 should be given in this case and blood-money to the amount of Rs 720 awarded in case No 33. In addition to this, owing to the serious nature of the offence, we recommend that a fine of Rs 280, making the total Rs 3,000 in all, should be imposed.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No.	No in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence	Name of Complainant	Name of Accused	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga.	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
33	10; 14th April, 1890 ... Shurani:	Alam Sher, caste Zarkani, of Zarkani.	1 Muhammad Yar, 2 Charkha, 3 Asai Khan, 4 Mahradd, 5 Nezam, 6 Saleh Mir, 7 Mirza Khan, 8 Zardain and others. } Shaman Khels.	Murder of Khan Muhammad, Zarkani, and Ghulam Kadir, Isa Khel.	Decree for Rs. 720 should be given	See above.
34	101; 21st July, 1898	Parma Ram of Khadak Kot ...	1. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel. 2 Mirza, Shirani. 3 Dangar Khan, } Abdul Rahman Khel. 4. Nika Khan, }	Theft of Rs 30-8-0 property.	If complainant, who is absent, takes oath, decree for Rs. 30-8-0 will be passed against accused.
35	102, 24th May, 1898 ...	Kaor, Miani, of Kot Khadak, per Ahmad Dun.	1. Guldad, } Abdul Rahman Khels 2 Dagar, } 3 Bakai, } 4 Mirza, Shirani, Hamsaya of Abdul Rahman Khels.	Lurking house-trespass with theft of a rifle and house property and jewels valued at Rs. 256-8-0.	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds	Case dismissed for want of proof.
36	104; 17th May, 1898	Hakim, son of Ali Khan, caste Suleman Khel.	1 Dargai, } Abdul Rahman 2 Isparia, } Khels 3 Tor, Shirani, Hamsaya of Abdul Rahman Khels.	Theft of 2 sheep valued at Rs. 10	Rs. 8 should be decreed . . .	Decree for Rs. 8 passed against accused in accordance with finding of jirga.
37	105, 21st June, 1898 ...	Gadde Khan	1 Tor Khan, Shirani 2 Dangar, Alusa. 3. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel.	Theft of 18 cows ..	No proof at present against the men charged. Recommended that the case be deferred to another jirga.	Agreed to.
38	106; 13th July, 1898 ...	Sher Dil, son of Namder Sheikh of Garwki.	1. Dagar, Waurgai 2. Tor, Shirani, 3. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel.	Theft of 8 cows valued at Rs. 178. Recovered 5 cows valued at Rs. 123.	Should be deferred till next Mahsud jirga meets.	Agreed to. Case deferred accordingly.
39	—; 8th March, 1898 ...	Bashar, son of Umar, caste Ama Khel, resident and iambardar of Nadar.	Said Ghulam, } Ama Khel Daur, }	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 36.	Should be dismissed, complainant being absent.	We agree. Case dismissed.

40	—; 23rd May, 1898 ...	Miru, son of Ahmad, caste Balooh, of Garra Mamrez	Abdulla, Faridae Alizai ...	Theft of a bullock valued at Rs. 50 Animal recovered on payment of Rs. 20 as bhunga	Decree for Rs. 20 should be given	Award confirmed and decree passed.
41	—, 18th July, 1898 ...	Shahra, son of Hosain, caste Lushari, resident of Tank.	1. Asal, 2. Muhabbat, 3. M u h a m m a d } Guri Khel Akber, } Aliza	Robbery of 5 camels valued at Rs. 448 and wounding the complainant.	Decree for Rs. 300 should be given.	Jirga award confirmed, and decree passed accordingly
42	—, 5th August, 1898 ..	Piara Ram, son of Pokhar Ram, caste Bareja, of Gomal. Kotu Ram, son of Murlji, of Murtaza. Takht Ram. Gele Ram.	1. Gulab Din, } Abdul Rahman 2. Amar Din, } Khels.	Dacoity of jewels, a bullock, wearing apparel, valued at Rs 267-0-6. Recovered Rs. 10-7 6.	Parties absent, should be deferred till next Mahsud jirga meets.	Case deferred.
43	—, 19th September, 1898	Dina, camelman, servant of Abdul Rahman, Camel Contractor.	Gungi, Shingi	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 80.	Decree for Rs. 85 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
44	—, 11th October, 1898	Nazar Khan, Zangi Khel Nazir, of Kirri Nazar Khan.	1. Isparia, Abdul Rahman Khel 2. Nazardad, } 3. Shahtazar, } Abdul Rah- 4. Alladad, } man Khels. 5. Rasul Khan, 6. Peawal, 7. Reshmin, } 8. Guldad, } Shaman Khels. 9. Daulat, } 10. Abdulla, } Faridae Ali- 11. Shahwal, } zais. 12. Khar Khan, } 13. Nadir, Abdur Rahman Khel	Theft of 60 goats valued at Rs 202 Recovered 58 goats valued at Rs. 196-8-0.	Decree for Rs. 8 should be given	Decree for Rs. 8 passed accordingly.
45	—; 18th October, 1898	Yaran, son of Gulan, caste Kumbhar, of Gara Balooh.	1: Mohabat 2. Muhammad } 3 Samandar, } Guri Khels	Theft of 2 camels valued at Rs 160.	Decree for Rs. 160 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
46	—; 21st June, 1898 ..	Tabrae, Bhattanni Warspun, of Kirri Khauru.	Gangi, Shingi, and Gul'Azam, Shingi	Theft of 3 camels	Case incomplete as yet; the statement of a man named Yasin has to be taken on oath and settlement of claim rests on this being done.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No	No in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence	Name of Complainant	Name of Accused.	Nature of the Offence	Finding of Jirga	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
			<i>Shirans.</i>			
47	—, 10th May, 1898	Palak, Shirani Tumandar	1, Shaktors and } Garera Mah- 2, Misa Khel, } suds.	Theft of 18 cows	Decree for Rs 270 should be passed against accused	Award approved, and decree passed accordingly
48	—; 25th August, 1898	Parnd Khan and Gul Khan, Shirbezais of Sheikh Meia.	Ashik Khan, Wazirga	Theft of 8 cows from Drazinda.	There being no sufficient proof against the accused, the case should be struck off the file.	Case dismissed for want of proof
49	—, 26th Sept., 1898	Aspin, Hasean Khel Shirani	1 Asal Khan, Guri Khel 2 Muhammad Akbar, 3 Alibat	Theft of 11 cows	Decree for Rs 165 should be passed against accused	Accused absent, jirga award approved, and decree passed in accordance therewith.

Tank,
The 22nd November, 1898.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

T. H. HOMAN,
Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

Annexure 4.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Homan, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated Camp Kulachi, 11th December, 1898.

I find the following opening sentence in an official letter, dated 6th October, 1898, addressed by Mr Merk to the Political Officer, Wana — "The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan has represented to me that the depredations of Mahsud Waziri robbers and thieves on the border of his district have of late been passing endurance, and that it is time that the consequent insecurity to life and property were put an end to" You were lately associated with Kettlewell at Tank in going through all cases committed since August, 1895, by Mahsuds on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District. So you are in a good position to judge of the misdeeds of the Mahsuds and the state of security on the border. I should very much like to know, for the information of Government, whether you think now that the words used by Merk, which I have quoted, are strictly applicable to the situation. I have analyzed the cases which came up for settlement before Kettlewell and yourself, and find that while there were five robberies, one dacoity and one murder, the majority of cases were cases of theft, house-breaking and lurking house-trespass. In all there were 49 cases, in 14 of which there was no evidence that Mahsuds were concerned. I hardly think that these figures justify the description given by Merk of the state of things on the Dera Ismail Khan border, and I certainly never had the least reason for believing that you considered things were as bad as he describes, quoting you as an authority.

Secondly, do you think that the Border Military Police of the Dera Ismail Khan border are as efficient as they should be, and that they patrol sufficiently? If they are sufficiently disciplined and patrol properly, how is it that Mahsud thieving parties are more numerous and successful than formerly? The Border Military Police are now armed with Sniders, why can they not cope with the Mahsud thieves and robbers?

Annexure 5.

Letter from T. H. Homan, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 15th December, 1898.

Your letter of 11th instant regarding offences committed by Mahsuds in this district since August, 1895. Mr. Merk was labouring under a mistake in considering that I made the very strong representation you have quoted from his letter. To the best of my recollection all that I said to him when he asked me about Mahsud raids was that they had considerably increased during the last few months. I certainly did not say the state of things was past endurance and attended with great insecurity to life and property.

Having been lately associated with Mr Kettlewell at Tank in putting all Mahsud offences committed since August, 1895, except those already settled, before jurgas, and seeing that with a few exceptions most of these offences consisted of raids in which cattle were carried off or were petty burglaries, I am of opinion that the words which Mr Merk through some misunderstanding represented me as saying were not justified by the situation, and that the state of affairs was not nearly so serious as they made out. As regards the Border Military Police, I do not think that it is as efficient as it might be made, if properly officered and supervised. Since Mr Mercer left it, except for a short time, during which Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant District Superintendent, Police, was in charge of it, it has been under the

control of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tank, who has no time to look after it as it should be looked after, and I fear, in consequence, little has been done towards teaching the men to use the Sniders with which they have been for some time armed, or towards seeing that they really do the patrolling they are ordered to do, and I think the sooner a special officer, a European if possible, who would devote his whole time to them, is appointed, the better

Annexure 6.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th January, 1899.

With reference to this office letter, dated the 4th October, and the correspondence ending with your letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to forward a copy of letter, dated $\frac{8\text{th}}{10\text{th}}$ instant, from the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, together with the enclosures, in original, regarding the settlement of cases in which Government or travellers in the Tochi Valley were the complainants against the Mahsuds.

2. The recommendations of the Political Officers as to the fines and compensation to be recovered from the Mahsuds are tabulated in two Appendices, A and B. I approve of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, and am authorising the Political Officer, Wana, to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. In regard to the cases in which Government servants or property were injured, I solicit early sanction to the recommendations of the Political Officers.

3. I beg to request that copies of the enclosures, which are submitted in original, may, when printed, be supplied for the use of this office.

Annexure 7.

Letter from J. G. Lorimer, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Tochi Valley, and A. B. Kettlewell, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tochi, 8th January, 1899, and Wana, 10th January, 1899.

We have the honour to submit herewith two lists of cases (I. and II.) showing the Government and travellers' claims dealt with by us in the recent jurga of Dauris, Waziris and Mahsuds, held at Bannu. Our recommendations as to the fines and compensation to be realized are tabulated in two Appendices (A and B) of this letter.

2. It will be observed from the lists that a few cases have been held over for further enquiry. When this has been made our joint recommendations in regard to these will be submitted.

3. Where a sum to be recovered is partly a Government fine and partly compensation, the portion payable as compensation has been made, where possible, realizable from Waziris and Dauris in order to reduce the delay in redress to private individuals to a minimum.

4. As some doubt was expressed as to the advisability of employing jurgas in Government cases, we beg to quote case No. 1 (3) as an extreme instance of this procedure. In this case there was no evidence or information such as a Government officer could have taken action upon, and the only

alternative to taking the opinion of Mahks was that we should dismiss the case *in limine*. We believe that a perusal of the list of Government cases will show that jargas have nowhere been employed by us with prejudice to the interests of Government. We have not proposed to dismiss any Government case in which there is reliable evidence or information against the accused.

5. Our recommendations on the lists submitted are somewhat more detailed than those conveyed in the Appendices. We would request that the orders of Government may be passed upon the recommendations as expressed in the Appendices, so that we may be left a free hand as to the distribution of the fines or compensation within the tribe, as expediency and further enquiry may indicate, upon particular sections or individuals.

6. The final instructions given us for the disposal of cases between Mahsuds and Dauris were that nothing beyond a friendly tribal settlement should be attempted. The attempt was made, but was unsuccessful, and we believe that from the nature of the case a friendly settlement between these two tribes is impossible. We would suggest that whenever an opportunity occurs the cases of the Dauris against the Mahsuds, together with any cases which the Mahsuds may have against the Dauris, should be taken up in the same manner as the travellers' cases against Mahsuds and Waziris have been on the present occasion. The Political Officer, Tochi, considers that the attitude of the Dauris to the British Government is at the present time all that could be desired, but he doubts whether this desirable state of matters will continue if Government declines to intervene effectually to obtain reparation for the Dauris against Mahsud aggressions, especially as Government now realises land revenue from the Dauris.

7. The Political Officer, Tochi, recommends that the claims of revenue-paying Waziri villages in the bed of the Tochi, which are practically an integral part of Daur, should be taken up in the same manner as Dauri cases proper, but he does not desire to press this point so strongly as these villages are not entirely helpless, and are able, to some extent, with the help of their kinsmen in the hills, to obtain redress from the Mahsuds.

Annexure 8.

APPENDIX A.

Fines to be realised in Government cases.

K. = Kabuli.

B. = British.

	Tribe.	No. of Case.	Amount of Fine.	REMARKS	
Mahsuds	Jalal Khels	I 5	Rs. 1,000 B or 500 B, and one Martini-Henry rifle of good quality in good condition	Government fine as complainant does not desire an amicable settlement with his brother's murderer	
	Do	I 8	800 B.	Payable as compensation to owners	
	Do	I 13	450 B.	Government fine.	
	Do.	I 15	350 B	Rupees 210 Government fine. Rs 140 compensation to owners	
	Do	I 17	500 B.	Government fine	
		Total		2,600 B or 2,100 B, and a rifle.	
		Shabi Khels	I 12	400 B	Government fine
		Do.	I 16	1,000 B	Rupees 800 Government fine. Rs 200 compensation to levy Sowar.
		Total		1,400 B.	
		Marsanzais	I 7	120 B.	Payable to Dauris fined.
Waziris	Bakka Khels	I 1	31 B.	Payable to Government, which advanced ransom money.	
	Mohmut Khels	I 8	150 B	Payable to owners as compensa- tion.	
	Do	I 17	500 B.	Rupees 300 payable to heirs of deceased and Rs. 200 to Com- missariat.	
		Total		650 B	
	Tpri Khels	I 13	300 B.	Payable as compensation for levy disabled.	
Dauris	Dauris	I 13	150 B.	Government fine.	

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 9.

APPENDIX B.

Compensation to be realized in Travellers' cases.

B. = British.

K. = Kabuh.

—	Tribe.	No. of Case	Compensation payable to Complainants	REMARKS
Mahsuds ..	Jalal Khels ..	II 1	Rs 38 B	
	Do	II 2	50 B,	
	Do ..	II 3	60 B.	
	Do ..	II 6	130 K.	
	Do ..	II 7	300 B.	
	Do ..	II 9	100 B	
	Do ..	II 10	200 B	
	Do ..	II 13	58½ K	
	Do. ...	II 14	162 K	
			500 B	
	Do ..	II 17	450 B	
	Do ..	II 18	205½ K	
	Do. ...	II 21	19½ K	
	Do ..	II 22	400 B.	
	Total ...	—	2,148 B and 744 K	
	Marsanza ..	II 5	75 B.	
Waziris ..	Mohmut Khels ..	II 2	50 B.	
	Do ..	II 13	58½ K.	
	Do. ..	II 18	205½ K.	
	Do. ...	II 22	200 B	
	Total ..	—	250 B and 259 K	
	Tori Khels ..	II 5	50 B	
Dauris ..	Dauris ..	II 5	25 B.	

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.*

Annexure 10.

LIST No. I.

Inquiry to Government Servants or Government Property

Serial No.	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence	Complainants in detail	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana
100, 1897	Saidgi Military Post, 6th February, 1897	Bata Singh, Sub-Overseer, Public Works Department	Guri Khels ...	Theft of a pony, which was recovered for Rs 31	Case dismissed as against Mahsuds Money should be recovered from Gulate, Bakka Khel A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Dated Bannu, 3rd December, 1898	
228, 1897	Soor Kamr, 4th April, 1897.	Empress ...	Jalal Khels and Abdulsais	Attack on dsk akka, murder of Muhammad coachman, wounding Bhois, Bhuшти, and killing akka pony and robbery of miscellaneous property worth Rs. 195	In this case the Tochi Waziris concerned make no claim against Mahsuds. The Dauris interested claim against Jalal Khels Gul Khan, Barakza, and Din Muhammad, Dauri Malika, consider that Shekh Mansur, Dauri Malik, should be allowed to put forward two witnesses who either recognized the accused at the time of outrage or heard the accused admit their guilt afterwards. Talib, Abdur Rahman Khel Mahsud Malik, thinks oath of innocence should be taken from the accused and Kargza and Karim Khan. Jalal Khel Mahsud Malika Shekh Mansur has allowed his witnesses to go home, and even if they were present we should not with regard to absence of confirmation by circumstantial evidence or otherwise be prepared to accept their testimony. We consider this case not proved against the Mahsuds. Fines have already been realized from Dauris and Tochi Waziris A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Dated Bannu, 23th December, 1898	
473, 1897	Soor Kamr, 16th July, 1897	Empress ..	Jalal Khels and Abdulsais	Theft of 12 camels and firing shots on Military pursuit party, in which a sepoy was wounded.	The jurga in this case have given the oath to Zakke Khan, Ghaubadin and Zarre Khan, accused, and their Malik Karim Khan, and the oath of innocence has been duly taken in the presence of the jurga. We consider the case not proved against the accused Mahsuds A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 8th December, 1898.	

4	549, 1897	Soor Kanr, 19th Aug, 1897.	Empress	Abdulla, Khushali (Tori Khels) and Mohmt Khels.	Attack on dák ekka, murder of 2 sepoy of 25th Punjab Infantry, a coachman and Telegraph Signaller and carrying of 2 Martini-Henry rifles	<p>In this case the Tochi Waziris concerned claimed against Abdulla Mahsuds on the ground that Amr Dun and Abdullahur and Lumar, Abdulla lohar, took part in outrage Arbitrators appointed as between Abdulla and Waziris found that the Abdullas could clear themselves by oath of following compurgators (1) Fazal, (2) Mamak, (3) Zaffar Khan, (4) Azim, Malik, (5) Darre, (6) Zarghun Shah, (7) Gul Shah, (8) Usman, Abdullas, to effect that the three Abdullas named did not take part in the offence nor steal the rifles. Darre, Amru, Fazal, Mamak, Zaffar, Gul Shah and Zarghun Shah, Abdullas, who are present, are willing to take oath that the rifles lost have never come in any way into the possession of Amr Dun, Abdullahur or Lumar. We do not consider it necessary that this oath should be taken. The Dauris claimed against Jalal Khels, especially Mohabbat, and opinions were taken from Abu Khan, Marwat, Talib, Abdurrahman Khel Malik, and Mirai, Darpa Khel. The Marwat Malik considers that Jalal Khel accused with two Maliks and seven Motabars should take oath of compurgation. The Mahsud Malik considers that oath of accused and one Jalal Khel Malik will be sufficient, while the Dauri Malik would allow the Dauris to produce two witnesses who either saw the accused committing the offence or heard them admit their guilt. We have heard the witnesses produced by the Dauris, Jasim Gul and Mad Amr. They are not men of any position, and we do not consider their testimony reliable. Their story is that Mohabbat, Jalal Khel, said in their presence that of the two rifles lost one was with the Jalal Khels and one with the Tanis, and that both could be recovered on payment of Rs 2,000. This story is in itself improbable for several reasons. Kargai and Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Maliks, are willing to take oath that neither of the rifles ever came among the Jalal Khels. We consider the charges against Abdullas and Jalal Khels in this case not proved. A large fine has already been recovered from the Dauris, Mohmt Khels and Tori Khels.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A B KETTLEWELL, J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Wana Political Officer, Tochi.</p>
	505, 1897	Parimat graveyard between Ajam chnauki and Sadrgi Post	Empress through— (1) Khanbad Shah, Bakka Khel (2) Nandram, son of Beli Ram, Narola (3) Ram Dyal, son of Dasu Ram, Golati (4) Ram Lal, son of Fritam Das, Bhagat, of Idak	Jalal Khel and Marsanzai	Murder of Murad Shah, Jamadar, Levisa, Sadrgi, and carrying off his Martini Henry rifle, with Rs 68 cash and other property worth Rs 44-1-6 from Nos 2 to 4	<p>In this case the relatives of the deceased Levy Jamadar, Murad Shah, have from the first consistently stated that the murder was committed by Aki Khan, Jalal Khel, who was accompanied at the time by a gang consisting mostly of Jalal Khels but including also one Marsanzai Mahsud, and at least one Tori Khel Waziri Aki Khan's defence is that the claim was suggested to the Bakka Khels by Dawar Khan, Shahl Khel, a personal enemy of his and one of the principal witnesses against him. The Jalal Khel Maliks present allege the existence of bitter enmity between Bakka Khels and Jalal Khels owing to a successful raid by the former on the latter some years ago, in which they say three Jalal Khels were killed. We do not consider the enmity of Dawar Khan against Aki Khan nor the tribal enmity, if such exists between Bakka Khels and Jalal Khels, sufficient to discredit entirely Khan Bad Shah's claim and evidence. He must know who the murderers of his brother really were, and we cannot suppose that in order to please Dawar Khan or gratify the ill-feeling of his tribe against the Jalal Khels he would suppress his claim against the real murderers and bring it against a mixed gang of Jalal Khels and others. We</p>

LIST No. I. -continued]

Injury to Government Servants or Government Property—continued.

Serial No	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
						therefore consider that Akri Khan or his section should be held responsible for the murder, and in our opinion a suitable order would be that the Jalal Khels should either pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 to Government, or a fine of Rs 500 and surrender a Martini-Henry rifle of good quality and in good condition. A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
6	51, 1898 ...	Post Saidgi 17th Jan- 18th uary, 1898.	Empress	Abdullah, Umar Khel, Shahi Khel, Marsanzai and Tori Khel	Theft of two officers' ponies, recovered by Levy pursuit party	Further particulars of wounded thief have been furnished by Atlas Khan, formerly Civil Officer, Saidgi, who saw him, and file made over to Political Officer, Wana, who will endeavour to identify the man A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
	165; 1898 ...	Kajuri Post, 19th Jan- 20th uary, 1898.	Do.	Marsanzai . ..	Attempt to break through the wall of Kajuri Post.	After reading the papers and seeing Ghazze's wound we are satisfied that Ghazze is the man who attempted to break into the Kajuri Post and was wounded in so doing. The wound is in the place assigned to it by the information before Ghazze had been seen by any Government Officer. In this case a fine of Rs. 180 was collected from the Wasiris and Dauris adjoining Kajuri. Rupees 60 recovered from the Tori Khels should remain on them as they were accomplices, but the Rs 120 paid by the Dauris should be recovered from Ghazze and repaid to the Dauris. A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 8th December, 1898.

8	248, 1898 ..	Near Boys Post, 9th February, 1898.	Bhai Khan, son of Zaman, of Isa Khel, Ramzan, son of Muhammad Zaman, Barkhurdar of Karra Kullo (Isa Khel Tahsil), and Ali Khan, Orderly, Political Officer.	Jalal Khels	Theft of seven camels with property worth Rs 75. One camel died with the accused and the rest (six) recovered on payment of ransom, Rs. 370 British coin	The seven camels were traced by Political Officer, Tochi, and party next morning to the Zuri Narai Pass leading out of Tochi into Khaisor (Mohmit Khel country). Alizai, Mohmit Khel, then hamsaya of Khan Muhammad Khan of Muhammad Khel, a well known agent of the Jalal Khels in the Tochi, was sent to look for the camels. He returned the fifth day and reported that he had found six of them with Mamak and Amlidar, Bhitannas of Sarataka in Band. The Political Officer, Wana, has been unable to obtain any confirmation of this story and considers it intrinsically highly improbable. On the other hand, Nazr Shah, a Bhitanni Malik, states that his son saw six of the camels with the Jalal Khels Momazzi, Machi Khel Mohmit Khel Malik, reported that not long after the loss that he had seen camels, probably those in question, among the Jalal Khels, and Nazir Khan and Ali Khel, his companions, have corroborated this. There seems no doubt that the camels were stolen by Jalal Khels with connivance of Mohmit Khels, and probably of Alizai himself. Rs 370 ransom and Rs 80 value of one camel (total Rs 450) remain to be recovered. We recommend that Rs 300 be recovered from the Jalal Khels and Rs 150 from the Mohmit Khels of Khaisor. A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Bannu, 25th December, 1898
9	327, 1898 .	Near water spring on the Spin Chilla route, 1st March, 1898	Empress . . .	Abdulla, Garrera and Gulram, Tochi Khel outlaw	Murder of Habibulla, sepoy of 33rd Punjab Infantry, and robbery of 41 Commissariat goats worth Rs 286	Political Officer, Wana, will make enquiries into this case, and, if possible, the Khudder Khels and Manzar Khels will be sent to Wana to prosecute their claim. File made over to Political Officer, Wana. A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December 1898.
10	185, 1898 ..	Spina Punga in Shudar, 26th March, 1898	Do . . .	Nezar Khel, Abdulla, Haibat Khel	Firing shots on Cavalry grass-cutting party, wounding a sowar, a horse, and killing a mule.	Political Officer, Wana, will make enquiries in this case. File made over to Political Officer, Wana. A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898
11	—	Saidgi; 18th/19th April, 1898	Do . . .	Marsanzai .	Theft of a rifle from the 1st Punjab Infantry	File made over to Political Officer, Wana, who will make further enquiries as to whether Zarif Khan, Marsanzai, was wounded in the commission of an offence in the Tochi. A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Bannu, 25th December, 1898.

LIST No. I.—continued.

Injury to Government Servants or Government Property—continued.

Serial No	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year	Place and Date of Occurrence	Complainants in detail	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana
12	870, 1898 ..	Post Idak, 22nd April, 23rd 1898	Empres	Shabi Khel	Prowling of thieves near post and wounding of a thief by a Levy sentry	We agree that there is very little doubt that Guljang was wounded in the Tochi while prowling near Idak Military Post with criminal intentions. We recommend a fine of Rs 400 to be recovered, if possible, from Guljang, who is understood to be a personal adherent of the Mullah Fowndah. The Mullah Fowndah has sent a letter admitting that he was wounded in the Tochi, but pretending it was done by thieves. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
3	862, 1898 ..	Socr Kamr, 27th May, 1898	Do.	Jalal Khels, Marsanzai, and Khushali Tori Khels	Attack on Panjabi coolies and wounding Guljanab Foot Levy, and carrying off his musket	We are agreed in this case on a consideration of the evidence and circumstances generally and of the opinions submitted by the Maliks nominated by us that the Jalal Khels were undoubtedly concerned in this raid, and that they received assistance from the Tori Khels living south of the Tochi. We consider that a fine of Rs. 900 should be imposed, of which Rs 450 should be payable by Jalal Khels, Rs 300 by Tori Khels, and Rs 150 by Dauris, the latter having failed to make a proper endeavour to trace the criminals. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898
4	874, 1898 ..	On high road between Ahmad Khel and Amsoni, 26th June, 1898	Do	Jalal Khels	Attack on Public Works Department coolies and theft of shovels, pickaxes, &c., and robbery of coolies' clothes.	The Maliks appointed by us to give an opinion are unable to give one, and the file is made over to Political Officer, Wana, for further enquiry as to the alleged death of Pilod, Jalal Khel A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.

15	561, 1898	Hinjarki Khwala within the limits of Land Daur, 11th July, 1898	Empress through Landwals	11 Jalal Khels	Theft of seven bullocks and firing shots on Cavalry pursuit party. One bullock was recovered for Rs 13 ransom.	<p>We are agreed that the Jalal Khels committed this raid. The chief Dauri Malik of Land is prepared to take oath that the cattle of his village were raided by Jalal Khels, who also fired at the cavalry pursuit party. Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Malik, is not prepared to swear, even along with the accused Balai, that a bullock lost by the Dauris on this occasion was not recovered or ransomed from Balai. We recommend, therefore, that a fine of Rs 350 be imposed on Jalal Khels, out of which Rs 140 will be payable to Dauri owners of cattle as compensation.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898</p>
16	439, 1898	On high road one mile east of Idak Post, 4th August, 1898	Empress	Shahi Khel Abdullah and Jalal Khels.	Attack on Levy Commandant's baggage camels and carrying off the camels, which were recovered by levy pursuit party, and killing a mare of a levy sowar	<p>We agree that the leader in this daring attack on the Levy Commandant's camels was Anaz, Shahi Khel, who is present here to day. The information regarding the other members of the gang is not sufficiently definite to warrant action being taken against them. The fight between the raiders and the levies, who ultimately prevented the camels being taken away, lasted a considerable time, and a large number of shots were fired, which could be distinctly heard in Idak Post. Political Officer, Tochi, considers that the raid is one which calls for severe notice. There was a levy guard with the baggage, and in spite of the guard being well armed with muzzle-loaders the raiders most obstinately endeavoured to carry the matter through, and succeeded in taking the camels a distance of two miles before they were recovered. A levy sowar's horse worth about Rs 200 was killed. We recommend a fine of Rs 1,000 be imposed on Anaz, Shahi Khel. If it cannot be recovered from him, it should be recovered from Shahi Khels. Of this Rs 200 should be payable as compensation to the sowar who lost his horse.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
		Near Boya; 17th August, 1898	Empress	Jala Khels, Ahza (outlaw) and Pila, Mohmt Khels	Murder of Commissariat shepherd and robbery of 42 sheep and goats	<p>In this case the opinion of the Mabsud Munsif is that the Jalal Khels should be given oath of innocence. The other two Munsifs think that the two witnesses, who state that they saw the stolen goats in Yargul's possession, should be allowed to take oath on Koran to this. In view of these opinions and circumstances of case and result of enquiries, we consider that the Jalal Khels and Mohmt Khels of Khaisar are both implicated, and that the fine should be paid in equal shares. As the case is a serious one, the Commissariat shepherd having been murdered in afternoon at a distance of 700 yards from Boya Post, we recommend a fine of Rs 1,000 to be divided as above.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi</p> <p>Bannu, 26th December, 1898</p>

Annexure 11.

LIST No. II.

Injury to Travellers in the Daur Valley.

Serial No	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year	Place and Date of Occurrence	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
1	287	Laka Ghundi, 30th October, 1895	Badr-ud-din, son of Mohy-ud-din, and Bandar Shah and Sanam Khan, son of Khan Baddar of Fatma Khel.	Jalal Khels ...	Eleven donkeys with property	In this case the jirga are agreed that decree in favour of complainant should be passed against Jalal Khels for as many donkeys as complainant takes oath to having lost at Rs 8 per donkey We approve of this finding, which is unanimous. Oath taken by complainant that 11 donkeys were stolen We, therefore, recommend a decree for Rs. 88 Sikks be passed against Jalal Khels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu.
2	409; 1896	Near Laka Ghundi; 30th November, 1896	Gulmat Khan, son of Allahdad, and Nazar Khan, son of Aikam Khan, Paipals of Birmal	Do. ..	Two camels worth Rs. 200 Kabuli	In this case the jirga are divided The travellers' munafs consider that the Jalal Khels are responsible for the whole of the loss, as the camels admittedly came into the possession of Sol, Jalal Khel. The munafs for the Mahauds give it as their opinion that the thieves were Mir Gul, his brother and another man, all of Thal village in Tochi, and that Sol only assisted in disposing of the stolen camels and is only responsible for Rs 10 The Sarpanches recommend that Sol and nine other Jalal Khels should prove his assertion on oath, and on condition of doing so should pay Rs 10 only. The facts as disclosed show that the Mohmt Khels of Thal and at least one Jalal Khel were in this raid, and we consider that Rs. 50 should be realized from each tribe and paid to complainant. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
3	362, 1897	Beri Khwaja, Hamroni, in January or February, 1897	Amir, son of Ilm, Saldgi, of Dande plain	Do.	One camel, 1 gun, 1 pistol with property	Jirga unanimously recommend a decree for Rs. 60 Kabuli being passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khels. We approve of finding, which is unanimous. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Bannu, 25th December, 1898.

4	273; 1897	Tochi, Bed south of 12th April, — Khuddi, 13th 1897.	Anab, son of Hamal, Arsala Khan, Ghulam, Shah, Ghatta, son of Sarogha, Umarzai Wazirs of Pirmal's village (Bannu Dis- trict)	Jalal Khels and Tori Khels.	Six camels worth Rs. 670 and property worth Rs. 22-8-0	Complainant admits having received full satisfaction. Case may be filed. A. B. KETTLEWELL, J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Wana. Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
5	354, 1897	Camp Miram Shah, 28th April, 1897 29th	Allahyar, son of Umed Ali, of Mianwali, Ahmad, son of Manjhi, Sarwans of Mianwali	Marsanzai sub-section of Abdullahs and Tori Khels.	Three camels worth Rs. 320 British coin.	Jirga have unanimously found that if three persons who are said to have seen two of the stolen camels in the possession of Zarif, Marsanzai, will take oath to this effect, Zarif should be considered guilty. The required oath has been taken in our presence, and we recommend that Rs. 75 be recovered from Zarif or those responsible for him, and from the Tori Khels and Dauris territorially responsible Rs. 50 and Rs. 25 respectively, the value of the camels having been fixed at Rs. 50 each by the jirga. A. B. KETTLEWELL, J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Wana. Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 26th December, 1898.
6	375, 1897	Wuzi Spring near Boys, 8th May, 1897. 7th	Aman Shah, son of Boysak, of Kot Kastura (Khushali)	Jalal Khels	Five camels (recovered on Rs. 150 Kabul bhangas)	Jirga in this case recommend that decree for Rs. 130 Kabul be passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khels We approve of finding A. B. KETTLEWELL, J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Wana. Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898
7	604	Paloon grazing-ground near Boys, 15th Octo- ber, 1897.	Yaghi Khan, Mir Ali, son of Bokhan, Sirakki Afridi of Gandi (Kohat)	Do	Theft of four camels.	In this case we agree with finding of majority of jirga, which is that with regard to four camels the complainant should take oath to that loss, and that he saw them in possession of Jalal Khels. As regards remaining two camels, seven Jalal Khels should be allowed to take oath of innocence. The required oaths have been taken in our presence, and we find the claim for four camels against the Jalal Khels proved and the claim for the other two not proved. We value the camels at Rs. 75 each, and recommend a decree for Rs. 300 against Jalal Khels in complainants' favour. J. G. LORIMER, A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Tochi. Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 26th December, 1898

LIST No. II.—continued.

Injury to Travellers in the Daur Valley—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
8	682, 1898 ...	Raghzai Wuzi near Bo, a, 24th October, 1897.	Mamanda, Rahman, Firra, sons of Miran, Maikshahis of Kurram.	Jalal Khels	Two hundred sheep and goats, and murder of Pashak, and theft of one mare	The jirga with one exception are of opinion that this should be treated as an inter-tribal case and not as a traveller's case. We agree in this opinion. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana Bannu, 25th December, 1898
	551, 1898 ..	Tut Shiga, 25th October, 1897.	Tor Guland Muhammad Roz, son of Said Gul, Pathan of Bhanamari (Peshawar).	Jalal Khels and Guli Ram, Taj, Khel, outlaw	Seven donkeys and Rs. 41 cash	In this case we agree with the majority of the jirga, who are of opinion that complainant should be given oath as to amount of his loss, and that he and one companion should take oath that they saw the stolen property in the possession of Pir Muhammad, Jalal Khel. Complainant has taken oath that he was robbed of seven donkeys and Rs. 41 in cash, and he and a companion have taken oath that they saw the stolen property in possession of Pir Muhammad, Jalal Khel. We consider that decree for Rs. 100 should be passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khel Mahsuds J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899
	565, 1898 ...	Same Kour near Khutti Killa, 5th December, 1897.	Bada, son of Muhabbat, Saku, son of Said; Rawak son of Rahmat, Kharotas of Saroba Wargun	Jalal Khels	Four camels worth Rs. 485 Nandrami.	Majority of jirga in this case have found that complainants should be given oath as to the amount of their loss, and as to the fact of the stolen camels having been seen by them in the possession of Aki Khan and Shah Bahram, Jalal Khel Mahsuds. We consider this a proper finding. Two complainants have taken oath that they were robbed of four camels which they subsequently saw in the possession of Aki Khan and Shah Bahram, Jalal Khels. We recommend that decree for Rs. 200 be passed in favour of these complainants against the Jalal Khels. The other complainant lost only miscellaneous property of small value. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.

11	555; 1898 ...	Near Boys, 11th December, 1897.	Sikandar, son of Pamdah, caste Bidwal, of Jabai Akhora, Tahsil Fatah-jang, District Rawalpindi, Daffadar, Commissariat.	Do	Theft of a camel with property worth Rs. 132-12-0	In this case the jirga is of opinion that Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Malik, should be given oath that he never said that this camel was stolen by Shadar Gul and that he knows nothing about it, and that accused should be given oath that they did not steal the camel and know nothing about it. We agree with the jirga The prescribed oaths have been taken, and we consider that the claim must be dismissed. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899
12	112, 1898 ...	Spin Chilla, 8th January, 1898.	Sheran, son of Sarwar, Kharoti, of Hasbat Killa (Bannu).	Jalal Khels, Abdullais and Gulram, Waziri outlaw	One camel	The jirga in this case recommend that Gulram Taj Khel, should be allowed to take oath of innocence. If he refuses to do so, the value of the camel should be recovered from him. If he takes oath the Sarpanches consider that the value of the camel should be recovered from those who are territorially responsible. File should be made over to Political Officer, Wana, in order that an opportunity to clear himself may be given to Gulram. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 26th December, 1898
13	567, 1897 ...	Khozhal hill near Aghzan Killa; 26th January, 1898.	Niaz Gul, Adamzai, sons of Firzada Dosali, Mohmt Khels of Khaosore	Jalal Khels	Two camels (recovered on payment of Rs 107 Nandrami bhunga)	In this case majority of jirga are of opinion that ten Jalal Khel Mahsuds should be given oath that Pita and Khangai, Mohmt Khel Wazari, committed the robbery and brought the camels to Shpzhmai and Trezhmai Jalal Khel Mahsuds, and took half the ransom money. If this oath is taken half the bhunga (which the Mahsuds must admit to be Rs 107 Kabuli) should be recovered from the Jalal Khels and half from the Mohmt Khels. We approve of this finding. The oath has been taken as prescribed, and we recommend that Rs 58-8-0 Kabuli be recovered from the Jalal Khels and the same from the Mohmt Khels for the complainants J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana Bannu, 7th January, 1899
14	84, 1898 ...	Zer Hill, 1/2 miles north of Lak Ghundi, 7th March, 1898	Sherjan, son of Khodadad, Ghazi Khan, son of Nek Kadam, and Masuliah, son of Shamska, Aka Khel Suleman Khels of Takwara, Tank Tahal, District Dera Ismael Khan.	Do	Robbery of 18 camels and property worth Rs 51 Three camels recovered on bhunga of Rs 220 Kabuli, 1 camel recovered from Khudder Khels for Rs 60 Rest (14) are still with the accused, also property	In this case the jirga are of opinion that oaths should be given to complainant (1) as to amount of bhunga paid by him for recovery of three camels, (2) as to the number of camels originally stolen, and a decree passed in his favour for amount of bhunga and number of camels to which he takes oath. We agree with the finding. Complainant has taken oath that he spent Rs 162 in bhunga and that ten of the camels lost by him in this case are still unrecovered. We recommend that decrees for Rs 162 Kabuli and Rs 500 British be passed against Jalal Khel Mahsuds J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana Bannu, 7th January, 1899

LIST No. II.—continued.
Inquiry to Travellers in the Daur Valley—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No of Case, with Year	Place and Date of Occurrence	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only)	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
15	818; 1898	Tarki Ghundi near Idak; 9th May, 1898 10th	Sadda Khan, son of Lallai, Sarki Khel Wazir of Karlasta, Bannu Tahsil	Jalal Khels ..	Two camels (recovered for Rs 141 Nandram bhunga)	Majority of jurga consider the case is a very doubtful one and that oath of innocence should be given to seven Jalal Khels, including Kargai, Malik, and the accused Jumaras. If they fail to take it, decree should be passed in complainant's favour. We agree with this finding. Oath has been taken as required, and we consider case should be dismissed. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899
16	—	Tochi bed near Kajuri, 16th May, 1898.	Shamir, Malik, son of Balal, Muhammad Khel Wazir, subsection Khiddra, of Bannu.	Shahi Khels ..	Two camels (recovered for Rs. 204 Kabuli bhunga)	Complainant has withdrawn his claim. Case may be filed. J. G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A. B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
17	499, 1898 ...	High road near Ahmad Khel, 29th May, 1898	Ali Khan, son of Muhammad Ali Khan, of Kohat (Tahsil Hangu), Fakir Khan, son of Muhammad Din, Gul-sada, son of Mamot Khan, of Kohat (Samori village)	Jalal Khels ..	Seven camels ...	Majority of jurga were of opinion in this case that complainants should be given oath as to the amount of their loss and as to having seen their camels in the possession of Jalal Khels. Two complainants have taken oath that they lost seven camels and that they saw them in the possession of Jumaras and Nizam Din, Jalal Khel Mahands. We consider that decree should be passed in favour of complainants against the Jalal Khels for Rs 480, the value of seven Kohati camels. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A B KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899
18	560; 1898 ...	High road near Ahmad Khel, 6th June, 1898	Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel	Do. ..	Five camels (recovered for Rs 400 Kabuli)	The Mahand munafa admit complicity of Jalal Khels in this raid, but say they were assisted by Mohmt Khels. Having regard to place and circumstances of robbery, it may be safely assumed that Mohmt Khels were either concerned in or connived at the offence. We therefore recommend that a decree for Rs. 411 Kabuli be decreed in complainant's favour and recovered, half from Jalal Khels and half from Mohmt Khels. J G LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.

421, 1898	High road near Musakki Tower, 9th July, 1898.	Said Khan, son of Ali Khan of Shoki (Lachh Tahal in Kohat).	Do	Two camels and Rs 45 in cash.	Majority of jirga in this case find that oath of innocence should be offered to Saradin and Khiddar, Jalal Khels, accused, and that if they clear themselves by oath the complainants' loss should be made good to them by villages or tribes territorially responsible. The accused have taken the prescribed oath, and the case should now be dealt with by the Political Officer, Tochi, as recommended by the jirga. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.
—	Kot Issori; 5th August, 1898	Gul Kadam and Gulbat Khan, son of Kippat Khan, Bora Khel.	Do	Three hundred and twenty sheep, one donkey, and one gun, with clothes, wounding Gul Kadam.	With the exception of one member, who is personally interested, the jirga are unanimously of opinion that this should be treated as an inter-tribal and not as a traveller's case. We agree. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
—	Chauki Wuz, 28th September, 1898	Payan Gul, son of Arzon Akhund, and Gulam Din, Jani Khels, of Bannu	Do	Two mares and one colt	In this case complainant states that it cost him Rs 220 to recover the animals stolen, of which he has already been repaid Rs 27 and Rs 198. Kabuli are still due. Jumara, Jalal Khel, admits that he is responsible for this balance, and will recover their shares from the other thieves concerned and pay the full amount to complainant, who is satisfied with this settlement. We recommend that this friendly settlement be accepted. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
—	Near Boya, 16th October 1898	Maoha, son of Nuradin, and Shahzad, son of Amzullah, Muhammad Ali, son of Darya Khan, Kharots of Mastoi (Khorasan), now living in Bharat (Bannu District)	Do	Twelve camels . . .	Mahsud munafs admit complicity of Jalal Khels, and they and the Sarpanchos think that Mohmt Khels mentioned in the enquiry were also in the raid. In any case stolen camels must have been taken through Mohmt Khel country in Khansore. We agree with majority of jirga, and consider that a decree of Rs 600 should be passed in complainant's favour, of which two-thirds will be recovered from Jalal Khels and one-third from the Mohmt Khels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 12.

ORDER.

We are agreed that these* travellers' cases against Jalal Khel Mahsuds should be tried by a jirga of 15 persons, appointed 5 by the Jalal Khels, 5 by the travellers and 5 by Government. The jirga will arrive at a separate finding on each claim as to the amount of property lost and the extent to which Jalal Khels are responsible for it. In cases where the travellers are natives of Waziristan or immediately adjoining tracts with whom it is possible the Jalal Khels may be at enmity, the first question for the jirga will be whether the raid, if committed by Jalal Khels, was in pursuance of a personal, family or tribal feud, if a feud is proved, the case will be removed from the list of travellers' cases and placed among tribal cases.

The Mahsuds have selected the following five men as their Munsifs:—

Mir Ajal, Nana Khel.
Allahbagh, Shaman Khel.
Muhammad Afzal, Langar Khel.
Sman, Shabi Khel.
Gulpir, Shingi

The travellers have selected the following:—

Gulbat Khan, Mohmit Khel, } For Waziris.
Aliyas Khan, Tori Khel, }
Nabbi Khan, Madda Khel, } For Kharotis.
Dost Muhammad, Kharoti, }
Mohibullah, Jowaki Afridi—For Peshawaris, Kohatis, Afridis, &c.

We approve of the above, and appoint the following five on the part of Government:—

Mir Abas Khan, Shahbuzurg Khel.
Akbar Ali Khan, Ditto.
Zabita Khan, Mama Khel (Bannu).
Allahdad Khan, Isa Khel, Marwat.
Wazir Khan, Shahbaz Khel, Marwat

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 9th December, 1898.

As Wazir Khan, Sarpanch, has not arrived, we reduce the Sarpanches to three instead of five. They will be Mir Abas Khan, Zabita Khan and Allahdad Khan

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 13th December, 1898.

As Muhammad Afzal, Langar Khel, is ill, Khoedar, Shabi Khel, has been substituted for him

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 23rd December, 1898.

Annexure 13.

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 19th April, 1899.

I am directed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, reporting the result of the cases relating to offences committed by Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District and decided at the joint jurgas held at Tank.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor approves of the orders passed by you in these cases and confirms your action in authorizing the Political Officer to enforce those orders. His Honour also agrees with you that the number and character of the complaints brought against the Mahsuds, as regards the Dera Ismail Khan border do not evidence any serious insecurity of life and property on that border

Annexure 14

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 19th April, 1899.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th of January, 1899, reporting the settlement of cases in which Government or travellers in the Tochi Valley were the complainants against the Mahsuds

2. It is observed that you have approved of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and have authorized the latter to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. Your orders are approved by the Lieutenant-Governor, who desires that his acknowledgments may be conveyed to Messrs Lorimer and Kettlewell for the satisfactory settlement effected by them

3. His Honour is also pleased, as desired by you, to sanction the recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, in cases in which Government servants or property were injured, and to direct that steps may now be taken to realize the fines and compensation awarded in these cases.

4. In conclusion, I am to request that you will be good enough to submit the statement referred to in Mr Kettlewell's letter of the 28th November, 1898, showing exactly the amounts outstanding against the tribe, the sections mainly responsible, and also the class of cases for which the compensation and fines are due, and to report what prospect there is of realization of the amounts due and what steps you propose to take to realize them. The Lieutenant-Governor will also be glad to receive your opinion on the recommendation of the Political Officers that whenever an opportunity occurs cross-cases between Mahsuds and Dauris should be taken up and enquired into as they occur, together with an opinion on the further suggestion that claims of revenue-paying Waziri villages in the bed of the Tochi should be taken up in the same manner as Dauri cases proper

5. The original enclosures of your letter under reply are herewith returned, together with six printed copies of the same

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from the Hon. Mr. L. W. Dane, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 20th September, 1899.

In continuation of this office letter, dated 11th August, 1899, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the telegrams marginally noted, on the subject of the Shaman Khel prisoners captured in connection with the telegraph wire cutting and the attack on the ration convoy at the Shahur Tangi on the 1st July, 1899. From my telegram, dated 11th September, 1899, it will be seen that, failing the discovery and surrender of the individual offenders, the Lieutenant-Governor has sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs 1,500 on the Shaman Khels, the release of the prisoners of that section as soon as the fine is paid and the immediate release of Suleman, Michi Khel Malik, who was acquitted by the tribal jirga.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th September, 1899.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Jirga consisting of Badshah Khan and Muhammad Afziel Khan, Alzais, Barahmat, Nur Agai and Azam Khan, Bohlolyai, and Marwat, brother of Allah Ragh, and Amin Khan, Shaman Khels, has found Suleman not guilty, main reason is that further enquiries proved that the two witnesses, who stated that they spoke to Suleman and his companions in Spltoi, were lying, and had been induced to tell this story in hope of getting their relatives, who were among Shaman Khel prisoners, released. Marwat and Amin Khan swear that the more important of these witnesses admitted this to them privately, and jirga is convinced that their evidence is false. This conviction appears genuine, and is considered well founded, case against Suleman thus breaks down, and jirga strongly affirms belief in his innocence; it is proposed that of fine imposed one-third should be paid by Shahur Shaman Khels and two-thirds by Shabar Khel, to be refunded if real murderers are found and punished. Proposal as regards Michi Khels is hardly logical if Suleman is really innocent, but jirga thinks that, if pressure is put on powerful section like Michi Khels in this way, they will be likely to find a clue to real offenders, and proposal might, I think, be justified on grounds that appearances against Suleman are still suspicious, and he is therefore bound either to pay share of fine or to prove case against offenders, so though failure to prove case up to date against actual murderers is to be regretted, I think jirga's award should be accepted, and fine of Rs. 1,500 imposed as proposed. I will submit detailed report as soon as possible, but should be glad of telegraphic orders about prisoners at once. I think Suleman might be released immediately on heavy security, and Malik required to give security for payment of fine within month, and I would also release Shaman Khel prisoners on payment of Rs. 500. Latter are innocent, and their further detention will serve no useful purpose, while it keeps their section in a state of irritation and contest. Fine of Rs. 500 will, I consider, be sufficient punishment for failure to prove case and for false evidence of witnesses. *Ends.* Commissioner wires:—*Begins.* In event of Suleman being discharged, the Michi Khels can be fined only if jirga awards that. Case against Suleman is doubtful, and they cannot return.

him guilty, and that they therefore recommend a fine on his section. Does the jirga make the above award? Do the Michi Khels object to or accept the jirga's proposal regarding imposition of two-thirds of total fine on them? If Michi Khels are to be fined, there ought to be a good reason for making them share responsibility with Shaman Khels. *Ends.* Political Officer, Wana, wires.—*Begins* Object of jirga in imposing two-thirds of fine on Michi Khels, though they considered Suleman innocent, was that latter should, in hope of fine being refunded, give clue to actual murderers. If Michi Khels fail to do this, but are innocent themselves, they will recover sum they have paid as fine from Shaman Khels. Shah Salim tells me that he has strong hopes of real offenders being discovered, but that, if they are not, it has been privately settled between Michi Khels and Shaman Khel Maliks that former should call on latter to repay them their share of fine, which Shaman Khels will probably do without demur. Shah Salim says Michi Khels have no objection whatever in these circumstances to paying two-thirds of whatever fine imposed, and I strongly recommend that proposal be sanctioned, as, though illogical, it is one on which all parties are agreed, further enquiries confirm impression that Suleman is innocent after all. Suspicion against him was roused by his visit to Nasib's kerr, and Shaman Khels, possibly with genuine belief in his guilt, invented other statements strengthen case against him, and get their prisoners released. If Suleman and Shaman Khel prisoners are now discharged at once, as proposed, unrest among both Michi Khels and Shaman Khels will cease, and tracing of real offenders will be facilitated. Please let me have orders before evening, as I wish to leave Sarwekai to-morrow, and Maliks here are waiting to hear orders passed, otherwise please wire when orders may be expected. *Ends*

Annexure 2

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, (repeated to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab), dated the 8th September, 1899.

You state that Michi Khels have made private arrangements with Shaman Khels to realise from Shaman Khels the part of fine imposed on Michi Khels, in event of their failing to trace actual offenders. Michi Khels are certain that they will not pay fine actually in any case, and the mere imposition of fine will not serve as a pressure on them to trace offenders. Under these circumstances, if Michi Khels are not proved to be responsible in any way, why should we not relieve them of all responsibility, release Suleman and let tribesmen see that we do not punish innocent section or men? On the contrary, if we are convinced of innocence of suspected men or section, we are ready to acquit them at once. In this case whole fine of Rs 1,500 proposed should be imposed on Shaman Khels, who are locally responsible, have brought a false charge against Suleman, and have failed to trace actual offenders. Is there any objection to this? In any case, in my opinion, not a single Shaman Khel should be released until whole of fine in this case has been realised, and then other Shahur Tangi cases have been satisfactorily disposed of.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 9th September, 1899.

Yours 8th September. I venture to deprecate further punishment of Shahur Shaman Khels beyond fine of Rs. 500 proposed. They are an inoffensive and well-disposed section, and more under our control than any

other Mahsuds; in present case I believe now they have to choose between proving case by false evidence against Suleman, whose actions had given rise to well-founded suspicion of his guilt and confessing themselves unable to trace offenders. Offence was committed on border of Shaman Khels' territory, none of offenders were wounded and they carried nothing off with them, so that, unless some one had actually seen them on way to or from Tangi, evidence against them would be difficult to procure; they would keep what they had done very dark, and facts would probably only leak out months afterwards, if ever. On other hand, in case of outrage in Tangi of July 23rd last, one raider was killed; I have, owing to this fact, succeeded in tracing offence to gang of ten or eleven Aimal Khels, of seven of whom I now know the names. In view of severe pressure brought to bear through baramta on Shaman Khels, where crops are suffering for want of men to look after them, I think there is some excuse for their action. I venture to think fine proposed sufficient punishment, but, if you consider it advisable, fine might be raised Rs 1,000, and Michi Khels absolved altogether. Imposition of fine on latter will exercise some pressure on them, though they expect to realise it ultimately from Shaman Khels, for it will be some time before they do so; there is always chance of friction arising, though Shaman Khels are at present complaisant. I mainly supported proposal, however, because it was that of jurga, and consented to by all parties, and I agree that it would perhaps be more fair to Michi Khels to absolve them altogether. In any case I venture again to urge most strongly immediate release of Suleman and Shaman Khel prisoners on payment of whatever fine imposed. I would again point out that Shahur Shaman Khel allowances are same as before Shahur route was opened, and I don't think we should come down on them too severely as regards local responsibility, especially in case like present and only other recent Tangi case, where responsibility can be enforced is that of wire cutting, in which they have given satisfactory clue to offenders. Latter case will be taken up at Tank jurga. Addressed Commissioner, repeated Punjab

Annexure 4

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th September, 1899.

Watson's telegram, 9th September. I adhere to imposition fine of Rs 1,500 on the Shaman Khels. There is no doubt that Shahur Shaman Khels are inoffensive and well-disposed, but punishment awarded in serious cases should be deterrent. I recommend accordingly fine of Rs 1,500 on the Shaman Khels and immediate release of Suleman. Shaman Khel prisoners may be released as soon as fine is paid. Watson refers to allowances of Shahur Shaman Khels. I would point out that all Mahsud allowances were forfeited after the attack at Wana, and subsequent military expedition, and new allowances were sanctioned afterwards in consideration of new obligation; the opening of Shahur route was a result of expedition.

Annexure 5.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 11th September, 1899.

Your telegram of 9th. Lieutenant-Governor agrees in your recommendation to impose a fine of Rs. 1,500 on Shaman Khels, to release Suleman immediately, and also to release Shaman Khel prisoners as soon as fine is

paid. As Zhob authorities are clearly not convinced of innocence of Mahsud prisoners arrested by them and now being sent to Wana, Political Officer should, before releasing them, in view of the failure to prove these cases on his side, again review the evidence against them in the view of what he has since learned.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 6th October, 1899.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my endorsement, dated the 6th September, 1899, I am directed to forward, for such action as the Lieutenant-Governor may think necessary, copies of two letters from the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, regarding raids committed by Waziris on Zhob

Dated the 25th August, 1899, with enclosures.
Dated the 26th August, 1899, with enclosure

2 I am to take this opportunity of enclosing a brief statement which has been prepared in this office of cases outstanding against the Mahsuds and Waziris. Additions may be necessary to make the statement complete up to date; but, even as it stands, the number of cases is considerable, some of them are serious, and the fines due from the tribes seem likely to reach a high figure. I am accordingly to enquire, with reference to your letter, dated the 17th October, 1898, what action it is proposed to take to effect a settlement of all these cases. I am to suggest that it would be convenient if your reply were accompanied by a statement, as far as this can be prepared without undesirable delay, showing all outstanding cases against these tribes, in which orders have not been passed or have not been completely executed, and indicating, to such extent as may be readily possible, the tribes, sections and sub-sections against which the liability in each case has been proved or is expected to be proved.

3. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will, no doubt, agree that an early settlement of outstanding cases is very desirable, since the record of the last twelve months, culminating in attacks upon regular troops as well as levies, and finally on Government officials, both in Zhob and in South Waziristan, appears to indicate an increasing spirit of lawlessness among the tribes. The Government of India would be very reluctant to sanction anything in the nature of an expedition to compel a settlement of these cases, and I am to enquire whether, if other means fail, vigorous action cannot be taken, before the tribes move to the hills for the next hot season, to recover fines by a system of reprisals against the various sections concerned.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Colonel H. Wylie, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ziarat, the 25th August, 1899.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my telegram, No 179, dated the 26th May, 1899, reporting an attack made by a band of Waziris on a party of five Zhob Levy Corps sepoy between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel.

2. I now forward, herewith, for the information of the Government

* Dated the 2nd August, 1899. of India, a copy of a letter,* with my reply† thereto, from the Political Agent in Zhob on the subject.

† Dated the 25th August, 1899.

3. It appears that, on the afternoon of the 25th May last, a Naik and four men of the Zhob Levy Corps, while returning from Girdao to Mir Ali Khel, and proceeding in single file up the bed of a nalla, were suddenly fired on, when about two miles from Girdao, by two parties of men, one on either side of the nalla. Three shots were fired. One struck and killed sepoy Bharat, another hit sepoy Kalla Khan in the left thigh, breaking the bone, while the third missed.

4. Seeing their comrade fall, and as their assailants—about ten in number—outnumbered them, the other sepoys took to their heels, making for Mir Ali Khel, where they arrived about 7 in the evening, and at once reported what had taken place.

5. Meanwhile the Waziris, for by the clothes they wore and their general appearance, there can be no doubt as to the tribe to which the men belonged, came down to where the dead and wounded men lay, and, after having relieved them of their arms, accoutrements, &c., decamped.

6. On receiving intimation of the attack, the Officer Commanding the Mir Ali Khel post at once wired to Fort Sandeman and Gul Kach, and sent messages to the other neighbouring posts informing them of what had occurred, at the same time sending out 2 parties in pursuit of the offenders, and making arrangements to bring in the dead and wounded men.

7. Three parties of the Zhob Levy Corps were also despatched in different directions from Gul Kach, and a party under Jemadar Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din from Fort Sandeman. The Commandant himself, with the Extra Assistant Commissioner, following a little later.

8. On the morning of the 27th, one of the parties despatched from Gul Kach came across three Zalli Khel Waziris near Toi Khulla on the Zhob side of the Gomal, and arrested them on suspicion. These men were found to have in their possession a rifle, recently discharged, 3 empty cartridge cases, 15 loaded cartridges, 1 pistol and 2 knives. It will thus be seen that appearances were very much against them.

9. On the 28th May the party under Jemadar Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din came across another gang of 4 Zalli Khel Waziris at the same place where the first three men were arrested, and accused them of having been concerned in the attack of the 25th May. One of these men escaped. The remainder stated that they knew the offenders and took the Jemadar and his party to the village of Karab Kot, some ten miles on the Waziri side of the border, where the offenders were supposed to be. On arrival the villagers, Mahsuds, were found scattered about attending to their fields. The Zalli Khel pointed out six men, all of whom were quietly secured and the party then returned to Gul Kach. While the arrests were being made, a woman was heard to say, "Did I not warn you against doing such deeds."

10. On being placed with others before the wounded sepoy, Kalla Khan, for identification, Kalla Khan picked out three of the Mahsuds as the men whom he had seen at the time of the outrage. One man in particular he recognised as a man who came down to where he (Kalla Khan) lay after his comrades had run away and levelled his rifle at him with the intention of despatching him, but desisted on the sowar's pleading for his life. Kalla Khan has since died.

11. Copies of the various statements for and against the accused have been sent to the Political Officer, Wana, who has been asked to find, if possible, corroborative evidence against (1) the 6 Mahsuds, or (2) the 3 Zalli Khels who were arrested on the 26th May. Should he be unable to do so,

the Political Agent, Zhob, has suggested that a combined Punjab and Baluch jurga should assemble and enquire into the case on such evidence as is already available. The Political Officer, Wana, is understood to have referred the matter to the Commissioner, Derajat

12. At the request of the Political Officer, Wana, the Political Agent, Zhob, has sent the three Zali Khels who gave Jemadar Baz Muhammad his information in custody to Wana, and has suggested to that officer the possibility of his learning from the prisoners something that might prove of use in the case.

13. It will be seen from my letter to the Political Agent, Zhob, that I have approved of the action taken by him.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Political Agent in Zhob to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 2nd August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 26th May, 1899, regarding the attack by Waziris on a party of the Zhob Levy Corps between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel, I have the honour to submit the following detailed report on the subject.

2. On the afternoon of the 25th May, 1899, a Naik and four men of the Zhob Levy Corps, while returning from Girdao to Mir Ali Khel, and proceeding in single file about 20 yards one behind the other, were fired upon in the defile about two miles from Girdao. The assailants, who were in two parties, one on either side of the nailla, were about 10 in number, and, from their appearance, garments and the arms they carried, were, without doubt, Waziris. Three shots were fired by them, one of which missed, while of the other two, one hit sepoy Bharat and killed him, and the other broke the bone of sepoy Kalla Khan's left thigh. The Naik of the party and the other two sepoys, seeing their comrades fall, and as their assailants outnumbered them and were posted in unassailable positions, took to their heels, and arriving at Mir Ali Khel—about 7 in the evening—reported what had happened. From the statement of sepoy Kalla Khan it appears that two of the Waziris came down to where the two men of the corps were lying. The others ran after the Naik and his party, but their pursuit, as already stated, was unsuccessful. One of the first two Waziris told the wounded sepoy that they had been after them for a week and that it was only to-day that they had got an opportunity of attacking them. The same Waziri levelled his rifle at Kalla Khan intending to despatch him, but at the latter's entreaties his life was spared. The Waziris then having stripped the wounded man and the dead one of the arms, accoutrements, &c, they had on them, decamped.

3. On the Naik's making his report at Mir Ali Khel, the Officer Commanding the post at once despatched telegrams to Fort Sandeman and Gul Kach and messages to the other neighbouring outposts, at the same time sending out two parties in pursuit of the offenders. These, however, returned unsuccessful. Arrangements were made to bring in the wounded man and the body of the dead man to Mir Ali Khel. On receipt of the news of the raid at Gul Kach, three parties of the Zhob Levy Corps detachment there at once set out in different directions. Besides this, early on the 26th May, a party of the Zhob Levy Corps under Jemadars Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din started from Fort Sandeman, the Commandant, Zhob Levy Corps, and the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lower Zhob, following them.

4. On the morning of the 27th one of the Gul Kach parties came across three Zali Khel Waziris near Toi Khulla on the Zhob side of the Gomal. They were proceeding towards the river from the Zhob direction, and the party suspected them of having been concerned in the late raid. They were,

therefore, secured, and they were found to have in their possession a rifle which had recently been discharged, three empty cartridge cases, 15 cartridges, one pistol, and two knives. Thus appearances were very much against these men

5. On the 28th May in the afternoon the party under Jemadars Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din, who were accompanied by Abdul Kahlik, a Jemadar, and some sowars of the 5th Bombay Cavalry from Mir Ali Khel, came across 4 other Zalli Khel Waziris on the same spot and accused them of having committed the crime. One of the Zalli Khels disappeared on some pretence, and the other three said that they were quite innocent. At the same time they stated that they knew who the actual offenders were and where they lived, and one of them agreed to go with the party and point the offenders out. Accordingly the following morning Jemadar Baz Muhammad Khan, accompanied by some of his men and the Zalli Khel, started for the village of Karab Kot, some 10 miles on the Waziri side of the border. On arrival the villagers, who are Mahsuds, were found scattered about attending to their fields. The Zalli Khel informer was hidden among the horses of the party, so that the Mahsuds might not become aware of his having informed against them, and from this retreat he pointed out one by one 6 Mahsuds, whom he declared he had seen cross the river after the outrage. These men were quietly secured and the party returned with them to Gul Kach. While the arrests were being made, a woman was heard saying to one of the men arrested, "Did I not warn you against doing such deeds." The six Mahsuds, together with the three Zalli Khels who had informed against them and the three Zalli Khels first arrested, were then brought to Fort Sandeman. Thus we had in custody six Mahsuds and six Zalli Khels in connection with this affair. These men, together with two Waziris arrested on the 23rd May near Khuni Burj, four Waziris arrested last year in connection with the outrage committed in May 1898 (since released) and certain other prisoners, were, on the 26th May, placed before the wounded sepoy Kalla Khan (since dead) with a view to his identifying any of them if possible. Kalla Khan picked out three of the Mahsuds as men whom he had seen at the time of the outrage. One man in particular he recognised as he who had intended to give him his *coup de grace*. I do not, however, attach the highest importance to this identification owing to the sepoy's wounded and weakened condition. It serves, nevertheless, when taken in conjunction with the information of the Zalli Khels, to constitute a sufficiently strong *prima facie* case to justify the retention in custody of the whole party of six Mahsuds, pending the result of further enquiries.

The three informing Zalli Khels, I should mention, completely denied before the Magistrate that they had ever said anything about the Mahsuds or pointed them out to the Zhob Levy Corps party. But Jemadar Baz Muhammad, Ghulzai, is a man of unimpeachable truthfulness, and I have not the least doubt that the Zalli Khels acted as he described.

6 The case now stands as follows:—

Copies of the various statements for and against the accused have been sent to the Political Officer, Wana, and he has been asked to find, if possible, corroborative evidence against—

- (1) the six Mahsuds, or
- (2) the three Zalli Khels arrested on the 26th May.

Should he fail to do so, I have suggested that a combined Punjab and Baluchistan jirga should assemble and enquire into the case on such evidence as we already have. The Political Officer, Wana, has referred the matter for the orders of the Commissioner, Derajat.

7. At the Political Officer, Wana's, request, I have discharged the three Zalli Khels who gave Jemadar Baz Muhammad his information. They were forwarded in custody to Wana, and I suggested to the Political Officer the possibility of his learning from them something that might prove of use.

Either they really did see the Mahsuds crossing the Gomal and can give valuable evidence against them; or, for some purpose which they should explain, they wilfully deceived Jemadar Baz Muhammad and his party.

8. I may mention that one of the parties sent out after the occurrence of the outrage on the 26th May was one consisting of the Thanadar and a few tribal levies at Moghal Kot. In the hills towards Bagh they were fired on by some Waziris. The party returned the fire, whereupon the Waziris decamped, and were not again seen by the Thanadar. No damage was done on either side.

9. I am making a separate report about the late wire cutting outrage near Moghal Kot.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to the Political Agent in Zhob, dated Camp Ziarat, the 25th August, 1899.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter, dated the 2nd August, 1899, reporting details of the attack made by Waziris on a party of the Zhob Levy Corps between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel.

2. I am now to convey the approval of the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General to the action taken by you in the matter, as reported in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your letter under reply. Your report on the result of the reference made to the Political Officer, Wana, is awaited.

Annexure 4.

Letter from Colonel H. Wylie, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ziarat, the 26th August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 25th June, 1899, and the entries in my diaries for the weeks ending 30th June and 24th July, 1899, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 14th August, 1899, from the Political Agent in Zhob, furnishing further details of the attack by Waziris on a telegraph-line repairing party under the Thanadar of Moghal Kot and a Zhob Levy Corps patrol near Kuchbina on the 21st June, 1899.

2. As this is the second occasion within the last few months on which parties of Waziris have raided into Zhob, I venture to suggest that the Punjab Government should be addressed with a view to steps being taken to prevent the recurrence of such attacks.

Annexure 5.

Letter from the Political Agent in Zhob to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 14th August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 24th June, 1899, on the subject of wire cutting near Kuchbina on the 21st June, 1899, I have the honour to forward a more detailed report as under.

2. On the afternoon of the 21st June, 1899, information was received at the Moghal Kot Thana that the telegraph line had been cut at a point some 6 miles distant on the road to Kuchbina and Khajuri Kach. The Thanadar, Moghal Kot, accompanied by 3 civil levy sowars and a tracker at once proceeded to the site of the damage and found that about 200 feet of wire had been cut and carried off. The party was soon joined by 2 telegraph-line-riders, one from Khajuri Kach and the other from Moghal Kot, who at once set about repairing the line. While they were thus engaged, the party was fired upon from an adjoining hill. The spot whence the fire came was subsequently found to have been roughly "sangared," and the idea is that the Waziris knowing a party would come out to repair the line had purposely lain in waiting in order to attack it, the object being, doubtless, to plunder fire-arms. At the time of the attack a Zhob Levy Corps patrol of five men, which was on its way back from Moghal Kot to Kuchbina, was present in the neighbourhood. Hearing the firing the patrol endeavoured to make its way to Kuchbina, 5 miles distant, in order to summon

* *Note*—The appearance of the raiders which is well known to the levies and others on the Waziri border, and the marks at the scene of the wire cutting of "Mirzai Chaplas" which are generally worn by Waziris establish the fact that they were Waziris.

assistance, but found their road blocked by a second party of Waziris.* They then returned and joined the Thanadar's party, which, in the meantime, had made an attempt to retire towards Moghal Kot, but here also retreat was cut off by a third Waziri gang. The only man that got away was the line rider from Khajuri. The Khajuri road was apparently not blocked, and the line rider reached that place without accident. It should be mentioned that his first act was to wire news of the occurrence to his superiors, adding that when attacked the Thanadar and party had at once fled to Moghal Kot, leaving him, the line-rider, to shift for himself.

3. However, the Thanadar and the Zhob Levy Corps parties, finding themselves unable to reach either Moghal Kot or Kuchbina, established themselves in the most sheltered spot they could find, and there remained on the defensive for several hours. The Waziris kept firing on them at intervals and from different directions, till about 1 a m., when they took their departure without having done any damage. In the morning a party of the Zhob Levy Corps came out from Moghal Kot, but nothing further was seen of the Waziris.

4. It seems to me that the Zhob Levy Corps patrol allowed themselves to be somewhat easily repulsed from their endeavour to reach Kuchbina. They were apparently fired at from a hill overlooking the Kuchbina stream. But the bed of the stream is wide and open, and is not bad going for horses, so that a smart dash would soon have got them past the point of danger. However, it is always difficult to judge of such cases without having been present, and the fact stated by Major Alban, to whom I mentioned the matter, that the men were mostly recruits, should be taken into consideration.

5. It is not known what the exact number of the raiders was on this occasion, but there were probably a dozen or fifteen of them. Nor is it known to what section of the Waziris they belonged. The Political Officer, Wana, has been informed of the affair and asked to take cognisance of it.

6. I may mention that, on the day after the above attack, damage was done, I believe, to the telegraph line near Khajuri. This was in the Wana jurisdiction, and the Political Officer, Wana, was informed of the report.

No. 2.

Letter from the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 18th October, 1900. Received 5th November, 1900.

Our despatch, dated the 20th October, 1899, forwarded certain papers relating to raids committed by Mahsud and Waziri tribesmen. Early in the current year, we received* from the Punjab Government copies of letters from and to Mr.

Anderson, then Commissioner of the Derajat Division, in which the actual position was reviewed; and, after further voluminous correspondence, the Punjab Government† transmitted a report in which Mr Anderson claimed that all cases outstanding against the Mahsuds up to the 24th March, 1900, had been disposed of

2. The report did not‡ appear to us to be entirely satisfactory, and it was not long before we learnt that the settlement had not only omitted to take note of a claim nearly as large as that concerning which an agreement had been arrived at, but was in other respects defective. Further correspondence§ which was transmitted by the Punjab Government in July appeared to indicate that the situation was drifting from bad to worse, and was such as to give ground for much anxiety. The Lieutenant-Governor was accordingly invited to summon to Simla for a personal conference Mr W. H. Merk, C.S.I., who had succeeded Mr Anderson as Commissioner of the Derajat Division. The result of the conferences held after Mr Merk's arrival at Simla is set forth in

Enclosures Nos 6, 7, 8 and 9
 § Enclosures Nos. 10 and 11

¶ Enclosure No. 13. our Foreign Secretary's letter|| of the 1st October, 1900, of which we invite perusal. It will be observed that the course to be followed will depend on the attitude of the Mahsuds when Mr Merk meets them in jirga next month. Mr Merk will submit in advance a sketch of the communication which he proposes to make to the jirga. Should the jirga prove obdurate, a strict blockade will be enforced

3 As the enclosed papers contain reference to the Mulla Powindah, we may explain that in June last the Mulla definitely asked Mr Merk for an allowance, and we sanctioned the payment to the Mulla of an allowance of Rs. 100 a month.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	CURZON
„	E. H. H. COLLEN.
„	A. C. TREVOR.
„	C. M. RIVAZ.
„	T. RALEIGH.
„	E. F.-G. LAW.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 6th February, 1900.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 14th January, 1900, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, on the subject of our present position in regard to the Mahsud tribe.

Letter, dated 24th January, 1900, from Commissioner, Derajat
 My letter, dated 6th February, 1900, in reply.

Annexure 1.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 24th January, 1900.

With reference to the serious offences recently committed by the Mahsuds, namely, the murder of Border Military Police at Zeranobo, on the 16th December, 1899, which was reported by the Political Officer, Wana, in his telegram, dated the 16th idem, and the attack made on the garrison of the Zam Post on the 9th instant, I have the honour to submit a report showing what is the present position as regards the Mahsud tribe and our relations with it in order to enable Government to determine what action should be taken to obtain redress both as regards the cases which have been disposed of, but in which satisfaction has not been obtained yet, and also with reference to the cases which are pending disposal.

2. In order to lay the case clearly before Government it will be necessary to give a brief account of the proceedings which have been taken in connection with the settlement of cases, and the realisation of fines since the autumn of 1898. In my letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, I have explained that much pressure was not brought to bear on the Mahsuds earlier to obtain redress in the cases which were pending when I left on three months' leave in August, 1898, and that this was done advisedly. Before these cases, which were disposed of in November and December, 1898, were taken into account, the fines due on the 1st November, 1898, from the Mahsuds and other tribes under the political control of the Political Officer, Wana, amounted to Rs. 3,703-3-9, on account of the offences committed by them in British territory, and against British subjects and Government in protected areas. Out of this sum the Mahsuds were responsible for Rs. 3,247-3-9.

3. The disposal of the pending cases referred to above in the last paragraph, in November and December, 1898, imposed on the Mahsuds a fine of Rs. 18,867-15-0 as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
On account of the offences committed in the Dera Ismail Khan District ...	5,567	14	0
On account of the offences committed in Zhob	1,715	0	0
On account of the offences committed in Gomal	90	0	0
On account of the offences committed in Tochi	7,258	12	0
Gurri Khel raid on the Jam Khel flocks and a few other petty offences committed in the Bannu District	3,801	5	0
On account of offences committed in the Sherani country	435	0	0
Total	18,867	15	0

and the total sum due from the tribe amounted to Rs. 22,115-2-9.

4. Since then fines aggregating Rs. 18,466-8-7 have been imposed on the Mahsuds from time to time during the year 1899, partly on account of certain offences committed during the year, and partly on account of the old cases disposed of during the period, as noted below:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
1. Attack on the Bhattanni Levies committed on the 29th September, 1898	2,000	0	0
2. Murder of two Bhattanni Levies in July, 1897	1,000	0	0

	Rs.	A.	P.
3. Raid by the Shingis on Suleman Khel flocks near Nasran in February, 1899 (share of the Mahsuds) ...	4,278	0	0
4. Murder of Sepoy, Isar Singh, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, near Shahur Tangi, on 1st July, 1899 ..	1,500	0	0
5. Murder of two Cavalry sowars near Tiarza, on 5th March, 1899 (share of Mahsuds) ..	1,856	0	0
6. Murder of Zhob Levy sowar near Darra Gardao, on 25th May, 1899 ..	2,000	0	0
7. Killing and wounding of Sherani with robbery (<i>vide</i> paragraph 3 of Commissioner's letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, share of the Mahsuds) ..	1,600	0	0
8. On account of petty theft and robbery cases in the Dera Ismail Khan District, Gomal and Wana, &c. ..	4,252	8	7
Total ...	18,466	8	7

This sum being added to the total arrived at in paragraph 3 raises the total charge against the Mahsuds to Rs. 40,581-11-4.

5. Out of this total charge of Rs. 40,581-11-4 sums aggregating Rs. 21,739-2-11 have been realised from the tribe from time to time during the year, and the outstanding balance at the close of the year amounts to Rs. 18,842-8-5. Moreover, in certain inter-tribal cases, action was taken during the year, and the amount of compensation awarded in respect of such cases including the opening balance brought forward from 1898 amounted to Rs. 12,460-7-11. Out of this sum Rs. 7,526-1-0 have been recovered, and paid to claimants. The outstanding balance in these cases at the close of the year amounts to Rs. 5,934-6-11. This balance is on account of cases which occurred outside the limits of protected area in the hills and among tribesmen themselves. For the realisation of this balance we are not as much concerned as we are for the recovery of the balances of the fines imposed on account of offences committed in British territory, Zhob, Tochi, and protected area against Government and our own people.

6. The figures given in the preceding paragraph of fines imposed and collected during the year, however, do not fully manifest what has actually been done. The value of the property, cattle, sheep and goats recovered in original by putting pressure on the tribe, section, or individual offenders soon after the occurrence of the offence or restored by the actual offenders after enquiry by a tribal jirga has not been included in the figures of fines imposed and recovered. There are several large cases in which property and cattle worth several thousands of rupees were recovered in this way, notably in the case of the Shingi raid on the Suleman Khel flocks near Nasran, and the Guri Khel raid on the Jani Khel flocks in the Bannu District; while there are numerous petty cases in which the camels or other property stolen were restored to complainants, and the cases were filed after imposing a small fine or without taking any further action.

7. As regards the steps which have been taken to realise the fines imposed during the year, I shall give a brief account of what has been done—

- (a) The first step taken was to stop the allowances of all the Mahsud Maliks temporarily. These allowances were, however, restored when the Maliks showed that they made a real endeavour to realise the fines and to assist the Political Officer.

- (b) In December, 1898, when a large Mahsud Jirga was sitting at Bannu, in connection with the settlement of the cases of offences reported to have been committed by the Mahsuds in the Tochi, I authorised Mr Kettlewell, the Political Officer, Wana, to make arrangements for the seizure of convoys of certain Mahsud sections. I authorised this step subject to one condition, namely, that the Mahsuds, whose jirgas had been invited by us to come to Bannu, and were then assembled at Bannu, would not look upon the seizure as a breach of faith. Mr. Kettlewell thought that the action might create a misunderstanding, and recommended that all seizures should be postponed until after the jirgas were dismissed. After the termination of the jirgas, Mr. Kettlewell, however, never returned to Wana or Tank, and was compelled to take one year's furlough on medical certificate from the 16th January, 1899. Mr. Watson, who succeeded him, was new to the work and unacquainted with the situation, and the proposed seizures had of necessity to be postponed temporarily.
- (c) Early in February, 1899, I happened to be near Nasran on my way to the Mahsud country, when I received the report of a serious raid by the Shingis on the Suleman Khel flocks, in which 1,200 sheep and goats were carried off, and 5 Suleman Khels of the pursuit party were killed. Being in the neighbourhood of the locality when the raid was committed, I was in a position to take immediate action. The Shingis were surprised in their homes at Kotka, and near Jandola, and orders were issued for the arrest of every Shingi at Tank and in the Dera Ismail Khan District. The result was that the Suleman Khels were fully redressed, all compensation due in the case was realised, and 12 of the ringleaders of the raid, who were surrendered unconditionally, or were arrested, were sentenced to imprisonment for terms varying from three to five years.
- (d) The Political Officer, Mr Watson, acting in accordance with the instructions given to him, summoned a large Mahsud Jirga, and impressed on them the necessity of an early settlement of the fines imposed in the cases of the past year. After long discussion it was proposed by the Maliks that the fines outstanding against each section and sub-section should first be explained to the Maliks of those sections, and if they could not be realised by those Maliks in a month's time from the date of communication the leading Maliks would then meet again to discuss matters. The suggestion was adopted, and the month asked for was allowed.
- (e) At this stage another serious offence was committed on the 5th of March, 1899, namely, the attack on the Cavalry sowars at the mouth of the Tiarza. The Garerais, a sub-section of the Aluzais, were believed to have been concerned in this offence. Proposals were submitted for the surprise of certain Abdul Rahman Khel and Garerai villages with the assistance of troops, and these proposals were sanctioned in your office telegram of 12th March, 1899. All arrangements were completed involving the movement of a considerable body of troops, but when Mr Watson went out to make the surprise sanctioned, he had to modify the scheme for the reasons explained in his telegram of the 14th March, 1899, and his letter, dated the 17th March, which gives an account of the operations. The surprise was carried out in regard to the Abdul Rahman Khels only. The results of this surprise are reported by Mr. Watson in his letter, dated the 31st March, 1899, copy forwarded to you under the cover of this office letter, dated the 18th April, 1899.

The claims against the Abdul Rahman Khel amounted at the time to Rs. 3,821, a very large part of this was paid up at the time, and good security was furnished for the payment of the balance.

- (f) The Malikis, who had gone to their sections to recover fines, as reported in clause (d), made many recoveries, but the outstanding balance was still very large. The leading Malikis met in April, 1899, and decided that they should give their allowances which had not been paid to them for some months past in settlement of the fines outstanding against their sections, and should make the recoveries from their tribesmen or actual offenders afterwards. The result of these measures was that sums aggregating Rs 4,864-10-1 were readily recovered.
- (g) Two sections which were heavily involved, and which were under blockade from the beginning of the year, namely, the Guri Khels and Jalal Khels, did not attend the jurgas. By this time the hot weather was setting in, and the sections removed to the higher hills, where it was difficult to reach them. The Guri Khels owed a sum of about Rs. 4,000, and the amount due by the Jalal Khels was Rs 7,000. These sections are small. Their Malikis are few in number, and do not appear to have a hold on their tribesmen. It was decided that further endeavours should be made to persuade them to come and settle their account. The Guri Khels disputed the fairness of the award made against them in the Jani Khel raid case, while the Jalal Khels expressed their inability to pay such a large sum.
- (h) In July other serious offences were committed, namely—
- (1) The attack on a convoy, and murder of a sepoy on the 1st July, 1899
 - (2) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and murder of his chaprasi, Mahar Shah, on the 20th July, 1899
 - (3) The attack on a convoy on the 23rd July, 1899.

In connection with offence No (1) the Shahur Shaman Khels were surprised in their villages, and a number of them were arrested on the ground of their local responsibility for the offence, and were detained until the whole amount of fine imposed in the case was realised.

- (i) The Guri Khels and the Jalal Khels were then induced to come in. A settlement was arrived at with the former; they have paid a part of the fine due from them, but they have not carried out the agreement they made to pay off their fines as has been reported to you. Some of the other sections, however, who were jointly implicated with them, such as Abdullas, have been induced to pay in their share of the fine.
- (j) Before the Zam attack was made, in the beginning of this month, arrangements were being made to arrest large convoys of the Shabi Khels and Jalal Khels in the Bannu District. These arrangements are being carefully worked out on the Tochi side, and will, I hope, be successful hereafter.

The result of the steps taken during the past year is that sums aggregating Rs. 21,739-2-11 have been realised during the year on account of the offences committed in British territory, and against Government or our own people in protected areas, and Rs. 7,526-1-0 in other cases.

8. The subjoined table will show the amount each sub-section has yet to pay on account of the former class of cases.

Section.	Sub-section.	Dera Ismail Khan.	Gomal, Wana and Shahur.	Zhob.	Sherani.	Bannu.	Toohi.	Total.
	<i>Alizais.</i>	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Giddi Khels.	Langar Khels...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Kai Khels ...	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
	Chund Khels ...	69 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	69 0 0
	Batkais ...	69 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	69 0 0
	Wasrgais ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Furidas ..	150 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	150 0 0
Dachhi Khels.	Salami Knels ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Guri Khels ...	640 0 0	—	165 0 0	165 0 0	3,283 3 0	—	4,253 3 0
	Mal Khels ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shumi Khels.	Mochi Khels ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Gareras ...	223 5 8	573 8 0	168 0 0	270 0 0	—	—	1,234 14 8
	Marias ...	—	182 0 0	—	—	—	—	182 0 0
	Bahadur Khels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Para Khels	—	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
Shahi Khels	Malik Dumas	150 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	150 0 0
	Sultanais	—	—	—	—	—	1,400 0 0	1,400 0 0
	Total Alizais.	1,351 6 8	805 8 0	333 0 0	435 0 0	3,283 3 0	1,400 0 0	7,808 1 8
Shaman Khels	<i>Shaman Khels</i>							
	Qasim Khels ...	360 0 0	56 8 0	—	—	—	—	416 8 0
Bahlozais	<i>Bahlozais.</i>							
	Jalal Khels ..	77 8 0	—	—	—	86 4 0	5,083 15 0	5,197 1 0
	Dhur and Nekzan Khels.	510 0 0	1,179 1 9	—	—	—	—	1,689 1 9
	Abdur Rahman Khels.	171 0 0	160 0 0	—	—	—	—	331 0 0
	Kikaras ..	—	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
	Shingis ..	285 6 0	376 0 0	—	—	—	—	661 6 0
	Aimal Khels ..	217 8 0	—	—	—	—	—	217 8 0
	Abdullais ...	—	364 0 0	—	—	—	—	364 0 0
Marsanzais ...	—	—	—	—	12 14 0	195 0 0	207 14 0	
	Total Bahlozais	1,261 6 0	2,129 1 9	—	—	99 2 0	5,228 15 0	8,718 8 9
Mahsuds ...	Mahsud Tribes	—	—	2,099 6 0	—	—	—	2,099 6 0
	GRAND TOTAL	2,978 12 8	2,991 1 9	2,432 6 0	435 0 0	3,382 5 0	6,628 15 0	18,842 8 5

It will be observed that the sum due from the Shaman Khels is very small, and this sum will be realised without the adoption of any special measures. Among the Alzais the sections which owe large sums are—Guri Khels, Rs. 3,283-3-0, Shabi Khels, Rs. 1,400, Garerais, Rs. 1,234-14-8. Among the Bahlolzais the sections from whom large sums are due are—Nekzan Khels, Rs. 1,689-1-9, Jalal Khels, Rs. 5,033-15-0. In addition to the cases in which the penalties have been fixed there are some serious offences pending disposal, namely—

- (1) Attack on a convoy guard on July 23rd, 1899.
- (2) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and the murder of his chaprasi on 20th July, 1899.
- (3) The attack on Border Military Police men near Zeraniobo, in December, 1899.
- (4) The attack on the Zam Post on the 9th January, 1900
- (5) The attack on the Zhob Levy sowars in May, 1898

The fines which are likely to be imposed in the above cases may be estimated at Rs. 12,000, which, being added to the sum of Rs. 18,842-8-5 outstanding on account of the cases already disposed of as reported in paragraph 5 will raise the total charge against the tribe to Rs. 31,000 in round numbers. To this sum may be added Rs. 9,000 more on account of the petty cases pending disposal against the Mahsuds, and the total charge will amount to nearly Rs. 40,000.

9. If the Mahsuds had not committed fresh serious offences during the year, the sums recovered during the year would have been sufficient to pay off all fines and compensation awarded in old cases. The sum of Rs. 40,000, which has been arrived at in the last paragraph is large, and cannot all be realised at once, unless measures of a very drastic nature are adopted to enforce the payment. It will be observed that to realise the sum of approximately Rs. 30,000 in the past year several surprises of villages were made, convoys were arrested both at Tank and in Bannu, sections were placed under blockade, Malikhs exerted strenuous endeavours to realise fines, and in fact paid large sums out of their allowances, and every effort was made to induce the sections which are heavily involved to clear their accounts, with the result that even the Jalal Khels and Guri Khels, who are the most troublesome sections and owe the largest sums, paid up Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 700 respectively. If it be desired that the fine due up to date on account of old and new undisposed of cases should be realised at once, the only measure which I can suggest to effect this is to place the whole Mahsud tribe under blockade until the whole sum is recovered.

10. There is at present great scarcity in the Mahsud country, in consequence of the failure of rains, and though the offences lately committed by them cannot, I think, be attributed directly to this cause, yet there can be no doubt that the privation caused by scarcity of food and fodder has occasioned a certain amount of restlessness among the disaffected. If a blockade of the tribe is decided on it will be necessary to strengthen the military posts in the Shahur, and to place military garrisons in certain levy posts, such as Ngandoba and Haidri Kach, and also to strengthen the Border Military Police posts on the Dera Ismail Khan and part of the Bannu border. As a result of blockade it must be anticipated that our negotiations with Mulla Powindah, which are at present being arranged to enlist his assistance on the side of Government, will be interrupted, the raising of the Militia Corps in Southern Waziristan will, no doubt, be interfered with, and our friendly relations with the tribe and the Malikhs will be broken off temporarily; but at the same time there can be no doubt that the blockade of the whole tribe, which is already hard pressed for food and fodder, will probably bring about the submission of the tribe in a reasonably short time, and will lead to the early recovery of all the outstanding fines. It is now for the Government to decide whether it is necessary to realise the whole sum promptly and at once. If so, there appears to be no other alternative than the adoption of the extreme measure suggested above. On the other hand, if Government is not disposed to sanction this measure, the realisation of the fine by means such as were adopted last year will proceed in due course. The progress in realisation will,

no doubt, be gradual, but there will be no serious risk of straining relations with the tribe or the Malks, who will in the future render the same assistance that they have rendered in the past.

11. As to the motives of the serious offences committed last year, there is yet some uncertainty in regard to them. Mr. Watson is positive in his opinion that these offences were committed at the instigation, or at the instance of Mulla Powindah. He has, in fact, from the very first suspected that the Mulla is at the bottom of these offences. But on the other hand, if the Mulla is actually desirous of coming to a settlement with Government, as he appears to be, why should he instigate offences of this kind. The Mulla does not attempt to gain his ends by openly showing that he can trouble the Government by the commission of serious offences. On the contrary he tries to exonerate himself and his men. On more than one occasion when an offence of a serious nature had been committed he has at once sent an express message to the Political Officer or to the Naib Tahsildar to the effect that his men were not concerned in the offence. Whether Mulla Powindah is or is not the instigator of these offences there can be no doubt that the Malks, as a body, are well disposed, and wish to maintain friendly relations with Government. Mr. Watson assures me that there is no sign whatever of hostility on the part of the tribe in general, or of any large section in particular, and I have no reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by him. I have, however, observed of late, and particularly since the Border Military Police have been armed with Sniders, that there is an ever-increasing desire among the Mahsuds to possess themselves of firearms of a superior kind, and there appears to be no doubt that in every case that has been committed during the past year the aim of the offenders was to get hold of rifles. It is not to be supposed that the Mahsuds are gathering together arms of precision as a preparation for the display of hostility towards Government. Like the Afridis they find that the better a man is armed the stronger he is in the tribe, and each man and boy does his best to acquire good arms, and will stick at nothing to obtain them. The Mulla's followers have devoted their energies particularly to securing firearms, and presumably the Mulla encourages them, in order to strengthen his own position in the tribe. He appears to be playing a double game, coquetting with Government, while he attempts to strengthen his position in the tribe by increasing the armed strength of his body guard. I have asked Mr. Watson to make further careful and searching enquiries to ascertain what are the objects of the Mulla, and what is the correct explanation of his conduct and submit a separate report on the point.

12. As regards the Zam case, the Shabi Khels, Jalal Khels, and Bhattannis are suspected. I have seen Mr. Watson and discussed the situation with him. He wishes that some further time may be given to prosecute enquiries as to the sections to which the offenders belonged. I have accordingly postponed action for ten days to enable him to complete his enquiries. I propose, in the event of a blockade of the tribe being not approved of, to make a large baramta of the sections implicated, if this can be done without serious risks. It is desirable to bring about a prompt settlement in this case as well as of any other cases that may be pending against those sections. This has already been reported to you—*vide* correspondence ending with this office endorsement, dated 22nd instant.

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 6th February, 1900.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th January, 1900, on the subject of our present position as regards the Mahsud tribe, in connection with the question of redress for offences in which satisfaction is still due to Government.

2. The case stands thus. No action was advisedly taken during the winter of 1897-98 to obtain a settlement, in consequence of the general excitement then prevailing on the border, which it was apprehended might spread to Waziristan. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with you that this was a good reason at the time for suspending pressure. The spring of 1898 would probably have been a favourable opportunity for resuming operations, when the news of the defeats of the tribes was fresh along the frontier. The pending cases were, as a matter of fact, taken up during the winter of 1898-99, and at the close of the year 1898, the balance for which the Mahsuds were found to be liable was Rs 22,115. In the course of the year 1899, a sum of Rs 21,739, in cash, with various recoveries in kind, was realised. While the proceedings for collecting the balance of Rs. 22,115 were in progress, a succession of offences, some of them having a grave character, has raised the outstandings payable by the Mahsuds to about Rs 40,000. In this sum is not included the penalty for the attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard, which occurred on the day before your letter was despatched. Against this, the proceeds of the seizures in the Zeranobo affair, amounting to Rs 3,460, may be set off, so that the pending balance at the present moment remains roughly Rs 40,000. After realisations which very nearly reach the opening balance of 1899 we find ourselves now with a closing balance of double the amount. The debit account apparently accumulates much faster than it can be liquidated.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor cannot regard the situation as satisfactory. The measures which you propose at this juncture are either a blockade or the recovery of the balance by means such as have been adopted during 1899. In view of the experience of the past year it is clear that the employment of these latter means gives us no reasonable guarantee of a speedy settlement or of the cessation of offences in the future.

4. In consideration of the large balance, and of the numerous offences lately committed by the Mahsuds, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor that the time has come for bringing home to the whole Mahsud tribe the gravity of the situation, in which it has been placed by the misconduct of many of its members. A blockade, to be of any use, should obviously be one, not of individual sections, but of the whole tribe. But before it is imposed the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the Mahsuds should have an opportunity of complying with our demands and that a formal demand should be made on the whole tribe. For this purpose it would be necessary to summon not alone the 270 Mahiks (*vide* Appendix D to Mr Bruce's letter, dated the 26th May, 1895), whom we subsidise out of a fighting strength of some 10,000 men, but all the grey-beards, elders and persons of influence who sway the tribal councils. If the fully representative body of the whole tribe fails to satisfy Government, we shall then probably be compelled to resort to a blockade. The Lieutenant-Governor will be glad of your opinion on the proposed step, *viz.*, to convene a full jurga of the Mahsuds and to formally call upon the tribe to make redress. A full jurga is requisite because it is abundantly clear from what has happened since December, 1898, that the Mahiks (who are reported to be willing to aid Government) have neither the power to restrain the clansmen nor the ability to furnish early information of the personality of offenders; in the Zeranobo case, for instance, although it occurred six weeks ago, the identity of the attacking party seems to be still doubtful. Much less do they appear to have the power to bring offenders promptly to justice.

5. In your letter under acknowledgment you have adverted to the effect of the blockade upon the negotiations with Mulla Powindah. The Political Officer is positive in his opinion that the more serious offences during the past twelve months have been committed at his instigation. If the Mulla is sincere in his overtures, it is very doubtful of course if this view or information can be correct. But the point is whether he is sincere or not; you yourself think that he is playing a double game. However that may be, it is unquestionable that the Mulla is responsible for the present state of affairs in exact proportion to his power in the tribe, like any other Mahsud of note and

weight. If he really wishes to further the interests of Government, he will have an excellent opportunity of using his influence in that direction at the jirga which is suggested.

6. A rupture in our friendly relations will naturally interfere for the time with the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Southern Waziristan Militia, but would probably not affect the non-Mahsud element, the Darwesh Khel, Dotams, Ghilzais and British subjects whom, the Lieutenant-Governor understands, it is also proposed to entertain in the Militia. I am to ask for your opinion in this matter.

7. It is quite possible that the present scarcity in the Mahsud hills may bring a blockade to a speedy conclusion, but it would have to be stringent and efficient, and we should be prepared for outbreaks. Under these conditions the Lieutenant-Governor desires your opinion, so far as you are able to frame it at the present stage, without delaying this reference, as to the employment of further troops and of Border Military Police and Levies on the lines of communication with Wana, along the border of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts, and, perhaps, in the Tochi also.

8. In conclusion, I am to remark that, as previously intimated, the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that, judging by results, the present procedure in force on the Derajat border for the settlement of cases requires some change; the process of ascertaining and, if possible, of effecting the surrender and punishment of individual offenders, and failing this, of dealing first with small sub-sections, then with sections, and so on till the whole clan or tribe is reached, seems to be productive of delay and complications. The following seems to be some of the necessary accompaniments of the system. First there is the difficulty in obtaining information, which has already been mentioned. Then the jirgas or judges in the trials of the offenders appear to run no inconsiderable personal risk when they do bring cases to light; this was brought to notice in Mr. Watson's report on the Tiarza case, received with your letter, dated the 6th December, 1899, and has been observed in other instances. At times, too, the Maliks, who are paid to help our officers, do not shrink from deliberate perjury, witness the case reported in your endorsement, No 34, of the 15th January, 1900. The procedure of gradation from the person of the offender through successive tribal sub-divisions to the whole body of the clan is no doubt excellent in theory, but the inherent difficulties make it so slow and uncertain that it seems to fail to give us redress or to act with sufficient deterrent force on the tribesmen, and the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that when offenders are not promptly given up by the Maliks, immediate recourse to tribal responsibility is likely to be more efficacious in preserving peace and in enforcing good conduct. This, however, is a subject that can be more conveniently discussed when matters have been put straight between us and the Mahsuds.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 16th April, 1900.

In continuation of this office telegram, dated 26th March, 1900, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 30th March, 1900, and enclosure, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, containing a complete report on the settlement recently effected with the Mahsud Waziris.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor desires me to say that he considers that this settlement, which is a most satisfactory one, is mainly due to the personal influence of Mr. Anderson, whom the tribes on the Derajat border have learnt to trust.

3 With reference to the remarks made in paragraph 10 of the Commissioner's letter regarding the future management of the tribe, His Honour can only say that he has no objection whatever to the system of dealing with individual offenders or sub-sections of tribes provided that—

- (1) this method is accepted by the tribal jirga; and
- (2) it is not productive of delay.

The present case, however, appears to His Honour to afford an exemplary instance of the value of resorting to general tribal responsibility. Although the Malik in the last sentence of their petition mildly protest against this method of treatment being regarded as a precedent, Sir Mackworth Young is inclined to regard it as a most valuable precedent. The Commissioner was enabled, by means of negotiations with the full tribal jirga, numbering as many as 2,500 persons, to effect a complete settlement up to date of cases involving demands to the amount of Rs 35,000. If these cases had been settled by the individual method, they would probably have dragged on for many months, perhaps years. Provided the amounts are realised, the incident seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to establish conclusively the importance of keeping in view the tribal responsibility, which is the only secure basis for diplomatic relations with such a heterogeneous body as the Mahsud tribe.

Annexure 1

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th March, 1900.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 24th instant, reporting the settlement made with the Mashuds by which all the cases pending against the tribe to that date had been disposed of, I have the honour to submit a translation of the petition presented to me by the Mahsud Maliks, on the 24th instant, and referred to in the telegram cited above.

2 It will be convenient to narrate here briefly the circumstances which led to the conclusion of the present settlement.

In the end of January last, after the commission of certain serious offences, notably—

- (1) the attack on Border Military Police sowars at Zarrani Oba, on the 15th December, 1899,
- (2) the attack made on the garrison of the Zam Post, on the 9th January, 1900,

I submitted a detailed report in my letter, dated the 24th January, in which I attempted to describe as clearly as possible our position as regards the Mahsud tribe, and our relations with it, in order to determine what action should be taken to obtain redress as regards both the cases which had then been disposed of, and also the cases which were then pending against the tribe. In my report I gave a brief account of the measures which had been adopted in connection with the settlement of cases, and the realisation of fines due by the tribes since the autumn of 1898, in order to show that all possible steps had been taken to obtain reparation as early as was practicable, with the concurrence of the Maliks, and without breaking off relations with the tribe in general, with the result that fines aggregating nearly Rs 30,000 had been realised from the tribe in the past year by means of those measures. At the same time I recommended that if it was desired that the fines due to date on account of the old disposed of and new undisposed of cases should be realised at once, the whole Mahsud tribe should be placed under a blockade until the whole sum was recovered, which measure I considered could be carried out after strengthening the military posts in the Shahur, and placing

military garrisons in certain levy posts, and strengthening certain Border Military posts on the Dera Ismail Khan and part of the Bannu border. I pointed out, however, that the measure was attended with certain difficulties, and would lead to the temporary interruption of our relations with the tribe, and suggested, as an alternative, the realisation of the fines by means such as had been adopted during 1899. The Government, however, decided that the employment of measures, such as were used in 1899, gave no reasonable guarantee of a speedy settlement or of the cessation of offences in the future, and considered that before the blockade was imposed the Mahsuds should have an opportunity of complying with our demands. The Government further proposed that a formal demand should be made of the whole tribe, and asked for my opinion on this proposal. In the meantime the Political Officer, Wana, was arranging for an interview which he had proposed with Mullah Powindah, and the submission of the opinion called for was delayed for a short while. The enquiries, however, made in the interval in regard to the serious offences, which had induced me to consider the position in regard to the tribe seriously, and to postpone drastic measures for reparation, showed that these offences were the work of intriguers, that the tribe in general was not to blame, and that it had, on the whole, behaved better than usual, as was reported in my telegram, dated the 9th instant. Mr. Watson strongly deprecated taking action against the tribe as proposed by Government. I recommended that a formal demand for the payment of the fines should be made, first on the jurga of Maliks, and then on the whole tribe, as proposed, if Government was prepared to pass orders that in default of compliance with our demands within a month a blockade of the whole tribe would be declared and carried out. At the same time I expressed my concurrence with Mr. Watson, that the tribe as a whole was not to blame for the serious outrages recently committed.

3. As the time for my making over charge of the Division before proceeding on furlough was drawing rapidly near, on the 9th March I summoned the whole Mahsud jurga to Tank for the 17th of the month, in order to go there, and first discuss matters with the Maliks myself, and see if any settlement could be made for the recovery of the fines and settlement of all pending cases.

I summoned the whole Mahsud jurga in order that if Government decided by that date that a formal demand should be made on the whole Mahsud tribe as proposed, there should be no difficulty in making it at once. The Government decided, however, that it was inadvisable to make a formal demand at this time, and left me to discuss matters with the Maliks, and see if any settlement could be made.

4. I proceeded to Tank on the 18th instant, and first interviewed the leading Maliks. I explained to them the gravity of the position, and impressed on them the desirability of making some arrangement to clear the tribe. I explained that I was shortly going on leave, and that I desired to bring about a settlement in the interest of the tribe as well as of Government, and this was the last opportunity that I would have of effecting such a settlement.

The maliks promptly expressed their readiness to fall in with my wishes, and asked me to have an estimate made out of the fines which would have to be paid on account of all pending cases.

5. The whole of the files which were found pending against the tribe on account of offences committed to that date in British territory, the Shirani country and Zhob and against Government or British subjects in the Gumal, the Shahur, Wana, and the Tochi were examined. It was estimated that the Mahsuds would be liable to pay a fine of Rs. 18,000 in respect of these cases in addition to nearly Rs. 17,000 already due by them, or in all Rs. 35,000. This estimate was communicated to the Maliks, who then held consultations, and discussions, with a view to make arrangements for the liquidation of this sum, and the outcome was the presentation of the petition of the 24th instant,

which was drawn up by all the Maliks unanimously, and was verified on the afternoon of that date in an open Darbar attended by over 2,500 Mahsuds of all classes.

6. In this petition the Mahsuds Maliks arranged for the payment of nearly Rs 20,000 at once, as follows:—

	Rs
(1) Their allowances for three months	8,466
(2) Half the pay of the levies for three months	3,300
(3) Estimated value of two-third share of the rabi crops of the Mahsud lands	3,234
(4) Sale proceeds of previous crops of the Mahsud lands in deposit .	5,000
Total	<u>20,000</u>

Most of the money under the first and second items will be available on the 1st of April, and will be awarded as compensation in cases. The amount of the fourth item has been made over to the Political Officer. As regards the third item, tenders were invited for the purchase of the green crops. The highest bid which was made was Rs. 4,000 for the whole share of the Maliks. The Naib Tahsildar, Tank, who inspected the crops, assured me that Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 5,000 might be accepted as a safe estimate of the full Mahsud share of the produce when ripe. In any case the sale proceeds of the crops will not be less than the estimated amount. With regard to the balance of Rs. 15,000, the Maliks offered to pay a toll on all camels, bullocks, cows, donkeys, &c, coming in trading convoys to the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts and the Tochi Valley. The offer was a reasonable one, and I had no hesitation in accepting it on the spot, and I issued orders for the imposition of the toll at once. It is hoped that the Rs. 15,000 will be recovered within six months.

7. The Maliks were certainly supported by the whole tribe in general in making the offer to pay tolls, as none of the 2,500 men, who were present in the Darbar, and to whom the Maliks' petition was translated into Pashtu, made any objection. The settlement which has been concluded has the great advantage, I think, of bearing on all classes equally, namely, the Maliks, the levies, and the masses who have any relations with British territory.

8. As soon as I discovered the satisfactory attitude of the Maliks, and before the petition of the Maliks was presented on the 24th, I arranged that the cases pending against the Mahsuds relating to the Dera Ismail Khan District and the Shirani country should be taken up by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan and the Political Officer, Wana. In the same way the cases in which offences had been committed against Government, British subjects, and Powindahs in the Gomal, the Shahur and Wana were referred to jurgas. The Political Officer reports to-day that Rs. 16,003 in all have been awarded as compensation by the jurgas, namely, Rs. 8,997 in the Dera Ismail Khan cases, Rs. 515 in the Shirani country cases, and Rs. 6,491 in respect of Gomal, Shahur, and Wana cases.

Statement A, which forms the enclosure of Mr. Donald's letter, dated the 21st November, 1899, a copy of which was forwarded to you with this office letter, dated the 16th December last, will show that there were only seven Tochi cases against the Mahsuds in which Government or British subjects are complainants. In most of these reparation has already been obtained. The Political Officer, Wana, however, is arranging to meet Mr. Donald in a few days to dispose of all the cases pending against the Mahsuds to date, and to ascertain the actual amount of compensation in respect of them.

The Political Officer, Wana, and the Political Agent, Zhob, held a joint jirgah at Tank in November last to dispose of the cases against Mahsuds, relating to the Zhob District, and only eight cases were then left undisposed of. These, together with any other cases that may have been brought against the tribe since then, will be taken up probably next month. Though the

Tochi and Zhob cases have not been actually disposed of, the amount which will be left in hand after paying for the disposed of cases relating to other tracts will, it is hoped, be more than enough to meet the demands of the Tochi and the Zhob District. Assuming that no modification is made in the awards of the jirga in the cases which are being disposed of, the demand against the tribe will amount to Rs 32,854-8-0, as follows:—

	Rs	A	P.
(1) Fines unrealised in cases disposed of before the present settlement (Kabuli rupee equals eight annas)	16,851	8	0
(2) Dera Ismail Khan cases recently disposed of	8,997	0	0
(3) Shirani country cases recently disposed of	515	0	0
(4) Gomal, Shahur, and Wana Valley	6,491	0	0
Total	32,854	8	0

This leaves Rs. 2,145-8-0 to meet the Tochi and Zhob demands. It is probable, however, that some modifications of the jirga awards, as reported by Mr. Watson will be made, and that the total receipts from the Mahsud land crops will exceed the estimated amount by about Rs. 700, in which case we shall have over Rs 3,000 in hand for the Tochi and Zhob cases. Under these circumstances, the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the inter-tribal cases, which will be disposed of as opportunities offer.

9. It is gratifying to me to be able to report to Government that the large Mahsud jirga, which assembled on the present occasion, showed a very friendly and cordial attitude. The Maliks displayed good feeling and gratitude for the friendly relations which have been maintained in the past between the local officers and themselves. This feeling of cordiality between the officers who are conducting our political dealings, with the tribe and the tribal Maliks, is increasing as time goes on, and as the intimacy and personal intercourse grow closer and closer, and the true knowledge of each other increases, the feeling will, I think, unquestionably grow stronger, provided the policy of the past, namely, the policy of acting through headmen, is maintained in the future. Mr. Gee and the other English officers, who were present at the jirga will bear me out in saying that the leading note struck by the tribal speakers at the jirga was that they were grateful to the local officers for the treatment they had received in the past, and they made this tribal settlement to show their good-will to the local officers, and to mark their gratitude for the friendly relations maintained by these officers with the tribal Maliks and the tribe through the Maliks.

10. It has been placed on record recently that the Lieutenant-Governor considers that the present procedure in force on the Derajat border for the settlement of cases requires some change, and the want of tribal unity is our principal difficulty in dealing with the Mahsuds. In view of these remarks it appears to me right that I should, before proceeding on leave, report the result of my experience of working the Mahsuds during the last four years. I have had charge of the tribe as Commissioner. I consider that the system for the settlement of cases which has been in force has, on the whole, worked well and satisfactorily. I fully admit that the Derajat system of working is slow, and is attended with difficulties. The effort to bring home offences to the actual offenders, and to obtain their surrender and punishment causes delay, and we do not generally, though we do occasionally, obtain prompt satisfaction. Similarly, the enforcement of the graded responsibility of subsection, section, and finally the tribe is not favourable to the immediate settlement of cases. On the other hand, the system of obtaining reparation from actual offenders, and of restricting punishment to a guilty section instead of at once punishing the whole tribe is a much less primitive system than the system of habitually from the first enforcing tribal responsibility. It is far more popular with the Mahsud tribe; the alternative system is distasteful to them. It is repugnant to them, because the weak and innocent are forced

to share the punishment with the strong and the guilty. The Mahsuds are sufficiently civilized to appreciate the ethical superiority of the one system to the other.

We have for some years past attempted to work the present system in the face of difficulties, but it must take its time before it can be fully developed, and time may well be allowed before it is condemned. During the past year we have enforced personal responsibility and inflicted punishment on actual offenders in more than one serious case of offence.

There can be no doubt, I think, that any essential change in the present system of working will weaken the power and influence of the Mahks, and the system of working through them will break down. In former years the system of dealing with the Mahsuds was that we dealt with the tribe as a whole. The evil of this system is that the tribe easily becomes committed as a body, and then there is no alternative but to enforce our demands by a military expedition. The experience of the past shows that, under this system, our chances of cultivating friendly relations are small, and it is difficult to enlist the sympathy of the tribe. Coercive pressures are the essential basis of this system, and they are not conducive to the cultivating of really friendly and sympathetic relations. Punitive expeditions mark our attempts in the past to manage the Mahsud tribe, dealing with it as a whole.

The Mahsud Mahks receiving allowances have, undoubtedly, not acted up to the full extent of their obligations, and their position and influence are weakened by their jealousies of each other, their feuds and intrigues. Moreover, their tribesmen are turbulent and difficult to manage. Making all allowances for their defects, it must be admitted, in my opinion, that the Mahks have been of the greatest assistance in managing the tribe. They are, I think, gaining power and influence, and are gradually justifying the position assigned to them in the tribe under our arrangements. Had it not been for their influence in the tribe, and their disposition to maintain friendly relations with Government, the settlement now arrived at would never have been effected. They saw clearly the seriousness of the position, they realised the danger of friendly relations being broken off, owing to the outrages committed by a small minority of tribesmen. They grasped the situation, and in return for the sympathetic treatment accorded to them in the past they readily acquiesced in my wishes that they should use all their power and influence in the tribe to induce it to pay up the fines due, and make a friendly settlement. Had we not had these sensible responsible men to deal with, I do not think that it would have been possible to have made a settlement. A blockade would have been necessary to coerce the tribe, our friendly relations, which we have done our best to create and consolidate at much expense and trouble would have been broken, and had the blockade failed, there would have been no alternative left but to send out another expedition. The settlement now made at Tank affords strong evidence of the power, strength, and friendly spirit of the Mahsud Mahks, and should not be overlooked when considering whether radical changes should be introduced into our present system of managing the Mahsud tribe.

11. In conclusion, I desire to tender my best thanks to Mr. Gee, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and Mr. Watson, Political Officer, Wana, for their hearty co-operation and assistance rendered in bringing about the settlement. Mr. Gee has acted as Political Officer in Southern Waziristan, and his knowledge of the Dera Ismail Khan Frontier, and the relations of the Mahsuds with British territory, enabled him to make full use of the intelligence and influence of the leading men of that frontier for the promotion of the settlement. Mr. Watson has earned the liking and respect of the Mahsud Mahks by the marked fairness and justness of his dealings with them, and by his accessibility and patience. He has acquired influence in Southern Waziristan, and I regret that we are soon to lose the benefit of his experience and knowledge of the Mahsud tribe.

I desire also to bring to the notice of Government the good work done in connection with the settlement by Mr. E. Tej Bhan, Head Clerk of my

office, and by Muhammad Azim Khan, Naib Tahsildar of the Mahsuds. The former proved himself invaluable in working out the terms of a practicable settlement and in obtaining the unanimous consent of the Malikhs to them. His intimate knowledge of the Malikhs and of their personal characters and relations once more came in usefully, and he showed his usual tact and judgment in his dealings with them. Muhammad Azim Khan showed good political capacity, and worked hard and well.

Annexure 2.

TRANSLATION of a petition, dated 24th March, 1900, presented by the Mahsud Malikhs representing all sections in a Darbar attended by nearly 2,500 Mahsuds at Tank

With reference to your enquiries as to what measures should be adopted for the realisation of the fines amounting to about Rs. 17,000 due on account of the cases already disposed of, and for the disposal of the cases pending against the Mahsuds, we beg to state as follows:—

After full consideration and discussion it is only right that the offending sections should be made to pay the fines due by them, in order that pressure might be brought to bear on the actual offenders. Each Malik should control and restrain his section, otherwise he should bear the consequences of his failure. This practice has been in vogue in the past. No doubt on special occasions the tribe joined in settling matters affecting the tribe as a whole.

You have now explained that the amount of the fine realizable in cases already disposed of, or still pending against the tribe, is a substantial one, and it would take time to recover it if each section is made to pay the amount due from it, that you are about to proceed on leave, and that you desire that the tribe should clear itself before your departure. You have examined all the files pending against the tribe in which the offence was committed in British territory or Zhob, or against Government or British subjects in the Gomal Pass, Shahur, Wana or Tochi.

You estimate that fines aggregating eighteen thousand will be imposed in those cases. The total fine will thus amount to Rs. 35,000 for all offences recorded against the Mahsuds to date.

This is a large sum, however, and, owing to failure of crops, there is great distress in the hills. The Mahsuds you are aware have scanty means of livelihood, and the recent drought has made their condition worse, and we, the Malikhs, are pressed hard. But as it is very necessary to settle all the cases at once, we unanimously propose that the allowances of all the Malikhs for three months, and half the pay of the levies for three months should be credited to the fines, as well as two-thirds of the Malikhs' share of the produce of the rabi crops of the lands granted to Mahsuds by Government, and the amount in deposit being the income of the Mahsud lands should also be devoted to the liquidation of the fine. We hope that in this way the sum of Rs. 20,000 will be recovered at once.

As regards the payment of the remaining sum of Rs. 15,000, we propose that a light toll should be imposed on camels, bullocks, &c., accompanying Bahirs to Dera, Bannu, and Daur, and Rs. 5,000 should be realised from each of the three sections of the Mahsud tribe, *i.e.*, Ahzai, Shaman Khel, and Bahlolzai. When one section has paid up its share of the fine of Rs. 5,000 its responsibility should cease, and it should not be required to help in the liquidation of the arrears of the other section.

The following scale of tax is proposed to be imposed:—

For a camel	8 annas.
„ bullock	3 annas.
„ donkey	1 anna 6 pies.
„ balla brought down to Tank by water	1 „

We trust that by this arrangement the tribe will clear itself in the course of a few months, but we request that this arrangement may not be taken as a precedent for the future, and pressure may be made to bear on the actual offenders, and the offending sections should be made to clear themselves, so that the bad characters may not be emboldened. Even in the present cases, the money, if realised from the actual offenders, should be refunded to the Maliks.

This petition is submitted for favour of sanction

We, the petitioners, are—

Sealed by Malik Bad Shah Khan, Alizai.
 Malik Muhammad Afzal, Alizai.
 Malik Badr Din.
 Mir Ajaal, Malik of Haibat Khel.
 Malik Bramat Khan, Aimal Khel.
 Fateh Khan Shungi, Bahlolzai.
 Ghazi Khan Malik, Shaman Khel.
 Ala Bagh, Malik, Shaman Khel.
 Signed by Muhammad Amir Khan, Malik.
 Malik Fateh Roz Khan, Shaman Khel.
 Marwat
 Muhammad Ayaz Khan, Shabi Khel.
 Sealed by Shah Salm, Michi Khel.
 Khawaja Muhammad Khan.
 Signed by Muhammad Amin Khan, Shaman Khel.
 Sealed by Shahzad, Shami Khel.
 Muhammad Afzal, Gaga Khel.
 Muhammad Afzal.
 Sur Kamand, Aimal Khel, Malik Shabi.
 Khatakai.
 Zabar Khan
 Pasham Din, Aimal Khel.
 Signed by Ali Khan.
 Sealed by Zama Khan
 Faqir, Shaman Khel.
 Tor Khan.
 Sealed by Gul Khan.
 Arsala Khan.
 Muhammad Ali Khan.
 Gul Pir.
 Tor.
 Gul Dad, Abdul Rahman Khel.
 Signed by Talb.
 Maizar.
 Sealed by Shahzam.
 Signed by Jamal
 Sealed by Janggi
 Signed by Muhammad Amin, Shahman Khel.
 Sealed by Muhammad Amir, Shahman Khel.
 Shahzar Shingi.
 Signed by Haji Muhammad.
 Sealed by Panani Khan.
 Rasul Khan
 Atta Muhammad.
 Signed by Ziyate
 Sealed by Maida.
 Malang
 Bara Khan
 Senrang
 Muazam Khan.
 Gandapur.
 Shahamar Din.

- Sealed by Saiyid Akbar Shah.
 Sanobar Shah.
 Muhammad Amin Khan, Shahman Khel.
 Fazal Khan.
 Azim Khan.
- Signed by Gauhar Malik.
 Muzaffargarh Khan.
 Gul Band, Band Khel.
 Gul Walli.
- Sealed by Ghaizal.
 Maindar Khan.
 Khawaja Gai.
 Fateh Roz, Shahman Khel.
 Khaila, Shahman Khel.
 Bailak.
 Nazar.
- Signed by Salehin.
- Sealed by Nazam Din.
 Samandi Khan.
 Piyao Shah.
 Mamdar.
 Karim Khan.
- Sealed by Khawaja Muhammad.
 Saiz.
 Bazgul Khan.
 Salim Khan.
 Zar Piyao, Badanzai.
- Signed by Gul Bagh.
- Sealed by Shahnazar.
 Nilgar.
 Haji Muhammad.
- Signed by Khana Shah.
 Nek Amal.
- Sealed by Badarkai.
- Signed by Pira Khel, Shamerai.
- Sealed by Tairsam.
 Maula Dad, Shaman Khel.
- Signed by Rasha Din, Gule Shabi.
- Sealed by Bat, Shabi Khel.
 Shanur.
 Suleman, Badanzai.
 Adal Khan, Badanzai.
 Shaujar Khan, son of Sayid Shaman Khel.
 Dinak, Shabi Khel.
 Mustafa, Bibizai.
- Signed by Suleman, Shabi Khel.
 Haidar, Shabi Khel.
 Darai, Shabi Khel.
- Sealed by Azmat, Batkai.
 Brahim Khan.
 Salehin.
- Sealed by Sabil Khan.
 Bala Hissar.
 Khudrai.
 Akbar Shah.
- Signed by Azam, Gori Khel.
 Tor, Gori Khel.
 Saidal.
 Tair Sam.
 Sayyid Muhammad.
- Sealed by Laki, Shamerai.
- Signed by Sher Ali Khan, Shamerai.

Sealed by Shahzad, Kasim Khel.
 Kakar, Shaman Khel.
 Barat Khan
 Iaman Khan
 Bara Khel, Shahman Khel.
 Mamdar, Shahman Khel.
 Lal Gul.
 Azam, Turi Khel.
 Saidal, Guri Khel

Enclosure 3 in No 2

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 16th May, 1900

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 16th April, 1900, forwarding a report on the general settlement recently effected with the Mahsuds.

2. As far as can be judged at present, the settlement may be regarded as satisfactory, but the confiscation of half the pay of the levies in Southern Waziristan, in order to make up the fine, indicates a weak spot, unless, indeed, this was expressly ordered on the ground that many of the offences were to be ascribed to the negligence of the levies. Experience alone can show whether the hope that Rs. 15,000 will be realised within six months by tolls on caravans is not over sanguine.

3. With reference to the future management of the tribe, the Government of India will only observe that the best method of dealing with the Pathans of Waziristan appears to be still a matter for experiment. The recent negotiations were not conducted exclusively with the Maliks, and the degree of success with which the negotiations were attended may indicate that it is desirable for the tribe to be more fully represented during discussions with the local authorities than had previously been the custom.

The matter, however, is one in which the Government of India do not desire to fetter in any way the discretion of the Local Government or of the local officers. Similarly, in regard to the question of individual offenders and tribal responsibility, the Government of India prefer to lay down no fixed principle, and will leave it to the local officers to deal with particular cases in such a manner as may, on a consideration of all the circumstances, seem suitable. They ought not to regard it as an inflexible rule that attempts must be made to find and punish the individual offenders before tribal responsibility is enforced.

4. The Governor-General in Council awaits with interest the result of Mr. Merk's negotiations with the Mahsuds concerning their difficulties with the Darwesh Khel, as decided upon at the recent conference at Dera Ismail Khan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2

Extract from letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 15th May, 1900.

The Lieutenant-Governor understands that, by suggesting in Mr. Barnes's letter, dated the 2nd October, 1899, that we should come to terms with the Mullah, the Government of India meant that, if he could be induced to formulate some reasonable basis for a good understanding, they,

would have no objection to subsidizing him. But while he may intend to do this in time, he has assuredly not done so yet, and Sir Mackworth Young is of opinion that, though a present may whet his appetite, it will, under present circumstances, be misunderstood. Whatever favours are bestowed upon him should have their equivalent in some engagement on his part.

I am to ask for very early orders on this reference.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douze, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 19th May, 1900.

With reference to correspondence, regarding the Mullah Powindah, ending with my letter, dated 15th May, 1900, I am directed to submit copies of the telegrams noted in the margin and to communicate the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

Punjab Government telegram, dated 14th May, 1900.
Commissioner, Derajat, telegrams, dated 15th May, and 18th May, 1900.

2 Sir Mackworth Young is much concerned to know that the balance of fine due from the Mahsuds was understated, and he has no doubt that Mr. Merk is quite right in regarding the position as a difficult one. Full explanation will be called for, and meanwhile the Lieutenant-Governor would be extremely sorry unduly to hamper Mr Merk in his conduct of negotiations.

3. But as regards the present of Rs 1,000 which Mr. Merk proposes to give to the Mullah Powindah, Sir Mackworth Young is quite unable to see that it is likely to do anything but harm. The Mullah is pretty sure to realize that we want something from him, will not be slow to avail himself of this advantage, and the last thing he is likely to do is to throw his influence into our scale for this small consideration.

4. Mr Merk speaks of the refusal to make the present as if it were a drawing back, but the Lieutenant-Governor does not suppose the Mullah has been led to believe that we are going to give him money before he has formulated his demands, and given us some assurance of his good will. Sir Mackworth Young therefore still thinks that, before showing him any favour, we should obtain this much from him.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 14th May, 1900.

Yours, dated 10th May, has been referred to Foreign. Lieutenant-Governor has not recommended the present.

Annexure 2

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 15th May, 1900.

Your telegram of yesterday evening. In my telegram of yesterday from Tank I reported that I had succeeded in getting Mahsuds to agree to mode of settlement of Badar disputes desired by Government; this was not done

without considerable difficulty. Please refer to my letter of 6th instant. I ascertained yesterday from Watson and am reporting officially that, in addition to the Rs. 35,000, of which payment was arranged by Mahsuds in March last, a sum of Rs. 32,000 is, at the present month, due from the Mahsuds, about the payment of which no arrangement has been made with them, and payment of this additional sum it will be by no means easy to obtain. Backed up as he is by the *ulus*, the man has certainly the power, and if not won over or neutralised, may very likely have the will to upset the arrangement about settlement of Badar disputes and any arrangements we may come to presently for payment of this additional Rs 32,000. If either arrangement is upset, we shall be within near distance of a rupture with the tribe and its grave sequels. I do not myself, after enquiry, share Watson's view that he is instigator or accomplice in most of the offences attributed to him, but, however this may be, I venture, in view of the general situation, to suggest a reconsideration of the case in respect of the present. It seems to me that it is eminently desirable at the present juncture to neutralise this element of evil, and if, after Watson's interview, and what was said by Watson at it, we draw back, I think he will certainly construe this withdrawal as a rupture, and will take up a position accordingly. I was personally not in favour of opening negotiations, but since they have been opened, and after what was said at the interview, I consider we have to go on at the risk of grave complications if we draw back

Annexure 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 18th May, 1900.

Yours of 15th instant to Government, India; please refer to my telegram of 15th instant. If Mullah Powindah only stands neutral in cases of border disputes and of realization of fines due by the Mahsuds, he will, I submit, have done us at this juncture considerable service, worth more as an equivalent than what I propose to give.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Telegram from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 21st May, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated the 16th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted regarding the cases outstanding against the Mahsud Waziris.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 8th May, 1900, and enclosures.
Punjab Government letter, dated 21st May, 1900

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th May, 1900.

In compliance with the instructions conveyed in your letters noted in the margin, the Political Officer, Wana, has now prepared and submitted a statement of cases against the Mahsuds and other Waziris, a copy of which is herewith submitted in his letter, dated the 1st instant, with enclosure.

2. The reasons given by Mr. Watson for the delay are insufficient. I do not understand the statement myself, but do not further delay its submission pending the explanations which I have requested the Political Officer to give, and which I will forward on receipt.

3. Apparently the statement does not include any of the cases on account of which a settlement of Rs. 35,000 has been effected. Yet those are the cases on which Government desires information. I am unable to explain what is meant by classes A, B, C and D of cases, and why some cases are "Miscellaneous" and others are not. I cannot make out how we stand in regard to our claims on the Mahsuds, one thing is clear, and that is that settlement for Rs. 35,000 has been effected in respect of a certain set of cases, what these are is described in paragraph 5 of my predecessor's letter, dated the 30th March, 1900. The Political Officer now estimates the fines that will be imposed in "classes A and B and Shirani cases" as Rs. 9,000, plus Rs. 6,000 in "classes C and D and Miscellaneous" cases, or Rs. 15,000 in all, apparently in addition to the Rs. 35,000, then (paragraph 3 of his present letter) the Political Officer says that Rs. 8,500 is still due in the less important classes of cases, in addition to the Rs. 35,000. Whether this item of Rs. 8,500 is included in the Rs. 15,000 above or not, I cannot tell on the information before me. Supposing that it is included, we have Rs. 50,000 in all due to us and to private individuals from the Mahsuds, if excluded then Rs. 58,500 are due. Lastly, it is difficult to understand the sentence in paragraph 4-IV of the Political Officer's letter, the settlement of Rs. 35,000 which I presume is what is meant by the "recent settlement" is *fait accompli*, and it is not easy to see how an item of Rs. 1,500 can now "if possible" be included in it, if it was not included when the account was made up, it is impossible to bring it in now.

4. I am on my way to Wana and hope to introduce some system and clearness into this complicated arrangement of Mahsud accounts. Meanwhile, I have requested the Political Officer to furnish an explanation of the doubtful points noted above before he goes on leave, as he is fully conversant with the cases.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent Derajat Division, dated the 1st May, 1900.

With reference to your predecessor's endorsement, dated 17th February 1900, and subsequent reminders on the subject of the preparation of a statement required by the Government of India showing the amount of the fines due from Mahsuds in outstanding and pending cases, I have the honour to forward herewith a statement which I trust will serve the required purpose. It shows the total fines due from Mahsuds in all decided cases still pending except those relating to the Tochi, particulars of which can be better obtained from the Political Officer, Tochi.

2. The statement comprises practically all the cases reported up to the end of March, 1900, the pending cases being those which it was impossible to include in the recent settlement for various reasons or those which have been reported since then. In such cases the amount of compensation awarded will be probably considerably less than the amount estimated, as some will be struck off the file and in some the loss will be found to have been much exaggerated. We may thus perhaps estimate the fines which will be imposed in classes A and B and Shirani cases as under:—

A	Rs.	2,000
B	4,000
Zhob	2,000
Shiranis	1,000
				Total	<u>9,000</u>

In cases of class C and in class D and miscellaneous cases the amount actually awarded will probably be still less in proportion and may be estimated at Rs. 6,000 in all, so that the total amount likely to be due in pending cases may be put at Rs. 15,000.

3. In the cases already decided the realization of Rs. 35,000 has been provided for, and the sum of some Rs. 8,500 is still due in the less important classes of cases. The realization of the latter sum is proceeding slowly.

4. As regards the serious cases mentioned in the memorandum of actual and prospective liabilities of the tribes compiled by Government of India, the results arrived at may be briefly indicated below:—

I—(a) Fine of Rs. 2,000 included in settlement of Rs. 35,000.

(b) Fine of Rs. 2,000 inflicted will be realized under recent settlement if possible.

(c) Will be disposed of at next meeting of Political Officers, Zhob and Wana.

IV—Some Tochi and Dauri cases were disposed of at a recent meeting of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and fines aggregating about Rs. 15,000 inflicted, which will be included, if possible, in the recent settlement.

V.—(a) Rs. 2,000 fine inflicted and realized

(b) All the fine due from the Mahsuds in this case has now been realized.

(c) Fine aggregating about Rs. 4,450 imposed on certain Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. Mahsud's share of fine included in recent settlement.

(d) Ringleader punished by two years' rigorous imprisonment as well as confiscation of rifle.

(e) Fine realized.

(f) Fine of Rs. 910 inflicted on Mahsuds in recent settlement. It is proposed also to impose a fine of Rs. 1,000 on some Tori Khels who were concerned as well. Case will be reported separately.

(g) Three of offenders surrendered and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment each.

5. Two other serious offences, viz., the attack on the Zam post and the murder of Border Military Policeman near Zaraminoba, were included in the recent settlement. A separate report on the latter case will be submitted. If any further report on the Zam case is required, it will, I presume, be submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to whom I have forwarded a précis of the information which I obtained.

6. In apologising for the delay in submitting this statement, I would at the same time venture to explain that I thought at first that the ground was covered in my two letters, dated January 16th and January 26th, 1900. Later I imagined that, in view of the settlement with the Mahsuds effected by Mr. Anderson, no such statement would now be required.

Annexure 3.

List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.

Serial No	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Sub section.	Section	Offence	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
					CLASS A.			Compensation. Rs. A. P.	
1	160-A.	26th-27th February, 1900.	Shera, son of Nawas of Shahbas.	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Theft of two bullocks and two donkeys valued at Rs. 80.	60 0 0	Case under enquiry.
2	167-A.	9th March, 1900 ...	Madar, son of Jamal of Girmi.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 20 goats valued at Rs 60.	60 0 0	Do.
3	168-A	23rd-24th March, 1900	Maghar, son of Shakho of Tank.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of three bullocks valued at Rs 100	60 0 0	Do.
4	169-A.	3rd-4th March, 1900...	Khota, son of Ghulam Muhammad, Baloch	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of ghi valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
5	...	23rd March, 1900 ...	Guldad, son of Tor, Badsai Bhattanni.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of two camels valued at Rs. 127-4-0	127 4 0	Do.
6	...	30th March, 1900 ...	Nasir Khan, Zangi Khal Nasir.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 800 sheep and goats.	900 0 0	Do.
7	...	38th March, 1900 ...	Sharfaraaj Shah, son of Lal Shah, Powindah.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 100.	50 0 0	Do.
8	...	30th March, 1900 ...	Kajuri Khan, son of Amir Hasan, Jani Khal.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of three bullocks valued at Rs. 95.	95 0 0	Do.
9	...	13th March, 1900 ...	Sahib, son of Nadir Khan.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 40 goats valued at Rs. 120.	120 0 0	Do.
10	...	2nd January, 1900 ...	Firzada, son of Ustrana	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
11-16	...	3rd-4th March, 1900... 26th February, 1900 .. 27th-28th March, 1900 23rd-24th March, 1900 29th-30th March, 1900 7th-8th December, 1899	Ahmed Khan and Loku Ram, Nihal Singh, Fateh Haji, Warsam Haji, Gurd- wir.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of property, &c...	160 10 0	Do.

17	164-A.	12th March, 1900 ...	Mian Khan, son of Brahim Khan	Jalal Khel Bhattannis ..	Jalal Khel Bhattanis	Bahlolzis, Bhattannis	Theft of 16 camels valued at Rs. 840 and wounding complain- ant.	1,082 0 0 Mahaud Ghure Rs. 688 De- crease for Rs. 688 given against Jalal Khel, rest against Bht- tannis.	Efforts will be made to realise share of Mah- suds by Baranata of kindred sections.	
								Total ... Rs.	2,430 0 0	
CLASS B.										
1	50-B	5th January, 1900 ...	Garas, son of Aju Dotani	Gulzada Sinak, Muham- mad Ali Maktar	Abdurrahman Khel.	Bahlolzai ...	Theft of 40 sheep valued at Rs. 120.	120 0 0	Case under enquiry	
2	48-B.	8rd November, 1899...	Dost Muhammad, son of Sarfaraz, Mian Khel, Powindah.	Do.	Do ..	Do ..	Murder of one man, theft of two revolvers, one sword, and one belt, &c., valued at Rs. 210.	470 0 0	Do	
8	58-B.	7th-8th March, 1900...	Shin Kai, Akka Khel, Powindah.	Unknown ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.	
4	...	26th March, 1900	Brahim, son of Zafar Khan.	Do. . .	Do ..	Do. ..	Theft of 180 sheep and goats.	540 0 0	Do.	
5 & 6	59-B	13th-14th March, 1900	Hakim, &c. Nasira and Adam Khan Levy, footman	Do. . .	Do. . .	Do. ...	Theft of eight sheep, &c., valued at Rs. 55.	55 0 0	Do.	
7	57-B	7th March, 1900 ..	Nasiran, Myanjar Khel	Abdurrahman Khel	Do. ...	Do. . .	Theft of 62 cows, 160 goats, and murder of two men.	2,180 0 0	Pressure is being put on Abdurrahman Khels to restore stolen pro- perty, but without effect as yet	
	58-B	7th March, 1900 ...	Nasirs through Hassan Suleman Khel.	Aimal Khel . .	Aimal Khel . .	Do. . .	Theft of 40 camels worth Rs. 2,000 and wound- ing one man	2,000 0 0	Five camels have been restored, and efforts are being made to re- cover the remainder. Six Aimal Khels are in custody and case will probably be settled satisfactorily.	
								Total ..	5,865 0 0	

List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.—continued.

Serial No	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused	Sub-section.	Section	Offence.	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
					CLASS C			Compensation.	
1	117-C.	21st December, 1899	Gulded, Tajl Khel of Wana	Najam Ikhtiar . .	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolza	Theft of one horse valued at Rs. 100.	Es A. P. 100 0 0	Under enquiry.
2	2-C.	2nd December, 1896...	Tersam and But, Zali Khels of Wana.	Asl Khan, Shahzaman...	Guri Khel, Shahman Khel.	Alisai Shahman Khel	Ransom money Rs 160 for 200 sheep.	160 0 0	Do.
3	125-C.	20th June, 1898 ..	Ismail, son of Khan Muhammad, Tajl Khel of Wana	Samand Khan, Zargul...	Mal Khel, Wasurgai .	Alisai	Claim of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
4	61-C	7th September, 1898	Shuja Khan, son of Sarfraz Khan, Ghuns Khel of Wana.	Bakas Khan ...	Wasurgai	Do.	Theft of four cows valued at Rs. 50.	60 0 0	Do.
5	58-C.	28th June, 1899 .	Baa Gul, Kaka Khel of Wana.	Rajak Gulzada Ashik .	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolzaas	Theft of one gun, together with cartridges and bait, valued at Rs 60	60 0 0	Do.
6	86-C.	18th July, 1898 ...	Ali Muhammad, Masti Khel of Wana.	Satal Mashkat, Mukhtar Garas, Bobsai	Farida: ...	Alisai ...	Theft of two camels and Rs. 50 Kabul.	150 0 0	Do.
7	53-C.	3rd March, 1899 ...	Piroga and Ekam, Khandi Khel.	Kusam and Abdulla .	Marisais ...	Do. . . .	Theft of five cows and clothing valued at Rs. 100.	100 0 0	Do.
8	120-C.	1st January, 1900 ...	Khamu Khan, Umar Khel.	Unknown	Theft of 50 goats valued at Rs. 150.	150 0 0	Do.
9	44-C.	9th November, 1897	Amir Khan, son of Fauid Khan, Dotani	Rakhu Shah and Abdul Ghafur	Dhur	Bahlolzaas	Theft of nine cows valued at Rs. 135.	135 0 0	Do.
10	89-C	14th August, 1898 ..	Shahazam Sarkai, Khojal Khel.	Hamzoon, Fasl Shah, Masti, Abdul Aziz, Mir Jamal Michi Khela.	Michi Khels .. .	Alisais	Theft of property valued at Rs. 200.	200 0 0	Do.

11	84-C.	10th January, 1899	Said Hassan	Khojal Khel	Akhtajan Marisa: Shadamir, Garera.	Alizai	Theft of five cows valued at Rs 75.	75 0 0	Do.
12	26-C.	8th July, 1899	Jallundhar, Tajri Khel...	Sahib Din, Nekzan Khel, Hassan, Lal Khan, Bhunga Khel.	Nekzan Khel, Bhunga Khel.	Bahlolzas	Theft of 56 sheep and goats and Bhunga money Rs 200 Kabul, etc., worth Rs 270.	270 0 0	Do
18	51-C	20th November, 1898	Pastaka, Khojal Khel .	Mir Alam, Para Khel, Kori, Michi Khel, Mastka, Farida, Guldad Malik, Shahi Gulwam, Garera, Satal Abdulla, Faridas	Para Khel, Michi Khel, Malik Shah, Farida.	Alizai, Bahlolza . .	Murder of one man . .	360 0 0	Do
14	174-C.	8th February, 1900 . .	Shakai Khan, son of Almar, Zalli Khel	Unknown	Robbery of 18 cows and cash Rs 80, total Rs 200	200 0 0	Do
15	123-C	8th January, 1900	Vallamir, son of Mir Khan.	Theft of 32 sheep valued at Rs 96	96 0 0	Do
16	86-C	1st August, 1899 . .	Nawar Khan, son of Pirwan, Utman Khel.	Gulzada, Sinak, Balocha Abdulla Khan.	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolza	Theft of 18 goats valued at Rs 50	50 0 0	Do
17	126-C	13th January, 1900 ...	Nizam Din, Utman Khel	Pao Shah, Aimal Khel, Satal, Farida, Abdulla.	Aimal Khel, Farida, Abdurrahman Khel	Bahlolza, Alizai, Bahlolza	Theft of 14 goats valued at Rs 52	52 0 0	Do
18	50-C.	12th November, 1898	Nandar Khan, Utman Khel	Mira Khel Kamin	Garera	Alizai	Theft of one camel, Bhunga money Rs. 80	50 0 0	Do.
19	55-C	24th July, 1898 . .	Bojar Zalli Khel . .	Kozam Ahmad, Marizai, Mushka, Farida	Marisa, Farida	Alizai	Theft of three cows valued at Rs 50	50 0 0	Do
20	183-C	19th February, 1900	Akbar Shah, Qaderdad Khan, Khan Mir Zalli Khels	Unknown	Theft of 12 bullocks and five donkeys	210 0 0	Do
							Total	3,000 0 0	
1-60	Other cases of class C	5,578 0 0	
							Miscellaneous	6,000 0 0	(roughly)

List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.—continued.

Serial No.	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused	Sub-section.	Section.	Offence.	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
1	5	25th March, 1899 ...	Mahi Shirani, Shirani	Jalal Khels Abdurrahman Khels	<i>Zhob</i> Jalal Khels, Abdurrahman Khels.	Bahlolzas ...	Theft of eight cows and 1 gun, Rs 150	Compensation Rs. A. P. 150 0 0	Under enquiry.
2	...	26th March, 1900 .	Mazar Khan, Suleman Khel.	Unknown	Theft of 2,020 Kabuli and murdering one man and wounding three others	1,223 0 0	Do.
3	...	2nd September, 1899	Bakhtar Nasir ...	Gulsada Abdullah, Id Muhammad.	Abdurrahman Khel, Nekzan Khel.	Bahlolzas ...	Theft of 40 goats	120 0 0	Do.
4	5	12th April, 1898 ...	Hassen Umar Khan, Shiranis	Id Muhammad, Abdulla Khan.	Nekzan Khel .	Do. ..	Theft of two horses worth Rs 400	400 0 0	Do
5	8	26th August, 1899 ..	Surat Hikmat Khan, Shiranis	Unknown	Theft of three bullocks worth Rs. 100.	50 0 0	Do
6	9	7th October, 1899 ..	Bas Gul, son of Rahim Khan, Madda Khel	Do.	Theft of 135 sheep worth Rs. 530.	530 0 0	Do.
7	...	24th August, 1899 ..	Khair Muhammad Juma Khan, Mihtar Musa, Madda Khel	Theft of 240 goats worth Rs 720.	720 0 0	Do.
8	3	10th April, 1899 .	Murad, son of Jehandad	Spin, etc.	Nekzan Khel	Bahlolzas ..	Theft of seven donkeys	70 0 0	Do
9	...	6th March, 1898 ..	Lala Khan, etc., Shiranis.	Theft of three bullocks worth Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
10	...	April, 1897 ...	Said Khan, Lambardar, Getoi	Theft of copper utensils	200 0 0	Do
Total ...								3,523 0 0	

1	..	28th October, 1899 ..	Gulistan, son of Gumbad, Shirani.	Unknown					Theft of 166 sheep worth Rs 400.	400 0 0	Do.
2	..	16th March, 1900	Empress, through Powindahs.	Do.					Theft of 15 cows, and murder of one man and wounding another	685 0 0	Do.
3	...	28th February, 1898	Alu Khan, Muhammad Yar, Musazi	Do					Theft of 120 sheep worth Rs 360	360 0 0	Do.
4	4	29th December, 1897	Shahbaz, Shirani	Do					Theft of 15 goats	50 0 0	Do
5	..	28th December, 1899	Kakar Khan, and Muhammad Nasir.	Asl Khan, Guri Khels	Guri Khel	Alizai			Theft of 130 goats	390 0 0	Do
Total										1,885 0 0	

Rs		ABSTRACT OF TOTAL FINES AND COMPENSATION DUE			Rs A. P	
A =	.. 2,430	Fine due from Mahsuds in accordance with recent settlement with tribes (including classes A, B, Shirani, Zhob, and Tochi cases)=			35,000 0 0	
B =	5,365	Fines outstanding in classes C, D, and Miscellaneous =			8,351 8 2	
C =	5,578					
Miscellaneous =	6,000				Total	
Zhob =	3,523				43,351 8 2	
Shirani =	1,885	Total fines outstanding (including sum of Rs 35,000) which is being realised in accordance with recent settlement			200 Kabul	
	24,781	Total amount of compensation estimated as due for loss of property, &c, in cases of all kinds (excepting Tochi cases) pending up to last week in March, 1900			43,351 8 2	
					200 Kabul	
					24,781 0 0	

Camp Sarwekai,
The 1st May, 1900.

(Signed) H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 4.

Letter from J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 21st May, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated 8th May, submitting a statement of cases against the Mahsuds and other Waziris, I am directed to say that the Lieutenant-Governor is much concerned to learn that the case has hitherto been so imperfectly reported, and that the outstandings against the Mahsuds appear to be so much larger than hitherto stated

Sir Mackworth Young awaits with anxiety the further explanation promised. He agrees with you in thinking that the reasons given by Mr Watson for not complying earlier with the orders for the preparation of a list of cases is insufficient, and a full explanation on this point should be submitted in due course. The first request for a statement of outstanding cases was made so long ago as 31st October, 1899, in Mr. Dane's letter of that date

2. With reference to Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, I am to send you a copy of a letter, dated 16th May, from the Government of India, Foreign Department, and to say that Sir Mackworth Young fears that the expression of satisfaction contained therein may, with reference to the facts you have now reported, prove to have been premature. I am to invite your attention to the remarks contained in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the above-mentioned letter

Enclosure 7 in No 2

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 29th May, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marked in the margin, regarding Mullah Powindah and fines due from the Mahsuds.

2. With reference to the proposal made by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, to give a present of Rs. 1,000 to Mullah Powindah, I am to say that if any negotiations with him could be secretly undertaken so as to commit him in the eyes of his tribe, it would be worth spending Rs 1,000 or more in order to gain that object, but the opportunity has probably passed, and the dealings with the Mullah have been so fully and openly discussed that anything given to him now would probably be regarded on every hand as an acknowledgment of him as a leader and a power in the tribe. This is precisely the position which the Government of India desire to avoid

3 As regards the fines due from, and the claims against, the Mahsuds, the Government of India have heard with much surprise and concern that the settlement arrived at with the tribe in March last omitted to take note of a claim nearly as large as that concerning which an agreement was come to. The Governor-General in Council will wait with interest to hear how so remarkable an omission can have taken place.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, dated the 29th of May, 1900, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted relating to the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr Anderson

Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 11th May, 1900, and enclosures
 Commissioner Derajat's endorsement, dated 18th May, 1900, and enclosures
 Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 18th May, 1900, and enclosures.
 Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 24th May, 1900.
 Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900
 Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 11th May, 1900.

With reference to this office telegram, dated the 17th January, 1900, regarding the Zam outrage, I have the honour to submit, for the information and orders of Government, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin

This office endorsement, dated 20th January, 1900, and enclosure,

Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated the 30th April, 1900, and enclosures

2 This offence is included in the settlement that was arrived at last March on account of which the Mahsuds are to pay 35,000 rupees. It seems to me that a very inadequate retribution has been made for this grave occurrence in that the Mahsuds have to pay only the blood-money for the murdered men and the value of the rifles and accoutrements carried off

3 But inadequate as the punishment is, we are, I think, precluded from further action against either the individual offenders or with a view to the recovery of the stolen property. It is always understood that a settlement with a tribe clears everybody and everything, except where it is expressly stipulated to the contrary. The tribe pays for all individual offenders and for all property stolen, unless there is a distinct agreement excluding special persons or special property. From my predecessor's letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, to your address, it will be seen that no such stipulation or agreement was concluded when the settlement was effected. Under the circumstances I am unable to support the proposals of Messrs Gee and Watson, and am obliged to suggest that, although the punishment for the Zam attack is exceedingly lenient, the recent settlement be accepted as final. I would ask for the instructions of Government in this matter

Annexure 2

EXTRACT from the Police Diary of the District Superintendent of Police, Dera Ismail Khan, for the week ending Saturday, the 13th January, 1900.

Police Station, Tank.

C R 6. Sections 302—396, Indian Penal Code—Zam Post.

On the night of the 9th instant a band of 30 or 40 men, said to be Wazirs, entered the Zam Post, the door of which was open, and killed two Border Police Sepoys, three Bhattanni Levies, and a zamindar, and carried

off four Snider rifles, two Enfield muskets and one Enfield carbine, besides uniform, belts and clothes, and 130 Snider cartridges. Tracks showed that the raiders came from the direction of Mianbagh, and after committing the offence the gang appears to have separated, twelve or thirteen men going through the Khoa Pass to the Shuza. One man of the gang appears to have been wounded, as there were marks of blood in three places near the tracks going to the Zam Pass. The report is that one Buchi, Bhattanni, Lance-Bardar, and his nephew, Ali Khan, vowed vengeance against one Talwar, Bhattanni Levy, as the latter had fired and killed Hakim, brother of Ali Khan, beyond Khirgi, Hakim being with a gang of badmashes. The gang is supposed to have been a mixed one composed of Shabi Khels, the Mulla Powindah's Sheikhs, some Niamat Khel, Bhattannis, and a few Shingis. I have submitted a full special report regarding this separately.

ENDORSEMENT by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th January, 1900.

Copy of the above forwarded to H. W. Gee, Esquire, C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, for favour of report, particularly as to the sections to which Buchi and the other Bhattannis named or who were killed in the attack belong.

Annexure 3.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 30th April, 1900.

In reply to your endorsement, dated 20th January, 1900, on the subject of the attack on Zam Post, I have the honour to forward in original letter dated 27th ultimo, from the Political Officer, Wana, who has now completed all the investigation that is at present possible.

With regard to Mr. Watson's remarks in paragraph 2 of his letter, the recent settlement of this case in the Tank Jurga held last month should not be considered as final, as the amount debited to the Mahsud account only consisted of the actual blood-money payable to the relatives of the murdered men and the cost of the rifles and accoutrements stolen.

Annexure 4

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated 27th April, 1900.

I have the honour to forward, herewith, a summary of the information which I have obtained up to date regarding the attack by Mahsuds on the Zam Post on 9th January, 1900. As most of these statements were made to me under pledge of secrecy, I would ask you to regard this communication as confidential.

2. This case has been included in the recent settlement made with Mahsuds, and therefore as regards the tribe may be considered as disposed of. This does not, of course, preclude proceedings being taken against the actual offenders, if further evidence is forthcoming against them, and any of them fall by any chance into our hands, nor does it mean the abandonment of all efforts to recover the stolen property. Some time, however, must probably elapse before any further progress is made in this direction.

3. The enquiries which I have made convince me that the ring-leaders of the gang were some so-called Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah, including

probably Raza Khel, Satar and Kamil, Shabi Khels, Fakur, a nephew of the Mullah Powindah, and Amr Din, Abdullai. I cannot obtain satisfactory evidence implicating any Bhattannis, for the statement of Shahzad (No. 17 in the Summary) is not reliable. Of course, the fact that the gang passed right through the Bhattanni country raises a presumption that some of the latter tribe were in collusion with them, but, on the other hand, the route is one which can be and is often taken by Mahsud raiders on their own account, while no Mahsud has given me any trustworthy information implicating the Bhattannis, although it was to be expected that the Mahsuds would do their best to throw the blame on them, and my most reliable informant, Haji Muhammad, the Shaman Khel Malik, expressly says, in his second statement, that he does not believe any Bhattanni was concerned.

4 If there was a Bhattanni in it, he would probably be Ali Khan, Niamat Khel, whose brother was killed by the Khurgi Levies in a chuga a month or so previously. Boche, the Niamat Khel Malik, was reported to have threatened reprisals, and accordingly I had put him and the other Niamat Khel Maliks on security, but Ali Khan was at the time a hamsaya of the Shungis, and may possibly have induced the Mahsuds to help him to take his revenge for his brother's death. I doubt if any other Niamat Khels were directly concerned, for they must have too vivid a remembrance of the punishment received for their share in the Nasran raid to dispose them to take part in any similar offence for some time to come.

5. The route taken by the raiders appears to have been as follows:— Numbering 12 or 14 men they passed down the Tank Zam from the Kaniguram direction, and were seen in the Barari Tangi by Nezam Din, Galeshahi. Further on they were seen by Amin Khan, the Shaman Khel Malik. They made their way into the head of the Shuza by a route some miles north of Jandola, and were seen by the women of an Abdullai Kirri, which lies just off that nullah, cooking their food in the nullah bed. The women took them water and they left a "guda" (skin for holding water) behind them there. Further on, at the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza Nullah, they were seen at noon by three Bhattannis, who were irrigating their land there, and lower down, just above the Pir Tangi, Abdullai Khan, a Bhattanni Levy Sowar, saw them cooking their food in the shade of some trees. Some Niamat Khels who were watering their cattle below the Pir Tangi probably saw them also. At Kirwam they left the Shuza and proceeded across the tract of country named Khua to the Tank Zam, which they probably reached via the Khua Nullah. From there they proceeded to the Zam Post.

6 On their return journey they followed the same route as far, at any rate, as the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza Nullahs. They are said to have been met in Khua by some Jalal Khels (see statement of Guldin, Kiharai, &c), but I am not sure whether this information is to be relied on.

7. As said above, I believe the ringleaders of the gang were the Mullah's Sheikhs, the rest were probably composed of hangers-on of the Mullah belonging to various sections, but mainly Shabi Khels and Abdullais. I doubt if any Shungis were concerned, but possibly there may have been one or two Jalal Khels and Abdurrahman Khels. The chief motive of the attack was probably the arrest of Hakim, the Mullah's Sheikh in the Bannu District, but it is possible that the Mullah did not intend that so serious an offence should be committed, and that what he meant was to kidnap one or two Levies or Border Police, and hold them as hostages. In murdering the men the gang may have exceeded their instructions, though the Mullah must have known what was likely to happen with such a set of ruffians, for they included men who have been involved in several of the more serious offences of recent years. Other motives may possibly have been the shooting of the brother of Ali Khan by the Khurgi Levies and the death of two Jalal Khels at the hands of Bhattannis, referred to by Shahzad, and several members of the gang may have had their individual grievances against Government. It is to be hoped that eventually by recovery of some of the stolen property or by other methods further light may be thrown on the matter.

Annexure 5.

Information received with regard to the attack on Zam Post, January 9th, 1900.

1. *Haji Muhammad, Shaman Khel Malik—13th January, 1900.*

On the day of the attack Amin Khan, Shaman Khel Malik, met in Bangewal a Shaman Khel bahir which was going down to Tank, and told them not to go on, as a gang of the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs had passed by. Masta Khan, Shaman Khel, told me he went to the kirri of Gat, Abdullai, in the Shuza, and the woman there told him that 12 of the Mullah's Sheikhs had passed down the nullah, and had been given food and water. A shepherd of mine at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah also saw them. The woman above mentioned recognised Vatta, Bhattanni, among them, and she also spoke of Kamil, Shabi Khel, as being one of them. They all wore pattis like Levies, and no one but the Mullah's Sheikhs wore these; both the woman and the shepherd noticed this. Maste Khan says Vatta was wounded.

2. *Second Statement of Haji Muhammad—6th February, 1900.*

The facts which I stated before are true. The Mullah Powindah sent his Sheikhs to make some prisoners. He did not mean that murder should be committed. Raza Khan, Shabi Khel, one of the gang, borrowed his rifle (Martini-Henry) from Hela, Shaman Khel Malik. Amin Khan, Shaman Khel Malik, lent his Martini-Henry rifle to Mad Akbar, Shabi Khel (cousin of Kamil). Both Maliks knew the gang were going to commit some offence.

The gang came to a Shabi Khel Kirri, close to mine; there are only three families in it, Patonais, chief man Jat. They also passed the kirri of Esamdin and Azim Khan, Abdullais. The woman who went to fetch water saw them cooking their food in the nullah. I made a mistake when I said they came to Gat's kirri.

The gang included Raza Khan, Kamil, Mad Akbar, Satar, Shabi Khels; Amr Din, Abdullai; Fakir, Shabi Khel, nephew of Mullah Powindah; 12 in all.

Some Bhattannis at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah recognised him. I don't believe now there was any Bhattanni in the gang. The route taken is one constantly used by Mahsuds. The Shabi Khel relative of the Mullah Powindah (Bazgul) gave information about the post. I don't believe any Jalal Khels were concerned. Balik and Amin Khan have sworn on the Quran to the Mullah Powindah that they said nothing about the matter to the Political Officer.

3. *Masti Khan, Shaman Khel—13th January, 1900.*

The day before yesterday at "Namazdigar," I came to the kirri of Gat, Abdullai, in the Shuza. All the cattle, &c., had been driven out of the kirri. I asked Lajmir, Abdullai, what was the reason. I had heard of the attack on Zam, the news having been brought by Faujdar, Sheikh of the Mullah Powindah. I asked Lajmir whether the murderers were Abdullais. He told me that he had heard at Jandola that Khan Mir, Badzar Bhattanni, was wounded, and suspicion would therefore fall on the Bhattannis. The women in the kirri told me they had fetched water for the gang, which was a large one.

4. *Bilak, Shaman Khel—14th January, 1900.*

The offence was committed by the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs. They came to Tank, thence by Narai Shua down the Shuza and through Pir Tangi. There were eight men with rifles. The Mullah Powindah sent them an account of Hakim's arrest. Shabi Khels were in it. Ask Nezam Din, Galeshabi, Amin Khan, Shaurang, Haibat Khel, Gulkhadin Umar Khel.

5. *Mamak, Umar Khel—14th January, 1900.*

Eight Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah were concerned, including the Afridi from Tirah, Raza Khan and Kamil, Shabi Khels. A boy from my kurri met them on the road, I think on the morning of the day of the attack.

6. *Amin Khan, Shaman Khel, Mahk—15th January, 1900.*

Two or three days before this affair I visited the Mullah Powindah, and he told me that his Sheikh had been treacherously seized in Bannu, and that, in revenge, he would send some men to seize a sahib who went out fishing, or if he could not do that, he would try some other plan. I went home and spent two nights there. On the third day there was a jurga of Shaman Khels at Adam Kachkai. As I was returning home in the afternoon I saw some men proceeding in the direction of the Shuza. Each had a rifle and their faces were muffled. They were going along in bodies of three or four. There were probably about 15 men. I recognised Raza Khan only. The brother of Khidrai, Shamara, told Nezam Din, Galeshahi, that there were some Garerans among them. I did not notice whether they wore pattis. I told my Kurri-wals not to take bahirs or go down to the plains as the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs were after some mischief. The Mullah Powindah told me to go to the Political Officer and find out about his Sheikh. He deceived me, and I did not imagine his Sheikhs would meanwhile commit this offence. The Mullah Powindah promised me that he would not do anything until he heard from the Political Officer. The Sheikhs passed one or two nights in the Khua Nullah watching for an opportunity to commit some offence.

7. *Gulpir, Shingi Malik—15th January, 1900.*

There were eight men, including Raza Khan, the Afridi Sheikh, Satar, Shabi Khel, and the son of Mit, Shabi Khel (Tomin). They were seen in Mattaghar. They had baked bread with them. They were sent by the Mullah Powindah. He was much annoyed about the new Militia scheme. Gulkhaddin, Umar Khel, told me this.

8. *Second Statement of Bilak, Shaman Khel—15th January, 1900.*

Amar Din, Raza Khan, Kamil, were heads of the gang. They were 12 in all. The Mullah Powindah told them to go and commit some offence. I don't know about Bhattannis.

9. *Third Statement of Bilak—26th January, 1900.*

A Galeshahi boy with a bahir saw a gang of 13 men returning up the Khua. He recognized three men by their clothes as Bhattannis. One was Khanmir or possibly Vatta or Amaldar.

10. *Nezam Din, Galeshahi—16th January, 1900.*

I was going up the Barari Tangi, about six or seven days ago, when I met 12 or 13 men coming down. I recognized among them Amr Din, Raza Khan and Kamil. About four days later the son of Piyadad, Galeshahi, who was with a bahir, saw them in the Shuza, but did not recognize them, as it was dark. After passing by me the gang passed the night in the kurri of Salemkai, Abdullai, in the Shuza. They left a "guda" behind them. Gat, Abdullai, lives in the same kurri. Every one knows that this was the gang Khanmir, Kamrza, Bhattanni, and two or three others were with them (The Galeshahi bahirwals told me this, they said the Bhattannis told them Khanmir and others were with them.)

11. *Gul Din, Kikarai, Muhammad Afzal, Haibat Khel, and Sandal, Kikarai—about 20th January, 1900.*

Two Jalal Khels, Salch-ud-din and Mir Zaman, told us that they went to Khua to raid Bhattannis, and met there at night a gang of 14 or 15 men, who advised them to clear out, as they had raided a post, and there would be a chiga. Among these men they recognized Kamil, Nashtar, Shabi Khel, Tomin, son of Mit, Raza Khan,

the son of Mamat, Shingi (who owing to a blood-feud lives with the Mullah Powindah), Makhad, Garera (lives with the Mullah Powindah), and the Tirah Mullah (the Afridi deserter). They met this gang at an old tank in Khua. They thought at first a Bhattanni chiga was after them. The Jalal Khels hurried off with them *via* the Pir Tangi, and turned off up the Khaisora Nullah, while the gang went on up the Shuza. They did not notice that any one of them was wounded. It is said in the hills that the gang had some food brought them from Gut Abdulla's kirri, which was in the Shuza. The gang was sitting on "Matta Ghar," between Shuza and Shilmanzai.

At first it was the Mullah Powindah's intention to openly boast of this attack on the post, but some wiser head advised him not to do so, but to protest his innocence.

The motive was probably the arrest of the Mullah's Sheikh. Somebody told the Mullah that Government refused to release him, and that he might do what he liked.

12. *Second Statement of Gulpir, Shingi—28th January, 1900.*

Daudin, Boblai, Shingi, told his relatives that he was with a bahur at the mouth of the Zam. When at Digarwala 12 men passed by with caps over the lower part of their faces like what sepoys wear, all had rifles. He recognized Raza Khan, Satar, Kamil, Muhammad Azam, Shabi Khels, the "Tirah Sheikh," the son of Mit, Shabi Khel, two Giga Khel Sheikhs and Amr Din. It is said the Mullah Powindah sent out three gangs, one towards Wana, one to Zam, and one to Bannu. Every one says this in the hills. I am certain no Shingis were concerned.

13. *Abdulla Khan, Levy sowar, Waruk Bhattanni—28th January, 1900.*

I was going on leave to my home in Khaisora, and was passing through the Pir Tangi, when I saw 16 or 17 men cooking their food among some trees in the nullah. I recognized Makin and Mauladad, Bibizai, Shabi Khels (relatives of Dinak, Ali Khan, the brother of Zanjr, Spozhmai and Tarazhmai, Jalal Khels. A Niamat Khel kirri (that of the two Ahmad Khans) was in Torwazar near Kirwam, and is still in the same place. I turned back on seeing the gang, and the Niamat Khels, who were watering their cattle in the nullah, drove the animals away at the same time. Karre, Niamat Khel, Ahmad Khan, Oba Khel, Niamat Khel, were with the cattle. I did not say anything to them about the gang. Then I went round to my home by another way. Jangbaz, Mirazah, Umar Shah and Katta, who were irrigating their land at Dur Kachka, at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah, saw the gang also, but they say they did not recognize them, except one, the nephew of the Mullah Powindah, but the gang was one of the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs. I suspect some of the others may have been Shingis. I heard of the attack on Zam the third day after this. All the gang had rifles. As they were cooking their food they had their faces uncovered, so I was able to recognize them.

14. *Jangbaz, Mirajall, and Umah Shah, Waruka Bhattannis—7th February, 1900.*

We were irrigating our lands at noon at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah when we saw some men pass down the Shuza Nullah under the cliff at the further side. First came eight men, each carrying a rifle, then at a distance of about half mile behind them three, four or five more men without rifles. Among the first lot we recognized by their appearance, gait, &c. (we did not see their faces, which were covered up) Kamil, Satar and Fakir, Shabi Khels. These men last year lived in a kirri close to us; so we knew them by sight. There were no Bhattannis among them.

15. *Mine Khan, Bhattanni Malik of Saraqhar—6th February, 1900.*

A small boy told a man who was stopping in the Niamat Khel kirri that some men who were irrigating land in Bedzahwam above Pir Tangi recognized

the gang. Then Ahmad Khan, son of Madad, stopped the boy from saying any more, so he did not mention their names. The men referred to were Niamat Khels of the same kurr. I suspect that one Bhattanni (probably a Niamat Khel) was with the gang.

16. *Ahmad Khan, son of Madad, Niamat Khel Malik—10th February, 1900.*

Abdullah came upon us in Torwazar. Karre was with me. My cattle were not in the Shuza Nullah. I have since questioned Karre, and he says he saw 12 or 15 men at "Peshinwala," going along by Kirwam, but they were a long way off, and he did not recognize them. He thought there were men going to the jirga.

17. *Shahzad, son of Mamad, Abba Khel Bhattanni.*

This affair was got up by the Niamat Khels, chiefly by Ali Khan, whose brother was killed by the Khirgi Levies, and who is a hamsaya of the Shingis. Ali Khan asked the Shingis to attack Zam, but they refused. He then went to Makomi Khan, Bibizai, Shabi Khel, an old friend of the Niamat Khel badmashes. The following then formed a gang:—Makomi Khan, Mauladad, Guldad, Shabi Khels, Chundai Khan, Juma Gul, Mumadar Khan, Jalal Khels, Matin Khan, Kamil Khan and a nephew of the Mullah Powindah (Fakir), Shabi Khels, in all 14 persons.

Munadar's brother had been killed by Bhattanni Lashkar along with another Mahsud. In revenge for one of these the Jalal Khels killed Namdar, Sheikh, the death of the other was laid by the Mahsuds to the account of Babrai Khan and Maluk Surars, who, from fear of the Mahsuds, came and lived in the daman.

The following rifles were in possession of the thieves:—

Makomi, 2 Martini-Henry
Mauladad, 1 Snider.
Guldad, 1 Snider
Chundai, 1 repeating rifle
Munadar, 1 Snider
Matin, 1 Snider
Amr Khan (? Ali Khan), 1 musket.
Juma Gul, 1 Snider
Kamil, 1 Snider.
Nephew of Mullah Powindah, 1 Martini-Henry.

Mukarrab, Dak Jemadar, a relative of Ali Khan's, knew of the intended attack, and on this account detained Imam Bakhsh, Jandola Muharrir, in his kurr on his way back to Jandola and sent for Sheikh Halim from Zam, but the latter did not come.

Salim Khan, Sara, sold seven packets of Snider cartridges to Amaldar, Bhattanni badmash. Salim Khan also took one of the muskets, which, perhaps, had been left behind by the raiders, or perhaps it was his share of the loot. He has now probably sold it. Salim Khan's wife has told people about this. Four Bhattannis are said to have been in the gang, viz, Zakkan, brother of Amad Khan, Nianat Khel Malik, Taji, Makhmad, son of Bochie, Ali Khan and another whose name I don't know, but Malik Shah, son of Akil Shah, does. Ahmad Khan and Karre saw the raiders in the Shuza and spoke to them. If Amaldar is pressed he will admit bringing the cartridges from Salim Khan.

18. *Gul Husan? Nubbul (as reported by Political Officer, Tochr)—
7th February, 1900.*

About 15th January a man went to the Shuza to look for a camel at Peshinwala. He met Abdullah, son of Akhmad, Abba Khel, Amrdin, Ghozrai, Srati Khan, Abdullans, and a Shabi Khel Talib of the Mullah Powindah, and altogether 19 men with a number of rifles, going apparently with the intention of committing some serious offence. That night or next the attack on Zam occurred.

19. *Sherin Khan, Shaman Khel (reported by Political Officer, Tochi)—
6th February, 1900.*

The six rifles taken from Zam post are with the Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah, Haji Muhammad, Shaman Khel, Gul Khatin, Umar Khel, Nezam Din, Guleshahi and Amin Khan, Shaman Khel, saw them.

H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 6.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 14th May, 1900.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter, dated December 23rd, 1899, I have the honour to state that I met the Political Officer, Tochi, at Bannu, on April 9th, 1900, and the following days, and discussed with him a number of pending Tochi and Dauri cases.

We disposed of several that had remained outstanding in the lists submitted by Messrs Lorimer and Kettlewell with their joint letter, dated Tochi, 8th January, and dated Wana, 10th January, 1899, and decreed against the Mahsuds sums amounting in all to Rs. 800. All the cases in these lists so far as concerns the Mahsuds may now be considered as disposed of.

2. Of the Dauri cases in the list submitted by Mr. Donald, we filed five, remanded four for future enquiry, and in seven gave decrees against Mahsuds, amounting in all to Rs 740.

So the total amount awarded by us against the Mahsuds was Rs. 1,540. The remaining cases it is proposed to take up at a joint jurga to be held, probably at Tank, some time next cold weather.

3. The question of the realization from the Mahsuds of the sum awarded is a part of the question of the liabilities of the Mahsuds under the recent settlement and otherwise, which is forming the subject of separate correspondence

Endorsement by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 18th May, 1900.

Copy of the foregoing submitted to J. M. Douie, Esquire, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Simla, for information, in continuation of the correspondence ending with this office letter, dated the 27th December, 1899

Annexure 7.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 19th May, 1900.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, on the subject of the fines and compensation still due by the Mahsud tribe over and above the Rs. 35,000 settled for.

Letter, dated the 13th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, with enclosure.

Letter, dated the same day, from the same, and enclosure.

2. I would explain that the statements of offences, classed A, B, C and D, were prescribed by Mr. Bruce when Commissioner of the Derajat, and are furnished monthly

to this office by the Political Officer, Wana. In addition the Political Officer maintains statements of what are known as "Miscellaneous," "Tochi," "Shirani" and "Zhob" cases. These eight statements show what offences have been committed during the month and how disposed of, but they do not show cases pending from previous months, and I have arranged for one statement in place of eight to be prepared monthly, which will include undisposed of cases from previous months and will group the offences according as the offenders belong to the main sections of the Mahsuds.

3. I will endeavour now to clear up the complicated accounts, taking first those connected with the settlement of March last. In paragraph 8 of this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, the liabilities of the Mahsuds are given as Rs 32,854-8-0. The Mahsuds arranged for a payment of Rs 35,000, which left a balance of Rs 2,145-8-0 in hand to meet Tochi and Zhob cases. In this Rs 35,000 is included an item of Rs 3,234, being the estimated value of the two-thirds share of the spring crop on Mahsud lands in the Dera Ismail Khan District. The Assistant Commissioner at Tank, however, anticipates that the value of the crop will be only Rs 2,500, which *pro tanto* will reduce the 35,000 rupees. But this loss we can make up in tolls, and we may assume the figures of Rs 35,000 to be so far unchanged. It appears, however, now that the liabilities of the Mahsuds for the cases on account of which they were held to owe Rs. 32,854-8-0 are in fact Rs. 36,055-1-11, and further that for the Tochi and Zhob cases, on account of which a balance of Rs 2,145-8-0 was reserved, a sum of Rs 3,540 is due. This raises the total liabilities of the Mahsuds on account of the March settlement to Rs 36,055-1-11 + Rs 3,540, total Rs 39,595-1-11. To pay this we have:—

	Rs.	A	P
(a) Agreed upon by the Mahsuds	35,000	0	0
(b) Sundry fines paid in at the March jirga	292	0	0
(c) Alimony of Mahsud hostages placed in jail owing to escape of a hostage; alimony is not paid to hostages in jail	1,100	0	0
Total	36,392	0	0
	39,595	1	11
	36,392	0	0
Deficit	3,203	1	11

or Rs 3,200 in round numbers.

Mr. Watson proposes to meet this deficit in part by crediting and paying to private individuals as compensation, &c., a sum of Rs 2,117, which is due to Government from the Mahsuds out of the March settlement of Rs 35,000 on account of the value of rifles and other Government property stolen. I am unable to support this proposal. The settlement from what the Political Officer says was a lenient one; the fines inflicted in several of the cases were hardly commensurate with the gravity of the offences, he states, and that being so, it seems if, on making up accounts, we find that Rs 3,200 more is due from the Mahsuds, plus the deficit on account of sales of the rabi crop, say, Rs. 4,000 in all, that it is for the Mahsuds to make the deficiency, and not for Government out of its just due. This deficit can be covered by continuing the tolls till they have produced Rs 19,000 instead of the 15,000 rupees contemplated in paragraph 6 of this office letter No 287 of the 30th March, 1900. I understand that it will take about eighteen months to realise Rs 15,000 by means of the tolls.

If Government approve I will arrange to meet the deficit in the manner suggested above.

4. This deficit of Rs 4,000 is a relatively trivial matter, however. The serious features in the present situation are, first, that at the time that the March settlement was made Rs 23,500 were (in addition to the Rs. 32,854,

or as it appears Rs. 36,392, then due and settled for) payable by the tribe, for the liquidation of which no arrangements have as yet been made; and, second, that the settlement of March last has had no effect in checking the predatory habits of the Mahsuds, for they have, since this settlement, run up an account of at least Rs. 7,500 in six weeks, as explained in paragraph 4 of the Political Officer's letter, dated the 13th instant, to which must be added Rs. 1,000 for two murders of British subjects in the Dera Ismail Khan District, committed last week by Mahsuds. The total due comes to Rs. 32,000. The Political Officer has informed me that when they engaged to pay Rs. 35,000 last March, the Mahsuds knew that more money was due, but not how much.

5. We are responsible for the realization and payment of this money to the injured parties. Leaving British subjects and their property out of consideration for the moment, it was accepted years ago that on the roads through the protected area we are bound to maintain the *Pax Britannica*, and if, off the roads, we do not redress the wrongs suffered at the hands of the Mahsuds by the residents of the protected area, we must either permit them to exact redress themselves (a course which would make the protected area a scene of constant raids and counter-raids) or face grave discontent.

6. In the hot weather and with cholera hanging about the Gomal and Tank, it would be hopeless to attempt to convene the Mahsud Jirga for the settlement of the outstanding sum of Rs. 32,000. Even if we could assemble the jirga, I apprehend that the burden may be soon becoming too heavy for the tribe to bear. The only thing I can suggest is to leave matters alone till August or September, when it may be practicable to send for the whole Mahsud Jirga to Sarwekai or Jandola and then to see what can be done. By that time I hope to be in a position to submit a review of the whole situation in respect of the Mahsuds; it is clear that things cannot go on as they have been doing.

7. One point remains on which I would ask for the instructions of Government. The Political Officer thinks of going behind the settlement of March last, of procuring the punishment of the actual offenders in the more serious cases or the recovery of the stolen rifles and other property. It seems to me that this is neither just nor expedient. A settlement is supposed to wipe clean the slate. Although the punishments may have been inadequate, yet, such as they are, they have been accepted, and there is an end of the matters. There must be finality in proceedings, and to go on trying to get hold of offenders and effect the recovery of property in cases of which many are one to three years old, after a settlement has been made, opens up an interminable vista of trouble and friction which had better be closed. We have enough on our hands without this. And I am not so sure that to go behind the settlement may not be considered by the "ulus" as a breach of faith, whatever individual Maliks may have been told or may think. We could not entertain the thought of going behind the settlements effected with the various tribes in 1897 and 1898, and I submit that the same applies here.

In the petition enclosed with this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1890, the Maliks say nothing of pursuing individual cases. They talk of putting pressure on bad characters and misbehaving sections, so that they may not be emboldened and the settlement may not be a precedent; and they ask that if in the present cases the money (clearly meaning whatever was fixed at the settlement, and nothing more) is realized from the actual offenders, it may be refunded to the Maliks. This I should certainly decline to do. It is for the Maliks to police their sections, that is what they are paid for; and we cannot undertake to do the work of the Maliks, though they would naturally much prefer us to do so, and to relieve them of all trouble and responsibility and yet to pay them handsome allowances.

Annexure 8

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 13th May, 1900.

With reference to your endorsement, dated May 8th, 1900, forwarding a copy of your letter to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, on the subject of the statement of fines due from the Mahsuds prepared by me and submitted with my letter, dated May 1st, 1900, I have the honour to state as follows.

2. In dividing cases into classes A, B, &c., I have followed the classification prescribed for the monthly statements of border offences which are submitted to you through the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan. These classes are explained in the foot-note to the printed form of Statement No. 1. Class A comprises offences committed by Mahsuds in British territory; Class B those committed against British subject (including Powindahs) in protected area, Class C those committed against the tribes in protected areas or near posts, Class D those committed in the area under political control exclusive of Class C. Tochi, Shiran and Zhob cases are separate.

"Miscellaneous" includes all cases not brought under the other classes. They are mainly claims brought against the Mahsuds some time after the offences to which they refer were committed, *e.g.*, a Powindah finds a stolen camel which he lost a year or so previously in the possession of a Mahsud, or he puts in a petition about some property which he lost several months or years before, and which he did not report at the time, having now perhaps received some information as to who the offenders were. These cases are of very little importance and very few of them can be brought home to the Mahsuds.

3. The sum of 8,500 rupees to which I referred in paragraph 3 of my previous letter is that due from Mahsuds in decided cases of Classes C and D and miscellaneous (the amount is really Rs. 8,351-8-2 + 200 Kabul rupees—*vide* abstract statement appended to letter). These are the inter-tribal cases referred to in paragraph 8 of Mr Anderson's letter to the Punjab Government dated 30th March, 1900, and are not included in the 35,000 rupees of Mr Anderson's settlement. Nor is this sum of about Rs. 8,500 included in the 15,000 rupees estimated by me as the additional fines to which the Mahsuds have rendered themselves liable for recent offences of the different classes which were not taken up at the jurga because in cases other than Classes C, D and miscellaneous, enquiries into them had not been completed.

They are the cases mentioned in the abstract statement referred to in my letter as pending up to the last week in March. The value of the property lost, &c., is there estimated at Rs. 24,781, but for reasons given in my letter I considered that not more than 15,000 rupees would probably be realized from the Mahsuds.

4. I have now brought the estimate of the liabilities of the Mahsuds up to date by a supplementary statement attached to this letter, which shows all cases reported against Mahsuds up to last week. The value of the property lost in these most recent cases of all is shown as for Class A Rs. 3,659-5-0, for Class B Rs. 7,993-8-3 (of which Rs. 2,000 is due from the Zalli Khels), for Zhob Rs. 682-8-0, and for C and D Rs. 630 and Rs. 90 respectively. As some of these claims are probably exaggerated or not proveable against Mahsuds, the amount of their liabilities may be estimated as follows:—

Class A Rs. 2,500, B Rs. 4,000, Zhob Rs. 500, Classes C and D Rs. 500

5. In saying that certain sums due in Zhob and Tochi cases would be included, if possible, in the settlement of Rs. 35,000, I meant that they might be paid out of the balance reserved by Mr Anderson to meet Tochi and Zhob demands (*vide* paragraph 8 of his letter above referred to), which he hopes will amount to over Rs. 3,000. Till it is known what the receipts from the Mahsud land crops will be, the account cannot be finally made up.

6. Leaving these Zhob and Tochi cases out of consideration, the total liabilities of the Mahsuds up to date may be estimated in round numbers as follows:—

	Rs.
Fines due from Mahsuds under recent settlement for outstanding cases of Classes A, B and Shirani, Zhob and Tochi	35,000
Estimated as due from them in the above classes of cases (exclusive of Tochi cases) up to end of March, 1900 (not included	
* With Rs. 6,000 below makes in settlement of	
15,000. J. M. D. Rs. 35,000)	9,000*
Estimated as due from them in the above classes of cases, reported between end of March and 2nd week in May, 1900	7,000
Total	<u>51,000</u>
Outstanding fines in Classes C, D and miscellaneous at date of Mr. Anderson's settlement	8,500
Estimated amount due in pending cases up to end of March, 1900	6,000
Estimated amount due in cases reported between end of March and second week in May, 1900	500
Total	<u>15,000</u>

Thus, briefly, in cases affecting British subjects or territory, the amount due up to date is Rs. 51,000; in inter-tribal cases it is Rs. 15,000. It must be remembered that this is a very rough estimate, and also that one or two of the more important cases are in a fair way to settlement through recovery of the stolen property or realisation of compensation from the offenders by baramta.

7. In conclusion I should be glad if one point in connection with the recent settlement could be cleared up. I have on several occasions told the Mahsud Maliks since that settlement that I shall not relax my efforts to procure the punishment of the actual offenders in the more serious cases or the recovery of the stolen rifles and other property. I understood that Mr. Anderson agreed to my saying this, and on the principle that the innocent should not be punished for the guilty, and also in view of the fact that the fines inflicted in several of the cases were hardly commensurate with the gravity of the offence (if they had been, a settlement of this kind would have probably been impossible, for the burden imposed on the tribe would have been too heavy) I thought it would be bad policy to regard these cases as altogether wiped off the slate. In pursuance of this policy I have detained in custody Sabar Khan, nephew of Baramat, the Aimal Khel Malik, who is believed to have been concerned in the theft of the Nawab of Tank's rifles, and a Balkai Mahsud, whose brother Atta Khan is believed to have been concerned in the theft of Snider rifles from the Border Military Police guard at the Murtaza rest-house, both of which cases were included in the recent settlement. I do not think the Mahsuds regard these proceedings on my part as unfair or breach of the understanding arrived at in that settlement; and if by the pressure thus exercised I can recover any of the rifles stolen or prove the case against any of the thieves, I do not see that I am precluded from keeping those rifles or punishing the thieves by fine or otherwise. If you think, however, that all these cases were finally disposed of at the recent settlement, I should be glad if you would send my successor early orders on the point.

Annexure 9.

List of Pending Cases.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Thana.	Nature of Offence	Complainant.	Accused	Tribe.	Brief Account of the Case taken to Date	Remarks.
					<i>Cases of Class A.</i>				
1	23rd 24th January, 1900 ...	Jamal Dial ...	Tank ..	Theft of four maunds wheat, valued at Rs. 16	Lal Chand	Case under enquiry.	
2	4th April, 1900 ...	Near Kulachi ..	Kulachi ...	Dacoity of four camels, valued at Rs. 360 and cash Rs. 260	(1) Khan, (2) Fairulla, (3) Shah Jahan, } Mear- Powindah	Do.	
3	13th April, 1900 ...	Kotnawas ...	Gomal ...	Theft of three sheep, valued at Rs 17-10-0.	Ain-ud-din, Sheakh	Do.	
4	17th April, 1900 ...	Near Manjhi ...	Do. ...	One bullock with wheat, &c., valued at Rs: 40.	Hakim Machi	Do	
5	18th April, 1900 ...	Talrod Ohur ...	Tank ...	Robbery of three camels with other property valued at Rs 110-8-0.	Amrdin. Ali Khel	Do.	
6	24th April, 1900 ...	Kasrawala Water-mill.	Do. ...	Theft of two camels, valued at Rs 170.	Alam Khan, Kundi, Powindah.	Do.	
7	22nd 23rd April, 1900 ...	Near Tank ...	Do. ...	Theft of one bullock, valued at Rs. 27.	Inayat Khan	Do.	
8	24th 25th April, 1900 ..	Gul Imam ..	Mullazai ...	Theft of property by house-breaking.	Ass Ram	Do.	Value not told by complainant.
9	25th April, 1900 ..	Gomal. .	Gomal ...	Theft of four cows Theft of seven goats, valued at Rs. 61.	Alidad, Kharoti Powindah.	Do.	
10	25th 26th April, 1900 ...	Near Jatta	Do ...	Theft of clothing, valued at Rs. 1-3-0	Mamit Khan, Khidarzai	Do.	
11	25th 26th April, 1900 ...	Mullazai ...	Mullazai ...	Theft of one camel, valued at Rs. 50.	Zarif Khan, Carpenter	Do.	

List of Pending Cases—continued.

Serial No	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Thana.	Nature of Offence.	Complainant	Accused.	Tribe	Brief Account of the Case taken to Date.	Remarks.
					<i>Cases of Class A—cont.</i>				
12	26th April, 1900 27th	Nasran	Mullasai	Theft of bullock, value Rs. 15.	Naurang Near	Case under enquiry.	
13	28th April, 1900	Kot Azam	Gomal	Theft of 45 camels, valued at Rs. 2,250.	Dauran, Mirvi Powindah.	Do.	
14	29th April, 1900 30th	Kot Nawas	Do.	Wounding complainant.	Bas Khan, Shaikh	Do.	
15	13th April, 1900	Near Tank	Tank	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 15-6-0.	Khadtin	Do.	
16	15th April, 1900 16th	Kot Nawas	Gomal	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 18-12-0.	Khaldin through Khargul.	Do.	
17	26th April, 1900	Near Draband	Chaudwan	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 251-14-0.	Abdulhafar.		
					<i>Cases of Class B</i>				
1	1st April, 1900	Khajuri Kach	Khajuri Kach	Theft of four camels, valued at Rs. 360.	Khar Khan Nasir	Unknown	Unknown	Do.	
2	2nd April, 1900	Sado Chilla	Do.	Theft of property and jewels, valued at Rs. 133-8-3	Ram Singh and Musammat Bhag Bhari.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
3	20th April, 1900	Spin	Ngandioba	Theft of 11 camels, valued at Rs. 550.	Sahib Khan, Powindah, &c.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
4	22nd April, 1900	Chapar Khulla	Do.	Theft of 100 camels, valued at Rs. 5,000.	1 Juma Khan 2 Jamal 3 Hassan	Numin Zangalte, &c.	Michi Khels, Malikdinias, Faridas, &c., also Zalli Khels of Spin.	Case under enquiry. Ten Zalli Khels of Spin have been arrested, and one has confessed, implicating himself, several of his companions, and a number of Mahsuds. Pressure is being put on the Mahsud Malikis to recover the camels, and six have been brought in by the Malikdinias. Share due from the Mahsuds may be estimated at Rs. 2,000.	
5	3rd May, 1900 4th	Pasta Kach	Khajuri Kach	Theft of five camels, valued at Rs. 250.	1 Haidar Shah 2 Umar Shah; Sayads	Case under enquiry.	

6	5th May, 1900	...	Near Ghwalaria	Do.	Theft of two camels, valued at Rs. 100, and cloth valued at Rs. 900, and cash Rs. 600 Kabul, and shooting four camels.	1. Mullah Muhammad, } 2. Sikandar, } 3. Lal Khan, } Pown- daha.	Do.
7	5th May, 1900	...	Grazing ground, Pasta Kaoh.	Do.	Theft of four camels, valued at Rs. 200.	Ghulam Rasul, Nasir ... Zhab cases, 1899-1900.	Do.
1	10th December, 1899	...	Chasohbi	Moghal Kot	Theft of 68 sheep, 50 bullocks, 60 cows, &c.; property valued at Rs. 882-8-0.	Khanak, Shirani	Do.
						<i>Class C.</i>			
1	January, 1900	...	Wana	Wana	Theft of 60 sheep and goats, valued at Rs. 180.	1 Nam Khan Tajji 2 Gandapur Khels	Do.
2	7th May, 1900 8th	...	Sarel	Jandola	Theft of 30 cows, valued at Rs. 450.	Razi Bhattanni	Do.
						<i>Class D.</i>			
1	Gomal	Theft of five cows, five goats, valued at Rs. 90	Dad Nasir	Do.

ABSTRACT.

				Rs	A.	P.
A	cases, value of property lost, &c.	5,659	5	0
B	do. do.	7,998	8	8 (of which Rs 2,000 is due from Zalli Khels).
Zhab	do. do.	682	9	0
C	do. do.	630	0	0
D	do. do.	90	0	0

H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan.

Annexure 10.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 13th May, 1900.

In accordance with your verbal instructions and in continuation of my letter of to-day's date, I have the honour to submit herewith a statement giving a more correct account of the sums due from the Mahsuds under the recent settlement, and of the sums which are or will be in hand for discharging those liabilities. It will be seen that the liabilities are more than were originally estimated, owing partly, I fear, to mistakes made in my office, and partly to the fact that Mr. Gee and myself found ourselves unable to keep within the limits allotted in awarding compensation.

2. On the other hand there are several items which can be added to the Rs. 35,000 which the Mahsuds agreed to pay; and I have shown these in the total sum realized or realizable from the tribe. I trust that under the circumstances they will be allowed to be credited

3. It will be seen that the balance in hand for settling Tochi and Zhob demands is Rs. 2,484-1-11 This will be diminished or increased according as the sale of Mahsud crops realises less or more than was anticipated.

4. The Tochi and Zhob demands in cases settled up to date (excluding those comprised in the item of outstanding fines) come to Rs. 3,540, viz., Rs. 2,000 for the murder of the Zhob Levies in May 1899 and Rs. 1,540 for Dauri cases recently decided at the meeting held by the Political Officer, Tochi, and myself. There is thus a deficit of Rs. 1,086 still to be realized under the settlement; and I would add to this Rs. 914 for settling some undecided Zhob cases which have been long pending. If it is considered advisable to settle up this particular account without making further demands on the Mahsuds, as I strongly recommend, part of the odd 19,000 rupees due for outstanding fines might be used for this object, for out of this sum over Rs. 2,000 are due as fines to Government and not as compensation to individuals, so Government would be the only loser if that amount of fines were commuted into compensation.

Liabilities of Mahsuds up to Settlement of March, 1900 (including cases decided at the jirga held).

	Rs.	A.	P.
Outstanding fines (as amended after re-examination of files)	19,113	0	5
Awarded in March jirga in Classes A, B and Shirani cases	16,942	1	6
Total	36,055	1	11
Realized or realisable under recent settlement	35,000	0	0
Fines paid in at jirga, &c	292	0	0
Pay of Mahsud hostages in Jail at Dera Ismail Khan	1,100	0	0
Compensation due to Government for rifles, &c, awarded in certain cases decided at recent jirga and included in the total of Rs. 16,942-1-6 above	2,117	0	0
Total	38,509	0	0
Balance in hand available for Tochi and Zhob cases	2,454	0	0
Due for Tochi and Zhob cases settled up to date	3,540	1	1
Deficit	1,086	1	1

Annexure 11.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., I.C.S., Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 24th May, 1900.

Your letter of the 21st instant has crossed my letter, dated the 19th instant, which furnishes the further report promised regarding the out-standings against the Mahsuds. Mr. Watson has left India on furlough, and I am therefore unable to obtain the full explanation called for by Government. I would, however, in justice to Mr. Watson, point out that insistence on the part of this office would doubtless have resulted in an earlier compliance with the orders of Government.

2. With regard to the remarks of the Government of India in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Foreign Department letter, dated 16th instant, I propose, with the permission of Government, to submit, in August next, the review of the situation in respect of the Mahsuds which is mentioned in paragraph 6 of my letter cited above. The accuracy of the conclusion in paragraph 2 of your office letter, dated the 6th February, 1900, viz., that the liabilities of the Mahsuds under present conditions accumulate faster than they can be liquidated, has been vindicated by the facts as now ascertained, and it seems to me that the whole position requires very full consideration, for it is clear, if the tribe cannot or will not reform its ways, that there can be but one end to the existing state of affairs.

3. I think it is very unlikely that the Rs 15,000 will be realized by tolls within the next six months, from what I was informed at Tank, I should say eighteen months would be nearer the mark.

4. I am unable to say why half the pay of the Levies was attached for three months, nor can any officer inform me, since the Political Officer was apparently not associated with the Commissioner in the actual settlement of the terms with the jirga. This was, I understand, effected alone by my predecessor, with the assistance of his Head Clerk, Mr. E. T. Bhan, who has left my office. It was arranged, I believe, that the Levies are to go in turn on leave, and that while they are away their pay is to be credited towards payment of the Rs. 35,000.

5. For the result, so far, of negotiations with the Mahsuds about the Badar disputes, I would refer to my telegram of the 14th instant, and to my letter of to-day's date to your address.

Annexure 12.

Letter from J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of yours, dated 18th May, regarding the disposal of certain Tochi and Dauri cases. In accordance with the orders contained in this office, No 83, dated 19th January, the reason why four of the cases remained unsettled should have been reported. I am to request that the necessary information may now be obtained from the Political Officer, Tochi.

Annexure 13.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters noted in the margin, giving further information as to the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr. Anderson.

2. Of the eight classes of cases described in paragraph 2 of Mr. Watson's, dated 13th May, to your address, your predecessor only professed to have dealt with five in the jirga held at Tank. These comprised offences in British territory, and offences against British subjects and Powindahs in the protected area, correspond to Classes A and B in the registers maintained in your office, also offences in the Shirani country, the Tochi and Zhob. Mr. Anderson expressly stated that he had not settled the "inter-tribal cases," which the Lieutenant-Governor presumes are identical with Classes C and D in your registers, and that these would "be disposed of as opportunities offer." For some unexplained reason the "miscellaneous" cases were also omitted, though to judge from the figures in the abstract at the end of the list appended to Mr. Watson's No. 663, dated 1st May, this last class is not unimportant. It was stated that the settlement "leaves no case" with the exceptions noted above "pending anywhere against the Mahsuds."

3. It now appears that the settlement was faulty in the following respects. A composition of Rs 35,000 was accepted for offences for which the amount really due is Rs. 39,595. The detail is—

	Rs.
(a) Unrealized fines in cases previously settled	... 19,113
(b) Fines due in cases settled at Tank jirga 16,942
(c) Tochi and Zhob cases	... 3,540

The figures given under the first two heads in paragraph 8 of your predecessor's, dated 30th March, are incorrect, and it is difficult to understand how such serious miscalculations can have passed muster. Moreover it now appears that Mr Anderson was in error in thinking that all pending cases of the five classes which he mentioned had been settled. A comparison of Mr. Watson's, dated 1st May, 13th May, and 14th May, shows that a number of cases were left unsettled in which the claim against the Mahsuds is stated at Rs. 13,203 (see list appended to Mr. Watson's letter, dated 1st May), which the Political Officer considers will probably be reduced to Rs 9,000 when the cases are finally decided. To this must be added the amount ultimately found due on account of four cases in the Tochi Valley. Had a complete settlement been made with the Mahsuds in March the demand made upon them should have been in round figures Rs. 49,000 instead of Rs. 35,000. Since March they have added Rs. 8,000* to their liabilities under the same five classes of cases. The claims against them in respect of the other three classes, namely, C, D and miscellaneous, may be roughly stated as—

	Rs.
(a) In respect of cases settled before March, 1900	... 8,500
(b) In respect of cases pending in March, 1900	... 6,000
(c) In respect of cases which have occurred since March, 1900	... 500
Total	... 15,000

Assuming that we are bound to enforce the responsibility of the Mahsuds in all these cases, the total claim against them amounts to Rs. 72,000, of

which cases involving in round figures Rs 40,000 are included in the settlement made at Tank and cases involving Rs 32,000 are not so included

4 The first question that arises is whether the difference between the real demand of Rs. 39,595 in the cases actually dealt with at Tank and the lump sum of Rs. 35,000, at which the demand was assessed, can be recovered. No doubt the petty fine of Rs 292 realized at Tank can be utilized, but Sir Mackworth Young fails to see how Rs 1,100, which would have been paid as alimony to Mahsud hostages had they not been transferred from the serai at Dera Ismail Khan to the Jail, can be used to make up part of the deficit. The question whether we can continue to collect tolls from Mahsud trading convoys till the whole amount now found to be due is realized depends on the question whether the Maliks understood that they were agreeing to pay Rs 35,000 as a final settlement of certain cases previously settled and certain other cases actually decided by jirgas at the time the payment was arranged. It would appear from paragraph 8 of Mr Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, that this is the case, and unless you have anything further to urge on the subject, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks we must forego the demand of Rs 4,303 (*i e*, Rs 4,595 — Rs 292) overlooked at the Tank settlement.

5 The question remains how we are to deal with the demand of Rs. 17,000 on account of the five classes of cases mentioned in paragraph 2 for which the Mahsuds are liable on account of cases left unsettled last March and cases which have occurred since, and with the further demand of Rs. 15,000 which is stated to be due on account of miscellaneous cases and cases of Classes C and D. With reference to the last two classes I am to refer you to the correspondence printed in the Foreign Department (Frontier) Proceedings, of May, 1899, where the policy to be followed with reference to them is discussed. In that correspondence you took the view which you have again expressed in paragraph 5 of your letter, dated 19th May, while Mr Anderson contended that we should only deal with such cases by giving friendly advice to the contending parties. As Mr. Anderson and Mr. Watson have both left the country, Sir Mackworth Young will be glad, if you can explain with special reference to the 3rd paragraph of Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 29th May, a copy of which has been sent to you with my letter of to-day's date, the precise nature of the C and D cases not included in the settlement, and endeavour to show why Mr. Anderson excluded them. As he stated that they would be disposed of as opportunities offered, it is clear that he did not regard them as pressing for settlement in the same way as offences in British territory or against British subjects in the protected area. You should also explain more particularly as regards cases of this description not settled before March last whether it is expedient to face the settlement of these inter-tribal cases as well as of the large number of cases in which the interests of British subjects are involved. Further particulars as to the cases classed as miscellaneous will also be useful. Subject to the above remarks the Lieutenant-Governor accepts your proposal to defer dealing with all cases against the Mahsuds not included in the March settlement till August or September next.

6. I am to add that the arrangement as to the Levies described in paragraph 4 of your letter, dated 24th May, is another unsatisfactory feature of the recent settlement.

7. Sir Mackworth Young endorses the views expressed in paragraph 7 of your letter, dated 19th May, and paragraph 2 of your letter dated 11th May, regarding the attack on the Zam Post. He entirely agrees with you in thinking that where a settlement with a tribe has been made in respect of any offence that settlement must, in default of express stipulation, be held to be complete, and to preclude further action against either the tribe or individuals of the tribe concerned in that offence.

8. But the demand made upon the tribe on account of the attack on the Zam post, consisting as it appears merely of the valuation of blood-money and of the property stolen, is so manifestly inadequate as a complete settlement of this very grave offence that the Lieutenant-Governor can hardly

believe that Mr. Anderson accepted it as such without recording his reasons. In the 5th paragraph of his letter, dated 30th March, he reported that the files in all pending cases were examined. His Honour would wish to be informed whether the particular file relating to the attack on the Zam post was laid before Mr. Anderson and whether there is any record on it of the settlement made with the tribe.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 25th June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 19th June, 1900, forwarding a copy of correspondence regarding offences recently committed by Mahsuds, including a reported robbery of the mails in the Tiarza Nulla on the 20th May, 1900.

2. The Political Officer in Southern Waziristan considers that the mail robbery was instigated by the Mullah Powindah, and the mail bags were said, on the 5th June, to be in the Mulla's house, where they had been taken after the robbery. In these circumstances His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the Mulla should not be granted any allowance at present, unless he clears himself of complicity in the robbery.

3. The Government of India are of opinion that the sooner the disbursement of the allowance, which has already been sanctioned, can be commenced the better, and the more so if steps are subsequently taken to ensure that publicity is given to the arrangement with the Mulla. With this view, the degree of Mulla Powindah's complicity, if any, in the robbery of the mail should be established by immediate investigation, so as to admit of further action being taken in the matter of the allowance, which is an object of much greater importance.

4. I am to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of the papers forwarded with your letter, dated the 2nd June, 1900, regarding the unfortunate defects which have been brought to light in the settlement made with the Mahsuds by Mr Anderson in March last. The Government of India observe that the Commissioner of the Derajat Division has been called on for further explanations on some of the points at issue in regard to the settlement. I am to request that, when this supplementary information has reached the Lieutenant-Governor, the views and recommendations of His Honour may be furnished at the earliest possible date.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douse, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 26th July, 1900.

With reference to the 4th paragraph of your letter, dated 25th June, Letter, dated 28th June, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the further correspondence noted in the margin on the subject of the settlement made with the Mahsud Tribe last March.

1. Endorsement, dated 2nd July, from Commissioner, Derajat, with enclosure.

2. In the 3rd paragraph of my letter, dated 2nd June, to the address of the Commissioner, a copy of which was submitted with my letter of the same date, the fact that cases as regards which the claim against the Mahsuds would probably amount to Rs. 9,000 had been overlooked by Mr. Anderson was noted. It now appears that to these must be added seven cases belonging to the Bannu District, which were pending in March last, but had, apparently, not been reported by the Deputy Commissioner to the Political

Officer at Wana. The last and most serious of these cases only occurred in the end of February, and the facts of its not having been reported is not wonderful. But all the other cases ought to have been reported, and some of them are very old. The amount due by the Mahsuds on account of the seven Bannu cases is put at Rs. 4,800.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor accepts the conclusion stated in paragraph 2 of Mr Merk's letter, dated 28th June, that the total amount due by the tribe at the end of March, on the assumption that the settlement made at Tank was intended to include all pending cases, except inter-tribal and miscellaneous cases was under estimated by about Rs. 19,000. In fact, it will be better to put the figure at Rs. 20,000, for Rs. 19,000 does not include Rs. 914, on account of pending Zhob cases mentioned in Mr Watson's letter, dated 13th May, 1900. This is a serious matter, and the question whether we are really bound, under the terms of the agreement, to accept Rs. 35,000 as a full acquittance for a demand, which ought to have been put at Rs. 55,000, is a difficult one. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it very desirable to have the opinion of the officer who made the settlement, and he further considers that Mr. Anderson ought to have an opportunity of furnishing such explanation as may be possible of the numerous defects which, on the information at present available, appear to have marked his proceedings. A copy of the whole correspondence is, therefore, being sent to Mr Anderson by this week's mail, with a request that he will favour the Punjab Government with his remarks on the various points in issue at a very early date. Until his reply has been received Sir Mackworth Young wishes to reserve his final conclusions on the case.

4. As already stated in my letter, dated 2nd June, to the address of the Commissioner of the Derajat, the Tank settlement did not profess to take account of claims relating to C, D, and Miscellaneous Cases, amounting to a sum of about Rs. 14,500. Mr Merk has now explained exactly what these cases are. There is, of course, no manner of doubt that we can enforce our claims regarding them against the Mahsuds, and this will have to be done sooner or later. The Lieutenant-Governor reserves his remarks on the proper way of dealing with cases in the area "under political control" but outside "the protected area" till he is in a position to deal fully with the whole case, on receipt of Mr Anderson's reply.

5. With reference to the proposed recovery of Rs. 3,300 out of the total composition of Rs. 35,000 by withholding part of the pay of the Levies, I am to refer to the correspondence submitted with my letter, dated 25th June.

6. It is, as the Government of India are aware, unfortunately the case that our claims against the Mahsuds have mounted up rapidly owing to the commission of fresh offences since the conclusion of the settlement in last March, and that our relations with the tribe are in an unsatisfactory state. Mr Merk proposes to report fully on this subject at a very early date.

Annexure 1

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government Punjab, dated 28th June, 1900.

I am now in a position to reply to your letter, dated the 2nd instant, on the subject of the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr. Anderson in March last. The case is complicated, and to avoid interrupting the text, all references to previous correspondence, and to copies of correspondence now enclosed, are given in the margin. I will, as far as possible, follow the heads of your letter under acknowledgment, in the order therein given. As none of the desired information could be found in my office, I addressed the

Dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer.	Political Officer, Wana, and attach a copy of my letter and of Mr. Waterfield's reply, which gives
Dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer.	information.

2. According to the information which was available when your letter under reply was written, the total sum really due from the Mahsuds, on

Paragraph 3 of your letter. account of the five classes of cases with which the settlement professed to deal, was Rs. 49,000. But since then it has been discovered that there were cases committed by them in the Bannu District,

No. 22, dated 20th June, 1900, from Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, and enclosure. which had not been brought up at the settlement. What these cases are will appear from the enclosed correspondence. The damages that

No. 922, dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer, Wana. can be held to be fairly claimable on their account amounts to Rs. 3,370; add to this Rs. 1,500 for

impose for offences, No. 1 (Rs. 200), No. 5 (Rs. 500), No. 7 (Rs. 800), and we have Rs. 4,870, or in round numbers Rs. 4,800 additional to the Rs. 49,000. This makes a total of Rs. 53,008 instead of Rs. 35,000, or an excess of Rs. 18,800.

3. In regard to this excess which is due, a very important point is raised by Mr. Waterfield. He says that the Mahsud Malikhs argue that the Rs. 35,000 were

His letter, dated 20th June, 1900 a composition for all offences of the five classes whatsoever and wheresoever against the Mahsuds, whether decided before the date of the settlement or decided during the settlement or not decided at all as yet when the Tank meeting broke up, and, therefore, still pending like the cases aggregating Rs.

* His letter, dated 1st May, 1900. 9,000, mentioned by Mr. Watson,* or these Bannu cases. Mr. Waterfield is inclined to accept the contention of the Malikhs, upon the strength of Mr. Anderson's statement

Paragraph 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government. that "the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the "inter-tribal" cases, which will be

"disposed of as opportunities offer." This statement certainly lends colour to what the Malikhs urge. But in the first place, since the Bannu cases apparently escaped the notice both of Mr. Anderson and of the Mahsuds, it is impossible to make the settlement embrace what neither side was aware of, or rather, did not think of. In the second place, Mr. Watson before going on leave distinctly informed me that the Mahsuds, when they engaged to pay

Paragraph 4 of my letter, dated 19th May, 1900, to Government. Rs. 35,000, knew that more was due, but not how much. The files of the cases for which the settlement was made were gone into, as will be described below. If these Rs. 9,000 cases had been included in the settlement

the files relating to them would have been gone into and disposed of; but they were not so gone into, and, therefore, they cannot have been included in the settlement, since a clear account of what was actually included in the settle-

ment is given by Mr. Anderson †. Against this is the puzzling statement that there were no cases pending. I do not understand it, and cannot explain it. That the Malikhs should be anxious to show that the settlement covered the Rs. 9,000 cases, and the Bannu cases, one can quite understand, they refer to their petition of the 24th March, 1900, but this petition must be taken *quantum valeat*, but in spite of the statement of Mr. Anderson, which appears to have been written under some misapprehension, I consider that the March settlement did not, and was not, intended to cover the pending, or what I call the Rs. 9,000 cases, and also the Bannu cases; that we shall be perfectly justified in demanding redress for these cases, in addition to the Rs. 35,000, and that this will involve no breach of faith or appearance of such.

4. The Rs. 4,303, mentioned by you were not overlooked, but miscalculated at Tank. What happened was this: The detail of the Rs. 35,000 consists of—

I.—Unrealised fines in cases previously settled.
II.—Fines due in cases settled at the Tank jirga.
III.—Tochi and Zhob cases.

There was no need at Tank to go into the files of Class I. The files of Classes II and III were, I understand, run through by Mr. Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk in this office. He prepared an estimate of the liabilities considered due on

* Paragraph 8 of his letter cited above. these Classes II and III, which seems to have been what is given by Mr. Anderson,* and then the officers concerned in the cases and the Mahsuds were told that an aggregate sum of Rs. 35,000 would be demanded, and would cover everything in Classes I, II, and III. Apparently the files of only four cases were put before the Mahsud jurga—see Mr. Waterfield's letter, dated 20th June, 1900. When, however, it came to working out the sums due in each individual case, the estimate could not be adhered to, and for the Dera Ismail Khan cases

† Letter, dated 9th June, 1900, from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

† My telegram, dated 14th June, 1900

† Deputy Commissioner's telegram, dated 15th June, 1900

alone the excess came to about Rs. 2,000 † Mr. Gee is mistaken in thinking that it was proposed to meet the aggregate excess (Rs. 4,000) by utilizing the fines due to Government on account of the Zam and Murtaza cases, *i.e.*, by making Government pay, for, firstly, it cannot have been foreseen when the estimate was framed that the actuals would be in excess, or otherwise, more than Rs. 35,000 would have been fixed as payable by the Mahsuds, and secondly, Mr. Gee himself, with Mr. Watson, assessed the payment for the Zam case, and they did not fix any fine at all. I will deal with the punishment awarded for the Zam and other serious offences later on

(5) Letter, dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer.

5. The proceeds of the sale of the $\frac{2}{3}$ rd share of the Mahsud crops have fallen short of the estimate by Rs. 234, Rs. 3,000 having been realised. The anticipations on this point have not been fulfilled, this gives a further deficit of Rs. 234, but the item is a trifle.

Telegram, dated 21st June, 1900, from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan

† Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government

6. The alimony of the hostages is looked upon as a tribal allowance. We call them hostages, but some years ago, in 1889, I think, it was proposed to send back the hostages to their homes, by way of punishment to the Mahsuds. This throws a new light upon the common interpretation of the term "hostage". It was because the allowance that I proposed to utilize it towards meeting the deficit. I am presently going to address Government separately on the whole question of Mahsud hostages.

Paragraph 3 of my letter, dated 19th May, 1900, to Government.

7. I thought we could explain to the Mahsuds that on working out the detail of the damages due from them we found that they come to Rs. 4,300, or rather Rs. 4,600 now (with the deficit on the Mahsud $\frac{2}{3}$ rd crop proceeds), and that they must make this good. But in view of the remarks in your letter I venture to agree that this measure is not feasible. The only course now open to us for giving some compensation, at any rate, to those injured British subjects, who will otherwise not have even partial justice done to them, is to reduce rateably the compensation payable throughout the cases, so as to make all the cases fit into the limit of the Rs. 35,000. I do not advocate that Government pay the Rs. 4,600.

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 2 (9) of my letter, dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer, and his letter, dated 20th June, 1900, clause (9).

8. But here another and very grave difficulty meets us, if the plea of the Malik is accepted, *viz.*, that the Rs. 9,000 cases and the Bannu cases are included in the Rs. 35,000 settlement. These cases aggregate Rs. 13,800. Obviously some compensation must be given in these cases. We cannot do justice in some cases affecting British subjects and their property, and not do justice in others that are in precisely the same class. If the Malik's plea is accepted, we shall have to fit in Rs. 13,800 + Rs. 4,600 worth of cases, or Rs. 18,400 worth of cases altogether, into the Rs. 35,000 in addition to the cases already supposed to be covered by the Rs. 35,000. This will reduce the compensation payable all round by 50 per cent. To judge from what was done

in the grave offences mentioned below, it is not to be supposed that the compensation fixed in the II and III Classes errs on the side of liberality to the injured people. And it can easily be realised what effect a further reduction by 50 per cent. of this compensation will have upon British subjects and Mahsuds alike. If, however, Government decide to demand the Rs. 13,800 from the Mahsuds, the distribution of the deficit of Rs. 4,600 over the already settled cases will not matter much, *quâ*, moral effect, although the process will cause infinite trouble to the Political Officer, since compensation has, I believe, been already paid in many cases from moneys in hand out of the Rs.

* Paragraph 6 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government.

5,000 Mahsud deposit, and the Rs. 8,466 Malki allowances.* However, it will have to be gone through.

9. Turning now to what have been called "C and D" cases, I would

Paragraph 5 of your letter.
Mr. Bruce, late Commissioner

of this Division, in 1895. "C" cases were defined by him to be inter-tribal cases in protected areas or near posts, &c., which, for political reasons, require to be taken up, and "D" were to be other inter-tribal cases. What are "Miscellaneous" cases, and why so classified by Mr. Watson we cannot† tell, beyond this that they

† Paragraph 2, clause (4) of my letter, dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer; clause (4) of his reply, dated 20th June, 1900

appear to be old or doubtful cases, which were not of sufficient urgency or importance to be entered in Lists C and D. I have endeavoured to obtain some insight into the nature of the cases in the C, D, and Miscellaneous lists by going through the statements for the past four years of all cases sent monthly to this office by the Political Officer, but Miscellaneous cases are not mentioned in them, and for Lists C and D only numbers, viz., abstract totals and results, and no details of the offences are given. No further information than the above can, therefore, be supplied to Government without a laborious and lengthy examination of all the files in the Wana Office. In Proceedings, Foreign—Frontier A., May, 1900, an abstract (from which, however, D cases are omitted) is given by Mr. Watson. Excluding the cases committed since

Paragraph 3 of your letter.

March, 1900, the money equivalent of which by this date is very considerably more, I know, than Rs. 500, Rs. 14,500 are due for cases in Lists C, D, and Miscellaneous. At a rough guess, out of this I suppose about Rs. 8,000 are due for C cases, Rs. 4,000 for D cases, and Rs. 2,500 for Miscellaneous cases. It will be observed that both Messrs. Watso..

* Clauses (2) and (3) of his letter, dated 20th June, 1900

and Waterfield* are of opinion that all moneys due on C, D, and Miscellaneous cases should be exacted from the Mahsuds.

My own view is that the amount due is a detail, and that in this matter we are under an obligation. The principle that should govern our line of action must be accepted and defined, the rest follows as a matter of course. I would premise by pointing out that the designation "inter-tribal" in no way removes a case from the category of those in which Government is bound to "do right," if the case happens to come into this category; the Guri Khel raid upon a Bannu village has been termed an "inter-tribal" case, but no one is prepared to say that this was not an offence which Government was bound to take up, in which we were not obliged as a matter of duty to see that justice was done and punishment was inflicted. Now, as to the principle. In Punjab Government letter, dated the 1st April, 1892, it is emphatically laid down that the British Government has taken possession of the Gomal route, and has established the Queen's peace, and has determined to maintain law and order there. Hence, the Lieutenant-Governor proceeds to say, any attack there or any attempt to carry off looted property along the route by any one must be severely punished. And in paragraph 6 of your office letter of the 1st February, 1892, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick agreed with the local officers that under no circumstances ought raids in the Gomal Pass to be passed over without severe punishment and redress. That is to say, the obligation and responsibility incurred by possession were as clearly as possible recognized

and pronounced. It will be seen that no distinction of persons was made: whether the injured persons are British subjects or others, whether the cases are "inter-tribal" or not, there must be peace and order kept, and justice done. At that time, in 1892, we had not extended our possession to Wana, to the Shahur line, and to the intervening and neighbouring tracts. Since 1894 we have done so. But so far as I am aware the principle then enunciated, viz., that effective possession implies and imposes the duty to maintain the peace, has not been traversed, and the orders of Government are still binding upon the local officers. There is here no mention of "friendly advice" to the parties, it is the authoritative maintenance of order, the official and peremptory redress of wrongs, which is meant. Looking at the question from another aspect, to put it bluntly, we cannot eat our cake and have it. We cannot occupy a country, cover it with posts, cross it with roads, exercise in it criminal and civil jurisdiction, levy taxes in it (*e.g.*, the Suleman Khel tirmi), call it a protectorate, and then say to its residents: "Well, we will give friendly advice to the Mahsuds to leave you alone and to restore your property and pay you damages for your people whom they have killed." Considering the huge bill against the Mahsuds for offences against Government and against British subjects, much will the Mahsuds heed friendly advice, especially when it relates to their dealings with their hereditary and bitter foes, the Darwesh Khel, Powmdahs and Ghilzais, who reside in or travel through our protected area. "Friendly advice" means practically an adjournment to the Greek calends, and both parties understand this. It would be out of the question to permit the residents or those who are temporarily in our protectorate to take the task of redress into their own hands. With raids and counter-raids the protectorate would soon be a pandemonium, and no one's life or property would be safe, they are not very safe now, but that is nothing to what would be the case if the door were thrown open to reprisals. But if we do not permit reprisals, and if we do not ourselves intervene with authority, what are those who are injured in our protectorate to do? A virtual denial of justice produces the worst effect upon all, upon the Mahsuds, upon the people in the protected area and upon British subjects. I am bound to say that I have recently had significant hints as to the state of feeling arising out of what the people within and without the border think is the almost unchecked licence of the Mahsuds to prey on their neighbours. If we do not protect those who live in the protected area, the discontent will be of such as to render it impossible to hold it with Militia drawn from the affected localities themselves. Lastly, in the Tochi we redress the wrongs suffered by the residents of the valley at the hands of the Mahsuds, and what we concede to one protectorate we cannot deny to the other. It comes to this: having taken the country we cannot abnegate our responsibility for the Queen's peace in it, "friendly advice," considering the character and habits of those concerned and the gravity of the bloodshed and rapine that have occurred is practically such an abnegation. The only course which in my humble judgment is wise, politic and just is to take up all cases that have taken place in the protected area in much the same way and to the same extent as if they had taken place in British territory and as if British subjects had been concerned. There is no other way out of it, legally and technically speaking the protected area is not British territory, but virtually to all intents and purposes it is like Zhob, and must be treated as such.

I am quite unable to say why Mr Anderson, in view of the orders I have cited and in view of the general position which I have endeavoured to

* Clause (2) of his letter, sketch, excluded the C and D cases from the dated 20th June, 1900 settlement; nor can Mr Waterfield* explain.

If the adoption of the principle which I have advocated is approved, we shall have to face the settlement of these cases, in so far as they have occurred in the protected area. It is expedient to do so, else there will be serious discontent in the protected area, and with the crisis in our relations with the Mahsuds, which is imminent, we cannot afford to have dissatisfaction behind us, even if for other reasons it were not highly expedient to

show those whom we take under our protection that we are prepared to incur trouble and risk in order to make that protection a reality and not a name, and our occupation a benefit and not an evil.

What will be the total of the cases that out of the aggregate of the Rs. 14,500 will on enquiry be found to have occurred in the protected area it is impossible to say without going through all the files; but I should not be surprised if we find all or almost all of the cases to have occurred in the protected area, since, however prepared Political Officers may have been on paper in the past to extend our responsibilities, I think that their practice did not correspond to their theory and that they were not particularly anxious to take up cases occurring outside of the rough limits of the occupied area. To this Rs. 14,500 or greater part of it must be added when the settlement comes off several serious offences committed since last March, *e.g.*, the robbery of 140 Powindah camels from Spin, out of which the Mahsuds have to account for 117 (Correspondence about this case will shortly be submitted)

My endorsement, dated 25th April, 1900, to your address

Paragraph 6 of your letter
† My letter, dated 4th June, 1900.

10. For my opinion in the matter of the fine on the Levies I would refer to the correspondence already submitted to Government †

11. I am at a loss to explain why Mr Anderson accepted a settlement of the Zam case consisting only of blood-money and the value of the stolen property. There is no record of this settlement in my office file of the Zam case, nor apparently in that of the Political Officer beyond the vernacular finding of the jirga, signed by Messrs. Gee and Watson, which fixes the amount of the blood-money and value of property carried off to be paid. The examination of the files to which you refer was conducted I believe by Tej Bhan. In order to see if this Zam settlement was a slip or in accordance with a definitely adopted plan for settling all the grave offences, I requested Mr Waterfield to report how the following cases had been settled:—

- (a) The murder of two Zhob Sowars in May, 1898.
- (b) The murder of two Zhob Levies in May, 1899
- (c) The attack on Mr Watson and the murder of his chaprasi in July, 1899.
- (d) The murder of two Border Military Policemen and the wounding of two others at Zerannioba in January, 1900.
- (e) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard in February, 1900

He reports that in the Zhob cases what appear to be fairly adequate fines were imposed, but that in the Punjab cases (as in the Zam case), only blood-money and the value of the stolen property has been demanded.

In the Zam case 2 Border Military Policemen, 2 Levies and 1 non-official British subject, 5 men in all, were killed; the blood-money awarded is only Rs 1,800, or Rs. 360 per man. The same rate is awarded in the Zerannioba case, which contrasts unfavourably with the Rs. 1,000 per head in the instances of the Zhob men. In the Zerannioba case a somewhat adequate punishment would have been inflicted if the Rs. 3,500 realized by a seizure of Mahsuds and their property had been retained as well as the Rs. 1,570 awarded in March, but Government are aware that the Rs. 3,500 were returned to the Mahsuds at the Tank settlement.

My letter, dated 26th June, 1900, to your address.

It cannot be that these amazingly lenient settlements were made with the power held in reserve to go behind the settlements and to punish the individual offenders; else why was not the same course

Paragraph 7 of your letter.

adopted in the Zhob cases? And if it was so intended, some record would exist of such a stipulation having been made and having been communicated to and accepted by the Mahsuds when they agreed to pay Rs. 35,000, regarding which it is expressly stated that it covered all cases, "leaving none pending anywhere against the Mahsuds," a comprehensive statement which doubtless covers individual Mahsuds as well as the tribe collectively. What verbal orders were given in respect of the principle of settlement of these grave offences I do not know, but it is clear that four of them were settled on the same lines, and therefore presumably some common mode of settlement must have been prescribed.

In the case of the firing upon Mr Watson, the Tori Khel Darwesh Khel concerned in the matter will be fined

* My letter of the 12th May, 1900, to your address.

Rs 1,000 by the Political Officer, Tochi, as I have reported already* But beyond the exaction of Rs. 910 (blood-money for the chaprasi that was killed and value of property carried off), nothing was done to the Mahsuds in or close to whose limits the offence occurred and who were active aiders and abettors, if not more. Probably Mr Watson holds that the Tori Khel were the men who actually killed the chaprasi and fired on himself. It may be so, although in such a case it would naturally be the

† Paragraph 12 of his letter, dated the 6th May, 1900.

the Mahsuds is manifestly inadequate

12. The item of Rs 5,000 to be paid out of a Mahsud deposit is explained by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera

His letter, dated 15th June, 1900.

‡ Proceedings, Foreign — Frontier A, June, 1896.

Ismail Khan Clearly the money is, in a way, Mahsud property, but having lain four years† in deposit, its confiscation cannot have much effect upon the tribe as a whole. Up to date the proceeds of the tolls have been—

	Rs. A. P.
In Dera Ismail Khan	775 0 0
In Bannu	24 1 6
In Tochi	4 0 0
	<hr/>
	803 1 6

I do not know if the Mahsuds will be shrewd enough to slightly raise the prices of what they have to sell, but if they do this then the consumers, British subjects, will have to pay so much of the Mahsud fines as proceeds from the tolls. An awkward feature about this tolls arrangement is that the usual, almost the only way of settling cases with Mahsuds, especially where property must be recovered, is to seize their caravans; the Political Officer cannot do this now, if he does, the realization of the fine is at once stopped or impeded

13. I am afraid the settlement cannot be considered satisfactory whichever way it is looked at, and if in future the Mahsuds give trouble, as indeed they have been steadily doing ever since the day of the settlement, I and the Political Officer, Wana, must ask the indulgence of Government, because what was done in March cannot have acted as a deterrent. It cannot have given cause to the Mahsuds to amend their ways, it may encourage them to think that the next time they are brought to book they will be treated with the same extraordinary leniency, and if so, a further and weighty element of complication will have been added to a situation which is already full of difficulties. What the Mahsud Maliks themselves think of it will appear from the extract given below from a letter on the general situation which I have received from Mr Waterfield, and which I shall submit separately to Government with the review promised next

Paragraph 5 of your letter.

month, preparatory to taking up the cases against the Mahsuds in August or September:—

EXTRACT from letter, dated the 12th June, 1900, from Political Officer,
Wana.

“That in making the settlement in March last they were induced by the “Master” (viz, Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk to Commissioner, Derajat) to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr Anderson. They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crime.”

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my endorsement, dated the 27th May, 1900, on the general subject of Mahsud misconduct and the March settlement, I have the honour to forward, for information and for *very early* report on the points noted below, a copy of Punjab Government letter, dated the 2nd instant.

2. The subjects on which you are requested to report are—

- (1) Did the Mahsud Malikhs understand that they were agreeing to pay Rs. 35,000 as a final settlement of certain cases previously settled and certain other cases actually decided by jurgas at the time the payment was arranged? Please refer to your office letters of the 13th ultimo
- (2) What is the precise nature of the C and D cases not included in the settlement, and is there anything on record in your office to show why they were excluded?
- (3) What is your opinion on the question whether it is expedient to face the settlement of their inter-tribal cases as well as of the large number of cases in which the interests of British subjects are involved?
- (4) What is the nature of the cases classed as “Miscellaneous”?
- (5) Does your office, in the English or Vernacular files, contain any note or record of the reason of the demand for the Zam case being limited to blood-money and restitution of the property stolen? Is there any record on the file, English or Vernacular, of the settlement made with the tribe for this case?
- (6) What were the demands made on the tribe and included I understand in this settlement, for the following cases:—
 - (a) The murder of two Zhob Levy Sowars in May, 1898.
 - (b) The murder of two Zhob Levy Footmen in May, 1899.
 - (c) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and murder of his chaprasi on 20th July, 1899.
 - (d) The murder of two Border Military Policemen and wounding of two others on the 9th January, 1900, at Zerannioba
 - (e) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard in February last.
- (7) What are the four Tochi cases left unsettled? *Vide* paragraph 3 of the Government letter enclosed.
- (8) Have the eight Zhob cases, and any others there may be pending, been disposed of during April by your predecessor and the Political Agent, Zhob, as was anticipated in paragraph 8 of this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, to Government

- (9) If we forego the demand of 4,303 rupees (paragraph 4 of the Government letter enclosed), how are the injured persons to be compensated? Are they British subjects?

In your reply please follow the sequence of the above heads in your report

3 Your letter, dated the 28th instant, with its enclosure, on the subject of fines on the Levies, has been submitted to Government.

4 Your special attention is invited to paragraph 7 of the enclosed Government letter. I attach a copy of paragraph 7 of my letter, dated the 19th ultimo, to Government, it relates to paragraph 7 of your office letter, dated the 13th ultimo

Annexure 3.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

I have the honour to reply to your No 82 C, dated 5th June, 1900, to forward the following answers to your questions contained in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned letter.—

(1) I have personally enquired from the Chief Mahsud Malik as to what cases they understood were settled at the jurga held at Tank by Mr. Anderson, late Commissioner of the Derajat, in March, 1900. The Malik all declare that all cases which were pending against Mahsuds and which had been committed against British subjects in British territory, in the Wana jurisdiction, and in the jurisdictions of Tochi, Zhob and Shirani prior

* I doubt if any Mahsud drew up or dictated this petition.

W R. H MERK,
Commissioner

to the date of this settlement were settled, and they one and all refer me to the petition* put in by the Mahsud Malik dated 22nd March, 1900, in which they show how the sum of Rs 35,000 can be realized.

(2) "C" and "D" cases not included in the settlement are purely inter-tribal cases, those committed within protected area being classed as "C" and those committed outside "protected area," yet which the Political Officer considered should be taken up against Mahsuds, being classed as D. Complainants in these cases are Suleman Khels, Dotanis, Darwesh Khels and Bhattannis.

There is absolutely no record whatever in this office to show why these offences were excluded from the settlement made in March, 1900

(3) I am of opinion that Government is bound to enforce the settlement of these inter-tribal cases, otherwise good cause will be given to the injured tribe for grave discontent, as the Bhattannis and Darwesh Khels both look to Government to protect them from injury at the hands of the Mahsuds, and, moreover, are forbidden to take the law into their own hands within the protected area, where only it is possible for them to retaliate on the Mahsuds.

(4) As to the definition of "Miscellaneous Cases," I can give no satisfactory answer. From Mr. Watson's letter, dated 13th May, 1900, I gather that they have to do with claims against Mahsuds brought forward some time after the commission of an offence which was never originally reported. There is nothing to show why these cases should not have been classed under the heading A, B, C, D, to one of which they properly belonged. Apparently such cases were taken up or not at the will of the Political Officer

(5) There is no record on any English or Vernacular file to show the reason why only blood-money and restitution of stolen property was demanded from the Mahsuds for the Zam case.

On the Vernacular file of the Zam case there is an order to the following effect signed by Messrs. Gee and Watson: "Finding of jirga agreed to. A decree of Rs. 2,650 issued against Mahsuds."

The jirga's finding was as follows:—

"We have gone through the files of this case; we can find no evidence against any special individual, but there is no doubt that this offence was committed by Mahsuds. We therefore propose that the following amounts be recovered from the three sections of Mahsuds—

	Rs
"For blood-money	1,800
"For stolen rifles	600
"For two stolen muskets	100
"For stolen property	150
Total	2,650

Signed by—Mir Ajal, Barahmat, Amin Khan and
Muhammad Azum of Kundi, &c."

(6) The demands made on the Mahsud tribe for the cases specified are—

- (a) Fine of Rs. 2,000
- (b) Fine of Rs. 2,000 plus Rs. 560 Kabuli paid for recovery of one of the stolen rifles, total Rs. 2,280 British.
- (c) No fine was imposed for the attack on Mr. Watson, Political Officer. The case was filed by an order signed by Mr. Watson. For the murder of the Political Officer's chaprasi Rs. 720 blood-money, Rs. 150 for rifle stolen, and Rs. 40 for other stolen property was imposed, total Rs. 910.
- (d) For the Zerrannoba case the following fine was imposed on the three sections of the Mahsuds—For blood-money of 2 Border Military Police sepoy Rs. 720, for wounding 2 Border Military Police sepoy Rs. 200, for theft of 4 rifles Rs. 600, for theft of property Rs. 50; total Rs. 1,570.
- (e) For the attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard the following fine was imposed—For theft of 3 Snider rifles Rs. 450, for theft of 36 cartridges, 2 belts and 2 bayonets Rs. 50; total Rs. 500.

(7) The four Tochi cases referred to in paragraph 3 of Government letter No. 648, dated 2nd June, 1900, are:—

- (1) Murder of Pir Ahmad and wounding of other herdsmen by a gang of Jalal Khels, headed by Sahib Khan, on 20th February, 1899, at Inzarka Hill.
- (2) Theft of a mare valued at Rs. 300 Kabuli on 1st June, 1899, at Lewana Hill. Complainants being Ghaina Din and Muhammad Afzal, Levy sepoy, and accused being Yargul, Kangrai and Lawang, Jalal Khels. This case has been settled by recovery of the mare.
- (3) Theft of 23 camels belonging to Commissariat contractors from Dande plain on 16th October, 1899, by Jalal Khels.
- (4) Theft of three smooth-bore muzzle-loading muskets from Levies at Pamani Ghundi tower on 18th October, 1899, by Jalal Khels.

These cases were apparently not included in those compounded by payment of Rs. 35,000, as my predecessor has ordered enquiries to be instituted by the Naib Tahsildar of Jandola.

(8) No meeting took place between my predecessor and the Political Agent, Zhob, in April last, and none of the eight Zhob cases have yet been settled, unless they are to be considered as included in the composition of Rs. 35,000, nothing in the files, however, show whether they are included or not:

(9) If the sum of 4,303 rupees in excess of the Rs. 35,000, for which cases in Classes A and B against Mahsuds were compounded, is not to be realized from the Mahsuds, the complainants who are British subjects cannot be compensated, unless Government will advance the money required

I have carefully noted paragraph 7 of the Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900, and will in future act accordingly.

In reply to your telegram, dated 18th June, in continuation of your letter, dated 5th June, 1900, now under reply, I have the honour to inform you that the Guri Khel Mahks were not present at the Tank jirga held in March, 1900, but Malik Badshah Khan, Salim Khel, is said to have always represented the Guri Khel section, and it was to him that the sum of Rs 781-8-0, which was due to the Guri Khels for baramta of their bahirs, was repaid. I find, however, that this sum of Rs. 781-8-0 was actually paid to Badshah Khan out of Political funds, owing to the fact that the original amount of Rs 781-8-0 realized by baramta of Guri Khel's bahirs had already been forwarded to Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, in part settlement for the raid committed by Guri Khels on Walli Khels in Bannu. Thus this sum of Rs 781-8-0 has been paid out twice over from this office, as this amount was not included in the Rs 35,000 to be paid by Mahsuds-

In reply to your telegram, dated 18th June, I have the honour to state that no Bannu cases were put before the jirga for settlement at the Tank Jirga held in March, 1900.

Annexure 4.

Letter from A. J. Grant, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 14th instant, which reached me at Shekh Budin on 19th, I have the honour to send you a list of offences outstanding against Mahsuds committed in my district which were probably not included in the settlement of March last (either because of not having been reported to the Political Officer, Wana, before that date or because of having been committed since that date). The list, I am afraid, may not be quite complete as there was no definite system of registering such cases till a few months ago, when I opened a regular register, but my pending files have been thoroughly searched, and I hope all cases have been included.

Annexure 5.

Statement showing the Cases Outstanding against the Mahsuds.

No.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused Person.	Charge.	Brief Account of the Case.
1 Damages assessed Rs 640 W R. H. MERR.	Bande, son of Manak, Wazir Malik-shahi of Malikshahi	Rahman, son of Makin, Shabi Khel	Theft of 160 sheep on 26th August, 1896.	The complainant's labourer, named Gud, was grazing his flock in grazing ground of village Amaldar. Four offenders came there and carried away the flock. Chigha turned out but without success Gud alleges to recognise one Bahman, accused.
2 Rupees 100 W R. H. MERR.	Nasra Din, son of Saad Amin, Sardi Khel Sardi Khel	(1) Khoji, son of unknown, (2) Purdil, son of unknown, (3) Wardin, son of Bandal; (4) Charri, son of Haji Muhammad, Shabi Khels	Theft of two camels on 9th April, 1897	The camels were found with the accused, and the complainant got them back on payment of ransom Rs. 85, and Rs. 15 were paid to spies.
3 Rupees 80 W R. H. MERR.	Shah Nawas, son of Hassan, Narmi Khel of Narmi Khel	(1) Samand Khan, (2) Tup, Mahsud, Shabi Khel of Bobar	Theft of two bullocks, 9th August, 1897	The complainant's bullocks were stolen from the Narmi Khel grazing ground. The complainant made search, and came to know that the bullocks were with the accused, who were asked to take ransom and restore the cattle, but they refused to do so
4	(1) Abbas, son of Mirdad, (2) Mir Alam, (3) Basit Khan, Powindabs of Kulachi.	(1) Ghanni Khan, (2) Fir Gul, Hasbat Khel Mahsuds	Dacoity, 21st March, 1898	Complainants' four camels were missed when they were watering them from the Gambula River When they searched for their camels they saw 10 armed men carrying away the camels Police Sergeant of Chanki Hawed went in pursuit, but without success. A spy brought the news that the camels were with the accused They asked Rs. 240 as ransom. They were asked to give the names of actual culprits, but they declined to do so. One camel was found with Dost Muhammad, Shabi Khel, at Gandi Khan Khel. One of the complainants recognised his camel. Dost Muhammad said that he had purchased from Mozaffar, Shabi Khel The former brought the latter, and they stood their trial by a Criminal Court. Dost Muhammad was discharged, and Mozaffar sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 10 fine, and the camel was restored to the complainant.
5 Rupees 600. W R. H. MERR.	Atal, Umarzai. of Umarvai	Gud, Mahsud Kikarai	Murder of Khan on 21st September, 1899	The deceased was murdered by the accused for private vend. A spy was sent to the Mahsud country to trace actual culprit. He, on his return, said that there was a prevailing rumour that the murder was committed by the accused.

Rupees 250 W. R. H. MERRK.	6	Captain Luck ..	Daulata	Theft, Section 380, Indian Penal Code, 26th December, 1899	The accused is being suspected of stealing seven saddles and harness of a trap from Captain Luck's bungalow.
Rupees 1,700. W. R. H. MERRK.	7	Villagers of Taoda	Shahi Khel and Jalal Khels . .	Dacoity, Section 397, Indian Penal Code, 26th February, 1900	The dacoity was committed by the Jalal Khels and Shahi Khels. In the course of dacoity the gang killed one man, wounded two men, and looted property worth Rs 476
Total Rs. 2,970 W. R. H. MERRK.					

C. A. SMITH, Lieut.,
for Deputy Commissioner.

The 20th June, 1900.

Annexure 6.

Letter from S S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

In returning the original correspondence forwarded with your letter, dated 14th June, 1900, I have the honour to state it is perfectly true that the case in question* was not put before the jirga held at Tank by Mr Anderson in March, 1900. In fact, no Bannu cases were produced at the jirga. This, however, in my opinion, does not alter the fact that the Mahsud Malikhs and jirga were distinctly told that the settlement then arrived at covered all cases committed against British subjects in British territory prior to the date of settlement. In my letter of 20th instant, in reply to your letter, dated 5th June, 1900, I have informed you that the Malikhs have declared that they were informed by Mr Anderson that cases which had been committed by Mahsuds against British subjects and in British territory were settled. In support of this declaration made by the Malikhs to me, I would refer you to paragraph 8 of letter from H A Anderson, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 30th March, in which it is distinctly asserted that "under these circumstances the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds except the inter-tribal cases, &c."

Even though this case was not brought up before the jirga, yet we cannot say that the Mahsud Jirga was to blame† for not mentioning the case, as at the time they were merely informed that for old cases outstanding against the tribe, fines amounting roughly to 17,000 rupees were unrealized, and that for recent cases undisposed of compensation and fines amounting to Rs 18,000 had been imposed, making a total of Rs 35,000 due from the tribe. Except in the cases of—

- (a) The murder of the Political Officer's chaprasi,
- (b) The murder of 2 Border Police and wounding of two other Border Police Sepoys at Zerannoba,
- (c) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard,
- (d) The raid on the Zam Post,

I can find no trace of cases having been put before the jirga at the time of the settlement. Now with regard to this case if it is taken up against the Mahsuds, I venture to point out that the Malikhs will accuse us of breach of faith

Then the Malikhs undoubtedly consider all cases committed in British territory prior to the date of settlement to have been settled.

From the point of view of the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, I grant that he has every right to demand reparation from the Mahsuds for this offence, but then again are we to go behind the settlement already arrived at? In connection with this question I would refer you to paragraph 7 of Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900, to your address, and also to paragraph 7 of your letter, dated 19th May, to address of Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab

Possibly this is not the only case which may come up for orders, and I would therefore ask for definite instructions as to how I am to act with regard to the settlement of such cases.

Annexure 7.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 9th June, 1900.

I have the honour to reply to your letter, dated 5th June, 1900. I speak from memory as the records are in the office of the Political Officer, Wana.

The estimate made for compensation payable in Dera Ismail Khan and Shirani cases, which were the only ones in which I had any concern, was, I believe, about Rs 9,500. The amount of compensation which Mr. Watson and myself did award in these two classes of cases was, I think, the minimum which we could have decreed. It was proposed to meet the excess amount over the estimate by utilizing that portion of the Rs 35,000 which was due to Government itself as compensation in the Zam case and the case of rifle-stealing at Murtaza.

Annexure 8

Telegram from Commissioner, Derajat, to Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated 14th June, 1900.

Your letter of 9th instant Telegram what was the amount of compensation which you and Watson did award

Annexure 9

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 15th June, 1900.

Your telegram. Amount of compensation awarded was eleven thousand and one hundred and sixty-two rupees four annas plus a fine of fifty rupees to be credited to Government

Annexure 10

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 21st June, 1900

Your letter. The Mahsud's grain has been sold to Dera Ismail at 3 rupees 12 annas per maund, hence exact price will be Rs. 3,000.

Annexure 11.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 15th June, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 4th instant, I have the honour to state that the Rs. 5,000 referred to as in deposit on account of Mahsud lands is not composed of sums due to individual Maliks, but represents the balance in hand out of the general Naskot Colony income at the time of the partition effected by Mr. Bruce, late Commissioner. Previous to partition amongst

individuals the income from this Colony was paid over to the main divisions of the tribe, to divide up amongst themselves, while a certain sum was kept for expenditure on the cultivating arrangements in the Colony.

I would refer you to paragraph 3 of Mr. Oglvie's letter, dated 21st January, 1887, to the address of Commissioner, Derajat, and also to paragraph 5 of Mr. King's letter, dated 9th March, 1892, to the address of the Commissioner.

The money, strictly speaking, belongs to the Colony, and not to Government; and, if it had not been paid to the credit of these fines, it would have been spent in developing the colonization scheme and on improvements, all of which the individual Maliks will now eventually have to pay for.

Annexure 12.

Letter from J. S. Donald, Esq., C.I.E., Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 23rd June, 1900.

In compliance with your endorsement, dated 12th June, 1900, I have the honour to submit a statement showing the reasons why the four cases mentioned in paragraph 2 of Mr Watson's letter, dated 14th May, 1900, to your address, remained unsettled at the recent meeting held at Bannu in April last.

Case No. 4 of the statement has since been settled and filed. Thus there are now three cases pending, and two of these have also been settled so far as the claim of the Government is concerned.

ENDORSEMENT by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division; dated Dera Ismail Khan, 2nd July, 1900.

Copy, with copy of the enclosure, forwarded to J. M. Dowe, Esquire, Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, for information, in reply to his letter, dated 2nd June, 1900.

Annexure 13.

List of Cases attributed to the Mahsuds which remained pending at the close of the Meeting of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, held at Bannu in April, 1900.

Serial No.	Reference to previous correspondence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Nature of offence.	Brief account of the case.	Remarks made at the meeting, with explanations
1	Statement A—Enclosure to Political Officer Tochi's letter No. 1425, dated 21st November, 1899 <i>Case No 5</i>	Ghulam Muhammad Fattah, &c, Sarwana, Commissariat Department	Jalal Khel Mahsuds	Theft of 23 camels on 16th October, 1899	From reports received in the Tochi it was found that the raid was committed by the Mahsuds and the camels were still with the raiders	File to be made over to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification. On tribal responsibility the Tochi tribes paid a fine of Rs. 1,500 so the case is settled as far as the Tochi is concerned. It is for the Political Officer, Wana, to verify now whether the Mahsuds had any share in this case.
2	Do <i>Case No. 7</i>	Empress	Do	Robbery of three Lévies' muskets on 18th October, 1899	The Amsoni Malik, in whose limits the robbery was committed, arranged and got back the muskets on payment of blackmail	File made over to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification of "bhunga," which apparently amounted to Rs 200 Kabul. The Tochi tribes have returned the muskets, but they claim the amount of "bhunga" paid by them to the Mahsuds
3	Statement B. <i>Case No. 2</i>	Gul Mir, &c, of Idal Khel, Daur	Do	Raid on flock and murder of shepherd on 20th February, 1899.	A gang composed of Papare, Khilji, Ballo, &c, committed the raid	File to be sent to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification
4	Do. <i>Case No. 10</i>	Ghamik Din, &c	Do	Theft of one mare on 1st June, 1899	Political Officer, Wana, also wired that the mare was found with the Jalal Khels	Mare has been returned. Owner to be asked by the Political Officer, Tochi, if he has received it, if he has, case will be filed. NOTE—Mare has been returned. Case can be filed 21-5-00 J. S DONALD.

Miramshah,
the 22nd June, 1900.

J. S. DONALD,
Political Officer, Tochi,

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 26th July, 1900.

I am directed to refer to the telegram from this office, dated 26th April last, and to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 2nd instant, from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, and enclosures, containing further details of the raid committed on Miani Powindas in Spin on the 23rd April.

2. The gang that committed this raid was composed of Darwesh Khel of the Zalli Khel section and Mahsuds. The names of 11 of the former and 17 of the latter have been ascertained by the local officers. Eight of the Zalli Khel offenders have been arrested, tried by jirga, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine, but the Mahsud Malikhs have neither restored the stolen property nor surrendered the offenders. The Commissioner has, therefore, sanctioned the announcement to them of the following terms:—

- (1) Return of 117 camels, or compensation at Rs 50 per camel for those not returned
- (2) Payment of Rs 360 as blood-money.
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs 1,000 if the offenders are not surrendered. If no camels are returned, and none of the raiders is surrendered by the Mahsuds, the sum payable by that tribe for this offence will be Rs. 7,210.

The Lieutenant-Governor has approved of the terms sanctioned by the Commissioner.

 Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 2nd July, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated the 30th May, 1900, I have the honour to submit a copy of the following correspondence regarding the raid on Miani Powinda camels:—

Report from Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter to the Political Officer, Wana, dated 21st June, 1900.

Political Officer, Wana's letter, dated 23rd June, 1900.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 2nd July, 1900, to the Political Officer, Wana.

 Annexure 2.

Report on the Raid committed by Mahsuds and Zalli Khel Darwesh Khels upon Miani Powindas in the "protected area" of the Wana political jurisdiction on night of 23rd April, 1900.

This case occurred at Chaparra Khulla in Spin, which is recognised as being "protected area," and, therefore, the case is cognisable by the Political Officer, Wana.

The complainants are Miani Powindas, who were travelling up the Gomal route on their way to summer quarters in Khorasan. They reported

that, when their camels were out grazing, a gang of some 80 men raided them and carried off 170, and that one Powinda who followed the raiders was shot.

Enquiries were at once instituted, and have been going on up to date, and the case has been most thoroughly worked out

It has been ascertained that this raid was the work of a gang composed of Mahsuds and Zalli Khel Darwesh Khels. This gang made the original attack on the Powindas and started a stampede among the camels; and that whilst the Powindas followed in pursuit, four small gangs of Abdurrahman Khel Mahsuds drove off a certain number of camels which were left behind. It has been ascertained that 23 camels fell to the share of the Zalli Khels and 97 camels have been traced to Mahsuds, this gives a total of 120, it is more than probable that the complainants did exaggerate their loss, but it is also probable that a certain number of camels were killed when being driven off, so that if we take 140 as the total number of camels looted, we shall not be far wrong. This will leave 117 camels to be accounted for by the Mahsuds.

From enquiries made the names of 11 Zalli Khels and 17 Mahsuds who were with the gang who made the original attack and shot the Powinda have come to light, and the names of the leaders of the Abdurrahman Khel parties who also plundered the complainants are known. They are as follows:—

1. Suleman Gul	} Zalli Khels.	7 Allahdad	} Zalli Khels.
2. Miansai		8. Mir Jang	
3. Imarsan.		9 Kakorai	
4. Zir Gul		10 Mirzadad	
5. Zar Khan		11 Babar	
6. Karimdad.			

Of the above, Nos 1 to 8 have been arrested, tried by jirga under section 13, Frontier Crimes Regulation, and sentenced to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 100, with exception of Nos 7 and 8, who assisted the jirga in coming to a decision. No 7, Allahdad, was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 100 fine, and No. 8, Mir Jang, was sentenced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 100 fine.

The fines, if realised, to be paid as compensation to the complainants.

Nos. 9, 10, 11, when arrested, will also be placed before the same jirga for trial

The following are the names of the Mahsuds known to have been with the original gang:—

1. Ashik	} Garerais Alizais.
2. Zardad.	
3. Larrai	
With others not known.	
4. Mina Khan.	} Kohat Khel Alizai.
5. Ammal Shah	
6. Adamai.	} Mahkdinai Alizai.
7. Miralam.	
8. Mashadi	
9. Sheikhar	
10. Amrai, Giga Khel.	} Hamsayas of Malik Radshah
11. Gulbaz-Faridai	
12. Shekhai.	
13. Brother of "Khak."	} Khan, Alizai.
14. Shamdai, Guri Khel.	
15. Son of Juma Khan, Nekzam Khel.	} Bahlolzai.
16. Saiyid Gholam.	
17. Abdul Ghafur.	

The following are the names of the chief men with Abdurrahman Khef gangs:—

- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| 1. Snak. | 4. Banotai, brother of Malik |
| 2. Khalo. | Jangin. |
| 3. Drazs, brother of Malik
Shahzor. | 5. Shahbaz. |
| | 6. Saleh Khan. |

In spite of constant letters being written to the Mahsud Malik, no efforts have been made to recover the stolen camels or to punish the offenders. It is impossible to allow such a case as this to slide, and I would, therefore, ask that I may be authorised to announce the following terms to the Mahsud Malik for a settlement of this case:—

- (1) Restoration of stolen camels, or compensation at Rs. 50 per camel for those not restored, with offenders to be given up; or
- (2) Compensation for 117 camels at Rs. 50 per camel, Rs. 360 as blood-money for murdered Powinda with fine of Rs. 1,000.

S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana.

Sarwekai,
The 5th June, 1900.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 21st June, 1900.

With reference to the report on the raid committed by the Mahsuds and Zalli Khef Darwesh Khels on Miani Powindas in Spin on the night of the 23rd April, 1900, I have the honour to say that I do not understand the terms proposed. Does (1) of the terms mean that the camels are proposed to be restored without any fine at all? As the letter stands, term (1) or term (2) is given as alternative

Annexure 4.

Memorandum from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 23rd June, 1900.

In reply to his letter, dated 21st June, 1900, has the honour to state that terms (1) and (2) should read as follows:—

- (1) Restoration of stolen camels, or compensation at Rs. 50 per camel for those not restored and offenders to be given up for punishment or fine of Rs. 1,000, also Rs. 360 blood-money for murdered Powinda to be paid.
- (2) Compensation for 117 camels at Rs. 50 per camel, Rs. 360 as blood-money for murdered Powinda with fine of Rs. 1,000.

Annexure 5.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 2nd July, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 23rd June, 1900, I have the honour to say that I agree to the terms proposed.

Enclosure 12 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douze, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 17th August, 1900.

With reference to correspondence regarding the affairs of the Mahsud tribe ending with your letter, dated 10th August, I am directed to submit a copy of a letter, dated 24th July, with its enclosures, from the Commissioner of the Derajat, and to communicate the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

2 In the note appended to his letter Mr. Merk has dealt vigorously and comprehensively with the Mahsud question, and has made definite proposals for meeting a situation which has become extremely involved. It is fortunate that his predecessor, Mr. H. A. Anderson, before proceeding on furlough, prepared a full report on Waziristan, of which the first 72 pages, including the greater part of Section II, which treats of the Mahsuds, are now available in proof. This portion of the Memorandum is submitted for reference, and I am to invite special attention to Chapters II, V and VI. of Section II and to paragraphs 70 to 76 in Chapter IV.

3 Mr. Merk bases his recommendations to a great extent on views of the history of our dealings with the Mahsud tribe, which are open to discussion. But Sir Mackworth Young proposes to say but little on controversial topics. When he appointed Mr. Merk to the Commissionership of the Derajat, he anticipated that his experience of the Pathan tribes would be most valuable in enabling him to deal with the Mahsuds, and he has no doubt that this anticipation will be justified. As regards their democratic character, the Mahsuds and the Northern Pathans are much alike, and, as recognized by Her Majesty's Secretary of State in the 15th paragraph of his despatch, dated 28th January, 1898, the latter differ widely from the Baluch tribes controlled from Quetta, to which may be added those controlled by the Commissioner of the Derajat.

4. As to the broad question of policy raised by Mr. Merk in his second paragraph, it is, in His Honour's opinion, needless to go behind the decision of the Secretary of State communicated in the above-mentioned despatch and explained in the 7th paragraph of Mr. Barnes' letter, dated 7th August, 1899. Although it is inevitable that our control should be gradually extended over the whole of Waziristan, the Lieutenant-Governor understands that it is by no means desired that the collapse of all tribal authority should be in any way hastened by our attitude towards the Mahsuds. On the contrary it is intended that internal tribal government should be strengthened with a view to averting the necessity of our occupying the country or exercising an amount of interference in its affairs which would be hardly possible without occupation. If this is a correct statement of the position, the conclusion reached by Mr. Merk in the 12th paragraph of his note, with which Sir Mackworth Young is completely in accord, is the only one possible.

5. The question then arises whether Mr. Merk is right in his criticism of the existing system of management, which he regards as faulty in two respects, namely,—

- (a) that the Maliks through whom we work, and who receive allowances from Government, have been selected by us, and not by the tribe, and do not fully represent the latter, hence their influence over the tribe as a whole is not large,
- (b) that the attempt to secure the surrender of individual offenders instead of enforcing tribal responsibility is carried too far, and results in much unnecessary delay.

6 With reference to the allowances paid to the Maliks, we need not go further back than the agreement concluded between them and Sir Robert Sandeman in January, 1890, which is described in the 123rd and

124th paragraphs of Mr. Anderson's Memorandum. Mr. Anderson says that the detailed distribution of allowances was made "according to the recognized standard of tribal shares" and the agreement itself records that it was effected "by common consent and according to tribal usage." But the jirga at which the agreement was concluded consisted of only 400 persons out of a tribe containing 10,000 fighting men, and Mr. Anderson himself notes (paragraph 71) that the distribution "had many flaws in it," and that "several important sections and individuals had received no share in the allowances." The redistribution of 1895 (paragraph 72) aimed at a concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of Maliks, not upon the basis of tribal representation or a democratic vote so much as by the support and favour of Government. It is clear from the 28th and 29th paragraphs of Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 26th May, 1895, a copy of which was submitted with Mr Fanshawe's letter, dated 10th June, 1895, that the distribution lists were drawn up by our own officers. A subsequent letter from the Commissioner, dated 12th August, 1895, which was not forwarded to the Government of India, shows that, before the allowances were announced to a large jirga of 700 Mahsuds assembled at Shekh Budin, an attempt was made to obtain suggestions as to the distribution from the tribesmen. But they failed to agree among themselves, and the distribution made by the Commissioner was then announced to them.

7. All experience supports Mr. Merk's conclusions as to the inability of the Maliks, who are the recipients of allowances, to control the tribe Mr Bruce, the author of the present system of management, clearly admitted the fact in the 6th paragraph of his No 98, dated 28th February, 1894, submitted with Mr Fanshawe's letter, dated 24th March, 1894, and it is put forward as a reason for placing a military garrison in Spin in the Secretary of State's despatch, dated 24th August, 1894. The murder in 1894 of three Maliks who had been instrumental in procuring the surrender of Kelly's assassins, and the attack on Wana by the Mullah Powindah and the discontented tribesmen in defiance of the Maliks were patent proofs of weakness, which the Maliks themselves have never been slow to acknowledge, witness their twice-repeated request for annexation at the close of the expedition of 1894-95 and the petition of 3rd August, 1899, submitted with Mr Dane's letter of 28th September, 1899. Notwithstanding what Mr Anderson has stated in the 10th paragraph of the letter forwarded with my letter, dated 4th April, Sir Mackworth Young is forced to believe that the usefulness of the Maliks as a restraining force is getting less rather than greater.

8. Turning to Mr Merk's second criticism of past methods of management, the Lieutenant-Governor has always held that, unless the individual offenders are surrendered at once, tribal responsibility should be enforced. This is the policy favoured in his telegram of 31st July, 1899, to the Commissioner of the Derajat, a copy of which was submitted with Mr Dane's letter, dated 1st August of that year. The enforcement of tribal responsibility was asserted by Sir Robert Egerton twenty years ago to be the proper method of dealing with the Mahsuds, as the extract appended to Mr. Merk's letter shows. But the policy then laid down was not persevered in, and the strongest argument for believing in its soundness is to be derived, not from our experience with the Mahsuds, but from that gained in dealing with other Pathan tribes of similar character. Mr Anderson's final defence of the Derajat system is contained in the letter mentioned at the close of paragraph 7, and the petition of the Maliks annexed to that letter contains a protest against its abandonment. But the arguments which Mr Anderson advanced do not seem to Sir Mackworth Young to be convincing. The sequel to the surrender of Kelly's murderers, to which reference has already been made, is one notable example of the fact that the method hitherto pursued in dealing with offences is totally foreign to the ideas of the tribe, and that insistence on it is in practice extremely difficult. Sir Mackworth Young does not wish to be understood as maintaining that in the case quoted, where an Englishman was assassinated in cold blood, we should have been content with anything less than the surrender of his murderers. He merely

quotes the case as illustrating the extreme difficulty of insisting on the surrender of offenders in ordinary cases. The tribesmen must have felt that the circumstances of the case were such that the British Government was bound to insist on very heavy retribution, but this did not save the Malikhs who helped us in the matter.

9 These being the faults of the present system, the remedies which Mr Merk proposes briefly are—

- (1) to make the allowances, as in the case of the Khaibar, to the tribe instead of to selected Malikhs, and
- (2) to deal with the tribe as a whole, and to enforce tribal instead of individual responsibility in the case of offences.

This will not preclude a demand for the surrender of an offender by the tribe in particular cases. And the Mahsuds can always, if they please, free themselves from responsibility for an outrage by giving up the guilty persons for trial by jirga or otherwise.

10 The Lieutenant-Governor believes that our future policy with reference to the Mahsuds should be reconstructed on these lines. He does not lose sight of the fact that we cannot deal with a mob of 10,000 fighting men, that there must be headmen to act as representatives and spokesmen of the tribe, that in recognizing such headmen there is room for the repetition of such mistakes as have occurred in the past, and, however good the selection may be, occasions may arise in which the headmen will be powerless to restrain their recalcitrant tribesmen. But it is essential that we should get into touch with the real tribal leaders, and, if we have not wholly succeeded in doing this in the past, we must be prepared to alter our system. In doing this we have to aid us the precedent of the Northern Pathan tribes. The introduction of a new system of tribal responsibility will require full consideration of details, among which may be mentioned the question whether there should be separate dealings with the three main subdivisions of the tribe in regard to smaller matters, or even with more of the tribal sections or sub-sections. But if we succeed in enlisting the tribe as a whole in our interests by a subsidy which is really tribal, we should not hesitate to exact correlative responsibility from the tribe as a whole when to do so suits our purpose.

11 What we require, in fact, is to find out whatever elements of self-government exist in the tribe, though the Mahsud "republic" is in actual working at present not far removed from anarchy, and to recognize these elements in our dealings with it. The 277 Malikhs whom we see are not the government of the tribe, though with our help they have been able to pose as such. We need to find a broader basis for diplomatic relations, and one which coincides with the tribal government such as it is. In this way we may hope to strengthen internal self-government, for the present weakness of which our past policy is in part responsible.

12. Meanwhile we have on the one hand our existing engagements with the Malikhs, and on the other a breakdown in our relations with the tribe. The present situation, though unfortunate in other respects, is favourable for a revision of our engagements. Mr Merk's plan for dealing with the long reckoning we have against the Mahsuds in such a way as to force them to recognize the unsuitability of the present compact is set forth in the 13th and succeeding paragraphs of his note. A month hence our demand against the tribe is pretty sure to exceed a lakh of rupees, and in view of the scarcity which has recently prevailed in the hills to the west of the Derajat, Sir Mackworth Young fears Mr Merk is somewhat sanguine in thinking it possible to have the account settled in a fortnight. But whether the settlement is long or short, it is essential that it should be effected, and that, failing voluntary compliance, the tribe should be coerced into submission. Mr. Merk's plan, therefore, has Sir Mackworth Young's entire support.

13. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with the Commissioner in thinking that, if coercion is necessary, it should take the form of a blockade. Former blockades of the Mahsuds have not always been very effectual. The one referred to in the 97th paragraph of Mr. Anderson's Memorandum was evidently severely felt, and, after being continued for nearly seven months, effected its object. But less than a year afterwards the most daring outrage which the Mahsuds have ever perpetrated was carried out when Tank was burnt on the 1st of January, 1879. We have now, however, far greater facilities than formerly for blockading the tribe. The Mahsuds can now be excluded from the Tochi, and though the back door to Afghanistan is still open, the approach to it through the Darwesh Khel country is likely to be closed so long as the Badar land dispute is unsettled. Sir Mackworth Young has no doubt that the pressure of a blockade would be very severely felt by the Mahsuds. It might be necessary to reinforce our posts, but if the tribe do not satisfy our demands, this and other inconveniences must be faced, otherwise greater troubles will ensue.

14. The submission of the tribe, however brought about, must be followed sooner or later by a revision of the arrangements as to allowances. Sir Mackworth Young understands that in the Khaibar a sum of about Rs 80,000 is allotted to six tribes containing some 20,000 fighting men. A grant of over Rs 60,000 yearly to the Mahsuds with 10,000 fighting men falls at a considerably higher rate per head. But the money will be well spent if we obtain a proper equivalent in the good behaviour of the Mahsuds, and it must be remembered that their military service is, and their militia service will be, much smaller than in the case of the Afridis.

15. The militia scheme may be somewhat interrupted, but the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it probable that the fear of being left out of it will be a strong lever to induce the tribe to compose their quarrel with us as soon as possible.

16. As regards the Mullah Powindah it is pretty certain that, if our new arrangement with the tribe is founded upon the actual facts of tribal government, he will, as Mr Merk anticipates, have to be reckoned with. But the place he will occupy in the system will depend not upon our ideas of his power and influence, but upon the place assigned to him by the tribe. We shall, generally, in dealing with these uncivilized tribes, have to accept their own representatives, however much we may disapprove of them. In connection with the Afridi rising of 1897-98, a strong attempt was made by the Military Authorities to induce Government to proclaim the two Zakha Khel Maliks, Wali Muhammad Khan and Khawas Khan, as disqualified from ever representing their tribe. But it was held that such action would be a mistake, as whatever their conduct had been, it would be impossible to exclude them from the position accorded to them by the tribe itself when negotiations should be re-opened. The wisdom of this decision has been proved by subsequent events.

17. As Mr Merk's views have been fully given in the letter now submitted, the Lieutenant-Governor has thought it best to defer summoning him to Simla till the Government of India has had an opportunity of considering the present communication. Further orders will be awaited, but meanwhile Mr. Merk has been warned that his presence may at any time be required.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 24th July, 1900.

In paragraph 5 of your letter, dated the 2nd June, 1900, His Honour accepted my proposal to defer dealing with all cases against the Mahsuds not included in the March settlement till August or September next.

2. The situation in connection with the Mahsuds is grave, and I have the honour now, in the note attached, dated to-day, to submit my views on it with recommendations for future action.

3. I also enclose copies of the following correspondence bearing upon the subject:—

- (1) Extract of paragraph 6 of Punjab Government letter, dated the 3rd January, 1881, to the Government of India, of which I specially invite perusal.
- (2) A Memorandum by Mr. Watson, late Political Officer, Wana, dated 14th May, 1900.
- (3) Telegram, dated 4th June, from Political Officer, Wana
My reply, dated 5th June
Letter, dated 12th June, 1900, from Political Officer, Wana
- (4) A Memorandum by Mr. Waterfield, Political Officer, Wana, dated 17th instant.
- (5) Letter, dated the 18th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, with statements of offences committed by Mahsuds since the date of the March settlement up to the 15th instant

Annexure 2.

Note by W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on our present position in respect of the Mahsud Wazirs, dated 24th July, 1900.

Before discussing briefly the present state of affairs in connection with the Mahsud tribe, and submitting proposals for future action, I will prefix a short historical retrospect, which will, I trust, serve to explain how the existing condition of things has come about, it may also be of use in elucidating mistakes that have been made in the past, and thereby in aiding to avoid them hereafter.

All references are given in the margin.

2 The key-note of the whole case regarding the Waziris is very well put in a recent military publication: "The organization of their clans, such as it is, is strongly democratic, and their headmen have little real power. . . . Contact with a settled Government like our own appears to have had a disintegrating effect on them, and their unity and power of combination are becoming things of the past" The question now is, shall we arrest this disintegration and endeavour to re-establish the power of combination; in other words, shall we strengthen and refresh internal tribal government, or shall we let the collapse of all tribal authority, of the internal controlling and restraining power proceed till, in self-defence, we shall be compelled to occupy the Mahsud country?

3. The Mahsuds from time immemorial, like many other frontier tribes who now are our peaceful neighbours, have been, and still are, robbers and raiders. The early and the later history of our dealings with them is—one brief interval of absolute peace excepted—that of constant friction and struggle, varied by the expeditions of 1860, 1881 and 1894-95 Till 1862 no systematic basis of political relations with the Mahsuds appears to have been adopted In that year, however, the three main sections composing the Mahsud tribe, viz, the Bahlolzai, Alizai, and Shaman Khel clans, formally accepted tribal responsibility for their respective subdivisions. The treatment, however, of the tribe does not seem to have been marked

with much vigour and success till 1875, when a local Chief in British territory, the Nawab of Tank, whose management of the Mahsud border and tribe had broken down, was set aside and "the enforcement among the Mahsuds themselves of complete tribal responsibility for offences committed

Page 532, Paget and Mason ; also extract of paragraph 6 of Punjab Government letter, dated 3rd January, 1881, attached

Page 533, Paget and Mason.

by any of their sections led to a marked change in the character of this part of the frontier." From 1875 to 1877 peace reigned. In the latter year, only for the kidnapping of a Hindu child (it was subsequently restored unhurt), the whole Mahsud tribe was promptly blockaded, a drastic and vigorous measure, which resulted in the full submission of the tribe in March, 1878. When one contrasts this action with such retribution as has been meted out for the recent grave offences committed time after time by the Mahsuds, with the punishment (if it may be so called) inflicted on account of the repeated slaughter of Government servants and the harrying of British subjects, one

Page 533, Paget and Mason

begins to realize why the tribe continues to misbehave. "This blockade demonstrated what a powerful engine of coercion such a measure was against the Mahsuds for the redress of all ordinary border crime. In 1878 it was reported that the Tank (Mahsud) border (of the Dera Ismail Khan District) had never been before in such a satisfactory condition." It is of this halcyon time that the Settlement Officer writes of the Mahsuds: "In spite of one or two blockades enforced with a view to establishing the principle of joint

Paragraph 348, Part I, Tucker's Settlement Report of Dera Ismail Khan.

tribal responsibility, raids and offences of all sorts have, during the last two or three years, become extremely rare. On the whole, our relations with the Mahsuds are now as friendly as with any of the other Pathan tribes on our border. The Mahsuds have no recognized chiefs or headmen. They are exceedingly democratic in their ways. They like to assert their equality."

4 Towards the end of 1878 the Mahsuds were drawn into the national and religious excitement which arose upon the outbreak of the Afghan War. On New Year's Day, 1879, they burnt Tank. For the next two years they were blockaded, and gave much trouble, till the expedition of 1881 put matters straight. It is doubtful whether this blockade was stringent enough. It was followed by a further period of quiet, during which tribal responsibility appears to have been steadily enforced. In fact, so friendly were the Mahsuds that in 1883 they helped the survey of the Gomal Pass.

5 We come now to the phase of the case relating to the Mahsuds with which we are still concerned. It commenced with an attempted exploration of the Gomal and adjoining country which failed in 1888. In 1889-90 the Gomal road was opened, and arrangements connected therewith were made with the Mahsuds, involving the payment of allowances and the constitution of Levies. Thereupon followed friction with the Amir, Afghan intrigues in Waziristan, and grave misconduct on part of the Mahsuds, the latter lasting throughout 1892 and 1893 and ten months of 1894, till in November, 1894, the Mahsud opposition culminated in the attack on the Wana camp. This led to the third Mahsud Expedition, 1894-95, and to a re-arrangement of the Mahsud allowances in July, 1895. Since then Mahsud misbehaviour has steadily increased in intensity and persistence till, after the faulty settlement of last March, we are confronted by an *impasse* and by the complete and openly acknowledged breakdown of what is known as the "Mahiki" system.

Pages 2-11, "Operations against the Mahsud Wajirs," issued by Quartermaster-General's Department.

Expedition, 1894-95, and to a re-arrangement of the Mahsud allowances in July, 1895. Since then Mahsud misbehaviour has steadily increased in intensity and persistence till, after the faulty settlement of last March, we are confronted by an *impasse* and by the complete and openly acknowledged breakdown of what is known as the "Mahiki" system.

6. The author of the existing political system which since 1890 has been adopted for the conduct of mutual relations by ourselves and by a portion (by no means numerically, and it seems politically, the strongest

portion) of the Mahsuds is Mr Bruce. This officer, before coming to the Waziristan border, had spent the chief part of his service in Dera Ghazi Khan and the Quetta Agency, among Biluchis and Brahuis. He had seen the striking success of the system among a congeries of tribes over whom the late Sir R. Sandeman had established British supremacy. It was done by the force of personal character, influence, and abilities, by the skilful conciliation of the chiefs and headmen, to whom, according to their habits and ingrained loyalty, which is the tradition and custom of immemorial generations, the clansmen render an implicit obedience. It was effected also by the introduction of peace and order, partly through the settlement of inter-tribal disputes, either in a friendly manner or authoritatively, backed up, as Sir R. Sandeman was, by ample funds and by troops and numerous garrisons throughout the country which he occupied. Mr Bruce came away impressed with the advantages of this political system, which, in a totally different people and in entirely different conditions had achieved a lasting victory. He approached his task with a strong pre-disposition to find among the Mahsuds, who are a purely Pathan tribe, with purely Pathan political institutions, that system of Chiefs and headmen and the existence of that official hierarchy and orderly discipline which are such conspicuous characteristics of the Biluch tribes, and also very probably (in a much less degree however) of the semi-Biluchized Pathan tribes fringing the

Paragraph 237, *et infra*, of Mr. Bruce's Memorandum on our past and present relations with the Waziri tribe, 1888.

Biluchis, such as the Dumars, Lunis, Musa Khels and others with whom in the course of his service in Biluchistan he had come in contact. In every community, however democratic it be, there are men who come to and remain at the front, owing to natural ability, hereditary wealth, or both, or from other causes. Among Pathan tribes these men are called Maliks, and it was natural for a man long accustomed to the Biluch hereditary and immutable gradation of undisputed authority and office bearers to assume that the same edifice existed in the Maliks among the Mahsuds, or if it did not actually exist, then that its rudiments were there and that with a little encouragement it might be built up. This assumption appears to me to have been the initial error—the leopard does not change his spots, nor can we graft on to political institutions what does not exist in them and what cannot develop except by the slow growth of centuries. We can destroy swiftly enough, but we cannot cause to grow much faster than is natural. least of all can the outsider implant political elements into a community with much hope of success. It seems to have been overlooked that Biluchis have not that fierce love of political and municipal independence, and that underlying current of fanatical dislike of the foreigner which are such marked features in the character of strong Pathan hill tribes. It seems to have been thought that, as with the Biluchis, with whom, however, these feelings are almost totally absent, the grant of allowances and of service would obliterate them. But the cardinal error lay in introducing the system without first providing the vital condition requisite for its successful working. That became soon enough apparent to Mr Bruce and to the Maliks themselves. Briefly the system was and is—

- (1) What are believed to be, and in many cases are actually, the leading men are selected by us, *not by the tribe*; are classified by us into five grades according to their supposed power and influence (a process almost impossible to achieve with any degree of accuracy), and are paid allowances according to their gradation. These are the Maliks. This is intended to gain the leaders.
- (2) In order to win the body of the tribe, the Maliks are told to produce a certain number of clansmen for service, whose pay they share. These are the Levies.
- (3) In return for the allowances, both Maliks and Levies are expected to serve Government, to control the body of the clansmen, the "ulus," and to arrange that individual offenders are surrendered for trial and punishment by us, and not by the

tribe. This last stipulation obviously implies the loss of the internal or municipal independence of the tribe, which explains why all tribes are so loth to agree to the surrender of offenders for punishment by aliens instead of their being punished by the clan itself, if and when the clan does not prefer to share their punishment.

7. In a rough way this system corresponds to our system of administration in British India. the Maliks are the Lambardars, the Levies are the Police, and the trial of individual offenders is what our law Courts do. For a country which is in our effective occupation this rough analogy to our more settled administration within the border suits admirably. Sir R. Sandeman

* *Note.*—This is practically stated in paragraph 9 of Mr. Bruce's Memorandum cited above.

W. R. H. MERR

was fully aware of this, but he also realised that, for the system to work, it was above all things necessary that the country should be occupied,* or else dominated to such a degree as differs only in name from occupation. He was careful to get hold of his country before he introduced his system. Mr Bruce reversed the process with naturally a reversed result. He started the system and hoped to get hold of the country, but failed in this. That was the cardinal error to which I have referred above. He should have made sure of getting the country before he began the system.

8. The crucial test of the system occurred shortly after it was set going; in July, 1893, Mr. Kelly was murdered by Mahsuds in Zhob. The Biluchistan authorities pressed for a heavy punishment, and correspondence ensued in the course of which Mr. Bruce defined

Paragraph 11 of his letter, dated the 16th February, 1894.

recommmend the imposition of heavy fines on both sections of the Waziri tribe (*i.e.*, to enforce tribal responsibility) or to act against the individual murderers of Mr Kelly. He chose the latter

Mr. Bruce's letter No. 287, dated 30th May, 1894

imprisonment. He states emphatically that it was impossible to enforce severer measures for the brutal and unprovoked murder of a European, because, as he had many times represented, "so long as our control over the

Paragraph 27 of above letter.

is impracticable for them to go beyond certain limits" What he wanted was "support of the Maliks from within," or, in other words, the occupation

Paragraph 9.

occupation he evidently foresaw the collapse of the system. Even so, without occupation, the Maliki system might have dragged on a precarious existence of doubtful value longer than it has done but for the sequel to the

Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 2nd August, 1894.

general service done for us.

It appears to have been intended that the surrender of the murderers of the Maliks should be demanded, on pain of an expedition, but the Boundary Delimitation and attack on the Wana camp intervened, and retribution for these murders seems to have been dropped, for in the terms to the Mahsuds enforced by the 1894-95 expedition there is no mention of the murderers of the Maliks. This pronounced the doom of the

Page 52, Operations against Mahsud Waziris, 1894-95.

Malik system, and it became hereafter a mere question of time when it would break down altogether. If the Maliks were weak before, if the system had already grave defects and was without the only foundation which could ensure its stability, it is clear that the tribal vengeance that overtook such Maliks as endeavoured to carry out their engagements, a vengeance which we did not punish, proved a fatal shock and settled matters, at any rate as far as the Maliks themselves are personally concerned. It was anticipated that, so far from the allowances and such support as could be given them short of occupation adding to the strength of the Maliks, "we are destined both in the Darwesh Khel and the Mahsud country to experience greater difficulties as time goes on from the weakness of the Waziri Maliks." No doubt, however, so rapid a decline and death was not foreseen as has actually occurred. Although the effect of the 1894-95 expedition and of the

Punjab Government letter, dated 6th August, 1896, paragraph 2, to Government of India.

grant of the enhanced allowances in July, 1895, brought about a temporary lull in Mahsud offences, they have from 1896-97 onwards steadily increased, and the will to control, and influence to restrain, of the Maliks have as steadily diminished, till we are face to face with the present crisis, within five years of an expedition on a large scale

9 Before considering this crisis, I will go back for a moment to the July, 1895, settlement. From the nature of things where we, who are outsiders, undertake to gauge the influence and position of persons in a community of which we can know but little and which itself has no means (such as we have in Parliamentary elections) of estimating political power, numerous errors must necessarily occur. In the 1890 settlement of allowances these did occur, and the 1895 settlement sought to remedy them. But the papers of Messrs. Watson and Waterfield, which I enclose, who, as Political Officers, have had to work the settlement, show that this second settlement has

Punjab Government letter, dated 21st January, 1895, to Government of India.

not escaped the defects of its predecessor. It was made at Shekh Budin by the Maliks themselves. The estimates that Maliks form of each other are not by any means always those that the "ulus" forms of them, any more than those of Members of Parliament regarding each other correspond with those of the electorate regarding the same.

* e.g., the Zaranj case, paragraph 7 of Political Officer Wana's letter, dated 14th May, 1900.

populo, in presence of the and serious point is that the Maliks have, generally speaking, utterly failed in carrying out the two first and also the two most important of the conditions attached to the grant of the 1895 allowances, viz, that they will prevent offences and raids in British and protected territories, and that they will surrender offenders in cases against Government or Government servants and interests.

Paragraph 4 of Mr Bruce's letter, dated 12th August, 1895, to Government.

The third condition, viz, that they will supply escorts to officers entering their country for the management of the tribe or its administration, has remained a dead-letter in view of the Government of India orders which were given shortly before this condition was made with the tribe, that "interference of this kind with the interior of the Waziri country and the establishment of posts as sketched by Mr Bruce are all contrary to the existing orders of Her Majesty's Government . . . and these questions must for the present be held in abeyance." That the third condition should have been formulated after the issue of the above instructions is a curious instance of the tenacity with which Mr. Bruce held to the postulate (without which no doubt he felt that the system he had established would break down) that concurrently with his system there must

Foreign Department letter, dated the 28th June, 1894.

with the interior of the Waziri country and the establishment of posts as sketched by Mr Bruce are all contrary to the existing orders of Her Majesty's Government . . . and these questions must for the present be held in abeyance." That the third condition should have been formulated after the issue of the above instructions is a curious instance of the tenacity with which Mr. Bruce held to the postulate (without which no doubt he felt that the system he had established would break down) that concurrently with his system there must

be some sort of occupation or administration of the Mahsud country. In view of what follows below, I note here that the allowances fixed in 1895 were—

	Rs.
	33,060 a year "service allowances," viz, shared by Levies and Malikhs
	28,488 a year "Maliki allowances," to the Malikhs alone.
Total	<u>61,548 per annum.</u>

10 The present position is this. after what are undoubtedly grave inadequate punishments had been fixed on our part for a series of grave offences against Government (in which the Malikhs as a body are bound by the conditions attached to their allowances, which conditions they deliberately and formally accepted, to surrender the offenders for punishment) and for a long series of other raids, murders and robberies, and after scraping together money, adding thereto items from the pay of Levies and from money that had lain for years in deposit, the Mahsuds have arranged, last March, to pay in the course of time 35,000 rupees, the liabilities in all probability not being liquidated for at least a year, if not more. But at

Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 12th August, 1895

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Punjab Government letter of 2nd June, 1900, and paragraph 2 of my letter, dated 28th June, 1900.

* Letter, dated 18th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, and enclosure.

the time there was in addition due from the Mahsuds the sum of 18,800 rupees for one set of cases and 14,500 rupees for another set, or a total of 33,300 rupees. Since the date of the March settlement the account against the Mahsuds has been further swelled by the addition shown in the enclosed correspondence* of fresh liabilities up to the 15th July, 1900, aggregating 26,809 rupees, making with the 33,300 rupees above a total of 60,100 rupees. Now this is a perfectly hopeless position, over and above the 35,000 rupees settled for we have a claim of 60,100 rupees against them. And this, five years after an expedition, and to a month five years after liberal allowances had been allotted all round, and after what are understood to be the most powerful and really leading political elements in the tribe had explicitly engaged to keep the peace.

11 If by a determined measure we should now succeed in obtaining redress from the Mahsuds, what guarantee have we as matters stand that five years hence we shall not be as badly off as we are now? None whatever, I should say. I venture to submit as strongly as I can that something must be done, that things cannot go on as they are. There is something radically wrong, and if my premises in this note are sound, then the radical wrong lies in the present system. We move in a vicious circle. We look to the Malikhs, and they look to us. Between the two the management of the Mahsuds falls to the ground. The system now in force pre-supposes—it demands—our occupation of the country. We do not occupy it, and the house that has been building from 1890 to date lacks its foundation. It seems to me that only two courses are open to us,—either to carry the present system to its logical and natural conclusion, viz., to occupy the Mahsud country, or to abandon a half-system and to revert to the other plan, which, as I have shown, certainly ensured a remarkable tranquillity from 1875 to 1878 and again from 1881 to 1889. This plan, viz., tribal responsibility and dealing with the tribe as a whole corporate body, and not alone with few representatives selected by us (270 men out of 10,000), has the merits of proved success in the past, and of being in entire consonance with the political constitution of the Mahsuds. There may be some other course available, but I can think of none. This at any rate is perfectly clear to me that an organic change in the present system is imperatively necessary, and that whatever measure we adopt ought not to be a half measure. As a matter of fact, in disbanding the Levies we have knocked away part of the structure that lacks its foundation.

12. Of the two courses indicated above, the occupation of the Mahsud country is a question of State policy, on which I am not called upon to give an opinion, beyond submitting my personal view for what it is worth, viz, that the game of occupation will be out and away not worth the large candle we shall have to burn for it. But that, if no change is made in the present system, we shall be driven, *volens volens*, to occupation, is, I submit, perfectly plain from the inferences to be drawn from the course of events since 1895 and from the accounts of the existing state of affairs contained in the enclosed Memoranda of Messrs. Watson and Waterfield. The Malikhs themselves entertain no illusions on the score of what the present system must inevitably lead to. They see clearly that to maintain their present

* See for instance paragraph 4 of Political Officer Wana's letter, dated 18th July, 1896, and paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 10th August, 1896, to the Government of India.

W R H MERK

position and emoluments we must be in their country, this conviction is at the bottom of their frequent petitions to us to take over their country,* and prompts the frank confessions of their political and social impotence which they might otherwise be tempted to conceal, which attitude again explains the power that Mullah Powindah has as the opponent of Malikhs who would sell their country, and the want of influence of the Malikhs among the clansmen themselves, who by no means long for our advent. As I have said, we are involved in vicious circles. If for other reasons it is not advisable to take the Mahsud country, then I submit it will be deplorable if we are driven to take it by adherence to a system which, worked by enthusiastic supporters who claim for it "ethical" superiority, has after a short time landed us in an *impasse* of unavenged bloodshed and rapine.

13. If Government approve of an organic change in the present system, I cannot with certainty predict that it will be carried through without a rupture in the existing relations with the Mahsuds, possibly a collision. But as we are anyhow, with our demand for satisfaction, on the brink of a crisis, and as the Malikhs by their patent failures to keep their promises of 1895 have offered us full justification for an alteration in the existing arrangements, the present moment seems the most favourable opportunity for introducing it. Moreover, the step brooks no delay, else, if the past is any indication of the future, we shall two or three years hence be again face to face with another unsettled bill of huge dimensions. That the Malikhs will object to the change is intelligible. At present they give plenty of advice, some information (if an enemy can be hit thereby so much the better), sit at home and pocket good allowances. This is pleasing, and there is further the agreeable prospect that this line of action may compel Government to occupy the country, after which they will peacefully draw their pay for ever. The "ulus," the clansmen, on the other hand, will no doubt welcome the change if it transfers to them what the Malikhs receive, and try as much as possible to stick to. Moreover, if the change removes the danger of an occupation of the Mahsud tract, it will commend itself to the bulk of the community and to fanatics, provided that both classes perceive this, and it ought not to be difficult to bring them to realize it.

14. But the main difficulty will be money. 28,488 rupees a year go a good distance when divided between 270 Malikhs, it comes to over 100 rupees per head; but they do not go far when shared by 10,000 fighting men. This sum of 28,000 rupees is one fraction of the total tribal allowance of 61,000 rupees; the other fraction is the 33,000 rupees, service allowance. Of this latter item a portion, viz, 12,504 rupees^(a), has been set apart as payable to the Malikhs† in lieu of sillahdari, which with their Malikhi allowance makes a total of 41,000 rupees a year. If the Malikhs by their failure to execute the conditions of 1895 are held to have forfeited their allowances, we shall have 41,000

† Paragraph 26 of Punjab Government letter, dated 5th March, 1900, to Government of India.

^(a) This is a mistake. Of the sum mentioned only Rs 6,600 will be payable to the Mahsud Malikhs—page 21 of Report of Waziristan Militia Committee

J. M. DOUTIE

* Punjab Government letters, dated 21st January, 1895, and (paragraph 9) 10th May, 1895.

† Page 63 of Waziristan Militia Committee's Report.

rupees available for distribution to the Mahsuds. There remain out of the 61,500 rupees* 20,500 rupees, being the pay of the Levies disbanded. Against this is the set off of the pay of the 300 Mahsuds, who will be entertained in the Southern Waziristan Militia, on 10 rupees per head, or 36,000 rupees a year.† But this pay and this service is something totally different from the old pay and the old service; men in the Militia will to all intents be on much the same footing as sepoy in the army. In fixing tribal allowances it has not been the custom to reckon in the pay of sepoy, &c, belonging to the tribe; *e.g.*, the Khaibar allowances, the Orakzai subsidies, the Kohat Pass allowances, the Mohmand allowances, have been allotted quite irrespective of the incomes of tribes from members drawing pay in Government service. At a moderate computation, some 1,800 Afridis serve in the army, some 1,200 more in the Khaibar Rifles. These 3,000 men between them draw at least three lakhs a year in pay, but I do not think that this fact has had any bearing upon the fixation of the amount of the allowances drawn by the Khaibar clans. I have no recent information of allowances paid in Biluchistan, but from Mr. Bruce's Memorandum of 1888 it would appear that the Marris draw 14 rupees a year per head of fighting men, the Bugtis 18 rupees, and the Kutchi Biluchis 16 rupees. On this scale the Mahsuds, who number 10,000 fighting men, should have been receiving at least 1,20,000 rupees, or, on the scale of the Thal-Chotiala Pathans, 80,000 rupees a year.

Paragraph 255.

15. There can be no question but that the Mahsuds are poor, that their country is small, and that the ever-increasing population is pressing upon its means of subsistence. We are not in the least called on to feed hungry hillmen. But it has been repeatedly brought to notice that the Mahsud allowances are small as compared with the strength and power of the tribe and with such payments elsewhere. What I would venture to point out is that the Mahsud problem is on all fours with the Khaibar Afridi problem: the cases are exactly parallel, in both we have powerful tribes of marked energy of character and restless predatory habits, living in distant highlands and commanding great routes or passes by which Afghanistan is reached through the mountain barrier on our frontier. No doubt the Khaibar is strategically much more important than the Gomal, but what is more to the point in the present question is that to both the Afridis and the Mahsuds allowances were granted, in 1879 and 1890 respectively, for the specific purpose of our use of the passes. By the 1895 settlement these allowances in the case of the Mahsuds have been extended to cover good conduct generally over a much wider sphere than is comprised in the Gomal Pass. On the whole, I would recommend that the Mahsuds be treated as the Khaibar Afridis. I have no exact details of the Khaibar allowances, but if I am not mistaken, a scale obtained by dividing the total amount of the Khaibar allowances among the number of fighting men in the Khaibar Afridi tribe will show that on a proportionate ratio the allowances for the Mahsuds would work out to something like 60,000 rupees a year. This is quite irrespective of the much greater income indirectly afforded to the Khaibar Afridis by their service in the army and in the Khaibar Rifles, as compared with the three companies in the Southern Waziristan Militia reserved for the Mahsuds.

16. I would therefore suggest that the whole 61,000 rupees be made available for re-distribution among the Mahsuds upon the basis of full tribal responsibility. This re-distribution I would leave to the tribe itself to effect, as I did with the Mohmands in 1896. The reasons for this course are as follows:—We cannot possibly know so well as the tribe knows itself who are the really powerful men, in a distribution by the tribe for the tribe the really powerful men and sections obtain what they want, for if they were not powerful they would not get it; and since our object is to win what power there is in the tribe, the process exactly ensures our aim;

lastly, the *odium* of irregularities is shifted off our shoulders on to the tribe itself. Moreover, as the distribution is arrived at ultimately, after a good deal of compromise and struggle within the tribe, by general consent, it has in it the element of stability and universal acceptance.

17. As to tribal responsibility *versus* individual responsibility, it is not a question of ethics at all, but one of international law, as applicable to our dealings with the politically subordinate, but municipally independent, little republics of the frontier. It is no use beating about the bush and hiding the true issue behind a coat of ethics. Tribal responsibility means internal self-government, which, I would add, is quite compatible with political subjection. The subsidising of selected agents coupled with the punishment of individual offenders means the assumption of the internal administration of the clans, and I hope I have made it clear that our difficulties with the Mahsuds are due to such an assumption having been declared in theory and attempted in practice without that essential condition to its success, the effective domination or occupation of the country. It is because the supporters of the present system have not clearly distinguished between political and municipal independence, and have argued that want of the first must necessarily bring with it loss of the second, that we are in the present dilemma. The Native States of India are examples of political but not of municipal subordination, and the establishment of tribal responsibility means that, *mutatis mutandis*, the little Mahsud Republic shall be in future a kind of Native State. From a practical point of view, the great advantage of tribal responsibility is that under it everybody in the tribe becomes, and is made to be, interested in controlling bad or restless characters, whereas by the Maliki system only a few individuals, perhaps small sections, are concerned in restrictive action. It is evident from the history of the past five years and from what the Maliks have cynically confessed to Mr Waterfield that these few individuals have not the power to control, and that when they entertain the inclination to act up to their duty they have excellent reasons, *e g*, the murders of the Maliks in Kelly's case, to leave their duty alone. Lastly, as I have pointed out above, tribal responsibility has, as a matter of fact, proved successful with the Mahsuds in the past.

18. In this re-distribution it will be convenient to reserve a certain sum, partly for payment by the Political Officer at his discretion in reward of special services or other sufficient reasons, and partly to compensate any Maliks who may lose by such a re-distribution and at the same time have special claims on us, though I doubt if there are many such Maliks. They have failed completely to do their duties, *e g*, Barahmat, the Aimal Khel Mahik, who was instrumental* in procuring the eventual surrender and punishment of the three minor offenders in the Shahur Tangi case, is the very man who broke up the recent settlement by *Shariat* of the Badar disputes.

19. It may be argued: why have a redistribution at all, why not enforce tribal responsibility with the present allowances and system of distribution? To which the tribe not unreasonably makes answer: "We see nothing of what the Maliks get, why should *we* be held responsible and *they* get the money? The 'service allowance' is paid for specific services rendered by the Levies, and is out of the account so to speak. We, the 'ulus,' receive nothing; it is fair that responsibility should fall on those who take money for it." And in fact this has been the attitude of the "ulus" all along. Were we to say that no one should get anything, but that it was incumbent on all with whom we have friendly relations to keep the peace with us, on pain of the displeasure of Government, that position would be perfectly intelligible to them. But what they do not understand and what seems to them unjust is that one set of members of the tribe should draw respectable allowances and that the second set (by far the most numerous), who get nothing, should suffer for the shortcomings of the first set. There is a good deal in this. It seems to me that to enforce tribal responsibility

* Punjab Government letter, dated 27th March, 1900.

with the existing distribution of allowances and system of management is to shift a burden from the shoulders of the paid to those of the unpaid; and although all are swept into the net when tribal responsibility is enforced, yet, under present arrangements, it is one thing to draw allowances and to pay, a fine out of them, and another thing to draw no allowances and yet have to pay a fine.

20. But before anything is done in the way of reform and of re-adjustment, it is absolutely necessary that our claim for redress should be satisfied completely, and that it should be thoroughly brought home to the Mahsuds that Government are firmly resolved not to permit future misconduct. At present nothing can be done with them. They are quite out of hand. And this is not astonishing. For five years they have done pretty much what they pleased; the attempts of the Political Officers to keep them straight and to enforce redress with good behaviour have been as profitless as beating the water in face of the inherent weakness of the situation. To wind up matters, the settlement last March must have been liable to raise the impression that the larger the bill the smaller the retribution. Till the Mahsuds are wheeled into line, it is useless to try to manage them. And if we do not now bring them up with a round turn, if we do not now peremptorily compel them to do us complete and full satisfaction, there will be an end of keeping the Mahsuds in order—for reasons that are obvious. It is nonsense to say that the Mahsuds cannot pay, the claim against them is for 60,100 or 95,100 rupees, as the case may be. If each fighting man subscribes 6 or 9 rupees, the account will be settled in a fortnight. There is no question of their ability to pay, but their willingness to pay is another matter altogether. It is just possible that the prospect of a re-distribution of the tribal allowance, of the adoption of tribal responsibility and the implied guarantee of municipal independence so long as they keep the peace with us and fulfil their obligations may lead the tribe to give us satisfaction. But I doubt it. The 270 Mahks who benefit by the present system will, of course, through their weight against a change, and though they cannot do much good they can do harm. How much harm they can do depends upon how far they have been discredited with the "ulus" in the course of the past ten years, and how far they see their way to getting a share of the allowances as distributed by the "ulus". The experiment of announcing simultaneously with the demand for redress that the organic change in the system is contemplated is at any rate worth trying, for the body of the tribe, who have all to gain by that change, will to that degree be influenced in favour of settling the account. We shall to that extent divide the opposition. On the other hand, it is a heavy account; for years the Mahsuds have been shuffling off payment, they have got the idea into their heads that they are to be handled very gingerly, and more likely they will elect to try and brave it out.

21. If so, we shall have without delay to resort to coercion. Of this there are but two kinds, a blockade and an expedition. As regards the first, a blockade had no doubt an extraordinary effect in 1877-1878, and now that we encircle the Mahsuds with two arms, one to the right in the Tochi, the other on the left at Wana, a blockade can be made infinitely more stringent than was possible 20 years ago. The Mahsuds are well aware of this. A blockade, of course, is a wearisome business; in all probability it will involve the employment of some additional troops (two regiments I should say), they may have to serve in the hot weather, to which the Military Authorities appear to take exception*; but this cannot be helped, and it will not be the first time that troops have had to serve in the heat. No doubt the blockade will be marked by raids and attacks, and it is possible that public opinion will press for the termination of the blockade by an expedition. But there can be no question that a strict blockade, unswervingly pursued to the bitter end, has a most punitive and lasting effect upon a tribe. And it has the great merit of being incomparably more economical than an expedition. An expedition, speaking under correction, means the employment of three

* Cf the communications received from the Lieutenant-General Commanding in March last.

brigades for some considerable time, especially as the Mahsuds are now not unfamiliar with expeditions. With a view to occurrences and eventualities elsewhere which are making calls on the Indian Army, it may be that three brigades cannot be spared conveniently this winter. If so, that settles the question.

22 A demand on the Mahsuds for satisfaction has to be made early this autumn or not later than November. On no account would I suggest that the demand be made without, in the event of a refusal, its being promptly followed up by coercion. And all things considered I recommend that coercion take the form of a blockade, which may possibly last for 10 or 12 months.

To sum up, my proposals are that I may be authorized to summon the whole Mahsud jurga as soon as convenient, it may be feasible to convene it in September; if not, it will certainly be practicable to get them together by the end of October, that then the demand be made, and that the jurga be informed that such a change as Government determine in the present system is in contemplation, but that refusal to comply with the just claim of Government will lead to coercion—a blockade or other measures, as Government may deem expedient.

23 A rupture with the tribe will, of course, affect the Mahsud portion of the Southern Waziristan Militia. But, after all, this is only three companies out of eight, and it is impossible that its members in the Militia should not be infected by the present temper of the tribe. If so, it may be better not to have them till their tribe is in order.

24. The dark horse here is Mullah Powindah. It may be that he is working to establish for himself a position similar to that of Chikkai. If so, and if he has the sense and ability of Chikkai, who has loyally kept the pact he made with us in 1892, we shall have gained much. But of the future attitude of Mullah Powindah, in case complications threaten with the Mahsuds, it is impossible to speak now with confidence. All one can say is that he will play a prominent part in whatever is going to happen.

25 There can, however, be no doubt that the announcement on the one hand that coercion will be unhesitatingly and thoroughly applied if the tribe refuses to make redress, and on the other hand that reparation will be followed by a re-distribution of allowances, must powerfully influence the counsels of the Mahsuds when they are brought face to face with us.

Annexure 3

EXTRACT from paragraph 6 of letter, dated 3rd January, 1881, from W. M. Young, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

It is sufficient to remark that, whereas in 1873 the Mahsuds were guilty of 68 serious offences, the average of the four following years was 23, and in 1878 they were implicated in one murder and six cases only of theft and robbery, for which full redress was at once procured. The policy thus inaugurated was further tested, and its success demonstrated, by the result of negotiations for the recovery of a Hindu child, kidnapped from Kot Nasran by a band of robbers belonging to the party of Umar Khai. For ordinary crimes it may be easy to obtain satisfaction by seizures and reprisals on the offending clan in British territory, but in this case our hold over the tribe had to be tested by the demand of specific redress. A blockade was enforced against the whole tribe, without distinction of clans, and with the energetic co-operation of the Bhattannis, whose passes were strictly closed to all Mahsuds, the pressure of want was soon felt among the tribe at large. The offenders, fearing that the clansmen would take the law into their own hands, surrendered the child to Ahmadi, till now ringleader of the opposition to the British Government; and, finally, he, with Umar Khan, Alizai, and the leading Shaman Khel Chiefs, formally surrendered their

prisoner to the British Authorities, laid down their arms, and made full submission. Thus was established the important principle of dealing with the tribe as a whole, and making all generally responsible for the misdeeds of the members of any sub-division. Before this the system attempted in 1861 of dealing separately with the three clans, Alizai, Shaman Khel and Bahlolzai, had been worked with but indifferent success, and with the result that all traded in British territory and had access to our markets under the name of Alizai, while all raided on British villages in the names of the proscribed sections. During the six months that the Mahsuds were under blockade for the offence last mentioned, from August, 1877, to February, 1878, not a single crime was recorded against the tribe; and this satisfactory state of things continued till the end of 1878, during which year the plains of Tank, formerly never at rest from Mahsud outrages, enjoyed an unexampled security of life and property

Annexure 4.

Note by H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, on the present state of the Mahsud tribe and our relation therewith, dated 14th May, 1900.

What I conceive to be more or less the facts as regards the Mahsuds and their Maliks is briefly as follows:—

After the last expedition Government revised the distribution of allowances to a number of leading men of the tribe called Maliks, and a new list was drawn up after the claims of the various Maliks had been investigated by the local officers with the assistance

* Azim Khan, Kundi.
Mr Tej Bhan.

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of certain native agents* Now, however intimately these officers knew the tribe, and however trustworthy those agents might be, it was inevitable that mistakes should be made. A Malh, for instance, who had for long been in close relations with our Political Officers might be treated with more liberality than another who had come in very seldom, but who really had more influence over his own section and was more respected in the hills. Or a section which had misbehaved itself or which lived some distance from the border and had few relations with Government officials might be deprived of a portion of the allowances which its importance in the tribal organization entitled it to. The Shabi Khels, Garerais and Jalal Khels are perhaps cases in point. And it also followed as a necessary consequence that the closer our relations with the tribe became and the more extended our control, the more prominent would become the cases of inequitable distribution of allowances. Our posts now line the border of the Mahsud country proper, sections which were left pretty much alone in the old days have to be controlled and punished, and their leading men come in to see the Political Officer to air their grievances or to protest against their fines, as they had never done before.

2 The Political Officer is being continually pestered by sections or individuals asking that the allowances which are their due may be allotted them. How far these claims are reasonable I do not, in most instances, know, and have not cared to enquire, so as to avoid raising false hopes. Such applications are generally torn up and the applicants informed that the settlement with the Mahsuds was a final one, for the time at any rate, and that unless and until a fresh distribution takes place nothing can be done for them. If ever a re-distribution is ordered, then their claims will be investigated and considered.

3 No doubt a large number of these claims are unfounded, or at least much exaggerated. But some of them are undoubtedly reasonable, if the view is held that such allowances should be assigned† to the best and strongest men in the tribe. To take one or two instances: Guldad,

† Of course.

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the Abdurrahman Khel badmash, is a man of far more influence in his section than most of the Malikis, and has shown by work that he has done for me that he can exercise a very real control over them. Muhammad Yar, formerly a noted raider, has similar influence over the Shahur Shaman Khels, and if we would induce other well-known raiders like Asl Khan, Guri Khel, and Khalo, Abdurrahman Khel, to reform in a similar manner, we should find also that they would do far more useful work for us than most of their Malikis. As it is, they care nothing for the Malikis, who have to pay in part for the raids which they commit, while they themselves get off practically scot-free.

4 Some of these men who are dissatisfied with their allowances, though not all, form part of the following of the Mullah Powindah. The rest prefer to raid on their own account, and do not have much to do with the Mullah, but if the latter declared a holy war against us, they also no doubt would side with him. I think it probable that the larger portion of the Mullah's immediate following consists not so much of men who consider themselves defrauded of their due share of the Government allowances as of fanatical patriots who resent our interference in their country in any shape or form. No doubt, however, if we could arrange that the allowances could be more equitably distributed (and also more liberally, for we should have to increase the present allotment, otherwise, while satisfying some, we should be making enemies of others) and could reach the tribe as a whole* instead of, as at present, being confined to the Malikis and their relatives, there would be a considerable diminution in the Mullah's following, while, if we could square the Mullah himself, the faction hostile to us would be altogether broken up

* A most important admission.

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5. At the same time we must give the Malikis their due; they are, on the whole, very well disposed to us, many of them, notably the Shaman Khel Malikis,† have their own particular sections well under control, and many of the rest are anxious that the badmashes should be repressed and punished, but they have not the power or the courage to do it themselves. United (which they are not) they could keep the Mullah and the whole tribe in order, and even disunited as they are they are strong enough to force their tribe, or rather the trading sections, to acquiesce with hardly a murmur in a heavy‡ toll on their bahirs. There are, however, certain sections, the Abdurrahman Khels, Jalal Khels, Garerai, &c., who do very little trading, whose misdeeds their own Malikis§ sometimes connive at and even participate in, and the Malikis of kindred sections make very little effort to check. It is these unruly sections who, together with the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs, give most of the trouble, and have brought about the present serious situation

† The two most powerful of these have just been murdered.

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‡ Light I should say.

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§ N.B.

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6. A redistribution of allowances, with regard to which the whole tribe would be consulted and asked to apportion the amount allotted among its leading men (subject, of course, to the approval of Government), would certainly be a very good thing, if it could be arranged without a rupture of our present relations. But this is doubtful. We could not consent to a redistribution (which must involve an increase of the total amount allotted if it is to give satisfaction) until the Mahsuds have settled up the account still outstanding against them, which has again mounted up considerably during the last few weeks; and if the present Malikis felt that their interests would suffer in a redistribution, as would probably be the case, they would not be disposed to give us much assistance in bringing about that settlement. On the other hand, if we told the Malikis plainly that unless the account was squared by the end, say, of the hot weather, Government would take its own measures to realise it and punish those who were responsible for this state of affairs, it is quite possible that the Malikis, perceiving that their

own interests were at stake, would pull themselves together and effect a satisfactory settlement. We might then carry out a redistribution, taking care that the Maliks who had had most to do with bringing about the settlement, and thereby shown their influence with the tribe, did not suffer any loss

7. Personally, however, I think it probable that the Maliks will be unable to make anything like a final settlement or prevent the worse behaved sections running up their account still higher. We must then resort to a blockade or an expedition, and after the operations a redistribution of allowances will be practicable and expedient. But then again the tribe is so *democratic*, and members of it attain to prominence and notoriety so

* This can be provided against in all probability.

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offences until their claims are satisfied, as their predecessors did. In fact, I doubt if under any circumstances the tribe can be kept in order without constant punitive expeditions, unless we occupy some position more near the heart of their country† like Kundiwan.

8. As regards the question of individual as against tribal responsibility, it does not seem to me advisable to go in wholly either for the one

‡ They have always done that.

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or the other. On the one hand we are in very close relations with the tribe now; their bahirs stream down to the plains,‡ they hold land in British territory; some of them are even permanent residents there; while we occupy posts on the border of their country, where our officials are in continual touch with them. We cannot therefore treat them in quite the same way§ as if there was a close border between us and them, for if by way of enforcing tribal responsibility we put pressure

on every member of the tribe found inside our territory, we should discourage their trade, prevent their settling down there, and generally create among them a feeling of uneasiness and insecurity which will seriously impair our relations. On the other hand, if we only aim at the punishment of individual offenders or the sub-sections to which they belong, we shall in most cases fail|| to secure the former and find

§ We do not find this to be the case elsewhere in similar circumstances.

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great difficulty in realizing the fine imposed from the latter. I would therefore adopt the middle course of putting pressure on the larger sections in the more serious offences (if the actual offenders or their sub-sections cannot at once be punished) and in less serious offences of endeavouring to bring the case home to individual offenders or their sub-sections with the least possible delay, at the same time not losing sight of the ultimate responsibility of the larger section and enforcing that if the case cannot be settled otherwise. At any rate to suddenly adopt now the principle of tribal responsibility *in toto* when the other system has been followed for several years past would involve the risk of a serious rupture of our friendly relations with the tribe.

Annexure 5.

Telegram from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 4th June, 1900.

Wire was cut on night of 2nd near to Zaramoba within sight of Karab Kot. Was mended in my presence yesterday. Have just heard wire cut in same place again last night. Officer Commanding, Wana, wires to-day. *Begins.* One shot from Kotkan fired on convoy this morning at 7.30 a.m. No damage done. *Ends* It is evident gangs of Mahsuds are out with

intention to injure Government property With regard to robbery of dāk, attack on Khajuri Kach picket, theft of carbine from Jandola, chief Maliks were written to, but none have replied, nor have any efforts been made by Maliks to clear up these or former cases Am expecting chief Maliks in here to-morrow and next day. The account against Mahsuds is increasing daily Have you any special orders for me to convey to Maliks?

Annexure 6.

Telegram from Commissioner, Derajat, to Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

Your telegram Please tell the Maliks from me that the position and their conduct is very unsatisfactory, and that they must do their duty on pain of incurring the severe displeasure of Government, to whom the present state of affairs is being reported You should point out to them that this kind of thing cannot continue, and that it was expected that after the March settlement there would be an improvement, whereas matters remain the same as before Please report by letter result of your interview

Annexure 7

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 12th June, 1900.

I have the honour to inform you that on the 9th-11th May, 1900, I interviewed the Mahsud Maliks I had summoned 22 of the chief Maliks to come in and talk over matters referring to tribal responsibility and to arrange for a more speedy settlement of cases. Instead of only 22 Maliks being present about 150 came in I first explained to the chief Maliks my proposals, which, briefly put, are:—Maliks of sections are responsible to Government for offences committed by members of their sections, and are bound by agreement to give redress for such offences, that in cases when sectional Maliks have not the power to coerce offenders, then the tribal Maliks, *i.e.*, Maliks of other sections, should step in and bring pressure to bear on the offenders.

I also gave to the Maliks the message conveyed in your telegram, dated 5th June.

I then dismissed the chief Maliks, asking them to talk over my proposals with the others, and promised to meet the whole of the Maliks after two hours On again meeting the jirga of Maliks I explained to them that the present state of affairs was most unsatisfactory, that since the recent settlement come to in March last a number of serious offences had been committed by Mahsuds, the majority of which were offences directly against Government; that in spite of intimation of these offences having been committed having been sent to the Mahsud Maliks, not a single Malik had made any attempt to assist in the detection of the offenders or to arrange any settlement of these cases, and that consequently it seemed to me necessary that some arrangement should be made between the Maliks and myself by which speedy settlement of offences would be effected, and by which in future punishment should fall on the real offenders, and not, as under the existing system, upon the Maliks and other innocent persons.

I clearly pointed out that I had no intention of giving any orders on the subject, but that I left the matter absolutely in the hands of the Maliks.

I pointed out that what seemed to me most necessary was that, when the time comes for rendering service, the Maliks should unite and bring pressure upon the offenders or the offending section, and force them to give

redress for the offence committed; that were the Malikhs to combine in this way they would undoubtedly be strong enough to control their turbulent sections. I further explained to them that my object in asking them to come to some such an arrangement with me was that the power for good of the Malikhs would be strengthened, and that, in future, by combination, they would have the power of forcing the real offenders to redress the wrongs they had committed, instead of, as has been the custom up to date, the Malikhs and other innocent members of the tribe having to suffer for the offences committed by others. The matter was discussed with the Malikhs on 9th, 10th and 11th, but eventually they declared that they could not come to agree to any new system being introduced, and preferred to stand by the old system, and they gave me in a written agreement putting forward their wishes as to how cases should be settled. This is as follows:—

- (1) We, Mahsud Malikhs, wish that the real offenders should be adequately punished.
- (2) If the Malikhs responsible have not the power to impose adequate punishment on the real offenders, then the Political Officer should assist the Malikhs with troops or with the Militia.
- (3) If this cannot be done, then the old system of gaining redress should be followed, which is as follows:—

The Malikhs responsible shall bring in the suspected persons on safe conduct; if found guilty they should be allowed to return with the Malikhs, and the latter will then be responsible for giving redress. If the Malik of the offenders "Kirri" is powerless to give redress, then only the sectional Malikhs should be called in to assist.

The chief argument put forward by the Malikhs against the introduction of a new system such as I proposed are:—

- (a) It is impossible, owing to the numerous feuds existing between them, for the Malikhs to combine
- (b) Even if they could and did combine to bring pressure on real offenders, each one of them would be in danger of being murdered,* and they are not prepared to take this risk.
* This is a sound reason and a real danger.
W. R. H. MERK.
- (c) They consider that the allowances paid to them by Government are on account of past services and [by receiving]† such allowances does not enforce responsibility upon them to settle cases.
† The receipt of ?
W. R. H. MERK.
- (d) That tribal responsibility has never‡ up to date been enforced, and the Malikhs who receive allowances are unable to coerce and control turbulent gangs or sections of the tribe.
‡ This is incorrect.
W. R. H. MERK.
- (e) That in making the settlement in March last they were induced by the "Master" (*i.e.*, Tej Bahn, late Head Clerk to Commissioner, Derajat) to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson.

They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crimes. They also declare that they were promised assistance of troops to coerce turbulent sections; also that when the Militia should be raised the Malikhs§ might always make use of it to coerce those over whom they have no influence.

§ I have specially guarded against this idea in my note of instructions regarding the raising of the Militias.
W. R. H. MERK.

As soon as I saw that the Malikhs were averse to the introduction of any new system, I stopped the discussion, and informed them that I would continue to work on the old lines, but that I expected the Malikhs to exert themselves more to maintain control of their several sections and to render me proper assistance in bringing cases home to the real offenders. I then put before the jirga the following cases, which have been committed by Mahsuds since the settlement made in March. These are:—

- (1) The Kurram raid case, in which 23 camels belonging to Powindahs were looted by Aimal Khel and Malikdinai Mahsuds. Ten camels have been recovered, but there is still a balance of 13. No fine was imposed for this offence.
- (2) The Spin raid case, which occurred on 23rd April, 1900, and in which 170 camels belonging to Miani Powindahs were looted by a gang composed of Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. The Darwesh Khels concerned have been arrested and punished, but with the exception of restoring 9 camels out of the 140 which fell to the share of the Mahsuds, the Malikhs have done nothing to get this case settled. In this case also one of the Powindahs was shot by a Mahsud.
- (3) The robbery of the mail bags in the Tiarza Nullah on night of 20th May, 1900. In spite of repeated letters to the Malikhs to exert themselves to get this case settled, no assistance has been given by any Malik. The mail bags are with the Mullah Powindah.

Doubtful.
W. R. H. MERR.
- (4) The attack on the water picket at Khajuri Kach, the wounding of a sepoy of the 27th Punjab Infantry, and theft of three Martini-Henry rifles, 42 cartridges and two belts. This case occurred on 23rd May. The Malikhs were written to to make enquiries and let me know who were the raiders, but have taken no steps whatever to enquire into the case.
- (5) The theft of a Cavalry Martini-Henry carbine from the Jandola Post. Suspicion points to members of the Shingis as being the offenders. Malikhs have taken no steps to recover the carbine or to punish the offenders.
- (6) Four cases of cutting the telegraph wire during April and May. No trace of offenders yet obtained.
- (7) Firing on the convoy from the Kotkan Hill by a party of Mahsuds, about two miles from Wana Post. The offenders were seen by a Public Works Department contractor making off towards Mahsud country.
- (8) Wounding of a levy sowar escorting the mails between Zam Post and the hills. Offenders said to be Gunge Shingi. Malikhs though written to have taken no steps in the matter.
- (9) Raid on a Bhittanni in Tank Ilqa and murder of a Bhittanni who followed up raiders. This case was committed by Mauladad, Shungi Mahsud. Case was put before Malikhs, who state they have no power over Mauladad.
- (10) Raid in Spin by Khalo, Abdurrahman Khel, and theft of 20 camels. Malikhs say they have no power over Khalo.

Besides the above-mentioned cases some 40 cases of petty raids along the Tank border are pending against the Mahsuds. These have been committed during April and May, 1900. The Malikhs, when asked how they intended settling these cases, asked for a week's grace, so that they might consider the subject. I have ordered them to meet me here on the 18th June, when I will hear what they have to say, and will report further.

Annexure 8.

State of the Mahsud Tribe and relations therewith.

Having only arrived in Wana in April last, and never before having served in the Derajat, I cannot claim to have an intimate knowledge of the Mahsuds. I can, however, claim to have had six years' experience of political working with Afridis, Mohmands, Swatis and Bajauris, and to be thoroughly acquainted with the system of political working carried out on the Peshawar Border.

I have had opportunities of observing the results of the system of political working carried out here, and I cannot say the results compare favourably with those attained on the Peshawar Border. In my opinion the principal defects in political working with the Mahsuds are:—

- (a) That instead of tribal responsibility, individual responsibility is enforced; this tends to delay the settlement of cases, and to bring upon the tribe such an enormous load of debt that it is impossible for the tribe to clear itself.
- (b) The majority of Malikhs have little or no influence over their fellow-tribesmen
- (c) The allowances paid by Government are, instead of being paid to the tribe as a tribal allowance, eaten up by a number of so-called Malikhs who do nothing for them in return.

Since my arrival in Wana I have had opportunities of meeting all the principal Malikhs of the Mahsuds tribe as well as many of the minor Malikhs and of discussing with them the above defects which I have noticed. From these discussions and from my own observation of the action of various Malikhs in their relations towards Government, I venture to put forward the following opinion:—

Owing to the fact that so-called Mahsud allowances are not shared by the tribe as a whole, but are merely paid to a certain number of Malikhs, the tribe as a whole does not consider itself in any way bound by any obligation to Government. Roughly speaking, about one-third of the tribe follow the lead of the Malikhs, and the remaining two-thirds follow their own sweet will, and consider themselves to be the equal of anybody. The Mahsud, on his own confession, being a born thief and highway robber, the result of this state of affairs is that there can be no peace in the country.

Again, the Mullah Powindah is doing all he knows to discredit most of the Malikhs with the tribe in order to increase his own power, with the hope of eventually forcing Government to consider him as the leader of the tribe.

The Malikhs declare their inability to exercise any control over the Mullah, and the consequence is that any Mahsud whom the Malikhs may wish to coerce at once goes over to him for protection. A recent example which clearly shows the weakness of the Malikhs is the case of the escaped hostage Mianji, Abdurrahman Khel. The Malikhs promised to bring him back or to bring in his two brothers as hostages in his place. The whole family promptly fled to the Mullah, and the Malikhs declare that they are now powerless to bring in any of them.

I venture to state that the system of political action carried out is greatly to blame for the want of control over the tribe and for the difficulties experienced in bringing pressure to bear upon the tribe. It has been the custom in obtaining redress for offences committed for responsibility to be enforced upon, firstly, the original offenders, secondly, if that fails, as it always does, upon the section or sub-section to which the offenders belong; the remaining sections of the Mahsuds consider that they have no concern in the matter and are in no way responsible for seeing that redress for the wrong is made. It is owing to this custom, which the Mahsuds* refuse to have changed, that cases remain so long unsettled, and eventually the total indebtedness of the Mahsuds

* i.e. the Malikhs
W. R. H. MERR.

amounts to such an enormous sum that it is impossible for them to liquidate the debt. Then, as the Malikhs themselves say, they have to bear the punishment by forfeiture of their allowances, and the real offenders get off scot-free, and are merely incited to commit further crime. As I have already pointed out to the Malikhs, the only cure for this evil is that they should unite, and by their combination bring such pressure to bear on the turbulent members or sections of the tribe that they cannot resist the Malikhs.

This suggestion, however, the Malikhs, though allowing it is a sensible one, say that they cannot carry out. As far as I can gather, the allowances to Malikhs were originally fixed on the information given by a small number of well-known and prominent members of the Mahsud tribe, who, only naturally, in order to strengthen their own position, principally put forward only the names of men of their own party to receive the smaller allowances. The consequence of this is that these so-called 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Class Malikhs, with a few exceptions, consider that they are in no way responsible for the control of their sections, and from what I have seen they live up to this idea, take their allowance, and do nothing.

I have no doubt that had the sections and sub-sections of the tribe been permitted to elect to whom and in what shares the allowances should be paid, as was done in the settlement of the Mohmand allowances,* several of these men would have received no allowances at all, and in their place men with the greatest influence in their sections would have been recognized as Malikhs.

* In 1896.

W. R. H. MERK.

From what I have observed some sections of the Mahsuds, such as the Shabi Khels, Garerais, Jalal Khels, Band Khels, have reason to be discontented with the amounts they receive as allowances,† as compared with those received by other sections. The Shabi Khels are said, owing to their numbers and influence, to have a right to a half share of the Alzai section, whereas by the present arrangement they receive a little more than a one-fourth share. The Garerais are a sub-section of the Datchi Khel, and out of a monthly allowance of Rs. 251 enjoyed by the Datchi Khels, they only receive an allowance of Rs. 34.

The Jalal Khels are a sub-section of the Nana Khel Bahlolzais, who receive a monthly allowance of Rs. 460, of which the Jalal Khels receive Rs. 40. The Jalal Khels in numbers and influence are in every way equal to the Abdurrahman Khel sub-section, which receives Rs. 151 per mensem.

The Band Khels are a sub-section of the Bahlolzais, the other sections being the Aimal Khels, Nana Khels and Shingis, yet, out of a total allowance of Rs. 1,154 per mensem enjoyed by the Bahlolzai section, the Band Khel receive only Rs. 39. The above examples are, in my opinion, sufficient to show that the Mahsud allowances were not apportioned out in fair shares, and also to show that the discontented sections have some reason for their discontent.

I agree with Mr. Watson that the majority of the Malikhs and their special following are well disposed towards Government in so far that they do not desire a rupture in the existing relations. From my experience of the Malikhs so far, I have found almost all of them very ready to give advice as to the treatment of offending sections, but when called upon to do their own work and to exercise control over the sections for which they are responsible, they one and all declare that they have not the power.

In one or two cases which have come to my notice lately they have not the will, notably the Badshah Khan, Shah Salem, Alzais, Fateh Khan, Gulpir and Khan Zaman, Shingis. The Malikhs have themselves declared to me that they consider that the allowances they receive are due to them for past services, and do not consider that in return for these allowances they are bound to serve Government. They persist in saying that each

Malik of a section is responsible for obtaining redress for any offence committed by his section or any member of it, but

* This is incorrect: tribal responsibility was enforced upon them,* and that they are unable to combine and bring tribal pressure to bear on offenders in order to redress wrongs for Government.

W. R. H. MERK.

The present system of dealing with the Mahsuds is impossible, as will be understood when it is known that since March last the bill against the Mahsuds for offences committed since by them amounts on a rough calculation to Rs 15,000 for compensation alone, not counting fines. Not a single case has been settled, and I am powerless to take any forcible measures against them, as, if I were to do so, the March settlement would never be completed

S. S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana,
Southern Waziristan.

The 17th July, 1900

Annexure 9.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Wana, 18th July, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated the 2nd July, 1900, I have the honour to forward the statement called for.

Annexure 10.

STATEMENT A.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property.

Serial No	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment inflicted	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
1	25th April, 1900	Gul Imam . . .	Asa Ram, son of Ganda Ram, Garbhir, of Gul Imam.	On the night of 24th-25th April, 1900, the thieves broke into the complainant's shop and took off clothing and property. The value of stolen property not yet explained by the complainant.	Unknown Suspicion on Mahsuds.	Nil . . .	Nil. A compensation will be proposed on proof according to the statement of the complainant.
*2	18th April, 1900	Pir Kachh ..	Khadim, son of Sher Khan, caste unknown, of Tank	On April 18th the complainant was carrying his atta from Pir Khan water null to Tank when he was set upon by 12 raiders, who robbed him of his atta and clothing worth Rs. 15-6-0	Twelve thieves, names unknown (Mahsuds suspected)	Nil . . .	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 15-6-0 shall be imposed on proof
*3	23rd April, 1900	Near Tank	Inayat, son of Sahrab, Gariban (oochman)	On 22nd-23rd April, 1900, thieves carried off one bullock valued at Rs 27.	Unknown Mahsuds suspected	Nil . . .	Nil. A compensation of Rs 15 shall be imposed on proof.
*4	27th April, 1900	Nasran	1. Naurang, son of } Muhammad Yar, } Nasirs 2 Muhammad Yar, } of son of Nawas, } Nasran. 3 Surkamand }	On 26th 27th April, 1900, the complainants' four bullocks, worth Rs 60, were carried off, two of them have been recovered, and tracks of other two bullocks led up to Shusa Pass	Four thieves, names unknown Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 30 shall be imposed on proof
*5	26th April, 1900	Near Jatta	Mamid Khan, son of Bazu Jatt (camel driver), of Khurza.	The complainant with his four companions was attacked on his way from Utar to Gomal by thieves, who carried off his clothes, worth Rs. 1-3-0	Five thieves, names unknown. Mahsuds suspected	Nil . . .	Nil. A compensation of Rs 1-3-0 shall be imposed on proof
*6	8th April, 1900 .	Chupar road bridge	1. Amar Din, son of Mian Khan, Ali Khel 2. Aqil Shah, blacksmith, of Ali Khel.	The complainants on their way back to Ali Khel were attacked by some thieves, who carried off two camels, some clothes and other property, worth Rs. 110-8-0. Tracks led to Zam Pass.	Four thieves, names unknown Mahsuds suspected	Nil . . .	Nil. A compensation of Rs 110-8-0 shall be imposed on proof.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence	Names and Detail of Complainants	Nature of Offence, briefly	Details of Offenders, briefly	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
*7	26th April, 1900	Mullasai	Zarif Khan, son of Surat Khan, carpenter, of Mur-taza	On the night of 25th-26th April, 1900, a few thieves carried off one camel, worth Rs 50	Unknown Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 50 shall be imposed on proof
*8	24th April, 1900	Kasa Watermill	Alam Khan, son of Malik Khan, Kundi, of Tank	On the night of 23rd-24th April, 1900, a few thieves carried off two camels, valued at Rs 170.	Unknown. Shung Mahsuds suspected	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 100 shall be imposed on proof. Not explained why compensation less than the value of the camels is proposed. W. H. MERK, Commissioner.
*9	28th April, 1900	Gomal Nullah	1. Allahdad Khan, son of Buland Khan, 2. Zarif Khan, Kharoti Pow-indah	Some thieves carried off 17 cows and 22 goats out grazing near Gomal Nullah	Unknown Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 110 will be proposed when the cases proved.
*10	30th April, 1900	Nawas Kot	Bas Khan, son of Shadi Khan, Sheikh, of Kot Nawas	Complainant was fired at and wounded by some raiders while he was watching his own crops.	Do	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 360 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*11	28rd April, 1900	Near Jatta ..	Sultan, son of Suleman, Dhobi (washer), of Maddi	The complainant with his companion was driving camels loaded with Commissariat stores towards Khajuri Koch; on reaching Jatta he was attacked by raiders, who robbed him of one camel	Do.	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 50 will be proposed when the case is proved
*12	13th April, 1900	Kot Nawas	Ayan-ud-din, son of Abdul Halim, Sheikh, through Aamat Khan, Daffadar	The complainant was robbed of his clothing, worth Rs. 17-10-0, and a sheep was carried off by thieves while he was in his own land	Fourthieves Unknown. Mahsuds suspected	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 20 will be proposed when the case is proved.

13	28th April, 1900	Azam Kot	1. Dauran, son of Muhammad Khan 2. Some other Miani Powindahs	Complainants' 45 camels out grazing near Kot Azam were raided and carried off by 20 Mahsuds. The value of camels reported is Rs 2,250	1. Khalu, 2. Shah Gul, 3. Shahrang, 4. Banocha Khan, 5. Muhammad Ali, 6. Nujam, 7. Asal Khan, Guri Khel, with 13 others	Abdurrahman Khels	Nil	Nil Rs 500 fine and compensation of Rs. 3,250 will be proposed when the case is proved
14	4th April, 1900	Near Kulachi	1. Khan, 2. Fazulla 3. Shah Jahan,	The complainants on their way to Kulachi from Shiranni country were attacked by five thieves and robbed of four camels, worth Rs 360, and Rs 260 in cash.	Five thieves	Unknown	Nil	Nil. Rs. 200 fine and compensation of Rs 200 for camels, and Rs 260 cash will be proposed when the case is proved.
*15	17th April 1900	Tarkhs Shakh	Hakim, son of Khalil, "Mochi" of Luni 2. Khanik, son of Bhai Khan, Hassan Khel.	The complainants were proceeding to Luni from Manjhi when they were set upon by 10 thieves, who carried off three cows and other property	Ten thieves	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs 50 will be proposed when the case is proved
*16	16th April 1900	Nawaz Kot	Khal-ud-din, Post Office, Kashmir Kar, through Khan Gul, Levy foot	The complainants' house was broken into and his property, worth Rs 13-12-0, carried off	Unknown		Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs 14 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*17	30th April 1900	Do	1. Shuja-ul-Mulk, son of Pir Wali, 2. Guldak, son of Sahh Khan,	The complainants' wheat crop was cut down by thieves, valued at Rs 12	Do.		Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs 12 will be proposed when the case is proved
*18	Do	Kirri of Bhattans	Zarif Khan, son of Sher Khan, Kharota Powindah living in Pathan Kot	On the night of 29th-30th April, 1900, the complainant's four donkeys, worth Rs 139, were carried off by thieves	Do		Nil	Nil. A compensation of about Rs 40 will be proposed when the case is proved Not explained why only Rs 40 compensation is proposed W R. H. MERR, Commissioner
19	3rd May, 1900	Kirri Jani Kai	1. Davlat Khan, son of Jhangri Khan, Wacaspur, of Kirri Jani Kai	On the night of 2nd-3rd April, 1900, complainant's two bullocks, worth Rs 30, were carried off by thieves. A chigha turned out from Janki Kirri and got over the thieves at Spinkai Baghza, and exchange of shots resulted in the death of Laghar and wounding of Amaldar, Bhattans, Chighawals	Mauladad, Shangi, and three others		Nil	Nil. Fine of Rs 1,000— Rs 360 blood-money, Rs 100 for wounding of Amaldar, Rs 30 as compensation for bullocks, has been imposed

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants	Nature of Offence, briefly	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
*20	24th May, 1900	Kirri Jangi ..	Piaru, son of Zaman, sweeper, of Kirri Jangi	On the night of 23rd-24th May, 1900, one horse, worth Rs 15, belonging to the complainant, was carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs 15 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*21	26th May, 1900	Khanwand .	1 Jangi Khan, } Mianis of 2 Khaasar Khan, } Murtaza	Complainants' seven sheep, worth Rs 48-8-0, were stolen	Do . . .	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs.80 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*22	16th May, 1900 ...	Mian Buta water-mill	Kamar Din, son of Ghulam Mahiy-ud-din.	On the night of 14th-15th May, 1900, the complainant's one sword and seven bags of atta, worth Rs 72-4-0, were carried off	Twelve thieves. Unknown	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs 70 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*23	4th May, 1900 ..	Mausa Budh .	Faqir, son of Nawas, Sheikh, of Garra Budh.	On the night of 3rd 4th May, 1900, some thieves broke into the complainant's house and carried off one gun and other property worth Rs 24-8-0.	Unknown ..	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs 125 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*24	4th May, 1900 ..	Umar Khel ..	Musammatt Lamki, daughter of Almar Khan, Dauran, Khel, of Umar Khel in Mullasa Thana.	On the night of 3rd-4th May, 1900, thieves broke into the complainant's house and carried off four goats and three bags of wool and some clothing worth Rs. 22-12-0. Tracks led up to hills.	Unknown Mahsuds suspected	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 50 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*25	28th April, 1900	Murtaza	1 Gandapura, } Mianis 2. Khaasar Khan, } 3. Saidal, } Lambardars 4 Isa Khan, } of Kot Nawas and Murtaza.	On the night of 27th-28th April, 1900, the complainants' wheat crop was cut down by the thieves, which is estimated at Rs. 450	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of not more than Rs. 100 will be proposed when the case is proved. Not explained why only Rs. 100 compensation is assessed.

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Commissioner

26	27th April, 1900	Gang toba near Chaudhwan	Abdul Fikar Shah, & Co, Powindahs of Khurसान, encamped near Gang toba.	On the night of 26th-27th April, 1900, the complainants were attacked by thieves, who robbed them of clothes and other property valued at Rs. 251-14-0	Unknown	Nil	Nil A compensation of about Rs 200 will be proposed when the case is proved
27	22nd April, 1900	Chappra Kholln	1 Juma Khan, 2 Jamal Khan, 3 Hassan Khan, } Mianis	On 22nd April, 1900, the complainants were attacked by a large gang of thieves consisting of 80 men and robbed of 170 camels.	This raid was committed by 11 Zalli Khel and 13 Michi Khel Mahsuds, Malik Denais, Abdurrahman Khels, &c.	Eleven Zalli Khels were found guilty by the jurga and punished judicially as follows — 1. Mihar Jan, six months' imprisonment 2. Allahdad, one year's imprisonment 3-8 Two years' imprisonment 9-11 Not punished as yet as they absconded Each was fined Rs 100, which will be made over to complainants if realized As the complainants have gone to Khurसान, the case will be tried against the Mahsuds when they return Rs 5,760 will be imposed on the Mahsuds as follows — Rs Blood-money 360 Compensation for camels . 5,400 5,760	Compensation due from Mahsuds shall be Rs 5,400 and blood-money 360 5,760, and from Zalli Khels Rs. 1,100
28	31st March, 1900 1st April, 1900	Khajuri Kuch	Kher Khan, son of Samundar Khan of Kirri Jahan Khan Nasir.	On the night of 31st March, 1900, some thieves attacked Kirri of Jahan Khan and carried off four camels	Unknown	Nil	A compensation of Rs 200 will be proposed when the case is proved
29	2nd April, 1900	Sado Chilla	1. Ram Singh, Ngandoba, Bania. 2. Mussammat Bhag Bhari	The complainants were attacked by 15 raiders, who took away their ornaments and some other property valued at Rs 133-8-3 These were coming along with convoy while robbed owing to their being left far behind the convoy	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs 133 will be proposed when the case is proved.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No	Date of Occurrence	Place of Occurrence	Names and Detail of Complainants	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly	What Reparation made or Punishment inflicted	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
80	21st May, 1900	Wucha Tiarza ...	Empress ...	Government dak was looted in Wucha Tiarza at about 8 a.m. on 21st May, 1900, by some eight raiders	Duranais, Senai, son of Khidrai, Nekzan Khel, Amrdin, Abdulla, Juma, Afzal, Giga Khels, &c.	Rs 2,000 fined ...	Rs. 2,000 fined Compensation Rs 500.
81	23th May, 1900	Khajuri Kach ...	Do, ...	Fifteen raiders attacked the water pocket, Khajuri Kach, consisting of three Sepoys and one Havildar and took away three Martini-Henry rifles and 44 cartridges and two belts. One Sepoy wounded in the attack.	(1) Zalumme, Shingri, (2) Panmai brother of Zalumme, (3) Mianji, Abdurrahman Khel, with three others	Compensation Rs 1,800, price of three rifles, pouch, &c	Due from Mahsuds Rs. 3,800 as follows — Rs Fine ... 2,000 Price of three rifles 1,500 Wound price ... 200 Price of goods ... 100 Total ... 3,800
82	23th May, 1900	Military Post, Jandola	Do ...	On the evening of May 23th a Martini-Henry carbine, No 211, with a pouch, belt and 20 rounds were stolen from Shahwali, Sowar, 5th Punjab Cavalry	Shah Jahan and Mirajan, Shingra, Boji Khels	Rs 600 has been imposed as compensation as well as fines.	Due from Shingra Rs. 600 as follows — Rs Compensation of rifles 300 Price of belt, &c .. 100 Fine .. 200 Total . 600
83	4th May 1900 ...	Grazing ground, Karkan	1 Haadar Shah, 2 Umar Shah, 3 Gul Muhamad Shah,	On the night of 3rd-4th May, 1900, complainants' 14 camels, worth Rs 840, were carried off by thieves from the grazing-ground of Karkan	Unknown ...	Nil ..	Fine of Rs 500, compensation Rs. 840 will be proposed when the case is proved.
			Syads, of Kirri Khoedad Khan				
84	5th May, 1900 ..	Ghwalwa Khurra...	1 Said Ahmad Luni, 2 Shikandar, son of Mawal, 3 Lal Khan, 4 Bahar Khan,	On 5th May, 1900, the complainants Kirris of Dotanis on their way from Nil to Khajuri were attacked by a gang of 300 bedmashes, carried off two camels worth Rs. 100, wounding and killing four camels clothes worth Rs. 900 and Rs 600 Kabuli in cash.	Do. ...	Nil ..	Nil Compensation of Rs. 1,600 will be proposed as follows:— Rs Two camels . 100 Clothing 900 Cash 600 1,600 when the case is proved, i.e.—Rs. 1,000 British Rs. 600 Kabuli.
			Mian Khels, of Khurasan.				

85	5th May, 1900 ..	Basta Kach	Ghulam Rasul, son of Paund Khan, Nasir, of Kirri Shah Muhammad Nasir, encamped at Panyala.	On 5th May, 1900, complainant's four camels worth Rs 200 strayed near grazing Basta Kach.	Do	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 200 will be proposed when the case is proved
86	15th May, 1900 .	Three miles from Jandola towards Haidari Kach.	Empress through Post Master, Haidari Kach	On 15th May, 1900, Post Master, Haidari Kach, wired that the telegraph wire was cut by some badmashes	Do.		Rs 50 fine has been imposed on Mahsud tribe.
87	10th April, 1900	Shirani Pass	1 Muhammad } 2 Shirin, } Suleman 3 Baddo, } Khels 4 Muhammad } Ashraf }	On 10th April, 1900, complainants were robbed of Rs 2,000 Kabul by robbers near Gaudi Muza Khan.	1 Shahwarmin, son of Lale Gul, with four others, 2 Asal Khan, 3 Kipat Khan, with six other Guri Khels	Nil	Nil Compensation of Rs 2,000 will be proposed when the case is proved
88	1st April, 1900	Unknown	Dadu Khan, Dawat Khel Powindah of Kirri Gul Khan at Kulachi	Twelve camels and five goats out grazing in the Shirani Pass were carried off by thieves	Unknown	Nil	Compensation of Rs 188 will be proposed when the case is proved
89	2nd April, 1900	Hissar Pass	Ghava Khan, son of Haibat Khan, Mandi Khel, Nam bardar of Kirri Ahmad Shah	On 2nd April, 1900, complainants 38 goats, valued at Rs 114, and three cows, valued at Rs 45, were carried off by thieves	Do	Nil ..	Compensation of Rs 140 will be proposed when this case is proved
40	24th May, 1900...	Zam Khulla	Empress through Maghar Khan, Bhattanni Sowar	On 21st May Dak runners were carrying Government dak from Gandola to Tank At Zam Khulla Maghar Khan, Dak badrags, was fired at by thieves and wounded in the wrist.	Nil ..		Fine of Rs 200 and Rs 100 for wounding the Levy Sowar will be imposed
41	1st April, 1900 .	Nurragai	Dad, son of Rakkai, Dawat Khel	On 1st April, 1900, complainant's nine cows, valued at Rs 185, and five goats, valued at Rs 15, were carried off by thieves	Unknown	Nil	Nil Compensation of Rs 142 will be proposed when the case is proved.
42	24th-26th May, 1900,	Tank Semi . ..	Tablu Ram, son of Chothu Ram, of Tank	On the night of 24th 26th May, 1900, some raiders broke into the house of complainant and carried off ghi, &c, valued at Rs 128-8-0	Do	Nil	Nil. Compensation of Rs 126 will be proposed when the case is proved
43	26th-27th May, 1900	Murtaza ...	Sawal Khan, son of Murtaza Khan, Miani, of Kot Murtaza.	On the night of 26th 27th May, 1900, some raiders carried off wheat collected at complainant's door, valued at Rs 10	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs 10 will be proposed when the case is proved.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence	Names and Detail of Complainants	Nature of Offence, briefly	Details of Offenders, briefly	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
44	3rd June, 1900	Kurah Kot ..	Empress	On 3rd June, 1900, telegraph wire was cut with no other damage.	Unknown	Rupees 50 imposed as fine on three chief sections of Mahsuds.	Fine of Rs. 50 is due from three chief sections of Mahsuds.
45	4th June, 1900 ...	Do.	Do	Do	Do.	Do.	Do.
46	Do ..	Mani of Guldad, Wana.	Do	On 4th June, 1900, some badmashes fired at the convoy proceeding to Ngandioba from Kot Kun hill, but no casualty occurred.	Mahsuds suspected .	Fine of Rs 1,000 imposed on three chief sections of Mahsuds	Rs 1,000 is due from three sections of Mahsuds.
*47	27th-28th April, 1900,	Tank	Dest Muhammad, son of Mauladad, Powindah Mulah.	On the night of 27th-28th April, 1900, some thieves penetrated into the Kirri of complainant, encamped near Tank, and took away one tent and some vessels, valued at Rs. 77.	Unknown	Nil	Compensation of Rs 77 will be imposed when case is proved before jirga.
*48	29th-30th May 1900	Mullazai Kirri, Lakkī Miohan	Chela Ram, son of Bihari Ram, through Sher Ahmad	On the night of 29th-30th May, 1900, some thieves broke into complainant's house and carried off a silver necklace.	Do	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 10 will be imposed when case is proved before jirga.
49	30th 31st May, 1900	Tattar Tank	Sahib Khan, son of Dinak, Akhund Khel of Tattar	On the night of 30th-31st May, 1900, some thieves carried off complainant's bullocks, worth Rs 30	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 15 will be proposed when the case is proved
*50	31st May, 1900	Garni, Thana Gomal	1. Asim Khan, } 2. Fateh Mir, } Marzyana.	On 31st May, 1900, some thieves attacked complainant's cattle and carried off 54, out of which 37 were recovered	Do	Nil	Compensation of Rs 255 will be proposed when the case is proved.
51	29th June, 1900...	Zaranoba	Assim Khan, son of Rustan Khan, Kamr-ud din, and Moosa, footman badragga.	On 29th June, 1900, complainant was going with Moosa Khan, badragga, to Khajuri Kaoh on his way to Zarranni, when some raiders attacked him and carried off Rs. 2 in cash and clothes worth Rs. 10-15-6, and also robbed of badragga's property as follows — Rs. A. P. Knife 3 0 0 Kabuli. Government belt 2 8 0 British.	Do	Nil	Compensation of about Rs 50 will be proposed when the case is proved.

*52	21st June, 1900..	Jatt .. .	Dyala Ram, son of Nawal Ram, Kathuria, and Gulla, son of Bahadur, Makkar, &c.	Some six raiders attacked complainants on their way to Gomal and carried off four bags of sugar which was loaded in complainant's rehries, and took Rs. 5 in cash.	Do	Nil	..	Compensation of Rs 65 will be proposed when the case is proved.		
*53	1st-2nd July, 1900	Military Po-4, Tank	Sahara, son of Shera, caste Uchara, and Mosalma, son of Gama.	Some raiders stole two camels, worth Rs 100, of complainants on 1st-2nd July, 1900	Nil	Compensation of Rs 100 will be proposed when the case is proved

		Rs	A	P
Total due		=	23,259	1 0 British
+ 2,600-0-0	Kabul	=	1,300	0 0 British.
Total			<u>24,559</u>	<u>1 0</u>

S WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana

Note—The cases marked * were committed in the Dera Ismail Khan District. Had the offenders been caught, they would have received substantial sentences of imprisonment in addition to fines. I consider, therefore, that fines should be imposed in addition to the compensation proposed in these cases.

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

STATEMENT B.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds in Protected Area against Persons not British Subjects.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offences, briefly	Detail of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment inflicted.	Amount of Compensation Due, also Fine Due or Proposed
1	20th April, 1900	Spin	1 Sahib Khan, } Miani 2 Torak Khan, } Powindahs	On the night of 20th April, 1900, the complainants' 11 camels worth Rs 550 were carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 550 will be proposed if the case is proved
2	2nd April, 1900 ..	Wana	Bahadar, Kari Khel ..	Complainant's brother Juma Khan was detained by the defendant in Khausara and kept in custody	1 Adilmiri, } Mahsuds, of 2 Isagai, } Khausara.	Nil	Nil. Fine of Rs 50 will be imposed on the appearance of the parties.
3	18th May, 1900 .	Jandola	Surkamand, Sarah, Bhit-tanni of Jandola.	On May 18th four cows worth Rs. 60 were carried off by thieves from the complainants	Gunge Khan, Shingri	Nil	Nil. Compensation Rs. 60 will be proposed provided that the case is proved.
4	8th May, 1900 .	Kirri Suhbatti Koch	Rom Khan, Bhitanni	On the night of 7th May, 1900, about 25 Mahsud thieves attacked the complainant and carried off 40 camels worth Rs. 608 forcibly	Unknown	Nil	Nil Compensation Rs 600 will be proposed on proof
5	21st May, 1900 .	Crazing-ground of China Khah	Waruka, son of Khan Shah, Ji Khel Zilli Khel	On May 21st four thieves carried off two sheep and 13 cows worth Rs 204	Do	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs 200 will be proposed when the case is proved
6	26th May, 1900 .	Jandola	1. Kabur Khan, } Bhit- 2 Dinak Khan, } tanna.	On the night of 26th May, 1900, some thieves burnt the complainants' 60 maunds of wheat	Do.	Nil	Nil A compensation of Rs. 180 will be proposed when the case is proved.
7	27th May, 1900 ..	Wucha Khurra	Nawar Khan, Khojal Khel.	On May 27th a Khojal Khel Bahur returning from Gurgura to Wana with bullocks laden with wood was attacked by several badmashes and robbed of their bullocks A Khojal Khel Chigha turned out and succeeded in recovering the animals, but one of the chigha party named Gul Muhammad was shot dead by the raiders	1 Suleman, son of Khushal Khan, Michu Khel 2 Sarwar, 3 Kundal, } Michu 4 Shahi Khan, } Khels 5 Mokhabbat, } Abdurrah- man Khel.	Nil	A compensation of Rs 360 and a fine of Rs 100 will be proposed when the case is decided. Rupees 360 will be the blood-money and Rs 100 will be the Government fine
8	17th May, 1900 .	Asrab	Muhammad Afzal, Dotani	Complainant was robbed of his sword and shield by some raiders, of whom two were recognised.	1. Boshé Khan, son of Bare Khan Pash 2. Mohabbat Khan, brother of Sekin, Pash, with some others of Khausara.	Nil	A compensation amounting to Rs. 15, the value of sword, &c., will be proposed when the case is proved.
9	6th July, 1900 .	Pasta Khulla in Spin	Piyo Shah, Yargul Khel, &c.	The complainants' cattle were out grazing at Pasta Khulla when nine cows out of them were carried off.	Unknown	Nil	A compensation of Rs. 135 will be proposed when the case is proved Total due Rs. 2,250.

Enclosure 13 in No 2.

Letter from Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 1st October, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated the 17th of August, 1900, I am directed to acquaint you with the decision at which the Government of India have arrived after perusal of the correspondence and discussion of Mahsud affairs, at two Conferences held at Viceregal Lodge, Simla, on the 4th and 8th of September, in both of which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab took part.

2. The first question in order of urgency and importance, is that of demanding from the Mahsuds a settlement in full of all fines and claims for compensation outstanding against the tribe, and of enforcing the demand in such a manner that it may speedily be satisfied, and that the Mahsuds may receive a lesson likely to deter them in future from disloyal and disorderly conduct. The Government of India regret to observe that the settlement with the tribe, effected by Mr Anderson in March, 1900, was little better than a nominal one, and that not only were a number of pending cases left out of consideration altogether, but, in some of those taken up and decided, the punitive fines imposed, or the sums awarded in compensation, were totally inadequate. The Government of India consider that it is impossible to re-open cases which were really disposed of, however unsatisfactorily, in Mr Anderson's settlement, but that all cases which, though pending before or at the time of that settlement, were not specifically included in it, should now be referred back to the Mahsuds, along with any others that there may be of later occurrence. It is important that all claims whatever against the Mahsuds, including those of an inter-tribal nature of which the settlement has already been undertaken by the Political Officer, should on this occasion be brought to a decision in order that the tribe, after giving satisfaction, should resume its relations to the British Government with a clear balance-sheet. The only exception made should be in respect of any claims which may possibly be brought hereafter by the Afghan Government on account of raids into Afghanistan committed since the demarcation of the frontier. As agreed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the Commissioner of the Derajat should, as early as possible in November, having regard to the probable duration of the proceedings, and the time required for completing the military preparations in support of a blockade, bring to the notice of the Mahsuds, in jirga assembled, the details and total amount of the claims against them, and, after announcing to the jirga the future policy of Government towards the tribe, allow a certain interval to elapse within which they will have an opportunity of making arrangements for the prompt and complete discharge of their liabilities. Should the Mahsuds refuse to settle, or should they temporise in such manner as to show an evident intention of evading settlement, the Commissioner should present them with a specific demand fixing a period within which they must, upon pain of blockade, comply. On expiration of the period of grace, without submission and compliance on the part of the tribe, the blockade should be declared as soon as the military preparations are ready, and it will be maintained with all possible rigour until further orders. The military preparations which are being made in order to support the civil power in blockading the Mahsuds will be separately communicated for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor. Mr. Merk should submit provisionally without delay such of his proposals for working the blockade as may involve increased political expenditure or the issue of orders by the Government of India.

3. The cases which are to be brought before the jirga of the Mahsud tribe will include claims on account of many and serious offences committed in the Baluchistan Agency Territories. I am to suggest that, with His Honour's permission, the Commissioner of the Derajat might place himself

in communication with the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan, with a view to the Agency being represented at the jirga by a British officer who will be in a position to safeguard the interests of claimants belonging to that part of the frontier.

4. The next point is the suggested change of policy in our future dealings with the Mahsuds, for the introduction of which it is suggested that the Government should utilise the opportunity now afforded of making a general settlement with the tribe. The Government of India agree that the system, hitherto in force, of dealing with the tribe through Mahks who have, to a large extent, been nominated and selected by British officers, has not been a success, and should be abandoned. They agree that the Mahks so selected should no longer be regarded and treated with as the representatives of the tribe, and that negotiations should in future be so conducted that in the case either of the whole tribe or of a section of the tribe there may be reasonable certainty that the views put forward will really represent the popular feeling. The way to ensure that the tribe shall be committed as a whole is to deal in important matters with the jirga of the tribe, and also, when accepting the spokesmanship of any individual, to be certain that he is accepted by the clan which he represents. The tribal subsidies also should be paid to the jirga of the tribe or section for division. The practice of paying to selected individuals should cease, unless the jirga itself makes the selection and desires that the payment be so made. A portion of the subsidy might, however, be reserved for distribution to individuals whose interests it would not be good policy to neglect, but which might suffer in a division of the allowances on an entirely popular or tribal basis. The Government of India also approve of the proposal that time should not hereafter be wasted in unavailing attempts to detect and bring to punishment individual criminals belonging to the tribe. There can be no doubt that adherence to a rigid system of individual and graded responsibility has been productive in the past of great delay in the settlement of cases, and has, therefore, contributed largely to bring about the present situation. The Government of India are convinced, therefore, of the necessity of relaxing this system and of permitting immediate resort, at the discretion of the local political authorities, to tribal or sectional responsibility. At the same time they desire that favourable opportunities of bringing actual offenders to justice should not be neglected, and that punishment should be inflicted on such persons, where this can be conveniently done, either instead of, or in addition to, the penalty upon the tribe.

5. These are the general outlines of the policy which the Government of India are prepared to sanction. As decided at the Conference of September 4th, it is desirable that the Commissioner should himself be responsible for the actual words employed; and there is no wish to fetter his discretion in the matter. Inasmuch, however, as the point now reached may be described as a parting of the ways in our relations with the Mahsuds, and as the Government of India will be bound in the immediate future by whatever is now said, it is important that considerable care should be devoted to its composition, and that a sketch or outline of the manner in which the Commissioner would propose to discharge his task should be submitted in advance to the Lieutenant-Governor and with his approval to the Government of India. I am to request that instructions may be issued to this effect to Mr Merk.

6. It is further proposed that Mahsuds settled on land in British India should be turned out and sent over the border during the progress of the blockade, and that like treatment should be accorded to the Mahsuds who have enlisted in the Waziristan Militia, a promise being given that, subject to their not participating in actual hostilities, they will be taken back again at its termination.

No. 3.

Letter from Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 30th January, 1902. Received 17th February, 1902.

In our despatch, dated the 18th October, 1900, we forwarded papers regarding our relations with the Mahsud tribe, who for a long period of time had committed a series of violent depredations and attacks upon British territory or British protected tribes, which patience and conciliatoriness had proved equally powerless to check or to compose. We informed Your Lordship that the situation was such as to give ground for much anxiety, that the tribal jirga were to be interviewed by Mr. Merk in the following month, with the view of expounding to them the intentions of Government, which, even then, were entirely compatible with a pacific solution, but that, if this attempt proved abortive, and if the tribe declined to accept the proffered settlement and to discharge their liabilities, a strict blockade would be enforced against them until complete submission had been obtained.

2 We now have the honour to enclose papers on the same subject up to the end of the year 1901. In October, 1900, the total sum payable by the Mahsuds on account of all offences, exclusive of those really disposed of by Mr Anderson's settlement in the preceding March, amounted to Rs. 1,87,000. Recognising that it was hopeless to expect the payment, with any promptitude, of so large a sum from a tribe of the limited resources of the Mahsuds, we decided, at the instance of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to demand a lump sum of a lakh of rupees on account of all offences up to the date of announcement. Even while we were considering this proposal, the Mahsuds added one more to the long list of crimes outstanding against them by attacking and looting, on the 22nd October, the Border Military Police post at Nasran. Two men of the Police were shot dead, several rifles and carbines were carried off, and Lieutenant Hennessey, who commanded a pursuit party, was killed.

3 Mr. Merk received a representative tribal jirga at Tank on the 8th November, 1900, explained to them the intention of Government to demand a lakh of rupees in complete settlement, and told them that if within fifteen days they had not paid half of this sum, a blockade would be established, and that it would not be removed until the final instalment had been paid. He also informed them of the determination to abandon the system of dealing with the tribe through Maliks, who had, to a large extent, been selected by British officers, and to adopt a system under which negotiations in important matters would be carried on with the tribal jirga. The intention of Government to relax the principle of individual responsibility which had in the past been productive of great delay in the settlement of cases, and to permit resort to sectional or tribal responsibility, was also announced. The jirga withdrew to discuss the proposals made to them, but at the end of the fortnight they asked for two months' grace, and as there was no prospect of the early payment of the half lakh, the blockade was proclaimed from the 1st December, and came into operation on that date.

4. At first it appeared that the Mahsuds were in earnest in their intention to pay the exceedingly lenient fine which had been imposed upon them. For a time raiding on British territory stopped, small sums in cash were handed in, and larger payments in rifles and cattle were made. Contributions, however, ceased in about the middle of January, 1901, and during the fortnight ending on the 15th of that month, some half dozen offences against Government servants and property were reported. These crimes were considered by Mr. Merk to have been deliberately instigated by the Maliks, in the hope of forcing Government into an expedition, in which

case they looked to being protected as friendlies, while the trouble would fall on the tribesmen and the Mahiks' political adversary, the Mullah Powindah.

5 During February and March the situation improved; but in April tension between the different political factions within the tribe increased, Mahsud raids, chiefly on Powindahs and Darwesh Khels, recommenced, and in one bold raid into Zhob, a gang ambuscaded the baggage of the Commandant of the Zhob Levy Corps, killing two men and two camels, and carrying off two Snider carbines. On the 12th May, a ration party of the Southern Waziristan Militia was taken at disadvantage by Mahsud raiders between Kajuri Kach and Kashmir Kar, one sepoy was killed, four wounded and seven rifles were carried off. Early in May, Mr. Merk held a protracted discussion with a Mahsud jirga numbering over 1,500 persons, at which it was agreed that two-thirds of the fine should be paid in cash or breech-loaders, and not more than one-third in cattle. Up to the 8th May, only Rs. 4,000 had been received in money, while Rs. 28,600 represented the value of rifles and revolvers and Rs. 24,100 the value of animals given up. By the 15th May, the total payments had reached Rs. 67,500. Difficulties having arisen in regard to accepting payment in live stock, it was decided by the Government of India that the balance of the fine still outstanding must be paid in cash. We agreed, however, to rifles being taken as security for cash payments, subject to the condition that they must be redeemed before any allowances could be distributed to the tribe after a final settlement had been come to with them. The Commissioner dismissed the jirga on the 28th May, after having made it clear to them that the blockade would not be removed nor any allowances distributed until the last rupee of the fine had been paid, and that any offences committed meanwhile would be sharply punished.

6 At this time Mr. Merk, in reporting on the effects of the blockade, stated that luxuries were unobtainable in the Mahsud country, but that food existed in sufficient quantities, and that it would require another eighteen months of blockade to produce an actual condition of famine in the country. An interesting account of the system of enforcing the blockade will be found in Mr. Merk's letter, dated the 18th May, 1901, to the Government of the Punjab.

Enclosure No 52.

7 During June and July small contributions towards the fine continued to be paid, but numerous fresh outrages by the Mahsud tribesmen were reported. Chief among these may be cited an attack on the village of Hassu Khel in Lower Dawar, when three villagers were killed and three wounded, an attack on the regimental grazing guard of the 45th Sikhs at Jandola, when three sepoys were killed, a raid on the Border Military Police post at Baran in the Bannu district, when fourteen rifles and a quantity of ammunition were carried off; a raid on the Charweshkai post in the Sheranni country, when three Levy sowars were killed, the Post officer wounded, and their arms carried off, and an attack on some Militia sepoys near Tiarza, when one non-commissioned officer was killed and two men were wounded. These were followed by a still more serious offence. On the 6th August, in broad daylight, the Militia post at Kashmir Kar was attacked by a band of Mahsuds estimated to be 200 strong. The thirty men of the garrison were surprised, a Havildar, three sepoys, and three labourers were killed, the Native Officer commanding the post and three men were wounded, and thirty rifles, with a large quantity of ammunition and property, were carried off. Papers regarding this occurrence have been furnished to Your Lordship with our despatches marked in the margin.

Dated the 29th November, 1901, and the 23rd January, 1902 (not printed).

8 Up to this time, the troops employed in the blockade had acted on the defensive, retaliation as a general rule not being undertaken, although the troops were in positions which must have afforded frequent opportunities for inflicting summary punishment on the offenders. But from the account

that we have given it will be recognised that the position was rapidly becoming intolerable, and that the account against the Mahsuds for offences committed since the blockade began was rapidly mounting up to a sum not much less than the fine originally demanded.

Enclosure No. 65.

Accordingly, in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 5th August, 1901, we pointed out to the Punjab Government that we had never initiated, ordered or sanctioned any prohibition of counter-raids, and that, so long as these did not develop into expeditions, and were short and swift in their operation, there appeared to be no objection to their being undertaken. We pointed out that it was our desire not only to bring the Mahsuds to complete submission as a punishment for their former offences, but also that they should meet with severe and prompt retribution for any fresh raids, otherwise there would be no finality in the operations, and the position at the close of the blockade would be no better than at the beginning. Therefore, whenever an opportunity offered, and it did not appear possible to effect the desired object by means of a passive blockade alone, we saw no reason why more drastic measures should not be adopted. On these suggestions we called for a report from the Commissioner, and invited the opinion and advice of the Lieutenant-Governor.

9 Both Sir Mackworth Young and Mr. Merk considered that no active operations should be undertaken until the cold weather, and we accepted this opinion. During September and October the Mahsuds were comparatively quiet, being occupied in fighting out a dispute of long standing with the Darwesh Khel, in regard to the Badar lands in the unprotected area. This did not, however, prevent them from committing several minor offences, and one of much more serious character. The latter occurred on the 23rd September, when a band of about 50 Mahsuds armed with rifles marched 25 miles into the Bannu district, and attacked a village, killing seven persons. All payments towards the fine had now ceased. After ten months' rigorous enforcement of the blockade, we had only collected some three-fourths of the original fine, and the account for fresh offences had reached a figure which there was little prospect of our being able to realise from the tribesmen by passive measures only.

10 In our telegram of the 19th October, we informed Your Lordship that the blockade alone appeared unlikely to bring the Mahsuds to their knees. There were two alternatives before us, (i) to continue the blockade throughout the winter and then to send an expedition through the country in the spring: this course had the support of Sir Mackworth Young—(ii) to continue the blockade, but to vary it by a succession of sharp sallies or raids of three or four days' duration, from different quarters of the blockade cordon, for the destruction of crops and the capture of cattle and men. It was contemplated that these operations would be conducted by columns of from 1,000 to 2,000 men each, and that the first would start from Wana and Sarwekai during the last week in November. This plan was recommended by His Excellency the Viceroy, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Edmond Elles, General C C Egerton, and substantially by Colonel Deane and Mr. Merk. We supported this latter course, because we believed that in it would be found the only means of bringing the Mahsuds to subjection without the usual expedition, which it had been our aim from the first to avoid. Your Lordship approved* the second alternative.

* Telegram, dated the 1st November, 1901—enclosure No. 85.

11 Two more grave offences remain to be recorded. On the 2nd November, a picket of the 9th Bombay Infantry was ambuscaded by Mahsuds at Nili Kach and three men killed. On the afternoon of the 3rd November, a party of 32 rifles of the 17th Bengal Infantry, under the command of a Subadar, forming part of the escort furnished for the survey of the Murtaza-Sarwekai road, was ambushed by Mahsuds about two miles from the Khuzma Khulla post. The Subadar, 23 rank and file and six other persons were killed, and two sepoy and four other persons were wounded.

12. The season had now arrived when it was possible for us to carry out the contemplated retaliatory measures against the Mahsuds. On the night of the 23rd November, a punitive column advanced from the Tochi, and on the night of the 24th, similar columns advanced from Wana, Sarwekai, and Jandola. These columns had all returned within less than five days, having completed the operations entrusted to them. Their labours were usefully supplemented by the recently constituted Southern Waziristan Militia under Major Harman, who, by a well directed succession of movements, effected a very large capture of cattle and flocks. During the course of the combined operations, a number of Mahsud villages, forts and towers were destroyed, 201 prisoners were taken, and a total of 4,000 animals—including cattle, goats, sheep, horses, camels and donkeys—were captured. In places considerable resistance was encountered, and the Jandola column had nine hours' continuous fighting. The casualties amounted, on the Mahsud side, to approximately 60 killed, and to 5 killed and 44 wounded in the British columns. The operations were throughout successful, and proved that it was possible to surprise the Mahsuds and to inflict upon them severe punishment without incurring undue military risk.

13. Feeling that a sharp and swift repetition of these blows was the most effective method of reducing the tribe, the local civil officers proposed an early renewal of the attack. The idea was entertained of forming an entrenched camp at Ahmedwam, to act as the base of a series of raids into the neighbouring valleys, but was abandoned owing to the lack of water. Between the 4th and 8th of December, however, General Dening's force effected considerable damage in the region north of Jandola. It was frequently engaged, but succeeded in inflicting serious losses upon the enemy, several of whose villages and towers were destroyed, with much grain and fodder.

14. In pursuit of the same policy and with the object of avoiding any measures which might involve a more than transient occupation of the Mahsud country, and might insensibly develop into an expedition, we next, in communication with General Egerton and Colonel Deane, arranged for a third series of operations which would have the effect of tightening the cordon of the blockade and of dealing further blows at the Mahsuds from an unexpected direction in the large grazing grounds lying between the Khaisara valley and Tank. These operations commenced on the 1st January, when three columns started from Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel to converge on the north-eastern portion of the Mahsud territory. The operations were entirely successful, but were unfortunately marred by the regrettable death of Captain Down, Political Officer in the Tochi, who was dangerously wounded in an attack on a Mahsud tower. The total casualties on the Mahsud side amounted to about 40 killed and 80 or 90 wounded; on the British side 3 were killed and 20 wounded; 20 Mahsud prisoners, and more than 4,000 head of sheep and cattle, were taken. We have not yet received a full report of these proceedings.

15. We invite Your Lordship's attention to the communication cited in the margin, in which Colonel Deane submitted a report by Mr. Merk on the operations which were carried out between the 24th and 28th November, 1901. Colonel Deane was of opinion that similar punitive measures must be continued until the Mahsuds make unconditional submission. As the foregoing narrative shows, this is the course that we have followed with a success that has so far more than answered our expectations. Whether the full submission of the tribe will be obtained, it is as yet too early to predict, but, according to our latest information, which has been telegraphed to Your Lordship, the Mahsud jurga have now sued for terms, and have accepted the preliminary conditions imposed by the Commissioner, viz., that the balance of the fine of one lakh shall be paid in cash, and that all rifles taken during the blockade shall be returned. Meanwhile, we have already seized or destroyed property which

Dated the 2nd January, 1902
—enclosure No. 116.

is probably of sufficient value not only to cover the balance of the original fine, but also to compensate for the offences committed since the commencement of the blockade, and we have inflicted on the tribe, in addition, punishment of the severest kind, without having recourse to the delay and the much greater expense that attend a regular expedition. It is satisfactory to record that, since the commencement of these retaliatory measures, no raids of any importance have been committed by the Mahsuds in British territory or in the protected area.

We have, &c,

(Signed)	CURZON
"	C M RIVAZ
"	T RALEIGH
"	E F-G LAW
"	E R ELLES
"	A T ARUNDEL

Enclosure 1 in No 3

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, 17th October, 1900.

In my letter, dated 26th July, Sir Mackworth Young promised to address the Government of India again on the subject of the settlement with the Mahsuds made last March after the receipt of an explanation from Mr. H. A. Anderson regarding some of the defects in his proceedings which came to light after he left India. The orders contained, in the second paragraph of your letter, dated 1st October, make it unnecessary to discuss

Letter, dated 25th July, this matter so fully as would otherwise have been necessary, but I am to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, and to convey the following remarks

Letter, dated 20th August, from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I.

2. The errors in the settlement will be dealt with in the order in which they are stated in the fifth paragraph of my letter of the 25th July. The worst feature of the case—the very inadequate recompense assessed in some important cases—is not dealt with in these papers, and indeed it admits of no satisfactory explanation. Nor is any real explanation possible of the miscalculation by which the demand against the tribe on account of cases settled before or at the Tank jirga was put at Rs. 3,201 below the proper figure. The under-estimate of the amounts due in the Zhob and Tochi cases argues a laxity of procedure. The records of cases against the Mahsuds would appear not to have been kept before the settlement in such a way that a list of cases and the probable amount of compensation due could be rapidly compiled in the Commissioner's office.

3. The omission of Rs. 9,000 on account of cases which it was held ought to have been included in the settlement admits of a partial explanation. These are the cases referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr. Watson's letter of 1st May, which forms one of the enclosures of my letter, dated 21st May. The amount claimed in the cases was Rs. 13,203, but Mr. Watson calculated that this might be reduced to Rs. 9,000 when they were actually decided. The jirga took place on 18th March. Some of the cases, as appears from the statement appended to Mr. Watson's letter, occurred after that date, and these should obviously be excluded from the account. It will be fair, indeed, to exclude all cases which took place after 1st March, for some time must be allowed for the report and registration of cases. At the same time, Mr. Anderson should not have committed himself to the rash statement that no case against the Mahsuds was pending. Of the cases the compensation for which, as originally estimated, amounted to Rs. 13,203, 17 occurred

before 1st March, and for these the compensation amounted to Rs. 4,200. If we omit nine Zhob cases, for which Mr. Anderson only professed to make an estimate (see paragraph 8 of his letter, dated 30th March), the deficiency is reduced to Rs. 1,900. There are altogether 10 Zhob cases in Mr. Watson's list, but one of these, the compensation for which is put at Rs. 1,223, took place after the jirga. The omission of case 2 in Mr. Watson's list of B cases and of four old Shirani cases belonging to the years 1897, 1898 and 1899 indicates regrettable laxity.

4 The failure to take up the Bannu cases, the compensation for which is put at Rs. 4,800, was due in the first instance to loose procedure in the Bannu District Office, but it must be admitted that Mr. Anderson was very rash in accepting the composition for Rs. 35,000 without having got any assurance from Bannu as to the state of the account against the Mahsuds there

5. It is not possible to argue that the agreement was not intended to be a complete settlement as regards all Zhob and Tochi cases reported to the Political Officers up to 18th March, as well as all cases which had occurred in British territory or in Southern Waziristan. But the misconduct of the tribe has been so flagrant since last March, and the agreement, such as it was, has so completely failed of its object, that there need be no hesitation, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, in demanding the settlement of cases not mentioned specifically or considered at the time. This is understood to be the conclusion of the Government of India, as expressed in paragraph 2 of your letter, dated 1st October, 1900, and accordingly, subject to any orders which the Government of India may issue, the following items will be included in the new demand, which will be announced by Mr. Merk in November.—

	Rs
(a) Cases referred to in paragraph 3, less Rs 2,300 for Zhob cases which occurred before 18th March	=10,903
(b) Bannu cases pending in March not included in the settlement	= 4,800

In addition to these, of course, all new cases, which have occurred since the settlement of March, will be considered in the new account, as well as all cases expressly excluded from the March settlement. The Lieutenant-Governor understands, from paragraph 2 of your letter above quoted that we are to undertake the settlement of all inter-tribal cases (called C and D in the correspondence) of which the settlement has been undertaken by the Political Officers, but it is probably not intended that any inter-tribal cases should be included in the new account which have not been in any way undertaken by the Political Officers, and which, in ordinary course, they would not undertake

6. In conclusion I am to express the Lieutenant-Governor's extreme regret at the incompleteness of Mr Anderson's proceedings. As the Government of India are aware, the Lieutenant-Governor was very anxious that the Mahsuds should be forced either to accept or definitely refuse a proper settlement of our claims against them before Mr. Anderson left the Derajat. It is clear that, in his anxiety to make a settlement in the time at his disposal, Mr. Anderson overstepped the bounds of prudence in giving to the extent which he did finality to his proceedings. This was his principal mistake, and it is the more regrettable, because he had not taken the precaution to make a searching enquiry from all his subordinates as to the total outstanding claims. There was also laxity of procedure before the settlement in getting together and registering claims against the Mahsuds, and, in consequence, great difficulty was experienced in making out a complete account. The faults in the general system of tribal management, which were largely responsible for these delays, have now been fully reported to the Government of India, and proposals for introducing a speedier and more effective method of settling cases have been accepted.

Annexure 1

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., dated Simla, the 25th July, 1900.

Since you went on furlough, there has been a good deal of discussion about the settlement which you made with the Mahsuds at Tank last March, and before finally disposing of the case, His Honour thinks you ought to have an opportunity of explaining certain apparent defects in the arrangement and of stating your own view of the scope of its terms. I therefore enclose, for your perusal, the papers, of which a list is appended to this letter.

2 It was unfortunate that this task fell to you just as we were leaving, and that you had to work against time. It was to be expected that, after you left, matters would arise requiring explanation, and, as already noted, such has been the case. Matters have been made more difficult by the fact that Watson soon followed you to England. The result is that Sir Mackworth Young is compelled to trouble you with the case, for no satisfactory conclusion can be reached regarding several of the questions involved without obtaining a statement of your views.

3 The proceedings at Tank comprised—

- (1) The framing of an estimate of all pending claims against the Mahsuds except the inter-tribal and miscellaneous cases
- (2) The communication of this estimate to the assembled Malikhs with a view to their making arrangements for its liquidation.
- (3) A petition of the Malikhs, dated 24th March, accepting the liability and stipulating that the amount, Rs 35,000, should be paid in a certain way.

4 In the course of the petition the following statement occurs: "You have examined all the files pending against the tribe in which the offence was committed in British territory or Zhob or against Government on British subjects in the Gomal Pass, Shahur, Wana or Tochi." Your remark on the transaction is: "The settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the inter-tribal cases, which will be disposed of as opportunities offer." You call it a "friendly settlement," and say that the Malikhs, "in return for the sympathetic treatment accorded to them in the past, readily acquiesced in my wishes that they should use all their power and influence in the tribe to induce it to pay up the fines due and make a friendly settlement."

5 It appears that besides the inter-tribal cases your settlement did not include or take account of—

No.	—	Rupees	—
1	Certain errors in demand on account of cases previously settled.	3,201	This is difference between Rs 36,055 (Rs. 19,113 + Rs. 16,942) and Rs 32,854 shown in paragraph 8 of your No. 287, dated 30th March.
2	Under-estimate of demand on account of Zhob and Tochi cases decided since March, but which were then pending.	1,394	You estimated that Rs 2,146 would cover demand on account of pending Zhob and Tochi cases. The principal Zhob case and most of the Tochi cases have since been decided, and the demand works out at Rs. 3,540 (see paragraph 4 of Watson's No. 429, dated 13th May).
3	Zhob and Tochi cases not yet decided.	1,605	Zhob cases Rs. 914 (see paragraph 4 of Watson's No 729, dated 13th May). Rupees 691 may be added for the Tochi cases referred to in Doland's No 851, dated 23rd June, though perhaps this may turn out to be an under-estimate.
4	Cases pending last March, but not included in calculation on which Rs 3,500 were accepted as a composition from Mahsuds.	9,000	See paragraph 3 of my No. 648, dated 2nd June.
5	Cases pending in Bannu last March, but not included in settlement.	4,800	See paragraph 2 of Merk's No. 202-C., dated 28th June.
	Total	20,000	

There ought properly to be another head on account of certain miscellaneous cases of the A and B Classes which were pending in March. It is not clear why these should have been excluded from the settlement.

6. His Honour will feel obliged if you will record your opinion in regard to each of the above heads, whether the amounts shown can now be demanded from the Mahsuds, or whether the tribe can be called upon to take action against the section or individuals concerned in the offences. You will also, no doubt, wish to explain how it happened that these cases were omitted from the settlement, and how far it was your intention that the composition should be accepted as wiping out all scores, whether reported or pending with you or pending with the local officers, or only pending in the sense that offences had been committed, but not investigated.

7 The Lieutenant-Governor hopes you will reply to this letter at a very early date so as to enable him to dispose finally of the case in September

Annexure 2.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., to J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Hunstanton, the 20th August, 1900.

I submit now my reply to your letter, dated 25th July, 1900, regarding the settlement made with the Mahsuds at Tank last March, and asking for an explanation of certain apparent defects in that settlement and for an expression of my views on the scope of its terms

2. In paragraph 5 of your letter you detail five items, with reference to which you ask for explanation and opinion. I take first the largest of those items, namely, Rs 9,000, on account of cases pending last March, but not included in the calculation on which Rs. 35,000 were accepted as a composition from the Mahsuds.

3 The existence of these cases comes as a surprise to me. Had I known of them at the time the settlement was planned, I should not have recommended that we should accept the composition of Rs. 35,000, nor should I have reported the settlement of all pending cases against the Mahsuds

4 On referring to the statement regarding pending cases of Classes A and B appended to Watson's letter, dated 1st May, 1900, I find that the cases included in the item of Rs 9,000 are divisible into three classes:—

- (i) Cases which occurred after the settlement, and which therefore call for no explanation.
- (ii) Cases which occurred before the 1st March, 1900.
- (iii) Cases which occurred during March, 1900, in which month the settlement was made.

As regards class (ii), it is difficult to give an explanation without referring to the files, registers and papers connected with the settlement. I do not know why the cases were not included in the statement of cases for which the composition of Rs. 35,000 was accepted, but think that the omission is probably due to incorrect registration at the time of their occurrence.

As regards class (iii) also, I experience difficulty in giving any explanation, but I think it probable that, as the cases were of very recent occurrence, they had not been made into files and entered into the registers. Reports had been received of their occurrence, but were pending enquiry and orders, and the Political Officer's staff had no leisure to post them to date. Even in ordinary times delay occurs in posting and registering political cases, but during the whole of March last a great strain was placed

on that staff, which was crippled by illness, absence on leave and other causes. From an early date in March onwards the staff was busily employed in bringing files into order, working out balances, &c, and at Tank in work connected with the settlement, which kept all hands hard at work all day and part of the night. The whole settlement, its preliminaries and details were carried through at high pressure. We were all working against time, and probably to these causes may be attributed the fact that cases occurring at the time were omitted. Now, of course, that the information regarding these cases has been collected, sifted and arranged, it seems surprising that they escaped notice, but I know that, even as regards cases which had been made into files or decided, we had great difficulty in finding out the correct balances and in bringing up to date the accounts which were extremely puzzling and voluminous. The preliminary work of the settlement was very heavy—the time was limited—and although my own staff and that of the Political Officer were employed on the work, I think that my conjecture is probably correct, that the cases occurring during March inadvertently escaped attention.

5. I am greatly concerned regarding the miscalculation referred to in items 1, 2 and 3 of paragraph 5 of your letter, as I took pains to arrive at a correct estimate of what was due in the cases examined, but of course it must be borne in mind that this examination and all the work of the settlement were performed in a limited number of days and under pressure of other work. I had the assistance of my own office and the office of the Political Officer, Wana. For several days before I went, on the 18th March, to Tank, the statements of cases in my own office and the registers of the office of the Political Officer, Wana, were examined at my head-quarters, with the assistance of the clerks who keep them. The accounts were complicated, but I thought that I had arrived at a satisfactory understanding of them when I went to Tank. Then all the pending files forthcoming were examined by the combined staffs, and in framing estimates I also made use of the leading Frontier headmen, who are accustomed to dispose of criminal and political case work in jurgas. The detailed results were brought before me for my orders in a statement which I checked. The estimate in each case was put before me, and in the larger cases I personally considered the facts and made the final estimates, while I generally checked and amended where necessary the estimates in the smaller cases. I made my estimate of Rs 35,000 deliberately, and I thought that this sum would practically meet all requirements. I can only express my great regret that the actual results of the cases have, after final decision, exceeded my estimate.

6. There remains the item of Rs 4,800, being an estimate of fines and compensation payable on account of cases pending in Bannu last March, but not included in the settlement. The oldest of these cases actually dates back to 1896. These cases were, so Mr Grant suggests, never reported to the Political Officer, Wana, and were not even properly registered in the Bannu District. Nothing was known about these cases at the Tank settlement. The reason why these Bannu cases were not brought into account as regards the Mahsud tribe as a whole is probably that the Deputy Commissioner intended to settle them himself with the individual sections concerned, Shabi Khels and other similar sections who live close to the Bannu border and at a distance from Wana and the Tank border. This was the old procedure, and it was effective, as the Shabi Khels have considerable lands in the Bannu District and they and their neighbouring sections trade with Edwardesabad and Lakki, the trading towns of the Bannu District.

7. I am asked for my opinion in regard to each of the heads specified in paragraph 5 of your letter, whether the amounts can now be demanded from the Mahsuds, or whether the tribe can be called upon to take action against the sections or individuals concerned in the offences. As regards the action to be taken, I think that the first three heads should be treated alike. It is unfortunate, but the cases included under these three heads were, without doubt, disposed of in the March settlement, which it would be

neither fair nor expedient to set aside in connection with these cases. I would not demand the deficit under these heads from the Mahsuds, and it is not open, in my opinion, to take action against the sections or individuals concerned in the offences, and it would certainly be impolitic to take any such action.

8 The item of Rs. 9,000 (head 4) stands, however, in a different category. The cases under this head escaped notice altogether in the settlement made in March, though they are covered by the terms of the settlement, as reduced to writing. The important points to consider in connection with these cases are that in the first place the March agreement is supplementary to the main agreement under which the Mahsud tribe draws its allowances on certain conditions—one being the good behaviour of the tribe, and, secondly, that the tribe has misbehaved and has not complied with this condition since March last. The March agreement not only provides for the settlement of outstanding demands for offences committed, but, taken with the main agreement, it carries with it the implication that the tribe will behave well in the future. Under the circumstances, it would be open to us to cancel the March agreement entirely, but I do not consider that this would be a wise course to take. I think, however, that it is perfectly open to us to reconsider the position and to press now a demand unintentionally omitted in the March agreement for offences actually committed by the Mahsud tribe and for which we have, in fact, obtained no reparation. I would demand the Rs. 9,000 from the Mahsuds, explaining the grounds for making this claim which I have stated above. I do not think that this course of action is open to any suspicion of bad faith. It is unfortunate that we should have to depart from the letter of the March agreement, but the subsequent misbehaviour of the tribe is the justification.

9 Similar action may be taken with regard to the item of Rs. 4,800 (head 5) if it is thought desirable to make one complete demand against the tribe. Otherwise the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu should be instructed to settle these cases direct with the Mahsud sections concerned and with the Darwesh Khel and Bhattanni sections responsible for the passes used by the offenders or through whose territories the offenders passed.

10. I think I have disposed of all the questions referred for my opinion and for explanation, and I have, in my reply, strictly kept to the points specified in your letter. There are, of course, other points in the correspondence which offer material for criticism and explanation, but I hesitate to express opinions or furnish explanations on matters which have not been expressly referred to me. I think, however, that the Government might be seriously misled if I did not correct one error of statement. This is contained in an extract from a letter of Mr. Waterfield's given at the end of paragraph 13 of Mr. Merk's letter, dated 28th June, 1900. The extract is as follows: "that in making the settlement in March last they (the Mahsud Maliks) were induced by the master, namely, Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk to the Commissioner, Derajat, to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson. They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crime." With reference to the last portion of this extract, I have to state that the Mahsud Maliks made no such declaration to me. With reference to the first portion of the extract, I quote paragraph 4 of my letter, dated 30th March, 1900.—

"I proceeded to Tank on the 18th instant, and first interviewed the leading Maliks. I explained to them the gravity of the position, and impressed on them the desirability of making some arrangements to clear the tribe. I explained that I was shortly going on leave, and that I desired to bring about a settlement in the interest of the tribe as well as of Government, and this was the last opportunity I would have of effecting such a settlement.

"The Maliks promptly expressed their readiness to fall in with my wishes, and asked me to have an estimate made out of the fines which would have to be paid on account of all pending cases."

Mr Tej Bhan, who is now officiating as an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Delhi, rendered me every assistance in bringing my persuasions and warnings home to the Malik, but when the Malik alleges that while they warned me they yielded to the persuasion of Mr Tej Bhan, they are obviously attempting to set up an excuse and to cast off responsibility and blame from their own shoulders. It is necessary to be very careful in accepting explanations and excuses tendered by the Mahsud Malik, as they are adept at intrigue and cunning of speech.

I have to thank His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for his appreciation conveyed in paragraph 2 of your letter of certain difficulties which I had to face in making the Tank settlement, and have now to face in submitting explanations. I shall be glad to render any assistance I can in explaining what was done, and in clearing up any remaining difficulties.

Enclosure 2 in No 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 19th October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

The detailed and thorough enquiry, mentioned in paragraph 2 of my letter of 9th instant, discloses that the grand total now payable by the Mahsuds for all offences exclusive of those really disposed of at the March settlement amounts to one hundred and seventy thousand rupees in round numbers, out of which ninety-nine thousand rupees appear to be due for offences committed prior to March settlement and therefore pending then. Add to the above grand total the sum of seventeen thousand rupees still unpaid on the March settlement, and the total liabilities of the Mahsuds amount, therefore, now to one hundred and eighty-seven thousand rupees. Out of this a sum of eighty-one thousand rupees is on account of offences against Government servants or Government property or British subjects and their property, including Zhob and Sheranni cases, and it includes an item of thirteen thousand rupees on account of fines for recent outrages sanctioned by Government. To this eighty-one thousand rupees must be added the seventeen thousand rupees still unpaid on account of the March settlement, as that settlement was almost wholly confined to offences relating to Government or to British subjects—see paragraph 5 of Mr. Anderson's letter of 30th March. The total, therefore, due under heads of Government and British subjects, including Zhob and Sheranni comes to ninety-eight thousand rupees. The balance of eighty-nine thousand rupees represents compensation due in inter-tribal cases, out of which forty-two thousand are due for Tochi inter-tribal cases. It is, I consider, hopeless, to expect to get out of the Mahsuds anything like the total sum due by any coercive process, whether blockade or expedition. What I, therefore, suggest is that we recover from the Mahsuds two-thirds of the compensation and fines due to Government and British subjects, namely, a sum of sixty-five thousand rupees and one-third of the compensation due on inter-tribal cases, namely, a sum of thirty thousand rupees. This makes a total of ninety-five thousand rupees. I am doubtful if even this reduced demand will be satisfied, but it is more likely to be complied with after pressure than the other demand about which I have no doubt at all. The Malik is endeavouring to temporise and put off Waterfield's enquiry. I have gone through the lists of cases with him, and have satisfied myself that now at last nothing has been omitted. I think now that a peaceable settlement is out of the question. Nevertheless, I will do my best to arrange it. I now ask for orders what total demand I should put to the tribe. I venture to suggest that it may place us in an awkward position to call upon the tribe to pay more than we are reasonably likely to get by pressure, and I therefore suggest the reduced demand of ninety-five thousand rupees. These figures will show what a curse the Mahsuds have been to their neighbours. In passing orders on my letter, it may be convenient to give me instructions also on this telegram. Addressed Punjab; repeated Foreign.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douse, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 20th October. 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated 1st October, on the subject of Mahsud affairs, I am directed to submit a copy of a letter, dated 9th October, from the Commissioner of the Derajat, and to convey the following remarks.

2. A copy of my letter, dated 17th instant, to your address is being communicated to Mr. Merk. This will show him what cases must, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, be considered as disposed of finally by the settlement made at Tank last March.

3. It will be observed that Mr. Merk has taken measures to carry out the wishes of the Government of India as to the presence at the Mahsud jirga of an officer of the Baluchistan Agency.

4. He asks that he may be informed of the military scheme in preparation for the blockade. The separate communication regarding this, promised in the 2nd paragraph of your letter under reply, has not been received.

5. Sir Mackworth Young supports the request of the Commissioner that a sum of Rs 1,500 may be put at his disposal for civil expenditure in connection with the blockade. A full account of the disbursements made will be submitted hereafter. The proposals regarding the building of posts will be separately reported.

6. The arming of the Bhattannis in the manner suggested by Mr. Merk is, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, a necessary measure under existing circumstances. The Inspector-General of Ordnance might be instructed to comply with indents received direct from the Commissioner for arms for the Bhattannis and Border Military Police up to a maximum to be fixed in each case. The proposition statements for the revision of the establishments of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Border Military Police will reach the Government of India shortly.

7. Arrangements have been, and are being, made for the reinforcement of civil staff in the Derajat Division. It is for the Government of India to decide whether Mr. Lommer's services can be spared for employment as special blockade officer.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor supports Mr. Merk's proposals for the improvement of the means of telegraphic communication, and will be obliged if the Government of India will issue orders direct to the Director-General of Telegraphs.

9. The Mahsuds settled in the Dera Ismail Khan district are being notified that they will be required to leave in the event of a blockade becoming necessary.

10. In the 9th paragraph of his letter Mr. Merk has given an outline of the announcement of the views of Government which he proposes to make to the Mahsuds assembled in jirga. The only part of this which seems to require modification is his proposed statement with reference to the annexation of their country and the permanent confiscation of their allowances. The threat which, in Sir Mackworth Young's opinion, should be held out as the penalty of non-compliance with our demands, is that of a rigorous blockade, and this view is in accordance with the orders contained in the 2nd paragraph of your letter. While Mr. Merk should be at perfect liberty to say that, if the blockade is established, Government will take such measures as it thinks fit to make it fully effective, and also any further measures which prove necessary to bring the tribe to submission, it will be unnecessary to state definitely what the further consequences of recusancy will be. In other respects Mr. Merk's proposed line of argument with the tribe appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be judicious.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derawat Division, to J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th October, 1900.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd instant, giving cover to Foreign Department letter, dated the 1st instant, which conveys the decision of the Government of India on Mahsud affairs.

2. So far as I was able to do so, in anticipation of orders, I set matters in train last month. I requested the Political Officer to prepare a complete list of all offences whatsoever pending against the Mahsuds, and to summon all the Mahsud Malikhs as well as the parties to the cases from the Tochi valley, the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, the Sheranni tract and Zhob, for a full enquiry into these cases at Tank, the enquiry to commence on the 8th instant. This enquiry he has been directed to finish by the 1st of November, when we shall be able to draw up the final bill of all fines and compensations that are fairly and reasonably chargeable to the Mahsuds, on account of all offences whatever which are pending, except those really disposed of at the March settlement and those committed in Afghanistan since the demarcation of the frontier. A subsidiary object in beginning this enquiry early in October was to remind the Mahsud tribe of its own liabilities and perils, just at the time when the Madda Khel were to be punished, which would probably make the Mahsuds disinclined to help them.

3. I have summoned the great jirga of the Mahsuds to meet me at Tank on the 7th November.

4. The Political Agent at Zhob was at Fort Munro last month, and I arranged with him to send his complainants and witnesses to Mr Waterfield at Tank as indicated above. Captain Macdonald himself will probably be present at the jirga fixed for the 7th proximo, and will therefore be fully posted as to what will happen.

5. I have asked Mulla Powindah to meet me next week at Tank. I do not at all expect that he will come. If he does come now, and there is trouble for the Mahsuds after the jirga of the next month, his friends will blame him for not preventing it or devising some means of escaping it, and his enemies will say he concurred in it. Either way he will be in a dilemma. Most probably he will foresee this, and will send a couple of trusted agents in his place. To them I shall hint that a change in the system of payment of allowances and in the basis of political management is coming, and that I should have been glad to have had a talk with the Mulla in consequence. This will be enough to bring all the Mulla's party in the tribe—the democratic cave of Adullam which is opposed to the oligarchy of Malikhs—to the jirga of next month, without my having to specially send for them and to show anxiety to get them in, which is what is wanted.

If, however, the Mulla does come, I shall have to see how far I can take him into my confidence.

6. By the 11th November probably I shall know whether the jirga will end with a settlement or with a blockade. If the Mahsuds show an honest intention of making a settlement, and this intention is unanimous, or is the resolution of such a majority as to make its execution reasonably probable, I propose to give them till the 25th November to pay in the first instalment of the money due to us, say, one-half of the whole sum. But if there is no prospect of a settlement, I propose to dismiss the jirga as soon as this is clear and as soon as the jirga has thoroughly grasped—first, that reparation will be fully enforced, and secondly, that, when friendly relations have been re-established, the change of policy indicated in the 4th paragraph of the Government of India letter will be adopted. I then propose to give them till the 25th November to think matters over and to discuss them at their homes. On that day they would have to let me know definitely whether they will do us justice or not, and, if the former, they will have to

bring in on that date one-half of the money payable as a guarantee of their good faith. On the 26th November, accordingly, it will be definitely known whether there will be a blockade or not. The military and civil arrangements should, therefore, be such that on receipt of a telegram on the evening of 26th November the blockade can commence on the 1st December.

The civil arrangements I will see to. Troops should (starting from Dera Ismail Khan on the 27th November and Bannu on the 28th November) reach Tank and Jani Khel on the 1st or 2nd December. I understand it is intended to hold Murtaza with troops and to strengthen Sarwekai; there will be no harm if this is done by the 3rd and 4th December. The troops, therefore, should be ready to start on the 27th November. I should be glad if the military scheme is communicated to me as early as convenient.

7. As regards the scheme for the civil portion of the blockade, I asked the Political Officers and Deputy Commissioners concerned, some time ago, to send me their views by the 15th of this month. From these views and my own ideas I shall prepare a comprehensive scheme which will be discussed and settled at a conference of the Political Officers, Deputy Commissioners and Officers Commanding Militias at Dera Ismail Khan on the 31st instant. I may have to submit additional proposals for orders besides those below, but I doubt it. Anyhow I am able to suggest now in this letter the more important proposals that require orders:—

- (1) *Funds*.—I do not think much money will be required; I am arranging for some Darwesh Khel to remain in Shawal, if necessary, during the winter, and thus to close that back door to the Mahsuds. Of course we shall have to pay this Darwesh Khel tribal post, say 50 men each on Rs. 10 per mensem, its cost will come to Rs. 3,000 for the six winter months. It may be necessary to build temporary towers here and there, to entertain Bhitanni tribal posts for the time, to give rewards on the spot for specially good service, &c., &c. I would ask for a grant till the 1st April, 1901, of Rs. 15,000 to my political allotment, out of which I can spend money either myself or through Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, without further reference for orders. Accounts will, of course, be kept and duly furnished with vouchers hereafter. But it will materially conduce to the efficient working of a blockade (when measures have often to be taken at a moment's notice) if money is available to be spent promptly without correspondence. Government may rest assured that every care will be taken to keep expenditure at a minimum.
- (2) *Posts*.—With my letter, dated the 2nd instant, I submitted proposals for the posts of the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias. If there is a blockade, the following new posts will be urgently required for the closure of principal raiding routes and for the protection of the country:—

<i>Northern Waziristan—</i>	<i>Southern Waziristan—</i>
Tutnarai	Tiarza.
Lakkanarai.	Karab Kot.
Shinkai	Dargai Obo.
Mirzail.	Khuzma Sar.
	Paste Khwaja.
	Urmana Khwar.
	Toi Khula.

If Government accept the proposals, I would ask that the construction of these posts be started at once. Whether there is a blockade or not, they are really required; and, if so, to build them now at once makes no difference.

- (3) *Protection of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts and enforcement of the blockade on their borders*.—With my letter,

dated the 20th ultimo, I submitted a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Border Military Police. If it meets with approval I would ask for very early orders. If the new corps can begin to be raised by the 1st November, they will be tolerably efficient in three months for blockade purposes, and an addition of 500 fairly armed and drilled men of the country will be of the greatest value in blockading. Here also, as in the case of the militia posts, if the proposals are acceptable, they may as well be set in hand forthwith.

- (4) *Arms and ammunition.*—By the recent orders of Government, the border villages of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan will be armed before the 1st December. It may, and probably will, be necessary to temporarily arm the Bhuttannis, upon whose cordial and efficient co-operation the stringency of the blockade will greatly depend. I do not

* M.L. rifles

W. MERR

delay this letter to enclose an indent for 800 Enfield,* 16,000 rounds of ammunition and 32,000

percussion caps, the formal indent will follow. But I would ask that the question of arming the Bhuttannis be now considered and disposed of, and that the Inspector-General of Ordnance be now authorised (if my suggestion is sanctioned) to promptly issue, up to the maximum given above, of rifles, ammunition and caps on receipt of an indent from me direct. The Bhuttannis are at enmity with the Mahsuds; they are a poor and weak tribe, they are practically British subjects, full security would, of course, be taken for the arms, they would only be issued to reliable men. I do not think there is any risk in giving the arms, or any likelihood of trouble in our getting them back when we want them from the Bhuttannis. If there is a prospect of the scheme for Border Military Police reorganisation being approved, I would ask for intimation by telegram, so that indents for arms (Sniders), ammunition and accoutrements can be sent in as soon as possible. I would also ask that the Inspector-General of Ordnance be authorised to comply with such indents sent direct to him by me. They will be on the same scale as for the Waziristan Militias, and such scrutiny as may, under the circumstances, be thought necessary might, if there is no objection, be conducted on the post-audit system in your office and in the offices of the Government of India.

- (5) *Staff.*—I should be glad of the services of Mr Lorimer, I C.S., if they can be spared as special blockade officer, working in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts under the Deputy Commissioners and, beyond the administrative border, under me direct. If there is a blockade, it may be possible for him to hold himself in readiness to join at Tank on the 26th November. I suggest that Lieutenant Bowring, Assistant Commissioner, whom I believe to be well qualified, be attached temporarily as the Assistant to the Political Officer, Wana, upon whom much work will fall. Mr French, Assistant Commissioner, who has been holding temporary charge of the Tank Sub-Division and has acquired a knowledge of this tract, might, I think, remain as General Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner on the Tank border when Mr. Pipon returns from leave. Lieutenant Bigg-Wither is commanding the Border Military Police of Dera Ismail Khan, and will be in charge of all the Border Military Police arrangements and work. There will be less to do in Bannu, but the Deputy Commissioner should be provided with a military assistant; this is essential if a new corps of Border Military Police is

raised there. The Tochi requires no special staff. The bulk of the work will fall on the Southern Waziristan and Dera Ismail Khan authorities.

- (6) *Telegraph*.—I recommend that from the 7th November the telegraph office at Tank be raised temporarily to the 1st class, viz, be open day and night. Tank is the central point for blockade operations. I propose to make it my head-quarters for the time. The transfer of the telegraph office from Jatta to Murtaza has been sanctioned. A temporary field office should be opened at Jani Khel from Bannu (if there is a blockade); it may be necessary later on to carry the line to Khairu Khel via Tajori; also (if there is a blockade), a field office will be required at Mullazai from Tank; it may be found advisable subsequently to protract this line via the Bain Pass post to Khairu Khel. But for the present two field lines to Jani Khel and Mullazai will be enough. These short light lines will cost little, nor will the expense be much if they are joined up via the Bain post.

8 I shall next week ask all officers concerned to warn every Mahsud whatsoever within their charges that he may be required to return to his hills, with his family and moveable property, at 12 hours' notice, next month. The news of this warning will, of course, reach the tribe, and will be a sign to them that business is meant.

9. As regards the manner in which I propose to communicate the decision and orders of Government to the jirga, I would, with the permission of Government, take the following line. I would commence with a history of the relations of the Mahsuds with the British Government, from annexation of the Punjab to the present day, dwelling with emphasis and at length upon the various occasions on which, in consequence of misconduct, the Mahsuds came into collision with us, and how little they gained thereby. The fathers and grandfathers of men who will be listening to this have suffered at different times, and point will be given to my remarks by recalling their names and fate. Then I would bring home to the Mahsuds how helpless they are, we surround them on three sides, on the fourth are their hereditary enemies and beyond these are Afghanistan and its ruler, whose subjects they have been liberally harrying in Khost and elsewhere. Then, and on this point, I would specially ask for the instructions of Government. I propose to tell them that they must see for themselves, unless some stable arrangement is arrived at, whereby offences shall cease in future, that Government, for the sake of its subjects and of those who live under its protection, who are and have been constantly murdered and plundered by Mahsuds, may (?) or will (?) have no other course open but to occupy their country and put down this intolerable condition of affairs for ever by force; and that, if this should happen, if this should be forced upon Government by the misbehaviour of the Mahsuds, not only will a signal retribution be dealt out to all, but there will also be no allowances for anyone whatever. This last sentence is intended to cut the ground from under the Maliks, who flatter themselves that, if Government should occupy the Mahsud country, they will draw allowances in comfort, and who have been working to this end.

The object of the whole of the above is to sober the Mahsuds, to let them see how they stand. Since the last thing that the tribe, as a whole, wishes is the occupation of their country, the blunt statement that they may drive Government to take it will not be without deep effect. It will probably take me a whole day to finish this prologue with hillmen, as, with the mass of uneducated people at home, *e g*, many rural constituencies, the bulk of an audience—some 90 per cent—are quite incapable of following the points of a speech or of taking in its drift, unless the same thing and the same point is repeated over and over again, and every head is explained patiently at great length. Thus, for instance, if I were simply to say in so many words what I have marked at A above, not one Mahsud in a thousand

would be in the least moved by it, or realise what it implies. I shall have to go through the leading offences, give names and details, paint each outrage in a lurid light, fully impress them with the grossness of their conduct on one hand, and the kindness with which we treat them within our limits on the other hand, before they will perceive clearly what they have been doing and how deep is their offence. The next day, after they have had time to reflect, I would approach business and explain how the existing system has collapsed, we have paid much money and obtained nothing to speak of in the way of cessation of offences in return, how the Malikis failed in their engagements and how they have thus themselves broken the pact entered into in 1895. This again will call for a mass of detailed illustration, and will involve considerable debate, since the leading Malikis will no doubt constantly interrupt and endeavour to argue their side of the case. And to avoid the feeling that they have been finally condemned unheard, to prevent that resentment which every Oriental cherishes whose petition has not been patiently listened to (whether it is successful or not is to his mind quite another matter, the order on the petition is fate, but to listen to it is within the power of the "Hakim"), a considerable margin of explanation and discussion will have to be allowed to the Malikis if they wish to avail themselves of it. It is quite possible that they may feel their case to be hopeless, and may take in silence what I shall tell the jirga. But, if not, if they want to speak, my experience is that it is never a mistake to listen in reason to what men have to say in jirga. Then I would explain that, exclusive of Rs 7,000 a year, which the Political Officer will retain in his own hands, to give to whomsoever and howsoever he pleases, Government are prepared to grant a subsidy of Rs 54,000 to the whole Mahsud tribe, to be distributed as the tribe arranges. The total comes to Rs 61,000, the sum mentioned in paragraph 16 of my note of the 24th July, 1900, and referred to in paragraph 14 of your letter, No 1137, dated the 17th August, 1900, to the Government of India. I have suggested Rs 54,000 for the whole tribe, because quite possibly the Mahsuds will arrange to divide in the first instance in three equal shares according to the three primary divisions of the tribe—the Bahlolzai, the Shaman Khel and the Alizai, and a sum divisible by three is therefore convenient.

This grant, I would continue to say to them, is contingent upon good conduct, loyalty and upon full or sectional tribal responsibility, as we choose, and coupled, if we like, with the punishment of individual offenders. I shall explain very fully to them that the rule we shall adopt will be literally their own Pathan custom; the custom is this. the injured party, if he can lay hands on the actual culprits (whether by capture or by surrender), punishes them. If he cannot do this, he does not waste time, but proceeds against their section or the clan containing the section, or the tribe containing the clan, as he thinks best. To this procedure no Pathan can possibly object. The first thought that will then occur to the Mahsuds, of course, is to complain that Rs 54,000 is by no means enough. To which the obvious answer is—"There it is; you can take it or leave it." Then I think the moment will have come for pointing out that, before any further step can take place in the way of distribution of the allowances, prompt reparation must first be made to Government. This will, no doubt, come as a shock, but the greater the shock the more keen is the reaction likely to be. By opening up the prospect of genuinely tribal allowances, the "Ulus," viz, the body of the tribe and those sections that have hitherto received nothing or less than their proper share, will have been attracted. Mulla Powindah's party, who are against the Malki "ring" and are all for a popular system, will at the jirga have heard what I say and will have welcomed the change of policy in our future dealings with the Mahsuds; they will be committed to it, and to that extent will feel themselves bound to promote the settlement of the Mahsud account that will hasten the introduction of the change of system. The Rs. 7,000 kept in the hand of the Political Officer will be a lever for working on really influential Malikis, if they do good service in bringing about a peaceable settlement, they are certainly worth their salt; lastly, however wild and savage Pathan clans

may be, they are by no means devoid of the sense of justice; and if they feel that they are reasonably and fairly dealt with, I have often found that they are quite prepared to act justly in return.

I do not in the least hope for or expect a peaceable settlement, but I venture to think that the course I have suggested and the sequence of steps I have sketched are as likely to bring about a peaceful composition of the Mahsud question as any other. At the same time, seeing that the chances are so greatly against a smooth settlement, every preparation for a blockade must be made, and I shall not permit the jirga to temporise or to put off their decision in any manner. By the 11th or 12th November, in all likelihood, the matter will practically be settled, one way or the other.

10 I much regret that I am unable to submit a draft sketch of what I intend to say. But in the case of a jirga like this, it is impossible to do so. Proceedings more resemble a lively debate than a speaker addressing an audience. One goes into a jirga with a fixed purpose, but the actual words used depend upon what one feels and perceives at the time being is the temper and are the thoughts of those present, upon their arguments and objections, upon the divisions of opinion that arise at the moment, in short, upon a set of conditions and circumstances that originate mostly at the sittings themselves. Moreover, the debates and proceedings are most lengthy, as all savage councils are, and from the nature of things must be, where not to hear a man out, or to overlook a point, may, and in most cases does, mean certain bloodshed thereafter. In 1896, when I had to take over the Mohmands, a simpler matter than will be the jirga of next month, I had to hold a speech or rather debate of six hours each for two days in order to hammer into their heads what was wanted, followed by 12 days' jirga work of eight hours daily before the distribution of the allowances was finally determined and accepted all round.

11. I do not think there are any minor points that have been omitted; such native establishment (Mohurrirs, &c) as may be required for the blockade, I think I can provide out of local establishments, or, if sufficient men cannot be spared, I can entertain temporary writers, &c., with the Rs 15,000 for which I have applied.

Probably some 2,500, perhaps 3,000, Mahsuds will come to the jirga. My object is, of course, to get as many down as possible. They will be disarmed at the border posts. But as the jirga may break up on strained terms, and as a mob of 3,000 hillmen is capable of some mischief, even when disarmed, I will arrange with the General Officer Commanding, Derajat, to have 200 sepoy at Tank. I mention this by way of explanation of the movement of these troops early in November.

PS—With reference to paragraph 2 of this letter, I have just received a telegram from the Political Officer to the effect that only a few Maliks have appeared at Tank, and that the Maliks generally have asked for a month's grace, owing, they say, to the harvesting of crops, to which I have replied with a message that three months' past allowance of every Malik will be confiscated who does not present himself in Tank by the 16th instant, and that meanwhile the Political Officer should enquire into the cases and satisfy himself of their truth. We cannot afford to wait on the pleasure of the Maliks.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 23rd October, 1900.

In continuation of correspondence regarding Mahsud affairs, ending with my letter, dated 21st October, I am directed to address you, with reference to a telegram, dated 19th October, from the Commissioner of the

Derajat, a copy of which Mr. Merk has sent to you direct. I am at the same time to submit copies of the telegrams noted in the margin. Mr. Merk has been asked by letter to give a detail of the cases for which Rs 99,000 are due, which were pending when the March settlement was made, but were not then decided. His reply will be communicated to you when received

2 The position is that the amount due from the Mahsuds is more than they can possibly pay. In reducing the amount of our demand, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks there is no particular object in saying that we will take two-thirds of our full claim in cases against our own subjects and one-third in inter-tribal cases. It will be better simply to state the total amount of compensation which the tribe must pay in order to avert the blockade, and this, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, might be put at one lakh of rupees on account of all offences up to the date of announcement. Mr. Merk might fix the instalments in which the money must be paid, and inform the tribe that failure to pay any instalment when due will result in a blockade being at once imposed. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that he should further tell the Mahsuds that all Malikī allowances are withdrawn till the whole of the money has been paid, and that their amount will be treated as finally forfeited to Government and not credited against the fine of one lakh. He should add that, if the instalments are punctually paid, it is the intention of Government, after the last instalment has been received, to start the new system of tribal allowances, provided that the tribe has behaved well in the meantime and has not run up a fresh bill

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, dated the 20th October, 1900.

Yours, dated 19th Of eighty-nine thousand rupees due on account of inter-tribal cases, what amounts, respectively, fall under classes C and D? By D cases we understand inter-tribal cases, which occurred outside the protected area.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st October, 1900.

Out of the eighty-nine thousand rupees, two thousand seven hundred rupees are on account of cases outside the protected area, leaving eighty-six thousand three hundred rupees for C cases. If outrage between Boya and Kanirogha, reported in telegram 495 of Political Officer, Tochi, is work of Mahsuds, an item of three thousand rupees will have to be added to the thirteen thousand rupees for fines in my 500-C, making total liability one hundred ninety thousand rupees

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 23rd October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Nasran Border Military post, eleven miles from here, surprised last night by gang of Mahsuds. Two Border Military Police shot dead, eight Snider rifles, two Snider carbines, about twelve hundred rounds ammunition

carried off. Circumstances show gross laxity on part of Border Military Police garrison. Trust Border Military Police Regulation will soon be passed into law.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 23rd October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Early this morning Officer Commanding, Jandola, took out party to intercept Nasran raiders. Succeeded in doing so. Regret to report that news just received that Officer Commanding killed, also one raider, whose body left behind by other raiders, who escaped. Am sending Lieutenant Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia, to be at Jandola till British officer arrives there to command.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 24th October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Raid had undoubtedly been carefully planned some time ago, but precise moment of execution was most probably chosen to embarrass the Malikis assembled here for examination of cases against Mahsuds. Suspicion at present is against Jalal Khels and Shungis, who are discontented with their Malikis, but it is quite possible that raid was committed at Mulla Powindah's instance to discredit the Malikis generally, who declare this to be the case. After full reflection, I do not advocate a change in the programme for next month after what has happened yesterday, because, both for future stable arrangements with Mahsud tribe and for purpose of making them comply sooner than would otherwise be the case with the demand of Government for redress, it is essential to have a meeting with the governing body of the tribes and fully inform them of future policy of Government. If I were to tell only the Malikis what is future policy of Government, they would, of course, misrepresent it to the tribes. Written communications and explanations addressed to the tribe are quite useless, and would reach no one. And after coercive measures, it is almost impossible to get together a full jirga in a reasonable time. It is, therefore, I think, best not to enforce the blockade at once, but that I should see the full jirga on the 7th November. The only changes I propose are that, in view of recent occurrences, the announcement of the views of Government suggested in paragraph 9 of my letter 748 of 9th October be clear and exhaustive, but much more peremptory than was contemplated, and that demand on tribe be now fixed at one lakh. Kindly communicate orders to me on these points.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, dated the 25th October, 1900.

Merk's telegram, 24th October. The Government of India agree to the demand being one lakh as already recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor, and, subject to any contrary advice which His Honour may wish

to give, they see no reason for interfering with the preparations and plan for dealing with the Mahsuds which had been formed prior to the occurrence of this raid.

Enclosure 9 in No 3

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 29th October, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the marginally noted communications regarding Mahsud affairs. The Lieutenant-Governor has already been informed by telegram, dated the 25th October, 1900, that the Government of India agree to the demand on the Mahsuds being fixed at one lakh, as recommended by His Honour in your letter of the 23rd October, and that, subject to any contrary advice which Sir Mackworth Young may wish to give, the Governor-General in Council sees no reason for interfering with the preparations and plans for dealing with the tribe which had been formed prior to the occurrence of the raid reported in Mr Merk's last message. Mr Merk will no doubt state the total amount of the "bill" to the jirga, and will then announce that one lakh is demanded instead of the total. It is, of course, desirable to provide that the demand of the round figure of one lakh shall not cause the more ignorant Mahsuds or other frontier tribes to suppose mistakenly that the sum has been arbitrarily fixed.

2. Mr Merk's sketch of what he means to say to the jirga is necessarily in general terms. It is approved by the Government of India, subject to the reservation, that Mr Merk must be careful not to make anything in the nature of a specific threat of annexation. All that he should say is that contumacy and opposition, if persisted in, can only in the long run lead to one result, that result being the loss by the Mahsuds of their autonomy and the occupation of the Mahsud country. This is a consequence that the Government have the strongest desire to avoid. The feelings and interests of the tribe must be equally in the same direction, and it rests with them to remove all necessity for the consideration of so painful an alternative.

3. With reference to the concluding sentences of your letter, dated the 23rd October, I am to observe that, under the original scheme, it was contemplated that, if half the full demand were not paid by the Mahsuds, as an earnest of good faith, by a fixed date, the blockade would be formed forthwith, and would be maintained until a settlement was arrived at. The Government of India consider it preferable to adhere to this design, and that no question of payment by instalments should be raised or entertained at the present stage. If the Mahsuds should ask that the Maliki allowances may be credited against the demand, this request should be refused, but in other respects it appears undesirable to go beyond the terms of Mr Merk's proposed communication to the jirga, as accepted by the Government of India.

4. Mr Merk has no doubt taken the steps which he contemplated for warning all Mahsuds who are settled on land in British India that they may be required next month to return to their hills, with their families and movable property, at 12 hours' notice. It may be left to the Commissioner to deal with the Mahsuds in the Militia, provided, as the Lieutenant-Governor is understood to recommend, that those who are unwilling to go to their country and undergo the blockade are not on the one hand forced to do so, but are not, on the other hand, left in a position where they will be

open to temptation or able to thwart operations by communicating with the blockaded Mahsuds. They must, in other words, be brought to a safe distance from the blockading cordon.

5. Mr. Lorimer's services will be replaced temporarily at the disposal of the Punjab Government in time to enable him to join Mr. Merk not later than the 26th November. A special grant of Rs. 15,000 is placed at Mr. Merk's disposal for political expenditure up to the end of the current financial year. The detailed bills for disbursement from this sum should be sent in due course to the Accountant-General, Punjab. Indents for arms, &c., for the Bhattannis, up to the limit of 800 M. L. Enfield rifles, with 16,000 rounds of ball ammunition and 32,000 percussion caps, will be duly complied with if sent direct to the arsenal at Rawalpindi. Steps are being taken to carry out Mr. Merk's proposals in respect to telegraphic arrangements at Tank, &c.

Enclosure 10 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

I interviewed to-day the Mahsud jirga, which, owing to recent occurrences, was small, not more than five hundred men, but all sections fully represented, tribesmen as well as Maliks. The Maliks said the time had passed for beating about the bush, and openly and explicitly stated that they had not the power to control the tribe, and that, although they, the Maliks themselves, wished us to take the country, and asked us to do so, this request of theirs was in direct opposition to the wishes of the Mahsuds. In reply to my enquiry what were their proposals to ensure the future good conduct of the tribe, they said they could suggest nothing and had no plan, and virtually abdicate, leaving it to Government to act as Government pleases. This was before I disclosed the change of policy in dealing with the tribes. I then addressed the jirga as authorised by Government. The change of policy came as a complete surprise to the jirga. It seemed to me that the bulk of the Maliks were relieved at the prospect of being extricated from a position which had become impossible. I then put the terms, one lakh of rupees or a blockade, with any other measures Government might think fit to adopt. The Mahsuds say that a blockade will hit them harder than an expedition. The jirga then asked permission to discuss matters to-night, see me to-morrow, and then talk over matters with the tribe. I have, of course, agreed to this, but told them at the time that fifteen days' grace was the utmost I could allow them, and that matters must be determined one way or the other on the 25th November.

Enclosure 11 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My telegram of yesterday. Jirga to-day said they wished to consult tribe, also Mulla Powindah, whose attitude, they said, they could not predict. The jirga said they would make every effort to collect the money, and would give me an answer on or before the 25th instant. I told them to consult together very carefully, also that blockade would commence, as already announced, unless they paid half a lakh within fifteen days, when question of further instalments would be referred to Government for orders; but that blockade, if established, could not be removed till final instalment

had been paid, also that payments in kind would be accepted at prices current in Tank Bazar, also that, if they remained quiet during blockade, they need not fear reprisals, but that, if any Mahsuds committed any offences during the blockade, we should then hold ourselves free to act as we pleased, also that the internal distribution of the fine was a private affair with which we had no concern, and in which we declined to interfere, also that we positively refused to deal separately with any section, though it might be ready to pay its share of the fine, and we should deal only with the Mahsud tribe as a whole, thus avoiding the dangers resulting from splitting up the tribe by dealing with small portions of it, also that the whole tribe would be blockaded or otherwise dealt with till the whole tribe had settled with Government. I then dismissed the jirga. I hear they are genuinely anxious to pay, but eventual result depends, of course, upon consultation in the hills. The jirga was deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation, as is shown by their not even hinting to me that the forfeited allowances should be credited towards the fine, a course which I should have been quite unable to suggest to Government for adoption. I forgot to mention yesterday that they said neither the Maliks nor the tribe had the power of compelling the surrender of the various offenders for punishment. This is, of course, true, else they would not face a fine of a lakh with the consequences of failure in payment. They fully realise that the sooner they pay the more quickly will their troubles cease, and the payment of the tribal allowance commence. And the rigid enforcement of the blockade exactly upon the date, fixed with the preparations now being made convince them that, as a number of them said in jirga yesterday, the time has passed for tricks and temporising. As there is no prospect of half a lakh being paid before the 25th instant, the blockade will begin on the 1st December, and I have in hand all the necessary preparations for the civil arrangements of the blockade.

Enclosure 12 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My telegram of yesterday. The Mahsuds will probably hold a great tribal jirga at Kram on 15th or 16th, which Mulla Powindah will be invited to attend. The leading men will there try to force his hand and make him declare his attitude. They will also get the Ulus to say what it proposes to do. If all agree to payment of lakh, it will soon be paid. Either way prospect of blockade and of the change in policy, of which the body of the tribe will hear to-morrow, will clear the situation. It is not likely that half a lakh will be paid by the 25th, but the consequent declaration of the blockade will materially accelerate payment if the tribe makes up its mind to pay.

Enclosure 13 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 16th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga is assembled at Kram. Mahsuds are begging Mulla Powindah, who is there, to help in collecting the fine. The Abdur Rahman Khel hold aloof, and a large gang of this clan is reported to have started to loot the Darwesh Khel of Shakai. This stupid act, of course, plays into our hands, as it will incense the Darwesh Khel and further induce them to join in enforcing the blockade which they were already prepared to do.

Enclosure 14 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Bannu, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga reported to have decided that fine be paid according to tribal shares and tribal custom, but not known yet when amount will be collected and paid in.

Enclosure 15 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 22nd November, 1900.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 23rd October, 1900, which was repeated to the Government of

Commissioner, Derajat's endorsement, dated 30th October, 1900, and enclosures.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 31st October, 1900, and enclosures.

India, I am directed to submit, for information, a copy of the letters marginally noted containing further details of the attack made on the Kot Nasran Post by a gang of Mahsuds on the 23rd ultimo, and a report regarding the conduct of the Border Military Police in charge of the post during the attack.

Annexure 1

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 26th October, 1900.

I have the honour to report that on the night of 23rd October, between 2 and 3 a m, I received a report that the Border Military post at Kot Nasran had been attacked by a gang of Mahsuds, who had killed two Border Military Police sepoy, and had looted the post, taking away with them eight Snider rifles, two Snider carbines, a revolver and a large number of Snider cartridges.

I at once telegraphed the news to Jandola and Sarweka, hoping that the gang might possibly be intercepted on the road back into Mahsud country.

On receipt of my telegram at Jandola, the Naib Tahsildar, Ata Muhammad, reported the news to Lieutenant Hennessey, 45th Sikhs, commanding the Jandola Post, who at once ordered out 10 sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and 35 sepoy of the 45th Sikhs in pursuit of the raiding party. Lieutenant Hennessey himself went with the troops, and took with him a number of Bhattanni Levies.

The troops took the road leading to the meeting place of the Shuza and Khaisora Valleys. The Cavalry sowars pushed on ahead of the infantry and, on arriving at Pir Tangi, came across the gang of raiders, who were resting there for the purpose, apparently, of dividing the loot obtained from the Nasran Post. The Cavalry fired upon the raiders and wounded one man of the gang, and the rest of the raiders fled up the side of the hill. The news that the troops were in touch with the raiders reached me between 2 and 3 p m. from Jandola, Lieutenant Hennessey having sent back to the post for reinforcements. The next news I received was conveyed in a telegram from Jandola, stating, I regret to say, that Lieutenant Hennessey had been shot dead and one Bhattanni Levy wounded, and that one of the

raiders had been killed. According to your orders, Lieutenant Knox, Adjutant of the Southern Waziristan Militia, was ordered to proceed on the morning of the 24th to Jandola to enquire into the case. I also ordered Naib Tahsildar, Muhammad Azim Khan, to accompany Lieutenant Knox and to take with him some Mahsud Maliks, out of the jirga now assembled here, for the purpose of identifying the body of the raider. On the 24th I received news that these Maliks had professed their inability to identify the body. I at once ordered that the body should be sent down to Tank for the purpose of identification by the Mahsud Maliks and their followers assembled here

The body arrived on the night of the 24th instant, and on the 25th every Mahsud Malik was given an opportunity of identifying it, one and all, however, expressed their inability to identify it. The Mahsud Maliks unanimously declare that this raid has been committed at the instigation of the Mulla Powindah, and that the members of the gang are the Mulla's followers

On the 25th instant I received news from Lieutenant Knox that through the enquiry instituted by Naib Tahsildar, Muhammad Azim Khan, it is believed that the deceased raider is one Sangai, a Malikshahi of Toda China near Makin. It has been ascertained that no Shingi nor Jalal Khel was concerned in this case. From the enquiries made up to the present suspicion is strong against Shahi Khel, Malikshahi, and other Sheikhs of the Mulla Powindah. It has been ascertained that on the day before the raid on the Nasran Post the gang of raiders were fed by Asaltai, Nehzamai and Pashai, Abdullais, brothers of Tarakai, a Mahsud hostage. These men have been summoned, and should arrive here on the 27th, and will be able to give evidence as to the members of the gang.

It has also been ascertained that on the day that the raiding gang came down the Shuza with the intention of attacking the Nasran Post the following "Kirris" were encamped in the Shuza, and members of these Kirris must have noticed this gang—

- (a) The Kirri of Sman Khan, Shahi Khel Malik, he himself was in Tank
- (b) The shepherds, Shaman Khel section
- (c) The Kirri of Sarang Khel Shingis
- (d) The shepherds of Abdullais and Malikshahis
- (e) Kirri Waruki Dhanna Bhattannis
- (f) Kirri of Badzai Bhattannis Malik Katai
- (g) Kirri of Ahmad Khan, Niamat Khel Bhattanni

All the above have been called on for an explanation as to why they made no attempt to stop the raiders nor made any report as to the arrival of this gang in the Shuza

I attach a copy of the report sent to me by Lieutenant Knox regarding the manner in which Lieutenant Hennessey met with his death

Lieutenant Hennessey's body has been sent in to Dera Ismail Khan for burial.

Annexure 2

Letter from Lieutenant A. W. F. Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated Jandola, the 24th October, 1900.

I have the honour to report as follows on the affair of yesterday, in which Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, 45th Sikhs, was killed.

The Post Officer here, Ata Muhammad, received a telegram from you about 4 a.m. yesterday, the 23rd, to the effect that the Border Military Police post, Nasran, had been looted by raiders on the preceding night

Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, Officer Commanding Jandola, was at once informed. He started about 5 a. m. for the junction of the Shuza and Khaisora nullahs, north-east of Jandola, and distant 13 miles. He sent on in front 10 sowars of the detachment, 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Daffadar Minhaj-ud-din, who was accompanied by three Bhattanni and four Mahsud Levy sowars and had under his immediate command Jamadar Sundar Singh, of the 45th Sikhs, and 35 rifles, besides seven Bhattanni and three Mahsud Levies.

Of the 35 rifles, 45th Sikhs, ten men under a Havildar were posted in the Tarazda nullah, to cover the Bigori path which debouches some 7 miles from Jandola. Second-Lieutenant Hennessey hurried on to the Shuza with the remainder. Meanwhile the Cavalry scouts had discovered the raiders, in number about 20, resting in the shade, on the north side of the hill, south of the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza. The Daffadar, in order to block their probable line of retirement, took his men a detour to the left and finally galloped up and dismounted in some trees between the two nullahs and north of their junction. He was then about 700 yards from the raiders, who, taking alarm, began to climb rapidly to the top of the hill. As he dismounted they opened fire, which he returned, wounding one man in the shin of the right leg. This happened about 7.30 a. m.

The infantry were now close, and Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, hearing firing, hurried them on at the "double," and formed them to the right under a hill to the north-west of that on which the raiders were. He then advanced against the hill in open order, but finding the enemy's fire too heavy to admit of further progress finally turned to the left and joined the Cavalry. A Bhattanni Levy sepoy, Kasim, was now sent back to the Havildar in the Tarazda to order him to bring his party of ten men to bear on the left rear of the raiders operating from the south-west. At the same time Lieutenant Hennessey seems to have recognised the smallness of his force for the work in hand, and sent back a note to Jandola as follows:—

"Send 15 rifles at once. Am in touch with raiders. Rifles to proceed from the cemetery on to the road to Shuza Darah, to Khaisora Darah by the Bigori road, not along the lower Tarazda road, but over the hills to where Khaisora and Shuza Darahs meet."

The Sikh Native Officer left in command at Jandola complied with this note at once, but the reinforcement only met the troops returning. Probably knowing that these men would arrive too late, Second-Lieutenant Hennessey divided his infantry and attempted to surround the raiders. Taking twelve rifles he himself approached the hill from the south-east, Jamadar Sundar Singh also with twelve rifles was sent against it from the east, and the Cavalry were told to operate from the north on the enemy's front.

Before, however, this general movement was commenced, the enemy's fire slackened, and they had retired to the south-east towards Pir Tangi, probably there crossing the Shuza and effecting their escape into the hills to the north-east. As they retired, the wounded raider lying in a small nullah on the northern face of the hill was loud in complaint, calling out: "I am wounded, carry me away." The Mahsuds, however, were overburdened with rifles and ammunition, and deserted him. He continued for a time to fire on the advancing troops, and prevented them from suspecting the retirement that had taken place. As the infantry drew near, he lay down flat hoping to escape notice. The troops now became aware that only one of the raiders remained, but could not exactly locate him. Jamadar Sundar Singh's party had veered to the right owing to the steepness of the hill. Lieutenant Hennessey working from east to west round the northern face of the hill with his twelve men in extended order suddenly came upon him. Thinking himself discovered, the man rose and fired his pistol at the nearest sepoy, missing him. Lieutenant Hennessey ordered Havildar Naram Singh, who was with him, to take most of the men to the top of the hill to fire upon the wounded man till he surrendered. He himself remained

with three sepoy and a couple of Levies. For a time he waited, then crept on, his helmet in his left hand and revolver in the right. He misjudged the position of the wounded man and took too downward a direction on the hill. The Mahsud remained quiet till he had almost passed and then shot him through the spine from behind, at a distance of five yards, the bullet coming out under the right arm. Death was almost instantaneous; he had only time to call out twice to the sepoy near him to send Havildar Narain Singh. As the Mahsud fired on all men who attempted to recover the corpse, he was finally despatched by a bullet from the top of the hill, which struck him under the right eye. Till then he continued to return the fire.

Meanwhile the Bhattani Levy, Kasim, was returning, having delivered his message to the Havildar in the Tarazda. He was fired on by mistake and slightly wounded in the fleshy part of the right calf by the Cavalry

As dols were then heard beating, Jamadar Sundar Singh ordered a general retirement, carrying with him the body of Lieutenant Hennessey and that of the Mahsud raider. The wounded Bhattani's village was close at hand, and he was handed over to his brother's care. The party reached Jandola at 6 p.m. Lieutenant Hennessey was killed at 2 p.m. The following arms, &c, were found with the dead raider and were forwarded with his body to you to-day for identification.—

One Snider rifle (stolen from Nasran).	Forty-three rounds Snider ball.
One muzzle-loader.	Three rounds Snider buckshot.
One sword.	Eight rounds Snider ball, empty.
One revolver.	One reza.
One waist belt.	

The Malik I brought with me from Tank professed themselves unable to identify the corpse, but there seems to be a general consensus of opinion that he was a Malikshahi of Makin or a Shabi Khel.

A Shingi Levy Aikhel sent out yesterday for information reports that he has only heard of two raiding parties being out, one under Azad Khan, Shingi, the other under Asal Khan, Guri Khel, and that both of them have gone towards Zhob. This man's information has been found generally trustworthy. A second Levy sepoy, Saki, a Shabi Khel, reports that on the 21st he heard from another Mahsud that the latter had on that day seen 10 or 12 Mahsuds lurking in the Shuza with two long bullies, likely materials for a ladder such as was used in the attack on Nasran. I shall endeavour to get this man in. Marwat, the Shaman Khel Malik, states that he saw the dead raider on two occasions in the Mulla Powindah's following, but the last occasion was two years ago.

Jamadar Nekamal, Langar Khel, states that the revolver found on the dead man was once in the possession of Sheikh Salim, Langar Khel

A Levy has been sent to call this man in

A third Levy sepoy, Gulnam, has brought in information that the raiders were fed last night by three brothers, Asti, Nizam and Pushi, Abdullais (brothers of Tarkhai, hostage at Dera Ismail Khan). These three men who live seven miles from here north of Fattah Khan Kot will be called in.

I shall inform you of any further information as obtained.

I have just heard that Makin, Shabi Khel, after seeing the corpse, has gone off to his home. Not having a horse he came with my infantry guard, which arrived after I had despatched the body from here. He saw it on the road. Dinak, also Bibizan, Shabi Khel, is in Tank, also Mauladad and Maula Khan of the same section.

Annexure 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 30th October, 1900.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, for information

Enclosure 16 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The Mahsud jirga at Kram agreed to pay by tribal shares, but the difficulty now is who is to collect the money and how. The Mahsuds want us to collect from each section. At the jirga they also agreed to control their bad characters by tribal force and to divide the allowances tribally. They have asked for two months' grace, and that, meanwhile, blockade be not imposed. They are very anxious that traffic with Mahsud country be not stopped for next two months. They are said to greatly fear that payment of the lakh will be followed up by an expedition. They are now waiting to see what we shall do. As the Mahsud requests are clearly impossible, I shall proclaim blockade this evening. I am telegraphing separately about this to you and to Military Authorities.

Enclosure 17 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference last sentence of my telegram of 9th instant. As half lakh has not been paid, the blockade will commence on 1st December, on which date troops ought to be in their position or as soon after as possible. Mahsuds are being sent back to their country, and blockade proclamation being issued.

Enclosure 18 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 28th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Have received letter from Mulla Powindah :—*Begins.* Mahsud jirga agrees to pay and obey. I am personally glad that bad characters are being punished. I ask that value of payments in kind be assessed in presence of my nominee. I ask you the order that fine be levied per family, and not by tribal shares. I ask for further grace, as the tribe is collecting the money; lastly, that allowances of Mahks may be credited towards fine. *Ends.* To which I have replied:—*Begins.* The sooner the Mahsuds pay in full, the sooner will blockade cease; secondly, payments in kind, such as I accept, will be sold and proceeds credited towards fine; thirdly, mode of collection of fine is one for tribe to determine, with which we have no concern; fourthly, Mahks' allowances cannot be credited towards fine; fifthly, no further grace can be given. *Ends.*

Enclosure 19 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 2nd December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Applications have been received from various Mahsud sections, asking permission to pay in their shares of fine, to which reply has been made that all payments will be received, but that the fine is a collective one on the whole Mahsud tribe, and that, till it is paid in full, the blockade will be maintained against all Mahsuds. Mullah Powindah writes asking that payment of fine be ordered according to tribal shares as fixed by recent jirga at Kram, also that payment of future allowances be ordered according to such shares, also that sections that decline to pay fine be coerced by us. Reply given that assessment and payment of fine and future distribution of allowances are matters of tribal concern, and settlement in which we do not interfere.

Enclosure 20 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 4th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Prices are rising in Mahsud Hills. News from various quarters, including Tochi and Sarwekai, confirms the report that Mahsuds are engaged in collecting the fine. Several Mahsud Maliks have been enquiring whether arms will be accepted in payment. I have already told the Mahsuds that payments in kind will be accepted, and property so brought will be sold and proceeds credited towards payment of fine. But arms cannot be sold in British districts. I do not advise their being sold to residents of the protected areas or to others, and lastly they are of no use to us. The arms which would be brought would, in most instances, be pistols, knives, swords and muzzle-loading guns, all of native patterns. I do not advise that these be taken, but, if breech-loading rifles are brought in that they be accepted, the market values being assessed by a Committee. Does His Honour agree?

Enclosure 21 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 8th December, 1900. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Lieutenant-Governor agrees that breech-loading rifles of English manufacture may be taken at assessed value in part payment of fine.

Enclosure 22 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

First payments in cash and in kind towards fine have been made at Jandola and Sarwekai. Mahsuds at present seem really resolved to pay, and Mulla Powindah is actively assisting in collection. By common consent

raiding on Government territory has been stopped for the present, but large raid reported to have been committed by Mahsuds on Afghan territory in Sarafza about 3rd instant, raiders slipping through Shawal. I shall endeavour to tighten Darwesh Khel closure of Shawal, as, if raiders get through, traders may contrive to do the same.

Enclosure 23 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 11th December, 1900. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Mahsuds now press for payments in kind to be accepted at a valuation. They hope, no doubt, that their cattle, &c, may be over-valued and fine thus reduced. To this I have replied that I have no objection to taking payments in kind at a valuation, provided Mahsuds make good any differences between the proceeds of sales and the valuations, if the latter prove to exceed the former. I have added that, if they do not accept this, I will permit Mahsud owners of payments in kind to be present at the sales, and arrange to have the property brought down from Jandola and sold, and that, if neither course suits them, they have still the option of paying in cash. It is quite possible that this Mahsud manoeuvre thus to evade full payment of fine may check satisfactory development of situation, but I think it would be fatal both in regard to effect of present punishment, and in regard to success of future management of tribe, if I were to do anything that would introduce a nominal element into the matter of the fine. I trust His Honour approves action taken

Enclosure 24 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, Khanewal, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 12th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta

Yours, dated 11th December. Lieutenant-Governor entirely approves action taken regarding payments in kind by Mahsuds.

Enclosure 25 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Attitude and temper of Mahsuds reported the same as in my telegram of 10th instant, but payments have ceased, and Mahsuds are considering what to do, since their wish to have payments in kind accepted at what they expected high valuations has been declined, and since they have been informed that only cash proceeds of sales of payments in kind will be credited to the fine. Mulla Powindah writes that, unless valuation system is permitted, he can assist no further in collection of fine. Complete cessation of raids, robberies and thefts along borders of Tochi, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Wana, charges, viz, a line 200 miles in length, since the 7th November last up to date proves, firstly, that the Mahsuds alone were

the disturbers of the peace; and, secondly, that the tribe is perfectly capable of combining for a common purpose and of controlling its bad characters if it chooses.

Enclosure 26 in No 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 31st December, 1900.

The Mahsuds have dropped the request for acceptance of payments in kind at a valuation. They now ask that they may be allowed to sell cattle, timber, &c, in Tank, and pay in the proceeds on the spot, subject to necessary precautions on our part that blockade is not broken by goods being taken back to their country. Apparently they do not trust each other, nor do they trust our native subordinates to sell their property. I have replied that their request is reasonable, and that, subject to the necessary measures to prevent smuggling, they will be allowed to come to Tank to sell what they bring, to pay in the money and to go back to their country. All accounts agree in representing Mulla Powindah as urging the tribe to pay, and as he seems to be the only business man in the tribe, and the only man who has some influence with all the sections, this is so far satisfactory. His letters to me during this month tend to confirm the reports that he is genuinely anxious for a payment of the fine. The Mahsuds naturally try to make the best terms for themselves, and finding now that a full payment is insisted upon, possibly they may make up their minds to comply. Mulla Powindah has convened a jirga to consider matters. I have directed Political Officer, Wana, to see that my letters to the tribe and to Mullah Powindah of the 26th instant, accepting Mahsuds' sales at Tank, reach before the jirga meets, and I hope this will take place, especially as the present rains are probably delaying assembly of the jirga.

Enclosure 27 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Miran, Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 6th January, 1901.

Payments have recommenced, and the Mahsuds appear inclined to avail themselves of the permission to sell and pay mentioned in my telegram 528 of 31st December, but till after the Id it is unlikely that a decided move will be made. Large Mahsud flock and herds have in last few days been grazing near Sarwekal, Haidari Kach and Jandola, which looks as if confidence had been restored. Tribe remains perfectly quiet and no offences have occurred.

Enclosure 28 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 14th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Payments towards fine continued till 8th instant, when they ceased. Reasons assigned for stoppage are, first, that some Mahsuds consider that, if they hold out for some time without paying, Government may get tired of the blockade and relax terms, second, that it has not yet been settled

whether assessments of fine shall be by tribal shares or by families; third, that the headmen are apathetic, and that Mulla Powindah, who has hitherto been energetic, is drawing back in order not to diminish his influence by appearing to be the sole or the principal mover in furthering the wishes of Government. As regards the second reason, till the tribe has settled mode of assessment, little progress can be expected. The principal obstacle towards an unanimous settlement of assessment is the Shaman Khel, who are numerically the smallest of the three great divisions of the Mahsuds, and therefore naturally wish for assessment *per capita*, whereas the other two divisions desire assessment *per stirpes*, both sides apparently overlooking the bearing that the assessment of loss now will have upon the assessment of profit hereafter when tribe comes to distribution of allowances. Colour is lent to the third reason by a letter I have recently received from Mulla Powindah, begging me to urge the headmen to co-operate vigorously in payment of fine. When they saw him energetically advocating payment, they drew back. Moreover, although they know that further relations with the Mahsuds will be direct and not through a system of selected Maliks, they are trying to stave off the day, hoping that something may meanwhile occur to alter what they know is the future policy of Government. The situation may clear itself or advance a step one way or the other after the Id. Up to date one thousand five hundred and eighty rupees have been paid in.

Enclosure 29 in No 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 16th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

On 14th afternoon a mail runner was killed near Nili Kach. Yesterday morning a sepoy of the 23rd Pioneers was shot on picket near Muliza and in the evening mail was looted near Sarwekai. Circumstances of these offences point to their having been committed by a former Mahsud Jamadar of mail runners who was discharged when blockade commenced, but this is only surmise as yet, and exact facts are being ascertained. The mails have not been sufficiently escorted, and have been allowed, it appears, to travel after sunset.

Enclosure 30 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan Quetta, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 16th January, 1901.

Following telegram, dated 15th, from Political, Zhob:—*Begins*. Following from S. D. O., Telegraphis, Dera Ghazi Khan:—*Begins*. Telegraph lines between Moghalkot and Kajuri Kach wrecked to-day by Waziris, breaking eight insulators, cutting wire in eleven places and carrying away two spans of wire somewhere within seven miles of Moghalkot. *Ends*. Following from Officer Commanding, Mirali Khel:—*Begins*. Officer Commanding, Moghalkot, wires Zarmelan post entered by party of thirteen Waziri raiders last night midnight. Two rifles belonging to Powindah Chowkidars taken. *Ends*. *Telegrams end*. Zarmelan is a Punjab post.

Enclosure 31 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Yesterday night rifle thieves, probably same gang as that mentioned in my telegram of yesterday, attacked picket of 23rd Pioneers at Khushma Khula between Murtaza and Nih Kach Two sepoy wounded, one rifle lost.

Enclosure 32 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 26th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The offences committed last week by the Mahsuds were, I consider, political in their tendency and purpose. The situation is this there are three political parties in the tribe—the Maliks, the tribesmen and Mulla Powindah, the third being the agent and leader of the second against the first mentioned party. An expedition would, the Maliks argue, fall principally upon the tribesmen and upon Mulla Powindah, who, as a Mulla, is bound to fight whether he likes or not, and who will, of course, be crushed if there is an expedition. The Maliks, on the other hand, recalling their experiences of 1894 and 1895, expect that, if there is an expedition again, they, their friends and property, will, as before, be protected as friends, and that the close of the expedition will be followed by increased allowances as in 1895, besides which their political adversary, Mulla Powindah, will be ruined. I am inclined to think that the offences were deliberately instigated with a view to worrying Government into an expedition. It is significant that the customary gathering of Mahsuds on the day of the *Id* at Makin, when some two thousand five hundred men are said to have assembled, was not attended by the leading headmen, whereas Mulla Powindah was present and upbraided the Mahsuds for the recent offences, and exhorted them to pay the fine. I have sent for the leading headmen, and shall particularly impress upon them the decision of Government in respect of the blockade and of future allowances, also the danger they incur by intrigue which will be useless. The difficulty is to get these Waziris to realise that what is said is meant; for instance, had the Madda Khel realised in May last, that there is no whittling of terms, they would have saved their autumn crop. A month ago some Ghilzais of Afghan territory arrived at Kaniguram with a demand for two and a half lakhs as compensation, on account of Mahsud raids on Afghan subjects. They were told to return after the *Id* and were present at the Makin gathering, and it is said brought a letter from Gul Muhammad Khan, Governor of Urghun, offering permission to the Mahsuds to trade with Afghan territory, and an asylum to Mulla Powindah, who is reported to have said that he would wait to see how things went. If a demand for redress was made by the Ghilzais, it is possible that this letter may, in part, be intended as giving some consideration for the redress desired.

Enclosure 33 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 3rd February, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

After jirga with leading and really influential headmen for three days, they have finally committed themselves in writing and by oath on the koran in my presence, to realise and pay in the fine as soon as possible; and to

unite for this purpose in the forcible coercion of any recusants in the tribe. They made sensible and reasonable suggestions for despatch of this business of liquidation, and the Shaman Khel (see my telegram 17 of 14th ultimo) agreed to accept assessment of fine by ancestral shares. It was also settled that offences committed last month shall be dealt with by whole tribe independently of payment of fine. The situation is better than it was ten days ago, but I cannot say whether internal dissensions of Mulla Powindah, out of antipathy to the leading headmen, may not impede settlement. Mulla Powindah is, however, so openly and explicitly committed to payment of fine that he could only act indirectly, and to make matters more secure, I have sent him a letter which ought to keep him straight. Further, the two parties now clearly understand that, if by their intrigues Government is driven to extreme measures, both parties will be destroyed, and that it is, therefore, to the interest of neither to try to cut the throat of the other at our expense. The information obtained during these discussions confirms correctness of political diagnosis in my telegram of 26th ultimo. The headmen have now gone off to arrange details of assessment and payment. I mention, for what it is worth, the fact that three breech-loading rifles and two revolvers were at this jirga produced in payment of shares of fine due by the owners.

Enclosure 34 in No 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 12th February, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Political Officer, Wana.—*Begins* State of affairs in Mahsud country during last week much more hopeful. Since meeting and interviewing of Mahsud Maliks by Commissioner at Jandola, the general demeanour of tribe has improved. Maliks are no longer sulky, and reports say that Mulla highly approves of action taken. All Maliks, since leaving Jandola, have called up their sections, and have arranged for the collection of fine. All arrangements for the realisation of the fine are ready at Sarwekai, Jandola and Tank. No offences have been committed by the Mahsuds during the past week. Bahirs are coming in as arranged at Sarwekai and Jandola. Badshah Khan, one of the chief Maliks, has personally paid in 755 rupees. *Ends*. The situation is more promising now than it has been since the blockade commenced.

Enclosure 35 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 12th March, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference Foreign letter of 20th February, paragraph 3. Owing to scarcity of cash among Mahsuds, it was settled at the Jandola jirga that animals produced by Mahsuds should be made over to complainants in cases of robbery of animals after the animals produced had been accepted by Political Officer as being in every respect equivalent to animals carried off. Mahsuds are bringing in numbers of animals, and these are being made over to complainants according to scale of distribution sanctioned in your telegram of 9th January. Up to 9th instant six thousand five hundred rupees worth of cash thus had been disposed of. Please telegraph if reconsideration of scale of distribution will take place, and under what circumstances. Animals brought in by Mahsuds cannot be kept by us pending

such reconsideration without considerable expense and some risk of animals dying or deteriorating. Nor would it seem advisable to check process of payment of fine by telling Mahsuds that they must keep the animals for the present pending reconsideration. Matter is urgent, because this method of settlement facilitates liquidation of fine without prejudice to the claimants.

Enclosure 36 in No 3

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 23rd March, 1901.

Commissioner, Derajat, wires.—*Begins* * Following telegrams repeated for orders Political Officer, Wana's:—*Begins*. Your question regarding fire-arms handed in by Mahsuds as payment of fine. Up to date 30 Martini-Henri rifles, 11 Martini carbines, 16 Snider rifles, 13 Snider carbines, 11 sporting rifles, 1 Kohat sporting rifle and 63 revolvers have been handed in. Twenty-seven Martini rifles, 4 Martini carbines, are Kohat made, all others are of European manufacture. Total value of fire-arms, as settled by Committees, amounts to Rs. 27,022. Mahsud Malik is averse to handing in rifles as security for cash later on. Regret delay, but information only received at 11 p.m. *Ends* My 148.—*Begins*. Your 221. See my letters of 10th December and of 5th January. Kohat-made arms should not have been taken. Unless you can justify their retention, they must be returned. Telegraph reply also what is value of arms received, exclusive of Kohat-made rifles and carbines. *Ends* His 175:—*Begins* Your 148. I understand breech-loading rifles of European make to mean Martini-Henri rifles, Sniders and sporting rifles, similar to those made in Europe, and which are equally serviceable. Of the 37 rifles and 4 carbines of Martini-Henri pattern received from Mahsuds and which have been designated as Kohat-made, all, without exception, have been put together from component parts made in Europe. All are sound, serviceable weapons, and to the Mahsuds are worth the money which Committees assessed on the rifles. At Jandola a sum of Rs. 15,002 has been realised up to date by valuation of fire-arms; of this amount Rs. 5,720 is the value assessed on the 23 rifles designed Kohat-made. All rifles collected at Sarwekai are being brought here. On arrival will send required information regarding them. Only two rifles out of 23 collected at Sarwekai are designated Kohat-made. Officer Commanding has informed me that, in his opinion, the values assessed on rifles are very fair. I would strongly recommend that the rifles be retained. Until further orders from you on subject, I have stopped taking over fire-arms from Mahsuds. *Ends* My 156:—*Begins*. Your 175. You can take another Rs. 2,000 worth of arms. By that time we shall have orders of Government. *Ends*. Under circumstances reported I think Kohat-made arms may be retained. Question now is as follows:—Value of arms brought in is nearly equal to totals of lists 1, 7 and 9 of statements with my 936-C of 8th December, plus Rs. 5,000 for Kot-Nasran case. Mahsuds, I understand, are willing to bring in more arms. It is policy of Government to obtain breech-loaders from tribes, and payment of arms of course facilitates termination of blockade. On other hand, if arms are brought in beyond arms of value already received which represents Government share of the lakh, we shall be short of money or animals to give as compensation to complainants in proportion to arms accepted after date, unless Government authorise assessed cash value of such arms to be paid to complainants. Kindly telegraph orders on this point. *Ends*. *Second telegram begins*—105-C My 155. I have now seen all the arms, they are in very good condition; the so-called Kohat-made arms are rifles of English barrels untouched and English locks, but fitted with country-made stocks. I believe the Mahsuds are prepared to bring in an additional fifteen to twenty thousand rupees worth of arms. If convenient, kindly telegraph

orders soon *Ends* Following reply sent:—*Begins*. No. A. Your telegrams 155, dated 18th, and 105-C, dated 21st. So long as great care is taken that Kohat-made rifles are not over-valued, Lieutenant-Governor doubts whether our accepting them will have any bad effect. He thinks we should continue to take rifles, such as those described in your second telegram, from Mahsuds. Value them in cash and pay complainants compensation according to scale laid down in your letter, dated 8th December, 1900 *Ends*

Enclosure 37 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Miram Shah, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st April, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Up to date fifty-five thousand rupees have been realised from Mahsuds. Tension between different political parties within the tribe has again increased, with consequence that payments are more slack, and that raiding, chiefly on Powindahs and Darwesh Khel, has recommenced.

Enclosure 38 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 7th May, 1901

Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, April 21st. Government of India would be glad to receive report from Mr Merk as to present position of affairs in Waziristan, and the manner in which blockade is being conducted. It is hoped that blockade arrangements are being maintained with unabated vigour, and that there will be no relaxation in its conditions, as, in the opinion of the Government of India, this is the only method of bringing the Waziris to complete submission. Hereafter and until termination of blockade, it would be convenient if brief fortnightly progress report could be sent by letter, copy being despatched direct by Commissioner to Government of India, in addition to any intermediate telegrams thought necessary.

Enclosure 39 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My letter of 22nd ultimo. After protracted discussion with large Mahsud jirga, numbering over fifteen hundred persons, the difficulties in way of payment of balance of fine have, I hope, been removed. It has been arranged that Mahsuds must pay two-thirds of fine in cash or breech-loaders, concession of payment by animals being withdrawn after one-third of fine has been so paid. Details of payments up to date are as follows:—By cash, four thousand rupees, by breech-loading rifles and revolvers, twenty-eight thousand six hundred rupees, by animals, twenty-four thousand one hundred rupees. It appears that some Mahsuds will not, and others cannot, pay their shares of fine. The jirga asks that, if members of the tribes pay or defaulters, those so paying may be helped to recover their debts after

blockade is finished, as follows:—First, by transfer to creditors of defaulters' shares of future allowances till debts are satisfied, second, by arrest of defaulters if found, at instance of creditors, in British districts or within protected areas of Tochi and Wana. Jirga explains that second provision may not be used much, and is meant more to induce those now hanging back to pay. I see no objection to accepting these arrangements regarding which please telegraph orders, for which I am keeping jirga waiting. As cash is scarce in Mahsud country, jirga asked permission to pawn breech-loaders as security for cash payments apart from rifles paid as part of the fine. I agreed on conditions that, if not redeemed within eight months from date of pawning, the rifles would be forfeited to Government in payment of fine.

Enclosure 40 in No 3

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference your telegram, repeating Foreign telegram. Present position regarding Mahsuds is reported in my telegram of yesterday on which I await orders. Blockade continues with unabated vigour, and there has been no relaxation in its conditions. Brief fortnightly reports, as desired, will be submitted. Present position regarding Mahsud-Darwesh Khel quarrel over Badar has been reported in my telegrams of to-day.

Enclosure 41 in No 3

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 9th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Yours of 8th May. Acceptance of breech-loaders, as security for cash payments on condition mentioned, is quite right. Acceptance of payments by tribe on account of defaulters, subject to conditions mentioned, is open to following objections.—If we promise to arrest defaulters found in British districts or protected areas, we shall take upon ourselves that coercion of recalcitrants, which should be done by the tribe itself, as one of the essentials to a satisfactory settlement, and the restoration of allowances. The basis of the new method of dealing with the tribe approved by Government, India, consists in the tribe being brought to put forward a thoroughly representative jirga capable of enforcing its own will against such recusants as those who are now said to be unwilling to pay, and, if we agree to do any part of this work for them, the objects of the blockade will not have been completely gained, and, as in the case of the Khyber, a portion of the fine will probably have to be condoned. The acceptance of payments from willing members of the tribe on condition of recovery from allowances of defaulters hereafter does not involve the risk of having to condone any part of the fine, but it, too, is open to the objection that, when we restore the allowances, the tribe will not have worked out the basis of settlement above mentioned, and the elements of further trouble will remain. Lieutenant-Governor is, therefore, of opinion that no promise of assistance to realise any portion of the fine either by transfer of prospective allowances or any other means should be made, but that the whole fine should be rigidly enforced, before the blockade is removed. The position which we shall thus establish is well worth the delay in settlement.

Enclosure 42 in No. 3.

Endorsed by Punjab Government, dated the 8th May, 1901.

A copy of the following letter is submitted, by direction of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, for the information of the Government of India, Foreign Department, with reference to telegram, dated the 21st of April, 1901, from the Commissioner, Derajat:—

From the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, No 66-C, dated the 22nd April, 1901, and enclosure.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 22nd April, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a copy of my telegram of to-day to the Political Officer, Wana, which explains the present situation and its difficulties in connection with the Mahsuds

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 22nd April, 1901.

I take the present situation to be as follows.—The leading Maliks promised last month at Jandola to accelerate payment of the fine and were at the time, I think, sincere. Upon this the Mulla determined to put in his oar in order to have a voice in the final settlement and to preserve his prestige in the tribe, with also an eye to the future allowances. Therefore he thwarted the efforts of the Maliks towards payments, and they dare and cannot carry into effect their promises of forcibly coercing sections that are slow in paying. In return for this, the Maliks thwart his efforts to contrive a settlement of the fine and termination of the blockade. The situation is, therefore, approaching the deadlock which existed in January last, and which was then solved at the Jandola jirga. It is possible that the Maliks may now, as then, think of forcing on an expedition in order to ruin the Mulla. As to this we can now, as then, paralyse this intention by pointing out that, if there is an expedition, they themselves will be ruined as well as the Mulla, and we have now the further powerful means of influencing them and the tribe by making them realise that, in the event of an expedition, the fifty-five thousand rupees already paid will be irretrievably lost. The point now is, will it be better for me to see the Mahsuds now or wait a fortnight or three weeks, and let the blockade, which you say is hitting the Mahsuds hard, do further work? Of this you on the spot can form an opinion, which please telegraph to me on the 24th instant to Bannu. The more the blockade acts upon the Mahsuds, the more likely is the tribe, and are the rival parties, to listen to reason and to pay. The doubt is whether, if I wait three weeks, the Maliks or the Mulla may not meanwhile do something unfortunate in supposed furtherance of their private aims and enmities. The course that payments are taking, as well as the information you are receiving, will enable you to judge and telegraph how matters seem likely to go. From Bannu I can come straight to Jandola. If, on the other hand, it appears better to wait three weeks, and let the blockade do more of its work, I shall march to Mianwali, then rail to Dera Ghazi and Muzaffargarh, and then come to Jandola and Sarwekai.

Enclosure 43 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division. Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram No doubt the tribe should coerce the defaulters, and, if the Mahsuds had for the past ten years been treated in a manner conducive to the preservation of internal tribal authority in the way that the northern tribes have been, I should have nothing to say, and should have refused to lay the petition of the Mahsuds before Government. A reference to paragraphs 19 to 25 of my note of the 24th July, 1900, and subsequent correspondence will show that the blockade was not intended as a means of re-establishing that tribal authority which the Malik's system has been shattering for ten years, but was intended as a punitive measure to compel redress. After the blockade is over, the various measures discussed in that note are meant to build up what has been during the past in process of being pulled down, but this will obviously require years of patient work unswervingly directed to the end in view. If the blockade could last for years, a thoroughly representative jirga, capable of enforcing its own will against recusants, would, no doubt, in the course of time arise, but, as I have repeatedly reported, the leading men are torn by many feuds, the tribe is exploited by two great parties headed by the leading Malik's and by Mulla Powindah, who balance each other, and who, though powerless for good, are powerful for evil, and under the circumstances we must to some extent back up judiciously those that comply with our demands against those that hang back. It is out of the question to hope that a jirga, such as exists in northern tribes, and as exists till recent times among the Mahsuds, can come into life under the above conditions in six months or a year. There is no risk of any condonation, for the blockade will not be removed till the last penny has been paid, and creditors know that they must take their chance hereafter of recovery by arrest of debtors. It was thoroughly understood by the jirga when it made its petition that Government would be responsible for nothing but the arrest of the debtors when pointed out. The basis of settlement has practically been worked out already, and one object of the great jirga I have just held has been to reconcile assessment of payments with basis of prospective settlement. The recusants and defaulters are not whole sections and clans, but families, individuals, and small sub-sections. The Mahsuds do not live each clan collected within its ring fence as do Afridis, Mohmands and others, but the clans, sub-sections and smaller divisions live intermixed in an extraordinary way. It is, therefore, not easy for clans to coerce individuals, even if there were not the essential difficulties in the way of concerted action which I have mentioned above. His Honour is aware that for years I have consistently advocated the re-establishment of tribal authority among the Mahsuds, and I should not propose anything that would combat this line of policy. After ten years of the Malik's system, the Mahsud political constitution is weak in comparison with that of tribes which has not been subjected to a process of disintegration, and we cannot, I submit, put on it a greater strain than it can just at present bear. Payments have been again coming in freely since Wednesday. If the petition is refused, those that have paid or that are prepared to pay will certainly feel disheartened, they will sulk in silence; the discontented will be proportionately encouraged. The blockade is severely felt in this way that salt, tobacco, cloth, gur are practically unobtainable, but food of some sort still exists in sufficient quantities. Nothing short of positive famine will produce at short notice that tribal authority which, I suggest, we build up gradually by patient and steady work. It will take, I think, another eighteen months of the blockade to produce a famine in the Mahsud country. Please telegraph orders early.

Enclosure 44 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 12th May, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Party of Southern Waziristan Militia attacked to-day on road between Khajuri Kach and Kashmir Kar which is post on Sherani border, three men killed, two wounded, rifles and ammunition carried off. Offenders not yet known, probably Mahsuds. Parties of Militia gone in pursuit.

Enclosure 45 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Further news shews only Militia sepoy killed, four wounded, none fatally.

Enclosure 46 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901.

Reference telegrams about Waziri blockade ending with Merk's telegram of 10th instant. Views of Government of India are. First, acceptance of rifles as security for cash payments is unobjectionable, provided rifles are redeemed by cash before any allowances are distributed. This qualification is essential, otherwise rifles may be redeemed and fine be partly paid out of allowances. Secondly, provided blockade is not raised and no allowances are paid till full amount of fine is realised, there is no objection to accepting tribal proposal for subsequent distribution of allowances, so as to exclude defaulters temporarily or permanently. Thirdly, after fine is paid and blockade is raised, we should certainly assist to enforce the tribal authority over individuals by arresting, at instance of the tribe, men found in our territory who have defied that authority. The tribe cannot touch such men in our limits, and we ought not to allow bad characters to defy tribal pressure exerted on our behalf, and then to take refuge under our protection.

Enclosure 47 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901.

My telegram of to-day, and your telegram of 23rd March. Governor-General in Council feels strong objection to arms being accepted in part payment of fine at fictitious value, or, indeed, at any price which cannot be readily realised in cash. Compare my telegram in Chamkani case, 1008-F., dated 26th April, 1899. It appears Kohat rifles are being accepted as equivalent to about Rs. 200 each. This may be the value to the tribesmen, though this is doubtful, but it is not their value to Government if the rifles are left on our hands.

That these and other rifles are not being redeemed seems to show that they are being accepted at too high a valuation. Commissioner should report values at which arms of European make have been accepted, and what it

is proposed to do with arms received. The chief object of Government is to realise fine of one lakh in full. Payment in stock is therefore acceptable, provided we realise by sale full value at which they are accepted. But this is impossible in case of arms, unless Government sells them to trans-border tribesmen. If rifles are accepted, it would appear that they should be taken only at such valuation as will tempt their owners to redeem them in cash. And this redemption should take place before allowances are begun, otherwise it will be paid out of allowances, that is by Government.

Enclosure 48 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 18th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

On informing the jirga of the orders conveyed in Foreign telegram of 13th May, they state that they are able and willing to pay a further nineteen thousand rupees promptly, making total eighty-seven thousand rupees, but that there is a deadlock about the remaining thirteen thousand rupees as follows.—The Shaman Khel, who are the smallest of the three sections of the tribe and the best behaved, only about eight hundred rupees being due by them out of the two lakhs liabilities incurred by the whole tribe, object to paying one-third of the fine, but claim one-third of the future allowances. The Mahsuds apparently felt the Shaman Khel case to be strong, for it seems that it was at first arranged by the tribe that the Shaman Khel should pay only twenty thousand, and the question of the thirteen thousand was left over and not decided. Subsequently, the leading men of all three sections appear to have settled among themselves that the Shaman Khel should pay five thousand out of the thirteen thousand, and the other two sections, viz., Alzai and Bahlolzai, four thousand each. This settlement appears to have been made after the tribesmen had assessed the fine among themselves on the basis that the Shaman Khel should pay twenty thousand and the Alzai and Bahlolzai thirty-three thousand each. This is an instance of crooked ways of Maliks. The body of the three sections was no party to this new arrangement by the leading men, and declines to give effect to it by a fresh assessment. On the other hand, the Shaman Khel are resolute in not paying more than twenty-five thousand altogether, urging that their joint tribal responsibility will be fully vindicated by paying one-fourth of the fine, though they are practically quite innocent of offences. The only way the jirga can suggest out of this difficulty is, first, that on the security of the new allowances, they may be allowed to borrow from non-Mahsuds, probably British subjects, the thirteen thousand rupees after the eighty-seven thousand rupees have been paid, the loan being repaid by us in one instalment from the allowances; second, that the thirteen thousand rupees be deducted in a lump sum from the new allowances in the shares given above, in the first case the blockade being removed when the eighty-seven thousand *plus* the thirteen thousand have been paid, or in the second case, when the eighty-seven thousand have been realised. There is no doubt that the blockade is being severely felt, and that all are anxious for its removal, and but for the following considerations I should not have hesitated to recommend refusal of the petition. The considerations are these: the tribe is so disunited, and there is such a want of internal authority, that it will take a long period of further pressure before the Mahsuds will be driven into concerted action with a view to solving the deadlock, and there is, besides, the difficulty that Mulla Powindah thwarts what the leading men do and *vice versa*. Meanwhile it is probable that further offences will be committed, and that the account for the offences during the blockade will run up so high as to be difficult of liquidation. If Government decide to take no notice of offences committed during the blockade, then I recommend that the petition be refused, and that the tribe be told to pay up in full. This would not be for some

time. If, however, it is considered that a payment of eighty-seven thousand rupees down, *plus* losses in other ways which I calculate to be about eighty thousand rupees in addition, is sufficient punishment, then one or other of the jurga's petitions may be acceptable to Government. Kindly telegraph orders urgently. I think there is no prospect of further payments till the question of the thirteen thousand rupees is settled.

Enclosure 49 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandala, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 19th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram of yesterday, repeating Foreign telegram of 13th May Arms are not accepted in part payment of fine at fictitious values, but at values according to quality of rifle, average price being below current market rates, as reported in Political Officers, Tochi and Wana's quarterly statements of prices current of arms among tribes in and near Southern Waziristan. A new Henry-Martini is worth to the local tribes about five hundred rupees: to Government it is worth thirty-one rupees eight annas. A worn Henry-Martini fetches in the local hills about four hundred rupees, and to Government it is worth its price as old iron. Of the so-called Kohat rifles which have been accepted here at current market prices, all but a few are not rifles of native manufacture, nor are they composed of many small pieces of condemned rifles welded together like the rifles which made their appearance in the spring of 1898. They consist of rifles cast in arsenals on the old system when the barrel used to be either not cut at all or else cut clean into three pieces, and the lock-plates used to be bent or broken. Such rifles are easily put together again or repaired, and are dangerous weapons in the hands of tribesmen. Only such of the so-called Kohat rifles have been taken here, and one-half of them have barrels that have not been cut at all. Waterfield knows something of the trans-frontier arms market, and I consider we can trust him in this matter. I and other officers have also seen the rifles that have been taken. They are good and serviceable, and have not been over-priced. If information has reached the Government of India which tends to show that fictitious values have been assigned, I ask the favour of being referred to it. No rifles have as yet been given in or accepted as pledges, and, therefore, none have been redeemed. The only thing we can do with the arms received is to destroy them, unless Government are prepared to sell them in India. A statement showing for each rifle the value assessed follows, and in this connection please see statement of trans-frontier prices for rifles printed at pages 209 and 210 of this week's Police blue abstract of intelligence. Live-stock to value of about thirty-one thousand five hundred rupees has up to date been accepted, and made over to complainants whose claims, except those of the Zhob complainants and a few Bannu and Tochi men, who have not yet appeared, have been satisfied. Zhob complainants live far away, and I propose to compensate them in cash. Moreover, Zhob list contains twenty-four thousand three hundred rupees worth of Government cases, which have by mistake not been entered as a separate list of Zhob Government cases. The Mahsuds would very much prefer to pay live-stock rather than arms or cash. In order to make the punishment more telling, I declined to take more than one-third of the fine in live-stock. Now that few complainants remain to be satisfied, the difficulties in the way of accepting live-stock in payment of the thirty-two thousand rupees still due are these: it is impossible for us to keep about fifteen hundred head, which this money represents; there is no great cattle market anywhere near, nor is this the season for buying; to throw so many animals on the small local markets would glut them completely, and we should not get one-fourth of the real value of the stock. Pending orders, I have stopped taking rifles, and solicit early

instructions. I think there is no doubt that cash is scarce among some of the Mahsuds, but to what extent and how far the tribe generally is without cash, it is impossible to say. I shall keep the jirga here till orders are received on this telegram, as well as on my 296 of yesterday.

Enclosure 50 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 20th May, 1901.

With reference to Mr Merk's telegram, dated 18th May, a copy of which has been sent to you direct, I am instructed to address you as follows.

2. The telegram shows that the tribe from the first only made arrangements for paying Rs 86,666 out of the Rs. 1,00,000 fixed by Government, viz. :—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	20,000
Alizai, one-third	33,333
Bahlolzai, one-third	33,333
Total	86,666

leaving Rs 13,333 undistributed

The leading Maliks of the three sections then appear to have stepped in with a view to making up the full amount, and to have distributed the balance of Rs. 13,333 as follows:—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	5,000
Alizai	4,000
Bahlolzai	4,000
Total	13,000

If Rs 333 were to be divided in the same proportions, the three sections would under this arrangement have been made responsible for the following amounts:—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	25,128
Alizai	37,436
Bahlolzai	37,436
Total	1,00,000

But while the Shaman Khel appear to agree to pay Rs. 25,000, the other two sections refuse to advance on their Rs 33,333.

3. Mr. Merk says this is an instance of the crooked ways of the Maliks. But the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it is a genuine attempt of the Maliks to get the tribe at large to accept responsibility for the whole lakh, instead of for only Rs 86,666, and that what it shows is that the tribe as a whole is not subdued by the blockade to such an extent as to lead the tribesmen to sink their sectional differences and meet the Government demand, reduced as it is to the lowest possible amount.

4. In addition to this, we have the fact that during the blockade offences have been committed, the amount due for which is not stated.

5. The jirga with which Mr. Merk has been holding communications is probably a representative jirga of the tribe, so far as such a jirga can be got together, and this jirga seems to accept the distribution of the Maliks in respect of the Rs. 13,000, because it recommends in its second alternative that this amount should be deducted from the new allowances in the shares given above, viz. :—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	5,000
Alizai	4,000
Bahlolzai	4,000

and in the first alternative it would fall upon Government to make the distribution, deducting the share due from each of the three sections from the allowances.

6 The Lieutenant-Governor is strongly of opinion that the tribe needs further coercion, and that, if a settlement is patched up on the lines sketched by Mr. Merk, we shall only have to do the whole business over again. We are told that the blockade is being severely felt, and Sir Mackworth Young recommends that it be maintained until the whole lakh is actually paid by the tribe, and that we should not attempt to meet their difficulty by in any way pledging the future allowances. As regards offences committed during the blockade, he has already made enquiry, and will be prepared to give an opinion later

Enclosure 51 in No. 3.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 23rd May, 1901.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 20th May, 1901, regarding the outstanding balance of the fine due from the Mahsud Waziris

2 The Governor-General in Council entirely agrees with the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as expressed in the 6th paragraph of your letter, and Mr. Merk should be instructed to at once make it clear to the tribe that the blockade will continue to be enforced with the utmost rigour until every rupee of the fine has been paid, and that no arrangement will be accepted by the Government which commits them directly or indirectly to the recovery of any portion of the fine from the future allowances. The tribe should clearly understand that neither will the blockade be removed nor the allowances be distributed until the fine is fully realised, and that any offences committed meanwhile will be sharply punished by immediate reprisals on any section of the tribe within reach

3 With regard to the Commissioner's telegram, dated the 19th May, 1901, the Government of India accept his assurances that rifles have not been taken at a valuation higher than that at which they are saleable among the tribesmen themselves, and will await the receipt of the statement promised before passing orders as to the disposal of the arms already in our possession. But they are of opinion that no more rifles should be taken in payment of the fine except as security for cash, and on the distinct condition that they must be redeemed in cash before the blockade is raised. It is clear from the Commissioner's telegram that no more live-stock should be taken in payment of the fine. It therefore follows from these instructions that the balance of the fine still due must be paid in cash, and that, till it is so paid, the blockade will continue

Enclosure 52 in No 3

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Jandola, the 18th May, 1901.

In compliance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram, dated the 9th instant, which repeated Foreign Department telegram, I have the honour to submit the report on the situation in Waziristan and the manner in which the blockade is being conducted.

2. I will take the latter subject first, and commence by saying that there has been no relaxation whatever in the stringency of the blockade. It is being maintained with unabated vigour. In fact, so far as it is possible to do this without alienating the sympathy of the people from us, which at present is on our side, an extra turn to the screw was given in the arrangements last month when the reaping of the plentiful spring crop rendered smuggling more likely, and, with the fall of prices in British territory, more profitable. It must be remembered that, for the success of a blockade which extends over 300 miles of country, we must depend very much upon the active co-operation and upon the good-will of the people. At present both are fully with us, for the Mahsud was feared and hated all round. Blockade operations involve much restriction upon the freedom of movement and liberty of trade of the frontier population in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and of the inhabitants of the Wana and Tochi charges; they imply and demand a close supervision by a native staff whom it is impossible to control with a few officers over an enormous area, and the more minute and exacting rules are, the greater opportunity is afforded thereby for malpractices by this staff. If the people were discontented with the blockade, we could do relatively little in the way of shutting up supplies compared with now when the people generally are with us. The question has been repeatedly discussed by me with the blockade officer and local officers, and we have always come to the conclusion that, having regard to the feelings of the local people, we could not make the arrangements more strict. At first, indeed, in December and January, they were in a few instances too strict, and we had to relax them so as to attain the happy mean.

3. The manner in which the blockade is being conducted will appear from the attached extract of general instructions which I issued a month before the blockade commenced. The detailed rules and arrangements, based upon the general lines there laid down, have been very excellently worked out by the Blockade Officer with the respective Deputy Commissioners, District Superintendents of Police and Political Officers concerned. With these details I do not propose to trouble Government. The general rules may be of use in future blockades.

4. The whole control of trade, all the blockade patrolling and all the measures for the prevention and detection of smuggling and contraband traffic are conducted by the civil authorities and their establishments, viz., Militia, Police, Border Military Police and armed villagers. The troops on blockade duty are employed only in the purely military functions of holding forts, supplying convoy guards and the pursuit of raiders. There is no need to ask them to undertake the harassing duty of patrolling for blockade purposes.

5. Prices in the Mahsud country are the best index to the working of the blockade machine. They are reported to me weekly by the Blockade Officer and the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana. Coming, as these reports do, from places many miles apart and through different agencies, it is probable that the average rates represent almost exactly the condition of prices. I attach a statement showing how prices have moved since December last. The table tells its own tale, which is corroborated by the ragged clothes and sickly faces of the Mahsuds. The British Medical Officer here informs me that, when the great jurgas come in, nearly every man appears to be suffering from dyspepsia, probably due to the want of salt and change in their diet generally. "None" in the statement does not mean that there is absolutely no salt, &c., but that there is none for sale.

Whoever has a stock of such articles, keeps it for himself, and will not part with it. Wheat has lately been going down in price, owing to the reaping of the crops within the lower Mahsud hills.

6. Judging from the movements of prices and from what one hears, I conclude that the want of all luxuries and of some necessaries, viz., salt and cloth, is most severely felt (some Mahsuds begged me the other day for leave to buy only two annas worth of salt each), but that there is sufficient food, chiefly Indian corn, left to carry the Mahsuds on to the gathering of the autumn harvest. Scarcity approaching to famine would not be produced unless the blockade lasts till this time next year, and actual famine probably not till September, 1902.

7. The effect of the blockade has up to now been good. The suddenness and completeness of the impenetrable ring-fence which surrounded the Mahsuds have very much depressed them for a time at least. In no other way can I account for the tribe having paid Rs. 68,000 up to date. This is a larger amount than any frontier tribe has paid without an expedition since the annexation of the Punjab. They have up to now given in 98 breech-loading rifles and 68 modern revolvers. Revolvers are taken because they are the favourite weapon of Mahsud burglars in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts. If these rifles and revolvers were in bad condition or had been over-valued, one could understand it, but they are all of European make, in serviceable condition, and have undoubtedly been valued at the market rates current in the Mahsud hills. I cannot account for this except on the hypothesis that cash is really scarce, and that the tribe is driven to part with what most Pathans value more than cash. It seems odd that cash should be scarce, but we know from reports at the time that after 1897-98 much of the spare cash of the Mahsuds was invested in rifles bought from the Afridis, and we are told now that men club together to give a rifle, their subscriptions being paid in cattle, sheep, goats and grain. Apart from the fine, the Mahsuds are suffering heavy losses from the cutting off of trade, of labour (the harvests in Marwat and Tank are cut usually by Mahsud labourers, and they work a good deal during winter on our roads and in the villages much as Ghilzais do in Peshawar), of the pay of the Mahsuds in the Militia, and of the former allowances. From all sources, I take it, the aggregate loss to the Mahsuds cannot be less than Rs 13,000 per mensem during the six winter months, and Rs 9,000 per mensem during the remainder of the year, *exclusive of the fine*. The resources of the tribe are being slowly but surely worn down.

8. Considering the discomfort and stress to the tribe, it is surprising that there have not been more raids. Some of these, as I have explained, have been due to political manoeuvres, the others have been carried out partly for loot and partly for supplies by the bad characters, of whom the Mahsuds have more than the normal share of a frontier tribe, and over whom a control can be, in the course of time, established only by the reconstruction of internal tribal authority. This cannot be done in a day, and if the blockade proves a success and terminates with full payment of the fine, it would still be sanguine to expect no more offences.

At the same time, I am convinced that the Mahsuds are "dogs with a very bad name." If the police or informers are at a loss to discover offenders, the case is put down to Mahsuds. In many instances, especially in the Tochi and along the Bhattanni border, offences are committed by members of tribes living near our territory who take care to have some Mahsud confederates with them in order to provide a safe and distant place of receipt for the stolen property and to be able to charge Mahsuds. These live far away, and do not care what is ascribed to them. I have given instructions to enforce territorial responsibility in the Tochi and elsewhere rigidly, and trust this will check such raids as are committed jointly by Mahsuds and by clans living along the borders of our country.

9. As regards the political situation, I am convinced that the bulk of the tribe is sincerely anxious to stand well with us and to pay. But the more one deals with them, the more is the political paralysis within the

tribe brought home to one. Even twenty years ago "Chalweshtis" were not unknown. Now, at these jirgas, the Mahsuds talk much of employing "Chalweshtis" to coerce defaulters and recusants and to accelerate payment of the fine, but it is nothing more than empty sound. They dare not start "Chalweshtis" They are even unable to convene a general jirga. Under the first shock of the announcements at Tank in November last, a kind of general jirga assembled, but it broke up *re infecta*. Unless we ourselves summon the jirga, it is unable to come together, this has been admitted to me by Mahsuds. The hand of each leading man is against his neighbour. The other day they went home from a jirga, and I asked a clansman what they, the leading men, would do "Do," he said, "what can they do? They shut themselves up in their houses, and cannot stir without fifteen men to their backs." The body of the clansmen has so long been dissociated from political business that it cannot take the initiative. And if the leading men should by any chance combine, the influence of Mulla Powindah is sufficient to neutralise them, but is not sufficient to carry the Mahsuds against them. The two, Mulla and Mahiks, just balance each other. I do not think we find this phenomenon anywhere else on the frontier, two political parties of about equal strength, and a tribe now leaning to one, now to the other. The recent events in Badar have deepened the ill-feeling between the two leading elements of the situation. Fortunately Mulla Powindah has everything to lose and nothing to gain from an expedition, so that *quâ* the blockade he is heartily on our side, which again at times reacts in lessening the efforts of the leading men to bring about the payment of the fine.

10. The inability of the tribe to convene a jirga explains the frequency with which I have to send for it. The political parties and the private feuds and quarrels with which the Mahsuds are seething, the great difficulty experienced by a people that cannot read and write and is innocent of all accounts, in the apportionment of a huge fine, explain the checks that from time to time occur, and the necessity for our composing differences and making up accounts.

11. A copy of this report has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat, with reference to my telegram, dated the 14th instant. As I have received no reply to it, I have assumed that there is no objection to this being done.

AVERAGE PRICES IN BRITISH SEERS PER BRITISH RUPEE IN MAHSUD COUNTRY							AVERAGE PRICES IN BRITISH SEERS PER BRITISH RUPEE IN BRITISH TERRITORY								
Date,	Salt.	Tobacco.	Gur.	Indian-corn.	Wheat.	Rice.	Longcloth in Yards	Date,	Salt.	Tobacco.	Gur.	Indian-corn.	Wheat.	Rice.	Longcloth in Yards
1900.								1900							
24th December .	8½	2	4	15	8	7½	7	24th December . .	17	4	9	16	9½	8	13½
1901.								1901.							
12th January ..	7	1½	3	15	7½	7	3	12th January ..	16	5	9	17	9½	7½	6½
26th January	5	1	3	15	7	7	3	26th January	16	4	8½	16	10	7	6
9th February .	4½	None	2½	15	7	6	2½	26th January ...	16	4	8½	16½	10	6½	6½
24th February .	4	"	2½	13	6½	6	2½	24th February ..	16	4	8½	16½	10	7	7
9th March ..	9½	"	1½	9½	5½	5½	2	9th March .	17	4	8½	16½	9½	6½	6
23rd March .	1½	"	1	9	5½	5	1½	23rd March	17	4½	8½	15	10	6½	6
6th April .	None	"	None	9	5	5	None	6th April ..	17	4½	9	15	10	6½	6½
20th April ..	"	"	"	9	3	8½	"	20th April .	15½	4	9	16½	13	6½	7½
4th May . .	"	"	"	9	4½	8½	"	4th May .	16	4	9½	16½	16	7½	8

W. R. H. MERK.

Annexure 1.

MAHSUD BLOCKADE.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

The blockade of the Mahsuds is meant to prevent any person whatever in the Mahsud country from having any dealings with the outer world while the blockade lasts.

The Mahsuds may resent this. We have also to keep ourselves informed as to whether the blockade is really effective or if there is a leakage anywhere.

The measures for carrying out the blockade, therefore, fall under three heads—

- A.—Establishment and conduct of the blockade.
- B.—Protection.
- C.—Information.

A.

The blockade may be proclaimed any time between the 15th November and the 1st December. The exact date depends upon the final reply of the tribe.

1. But on the 7th November the export of grain from British territory to the Mahsud country should be quietly stopped by the Deputy Commissioners of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and no Mahsuds should be allowed to proceed in search of work beyond Tank, Lakki and Bannu.

2 Lists of all traders with, and associates of, Mahsuds in the four charges (Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Wana and Tochi) should be prepared and ready by the 15th November; also lists of men in the Mahsud country known to trade with our people and their agents here.

On the proclamation of the blockade, sufficient security must at once be taken everywhere from the persons in these lists, including the agents here of the Mahsuds, not to send, or help in sending, anything whatever into the Mahsud country or to assist the Mahsuds in any way. Similar security must be taken in a collective form from the headmen of all border villages, from such Bhattannis and from such Darwesh Khel as officers think fit. The prohibition under section 23, Frontier Crimes Regulation, should be widely and fully circulated along the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan borders, and men disobeying it be dealt with under the Penal Code for disobeying the lawful order of a public servant.

Villages that are guilty as a body can be fined.

3. All Mahsuds whatsoever will have to be sent over the border into the Mahsud country on declaration of the blockade. The preliminary notice asking officers to warn them to be ready will issue on the 7th November. If it is proposed to exempt any Mahsud, special application, giving names and reasons for the application should be made to me. Few, if any, exemptions, however, will be made. This expulsion will include all the Mahsuds settled in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts, and all Hamsayahs at present in the Tochi, or that come down with the Gurbuz. I will write to the Officers Commanding Bombay Regiments that have enlisted Mahsuds, and ask them, when the leave season comes, to settle matters with me.

4. After declaration of the blockade, Rs. 20 will (for the present) be paid for every Mahsud who comes into our country to earn his livelihood or to trade and is caught there. Such Mahsuds should at once be sent back into their hills, and all their property, except the clothes they wear, be confiscated. To imprison them will play into their hands.

5. No Mahsud should be permitted to come in across the blockade line, without the written order of the Blockade Officer or Political Officer.

6. Contraband goods and animals should be confiscated and sold, or otherwise disposed of.

7. The border villages of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts should be divided into groups, police should be told off to each such group, who are to live in it, and to be responsible that all blockade arrangements are properly carried out in that group. The Deputy Commissioners of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu should send indents for additional police without delay. An Inspector of Police should be specially told off in each district to supervise, and be responsible for the police working in connection with the blockade. The additional police indented for should be placed in Thanas, and the Thana police into the groups of villages.

8. The Political Officer, Tochi, and Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, must arrange so as to regulate Darwesh Khel Bahirs that there is no contraband traffic, similarly the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and Political Officer, Wana, as regards Bhuttanni and Darwesh Khel trade.

9. The traffic on all dangerous roads must be regulated.

B.

1. The Enfield rifles for villages sanctioned by Government should be issued as soon as received in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

2. All Border Military Police posts on the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan border should be strengthened and the frontier roads put in good repair.

3. Deputy Commissioners should take up the question of irregular levies that are required, and be ready with schemes by the 19th November. I may be in a position to issue Enfields for such levies.

4. The Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia must be ready to occupy such posts and situations as are obligatory as soon as the blockade is proclaimed.

By "situations" are meant the sites of posts not yet built. Here the men will be temporarily in tents, till the posts are constructed. Such camps must be "sangared" the very first day they are pitched, a rough five feet wall of dry stones is enough, with two towers for sentries diagonally placed. The towers can be rough mud or stone platforms five feet to ten feet high with a sangar round them. Commanding Officers will settle details, the main point is to "sangar" at once.

5. Patrolling must be carefully done, never less than six men at a time, on the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan border.

6. All British officers must never travel or patrol before sunrise; they must invariably reach a post or camp with their escorts one hour before sunset.

7. The list showing disposition of the troops has been already communicated to officers.

8. The responsibility for, and direction of, military operations carried out by troops rests with the Officers Commanding the troops. We can offer advice, and should always give all the information in our power, but on no account can we assume the responsibility for, or the direction of, military operations. Blockades are very trying to every one, and it materially eases and expedites matters if friction is resolutely avoided.

C.

1. Information here will be of two kinds: (a) general information as to what the Mahsuds are saying and debating; what from time to time

is the feeling in the tribe; what conclusions they are coming to; and what is the effect of the blockade; (b) special information as to raids and attacks and specific evasions of the blockade. Care must be taken that spies and informers do not help the Mahsuds.

2. As to (a), the best plan is to make the duty over to one particular good and sound native officer, and let him make his own arrangements for getting information. Every Saturday afternoon officers should telegraph briefly to me what is the news; a report at greater length should be sent by post the same day, noting what are the prices of Mahsud products in the respective charges, and what they hear are the prices of wheat, barley, Indian corn, jowar, cotton cloth, tobacco, salt and gur, in the Mahsud hills. These prices will soon show how far the blockade is telling both ways.

3. As to (b), every Post Officer must make his own arrangements regarding news of raids and attacks; and the Blockade Officers and Inspectors of Police ditto about evasions of the blockade in the two districts.

4. One officer will be in charge of all the blockade arrangements in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, reporting, where necessary, to the Deputy Commissioners. Everything connected with the blockade should be placed under his orders by the Deputy Commissioners.

5. It should be impressed on the people, high and low, that this is the time for service, that as they work and co-operate so will they be rewarded; and that loyal and thorough service will meet with generous recognition. They will be enthusiastic at first, but a blockade is a wearisome business, and natives are seldom capable of sustained effort. We shall have to keep the thing going and to show them that, however irksome and trying the thing is, we are not going to be beaten in tenacity and doggedness.

W. R. H. MERR,
Commissioner, Derajat Division.

Dera Ismail Khan,
The 31st October, 1900.

Enclosure 53 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram says that the tribe should clearly understand that any offences committed, pending termination of the blockade, will be sharply punished by immediate reprisals on any section of tribe within reach. Owing to hot weather, great majority of Mahsuds, within striking distance of Jandola and Sarwekai, have removed to higher hills beyond reach, and announcement that those still within reach will be punished if offences occur will lead to these also going off. With approval of Government, therefore, I suggest that tribe be simply told that offences will be severely punished. Sudden reprisals can only be made in winter with much effect. Next point is this: Foreign telegram 1129 says that rifles may be taken as security, provided they are redeemed by cash before any allowances are distributed, but your present telegram says they must be redeemed in cash before the blockade is raised. Which announcement should be made to the jirga? As they have repeatedly represented that they have no cash, it would appear that former course will be easier for jirga to carry out, as it will give tribe time and opportunity to procure cash after blockade is raised. This course was, I believe, recently followed in case of Aka Khel blockade. We would take rifles in pledge at half market values only. Kindly telegraph early orders both regarding reprisals and redemption.

Enclosure 54 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 23rd May, 1901.

In continuation of correspondence ending with my letter, dated 20th May, on the subject of the taking of rifles in part payment of the Mahsud fine, I am directed to submit a copy of a telegram, dated 21st May, from the Commissioner of the Derajat. Mr. Merk has sent to you direct a copy of his telegram, dated 19th May.

2 The Government of India have been kept informed of all that has been done in regard to the acceptance of rifles. The Lieutenant-Governor did not overlook the orders of the Government of India in the Chamkani case, to which reference is made in your telegram, No. 1130-F, dated 13th May. But the point in that case was that we wanted to obtain the surrender of particular rifles, and the rifles which we ultimately accepted were not what we wanted or even of the same kind. Sir Mackworth Young thinks there is much to be said in favour of taking serviceable rifles of any kind from the Mahsuds so long as they are properly valued, *i e*, so long as the burden of the fine is not diminished

3. I am to solicit the favour of early orders on this reference.

 Annexure.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st May, 1901.

Reference Foreign telegram of 13th instant to you. Question of arms being received at market values was, I understood, settled by Government long ago. Please see my telegram of 4th December to you and Foreign, also your letter of 31st December to Foreign, also your telegram of 23rd March to Foreign. If convenient, could orders on my telegrams of 18th instant and of 19th instant be telegraphed to me soon, as heat of weather and suspense are telling on the jirga!

 Enclosure 55 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 28th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The orders of Government were to-day communicated in writing to the jirga, who have been dismissed to their homes. They thoroughly realise that the blockade will not be relaxed or removed till the last rupee of the fine has been paid. They said very emphatically that there was no hostility between them and us, and that they would see about payment. The attitude of the jirga was satisfactory, but it remains to be seen what course the tribes will take after discussion in their homes.

 Enclosure 56 in No. 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated Camp Jandola, the 27th May, 1901.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Secretary to Government, India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Jandola, the 27th May, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 18th May, I have the honour to submit the second fortnightly report on the blockade. It is being continued without any relaxation. Prices in the Mahsud country are much the same as last reported, except that wheat has fallen to six and a-half seers per rupee, and Indian corn appears to have risen to about eight and a-half to eight seers.

Several robberies of cloth, attributed to Mahsuds, were lately reported by Powandahs from the Gomal. As it seemed odd that Mahsud thieves should be able to locate exactly at night where cloth was kept in the kirris, measures were taken to shadow suspected kirris, on which the robberies stopped.

2. The total sum realised up to date on account of the fine is Rs. 69,056-1-0, viz, by cash Rs 4,039-10-6, by value of arms Rs. 31,657, by value of live-stock Rs. 33,359-5-7

3. When payment commenced to be made in earnest, I specially directed the Political Officer, Wana, to see that arms were not over-valued, and that the proceedings in connection with the receipt of live-stock and the making it over to complainants, in compensation for live-stock carried off, were fair to all concerned, viz., Government, the complainants and the Mahsuds. From my report, which has been separately submitted, Government are aware that in respect of arms Mr. Waterfield carried out his instructions satisfactorily. I think it well to place before Government the full facts relating to live-stock also. In this matter, too, the Political Officer has taken care to execute the orders he received

4. The attached statement shows that 1,639 head of live-stock have been paid in. I myself saw a good many of them; the Political Officer saw them all, and rejected such animals as were in bad condition or from any reason were unfit for acceptance. The animals taken were fair average specimens of their classes. The procedure in awarding compensation was as follows:—

Complainants were allowed to select any animals they fancied out of those daily brought in by the Mahsuds. If a complainant did not suit himself one day, he waited to the next or as long as he liked. The animals selected by the complainant were then taken by him and the Mahsud owners before a valuing committee of three, composed of one of the complainants, of a Mahsud and of a third, independent, individual who was a Darwesh Khel, or Bhattanni, or resident of Tank or Bannu, as the case might be. This committee then valued the animals; if the complainant and the owners accepted the valuation, and it covered the compensation due, the complainant took off the animals, giving a receipt, and our officials gave a receipt to the Mahsud owners. If either side objected to the valuation, the complainant could select fresh animals, and the Mahsud owners had to wait for fresh complainants. From the averages of the valuations it is clear that, if anything, low prices have been assessed, the Political Officer seeing that the live-stock was of fair average quality. I am fully satisfied that the way in which Mr. Waterfield carried out the difficult task of disposing of the live-stock in a manner which was fair to all concerned.

5. A copy of this report has been sent to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

*Statement showing Valuation of Live-stock taken in payment of one-third of the
Fine of one lakh on the Mahsuds.*

				Rs.	A.	P.
82	Camels valued at	5,580	13	4
44	Horses and mares valued at	4,262	9	0
1	Mule	80	0	0
48	Donkeys	392	14	0
2	Buffaloes	100	0	0
1,193	Cattle	21,912	2	7
247	Goats	933	15	8
22	Sheep	96	12	8
1,639 head.				Total	...	33,359 3 3

The average valuation per head was—

				Rs.	A.	P.
Camel	68	0	11
Horse or mare	96	14	0
Mule	80	0	0
Donkey	8	2	11
Buffalo	50	0	0
Cattle	18	5	10
Sheep	4	6	5
Goat	3	12	6

Enclosure 57 in No. 3.

*Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the
Honourable Mr. J. M. Doue, Chief Secretary to the Government of the
Punjab, dated the 23rd May, 1901.*

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 13th instant, in connection with the attack upon Southern Waziristan Militia, near Kashmir Kar, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin. On the night of the 10th instant the Militia at Tormanda reported having shot two Mahsuds as marauders, who, it subsequently appeared, were men employed by the Deputy Inspector of Police at Gomal to obtain information for the Blockade Officer, and who had therefore been specially exempted from the blockade rules. This information came by post simultaneously with the news of the attack upon the Militia, which was telegraphed. As there were suspicious circumstances attaching to the death of the two Mahsuds, I requested the Blockade Officer to proceed to Murtaza on Mr. Waterfield's return, and hold an enquiry into the case. Meanwhile this telegram of the Officer Commanding has come. I have directed the Political Officer, Wana, to try the accused for murder or culpable homicide, as the case may be, under the quasi-judicial powers conferred upon him by the Supreme Government. If it is established that the Mahsuds were killed for no fault of theirs, blood-money will be paid to their relatives. There can be very little doubt now that, as stated in the last diary of the Political Officer, the attack upon the Militia was in revenge for the death of the two Mahsuds. Although this is an explanation of, it is no excuse for, the attack, which will be dealt with as soon as the blockade is over. The death of the two Mahsuds is an unfortunate occurrence. Major Harman has taken the proper course both in regard to his own corps and to their position respecting the Mahsuds.

Enclosure 58 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 13th June, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated 5th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an endorsement and enclosures, dated 28th ultimo, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, containing details of the attack on a guard of seven rifles of the Southern Waziristan Militia in the Manzai Algad on the 12th May, 1901.

Annexure 1.

Endorsement by Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Jandola, the 28th May, 1901.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, Simla, in continuation of this office letter, dated the 23rd instant.

Annexure 2.

Copy of a report, dated 14th May, 1901, made by Lieutenant A. W. F. Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia.

I have the honour to report as follows concerning the guard of seven rifles of the Southern Waziristan Militia, which was attacked in the Manzai Algad on Sunday, 12th.

This guard was sent by Subadar Baluch Khan in command of Kashmir Kar Post to Nili by my order on that date, in order to escort ration from Nili to Kashmir Kar on the 13th. At a point in the Manzai Algad about three miles from where that Algad joins the main Kajuri-Nili Kach road, the party stopped to drink water. When they started again and the scouts had not had time to get the proper distance ahead, they were fired on from the left front at a distance of about 20 paces only by a party hidden in the nala. The guard were marching as follows:—

	↑	
	10 paces.	
Hayatullah Marwat.	↑	Lance Naik Kabir (in command) Marwat.
	6 paces.	
	↑	
	Najam Shah Khattack.	
	↑	
	12 paces.	
	↑	
	Umar Khan, Gundapur. Salim Khan, Miani.	

This first volley knocked over two men. The remainder took cover and commenced returning the fire. They were now, however, fired on from their right rear by a party of the enemy above on the cliff, and three more men were hit. Two men, viz., sepoy Nazam Shah and Umar Khan, were untouched, and they state that, together with the less severely wounded, they continued to return the fire until suddenly seized by men, who had

crept up behind, they were robbed of rifle and bandolier. The raiders swarmed down and robbed the party of the following Government property:—

- 7 Rifles, Snider, 63, *viz.*, Nos. 21, 25, 27, 16, 409, 397, 247.
- 4 Bayonets, Snider, Nos. 21, 16, 409, 397.
- 4 Belts, Nos. 21, 16, 409, 397
- 7 Bandoliers.

As many of 280 rounds Snider ball ammunition as had not been used in the skirmish, probably about 250.

Nazam Khan states that the man who took his rifle said, as he snatched off his bandolier and tore his coat open—"The Feringis have said they are going to settle us, there, that's our answer." Lance Naik Kabir Khan sent the unwounded men and those of the wounded who were able to walk to Nili to telegraph what had happened. These men met on the road Havildar Khwajagai (Urmur) who was marching to Nili with 20 rifles to bring in rations. The attack must have taken place at about 11 a.m., news was brought to Khwajagai (as he states himself) at about 2 p.m., and he reached the scene of action at 4 or 4.30. Kabir Khan had then died; he had been hit in the thigh and bled to death. Amir Khan was very badly wounded. Khwajagai decided that it was too late to follow the gang up. After tracing the blood for some little distance on the line, they had retired, he carried the wounded back and handed them over to a Powindah Killi, who brought them in here on morning of 13th. Havildar Khwajagai should undoubtedly have followed the raiders up, as his party of 15 rifles was well able to take care of itself. I can only account for his action by the supposition that, while willing to give all information and to recover stolen camels where no risk is involved, he is afraid of the feuds which would result from a fight with raiders who would not give up their rifles as easily as camels. He excuses himself half-heartedly by saying all the men said that the raiders numbered 40, and every man had a rifle, but acknowledges they must exaggerate, and that there were probably not more than 12 or 14. On receipt of news by wire from Nili at 4 p.m., on 12th, Sarwekai was warned and Moghal Kot was asked by wire to order Kuchmina to close roads between Kuchmina and Zarmelan. Four sowars were despatched to Karkan Obah ordering Non-Commissioned Officer in command to picquet mouth of Suu nightly till further orders. Three sowars galloped on to Toi Khulla, and warned the Subadar in Command to picquet the hills between Gomal and Karkani. Four sowars warned Zarmelan to picquet nightly likely roads from hills to the Gomal, and ten men despatched to Kashmir Kar ordering the Subadar in Command to move out all available men from the post and search the hills to north-east day and night. Spinkai Kach and Khuzma Khulla were told to close possible roads north of Nili by picquets night and day and send 20 rifles across the river next day to search hills towards the Sharan Nala. The Officer Commanding Khajuri Kach sent 30 rifles to picquet Adam Kak night and day for 48 hours. Two parties, 20 rifles each, of the Southern Waziristan Militia, were despatched at nightfall into hills, the first under Havildar Mohibulla to claim Wuch Sar (south of Gwaleri), to remain there in observation next day, the second under Havildar Pir Muhammad to close roads over the Manzai Kotai. The 27th Punjab Infantry and Pir Muhammad's party returned after 48 hours, having seen nothing. On the 13th, two days' rations were sent out to Havildar Mohibulla carried by four men in goat's skins, and he was ordered to move down towards Ruma Khulla, as a Powindah killed had been attacked near there that morning by a gang estimated at from 70 to 100 Mahsuds.

There is no doubt that the party attacked were marching along carelessly and contrary to orders. Once they fell into the trap, they appear, however, to have behaved well. Kabir Khan took up a position giving good cover from first attack. They were overwhelmed by the second attack from their right rear. They state that three of the enemy were wounded

and a party of mounted infantry on the 13th traced three distinct blood trails on line of enemy's retreat. It is hard to see what the survivors could have done. They were outnumbered, and could get no cover from the fire which came from two sides; they were also fighting a gang better armed, for the raiders are stated to have had several Martinis, and two at least of the wounds were by Martini-Henris. As these Mahsud "Chapans" always arrange for a fire from two and sometimes three sides, the best thing a party once surprised could do would be to double either straight back or straight ahead for 100 yards and look for cover there. This attack took place in country which is really covered by Nili Kach. Had the garrison of Nili been Miltua, it would have been easier for us to have followed the raiders up, for the gang is skulking in the country between Nili and Manji, if it has not already escaped. That the party first warned of the disaster was under Havildar Khwajagai was another misfortune. I regret it seems clearly proved that at present Mahsuds, unless under British officers on the spot, cannot be trusted to take energetic and prominent action against their fellow tribesmen. I am convinced that the reason of this is not disloyalty to the regiment, but fear of the after consequences to themselves in their own country. I trust that, as you hope, it will be possible to make tribal arrangements by which it will be understood that the killing of Mahsud raiders by Mahsud sepoys will not

THIS will come in time.
W MERK.

lead to after feuds

The following is a list of the casualties in our guard on the 12th:—

Killed

Lance-Naik, E—74, Kabir Khan Marwat.

Wounded.

Sepoy, A—362, Amir Khan, Mia Khel (dangerously), gun-shot from right hip through bowels
 Sepoy, A—348, Mahr Dad, gun-shot, left forearm and chest (severe).
 Sepoy, E—8, Hayatullah, gun-shot, right shoulder (severe).
 Sepoy, A—352, Salm Khan, gun-shot, inside right hand, grazed back (slight).

Enclosure 59 in No 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Doue, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 17th June, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the third fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2 Prices of wheat and barley are easier in consequence of the spring crops in the lower-lying portion of the Mahsud country having been reaped. A little cloth, at 2 to 3 yards the rupee, has been sold in Kaniguram and Makn, the produce of the pseudo-robberies mentioned in my last report. But as a rule, cloth, tobacco, salt and gur are not for sale.

3 During the fortnight under report attention has been paid to closing Shawal for contraband trade. Up to date all reports show that there has been no smuggling there, but, as it was unlikely that this would continue, I again put strong pressure on the Jani Khel and Bakka Khel (Utmanzai), Darwesh Waziris, whose territory Shawal is, and they are sending up a hundred men to patrol the valley under leaders specially selected by us, who will be responsible for the blockade line in Shawal and will send reports of what goes on. A Government post in Shawal would be out of the question; this step would cause alarm and excitement among the Mahsuds, which would, in all probability, end in an attack. No trade is now permitted with Urgun or Birmal direct. Carriers and merchants bringing up

goods from Bannu and elsewhere have to strike off at Miram Shah for Khost, whence they can reach Burmal. This deflection makes the cost of the transport prohibitive as regards smuggling from Burmal into the Mahsud country through Shawal. As there is a prospect of the continuation of the blockade, the regulations for the control of supplies imported into Northern and Southern Waziristan by banias at posts have been tightened, the temptation of 1,600 per cent. or 800 per cent. profit on salt or cloth, as the case may be, is very great, and a sharp eye is kept on the regimental, political and militia banias. The same profits explain the pseudo-robberies, the Powindah or other owner of contraband sells at a large profit and then rushes in with a story of a theft or raid; whether he has sold the animals or not which are said to have been carried off, does not matter to him; he expects to obtain compensation through Government from the Mahsuds. They, on the other hand, do not mind a little risk, and the game being played of a reported raid, a pursuit and perhaps the rescue of the animals and part of the goods, the profit on the rest covers all losses. Where no personal violence has been offered to the owners, I think not only that no compensation should be paid to them for losses of cloth, salt, gur or tobacco, but also that they should be fined as well. They have certainly sold the things if they have not been wounded by the alleged robbers. To prevent this sort of thing, the Powindahs next October will all have to come down by the Chuhar Khel Dhana Pass and not through the Gomal. During the fortnight a smart capture of seven camels laden with cloth, salt and tobacco, on their way to the Mahsud hills, was effected by the Bannu Border Military Police. The men with the camels were Ali Khels of the Turi Khel Darwesh Waziris. They resisted the seizure of the camels, one Ali Khel was killed and another wounded. Latest reports from the Tochi say that the Mahsuds have asked the Turi Khel and Mohmit Khel of Razmak for aid in obtaining supplies, but, as the traffic of these latter clans is itself under strict supervision, they will not gain much by their appeal.

4. There appears to be an impression that the Mahsuds have been raiding worse during the blockade than before it. If it had been so, there would have been no reason for surprise. A blockade is not a friendly operation, the discomfort, stress and loss of income are trying to the temper and self-control of reckless men who are singularly wanting in both, and who, when the tribe was on a friendly footing, showed little self-restraint in respect of marauding propensities. As a matter of fact, the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts have been almost entirely free from offences, and for five months there was peace in the Tochi. A list of cases charged against the Mahsuds since the blockade commenced has been prepared, and will shortly be submitted to Government when I have received some further information from the Political Officers. It shows that, excepting some political offences, viz., attacks made much on the same grounds that a community in Europe calls indignation meetings or passes votes of no confidence in political opponents, the great bulk of the raids and thefts have been directed against the Darwesh Khel and Bhattannis of Southern Waziristan (whom the Mahsuds have been raiding steadily with little check or notice taken from 1895 till November last year) and against Powindahs in the Gomal. Some other offences cannot be assigned to either category, and are the work of the irresponsible scoundrels and criminals of whom specimens are to be found in the best regulated tracts of India, or of Europe too for the matter of that. A certain quantity of crime there must always be among all human beings; the only thing one can do is to strive to reduce it to the possible minimum. The policy of arming the border villages and Bhattannis has produced excellent results. It has put heart into the men, and, greatly to their astonishment, Mahsud raiders now come off second best. Within the past three weeks, two gangs have lost three men each, on the last occasion at the hands of the hitherto despised Damanis (or villagers) of the Tank Tahsil.

5. Since the 28th May all payments towards the fine have stopped. But the Shabi Khel (the section to which Mulla Powindah belongs are at the present moment engaged in borrowing Rs. 3,409, which is the amount

still due from them on account of the fine according to tribal shares, they reckoning as one-half of the Alizai clan. This does not look as if they had cash themselves, or they would not be obliged to borrow. I believe they will pay it next week. No jirga has yet been held as to how the remaining Rs. 27,000 are to be produced in cash. The jirga may assemble by the end of this month.

6 A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department direct, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 60 in No. 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 1st July, 1901.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 1st July, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fourth fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2 Wheat and barley have still further declined in price; as regards other commodities, I would refer to the remarks in the last report.

3. Smugglers are constantly trying new ways of evading the blockade. The latest rumour is that Khojal Khel carriers have conveyed some salt to the Mahsuds from the Bahadur Khel mine by taking it across to Kaitu, thence on to the Khost-Tochi border, and crossing the Upper Tochi somewhere by night. The enormous profits to be made on salt would make even this immense detour pay. At the same time, if smugglers have been obliged to take this route, it shows that the arrangements on the Mahsud frontier are working well. The Blockade Officer is about to visit Bahadur Khel in connection with this rumour. The contingent to hold Shawal has arrived there.

4 Rupees 73,073, annas 4 and pies 9 have been realised up to date, including the Rs 3,409 due from the Shabi Khel mentioned in the last report. The account of each main section stands as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Alizai, paid	30,247	11	4
Bahlolzai, paid	27,771	2	7
Shaman Khel, paid	15,054	6	10

Mulla Powindah is reported to be constantly exhorting the Mahsuds to pay the balance, whereas the Maliks are said, with a few exceptions, to be doing nothing—no doubt to spite the Mulla. This is the difficulty, whatever one party does, that the other party counteracts, and neither party is strong enough to destroy its opponent. The Mulla's Sheikhs have recently been collecting alms from the Shahman Khel, who paid willingly; this looks as if the Mulla's influence were again rising in the tribe. He recently visited Badar.

5. There has been a cessation of Mahsud raids during the fortnight under report.

6. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 61 in No. 3.

Letter from the Officer Commanding at Jandola, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Derajat District, dated the 11th July, 1901.

I have the honour to submit the following report in continuation of my telegrams of yesterday's date.

At about 8 30 a.m. on the morning of the 10th instant the Regimental Grazing Guard, consisting of three armed and two unarmed sepoy of 45th Sikhs, proceeded about 800 yards up a nullah south-west of the post for the purpose of grazing their goats. The goats were in the nullah and three of the escort were ascending the hill on their right flank, the other two having gone back towards the post to drive in some goats which had strayed, and were out of sight. These three men, one of whom was unarmed, on ascending the side of the nullah, which at this point is very steep, were suddenly fired on from a natural "Sangar" made by the peculiar formation of the crest of the hill. The spot from which the Mahsuds fired was hidden from view of the post by an intervening knoll, but a sentry from No. 2 picquet, immediately on hearing the shots, saw the men fall. Two fell first, one being wounded and trying to get away, but at the second volley he and the remaining sepoy were shot down. The distance at which the shots were fired is about 20 yards, and evidence of the steepness is given by the fact of medical officer's statement that nearly all bullets have taken a downward course. The sentry of No. 2 picquet immediately raised the alarm, and the inlying picquet was quickly on the spot, and, following the direction of the wounded man, went on in pursuit of the murderers. Near the scene was picked up a packet of M-H ball ammunition and a bayonet. I immediately sent Jemadar Teja Singh with 50 rifles to support the small party in pursuit, Jemadar Nur Shah, 5th Punjab Cavalry, with sixteen sowars up the Shapur valley to close the nullah leading into the Shapur Jongi, and Subadar Bhangra Singh to place a picquet at the meeting of the Shapur and Takhihan rivers. The Political Officer issued orders for the Bhattani Chiga to go out, and, getting behind Sirni Sar, drive the gang, if possible, towards my picquet. Jemadar Jefa Singh recovered a belt with pouches containing 49 rounds of ball ammunition and bayonet about three miles out, which had evidently been discarded by the Mahsud, thinking himself closely pursued. None of the party saw a Mahsud the whole time, so having gone about five miles and reached a perpendicular hill up which there seemed no possibility of the enemy having gone, he called a halt. Then making a short detour he retired towards the post carefully searching the ground. However, when he had arrived back, I sent out a fresh party under Subadar Bhangra Singh, who had returned after placing the picquet up a nullah south-west of the post beyond the one taken by the first party with the hope that perhaps the Bhattanis might drive the Mahsuds towards them. This party searched the ground for about seven miles on a broad front, but with no result, and retired about 6 p.m.

At the time of sending out this second party, I strengthened the picquet at the meeting of the Jakhi Zam and Shahur by an additional non-commissioned officer and ten men, and sent orders to Jemadar Nur Shah to proceed to the Rastong Jangi in case the gang should try to escape by this route behind the Charkuadi. I regret to say that none of these parties saw anyone, and it is my opinion that the Mahsuds, having got a quarter of an hour's start, lay hidden during the day in caves or recesses in nullahs and got away at night. My opinion, which is confirmed by the Political Officer, is that this was a deliberately planned revenge on the garrison for having wounded severely a noted raider of the Shingi Khel, Assad Khan by name,

on the 22nd of last month, when he was tampering with (or attempting to do so) the iron posts of the wire entanglement round the post enclosure. The gang of Mahsuds is estimated at about 30 or 40, of whom about 12 formed the party who shot these sepoy. I much regret to have to report that the wounded man, 4241 Sepoy Ralla Singh, succumbed to his wounds shortly afterwards. I do not think this unfortunate occurrence was due to any carelessness on the part of the escort, but think rather that they were the unlucky victims of revenge. The goats had all huddled together on hearing the shots, and started off at a run up the nullah, but these were evidently not the object of the Mahsuds' desire, as they were left alone and were all driven back here later complete in numbers.

Casualties.

No 3358 Sepoy Wadawa Singh (killed)
 No 4087 " Uttam Singh (killed).
 No. 4241 " Ralla Singh (died of wounds)

Remarks.

Sepoy Wadawa Singh, 9 bullet wounds
 " Uttam " 5 " "
 " Ralla " 5 " "

Taken by Mahsuds

2 M.-H. Rifles.
 140 rounds M.-H. ball ammunition
 2 Bayonets.
 2 Belts, braces, and oil bottles.
 6 Ammunition pouches

Recovered during pursuit.

69 (sixty-nine) rounds M.-H. ball ammunition.
 2 Bayonets
 1 Belt, braces, and oil bottles
 3 Pouches

Government property lost

Of which description is attached. (This description has also been furnished to the Political Officer)

2 M.-H rifles, Nos 456, 468
 1 Belt with braces and oil bottle.
 71 rounds M.-H ball ammunition.
 3 Ammunition pouches

Memorandum from the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier District, dated the 15th July, 1901.

Forwarded.

Enclosure 62 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla. 13th July, 1901.

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 7th July, 1901, from the Commissioner and

Superintendent, Derajat Division, and enclosures, being copies of correspondence between Mulla Powindah and Mr. Merk in regard to the payment of the balance of the fine due by the Mahsuds.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Shekh Budin, 7th July, 1901

With reference to the remarks in paragraph 4 of my letter, dated the 1st instant, I have the honour to enclose a copy of correspondence with Mulla Powindah which to some extent explains itself.

2. We have, I think, reached another critical stage in the history of the blockade. The difficulty which the Mahsuds experience at present in producing cash and in settling the internal distribution of the fine has presented another opportunity to the Mulla for coming forward as the only business man in the tribe, the one individual to help the Mahsuds out of their trouble. In a way, too, according to his light, he is, I think, what we would call a patriot. He has promptly availed himself of the opportunity, and has undoubtedly been doing his best during the last month to bring about a payment of the fine and the termination of the blockade. This of itself has been quite enough to set the Maliks against him, they are sulking in their homes, the latest report I have is that the ill-feeling between them and the Mulla is more bitter than ever. After a cessation of three weeks, raiding has recommenced, numerous gangs have been out, and last night the village of Assu Khel in the Tocha was attacked, three Dauris and one Mahsud raider being killed. There can be no doubt whatever that, as last January, this raiding is, if not started, at any rate deliberately encouraged, by the Maliks to spoil the Mulla's game. The note of fear in the Mulla's letter confirms the belief that some mischief is on foot. We must, I think, be prepared for offences, but this has been contemplated all along, from before the commencement of the blockade.

3. It is a descent in pride and dignity that the Mulla should show anxiety to borrow money from Darwesh Waziris and from Marwats. At the same time one may infer that there is not much cash in the country or he would not wish to borrow in this fashion. His recent change of front respecting the Badar dispute explains why he does not hesitate to ask for permission to deal with Darwesh Waziris in order to obtain their aid in his plans. There is, of course, not the least chance without a Government guarantee of repayment that any of the men whom he mentions would trust him or any other Mahsud with money, unless the Mahsuds pledge either land or arms with the creditors, to the full value of the debt. The creditors would, of course, ask for Mahsud lands in British territory; land mortgaged in the Mahsud hills would not be accepted by them.

4. As regards the Afghan communications, I am informed that Khalifa Nur Muhammad, the Afghan Governor of Birmal, recently advised the Mulla to send some of his Sheikhs to Kabul, and that no message or letter from the Amir has reached the Mulla as yet. The Afghan Governor has, of course, heard of the present difficulty of the Mahsuds, and thinks it would please the Amir if he (the Khalifa) could induce the Mahsuds in their straits to turn to the Amir for help. The Mulla naturally takes advantage of the Khalifa's advances to exaggerate and thereby to bluff us into giving easier terms or relaxing the conditions which have been fixed by Government. My reference to past history reminds the Mulla of his visit to Kabul, which produced no benefit (or indeed any result, even no present worth having) to himself or to his tribe.

Annexure 2.

Translation of a letter from Mulla Powindah to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

After compliments.—In the beginning I had a council at Kanigoram about the fine. The fine was divided into three shares,—one was allotted to the Bahlolzai, the other to the Shaman Khel, and the third to the Alizai section. The amount due from a section* was divided into two shares (kaum do hissa shuda),—one share was allotted to Shabi Khel and the other to Manzai.

* He refers here to the division of the Alizai share,
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

Secondly, I wrote to you in the beginning that the fine had been divided into three shares, each section should be called upon to pay its own (share of the) fine.

What was the cause of this (viz division)? The cause was that they have enjoyed benefit according to three shares. The Sarkar may now kindly recover from the Shaman Khel their share of the fine. The Government has itself caused the delay regarding the fine. The Sarkar has given satisfaction to the Shaman Khel and does not demand the fine from them. The Mahsuds have shown disapproval of this. Be it known to you that you should tell the Shaman Khel that either they should not demand allowances in future or they should at once pay their share of the Mahsud fine. Whatever delay has been done is on account of the Shaman Khel, because they do not pay their share of the Government fine and have enjoyed one-third of the allowances* from the Government. I request that the Government may not be hostile towards me, nor censure me, because I have enjoyed

* This is incorrect as regards the past.
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

no benefit or allowance.

The other people† who enjoyed allowances are stubborn and perhaps may be severely treated by Government. You may now kindly have Jallandhar Shah, son of Najib Khan, Mani Khan, Sperka and Daurana Khan or Saurana Khan, Marwat, and Nezam Khan, Taj Khel, sent soon to Jandola so that

† I presume he refers to the Mahks.
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner

I may take a loan of this money from them and pay to the Government. These four men may be given assurances so that they may gladly come up. The Government may kindly give me assistance in this way that the creditors may be repaid from the allowances of the Mahsuds. You are the King. This agreement will be accepted on your security. You may please do the kindness so that hostility and reproach may be removed, and the fine paid off. This arrangement is advantageous to you, and will give you a good name. This is good and will remove mischief.

Annexure 3.

Translation of a letter from Mulla Powindah to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

After compliments.—Letters have come from the Amir asking me to tell him what I and the Mahsud tribe want? Whether to be allowed to go towards Kabul or towards Sarkar (British territory). I have given you a promise. For the sake of the genuineness of the promise and of securing peace I request that either the fine may be recovered from the Shaman Khel, or the four men (Jallandhar Shah, Mani Khan, Daurana Khan and Nezam Khan) may be made to appear at Jandola so as to make a business-like arrangement for Government. I may kindly be given a reply to this, because I have a "khidmat" (order) of the Amir to comply with. First I will do your service (khidmat) then that of the Amir. Reply to this may kindly be sent soon. This letter is sent by the hand of Sheikh Faujdar.

Annexure 4.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to Mullah Powindah, dated Shekh Budan, 7th July, 1901.

After compliments,—I have to-day received your two friendly letters relating to the payment of the fine and to messages which you have received from the Afghan Governor of Birmal. My friend, no special kindness has been shown to the Shaman Khel in the matter of the fine or in any matter. All Mahsuds have been treated exactly alike, and I have always told the Mahsuds that it is for them to settle in what shares the fine should be paid. That it is their affair, not mine. If the Shaman Khel do not pay what the Mahsuds think is their proper share, why do not the Mahsuds take out Chalweshtis as their fathers used to do and compel the Shaman Khel to pay? My friend, I have no objection of course to the Mahsuds borrowing the cash if they have not got it themselves, but the security of payment from the new allowances which Government in its kindness has promised refers only to Mahsud creditors, Jallandhar Shah, Mani Khan and Nezam Khan are Darwesh Waziris, and Daurana Khan and his brother Saurana Khan are Marwats, therefore the security does not apply to them.

The orders of Government are very strict, only Mahsud creditors are to be repaid out of the new allowances. But if any one who is not a Mahsud lends the Mahsuds money without the intervention of Government and without Government being directly or indirectly responsible in any way for the repayment, I have no objection. And if the Mahsuds wish to see any one on these terms they will have every facility to go to Jandola. I am glad to see that you are exerting yourself in inducing the Mahsuds to pay the fine; it is the act of a wise man, and of one who has the good of his tribe at heart. If you and the Mahsud jirga succeed in effecting an arrangement for paying of the balance it will be well. For the rest, I thank you for your courtesy in informing me of the Afghan communications you have received. As to these it is sufficient that I should remind you of what happened seven or eight years ago. I desire your welfare.

Enclosure 63 in No 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Camp Simla, the 19th July, 1901.

Copy of the following submitted to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Simla, the 19th July, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 1st instant, I have the honour to submit the fifth fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade

2. Prices are stationary, salt, cloth, tobacco and gur are stated to be very rare, practically not procurable, and the Political Officer, Tochi, reports that, owing to the lack of salt, a great many Mahsud cattle are suffering from disease, and some goats belonging to the tribe found in the hills to the west of the Upper Tochi were in a very bad state. The frequent rumours that Mahsuds were gathering in force to loot village bazaars of cloth and salt in the Tank Tahsil have not been verified by actual occurrences, but they show that plans to this end must have been widely discussed among the Mahsuds, a symptom of the pressure of the blockade. In fact, the tug-of-war is now coming, and it is simply a question of who can hold out longest, Government or the tribe. If we hold out longer, it is plain that the tribe must give in. Under the peculiar conditions of Mahsud society, the payment of cash (as with the Afridis of Tirah, who in the spring of 1899

had to borrow cash, notwithstanding the heavy punishment they had received, and the enormous sum, about three lakhs, which one way or the other they had been drawing annually direct from us in the shape of allowances and savings of Afridis in Government service) is a matter of great difficulty, and, if the Mahsuds are eventually driven to pay cash, it is reasonable to conclude that they will have been thoroughly brought to their bearings. All accounts agree in estimating the amount of cash in the Mahsud country at about half a lakh, up to date Rs. 8,300 have been realised in cash, Rs. 27,000 remain due, when this is paid, therefore, there will, if the estimates are correct, only remain some Rs. 15,000 in cash among a tribe of 10,000 fighting men, or Rs 1-8 per head, which is not much. This will explain why further steady pressure is necessary before we can extract the cash.

The rumour that Khojal Khel had been carrying salt from the Bahadur Khel mine *via* Khost to the Mahsuds, mentioned in my last report, is unfounded. Shawal continues to be firmly held.

3 Owing to the reports that numerous gangs of raiders had started or were about to start at the beginning of this month, the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, at my instance, issued a warning to all military posts in Northern and Southern Waziristan and along the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu border to be especially careful and on the alert during July, August, and September. As a matter of fact, only three offences are reported, an attack upon a Dawar village in the Lower Tochi (probably with the intention of stealing salt and grain), in which three villagers were killed, two wounded, one Mahsud killed and several wounded; the second offence is the looting of a small Darwesh Khel hamlet four miles from Wana, called Gulkot, and the third is the attack upon a grazing guard of 45th Sikhs at Jandola, in which three sepoy were killed. This offence was committed by only seven Mahsuds; it does not appear to be a tribal act at all, but to be the outcome of feelings of personal revenge and ill-will on the part of a notorious scoundrel, Assad Khan, Shungi. Had the watch tower to the west of Jandola been picketed, it is doubtful if the Mahsuds could have got at the grazing guard. I have suggested to the General Officer Commanding the issue of fresh orders to all military posts enjoining the utmost vigilance and unremitting strictness in taking all precautions, and have given similar orders to the officers in charge of Militias, Border Military Police, ordinary police, and levies. This sort of annoyances must be expected during a blockade, they increase in frequency, as is natural, in proportion to the increased severity of its effect, and, though regrettable in themselves, are not unsatisfactory evidence of the discomfort of the tribe. The only way to meet them, at any rate at present, for till the cold weather comes nothing really appreciable can be done in the way of reprisals, is to be constantly on the guard, to hit raiders as heavily as can be done, and never to give them a chance of bringing home their attacks. A blockade is in its nature essentially a semi-defensive operation, and to conduct it with a series of constant attacks upon the tribe would alter its whole character and bring about a state of things that must inevitably drift into an expedition. I do not suggest that we should not hit back, but obviously the blow, when delivered, should be a heavy one, and this is not the season when such a blow can be struck. Moreover, it can only be struck *once*, thereafter the Mahsuds will be on their guard. Small attacks on the Mahsuds are a policy of pin-pricks, seeing that one has to deal with a large powerful tribe. These are the reasons, I submit, for remaining on a semi-defensive attitude for the present.

4. As regards the general political position, I have already reported in my letter, dated the 7th instant, to which I would refer. The Mulla Powindah has summoned a tribal jurga to meet him to-day. There is no doubt that he is doing his best to bring about a settlement of the account and termination of the blockade. In a way he is what we should call a patriot, and then, if he does succeed in extricating the Mahsuds from their present position, he has scored over his enemies, the former Maliks. Naturally these do their utmost to thwart him. The coquetting of the Afghan

Governor of Birmal with the Mulla, and through him with the Mahsuds, may be explained as due either to his thinking that the Mahsuds mean to break with us (but of this there are no signs), or to his impression that the Mahsuds are in straits, and to his belief that he can, therefore, induce them to turn to the Amir for aid or mediation, which appeal, he thinks, will please his master. If the latter explanation is correct, then it is another favourable symptom. What the upshot of the jirga will be I cannot, of course, tell, but up to date the position is that the Mahsuds mean to pay and will do so when they have settled upon a mode of getting hold of the cash among them. That is the difficulty which the blockade is pressing them to solve.

5. A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, and has been also communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 64 in No. 3.

Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., dated 27th July, regarding the Mahsud Blockade.

As I understand the present position, it is that the tribe have paid up Rs. 73,000 of the fine imposed on them, and that matters are now at a deadlock. The deadlock seems to be due to tribal factions—the one with the Maliks, the other with the Mulla Powindah—each playing for their own pockets, and, as each side helps with us or succeeds in drawing us into direct relations, the other sulks and adds to difficulties by encouraging raiding. Each raid that is committed helps to add up another account to be settled when the fine for which the tribe is blockaded is paid up. I do not know what that account amounts to now. But judging from the raids reported in the papers, it must be something considerable. The question is, if this present position continues, when can Government hope that the blockade will be over? Unless the tribe, when they have paid up the original fine, are allowed to compound for offences committed during the blockade out of their allowances, they will have to be blockaded again for recovery of another fine. I wish to urge for consideration that the first point to avoid in connection with the present blockade is the running up of another account for raids committed during its progress, and this can only be done by prompt retaliation on the tribe. We shall have an interminable business, if we wait to take up all these cases as regards individuals with the jirga when they choose to come in. His Excellency wishes and intends that the blockade shall, if possible, be successful and save the necessity for a punitive expedition. I believe this can only be done by taking every active and offensive step that we can against every member of the tribe that we can get at. If our troops and levies merely sit still in their posts, we shall not gain the desired end. I am not speaking without knowledge or experience of a blockade. I had experience in running the Buner Blockade, 1885—1887. We only got real pressure to bear on the tribe by making it unsafe for them to come or to bring their cattle near the border. I do not ignore the fact that the Mahsud blockade is a far more difficult business. But the same principle of making matters as uncomfortable for the Mahsuds as possible applies. If our men are ready to raid, take every opportunity of raiding; the Mahsuds will never know what to expect, and it will keep them much more in bounds in looking after themselves and make them think more about doing this than raiding on our people. If when we get in a fine of a lakh, we find that we have another account of half a lakh or more to claim as redress for offences committed during the blockade, our position is not very much improved. It is when we succeed in pressing the Mahsuds back from their own border on the defensive, when, in addition to depriving them of necessaries of life, we can keep them in a state of uneasiness and anxiety in not knowing what to expect next, that we shall drive the "Ulus" to force the Maliks and the Mulla to drop the factional game they are playing, and to act together in the interests of the tribe. Raids on our

part should be made by the troops wherever possible, and the troops could any way render it unsafe for a Mahsud to show himself anywhere within range of ground that troops can comfortably cover during the day; levies and our own subjects could do a great deal, it seems to me, in making things uncomfortable for the Mahsuds, and why not let them have a free hand to do all the damage they can? Judging by what I understand to be the present position of the business, it seems to me the only possible way of avoiding Government being driven eventually into an expedition, and of giving His Excellency's policy of forcing the tribe to submission by means of a blockade a really fair chance of success.

Enclosure 65 in No. 3.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Downe, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 5th August, 1901.

I am directed to forward, for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of a memorandum* which has been received from Lieutenant-Colonel Deane regarding the Mahsud blockade.

* Dated the 27th July.

2. A large number of offences have already been, and continue to be, committed by the Mahsuds during the progress of the blockade, and, unless some steps in the way of retaliation are adopted in the interim, it will be necessary, when the fine of one lakh has been finally paid, to consider in what way reparation for these later offences is to be obtained. But a second blockade, for the purpose of punishing the tribe for these misdeeds or of exacting a further fine, will inevitably result in a further list of offences, and in further arrears of the sum demanded; while the position at the end of the second blockade would, in all probability, be no better than at the close of the first. The Government of India are, therefore, inclined to agree with Colonel Deane that it is very desirable, if possible, to avoid the accumulation of another account for raids committed since the present blockade began; and that the only way to effect this object is to retaliate promptly on the tribe for every offence.

3. It is understood that such retaliation is not, as a general rule, at present allowed, although the troops are in positions which must afford frequent opportunities for inflicting summary punishment on the offenders. I am to point out, however, that the Government of India have never initiated, ordered or sanctioned any prohibition of counter-raids, and so long as these do not develop into expeditions, and are short and swift in their operation, there does not appear to be any objection to their being undertaken. It is the wish of the Government of India, both that the Mahsuds should be reduced to subjection as a punishment for their former offences, and also that they should meet with severe and prompt retribution for any fresh raids, and, accordingly, whenever and wherever an opportunity offers, and it does not appear possible to effect the desired object by means of a passive blockade alone, they see no reason why more drastic measures should not be adopted. The permission thus accorded must not be interpreted as conveying sanction to dangerous military marches, or to prolonged incursions into tribal territory. It must obviously be subject to reasonable conditions as to scope, number of troops employed, and distance.

4. I am to request that Mr. Merk may be called upon at an early date to report upon these suggestions, and that the Government of India may also be favoured with the advice and opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

Enclosure 66 in No. 3.

Endorsed by Commissioner of the Derajat Division, dated the 16th August, 1901.

Copy of the following, with copy of enclosures, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, in continuation of endorsement of yesterday:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr J. M. Douie, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 16th August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter of yesterday, I have the honour to submit, for the confidential information of Government, a copy of my letter of today to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, with a copy of its enclosure. A copy has also been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

 Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, dated the 16th August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated yesterday, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a plan of operations for an attack or attacks on the Mahsuds, embodying political and such other suggestions as offer themselves. It is the first blow that will count in the way of seizures of men and animals. Therefore the utmost secrecy should be observed regarding this first blow. Thereafter the Mahsuds will be on the alert, and the more they are kept on the *qui vive* and harassed by alarms and attacks the better.

 Annexure 2

(Confidential)

Plan of Operations.

1. Conditions that determine raids and attacks upon the Mahsuds—
 - (i) Except a few settlements near Jandola and Sarwekai, the Mahsuds live more than one day's march, there and back, from our posts, taken from Wana round by Tank and Bannu to Datta Khel
 - (ii) The lower Mahsud hills are so hot and waterless that well into October they are impracticable for troops that have to march far or swiftly
 - (iii) But till the middle of November the Mahsuds with their flocks and herds are scattered over the hills, especially the upper ones. The further you penetrate into their country, the greater difficulty in retirement. After the middle of November the cold on the high ranges drives the Mahsuds down and makes matters very difficult for them if they are driven up.
 - (iv) After the beginning, certainly the end, of December, it is hardly possible for them to escape in bulk with their animals across Shawal into Afghan territory, where we cannot follow them.
 - (v) The Mahsud country is difficult, the men are active, bold and plucky, intelligent and with plenty of breech-loaders, but beyond, say, 400 yards, they are not good shots as compared with the Afridis.

- (vi) The Mahsuds love night attacks in force. Operations should be during full moon and the first few days of a waning moon, for obvious reasons.
- (vii) As to numbers that can collect: their being able to operate on interior lines gives them a great advantage; say, 1,000 men could collect in 24 hours, 2,000 to 3,000 in 48, but it depends almost entirely upon the suddenness of the attack and rapidity of movement of the troops, and the distance to which they penetrate into the Mahsud country, of which the tract from Kanguram to Makin is the heart and centre.
- (viii) A feeble reprisal or an operation which results in heavy loss on retirement, though it may have been successful in its primary object, is worse than no reprisal at all.
- (ix) Cavalry are no use in the hills, and I doubt if mountain guns are necessary for these sudden raids.

2. Conditions (ii) and (iii) practically settle the time when the first attack can take place, as, about the 26th November on which day it is full moon, a very important detail noted by General Dening. There is a full moon on the 27th October, but by that time the Mahsuds will not be properly down yet, and the troops will not have shaken off the effects of autumnal fevers.

3. On the 22nd November, I would make a strong feint with all available troops and Militia from the Tochi, viz., Datta Khel and Miram Shah on the Mahsud country, in order to draw the Mahsuds in that direction. The news will travel all over their hills during the 24th, and by the 25th the fighting men will be moving towards their Tochi boundary. On the 26th the Tochi force, having made such captures and done such damage as it safely can, might withdraw.

4. On the 25th November, I would move 300 troops and 200 Militia from Wana to Tiarza, where they would be joined by 400 Pioneers from Karab Kot—900 men in all, to halt there that night. The same afternoon the Zam troops, 600 men, would move to Jandola picking up such men as can be spared from the garrisons of Girmi, Khirgi and Jandola itself. Early on the 26th November the (1) Wana column (900 men), the (2) Sarwekai column (400 men) and the (3) Zam column (700 men), or 2,000 men in all, would move into the Mahsud country, on objectives arranged at the time, do all they can, staying two or three nights, and come out as the Military Authorities settle. Columns (1) and (2) might join hands in the evening of the 26th November, and all three columns might unite on the 27th or 28th, but this is a matter for military consideration.

5. On return, column (1) might revert to its stations, column (2) would naturally stay at Sarwekai; and column (3) should remain at Jandola, ready for further work.

6. Then, in a fortnight or three weeks, we might repeat the operations, striking if possible this time from the Tochi and feinting from the south. On the third occasion we might strike simultaneously from both sides. If these operations are repeated at uncertain intervals, the strict blockade continuing the whole time, the effect must be very severe upon the Mahsuds. They will be jammed up into the higher tracts where the cold is great, pasture will be scarce, the tribe will be constantly harassed, it is to be expected that the troops will do much damage. Repeated attacks by strong bodies of troops during a blockade is a new feature in frontier management, and if properly worked coupled with the blockade itself ought to reduce the Mahsuds to full submission by the end of winter. If not, they will not have much power of resistance left in them in April next.

7. The troops for columns (1) and (2) are on the spot. The movable column at Suleiman Khel in the Bannu district is useless there. I would move it down to Zam by the end of September, Zam is healthier than Tank

and nearer Jandola. If the Mahsuds think anything at all about this move, they will think it is the old Zam movable column being re-established. Anyhow by the 26th November their suspicions will have died away.

8. Supplies might quietly be massed at Tank during September. The less said about what we intend doing the better, or numbers of Mahsuds may bolt through Shawal—it is impossible to guard a long valley against a rush—into Afghan territory which *pro tanto* will baffle us. Anyhow the whole tribe will be on its guard.

Enclosure 67 in No. 3

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 21st August, 1901.

I am directed to refer to the letter from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, dated the 16th August, 1901, submitting a plan of operations which it is proposed to undertake against the Mahsud tribe in November, 1901.

2. I am to request that the Government of India may be furnished with an early expression of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on Mr. Merk's proposal.

3. The Government of India would also be glad to know whether, pending the arrival of the time for reprisals, it is not possible to arrange that all Mahsuds found within reach of our posts shall be arrested and imprisoned. It may be that action of this kind is taken already, but, if so, the Government of India have not heard of it, and it is evident from the Kashmir Kar incident that considerable parties of tribesmen are able to pass through our line of posts and to attack a distant outpost without molestation.

Enclosure 68 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 21st August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated 19th August, 1901, I am directed to submit a letter, dated 15th August, 1901, from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, regarding the action to be taken against the Mahsuds on account of recent outrages.

2. In his letter, dated 19th July, written some time before the attack on the Kashmir Kar post, Mr. Merk gave it as his opinion that till the cold weather no effective blow could be struck at the Mahsuds in retaliation for the less serious outrages of which they had up to that date been guilty. This view is repeated in his present letter, and the reasons advanced appear to the Lieutenant-Governor to be convincing. I am, therefore, to say that he agrees throughout with the advice given by the Commissioner.

3. It is understood that the Government of India have received a copy of Mr. Merk's letter, dated 15th August, 1901.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 15th August, 1901.

In reply to your letter, dated the 10th instant, enclosing a copy of the papers noted in the margin, I have the honour to refer you to my letter of to-day's date.

Letter from the Government of India, dated the 5th instant, and memorandum by Colonel Deane.

2. The action which I advocate now and advocated in my telegram of the 7th instant is, I find, independently proposed by Colonel Deane. But in taking this action, local conditions have to be considered. I do not mean to advise anything that may lead to a disaster; small parties of troops operating about in the Mahsud hills will go in, but certainly will never come back.

3. The Mahsuds are a bold, plucky race, as active over the hills as Afridis, and next to them they are all round the best armed large tribe on the frontier. I have not been in Tirah, but those who have and who have seen the Mahsud country, military men, inform me that the Mahsud country, especially that within reach of our posts, is more difficult than Tirah. To the south and east it is girt by a belt of uninhabited, generally waterless, mass of the most tangled and intricate hills and ravines, which have to be seen to be realised. To the north a zone of Darwesh Khel territory, not less than twenty miles in width, hilly and difficult, separates the Mahsuds from the Tochi. To the west lies Shawal. The Mahsuds are far better armed than our subjects, and in their own hills are more than a match for any tribe and race whatsoever surrounding them. Moreover, as a look at the map will show, they have the opportunity of moving on inner lines. To this they owe their immense advantage apart from arms and personal characteristics over the surrounding populations. Our subjects and the Darwesh Khels and Bhattannis can and do cope with small Mahsud gangs who come out of their country into neighbouring tracts. But they cannot possibly cope with Mahsuds within Mahsud country; we cannot supply our subjects, the villagers are the Bhattannis, with breech-loaders, and that being so, it is perfectly useless to send them into Mahsud country to harass the Mahsuds, of whom 20 men with Sniders could hold up a whole lashkar of villagers or Bhattannis. The Darwesh Khel who live to the north, west and east of the Mahsuds are too weak to do much; they have been expressly prohibited from combining against the Mahsuds in a tribal quarrel, and they show no desire to combine against them in our cause. The conditions and circumstances of this blockade are totally dissimilar to those of the Buner Blockade.

4. I entirely agree with the principle of Colonel Deane (a blockade with harassing attacks), but the application of that principle must obviously be determined by local conditions. The application cannot be the same everywhere. There is no prohibition whatever regarding the pursuit of raiders, but this, like everything else, is governed by the local conditions of the place and time. When I say that troops against Mahsuds in Mahsud country are like British Infantry against the Boers among the kopjes, the need for caution will be understood. Counter-raids were unnecessary before the 1st of June. The tribe till then was paying up satisfactorily, no abnormal offences had been committed, and to have made counter-raids would have broken all such friendly relations as existed, and would have greatly impaired the chances of a complete success of the blockade, and of the execution of His Excellency's policy. After the offences that have recently been committed, since the 1st June, that has to be undertaken what will undoubtedly imperil the prospect of a complete success of the blockade, but what is now inevitable by the force of circumstances. Counter-raids will not stop offences at first. The Mahsuds will hit back, and will not cease till the tribe is worn down by the blockade and by heavy blows struck during the winter. This may, and probably will, save an expedition. Action for

reasons which I have repeatedly represented, cannot be commenced till November, but, if accepted by Government, will be unremittingly carried out during the winter. The General Officer Commanding the Derajat District and I will, in the course of a day or two, submit proposals for this action, but it will not be by small bodies of troops, however swiftly they may move, to send small bodies of men into the Mahsud hills more than ten miles away from our post is simply to court disaster, and our posts have been so placed years ago that not much can be done against the Mahsuds within ten miles of them.

Enclosure 69 in No. 3.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Resident in Kashmir, dated Simla, the 23rd August, 1901.

With reference to your memorandum, dated the 27th July, 1901, I am directed to forward a copy of a letter* from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, submitting a plan of operations which it is proposed to undertake against the Mahsud tribe in November, 1901.

*Dated the 16th August, 1901, addressed to the Government of the Punjab.

2. I am to request you to favour the Government of India with your opinion on Mr Merk's proposal.

Enclosure 70 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Sheikhbuddin, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 22nd August, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Political Officer, Wana, reports that Mahsuds are hard pressed, and that increasing lawlessness is partly due to instigation of some leading Malikis, notably Badshah Khan, who, it will be remembered, was recently turned out of Badar by Mulla Powindah. The Mahsuds recently tried to get grain from Shakai, but Shakaiwals refused from fear of Government. Rates of food-grains are rising in Mahsud country.

Enclosure 71 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner, Derajat, Sheikhbuddin, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 27th August, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Officer Commanding, Murtaza.—*Begins.* About eight to-night special tonga conveying Post Office Inspector Simpson and two European signallers and Tahsildar of Sarwekai was ambuscaded and fired on by band of some 20 Waziris half-way between Jatta and Murtaza. Tahsildar slightly wounded in arm, Inspector Simpson slightly wounded by splinter in leg. Fire returned, but result unknown. *Ends.* The tonga went against orders strictly forbidding travelling after sunset on Tank-Murtaza road. Explanation has been called for.

Enclosure 72 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 26th August, 1901.

With reference to your letter, dated the 15th of August, 1901, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a preliminary report received from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on the raid committed on the Border Military Police Post at Baran in the Bannu District on the 18th of June last.

Commissioner, Derajat's
letter, dated 8th August, 1901,
and enclosures.

2. From enquiries made, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu believes the raiders consisted of a mixed band of Mahsuds and Tori Khel Darwesh Khels, who must have come down the Baran pass the night before the raid. The Muhammad Khel, a section of the Darwesh Khel tribe, who are responsible for this pass, have been fined Rs. 700, and the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana have been called upon for proposals as to the punishment to be inflicted on the Tori Khels and Mahsuds, respectively. The Deputy Commissioner of Bannu estimates the total value of the Government property looted at Rs. 1,268-2-0, of which Rs. 825-10-6 will be recovered from the Silladars of the garrison of the post; but Mr. Merk is making further enquiries on this point, as he estimates the value of the eight Sniders and two Enfields taken away at Rs. 2,600. From the Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 19th June last (which was repeated to the Government of India), it appears Mr. Merk has also ordered the dismissal of the members of the Border Military Police who formed the garrison of the Baran post, the confiscation of the Silladari fees of their Silladars, and the recovery of the value of the rifles lost from their sureties.

Annexure 1

Letter from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 2nd August, 1901.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a report of the raid on the Baran Border Military Post which took place on the morning of the 18th June, 1901.

1. The case has worked out neither quickly nor easily, nor is there any considerable quantity of evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to go upon, and I have had, to a very large extent, to frame this report on a consideration of the information received from various quarters; the chief reason of credibility is their unanimity and the opposing interests of their sources.

2. It appears that a mixed band of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, to whose personnel I shall allude later, came down the Khaisora, crossed the Tochi into Tori Khel territory, and probably on the night of the 17th June, 1901, came down the Baran and had before dawn concealed themselves in a ravine in independent territory some half mile from the post. Such a place, lying off the beaten track and well away from any hamlet, affords excellent cover for a small party, and there is no reason to suppose that anyone was aware of their presence there. Whether their original intention was to attack the post is doubtful, and it is rather more probable that they proposed to be in wait for the cattle of the Muhammad Khels. However, about 10 or 11 they sent a man to spy out the condition of the post. This man entered the fort ostensibly as a wayfarer who had come to beg a drink of water. He was able to report everything in a state favourable for

attack, and about an hour later the entire body moved down. There was no sentry on the watch tower, and the raiders were enabled to walk right up to the gate.

3. The garrison of the post at the time consisted of 22 men and a dafadar, of whom 11 men were absent, either on duty, without leave or in gaol, leaving 11 men and the dafadar in the post. The whole of these men appear to have displayed the most contemptible negligence and cowardice; and their statements as to what occurred are so tinged with puerile exaggeration and desire to save themselves as to be practically worthless. Finding the wicket gate open, the raiders rushed in and surprised the entire guard, either asleep or engaged in music. These men allowed themselves to be overpowered without a shot being fired or even a loud cry being raised. The raiders then took from the dafadar his keys and proceeded to collect the garrison. During the confusion the dafadar managed to slip out of the gate and get away. Had he gone straight to the nearest village, much

Probably hid himself in a ravine till the gang were well away

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

Chauki after the news had reached that post

4. The rest of the garrison were collected by the raiders and driven into a room in the post, the door of which was padlocked. The raiders then cleared out the magazine, in which they found eight Sniders, six Enfields, one Enfield revolver, 429 Snider rounds, 119 Enfield rounds, 180 caps, seven bayonets and Rs 33-9-0 in cash, as well as a small amount of uniform. With this booty they made off up the Baran

5. The first assistance seems to have come from an unexpected quarter. Jan, the Gummatti outlaw, who is himself a Muhammad Khel, had come into that neighbourhood with Piao Dad, another outlaw, to settle a family matter. These two were, of course, armed, and opened fire on the raiders from a considerable distance. They succeeded in killing one and in causing them to drop four of the Enfields. It might naturally be asked whether the facts are not really the other way, and Jan himself among the raiders, but the evidence leaves little doubt in my mind that on this occasion he played the part of the ally of Government.

6. In the meanwhile, the garrison immured in the post, once satisfied that the raiders had gone, made their escape through the ventilator above the door and sent off three horsemen to raise the Kurramgarhi and Islam Chauki posts and the Muhammad Khel villages.

The news was sent into Bannu, and a considerable force started to Kurramgarhi. The Political Officer, Tochi, and Commandant, North Waziristan Militia, who happened to be both in Bannu, made arrangements to have parties out in the Tochi in the hopes of intercepting the offenders; should they prove to be Mahsuds.

We ourselves, Lieutenant Coldstream and I, rode straight up the Baran and met a considerable portion of the pursuit party returning carrying a wounded man. We found that the first person to turn out had been two Muhammad Khels—Muhammad Alim and Paria Din Malik.

These were joined up the Baran by a few sowars belonging to the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and Border Military Police, and followed the raiders up at a considerable distance. The bulk of the Muhammad Khel pursuit party turned out somewhat later and followed up behind. When the raiders had reached the first low range of the hills separating the Baran from the Sheratalla plain, Paria Din ran forward, and in the interchange of shots received a bullet through the fleshy part of his thigh. His wound was dressed later by the Civil Surgeon who had accompanied us, and it is expected that no permanent effect will be left. The advance party then waited for the main body, and the raiders made good their escape across these hills. When we came up, the Muhammad Khels had turned out in force and were holding these lower hills, but they had not seen fit to carry the pursuit any further.

As the latter had then got a full start, and evening was approaching, the party returned. I had parties of the various tribesmen out in case the raiders should try to double back through British territory, but this they do not appear to have done.

7. I examined the garrison of the fort, but their statements, for the reasons already given, were absolutely worthless as tending to identify the raiders. The Muhammad Khels professed entire ignorance as to the personality of these raiders. I told them that, as the pass responsibility was theirs, so also was the duty of bringing home the crime to some one, and that, if they failed to do so, I should hold them responsible as if it had been committed by themselves.

8. The first information was obtained from the finding, several days later, about a mile from the post, of the corpse of the man to whom I have alluded as having been killed by Jan. This corpse was found in a ravine to the west of the ordinary track, which accounts for its being left so long undiscovered. Owing to decomposition and the action of wild animals, this corpse was little better than a mass of bones and putrefaction, rendering identification impossible. However, certain articles of clothing led to a suspicion of the dead man having been a Mahsud.

9. On the 6th July, 1901, the Muhammad Khels handed in a list of names whom their emissaries declared to be concerned in the raid. This list gave the names of 13 men, two Shingi and three Abdullai Mahsuds, and five Tori Khel and three Mohmit Khel Waziris. Copies of this were sent to the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and from their reports there is no doubt as to the complicity of the Abdullais under Amardin and the Tori Khels under Kandar Khushali. The whole gang appears to have been some 80 in number, consisting, as the Political Officer, Wana, says, of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, while the personnel of the latter, according to the Political Officer, Tochi, appears to have been made up chiefly of Tori Khels. The majority of this gang, however, remained in the hills, and the actual raiders numbered about twenty under Amardin and Kandar.

10. With these tribes I have no concern, and any proposal for imposition of fines cannot come from me. It only remains to deal with the question of pass responsibility and of the complicity of the Muhammad Khels. As regards the last question, I am perfectly convinced that neither did the Muhammad Khel as a tribe aid in or connive at the raid. It was perfectly possible for the party to have come down and made the attack as described without their knowledge, and this, I am assured, was the case. At the same time, I will not go the length of saying that there were no Muhammad Khels in the affair. It is possible that one or two bad characters with no stake in the tribe, Kuzi Khels for choice, allied themselves to this enterprise, as they would to any wickedness that was going. But of this there is no proof. The raid, as it occurred, required no local knowledge which the Tori Khels could not have provided. I therefore do not think that I have any grounds to make the Muhammad Khels liable on the ground of complicity, and propose to base their liability solely on their responsibility for the Baran Pass. It may be noted that the ground on which the post stands lies just outside Muhammad Khel territory, and is the property of the Bakka Khels. But the former tribe have no hamlets nearer than two miles, while the matter has all along been considered as one affecting the Muhammad Khels only, so that it would be neither just nor politic to bring the Bakka Khels into the affair. The Muhammad Khels themselves argue that they have done their best, that they have killed one raider, recovered four rifles, and had one of their Maliks wounded. To whatever extent these arguments may result in mitigating the penalty imposed, they cannot affect the general principle that a tribe is absolutely responsible for the maintenance of its passes, and that if it does not choose to patrol and watch these passes so as to effectually safeguard against any raid like the present, it must take the consequences of its own security.

11. The total value of the Government property taken and not recovered is Rs. 1,268-2-0; of this by your order, Rs. 825-10-6 will be or has

been recovered from the Silladars of the garrison of the post. There remain Rs. 442-7-6, the value of the property in charge of Government employées absent on duty, and this, I think, cannot in fairness be recovered from their Silladars.*

12 In recommending the fine on the Muhammad Khels I have been guided by the fines levied by you on the Bizan Khels and Hathi Khels in the case of the raid on the Domel Thana, which took place almost exactly a year before. In that case you recommended, in the event of no Hathi Khel complicity being shown, a fine of Rs 400 on each tribe, in all Rs. 800, on the ground of pass and tribal responsibility. That case was, to my mind, more serious than the present case. A police station, fully three miles inside the border, surrounded by Hathi Khel villages, was raided by a party which had been actually met by Bazin Khels in the pass for which the latter are responsible, and which must have passed through several Hathi Khel villages. In the present case, the Baran post lies just on the border, and there are no Muhammad Khel villages in the further direction. The Muhammad Khels certainly turned out as fast as could be expected, they killed one man and had one of their Mahks wounded. In addition to this, the behaviour of the tribe has during the last year been excellent. Under these circumstances, I would not press for a heavy fine, but rather for one sufficient to bring home a realisation of pass responsibility. I would, therefore, recommend a fine of Rs 700 on the Muhammad Khel tribe, that is, Rs 100 on each of its sections.

13 In conclusion, I should like to point out the difficulties with which, in the present constitution of the force, the Commandant has to contend in his efforts to bring an untrained and undisciplined body of men into a state of efficiency. Lieutenant Coldstream, Commandant, in his report on this raid, says: "This disgraceful affair is due primarily to the negligence of the sentry in leaving his post, and, secondly, to the pusillanimity of the dafadar and the remainder of the garrison, and the only punishment to which they are liable is dismissal from the force and forfeiture of the securities for the stolen rifles. I regret to say that the absence of a sentry from his post is only too common. I have, on several occasions, when visiting a post, found the sentry absent from his beat. Until these men know that they will be heavily punished for such conduct, they will not do their duty. Without fear of punishment, there will be no discipline, and without discipline such incidents as the Baran raid are bound to occur."

Enclosure 73 in No 3

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 2nd September, 1901.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, dated the 21st of August, 1901, on the subject of Mahsud affairs, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 27th August, 1901, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, from which it will be seen that all Mahsuds found outside the line of posts are arrested and imprisoned. For the reasons given by Mr. Merk, the Lieutenant-Governor agrees with him in thinking that reprisals within the line should only be carried out systematically.

2 As regards paragraph 2 of your letter under reference, I am to say that His Honour is still awaiting an expression of General Egerton's views, on receipt of which he will submit his opinion to the Government of India on Mr Merk's plan of operations against the Mahsuds in November next.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 27th August, 1901.

In reply to your endorsement, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to submit the report on paragraph 3 of Government of India letter, dated the 21st instant.

2. If by "all Mahsuds found within reach of our posts" are meant Mahsuds residing in their settlements beyond the area occupied by Government, but within reach of Sarwekai and Jandola, then the troops moving out of these posts might, if lucky, seize by surprise some fifty, perhaps a hundred Mahsuds. On a tribe computed to number nine to ten thousand fighting men this would have no particular effect. Thereafter a surprise will be out of the question. The Mahsuds are intelligent men. When the blockade commenced, they posted men on the hill tops for two months, who day and night watched Sarwekai, Jandola and the Tiarza. These sentries are specially selected for their keen sight and activity. Men of this stamp accompany every considerable raiding gang, and make it a profession to be what are called "chirgs," viz., cocks. It is their business to be constantly on the look-out and to warn the raiders either of their prey or of their enemies. If it is intended to do anything hereafter on a scale sufficient to be an appreciable blow to the tribe, it would be fatal to put the Mahsuds on their guard now.

3. Mahsuds who steal across the blockade line for peaceful purposes, viz., to purchase supplies, to work for wages, &c., are at once arrested and imprisoned. Many instances of this have occurred. Rupees 20 are paid for every Mahsud so caught.

4. Raiding gangs are attacked and shot out of hand, *when found*. But, as I have already explained, the country surrounding the Mahsud limits, especially on the south and east, is a mass of low hills and ravines, an uninhabited desert. In this desert our posts lie dotted at intervals of from ten to fifteen miles. When Mahsuds have ventured into inhabited country, they have suffered—witness the two gangs that were cut up by villagers and levies, for which in one case the Government of India have sanctioned a reward. But in the uninhabited desert it is not easy to find gangs. They move much faster than our troops and even our Militia. They slip through the chain of posts during the night, and lie up during the day; the country is such that one might pass 200 men lying up within a stone's throw and be no wiser. The Pezu pass near Sheikhbuddin is a fair illustration of the kind of terrain we have to deal with. But whereas the rugged hills through which the Pezu pass leads are only four to six miles in width, the desert belt south and east of the Mahsud country varies from 50 to 200 miles in width, and is about 100 miles long, curving from Wana round to the Bannu district. In such terrain all we can do is to hold safe the lines of communication, to see that posts are not rushed, to obtain early news of gangs who start to raid, and to do our best when after them to come across them in the desert hills. If one were to station a man every fifty yards between the posts, it would be impossible to prevent gangs from slipping through at night, or to find them afterwards in the desert wilderness of hills south of the Gomal. It is on similar lines with the case in South Africa; all our enormous forces there cannot prevent small parties of Boers from slipping through at times, and from holding up a block-house or derailing a train; the only final remedies there and here are to wear down the enemy, taking the chances of an occasional mishap meanwhile. In the case of Kashmir Kar, the full facts will soon be laid before Government, and I trust a thing like that will not recur. In that instance the gang had 18 hours' start after the post had been taken [Kashmir Kar was captured at 2 p.m., the news reached Kajuri Kach at 8 p.m., and troops are not permitted (wisely, I think) by the Military Authorities to go out till sunrise].

and were back without molestation in the Mahsud country before any action could be taken. In 18 hours a gang can and does sometimes cover 40 miles. The Government of India may rest assured that all that can be done is and will be done on the civil and military sides. But with the terrain and people that we have to deal with, in my humble judgment no more can be accomplished with any degree of certainty than what I have indicated. Owing to the excessive heat, the troops have necessarily been confined to their posts, but after the middle of next month the General Officer Commanding will take steps to frequently move detachments of sufficient strengths about to places calculated to intercept raiders where troops would not be expected by them.

Enclosure 74 in No. 3

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gulmarg, the 29th August, 1901.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 23rd August, 1901, with reference to proposed operations against the Mahsud Waziris, and to offer the following remarks

2. The general plan proposed seems to me more elaborate than is necessary, and I think it would be exceedingly difficult of execution, owing to the great probabilities of information leaking out. The plan that I should feel most inclined to propose is that flying columns at Jandola and Sarwekai should co-operate with a flying column from Wana. The troops would be there *en evidence*. The Mahsud country on the line from Jandola to Wana is that from which apparently the Mahsuds mostly raid, and it is important that our troops should clear this country and should destroy all settlements, crops, grass and wood within their reach. The manner of execution must be left for the Military Authorities to decide, but all individual Commanders should be instructed to lose no opportunity which presents itself of inflicting loss on the Mahsuds. It is to systematic working of this sort, the Mahsuds seeing our troops ready to assume the offensive on every occasion which presents itself and constantly on the move, that I think we must look for pressure on the Mahsuds rather than to the troops occasionally turning out. Is it not possible for the troops to reach and destroy the Mahsud settlements on the Tank-Zam line or the (Mahsud) Jalal Khel settlements in Shaktu from Suleiman Khel? The flying columns in Tochi could also presumably inflict a certain amount of damage.

3. Another point which I suggest is that there must be enterprising Native Officers in the Militia, who, with 40 or 50 men, could raid the country near them, probably capturing cattle, but any way destroying grass which must be of considerable value to the Mahsuds. It may be urged that this would involve risk and possible loss of life and rifles. But Pathans will generally take very good care of themselves, and it is better to risk the loss of a rifle in this manner than in having them taken wholesale from our posts.

4. If the troops move out, I should advise guns being taken wherever practicable. At the same time, I would not advise the Militia being mixed up with the troops. The Militia, if given a free hand to inflict loss, could act far better independently.

5. With regard to any idea of the Mahsuds collecting against our troops, there is the view that this would give the best opportunity of dealing with them. As to their going off to Afghan territory, they will not be welcome there, and a considerable check can be kept on them by the maintenance, and, if necessary, the strengthening of the Darwesh Khel picquets on the Datta Khel-Wana line. Their moving off to Afghan territory will not relieve them of hardship, and from our point of view it is better for them to be uncomfortable in Afghan territory than amusing themselves with raiding at our expense.

6. The question whether Militia being associated with the Darwesh Khel picquets in order to keep the Mahsuds uneasy on the Datta Khel-Wana line seems also worth considering. Active steps which may be possible taken now will make the Mahsuds fearful as to their winter settlements, and may have a good effect in forcing them to submission.

7. I would recommend an account being kept of damage done, whether in capturing cattle which are afterwards killed or in any other way. This will put Government into a position to judge how far the discussion with the Waziris of compensation for offences committed during the blockade can be dispensed with. The main point is to cause as much loss as possible to the Mahsuds. I would urge, on the other hand, that Government should not postpone the settlement of the blockade by such a restriction as that the fine imposed must be paid in cash. The Mahsuds probably are unable to find cash, and payment in kind is reasonable in Government interests as in theirs. If any Mahsuds should be captured, a reasonable manner of dealing with them is to allow them to ransom themselves, the amount of ransom being credited to the fine.

Enclosure 75 in No 3.

Endorsed by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 5th September, 1901.

Copy of the following submitted to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Duack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 5th September, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade

2. The prices of food-grains continue to rise slowly. Conflicting reports are received regarding the state of the Mahsud autumn crop. According to some accounts it is above the average, according to others it is suffering from drought. This latter report tallies with the condition of the unirrigated crops in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and with the report of the Meteorological Office that the monsoon rainfall of the "Dry North-West area" which includes Waziristan is 46 per cent. below the average. Some Bhattannis beyond the border are charged with having sold small quantities of grain to Mahsuds, and are being dealt with. During the past fortnight 26 Mahsuds, chiefly women and children, who had stolen across the blockade line for food, were seized. The men are arrested and imprisoned, but it is difficult to know what to do with the women and children. They are sent back, but there is no guarantee against their returning.

3. The total sum realised up to date is Rs. 73,761, or Rs. 761 since the 30th June. This small item is derived from the "bahir" tax of 50 per cent. on proceeds of the tumber and matting brought by Mahsud caravans (under proper restrictions to prevent evasions of the blockade) for sale to Tank. This bahir system is still permitted, not because it helps towards liquidation of the fine, but because it is a valuable index towards tribal feeling. If a general hostile combination of all Mahsuds were forming, bahirs would naturally stop at once. But, at present anyhow, there are no symptoms of such a combination: the frontier generally is perfectly quiet, the Mulla element with Mulla Powndah at their head are undoubtedly sincere in their desire for a peaceful solution of the situation, and the bulk of the Mahsuds have given security for good behaviour to the extent of Rs. 73,761. Still, with the inconsequence peculiar to Pathans, they may at any moment change, and the Political Officers of Southern and Northern Waziristan keep a vigilant watch for any symptoms of a general movement:

4. Since the capture of Kashmir Kar on the 6th August, regarding which a full report has been submitted to Government, there has been a sudden cessation of offences, during the past month only two cases against Government have occurred, one is firing on the tonga, which, against orders, was travelling after sunset between Tank and Murtaza, and the other is the shooting of a Zhob Levy sowar on the 30th ultimo and the robbery of his rifle. The first offence was the sudden thought of a small thieving gang who did little harm; a report on the matter has been submitted to Government, and those to blame in it are being dealt with. The second offence is probably the work of one particular set of rifle thieves who select the southern bank of the Gomal river west of Toi Khula for their operations, and every six months or so shoot Zhob Levy sowars and walk off with their rifles. Offences like those that have occurred since the 6th August are more the acts of "blackguards in the shrubbery," to quote an Irish saying, than tribal acts, still the tribe is responsible for all its blackguards. In the British districts, and latterly in the Tochi also, the Mahsuds have had the tables turned on them in their attempts to loot and do harm. The villagers and levies of the Dera Ismail Khan district have cut up two gangs, the Bannu Waziris have held their own beyond the border; at Hassan Khel in the Tochi the Mahsuds fared badly two months ago, and now on the 30th ultimo the Tochi Militia and villagers killed two Mahsuds of a gang that attempted to lift village cattle. In Southern Waziristan alone of late have the Mahsuds been successful, but here also I hope there will be a change for the better soon. Special arrangements are being made for the regulation and protection of the Powindah migration through the Gomal, which commences next week. During the past fortnight three Mahsud raiders and thieves (names given) are reported on different occasions to have died of sunstroke and heat in the low dry hills.

5. There is no doubt that the Kashmir Kar affair caused great consternation among the Mahsuds. Mulla Powindah and the Maliks met in jirga to arrange for the restoration of the rifles and ammunition, and excellent resolutions were passed, but nothing has been done. The Mahsuds are in much anxiety as to what Government will do, an anxiety which will not be allayed by my last letter breaking off all negotiations and all dealings with the tribe till the balance of Rs 26,400 has been paid. The anxiety may keep them on their good behaviour for some time.

6. A copy of this report has been submitted direct to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 76 in No. 3

Letter from A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 11th September, 1901.

In reply to your letter, dated 21st August, 1901, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters marginally noted, and to convey the following views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the plan of operations which Mr. Merk proposes to undertake against the Mahsuds in November next.

From Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 3rd September, 1901.

2. Mr. Merk's plan is for a baramta on a large scale. A baramta on a small scale will not, in his opinion,* affect the present situation, but will only annoy the tribe and lead them to commit more offences. He proposes that, after a feint has been made in the Tochi, which he thinks will divert the attention of the Mahsuds, three small columns from

* *Vide* Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated the 16th August, 1901, submitted to Government of India with Punjab Government letter, dated the 19th August, 1901.

Wana, Sarwekai and Zam composed of 900, 400 and 700 native infantry, without cavalry or artillery, should enter Mahsud territory, presumably penetrating as far as Kaniguram and Makin, respectively, 16 and 28 miles from Khaisara, stay there two or three nights and then return to their quarters, and repeat this operation at intervals. The object, he explains, would not be so much the destruction of crops as to effect the capture of Mahsuds with their flocks and herds, and keep the tribe in a state of alarm.

3. General Egerton considers the force proposed by Mr. Merk insufficient for the measures designed by him, and would only be prepared, even with a force of 3,800 strong, to operate in the Khaisara, the Shahur and the Tank-Zam, that is to say, on the outskirts of the Mahsud country.

4. In view of General Egerton's opinion, the Lieutenant-Governor feels that Mr. Merk's plan for a surprise in the heart of the Mahsud country must be abandoned, and it remains to consider General Egerton's modified proposal. General Egerton says our first object should be to prevent the Mahsuds harvesting their autumn crops or sowing their spring crops. His Honour does not see how this object can be attained without a prolonged occupation. The only objects which can be attained by sharp reprisals not amounting to an expedition are (a) a baramta or the seizure of men and cattle, and (b) damage to property. A small column operating for a few days cannot destroy standing crops to any extent, or restrain the tribe from agricultural operations so as to affect their harvest. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it very doubtful if we should secure any of the fighting men by the movement of a flying column, however skilfully and secretly devised, and the seizure of women and children and a few stray cattle will not help us much. On the other hand, if the object is damage to property, then, as Mr. Merk points out, the best time to choose is after the crops have been harvested. Combined with this form of damage, the destruction of towers and even of villages presents an effectual method of punishing the tribe. And this is, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, at once the easiest and most decisive form of punishment which it is open to us to inflict. The time for doing so, as shown by Mr. Merk, is about the end of November.

5. With the force proposed by General Egerton, there can be little doubt that operations of the character above indicated can be carried out in the Khaisara, Shahur and Tank-Zam villages, and, if the Government of India decide to undertake these operations, Sir Mackworth Young sees no very strong objection. But he thinks that the ultimate object of our present dealings with the tribe, viz., their absolute submission, if not secured by the blockade, will be more surely gained by an expedition into the heart of the Mahsud country and the occupation of that country with a sufficient force so long as it suits our purpose. If a force,* such as that sent to Kaniguram and Makin in 1860 and 1881, is despatched when the crops have been harvested to penetrate into the heart of the country, eat up and destroy the harvested grain, and destroy towers and fortified villages, the object will probably be attained more speedily than by partial measures. The Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, advises that a plan of campaign on a somewhat more extended scale be worked out and put into execution as soon as it is established that the tribe will not or cannot conform to our reasonable demands for their submission.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Lieutenant-General C. C. Egerton, A.-D.-C., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Forces, Punjab, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Murree, the 29th August, 1901.

With reference to your letter, dated 28th instant, I have the honour to forward herein, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my views on the proposals of the Commissioner, Derajat, for the coercion of the Mahsud Waziris.

2 I regret the delay which has occurred in submitting these views which were asked for by the Punjab Government on the 21st instant, but, by some unaccountable mistake in the office, the telegram asking me for my views on the question was not submitted to me until yesterday, and in the meantime copies of Mr Merk's letters had reached me addressed to me by name and apparently sent for information only.

3. I am entirely in accord, and have been since the institution of the blockade, with Mr Merk's proposed policy of counter-raiding on the Mahsuds, while maintaining the blockade against them rigorously. It was with this object in view, as well as to reinforce threatened points—as may be seen from my original proposals on the subject—that I originally recommended the establishment of movable columns at Sarwekal, Zam and in the Bannu district. I did not contemplate, however, that these small columns should at any time operate to such a distance as would preclude their returning to their own base by nightfall, but I asked that the officer in charge of blockade operations should be empowered to draw upon the troops in Dera Ismail Khan, in case any more serious operation necessitating the troops being absent for a night or more should be sanctioned by superior authority.

4 Mr Merk's scheme contemplates the absence of comparatively small columns from their base for several days in succession at a time of the year when the villages are at their fullest, and when, harvesting operations being over and spring crops sown, the people would be most at liberty to assemble and make common cause against our troops, and it provides nothing to fall back upon in case of one of the columns suffering a reverse.

5. Mr. Merk relies upon suddenness and celerity of movement in various directions to baffle the tribesmen, and no doubt this is an essential feature of any scheme that falls short of an actual expedition, but, at the same time, if the columns are to remain several nights in the country, I doubt if the strength advocated by Mr Merk is sufficient.

6 The feint from the Tochi does not altogether commend itself to me. The only direction in which it could take place would be towards Razmak and the Loargi pass and through the intervening Darwesh Khel country. The Razmak Kotal is a difficult one, and there is no village or settlement of any importance until Makin is reached, and I am further of opinion that, although a feint in this direction would no doubt have the effect of drawing the tribesmen of Makin and the immediate neighbourhood to oppose it, it is doubtful if the Khaisara and Kaniguram would be much affected thereby. Moreover, it is certain that the inevitable retirement would be promptly followed up, and both Razmak and the Loargi Narai are unpleasant places to retire through in the face of superior numbers, so I fear the result which Mr. Merk so strongly deprecates in paragraph 8 of his plan of operations would be attained, viz, considerable loss to ourselves and a minimum of damage to the Mahsud. A small column largely composed of Militia and quite unsupported could not hope to reach Makin itself, and until that was reached—except, perhaps, the capture of a few stray cattle—little or nothing could be effected in the way of damage to the enemy. If a demonstration be made from the Tochi, I do not think it should attempt more than an advance to Razana, and possibly a reconnaissance of the Kotal, though even the latter might involve us in serious fighting.

7 The vulnerable parts of the Mahsud country seem to be the Khaisara, Shahur and the Tank-Zam, as far as the Barari Tangi, and I think columns might operate in those directions very successfully, but I would deprecate their being too weak. I should prefer to see the Tiarza column at least 1,200 strong, the Sarwekal column (which would join hands with the Tiarza column at Kundiwan) to be 600 strong, and the Jandola column about 1,000. I think these numbers might very easily be obtained by the employment of the 17th Bengal Infantry from Dera Ismail Khan, and turning the movement of the troops marching in relief to Dera Ismail Khan, viz., wing 27th Punjab Infantry from Bannu, and 1st Punjab Infantry (?) from Kohat, so as to arrive at Tank by the date fixed for the operations.

8. With reference to that date, Mr. Merk is, of course, in a better position than I am to speak with authority, but I cannot but think that by the end of October (not November) the bulk of the tribesmen will be engaged in harvesting operations, though their cattle may remain in the upper grazing lands with a few attendants until later on. It should be our first object to prevent their harvesting their autumn crop or sowing their spring crops, and I think that the time of the operations should be subordinated to this consideration rather than to the phases of the moon, though, of course, moonlight nights are an enormous advantage in dealing with tribesmen given to night attacks. Still, it is not everything, and the disadvantages of dark nights may, at any rate, be partially obviated by extra vigilance and precaution, the careful selection of sites for bivouacs and effective *sangaring*.

9. I recommend, therefore, before Mr. Merk's suggestions are adopted, that it should be ascertained more exactly between what dates harvesting operations are most likely to be in progress, and our operations timed accordingly.

MEMORANDUM by the Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command

Forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, with reference to Punjab Government telegram, dated 20th instant.

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 3rd September, 1901.

With reference to paragraph 9 of letter, dated the 29th August, 1901, from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, to the Adjutant-General in India, a copy of which has been sent to you under cover of his endorsement of the same date, I have the honour to say that it is better not to try to either prevent the harvesting of autumn crops or destroy them as they stand. The first means a prolonged occupation of the area growing the crops, for in harvesting it does not matter much whether you cut ten days earlier or ten days later. The second is very difficult to accomplish, as our experience last year in the Madda Khel country shows. It takes an immense time to destroy any quantity of standing Indian corn or jowar, the staple Mahsud autumn crops. This again means prolonged occupation. Next, to prevent sowing spring crops means a prolonged occupation, because it does not matter within a margin of two months when the rabi crop is sown. Lastly, the cultivated areas of the Mahsud country lie at different altitudes, ranging from 2,000 to 7,000 feet. It is clear, therefore, that whichever crop we take, spring or autumn, it must always be at different stages of growth, cultivation and ripeness. All this would mean what would virtually be an expedition on a large scale.

2. The object of the attack in November and of the subsequent attacks is not so much the destruction of crops as at the first onset to capture as many Mahsuds with their flocks and herds as possible, and thereafter to keep the tribe in a state of alarm and anxiety, to jam them up into the high country round Kaniguram and Makin, where it is cold and where they will be crowded together, instead of spreading as they do over the lower hills for comfort and pasture, and so, with the blockade continuing in full force, to wear them out. If at the first attack we can succeed in seizing a large number of Mahsuds, it is probable that the tribe will promptly give in and the whole thing be over. But this demands absolute secrecy and a surprise. I am afraid the employment of reliefs as proposed will give

people (natives) an idea of what is intended, and will leak through to the Mahsuds. So far as I can judge, I think the forces I propose are sufficient, and no unreasonable risk is incurred. Crops, &c., would, of course, be destroyed *en passant*. But by the end of November, the autumn crop everywhere is cut, *is dry and stacked*, and a box of matches will then in half an hour do more damage than 500 men working all day could effect with standing maize or jowar. Grain itself is easily carried off by troops and consumed, but grain in ear is difficult to eat or to remove or destroy.

3 For these reasons, I adhere to my view that it will be better to make the first attack towards the end of November. There is this too that in December it is not easy, owing to the great cold, for Mahsud families to escape *vid* Shawal, but, if we attack in October, it is probable that large numbers of the Mahsuds will, after the first attack, instantly go off to spend the winter in Birmal with their families, and we shall be *pro tanto* baffled. The Darwesh Khel contingent that holds Shawal for blockade purposes is not strong enough to resist a large and determined rush of Mahsud families and fighting men anxious to escape a hard time. If I increase this contingent to a strength sufficient to stop a rush, the Mahsuds, who are by no means deficient in intellect, will at once suspect what is coming and will act accordingly.

4. As regards the Tochi operations, I proposed a *feint*, and not fighting. I did not suggest reaching Makin. The Mahsuds are at present and will remain in a highly nervous condition, and the mere appearance of half a regiment in the vicinity of the Razmak Kotal or Spina Punga Narai will send them hurrying in that direction. This will divide Mahsud forces, by the time the Makin men are back, the southern troops will be out of the country. The Tochi troops could retire, if necessary, before the Mahsuds arrived.

5. A copy of this letter has been communicated to Generals Egerton and Denig.

Enclosure 77 in No 3

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to A. H. Diack, Esq, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 18th September, 1901.

I am directed to invite attention to paragraph 3 of Mr. Merk's letter, dated the 5th September, 1901, submitting his fortnightly report on the progress of the Mahsud blockade.

2. In Mr. Merk's telegram, dated the 31st December, 1900, it was stated that he had agreed to the tribesmen coming in to Tank to sell cattle, timber, &c., and to pay the proceeds on the spot towards the fine. The Mahsuds had requested that this might be allowed on the rejection of their proposal to make payments in kind. The present arrangement, as now detailed, appears to differ from the former one, inasmuch as the tribesmen are allowed to return to their homes with half the proceeds of their sales, the other half being taken by Government in the shape of a tax and credited to the outstanding fine. In the opinion of the Government of India, this arrangement appears to be open to much objection. Mr. Merk states that the caravans are admitted under proper restrictions to prevent evasion of the blockade. Their admission is, however, in itself a primary evasion of the blockade, there is no evidence that the "bahirs" have ever furnished any information of real value, and the supplies which they take back with them must tend to prolong the resistance of the tribesmen and the duration of the blockade. Subject, therefore, to any further explanation which may be forthcoming, the Government of India consider that, while the blockade is proceeding, all caravans from the Mahsud country should be absolutely prohibited, and it appears doubtful whether the sums already received from the "bahir" tax should be credited in reduction of the fine.

Enclosure 78 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Bannu, the 18th September, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 5th instant, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade

2. Average prices are reported to be as follows in the Mahsud country, in seers per rupee—

Maize	5½	} These are practically nominal prices, as these four articles are generally not in the market at all.
Wheat	5½	
Barley	7½	
Rice	3½	
Salt	2½	
Tobacco	2 1/4	
Native cloth	3 yards	}
European cloth	1½ "	

The price of maize will fall when the kharif harvest is gathered next month. The crop is poor in the lower tracts to the south and east, but average in the higher valleys to the north and west. There are indications of an early and possibly severe winter, snow fell on Shuidar last week. The real stress of the blockade will come in January and February when the produce of the autumn crop will have been consumed, and the harvest of the spring crop be still distant.

It is reported that those Mahsuds who usually came to the plains in winter for labour intend this year to steal across the Madda Khel country or the Tochi (which they can easily do by night), and make for the Kohat and Peshawar districts and Kurram, there to take work. I am arranging to post men, who know a Mahsud when they see him, at Thal, Hangu, Kohat and Khushalgarh to recognise such Mahsuds, who will be arrested and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The fine on the Tori Khel Darwesh Khel Waziris, who are more than suspected of complicity in Mahsud raids on the Tochi, has had an excellent effect. The Tori Khel are now almost under blockade themselves, so strict are the rules under which they may obtain supplies, cloth, salt and tobacco from Bannu and the Tochi. This is necessary since several cases of smuggling have been brought home to them. As prices rise in the Mahsud country, blockade running becomes proportionately more profitable, and our precautions and regulations are correspondingly tightened. Several small smuggling parties have been captured and dealt with.

3. The total sum realised up to date on account of the fine of one lakh is Rs 73,897-10-2.

4. Since the date of the last report, no offences appear to have been committed in the Tochi, Gomal, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts. In the Sheranni country 30 cows were lifted in the hills near Drazinda, and some Mahsud robbers attacked travellers between Domandi and Draband, killing one and wounding another; the pursuit party report having wounded a Mahsud. The lower Sheranni hills are empty at present, which facilitates the operations of small gangs from the Mahsud country as far south as the Zhob road by the Chuhar Khel Dhana pass; the low hills are just now an uninhabited desert. Later on, when the Sherannis, Zalli Khel and Powindahs come down from their summer quarters, a part of these hills will be more occupied, but the Gomal country remains empty all the year round. Some Bhattanni flocks were lifted by Mahsuds from beyond the Tank border; the Bhattanni pursuit parties in return lifted Mahsud flocks.

5. The general political situation is unchanged, and the Mahsuds continue anxious as to what is going to happen to them.

6. A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department direct, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla

Enclosure 79 in No 3,

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 8th October, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2 The prices of rice, Indian corn, and millet have slightly fallen in view of the autumn crop. Other prices remain stationary, except salt and cloth, which have risen so far as rates which are virtually nominal can be said to vary at all.

3. During the past fortnight the attention of the Mahsuds has been concentrated on their struggle over Badar with the Darwesh Khel Waziris, at whose hands they suffered an ugly reverse which they are now gradually retrieving. Mulla Powindah endeavoured unsuccessfully to intervene. He is now biding his time, and will no doubt step in when both sides are tired of fighting, and want an excuse to leave off.

4. The offences of the period under report have been several petty raids on Powindahs along the Dera Ismail Khan border. the largest of these was the lifting of 50 camels from almost under the walls of the Zarkanni Border Military Police post. The Native Officer in command at the time has been dismissed. The Tochi has been free of raids, and the Tori Khel, who have been well fined for giving passage to, and combining with, Mahsud raiders, are paying up. A singularly daring dacoity was committed in the Bannu district by a band of Mahsuds and Tori Khel and Wali Khel outlaws, who were collected by one Nabi Bakhsh (a desperate bad character and religious fanatic to boot, who fled to the Mahsuds last March after murdering a Deputy Inspector of Police) and brought down to attack the village of Attar Shah Sing, a prominent Hindu with whom Nabi Bakhsh had been long at feud. The gang, helped by the undoubted sympathy of the neighbouring villages, who will suffer for it, succeeded in killing Attar Shah Sing and six others. But on their retirement, the dacoits were attacked by the Bakka Khel and Shogi Khel (Tori Khel), Sheikh Amardin, a most notorious scoundrel and leading follower and employée of Mulla Powindah, and Kandar, Tori Khel, a prominent leader of raids, were killed, and the gang retired in confusion to the Mahsud hills where the deaths of Amardin and Kandar made a great sensation. The Bakka Khel and Shogis have been suitably rewarded. The Tochi Militia recovered some 1,000 sheep which were being driven off by Mahsud thieves near Saidgi.

5. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla

Enclosure 80 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 11th October, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Political Officer, Wana, repeated for information:—
Begins. Jirga of principal Mahsud Mahks and representative tribesmen met on 9th at Kaniguram, and passed excellent resolutions regarding prompt payment of balance of one lakh due to Government and restitution of Kashmir Kar rifles. It remains to be seen what action, if any, will follow. Difficulty with Government was one cause of Mahsuds letting Darwesh Khels at Badar off as easily as they did. Mulla Powindah returned home without taking part in yesterday's jirga. Settlement of Badar question entirely in favour of Mahsuds without his assistance, if not in spite of his opposition, has affected his position prejudicially. *Ends.*

Enclosure 81 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 11th October, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours reports that Mahks and Mahsuds in jirga assembled at Kaniguram on 9th instant resolved to pay balance of lakh and restore Kashmir Kar rifles. When Mulla Powindah lately was endeavouring to finance the tribe and had got the Mahks to join him, the party opposed to him arranged the Kashmir Kar attack. It is now on the cards that the Mulla will retaliate, especially as he was not present at the jirga, and is angry about the way Badar has been taken. His retaliation may be at our expense, and, till we know what turn internal affairs take with the Mahsuds, extra vigilance is necessary. If he means mischief, it will be by a band of eighty or a hundred raiders, and not by a gathering in force.

Enclosure 82 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 16th October, 1901.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 24th of September, 1901, which was repeated to the Government of India, I am directed to submit, for information, a copy of the letters noted in the margin, from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, containing particulars of the raid committed by a band of Mahsuds headed by a notorious outlaw named Nabi Bakhsh on Attar Shah Singh's village in the Bannu district.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th September, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram, dated yesterday, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin. Nabi Bakhsh was a Malik and a notorious bad character in the Bannu district. Last March he was arrested by the Deputy Inspector of Police of Ghoriwala, and, while being taken to the thana, he shot the Deputy Inspector and escaped across the border to the Mahsuds, going to live, it is said, with Mulla Powindah. His land was confiscated and sold, and Attar Shah Singh, a prominent Hindu living near Ghoriwala, I believe, bought some of it. About two months ago Attar Shah Singh's house was attacked by a few armed men, but the dakaits were beaten off without loss to Attar Shah Singh's people, and it was reported at the time that Nabi Bakhsh had been present at the affair and had been badly wounded. Action was, I understood, being taken by the Deputy Commissioner against the neighbouring villages, who were suspected of sympathy with Nabi Bakhsh. If he lived with Mulla Powindah, he possibly took advantage of the Mulla's absence at Badar to carry out his revenge, or the Mulla's absence is a convenient excuse for the Mulla should Nabi Bakhsh have been living with him, which I think was certainly true some time ago, if not now. This case will, of course, be taken up with the other offences charged to the Mahsuds since the commencement of the blockade.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 24th September, 1901.

My telegram of to-day. Report just received confirms death of Attar Shah Singh and six others killed by raiders headed by Nabi Bakhsh, outlawed murderer of Deputy Inspector. Raiders reported to be Mahsuds with whom Nabi Bakhsh has been living. Raiders reported to have entered district along the bed of Kurram river, but it is not known yet by what route they entered. One man wounded in addition to seven killed. Raiders went away apparently unharmed. Motive of raid apparently personal grudges against Attar Shah Singh, who had wounded Nabi Bakhsh two months ago in an attack on his village. Will telegraph further particulars as to territorial or tribal responsibility, if any, as soon as I know more about facts.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 25th September, 1901.

My two telegrams of yesterday. Slingsby, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and I returned late last night from pursuit of raiders who entered Khaasara pass. We just missed them as we blocked passes leading up to Shaktu, and raiders slipped by the Burji post, which was deserted when we came up with the cavalry at 4 a.m. We turned out pursuit parties from Michan and Bakka Khel Waziris. Some of the latter came up with raiders and fight ensued. One Mahsud killed; his head and Martini rifle brought in. One of the pursuit party killed. Raid organised and carried out by Nabi Bakhsh, murderer, said to be residing with Mulla Powindah. It seems time that

some retributive or other measures were taken to prevent, if possible, these recurring and successful onslaughts on our posts and villages. Pursuit party recovered three horses looted from Attar Shah Singh, whose eldest son and granddaughter were among the slain. Some of the neighbouring villages through which raiders went appear to have behaved badly.

Annexure 4.

POLICE DEPARTMENT, BANNU DISTRICT.

Special Report of an Offence (No. ²⁹ Part II. of September, 1901), dated the 25th September, 1901.

Description of Offence and Section of Law Offended against, also Distance and Direction of Place from Police Station and Name of Deputy Inspector in Charge.	NUMBER OF PERSONS		VALUE OF PROPERTY		Statement of the Case. Conduct of the Police Steps taken by them.
	Supposed to have been concerned	Arrested	Taken.	Recovered.	
Murder and Dakaiti—Section 996, Indian Penal Code, seven miles south-east of Police Station Ghoriwala. Third grade Deputy Inspector Muhammad Umar Khan.	About 40	—	Rs. A. P.	—	Date of occurrence— 23rd September, 1901. Date of report to Police — the 23rd September, 1901.
			7,696 12 0		
			860 6 0		
			2,300 0 0		
		Total ...	10,347 8 0		

Annexure 5.

Charge Registers Nos. 89 and 90, Sections 396 and 395, Indian Penal Code, Police Station, Ghoriwala.

About six o'clock on the evening of the 23rd September, 1901, a body of men alleged to be 200 Mahsuds, but probably not exceeding 40 or 50 persons, armed with rifles and led by a notorious outlaw Nabi Bakhsh, Sadozai, made an attack on the house of Attar Shah Singh in the village of that name.

Attar Shah Singh was a wealthy money-lender who had gradually absorbed into his possession a good deal of land in the neighbourhood, including the whole of the land which belonged to Nabi Bakhsh and his brothers, and it will be remembered that in July last Nabi Bakhsh, with a party of Mahsuds, Shinkai and a few other outlaws, made an unsuccessful raid and attempt on the life of Attar Shah Singh (*vide* special report No. 24, Part II., dated the 14th of July, 1901).

On that occasion the assailants were driven off, and it was stated that Nabi Bakhsh and one of the Mahsuds had been wounded. This time Nabi Bakhsh has been only too successful. The raiders entered the Bannu district at a spot as yet unknown, but probably somewhere near the Gummatti pass and travelled along the Kurram river. They must have remained hidden somewhere during the daytime, on the 23rd September, and in the afternoon marched to Attar Shah Singh, surrounded the house and opened a hot fire on the inhabitants, who returned it from the roof, where they had retired for safety, on seeing the raiders approach.

Attar Shah Singh himself was the first to fall shot dead. His son, daughter and three others were then shot down and his nephew wounded.

Meanwhile a chigah came up and one of the party was shot, making in all seven victims killed and one wounded. Nabi Bakhsh and his men then looted the premises, carrying away (it is stated) cash, jewellery, clothes, one rifle, two guns, four swords, two revolvers and two horses (altogether

valued at Rs. 7,696-12-0). Some of the raiders at the same time looted the shop and house of a neighbouring "bania" of cash and jewellery valued at Rs. 350-6-0. The bania's name was Tikaya Ram, and he was amongst the victims shot on the roof of Attar Shah Singh's house, where he happened to be at the time of the raid. The raiders then proceeded to village Nar Bachcha Khan, situated some two miles distant, where the children (a boy and two girls) of Nabi Bakhsh were living in the house of a man called Nasrat Khan. Nabi Bakhsh carried off his children, and it is stated also looted the house of Nasrat Khan of jewellery and cash valued at Rs. 2,300, but this theft is not admitted by the police who have reason to believe the statement has been made to show the family had no dealings with Nabi Bakhsh, whereas it is common knowledge that they are strong sympathisers, if not active abettors, of Nabi Bakhsh, Nasrat Khan himself and his son, Asot, both being in jail and awaiting trial for having aided Nabi Bakhsh in his former raid on Attar Shah Singh in July last. The raiders then departed in the direction of Jani Khel followed by a strong chigah party.

News of the dakaiti reached Police Station Ghoriwala at nine o'clock on the 23rd, and the Deputy Inspector immediately proceeded to the spot with all the policemen he could collect, and he is now in pursuit with chigah party.

Information reached Bannu at 11.30, and Inspector Kazi Amin Jan immediately proceeded to inform Mr. Donald, District Magistrate, who telegraphed at once to Jani Khel to guard the passes and proceeded in that direction himself with some sowars obtained from the cavalry and sent Inspector Kazi Amin Jan to the spot with 30 sowars.

The District Superintendent of Police was on tour in the district, and heard of the raid on arrival at Lakki yesterday morning (24th September). He immediately rode on to Attar Shah Singh, where he met the Inspector of Police and made an examination of the spot. The bodies had already been despatched to Bannu, but the whole premises were in an indescribable state of confusion. Blood was lying all over the place and the numerous bullet marks in the walls showed that the firing must have been heavy. The floors of various rooms had been dug up in the search after money and valuables.

It is undoubted that the raiders were Mahsuds, led by Nabi Bakhsh, who is living with the tribe and known to be befriended by the Mulla Powindah. A few of the party may have been outlaws and Waziris. Nothing further is known at present. The matter is under investigation, and particulars will be reported in due course after District Superintendent of Police has met the District Magistrate.

A raid of this magnitude is unknown within the memory of the present generation, and it is no exaggeration to say the whole countryside is terrified and appalled at the knowledge that it is possible for such a large body of armed trans-border men to march 25 miles into a British district and commit raids of this nature with (apparent) impunity.* Nabi Bakhsh, Sadozai, is a ruffian of the most desperate type. He is fanatical and half mad, and he led the attack

on Attar Shah Singh bareheaded, flourishing a sword and calling on "Allah" for success.

He has given out publicly his intention of paying off old scores and looting the ilaka, and it is imperative that something be done to save the people from this ruffian's depredations.

At present a feeling of insecurity prevails throughout the ilaka, and a growing belief that Government is unable to protect its subjects.

Camp Nowrang,
The 24th September, 1901.

A. C. STEWART,
District Superintendent of Police.

Annexure 6.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner of the Bannu District, dated the 26th September, 1901.

Copy forwarded to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, in continuation of my telegrams, dated 25th and 26th instant, respectively. The facts, so far as known at present, are fully given in the District Superintendent of Police's report, and I have no remarks to add to it just now, except that the death of Amardin, the Mulla's right hand man, at the hands of the pursuit party, supports the District Superintendent of Police's theory that Nabi Bakhsh is being befriended by Mulla Powindah, and further trouble may be expected; in fact, the countryside is apprehensive of this. It is also astonishing that such a large body of trans-border armed men should have advanced

They will be punished.
W R. H. MERK.

so far into the district without being seen by any one who was willing to give information, and that no assistance was given by the neighbouring villages except Mamma Khel, which lost one man shot dead. Enquiries are being made as to the cause of delay in reporting the attack to the District Magistrate

Endorsed by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 30th September, 1901.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to A. H. Dack, Esq., C S, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab

Enclosure 83 in No 3

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, dated the 19th October, 1901.

The blockade alone of the Mahsuds appears unlikely to bring tribe to their knees. There are two alternatives—(1) To continue blockade throughout winter and then to march through country with expedition in spring. This is recommended by Lieutenant-Governor (2) To continue blockade, but to vary it by succession of sharp sallies or raids of three or four days' duration from different quarters of cordon for destruction of crops and capture of cattle and men. These operations would be conducted by columns of 1,000-2,000 men, and the first would start from Wana and Sarwekai in last week of November. This plan is recommended by Commander-in-Chief, Military Member, General Egerton and myself, and, substantially, by Colonel Deane and Merk. I should have issued orders at once did not affairs in Afghanistan seem to render it desirable that you should be consulted before any blow is struck on frontier. My own belief is that blockade alone will not reduce Mahsuds, that blockade plus harassing may, and that this is the only way to avoid ultimate expedition. I do not think that area of fighting will spread or that tribes other than Mahsuds will be affected. Will you kindly telegraph as soon as possible your views on the matter?

Enclosure 84 in No. 3

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismaïl Khan, the 25th October, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Average prices of the main staples in the Mahsud country appear at present to be as follows:—

Maize	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	seers per rupee.	
Wheat	5	do. do.	
Barley	8 $\frac{5}{8}$	do do	
Rice	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	do. do.	
Tobacco	2 $\frac{1}{8}$	do. do.	} When procurable.
Salt	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	do. do.	
Cloth	3	yards	

These are what we should call famine rates in India. Maize has, of course, fallen, in consequence of the autumn harvest

3. Till the 9th instant, the whole tribe was fully occupied with the struggle over Badar, from which they have, at any rate temporarily, ousted the Darwesh Khel, whose garrison was permitted to depart with the honours of war. Mulla Powindah endeavoured, in vain, to intervene on behalf of the Darwesh Khel, and his prestige has undoubtedly suffered in consequence. After the conquest of Badar, a great jirga was held at Kaniguram, and good resolutions were again passed to pay the balance of the fine and restore the Kashmir Kar rifles and ammunition, but up to date without result. It is reported that Mulla Powindah has secretly thwarted the resolutions of the jirga which was held by his political opponents, and at which he was not present, and has persuaded the Shaman Khel and others to stand aloof from the arrangements of the jirga. It will be remembered that the difficulty put forward by the Shaman Khel is that although they are sharers to one-third in profit and loss according to tribal custom, yet, owing to their numerical weakness, as compared with the other two main sections, the Ahzai and Bahlolzai, and owing to their not having misbehaved at all, they ought not to pay a full one-third share of the fine; still they claim one-third of the future allowances

4. The Tochi and Bannu have been entirely free of raids. From the Dera Ismail Khan border petty thefts of grain are reported, in the course of which one band of thieves was pursued by villagers; two Mahsuds were wounded and one was captured, he will be tried by the Sessions Court. On the Wana side, Mahsud gangs have fallen on evil days. On the 18th and again on the 20th instant, the 5th Punjab Cavalry at Spin pursued gangs from whom they rescued 1,542 sheep and captured one raider, who will be tried by the Political Officer for the offence described in Section 395, Penal Code, and punishable with transportation for life. The cavalry report killing four and wounding five raiders. The Darwesh Khel have lifted large numbers of Mahsud cattle and sheep, and on the 21st instant, they came across a gang north of Wana on the way to the Upper Gomal to raid Powindahs. The Darwesh Khel attacked the Mahsuds and shot Raza, a leading Sheikh of Mulla Powindah, the gang returning to the Mahsud hills. Following so closely on Amardin's death, this is another blow to the Mulla. The Powindah migration down the Gomal is progressing quietly up to the present

5. Up to date Rs 74,283 have been paid towards the fine. The Tank bahurs have been stopped. A few trivial cases of blockade running have been heard of and are under investigation. Now that the Darwesh Khel and Bhattannis are coming down from the upper hills, it will be easier to keep an eye on them. The Shawal contingent has been withdrawn, as the Darwesh clans have migrated to the plains. Shawal is empty, and it is not safe to leave the contingents there. The Political Officer, Tochi, reports that the cold on the high passes into Shawal from the Mahsud settlements and from Shawal into Burmal is prohibitive of smuggling now.

6. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 85 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla, dated the 1st November, 1901.

Your telegram of 19th October. Mahsud. I agree to the course 2, a succession of sharp sallies.

Enclosure 86 in No. 3.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Sialkot, the 30th October, 1901.

With reference to the question of active operations in order to press the blockade of the Mahsuds, and, if possible, to bring the Mahsuds to submission by means of the blockade, I have the honour to inform you that I have personally discussed the whole matter with Mr. Merk, C.S.I.

2. If any operations are undertaken, it is essential that they should be vigorous, and that the Mahsuds should be repeatedly and continuously pressed in every possible manner in order that as much loss as can be caused to them, and that they be prevented from occupying their winter settlements and sowing their next crop.

3 Mr. Merk's idea is that relatively small columns should be constantly on the move, and that the levies and tribesmen on our own side of the line also be made use of

4. I understand from Mr Merk that the operations so far contemplated do not include any movement from the Tochi. Mr. Merk and I are both most strongly of opinion that, even if but little damage can be effected from the Tochi side, movements on our part from that quarter should be made simultaneously with those from the south to secure the usual effect which can best be produced by hemming the Mahsuds in on all sides. I think this is most essential to the success of the proposed pressure to be put on the tribe during the winter. It will be a distinct advantage in my opinion if matters are left as much as possible to the discretion of the local officers and authorities.

5 I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Merk, and consider that, if carried out vigorously, they will give Government the only chance of avoiding what they desire to avert, viz., the necessity for a regular expedition into the Mahsud country.

Enclosure 87 in No. 3

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 31st October, 1901.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins*. Officer Commanding Southern Waziristan Militia, wires from Khajuri:—*Begins*. On 28th both telegraph lines between this and Kashmir Kar and Toikhulla were cut in several places. Wire repaired yesterday. On 29th rear guard of Militia party from here were fired on by gang, 20 Mahsuds, seven miles from Kashmir Kar; one man, Militia, wounded. Gang fled. One of them was wounded. *Ends Ends*.

Enclosure 88 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 2nd November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Officer Commanding, Nili Kach, wires:—*Begins.* Mahsuds, number unknown, ambuscaded picquet five men this morning, killed three, captured two rifles. News reached Nili Kach 1.30 p.m. Have just returned from unsuccessful pursuit. *Ends.*

Enclosure 89 in No. 3

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 3rd November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Report just received that party of 32 rifles, 17th Bengal Infantry, forming part of escort of 75 men furnished for survey of Murtaza-Sarwekai road was ambushed this afternoon. No clear details yet received, but fourteen sepoy's said to have been killed and some of Mahsuds captured. Captain Argles, 17th Bengal Infantry, in command, has not yet returned from scene. I do not suggest that this incident make any difference in policy of deliberately wearing down the tribe this winter.

Enclosure 90 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 4th November, 1901.

My telegram of last night. Following from Political Officer, Wana, repeated for information.—*Begins.* Captain Jacob, Southern Waziristan Militia, wires:—*Begins.* Your wire. Captain Argles reports that survey escort, consisting of one Subedar and 32 men was returning from work to Khuzma Khulla. About 4 p.m. shots were heard at Khuzma Khulla post. Captain Argles turned out with available men, 17th Bengal Infantry, and Militia, and proceeded up Khuzma nulla. About 1½ miles up nulla he was fired on by a party of Mahsuds; these were quickly driven off, and half mile further up found overseer and one Havildar badly wounded and two coolies killed. A little further on about 16 bodies of sepoy's of survey escort were found and two wounded. Ground was searched until dark for remainder when Captain Argles returned bringing in wounded. From survivors' story it appears that escort was ambushed as last picquet was returning and shot down at close quarters, only seven escaping. Am proceeding with 50 Militia; 40, 9th Bombay Infantry, and 20, 17th Bengal Infantry, at daylight to-morrow to scene of attack. So far as can be ascertained at present, casualties are as follows: 16 sepoy's, 1 overseer, 2 coolies, 1 bhisti, 1 muleteer, killed; 2 sepoy's, 1 overseer and 2 coolies, wounded, 1 Subedar and 7 sepoy's reported missing, may possibly have escaped. *Ends. Ends.*

Enclosure 91 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Dera Ismail Khan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 4th November, 1901.

Discussed everything with Denning and Merk, and have also received copy of Deane's letter 71, dated 30th October, to Foreign Secretary, which has doubtless reached Your Excellency by this date. I agree with local officers and Deane.

- 1st—That action is necessary.
- 2nd—That action should be taken simultaneously from Tochi, where a suitable force is available, and from Sarwekal-Wana line.
- 3rd.—That proposals of the local officers for mobile column are sound.
- 4th.—That all details should be left to the local officers.
- 5th—That operations should be repeated at discretion of local officers.

Merk has arranged for tribal attacks from the north, east and south to follow on heels of our first attack, and I agree with the local officers that our second attack should follow upon these tribal attacks and be delivered about the 15th December. As a reserve, I think, it would be a good thing to move a battalion to Bannu and another to Tank in addition to force at present contemplated. The move not to take place till the secret is out. Proposal for the selection of these two battalions will follow, if Your Excellency approves of principle

Enclosure 92 in No. 3

Telegram from the Officer Commanding at Nili Kach, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 2nd November, 1901.

Picquets five men, 9th Bombay Infantry, were stalked by Mahsuds 1.10 p m yesterday. Two were killed. Two rifles captured. Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, Assistant Adjutant-General, Derajat, already informed

Endorsed by Military Department, dated Simla, the 5th November, 1901.

Copy of the above forwarded to the Foreign Department, for information.

Enclosure 93 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Dera Ismail Khan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th November, 1901.

Continuation of my telegram of 4th November. May I represent to Your Excellency that, if you decide upon action, we must begin on the 22nd November, and time is running short for necessary preliminary arrangements? There are indications that the Mahsud tribe as a whole is changing its attitude to one of tribal hostility, and there is considerable uneasiness along the frontier. On military grounds it appears very desirable to keep the initiative in our hands. If we lose it, the result may become grave.

Enclosure 94 in No 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th November, 1901.

Following telegram sent to Sir Bindon Blood:—*Begins* Viceroy repeated your telegram regarding action against Mahsuds. Please in wiring anything to Viceroy send, with His Excellency's permission, after to-morrow to me and to Military. I do not concur with your 3rd, 4th and 5th. As regards operations, nothing, in addition to what has been already approved, should be undertaken which entails troops remaining out of their posts after nightfall. There is no objection to a demonstration being made from the Tochi Pass on similar lines to, and simultaneous with, the demonstration from Jandola, returning at night. Please, after communication with General Egerton, submit any proposals for troops in addition to those already arranged.

Enclosure 95 in No 3

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, dated the 8th November, 1901.

Your instructions to Blood approved. I have told him to repeat all telegrams to you and to Military. Sanction of Secretary of State to proposals contained in my telegram of 19th October was received on 1st November. Please inform Blood.

Enclosure 96 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 8th November, 1901.

Your telegram. Survey party were laying out line of direct rail from Murtaza to Sarwekal mentioned in your letter of 27th May, 1901. Escort was provided of 75 men under British officer, who received personally instructions here from Military Authorities. He, however, apparently remained himself with 43 men at Khuzma Khulla Militia post and sent out 32 men under Subedar with Survey party. On return the escort appears to have neglected order of march and precautions expressly prescribed by General Officer Commanding, and must have been shot down in a lump in narrow ravine at very close quarters, as clothing of some of sepoy's is described as having been burnt by shots. Matter is being dealt with by Military Authorities. Mahsuds probably numbered less than fifty.

Enclosure 97 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Spécial Duty, Murtaza, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 12th November, 1901, and repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Have just seen military programme as sanctioned. Tochi and Jandola columns may not stop out one night. Since Datta Khel and Jandola are some distance from inhabited Mahsud country, these day marches will not even be demonstrative, and will be inoperative, since they will not reach any objective at all. I must point out that, if an expedition is to be avoided, it is absolutely necessary to deliver a very telling stroke at the outset. Jandola column will be eleven hundred infantry alone, and Tochi column nine

hundred infantry, which can be raised to one thousand, besides three hundred militia. Further, the Sarwekai and Wana columns will be two thousand six hundred infantry, and altogether four thousand six hundred infantry alone can operate simultaneously. Unless as crushing a blow as possible is struck at the beginning, the desired effect may not be attained. I, therefore, urge that Jandola and Tochi columns be permitted to be more active factors in this business.

Enclosure 98 in No 3

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 14th November, 1901.

Reference Merk's telegram, dated 12th November. I have to-day talked over the matter with Sir Bindon Blood and General Egerton, and we are all agreed on certain modifications which Sir Bindon Blood will telegraph to Commander-in-Chief, and which, we hope, Government will approve.

Enclosure 99 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Nahan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 16th November, 1901.

Reference Sir Bindon Blood, November 14th. I have sanctioned adoption of modified programme unless Your Excellency wires to him differently. The original further action proposed could be taken late if desired.

Enclosure 100 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 17th November, 1901.

I have never received Blood's of 14th November, and, therefore, do not know what modified programme is. If, however, as I understand, Blood, Deane and Egerton agree, and if you approve, I gladly sanction action decided upon. Please repeat to me Blood's telegram, but action need not be delayed.

Enclosure 101 in No. 3

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Rawalpindi, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 18th November, 1901.

Following is copy of telegram sent to Commander-in-Chief and to Military Department, 14th November, which I have been ordered to repeat to Your Excellency:—*Begins.* Deane, Egerton and I met this morning and agreed to recommend to Your Excellency the following modifications of original Waziri programme:—1stly, the Datta Khel column to move to Loargh Kotal afternoon of 23rd November and to vicinity of Razmak Pass 24th November as a demonstration and support to operations of levies and Darwesh Khels to be arranged by Political Officer; 2nd, the Jandola column, after moving to Shingikot and back on 25th November, may be used near Barwand as required. In the absence of any information regarding route,

we do not like to suggest moving of Jandola column on Splitoi from Shingikot with a view to junction with combined Sarwekai and Wana columns, 3rd, Wana and Sarwekai columns, after junction, to retire *via* Barwand if that route is preferred by General Officer Commanding when the time comes, 4th, we would prefer that artillery should accompany all the columns, but would leave proportion of these arms of the service to General Officer Commanding. If General Officer Commanding, Derajat, gets Your Excellency's order by the 18th November, he will be able to carry out original or modified programme without difficulty. *Ends*

Enclosure 102 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Wana, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 26th November, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

The present operations only singe the beard of the Mahsuds, and retirements of columns may be misunderstood by them unless followed up by continued offensive operations. If we were now to demand reparation for offences committed during blockade, the amount, exclusive of any fine, would be nearly two lakhs. I mention this to show that the tribe must be thoroughly broken this winter if a lengthy occupation of their country is to be avoided. An expedition is useless, for within four years of the 1894 expedition the condition of the Mahsuds was worse than ever. They must be thoroughly hammered if we are to have a permanent peace. In order to strike before whole tribe can combine and while the iron is hot, and before the winter rains and cold in the higher hills prove a serious obstacle to bivouacking, we propose that next week the joint Wana and Sarwekai columns in a compact body of two thousand five hundred infantry push to Ahmedwam, the Jandola column, a thousand strong with four guns, meanwhile bringing up supplies and tents to Ahmedwam, and that the three columns united with the two extra regiments, the desirability for which has already been discussed with the Lieutenant-General Commanding, go into an entrenched standing camp there. Total force in camp would thus be three thousand five hundred infantry, four guns, besides eight hundred Tochi and Wana Militia, which I can provide. This force, if not considered sufficient, could be augmented by five hundred infantry, if the two regiments mentioned above are brought up, the remainder of these two regiments being utilised to strengthen blockade posts, the garrisons of which have been reduced to a minimum, to permit of present operations. Ahmedwam is three easy marches from Tank, and from Ahmedwam we can raid with ease and safety in every direction and make the lower half of the Mahsuds' country absolutely untenable for tribe, depriving it thereby of its winter pastures and of its spring crops, which is grown in this lower country. Two months of this will, I think, bring the tribe completely to its senses. If these proposals commend themselves, I suggest that all details be left to us, and that orders be issued to us immediately, because delay will give heart to the Mahsuds and will lose us the advantage of retiring the initiative (*sic*) the benefit of the moon. Moreover, the weather will soon be cold. While we are at Ahmedwam, movements would continue to be made from time to time from the Tochi.

Enclosure 103 in No. 3

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Wana, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 27th November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, we suggest that it be left open to us either to move joint Wana and Sarwekai columns direct on

Ahmedwam or, if it seems preferable owing to weather or other reasons, to move them *vid* Haidari Kach to Jandola and thence all three columns to move up together to Ahmedwam.

Enclosure 104 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 27th November, 1901.

Telegram from Commissioner, Special Duty. I entirely agree with Merk and strongly recommend that authority be given at once for continuance of operations and movements as he and General Officer Commanding may see will be effective. I think all are to be congratulated on success of late movements. While operations last, I would advise strengthening of Jandola column.

Enclosure 105 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 27th November, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day Urgency for early orders for further movements proposed is necessity for another blow to be struck before Mahsuds have time to remove grain and fodder to the hills and to hold jirgas to arrange concerted action.

Enclosure 106 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, Malakand, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 27th November, 1901.

General Dening wires:—On 1st or 2nd proximo I suggest my moving to Kundiwam and raiding from there with the force at my disposal, viz., 3,500 infantry from the three columns, four guns and 50 sabres. I have sufficient transport to take (on) tents, bedding, and supplies can be arranged for. Now would be opportune if two battalions available to send both to Tank. If we are constantly on offensive, then they will be obliged to give in. Also General Dening's. My telegram of to-day—for Kundiwam please read "Ahmedwam," which is three marches from Tank. See routes in Waziristan, Nos. 47 and 50. I went fully at Dera Ismail and Peshawar into proposals now made by Dening, with which I fully and entirely concur. You, of course, see Dening's reason for change from Kundiwam to Ahmedwam. I recommend sanction being given me as under:—

Firstly.—To contract the cordon of blockade by moving a post or posts forward where possible.

Secondly.—To continue raiding from new posts and from posts as may be suitable.

Thirdly—In (view) of effectually carrying out firstly and secondly, to move two fresh battalions to Tank at once.

I am now beginning to see my way to bringing the Waziris to their senses without an expedition. But to do so we must give the local people a free hand. I am obtaining further details of his proposals from Dening, which I will send you when received, but meanwhile I hope my three points as above will be approved at once

Endorsed by Military Department, dated Simla, the 29th November, 1901.

Copy forwarded to the Foreign Department, for information

Enclosure 107 in No. 3

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, Maymyo, to the Commander-in-Chief, Bikaner, dated the 30th November, 1901.

Viceroy approves proposals, which seem to him legitimate extension of recent successful operations rather than expedition, and he begs you to issue immediate orders.

Enclosure 108 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 3rd December, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Three Maliks arrived this morning to ask what terms would be given to the Mahsuds I simply told them that the orders of Government, when received, would be communicated to the tribe and sent them away

Enclosure 109 in No 3

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Dera Ismail Khan, to Foreign Secretary, dated the 3rd December, 1901.

Reference Commissioner, Special Duty's telegram I agree with Merk, and think we should make a great mistake to enter into any discussion about terms with Mahsuds at present. The blockade should be pressed, to settle the question, if possible, so as to ensure future peace If we discuss the matter now, we shall have the same trouble again six months hence.

Enclosure 110 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Camp, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th December, 1901.

*Clear the line. Egerton's telegram begins:—*6th December. Following scheme for tightening blockade of cordon, in case Dening's operations for Ahmedwam should not be sufficiently effective, the later phases of which have been repeated to Foreign Department by Lieutenant-General, Punjab, has been drawn up after personal interviews with Deane and Merk. General principle being to continue to deal severe blows from unexpected direction,

consider, therefore, that so-called reserve brigade should be actively employed, and not kept concentrated at Tank. Dening's operations can only be effectual in the southern portion of Mahsud territory, it will then be necessary to act in an area bounded on the north by the Khaisora valley, west and south by the Tank, and east by the Bhattanni country. This tract is a vast grazing ground. To give effect to this, the following are my proposals:—One battalion to move to Datta Khel, two battalions with two guns to Khagan Zuo at mouth of Shaktu, the fourth battalion to reinforce Sarwekai and Wana column of 1,000 to 1,200 troops, and any Militia available to move *vid* Loargai next to Mamirogha, thence *vid* Khaisora and Dosalli to Waladin in the Shaktu. Karkunwam column to Mundawam in the Shaktu, there linked up with Datta Khel column. Jandola column, about 1,000 strong, to Shuza Tangi. A column from Ahmedwam, 1,200 to 1,500 strong, to the Upper Shuza. These four converging columns would thoroughly search neighbourhood in from two to three days, and then return to their respective starting points. *Ends.*

This is considerable improvement of Dening-Merk original proposal, which would almost amount to expedition. Mahsuds will receive sharper lesson than from expedition, and it constitutes legitimate extension of recent successful operations. I therefore strongly recommend that sanction be given to Egerton's proposal.

Enclosure 111 in No. 3

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Edwardesabad, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 8th December, 1901.

I have seen trans-border jurgas here who are delighted with hope that Mahsuds may now be thoroughly crushed. Neither here nor at Dera Ismail Khan have I found a man with a good word for them. The only fear all express is that Mahsuds will come forward at once with customary submission and break out again as soon as accepted. Losses of Mahsuds, exclusive of Dening's last operations, are reported by Bhattannis and Wazuris as 80 killed. Dening's operations have had great effect.

Enclosure 112 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 8th December, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Following is connected accounts of operations just concluded. On fourth instant force marched over twenty miles from here to Dwe Shinkai, which is within twelve miles of Kaniguram, and camped at Dwe Shinkai for the night; the advance was unexpected by the Mahsuds. During the night of fourth the news spread over Mahsud country, and leading men and others assembled at Karanima, six miles above the camp, Mulla Powindah receiving the news at his home, where he at once collected his personal adherents. On morning of fifth troops destroyed some villages and towers two miles above the camp, and returned towards Guri Khel, being followed up by Mahsuds who came to close quarters in rear guard action. That night the Mulla with his following had reached to about three miles from the camp, and is reported to have sent message to Mahsuds in southern and eastern lower hills to move up with their families and flocks towards the higher country, as Government was evidently in earnest. This migration is just what is wanted, as concentration of Mahsuds in high and cold country

will be severely felt by them. On the sixth the troops halted at Guri Khel, there was sniping during the day, but not at night, Mulla Powindah and his following keeping parallel to the troops at some miles distance. On the seventh the troops retired slowly to Marghaband, destroying villages. The Mahsuds followed up as far as Kot Shingi, charging to close quarters once, and being repulsed with much loss. To-day part of the force returned direct to Jandola, the other part moved up the Shai Tak as far as Zeriwam, destroying villages without opposition, the Mahsuds having disappeared, the whole column is now back in Jandola. Our total casualties have been one British officer wounded, native ranks thirteen killed, seventeen wounded. Mahsud losses not yet accurately known, but following men of note known to have been killed: Jan Khan, son of Badshah Khan, who is the principal Mahsud Malik, also Asal Khan, Guri Khel, a most notorious raider, who took a prominent part in the Khuzmah attack on 17th Bengal Infantry, also Shadamir, Gereral, and his brother, and Isad Khan, Shungi, well-known raiders. Fifteen villages and six towers destroyed, and much grain and fodder. On the body of Jan Khan were found a revolver marked "made for Fracis, Times & Co, London," also Henry-Martini cartridges marked F.T.C. with double-headed eagle, also other solid drawn Henry-Martini cartridges of different non-Government patterns. I have seen similar F.T.C. cartridges in possession of Darwesh Khel this year, and the Commandant, Border Military Police, Dera Ismail Khan, reports that among the arms deposited as usual by the Powindahs at Tank this year are fifteen Henry-Martini rifles, evidently imported from Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 113 in No. 3

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Gwalior, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 11th December, 1901.

Egerton proposes to carry out the operation specified in his telegram repeated in my telegram of 7th December, as soon as additional troops now *en route* reach him, and to commence the following minor intermediate operations about the 14th December:—One thousand men and four guns in two columns co-operating for three days from Jandola and Sarwekai in the Trebran of the Shunaki Algad, and after returning to Jandola and reequipping again operate as far as Kharwanan and again retire on Jandola. Egerton expects by these tactics to draw attack from strong gathering from Kaniguram and Makin, as it is in these retirements that the greatest loss is inflicted on the Mahsuds, and he is confident of success with the selected troops employed. He states that Dening and Merk fully concur. I think that all concerned may be permitted to carry out these proposals, which I propose sanctioning, unless Your Excellency objects.

Enclosure 114 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Gwalior, dated the 12th December, 1901.*

Your telegram 11th. If Egerton is confident of success, and does not fear difficulties on retirement, Military Member and I are willing to sanction proposed intermediate operations. But if your telegram means that columns should only be 500 men and two guns each, we think this too small. Probably, however, you mean 1,000 men and four guns in each column. Pre-

* NOTE.—The further operations referred to in this telegram were finally sanctioned at a conference in Calcutta on 18th December.

parations can be made for further operations proposed in your telegram of 7th December. But it does not seem necessary to issue orders for their actual execution until I have returned to Calcutta.

Enclosure 115 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 1st January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

This morning three columns started from Jandola, Jani Khel, and Datta Khel, to converge on north-eastern portion of Mahsuds' country. If the operations are successful, they should result in large captures of cattle and sheep, besides dealing with Mahsuds' villages in the Shaktu valley. Addressed Chief Commissioner

Enclosure 116 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 2nd January, 1902.

I have the honour to forward the enclosed report from Mr W. Merk, C.S.I., on Special Duty in connection with the Mahsud-Waziri Blockade, on the recent operations undertaken with a view to render the blockade more effective, and to prevent the Mahsuds from continuing their raids into British territory and on British posts

2. That steps of the nature taken were necessary is shown by the fact that in certain tracts the blockade had not affected the Mahsuds to any great extent, that they possessed considerable stores of grain and fodder, and that they were comfortably settled in the lower and warmer valleys of their country, whence their raids into British territory were carried out with great impunity.

3 During my late tour on the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu borders I was much struck by the system of Mahsud terrorism under which that frontier has suffered for some time past, described and complained of by the Chiefs and British subjects as well as Bhattannis and Waziris. The state of affairs has been such that it is absolutely necessary that steps be taken such as will settle the Mahsud question for some years to come, if not once and for all

4 In the case of the Mahsuds the policy adopted by the Government of India in determining to avoid a regular expedition, and, instead of this, to coerce the tribe, if possible, by an active blockade, has been more than justified by the results attained and now reported by Mr. Merk. Government are not only relieved of the expense of extensive operations, but the system followed avoids the spending of money in the Mahsud country for the benefit of the Mahsuds, and more real loss has apparently been already inflicted on the Mahsuds than in any of the former expeditions against them

5. The operations have been very successful, and Colonel Tonnochy's move on to Makin and back was a very brilliant performance. A very satisfactory feature has been the manner in which the Southern Waziristan Militia in particular carried out their part. It is good proof of the value

of militia in the hands of competent officers and supported by troops Mr. Merk and all the officers concerned are to be congratulated on the success of the plans they drew up.

6 I think it not improbable that these late operations will drive the Mahsuds into submission to Government. The native opinion on the border is definitely that the Mahsuds will submit and will later again break out, that the tribe cannot be reformed and induced to relinquish their old ingrained habits of murdering, raiding and thieving by anything short of permanent occupation of the country. This is a point which may some day be forced on to Government, but meanwhile the line now taken may well be given a fair chance, and the knowledge that Government can coerce them by means of a blockade and can reach them with their troops without moving in force into their country and putting money into the pockets of the people in purchase of supplies and making of roads, may, it is hoped, have some effect in keeping them quiet in future. Until the Mahsuds do submit, I consider that operations should be continued, and, in my opinion, it is essential that Government should leave the tribe to sue for peace. Any hasty submission or calling in of the jrgas to discuss terms would put us back into the old position.

When the time comes, we should first satisfy ourselves as to what terms can be enforced, and those terms should be dictated to the tribe by Government and then enforced in full.

Annexure 1

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner on Special Duty, to the Honourable Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 15th December, 1901.

I have the honour to enclose, for the information of Government, copies of reports by the officers on Political duty and by the Commandants of the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias, relating to operations from the 24th to the 28th ultimo, against the Mahsuds

2. I do not propose to trouble Government with similar reports on each operation. I submit these reports because the surprises (except in the case of the Jandola Column) came off successfully, though this was contrary to general expectation; because the reports of the Commandants of Militias are gratifying testimony to the efficiency and marching powers of their corps, and because subsequent operations of the now offensive blockade will, the element of surprise excluded, be conducted much on the lines indicated in the report.

3. During the discussions preceding the action that was taken, the secret must have leaked out, where, I do not know, but on the 13th November there was a strong rumour in the Bannu Bazaar that four columns were going to attack the Mahsuds in the last week of November; and across the Indus the matter seems to have been known to several whose position did not imply an official knowledge of confidential matters. The report of a pending attack by Mahsuds on us, which I carefully communicated to every post in Bannu, Northern and Southern Waziristan and Dera Ismail Khan, served to confuse men's minds, some believed one thing, some another; and though the Mahsuds had a shrewd suspicion that something was coming, they had no idea (except at Jandola) that it would be so soon or so sudden. At Jandola an incident which, at first sight seems trifling, aroused their suspicions, the troops coming up ostensibly as reliefs marched in with bands playing, to trans-border men this means action.

4. I assess the damage done to the Mahsuds to be Rs 95,000 worth at a moderate estimate; moreover, 201 prisoners were taken. Of these,

about 20, who were either old and infirm or else young boys, were released, and of the remainder a part have already reached the Dera Ismail Khan Jail and a part are on their way there.

5. Leaving aside the blow struck at the Mahsuds, the surprises are of immense value as demonstrating to them (and to other tribes) that even distant quarters (such as Makin, destroyed in the brilliant moves of Colonel Tonnochy) are not safe from our sudden attack, while the subsequent march of General Dening has shown them that Kaniguram can be easily reached in two marches from Jandola. This knowledge of helplessness tends more to keep tribes on their good behaviour than anything else.

Annexure 2.

Copy of a letter dated Jandola, the 27th November, 1901, from Lieutenant J. B. BOWRING, Assistant Commissioner, S. W. M. Column, to the Commissioner on Special Duty.

With reference to the operations of the S. W. M. Column against the Mahsud Wazirs on the 24th—27th instant, which I accompanied as Political Officer, I have the honour to make the following report:—

The force moved out from Jandola at 11 p.m. on 24th.

2. The force reached Zhokkai at 3 a.m., the tower was blown up and houses destroyed, the place, however, was empty, as a warning shot had been fired from the ridge 2 miles from Jandola, when the column reached there. Further on, a mill was blown up.

From the Narai between Zhokkai and Mandana large fires were seen at Kot Kai,* and on arriving within two miles, the continuous shouting of the inhabitants showed that they were aware of our approach.

3. Kot Kai, a very strong position of caves and morchias at the point of the ridge where the Tuzar runs in the Shi Tak, was attacked about 4.30 a.m., and carried after a strenuous defence. After the capture the Shingis kept up a continuous sniping, and some Malikshais from Isappara came down to assist. Owing to the number of men wounded the Officer

Commanding Column decided to return to Jandola at 8 a.m. Asad Khan Shingi's tower was not blown up,† owing to the Engineer party being employed in the destruction of the Amal Khel tower, which having been set fire to caused

great delay.

4. In the retirement, the force was closely followed up, and Asad Khan, with Guri Khels and others from the neighbourhood of Shahmazai, came down to assist the Shingis, but by the time they had arrived the troops had reached Mandana Kach, having burnt much fodder *en route*. At Mandana a Subadar of the 1st Punjab Infantry was shot and Fateh Khan's house was set alight and considerable damage done.

The force had 1 Subadar, 2 men, and 1 follower killed, and Lieutenant Peile, I.M.S., slightly and 16 men wounded.

The following names of Mahsuds killed and wounded have been ascertained:—

Shujak, brother of Baramat, Aimal Khel Bahadur Khan, Mian Khan, Shingi, Raza Khan Shungi, killed, and Brahum Gul, Sarang Amir Shah, Khan Zaman, Middi Khan, Shingis, wounded.

There were, doubtless, more casualties. No prisoners were taken, nor cattle looted. S. Asad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, Jandola, rendered valuable assistance, and the guides behaved excellently, especially Fateh Khan, who deserves special mention.

The cattle were removed from Kot Kai the day the troops reached Jandola, a day or two before the attack, and it is reported that a Bhattanni, resident of Kot Kai, gave information on the 24th to the Shingis that something was up and put them on their guard

The force remained in Jandola the 26th, and on 27th reconnoitred towards the Shuza to strengthen the Bhattanni Lashkar, but this move was abortive, because the Jalal Khel against whom it was directed had driven their animals to distant hills.

I estimate the total damage to the Mahsuds at Rs. 2,500

Annexure 3.

POLITICAL OFFICER'S REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SARWEKAI MILITARY COLUMN.

The column started at 4.15 a.m. on the 25th November. The Political staff consisted of the Political Officer, Tahsildar Muhammad Azim Khan, Officiating Naib Tahsildar Kul Khan, and about 20 Mahsud spies and guides. Naib Tahsildar Ahmad Khan remained in Political charge of the Sarwekai post.

By a fortunate chance the inhabitants of the nearer villages in the beat of the Sarwekai Column had sent Tale, Michi Khel, Malik of Dama Khel, to Sarwekai on the morning of the 24th to find out the intentions of Government and give them timely warning if any movement seemed to be intended. Tale was placed under supervision on his arrival at Sarwekai, and the people of the Tangai, Waspas, &c., not having received any message from him, remained in fancied security, and were taken completely by surprise on the morning of the 25th.

Before reaching Barwand, a column under Captain Rice, 35th Sikhs, was detached to make straight for the upper part of the Waspas Algad *via* the Ezhghozh Narai and surprise the village of Waspas. Officiating Naib Tahsildar Kul Khan accompanied this column.

The Political Officer and Tahsildar remained with the main column which reached the first villages in the Tangai shortly after sunrise. The ground was unfavourable for the capture of live stock, and though the flocks and herds had only a very short start, they mostly succeeded in getting away* by the small side nullahs which came down from the Splitoi direction.

The village of Hassan Kelai, a small but strong Kot without a tower belonging to Abdurrahman Khels, was destroyed by a Pioneer party with explosives, and the cave villages of Ghazo and Khak were burned, the former contained a large quantity of grain. The movements of the main column ended with the occupation of the village of Espara Raghzai in the afternoon.

Meanwhile Captain Rice had surrounded the village of Waspas, four or five miles to the west of Espara Raghzai, and had shut in a number of the inhabitants and their cattle, Shah Salim, † the Malik of the place, surrendered, and was made prisoner, but a tower which commanded the whole village and the approaches to it was held by several men with breech-loaders, and it did not appear that the village could be entered without loss disproportionate to the object to be gained. Captain Rice accordingly turned his attention to the neighbouring village of Abas Khel in the Tangai, it likewise contained a tower, and was held by a few breech-loaders, but it was not so difficult of entrance as

* These were captured subsequently by the Southern Waziristan Militia, whom I sent out to raid the northern slopes of Kundighar.

W. MERE,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

† A mischievous, double-dealing old man

W. MERE,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

Waspas, and the inhabitants abandoned it without resistance. A brother of Samandar, one of the Malikhs, being taken prisoner. The tower was blown up and the village burned. Shortly before dark the Political Officer with two additional companies joined Captain Rice, and the party returned to Waspas, but it was then too late to make arrangements for surrounding the village, besides which the cattle and most of the people had escaped during Captain Rice's absence at Abas Khel. Waspas was entered without opposition the next morning, and the tower and village destroyed along with the grain which they contained.

While this destruction was taking place at Waspas on the morning of the 26th November a column had been sent out from Espara Raghzai to the village of Badshah Khan on the Nano Narai, which was found deserted. The Tahsildar accompanied this column. Badshah Khan was somewhere in the neighbourhood and attempted to gain time by holding out hopes to Major Drew, in Command of the Column, that he would give himself up; but he did not do so, and after destroying two large towers and the whole village the column withdrew. It was followed up by a few men during its retirement. After the return of Captain Rice from Waspas, and before the return of Major Drew from Badshah Khan, a strong tower belonging to Sadda Gul between Espara Raghzai and Abas Khel was destroyed and the cave villages of Gaji Khel and Masti Khel in the same direction were looted by detachments of the 35th Sikhs and 29th Punjab Infantry, the last-named two villages yielded a large proportion of the prisoners and cattle brought in by the column.

On the night of the 26th the whole force bivouacked at Espara Raghzai, and the next morning it retired *via* Barwand to Sarwekai, which was reached about 2 p.m. The Mahsuds unsuccessfully attempted to harass the first stage of the retirement.

A few houses belonging to Tale, Michi Khel Malik, were spared in consideration of the services rendered by him with the column, and also as an incentive to him to continue furnishing political information at Sarwekai and as a convenience to spies sent out from Sarwekai in the Tangai direction who cannot well work without a friendly *pied-à-terre* there. In Ghazas village one cave belonging to a spy was spared. These were the only exemptions. Unquestionably the chief results attained by the Sarwekai Military Column were the destruction of Badshah Khan's and Shah Salm's villages and the capture of Shah Salm. These incidents cannot fail to impress the lesser Malikhs throughout the Mahsud country. The losses in grain, cattle and prisoners to the inhabitants of the lower Tangai at large have also been serious; the exact numbers of prisoners and live stock brought in have already been reported. The prisoners include besides Shah Salim, Ghazo, a Thaman Khel Malik, and Daulat Khan, brother of Samandar, Abas Khel Malik. There is still some doubt as to the exact number of casualties sustained by the Mahsuds in killed and wounded, but Khojagai, Abdurrahman Khel headman of Hassan Kelai and a relative and harbourer of Mianji Khan, the celebrated badmash, was certainly among the killed. The successful retirement on Barwand will be depressing to the Mahsuds, as it proves them incapable of following up troops, which are well handled, with any success. Badshah Khan, Adam Khan and their sons personally took part in the unsuccessful chigha.

The only village left unvisited and undestroyed in the beat of the Sarwekai Column were two or three in the Tangai above Abas Khel and those in the Gurgurra and Nazhwar Algads which come down from the direction of Kanguram. These could easily have been disposed of on the 27th, had not want of rations obliged the force to return to Sarwekai on that day.

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan.

Sarwekai,
The 30th November, 1901.

Annexure 4

COPY OF A REPORT BY MAJOR HARMAN, D S O., COMMANDANT S. W MILITIA,
DATED SARWEKAI, THE 1ST DECEMBER, 1901.

On Tuesday, 19th November, at 4 p.m., I received your orders to concentrate 250 or 300 Militia at Sarwekai. As I was debarred from using the wire, I sent orders to Captain Knox, whom I expected to reach Kajuri on the 20th, by a Darwesh Khel sowar. The orders reached Captain Knox at 3 p.m. I sent down Jemadar Ayub Khan with 15 Niazis to free the Afridis there. In accordance with orders, I recalled all the Mahsuds from the posts. The last of them reached Wana on Friday, the 22nd, including the two ex-levies in my employ at Spinkai Kach. I reduced all my posts except Kashmir Kar, which I considered too isolated to weaken, to a minimum, and gave orders that the diminished garrisons were merely to protect the posts and were not to patrol.

I marched to Ngandi on the 22nd with 2 Native Officers and 74 rifles, and was met by 1 Native Officer and 41 rifles from Toi Khulla and 1 Native Officer and 51 rifles from Kajuri.

I marched to Sarwekai on the 23rd, taking 7 rifles from Dargai Oba, and was joined by Captain Knox, with 4 Native Officers and 86 rifles, who marched over the Khuzma, giving a total of 2 British Officers, 8 Native Officers and 259 rifles. Subedar Saidulla from Toi Khulla brought me 18 Powindah coolies, some of them armed, and Malik Gulrang reached Sarwekai late on the 24th bringing in 25 more from Kajuri Kach. In order to carry out the destruction of the Lower Shaman Khel villages I started at midnight with Captain Knox, the Subedar-Major and 6 Native Officers and 200 rifles and marched across the low hills between the Danaot and Wach Shahur Valleys and reached the Tangi below the mouth of the Sarela at 5.30 a.m.

From Sarwekai I detached Subedar Shahdad with 40 Eusufzais to hold the mouth of the Sheranna Nullah with orders to remain concealed until the cattle of Badrakai should come out at dawn.

On my arrival at the Sarela Tangi I picquetted the hills on each side with the Gandapurs and Merwats, sent on the Darwesh Khel to picquet above Moghal Shah's village and halted the remainder till dawn. This latter picquet alarmed the dogs of Moghal Shah's village, and some of the cattle of this village and some of Haidrai Killi were driven off before we attacked.

At the first streak of dawn I sent Captain Knox with Bhittannis and Sherannis against Moghal Shah's Kirri, the Subedar-Major with the Khat-taks against Haidrai, and went with the Afridis to Fattehroz Killi, firing broke out at once at Moghal Shah's Kirri. The Subedar-Major pushed on to Haidrai and was followed by Captain Knox, who first attacked the two villages near him. Within a very short time we were in possession of all the villages. Firing meanwhile had been general. When I saw that fighting was meant I sent up a picquet of Bhittannis on to the high ridge above my early morning picquets. This picquet proved very useful later in the day, as a considerable party tried to get on our flanks and rear, and would have succeeded except for the good work done by this picquet.

I then started off the cattle up the Shahur and went on to Haidrai. A heavy fire was heard from near Badrakai's villages, and it proved that Subedar Shahdad had carried out his orders splendidly and seized all the flocks and cattle, the men of the towers* bolting into the hills.

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* All these towers were subsequently blown up on the 10th instant, and three more prisoners taken by troops marching from Jandola to Sarwekai.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

When I reached Haidrai I found we had one man wounded. Captain Knox was out recalling a small party who had pursued the Haidrai cattle into the hills. I

left him with the rear guard, and sent Subedar-Major Mir Hassan with the Khattaks to take and retire along the high hill on the right bank of the Danaot. As soon as we retired we were persistently fired on, and a fresh party joined the enemy and climbed the high hill on the left bank. We retired slowly, burning all we could, and capturing all the cattle in the valley. Subedar Saidulla, Afridi, saw some cattle trying to get away and at once sent Jemadar Ghani Khan with his merwats after them. Ghani Khan rounded them up and pushing on picquets got in touch with Subedar Shahdad. The Subedar-Major had a skirmish on his hill and had two casualties getting off the hill and rejoined us at Badrakai's towers. Subedar Makham and his Bhattannis having successfully opposed the men in front of him, got off his hill without loss and joined us. I had halted the cattle at Badrakai's spinney, as the men were suffering from want of water. Captain Knox, who had managed the rear guard splendidly, had here to halt his rear guard. Excellent positions had been taken up, and most of the opposition gave up here. Captain Knox, after letting the cattle get well on, brought off every one without loss. Two men followed on sniping the rear guard, one of our men who tried to *chupao* these two picked up one Lee-Metford cartridge and one Martini cartridge at a place from which they had just left. We arrived at Sarwekai at 4 p.m. with seven prisoners (another died on the road).

2,044 Sheep and goats
 19 Donkeys.
 315 Cows and calves
 6 Camels.
 3 Horses.
 Total cattle, 2,387

The conduct of the Militia in this their first fight was excellent. The men worked at a great pace, were excellent, and were well able to look after themselves. Had any of our picquets failed us, we must have had considerable losses. Several picquets declared they inflicted losses on the Mahsuds during the retirement and some were killed at our first onslaught. As the Mahsuds showed no anxiety to press home any attack, though Kalu and his gang were present, I feel sure they had losses.

Captain Knox was admirable in his handling of the rear guard. He was always with the rear party and showed excellent judgment throughout.

On the evening of the 26th orders were received to start as early as I liked for the top of Kundighar and search the northern slopes for cattle. As there were no coolies for the troops, I took up 24 mules with me carrying one day's rations. I marched off at 6.30 a.m. As I did not know the ground, I preferred to have daylight to work in as I knew the ground to be difficult—1 blanket per man and 8 boxes ammunition.

The forces consisted of—

* Major Harman and Captain Knox, 2 British Officers,* 7 Native Officers and 196 rifles Militia

† Lieutenant Coates, 29th Punjab Infantry, † 2 Native Officers and 70 rifles of the 29th Punjab Infantry and 35th Sikhs.

No opposition was met with during the ascent. A spring was found on the way up two miles from the Marg near the top of the hill. There was sufficient water for the men, but not enough for the mules. On the advance guard reaching the crest beyond the Marg, cattle and sheep were seen grazing below and beyond us on the far slopes of and near the head of the Waspas Nullah. I decided to drop "gadda" coats and select our best hill-men, and sent them on under Captain Knox to round these up. I selected 70 men, and Captain Knox went off at a great pace with these. I picquetted the crest, keeping everyone out of sight of the Waspas Nullah.

The distance to be got over proved much longer than I anticipated. The slopes are cut into deep ravines and some of the ground proved very

difficult. When Captain Knox reached the hills overlooking the column connecting the Shin Algad and the Waspas Algad, he dropped two picquets on to the column, and recognizing that it would be impossible to get the cattle up the road he had gone down by, he brilliantly decided to detach 24 rifles under the command of Havildar (1st grade) Mohibulla, an Adam Khel Afridi. These he sent straight at the cattle with orders to hustle them over the Waspas, a very deep nullah, and with orders to drive them up the spur which ran down below the site of our bivouac. He took on the rest of the men along the hill on the left bank of the Waspas and moved down till he immediately overlooked the Abbas Khel villages. Unfortunately before the movement was complete the sheep and goats had turned and were grazing back towards their villages. As Captain Knox got down over the hill he encountered opposition, and the alarm was given, and the sheep and goats were driven right away down the hill. Captain Knox

<p>* These will be taken up presently.</p>	<p>W. MERE, Commissioner on Special Duty.</p>	<p>found there were eight villages below him which had not been touched* by the Sarwekai Column. I was greatly relieved to see that he did not attempt to go on down after the sheep and goats. He maintained his position until Havildar Mohi-</p>
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bulla had got the cattle well over the stream, and nearly up the big spur running down from our bivouac. In crossing the Nullah, Havildar Mohibulla's party was fired on, and he returned the fire freely. He states he killed four men here. Captain Knox then drew off his men, getting back to his picquets with only one man very slightly wounded. He was followed up until he reached the hills overlooking the column. He then drew off the picquets and reached the bivouac about 4.30 p.m.

Captain Knox showed great dash and judgment in this affair. He was always on in front, and as my men told me tired out some of the best of our hillmen. The want of water distressed the men much, but they all got back without assistance. When Captain Knox started to raid the cattle I brought on more men and remained on the hills overlooking the column I mention above.

As soon as I saw the course of events, I sent back to camp with orders to push out available Sikhs well down the spur across and up which Mohibulla was driving the cattle. As soon as I saw that Captain Knox was getting well back from his advanced position, I left the picquets and went back to the bivouac. I had previously left orders for the Subedar-Major to, as soon as he got in (he was on rear guard) select a bivouac, make defences and to send down for water. He had been told there was always water on the top of the hill, but found that the two tanks on the Marg were dry, and that no cattle had been on the hill for about a month.

When I got back to the bivouac, a distance of some two miles, I found Mohibulla, judging that the hill was too steep for the cattle to get up to bivouac, had crossed the spur and was driving them fast down another spur trending towards Sarwekai. The Subedar-Major with 30 Sikhs had reached a marked under feature above the path Mohibulla had crossed by. He was instrumental in driving back a small Chiga that had come up from Waspas. He waited till Mohibulla had got well down the spur, and brought his men back up the hill. I was fortunately able before the sun sunk below the hill to helio into Sarwekai. The force had no water, it came up by 4.30 p.m., and the men were very done up, so I had to trust to Mohibulla pulling through, though I expected he would be followed up. He had sent me up one of his men to explain to me why he had gone down and to report that his party was well able to look after themselves and the cattle. He reported next day that 40 or 50 men came after him with 2 or 3 breech-loaders. He drove the cattle on with six men hugging the hill, and extended his 17 others (all good men) as a rear guard, and succeeded in preventing the pursuing party closing on the cattle. The Officer Commanding Sarwekai sent out parties to the edge of the Rogzha who lit fires, and I was delighted to get a helio next morning that all the cattle had got in by 7 p.m., and that we had no casualties.

Havildar Mohibulla reported that he certainly shot some of the men who followed him up, and showed me that they followed up to about 400 yards from the line of fires.

Had I known the ground, I doubt if I should have attempted to seize the cattle that day. A reference to the map will show the great distance covered by the men. However, everything came off, and our sole casualty was one man slightly wounded. I am informed that we killed Ghazo, a leading Abbas Khel, and wounded Shah Salim's brother.

The number of cattle brought in was as follows:—

Camels	3
Cattle	240
Goats		24
Sheep	49
							<hr/>
Total .	..						316
							<hr/>

One very fine camel which refused to be driven was shot by our men.

The force on the hill had barely enough water that evening and many of the men were very done up. The night, which was very cold, passed quietly. At dawn—I did not think it safe to attempt sending a party through the ilex forest at night—a strong party went down to the spring for water. They reached us about 9.30 a.m. The men were then able to cook food. Meanwhile we watched Kundiwam and the Khaisara burning, and satisfied ourselves that no cattle or fugitives made for the Shin Algard.

Shortly before noon I sent the Khattak Company under Subedar-Major Mir Hassan to the top of Kundighar with orders to search Madijan with glasses, directed the Sikhs to hold and descend down the crest of the northerly spur, and after unsuccessfully trying to communicate with the Wana column by helio, retired down the nullah we came up by. Captain Knox, after his tremendous exertions of the day before, want of water and a cold night, got a severe attack of fever. He was able to walk down to the spring, but after that, had to be carried down the hill. He recovered sufficiently to ride in when we met our horses at the bottom of the nullah. Nothing occurred during our retirement. The Subedar-Major reported that nothing was to be seen on Madijan or the western slopes of the hill. Lieutenant Coates with his Sikhs took the mules up and down the hill over bad ground, finding his own road. He worked this very well without delaying us at all.

The conduct of my men and their endurance pleased me immensely. In spite of the scarcity of water after an exceptionally hard day, all were cheerful, and all of them got down the hill fit and well next day. Sarwekai was reached by 5 p.m.

Of Captain Knox's services I cannot speak too highly, and I shall be glad if the Commissioner will think fit to bring them to the notice of the Military Authorities. In all that he did he showed great dash, endurance, and judgment, and always worked to carry out the objects I had in view. He was invaluable throughout. I similarly wish to bring to notice the valuable services of Subedar-Major Mir Hassan, who has now got 29 years' service. For a man of his age his endurance and energy are wonderful. He is a splendid man on service, very cool, with lots of dash, and is greatly looked up to by all ranks of the Militia.

My Hospital Assistant Abdulla Khan is worthy of notice. He never spared himself, was always where he was wanted, whether under fire or not, and was always cool and quick over his work. He proved himself an excellent man and able to undergo great fatigue without breaking down. I was greatly pleased with the go and dash and cheerfulness of all ranks.

The results of these affairs has shown that the pick of my men, excluding Mahsuds, are:—

(I take the companies in numerical order)

The Darwesh Khels
The Bhattannis
The Afridis.
The Sherannis

I have excellent men among—

The Gandapurs.
The Eusafzais
The Merwats
The Khattaks

I am in hopes that this opportunity will give the necessary fillip to recruiting, and that in a few months the whole of the corps will be up to the standard of the selected men chosen for this affair. I wish lastly to bring to your notice the name of Malik Gulrang,* a Dotanni Powinda, who brought me coolies from his own Kirris near Kajuri. His men have behaved excellently throughout and were of great assistance.

* He will be rewarded
W MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

GENERAL REMARKS

The tactics employed were, as nearly as possible, Mahsud tactics. The fastest and best men raided, the rest were used for picquets. I was impressed of the necessity of picqueting thoroughly, and on the top of hills within reach. A Mahsud will not come up a hill against a picquet, and events proved that he takes great care of his own skin. They proved themselves adepts at taking advantage of grounds.

I was surprised at the long distances men can cover, and if allowed to go the pace the hill men can cover ground.

The Militia had no collective training. The constant picqueting and patrolling from our posts stood us in good stead. The men were accustomed to rely on themselves in small parties. Most of them looked on the skirmishing as a huge joke.

If any raid is again intended on Tangar, a force should certainly be sent up Kundighar to descend on to the head of the villages. There would be then no escape for the villages if simultaneously a force dashed up from Barwand. Pace and picquets are everything.

Annexure 5.

BRIEF REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS WITH THE WANA COLUMN.

Late on the afternoon of the 24th November, I met a jurga of the Ahmadzais and dismissed them just before the gates of the fort closed after communicating to them the orders of the Commissioner on Special Duty that they were now at liberty to raid the Mahsuds to any extent they pleased. They departed expressing their intention of sending out gangs as soon as possible and this they seem to have done, as I have had news of gangs being out in all directions. These do not appear to have done very much damage so far, though I have received news that the Shakawals lifted several score of cattle which had escaped from the Khaisara, and more damage may have been done which has not yet been reported, but there can be no doubt that these gangs serve a useful purpose in distracting the attention of the Mahsuds.

The column left Wana at about 9 p.m. on the evening of the 24th November and marched straight to just above the Naraioba Levy post,

where a few hours' halt was made. It then proceeded through Shakai down the Sperhaaland. At this point I sent the Shakaiwal Mahks, whom I had brought with me, back to their homes with strict injunctions to mass their tribesmen and prevent any force from Kaniguram coming down on our rear. Before proceeding further a short description of the country may serve to elucidate this report. The Khaasara in an exaggerated form represents the letter Z, the Tiarza post lying to the left of it and Shakai to the top. Commencing from the top the first village is Torwam and down that arm are built eight kots or separate habitations, mostly strongly guarded with towers. However, it should be noticed that enumeration by kots can give no very clear idea of the situation, as one kot may be merely a barn with a tower, while another may be a large collection of houses. Again, one kot may be counted occasionally as one or more, according to the ideas of the enumerator, owing to the superposition of the building. The valley is one of very extreme fertility, to my mind quite superior to any I have seen in South Waziristan. The arable soil in the bed of the Khaasara is large in extent and appears exceptionally good and is irrigated entirely by canals. The jowar crop had been just got in, and the roof of every building was very thickly covered with jowar straw, while many heaps of buried grain of considerable extent were unearthed and doubtless there are many more. The theory that the Mahsud country cannot support itself is certainly false so far as the Khaasara is concerned.

To return to the column, shortly after eight Torwam was sighted. Our raid appears to have been a complete surprise. The people emerging from their houses with cries that the troops had come, commenced to drive off their cattle. As we were then well over a mile distant, all attempts at pursuit with infantry proved futile, and the Mahsuds were successful in getting most of their cattle into the hills behind where pursuit was practically impossible. The only cattle captured were a few which were left behind in the haste of flight. The troops then spread down the upper arm lighting the fodder on the tops of the roofs. This caught excellently and in almost every case the fire burnt down into the rafters of the roof itself and the whole came down. In a very short time the Upper Khaasara was in a blaze, opposition then began from Kot Maisara and Juma and Daun Kot, which villages contain most of the bad characters of the Khaasara as well as a considerable proportion of the Kashmir Kar rifles. These men were, however, firing from a very safe distance and did no harm. Colonel Bunbury, thinking the first firing of the houses had been done too hurriedly so that the Engineers had no chance, and to rest his men and return to complete his work more thoroughly, drew off first to a low hill about half a mile in the direction of Wana, and then to a distance of another mile, where, after a short halt, he moved his column down through the Wucha Tiarza to the plain by the Tiarza Militia post, where he bivouacked for the night. During the day the cavalry had been creating a diversion at the lower end of the Khaasara. The next day the troops moved out about 9 a.m., accompanied this time by the cavalry and artillery, and taking the route of the Tandar Tiarza. The cavalry going on ahead managed again to effect a complete surprise. This, I think, must be put down to the idea of the Mahsuds that the attack was only a day's raid and to their distraction on hearing of the operations of the other columns. On this occasion the cavalry pushing far ahead, brought in 120 prisoners and about 350 cattle, sheep and goats. The infantry succeeded in killing Maisara, a well known bad character, while the whole of the lower part of the middle arm of the Khaasara was set ablaze and two towers belonging to the Michi Khels blown up. The troops again bivouacked on the plain by the Tiarza post.

The next day the troops rested till three in the afternoon when they moved up and bivouacked on the Tiarza Narai, reaching there just at dark.

Starting next morning before dawn the cavalry moved on Kundiwam and with the aid of the 23rd Pioneers burned eight kots on the lower arm down to the Tangi, while the main body turned its attention to the nest of bad characters round Juma Kot. The tower of Maisara, which practically

commands the valley, was blown up as well as the two towers of Juma Kot and the two towers of Dauram. These villages were fired by Captain Sherwood and are practically razed to the ground. The owners of these are all Nekzan Khel, Nana Khels, and are the very worst characters in the Khaisara, and, indeed, take a place of honour in the whole Mahsud clan.

The 23rd Pioneers then came up the valley driving cattle which had been again brought back to their houses and completing any small burnings that had been overlooked. Then the troops returned to Wana. To sum up the proceedings, the troops have killed over 20 Mahsuds, wounded several more, taken 120 prisoners and about 250 cattle and 350 sheep and goats. Seven towers have been blown up and the entire valley, numbering 29 kots from Torwam to the Tangi, fired and mostly roofless, while every particle of fodder stored has been destroyed. This loss falls on the Michi Khels and Nana Khels, who own the valley in about equal shares, and on the Shabi Khels who own a small share. There can be no doubt that on the first day the advent of troops came as a perfect surprise, and that the secret of the preparations had been well kept. The whole extent of the damage, if put into actual figures, is probably about Rs 50,000, but we have to reckon in addition the enormous discomforts caused by the loss of fodder, the capture of the prisoners and the unroofing of the houses at this season of the year. While we have demonstrated to the Khaisara Mahsuds how well they are within striking distance of Wana and with what ease this raid can be repeated at any day

F W JOHNSTON,
Political Officer

Camp Sarwekai,
The 1st December, 1901

Annexure 6

Copy of a letter, dated the 4th December, 1901, from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner on Special Duty

I have the honour to submit my political report on the late operations against Mahsuds in directions of Spinkamar and Makin

The force, consisting of 1,000 men and 2 guns, moved from Datta Khel at 9 20 p m on 23rd. After a very trying night, Shudrar Narai, distant 13 miles, was reached about 10 a m on 24th, the troops having halted for three hours on the northern slopes of Shudrar. A start was made over the wooded slopes south-west of Shudrar at 12 noon in direction of Spinkamar. In the afternoon the Abdullai village of Dod Gul, with two towers, was sighted at the bottom of a deep nullah, running down from Spin Narai. The force descended on this, being probably seen for the first time as they went down the nullah side. The villagers had cleared off with most of their animals by the time the village was reached, leaving only two men, who came out with a sheep as the troops approached. They were taken prisoners and the village occupied. Further down the nullah two more hamlets were seen, and a party went out ahead to capture any men or animals there might be in them. Here a few shots were exchanged. Five prisoners were brought in, all Abdullais.

The night passed quietly. In the early morning the two towers in Dod Gul were blown up and the village thoroughly burnt. The troops then marched down the valley, a few shots being fired here and there, destroying and blowing up as they went. In this way, the tower of Mohabat, a very fine one, and two hamlets were destroyed. Then a tower and hamlet belonging to the Pushon (blacksmiths). Next a tower and hamlet of Abdulla Khan, a tower and hamlet of Nazar, a tower and hamlet of

Amazdar, a tower and two hamlets, owners unknown, then a tower and hamlet of Tin, then another hamlet. This brought us to the Shuran Algad where there was a cultivated "Kachi" on which Kandar, the Khushali Tori Khel outlaw, who was killed a few weeks ago, had built his tower and village. After his death, the village was occupied by Kandar's brother and one Mir Alam, member of his gang. This tower and village were also destroyed, as well as a mill belonging to them. At this point a certain amount of firing took place, the enemy being among the wooded slopes to the southwest. Captain Forster, 2nd Punjab Infantry, was shot through the calf, there being no other casualties. Some shots being fired from the vicinity of a Datta Khel Tori Khel village near by and this hamlet was also burnt. The troops then retired over the Razmak plain, a wide open grassy down, intersected here and there with nullahs, to the village of Bitt, Malikshahi Mahsud, which was reached about 5 p.m., and found to have been just evacuated. This village is that marked "Mahsud" in the map, south of the Narai called Razmak Narai, but of which the real name is Solanarai. The night was passed in peace.

The force halted at Bitt's village to rest. A party of 200 men was taken out by the Political Officer to the Wuzi Khel Mohmit Khel villages of Zargar Khel and Razoni at the head of the Khaisara. These villages have been noted all along for assisting Mahsuds in the way of supplies. There was also a fine outstanding against them, so the opportunity for a barامت could not be neglected. The villages were completely surprised, and a certain number of goats and sheep and a quantity of ghi were brought away for the troops. Their chief men were also arrested and brought along.

Colonel Tonnochy carried out a reconnaissance during the day to the Nawal Narai above the camp, from which some Tori Khel and Mahsud villages on the head waters of the Shaktu could be seen. The force was unmolested during the day.

Leaving about 200 men in camp to look after the sick, the remainder of the force started at 6 a.m. towards Makin, with the exception of a few shots fired from the hills on the left at our flanking parties in the early dawn, and some fired probably by exasperated homeless men from Spinkamar on the right, none of which did any damage, the ridge overlooking and commanding Makin was reached without opposition. The place was practically evacuated, a few persons being seen in the villages on the far side of the bay of cultivation, round which the hamlets are placed. Picquets having been posted on the covering knolls the work of destruction commenced. Three towers were blown up and all the hamlets lying on the northern slopes utterly burnt out. The inhabitants had themselves, to save their name, set fire to a certain amount of brushwood, &c., round their houses, and this helped us materially. Only three of the Makin hamlets were unvisited. A good many animals which had been left behind were also destroyed. The retirement commenced about 1.30 p.m., and the force was followed up for four miles, sustaining then and in the firing during the day a loss of one man killed and three wounded. Bitt's village was reached at 5 p.m.

Shortly after dark some sniping took place, and one man, 3rd Sikhs, was hit in the groin. He has subsequently died at Datta Khel. During the night a man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was also dangerously wounded on picquet.

The force left Bitt's village at 7.30 a.m., the village being thoroughly burnt, during which process a man of the 3rd Sikhs was shot in the foot by men concealed in the trees on the hill side. For the first eight miles as far as Zargar Khel village the force was followed up and rear guard fighting took place in which one man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was killed.

and two or three wounded. One of the Wuzi Khel men, who had been arrested the day before, was also shot in the leg. Reports received subsequently relate that Mulla Powindah himself came up to Bitt's village in the morning with some of his "talibs". These he sent on to Razmak Narai to ascertain if the force was going to halt at Razoni, in which case a lashkar would have come to attack. In the rear guard fighting that ensued one of these talibs was killed, and the remainder returned to the Mulla who went back. I had heard the night before that during the burning of Makin he had been at Kaniguram.

The pursuit ceased at Zargar Khel and the force arrived at Mamirogha about 2 p.m., resting there for an hour and then going on to Datta Khel which was reached at 7 p.m., after a march of 22 or 23 miles.

The actual casualties during the five days were two men killed, eight severely wounded (including one officer) one of whom has since died and eight slightly wounded, mostly grazes. Damage done to Mahsuds was 13 towers blown up, some of which were very fine ones, fourteen hamlets destroyed. Two-thirds Makin burnt utterly. All fodder and corn, wherever found, the former in very large quantities, burnt. A considerable number of cows, bullocks, sheep and goats killed. Owing to the nature of the operations cattle could not be driven off, and no large flocks or herds were seen. Several Mahsuds, all Abdullai, captured.

Four Mahsuds killed and probably more, but this again owing to the fighting being all of a rear guard nature, could not be ascertained. In addition to the above the moral effect of a small force of 800 men and 2 guns having reached and burnt Makin must have been very great.

The operations would seem to have come as a complete surprise to the Mahsuds. Prisoners told me that they had no idea of anything of the kind, until they saw us descending the hill side to Dod Gul's village. Neither do I think that the Makin men had much idea that we should pay them a visit. On our arrival there the houses had only shortly been evacuated, and I was told that a Native Officer saw the hill sides above the villages on the west covered with flocks, herds and people. I put down the slight opposition experienced to the fact that most of the men knowing of our near proximity on the north, and probably also of the Wana Column on the south, were removing their families on the day we arrived.

Maize in fair quantity was found in most houses and small bits of salt* here and there, but in no quantity. I saw no tobacco anywhere or cloth, and only here and there a little lump of gur. Compared with the houses of the Wuzi Khel of the Khaisara those of the Mahsuds were very empty of all luxuries and necessaries. Of course a great deal may have been taken away, but this could not have been the case in the first village we visited, which was similarly poverty stricken. I should say that the blockade has been hitting them hard.

In addition to the force from Datta Khel, a party of nearly 200 Militia, under Captain Ferguson Davie, accompanied by Captain Finnis and Lieutenant Godwin went from Miramshah on night of 23rd to the Shaktu at Baramand. The Commandant's full report on this operation has been forwarded to you.

Annexure 7

Copy of a letter, dated the 4th December, 1901, from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner on Special Duty.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a report received by me from the Commandant, Northern Waziristan Militia, on his recent operations. A small force such as he had under his command could not have done more than it did. By making their presence felt on the Shaktu the object desired

was attained and Militia deserve very great credit for the fine march they made in difficult country, doing as they did a distance of over 60 miles in under the 48 hours. That a force of recently raised Militia were able to accomplish this reflect the greatest credit on Captain Ferguson Davie and his officers.

Annexure 8

Copy of a letter, dated the 26th November, 1901, from the Officer Commanding Northern Waziristan Militia, to the Political Officer, Tochi.

I have the honour to report that I left Miramshah at 7.30 p.m. on the 23rd instant with 172 rifles and 20 Mounted Infantry of the Militia and proceeded in the direction of the Shaktu valley, intending, if possible, to raid any Mahsud villages I might be able to surprise. Captain Finnis, second in command, and Lieutenant Godwin also accompanied the force.

Proceeding *viâ* Tal and Kam Sarobi we crossed the Khaisora undiscovered at 1 a.m. on the 24th, just above the village of Guland and below the village of Badki. From this point the path led upwards as far as the Gurgurai Kotal due south and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles (2 hours' march) from the bed of the Khaisara. On the Kotal, which we reached at 3.30 a.m., we halted for half an hour continuing our march till 5.30 a.m., when we arrived at the Khanaki Kotal. As the men were too tired to proceed further I decided to lie up for the day in the Khanaki Nullah to let them rest, and proceed, if possible, to Shaktu during the night of the 24th. We left the Khanaki Nullah at 6 p.m. on the 24th, and proceeded *viâ* the Shaid Ziarat to the Dakki Algad, which we crossed at 8 p.m. From the Dakki Algad the path led up to the plateau of Kam Sham, which was reached at 9.30 p.m. On the advice of the Tori Khel Maliks accompanying us I halted in a Ziarat at the north end of the plateau till 4 a.m. on the 25th, and then proceeded as quickly as possible due south across the plain along the Ziande Nullah to the Shaktu, at the junction of the Ziande Nullah with the Shaktu we turned due west and proceeded along its left bank, halting finally at 6.15 a.m. at a Ziarat about half mile above Baramand. The Maliks, who up to this point had been most confident regarding the success of the raid, here showed signs of uneasiness regarding the lateness of the hour of our arrival, and as they were unable to point out the positions of any Mahsud villages, or give any accurate information regarding probable numbers of men or houses, I considered it advisable to retire at once. The men were too tired to have carried out a retirement if pressed, and there was every reason to expect that the country through which we should have to retire would be as difficult as that through which we had advanced.

I retired on Idak over the Kemal and Khazhamlas Narais to the village of Khanir in the Khaisara and thence *viâ* Katira. The force halted one hour at Khanir, half an hour at Katira and arrived at Idak at 6 p.m., having been marching continuously with the exception of these two halts for 14 hours. I think the raid would have been successful if I could have got anything like accurate information regarding the position of any Mahsud village and if, instead of having halted at the north of the Sham plateau during the night of the 24th, we had proceeded to its southern end, and we should have there been within an hour's march of the Ziarat, where we finally halted, and arrangements to surprise the villages could have been carried out before dawn. I think the force was discovered while halted in the Khanki Nullah; during the daytime several small parties of men were seen by our look-out men close to the spot where we were lying, our tracks anyhow must have been seen, and again while halted on the Kam Sham plateau a gang of raiders passed within 300 yards of us. Not wishing to disclose ourselves, I gave orders not to fire on them and tried to capture them; a horse neighed and the gang bolted to the hills. Two other parties of men also

approached our position, but returned towards the Shaktu, and I think though they did not know who we were that they gave information regarding our presence, and the Mahsuds were ready for us. From the Ziarat above Baramand, where we finally halted, a fire, and what looked like a signal fire too, was visible in the hills above, where a Mahsud village was said to be. It was disheartening to all ranks to have to retire without doing anything, when so close to our goal, but I think, taking everything into consideration, it was the only course to pursue. At the time I did not know it, but on our return march a well known Tori Khel badmash informed us that Mulla Powindah was with the Jalal Khels some four miles from where we halted, and he would most probably have joined in if there had been any firing.

I should like to say a word in praise of the way the men of the Maltia worked, they were as keen and cheerful as possible, and the fact that they covered over 60 miles of bad country carrying 60 rounds of ammunition, two days' food and a cape speaks for itself. The cold while halted at Kam Sham was intense, and sleep was out of the question, fires could not be lighted for fear that Mahsuds would see them, and all ranks had to remain prepared for every eventuality.

Of the 172 rifles that left Miramshah on the 23rd only 19 did not complete the whole march, and 13 of these reached Katira, only six miles distant from home.

As requested by you, the Mahks of the villages of Musakki and Asad Khel in the Khaisora were arrested on our return journey, and have been sent into Miramshah.

Copy of a letter, dated the 9th December, 1901, from Captain C P DOWN, Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to W R H MERK, Esq, ICS, CSI., Commissioner on Special Duty.

In reply to your telegram I have the honour to state that I put down the damage done to Mahsuds by the Tochi Column as under:—

	Rs
13 Towers at Rs 200 each	2,600
14 Hamlets burnt at Rs 300 each average	4,200
Grain, forage, &c, destroyed	2,000
Animals killed	500
Total	9,300

Enclosure 117 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, North-West Frontier, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 16th January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsuds having sent in letters of full submission asking for terms, also a deputation of Saiyids, I have replied that I am prepared to see the jirga and discuss terms, provided, as preliminary condition, that jirga brings balance in cash of fine of one lakh and all rifles taken during the blockade. I have given the jirga till the 21st instant to send me a letter in reply to mine. I hear that the jirga meets to-day or to-morrow.

Enclosure 118 in No 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, North-West Frontier, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 22nd January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga having notified by letter and deputation that they accept of preliminary conditions, I have given them till the 1st Zilkad, corresponding to the 9th February, to comply. The deputation suggested permission to borrow the cash in British territory, which I refused. As the troops require a rest, and as we must in any case wait for the heavy winter snows which have not yet fallen, the delay is convenient on other grounds. Proposals for final settlements will be despatched to-morrow.

No. 4.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th January, 1902.

Foreign. Mahsud jirga has sent in letters of submission asking for terms. Merk has replied that he is prepared to see jirga and discuss terms, provided, as preliminary condition, jirga brings in balance of fine and all rifles taken during blockade. He has given them till 21st January to reply.

No. 5.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd January, 1902.

Foreign. My telegram of 18th of January. Mahsud jirga have notified acceptance of preliminary conditions, and Merk has given them to 9th of February to comply.

No. 6.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th February, 1902.

It is expected that the preliminary conditions referred to in my telegram of 23rd January will be complied with by the 9th February. The Mahsuds are trying hard to fulfil them. When they have complied with these terms that before the blockade is raised they must surrender certain named outlaws and must restore all animals looted during the blockade. This done, the accounts against them would be regarded as closed. As to our future relations with the tribes the matter will have subsequently to be discussed. Unless the tribes can show satisfactory proof that they are able and determined to perform their obligations, the former allowances to them will not be renewed.

No. 7.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 6th February, 1902.

To insist before blockade has been raised on all Merk's conditions, may possibly commit us to further military operations. What we require, so far as the raising of the blockade is concerned, is the full performance of our original demand, plus reasonable reparation for offences committed during blockade, due allowance being made for the damage that we have recently inflicted. Any further demands from Mahsuds will, preferably, be a matter of bargain, in connection with the grant of allowances to the tribe. Applying these principles, the Government of India consider that, in addition to the preliminary conditions accepted by the Mahsuds, namely, payment of balance of fine in cash and restoration of rifles taken during blockade, Merk should demand surrender of outlaws, and restoration of animals carried off during blockade up to the end of November, 1901. The jurga can be told that when these four conditions are accepted, and fulfilled, the blockade will be raised, and the account against the Mahsuds will be regarded as closed. When blockade has been raised our future relations with tribe will be settled. On this point Merk should tell jurga they must supply us with clear proof of their sincerity, and of their ability and determination to enforce order before any allowances are fixed.

No. 8.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 6th February, 1902.

I have the honour to submit, for information, a copy of a note written by Mr Pison, Assistant Commissioner, who was for two years in charge of the Tank Sub-division. At Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, as already reported in my No. 9 P, dated the 2nd January, 1902, I heard complaints of Mahsud terrorism on all sides, and later in talking over the subject with Mr Pison, I asked him to give me a note of what he knew of it by his own experience. His note gives some idea of the intolerable state of affairs which existed on the Dera Ismail Khan border.

Annexure

Note by P. Pison, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, dated the 1st February, 1902

I have been asked to illustrate the attitude of the Mahsuds during 1899 and 1900, while I was Assistant Commissioner at Tank. During those years, until the commencement of the blockade, the terrorism systematically created by the Mahsuds was marked. Apart from the unprecedented number of raids and outrages, this terrorism penetrated to the ordinary avocations of not only the zamindars of the border, but also to the Border Military Police, the Police, and even higher Government officials. There are plenty of statistics dealing with raids. The other effects were less definite, more insidious, and could naturally be observed only by those on the spot. I will try to recollect as many illustrations as possible, but these are perforce only scattered instances dependent on memory.

It would of course be an exaggeration to say that the Mahsuds ever attempted directly to intimidate British officers. They were far too clever for this. But they actually did intimidate superior native officials. Bhanju Lal,

Tahsildar, told me that on one occasion, during the hearing of a case in his Court, a Mahsud deputation had commenced with petitions and proceeded to direct threats regarding his decision of the case. Karimdad, the Naib Tahsildar, who was deputed to superintend the demolition of a tower illegally erected by Fattah Khan, Shingi, near Musalli, went long afterwards in fear of Fattah Khan's revenge. Similarly, the police treated the Mahsuds entirely differently from other offenders. A notorious raider, Tuman, Chuhand Khel, was got in, I was away at Sheikhbuddin at the time, and Deputy Inspector, Thana Ram, let him go rather than remand him to custody. Mr. Grant will recollect the same official, during the Shingi baramta, demurring to the handcuffing of arrested Mahiks. Yet Thana Ram was a most excellent police officer generally, I have seldom met a better. In the Gumal Thana, I have reason to believe, bands of armed Mahsuds used consequently to stroll round the Miani lands, looting crops as they pleased. The Mianis would not report these at the time, but send in belated petitions in the hopes of getting some monetary compensation out of Government when tribal cases were settled. Neither the police nor the Border Police did anything to check this. Practically no cases under the Arms Act were ever sent up from the Gumal Thana. Notwithstanding this, I believe armed Mahsuds were everywhere.

I was confirmed in this view by an incident in November, 1899, when I happened to be riding to Murtaza at a time when tongas do not ordinarily pass. I met a Mahsud carrying a gun down the high road in broad daylight. He was arrested, proved to be a well-known badmash, and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. I do not believe for a moment that, had the police in any way attempted to enforce the Act against Mahsuds, such an occurrence would be possible. Indeed, before the beginning of 1899, the Arms Act seems not to have been enforced at all against Mahsuds. When I accompanied Mr. Grant in the Shingi baramta (7th February, 1899, so far as I remember), any number of valuable rifles were found in the Mahsud houses. These must have been "carried." It was shortly after this that attention was directed to the stringent enforcement of the Act against Mahsuds. The orders then issued were always alluded to by the police as the "new orders about Mahsud arms."

The Border Military Police again were useless from fear. During these two years, so far as I know, not one Mahsud was ever killed or even wounded by the Border Military Police, and this in spite of the Zam massacre, the shooting of four Border Military Police sepoy at Wana, and the many rifle thefts. It was well known that no Border Military Police sepoy would ever shoot a Mahsud. He would fire, but be careful to miss.

It was generally a recognised fact that the Mahsuds had become more and more dangerous of late years. I have had many conversations with our own Mahiks on the subject, and they attributed the fact to their receiving large allowances with which to buy rifles, to the disarmament of British subjects, to the invariable consideration shown to Mahsuds of all classes in British territory, and to the Mahsud colony. The last-named scheme gave every Mahsud "badmash" an explanation for his presence; it afforded a perfect rendezvous for raiding gangs, and a handy repository for arms and stolen property. Beyond Dabra the road was almost as unsafe as beyond Murtaza. Besides this there is no doubt the colony had the worst influence

on surrounding clans. It was, as a Gundapur
 * K. S. Haji Kalandar Khan. Khan* dryly described it, a "school of badmashi opened by Government for the instruction of our young men."

It was of course when a large jirga was in, that the Mahsuds' conduct was the most overbearing. Thefts were then rife, but the jirgas had to be conciliated. My kitchen was broken into and a man stabbed within 20 yards of my bungalow. Mr. Gee's horse clothing was looted, the serais were broken into, and the shops in Tank bazar pilfered just as the Mahsuds pleased. Two cases were brought before me in which the Hindu shop-keepers had rushed off to the police, but on being confronted with the Mahsud prisoner in Court, refused to open their mouths against them, evidently in abject fear. As the jirga discussions were over, I had both the Mahsuds flogged. But

shortly before this the Commissioner had instructed me not to take up a case against a Mahsud under the Arms Act, owing to the jurga This was in March, 1900.

I remember two instances showing how very largely even prominent men were affected I had appointed Choka Ram, our only Hindu Lumbaradar of the Sub-division, upon a committee to assess the value of improvements made by Mahsud tenants in the Utar Colony; he implored me, in the most abject way, to excuse him, admitting he was too much frightened. Choka Ram is a most respected man, an ex-Kanungo, and very often referred to for an expert opinion on valuing crops, &c

A far more striking instance was an occasion when, to my intense astonishment, Ghulam Muhammad of Chaddar came up to give security for a Mahsud badmash under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code. Ghulam Muhammad had the best reputation in the sub-division and was a man who was trusted in criminal jurgas to stand out against the most influential interest and intimidation I can remember now his bitter shame and humiliation when I asked him if he was giving the security willingly, and he replied, "do you really believe I should ever do it willingly?"

I attribute the assistance given in raids to Mahsuds by border villages almost entirely to fear and disarmament In one case I arrested some of the Koti Sheikhs who had seen the Mahsuds firing on Gurni post. Though they were told they would be imprisoned till they disclosed the names of the offenders, they preferred any imprisonment to the consequences of informing against Mahsuds Their position was, it is fair to say, peculiarly exposed.

I have mentioned the tendency of Mahsud Mahiks to constitute themselves a final Court of Appeal On one occasion they gave me a petition, demanding that I should decide a civil land case between Mianis in favour of one side On another occasion a telegraph chaprassie applied for the settlement of a case under section 10, Frontier Crimes Regulation. The Deputy Commissioner definitely refused this After the order was delivered, an application from the Mahsuds appeared demanding that the case should proceed on the ground that the man was their "hamsaya" Personally, I found the only way to stop this practice was to tear up the petition publicly and put the original litigant on security, but this was regarded as an innovation, and I have heard a petition of this sort on behalf of an outsider convicted under British law listened to in jurga, and hopes held out that something might be done to propitiate the jurga.

I think the attitude of our own subjects towards the Mahsuds was due not only to fear of the tribe but also to fear of Government action. Rightly or wrongly, there was a prevalent idea that all Mahsuds were privileged persons, to offend whom would be to offend the authorities They were exempted from all annoyances, stamp duty on petitions, begar and all other burdens Even in the case of the joint irrigation labour performed by all villages irrigating from the Gumal dams, the Mahsuds Colonists were exempt and their share performed by British subjects. Mr Gee mitigated this subsequently by helping the zamindars with a grant from the Colony savings, but it was never expected that the Mahsuds should do any work The whole feeling as to Mahsud privileges is difficult to describe and illustrate When I first came to Tank, even the chaprassies used to announce that a Mahsud was waiting, in a manner that showed all other work, however important, was to be thrown to the winds. When I refused to let Mahsuds interrupt the Court on all occasions, they complained on the subject to the Political Officer.

Another extraordinary privilege allowed to the Mahsuds was that of carrying arms (of all kinds) along the eight miles of road from the Zam pass to Tank. Consequently the road was utterly unsafe and dakatis were common. I remember several cases now. The ridiculous feature of the system was a Hindu shop-keeper carrying a dagger on that road was tried under the Arms Act, while a Mahsud badmash carried his dagger freely

Muhammad Afsul, the Gidi Khel Malik, once told me (quite politely) that I was mistaken in thinking Mahsuds in British territory were to be treated like other persons, he went on to say that he quite realised the power of Government, but was aware that Government did not want the expense of opposing Mahsuds, and found it better to propitiate them. These remarks related to an offence committed by a Mahsud in British territory, and I believe they were sincerely believed by the speaker.

No. 9.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 9th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

An enormous jirga, reported 5,000 strong, being said to be on its way to-day to Jandola. I sent the Political Officer, Wana, there this morning to stop it four miles from Jandola, and to ascertain if it had fulfilled the preliminary conditions. He telegraphs that no exact information can be obtained, as the cash has not been pooled in one fund or even three funds, but that the people not trusting each other have all brought their own quota, and that any attempt at making them put in the cash in a lump sum will lead to a break up of the jirga and wreck the settlement. I have, therefore, instructed him to take the cash and rifles as they are brought, which will require two or three days by which time we shall know if preliminary conditions have been complied with, so that I can see the jirga. A number of women's ornaments have been brought, and I have had to send up a silversmith to Jandola to value them. Political Officer reports jirga is really desirous of peace, but cannot help itself in arranging to pool the cash.

No. 10.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 23rd February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

By this evening the whole fine and 60 rifles have been received. A number of Mahsuds anxious to enlist in the Militia appeared to-day under the impression that the blockade was over. They were told to wait.

No. 11.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 24th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The account stands as follows:—Of the fine, Rs. 12,750 have been paid in cash and ornaments, and for the balance of Rs. 12,250, I hold breech-loaders, value Rs. 14,050, of which the redemption is already commencing. Of the 70 rifles which we charge the Mahsuds as having taken during the blockade, they admit 65. Out of these, up to date 31 identical rifles have been surrendered, plus 30 substituted, or 61 in all. Substitutes have been given, because some rifles have been sold out of Mahsud country, others have

been taken to Birmal by the fugitives, and others again, although known to be somewhere in the Mahsud country, have not been traced to individuals, those who are charged with having them denying the accusation and charging others. These substitutes are all Government rifles, and are given Snider for Snider, Martini for Martini. All these substitutes have been passed by the regimental armourer and regimental officers here, and are as good as, and in some instances better than, the missing rifles. Under the circumstances, I see no particular object in insisting upon the surrender of identical rifles which would cause great delay. The substitutes being equal to the missing rifles, one rifle is as good as another, and as regards the bad characters, the tribe will recoup itself at its own time and in its own way, so that the bad characters will not benefit by our taking substitutes. As regards the five rifles not admitted by the Mahsuds, they were stolen generally at night in and near the Gomal, where Powindahs and Darwesh Khel are not above getting hold of rifles. These five rifles have not been seen in Mahsud possession, and we have nothing more to go upon than the reports of informers, who, in the cases of two rifles, were unable to give any names of thieves. These five rifles must be considered doubtful, and in their case, I think, the best plan is to take security now for their surrender if hereafter the tribe is found guilty, and to strike them off if, on further enquiry, the jirga clears the tribe by oaths or by proof. If above is approved, I will see the jirga as soon as 65 rifles have been put in and security given for the doubtful five rifles. Addressed Chief Commissioner, repeated Foreign.

No. 12.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 26th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The preliminary conditions are now fulfilled as indicated in my previous telegrams. The jirga have just sent me a message begging for the blockade to be taken off, and promising to carry out any further terms there may be. I have not yet of course mentioned what further terms there are. The jirga adds that, if it fulfils further terms after the blockade is now raised, the tribes and bad characters will realise that the jirga is active of its own motion, and not under pressure. If the blockade is now taken off, I cannot say how far the jirga can and will fulfil terms, but the restoration of live-stock carried off during the blockade is relatively a small business and can be clinched by taking hostages for the purpose. The matter of the British outlaws is more serious. There is this that, if the jirga act of their own motion about the outlaws, it will naturally have a deeper and more lasting effect than if the jirga acts under compulsion. As regards the Mahsud raiders who have fled to Birmal, there are indications that the jirga seem to have secretly passed sentence on them should they return to Mahsud country and come into the hands of the Mahsuds. This, at any rate, is the present frame of mind of the jirga about these fugitives. But I cannot, of course, guarantee that, if the blockade is now raised, the British outlaws will be given up. Hostages to this effect could be taken, but the Mahsuds know that it is against our principles to ill-treat hostages in event of failure to keep promises for which the hostages are sureties. Quite possible request of jirga is prompted by desire to raise its status and importance by showing tribe that its petitions are acceded to by Government. Anything that gives the jirga greater weight is a gain, but the point is, if the blockade is now raised, will they stick to what they say now; or, if they do stick to it, can they effect what they wish? On this point I cannot speak with confidence. Addressed Chief Commissioner; repeated Foreign.

No. 13.

Telegram, No. 602 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 28th February, 1902.

Proposals in Merk's telegram, February 24th, are approved, and security, but not hostages, may be taken for five rifles which are not definitely brought home to Mahsuds. With reference to Merk's telegram 519 B. of 26th February, Government of India ordered in my telegram 383 F., February 6th, that four conditions must be accepted and fulfilled before blockade would be raised. Only the two preliminary conditions have as yet been complied with; the other two, namely, restoration of animals taken during blockade and surrender of outlaws, must be fulfilled before Government of India can agree to withdraw blockade. Merk should now see jirga and explain position.

No. 14.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 2nd March, 1902.

In face of Government of India's orders received in your No 602 F, the best course seems to be for Merk to announce the fourth term with others, and, should it prove incapable of fulfilment by the absconding of individuals from Mahsud country, it must rest with jirga to prove to satisfaction of Government their inability to prevent this, and to give guarantee of arresting and handing them over should they return. This would have the effect of ridding Mahsud country of class referred to, which is important and would save a deadlock.

No. 15.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd March, 1902.

Mahsuds have now complied with preliminary terms, and Merk has been instructed to see jirga and tell them the further conditions we require before blockade will be withdrawn. Please see our telegram 6th February.

No. 16.

Telegram, No. 647 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 4th March, 1902.

Your telegram, dated 2nd March. The terms prescribed by Government preliminary to raising blockade are those that you proposed, and are considerably less onerous than those that Merk suggested. Government have no wish to impose impossible conditions, and your proposed instructions to Merk in your telegram above quoted are approved. The sooner Merk can see the jirga now the better. We wish to know what they have to say, not only in

regard to performance of conditions preliminary to raising blockade, but in regard to general settlement and guarantees for future good conduct. Addressed to Agent, Governor-General, Peshawar, and repeated to Mr. Merk.

No. 17.

Telegram, No. 458 B., from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 5th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Have seen jirga. Rumours were started, it seems, by neighbouring tribes hostile to Mahsuds, in order to break up the jirga and bring them to grief. After I had announced the terms, the jirga at once asked about such outlaws as had bolted, to which I replied as authorised. They then said that they had been told at the outset, November, 1900, and again last May, that on payment of the fine the blockade would be taken off, and now the fine and rifles as well had been put in and there were further terms, how could they be sure that, when these had been fulfilled, there would not be more terms again. To these I replied with the whole history of the blockade, showing how Government had kept faith, but the Mahsuds had not, and how especially they had broken their promise of the 28th May to pay and not to raid. They begged most earnestly that the blockade might now be taken off, promising security for fulfilment of the terms to-day announced. It seems clear that they do mean to stand well with Government, and there can be no doubt that almost their only thought is for the raising of the blockade for which they are intensely impatient. The Malik observed reasonably enough that, even if the security they offered failed, it would still be easy to enforce the terms by a baramta of Mahsuds and of their animals in British territory, which, it is true, could be done any day if the blockade is raised. They gave spontaneously satisfactory assurances about Mahsud bad characters for whom the whole tribe would be responsible in future and whom they would punish as regards the past. Their first object is to get the Mahsud fugitives back from Birmal in order to obtain the stolen rifles with them, for which they have given substitutes to us. After this they will deal with them in their own way. I really think, if the jirga gives us a sufficient number of jirga prisoners as security for fulfilment of the terms, that there will be no danger of non-fulfilment. We have plenty of other security as well in the ease with which a baramta could be made. The past three weeks have shown that jirga prisoners constitute a very efficient security. If we have good security, there seems no object in prolonging the blockade. The jirga consult together to-day, and will give an answer to-morrow.

No. 18.

Telegram, No. 184, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, dated the 6th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your 458 B. regarding security. If Mahsuds give tangible security, such as rifles, which would be tantamount to returns of live-stock and satisfy us as regards surrender of outlaws, I shall be prepared to recommend Government to remove blockade, which would have advantages for Government as well as Mahsuds. Otherwise, I do not think we should as yet remove pressure of blockade, for it is important that Mahsuds should realise that, though Government do not desire to be unduly hard on them, our future policy will

be a firm one. As to assurance given by jirga regarding tribal bad characters, the opportunity is a good one for impressing on them that practical proof of these assurances in form of definite action now against some such character and in finally breaking up the gang of bad characters and outlaws who have hitherto taken shelter with the Mulla Powindah will be the best recommendation that can be made to Government on their behalf. When the question of tribal allowances comes to be considered, jirga must be reminded that, after their past misbehaviour, Government will naturally require some such guarantee besides verbal assurance

No. 19.

Telegram, No. 673 B., from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 6th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

I have to-day again seen the jirga. Yesterday the jirga despatched 200 chaweshti for arrest of outlaws and their belongings. They have settled to punish with a fine of Rs 800 any Mahsud guilty of connivance at escape of these outlaws from the country. There are no outlaws from Tochi, Wana, Dera Ismail districts. Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, has given me the names of seven men, of whom Nabi Baksh, the worst, went off to Birmal in December. As regards animals to be restored, the jirga offer jirga prisoners in sufficient numbers, which is good security. There is a great difference between hostages demanded by us and jirga prisoners put in voluntarily of their own motion by the jirga. In the first case, a tribe selects men of as little consequence as it can, and when pestered by the relatives of the hostages, shifts the responsibility on to us. In the second case, the jirga knowing very well whom to seize, selects the proper men, and is directly and solely responsible to their friends for their detention. The seizure of jirga prisoners had a surprising effect upon the recusant Shaman Khel and Shabi Khel last month. The value of the animals to be restored is about Rs. 15,000, and it will take about a month to get them in. If I were to demand 50 rifles as security, it would take a month to get them. The security being good, it seems needless expense to prolong the blockade for a month. The jirga represented very respectfully but firmly that, although they accepted and would fulfil the terms announced yesterday as far as they could, in their opinion the tribe was being asked to do more than they had been led to expect. They said that they had been told all along that, if they paid the fine, the blockade would be removed, and if they misbehaved during the blockade, we should make reprisals. Now they had paid the fine and besides 65 rifles, and in addition as good as paid the animals carried off, and further had been severely punished for their misbehaviour during the blockade; and that they, having now, as it were, completed more than their share of the matter, it was just and fair that we, on our part, should now complete our share by raising the blockade. This is their view and there is force in it, although we have at no time said we did not reserve liberty of action. Your telegram, 184, of to-day. The Mahsuds make no allusion to themselves as to further want of firmness in dealing with them. They have suffered more now than in the three expeditions of 1861, 1881 and 1894 together; but, as I have previously represented, punishment alone will not keep them straight in future. The redistribution of allowance according to true political power in the tribe, its management by and through the whole jirga, ignoring individuals, whether they be Maliks or Mulla Powindah, the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Militia and the army and their employment on the Wana road and other works, combined with the memory of the blockade and its measures, will give a reasonable hope of reforming the tribe. The leading tribal bad characters are in Birmal, and so long as they are there, the jirga can do no more about them than give

every assurances. Mulla Powindah sent a letter yesterday which was delivered in jirga, and in which he asked if he were wanted, evidently wishing to be summoned and the jirga to be postponed till his arrival. Also he sent a message that, if not wanted, he would go to Birmal. To this I replied to the satisfaction of the jirga that I refused to deal with any Mahsud except in open jirga, which any Mahsud was at liberty to attend, if he chose to come in time for the jirga meetings. To-day a Shabi Khel Sheikh of his tried in my presence to introduce discord into the jirga, but was put down by it. The less we notice him, the less important in our eyes will he seem to himself and to the tribe, and the sooner will he find his proper level. It seems to me perhaps risky to say much at present about the tribal bad characters and the Mulla to the jirga, or the tribe may gain the power to which allusion is made in Foreign telegram 383 F. of the 5th ultimo. The great anxiety of the Mahsuds for the removal of the blockade cuts two ways, delay in removing may serve as a lever for the execution of conditions, it may also induce impatient hot-headed fools, or give chances for men who wish to discredit the jirga, to commit some outrage which will throw everything back and may have far-reaching consequences. At this stage this would be deplorable. For all these reasons, I ask for permission to raise the blockade the day after to-morrow, if to-morrow the jirga give good and sufficient jirga prisoners as security for the animals

No. 20.

Telegram, No 192, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 8th March, 1902.

Following correspondence with Merk repeated for orders. Chief Commissioner's No. 186.—*Begins* Your 673 B. How are we to be satisfied regarding action of chalweshtis regarding outlaws? If jirga genuinely mean to act up to terms, why cannot they hand in 25 good rifles as security? This would suffice accordingly to valuation of animals. We could only treat jirga prisoners as hostages. Is not delay now in raising blockade preferable to risk of further trouble in Government having possibly to make baramta later? If 25 good rifles are given in, I shall be ready to advise Government to raise blockade. *Ends* Commissioner on Special Duty, No 674 B :—*Begins* Your 186. We must trust the jirga in this matter, and if they do not get hold of the outlaws, at any rate the outlaws will have to clear out, which, as you say in your 173 of 2nd instant, is important, and the jirga have already promised to exclude them permanently if they should get away. It is no good hanging up the whole business and incurring risk of further grave complications on account of six miserable outlaws. 50 rifles represent the value of the animals, not 25. The animals have to be given up by the people who took them, and it takes time to compel men to pledge their rifles for others. One Mahsud will naturally not pledge his rifle for another Mahsud without getting tangible security from the latter, and all this involves great discussions, many transactions, and delays as great as getting in the animals themselves. It does not matter how we treat the prisoners. They are not given as hostages, but as prisoners to be kept in prison, and you have seen what effect is produced by the jirga seizing men. No baramta can be required if we have these prisoners. The fact is that the situation has now come to a stage when we shall drive the Mahsuds too hard by insisting upon relatively unimportant details. I can see this from my conversations with the jirga. The bulk of the tribe undoubtedly expected that payment of the fine, plus undergoing our reprisals for their misbehaviour, would terminate the blockade. It came as a shock to the tribesmen that more was wanted by us. Had the immense pressure been available, which was in my mind when I made my proposals about terms, the feelings of the Mahsuds would not have mattered sixpence; but now they do matter very much; that is the crux

of the whole position. I must tell you that there is danger. The jirga has been at it now since the 9th January, and they are sick and exhausted. I believe them to be perfectly honest in their promises to give up the cattle and in the security they offer. If we make things too difficult now for them, they and the tribe will get it into their heads that we mean one way or the other to have a rupture, which is being industriously drummed into them from all sides. If they once think this, then there is an end of a peaceful settlement. We have got a great deal and there is no use in throwing it away for a little. I repeat that delay is very dangerous. If matters go now so that hostilities break out again, the power of the jirga, which we painfully have re-established, will be destroyed, and, what is worse, the Mahsuds will not treat with us again. *Ends*. With reference to the latter. No. 674. Accepting Merk's view that the tribe is honest in submission, I recommend Government to receive jirga prisoners as security for restoration of animals, the collection of which must necessarily take time, and to raise blockade. Despatch of chaweshtis to arrest outlaws may be accepted as proof of good faith of jirga, and will have effect of clearing country of troublesome class. I do not in the least understand Merk's allusion to withdrawal of immense pressure as affecting terms, unless he means that new imposition of his originally proposed terms has weakened our position. The political position has only changed in that we are in a more advanced stage and no military pressure has been withdrawn. If Government accept these proposals for raising blockade, I propose going to Jandola to take opportunity of interviewing jirga before they are finally dismissed.

No. 21.

Telegram, No. 699 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 8th March, 1902.

Your telegram 192 of 8th. The Government of India agree to your proposals, viz., that prisoners should be accepted as security for restoration of cattle and that blockade should now be raised. But, when you see the jirga, it is advisable to stipulate that the cattle should be restored within a reasonable period, failing which Government reserve right to seize cattle in their place. You should also explain to them that, although relying on their good faith Government will now raise the blockade, the Government reserves the right to make reprisals when and where it pleases, if the outlaws are in the country and are not arrested, or if, having left the country, they are allowed to return.

You might take the opportunity of your interview with the jirga to discuss the question of allowances and the consideration which the jirga are prepared to offer in return, and inform Government of the result.

No. 22.

Telegram, No. 685 B, from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 10th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

I have fully explained to the jirga the contents of your 197 of 8th with Foreign 699. They understand thoroughly. As regards British outlaws, if they are not arrested, they have promised to exclude them permanently from Mahsud territory, and in future not to harbour any outlaws whatever from

British territory or the protectorates. They have accepted full tribal or sectional or individual responsibility for offences in future as we choose; also that it is the business of the tribe to control its members. They further engage not to give passage through Mahsud territory to such bad characters, whether Mahsuds or British outlaws, as remain in Birmal. They earnestly begged for some means of livelihood to be provided for them, to which I replied that their country held plenty of grain and live-stock, but that Government would permit enlistment in the South Waziristan Militia, and, when the complement there was full, also in the Army, and that Mahsuds would be permitted to work on the Wana road and other works. They asked for land, to which I said no land was at present available, but, if the Pabarpur-Dera Ismail Khan canal were made, the question might possibly be considered by Government, if land were available and their behaviour good, but that I could not guarantee or promise anything about land. I pointed out to them how other frontier tribes benefited by entering the service of Government, and by good conduct, giving Afridis and Mohmands and Yusufzais as instances, which was corroborated by members of these tribes serving in the 1st Punjab Infantry and present as my escort. The jirga have given in 93 good prisoners for the restoration of the cattle within a month. The jirga after the Id reassembles at Tank on the 24th instant to settle distribution of allowances, and any time after that will suit for your meeting with it whenever convenient to you. The blockade will be raised this evening. I sincerely hope that future relations with the Mahsuds will be more stable and happier than they have been in the past.

No. 23.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 10th March, 1902.

With permission of Government the blockade is raised to-day, and all restrictions upon our people and the Mahsuds in connection with the blockade are withdrawn. Addressed to all concerned

No. 24.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th March, 1902.

Our telegram in the Foreign Department, dated 3rd March. Mahsud blockade was withdrawn on 10th, jirga having given security for restoration within a month of cattle looted during blockade and for arrest of outlaws. Jirga promised to permanently exclude from Mahsud territory any British outlaws who may escape immediate arrest by flight beyond tribal limits.

No. 25.

Telegram, No. 758 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 13th March, 1902.

I am to ask you to communicate to Mr. Merk His Excellency the Viceroy's appreciation of the energy and ability with which he has conducted the Mahsud blockade, and His Excellency's congratulations on its successful termination.

No. 26.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 14th March, 1902.

Your 699 F. Mahsud jirga, whom Merk was obliged to permit to go to their homes as they had been a long time with him, reassemble on the 24th instant with reference to allowances. Allowances were already promised to jirga before blockade—*vide* correspondence paragraph B of Merk's letter No. 748 of 9th October, 1900, paragraph 2, your letter No. 2621 of 29th October, 1900, and Merk's telegram No. 550 C., dated 8th November, 1900. Regarding the considerations now to be given by tribe in return for allowances, Merk's telegram No. 685 B. of 10th instant describes what the jirga have agreed to. It is difficult to see what more can be expected from them. This, of course, will be reduced in writing and signed by the jirga, and is as much as we can obtain in the way of guarantee. If Government agree to this view, it remains only to announce definitely the grant of their allowances when the jirga reassembles and discuss the matter of distribution

No. 27.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 15th March, 1902.

Your 758 F. Merk wires kindly convey to His Excellency my grateful thanks for his most kind message which I value deeply.

No. 28.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 27th March, 1902.

I have the honour to offer the following remarks on Mr Merk's letter No. 817 B of 20th March, a copy of which has been submitted direct to the Government of India.

2. I fully share Mr. Merk's satisfaction at the success which has been obtained. This success may be summarised as the realisation from the tribe of the fine for which the blockade was imposed, the wiping off by retaliation of the account run up since the blockade began, the restitution of rifles and cattle stolen during the blockade, and finally the compulsory representation of the tribe, in face of internal feuds and factions, for the purpose of dealing with Government.

3. It must not, however, be lost sight of that the passive blockade from December, 1900, to November, 1901, failed in its object. For, while during this period some Rs. 75,000 were paid in cash and kind by the tribe, the new penalties incurred by the tribe during that period greatly exceeded the amount paid in, and by July, 1901, there was obviously no further intention on the part of the tribe of paying any further sum, and matters had reached a political deadlock.

4 This position entailed the blockading troops being employed in active operations against the tribe. These operations consisted in the simultaneous movement of small columns from several directions for a few days at a time and without warning. While eminently successful in their object, namely, the punishment of the tribe, they had the additional advantage of entailing no expenditure in the country itself for supplies or the making of roads, and kept the Mahsuds uncertain from day to day as to what the next move would be. It may be here noted, however, that this particular method of coercing the Mahsuds was due greatly to their peculiar geographical position in relation to the points held by us, in the Tochi, on the border of the District of Bannu, at Jandolai, in the Gumal and at Wana, which enabled us to strike from three sides at the same time, while the fourth side was held by a tribe inimical to the Mahsuds and during winter presented physical difficulties against retreat into Afghanistan. Having regard to these special conditions it is perhaps unnecessary to remark that this system of coercion, successfully applied on the present occasion, must not be accepted as one which can necessarily be employed with equal success against all the tribes on the frontier. Ordinarily speaking, the punitive expedition remains and will remain as the best resource for enforcing peace on the frontier. In the case of the Mahsuds any further operations must have assumed the form of an organised expedition or series of small expeditions moving into the country and out again after inflicting such damage as was possible on the tribe.

5 Without being over-sanguine as to the future, the present settlement with the Mahsuds is a genuine one, and on this ground Government may have fair hopes that amicable relations with the tribe as a whole may be maintained any way for some time to come.

It is hopeless to expect that there should be no trouble with a tribe whose record from all time has been one of thieving and raiding and who for years past have terrorised their neighbours, and it may be that restless and turbulent spirits in the tribe may again prevail.

The main point now to be seen is how far the establishment of a political reform in the internal administration of the tribe, which has been forced on them for the time being by stress of circumstances, may prove to be real and permanent. This can only be ascertained by actual experience. Doubtless a great deal depends on whether we can assist the tribe to a distribution of the allowances sanctioned by Government which will be satisfactory to a strong majority who will then find it worth their while to maintain tribal discipline which will result not only in a check on the commission of offences but also in the prompt settlement of such as may occur.

6. Turning to the individual work of officers and men engaged on the blockade, I can heartily endorse all that Mr Merk has said of the services of Mr. Lorrner, the late Captain Down, Mr. Johnston, Captain Bowring and others mentioned by him. I must take this opportunity of recording my sense of the loyal, energetic and capable manner in which Mr Merk himself, who remained on Special Duty after the formation of the North-West Frontier Province to carry through the blockade, has discharged his arduous and responsible duties. All credit is due to him for the direction of the blockade to a successful issue.

7. I strongly support Mr. Merk's suggestion as to the grant of one month's blockade leave.

8. As to native titles I am submitting my recommendations separately.

9. As regards the khilats and rewards proposed by Mr Merk, I think, considering that the services for which it is proposed to grant them have extended over a period of 15 months under trying conditions, the proposals are by no means immoderate, and I therefore ask that they be sanctioned.

Enclosure in No. 28.*

From W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner on Special Duty, to the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province No. 817 B., Dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 20th March, 1902.

I have now the honour to submit the final report on the Mahsud blockade, which commenced on the 1st December, 1900, and terminated on the 11th March, 1902.

2 The blockade has been completely successful in the attainment of the two objects for which it was instituted. These objects were firstly, reparation and punishment on account of offences committed before (also during) the blockade, and, secondly, the establishment of a political reform in the internal administration of the tribe, the governing organ, hitherto composed of Malikhs selected and paid by us, being replaced by the old tribal jirga which, in a democratic republic, like that of the Mahsud community, is the natural, and indeed the only possible, governing agency.

3. The first object could no doubt have been attained by an expedition. The second object no expedition could have brought about, the process of reform takes time, discordant and mutually repellent elements are not readily compressed into a living whole, the leading men and the mass of the tribe require leisure to reflect, to consult and combine, the more thoroughly they have opportunity to consider the situation, the more likely is their conclusion to be deliberate and lasting. A short expedition would have swept through the country and gone out, leaving political matters much as they were. A prolonged stay of the troops in the Mahsud hills would have broken up Mahsud society, each man would have tried to make peace for himself, and the constant inevitable collisions between the troops and them would have distracted the Mahsuds and deprived the jirga of a fair chance of formation, and of growth in power and in the consciousness of power. Moreover, the presence of troops would have been a powerful incentive for those who desire a permanent occupation to endeavour to contrive it.

On all grounds, therefore, a blockade was preferable to an expedition, as a means both of penal coercion and of the rehabilitation of that paramount internal authority in the tribe without which the necessity for the annexation of the Mahsud country will be merely a question of a few years.

4 As a punitive measure, the effects of the blockade have been severe; the Mahsuds have paid a fine of one lakh (the largest fine ever paid by a frontier tribe); they have lost their allowances* for 15 months; also profits of trade and wages of labour and the pay of 250 Mahsuds in the Militia, or, at the rate under these heads of Rs 10,000 per mensem, a sum of Rs 1,50,000; they have surrendered 65 rifles taken during the blockade, worth at least Rs 24,000, they are restoring animals taken during the blockade, worth Rs 15,000; the property and live-stock lost by them during the active operations were worth about 2½ lakhs, their total pecuniary losses have been about Rs. 5,39,000. Besides, they have lost about 130 Mahsuds killed and some 250 wounded. They have accepted full tribal responsibility, they have agreed to arrest, or, failing arrest, to permanently expel, all British outlaws and never to harbour them again. And it has been brought well home to them that the centre of their hills can be suddenly reached by troops from north, east and south, without the hope of successful resistance on their part.

5. It is interesting and instructive to observe the course and progress of the reform which was the second object of the blockade. For some time before the 1st December, 1900, I may say for years, there had been a deadlock of parties, our Malikhs *versus* Mulla Powindah with the bulk of the tribesmen hungering for allowances at his back. Each side fought the other at our expense, and matters reached a stage at which it became imperative for Government to arrive at definite conclusions with the Mahsuds. I was accordingly directed to summon the jirga; and, in default of some reparation

to Government, viz, the payment of a fine of one lakh of rupees, to declare a blockade, with the warning of reprisals if offences were committed during it. Simultaneously, I was authorised to announce that after the blockade we should deal alone with the whole jirga and not with individuals, and that the allowances would be granted to the whole tribe (to be distributed by the tribe for the tribe) and contingent upon loyalty, good conduct and the acceptance of full tribal, or sectional, or individual, responsibility, as we chose.

The jirga was held on the 8th November, 1900, and was signalised by the complete, public and unqualified admission of the Malikhs that the maliki system had broken down. In short, they abdicated.

6 The first step taken by the Malikhs, after this jirga, was to consult Mulla Powindah, whom, to their disgust, they saw anxious to pay the fine. That they went to consult him is significant in view of the subsequent events that have occurred during the past two months. Nothing, however, came of their conference, and on the 1st December, 1900, the blockade was proclaimed.

7 For a couple of months the leading men hung back, there were difficulties in apportioning the incidence of the fine, there was a good deal of manœuvring between the political parties in the tribe, and some dodging by the Mahsuds to get the fine virtually reduced, while ostensibly paying it in full. Finding that petitions with this view were not listened to, and discovering that the blockade was very seriously meant and was enforced with great stringency, the jirga met me at Jandola in February, 1901, and payments commenced in earnest. By the end of May, Rs. 69,000 had been paid, including 98 rifles, 68 revolvers and 1,639 head of live-stock. I wish to note here that Mr S. Waterfield, then Political Officer in charge of Southern Waziristan, who was entrusted with the duty of valuing the arms and live-stock, scrupulously carried out my instructions that the valuations were to be fair to Government and to the Mahsuds alike, also to complainants to whom live-stock was made over in compensation.

8. By the end of June, 1901, the sum of Rs. 73,000 had been paid, to which, in the course of the next three months, small sums, aggregating Rs. 2,000, were added intermittently. But generally speaking, payments ceased early in July, 1901. The political parties in the tribe were still at a deadlock, the jirga had not yet arisen on the ruins of the "maliki" system, and there was no central authority as yet apparent which was capable, on the one hand, of restraining bad characters and the growing impatience of the tribesmen at the increasing pressure of the blockade, and, on the other hand, of authoritatively deciding the knotty questions over the assessment of the fine that existed, especially in connection with the Shaman Khel. The Malikhs, as they have since confessed, sat sulking in their homes; Mulla Powindah played his own game, in short, there was no general control. It is true that several jirgas were held among the Mahsuds during this period, but the general jirga was not yet ripe for action. Several serious offences occurred, and in August, 1901, the retaliatory measures, of which the Mahsuds had been warned before the blockade commenced, were considered. It was decided to begin with sudden attacks, and on the 25th November, 1901, and the three following days, surprise raids were carried out with the fullest success, except from Jandola. The Mahsuds were completely taken aback, and the heart for any organised general resistance, then or thereafter, was knocked out of them.

9 The blockade had now passed from the defensive into its second, or offensive, phase. This was of short duration—only 45 days. During December, several raids were effected by simultaneous small columns to which the Mahsuds opposed a resistance steadily declining in vigour and intelligence. To military students of the art of frontier warfare, the system followed on these occasions (commencing with the surprise of November) will prove a new departure, as compared with the time-honoured methods of cumbrous expeditions.

10. The pressure of the offensive blockade rapidly matured what had been silently growing—the authoritative tribal jirga. On the 9th January*

1902, the leading men and others met at Kanguram and sent letters of full submission. In reply they were informed that, before I could see the jirga, it would have to pay in Rs. 25,000 in cash, and the breech-loaders taken from us during the blockade, 70 in number (of which, however, five are doubtful cases) On receipt of my reply, the jirga immediately set to work In May, 1901, I reported that I had in vain urged the jirga to call out the "Chalweshtis" This is a peculiarly Mahsud institution Chalweshtis are tribal police appointed by the jirga to carry out its orders: while doing so the Chalweshtis are inviolable, and should they cause death in the execution of their duties, the blood-feud does not lie For many years the system had fallen into abeyance so far as Government business with the Mahsuds was concerned, and, as I say, last May the jirga would not or could not revive it There was now no hesitation about calling them out, nor was there, as in November, 1900, any question of consulting Mulla Powindah On pain of personal violence, he was compelled to give up rifles in his possession and in that of bad characters under his wing, the principal bad characters (whom he helped by tricking the jirga) fled to Afghanistan, and the Chalweshtis patrolled the tribe collecting the fine On the 9th February the jirga came, 3,000 strong, to Jandola, with a considerable portion of the fine and rifles, and the balance of both was paid in by the 26th February The Shaman Khel and Shabi Khel had been making difficulties, but both sections were coerced at Jandola with astonishing vigour and celerity by the jirga, which acted with equal resolution when it came to giving guarantees for the restoration of the cattle carried off during the blockade. With these, and the giving of satisfactory engagements in regard to tribal responsibility and the British outlaws, the conditions determining the closure of the blockade were fulfilled, and the blockade was raised on the morning of the 11th instant

11 We have now the jirga in full strength and successfully at work in its task of controlling the tribe. Upon the existence and maintenance of this supreme internal authority depends the success of our future relations with the Mahsuds. There are no two ways about it Given a tribe without a sufficient internal government, and it will assuredly embroil itself with its neighbour, just as any European State in anarchy becomes intolerable. The first and cardinal principle, therefore, in dealing with the Mahsuds is, I submit, the maintenance of the jirga in its present position With a democracy of this kind, it is fatal to deal with individuals, however powerful they be In the power and will to raid, every Mahsud possesses the *liberum veto* of Poland, and under these circumstances everything must be done by, with, and through the whole tribal jirga, if the Mahsud country is to escape the fate of Poland. This naturally involves and demands the distribution of allowances in conformity with the political power in the tribe, viz, both to the democracy and to its leaders

12. The memory of the heavy punishment they have received, though effective, will not suffice to ensure future satisfactory relations with the Mahsuds The traces of every flogging wear off after a time The punishment will of course not be soon forgotten; still less likely are the Mahsuds to cease to remember how helpless they are against attack all round their country, and should it ever become necessary hereafter to resort to military pressure, probably the mere arrival of troops at Wana, Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel will bring them to their senses But it is better to avoid that necessity Subject to the application of the cardinal principle which I have mentioned above, I believe that the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Militia and in the Army, employment for them on public works in the neighbourhood of their country (they are excellent labourers, as good as Hazaras), frequent and close touch of the Political Officer with the jirga, and a system of short accounts in connection with offences, will give a very reasonable hope that our relations with the tribe will be more stable and happier than they have been in the past. It would be idle to expect that there will be no offences, as idle as to anticipate that burglary will ever be extinct in London. But there is a wide difference between the normal crime of a border tribe and those offences and that temper that have a political motive or are dictated by hostility to Government. As regards normal crime, the system hitherto

in force on the Derajat frontier has been one of long accounts which have made very short friends. If my proposal (about to be made) is accepted, that the tribal allowances shall be paid quarterly, there will be every opportunity for short accounts. And in all respects I strongly recommend that the Mahsuds be treated as the northern tribes are treated that draw allowances from us, viz, the Orakzais, Afridis, Mohmands, Black Mountain clans, &c

13 The Mahsud country is certainly self-supporting as a whole in respect of grain and live-stock. But, as everywhere among large tribal communities, certain sections are worse off than others, and to these it may be possible to make grants of land on the new Paharpur-Dera Ismail Khan canal, should that project be carried out. If so, some arrangement will have to be made permitting the families of Mahsud cultivators to go to the hills in summer, as Mahsuds generally are intolerant of the hot weather.

14. In dealing with the Mahsuds, it must be remembered that from Wana to Tank, from Tank to Bannu, and from Bannu to Datta Khel, or for a distance of over 200 miles, our territory is open to Mahsud depredations. This is precisely as if the country from Thal to Kohat, thence to Peshawar and round by the Malakand to Buner, this frontier, lay exposed to the action of one single tribe. Taking the normal border crime to which I have alluded, as a standard, the account along 200 miles may appear enormous as against one single tribe, and yet be no more than that of eight or ten tribes taken together, therefore I submit that the proper way to judge it is by comparison with the volume of similar crime upon an equally extended stretch of the frontier elsewhere. On the Thal-Kohat-Peshawar-Malakand line, the account is split up among some eight or ten tribes, and as against each of these the quantity is comparatively small, whereas against one tribe alone the whole account would loom enormous and would be of course intrinsically large, though not relatively so. But it does not necessarily follow that the one single tribe is, therefore, behaving worse than the eight or ten tribes taken together. No doubt from Tank to Bannu and thence to Datta Khel, the Bhattannis and Darwesh Khel act as buffers between us and the Mahsuds, and the rigid future enforcement of their territorial responsibility, which I have established, will do much to stop Mahsuds from traversing their territories. But these buffer clans are weak, the country is extraordinarily difficult and intricate, and in the hot weather much of it is entirely deserted. I am not making excuses for the Mahsuds. I mention these facts only to explain why the territorial responsibility of the buffer clans is insufficient.

Then again, it must be borne in mind that, whereas for the protection of 23 miles of the Khyber Pass (Jamrud to Landi Khana) we pay over Rs. 80,000 a year allowances, *ad hoc*, to the Afridis and maintain a force of 1,200 Khyber Rifles, the Khyber itself being invulnerable in parts, for the Gomal Pass from Murtaza to Wana, 60 miles in length and open everywhere to Mahsud attack, we have only 800 Militia and (by implication only, for the safety of the Gomal was *not* a specific condition of the 1895 agreement with the Mahsuds) paid Rs. 61,000 to the Mahsuds. The safety of the Gomal will of course be made a specific condition of the new allowances. Traffic through the Gomal should, I consider, be regulated and protected as in the Khyber, and special arrangements should always be made to protect the semi-annual Powindah migrations. Formerly traffic went through the Gomal as it pleased; it is better not to give avoidable temptation to a tribe which from time immemorial has looked upon the Gomal as its rightful hunting-ground.

15. I am happy to say, as far as I can judge, the blockade has left no rancour. I think the Mahsuds themselves, and certainly the surrounding population, looked upon the measure as an act of temperate, patient justice and of legitimate retribution. I conclude this from the facts that there was no fanaticism whatever apparent at any time in the matter, not a soul stirred across the border or in Afghanistan to help the Mahsuds, before the blockade had been raised numbers of Mahsuds presented themselves for enlistment in the Militia and for work on the Wana road; and it is a remarkable incident that the man who pre-eminently among all others exerted himself to form the jirga and to combine the Mahsuds for compliance with the terms of

Government, is Badshah Khan, the head of the leading family in the tribe, whose grandfather was killed by us in 1861, whose father died in our prison in 1884, and whose eldest son was killed now in fighting us in December, 1901.

16. The blockade was as stringent as any blockade could have been under the circumstances. No blockade that ever was, but could be run, especially when profits ranging from Rs 800 to 1,200 per cent were to be made by successful blockade runners. It would be absurd to expect that any blockade, even of block-houses and barbed wire, will be unbreakable. Here we had, in winter 200 miles, in summer 300 miles, of unusually difficult country to tackle. But there can be no manner of doubt that the blockade was, as a matter of fact, as stringent as it could be. Proofs are, firstly, that the defensive blockade alone brought in Rs 73,000 in five months, or more than any frontier tribe has ever paid, with or without military operations, secondly, the intense anxiety of the Mahsuds for the termination of the blockade, about which anxiety there could be no mistake; and, thirdly, the prices of salt, cloth, gur, tobacco, as reported steadily for 15 months from four different quarters by British officers (each 60 miles distant from the next, thus giving a fair guarantee of independent sources of information); showing conclusively that the supplies of these articles (which, except salt, are easily portable), were practically quite cut off. Nor were any of these articles found in the Mahsud villages. As I have said, in the matter of grain and live-stock, the Mahsud country is, as a whole, self-supporting. It has been publicly alleged in a newspaper that the blockading troops themselves evaded and broke the blockade. I am glad to state that there is no truth whatever in this. The troops behaved admirably in every respect.

17. There now remains for me the pleasant duty of bringing to the notice of Government the services of those engaged on blockade work. The list is somewhat long, but then the operations extended over a large area and were protracted over 15 months. I could not have had a better staff, one and all worked with zeal and loyalty towards the common end under trying conditions, in a bad climate, and a most unattractive and inhospitable country. There was naturally no leave for them during the 15 months. Under the circumstances, I would ask the indulgence of Government, on behalf of all, in the shape of one month's special privilege leave in addition to any privilege leave that may be due (as in the case of the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1884). I suggest this for all those who were engaged more than six months continuously on blockade work. This would include officers like myself, the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana, the Militias and the Commandants of Border Military Police, Native officers and men of the Border Military Police and regular Police, and others who, in addition to their ordinary duties, performed blockade work, as well as officers and men specifically entertained on the blockade alone, like the Blockade Officer and the Special Blockade Police.

18. The brunt of the executive work in connection with the blockade fell upon Mr. Lorimer, I C S, who most fully justified his selection as Special Blockade Officer. The blockade over 200 miles of country demanded a mass of intricate, minute and detailed arrangements, rules and provisions, the preparation, execution and supervision of which called for the closest personal supervision and incessant guidance and care. The task was admirably done by Mr. Lorimer, he worked indefatigably and most zealously, often under conditions of great exposure and failing health. That the blockade was really stringent, without alienating the good-will of our own people who had to put up with restrictions and restraints, was in great measure due to him and to the manner in which he carried with him those with whom he had to work, and his subordinates. As Political Officer, temporarily in Southern and then in Northern Waziristan, he fulfilled all expectations; he has shown remarkable qualifications, and has added greatly to an already deservedly high reputation. I venture to commend him for a special mark of the recognition by Government of his most valuable services.

I should have submitted the same recommendation for the late Captain Down. His loss has dimmed the success of the offensive blockade. In him

we have been deprived of the best of friends and comrades, and Government of the most promising officer on the frontier, of his standing. Gifted with a cool judgment, clear perception, rapid determination, devoted to his work and to the people in his charge, if he had been spared, he would have risen to a conspicuous place in the distinguished roll of the officers of the marches.

Captain Bowring, Commandant of the Dera Ismail Khan Border Military Police, has done excellent work both in his substantive capacity and as Assistant Blockade Officer. It fell to him to organise the protection of the Dera Ismail Khan border, this he did so well that not only was the border free from annoyances, but also in several instances Mahsud gangs were cut up by the villagers who had hitherto been before Mahsuds as sheep in the presence of wolves. His influence upon the Bhattannis was marked, and entirely ensured the stout stand they made against the Mahsuds. He did not spare himself in carrying out and perfecting the blockade arrangements, at which he was constantly working without regard to his health or to the appalling heat of the Tank border. He is a very promising, active and energetic officer, with a good judgment and much personal influence, and deserves high credit for his services.

Lieutenant Coldstream, Commandant of the Bannu Border Military Police, and Assistant Blockade Officer, performed his duties with great zeal, devotion and success, though much hampered by bad health, which, however, in no way deterred him from arduous work.

Mr Bosworth Smith, I C S, acted for some months as Assistant Blockade Officer, and, though unacquainted with the frontier, performed his duties satisfactorily.

Mr S Waterfield, while Political Officer in Southern Waziristan, had exceedingly heavy work, first, in connection with matters preparatory to the blockade, and afterwards with the receipts of the fine paid in kind by the Mahsuds. He carried out his duties with thoroughness, single-mindedness and care, in spite of constant attacks of fever, which to many would have been a sufficient reason for going on sick leave.

Such work as fell to his share in connection with the blockade was very satisfactorily performed by Mr Johnston, now Political Officer in Southern Waziristan. He has already acquired a good knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the Mahsuds, he has personal influence, he has shown judgment and tact, and will, I anticipate, discharge well the somewhat difficult business of conducting our relations with them in future till matters have settled down to the routine which now obtains with the northern tribes.

I have to cordially acknowledge the willing help of the Deputy Commissioners, past and present, of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan—Messrs. Donald, Kettlewell, Captain Fox-Strangways and the late Mr Gee. They have been forward in placing their establishments and the resources of their districts at the disposal of the blockade, which they have aided in every way in their power, and the success of which has been considerably due to their influence and co-operation.

Mr Gregson, Assistant District Superintendent of Police, acted as Assistant Blockade Officer from the 9th December, 1901, to the close of the blockade. He showed commendable energy, tact and devotion to his duty, and I have been thoroughly satisfied with his work.

19 In Southern Waziristan, Muhammad Azim Khan, Officiating Tahsildar, stands foremost for the very valuable services rendered by him. His knowledge of, and influence over, the Mahsuds are great, and were ever readily and honestly at our disposal; his information was always full, accurate and early—many points in the game—and he was of the greatest assistance to Messrs Waterfield, Lorimer and Johnston, Political Officers at Wana. I consider he has done best of all the Native officials connected with the blockade, and I venture to recommend him for the title of Khan Bahadur and confirmation as Tahsildar.

Subadar Sultan Asad Jan is a very promising officer, willing, hard-working, and popular with the troops. He was of special assistance to Mr. Waterfield in connection with the payments in kind. I would recommend him for the title of Khan Sahib.

Musa Khan, Naib Tahsildar at Wana, has done very well and deserves a khilat of Rs 200.

Kalla Khan, Ahzai, and Guldad, Abdur Rahman Khel, Mahsuds, acted as deputations on our part during the past two months; it was greatly owing to their straightforward reports to the Mahsuds of what we said, and their equally honest reports to us, that an understanding was rapidly arrived at. They have done good service. Kalla Khan, moreover, with Malik Bannuchi Khan, Darwesh Khel, of Wana, were the valuers of payments in kind, and, as such, did heavy work for several months, honestly and truthfully. I propose khilats of Rs 400 each for Kalla Khan and Guldad, and one of Rs 200 for Malik Bannuchi Khan.

20. In the Dera Ismail Khan district, the Bhattannis, Subadar-Major Muhammad Akbar Khan of the Border Military Police, Officiating Inspector of Police, Thana Ram, Deputy Inspectors Mir Badshah of the Gomal Thana, Arbab Muhammad Yakub Khan of Mullazai, Muhammad Hyat Khan and the Nawab of Tank, deserve special commendation.

Subadar-Major Muhammad Akbar Khan, an officer of long and approved good service, was Captain Bowring's right-hand man in the border arrangements, which, as I have said, were completely successful. Akbar Khan himself organised an effective Bhattanni counter-raid. I recommend him for a khilat of Rs 500 and the title of Khan Sahib.

Thana Ram, who has been some 25 years in Tank and knows the Mahsuds and the Tank border better than anyone else, admirably supervised and managed the blockade arrangements and merits a khilat of Rs. 500.

Deputy-Inspector Mir Badshah had an exceedingly troublesome charge in the Gomal Thana, which swarms with relatives and friends of Mahsuds. It was the most dangerous portion of the Tank border. He frustrated several attempts to loot the Gomal bazaar. I recommend for him a khilat of Rs. 350.

Deputy-Inspectors Muhammad Hyat and Arbab Muhammad Yakub were exceedingly active and zealous in supervising the blockade police and visiting villages, keeping everyone up to mark. They deserve khilats each of Rs 200.

I recommend commendatory certificates for Zarif Khan, Alam Khan and Ghulam Hussain, Sergeants of blockade police.

Nawab Ghulam Kasim Khan, Nawab of Tank, maintained the whole time, at his own expense, ten sowars and twelve footmen for blockade duty, which they did well. As a large and opulent jagirdar, he is of course bound to render service, which, indeed, he volunteered to do and offered money as well towards the expenses of the blockade. At the same time, though service was his duty, I suggest that an appropriate acknowledgment of the proper fulfilment of that duty would not be out of place. Considering his rank, wealth and the title he already holds, I am inclined to think that a special khilat in the shape of a gold watch with a suitable inscription would meet the case.

The following yeomen and village headmen have done good service on the Tank border:—Khushal Khan of Jatta, Shahnawaz Khan of Ah Khel, Nasrat of Kirri Hadar and Malik Talibdin of Mullazai. For each of these I suggest a khilat of Rs 100, with, in the case of Malik Talibdin, the grant of a chair when visiting British officers. The Bhattannis of the Dera Ismail Khan district have done exceedingly well. They have more than held their own against the Mahsuds; they have thoroughly fulfilled their pass and general border obligations and responsibilities, and they decidedly merit the favour of Government. By a curious arrangement of old-standing, these Bhattannis pay their land revenue by one-third of the crop harvested being taken and the value appraised. Out of this one-third a quarter is returned to

the Bhuttannis as their inam (called the "chaharum") and is shared equally between the Malik and the tribe. The simplest and adequate way, I think, for rewarding them would be on account of this spring crop to double the "chaharum," i.e., to let them have $\frac{1}{2}$ instead of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Government one-third share of the crop. This means a grant of about Rs. 200 which among so many is not much. There are besides some individual Bhuttannis, 20 in number, especially mentioned by name in Captain Bowring's report, seven of whom share in the chaharum, while the rest do not. For these he proposes money rewards aggregating Rs. 880, which I suggest that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan be empowered to grant.

21 In Bannu, Khan Bahadur Haknewaz Khan, Superintendent of irrigation, was in charge of the blockade check and pass arrangements, a difficult duty which he performed tactfully and very successfully. I propose for him a khilat of Rs. 300.

Malik Khudadad Khan, formerly Commanding the Border Military Police, and now Inspector of Police at Peshawar, efficiently worked the border arrangements, and I recommend him for a khilat of Rs. 350.

Inspector of blockade police Nur Khan worked very well and merits a khilat of Rs. 200. Subadar-Major Nur Muhammad Khan, and Subadars Matiulla Khan and Said Hassan Khan of the Border Military Police are highly spoken of in connection with blockade duty. I propose for the first a khilat of Rs. 150, and for the latter each a khilat of Rs. 100.

Sergeant Ata Muhammad Khan of the blockade police merits a commendatory certificate.

22 In the Tochi, Officiating Tahsildar Ahmad Din did excellent work in supervising blockade arrangements and obtaining information. I recommend that he be confirmed as Tahsildar and receive a khilat of Rs. 400.

Naib Tahsildar Hyat Khan is highly commended, and I propose for him a khilat of Rs. 200.

23 Numbers of jagirdars, mafidars, village headmen and notables were asked to produce levies for blockade duty. These levies were of course paid; Rs. 15 per mensem a horseman and Rs. 5 a month per man on foot. Still the native gentlemen in question did service in producing them, and would be highly gratified by the grant of commendatory sanads of the usual type. There are in all 71 such in the two districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu; and, with your approval, I will separately furnish lists of names with the quota of horse or foot, or both, supplied by each.

24 Should His Excellency be pleased to confer, in the Darbar at Peshawar, such khilats and titles as are approved, their value will be immensely enhanced in the eyes of the recipients. I would suggest that each khilat be accompanied with a complimentary sanad.

25. The certificates for subordinate members of the blockade police might issue from your office through the Inspector-General of Police, and, if you approve of commendatory sanads for the suppliers of levies, they might issue from your office and be presented by the Deputy Commissioners concerned.

26. An especially gratifying feature of this winter has been the reliability and efficiency shown by both Militias. They have done exceedingly well, as well as old and seasoned troops, while preserving the irregular character, mobility and elasticity of Militias. We could not ask for more. I especially commend the Officers Commanding the Militias and their Second-in-Command and Adjutants to the favourable notice of Government for their hard, self-denying and most successful work. It has been a pleasure to see the Militias developing into the fine corps they now are. The results have justified the experiment and augur well for the future.

As regards the non-commissioned officers and men, I attach a copy of a telegram, No. 72, dated the 18th instant, from the Officer Commanding Northern Waziristan Militia, and will forward Major Harman's proposals

and recommendations when received. I think that gratuities taking the shape of from one month's to three months' pay may be appropriate to meet the cases of such as are specially mentioned. I am unable to say whether the rules of the Order of British India permit of its grant to those of the army that are serving in a Militia.

27. In conclusion I should like to record my gratitude to Generals Hill, Dening and General Egerton for the sympathy, advice and most ready co-operation which I have had the good fortune to enjoy at their hands. It has been throughout a case of military and civil officers working together in the interests of the State, and without this combination on part of both authorities on the spot, it would have been impossible to have reached a successful end.

28 To save time a copy of this letter has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department

No. 29.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merh, Esq., Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandala, to Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province. No. 803 B. Dated 6th April, 1902.

Distribution of allowances settled and agreement signed by Jirga, which is dismissed to-day.

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LONDON:
• PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
By DARLING & SON, Ltd, 34-40, BACON STREET, E.

1902.

EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

PAPERS REGARDING

- I. ORAKZAIS: Request of certain Clans to be taken under British Administration.
- II. ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS: Operations.
- III. MOHMANDS: Operations

5

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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1908.

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PART I.

ORAKZAIS: REQUEST OF CERTAIN CLANS TO BE TAKEN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 18th August, 1904 Received 5th September, 1904.

(Extract)

We have the honour to forward copy of a letter from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province, submitting a proposal to extend protection to certain of the Orakzai clans on the Kohat border. The clans in question are the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Sipaia, Abdul Aziz Khel, Ibrahimzai, and Chappar Mishtis, whose total fighting strength is estimated at 2,710 men. Of these clans, the Chappar Mishtis only are Sunnis, the others are Shias. The tract which these sections occupy is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles. It extends over both slopes of the Star Ghar range from the Oblan Pass on the east to Dappa on the west, just short of the point where the road made in 1897 crosses the Sampagga Pass. On the north, the boundary is the Mastura River, with the exception of the portion between Zera and Osi, where land on both banks is owned by the Sipaia; on the south, their territory runs down to the broken and undulating country within the limits of Kachai and Marai, in British territory. The Orakzai clans are divided into two religious sections, of Shias and Sunnis, between whom exists a long-standing animosity, easily fanned by a fanatical leader into bitter conflict. This was the case last summer, when a Muhammadan fanatic, coming, it is believed, from Ghazni, and known as the Malang Fakir, created disturbances in the Orakzai country, and preached a *jihad* against Shias. Several Orakzais joined him, till he had a large following, which had several conflicts with the Shias, in one of which the Fakir was wounded. The Shias in adjacent British territory asked for permission to help their co-religionists, but were not allowed to do so, though probably some of them crossed the border. The organised attack on these Shia clans caused also great excitement amongst their co-religionists in Kurram; and, if matters had proceeded to extremities, it would perhaps have been difficult to have prevented them from joining in the fray in large numbers. The Shias applied for assistance from Government, which was not given them, and declared their intention of asking, in a body, after the termination of the fighting, to be taken over by Government. In August, 1903, owing, it is said, partly to treachery on the part of the Aka Mulla, who, jealous of the ascendancy acquired by the Malang Fakir, gave secret intimation of their plans, the Sunnis were defeated by the Shias. This weakened the influence of the Fakir, though he subsequently managed to raise a general Afridi *jirga* to carry on the war. The Shias defeated this combined attack, and burned or mutilated the bodies of the Sunnis whom they had killed. This defeat led to the break-up of the *jirga*, amid mutual recrimination, and to the termination of hostilities. The Orakzais openly denounced the Malang Fakir as an impostor, and he departed from the country, after a futile attempt to raise another *jirga*. It is rumoured that he returned in June of this year from Afghanistan, and is again trying to raise another gathering to attack the Shias. While the fighting was still in progress last year, the

Chappar Mishtis applied to be taken over by the British Government. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no petition could be entertained until peace had been restored. At the end of the year, after the restoration of peace, the Shia clans commenced to sound the local authorities as to whether, if they petitioned Government to take them over, there was any chance of Government agreeing to do so, they suggested that their tract should be taken over on the lines of Kurram, and expressed their readiness to pay tribute or revenue. It is stated that the so-called religious attacks on the Shias have their real foundation in the desire of the Afridis to annex their neighbours' rich lands; and though the Shias on the last occasion proved that they were able to defend themselves, their wish to be brought under British protection is undoubtedly genuine. The question is constantly mentioned by the tribal jirgas at their meetings with the local political officers, and it is desirable to come to some decision as to the reply to be given to the tribes. Colonel Deane considers that there are many advantages from this extension of control; to take over the country—he says—would definitely stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very substantial guarantee for the peace of the border, while, if we leave things as they are, and if the persecution of these clans by the Afridis and Orakzais, under the cloak of religion, is persistently carried out, there must be a risk of the clans being gradually weakened and ousted, or of their being compelled to throw in their lot with the Afridis, in which case their attitude towards us, which has been hitherto uniformly friendly, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult than it is even at present. Colonel Deane further points out that, if we take over the tract, it will facilitate a greater political control over adjacent Afridi sections, notably the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel, and the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border will be avoided, while there will be the obvious strategical gain of obtaining a position in rear of the Afridi country, whence troops could act, when necessary. He admits that the arrangement would be unpalatable to the Afridis, but he thinks that this may be disregarded. He accordingly recommends that we should give to the clans named the protection which they are anxious to secure, and administer the tract somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, collecting a cess of four rupees per house, and raising for the actual protection of the border a corps of 200 local levies, to be affiliated to the Samana Rifles. The subject has already been considered by the Government of India, in connection with somewhat similar proposals to the present one. In 1894, the Bar Muhammad Khel, one of these Shia sections, submitted a petition to be taken under the control and protection of the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, believed that the offer was a genuine one, but expressed the opinion that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. In 1895, some of the leading men of the Baba Nmasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan also petitioned to be taken over by Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor expressed the same opinion as he had in regard to the Bar Muhammad Khels. The Ali Khel lands form an isolated block in the west of Tirah which in existing circumstances could hardly be taken over. The Government of India accepted His Honour's views in both instances. We enclose a copy of the correspondence which then took place, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's opinion, which was fully concurred in by Mr. Udny, states the case very strongly against the extension of our responsibilities in the tribal tracts beyond the Kohat District. So matters remained until the frontier disturbances of 1897-98, during which these Shia clans maintained a uniformly friendly attitude towards us. At the close of the disturbances the lines on which our frontier policy should be conducted were laid down in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated 28th January, 1898.* The leading principles, inculcated in this despatch, were that no new responsibility should be taken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities, and the protection of the British border; that interference with the tribes must be avoided, where possible, that we must not give any countenance to the idea that Government intended to administer the tribal country, or to enclose it within provincial limits, since the extension of direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities; while annexation would imply a still larger addition to our civil and military establishments, with a very serious and

* See Cd. 496 of 1901, p. 5.

growing burden upon our financial resources. It was further stated that the demarcation of the Durand line had aroused suspicion and misgiving among certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of Government, and that "to gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future actions". It was laid down that "the immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehensions of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence". We do not at this stage propose to discuss the details of Colonel Deane's scheme, since, while the proposal itself involves *pro tanto* a departure from the principles of the frontier policy which were laid down for our guidance in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated the 28th January, 1898, in the discussion which has arisen on the proposal the applicability of those principles in their entirety to existing circumstances has been directly challenged. Should His Majesty's Government be prepared to reconsider the principles therein indicated, we would probably be ready to take action somewhat on the lines now suggested by Colonel Deane, which have undoubtedly much to commend them; but before doing this, we desire, without committing ourselves to any definite expression of opinion, to lay before you the arguments for and against adopting a departure from the policy to which we are at present committed. We are impelled to take this step, partly because we are not unanimous as to the desirability or necessity of extending our responsibilities, and partly because His Excellency Lord Amphill, who is only in temporary charge of the office of Viceroy, considers that a definite recommendation on an issue which, in view of the light in which it is put forward by some of his advisers, involves a vitally important question of frontier policy, could best be made when permanent arrangements for the Viceroyalty have come into existence. It is urged by opponents of the present proposal that, besides being in contravention of the policy laid down for our guidance, the scheme is calculated to cause excitement among the Afridis; it entails our assuming responsibility for protecting the sections concerned, it will cost not less than a quarter of a lakh of rupees a year, plus a considerable initial expenditure, in return for which we are to receive, by way of tribute, a cess of four rupees per house, or about Rs 8,000 per annum. Those in favour of the scheme contend that the present proposals differ materially from those before Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1894. Then only one of the sections concerned, and that not the section adjoining British India, had applied for arms or protection, now all the sections, owning a compact block of territory, and running down to within four miles of Kohat itself, have repeatedly asked to be incorporated in British India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, then, could hardly have foreseen the great success which has attended the taking over of the Kurram in 1893, under similar but perhaps more unpromising conditions, as the Turis were hopelessly broken, and this success is cited as an example of what we may expect in the present instance. The cost involved is declared to be small in comparison with the results to be achieved. Further, it is urged that, as these tribes have been consistently friendly to us, and have shown that they possess a considerable power of resistance against aggression, it would be as unchivalrous as impolitic to leave them to be crushed by an overwhelming coalition of their Sunni enemies who have been almost as consistent enemies to us. It is also obvious that if we can hold this tract, and so secure in friendly territory a good road to the heart of Tirah, we shall acquire a most potent lever against the Afridis and Orakzais. In fact, passing from the comparatively petty case in question, our military advisers, while fully recognising that this involves a departure from the policy hitherto laid down for our guidance, consider that the time has arrived when the essential principles of that policy should come under reconsideration. In brief, they are of opinion that our general frontier policy should contemplate the gradual and peaceful extension of our close control over the tribes as far as the Durand boundary, at any rate, where this is necessary on strategical considerations. Lord Kitchener, after a prolonged tour along the whole length of the frontier, during which he penetrated, with a small Militia escort only, into tracts hitherto almost entirely closed to our officers, is convinced that the policy of peaceful penetration is working admirably, and that in the Militia forces that we have raised we have not only reliable bodies for the work that they have to perform, but most valuable instruments of pacification that in the course of time will bring the whole of the tracts, in which they are employed, under our full control. The instance of Baluchistan is adduced to show how the tribes have settled down wherever the direct influence of our officers has been introduced, and even allowing for differences in the Pathan tribes north of the Gomal and those to the south of that

river, it is held that the same results are rapidly following, where, as in Kurram and the Tochi, our officers are dealing with the tribes from within. The tribesmen look to them for guidance in their disputes and difficulties, and our practical interference with the administration of the tracts concerned of necessity increases as time goes on, and is even now much greater than when the country was held by purely military garrisons. It may take longer to bring the Afridis into line, but it is impossible to predict how long it will take until a beginning is made, and if we reject so excellent a chance of making that beginning as is offered to us by the spontaneous and repeated offer of these Shia clans, we can hardly hope that other tribes elsewhere will elect for that closer union with us, which is so essential in the event of military operations, while the Afridis will infallibly attribute our refusal to extend our protection to tribes asking it of their own free will, to our dread of themselves, which will render them even more difficult to deal with in the future. The main objections to this policy are indicated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch already cited. There is the additional objection that the occupation of the tribal territory up to the Durand line brings us into direct contact with a large section of the Afghan frontier, across which raids and counter-raids are of frequent occurrence, for the continuous settlement of which we have not yet found any adequate means. If we eventually bring all the tribes that now lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, we shall become immediately and directly responsible, both for protecting them against attack from, and for restraining them from excursion across, the Afghan border. Then, if the policy of peaceful penetration is actively pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously to our responsibilities. The weaker tribes who have come over to us have undoubtedly benefited largely, and are contented with their position, but it is doubtful if the stronger tribes would view the matter in the same light. The Pathan tribes are greatly attached to what they regard as their independence, that is to say, their freedom to manage their own affairs in their own way, and their exemption from the payment of revenue to any suzerain Power. It seems doubtful whether the stronger tribes would ever voluntarily consent to such relinquishment of their independence as would be involved by inclusion within our administration; and if, by force of temporary circumstances, such a tribe were to agree to absorption in British India, it is probable that, when the special circumstances had passed away, they would regret the action which they had taken, and desire to return to their former status of limited independence. In such an event, serious trouble might arise, if not immediately, at any rate in time of difficulty; and our position, when we were compelled to advance, might become weaker rather than stronger, owing to their discontent. Turning now again to the definite proposal which has given rise to this correspondence, news that the Shias are contemplating making over their country to the British Government has already reached the Afridis, where the question has aroused great interest—as one emissary graphically expresses himself, “there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not find three or four men discussing the Shia affair.” Some argue that, if the Shias wish to give up their country, the Afridis have the first right to it; others are in favour of making an alliance with the Shias, binding themselves never again to attack them or interfere with them, and the general idea is that, if the Shias can be induced to withdraw from the step which they were about to take, the Orakzais and Afridis would make a united protest against the occupation of the tract. It is considered doubtful whether the Afridis and Orakzais generally would proceed to extremities, but the feeling amongst them against annexation is undoubtedly strong. The question of the annexation of the Shia Orakzai tract is also closely connected with the proposal to withdraw the troops from Fort Lockhart, on the Samana, and to replace them by military police, a proposal to which we attach great importance, but to which the military authorities have hitherto been opposed. In view of the great strategical importance of the tract, giving as it does a stronger political and military control over most of the Afridi and Orakzai sections, our military advisers would be prepared, in the event of it being taken over, to concur in the withdrawal of the regular troops which, by removing a visible armed menace to Tirah, might go far to reconcile the tribes to the altered position in the tract in question. This undoubtedly is a strong argument in favour of this small extension of our closer control. Such are the arguments for and against Colonel Deane's present proposals, and for a partial change in the policy laid down in 1898. The force of circumstances has led to a gradual extension of the direct influence of our officers throughout the greater portion of

the tract south of the Safed Koh, and to this extent there has quietly grown up a certain amount of interference with the administration of the border tracts there. None of us is in favour of unduly forcing the pace or of forcible interference with the tribes anywhere, but we are not entirely in accord as to the absolute necessity of availing ourselves of every suitable opportunity, such as that now offered, of extending our friendly control more closely over those tribes whom it is, for strategical reasons, necessary to bind firmly to us in times of peace, so that we may not be leaning on a broken reed when the stress of war is upon us. We therefore think it best to state all the facts and arguments for your consideration at once. Circumstances may render it necessary to arrive at an early decision on the particular case that has given rise to this discussion, and it will doubtless be convenient that it should have been fully reported in advance. Otherwise, we propose to leave our decision on the particular matter over until the autumn, by which time we shall have had further proof of the real wishes of the Shia clans, and shall also be perhaps in a better condition to judge of the probable effects of our acceptance of their offer, if it is again made. On the general question of the desirability of a more active prosecution of our present policy of extension of friendly influence and control over the tribes on the British side of the border up to the Durand line, where this is desirable for strategical reasons, we are content to await the decision at which His Majesty's Government may arrive after full consideration of the weighty arguments that our military advisers have now adduced.

Enclosure 1 in No 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 26th September, 1894

(Extract.)

I am directed to submit, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated 5th September, 1894, and enclosures, from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, on the subject of the wish of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan to put their country under the control and protection of the British Government, and to convey the following remarks and observations of the Lieutenant-Governor. The Muhammad Khel tract, of which the Bar Muhammad Khel tract is a portion, lies in the south-eastern part of Tirah. It is a Shia patch in a Sunni country and its inhabitants are hard pressed by their neighbours. An idea prevails among the people of those parts that our Government entertains aggressive designs on Tirah, as some of its subordinate officers undoubtedly do, and it is accordingly the most natural thing in the world that the Bar Muhammad Khels should offer us a footing in their country in return for protection against their enemies, especially as they see how we have recently delivered the Turis from their Sunni persecutors. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick accordingly quite agrees with the local officers in thinking that the offer is a genuine and *bonâ fide* one, and with them he should be quite prepared to find that the other sections of the Muhammad Khels would soon join in it. But His Honour thinks at the same time that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. From the point of view of the maintenance of peace with the tribes on our border, there may be something to be said in favour of establishing a position for ourselves there, provided it was an overwhelmingly strong position. Such a position would give us a powerful hold over the Afridis as well as the Orakzais, and would place our arrangements in the Khyber on a more secure footing than they stand at present, but the cost of establishing and maintaining such a position would, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks no one can doubt, be out of all proportion to the advantages to be derived from it. Any movement forward in advance of our present position on the Samana would excite against us the bitterest animosity of the Orakzais and Afridis, and if such a movement was to be made at all, it would have to be made in very great strength. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, therefore, that any idea of establishing for ourselves in Tirah any really strong position in which we would be able to hold our own and dominate the country may be dismissed from consideration. There remains the

suggestion that we should put in what may be called "the thin end of the wedge," that we should start some sort of tribal militia in the tract in question, to be paid and armed by us, which would give us some sort of footing in that tract and would to some extent strengthen the inhabitants of it against their enemies. But the Lieutenant-Governor is just as strongly opposed to this. It would no doubt cost little to start the thing, but it would, in His Honour's opinion, be worse than useless to start anything of the kind; for it would give us no real hold on Tirah and would create such an amount of suspicion and irritation in the minds of the people of that country as would most detrimentally affect our relations with them everywhere and in particular in the Khyber. Moreover, it would be vain to imagine that we could stop, for any time to speak of, at what is proposed. Our protégés would be attacked, and we should have to send a force of regular troops to defend them and would inevitably end by keeping it there, which, as already observed, would be a most serious burthen on us. It is all very well to say at starting that we would not guarantee protection to any one. It would be impossible, with any regard to our own credit, to adhere to that. It cannot be too often repeated, when proposals of this sort are under consideration, that it is absolutely impossible to get a hold over any section of a tribe or any tract of country on the frontier in this way without at the same time giving it a hold over us. These observations would apply to a proposal of the nature now before us in regard to any tribe or section of a tribe in Tirah, but there is an additional reason, and a very weighty one, against adopting any such proposal in the case of these Bar Muhammad Khels, namely, that they as Shias are regarded with fanatical hatred by the great mass of the people of the country round, who are Sunnis, and that to go in there on their invitation and as their protectors would be about the very worst introduction we could possibly have. It must be remembered that we have already established with these Shia communities friendly relations of the same sort that we have established with their Sunni neighbours, that is to say, we employ them on certain frontier services and give them allowances for those services, and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick feels assured that we had better be content with that, at least till we have disposed of the Waziristan question and the other large questions that may arise out of the demarcation. In conclusion, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor has mentioned what has been proposed to Mr. Udny, and that he agrees with His Honour in thinking that it is altogether inexpedient to make any move of the sort suggested.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 5th September, 1894

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward, for the information and orders of Government, copy of a letter of 30th August, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reporting that the jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel have represented that the clan desire to put their country under the control and protection of the Government of India, finding themselves cut off from local supplies of arms and ammunition, owing to the influence of the preaching of Sunni Mullas, and fearing that they will be unable to hold their own against the more numerous and powerful Sunni clans in Tirah. From the Deputy Commissioner's report there seems no doubt that their fear and the wish that is born of it are genuine. Like their brethren of the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel sections of the Muhammad Khel division of the Orakzai tribe, the Bar Muhammad Khel are Shias, and consequently an object of hatred to the surrounding clans; but the physical advantages of their country have enabled them, though outnumbered, to maintain their position. These Shia clans hold the hills between Atrida Waran on the north and the Samilzai ilaqa of Kohat on the south, and are interposed between settlements of the Daulatzai clans and the Mastura Towi Valley. They command one of the shortest routes to the centre of Tirah from the Kohat side, by the Landuki Pass. From their country there is access by the Maturi Pass or the Uchpal Pass to the Bara Valley, and by Waran to the Khyber Afridi settlements in Rajgal and Madan on the west. Their position overlooks the Hamsaya clans, Mishti, Shekhan and Malla Khel, and lies in rear of the Ismailzai sections, Rabiya Khel, Akhel and Mammuzai. The Deputy Commissioner represents the advantage which control over the Bar Muhammad Khel country would secure to us in the event of operations in Tirah, and the same view is expressed in the article on Tirah in the North-Western Frontier "Gazetteer." Major Leigh is not explicit as to the manner in which our control would be exercised or protection afforded if Government should desire to take any action upon the offer of this clan. It will be noted that the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel, who are in a similar position, are likely to come forward with the same petition. His view apparently is that we might extend the Border Military Police system so as to raise a tribal militia holding certain posts in their country, and by this

means protect them from their neighbours. The most detailed expression of the views of Government in regard to extension of control over a trans-border clan that I can quote at present will be found in the instructions which were issued by the Foreign Department of the Government of India in connection with the expedition of 1891 against the Black Mountain tribes. The system approved is there described as one "of tribal management, in which the co-operation and goodwill of the tribal chiefs would be enlisted on the side of peace and order by the grant of tribal allowances in return for service rendered," with the object "by means of allowances and the entertainment of levies to strengthen the authority of the headmen sufficiently to enable them to protect and escort British officers visiting their country, and ensure their attendance when required in the settlement of tribal disputes or tribal outrages." We have here then an opportunity of extending control over the Muhammad Khel Orakzais at a cost perhaps of a few thousand rupees in pay of tribesmen enlisted in a militia as a kind of adjunct to the Border Military Police. The control would no doubt ensure protection of British officers visiting their country, if Government still consider that an object of importance, but in return the tribe ask for some assistance for their own protection. It is, I presume, unlikely that Government would care to guarantee the protection of an independent clan against its neighbours, but it does not seem necessary that we should bind ourselves to do more than to pay and perhaps arm a small tribal militia; ammunition, if not arms, could be given in lieu of money allowances. It is quite possible that when the Sunni clans hear the step which the Bar Muhammad Khel have taken, they may think it worth while not to bully their Shia neighbours to the point of desperation, and this offer may have been actuated by some such hope. I do not suggest that Government should accept anything which would involve responsibility for the protection of the Shia clans, but if with the aid of a purely tribal militia paid by us, but not as servants of Government, and of some assistance in the shape of supply of ammunition, they can hold their own, and in return for that are willing to open their country to us, the offer which they have made should be worthy of consideration; and as they are actuated by the strongest of all motives, self-interest, there is some assurance that the offer is genuine and may be trusted. More detailed proposals would be premature until it is known whether Government consider the advantage worth the expenditure of some few thousand rupees per annum.

Annexure 2

Letter from Major H. P. P. Leigh, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated 30th August, 1894.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward a report from Mr. D. Donald, Assistant Political Officer, by which it will be seen that the Bar Muhammad Khel clan are anxious to be afforded British protection for the reason that, owing to the edict issued by the Mullas of Tirah, their supply of arms and ammunition has been cut off, and they will be unable in the future to protect themselves from the attacks of their Sunni enemies. I interviewed the Bar Muhammad Khel Jurga on the 18th instant at Mastan, and they confirmed what they had already stated to Mr. Donald, and said that they were willing and anxious that their country should be taken over by us. I said that I would report their wishes for the orders of higher authority, but that it was out of the question that we could at present supply them with arms and ammunition. If it be agreed that we should not lose the opportunity now offered it would not be necessary to occupy the country with troops. The Bar Muhammad Khel, in common with the Mani Khel, receive a fairly large allowance for service, and we could easily extend our Border Military Police system to their country, when, with an unlimited supply of ammunition, the positions would be practically impregnable. That this is so is proved by the fact that the Shia Sayids have up to the present time always held their own when attacked by largely superior numbers of Sunnis. If the Afridis were ever arrayed against us the possession of the Bar Muhammad Khel hills would be most important for us. If you agree that this is a matter for serious consideration (and I personally am of opinion that the benefits which will accrue will be great), I can have a rough survey of the country made showing the boundaries of Shia territory. The Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel (the remaining sections of the Muhammad Khel clan) would probably soon ask for our protection in the same way as their brethren have done, and it would be easy at any time for myself or Mr. Donald to visit the country and come to a definite conclusion as to what localities would be the best for towers for the defence of the Shia border, manned by their own people enlisted as Border Militia. It might be necessary eventually to give allowances to the Abdul Aziz Khel, which they do not now get, but with this exception a magnificent piece of country would become accessible to us at practically no cost whatever. The Shia clans have always been friendly to us: they gave us material assistance during the Miranzai expeditions, and I think it would be a calamity if they were now driven from their hills by the Sunni tribes, who would thus greatly strengthen their own position, while the Shias would have no course open to them but to flee to British territory, where they would be a source of trouble, and we should not know what to do with them.

Annexure 3.

Report by the Assistant Political Officer, Kohat.

On the 16th August a representative jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan of Orakzais came to see me and requested that I should obtain through you the sanction of Government to help them with arms and ammunition, which would enable them to hold out against the attacks of the Sunnis. The jirga represented that they could not now obtain arms and ammunition from the Afridis, as the Mullas had issued edicts threatening to deprive all Sunnis who sold arms, &c, to Shias of funeral and other religious rites. I informed the jirga that the Government would not grant a request of this kind. The jirga then requested that their tribe may be allowed to come under British rule as they could not defend themselves much longer against the Sunnis as their chief source of supply of arms, &c, had now been cut off by the edict of the Mullas. The jirga also stated that the second request was made with the approval of the whole clan. I brought the jirga up before you on the Samana on the 18th August where the Maliks repeated their request of their clansmen being allowed to become British subjects.

I am of opinion that it is in the interests of Government that this clan should in some way be protected, as the Bar Muhammad Khels have always behaved well and seem well disposed towards Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 27th October, 1894.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 26th September, 1894, regarding the Bar Muhammad Khel clan on the Kohat Border.

2 In reply, I am to say that the Government of India think that no action should be taken to meet the desire of this clan that their country should be put under the control and protection of the British Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 19th August, 1895.

I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 30th July, 1895, and of its enclosures, received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, giving cover to a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, praying to be taken under British protection and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that, as in the case of the similar request of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan, no action be taken on the petition.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 30th July, 1895.

I have the honour to forward copy of an endorsement, dated 27th July, 1895, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, with translation of a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, imploring to be taken under British protection.

After the orders of Government upon the similar request put forward last year by the Bar Muhammad Khel, it seems unnecessary for me to say anything about this petition.

Annexure 2.

Endorsement by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, dated 27th July, 1895.

The following translation of a petition presented to me by the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel tribe on the 17th July is forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for information.

On a previous occasion I recommended that the petition of the Shia inhabitants of the Bar Muhammad Khel country should be favourably listened to by Government, and that they should be recognized as British subjects. The suggestion, however, was not considered feasible. This petition is of a similar nature, and I have told the petitioners that though, as they wished it, their request would be forwarded, yet there was not the least chance of its being acceded to. In the former case the tract of country offered to us was an undivided stretch of hills with no inhabitants save Shias. In the present case, although some of the villages concerned are large and powerful, yet they are mixed up with Sunni communities, and their annexation would be impracticable, even if desirable.

Annexure 3.

Translation of the petition from Shias of Ali Khel, dated 16th July, 1895

(Extract)

Although we Baba Numasis, of Talai, Ali Khel and Mirwas Khel, number 1,000 armed men and possess rich tracts of Ali Khel, Chango Channa and other hilly tracts of Ali Khel, yet we are so hardly oppressed by the Sunnis and their mullas that we are much more inclined than before to submit ourselves to the yoke of the British Government and to obey its commands cordially. We have been making this request for some years past, and now hope that our request to be taken over by the British Government may be accepted. The 1,000 men of our tribe promise on oath that they will furnish supplies required by the British Government and will fight against the enemies of Government if ordered to do so. At present we are quite independent and shall be most grateful if taken over by Government. If we are taken over by Government, there would be no inconvenience to Government, nor would there be any opposition. We assure Government that we will pay revenue and render any services required of us, even if the Government do not take the trouble of occupying our country. We, therefore, first of all declare on oath that these 1,000 men are ready to sacrifice their lives for the British Government, and again beg to request that our old standing petition may once more be laid before Government, and that we may be made British subjects, which is the only course open to us to enable us to escape the tyranny of the Sunnis, and for this act of benevolence we shall ever pray for the prosperity of Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 6th September, 1895.

I am directed to reply to your letter, dated the 19th August, 1895, regarding a petition presented to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat by certain Shias belonging to the Ali Khel clan of the Orakzai tribe, in which they pray to be taken under British protection.

2 The Government of India agree with His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that no action need be taken on the petition.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 14th May, 1904.

(Extract)

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the letter dated the 6th September, 1895, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, on the subject of extending protection to certain clans on the Kohat Border. The question has again arisen, and as circumstances have entirely changed since the time of the letter under reference, I deem it advisable again to lay the question before the Government of India. A reference to the diaries and reports of the summer of

1903 will show the detailed history of the religious war which was waged on the Kohat border. The Orakzai clans are divided into the two religious sections of Shias and Sunnis. The latter, assisted by the Afridis under the leadership of the Fakir, attacked the Shia clans in force. The nominal object was the conversion of the Shias, but the real inducement was the desire of the Afridis to annex their rich lands for themselves. The Shia clans showed themselves able to defend their own borders and the fighting ended in the discomfiture of the Sunnis. While the fighting was still pending, a Sunni clan, the Chappar Mishtis, applied to be taken over. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no such petition could be entertained until peace had been assured. In addition to this clan, the Shia clans of the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Abdul Aziz Khel, Sipaia and Ibrahimzai are now also making overtures to be taken over. They express their desire to come under Government control somewhat on the same lines as the Kurram clans, but are unwilling to make a formal petition, as on the former occasion, until assured that such a petition will not be rejected. The fighting strength of these tribes is approximately—

Mani Khel	600
Bar Muhammad Khel .. .	1,500
Sipaia	350
Abdul Aziz Khel	80
Ibrahimzai	80
Chappar Mishtis	100
Total	<u>2,710</u>

but these numbers will increase considerably if the security of the tract is assured by occupation. The entire tract is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles, containing about 70 villages of the various clans. The soil itself is generally of an excellent nature. There are large irrigated tracts, especially down the valley of the Mastura, while the lands dependent on rainfall have always within experience rendered abundant harvests. Fruit cultivation is extensively practised. There can be no doubt that, with a continuity of peace, all the conditions of the country point to a growth of wealth. There are many advantages to be derived from this extension of control. To take over the country would be definitely to stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very considerable guarantee to the peace of the border, as our numerous Shia subjects within the adjacent border must become involved in the feud should it show any signs of substantial recrudescence. The same remark applies to a certain extent to our Sunni subjects. If this persecution of these clans under the cloak of religion by the Afridis and Orakzais is persistently carried out, there must be a risk and danger of the present clans being gradually weakened and ousted or of being driven to throw in their lot with the Afridis; in which case their attitude, which has hitherto been uniformly friendly to Government, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult even than it is at present. The occupation of this tract would aid materially in the protection of the settled area within the Kohat border. The position is one which would render practicable a certain amount of political control over the adjacent Afridi clans, notably the Zakka Khels and Aka Khels, while the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border would be averted. There is, moreover, the obvious strategical gain in obtaining a position near the Afridi country, from which troops could act when necessary. As regards the objection that this advance will have an unsettling effect on the Afridis and other clans, I am not inclined to regard this seriously. The Pathan custom whereby a weaker seeks the protection of a stronger is so clearly defined and so frequently acted upon among the clans themselves that its extension to Government protection affords no reasonable ground for discontent. In return for this protection, if afforded, I would propose a cess of four rupees per house, which ought to yield about Rs. 8,000 annually. The tract might be administered somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. For the actual protection of the border, a locally raised Corps of approximately 200 levies, affiliated to the Samana Rifles and occupying 4 posts, should be sufficient to guard against outside aggression. The

initial cost of this establishment would be roughly Rs. 24,000 and the annual cost Rs. 36,000. It is, however, to be noted that, in the event of these proposals being sanctioned, it would probably be possible later to do away with the Border Military Police posts at Marai, Kachai, Alizai and Danozai Tang, at an annual saving of approximately Rs 4,000. As these clans constantly bring up the question at the meetings of their Jirgas with the local officers, I consider it my duty to refer it for orders. The policy of the Government of India, is, I understand, a forward one only when necessity compels, and stationary where circumstances permit. In the present proposals, political advisability and strategic advantage are clear. Actual necessity at the present time cannot be urged. But it is a question whether it is not better to act now, at the desire of the tribes concerned, rather than to run the risk of the difficulties which would be involved by the extension of Afridi influence and power over these clans. The present position may be compared with that in the Kurram, where aggression, with the real object of obtaining possession of their lands, carried on under the guise of religious war, compelled the Turis to seek Government protection rather than throw themselves on the mercies of their persecutors. After careful consideration, I have come to the opinion that to accede to the desire of these tribes and bring them under Government protection would be advantageous both to themselves and to Government.

No. 2.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated 28th October, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have considered your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, dated the 18th August, 1904, as to the proposal submitted by the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province to take under our political control certain clans of the Orakzais on the Kohat border, who have applied for the protection of the British Government. The reasons in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal are clearly stated in his letter of the 14th May, 1904, and it is further claimed for the step which he contemplates that, if successfully accomplished, it would render practicable the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Lockhart and their replacement by military police. Colonel Deane expresses the opinion that the proposed extension of our control will not have any seriously-unsettling effect on the Afridis and other tribes adjoining the district in question. On the other hand, your Excellency states that the action of the clans in applying for our protection has already caused considerable excitement in Tirah, and you recognise that the feeling on the subject among the Afridis and Orakzais generally is undoubtedly strong, though you consider it doubtful whether they would proceed to extremities, if effect is given to the proposed policy. I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the question must be considered not as an isolated one, but in connection with the general lines of policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch of the 28th January, 1898, to govern our relations with the tribes along the frontier. It appears from your letter that those members of your Excellency's Government who are most strongly in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal advocate it on the ground that, for strategical reasons, the principle of avoiding, where possible, interference with the tribes must be abandoned, and that we must contemplate the necessity of extending our control as far as the Durand boundary on this section of the frontier, so as to obviate the danger which would arise, in time of war, if the tract of country between the Kurram and the Khyber should be left in the occupation of practically independent tribes, over whom we have exercised no direct influence. Lord Salisbury's Government, however, when they arrived at the conclusions formulated in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch, were fully alive to the force of the arguments in favour of a policy of gradual and continuous extension of the field of our political control, and to the anomalies arising from the absence of such control. But they were convinced, by the experience of the tribal risings of 1897, that the policy they laid down was the sound one; and the history of the last five years does not appear to His Majesty's Government to afford grounds for modifying it in any material

sense. His Majesty's Government also attach great weight to the view, expressed in your letter, that, even if we eventually bring the tribes which lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, the result will be to add seriously to our responsibilities. His Majesty's Government are therefore unwilling, after full consideration of both sides of the case as presented in your letter, to authorise, in present circumstances, any material departure from the general policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch; and they see no sufficient reason, on the information now before them, for incurring the risks attaching to the proposed extension of the tribal area under our control.

PART II.

ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th November, 1898. Received 5th December, 1898

(Extract)

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the settlement effected with the Khyber Pass Afridis.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, Landi Kotal, dated 26th September, 1898.

(Telegraphic.)

The Government of India expect to be able shortly to issue to you and to Mr. Cunningham, who will be associated with you, instructions as to the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with the Khyber Afridis, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass. Please summon the jirgas of Kuki, Kambar, Malikdin, Zakka, Sipah and Kamrai to meet you at Peshawar, and to hear these terms and the orders of Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

From the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th September, 1898.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 26th. After consulting with Mr. Cunningham, I have summoned the jirgas therein mentioned to be at Peshawar on the 22nd October, with a view to the announcement of terms on the 24th.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 3rd October, 1898.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram of the 29th September, I have the honour to forward, for your information, a translation of the summons which has been issued to the jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Zakka Khel, Sipah and Kamrai sections of the Afridis, in accordance with your telegram of the 26th ultimo.

Annexure.

Translation of orders issued by the Political Officer, Khyber, dated Peshawar, the 28th September, 1898.

(Extract.)

The Government of India being now prepared to announce to your clans the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with you, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass, I have been ordered by the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to summon you to attend with a full and representative jirga of your clan to hear the same from him and Mr Cunningham in Peshawar on Monday, the 24th October, 1898, i.e., the 8th Jamadi-us-Sani, 1316 H. You are particularly to bear in mind that your jirga which attends must be a full and representative one. You are accordingly summoned to attend on Saturday, the 22nd October, i.e., 6th Jamadi-us-Sani, 1316 H.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from Secretary to the Government of India, to the General Officer Commanding the Khyber Brigade, dated 7th October, 1898.

(Extract)

The Governor-General in Council has decided to associate Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., with you for the purpose of communicating to the full jirga of the Afridi clans* with whom the Khyber agreement of the 17th February, 1881, was concluded the terms upon which the Government of India have decided to renew friendly relations with them, and to deal with the Khyber Pass. The jirga has been

• Kuki Khel.	Zakka Khel.
Kambar Khel.	Sipah.
Malikdin Khel.	Kamrai.

summoned by you to assemble in Peshawar on the 24th October, 1898, and I am now to convey instructions as to the manner in which you and your colleague will announce the Government terms and explain their nature and intention. The announcement to be made is to the following effect:—*First*.—The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass, which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhart, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable. *Second*.—The Pass will be kept open for trade. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway, in the fort and posts, and in the neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes. *Third*.—The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country; but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will co-operate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway, and within the limits of the Pass. *Fourth*.—The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Khyber Afridi clans for discharging this duty, and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake always to keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the Militia if circumstances require. *Fifth*.—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the Militia will be used for guarding traders. *Sixth*.—The allowances granted by the British Government will commence to reckon from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India; but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Translation of written statement of acceptance of orders of Government handed in by Maliks, elders and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in full jirga.

To Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Commissioner, dated 26th October, 1898.

We, headmen, representatives, and men of the Afridi clans, Kuki Khel, Malikdin, Sipah, Zakka Khel, Kamrai and Kambar Khel, represent that on the day of the Darbar, † six terms (or conditions) laid down by Government were read out to us, and after that copies

† i.e., 24th October.

of a Pashtu translation were given to us, we have thoroughly understood them, we now declare by this writing that we accept and acquiesce in these six terms which are attached to this paper, and this "jirga" for itself, and as representing all the clans concerned, agrees to these terms unconditionally.

(Here follow seals and attestations of over 200 Maliks, elders, and representative men)

No. 2.

Letter from the Government of India, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 5th January, 1905. Received 23rd January, 1905.

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the Afridis.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 25th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic)

Party of about 15, consisting of Zakka Khel, Kamar Khel, and Orakzais, committed a raid at Darshi Khel in Teri tahsil of Kohat district on night of 3rd September, looting shop of Bhamain Das and killing owner and wounding a Bannuchi Mulla, and breaking other houses. Village pursuit party turned out at once, and pursued raiders, who had retired into hills. Mr Reid, of Salt Department, was first officer to arrive, and rendered valuable services in directing pursuit. Raiders finally succeeded in evading pursuit after killing five and wounding six villagers, and carrying off four Snider rifles from the villagers. Of the raiders one was wounded and captured, and another shot dead. Tribe mainly implicated in raid appears to be Zakka Khel, and it is reported that this tribe considers that it has committed itself too far, and intends to do further mischief on a large scale, and it is said revenge itself on Mr Reid for action taken by him. Every possible precaution is being taken to guard against this, and Political Agent, Khyber, has warned Zakka Khel Maliks of absolute responsibility of tribe, and reports that Maliks are making genuine efforts. If further threatened raid takes place, a serious situation regarding the Zakka Khel will be created.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 28th September, 1904.

(Extract)

I have the honour to refer to my telegram, dated 25th September, 1904, reporting a raid on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, by a gang, consisting mainly of Afridis, mostly of the Zakka Khel Section. Later information goes to show that this was not a raid of an ordinary character, but rather an act of defiance to Government, and of hostility to the two Zakka Khel Maliks. Owing to an outlaw, Multan, harboured by the Zakka Khel having taken part in the dakaiti at Jangal Khel in the Kohat District, last spring, two Zakka Khel Maliks had gone to Tirah to try to obtain security for the future good behaviour of this outlaw. In their efforts they found themselves confronted by the partisans of Khwas Khan, who succeeded so well that, on the very day the Maliks left Maidan, a raiding party, headed by this very outlaw, started for the Kohat border, and committed the raid at Darshi Khel. The value of the actual damage inflicted in this raid including compensation for men killed and wounded amounts to approximately Rs. 6,000, while the allowances due to the sections implicated amount to only

Rs. 4,500, of which Rs. 1,000 is already due as fine for their complicity in the Jangal Khel dakaiti. The position thus appears to be exactly that desired by Khwas Khan and his agents. They have induced the Zakka Khel to commit themselves beyond their ordinary means of settlement, and to hope to extricate themselves from this difficulty by continuing their depredations on such a scale as to commit the entire Afridi tribe. An exactly similar point of view is that of the elders who have taken a leading part in organising or accompanying deputations to Kabul. A report has been received that, on the 16th September, a meeting was held at Bagh attended by all Afridis hostile to the British Government, who could be collected, as well as by agents of Khwas Khan. After discussing the situation, this jirga came to the conclusion that apart from this Darshi Khel raid, it was certain that some measures would be taken to punish those who had gone to Kabul this year, and that the best course lay in an attempt to commit the entire tribe to a common cause. To this end it was suggested that the raiders who had already committed the Darshi Khel raid should be induced to commit further raids, as the resulting fines would be so large as to necessitate their collection from the entire Afridi tribe, which would thus be rendered hostile to Government, and possibly blockaded from British territory. The raiders agreed to adopt this course, though whether they will do so remains to be seen. It was also suggested that, as efforts had failed to remove by violent means Major Roos-Keppel and Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, other measures should be tried. The question was discussed of addressing a petition to His Excellency the Viceroy against both these officers, but it was finally decided that there was no prospect of success in the case of a petition against Major Roos-Keppel, but that it might be tried in the case of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum. The situation has already been discussed with the Zakka Khel Maliks, who suggest that they should summon a jirga of the whole clan, which might then be arrested by the Political Agent on the ground that he did not summon it. This is, of course, not possible, but the expedient suggested by these Maliks is evidence that they feel they are losing control of their clan. As an alternative these Maliks suggest that the whole of the Afridis should be excluded from British territory this winter, or that Bazar should be taken and retained. Up to the present time the leading Maliks and elders have been doing their best to ensure the maintenance of peace. Their efforts are, however, being constantly frustrated by Khwas Khan, who is employing all his energies to give trouble, and who finds little difficulty in leading the more turbulent element of the Afridis in the direction in which it is already inclined to go. There can be no doubt that the state of affairs, which is due to the efforts of Khwas Khan, has become very serious, and that, if the raids contemplated do occur, Government may find itself committed to hostilities with the Afridi tribe. The case of the Darshi Khel raid will be taken up in the ordinary course with the jirgas, and endeavours will be made to come to a settlement regarding it, but in view of the serious state of affairs in the Afridi tribe, I deem it advisable to place the Government of India in possession of the facts with as little delay as possible.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter of 5th October, 1904, from the Political Agent, Khyber, in which he proposes at the next distribution of allowances to the Afridi tribe to withhold the shares of those who this year have either themselves gone to Kabul or have sent representatives, and to distribute the money thus saved among those who have supported Government.

2. I agree with the view expressed by Major Roos-Keppel, and recommend sanction being given to his proposals.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th October, 1904.

I have the honour to point out that, by the existing system of distribution of tribal allowances to the Afridis, every head of a family or "kandi" receives his share direct from me, less fines recoverable from individuals whom he represents.

Before 1897 the allowances were paid to the Maliks who kept a large share, and divided the remainder among those who supported them. The present system came in at the settlement of 1898 owing to the absence of many of the Maliks. At present men who are known to be hostile to Government, who visit Kabul and receive large sums of money, share equally with those who have supported us, and who have resisted the very great temptations held out to them from Kabul. This naturally makes the latter very discontented and inclined to join the Kabul party, and I propose, if the Honourable the Chief Commissioner has no objection, to withhold the shares of those who have this year either been to Kabul, or have sent representatives, and to distribute the money thus saved among those who have supported us.

It is, I think, absolutely necessary to encourage these men, as they are getting disheartened and gradually detached from us.

There are no Government orders regarding the distribution of the subsidy, and the Political Officer has always distributed it as seemed best to him, but I am now asking for orders on this point, as my proposal involves the punishment of those who have gone to Kabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 25th September, 1904, I have the honour to forward a detailed report of the raid on the village of Darshi Khel on the night of the 3rd September.

2. The raiding party which, it is believed, consisted of thirteen Afridis of the Kambar Khel and Zakka Khel sections, and two Mishti Orakzais, met at Bagnak Masjid within the limits of the Ali Khel Orakzai country. Here an Ali Khel Orakzai was induced to join the party on the pretence that the real object of the enterprise was the murder of a private enemy who was proceeding from Tirah to British territory. The party then proceeded via the Chargu Pass, near Kot and Ramdan, two Ali Khel Orakzai hamlets in Khanki, and from there to Saidarra, a village belonging to the religious sect of Khadazai Orakzais, and thence via Bullula Tseri, to Askha Darra, some three miles from the Shinawari post, in Zaimusht territory. Here the party was seen by some Zaimushts, and the villages of Sperkot and Mauzabhi turned out to bar the raiders' passage. However, the Ali Khel Orakzai already referred to repeated the story told to him, and assured the Zaimushts that no harm was intended to them. The Zaimushts took the Ali Khel's rifle as security for his statement, and returned to their villages. The raiding party then proceeded on their way, with the exception of the Ali Khel who, being now weaponless, judged it best to retire from the enterprise. The raiding party then crossed to the Karboga Hills, and from there to the Manzalai Range, south of Anon Kot; then, leaving the Sperkai Border Military Post to the west, they hid in the hills and ravines north of Darshi Khel. They appear to have travelled by night, and, after their meeting with the Zaimushts, to have had no dealings with, or assistance from, persons in British territory.

3. On the afternoon of the 3rd September, three of the party came unarmed into the Darshi Khel village, and purchased some flour and other provisions at the shops of Bhawani Das and two other Hindus. This they had cooked in the village, and while waiting were doubtless enabled to familiarise themselves with the place without arousing suspicion. At about 8 p.m., the whole party came down armed, and sacked Bhawani Das's shop, shot the owner dead, and wounded a Bannuchi Mulla, who came to his assistance. They then proceeded to break into the adjoining houses of Hindus, and to rob the women of the jewellery they were wearing. The village alarm drum was at once beaten, and messengers ran off to warn the Bahadur Khel Thana and Border Military Police Post. It is to be noted that Darshi Khel consists of a small village with a large number of hamlets situated from a quarter of a mile to a mile-and-a-half from the parent village. The villagers turned out as promptly as the distance would allow, and those who possessed arms continued to fire on the raiders. The Police and the Border Military Police turned out sharply, but the raiders had left before they reached the village.

4. Mr. Reid, Superintendent of the Northern India Salt Department at Bahadur Khel, hearing the news, galloped up the village, and was able to render valuable services. At first, the pursuit party thinking the raiders to be Waziris, started towards the west. Mr. Reid, however, finding tracks leading to the north and

north-east, recalled the pursuit party, and directed them to follow these up. The night was dark; but with the aid of torches, the pursuit party, augmented from Bahadur Khel, Nur, and Kurram followed these tracks to the foot of the Surtang Range, and thence up a very steep and narrow hill-track which leads to the Surtang Salt post: here the raiders had evidently made use of the Salt Department hill-path.

5. At about 2 a. m., the pursuit party were surprised by a volley fired from above at a distance of 150 yards by the raiders, who were concealed in a ravine: this volley killed two men and wounded two others. In spite of this reverse, the villagers armed with Snider and Enfield rifles continued to oppose the Martini-Henry rifles of the raiders, who gradually retreated to the highest point of the range which stands some 3,000 feet above the plain, and is inaccessible from the south. The raiders retired by sections from this point, and were careful to take good cover.

6. The pursuit of the retiring raiders was continued throughout the day, but the superiority of their armament kept the pursuit party at a distance. In the afternoon a shot fired by a sepoy of the Surtang Salt post broke the thigh of one of the raiders. His comrades attempted to carry him off, but finding this impossible, took his rifle and cartridges, and left him concealed in a bush. He was subsequently captured and found to be a Zakka Khel Afridi, Khairabaz, a reservist of the 26th Punjab Infantry.

7. About 6 in the afternoon, the Khan of Teri's party and the Police of Teri joined the pursuit party, bringing with them a Lee-Metford and a Martini-Henry rifle, and this doubtless increased the speed with which the raiders then retired. The pursuit slackened off at dusk, when it is found that the casualties among the villagers were two shot dead and six severely wounded; while four Government Sniders had also been taken. The raiders' tracks were followed during the night into the next day as far as Mardan, where they were obliterated by heavy rain. In the morning it was found that three of the villagers were missing; search parties went out and found their dead bodies in the Surtang Range.

8. Subsequent enquiries show that the raiders marched the whole of the night, and entered Zaimusht territory before dawn on the 5th September, thus escaping the parties of the Border Military Police and the Samana Rifles, who closed the passes as soon as they were in possession of information as to the direction taken.

Some days later a wounded dakait, who was subsequently identified as Dilbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, was found on the Surtang Range with a Lee-Metford rifle by a patrol of villagers and shot dead. The casualties among the raiders were then one killed and one wounded and captured, while two others are known to be wounded. The casualties among British subjects were six killed and seven wounded, in addition to the loss of property valued at Rs. 2,000 and four Snider rifles.

9. The facts themselves and subsequent enquiries show that the inhabitants of British territory had not only not connived at this raid, but had, on the other hand, done all in their power to arrest the raiders, and in face of serious difficulties showed indomitable pluck and bravery with their inferior weapons. The question of suitably rewarding them is engaging my attention. I would also bring to the notice of the Government of India the prompt and practical services of Mr. Reid, superintendent, Northern Indian Salt Department. That officer's readiness and assistance enabled the pursuit to be carried on, and two of the raiders to be captured or killed; but for him they would have probably escaped scot free. This, indeed, is recognised by the raiders themselves, who are said to have vowed to be revenged on him for his action. I have directed the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to see that suitable measures are taken for Mr. Reid's protection.

10. I have already in my letter, dated the 28th September, dealt with the case as regards the Afridis implicated in this raid. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, is investigating the case as regards the Orakzais, of whom two belonging to the Mishti section are said to have actually taken part in the raid, while the Ali Khel section is being called upon to explain the passage of the raiders through its country. On the conclusion of the investigation, suitable action will be taken against these sections.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

(Extract.)

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter, dated 8th October, 1904, regarding the raid on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, on the 3rd September, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter, dated 5th October, 1904, from the Political Agent, Khyber, regarding the measures which it is proposed to take on account of this offence. I have already pointed out the serious position in which Government has been involved with the Afridis by the intrigues of Khwas Khan. The case of this raid on Darshi Khel is such that it is impossible to obtain full redress from the Afridi sections concerned, and I can suggest no other means of meeting the case than by having it placed, as Major Roos-Keppel suggests, before a jirga of the whole Afridi tribe, and by seeing whether this jirga can, or will, continue to enforce peace and order on the border. The tribe should be specially called in for this purpose, and I consider it necessary that, pending their decision in the matter, the Afridi tribal allowances should be withheld. If the combined jirga take action in the matter, and render proper assistance in the maintenance of order, I see no reason to impose a heavy fine in addition to the redress which would be obtained for this raid. The imposition of such a fine would and must mean its recovery from all the Afridi clans, and to do this would be to achieve the result aimed at by those responsible for the raid, namely, to commit the whole tribe with Government. If the combined jirgas do make honest efforts to keep the Zakka Khels in order, it would be impolitic to make them discontented by the enforcement of tribal responsibility. On the other hand, if they refuse to give honest assistance, the hands of Government will be forced, and it will be necessary to deal with the Afridis as a whole. If the Government of India approve of the above views, which I have put forward as in my opinion the best calculated to avoid general trouble with the Afridis, I would solicit early orders, so that timely instructions may issue to Major Roos-Keppel

Annexure.

Letter from Major G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th October, 1904.

I have the honour to state, with reference to the recent raid at Darshi Khel, that it has been ascertained that this raid was committed by a party of Afridis and Orakzais numbering about 15 or 16 men. The Afridis were greatly in the majority, their clans implicated being the Anai Zakka Khel, the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, and the Shalobar Kambhar Khel in about equal proportions.

The amount of damage done in the raid (including blood-money for the twelve British subjects killed and wounded) is variously estimated at from Rs 6,000 to Rs 8,000, and if a fine is imposed, its amount would be, judging by fines imposed in former and less serious raids, not less than Rs 6,000. Thus the total amount to be recovered from the relatives of fellow-tribesmen of the offenders is Rs 12,000 to Rs 14,000, or, say, Rs 13,000. I have given throughout the lowest possible figures and the Honourable the Chief Commissioner may not consider this amount to be sufficient, but it is necessary for the purposes of this report to name a definite sum, and arguments for and against the imposition of a fine of this amount will apply proportionately to any greater or less sum that may be decided upon.

I do not, of course, know in what proportion the Honourable the Chief Commissioner would wish to impose this fine upon the Afridis and Orakzais, but may safely assume that the share of the Afridis will be not less than one-half, or Rs 6,500.

The Afridi allowances are paid half-yearly, and the autumn share ($\frac{1}{3}$ th) is payable in November or December next. The following amounts will then be payable to the three clans concerned in the Darshi Khel raid, after deducting a sum of Rs 1,000 due from the Anai Zakka Khel on account of a fine already imposed, but not yet recovered

Anai Zakka Khel	1,800
Zia-ud-din "	350
Shalobar Kambhar Khel	2,100
—	
Total	4,250

The share of the Zia-ud-din is so small that it is impossible to equalise the incidence of the fine, and even if the whole of the allowances of the three clans were forfeited, the amount realised would be Rs. 2,250 short of that required. The general conduct of the Anai

and Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel has been so bad that there would be no injustice in forfeiting the whole of their allowances, although to do so would be to alienate those of their elders who have hitherto supported us.

The case of the Shalobar Kambar Khel is different, as they are in general a well-conducted clan, and this is the first time that any of them have joined the Zakka Khel in raiding. In any case, the whole fine cannot be recovered from the three clans concerned and, as the matter is too serious to be passed over, we shall be forced to deal with the Afridis as a whole. The Zakka Khel Maliks have suggested the exclusion of all Afridis from British territory and the stoppage of all tribal allowances until the Afridis have brought the Zakka Khel to reason. This remedy would, I have no doubt, be effectual, but a paper blockade would be useless, and an armed blockade is almost certain to develop into an expedition. That we are bound to have an Afridi expedition sooner or later I am convinced, as no one could hope that the settlement of 1898 would be final, but, if Government for reasons of higher policy are not at present prepared to sanction strong measures, I would suggest, as an alternative to the Malik's proposal that I should summon at the end of November or the beginning of December a jirga of all the Afridis, and inform them that they must come to some understanding to punish the Zakka Khel, that they are responsible for their behaviour, and that payment of the tribal allowances will be withheld until they have brought the Zakka Khel to order or have at least done their best to do so.

That they will succeed on any large scale I do not expect, but it is possible that they may settle this last raid and may stop Zakka Khel raiding for a time.

It is also possible that they may try and fail, and may then ask us to deal with the Zakka Khel ourselves. In this case the only way to gain a permanent hold over this troublesome clan is to take and occupy the Bazar Valley.

I would not propose to suspend Maliki or special allowances, as the recipients have been and are working honestly in our cause, and it would be a mistake to discourage them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 15th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, 8th October. Pending experience of effect of announcement of forthcoming Mission to Kabul, authority to make which we hope will shortly be sent you, Government of India still think it undesirable to take strong measures against Afridis. Within reasonable period of announcement of Mission, you should report effect on Afridis, when your proposals for dealing with Zakka Khels will be reconsidered. In the meantime no allowances should be paid except maliki and special allowances to men who have done service.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 18th October, 1904.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 8th October, 1904, in which you furnish a detailed report of the raid by Zakka Khels and others on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, on the 3rd September last.

2. The general views of the Government of India as to the necessity of refraining for the immediate present from taking strong measures against the Afridis, have been explained to you in my telegram, dated the 15th October, 1904. I am now to add that Mr. Reid, Superintendent, Northern India Salt Department, is being informed through the head of his Department that in the opinion of the Government of India his prompt and plucky initiative in organizing and conducting the pursuit of a well-armed gang of raiders is worthy of high commendation.

3. His Excellency the Viceroy has observed with satisfaction that the inhabitants of British territory had not only no concern with the outrage, but, on the other hand, in the face of serious odds, showed great bravery in their efforts to arrest the raiders. Your proposal to suitably reward them is approved, and His Excellency the Viceroy trusts that this will be done with the least possible delay.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram October 15th. You are now authorized to publicly announce despatch of Mission to Kabul in following terms:—

Begins: Since the accession in 1901 of the present Amir of Afghanistan there has been no opportunity hitherto for a meeting for the discussion of general topics between His Highness and a representative of the Government of India. The Amir has now proposed to send his eldest son, Sardar Inayat Ulla Khan, to meet Lord Curzon on his return to India, and will receive at Kabul an official of the Government of India authorised to discuss with His Highness questions concerning his relations with the British Government. Mr Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, who has been selected for the purpose, will proceed to Kabul at the end of November. *Ends.* Please closely watch and report effect of this announcement.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram October 20th Government of India will be glad to learn effect on border tribes of announcement of Kabul Mission.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th November, 1904.

(Extract)

In continuation of the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 13th November, I have the honour to state that, since the announcement of the forthcoming mission to Kabul, there has been a lull in the going of tribesmen to Kabul and the general attitude of the tribes is now one of expectation. The effect of the announcement has been much as I expected; and so far as I can judge at present the announcement has put a stop to active restlessness, as the tribesmen are waiting to see the results of the Mission.

No. 3.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

On the 28th ultimo Afridis raided police post at Matanni, carrying off nine rifles and other property Matanni is between Peshawar and Kohat.

No. 4.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram of the 3rd instant It is now reported that it was a gang of outlaws from Afghan territory that raided the police post at Matanni.

No. 5.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Deane reports another raid at Garhi Shahdad near Peshawar-Mullagori border on 8th March. One Hindu and two villagers killed, three wounded, and property looted. Same gang of outlaws mentioned in my telegram of 7th instant apparently implicated.

No. 6.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

Raids recently made in Peshawar district. My telegram of the 13th March. Kaddam, Kuki Khel village, two miles from Jamrud, was successfully surprised yesterday morning by Roos-Keppel. No opposition was encountered. Leader of raiders was captured and his house burnt. Some clothing and jewellery which had been looted was recovered

No. 7.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May, 1905. Received 13th June, 1905.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch dated the 5th January, 1905, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding offences committed in British territory by Afridis and by a gang of well-known outlaws and dakaites who reside at Hazarnao, in Afghan territory. The Afridi jirga has behaved well in inflicting severe punishment on the offenders concerned in the serious raid on the Darshi Khel in the Kohat district on the 3rd September last, and in recognition of the attitude of the tribe as a whole, we have waived the realisation of a fine from them in this instance, and the tribal allowances which had been temporarily withheld have been paid. We directed, however, that no payments should be made to those who went to Kabul last year or this, or who sent representatives there. We invite your attention to Colonel Deane's report on the more recent raid at Matanni on the 28th February, 1905, which was organized at Hazarnao by Shakar, the notorious dakait and rifle thief, and carried out by members of his gang, comprising several Afghan subjects and others who are harboured in Afghanistan in close proximity to Afridi limits.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending Saturday, the 17th December, 1904

All the Bazar Zakka Khel came to Chora on the day of the Id (9th December, 1904) to pay their respects to Khan Bahadur Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel. During the course of conversation, the Malik told them that they had, owing to their own misconduct, displeased the British Government; and that, unless they repented and gave good securities not to commit themselves again, they would suffer one day very heavily. They said that they had already held jirgas among themselves, but had arrived at no definite understanding owing to the intrigues of the ex-Malik Khwas Khan, and that they intended on their return to settle

matters with their bad characters, if possible. The Malik gave them sheep, and they returned highly pleased with him. On 9th December, 1904, after the *Id* prayers, the Sipah elders held a jirga with the Kambar Khel, Malkdin Khel, and Zakka Khels, in the Kajuri Maira, for the punishment of the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel concerned in the Kohat raid case, and elected 60 elders from among themselves to go to the Zia-ud-dins, and to ask them to show cause why they should not be made to give up the offenders. The Kambar Khel also intend to collect a lashkar for the punishment of Mirza Ali, accused in the Kohat raid case. A party of the Zakka Khels of Karamna, assisted by some Shinwaris of Loargi, are reported to have raided and taken to Karamna about 200 Kuchi sheep grazing near Kam Dakka. Certain Ghilzais while coming down to India from Ningrahar, *via* the Bara Valley, attempted to kidnap a three-years old son of Mulla Said Akbar, Aka Khel, but they were pursued by the Mulla's men and arrested near Shin Kamar and taken back to the Mulla, who ordered them to be sent to the Sarhang of Dakka with a letter, stating the facts and asking him to have them suitably punished.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 7th January, 1905.

A large jirga of Afridi Maliks and elders, representing every clan and section of the tribe, waited on the Political Agent, Khyber, on the 2nd January, 1905, and asked to be paid their autumn allowances. They were told that, besides breaking their agreement with Government by sending jurgas to Kabul during the summer, some of their bad characters were concerned in some very serious raids in the Kohat district, and that, unless they thoroughly punished Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel, Multan, Zamir, and Amal Shah, Anais, Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din, and Chaman, Khusrogi, six of the leading raiders and dakajits, they could not be paid their allowances. After a long discussion, the jirga asked to be allowed a day or two to think over the matter and give a final reply. They held jurgas among themselves in the city for two days, and decided to punish the offenders. They saw the Political Agent on the 5th January, 1905, and informed him of their decision. Their lashkars have since left for Tirah and Bazar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 12th January, 1905.

In continuation of my letter of the 8th October, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 5th January, 1905, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the results of an interview with the Afridi Jirga who visited him with regard to the holding up of the tribal allowances.

2. It is satisfactory to note that the Afridi Jurgas are making some attempt to prevent raiding into British territory. At the same time, owing to the want of combination amongst the Afridis, it would be too sanguine to expect that they will arrest and hand over the men implicated in the Darshi Khel raid, but if, by destroying the houses of the men concerned and confiscating their lands, they prove their intentions of maintaining peace with Government, a great point will have been gained, and a reasonable fine imposed as compensation for the loss occasioned in the Darshi Khel raid will be all that is necessary to secure adequate redress.

3. The point raised by the Afridis and mentioned in Major Roos-Keppel's letter is one which they have no grounds for complaint. The only occasion during the last three years on which an Afridi clan has been held responsible for allowing another tribe to pass through its limits, is one which occurred two years ago, when an Aka Khel raiding party collected in the Sipah village of Ilm Gudar close to the Bara fort, and from there raided into the Peshawar District. On this occasion, in addition to the fine imposed on the Aka Khel tribe, the Sipah also were fined Rs. 1,000 for the direct complicity of Ilm Gudar. On the other hand, the Daulatzai and other Orakzai clans on the Kohat border, and again lately the Zaimusht clan, have been held responsible on the principle of the enforcement of territorial responsibility for the passing of Afridi raiders through

their limits. On the occasion of my late tour on the Kohat border, the Orakzai and Zaimusht clans protested against being held responsible in all these cases, when, in many instances, full satisfaction had not been obtained from the Afridis, and they urged that such pressure should be put on the Afridi clans as would ensure their controlling their bad characters. The Zakka Khel, and more particularly the Zia-ud-din section of the Zakka Khel, are mainly responsible for so-called Afridi offences, both on the Peshawar and the Kohat borders; and though lately, as pointed out by the jirga to Major Roos-Keppel, there has been a considerable improvement in respect of such offences, the case of the Darshi Khel raid is one which calls for special notice, inasmuch as almost every Afridi clan must have known of the intention to commit that raid. It was openly hatched in Tirah, and committed, in defiance both of the Zakka Khel Maliks and of Government, by the party who were benefiting by the intrigues of Khwas Khan at Kabul, at a time when the Afridi clans generally were breaking their agreement with Government by visiting Kabul.

4. Although there were many threats that the Darshi Khel raid would be followed by others, it is satisfactory to note that none such have occurred. It is true that, in the Kohat district, two small salt posts were lately raided and six old Enfield rifles looted, and that this was attributed by the Khan of Teri to Zakka Khels. So far enquiries do not support the assertion that this offence was committed by Afridis at all, and there appears to be reason to believe that it was the work of local bad characters. The case, however, is still under enquiry.

5. It remains to be seen how far the Afridi Jirgas take definite steps to punish the individuals and families of those concerned in the Darshi Khel raid. Should satisfactory action be taken, it will afford some guarantee against future raids, and at present it is believed that the Afridi Jirgas have a genuine intention of putting pressure on the men concerned.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th January, 1905.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, that the Afridi Jirgas came in in large numbers during the Christmas week to ask for payment of their autumn allowances. They had not come in before, as they were waiting to be sent for.

On the 2nd instant, I interviewed a representative jirga, comprising all the Maliks and a number of representative elders of each clan. They asked why they had not been summoned as usual in November to receive their allowances, and when these allowances would be paid. I replied that, by their behaviour throughout the summer and autumn, they had deliberately broken the agreement which they came to with Government in 1898, and that besides their misconduct in sending jirgas to Kabul, some of their number had committed a raid in the Kohat district, in which six men, British subjects, were killed and six wounded; that this was practically an act of war, and could not be settled in the ordinary way, *e.g.*, by the imposition of fines upon the actual offenders. That the Afridis, as a whole, would be held responsible for this very grave offence, and that, until they had given us satisfaction, I should withhold their allowances.

The elders, in reply, put forward many arguments. They said that the difference between the state of the Peshawar border now and formerly was sufficient proof that they did their best to prevent any raiding into British territory. That as the British Government had not in sixty years succeeded in stamping out crime in settled districts or in cities like Peshawar, so they, the elders, could not make it impossible for individuals or small gangs to commit offences in British territory.

They complained that, when other tribes, *e.g.*, the Aka Khel, passed through Afridi limits to raid into the Peshawar district, the Afridis were held to their territorial responsibility, and were punished for the offences of others; but that, when individuals or gangs of Afridis joined Orakzais in the commission of offences in the Kohat district, the Afridis were again held responsible, though it was quite impossible for them to guarantee the peace of the Orakzai border.

After a long discussion, the elders asked if this Kohat raid case, which they did not deny, could not be settled by the imposition of fine, either upon the offenders' clans, or upon the whole tribe, and were told that this could not be accepted, as no fine upon the tribe would deter from further raiding the half-a-dozen men, who were ringleaders in all these cases. The elders then asked what terms would be accepted, and were told that they should hand over for punishment the following six men:—

Multan, Anai Zakka Khel,
Amal Shah, Anai Zakka Khel,
Zamir, Anai Zakka Khel,
Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel,
Chaman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel,
Mirza Ali, Kambhar Khel,

who were the leaders and organisers of every raid which had taken place during the last few years

At first the elders replied that this was quite impossible, but after some discussion said that the six men named would probably either fight or bolt to Ningrahar or to the Orakzai country, where they could not follow them. They were told that, if six men and their near relations fought against a combined lashkar of the whole tribe, they would almost certainly be killed, and that this would be sufficient, and that if they fled to Ningrahar or to other tribal country, the elders should make it impossible for them to come back to Tirah by destroying their houses, confiscating their lands and cattle, and giving a heavy security against their return.

Some of the younger men said that they would never comply with such demands, but they were silenced by the elders, who, after talking the matter over among themselves, asked for time for consideration. They were given until the 4th, but, on the morning of that day, they had not come to any agreement, and I saw them again to-day.

They were in a quiet and business-like mood, and had agreed that the elders of the two Gara clans, the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel, should leave Peshawar at once for Tirah, raise a lashkar, and, if possible, capture Mirza Ali and bring him in. The Samul clans, *i.e.*, the Malkidin Khel, Sipah, Kamrai, and Zakka Khel elders had come to similar agreement with regard to the five Zakka Khel offenders. A truce has been made for all feuds, both tribal and personal, and there is no doubt that the bulk of the elders are in earnest. They have agreed that any man not joining the lashkar shall be fined twenty rupees, that any man siding with the offenders shall have his house burnt, and have asked that, in the event of the Zakka Khel taking sides with the offenders, all Zakka Khel in British territory may be arrested. I have told them that I will arrest any Afridi whom they may point out.

I asked them what they would do if the whole Zakka Khel clan were to oppose them, and they replied that in this case they would not be strong enough to coerce them, but would assist us to do so either actively or by giving hostages who should remain in our custody while we punished the Zakka Khel of Bazar and Bara. The Malikis privately urged me to continue to withhold the allowances until the matter is settled, as this is the only hope of keeping the clans together.

The Malikis and elders and the bulk of the tribesmen are thoroughly tired of being constantly punished for the misconduct of a small handful of their tribe, and are now in earnest. There is no doubt of this, but how long the mood will last it is impossible to say, as once the lashkars meet in Tirah the Mullahs and other mischief-makers will do their utmost to sow dissensions among them. The Zakka Khel will have a strong inducement to settle matters, as they will find the entertainment of the three other Samul clans a very heavy tax.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th January, 1905.

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated the 18th October, 1904, regarding the raid on the village of Darshi Khel in the Kohat District.

2 The proposals for rewarding suitably the villagers who took a prominent part in following up the raiders have been under consideration, but could not be framed earlier, as the announcements of revenue under the new assessment were made only in November, and the intervening time has been taken up in the preparation of the Bachh statements in the villages concerned.

3 The villages which took part in the pursuit of the raiders were those of Darshi Khel, Bahadur Khel, and Nar, while the lambardars of Kurram also rendered valuable assistance. The revenue of these villages is credited, not to Government, but to the Khan of Teri, and the Khan has stated that he himself desires to join in rewarding the villagers, and asks to be allowed to bear one-half of the expense of any reward which Government deems suitable.

4 The exact numbers of the villagers who joined the pursuit party have been ascertained. It is found that the revenue for Kharif 1904 paid by these, excluding local rates and cesses, amounts to Rs. 910-9. I propose, therefore, that, in recognition of their good work, the revenue payable by these villagers for Kharif 1904 be remitted. As the revenue to be remitted is paid to the Khan of Teri, who is bearing the expense of one-half of the reward, I recommend that the other half Rs 455-4-6 be adjusted by deduction from the annual payment of Rs 18,000 presently made to Government by the Khan.

5 As regards compensation for the villagers killed and wounded, I would refer to my letter dated the 12th January, 1905, regarding the action to be taken by the Afridis against the perpetrators in this raid. Whatever be the result of the action taken, it will be necessary to impose a fine sufficient to cover the loss actually inflicted in the raid, and from this fine the wounded and the heirs of those killed can be compensated.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 21st January, 1905.

The Samil Afridi jirga was interviewed by the Political Agent, Khyber, on the 20th January, 1905. They handed over Amal Shah, one of the five Zakka Khel bad characters, in person, and surrendered Sher Ahmad, Anai, who had stood surety for the good behaviour of Multan and Nur Abbat, a near relation of Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din, as prisoners; and said that, owing to the severity of the winter and the heavy snowfall in Maidan and Tirah, they could not go beyond Bazar to punish the bad characters who had crossed to Ningrahar; but that, as soon as the weather was a little warmer, they would take a lashkar against the offenders, and would either bring them in or punish them thoroughly to the satisfaction of the Political Agent. After a long discussion, they volunteered to leave the leading Anai and other Zakka Khel elders as hostages to show that they really meant to punish the offenders, and also as a proof of their good faith; so twelve Anai elders were selected as hostages for Multan and Zamin, six Zia-ud-din for Mir Akbar, and four Khusrogi for Chaman and handed over by the Samil jirga with the three prisoners. They all were sent to the Political *havelat*. The jirga promised to take action against the offenders after the *Id-ul-zuha* (beginning of March), and did not press for the payment of the allowances.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 31st January, 1905.

In continuation of my letter dated the 12th January, 1905, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, of 21st January, 1905, reporting the action taken by the Afridis in regard to the men concerned in the Darshi Khel raid. By their action the jirgas have shown their desire to put a stop to these depredations in British territory, and it is to be hoped that this end will to some extent be secured. Further, the action taken will enable the case of the Darshi Khel raid to be settled up by a fine in payment of compensation in the usual manner. Major Roos-Keppel deserves great credit for the manner in which he has conducted this matter.

2. I ask for sanction to pay to the Afridis the allowances which have been withheld in accordance with the Government of India telegram dated the 15th October, 1904. I also ask for instructions as to the line to be taken in regard to the breach of their agreement with Government by the Afridis in their visits to Kabul. The matter might be taken up when the jirgas attend to receive the allowances which it is not proposed to distribute until the instalment in spring also falls due.

3. Admittedly, it is practically impossible for us to prevent the Afridis from paying visits to Kabul. In my letter of the 8th October I recommended that Government should mark its disapproval of these visits by paying to other members of the tribe the allowances of such men as had gone to Kabul. I still recommend that this course be adopted, and ask for definite orders. I would recommend further that the subject be discussed in open Durbar, and the jirgas be told that Government has a right to expect that the Afridis should in future adhere strictly to their agreement. An announcement to this effect will, to some extent, strengthen the hands of the well-affected Maliks.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 21st January, 1905.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report, in continuation of my letter of 5th January, 1905, that I interviewed to-day the jirgas of the Samil Afridi clans (*i.e.*, the Malikdin Khel, Kamarai, Sipah, and Zakka Khel); all the Maliks were present, and the jirga was a thoroughly representative one, the total number being about 1,100. They informed me that they had taken

the united Samil lashkar to Bazar and Bara, and had lived at the expense of the Zakka Khel for some time, and had brought pressure upon the five men wanted and upon their relations. Of the five men, (1) Múltan and (2) Zamin (brothers) had fled to the hills beyond Mardan, where it was impossible now to follow them owing to the heavy snow and to the difficulty of feeding the lashkar. The lashkar propose, however, to go after them again as soon as the snow melts. They handed over, as a prisoner, Sher Ahmad, an elder, who had stood surety for Múltan's good behaviour, and agreed to hand over, as hostages for Múltan's good behaviour and for his eventual production, as many Anai elders as I might wish to keep. Amal Shah (No 3) they had brought in as a prisoner, and handed him over unconditionally. As regards Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din (4), who had fled at once on hearing of the jirga, they handed over his uncle, Nur Abbat, as a prisoner, and said that they would give us hostages from the Zia-ud-din elders. Chaman Khusrogi (5) left for Dakka with some other bad characters. The jirga say that he cannot escape them, as he owns land in Bara, and that they will arrest and bring him in sooner or later, and in the meantime will hand over elders of his section as hostages. The net result is therefore:—

- (1) Amal Shah—brought in and handed over as a prisoner.
- (2) Múltan { Sher Ahmad brought in and handed over as a prisoner; Anai elders,
- (3) Zamin { including the leading men in the section, and one Shan Khel, a friend
and connection of Múltan, handed over as hostages.
- (4) Mir Akbar—his uncle, Nur Abbat, handed over as a prisoner and six Zia-ud-din elders as hostages.
- (5) Chaman—four Khusrogi elders handed over as hostages.

All the prisoners and hostages have been sent to the *Havilat*. The Gara jirgas, that is, the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel, who had gone after Mirza Ali, have not yet returned, but with this example it is probable that they will bring him in, as it is believed that they had been waiting to see the result of the Samil lashkar before taking action. I would bring to the notice of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner the very good work the Samil Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan, Sher Muhammad Khan, Hafiz Samandar Khan, Nur Ahmad Khan, and Jabbar Khan have done during the whole of the negotiations, during the despatch of the lashkar to Bazar, and in the handing over of the prisoners and hostages.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 4th February, 1905.

The Garai Afridi jirga, consisting of the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel elders, who had been to Mardan to punish Mirza Ali, returned on the 1st February, 1905, and were interviewed by the Political Agent on the following day. They stated that, on hearing of the arrival of the Kambar Khel lashkar, Mirza Ali collected a party of 8 Kambar Khels, 4 Aka Khels, and 2 Orakzais, shut himself up in his garhi, and defied the lashkar, and that firing went on all the day without any result. The lashkar closely invested the village; but owing to a heavy fall of snow, the lashkar could not maintain its position, and the next morning they found that the village was deserted, and that Mirza Ali had fled to the Aka Khel country with his companions. The lashkar were unable to capture him, but burnt his garhi completely and destroyed all his property. They considered that they had done enough to punish him. It was, however, explained to them that it was not sufficient to burn his garhi, and that further efforts were required. After a long discussion they agreed to leave the leading elders of Mirza Ali's section (the Zena Khel) as hostages, and to make a fresh attempt to catch him. Mirza Ali has taken refuge at Lawata on the Aka Khel-Sturi Khel (Orakzai) border, and the Kambar Khel find it rather difficult to bring any effective pressure to bear upon him in foreign limits, but several of his relations have been pointed out by the jirga in villages near Peshawar and have been arrested. It is hoped that through them Mirza Ali may be forced to come to terms.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11th February, 1905.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar held a jirga on the 10th February, 1905, and decided to wait on the Political Agent, after the "Id," to arrange for the exchange of hostages. They think that, unless the elders among the hostages are replaced by their younger near relations, such as brothers and sons, there will be difficulty in raising a lashkar to punish or making any other "sarishtha" (arrangement) to capture the men whose surrender has been demanded.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 21st February, 1905.

In reply to your letter dated the 14th January, 1905, I am directed to convey sanction to your proposals for rewarding the villagers who aided in the pursuit of the raiders on the village of Darshi Khel.

Enclosure 10 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 25th February, 1905.

The Garhi Afridi jirga of Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel attended on the Political Agent on the 24th February, 1905; and after discussing at length the question of the further punishment of Mirza Ali and his companions (see diary for the week ending 4th February, 1905), decided to take a lashkar against Hamidulla, a relation and friend of Mirza Ali, and to press him to exercise his influence in getting in Mirza Ali, whose *garhi* was burnt and who himself has taken refuge with the Aka Khel and the Sturi Khel Orakzais at Lawata, near Barkai. The jirga seemed prepared to do their utmost in awarding effective punishment to their bad characters, and will take the lashkar as soon as the weather improves. At present the roads to Maidan are impassable. The Afridis can now fairly realise the extent of their loss and trouble on account of the misbehaviour of their bad characters, and are determined to punish them if they can get hold of them. The Political Agent visited the Afridi hostages in the Peshawar jail on the 24th February, 1905, and, at their request, arranged to get in some of their relations from Bazar to raise a *sarishita* for taking action against Multan and others. So much pressure has been put on Multan by the relations of the hostages now in custody that he has sent messages to the hostages, offering to return all rifles and property taken at Darshi Khel, burn his village, leave his lands, and move to Afghan territory, if he can obtain their release on these terms.

Enclosure 11 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 1st March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

Report received from Peshawar that Matanni Thana was entered by Afridis last evening, and nine Martini rifles, with ammunition, two horses, and other property, carried off. No further information received as yet.

Enclosure 12 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 7th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

In view of present satisfactory attitude of Afridi jirga, Political Officer, Khyber, may be given discretion to pay Afridi allowances when he considers it desirable, on understanding that no payments are made to those who either went to Kabul last year or this, or who sent representatives there.

Enclosure 13 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 10th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

Continuation my telegram of 1st instant Another raid, supposed to be by the same gang as was concerned in Matanni Thana case, is reported to have occurred on 8th at Garhi Shahdad in Peshawar district, near Mullagori border. One Hindu and two villagers killed, and three wounded, and property estimated at Rs. 1,500 taken.

Enclosure 14 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 11th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of yesterday. Raid on Garhi Shahdad is found to have been work of six Kuki Khel Afridis from Kadam, near Jamrud, some Peshawaris, including one outlaw and two Khusrogis of China in Bazar, members of Hazarnao gang. Leading Kuki Khel raider, Sahib Gul, is now in Kadam, and it is believed that a wounded outlaw with him. Roos-Keppel proposes surrounding their village with Khyber Rifles, and to try and effect capture and burn house of Sahib Gul. He would want support of two guns in case of opposition. He is confident of success, and I support his proposal strongly, as otherwise these raids will increase. Please telegraph if Government of India agree

Enclosure 15 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, dated 13th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 10th March Viceroy considers this succession of successful raids and dakaitis, in which apparently raiders get off unscathed, very unsatisfactory, and is disposed to doubt whether military police protection can be adequate. Please submit full report on the Matanni and Garhi Shahdad raids as early as possible.

Enclosure 16 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11th March, 1905.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar held a jurga on Friday, the 10th March, 1905, and decided to take another lashkar against Multan Anai and Mir Akbar Zia-ud-din in Maidan. A "nagha" (fine) of Rs 200 was fixed to be recovered from anyone failing to attend the lashkar. The whole lashkar is to assemble at Bazar on Friday, the 17th March, 1905. The Paindai Zakka Khel of Bazar sent a message to Usman, Khusrogi, to say that as he would not give up thieving and raiding in British territory, which must sooner or later lead to the occupation of Bazar by the British Government, they intended to invite the Government to take China which solely belonged to them (Paindais), and that if they asked the Political Agent to come up at once, the Khusrogi and other Bazar Zakka Khel should only thank themselves for it. Several raiding parties having passed near the village of Ilm Gudr, the Sipah Malik Sher Muhammad Khan again requested the Political Agent to put a post of Khyber Rifles in that village in order to satisfy himself that the inhabitants did not in any way harbour the raiders. With the approval of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner a post has been established in Sheikh Garhi, the furthest village of the group, no Sipah Sepoys being sent. Some threatening messages have been received from the Aka Khel, and from the Afridis living in Kajurai and Shin Kamr, but it is unlikely that they will take any overt action. A Shinwari, who was in Hazarnao on the 9th instant, reports that about 60 armed men were collected in Shakar's Garhi, about one-third of them being Khusrogi Zakka Khel. Great irritation was expressed at the measures being taken to punish the Darshi Khel raiders in Tirah, and it was suggested to retaliate by a determined attack on a

caravan in the Khyber or on the Kafila Serai guard at Landi Kotal. The guards have been strengthened. An exceptionally brutal raid was committed at the village of Shahdad Garhi on the night of the 8th and 9th instant, four of the villagers, who were quite unarmed, being killed. It has been ascertained that the raid was organised at the village of one Sahib Gul, a Kuki Khel of Kadam (about four miles from Jamrud), and that the raiders, about 18 in number, included Shakar's followers Turai (a Peshawari outlaw), two Khusrogis of China in Bazar, Sahib Gul and some of his hamsayas and some five Peshawaris. Some Zakka Khel of Bazar who are at feud with Usman recently committed a raid into Dakka limits in order to get Usman into trouble with the Sarhang. They carried off a flock of sheep. This has annoyed the Sarhang so much that he has collected at Dakka a large number of Kuda Khel Mohmands nominally to defend his shepherds. It is, however, believed that these men should raid the flocks of the Shinwaris of Landi Kotal in order to recover his losses.

Enclosure 17 in No 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram 11th March. Viceroy concurs in proposal to surprise Kadam. You can arrange with General Officer Commanding for guns.

Enclosure 18 in No. 7

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th March, 1905

(Telegraphic.)

Surrounded Sahib Gul's village at dawn with Khyber Rifles Cavalry and guns in support. Infantry in reserve. Village completely surprised. Arrested Sahib Gul. Searched village, finding clothing and jewellery, probably obtained in recent raids. Burnt Sahib Gul's house completely. No opposition.

Enclosure 19 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to Political Agent, Khyber, dated 15th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic)

Viceroy desires to congratulate you on successful surprise of Kadam village.

Enclosure 20 in No 7

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 18th March, 1905.

On the morning of Tuesday, the 14th March, 1905, a small force surprised a village of Kadam to arrest Sahib Gul, a Zora Khel Kuki Khel, concerned in the Shahdad Garhi dakaiti case [see last Diary]. The village was surrounded at dawn and searched, and Sahib Gul was arrested. The house of one, Naimulla, a notorious bad character, was also searched, and some jewellery and clothes found in the houses of Sahib Gul and Naimulla, and suspected to be stolen property were brought in with the prisoner. Everything went off quietly, and there was no occasion to use force. The Zakka Khel of Bazar took a lashkar against Multan and Mir Akbar on the 16th March, 1905, but the news of the advance of the lashkar having been received by them prior to the arrival of the lashkar in Maidan, Multan managed to escape to Ningrahar with his family, and the lashkar could only burn his garhi. Mir Akbar had, meanwhile, collected about 20 Aka Khel and some Feroz Khel and other Orakzais in his garhi, and offered opposition to the lashkar which surrounded the garhi. Firing went on during the night of the 18th March, and Mir Akbar himself was shot in the morning. Full details will not be known until the return of the

lashkar. Akbar Khan, a nephew of ex-Malik Khawas Khan, came to Kahi from Mama Khel on 13th March, 1905, and having summoned Borai and some other Zakka Khels from Bazar told them that his uncle had deputed him to ask them either to do mischief in British territory in order to disgrace the Maliks and others engaged in punishing the offenders or to try to create dissensions among the lashkar going to Maidan. The Zakka Khel replied that they were too few to be able to do anything against the will of the rest of the tribe who had surrendered hostages to the Sarkar, but that they would do their best to carry out the wishes of their old Malik. They, however, returned to Bazar on the 17th March, 1905, by which time the lashkar had started for Maidan

Enclosure 21 in No 7

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 24th March, 1905

(Extract)

In continuation of my telegram of the 11th March, 1905, I have the honour to submit the report called for in your telegram of the 13th March, 1905, regarding the recent raids at Matanni and Garhi Shahdad. The raid on the Matanni Police Station took place between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 28th of February, 1905. At the time of the raid the police station was in charge of a sergeant, the Deputy Inspector being in Peshawar on duty. The sergeant, moharrir, and three village watchmen were at work in one of the towers: three other constables were in their barracks and one constable was on sentry duty inside the post over the gate which was closed. Some men came to the gate, and demanded admission saying they were village watchmen, come to report their departure on patrol. The sentry opened the wicket gate, and two men entered who at once fell upon him, and overpowered him. A number of other men then rushed in and shut up the rest of the occupants of the police station in the rooms in which they happened to be. The raiders then broke open the malikhana from which they obtained 9 Martini-Henry carbines, 1 sword, 1 double-barrelled gun, 6 bayonets, 1 saddle, 241 rounds of ammunition, and Rs 33 in cash. They then went off taking with them two horses, the property of the Deputy Inspector, and a sowar. The alarm was raised, and the Matanni villagers turned out in force. It had been raining heavily, and tracking was simple. The tracks were followed to a spot within a few hundred yards of the ford over the Bara river between the Sipah villages of Ilm Gudr and Garhi Sheikh Ismail. Here the pursuit was abandoned, as unprotected Afridi territory had been reached. Enquiries show that this raid was planned and organized in Hazarnao in Afghan territory by Shakar, the well-known dakait and rifle thief. The raid was led by Shakar's brother Ilm Din. With Ilm Din were three Peshawari outlaws who live at Hazarnao, and 15 other men, residents of Hazarnao and Afghan subjects. This party of 19 proceeded from Hazarnao direct to China in Bazar. Here they were joined by Usman Khusrogi of Bazar; they were also joined by four more Khusrogis and by Mursil Khusrogi. Later six more men, three Orakzais and three Aka Khels, joined the gang. It is significant that while halting at Narhadal the gang sent for Multan, Zamir, Mir Akbar, and Mirza Ali to join them. These men, who have taken refuge at Lawata to escape the Afridi tribal *lashkars*, who are endeavouring to punish them for the Darshi Khel raid, refused to join, or even to visit, the raiders on the ground that all their relatives were in jail in Peshawar as hostages for their good behaviour. The raid on Garhi Shahdad took place at about 9 p.m. on the 8th March. A Hindu, Chaju Mal, was with his family and two chaukidars in his house, which is on the outskirts of the village, when suddenly the door was broken in, and a party of raiders, numbering some 18 or 20 men, entered. Some of the inmates of the house climbed on to the roof and raised the alarm. The raiders then commenced firing promiscuously, shooting Dhani Ram, Chaju Mal's son, dead on the roof where he had taken refuge. The villagers turned out in strength, but they had with them only one *jezail* in the way of fire-arms. They, however, resisted the raiders to the utmost as is shown by the fact that they lost two men killed and three badly wounded. The raiders who were strongly armed got away taking with them all the

jewellery, clothes, and cash which they found in Chaju Mal's house, the total value being about Rs 1,500. Enquiries show that this raid was not, as was at first suspected, the work of the same gang as committed the raid on Matanni Thana, but that it was planned at Kadam in the Garhi of Sahib Gul, Kuki Khel. In the party were Torai, Peshawari outlaw, living with Shakar at Hazarnao, two Zakka Khels of China in Bazar, Sahib Gul, Kuki Khel, with some other Kuki Khels and Zakka Khels and Peshawari outlaws. Subsequently, on 14th March, Kadam was surrounded by the Political Agent, Khyber, and Sahib Gul arrested and his house burnt, as reported in the Political Agent's telegram of the 14th March, 1905. Since the end of November last, in order to cope with raiders, six special patrols, three of the Border Military Police, and three of the Regular Police, have been organized: and the Border Military Police posts upon the Afridi section of the border have been strengthened. There have also been ordinary Border Military Police patrols both day and night between villages and between posts. The work has been onerous and difficult and the men have had little rest and very great hardships in the matter of food and shelter. That they failed to encounter any gang is due to the elaborate system of espionage employed by trans-border raiders, and to the fact that the numbers of the Border Military Police render it an impossibility for them to guard and patrol every route traversed by raiding gangs. Owing to the wide stretch of country and its physical features it is perfectly easy for a gang to avoid villages, patrols, and posts. To capture or even to encounter a gang is an exceedingly difficult matter, and must in view of the above facts be a matter of chance, rather than a result to be normally expected. Moreover, Border Military Police and police protection to be effective requires the support of the inhabitants of the district, and these have been practically disarmed. Rifles and pistols are now denied to them except under licence, so that villages which formerly could and did hold their own, can now turn out armed only with *jezails*, swords, and sticks to combat a gang armed with weapons of precision and reckless of life. The number of Government rifles distributed to villagers on security is not great, and these rifles are merely Enfield muzzle-loading weapons of antique pattern and doubtful utility. The abject helplessness of our own villagers in respect of armament is well known across the border, and is a subject of widespread complaint by the people of the district. When large gangs, such as have recently been formed, decide to embark upon a series of dakaities within the border, their success may be held to be assured unless and until villages are armed with weapons which enable them to defend themselves. In view of the urgency of the matter I have directed the temporary issue on security of the smooth-bore Snider carbines discarded by the police, and I now ask that I be allowed to retain these weapons to arm the villagers. To prevent raids like that on the Matanni Thana, the main chance of success lies in gangs of this nature being stopped across the border. The Afridi Malik, however, have pointed out their inability, so long as Bazar is in its present state, to cope with what are really gangs from Afghanistan. In the case of the raid on Garhi Shahdad, the robbery was planned close under the walls of Jamrud fort and was carried out from Kuki Khel territory which lies close to the village attacked. Blame can hardly attach to the Border Military Police that they received no information regarding this raid. The raid on Matanni Thana, however, raises a much larger question. This raid differs materially from ordinary raids in the fact that it was organized in Afghan territory by Afghan subjects. During the last three months there have been within the Peshawar district ten other dakaities and robberies, some of them serious and some of lesser importance, which have now after police and political enquiry been attributed to members of this gang from Hazarnao, and while members of that gang may not have been actually concerned in all of these, there can be no doubt that they have taken part in most, with the assistance of the bad characters in the villages themselves who take advantage of the state of unrest, which the presence of such a gang naturally creates, to act as their spies and assistants. While enquiries point to these dakaities being the work of this gang, it will at the same time be difficult to obtain absolute proof. It is known that rifles and horses obtained in these robberies are now with Shakar at Hazarnao. In one case in which a robber supposed to be a member of this gang was shot by the police, his companions cut off his head and carried it away with them to prevent identification, throwing the stripped body into the river. The body was recovered, but, as anticipated by the raiders, identification was impossible.

This new development of raids from Afghanistan is far more serious and more difficult to deal with than tribal raids on however large a scale. The originators of raids from Afghan territory are beyond our reach, and no arrangements we can make can be depended upon to prevent these gangs passing through the sparsely inhabited hills between the Sassobi pass and the British border. That tribal raiding can be stopped to a large extent has been proved by the absence of any such raids since that on Darshi Khel in September last and by the fact that the measures adopted by the Afridis against the leaders in that case led to the latter's refusing the invitation to join the Hazarnao gang. The Afridi Maliks the measures adopted by the Afridis against the leaders in that case, led to the that the *eclat* which must necessarily accompany the success of this gang, which has sprung into fame in so short a time, will secure the adhesion to the gang of every malcontent Afridi. It is, of course, hopeless to expect that the officials in Ningrahar will do anything to discourage this gang. The Political Agent, Khyber, has expressed the opinion that nothing but the closing of the Sassobi pass can prevent raiding from Afghanistan, and that in taking this measure Government would have the support of all the Afridi Maliks and of most of the elders. I have personally discussed matters with the leading Afridi Maliks, and their view is that troops should be sent into the Bazar valley. They state that after this is done they themselves, with tribal levies from the clans generally, are ready to occupy any post which may be built. This measure would of course lead to expense in the payment for the levies, and the troops would certainly encounter opposition not only from the Zakka Khels but from the malcontents of all Afridi sections.

Enclosure 22 in No 7.

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 25th March, 1905

The Zakka Khel lashkar, who had been ordered to go to Maidan to punish Mir Akbar Zia-ud-din, Multan Anai, and Zamir Anai, returned to Peshawar on the 24th instant. They went first to Multan's village, but he, on hearing of their approach, fled with his family to Afghan territory. The lashkar destroyed his village and crops, and levelled the walls and towers of the village after burning it. They then went on to Mir Akbar's village, and found him there. As he refused to surrender himself, the lashkar attacked the village and captured it and killed Mir Akbar. They then went to Bara and captured Zamir, whom they brought in and handed over to the Political Agent. On the 25th instant, the Political Agent interviewed the lashkar, who were accompanied by the Samil Maliks and elders, and told them that, as they had now carried out their promises to punish the Darshi Khel raiders, he would release their hostages and open payment of allowances. He pointed out that, during their absence, Usman, Khusrogi, had joined an Afghan band of raiders, and had, with them, committed serious dakaitis in the Peshawar District, and told them that it was absolutely necessary that they should, in their own interest, take steps to at once punish Usman, and any other Zakka Khel of Bazar who might help or harbour Afghan raiders. Reference diary for the week ending 11th March, 1905. On the 19th instant, the Sarhang of Dakka sent a message to the Khusrogi of Bazar, through a son of Madak Fakir, asking them not to raise a lashkar to punish his friends, Chaman and Usman, but the Khusrogi replied that the question of punishing the Afridi offenders had been taken up by the whole *ullus*, and that they had no power to stop it. The surprise of Kadam on the 14th instant has had an effect out of all proportion to its importance. The Afridis say that it is a very serious matter, as it is the beginning of a system of punishment by counter-raiding. It was at first suggested by some that the Political Agent had exceeded his powers in taking the force to Kadam, and would incur the displeasure of Government, but, at a large meeting held in Maidan to discuss the situation, the leading elders informed the people that it was a strict rule that "cannons could not be taken from their houses without the orders of the company," so all were forced to believe that the raid had the sanction of Government. The Afridis, who have recently returned from punishing the Darshi Khel raiders, have come in for a good deal of abuse in Peshawar city, where the people say that the Afridis are "Kafirs" for killing a Musulman at the bidding of a "Kafir."

Enclosure 23 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 28th March, 1905

In continuation of my letter, dated 31st January, 1905, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter, dated 25th March, 1905, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the further action taken by the Afridis against the leaders in the Darshi Khel raid.

2. The action which has been taken is in every way most creditable to the Afridis and to Major Roos-Keppel, the Political Agent.

In regard to the last paragraph of the Political Agent's letter, in which he asks what fine, if any, should now be recovered from the Afridis on account of the Darshi Khel raid, I am now of opinion that, after the exceptional action taken by the Afridis, to realise any fine from them for the Darshi Khel raid would be injudicious and impolitic, and I am instructing the Political Agent to this effect.

The compensation due for the villagers killed and wounded in this raid can be realised from the Orakzai clans through whose limits the raiders passed.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 25th March, 1905.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, that the Zakka Khel lashkar, who started on the 7th instant to punish Multan, Zamir, and Mir Akbar for their share in the Darshi Khel raid, have now returned.

They went from Peshawar to the Bara and Bazar in two bodies, and hearing there that the three men wanted had gone to Maidan, the lashkar joined forces in the Upper Bara and went after them.

They decided that the only effective way to punish Multan and Mir Akbar, the two leaders of the Darshi Khel raid, was to kill them, and determined to do this. They first went against Multan's village, but Multan just succeeded in escaping them and getting to Hazarnao, leaving, however, all his property.

He, with his nephews, Taza Khan and Zamir, owned a very fine garhi with several towers, the whole was valued at Rs 4,000, British, which estimate, I am told by the Maliks, is approximately correct. The lashkar not only burnt the whole village and all the property in it, but levelled the walls and towers to the ground. They made every man of the lashkar take a share in this, in order that the responsibility of all towards the tribe might be equal.

They then went off to Mir Akbar's village and found him there. They demanded that he should give himself up, but he refused to do so. The lashkar then encircled the village and bivouacked round it for the night. In the morning they made a determined attack and killed Mir Akbar.

Hearing that Zamir had not gone to Hazarnao, but was in the Bara, the lashkar went after him, caught him, and have handed him over unconditionally to me to-day.

I have told the jurga that the behaviour of their lashkar has been eminently satisfactory, and that their hostages will be immediately released and their allowances paid in due course.

I have, however, warned them that, as long as they continue to own the Bazar Valley, it is necessary to hold them responsible for the passage of Afghan raiders and for the behaviour of Usman and the other Khusrojis who have joined Shakar's gang, and have impressed upon them that, in their own interest, they must punish the latter although this is outside the original orders, for the carrying out of which they had given hostages. They are quite prepared to do this, and will take their lashkar to Bazar and settle with Usman.

The really astounding success of their expedition to Maidan has, although only a few days' old, had a crushing effect upon the Bazar bad characters. Usman is hastily removing his property to the Sassobi villages, in Afghan territory, and his neighbours are grazing their cattle in his crops. He had sent me several messengers, asking for forgiveness, and begging that the lashkar may not be sent against him, and many less notorious men have sent messages to the Maliks and to the lashkar, offering to give securities for good behaviour if they can be spared.

The punishment for the Darshi Khel raid has now been inflicted in full. Mir Akbar has been killed, Multan has been driven out of the country, and his house, together with those of Mirza Ali, Zamir, and Taza Khan, have been totally destroyed. Amal Shah and Zamir, well-known Anari bad characters, have been handed over, and the Gara lashkar, after burning Mirza Ali's village, are trying to catch or kill him. He has, however, taken refuge with the Aka Khel and Sturi Khel and is protected by them. If the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, who has been asked to get him turned out, can effect this, he will either be killed or captured.

I have the honour to ask what fine, if any, should now be recovered from the Afridis on account of the Darshi Khel raid, pointing out that the fine can now only be recovered from the men who have punished the raiders.

Enclosure 24 in No. 7

Extract from the enclosures of a letter from L W Dane, Esq, C S I., Foreign Secretary on Deputation with the Kabul Mission, dated the 23rd March, 1905

(1)

Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, to L W Dane, Esq, dated 15th Muharram, 1323 H (22nd March, 1905)

(Extract)

You also mentioned the movements of frontier people and made a friendly complaint that recently their intercourse (with Kabul) had increased. I write to say that in this matter, please God, I will not exceed my father's principles

(2)

Translation of a letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, dated the 23rd March, 1905

(Extract)

I am glad to receive Your Highness's assurance that, in regard to the too frequent comings and goings of British frontier tribesmen, you are prepared scrupulously to adhere to the engagements of your father.

Enclosure 25 in No 7

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 1st April, 1905

The Gara jirga, who after burning Mirza Ali's garhi had been to bring pressure to bear upon his relations in Maidan to get him in from Lawata and surrender him, returned on the 29th March, 1905. They stated that, as Mirza Ali's uncles, Hamidulla and Nasimulla, failed to get their nephew in, although they were able to recover the rifle fallen to his share in the Darshi Khel raid case, they burnt their garhis also. They handed over the rifle to the Political Agent, and requested that the Kohat authorities might be asked to expel Hamidulla and others from the Aka Khel country, where they had taken shelter with some bad characters. Hearing that the Zakka Khel lashkar were coming to Bazar to punish them, Chaman and Usman, Khusrogi, have removed most of their property to Dakka, and are, it is said, prepared to resist the lashkar.

Enclosure 26 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 8th April, 1905

Reference diary for the week ending 25th March, 1905. On arrival at Bazar, the Zakka Khel lashkar, which had been despatched to punish Usman, found that he and Chaman, Khusrogi, had shut themselves up in Usman's garhi at China, and had been joined by their friends, Imdin, brother of Shakar of Hazarnao, Ghani, Sangu Khel Shanwara of Naziam, Jafar, Rasul, Torai, Peshawar outlaws, Hazrat Shah, Aka Khel, and about 30 Ningraharis, Orakzais, and Aka Khels. The Ningrahar contingent were in favour of a desperate resistance, but Usman did not wish to finally debar himself from any chance of returning to Bazar and opened negotiations with the lashkar, who did not like the idea of attacking so well-defended a garhi and were very glad to let him go. He went with his family and portable property to Dakka, and the lashkar then burnt his share of the village, two houses, and some stack of bhoosa. The lashkar then went to Bara to the village of Sher Baz, uncle of Chaman, another Khusrogi bad character, and not finding Chaman there, burnt his uncle's village. The Kambhar Khels were paid their allowances for the past year on 5th April, 1905. There were no serious cases against them except that of Mirza Ali's complicity in the Darshi Khel raid case, for which he has been thoroughly punished. All petty cases were settled on the spot. The shares of those who had been to Kabul during the year were cut from the tribal nowajib, and are being paid to deserving elders who did not go to Kabul and who rendered service to Government.

Enclosure 27 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 15th April, 1905.

Allowances for the past 12 months were paid to the following Afridi clans on the dates given below:—

Kamarais	}	11th April.
Malikdin Khel		12th April.
Kuki Khel		13th April.
Pakhai	}	15th April.
Shan Khel	
Anai	

There were no cases against the Kamarais and Shan Khel, and very few of them had been to Kabul. The Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, and Pakhais had gone in large numbers to Kabul and the shares of all who had been were cut. The Anais, though guilty of several serious offences in British territory, had done exceedingly well in punishing their offenders, and very few of them had been to Kabul during the year. They paid Rs. 1,000 on account of the fine imposed on Multan and Zamir in the Jangal Khel raid case of last year. All petty cases were settled on the spot. Mulla Said Akbar has convened all the Mullas of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes to a meeting at the beginning of next month (Muhammadan calendar). He has merely informed them that it is urgently necessary to make a very important "sarishtha." His action has caused widespread speculation as to his intentions. A probable explanation is that the Mulla is much frightened at the action of the Afridi lashkars in punishing the Darshi Khel raiders, and, fearing that a lashkar may be sent against him, wishes to excite the tribes against their leaders of the lashkars.

Enclosure 28 to No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th April, 1905.

(Extract.)

I am directed to refer to your letter, dated the 24th March, 1905, regarding the recent raids at Matanni and Garhi Shahdad. You have therein pointed out that these raids were either deliberately planned and carried out by men living in Afghan territory, or were participated in by such men; that such raids are more difficult to cope with than ordinary tribal raids; and that the tribesmen within our sphere of influence are powerless to prevent them. You have not yourself proposed a remedy, but report that the Political Agent, Khyber, is of opinion that nothing but the closing of the Sassobi Pass will prevent raiding from Afghanistan, and that the Afridi Maliks and most of the elders would lend their support to this measure. Their view, which you have personally ascertained, is that troops should be sent into the Bazar Valley, and that thereafter any post, which might be built, could be held by tribal levies. At the same time you have pointed out that the troops would encounter opposition, not only from the Zakka Khel, but from the malcontents of all Afridi sections, and that the plan would lead to expense in the payment of levies. With this warning before them the Government of India are not inclined to consider the despatch of troops into the Bazar Valley, except in the last resort. His Excellency the Viceroy has already congratulated Major Roos-Keppel on the successful surprise of the Kuki Khel village of Kadam and the capture of the leader of the Garhi Shahdad raid. The question of arming the border villages with the smooth-bore Sniders discarded by the Border Police is under separate consideration.

Enclosure 29 in No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th April, 1905.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 28th March, 1905, reporting the further action taken by the Afridis against the leaders in the Darshi Khel raid.

2. The Government of India agree with you that the action taken is most creditable to the Afridis, and not less to Major Roos-Keppel, who has handled a very difficult situation with great ability, and has achieved a remarkable success. In recognition of the attitude of the Afridis as a whole, your instructions to Major Roos-Keppel not to realise any fine from them for the raid in question are approved, and the Darshi Khel villagers may, as you propose, be compensated from the fines to be realised from the Orakzais, through whose limits the raider passed.

Enclosure 30 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 22nd April, 1905.

Allowances for the past 12 months were paid to the Paindais, Sipahs, and Khusrogis on the 17th, 20th, and 21st April, 1905, and all pending cases settled. On the 17th instant Multan, Anai, returned to Bazar, and asked Dadai, Miras Khan, &c, elders, about the fate of his nephew, Zamir. Dadai informed him that Zamir was in jail in Peshawar, and told him that he could not remain in Bazar, upon which Multan went to the village of Sunjab Khan of Barkai, where he was joined by Mirza Ali, another of the Hazarnao gang. They stayed there for four days and returned to Ningrahar. Mulla Said Akbar and other Mullahs in Tirah were approached by a deputation from the Zakka Khel bad characters recently expelled to Ningrahar, asking them to take up their cause, and to induce the Afridis to allow them to return to their homes. The Mullahs said that they would do all in their power to help them as soon as the Afridi Kaddas returned to Tirah from the plains. It is reported that the Afridis will hold a big jirga as soon as they arrive in Tirah to discuss the question of whether to go to Kabul this year or not. Torai, the Peshawari outlaw, came on the 22nd April, 1905, to the Sipah Village of Dora, and asked Sarmast, Sipah, to allow him to cook food in the village for about 25 men, who, he said, were waiting at the Gandao Pass; but Sarmast replied that the Sipah allowances had been cut by the Khyber authorities for harbouring bad characters, and that he could not help him. Torai then went to the Miri Khel Aka Khel caves.

Enclosure 31 in No 7

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th April, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

A dakaiti occurred last night at about 3 a. m., at the tonga chauki, near Matanni Police Station. Twenty raiders are reported to have taken off five tonga ponies. No lives were lost. It is not yet known who raiders were, but they are supposed to be the Hazarnao gang.

Enclosure 32 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th April, 1905

(Telegraphic)

Continuation my telegram of 26th instant. Village chigha followed up raiders to Barkai limits, and recovered the stolen horses. The identification of the raiders is not yet established. Political Agent, Khyber, now reports another raid on the 24th near Jamrud, supposed to be by the same gang.

Enclosure 33 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 29th April, 1905.

On receipt of information that Torai, outlaw, a leading member of the Hazarnao gang, was in the Kajuri plains, in Sipah limits, the Political Agent, accompanied by Assistant Political Officer and some Khyber Rifle sepoy and

Sipahs, left in search of him on the evening of the 28th April, but failing to find him, returned the next morning, leaving some Sipah of Tandai to arrest him if he returned later. They lay in wait for him above the Gandao Pass, and tried to arrest him, and, as he resisted, shot him through the body. They were bringing him in to the Khyber Rifle post at Sheikh Garhi when they were attacked by a pursuit party of Sturi Khel from Barkai and Bini Garhi. They succeeded in making their escape, bringing with them Torai's rifle, but were obliged to leave him. The rifle has been handed over to the Political Agent, and has been identified as one of those taken from Matanni police post. Torai was taken to Bini Garhi, a hamlet of Barkai, by Jumma Khan and other Sturi Khel. The Sipah jirga went to Bini Garhi, and threatened to punish the Sturi Khel for having violated their limits by the taking away of the wounded man and demanded his surrender, but unfortunately Mulla Mir Ahmed, Akhundzada, Sultan Khel Aka Khel, of Bara, happened to be at Barkai at the time with a large following of Mullas. The Mullas came to Bini Garhi, and took away Torai to Barkai, thence to Vaisaki, Barwan, &c. It is reported that the outlaw cannot recover.

No. 8.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 16th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. Letter from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 3rd December, 1906, and other papers sent home by mail of 13th and 20th ultimo* It is presumed that previous reference will be made to me before any action is taken other than baramta and stopping allowances.

No. 9.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st January, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Zakka Khels. Your telegram dated the 16th instant. We are sending you all papers as they are received. Reference will be made to you before any definite action is taken against tribe. After March next, question of further action will be considered in light of their behaviour between then and now; up to that time we have decided, as far as possible, to ignore tribe. Another raid is reported near Peshawar, probably by the same men as those who conducted the Pabbi raid, in which latter complicity of Zakka Khel has been proved. When British Agent made representations to Amir on the subject, latter replied that Zakka Khels were subjects, if of anybody, of the British Government, and that he had nothing to do with them.

No. 10.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram dated the 21st instant. On the 14th instant another raid was committed by gang believed to consist principally of Zakka Khel on serai at Matanni. Raiders escaped uninjured, carrying off 43 camels as booty. One Border Police horse wounded.

* These papers are printed as enclosures 1-7 in No. 11.

No. 11.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 7th March, 1907. Received 23rd March, 1907.

(Extract)

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 25th May, 1905, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the hostile attitude of the Zakka Khel section of the Khyber Afridis. It will be remembered that in September, 1904, Sir H. Deane brought strongly to notice the attitude of the Zakka Khel, and warned us of the possibilities of our finding ourselves committed to hostilities with the Afridi tribe. The conclusion of the Convention at Kabul was followed by a cessation for a time of the serious raids upon British territory, and so no further action was taken, in the hope that the tribesmen would in the future behave with more regard for their engagements. In this hope we have been disappointed, so far as the Zakka Khels are concerned. Visits of the tribesmen to Kabul, though perhaps not in such large numbers as before, have continued, and while the conduct of the Afridis as a whole has, generally speaking, been good, the Zakka Khel have become more and more troublesome and defiant. The present position of affairs is summed up in the Chief Commissioner's letters of the 3rd December, 1906, and the 13th February, 1907. These formulate a very grave series of charges against the Zakka Khel. The offences outstanding against them have been tabulated by the Political Agent, in the enclosures of his letters to the Chief Commissioner, dated 26th November, 1906, and 7th February, 1907, and their hostile attitude towards Government is shown with great clearness in the correspondence. During the period that has elapsed since the first of Sir H. Deane's letters cited was written, four more serious raids have been committed in the Peshawar District. On the 5th December, the village of Badbher, eight miles from Peshawar, was attacked by a gang of 40 men, most belonging to the Zakka Khel. The raiders, besides lifting 2 ponies, 14 camels, and other live-stock, carried off 7 men, including 2 police constables. The two constables were ransomed by a Kamarai Afridi Malik, acting on his own initiative, but two Hindus are still retained as prisoners in Afghan territory. The seizure and detention in Afghanistan of these Border Military Police constables has caused a considerable stir along the frontier, which renders it very difficult, if not dangerous, to overlook the incident. On the 15th December, a gang attacked and looted the Pabbi Police Post, about 14 miles to the east of Peshawar, securing 5 rifles, and fired on a British officer and detachment of troops who were in the vicinity. There is no doubt that this gang also consisted mainly of Zakka Khels. On the 11th January, four bullock-drivers were seized on the road between Peshawar and Matanni, by thirty armed raiders, of whom half were Zakka Khels, and taken to independent territory, whence the men were allowed to return, their eight bullocks being held up to ransom. On 14th January, the same gang attacked the Serai at Matanni in the vicinity of a Police Station, and carried off 31 camels and other property after firing on a Border Military Police patrol. Other raids were contemplated during the dark nights at the beginning of February, but the raiders captured a large herd of camels owned by men of the Peshawar District, just across the administrative border, and so did not actually enter the district. It must be also remembered that, in addition to these specific offences committed mainly by the Zakka Khel at the end of a long course of misconduct which we have vainly tried to ignore or hush up by *pro forma* settlements, we have to deal with the fact that, while the clan solemnly agreed in the spring of 1905 not to allow certain outlaws to return to Zakka Khel limits and to prevent the passage of raiders from Afghanistan, they have violated their promises in the most flagrant manner. One headman did try to carry out his promises as regards preventing the passage of raiders. The result was that the whole of the clan went against him and burnt his village and killed the headman and his brother and turned out his relations. This shows that the clan can act effectively when they choose, and they ought to be made to act for, instead of against, Government. We cannot hope to secure the support of well-disposed men of the tribe, if we ignore so open an act of hostility towards the British Government and their well-wishers as this.

Fortunately, a day or two after the Baddher raid, the local authorities were able to make reprisals and made prisoners of 21 Zakka Khel—of these, 11 belong to the Zia-ud-din subsection, with whom the Baddher raiders put up, both coming and going—and this promptly had the effect of bringing in the Zia-ud-din section to beg for the release of the prisoners. This success, satisfactory so far as it goes, cannot be expected to have any lasting effect upon the real problem. In order to minimise the risk of the Zakka Khel causing trouble while the Amir was on his way to India, either in the Khyber, or in Afghan territory, we brought the fact of the Pabbi and Baddher raids, and the general misconduct of the Zakka Khel, to the notice of the Amir, through the British Agent at Kabul. The Amir replied to the British Agent that the Afridis were under the Government of India, that he had no concern with them, and was not responsible for their acts. In conversation with our Foreign Secretary the Amir again disclaimed any connection with the Zakka Khel. Notwithstanding this, however, a great many of the Zakka Khel went to Basawal and Dakka in the hope of being recognised by the Amir on his journey to India; they argue that they are independent and can choose whether they shall be our or the Amir's subjects. In our telegram of the 13th December, 1906, we warned the Chief Commissioner against taking any action which was likely to lead to an open rupture, till after the Amir had gone back to Afghanistan. If the Zakka Khel continued thereafter to raid in British territory, and to maintain their defiant attitude, we were of opinion that it would be impossible any longer to avoid taking active measures to bring them to submission. Sir H. Deane represented that it would be useless to call in the Zakka Khel when the other sections of the Afridis came in for their allowances, and to patch up another settlement. Forbearance was regarded as weakness, promises given were broken as soon as made, and the section had, moreover, taken up an attitude of deliberate defiance. He proposed, therefore, not to call in the Zakka Khel, and, if possible, to ignore them till March. To ignore the Zakka Khel would have no worse effect than to call them in and stop the whole of their allowances for the payment of fines and the settlement of cases, and we therefore authorised Sir Harold Deane to adopt this course. It was not anticipated that this would bring the Zakka Khel to their senses, and though they might realise that the patience of Government was exhausted, and under pressure from other sections might possibly mend their ways, the probability was that they would continue to commit offences as before, in which case, Sir Harold Deane pointed out, the only course would be that recommended by the loyal Afridi maliks themselves, viz., the occupation of the Bazar valley. In putting forward this proposal, the Chief Commissioner explained that occupation entailed, first, the subjugation of the people by troops, and thereafter the establishment of posts in the country. The attitude of the Zakka Khel has not improved. The tribe regard themselves as committed to an attitude hostile to Government and have picketed all the roads and passes leading from the Khyber to the Bazar Valley, and it is reported that they are only waiting an opportunity to commit further serious raids. But, even should there be for the moment a cessation of raids, the clan already owe, in the shape of fines and compensation for raids an amount which would not be covered even by the stoppage of their allowances for the next three years, a measure which would be undesirable as tending inevitably to lead to further disturbances. It would be manifestly unjust to make the other clans of Afridis, who have behaved well, responsible in any way for the misconduct of the Zakka Khel, and any such course would have the effect of driving the whole of them to make common cause with the Zakka Khel and consolidate the already weakening bonds of Afridi union. The immunity of the Zakka Khel from punishment is, it is reported, having the worst effect on the border tribes; and it is confidently expected that, if we do not speedily adopt severe measures, we shall be called upon, sooner or later, to undertake punitive operations on an extensive scale. The Amir, apparently, has genuinely changed his policy towards the Afridis and forbids his officers to intrigue with them. If this attitude is strictly maintained it will give us a much freer hand and relieve us of some anxiety in dealing with tribal territory on the Afghan frontier; and we are confident that, so far as our relations with the Amir and the tribes are concerned, better and more lasting results are to be expected by our taking a bold course and by holding the western exits from the Bazar Valley than by any minor temporary punishment of the tribe that might be inflicted. We should, as was done in the case of the Mohmands in

1897, give the Amir full information of our intentions and of the causes that have compelled us to take action, and would request him to prevent his bad characters from joining in, so that our operations may be confined to the territory of the Zakka Khel. The present would appear a very suitable time for carrying the project into execution, as the Amir has twice repudiated any connection with the Zakka Khel and has indicated clearly that the duty of keeping them in order lies with us. In ordinary circumstances we should have no difficulty in recommending to you a punitive expedition against this clan, or a blockade of their country. But the geographical position in which they are placed gives rise to several important considerations. Should we enter the Bazar Valley with a punitive expedition, only to retire from it as has previously been done in numerous instances, both there as well as in other parts of the frontier, we should merely raise a possible hornet's nest and a fresh outburst of hatred against us. The openings from the Bazar Valley over the passes into Afghanistan, and southwards into Tirah, would enable all the fighting-men and bad characters of the tribe to escape with ease, leaving only women, children, and the better disposed inhabitants to suffer the punishment that would be inflicted on their country; and, when we had withdrawn, the present raids and disorders would recur in an aggravated form. Whereas, if we were to remain and administer the Bazar Valley, we could, by making roads, develop it, protect the law-abiding portion of the population, and prevent further intrigues with Afghanistan. We cannot, however, place these considerations before you without letting you know that there is a possibility of the other Afridi clans taking part with the Zakka Khel, in which case the expedition would become one of greater dimensions. But we do not consider that such action on the part of the other Afridis is probable, as their sympathies are evidently not with the Zakka Khel in their misbehaviour and hostility to Government, and, if an expedition struck sharply and without long warning, the remainder of the tribes would probably agree entirely that the punishment meted out to the section was justly deserved. In any case, our position in the Bazar Valley would be an excellent one both from the political and military point of view, protecting the Khyber line and with easy communication with the settled districts we now occupy. If we remained in the Zakka Khel country the position we should hold would be strictly limited to the Bazar Valley alone, bounded on the North-West by the range crossed by the Sassobai and Thabai passes and on the South-West by the range dividing it from the Bara Valley. These natural boundaries would give clear lines of demarcation between our posts and Afghanistan on the one side and the remainder of the Afridi country on the other. If, after due examination of the facts and considerations placed before you, you agree with us that an expedition against the Zakka Khel is now advisable in order to maintain our prestige and authority amongst the tribes on the North-West frontier, we shall be glad to receive early instructions, as such an expedition should be undertaken in the spring and the necessary preparations will have to be made. If, on the other hand, you do not consider that any interference with tribal country is at present justifiable, we fear that, owing to the wild and mountainous country on our border line marching with Afridi country, it will be impossible by any extension of local guards or patrols adequately to protect our territory from nightly raids by the Zakka Khel. It seems to us that the only course we can follow in these circumstances will be to wait until the Zakka Khel have by their hostile acts rendered military operations of the nature we have discussed indispensable. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that we are thus running a considerable risk of other tribes on the frontier joining the Zakka Khels, which would no doubt entail military operations on an extensive scale in order to maintain the position we now hold.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 3rd December, 1906.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward copies of the marginally noted correspondence regarding the future treatment of the Zakka Khel section of the Afridis, and to submit the following remarks for the consideration and orders of the Government of India. Ever since the settlement of 1897 the record of this section has been consistently unsatisfactory. The Khyber Diaries give continuous evidence of the misdemeanours of the Zakka Khel, and for the last three years their misconduct has on more than one occasion been tantamount to open hostility to Government. In my letter, dated 28th September, 1904, I was constrained to call attention to the attitude of open defiance assumed by the Zakka Khel in connection with the Darshi Khel raid case. But for special reasons it was impossible at that juncture to recommend strong measures against them. The following year showed no improvement. Indeed the accumulation of offences committed by the Zakka Khel between April, 1905, and January, 1906, was of so grave a nature that the Political Agent pressed for drastic action against them. A list of these offences is enclosed. After a very full consideration of the whole circumstances of the case I came to the conclusion that the time was not suitable to press Government to adopt measures which might lead to punitive operations on an extended scale. I accordingly asked Major Roos-Keppel to do his utmost to effect a settlement on the usual lines, and to induce the Zakka Khel by political methods to mend their ways. The result was the settlement last spring, which, while reflecting great credit on the diplomacy of the Political Agent and his Assistant, was obviously little better than a makeshift for the maintenance of peace. There was one element in it, however, which gave some hope that there was genuine wish on the part of the Zakka Khel not to break with Government, namely, that they definitely disclaimed all connection with the Hazarnao gang, and repudiated any idea of sympathy or co-operation with these marauders. The sequel, however, has been not only a continuance of raiding on the part of the Zakka Khel themselves, but an open declaration of their intention to support the Hazarnao gang against Government. The list of offences enclosed with Major Roos-Keppel's letter dated 26th November, 1906, shows that this section have no intention whatever of abiding by their promises made last spring, while the action of the section in combining to kill publicly the persons believed to have helped Government against a gang from Hazarnao, in which no Zakka Khel was included, is sufficient evidence of the intention of the tribe to support raiders from Afghanistan by all means in their power against Government. The actual execution of Zakka Khel by Zakka Khel is a matter with which Government, *ipso facto*, is not concerned; but where such execution is tantamount to an open declaration to Government of the adoption of a line of action directly opposed to Government, emphasised by the re-admission into the country of Multan and other bad characters, the matter cannot, I think, be ignored. The fact must be faced that the Zakka Khel have dared openly to take up an attitude of defiance to Government, and, as shown by Major Roos-Keppel, they and all other Afridi clans are waiting to see the result. It is impossible to ignore this factor in the case. Our information is very definite regarding the visits of Zakka Khel elders to Kabul. In view of the present position as described above Major Roos-Keppel has again pressed for definite action. I have personally discussed the whole question with Major Roos-Keppel and with Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan, his Assistant, and have given the question very full consideration before deciding to address Government. But I think the time has come when Government must decide whether things are to go on as before or whether definite action is to be taken against the Zakka Khel. I am the more ready to bring the matter forward, as I am of opinion that whether Government decide, as proposed, to decline to call in the Zakka Khel and forfeit the allowances, or whether they prefer another settlement on the old lines, raiding and misconduct will continue; and indeed that inaction on the part of Government is more likely to encourage such offences than the forfeiture of the

allowances. An exercise of patience is not likely to be more successful in future than it has been in the past. Indeed, the Malikhs of the tribe themselves have long realised this; and I need only refer to the opinion given me by responsible Afridi Malikhs, and reported in my letter, dated 23rd September, 1904, to the effect that the only remedy was to be found in the occupation of the Bazar Valley. This alone will effectually protect British subjects in the adjoining settled districts against the constant depredations from which they have so long suffered. I think, therefore, that the least that should be done is to direct the Political Agent not to call in the Zakka Khel for their allowances, and to explain to the other sections when they attend for their allowances the reason. As already stated, I do not anticipate that this will effectually bring the Zakka Khel to their senses. It is possible that they may realise that the patience of Government is exhausted, and under pressure from other sections may mend their ways. It is more probable that they will continue to commit offences as before. In this case the only course will be that recommended by the Afridi Malikhs themselves, viz., the occupation of the Bazar Valley, which will not only finally close this back-door for raiding, but will secure, what is infinitely more important, this flank of the Khyber. Such action would have the full punitive and deterrent effect which the Tirah Expedition of 1897-98 so signally failed to produce on this section. By occupation of the Bazar Valley, I must explain, is meant first, the subjugation of the people by troops, and then the building of posts at important points in the country to be held by the Khyber Rifles. It would be unnecessary to take further steps than this beyond disallowing the erection of fortified towers anywhere in the valley. I believe that such occupation would be speedily followed by the Zakka Khel settling down to the peaceful cultivation of their lands. In his reply to my letter, dated 24th November, 1906, Major Roos-Keppel suggests that, in the event of Government being driven to use force against the Zakka Khel, there is the possibility of an outbreak of what we call fanaticism, but which the tribesmen call patriotism. In cases of this nature, where not only our own subjects, but trans-border men as well, admit that Government is driven to use force, owing to the misbehaviour of a tribe, there is little fear of an outbreak of fanaticism, while with the Afridis generally the feeling of patriotism, which, I venture to say, is an entirely different thing from fanaticism, is far more calculated to keep other sections from taking part with the Zakka Khel. They have nothing to gain by so doing. And if the other sections are given clearly to understand that the action of Government is directed against the Zakka Khel alone, they will think twice before committing themselves to action which might lead to another invasion of Tirah. The fighting strength of the Bazar Zakka Khel is only 600 men, and while doubtless individual members of other sections might join them, I do not think it probable that they would do so in large numbers. I have thought it right to lay the whole facts as clearly as I can before Government, and to state, as far as possible, what seems the probable results of the course proposed; and I would ask for early orders as to the action, if any, approved by Government. In the meantime I propose to direct the Political Agent, in view of the fact that the allowances are paid early in January, not to call in the Zakka Khel pending the decision of the Government of India on the case. I would ask that the approval of Government to this course, if given, may be intimated to me by telegram.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 18th November, 1906

(Extract.)

I have the honour, as the Afridi jirgas will shortly be coming to Peshawar to receive payment of their annual allowances, to ask for an expression of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner's wishes regarding the manner in which the Zakka Khel section is to be treated. Throughout the seven years during which I have held charge of the Khyber Agency the most troublesome and difficult question to be annually decided has been the treatment of this intractable clan. Everything that it is humanly possible to do by kindness, liberality and patience to show the Zakka Khel the error of their ways has been done, but to their minds liberality spells blackmail and patience fear or weakness. Bitterly hostile as they are to everything and every person connected with British rule, they would prefer to remain in savage isolation and to have no relations with us, but owing to the barrenness of their country and to their poverty and cupidity they are forced to pay bi-annual visits to Peshawar to receive their allowances and to purchase the necessaries of life. Each year there is a

long tale of accusations against Zakka Khel for offences committed in British territory, and each year those offences which are considered proved are settled, or, to speak more truly compromised, and the clan gets a fresh start, with a clean sheet, on its career of mischief. The jirga of the tribe professes at each interview the greatest goodwill towards Government and a keen desire to live on good terms with us. As case after case comes up for discussion the elders point out that the offence has been committed by individuals, and that just as the police cannot prevent the commission of such offences in British territory, so it is unreasonable to expect that a community without head and without organization can restrain its individual members. There is something in this argument, but there would be more but for the fact that every man, woman and child in the clan looks upon those who commit raids, murders and robberies in Peshawar or Kohat as heroes and champions. They are the crusaders of the nation, they depart with the good wishes and prayers of all, and are received on their return after a successful raid with universal rejoicings and congratulations. Should a raider be killed during a raid, as has happened several times during the past year, he is pronounced to be a martyr, and is mourned as such. On the other hand his victims die as "Kafirs," and are condemned to eternal damnation for no crime but that of being British subjects. This feeling not only extends to members of the clan but to outsiders, Afghans and outlaws; in fact to any one who will openly defy and challenge the British authorities. Year after year the evil has grown, and each year the necessity of punishing the Zakka Khel has become more pressing. Circumstances, larger questions of policy, and the natural dislike of Government to strong measures, have saved the clan from the punishment which it so richly deserves. As long as these frontier tribes—hungry, heavily armed and hostile to us—continue to exist on our immediate border we must, of course, expect offences to be committed in British territory, and had nothing more serious occurred during the past year I would not have troubled the Honourable the Chief Commissioner with this representation, but would have, as usual, patched up some sort of a settlement to carry us on to next year, waiting for the day when the Government of India will decide to end a situation which cannot be a source of pride or satisfaction. I will therefore not refer to the usual list of raids, murders and robberies. It is not greater than usual, and is capable of settlement according to the precedents of the last seven years. This year the Zakka Khel have as a whole broken all their promises to us, have committed themselves to a deliberate demonstration against Government, have openly taken sides with our avowed enemies, and have formally inflicted a tribal punishment upon men who have ventured to serve us. All this has been done to avenge the deaths of three Peshawar outlaws, members of the "Hazarnao gang," and to crush out from amongst the Zakka Khel any remnant not actively hostile to us. Whenever the question has been raised of the "Hazarnao gang" and of the responsibility of the Afridis through whose country its members have passed when on raiding expeditions, the Zakka Khel elders have always protested that they were the greatest sufferers by the gang, being always unjustly punished for the offences of men, their enemies, who lived in Afghanistan and were able to cross the uninhabited hills between that country and Peshawar without observation. Under great pressure, and with the fear before their eyes of the loss of their allowances, they, in 1905, cleared themselves of complicity with these foreign raiders by burning the houses of some Afridis who were members of the gang, by driving them out of the country, and by giving a written agreement that these men would never be allowed to return. They have all returned, have rebuilt their houses without let, hindrance, or objection of any kind, are now stronger than ever, and take a leading part in the politics of the clan. The Zakka Khel elders also promised to do all in their power to prevent the passage through their country of raiders from Afghanistan, to resist them by force if necessary, and to co-operate in their capture. In July this year a Zakka Khel elder named Lal Baz gave information regarding the movements of a detachment of the Hazarnao gang, and he and his brothers, Inzarai and Sher Baz, and nephew, Kachkol, were induced to co-operate in the capture of the detachment. A most successful sortie by Captain Bickford resulted in the killing of two Peshawar outlaws, the arrest of one Peshawari outlaw, and of one Afghan subject, all members of the "Hazarnao gang." Although none of these men were Afridis, and though they had no connection with the Zakka Khel, their capture caused throughout the clan the greatest sympathy with them, and the greatest indignation against those who had been instrumental in their downfall. Within a few days of the return to Bazar of the men who had helped us it was resolved to take a jirga and lashkar of the whole clan to mete exemplary punishment to those traitors to the national cause who had dared to keep their promises and to aid the British authorities. The complete lashkar of the clan (excluding only the two Maliks and the Pakhai section who live in the Khyber and have little concern with affairs in Bazar) proceeded to the village of Lal Baz, the Elder who had helped us. Lal Baz was first ordered to pay a fine or "nagha," which he at once agreed to do, but this did not satisfy the avengers of the Peshawari outlaws. Both he and his brother Inzarai were shot dead, their village sacked, and their relations and dependants driven out of the tribe to take refuge with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, the Malikhin Khel Chief of Chura. The Zakka Khel are now watching to see what action we will take in the matter. They have deliberately broken their engagements, have defied Government, and have executed and banished members of their clan for the offence of assisting the British authorities. If we pass over this matter it will be obvious to all that we do so out of fear of the consequences, and the other Afridi clans, who are closely watching this test case, will be encouraged to defy us. We can, of course, never hope to induce any individual Zakka Khel elder to help us again now that all have seen the consequences of such action, but we still have an important party and many loyal Maliks and Elders amongst the other Afridis. If we do nothing in support of the men who have died and been ruined in our cause, we shall destroy our only machinery for controlling the Afridi clans and shall make a great step towards open war with them, as all restraint will be removed by the loss of the influence now exerted by the loyal party. The only way to effectually and finally

punish the Zakka Khel is to occupy and hold Bazar with posts at China, Mangal Bagh and Sassobi. This was recommended by all the Afridi Maliks in 1904, and it remains, and will remain, the only completely satisfactory solution of the problem. If, however, Government are not yet prepared to take strong action, I can only recommend that the allowances now due to the Zakka Khel (excluding the Pakhal) amounting to Rs 5,950 shall be forfeited, and that compensation be paid to the families of the two men who were executed for assisting us after we have settled up the claims against the clan for offences in Kohat and Peshawar. Every opportunity will be taken to carry out the Honourable the Chief Commissioner's instructions regarding punishment by "baramta," but the Zakka Khel do not migrate to the plains in any large numbers as do the other Afridis each winter, and the men we want to get hold of seldom venture within the border except under the safe conduct of a jirga.

Annexure 2

Letter from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Political Agent, Khyber, dated 24th November, 1906.

With reference to your letter dated 18th November, 1906, regarding the future treatment of the Zakka Khel Afridis, I am directed to say that before definitely deciding what, if any, action should be taken in the matter, the Chief Commissioner would be glad of further information on the following points, viz —

- (1) In the event of the Zakka Khel allowances being forfeited as suggested in your letter, what attitude may this section reasonably be expected to adopt? Is the immediate result likely to be a considerable increase in raiding and lawlessness on the part of the Zakka Khel?
 - (2) If so, and if the misconduct of the tribe is such as to force Government to adopt the only effectual measure possible to check it, viz, the occupation of the Bazar Valley, what do you consider would be the attitude of the other Afridi clans? Would they openly join the Afridis in resisting Government, and thus necessitate another general Afridi war?
- 2 I am also to ask you to furnish a statement of the important cases now outstanding against the Zakka Khel

Annexure 3.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 26th November, 1906.

I have the honour, with reference to your letter of 24th instant, to state in reply to your queries:—

(a) It is difficult to prophesy regarding the attitude of the Zakka Khel under and after serious punishment. This clan has no equal in unruliness and we have no precedent to guide us, as they have never been really punished. You will remember that even after the Tirah Expedition the Zakka Khel escaped, as their share of the Afridi fine was paid by the other clans, who have not yet succeeded in recovering any part of it.

Now that nearly all the Zakka Khel have committed themselves to a deliberate demonstration against Government (as explained in my letter of 18th instant), that some of their most powerful elders, such as Dada and Sherzada, who were formerly in favour of peaceful relations with us, have openly thrown in their lot with the anti-British party in Tirah, and that the Afridi leaders of the late "Hazarnao gang" have returned to their country, we may, I believe, expect during the coming winter raiding on a more extensive scale than usual whether it is decided to forfeit the allowances or not. The Zakka Khel as a tribe are, I believe, cowards at heart, and if they take the forfeiture of their allowances to mean that the patience of Government is really exhausted and that their long delayed punishment is really coming, it is possible that they may be frightened into comparative quiescence for a time. On the other hand they may think that by repeated raids they may frighten Government into buying them off. They now feel that they have committed themselves almost beyond forgiveness, and are waiting in considerable trepidation to see what we will do.

If we send for them as usual, they will take it that their punishment is to be again indefinitely deferred, and will be proportionately elated. Their offences have been so serious that after deducting the compensation due to sufferers by their raids and fines imposed for their misconduct there will be no balance to pay, and this will irritate them all the more on account of the high hopes raised by receipt of the summons to come in. They would, of course, drag out every case and force us to feed their huge jirgas for so long that they would probably go away feeling that they had received allowances in fact, if not in name, but they would have the grievance that all, or nearly all, their allowances had been cut, and would proceed to "call attention to this grievance," as they put it, by raiding.

(b) If we call the elders of the other Afridi tribes, explain the whole case to them, and assure them that unless they deliberately join the Zakka Khel we have no quarrel with them, and have no intention of going beyond Bazar or of interfering with them in any way, it is probable that they will acquiesce in our action, though they will not be able to prevent individuals joining the Zakka Khel in their resistance. But if we go in without warning they

may believe that our advance on Bazar is but the first step to the occupation of Tirah, and in that case they would assemble to defend the glacis of their position.

There is, of course, the possibility of an outburst of what we call fanaticism and what the tribesmen call patriotism, and this might unite all sections in a last struggle against us, but the dominating characteristic of the Afridi, his overpowering selfishness, gives reason to believe that he would sacrifice his neighbour to save himself.

2. I enclose a statement of the more important cases against the Zakka Khel, from which you will see that the estimate of compensation to be recovered from them is Rs. 6,058-8-0, and of fines Rs. 4,875, a total of Rs. 10,933-8-0.

This estimate is, of course, very rough. We have not yet heard the defence in any of the cases. Some it may not be possible to prove, and some of the claims for compensation may be exaggerated. On the other hand more claims may be sent in before the time comes for the distribution of the allowances. The amount for the past seven months due to the Zakka Khel (excluding the Khyber Pakhs) is Rs 5,950, so there can be nothing to be paid to them, but by forfeiting their allowances, instead of sending for the jirga and going into each case separately, we shall save so much, by not having to feed them for ten days or a fortnight, that we should still be able to pay compensation to the families of Lal Baz and Inzara, who were killed by the Zakka Khel jirga, if it is considered expedient to do so. In the list of cases I have not included the very serious raid by the Hazarnao gang on the village of Chogna on 21st March, 1906, in which property worth Rs 15,722 was carried off, although it is said that some Zakka Khel were of the party, and although, according to Afghan and tribal custom, the Zakka Khel have now by their protection of the members of the Hazarnao gang acknowledged their responsibility for them.

Nor have I included any fine or "nagha" on account of the return to Tirah of Multan, Usman, Raktao, Mirza Ali, Khealai and other Afridis of the "Hazarnao gang," although the Zakka Khel were forgiven heavy fines in 1904 in return for expelling these men from their country and for swearing that they would never allow them to return.

Annexure 4.

Statement of serious offences of which Zakka Khel Afridis are accused since the settlement of 31st March, 1906.

No.	Date of occurrence.	Note of case	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks
1	28th March, 1906 ..	Alam Shah, Anai, Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din, some other Zia-ud-din, Multan and some outlaws of the Hazarnao gang raided the grazing grounds of Masho Khel, Peshawar District, and carried off six buffaloes and six bullocks.	Rs. A. P. 400 0 0	Rs. 500	Information as to the offenders in this case was not received until after the settlement of 31st March, 1906. The owner of the animals, Usman, of Shahab Khel, went to Dakks and paid the Sarhang Rs 50 to help him, paid Rs. 10 to Sadrashi Moghal, and Rs. 40 to Multan at Hazarnao. He eventually recovered three buffaloes and six bullocks through the assistance of the above. Putting the three buffaloes he lost at Rs. 100 each, he spent directly Rs. 400, besides incidental expenses. The offenders must be fined for violating British territory.
2	2nd May, 1906 ..	Sadozai Paundai, Azmat, Muhammad Asghar, Muhammad Afzal, Gul Mir, Mir Ahmad, Zia-ud-din, Multan and Bakhtu, Anai; Majid and Khawas Khan, Pakhsai of Bam, and other Zakka Khel kidnapped two Hindus, Indar Singh and Mangal Singh, of Lahore in Orakzai country, and held them to ransom.	500 0 0	—	The Hindus were eventually ransomed by their friends for Rs. 1,000 Kabali = about Rs 500 British. No violation of British territory occurred, so it is not necessary to impose any fine.
3	28th May, 1906 ..	A band of about 27 men, including Chaman, Khusrugi, and other Zakka Khel of Bazar, some Peshawar outlaws, and some Aka Khel Afridis, attacked the village of Shahab Khel in the Peshawar District. The villagers defended themselves and drove the party off. Two of the villagers were killed and one wounded, and one raider, a Zakka Khel, is said to have been slightly wounded.	1,500 0 0	1,500	This is a very serious case as an armed violation of British territory, and as including two murders and one attempted murder. The third person wounded eventually died from the wounds received.
		Carried forward ...			

No	Date of occurrence	Note of case.	Amount of compensation due.			Remarks.	
			Rs	A	P		
		Brought forward ...	Rs			Rs	
4	7th June, 1906 ...	Usman and a band of Zakka Khel of Bazar kidnaped a Hindu named Jamal Singh from the border near Jola Talah, Peshawar District. The Hindu was passed from hand to hand to Nazian, where he was held to ransom.	407	8	0	300	Jamal Singh was eventually ransomed for Rs 250 (British), and claims Rs 157-3-0, value of a mule and other property stolen.
5	5th July, 1906 ...	Muhammad Asghar and other Zaid-din, with Multan, Anai, and some Hazarnao outlaws, attacked the village of Marai Bala, but the villagers were on the alert, and the raiders were driven off after some shots had been exchanged.	—			500	No damage done, but an armed violation of British territory.
6	6th July, 1906 ...	The same gang as No 5 raided the village of Kajai Marai in the Kohat District. They killed two men and carried off two Government rifles—one Enfield and one Snider.	1,300	0	0	1,200	A clear case. The rifles were with the Zaid-din Zakka Khel, and have now been sent to Nazian for sale. The market value of a Snider rifle is about Rs 200 and of an Enfield is Rs 100.
7	29th/30th June, 1906	Usman, Gudai and Babai, Khurogi Zakka Khel, with a band of Peshawar outlaws and Aka Khel, murdered three men of Matanni, Peshawar District.	375	0	0	375	In this case there were three Zakka Khel concerned out of a band of twelve. Putang compensation for the three men murdered at Rs 1,500 and fine Rs. 1,500; the Zakka Khel would be liable for one-fourth of this sum.
8	29th August, 1906 ..	Amir Shah and other Zakka Khel of Bazar and Ghandal and other outlaws of Hazarnao raided the village of Urmur and carried off 81 donkeys and Rs 336 in cash.	1,576	0	0	500	A violation of British territory. Urmur donkeys are worth from Rs 40 to Rs. 80 each. Taking the lowest figure, the 81 would be worth Rs 1,240.
		Total . . .	6,058	8	0	4,875	

Annexure 5.

Statement showing cases pending against the Zakka Khel Afridis since the 1st April, 1905.

Serial No	Date of occurrence.	Place of occurrence	Complainants	Accused.	Nature of offence	Remarks on the case.	Value of property still to be recovered	General Remarks.
1	9th April, 1905	Ashtrarai, Kohat District	Baz Gul of Ashtrarai	Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel	Theft of seven bullocks valued at Rs 210.	—	Rs A. P. 210 0 0	
2	24th April, 1905	Near Wazir Talab	Mir Ahmad of Kabul, Muhammad Rafiq, Zakka, of Barg, and Akbar, Kuki Khel, of Sarakus	Mir Husain, Bandrai, Angrezai and Sarfaraz, Khusrugis, and Gul Badshah, Anai.	Plunder of property worth Rs 216-9-0	—	216 9 0	
3	Ditto	Banda Marai Bala, Kohat.	Maghani, Ali Muhammad, Bagh Ali, Mani Khels, now of Banda Marai	Yar Ghulam, Haidar, Sahib Alam, Dedak, Zia-ud-din, and three Pakhrai Zakka Khel of Bara.	Theft of 16 sheep.	The sheep were eventually recovered.	—	
4	26th/26th April, 1905	Matanni	Shahzaila of Matanni	Hasan Gul, relation of Multan, Anai, Mehrab Shah and Abdul Wahid, Aka Khel.	Theft of five dak tonga horses.	Hasan Gul is accused of having fed the offenders. The horses were recovered by the ohig-ha party.	—	
5	9th/10th May, 1905	Adeza (Peshawar)	Crown through Bhagwan Das, son of Harji, of Adeza, Rohai Singh, Mahmud and Mosaifar, wounded.	Usman and Nazari, Khusrugis, Kachkol, Akbarai, Sher Ali and Lal Mast, Painsai, and some Aka Khel and Hazarnawia.	Dacoity with plunder of property worth Rs 901, one Enheld rifle, and wounding of the three complainants.	—	1,001 0 0	This does not include blood money for three men wounded at Rs. 180 each
6	31st May, 1905	Kesar (Marai, Kohat District).	Villagers of Kesar	Multan, Anai, Jafar, outlaw, Ismail, Mishta, Sher Ahmad, Feroz Khel, and some Hazarnawia.	Plunder of 162 goats	The goats were recovered	—	
7	9th/10th June, 1905	Spin-Varai (Kohat)	Nand Ram, son of Bojah Ram, of Dara, Miani Khel	Sarmast, Zia-ud-din	Rs 42 on account of bhungamoney for a mule.	—	42 0 0	
8	12th June, 1905	Matanni (Peshawar)	Crown through the villagers.	Usman, Babrai, Gul Samand, Mar-dur, Nazari, Muhammad, Gul Hasan and Shahmard, Khusrugis, Kachkol, Anai, hamsaya of Shino, brother of Santak, Shan Khel.	Theft of 16 camels	—	1,600 0 0	
9	20th/21st June, 1905	Shahab Khel	Crown through Haidar Khan of Shahab Khel.	Nur Ghulam, Shan Khel	Abduction of two women and theft of property worth Rs. 1,230.	—	1,230 0 0	
10	21st June, 1905	Kohat border near Mishti.	Fateh Khan and Gulab Din of Hangu.	Said Nur, Mehr Haq, Muhammad Asghar, Mir Rahman, Sher Asghar, Zia-ud-din.	Theft of four bullocks and property worth Rs 185-9-0.	—	185 9 0	
11	8th July, 1905	Sadda (Kurram)	Ghan-ud-din, Salim, Mulla Umar, Nur Muhammad and Dharmu, Hindu, of Sadda.	Shah Mir, Shan Khel, Zakka Khel	Theft of two mares with two colts and kidnaping of two men.	The men effected their escape from Tirah.	200 0 0	
12	5th August, 1905	Matanni (Peshawar).	Fahim and others of Matanni.	Usman, Nazar Gul, Dar Samand, Ahmad and Shino, Khusrugis, and Mir Khush, Anai.	Dacoity with plunder of 135 goats and 2 donkeys.	—	600 0 0	

13	30th/31st August, 1905.	Shahi Bala (Peshawar).	Crown through Maulvi Abdul Rahim Khan, retired Extra Assistant Commissioner	Yar Shah, Gul Basa and Akhtar Shah, Pakhata, of Barg Kachkol, Inzar, Daulat, Paundas, Dar Samand, Khusrogi, Mehr Gul, Karigar, of Kadam	Dacoity with plunder of property worth Rs 700 and cash Rs 40	—	740 0 0		
14	4th September, 1905	Mara Bala and Payan (Kohat border)	Malik Babrai, Gul Dun of Dara Saraka.	Said Mir, Bas Mir, Payo Nur, Mir Akbar Muhammad Afzal, Asghara Zia-ud-din.	Theft of eight camels valued at Rs. 1,600	—	1,600 0 0	Value of property as estimated by owners. Probable real value about Rs. 700 or Rs 800.	
15	26th September, 1905	Urnur Payan (Peshawar)	Lodi Khan, son of Arala, Mishta, of Mishta Darra, Kohat District.	Inzar and Akbar Shah, Paundas, Sabat of Bazar, Miran Shah of Bara	Theft of four camels	—	400 0 0		
16	27th September, 1905	Hills near Maira Matanni (Independent territory)	Baza, &c, 25 men of Matanni (Peshawar)	Rakhtu, brother of Multan, Anai, Amir Shah, brother of Yar Shah, Ghandal outlaw, Ismail and Lal Khan, Mishta, Sher Khan, Mir Badshah, &c., Aka Khel.	Dacoity with plunder of nine bullocks, three Snider rifles, and murder of one man.	Though the actual scene of occurrence was in independent territory, the accused committed the offence regardless of British or independent territory	600 0 0	This does not include blood money for one man Rs. 360	
17	3rd/4th October, 1905	Spin Khak (Peshawar)	The villagers	Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel, Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Asghar and Waliz Khan, Zia-ud-din, Yasin Gul, Sher Aslam, Nigab Shah, &c, Aka Khel	Theft of seven ponies with gunny bags	—	350 0 0		
18	24th October, 1905	Maira near Jamrud Railway Station	Dad Shah, son of Akbar Shah, of Lund Khowar, ilaqua Mardan	Yar Shah, Pakhata, of Barg, with his hamsayas Aurang Shah and Muhammad Shah, Mians, of Barg	Dacoity with plunder of six camels	The camels have been recovered and restored to the complainants	—		
19	28th October, 1905	Daulat, Rai Banda, Kohat border	Izzat Khan, Sohbat Khan and Wali Khan, sepoy of 21st Infantry	Saidak, son of Sherzade, Anai, Zar Gul, son of Taza, Paundat, and Ismail and Lal Khan, Mishta, and others	Kidnapping of three men	The complainants effected their escape by killing the two Zakka Khels in Tirah	—		
20	7th November, 1905	Kachai (Landa, Kohat)	Gulab Sher, Shah Anwar Gul, and Miru	Ghandal, Peshawari outlaw, Gul Samand and Bibrat, Khusrogi, Said Nur, Mir Asghar, Muhammad Afzal and Fahalwan, Zia-ud-din	Kidnapping of Shah Anwar Gul and Miru, complainants, and plunder of clothes &c, worth Rs 85	The two men managed to escape from Bazar	85 0 0		
21	14th November, 1905	Mackeson Bridge on the Khyber road below Fort Maude	Muhammad Zaman, son of Malik Afridi Khan, of Malazai.	Usman and Mursal, Khusrogi, Santak, Shan Khel, with ten others and a Pakhata of Karamna	Dacoity with plunder of eight camels	—	800 0 0		
							Total	9,813 2 0	

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 8th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

On night of 5th instant party of some 40 raiders appeared near Baddher eight miles from Peshawar, and carried off four Hindus, one Muhammadan, two tonga ponies, fourteen camels, eight bullocks, two donkeys. A patrol of two police sepoy's supposed to have come across the gang are missing. Raiders are reported to be gang headed by Multan, Zakka Khel, and Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel. Village chighas and Border Military Police pursued, but failed to come up with raiders. This case should be considered, in connection with proposals contained in my letter dated 3rd December.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 11th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 8th December, raid on Baddher. The police constables carried off by the gang are said to be alive, and at present detained at Nakhtarnao, between Nazian and Hazarnao, but we have no certain information as yet on this point. We have made a baramta of 21 Zakka Khels, of whom 11 are Zia-ud-dins, with whom the raiders put up, both coming and going, and this may assure safety of men carried off.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter 3rd December. In view of necessity of avoiding disturbance in Khyber direction during Amir's visit to India, and of baramta reported in your telegram of 11th December, do you still propose that Zakka Khel should be called in next month? It is essential to take no action likely to lead to open rupture till after Amir has gone back, and if Zakka Khel must be excluded from payment of allowances, might it not be better on some suitable ground to defer payment of all Afridi allowances until March?

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 11th December. Report now confirmed that two captured policemen are detained at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, in Afghan territory. Gang consisted of 40 persons, mostly Zakka Khel, but including some twelve Sangu Khel of Nakhtarnao.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 13th December. Payment of Afridi allowances has already commenced; anyhow to defer payment would only lead to general misapprehension. Baramta has had effect of bringing in Zia-ud-din section to beg for release of prisoners. They admit entertaining raiders but offer no restitution. We cannot deal with Zia-ud-din without remainder of Zakka Khel, who are unlikely to come in as majority of them have started for Jalalabad in hopes of securing

recognition by Amir. I adhere to the opinion that Zakka Khel should not be summoned and, if possible, should be ignored until March. To this end I have given orders to Roos-Keppel to omit all mention of them to other jirgas, and if Zakka Khel approach him, to put them off till March. It is imperative in interests of British subjects to show Zakka Khel that their defiance followed by raid reported will not be overlooked.

Enclosure 7 in No 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 16th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic)

Information received that on 15th instant gang of raiders attacked Pabbi and looted Police Post taking five Police rifles. At request of villagers Major Miles, who was in vicinity with Military Detachment, proceeded to village and was fired on by raiders who retired. Enquiry is proceeding as to constitution of gang and details of damage done and route taken. The gang was evidently a trans-border one.

Enclosure 8 in No 11.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 14th December. In circumstances reported, your proposal not to summon Zakka Khel and, if possible, to ignore them till March next, is approved.

Enclosure 9 in No 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 3rd January, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram of the 16th December, 1906, regarding the raid on Pabbi, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated 24th December, 1906, from the Political Agent, Khyber, on the subject.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 24th December, 1906.

I have the honour to report that the result of my enquiries regarding the raid on Pabbi on the night of the 15th instant tends to show that the raiding party was composed as under:—

1. Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi,
2. Rakhtu, brother of above,
3. Khialu, brother of above,
4. Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi,
5. Usman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
6. Babbari, brother of Usman,
7. Gudai, brother of Usman,
8. Dawar Khan, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi,
9. Madak (Fakir), Paandai Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
10. Azghari, Paandai Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
11. Saddozai, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi,
12. Mian Gul, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi.
13. Ibrahim, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi,
14. Mirullah, Sipah Afridi,
15. Muhammad Akbar, Sipah Afridi,
16. Nikab Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
17. Hasham Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
18. Wali Jan Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
19. Zarghun Shah, Madda Khel Aka Khel,
20. Mullagai Shah, Madda Khel Aka Khel,
21. Nur Shah, Bizoti, a Hamsaya of Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel,
22. Sher Rahman, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Bara,

23 Zari Shah, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Lawatta,
 24 Muhammad Afzal, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Barwan,
 25. Khairullah Khan, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Barwan,

with about six or seven Shinwaris of Nazian, Afghan subjects

This party is reported to have been collected in the neighbourhood of Barkai before and after the raid and to have been entertained by Malik Sanjab. As they brought no cattle or other loot which could not be hidden, the case is not clearly proved against them, but it is generally believed that they committed the raid. None of my informers has seen the Police rifles taken at Pabbi, but it is probable that they would not have recognised them had they done so. In the event of my obtaining any more definite information I will report further

Enclosure 10 in No. 11

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 5th January, 1907.

Large numbers of Zakka Khel went to Basawal and Dakka to pay their respects to the Amir, but could not find an opportunity of doing so. They lined the roads by which he was to pass, but no notice was taken of them. Some *rukhsatana* was, however, paid them by His Highness's orders, which did not exceed Rs. 2 Kabuli per man. They were much disappointed with the not-at-all warm reception they met with. A serious quarrel has risen between Dadai and Sher Ahmad, Anai Zakka Khel elders. Dadai seems to have incurred the displeasure of the majority of the Anai elders for having embroiled the whole Zakka Khel clan in *badi* (trouble) with the Sarkar, and there are some indications of a rupture among the Bazar Zakka Khel elders. They are sending in messages to be sent for, but so far with no definite proposals to settle anything. The Zakka Khel cattle that had been made *baramta* of last month were sold by public auction in Shilman during the week and fetched over Rs 600 British. The money will be sent to district authorities to pay as part of compensation in the several cases pending against the Zakka Khel

Enclosure 11 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 12th January, 1907.

The Zakka Khel are showing no signs of settling their cases, and are perhaps under the belief that sooner or later Government will release their men and patch up a settlement of the old type with them. The mischief-makers among them are not slow in holding out to them all sorts of hopes and vague promises of support, and it is not seldom that self-deputed messengers arrive in Bazar from Ningrahar with summons for *jirgas* or invitations for individual elders

Enclosure 12 in No. 11.

Endorsement by Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 14th January, 1907.

Copy of the following is forwarded to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department for the information of the Government of India

Annexure.

From the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Report received from Fort Mackeson, 12th instant, states that at 7, evening, on 11th instant, while Hayatulla and Wahid and Sultan and Taj Muhammad, bullock drivers, of Dagi Banda, Taru Thana, were travelling from Peshawar to Matanni, they were seized near Haidu Talab by thirty armed Afridis who carried off then and there eight bullocks westward. When near independent territory some went towards Baddher, while six were left to look after the prisoners, who were released two hours later. Bullocks were carried off. This occurrence was reported at Matanni Police Station at 3 a m on 12th.

Enclosure 13 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 19th January, 1907.

Multan, Mirza Ali, and other members of the Nazian gang were seen lurking about in the neighbourhood of Barkai during the week. They are reported to have raided some bullocks on the Matanni road on the 11th instant, and having deposited the same in some caves near Barki, they returned and raided 43 camels from the Serai at Matanni on the 14th instant. They were assisted by some Zakka Khel and Aka Khel Afridis. In all their recent operations they have been freely passing through the Aka Khel, Barki, Sturi Khel, and Bazar Zakka Khel limits, and unless territorial responsibility is enforced against these clans, especially at this season of the year, when all their *Kaddas* are on the spot, there is no likelihood of their lifting a finger to stop the free use of their countries by the raiders day and night.

Enclosure 14 in No 11

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 22nd January, 1907.

With reference to my endorsement, dated the 14th January, 1907, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 17th January, 1907, from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, reporting the commission of a raid upon the Matanni Serai on the night of the 14th instant.

Annexure

Letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar District, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17th January, 1907.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Chief Commissioner, the commission of a raid upon the Matanni Serai on the night of the 14th instant. As far as has been ascertained, it appears probable that this raid was the work of the same gang as that which carried off the four men and eight bullocks from the Kohat road on the evening of the 11th instant, as reported in this office telegram, dated 13th January, 1907, and as that which raided Pabbi and Baddher in December last. The raiders carried off 43 camels from the Serai; they were seen by two Border Military Police sowars, who accosted them; the raiders in reply fired upon the sowars and shot one of the horses in the neck; the sowars at once gave warning at the Police Station and the village. A *chigha* turned out, but failed to come up with the raiders.

Enclosure 15 in No 11

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 2nd February, 1907.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd January, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters noted in the margin, from the Political Agent, Khyber, regarding the raids on Matanni on the 11th and 14th January, 1907.

- (1) Dated the 26th January, 1907.
- (2) Dated the 29th January, 1907, and enclosure.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 26th January, 1907.

I have the honour to report that our enquiries regarding the raids on Matanni on the 11th and 14th instant, show that these raids were committed by a mixed gang of Afridis and outlaws, Sangu Khel Shinwaris (Afghan subjects), Aka Khel, and Sturi Khel, the raids being led and organized by Zakka Khel.

About the 8th instant a party left Naktarnao (Nazian) in Afghanistan for Bazar; it consisted of the following men:—

- (1) Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
- (2) Rakhta, brother of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi
- (3) Khialu, " " " "

- (4) Taza Khan cousin of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
 (5) Zamir, nephew of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
 (6) Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi.
 (7) A brother of Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi.
 (8) Fakir Shah, Kambar Khel Afridi.
 (9) Malang, Kambar Khel Afridi.
 (10) Ismail Khan, Mishti Orakzai.
 (11) Samand Khan, "
 (12 to 17) Six Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Nazian
 They came to Bazar via the Tabai Pass and spent the night with Dada, Anai Zakka Khel, at Halwai, where they were joined by—
 (18) Sahibdad, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi
 (19) Alam Shah, "
 (20) Babri, brother of Usman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi.
 (21) Niazi, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi
 Thence they went to Barkai in the Lower Bara, where they were joined by—
 (22) Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi
 (23) Muhammad Afzal,
 (24) Nur Akbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi.
 (25) Mehr-dak, "
 (26) Ibrahim, "
 (27) Baz Muhammad, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley
 (28) Khagai, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley.
 (29) Mehrab Shah, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley
 (30) Zari Shah, Sturi Khel Orakzai, Lower Bara Valley
 (31) Muhammad Afzal, Sturi Khel Orakzai, Lower Bara Valley
 The party then went to the Aka Khel country limits opposite Mamani.
 On the 11th instant, they went in the direction of Matanni and, having come across some cartmen on the Matanni road, carried off 8 bullocks and some property. They brought the looted bullocks and property to Benai Garhi and having deposited the same with Juma Khan, Sturi Khel, again proceeded towards Matanni on the 14th instant. On their way to Matanni they came across two Border Military Police sowars whom they fired at. They then entered the Matanni Serai and carried off 31 camels, which they took to Nazian together with the bullocks and other property deposited by them at Benai Garhi on the 11th. Both on their way to and from Matanni they were entertained by Aka Khels, Barki Sturi Khels, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel of Shin Kamar, and by the Zakka Khels of Bazar, and as usual they followed the route passing through Aka Khel Maira, Mamani, Shin Kamar, Wala Kandao, Bazar and Tabai Kandao, a route absolutely safe from our interference.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 29th January, 1907.

I have the honour to forward copy of a statement of a man who has just returned from Nakhitarnao after ransoming his bullocks which were carried off from Matanni on the 11th instant. This statement supplies clear proof, if such be needed, that these recent raids have been the work of Zakka Khel of Bazar and that all the prisoners and loot of these raids are regularly deposited at Nakhitarnao in Afghan territory and there disposed of.

Annexure 3.

Statement of Niamatulla, son of Aminatulla, of village Dagai-Banda, Nowshera tahsil, dated 29th January, 1907.

About 20 days ago eight head of cattle belonging to me and to three others were taken by Zakka Khel raiders from Matanni, where we were working with carts for hire.

I and Mosam and Sultan of my village went to ransom them.

We first went to the house of Muhammad Rafik, Zakka Khel, in Walai village in the Bazar Valley. He told us that the cattle had been taken from Bazar to Nakhitarnao in Afghanistan.

He went with us to Nakhitarnao, where we were met by Multan, Zakka Khel, and after some negotiations we ransomed our cattle for Rs 520.

We saw in Nakhitarnao 31 camels taken from Matanni the day after our cattle were taken and we also saw two Hindus and two policemen who had been previously carried off from Baddher.

The Hindus gave us messages for their relations to the effect that the Zakka Khel demanded one thousand rupees for their ransom and begged that their relations would send the money soon.

The policeman said that they had no relations who could pay ransom for them and asked whether Government were not doing anything to obtain their release.

I saw in Nakhitarnao the six rifles which were taken from Pabbi and the Zakka Khel asked how many police were in Pabbi now.

Finger-print of Niamatulla.

Enclosure 16 in No 11

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 2nd February, 1907.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar have sent various messages to the Political Agent to the effect that they are willing to send in a *jirga* to discuss cases and to take oaths of innocence. They have been informed that they will be sent for when wanted, and that in the meantime it will be seen whether they take any action to stop the constant raids into British territory committed by members of their tribes, as the tale of these outrages is growing so rapidly that it is difficult to see what satisfactory settlement they can offer. The Zakka Khel consider themselves in a state of war with Government, and are apprehensive of attack by us. They have permanent pickets on all the roads and passes leading from the Khyber to Bazar and these pickets are detailed on a regular roster. Their raiding parties are now practically permanently out and in the neighbourhood of Kajurai, Gandao, Mamani, and Barkai, on the look-out for cattle grazing near the border, and it is understood that they are only waiting for dark nights and accurate information to commit more large raids. Reference diary for the week ending 19th January, 1907: Niamatulla, the owner of the bullocks carried off from Matanni on the 11th January, 1907, by Zakka Khel raiders, went to Nakhtarnao in Nazian to recover the bullocks and returned on the 29th ultimo. He states that he had ransomed his cattle on payment of Rs 65 per head as *bhunga*. Yar Khan and Tor Khan, the owners of the raided camels, who had also been to Nakhtarnao to recover the camels, returned on the 31st ultimo, and stated that they had ransomed their camels on payment of Rs 156 per camel as *bhunga* through Nur Ghulam, Sipah, who escorted them through the Afridi country. They stated that they could not get back their remaining two camels as the raiders said they were lost on the way on the night of occurrence. The two policemen and the two Hindus kidnapped from Baddher were also reported to be with Multan and others at Nakhtarnao, and Niamatulla was shown the police rifles carried off from the Pabbi post on the 15th December, 1906. Multan and party are reported to have carried off 53 camels belonging to Mian Biaz, Kaka Khel, and Lal Chand, Hindu (Peshawari), from near Barkai on the 2nd instant, and to be still lurking about in the neighbourhood, having despatched the camels to Nakhtarnao in Nazian in charge of two men.

Enclosure 17 in No 11

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 9th February, 1907.

The Pakhai Zakka Khel attended on the Political Agent on the 4th instant, and petitioned that they had no connection with the Bazar Zakka Khel, and hoped they might be dealt with and paid separately. They were told that until they had made an agreement to hold themselves responsible for the conduct of all the Pakhai section, wherever they might be, they could not be separated. On the 9th a full Pakhai *jirga*, including the Pakhais of Burg, Karamna, Ilacha, &c, again attended on the Political Agent and presented an agreement duly signed by them all that the *jirga* would be answerable in future for the conduct of any Pakhai wherever they might be, and that any member of the section would be liable to arrest, &c, for the misdeed of other. On the 4th instant the telegraph wire in the Khyber was cut between Jamrud and Ali Masjid and several yards of wire taken away. The offenders are said to be Zakka Khel.

Enclosure 18 in No 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 11th February, 1907.

(Extract)

With reference to previous correspondence I have the honour to report that from information received it appears that the two policemen and the two Hindus who were carried off are still at Nakhtarnao, where they are said to live in a mosque and enjoy a certain amount of freedom except that they are placed in the stocks at night. They are reported to have sent letters to their friends, through the men who went to Nakhtarnao to ransom the live-stock carried off in this and other raids. The

raiders are willing to release the two Hindus for Rs. 1,060 (Kabuli). It has also been reported that they are willing to release the two policemen for Rs. 100 each, and this sum the members of the District Police are said to have subscribed among themselves to obtain their brother constables' release. In justice to the two constables and in view of the widespread feeling amongst the members of the Police Force and on the Peshawar border generally, it is a question whether advantage should not be taken of any opening for ransoming the men who are constantly asking if Government will do nothing for them.

Enclosure 19 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 13th February, 1907

In continuation of my letter, dated the 3rd December, 1906, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 7th February, 1907, with its enclosure, from the Political Agent, Khyber, on the subject of the future treatment of the Zakka Khel section of Afridis, and to say that I have nothing to add to the view of the situation which I have already fully set forth in my letter dated the 3rd December, 1906, and which is now before the Government of India, except that I think that it would be a grave mistake to attempt to enforce responsibility for the Zakka Khel against the other Afridi clans, which would involve the risk of their all assuming a similar attitude. At the same time I agree with the Political Agent as to the desirability of the issue of early orders on the subject. The steady misconduct of this troublesome section is illustrated by the fact that during the last seven years no less than 32 British subjects have been murdered, 29 wounded, 37 kidnapped and held up to ransom by members of this tribe, either alone or in conjunction with the Hazarnao gang, while the value of property of British subjects carried off by them is estimated at over one lakh of rupees. In redress for all this only Rs. 14,000 have been realised from the tribe during this period

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 7th February, 1907.

I have the honour to report, in continuation of my letters of 18th and 26th November, 1906, that the situation in regard to the Zakka Khel Afridis has not in any way improved—in fact that it is now worse than it was three months ago.

In my last letter I estimated the amount to be recovered from the Zakka Khel to be—

	Rs.	a.	p.
On account of compensation	6,058	8	0
On account of fines	4,875	0	0

I now enclose a list of further cases, and in this list the amount to be recovered is—

	Rs.	a.	p.
On account of compensation	13,713	4	0
On account of fines	8,900	0	0

or a grand total of Rs 33,546-12-0, of which Rs 19,771-12-0 is on account of compensation and Rs. 13,775 on account of fines.

The annual allowance of the Zakka Khel Afridis (after deducting the share of the Pakhail section, with whom we have no quarrel) amounts to Rs. 10,200 per annum; so, even if we have no more raids in February and March, the clan is already liable for nearly two years' allowances for compensation alone, and for over three years' allowances if we exact the very moderate fines estimated in the various cases.

It is obvious that nothing can be paid to the Zakka Khel at the spring distribution, and if Government decline to take in hand the punishment of this incorrigible clan, the only logical course will be to recover the balance from the other Afridis, as it would be absurd to allow the Zakka Khel to continue to mortgage their allowances for years to come. The effect of punishing the other Afridis for the offences of the Zakka Khel would be to range them upon the side of the latter, as they would argue that, if they are to receive the same punishment whether they misbehave or not, they may as well join in the very lucrative pursuit of raiding the defenceless villages and roads of the Peshawar and Kohat Borders. The Afridi clans have behaved remarkably well under great temptation; only one man (a Kambar Khel named Mirza Ali) has, as far as is known, joined Multan's gang of Zakka Khel raiders and for his complicity the Kambar Khel paid a fine of one month's allowances

(Rs. 600) without hesitation. Men of other tribes—Aka Khel, Orakzai Sturi Khel, &c.—are joining the raiders and the temptation to the Afridis of all sections to do so is becoming overpowering as they see that, week after week, villages, police posts, caravanserais, and main routes, can be attacked with impunity, that cattle, camels, horses, women, and men, even Government servants, can be carried off and sold or held to ransom, while the authorities appear to regard the matter with indifference. The evil has, as I have said, already spread to the Aka Khel, Sturi Khel and others, and I venture to prophesy that if we persist in the present policy of drift we shall have shortly to deal with the whole of the Afridis and with a large proportion of the Orakzai instead of, as at present, with the Zakka Khel section alone.

Even the Zakka Khel are astonished, in spite of their long experience of the forbearance of Government, at our inaction and more and more of them are joining Multan and the "war party," while the other clans are watching closely the course of events and are learning from it an undesirable lesson.

It is most desirable that I should be informed as early as possible of the wishes of Government, as, if it is decided that the Zakka Khel are not to be punished and that a compromise of some sort is to be made with them, the sooner that is done the better. We cannot now compromise with dignity or with any hope of real improvement, but if we leave the matter alone much longer it will not be possible to arrive at any compromise at all.

Annexure 2.

Cases which occurred prior to, but were reported by Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, after, despatch of this office letter of 26th November, 1906, to Secretary, North-West Frontier Province

No	Note of case.	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
1	On 5th June, 1906, some villagers of Alizai, Kohat District, were robbed of cash and goods, value Rs. 60-4-0, in Sipasa Country on the Kohat border, by Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel.	Rs a p 60 4 0	Rs a p Nil	A trifling case. Complainants can claim to recover their property by <i>Baranata</i> of Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel, in British territory, but no fine need be imposed as the offence was committed across the border.
2	On 16th June, 1906, a band of 11 Zakka Khel carried off ten bullocks from the village of Marai-Bala in the Kohat District. On their way back the raiders were attacked by a party of the villagers who recovered all the stolen animals.	Nil	500 0 0	No compensation due, but an armed violation of British territory.
3	On the 5th October, 1906, a band of seven Zakka Khel carried off one man and three women of Sher Koh, Kohat District, and recovered for them a ransom of Rs 1,000, Kabul.	500 0 0	Nil	The prisoners were carried off from Independent Territory, so no fine is necessary, but the amount paid as ransom is recoverable.
4	On the 5th November, a band of eight Zakka Khels carried off from Marai village, Kohat District, seven men and eight bullocks. The men were eventually released without ransom and claim the value of the bullocks and other property stolen from them.	298 0 0	500 0 0	Compensation and fine for armed violation of British territory.
5	On the 24th November, a band of about 21 men consisting of Zakka Khel, Sturi Khel, and Afghan Shinwaris, the whole under the leadership of Multan, Zakka Khel, carried off 100 goats from the village of Jangal Khel, Kohat District.	500 0 0	1,000 0 0	This is a more important case than the previous ones as the band was an organized raiding party coming from Bazar and Nazian, and not merely a party of armed prowlers as in the above-mentioned four cases—a bold violation of British territory.

Offences committed since despatch of this office letter of 26th November, 1906, to Secretary, North-West Frontier Province.

1	On the 5th December, 1906, Multan, Zakka Khel, with a gang of about 40 men—about half of whom were Zakka Khel—attacked the caravanserai of Badbher on the main road between Peshawar and Kohat, and carried off four Hindus and one Muhammadan villager and two sepoy of the District Police, also 14 camels, two tanga horses, eight bullocks, and two donkeys.	3,100 0 0*	2,000 0 0	The Muhammadan and two of the Hindus escaped <i>en route</i> or were released, eight camels were ransomed by their owners on the 19th January for Rs. 1,240, Kabul. The two remaining Hindus (for whom a ransom of Rs. 500 each is asked), the two Police sepoy, and the remainder of the looted property are still in the hands of Multan, Zakka Khel, at Naktarnao, Nazian, Afghanistan. A very grave and bold violation of British territory, including the abduction of two Government servants in the execution of their duty. * Includes Rs. 1,000 ransom for the two Hindus. This is being collected by their relations.
Carried forward ...		4,453 4 0	4,000 0 0	

No.	Note of case	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
	Brought forward ...	Rs. a. p. 4,453 - 4 0	Rs. a. p. 4,000 0 0	
2	On the 16th December, 1906, the same band as in case No. 1 attacked and captured the Police Post at Pabbi, on the Grand Trunk Road, 25 miles from the border, carried off all the arms (six rifles) of the post, and proceeded to loot the village. They were disturbed by a party of 53rd Sikhs, so got no plunder from the village.	600 0 0	2,000 0 0	As grave a case as can be conceived. But for the accident of the presence of regular troops at Pabbi the flourishing bazar of Fabbri would have been sacked.
3	On the 12th January, 1907, Multan, Zakka Khel, with a party of about 80 raiders, of whom about half were Zakka Khel, attacked a caravan of traders on the Peshawar-Kohat road near Matanni, captured and carried off the traders, whom they released on arrival at the border, and carried off eight bullocks valued at Rs. 300.	360 0 0	500 0 0	The eight bullocks were eventually ransomed by the owners from Multan, Zakka Khel, at Nakhtranao, Nuzian, Afghanistan, for Rs. 260. These men saw and conversed with the two Hindus and two Policemen mentioned in case, and were shown the rifles mentioned in case 3
4	On the 14th January, 1907, the band mentioned above (case 3) after depositing their loot at Barkan in Independent territory again entered British territory and attacked the Caravansera of Matanni on the Peshawar-Kohat road. They fired upon a Border Police Patrol, shooting one horse, and carried off 31 camels and miscellaneous property valued at Rs. 550—	8,100 0 0	2,200 0 0	Twenty-nine camels were ransomed by the owners for Rs. 4,500 Kabul, and one stray camel has been brought in by a Zia-ud-din. This is a grave case, including as it does armed violation of British territory, dakaiti, cutting the telephone wire and firing upon the Police.
	On their way back they cut the telephone wire near Jola Talso, Border Police Post.			
5	On the 2nd February, Multan Zakka Khel, again brought his gang as above to Barkan, doubtless to raid into British territory. He happened, however, to find 53 camels belonging to Lal Chand, Hindu, of Peshawar City, and Bias Mian, Kaka Khel, of Nowshera, grazing across the border, and carried them off to Nakhtranao.	5,300 0 0	Nil	The case occurred across the border, so no fine is imposed, but the losers have a claim to compensation either from allowances or by <i>baramta</i> .
6	On 4th February a party of Zakka Khel cut the telephone wire three miles above Jamrud, and carried off some of the wire	—	200 0 0	
	TOTAL	18,713 4 0	8,900 0 0	

Enclosure 20 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th February, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my letter dated 11th February. Two policemen have been ransomed by a Kamarai Afridi Malik and brought in to Political Agent, Khyber. Report follows.

Enclosure 21 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 15th February, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram dated 14th February, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter dated 12th February, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the particulars of the release of the two Policemen who were carried off by raiders from Badsher on the 5th December, 1906

Annexure

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 12th February, 1907.

(Extract)

I have the honour to report that the two Police Sepoys captured by 'Zakka Khel' on the 5th December, 1906, were to-day brought in to me by Malik Hafiz Samandar Khan, Kamarai, who obtained their release by a payment of Rs 200 Kabuli to Multan, Zakka Khel, at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, in Afghanistan. The two Hindus who were abducted from Baddher at the same time as the Sepoys are still awaiting release at Nakhtarnao.

- Enclosure 22 in No 11. -

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 15th February, 1907

In continuation of my letter dated 2nd February, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter dated 5th February, 1907, from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, regarding the raid committed on the Peshawar-Kohat tonga road near Matanni on the 11th January, 1907.

Annexure

Letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th February, 1907.

With reference to my telegram, dated 13th January, 1907, reporting that four men and eight bullocks were carried off by armed Afridis at about 7 pm on the 11th January, 1907, from a point on the Peshawar-Kohat tonga road, close to and north of Matanni, I have the honour to state that further enquiry shows that the raid was committed by a gang of about 30 Zakka Khel and Sangu Khel Shinwaris, assisted by one or two outlaws and, perhaps, some Aka Khels, and that the raiders returned through a corner of the Sultan Khel, Mada Khel, and Miri Khel limits of the Aka Khel, and thence to Nakhtarnao, *via* Shin Kamar and the Bazar Valley.

2 The four bullock drivers were released in British territory near the frontier. The bullocks were taken to Nakhtarnao. Two of the owners proceeded to Bazar Valley and persuaded Alla Dost, Bash Khel Zakka Khel of Walai, to accompany them to Nakhtarnao, where they arranged to ransom the eight bullocks for Rs 520, Kabul. Alla Dost stood surety for the payment of this sum. The bullocks were then sent down to the Bazar Valley and kept there while the money was being fetched from Peshawar. The money was paid over to Alla Dost and his cousin, Muhammad Rafik, at Walai, and the bullocks reached Peshawar on the 30th January, 1907.

No. 12.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th March, 1907

(Telegraphic)

See my despatch of 7th instant regarding Zakka Khel. As less hostile attitude on the part of some of Zakka Khel elders seemed to be indicated by entries in Khyber diaries, we requested Deane on the 17th instant to give his views as to present attitude of the section as a whole, and as to prospects of amicable settlement being effected. Telegram from Deane, dated 18th instant, states that an attempt to induce hostile party to settle with Government has been made by those among the Zakka Khel who have gained nothing by raids, but anticipate that if section is punished they may incur loss. Defiant attitude is, however, maintained by hostile faction. Police tower was raided on night of 15th by a gang of 15, mostly Zakka Khel, three rifles, ammunition, and some property were carried off, and a constable was severely injured. Further raid is reported by Roos-Keppel to be in contemplation. Chief Commissioner says he is compelled by situation to adhere to recommendation made in his letter of 3rd December last, as desire of section is to escape punishment, without giving up offenders or making adequate reparation for offences committed. It is satisfactory to learn that the Amir pointedly ignored those Zakka Khel who went to Basawal to meet him on his return from India.

No. 13.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31st March, 1907.*

(Telegraphic.)

Please see my telegram of 24th March Zakka Khel. Two villagers and fourteen head of cattle were carried off from Khaizara, near Marai in Kohat, by ten well-armed raiders on 20th March. Raiders stated, on reliable authority, to be members of Zakka Khel tribe. The villagers were released in independent territory nine miles beyond the border.

No. 14.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th April, 1907*

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. My telegram of 31st ultimo. Release reported of one of Hindus kidnapped on 5th December from Baddher Zakka Khels, in despair of getting ransom, have now released him themselves. Other Hindu, who is old and ill, is still in Nazian

No. 15.*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th April, 1907.*

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels Your despatch of the 7th ultimo. I should be glad to know the strength and constitution of the force you would employ in the event of operations, probable duration of the latter, and latest date to which it is possible to defer starting. Having regard to present attitude of Amir and the pressure of other sections of tribes, I am not satisfied of expediency, under present circumstances, of immediate resort to punitive measures.

No. 16.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd April, 1907.*

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel Your telegram dated the 10th instant Two brigades of infantry with usual complement of mountain artillery, sappers and miners, &c., would constitute force to be employed in the event of sanction being given to operations against the tribe. A reserve of one brigade of infantry would also be held in readiness. The 1st May is latest date to which commencement of operations can be deferred. Two weeks' operations would probably suffice for permanent establishment of our troops in the Bazar Valley, unless other sections of Afridis should join against us. Lord Kitchener considers that postponement of operations till October next would be preferable, and we accept his advice. We would propose in September next to re-submit case for your consideration.

No. 17.*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 1st May, 1907.*

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated the 22nd ultimo. Proposal to defer operations and re-submit case for consideration in September is entirely approved.

No. 18.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O M, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 30th May, 1907 Received 17th June, 1907

(Extract)

In continuation of our despatch dated the 7th March, 1907, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence on the subject of the behaviour of the Zakka Khel Afridis in accordance with the decision conveyed in your telegram, dated the 1st May, 1907, consideration of the question of punishing the Zakka Khel will be deferred till next September.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 16th February, 1907

The policemen kidnapped in Badbher raid were brought in by Malik Hafiz Samundar Khan, Kamarai, from Nakhtarnao in Nazian and sent to the Superintendent, Police, Peshawar, on the 12th instant. They stated that the Hindus kidnapped along with them are still at Nakhtarnao. Certain Zakka Khel elders, headed by Kazi Sheikh Karim of Bara, visited Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malik-din Khel, at Chora, on the 12th instant, and requested him to intercede on their behalf and ask Government to forgive their past offences in return for promises that they would behave well in future, but the Malik replied that he would not approach the authorities with any request on their behalf, since they had so often broken promises and violated securities, and that, unless they thoroughly punished their bad characters for past offences, there was no hope of Government making any settlement with them. The elders returned disappointed and went to Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, in Bara.

Enclosure 2 in No 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 23rd February, 1907.

The Zakka Khels are now holding daily jirgas and consultations in Bazar and this occupation has caused a temporary cessation of raiding into British territory. They look upon an expedition to Bazar as inevitable and the occupation of the valley as probable. The tribesmen appear to be living in a state of some discomfort, with all portable property packed and all women, children, and cattle prepared for instant flight to Tirah or to Afghanistan. Each visit of the Political Agent to Landi Kotal causes a stampede from the nearer villages of Bazar and the inhabitants of these villages are feeling some of the inconveniences which they have caused to the villages of the Peshawar Border during the last eight years. Messengers from Bazar visit the Political Agent from time to time to ask when the tribe will be summoned to "settle" cases and to receive allowances. They are informed that the matter has been referred to Government and that any orders on the subject which may be received will be communicated to them.

Enclosure 3 in No 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 2nd March, 1907.

On the 27th February a deputation of eight Zakka Khel elders of Bazar visited the Political Agent to sound him as to the intentions of Government regarding the tribe. There were no men of note among the party. They stated that the Zakka Khel were willing to make peace with Government on the usual terms, *i e*, the deduction of a reasonable fine from their allowances and the return of a few

articles of stolen property. They professed inability to accept responsibility for Multan or his gang, but said that they were prepared to take oaths as to the innocence of other members of the tribe. They stated that they could not punish by tribal action any of the leaders in the numerous raids committed last year. They were informed that the question of their treatment had been referred to the Government of India, and that as soon as any orders were received they would be communicated to them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 9th March, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel sent a deputation to the Fakir in Tirah to ask him to gain the support of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes in their dispute with Government, but they received a very discouraging reply from the Fakir who stated that, while he was ready to join and lead them himself, he could not guarantee the assistance of the tribesmen, who were angry with the Zakka Khel for wantonly forcing on a quarrel in which all stood to lose. Some of the more far-sighted of the Zakka Khel elders are urging their fellow tribesmen to send in to the Political agent a jirga with a few rifles and some stolen property, as they argue that if they can stave off punishment until the hot weather something will probably occur to distract the attention of Government from them and they will escape with the loss of their last year's allowances, which they already regard as forfeited. A few days ago a few Aka Khel bad characters went to Bazar and told Usman and other Zakka Khel that they were prepared to assist the Zakka Khel in case Government took any active measures against them and that the Bazar people might depend on their help.

Enclosure 5 in No 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 16th March, 1907.

For the last month discussions have been going on among the Zakka Khel as to the best means of evading the punishment which they know that they have earned. Each elder is anxious to sacrifice his neighbour lest he should suffer himself and some of those who have received no share of the booty gained in the raids of the past six or eight months have suggested that some of the leading raiders should be arrested by the tribal jirga and handed over for punishment to Government and that some of their property should also be given in. Unfortunately, they appear to have reckoned without their hosts. The raiders, and their friends and supporters, who were taken by surprise by this proposal, agreed, in order to gain time, to hold jirgas with their fellow tribesmen to discuss the question and sent re-assuring messages to the effect that they were prepared not only to make full restitution but to sacrifice their liberty, and if necessary their lives, to the salvation of the clan. After interminable discussions with their fellow tribesmen, during which they had been privately sounding every man of note to know how far they could depend upon them, the leaders of the raiding party came to the conclusion that they were strong enough to defy the tribe. They announced to the jirga that they would do nothing to carry out their promises and that they meant to keep what they had got and to gain more. They then held forth to the effect that the best course was to continue to raid, and Dadai, the most influential man in the tribe, sent off messengers to the Zia-ud-din urging them to commit a raid and promising to send men to join them. If the tribe really wished to put a stop to raiding and to punish the raiders they could of course do so by taking a lashkar against them, as they did in the case of Lal Baz and Inzarai last summer, but their utmost desire was to patch up matters by a nominal restitution and now even this seems unlikely at present. On the night of the 15th instant, a raiding party of about 16 men attacked the Police post of Jangli Burj on the Kohat road, severely wounded one policeman and carried off the rifles, ammunition and clothing of the guard. According to our information the gang was composed of about ten Zakka Khel and six Aka Khel, the whole under the leadership of the notorious Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel. It is reported from Bazar that the Zakka Khel intend to carry off, if

possible, some man of importance, Khan, Malik, or Native Police Officer, from the Peshawar border and to offer to exchange him for the prisoners taken in the *baramta* of 9th December, 1906

Enclosure 6 in No 18.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, dated 15th February. With reference to Khyber Diaries weeks ending 2nd and 9th March, which appear to indicate less hostile attitude on part of some of the Zakka Khel elders, Government of India would be glad of your opinion as to present attitude of section as a whole and of the prospects of effecting satisfactory amicable settlement with them. Do you see anything in present situation which would lead you to desire to alter recommendation submitted in your letter of 3rd December last?

Enclosure 7 in No 18.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 18th March, 1907

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, dated 17th March. Those amongst the Zakka Khel who have gained nothing by raids but anticipate loss if section is punished have tried to induce hostile party to settle with Government. Their endeavours have ended in defiance on part of hostile party, who on night of 15th raided Jangli Burj police tower, one constable being badly hurt, and three rifles and ammunition and property carried away. Report just received from Khyber that this was work of gang of 16, mostly Zakka Khel. Roos-Keppel reports further raid intended. Present attitude of section as a whole is that they wish to escape punishment without making any adequate reparation for offences committed or give up any offenders. Therefore difficult to see what settlement is possible, and I regret that the situation compels me to adhere to recommendations submitted in my letter of the 3rd December last. Zakka Khel, who went to Basawal, lined road as Amir passed, he averted his head and ignored them.

Enclosure 8 in No 18

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 23rd March, 1907

On the 20th instant some six or seven Zakka Khel came to Lala China bringing with them one of the Hindus carried off from Badbher on the 6th December, 1906. They consulted one of the Kuki Khel headmen as to the possibility of exchanging the Hindu for one or more of the Zakka Khel prisoners taken in the *baramta* of the 9th December, 1906. The Kuki Khel, however, refused to make any such request for them, as he knew that it would be refused. The Zakka Khel then went to Kajurai, taking the Hindu with them. They asked the elders of the Malikdin, Kamarai Afridis to make a truce among themselves in order to hold *jirgas* with the Zakka Khel who were anxious to obtain their support and assistance. This the elders refused, after some deliberation, to do. The Zakka Khel were taking the Hindu to Bara, but the other Afridi elders objected, saying that the man was now in their limits and that they were not going to share in the blame attaching to the Zakka Khel. After some argument the latter, who were tired of keeping and feeding the Hindu for so many months and were despairing of getting any ransom for him, let him go, and he was brought in to the Political Agent by Subadar Anar Gul, a Kamarai Afridi, late of the Khyber Rifles. The other Hindu, Ganga Ram, of Badbher, is still imprisoned in Nakhtarnao, Nazian. He is a very old man and ill, and will probably die. On the 18th instant, information was received that a strong raiding party of Zakka Khel had gone in the direction of Kohat and Hangu, and a warning was wited to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. The raiders carried off a herd of cattle

and two men from the neighbourhood of Hangu on the 20th. They were pursued by Border Police and villagers and released the men, but got away with the cattle. The well-known raider Multan, Anai Zakka Khel, has left Bazar for Tirah but it may be presumed that he intends to commit mischief. The report that the attack on the Jangli Burj Police Post was made by Zakka Khel is now fully confirmed.

Enclosure 9 in No. 18.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 24th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Reliable information received that raid on Marai near Hangu on 20th was committed by Zakka Khel. Report that raid of 15th on Jungli Burj was committed by Zakka Khel now fully confirmed.

Enclosure 10 in No. 18.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports that about 6 p.m. on 20th instant, two villagers of Khaizara, a hamlet of Marai, while returning with their 14 cattle from grazing, were set upon close to border, but within British territory, by ten armed men who kidnapped the villagers and drove off cattle to Torapka pass to the west of Zera pass, where they were joined by further party of ten armed men. Whole gang then apparently travelled in northerly direction through Tirah Sturi Khel limits as far as Kukukadda hill, some eight or nine miles across border, where the two villagers were released. Our two villagers say they recognized one of the offenders, namely Phalwan Zia-ud-din. They also say that one of raiders was addressed as Mir Azam, and that from talk and appearance whole gang appeared to be Afridis. Gang were well armed with rifles, including two Lee-Metford rifles. Border Military Police failed to come up with raiders. This is the raid alluded to by Political Agent, Khyber, in his telegram addressed to you on 24th instant.

Enclosure 11 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 30th March, 1907.

A deputation of 150 Zakka Khel elders went to the Kajurai Plain on the 28th instant and asked the Malikdin Khel to intercede on their behalf with Government, but the latter replied that they had done so so often and that the Zakka Khel had never kept their promises of good behaviour and that now the Zakka Khel must prove that they were in earnest by punishing their bad characters, recovering the stolen property and surrendering Multan, Usman, Dadai, and three or four other leading bad characters to Government for trial before they could again intercede with Government on their behalf. They further said that they had themselves petitioned the Political Agent not to hold them responsible for the misdeeds of the Zakka Khel and would not now mix themselves up in Zakka Khel affairs. The elders are still in Kajurai, trying to secure the sympathies and co-operation of the Afridis, but with little success.

Enclosure 12 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 6th April, 1907.

Reference last diary. The Zakka Khel elders who had been to Kajurai to effect a reconciliation between the Malikdin Khel and Kamar Khel, failed in their endeavours and returned to Bazar on the 4th instant. They threatened to take sides with the Malikdin Khel in fighting and to stop the Kamar Khel *Kaddas* from passing through their limits, but neither of these threats could frighten the Kamar Khel. The two clans have fortified themselves in *sangars*

at different places in Kajurai and fighting is going on between them. The Kambaras are assisted by the Sipahs and the Malikdins by the Kamarai, but the former have the sympathy of the majority of the Khyber Afridis and are numerically stronger than the latter. On the 5th a fight took place between them in which two men were killed and several wounded. The result would have been disastrous had not the Kuki Khel of Jam and Kadam intervened and put a truce between them for a few days. The period of truce is about to expire and both parties are making preparations to resume hostilities. The Malikdin Khel have applied to the Aka Khel and Zakka Khel for assistance and the Kambar Khel are begging their Gara brethren, the Kukis, to save their honour. Some Zakka Khel elders have remained in Kajurai to make a second attempt to mend matters, but with no great hope of success. The Zakka Khel seem to think that, if peace is made between these two leading clans, there will be more chance for them to move the Afridis to take sides with them against Government, but the Afridis do not at present appear to be inclined to do anything of the sort, as they themselves are tired of the Zakka Khel, who are showing no signs of improving their behaviour, and who have taken no steps to punish their bad characters. They are simply hoping to see fortune turn in their favour by a change in the tide of Afridi politics. Their raiding parties came twice to the neighbourhood of Barkai during the last few days, but the tribal feuds going on in the Kajurai absorbed their attention so much that they did not raid.

Enclosure 13 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 13th April, 1907.

A few days ago a party of about 60 Zakka Khel headed by:—

- (1) Usman, Khusrogi,
- (2) Niazaï „
- (3) Dadai, Anai,
- (4) Gulistan „
- (5) Rahdar „

went to Jalalabad to pay their respects to the Amir before his departure for Kabul, but they were not granted an interview by His Majesty and returned to their homes during the week.

Enclosure 14 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 20th April, 1907.

The Kuki Khel jirga was received on the 16th instant and allowances for the past half year were paid. They have behaved well and there were only a few trifling cases to settle. They are at present much incensed with the Zakka Khel and pressed to know whether the latter were to be punished, offering to assist in every way. They were informed that, unless the Zakka Khel made reparation and reformed, they would eventually have to be punished, but that Government was at present occupied with more important matters and no orders regarding the Zakka Khel had yet been received. The Malikdin jirga was received on the 19th instant, a truce for four days having been put for the purpose. They had committed no offences of any sort and their allowances were paid in full. It was known that they had promised the Zakka Khel that they would ascertain the intentions of Government towards them, but the only reference made to Zakka Khel was a request that two political prisoners in the Peshawar jail might be released. This request, however, led to some discussion during the course of which the Malikdin Khel were told that, if they really wished to help the Zakkas to a settlement with Government, they should stand security for their future good behaviour. This suggestion produced a storm of protest, all the Malikdin elders saying that the quarrel of the Zakka Khel with Government was no concern of theirs, that they would not be mixed up in it at all, that they would not help the Zakka Khel either by standing security for them or in any other way, and that they would never pay any fine for them as they had not recovered a penny of the amount which they paid on behalf of the Zakka Khel fine in 1898. No messages of any sort have lately been received from the Zakka Khel, and

According to report they are waiting for the conclusion of the payment of allowances to the other clans to see whether their allowances are to be paid or not. The leaders of the tribe, Dadai, Usman, Sheikh Ahmad Nur, and others, are in Kajurai enjoying the opportunity of exercising their talents for intrigue in a profitable manner by acting as intermediaries and arbitrators in the feud, and Multan has gone to Maidan with the whole of his family and possessions.

Enclosure 15 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 27th April, 1907.

The Kambhar Khel, Sipah and Kamarai jirgas came in for their allowances during the week and were interviewed by the Political Agent on the 23rd and 24th instant. All cases pending against them were settled and their allowances for the past five months were paid. They were paid Rs 1,300 as compensation for land taken up for the doubling of the Khyber road. None of these clans made any petition on behalf of the Zakka Khel. The Zakka Khel held a jirga in Bazar on the 27th April, 1907, and decided to turn out from their "garhis" at China the families and children of the near relations of Lal Baz and Inzarai who were killed by the Zakka Khel for giving assistance and information to the Political Agent last year. The jirga destroyed their crops and are threatening to burn their villages, for no other fault except that they happen to be the near relations of the unfortunate men killed.

No. 19.

From Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 31st October, 1907

(Telegraphic)

On 28th October last, at 6.30 p.m., band of Afridis, estimated number 12 to 30, appeared at Pabbi, on railway between Naushera and Peshawar, and seized three Hindus and proceeded with them towards Peshawar, capturing on the way two Hindu patwaris. Village pursuit party turned out and followed; near railway station, raiders came upon detachment of 45th Sikhs camped there. The Havildar in command enquired what was happening. Raiders replied with a volley, wounding severely one sepoy and a Zamindar. Sikhs fired in reply, causing raiders to abandon Hindus and retreat by Cherat Road. On receipt of news at Peshawar, police and sepoy were sent out in several directions to intercept party, raiders proceeding to Nasargarhi, where they robbed 10 cartmen, thence to Turnab, where Hindu Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner was in camp; they wounded latter with knife, and would have carried him off, but he could not ride or walk. They looted his tents and carried off his three horses towards Hazar Khani; they were challenged about 3 a.m. by a force of police on Kohat road about 2 miles from Peshawar. They replied with a volley, wounding two constables, and a running fight ensued in which one raider was apparently wounded, and horses and heavy loot had to be abandoned near Siahband. Raiders escaped in darkness. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphs that he has no definite information as to the identity of raiders, but in view of Khyber reports they were probably Zakka Khels.

No. 20.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Please see my telegram of 31st ultimo. Situation as regards Zakka Khel is reported by Chief Commissioner as very unsatisfactory. Adequate protection of our frontier against raids by this section of the Afridis has been found to be impossible, as was anticipated in our despatch of 7th March last. Besides the raid on Pabbi, which was reported in my telegram of 31st October, other serious raids, detailed below, have been committed by Afridis belonging mainly to the Zakka

Khel section, instigated apparently by Dadai and Multan. The following are raids referred to:—

- (1) An attack was made on the village of Samarai in the Kohat District on the 5th October. Two Hindus were abducted and one villager killed.
- (2) The village of Lachi in the Kohat District was attacked by a gang of 30 men on the night of the 13th November. The post office was looted, one villager was killed, and three were wounded. A party of Border Military Police were intercepted by the raiders, who killed two of the police and wounded two others, one of whom has since died. The raiders carried off loot, including jewels, and much greater damage would have been done had it not been for the conduct of the villagers. Although the frontier was guarded, the raiders made good their escape with the loss of two men, one of whom was killed by the Lachi Border Military Police and the other by a picket of the 56th Rifles near Hangu.
- (3) On the 7th November a similar raid, which involved the abduction of three Hindus and considerable loss of property, was committed at Banda Daud Shah in the Kohat district. The perpetrators of this raid have not, however, been yet fully traced. The places where the foregoing outrages were committed are all far from the frontier.
- (4) On the night of 22nd November, some shots were fired at Bara Fort by a similar band. The garrison of Border Military Police, which turned out, fell into an ambush 200 yards from the fort. At the first discharge four of the police were wounded. One of the raiders was wounded.

A new feature in these raids is the practice of abducting Hindus. The attack on Bara Fort is regarded by the Chief Commissioner as a very deliberate act of hostility against Government. Immunity of the Zakka Khels from punishment may, in his opinion, lead to other sections and tribes joining them, unless we take prompt action; and for this purpose he can only recommend the measures already proposed for the occupation of the Bazar Valley. I am afraid that it will soon become necessary to punish the Zakka Khels, and I cannot at present devise alternative measures to those which have already been submitted to you, as the policy of inactivity and reliance on pressure from other tribal sections has not, as I anticipated, been attended by success. I will address you again as to the actual measures which we consider necessary. In the meantime, I have forwarded to you copies of the letters and telegraphic reports which have been received from the Chief Commissioner.

No. 21.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th November, 1907

(Telegraphic.)

The following is in continuation of my telegram of 25th November as to Zakka Khel raids. Chief Commissioner reports two further raids,—(1) in Peshawar on cattle at Matanni, when post of Border Police was fired on, and (2) a raid in Kohat near Marai. Damage caused was not serious. In the Marai case the raiders were followed up by parties of regular troops, Border Police, and villagers, and two of the raiders were killed, both of whom are believed to be Zakka Khels. Bodies have been sent to Kohat for identification. The behaviour of the villagers was very good, and the chigha of one section of Bar Muhammad Khel Orakzai, across the border, co-operated by holding one of the lines of retreat. It is said that a larger body of raiders under Multan is in waiting in the Aka Khel country. The Chief Commissioner once more respectfully urges that we should not defer action against this tribe, as he anticipates that lawlessness will spread. He pronounces the position of the villagers, police, and Border Military Police to be intolerable. The Zakka Khel tribesmen have declared a feud against the Border Military Police. There has been a show of opposition by Khuda Khel and Khwaizai Mohmand Afghan subjects to the examination of the railway alignment at Smatzai and Shinpokh by Mr. Johns, of the Public Works Department, with an escort of 100 Khyber Rifles.

Chief Commissioner attributes this also to the continued impunity of Zakka Khel, whereby lawlessness along the frontier is being encouraged. No damage has been done in this case, and adequate measures for the protection of the party and of the British villages concerned have been taken by the Political Agent, Khyber.

No. 22.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 3rd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to your telegram of 30th, please let me have information on following points:—(1) Is it certain that raiders into Kohat were Zakkas; (2) were the two men killed found to be Zakka Khels or were they not?

No. 23.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams of the 25th and 30th ultimo as to the Zakka Khel. Please keep me fully informed as to course of events.

No. 24.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th December, 1907

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram on the subject of Zakka Khel, dated 3rd instant. There seems to be no doubt that raids reported were all the work of gangs mainly composed of Zakka Khel. The Political Agent, Khyber, reports that the two raiders who were killed in the Marai affair were Rokhan Khusrogi and Yardin Zia-ud-din, both Zakka Khel. The former, usually called Rokhan Karigar, was a very notorious raider.

No. 25.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 11th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports that on 5th December a gang of 16 persons, of whom most have been recognised as Zakka Khels, made a raid on the village of Masho Khel near Bara. A bania was killed, and his shop looted. Some Zakka Khels, on the same day, captured 12 mules working on the Khyber road near Fort Maude, and carried them off to Bazar.

No. 26.

Papers transmitted by the Government of India by the mail of 5th and 12th December, 1907. Received 21st and 28th December, 1907.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Captain Brown, who is with Mr Johns at Bar Ugda, wires to-day to Political, Khyber—*Begins* Two hundred Mohmands appear holding hills opposite Kuz Ugda rendering passage down river impossible. They refuse to send jirga or treat in any way. Mohmands are firing on Smatzai and Shinpokh. Have sent for Hasmzai Jirga. Camp stops at Bar Ugda till situation clears or other orders are received. Mohmands reported holding position opposite Narai. *Ends* If Mohmands maintain attitude of opposition Johns will be unable to examine this portion of river route. He will meanwhile examine Harington's line. Our arrangements are confined to ensuring safety of Shilman.

Enclosure 2 in No 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907

(Telegraphic)

Captain Brown reports, dated Camp Bar Ugda this morning, that Smatzai and Shinpokh have been under constant fire from across the river for the last three days. He started for Kuz Ugda yesterday and, on getting near the river, came under a very heavy fire from the hills on the left bank. Captain Brown saw one party of about 120 men, and according to local information the Mohmands numbered three to four hundred Khwaizai and Khuda Khel. Captain Brown did not reply to their fire, as he hoped to arrange matters peaceably. He sent a Shilmani Mulla across to speak to the enemy, who stated they would not treat until their full jirga had assembled in two days' time. The Mulla behaved with great gallantry, swimming the river under a heavy fire.

Enclosure 3 in No 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th November, 1907

(Telegraphic)

Continuation my telegram of 27th November. Roos-Keppel wires 28th instant:—*Begins* Camp Loi Shilman, 28th November. Mr Johns states that if he can see river at Shinilo Gudr he will not require to go down from Kuz Ugda. I will arrange for him to go to Shinilo to-morrow, and it is improbable that he will be interfered with. This will complete his work, as he has seen line from Smatzai to Kuz Ugda and from mile 300 to Warsak, besides completing his inspection of Harington's line. Strong force of Khuda Khel and Khwaizai Mohmands holding left bank of river from Palosi down. They are determined not to allow railway survey, but are not otherwise aggressive. It is reported that firing on Smatzai and Shinpokh has ceased. I have three hundred men here to-day and am expecting two hundred more to-morrow, but I shall now order these to stand fast at Landi Kotal, as I do not think they will be required here. The Khwaizai sent a message to Captain Brown last night that they would treat with him if he would send a jirga across the river to them, and he replied that they had fired upon us without provocation and that if they had any explanation to give or representation to make they could come to Shilman. It does not appear necessary now to

treat with them in any way, so as soon as Mr. Johns' work is completed I shall make such arrangements as may be required for the safety of Shilman and then withdraw the force here as quickly as possible, when the Mohmand gathering will probably fade away. *Ends.* I have wired directing Mr. Johns to return to Peshawar after seeing Shinilo, and Roos-Keppel to withdraw Khyber Rifles from Shilman as soon as practicable. I have heard direct from Mr. Johns that he has collected all data necessary for his report.

Enclosure 4 in No. 26

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Mr. Johns has left Shilman, and all the Khyber Rifles are returning to Landi Kotal to-day.

Enclosure 5 in No. 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 2nd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 29th November Mr. Johns has returned to Peshawar and proceeds to Lucknow, whence he will send his report Roos-Keppel with all Khyber Rifles returned to Landi Kotal on 30th November, there being no apparent necessity for his remaining longer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Messenger from Jamal of Smatzai arrived here yesterday evening, and stated that yesterday morning a large body of men, estimated at five hundred, appeared opposite Smatzai and without warning opened fire on the people. Two cows were killed and the people took refuge in the village. It is stated that the force attacking Smatzai consists of Shinwaris of Ningrahar, Lalpura and Khuda Khel Mohmands and a few Khwaizai. The Mohmand Lashkar who were holding the left bank of the river from Palosi down, dispersed on the 1st instant.

Enclosure 7 in No. 26

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Messenger from Smatzai reports that firing on Smatzai was kept up from dawn till dark yesterday. No firing last night and no sign of enemy up to 8 o'clock this morning, though it is believed that they have not left.

Enclosure 8 in No 26

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 5th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Number of Lashkar opposite Smatzai appears to have been much exaggerated, and Lashkar is believed to consist mainly of Mohmands. Messenger from Smatzai reports a little firing this morning.

Enclosure 9, in No. 26

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Jamal of Smatzai has arrived and reports that Lashkar opposite Smatzai has broken up and gone to Lalpura. They called out to Shilmanis that they had fired on Smatzai by mistake, having been informed that it was occupied by troops. They may return, but this seems improbable

No. 27.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th January, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Following dated 4th January from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—

“Transport post at Jalozai in Peshawar district was attacked last night by large raiding gang, and one duffadar and one driver were wounded and 41 Government mules carried off”

Jalozai is half-way between Pabbi and Cherat.

No. 28.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th January, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 4th January Raid on transport post, Jalozai. Raiders comprised 15 Zakka Khel and a few others The wounded Duffadar and driver have since died.

No. 29.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 9th January, 1908 Received 25th January, 1908.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 30th May, 1907, we have the honour to forward further correspondence on the subject of the Zakka Khel Afridis. In our despatch of the 7th March, 1907, we gave an account of the situation as it then presented itself, pointing out that the conduct of the tribe had for a long time previously been most contumacious, that they had adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Government, and that their immunity from punishment was reported to be having the worst effect on the frontier tribes. We described the disadvantages of merely sending a punitive expedition into the Bazar Valley and thereafter retiring, and the advantages which we foresaw would result from our remaining and administering the valley, and we said that, if you were unable to agree with us that an expedition against the Zakka Khel section was advisable, and if you did not consider that any interference with tribal territory was at the time justifiable, we were afraid that it would be impossible adequately to protect our territory from raids by the Zakka Khel, and that it seemed to us that the only course that we could follow was to wait until the Zakka Khel should by their hostile acts render military operations indispensable. On his return from India to Afghanistan the Amir openly discouraged the advances made to him by the Afridis, and during March, 1907, there were indications of slight improvement in the

attitude of some of the Zakka Khel elders, and we asked the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province his opinion as to the prospects of effecting a satisfactory amicable settlement. He replied on the 18th March that those among the tribesmen who had gained nothing by raids, but anticipated loss if the section were punished, had tried to induce the hostile party to settle with Government, but their endeavours had ended in defiance on the part of the hostile party, and the object of the section as a whole was to escape punishment without making any adequate reparation for past offences or giving up any offenders. He was therefore compelled to adhere to his recommendation for the occupation of the Bazar Valley, entailing the subjugation of the people by troops, and the building of posts at important points in the country to be held by Khyber Rifles. We informed you of Sir Harold Deane's views in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 24th March. Before the end of the month two more raids had been added to the list of Zakka Khel offences: in the first, on the night of the 15th, a gang of 15 men raided the Jangli Burj police tower, severely injuring a constable and carrying off three rifles and other property: in the second, on the 20th, two villagers and some cattle were carried off from near Marai in the Kohat district. The villagers were subsequently released. On the 10th April, you telegraphed to us asking, in the event of operations being sanctioned, what were the constitution and strength of the force to be employed, the latest date to which starting could be postponed, and the probable duration of operations. You added that in the existing circumstances you were not persuaded that it was expedient immediately to resort to punitive measures. We replied to you by telegraph on the 22nd April, furnishing the information called for, and stating that, in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, it would be preferable to postpone operations until the month of October. We stated that we proposed to re-submit the case for your consideration in September. During the summer raids by the Zakka Khel temporarily ceased. The allowances due to them in June amounted to Rs. 11,900; the fines outstanding aggregated Rs. 13,775, and the claims against the section totalled Rs. 19,771-2-0, though the latter were probably exaggerated. On finding that there was no intention to call their jirga in along with the other Afridi sections to receive their allowances, a Zakka Khel jirga came in uninvited to Landi Kotal on the 2nd June, and announced that they had come to make peace with Government, to hear the charges against the section and to settle the cases. On being informed of the claims against them, they said they were absurd and could not be entertained. They were prepared to restore any stolen property which accused men might acknowledge to be in their possession, and to return three of the rifles taken from the Pabbi police station. They said that the system of deducting fines from the allowances must be stopped; that their oath must be accepted in all cases; that they would accept no responsibility for raiders passing through their country to Afghanistan; that in no circumstances would they surrender offenders for punishment; and that all restrictions on members of the tribe going to Kabul must be removed. Their attitude, in short, showed that they had no real desire to come to a settlement, and they returned to Bazar without matters having in any way advanced. During July and August many Zakka Khels, including all the most notorious raiders, visited Kabul. Within a few days of their return from Kabul, offences began to be reported with unceasing regularity. Among the more important may be cited the following:—On 5th October a gang of some 30 Zakka Khel under Dadai raided the village of Samarai in the Kohat district, killing one Muhammadan and carrying off two Hindus and property to the value of Rs. 600. On 28th October a gang of 30 Afridis, mainly Zakka Khel, attacked Pabbi in the Peshawar district and seized five Hindus. They fired on a party of troops at the station, seriously wounding a sepoy and a zamindar. At Tarnab they attacked and wounded the District Revenue Officer in camp and carried off his Chuprassi and horses. *En route* they robbed ten cartmen. Near Peshawar they encountered a party of police and fired on them, wounding two constables. Here they had to abandon most of their heavy booty and retreated into tribal territory. On 13th November the village of Lachi in the Kohat district was attacked by 22 men, mainly Zakka Khel. The Post Office was looted and one villager killed and three wounded. The raiders met a party of Border Military Police and fired on them, killing two and wounding two others. They carried off four rifles, jewels, and other property. On 20th November a similar gang under Dadai fired on a village near the Bara Fort. The garrison of Border Military Police turned out and

were at once attacked, two men being killed and two wounded at the first discharge. On 24th November a large gang of Zakka Khel attacked the Marai village in Kohat, but were driven off by the troops and villagers with a loss of two men killed and three wounded, all Zakka Khel. One of the men killed was Rokhan Karigar, Khusrogi, a well-known raider of the Dadai faction. On 25th November Multan with some 35 Zakka Khel carried off 400 goats from Matanni and attacked a police post, where they were repulsed. On 5th December the village of Masho Khel in the Peshawar district was attacked and a bania's shop looted and the owner killed by a gang of 16 persons, mainly Zakka Khel, and on the same day 12 mules working on the Khyber Road near Jamrud were carried off to Bazar by the Zakka Khel. It must not be supposed that these raids are mere border affairs such as might reasonably, in the circumstances of the frontier, be passed over without very serious notice or dealt with by local reprisals. Many of them, and those the most important, are organised raids by large and well-armed bodies of men on peaceful villages far in the interior of our administered districts or direct attacks upon Government posts and property, a fact which, in our opinion, necessitates much more stringent action on our part. Meanwhile the attitude of the Zakka Khel remains defiant. The position, in short, seems to us to have arrived, when the conduct of this truculent section leaves no alternative but to adopt punitive measures. On the 17th December, we enquired from Sir Harold Deane what, in his opinion, would be the effect on the Afridis and border tribes in Afghanistan, if we now took action against the Zakka Khel and occupied the Bazar Valley. He replied on the same day as follows:—"Judging from the present attitude of the Afridis there is no disposition on the part of other section to identify themselves with the Zakka Khel, and there is no reason to anticipate that they would join in opposing our advance into Bazar. Until the punishment of the Zakka Khel has been carried out, it is impossible to predict the future attitude of other Afridis, to whom the occupation of Bazar will doubtless be distasteful, but who, at the same time, have no desire to give Government cause for again entering Tirah. The only Afghan border tribe of any importance, viz, the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, have no interest in Bazar or Tirah, and I see no reason to anticipate trouble from them." Telegraphing again, three days later, Sir Harold Deane suggested that he should be permitted to summon the Afridi jirga, and clearly tell the clans that, unless they put an end to the present state of affairs created by the Zakka Khel, Government had decided to punish that section at once. If, he said, the Afridis express inability or unwillingness to coerce the Zakka Khel, and to take responsibility for their future behaviour, it would be tantamount to a public expression of our right to adopt coercive measures ourselves, and would deprive them of any excuse for joining the Zakka Khel. It may be that action in this direction may obviate the necessity for punitive measures, and though we confess that we do not anticipate this with confidence, we agree that every possible alternative should be exhausted before having recourse to such measures ourselves. We accordingly ask your sanction to authorise Sir Harold Deane to call in a jirga of the Afridi clans, and to announce to them that, if the tribe as a whole refuse actively to insist on the Zakka Khel affording reparation for the past and behaving in a proper and orderly manner, or if, after undertaking to do this, they fail to carry out their engagements, the Government of India will be compelled to take whatever steps they may consider advisable to punish the Zakka Khel section at such time as may be considered best. We should explain that we do not contemplate the despatch of a punitive expedition on the old lines, which included the burning of villages, blowing up houses, cutting down and ringing fruit trees and other acts of destruction. The action that we would propose to take would probably include the following measures:—The recovery of a fine and the disarmament of the section. The capture and trial of the ringleaders and those implicated in the recent raids. The construction of a road which would in the future contain this section and prevent their escape into the inaccessible regions to which they now resort. The road would be maintained on lines similar to those prevailing with regard to the Khyber, so far as they are applicable. The actual offenders in the recent raids and their supporters, if captured, would be dealt with by suitable tribunals locally assembled. It would be undesirable for Sir H. Deane to announce definitely that it is intended to send a force into the Zakka Khel country. If the other sections refuse or fail to keep them in order, he would report the fact, and the military authorities would then be requested to put into action the scheme which they have prepared. We ask,

however, that, in the event of the failure of the reference to the Afridi jirga, we may be allowed discretion to order the advance into the Bazar Valley whenever this may seem desirable. It is most desirable that the movement should be made suddenly and without previous notice or discussion which may lead to premature disclosure of our plans, and possibly involve other sections in opposition to the advance. We think it desirable, as was done in the case of the Mohmands in 1897, to inform the Amir of our intentions before we take coercive measures against the Zakka Khel. As the most favourable season for military operations is drawing near, we should be glad to receive an answer to this despatch by telegraph.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 4th May, 1907

The Zakka Khel are reported to have held a meeting at China on the 28th April to discuss their future course of action. They decided to do nothing definite until the completion of the harvesting of their crops, which will take place in the latter half of May. One of the regular messengers of the Political Agent brought in a letter without signature or seals, purporting to be from the Zakka Khel Jirga, in which they referred vaguely to services they had previously rendered to Government, and stated that they had recovered some stolen property from thieves. The bearer of the letter brought a verbal message to the effect that the Zakka Khel Jirga was willing to come in to visit the Political Agent and make peace with Government if formally summoned and guaranteed honourable and liberal treatment. The messenger was told to reply that the Political Agent did not purpose to summon the jirga, but that he intended to go to Landi Kotal within a week, and that the Zakka Khel might visit him there if they had any serious proposals to advance for the settlement of the numerous cases against them. A later messenger reports that the receipt of this reply has again unsettled the tribe, as the majority consider that by holding out and refusing to make any settlement, Government will be forced to condone their past offences and to pay their allowances.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11th May, 1907.

Reference diary for the week ending 2nd February, 1907. Of the camels raided by the Zakka Khel, 19 were ransomed by the owners through Khan Bahadur Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel of Chora, during the week.

Enclosure 3 in No. 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 18th May, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel are threatening the relations of Lal Baz and Inzarai, who were killed last year for giving assistance to the authorities in capturing outlaws at Tandai, that, unless they can induce the Khyber authorities to pardon the Zakka Khel for their misbehaviour, they will burn their villages and turn them all out of the country. Usman went so far as to occupy one of their *garhis*, but the jirga subsequently decided that they would wait for a month more and take up the case again if not sent for by the Political Agent. The Zakka Khel exacted a large number of sheep from the Afridis passing through their limits on their way back to Tirah with their *kaddas*, as transit duty. Now that the Afridis have returned to their homes in Tirah, they have re-opened their private feuds and are prosecuting them vigorously. No less than five men, including one Payao, a leading Anai Zakka Khel elder, were killed during the week. On the 18th instant, Muhammad Asghar, the notorious Zia-ud-din raider, who had been for many years the leader of raids into the Kohat District, was killed at Shin Kamar by a Zia-ud-din in the course of a jirga. It is stated that the elders wanted him to come down and settle his cases with the Political Agent, but as he persistently refused to do so, and they could not bring him in by force, they shot

him dead. Some say that he was killed in a private feud and the real reason for his murder is being enquired into. Dad Shah, one of the Zakka Khel prisoners taken in the *baramta* of December last, was waylaid by his enemies in Bazar and killed on his way to his home on release

Enclosure 4 in No 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 1st June, 1907.

The Zakka Khel Afridis have been holding jirgas in Bazar almost every day for the last week or two to decide what they should say to the Political Agent, at Landi Kotal, where they propose to visit him. Much tall talk was indulged in and many defiant resolutions passed. The tribesmen seem to have quite recovered from the fear of punishment which they felt in the spring. Their jirga arrived in the Khyber villages on the 1st June *en route* to Landi Kotal. The murder of Muhammad Asghar, the Zia-ud-din raider, has caused a great stir in Tirah. Muhammad Asghar was a man of note in the tribe and was a bold and daring leader of raids. He had amassed much property by raiding, and was generally respected and liked. The way of his murder was that three men with whom he had a hereditary feud had given security that they would suspend the feud for a certain time. Feeling secure in this, Muhammad Asghar relaxed his caution and came to a tribal assembly at Shin Kamar without followers. His three enemies had hired a fourth man who openly shot him in the assembly. As the people did not know how many of those present were interested in the murder, no one moved or protested until the meeting broke up in the usual way, when Muhammad Asghar's relations went hot foot to Tirah and seized two villages belonging to Yar Ghulam, uncle of Ghulam Muhsay-ud-din, the assassin. Yar Ghulam's family took refuge with Sahib Alam, a friend and neighbour. The Mullas then took a hand, and preaching that Ghulam Muhsay-ud-din had been hired by the *Feringhi* to murder Muhammad Asghar, drove out all his relations and occupied their villages after burning Yar Ghulam's property. His relations, about 40 in number, have taken refuge in the Aka Khel country. An old feud between the notorious Zakka Khel Dakait, Multan, and one Santak, a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, was revived during the week, and is being vigorously prosecuted. Some of the Zakka Khel elders have volunteered to arbitrate between the rival parties

Enclosure 5 in No 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 8th June, 1907.

The Zakka Khel jirga, which arrived in the Khyber on the 1st instant, visited the Political Agent at Landi Kotal on the 2nd and 3rd. They announced, on arrival, that they had come to make peace with Government, but their attitude was independent, and it was obvious that to come to any sort of settlement with them, all concessions must be on our side. The proceedings of the jirga have been separately reported. The jirga left on the evening of the 3rd instant, saying that they would discuss matters among themselves in the Khyber villages and return next day, but on the 4th they all left for Bazar on the transparent pretext that they feared arrest. The leaders of the "War party," Dadai, Usman, Multan, Zamir, and others, had refused to accompany the jirga to Landi Kotal but were waiting its return on the Bazar border. On arrival in Bazar on the morning of the 5th instant the jirga dispersed, but a number of the leading elders proceeded to Chura to discuss matters with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel. Yar Muhammad's attitude is curious, as he has always taken the lead among the Afridi Maliks in pressing for the punishment of the Zakka Khel and for the occupation of Bazar, but he is intensely jealous of the two Zakka Khel Maliks who have been working well to bring their tribe to reason and he sees that any settlement in which they are concerned must result in strengthening their position to an extent which will be distasteful to him. It is possible also that it may have dawned upon him that an occupation of Bazar, or a settlement which would strengthen our hold on the Zakka Khel, might be inconvenient to him and might lower his importance. He is anxious that negotiations with the Bazar tribes should be conducted through him and not through the Zakka Khel Maliks.

Enclosure 6 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th June, 1907.

With reference to the previous correspondence, I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated 5th June, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, dealing with the present attitude of the Zakka Khel and proposing that the allowances now due to the clan, amounting to Rs. 11,900, should be confiscated and utilised in settlement of the claims for compensation made by British subjects on account of losses suffered in the raids committed by the Zakka Khel during the last twelve months. These claims amount to Rs. 19,771-12-0, but, as pointed out by the Political Agent in his letter, are doubtless exaggerated.

2. The present position of affairs, as described by Major Roos-Keppel, more than confirms my report on the attitude of the tribe, submitted in my telegram dated 18th March, 1907, and it is evident from the Political Agent's letter that the attitude of the Zakka Khel continues unconciliatory and uncompromising. There appears to be no probability of a satisfactory settlement with a clan who, instead of offering redress for their offences, put forward a number of preposterous and impossible proposals. The fact that the principal offenders were present at the jirga held before the Zakka Khel attended at Landi Kotal and that they openly refused to be bound by any agreement which the tribe might come to with Government, is in itself sufficient indication that there is at present no hope of a satisfactory settlement.

3. There seems to be no immediate necessity for finally confiscating the accumulated allowances and for paying them to the injured parties, until Government have definitely decided what action, if any, is to be taken in regard to the Zakka Khel. I would, however, ask for sanction to the accumulated allowances being placed meanwhile in deposit, with a view to meeting claims for compensation later.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th June, 1907.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my letter of the 7th February, 1907, I have the honour to report, with regard to the Zakka Khel Afridis, that in February and March last, rumours were widely current in Peshawar and on the border that a punitive expedition was to be sent against the tribe. This rumour put the Zakka Khel on the defensive and deterred them from raiding for the time, as they feared that any night the Bazar Valley might be surprised. They organised a system of defence and for many weeks, in all weathers, their pickets occupied the numerous passes leading from the Khyber to the Bazar Valley. By the beginning of April, when the fear of invasion had begun to pass away, the usual messages were sent to all the other Afridi tribes to come in to receive their annual allowances, and the Zakka Khel waited to see whether they would be sent for or not, as they still hoped that we would be anxious to patch up some sort of a "settlement" by which they would retain their gains by paying a nominal fine in return for a free pardon. During this month they had approached each clan of the Afridis in order to induce them to take their part, but without success, and at the distribution of the allowances none of the jirgas expressed any sympathy with the Zakka Khel, while some openly said that they would be glad to see them punished. Early in May it became obvious to the Zakka Khel that it was not intended to summon them, so they began to send messages asking why they had not been invited, and enquiring whether they might come in to discuss matters. As the sending of an invitation to them would have implied that it was intended to pay their allowances, their messages were invariably given the reply that no invitation would be sent, but that the jirga could come in at any convenient time to see the Political Agent, to ask any questions, or to make any proposals. A lingering fear of attack induced them to cause delays until the crops of the Bazar Valley were harvested and threshed, and this interval was employed in sending childish messages regarding the nature of their reception. To these messages, which were sent with the object of gaining time, no replies were given. By the 25th May a fully representative jirga, including all the leading dakairs, had assembled in Bazar, and a week was spent in discussions as to the demands to be put forth by the jirga and the extent of concession to be made by them. On the 1st June, the jirga crossed into the Khyber villages, but the more notorious raiders and organisers of raids, such as Multan, Usman, Zamur, and Dadai, refused to accompany it or to be bound by its decisions. The jirga came to Landi Kotal on the 2nd, and that and the following day were spent in discussions with them. The jirga announced that they had come to make peace with Government, to hear the charges against the tribe, and to settle

the cases. They were informed of the claims against them, and they replied that these claims were absurd and that they could not entertain them. They went on to explain that they were prepared to restore any stolen property which accused men might acknowledge to having in their possession, and that they would return three of the smooth-bore rifles taken from the Pabbi Police Station. Fines, they said, were irrecoverable, as they had decided to insist upon reverting to the "old system" (which they state was in force before 1897) by which stolen property was claimed from the tribe, who then decided, by questioning the actual accused, whether in their opinion the claim was or was not a valid one. They also said that their allowances must in future be paid in full, as the system of deductions on account of fines, which had been introduced of late years, was, in their opinion, unfair and must be stopped; that their oath must in future be accepted as settlement in all cases, that they would acknowledge no responsibility for raiders passing through their country from Afghanistan or for property taken to Afghanistan, and that all restrictions on members of the tribe going to Kabul must be removed. As regards the punishment of notorious offenders, they said that they would never, under any circumstances, give them up for punishment, but would, if they considered their guilt proved, punish them in their own way, *z e*, by a demonstration and a feed at the expense of the culprit. Unfortunately this mild remedy can only be applied to a very weak man. From the above it will be seen that their desire for a settlement was not very real, nor their attitude promising. Had they seriously wished to settle their cases they could have done so by the deposit of half the rifles they had brought with them, until recovery of the value from the raiders, but in their then mood no settlement would have been satisfactory to them which did not involve the abandonment of practically all our claims. I do not suppose that all their terms and demands need be taken literally. For several months they have had a very real fear of actual punishment before their eyes and now that this fear is removed the revulsion is proportionately great. By the afternoon of the second day of discussion they had talked themselves out, and they left for the Khyber villages saying that they would discuss the matter amongst themselves and return next day. Next morning, however, they did not come but sent messengers, followed by the two Zakka Khel Malikis, with frivolous messages asking for formal invitation, guarantees of safe-conduct, &c. No answer was sent and by the time the Malikis returned to the Khyber villages in the afternoon the *jirga* had left for Bazar. What the result will be it is not possible to say. The *jirga* may decide to come in again with more reasonable suggestions, the tribe may remain quiet in the hope that things will blow over, or there may be a recurrence of raiding. Of the three alternatives the latter seems the more probable. It is clear that in the present mood of the tribe there is no hope of any settlement unless Government is willing to pay blackmail by abandoning its claims and those of the unfortunate sufferers by the raiding of the last year, and even such a settlement as this would only wipe out past offences while encouraging the tribesmen to further outrage. The Zakka Khel believe that they have tried their strength with us and that we have shirked the issue and the result is that their mood is now anything but conciliatory. The allowances due to the Zakka Khel up to the 31st May total Rs 11,900. I propose to send this amount to the Deputy Commissioners, Kohat and Peshawar, for *pro rata* distribution to the sufferers by the raids of the past twelve months. The claims amount to Rs 19,771-12-0, but they are doubtless exaggerated, and Rs 11,900 should settle them. The claim of Government for Rs 13,775 on account of fines can stand over for the present, and can be enforced or remitted in the autumn according to the behaviour of the Zakka Khel in the meantime.

Enclosure 7 in No 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 15th June, 1907.

Messengers from Tirah state that Muhammad Asghar's brothers [diary for the week ending the 1st June, 1907] are being pressed by the Zia-ud-dins to give up Yar Ghulam's *garhi*, but that they are supported by Multan and several other Zakka Khel and are offering opposition to the tribe. The Mohib Khel section of the Zakka Khel sent in a message to the Political Agent during the week to say that there were no serious cases against them and that they were prepared to make peace with Government if their similar offences were pardoned. No reply was sent, as it is quite impossible to deal with the clan piecemeal. It is reported that a few days ago a party of Zakka Khel headed by Usman, Khusrogi, while on one of their ordinary visits to Ningrahar, kidnapped a Hindu, with a donkey load of miscellaneous goods from Battikot, and brought him to the Bara Aka Khel country. The Hindu managed to escape from Bara and took refuge with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan at Chura and has sent a message to his relations to come and take him back to Ningrahar.

Enclosure 8 in No 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 22nd June, 1907

The Bazar Zakka Khel held a meeting at China on the 17th instant to discuss the question of their future behaviour towards Government, but with no definite result. The majority of them were of opinion that they should make no

overtures for peace until the autumn when they will have learnt more about the intentions of Government, and that, if they then found the Government firm in their demands for full restitution and for the thorough punishment of their bad characters, they will decide what to do. The old feud between the Zarif Khel and Hatim Khel sections of the Khusrogi Zakka Khel was finally disposed of by the former killing three of their own men to settle up their account with the Hatim Khel. The Zarif Khel had also the inheritance of the large estates of the deceased for their second object in view. Sher Baz, Paindai, whose brothers Lal Baz and Inzarai were killed by the Zakka Khel *lashkar* last summer for assisting us in the Tandai affair, and who had taken refuge at Chura, returned to China on the 19th instant, and with the assistance of Mir Ahmad Shah, Pakhai of Barg, occupied a *garhi* at China which he is still holding against Usman and other Khusrogis who had taken a leading part in the murder of his brothers. Usman has applied to Dadai and other Zakka Khel elders for help, reminding them that it was they who had put him up to the mischief and that they should therefore support him through thick and thin. Saiyid Mir and Jabbar, two of the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel tried by jirga, were found guilty of being members of a notorious gang of dakaits and sentenced to seven and four years' rigorous imprisonment each

Enclosure 9 in No. 29.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 3rd July, 1907.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 14th June, 1907, in which you recommend that the accumulated allowances (amounting to Rs. 11,900) withheld from the Zakka Khel on account of their misconduct, may be placed in deposit, pending a settlement as to the line of action eventually to be followed in regard to the Zakka Khel. The proposal is made with a view to the sum confiscated being available hereafter to meet claims for compensation preferred by those who have suffered loss at the hands of Zakka Khel raiders during the past twelve months.

2. I am to inform you that the procedure proposed is irregular and cannot be sanctioned. The unpaid allowances, if they have been drawn by the Political Agent in the Khyber, should be recredited to Government, and if, hereafter, sanction is given to the payment of compensation to sufferers at the hands of the Zakka Khels, the expenditure must be met from general revenues.

Enclosure 10 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 6th July, 1907.

The visit of the Bazar Zakka Khel jirga to the Political Agent seems to have temporarily quieted the tribe as, although the raiding season has begun, no movements are reported.

Enclosure 11 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 13th July, 1907.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar having finished the sowing of their kharif crops have started with their Kaddas for Tirah. They have as usual left behind a guard of 30 men to guard their villages. Before leaving for Tirah they held a jirga in which they discussed the question of their future dealings with Government. Some of them were in favour of not committing any mischief in future in British limits, others suggested the resumption of hostilities, but nothing definite was arrived at, and the jirga decided to go into the question again on their arrival in Tirah in consultation with the Zakka Khel of Maidan, Bara, and Waran. The usual Afridi visits to Kabul have commenced.

Enclosure 12 in No 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 16th July, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Reference correspondence ending with my letter dated 15th February, 1907. Political, Khyber, reports that Ganga Ram, the Hindu who was abducted from Badbher in December, has been brought in by a Kambar Khel jirga.

Enclosure 13 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 27th July, 1907.

(Extract)

With reference to the release of Ganga Ram, who was abducted from Badbher in December last, I have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a letter dated 15th July, 1907, with its enclosures, from the Political Agent, Khyber, from which it will be seen that the Hindu was ransomed for Rs 64, Kabuli, by a Kambar Khel.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 15th July, 1907.

I have the honour to report that to-day a jirga of the Shalobar Kambar Khel brought in to me Ganga Ram of Badbher, who was carried off by a raiding party on the 5th December, 1906, and who has since been kept a prisoner in Nakhtarnao, a hamlet of Nazian village, in Ningrahar, Afghanistan.

Mirza Ali, the only Kambar Khel member of the band of Zakka Khel raiders, who so harassed the Peshawar border last summer and winter, was instrumental in obtaining the release of the prisoner and in handing him over to the jirga of his tribe.

When the autumn allowances of 1906 were paid to the Kambar Khel Afridis on the 15th December, 1906, the tribe paid a fine of one month's allowances as a settlement of Mirza Ali's share in recent raids, and bound themselves to either reform him, or permanently expel him from their country. Since then Mirza Ali has entirely severed his connection with the raiders and the unconditional bringing in of the Hindu is a hopeful sign of his reformation, and the jirga seem quite determined that they will not allow him to compromise them further.

The Kambar Khel jirga made a petition for Mirza Ali's pardon, and were informed that his past offences would be so far condoned that no further action would be taken on this account against him through his tribe, but that if he were to enter British territory he would be liable to trial for the dakaities in which he had taken part. The jirga were quite satisfied with this reply.

I enclose translation of the petition of the jirga and of the Hindu's statement.

Annexure 2.

Translation of a statement by the Shalobar Kambar Khel Jirga, dated the 15th July, 1907.

We harassed Sadr Ali, brother of Mirza Ali, the Kambar Khel outlaw, very much, and told him that, if the latter would cease to raid in British territory and would hand over to us the Hindu carried off from Badbher, we would allow him to return to his country and at the same time would recommend him to Government for pardon. Sadr Ali, who has since been killed in a feud, communicated our words to Mirza Ali who consequently settled the Nakhtarnao Shinwaris' claims regarding the Hindu, handed him over to us and promised before us that he would never henceforth commit any mischief whatever in British territory. We then brought the Hindu with us and proceeding *via* Samana reached Kohat where we reported the matter to Mr. Donald. He detained a sepoy with us to avoid our being interfered with in the way. We reached Peshawar the day before yesterday, and as you were not present there we have now brought the Hindu before you here, and beg to request that, as Mirza Ali has not offered any excuses in the restoration of the Hindu, has paid a large sum of money to the Nakhtarnao Shinwaris in effecting his release, and has moreover promised never to commit any mischief in British territory, his past offences may be pardoned.

Annexure 3.

Translation of a statement by Ganya Ram, son of Nand Kaur, of Badbher, dated the 15th July, 1907.

(Extract.)

About seven months ago when I was going to my village after closing my shop in the Badbher serai at about 9 p.m., a raiding party of about 21 men arrived there. At first they made me, Ramji Mal, and two other Hindus, prisoners. Before this they had seized two Police sepoy. Six of the raiders took us to a distance and seated us there, and the rest went to attack the serai from where they raided 11 camels, two horses, six bullocks, and two donkeys. They then returned to their homes and took us too with them. Early in the morning we reached Shin Kamar. The raiders released one of us named Hukma in the way as he was ill, and the other, who was dumb, they released on arrival at Shin Kamar. Next day the raiders took me, Ramji Mal, and the two Police sepoy, also the looted property, to Lakarai Ziarat, and the following day they got us to Nakhtarnao. The raiders had robbed me of a *khes*, valued Rs 10, and cash, Rs 11. The ringleaders of the party were Multan Anai Zakka Khel and Nur Rahman Afghan Shinwari, of Nakhtarnao, and the other members of the gang were either their relations or fellow-tribesmen. During my stay at Nakhtarnao, Multan, with a gang consisting of his brothers and other Zakka Khels and of Shinwaris of Nakhtarnao, had twice left Nakhtarnao for British territory with intent to raid. In the first raid they sacked Pabbi and carried off six rifles and other miscellaneous property, and in the second they attacked the Matanni serai and carried off 31 camels and eight bullocks. Sheikh Ahmad Nur, of Bara, ransomed the two Policemen for Rs 160, Kabuli, and brought them in, while the Kamarai, Malikdin Khel, and Sipah Jirga, effected the release of Ramji Mal and brought him in to Peshawar. Mirza Ali paid Rs 64, Kabuli, to Nur Rahman Shinwari, of Nakhtarnao, on my account, and thus effected my release and handed me over to the Kamar Khel jirga, who brought me to Peshawar *via* Kohat, and from there they brought me here and presented me before you. Mirza Ali has now given up raiding, as his enemies have killed his brother Sadr Ali in a feud, and he himself has been prevented by the Kamar Khel from committing raids.

Enclosure 14 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 24th August, 1907.

A Hindu and a Musalman, who were abducted from the Kohat border on the 11th ultimo, are reported to be the prisoners of Mir Khawas (a Sangu Khel of Nakhtarnao in Nazian, Afghanistan), who has held them to ransom. Enquiries made into the case show that the men were originally kidnapped by Gulab Sher and other Orakzais who handed them over to Taza Khan and other Zakka Khels for disposal. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, has been informed

Enclosure 15 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 14th September, 1907.

¹A party of 24 men, Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Nazian and Zakka Khel of Bazar, is reported to have carried off from near Basawal in Ningrahar about 30 camels belonging to some Peshawaris, who were taking goods to Kabul, and to have brought the camels to Bazar. They are also said to have robbed the camel-drivers of Rs. 300 in cash. The Peshawaris are arranging to ransom their camels in Bazar.

Enclosure 16 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 21st September, 1907.

The theft of a drove of camels from near Basawal by a party of Sangu Khel and Bazar Zakka Khel raiders was reported in the Khyber Diary for week ending the 14th September, 1907. The Zakka Khel elders, headed by Dadai and Usman, called out the tribal *lashkar* and completely destroyed the villages of some of the Zakka Khel who had taken part in the raid.

Enclosure 17 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 9th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, wires 8th instant.—*Begins* A serious raid occurred about 8 p.m. on night of 5th instant at Samarai village in Lachi Thana limits. The Officiating Superintendent of Police, whose report has reached me to-day from Samarai, reports that the raiders appeared to be Afridis and were well armed with Lee-Metford and Martini-Henri rifles. The raiders, said to be about 20 in number, divided into two parties and attacked the houses of two Hindus, namely, Kishan Ram and Moti Ram, who allege that goods to value of about Rs 300 were taken from each house. The villagers tried to hold up the raiders at Moti Ram's house, but the raiders were too well armed and succeeded in getting out of the village, taking with them Shankar, son of Kishan Ram, and Ganga Ram, son of Moti Ram, and property to the value of Rs 600, but as the raid was very quickly over it seems probable that complainants have exaggerated their losses. Villagers attacked raiders with stones and swords, upon which one villager named Muhammad Jan was shot dead. Eighteen empty Lee-Metford cartridges and 15 empty Snider cartridges were found on the scene of the occurrence. Kishan Ram, who is a rich Hindu, is trying to ascertain whereabouts of his son in order to pay ransom. Officiating Superintendent of Police reports that raiders are believed to be Zakka Khels, and it seems probable that some of this gang were Zakka Khels. The raiders made good their escape before special patrols could be sent out and the place where they crossed into independent territory after committing raid is not yet known.

Enclosure 18 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 10th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 9th October, 1907. Political Agent, Khyber, wires 9th instant.—*Begins* A party of 27 Zakka Khels, headed by Dadai and Yar, left Maidan on 4th instant saying that they were going to raid. They have not yet returned, and it seems probable that they committed raid on Samarai in Kohat district; enquiries are being made. *Ends*

Enclosure 19 in No. 29.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 10th October, 1907.

(Extract.)

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 27th July, 1907, I am directed to request that you will furnish the Government of India with a report on the present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis. I am to enquire, with reference to the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 24th August, 1907, whether the Hindu and Muhammadan who were abducted from the Kohat border on the 11th July last, and held to ransom by Mir Khawas of Nakhtarnao, have yet been released.

Enclosure 20 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 24th October, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram dated the 10th October, 1907, regarding the occurrence of a raid on the night of 5th instant at Samarai village in the Kohat district, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the Political Agent, Khyber's letter dated the 19th October, 1907, on the subject.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 19th October, 1907.

Reference Deputy Commissioner, Kohat's, telegram of 8th instant, to your address. I have the honour to report that the raid of 5th instant upon Samarai village in the Kohat district was committed by a gang of about 27 Zakka Khel, including the following men:—

- (1) Dadai, Anai
- (2) Tut, cousin of No. (1).
- (3) Randu "
- (4) Saidanai "
- (5) Nurbai, Paundai.
- (6) Yar Shah, Anai.
- (7) Mir Akbar, brother of No. (6).
- (8) Amber Khan, cousin of No (6).
- (9) Saiyid Akbar
- (10) Sarfaraz Khan, Shan Khel
- (11) Shermadi, son of Khanukai, Anai.
- (12) Sobai, Anai.
- (13) Shina, Anai.
- (14) Nazar Gul, Anai.
- (15) Saiyid Mir, nephew of Saiyid Khan, Anai.
- (16) Pahlawan, Zia-ud-din.
- (17) Gulzaman, brother of No (16)
- (18) Mir Azam
- (19) Rakhtu, brother of Muhammad Jan, Zia-ud-din.
- (20) Nur Khalim, Zia-ud-din.
- (21) Majid, cousin of Multani, Anai.
- (22) Murak, Anai.
- (23) Mulja Ghulam Muhammad, Zia-ud-din.

Dadai, who has recently returned from Kabul and who is now the most prominent of the "Kabul Elders" among the Afridis, has been urging the Zakka Khel to recommence raiding. Failing to induce his fellow-tribesmen to pull the chestnuts from the fire for him, he has been forced to take the field himself, and this is the first time for five years that he has actually taken part in a raid. Dadai was in doubt in which direction to raid, he personally being in favour of attacking some village in the Peshawar district, as he said that this would most annoy Government, but his followers preferred Kohat, as they said that the risk there was less and the chance of booty greater. While still undecided, Dadai received information from one Mir Akbar, a Malkdim Khel Afridi of Mirobak, in the Kohat district, with whom he is connected by marriage, and from Mir Azam, a Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, who is in the habit of visiting Kohat, that a rich Hindu at Samarai would be worth attacking.

Dadai consequently collected his gang at his house in Maidan on about the 3rd instant. He went first to Swaikot in the Bora to pick up his Zia-ud-din friends and from there proceeded *via* Zera and by Zangal Killi, in Shia limits, to Borakka and from there made his attack on Samarai. On his way he picked up two Firoz Khel Orakzai guides named Zarjhun Shah, Kasim Khel Firoz Khel, and Sher Ahmad, Haidar Khel Firoz Khel.

At Samarai they met with trifling opposition, killed one man, carried off what little loot they could find, captured two Hindus (one Shankar, son of Kishan Ram, and Ganga Ram, son of Moti Ram), and returned to Maidan *via* Kandauli and Ublan, thence through the Bizoti and Firoz Khel limits to Barki.

One of the raiders (No 22), Murak, who is deaf, was left behind, and the raiders waited two nights and one day for him in the hills near Barkai, being supplied with food by Malik Sanjab Khan of that place. Murak eventually returned and the raiders broke up. Of the two prisoners, one is in the hands of Dadai, in Maidan, and the other is with Pahlawan, Zia-ud-din (No. 16) at Tseri-Kandao. The amount of loot actually taken appears to be small—it only gave each man Rs 8.

I would suggest that the relations of the captured men should be dissuaded, if possible, from paying ransom, as to do so will only encourage this form of crime. There is no chance of the Hindus being killed or seriously ill-treated, and they will no doubt be released after a time if their captors find that there is nothing to be gained by keeping them.

The benevolent neutrality shown towards Zakka Khel raiders by all sections of the Orakzai has, in this as in all previous dakaities in Kohat, greatly contributed to their success.

Enclosure 21 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Raid on Pabbi on 28th reported. As raiders were carrying off two Hindus and Patwaris (subsequently released), they encountered party 45th Sikhs, and shots were exchanged. One Sikh sepoy wounded and probably one raider. Raiders, while retreating, passed, at Turnab, Camp of Native Revenue Assistant, whom they wounded slightly, carrying off his chaprassi and three horses. Chaprassi escaped and horses were recovered by Police near Baddher. No information yet as to identity of raiders, but in view of Khyber reports they were probably Zakka Khels.

Enclosure 22 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 30th instant. Following details of Pabbi raid now reported: About 6.30 p.m. on 28th, band of Afridis, numbering from 12 to 30, appeared at Pabbi and seized three Hindus (Aya Singh, Kifa Ram, and Natha Singh) and proceeded with them towards Peshawar. In addition, on the way, two Patwaris (Gobind Sahai and Ram Chand) were captured. Village Chigha turned out and followed. Near Railway Station they came upon detachment of 45th Sikhs camped there. Havildar Nand Singh, Commanding, enquired what was happening. Raiders replied with volley, by which one Sikh sepoy was seriously wounded and also Zamindar Ghulam Rasul, who happened to be in line of fire. Sikhs fired in return, causing raiders to abandon Hindus and retreat by Cherat road. Sergeant Crawford, 1st Mule Corps, camped at Pabbi, taking ten rifles, 45th Sikhs, and three policemen, proceeded in pursuit, but, owing to darkness, failed to come up with raiders. On receipt of news at Peshawar, 40 police were despatched by tum-tum to Badbher and 30 sepoy to Phandu, 15 to Pakhai, and 15 down Grand Trunk road, Border Police holding Bara-Janigarhi line. Raiders proceeded to Nasargarhi, where they robbed ten cartmen, thence to Turnab, where they found Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner Bakhshi Ghani Sham Das in Camp. They wounded him with knife and would have carried him off, but he could not ride or walk. They looted his tents and carried off his three horses. Raiders apparently proceeded towards Hazar Khani and were met and challenged about 3 a.m. by body of police on Kohat road about two miles from Peshawar. They replied with volley, wounding two constables, and a running fight ensued, in which one raider was apparently wounded and horses and heavy loot had to be abandoned. Near Siaband the raiders escaped in the darkness.

Enclosure 23 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 2nd November, 1907.

On the night of the 28th October, 1907, a raid was committed at Pabbi (Peshawar District), in which one sepoy of the 45th Sikhs was wounded and an attempt was made to abduct some Hindus. An attempt was also made to abduct Ghani Sham Dass, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Revenue Assistant, Peshawar, who was in camp near Taru, but this failed, as the Police, who had received information of the raid, waylaid the gang and had an encounter with them, losing three men wounded. From inquiries made it appears that the party consisted of 16 Zakka Khel, 4 Aka Khel, and 6 Nazian Sangu Khel. Abduction, which was formerly rare, is now a feature of nearly every raid. It has been ascertained that a dacoity, which was committed at Patwar Bala (Peshawar District) on the 23rd October, was the work of a gang of Zakka Khel raiders headed by the notorious Multan. The gang only got about three hundred rupees and, not being satisfied with this, left for the Kohat border, whence they have just returned unsuccessful. On the 29th instant a Zakka Khel raiding party is reported to have entered the Loi Shilman valley via Dakka and Kam Dakka and to have had a fight with the Shilmanis, in which two Zakka Khel and one Shilmani were killed or wounded. Some say that the intention of the raiders was to attack the railway camp at Shahid Miana, but no details are yet known.

Enclosure 24 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 3rd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 30th October. Political Agent, Khyber, reports that Pabbi raid was committed by gang of about twenty-six, the majority of whom were Zakka Khels, accompanied by six Shinwaris, Afghan subjects, and about four Aka Khels. He reports rumour that one of the raiders was wounded and lost his rifle, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Enclosure 25 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 7th November, 1907.

In compliance with your letter dated 10th October, 1907, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter dated 1st November, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, and to submit the following remarks regarding the present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis, for the consideration of the Government of India

2. Major Roos-Keppel's letter gives a full statement of the facts of the case up to date. The only other incident which perhaps deserves mention in this connection is a very deliberate attempt to derail the mail train, which occurred on the night of the 1st November. Several large stones were placed on the line near Taru, which luckily failed to upset the engine. It seems more than likely that this outrage was the work of one of the gangs mentioned in the Political Agent's letter.

3. I entirely agree with the Political Agent that the situation is even worse than it was last year. And, unless prompt and vigorous action is now taken, I anticipate that there will be a very serious epidemic of lawlessness on this border. One tribe is easily influenced by the bad example of another; and the fact that these Zakka Khel gangs are again harrying the Peshawar border with apparent impunity can only have the effect of encouraging other sections of the Afridis and adjoining tribes to follow suit. My recommendations for dealing with the situation have

Letter dated 3rd December, 1906.
Letter dated 13th February, 1907.
Telegram dated 18th March, 1907.

already been submitted to Government fully in the marginally noted correspondence, and I have nothing to add to the views there set forth, except that the present season is

favourable for military operations, should such be sanctioned, as the cold weather migration from Tirah has commenced.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 1st November, 1907.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to state that the resolute attitude of Government in the spring and the uncompromising reception of the Zakka Khel Jirga in June had so excellent an effect that we enjoyed the only quiet summer since 1897, and the peace of the five months from 1st April to 30th September was only broken by one offence, viz., the kidnapping of one Hindu and one Musliman from Hangu referred to in the Government of India letter of the 10th October last. I have received information that both have escaped. The Zakka Khel really believed in the spring that the time of their long-delayed punishment had arrived, and when this belief had begun to fade it was again revived by the reception of their Jirga in June, which convinced them of the firmness of Government. These beliefs, however, are not lasting, unless they are proved to be true by subsequent facts, and as time passed, the fear of punishment passed with it, with the result that a strong party, headed by Dadai himself, crossed the Miranzai Valley and attacked the village of Samarai, in the Kohat district, killing one man and carrying off two Hindu boys (who are still prisoners of the Zakka Khel) and some booty in cash—as detailed in my letter of 19th October, 1907. Since then five separate raiding gangs have been organised under the following leaders:—

- (1) Dadai, Anai, Zakka Khel.
- (2) Multan " " "
- (3) Gul Baz " " "
- (4) Muhammad Atzal, Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel.
- (5) Usman, Khusrugi, Zakka Khel

On the night of the 23rd October, Multan's gang (No 2) raided the village of Patwar Bala and carried off a small booty in cash after firing some shots. Disappointed with the result of this, they left for the Kohat border, whence they have just returned unsuccessful. I received reliable information in October of the intention of one of these gangs to attack the coolie-camp working at the Shahgai cutting on the Khyber road and was forced to move the camp to Fort Maude for protection. On the 28th October, Gul Baz's gang (No. 3), consisting of sixteen Zakka Khel, six Afghan Shinwars of Nazian and some Aka Khel, committed a raid at Pabbi (about 25 miles inside the border) where they wounded a sepoy of the 45th Sikhs and carried off some Hindus. On their way back they attempted to carry off the Revenue Assistant, Peshawar district, and looted his camp; they were, however, intercepted by a party of Police, of whom they wounded three. I have just heard from Landi Kotal that a Zakka Khel raiding party had attacked Loi Shilman from Kam Dakka and had killed or wounded three of the Shilmanis. No details have been received. Dadai, a Zakka Khel elder who has just returned from Kabul and who poses as the leader of the Afghan party among the Zakka Khel,

has been preaching to his fellow-tribesmen that, if the worst came to the worst, they can always save themselves from punishment by declaring themselves Afghan subjects. So far as the situation has changed at all during the last 12 months it has altered for the worse. The Zakka Khel believed last spring that they were to be punished for their long misconduct, but they now believe that, although we had then decided to punish them, we were afraid at the last moment to do so. The Samarai and Pabbi raids of last month have equalled, if not surpassed, in boldness any previous records of such crimes, and the bill against the tribe has grown considerably. In February last I computed our claims against the Zakka Khel at Rs. 33,546, of which Rs. 19,771 was on account of compensation to sufferers and Rs. 13,775 on account of fines (see my letter of 7th February, 1907), and I now attach a list of offences which were not included in that letter or which have occurred since its submission. The present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis is that the tribe is openly hostile to us, that the tribesmen have got over their fear of punishment, that they believe that Government does not dare to attack them. As I stated in my letter of 18th November, 1906, the only possible solution of the problem is the occupation of the Bazar valley, and to this I have nothing to add.

Annexure 2.

Raids committed by Zakka Khel since submission of Political Agent, Khyber's letter of 7th February, 1907.

No	Date of occurrence.	Place of occurrence.	Parties.	Nature of offence	Remarks
1	2nd January, 1907.	Khatak Banda, tahsil Hangu, Kohat district.	Crown <i>versus</i> Sher Ali, Sarfaraz, &c., Shen Khels, Nuzai, Majid Sikan-dar Khan, Anai, Malang Shah, Mir Afzal, Zaefran, &c., outlaws.	Abduction of 3 Hindus, 2 Muhammadan boys and 6 donkeys	Released on payment of ransom.
2	15/16th March, 1907	Jangli Buri, Police Station, Peshawar	Crown <i>versus</i> Gulbaz, Sahib Dad, Zamir, Rakhtu Anai, Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Asghar, and Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din, Sher Ghulam, Zakka Khel (Kurrami), Zarghun Shah, Mehrab Shah, Zari Shah, Mir Afzal, and Malang, Aka Khel.	Robbery of 3 Martini-Henry rifles with some cartridges and Government uniforms.	—
3	20th March, 1907.	Masru Lalma, Marai, Kohat	Crown <i>versus</i> Yar Shah, Anai, Mir Akbar, Pahlawan, Mir Asam Zia-ud-din, and Habib, Peshawari outlaw	Abduction of two Muhammadans and theft of 15 bullocks	The men were subsequently released.
4	11th July, 1907	Jabal, tahsil Hangu, Kohat district.	Crown <i>versus</i> Multan, Khailu, Gulbas, Sahib Dad, Amir Shah, Tarza Khan, and Mitha Khan, Anai, Sarfaraz, Shan Khel, Babarai, Nazar Gul, Nizam Gul, Mir Din, Khusrugus, Muhammad Afzal, Zia-ud-din, with four others, Baz Muhammad Aka Khel, Gulak Sher, Musalli Gulfaraz, Wali Sherzai, and Nadir Sher, Mithas	Abduction of one Muhammadan and one Hindu	Since reported to have escaped from Nazian
5	5th October, 1907.	Samarai, Kohat distric.	Crown <i>versus</i> Dadai Tut, Randu, Saidanai, Yar Shah, Mir Akbar, Akbar Khan, Sayid Akbar, Sher Madi, Sabi, Shunai, Nazar, Gul, Sayid Mir, Majid, Nurakh, Anais, Nurbai Faundai, Sarfaraz, Shan Khel, Pahlawan Gul Zaman, Mehr Asam, Rakhtu and Nur Khalim, Zia-ud-din	Murder of a Mussulman and abduction of 2 Hindus and theft of property valued at Rs 600	—
6	24th October, 1907.	Patwar Balá ...	Devi Das <i>versus</i> Multan, Zamur, Tarza Khan, and other Zakka Khel	Dakaiti with theft of property valued at Rs 384-10-0	Shots were exchanged between the villagers and raiders, and Nanik Chand, son of the complainant, was wounded (with knife) on both hands
7	28th October, 1907.	Pabbi	Crown <i>versus</i> Gulbaz, Sangar, Sahib Khan and 13 other Zakka Khels, four Aka Khels, six Sangu Khel Shinwaris, two Bará Sturi Khels.	Dakaiti with attempt at abduction of Revenue Assistant Ghani Sham Das and some Revenue subordinates. Also wounding of one sepoy, 45th Sikhs, and three sepoy of the Police.	Full details not yet known.
8	29th October, 1907.	Zoi Shilman ...	Zakka Khel raiding party . . .	Cattle raid and wounding of 3 men.	Reported by telephone, detailed report not received.

Enclosure 26 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 9th November, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel assembled at China on the 8th instant to celebrate the *Id* and freely discussed the question of their future behaviour towards Government. The majority were for war though some of the more sober-minded elders advised the *Kishara* that they could still avoid trouble with the Sarkar if they only abstained from committing further mischief in British territory. On the other hand Usman and others were arguing that, mischief or no mischief, Government were bent on taking Bazar, and that it was better to die in honour than to be vanquished in disgrace. No definite decision was however arrived at.

Enclosure 27 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports serious raid committed on night of 13th instant at Lachi by Afridi gang of about fifty raiders. They broke into post office and looted cash chest and into Hindu's shop and took away jewellery, cash, and silks. Some men of Lachi kept up fire on raiders, otherwise losses would have been much heavier. Raiders shot one villager and wounded three others. Raiders cut telegraph wire on main road three miles north of Lachi. Party of Border Military Police, in three tum-tums, proceeding to Lachi to take part in search for Khatak outlaws in recent Banda Daud Shah case, were ambushed by these raiders with result that two sepoy were shot dead and two seriously wounded and four rifles and 160 rounds ammunition were carried off by raiders. Remaining sepoy acted with great presence of mind, lying flat on road under heavy fire, and opened fire on raiders, who dispersed westward. Every effort has been made to intercept gang and military at Hangu and Kohat have been asked to co-operate in stopping routes.

Enclosure 28 in No. 29.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 16th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram dated 14th November. Lachi raid. You will no doubt inform us as soon as possible to what clans raiders belonged and if they were also responsible for Banda Daud Shah raid.

Enclosure 29 in No. 29

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 16th November, 1907.

The Tirah Zakka Khel held a *jirga* at Madato-Kass-Maidan on the day of the *Id* (Friday, the 8th instant) to discuss (like the Zakka Khel in Bazar) the question of their future behaviour, and the majority of the elders present voted for war. They said that it would be a great blow to their *izzat* if they took the initiative in suing for peace and that unless Government themselves invited them to a conference at Peshawar, and agreed to entirely wipe out the past, it would pay them to maintain their hostile attitude as no *gharib* tribe was ever treated with consideration by the British Government. There was hardly a dissentient voice among them. The majority are now busy in bringing their *kaddas* to Bazar. A very serious raid was committed at Lachi on the 12th instant. The raiders seized the Post Office, broke open a treasure chest, and entered some Hindus' shops and carried away a quantity of jewellery and silk. Some of the raiders came across a party of Border Military Police going out in *tumtums* in the direction of Lachi in search of some Khatak outlaws, who had kidnapped three Hindus from

Banda Daud Shah on the 7th instant, and fired on them, with the result that two of the sepoy were shot dead and two others severely wounded and four rifles and 160 rounds of ammunition were captured by the raiders. One of the raiders, a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, is reported to have been killed by the pursuit party and to have been left behind by the raiders. It is not yet known definitely who the raiders were, but it appears almost certain that they were Zakka Khel. They fled in the direction of Tirah and the man killed is reported to be a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, brother of a notorious raider

Enclosure 30 in No 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 18th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Continuation my telegram dated 14th November. Troops in Kohat garrison co-operated with Samana Rifles, Border Military Police and villagers in holding line between Kohat and Mirkhewli to intercept Lachi raiders. Raiders apparently retreated in two parties, one of which is hitherto untraced. Other party retreated west in direction of Orakzai country and broke through line of pickets held by 56th Rifles near Hangu on night 14th instant, losing one man killed, subsequently identified as Yamir, brother of Niazmir, Shan Khel Zakka Khel. One of police wounded near Lachi has succumbed to wounds

Enclosure 31 in No 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 21st November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

At 8 30 last night party of Afridis came to vicinity of Bara post and fired few shots in order to turn out garrison of Border Military Police. Border Police went out and were ambuscaded about 200 yards from post on road to Ilm Gudar, losing two men killed and two wounded. Raiders then retreated towards Ilm Gudar followed by border police and village chighas, who have not yet returned. Affair is very deliberate act of hostility to Government.

Enclosure 32 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 22nd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 21st November. Following letter, dated 22nd instant, from Political Agent, Khyber, is repeated for information:—*Begins.* One of my Zia-ud-Din Zakka Khel messengers has just arrived and states that he met at Mamanai the party who attacked the Border Military Police at Bara on the night of the 20th instant and recognised among them: Anai Zakka Khels, (i) Dadai, (ii) Multan, (iii) Rakhtu, (iv) Zamir, (v) Amir Shah, (vi) Saidanai, (vii) Mastan, (viii) Gulistan, (ix) Mehr Jan, (x) Mehr Dast, Zia-ud-Din Zakka Khels, (xi) Shaghar, (xii) Mir Akbar, (xiii) Sher Alam, (xiv) Mir Afzal, (xv) Sher Khulam, Shan Khel. There were also about half a dozen Aka Khel and Sturi Khel of Bargdi. He states that the plan of the raiders was to lure the Border Military Police out of the Fort at Bara and, if possible, to kill them all—partly as an act of war and partly in revenge for the raider killed in the Pabbi raid of 28th October, 1907. Four of the Border Police fell at the first discharge, but two men stayed with the fallen sepoy and opened fire on the raiders, severely wounding Mehr Dast (No. x), a first cousin of Dadai and a man of importance. This loss upset the raiders' plans and they had to abandon their attacks on the Border Military Police and carry off their wounded comrade. They retired slowly in the direction of the Besai Spur, keeping back the chigha by occasional

shots. Their reason for going in this direction was that there is, at the south side of the Besai spur, a tower held by about 60 Kambar Khel, and they counted upon these men for support. Having arrived safely there, they swung to left and went to Mamanai, where they rested for some hours and got a charpoy on which they carried Mehr Dast up the Bara. Mehr Dast's shinbone is completely shattered and he is certain to die. The raiders said that as the Border Military Police had now killed their men they would revenge themselves upon every opportunity. Since writing this, other messengers have come in who fully confirm above. *Ends.* In the recent raids since 5th October, in which Zakka Khels were implicated, the tale of killed and wounded has been as follows :—

At Samarai, one villager killed.

At Pabbi, one sepoy, 45th Sikhs, two Police Constables, Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner, and one villager wounded.

At Lachi, two Border Military Police and one villager killed and two Border Military Police sepoy and three villagers wounded.

At Bara, four Border Military Police sepoy wounded.

Enclosure 33 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 23rd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 18th November. Lachi raid. Political, Khyber, reports that gang consisted of twelve Zakka Khels and about ten others, chiefly Orakzai and Aka Khel. Names of all Zakka Khel concerned are known. Gang started on day after *Id* from Maidan and proceeded via Sampagha Pass and Rabbia Khel Orakzai country, where they stayed three days. They left eight men to watch road while sixteen attacked Lachi. The eight men encountered the Border Police and one of them, Yar Mir, Zakka Khel, was killed on spot. Raiders got four rifles from the Border Police, of which three are now in Maidan in possession of Niaz Mir, Majid, and Jafar, Zakka Khel, while the fourth was left with the Orakzai. This information is all amply corroborated. Unless prompt action is taken to deal with these cases, I anticipate a spread of lawlessness to other tribes and consequent serious trouble.

Enclosure 34 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 23rd November, 1907.

The Zakka Khel Afridis continue to preserve a warlike attitude. A Malikdin Khel Afridi who recently visited China in Bazar states that the peace party has practically disappeared and that all sections of the Zakka Khel are openly hostile to Government. The Zakka Khel have sent messages to the Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, Kambar Khel, and Sipah Afridis informing them that they (the Zakka Khel) have declared war against Government and that they wish to attack the Khyber if the other tribes do not object. The tribes have replied that this is too important a matter to be decided off-hand, and that they will reply after their *kaddas* have moved from Tirah and after they have had time to discuss the subject. On the night of the 20th instant a strong party of Zakka Khel, including almost every raider of note, attacked the Border Police Garrison of the Bara Fort. They sent a few men to fire shots in the offing and, having thus lured a part of the garrison out of the fort, fired into them at short range, killing two and wounding two sepoy. Some of the Border Police returned the fire, seriously wounding one of the raiders. This forced the raiders to retire and they retreated in the direction of the Besai spur, where there is a tower with a garrison of Kambar Khel Afridis whom the raiders counted on to cover their retreat if necessary. It is generally believed that the man wounded was one Mehr Dast, a cousin of the notorious Dadai, but there is a rumour that Dadai himself was wounded and that the fact is being kept dark so as not to discourage the tribe. Neither Dadai nor Mehr Dast has yet returned to Bazar or Tirah. On the evening of the 18th instant one Abdulla Jan, a cousin of Dadai, went to Chura and

spent the night with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan. The Malik sent in a letter, dated 19th, regarding the whereabouts of a horse recently stolen from Lieutenant Crosthwaite. On the 21st instant (the day after the attack on the Border Military Police at Bara) another letter was received from the Malik warning the Political Agent of an impending raid. Enquiries show that the Malik had had no other Zakka Khel visitor in the meantime, so it appears probable that he knew on the 18th of the departure of the raiding party and that he intentionally sent the information a day too late. The Malik's inveterate tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds will inevitably bring him to grief before long. On the 23rd instant information was received that the party of raiders who attacked Bara Fort on the 20th had reassembled at the mouth of the Bara and intended to commit another raid. Precautions were taken and no raid occurred, but it is stated that the raiders actually started on the night of the 23rd, but that they had a dispute with the Aka Khel, who accused them of getting them into trouble by using their country as a raiding route and demanded that they should keep to their own side (the left bank) of the Bara. The raiders have asked the Kambar Khel and Malikdin Khel garrisons of the Kajurai Plain what will be their attitude if that line is used for raiding and have received a reply that this question can only be settled when the elders arrive from Tirah. In addition to the raider Yah Mir (a Shan Khel Zakka Khel) who was killed in the raid on Lachi on the 13th instant, two men, Yar Shah and Hazrat Gul, both Zakka Khel, have been missing. Yar Shah has just returned severely wounded, but nothing is known as to the fate of Hazrat Gul. Although the Afridi *kaddas* have not yet come down, the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel have very strong garrisons in the Kajurai Plain. To the south of, and close to, the Besai spur the Kambar Khel have two towers held by about sixty men, while about a mile to the south the Malikdin Khel have a strong tower with a garrison of about the same strength. In the caves in the north-west corner of the plain there are about 150 Kambar Khel and further south are the Malikdin Khel caves with between 200 and 250 men. All these men are well armed, and are unencumbered by families or flocks and they are a source of anxiety, as there is always a chance of some of them joining the Zakka Khel in their raids. Hitherto they have been fully occupied with their own feud and on the 19th an engagement took place in which four men were wounded, but they have now arranged a truce until their *kaddas* arrived. Probably the nearness of the payment of their allowances will keep them steady; but the impunity with which the Zakka Khel have extended their operations far into the Peshawar and Kohat Districts makes the temptation to individuals of an adventurous disposition to take a hand, almost too great to be resisted. The Shinwaris of Lowargai are now excluded from Afghanistan on account of their loyalty to the British Government and of the complaints of the Zakka Khel with whom they are at feud.

Enclosure 35 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports that sowar, proceeding on 24th from Marai to Kachi was fired on by raiding party. Sowar was unhurt. Pursuit parties turned out and engaged raiders said to be about fifty strong.

Enclosure 36 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic)

Since the receipt of your telegram of the 25th November to Secretary of State, two further raids have been separately reported, namely, at Kachi and Matanni, and we hear Multan with gang of 100 raiders have been in Miri Khel cave in Aka Khel country for three nights, and have only been deterred from raiding by troops

sent out to different posts. Situation has become intolerable for villagers, police, and Border Military Police, against last of whom Zakka Khel have declared open feud. I must respectfully urge that action should not be deferred, as I anticipate spread of lawlessness with damage and loss of life to our subjects and servants, who are already suffering great feeling of insecurity.

Enclosure 37 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received of raid on cattle last night near Matanni. Some shots were fired at Ladaur Burj (small road post near Matanni), but no one was hit. The telephone wire was also cut.

Enclosure 38 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 26th November. Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, wires 26th instant:—*Begins.* Parties of Samana Rifles, Border Military Police, half troop 23rd Cavalry on foot, and large chighas from villages of Marai and Kachi, encountered raiders yesterday evening south of Marai and pursued them till dark. Raiders reported to have been in large numbers, but about 30 to 35 only were seen. No heavy firing took place, no casualties on our side, but raiders lost two men, whose corpses are being sent to Kohat for identification. Both are believed to be Zakka Khels and ring taken from one corpse bears impression "Rukhan." One Martini-Henry rifle also recovered from one corpse. Raiders retreated north-west towards Sturi Khel country, and it is believed that others are wounded and search will be made in the hills close to our border. Bar Muhammad Khel chigha of Karez (Independent Territory) turned out and gave great assistance and successfully held one line of retreat of raiders. Am sending this telegram from Marai, and on return to Kohat will submit a further report. Manner in which Militia, &c, turned out in pursuit most satisfactory and promptness and pluck of village chigha most commendable *Ends.*

Enclosure 39 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to-day:—*Begins.* Owing to activity of raiders on this border the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police have, during past fortnight, had little rest and very few nights in bed, and hard work is telling on health of the men, many of whom are suffering from fever and pneumonia. With the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police at present strength, it is not possible, along such a long border line, to undertake proper and adequate measures for defence of our villagers and subjects in British territory from the attacks of Afridi raiders without calling upon the Military to afford greater assistance than I have hitherto asked for. I now propose asking General Officer Commanding, Kohat, to send half battalion Native Infantry to Raisan and half battalion to Chillibagh for co-operation, when opportunity arises, against raiders. This would be in addition to small detachments regular Infantry and Cavalry which I might require at Alizai and Muhammadzai posts. I have deferred making these proposals to General Officer Commanding, Kohat, pending receipt of orders of Chief Commissioner as to his concurrence and would request that his orders may be telegraphed to me. *Ends.* I have replied:—*Begins.* Your telegram of to-day. Chief Commissioner agrees to your asking General Officer Commanding for troops as suggested. We are informing Government of India accordingly. *Ends*

Enclosure 40 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 26th instant. Appears that Multan, with gang of about 35 Zakka Khel, came from Miri Khel caves on night 25th instant. Gang divided into two parties, one of which lifted 400 goats from Matanni and carried off herdsman as far as Shinkamar where he was released. Other party fired on Ladaur Burj, but fled on arrival of Matanni chigha. The telephone wire was cut in several places and about one thousand feet of wire carried off.

Enclosure 41 in No. 29.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 30th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 27th November. Viceroy has received with satisfaction report of satisfactory behaviour of troops, police and villagers on occasion of Marai raid. He regrets the strain imposed on all concerned by the present raids, but trusts that raiders may find that, with our border on the alert, these raids are more damaging to themselves than to us.

Enclosure 42 in No. 29.

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 30th November, 1907.

In last diary it was noted that the raiders who attacked Bara Fort on the 20th November had re-assembled at the mouth of the Bara and on 23rd news was received that one raiding party had left for the Kohat District and that one intended to raid into Peshawar. This information was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner concerned, and the first party were so warmly received by the Kohat Border Police and villagers, on their arrival at Marai on the 25th instant, that they lost two killed and three wounded, while they got no booty and there were no casualties on our side. One of the men killed was the notorious "Rokhan Karigar," a Khusrogi, who has been a bold and determined raider for the past twelve years. The other party made a futile attack on a Border Police post named Ladaur in the Peshawar District, cut and carried off about 1,000 yards of telegraph wire and some herds of cattle. Raiding parties are still hanging about Barkai and the mouth of the Bara, but there are detachments of troops on the line Matanni-Peshawar, and it is difficult now for them to raid with comparative safety. It is stated, however, that their recent losses, viz, two killed and three wounded at Marai, one killed and one wounded at Lachi, one mortally wounded at Bara, and one mortally and one slightly wounded at Pabbi, have not discouraged, but have rather exasperated the Zakka Khel. In last diary it was noted that there was some doubt as to the identity of the raider shot at Bara. He turns out to be Mehr Dast, as at first reported, and it is stated that he expired in Bazar on the 30th November. Malik Sinjab, Sturi Khel, appears to have abandoned all pretence and to have now openly taken sides with the Zakka Khel. Almost every raiding party is lodged and fed at Barkai, Sinjab's men regularly join the raiders—in fact it is stated that his son, Abdulla Jan, has taken part in the Bara Fort affair and in other raids. Sinjab receives a share of all loot, openly gives out that he is at war with the Sarkar, and is now turning out many of his *hamsayas* to make room for Zakka Khel and Aka Khel mercenaries to defend Barkai in case of attack. This village has been a thorn in the side of the Peshawar district for years and is now a second Gumatti. The two Hindus carried off from Samarai on the 5th October last are still in captivity in Maidan, one is with Dadai's family, and one with the relations of Pahlwan, Zia-ud-din.

Enclosure 43 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 2nd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 27th November. Following telegram from Political Agent, Khyber, to Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, dated 1st December, is repeated for information.—*Begins* The two raiders killed were Rokhan, Khusrogi Zakka, a very notorious raider generally known as Rokhan Karigar, and Yardan, Zia-ud-din Zakka. Three men were wounded, Jemadar, Zia-ud-din Zakka, Ser Jan, Khusrogi Zakka, and Mandozai, Anai Zakka. *Ends* Political Agent adds that Rokhan Karigar was one of the boldest raiders among the Zakka Khel, who has lived by raiding and receiving stolen goods for the last ten years, and he considers him equal in importance to Maltan or Dadai

Enclosure 44 in No 29

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Twelve mules and donkeys employed on Fort Maude cutting carried off yesterday from Khyber Road at mouth of Pass by Zakka Khel raiders. Animals taken to Bazar

Enclosure 45 in No. 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

On night of 5th instant a gang of about 12 raiders, said to be Afridis, broke into a bania's shop in Masho Khel in Peshawar district, and after ransacking boxes shot the bania dead and made off. Before leaving village they fired ten shots at Lambardar Village Chigha turned out and met party of 57th Rifles, who had come out from Bara, and by mistake fired on them wounding an Afridi lance-naik, but not badly. The party of 57th Rifles and Border Military Police proceeded to Hamzarai Ender in search of the raiders, but returned without success this morning

Enclosure 46 in No 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 8th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Commandant, 17th Cavalry, Bannu, reports that four Afridi sowars of his regiment have deserted with four Martini-Lee-Enfield rifles and 80 rounds each ball ammunition from Squadron Training Camp, Laluzai, near Bannu.

Enclosure 47 in No. 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 9th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 6th December. From information received it appears that gang who raided Masho Khel and shot bania on 5th instant consisted of 16 persons, of whom 6 were recognised as Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel; namely, Sher Dil, Merak, Mir Azam, Pahlwan, Amir Shah, and Saiyid Khan. The remainder consisted of another Zakka Khel and persons unknown, possibly also Zakka Khel. They retreated via Mamari Gudar towards Barkai

Enclosure 48 in No 29

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to your letter of 3rd December, 1906. What, in your opinion, would be the effect on the Afridi and border tribes in Afghanistan, if we now took action against Zakka Khel and occupied Bazar Valley?

Enclosure 49 in No. 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 17th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 17th December. Judging from present attitude of Afridis, there is no disposition on the part of other sections to identify themselves with Zakka Khels, and there is no reason to anticipate that they would join in opposing the advance into Bazar. Until punishment of Zakka Khels has been carried out, it is impossible to predict the future attitude of other Afridis, to whom occupation of Bazar will doubtless be distasteful, but who, at the same time, have no desire to give Government cause for again entering Tirah. The only Afghan border tribe of any importance, viz., the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, have no interest in Bazar or Tirah, and I see no reason to anticipate trouble from them.

Enclosure 50 in No. 29

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 20th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 17th December. If we are allowed to say definitely to the Afridi clans that unless they put an end to the present state of affairs with the Zakka Khels, Government have decided to punish Zakka Khels at once, I would ask permission to summon Afridi Jirga and put matters clearly before them. This course offers only possible alternative to use of troops. If Afridis express inability or unwillingness to coerce Zakka Khels and to take responsibility for future behaviour, we should, any way, obtain from them public expression of our right to do so and deprive them of any excuse for joining Zakka Khels. It would, however, be useless and only weaken our position to discuss matters with them unless we can express intention of Government definitely

No. 30.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. See our Despatch of 9th instant. Telegram from Sir H Deane states that Kacha Garhi railway station between Jamrud and Peshawar was attacked by 30 raiders on night of 24th instant; one of the station staff was severely wounded and another was carried off. Latter was subsequently released, on station-master raising cry of approach of Khyber Rifles, at which raiders took to flight. As regards composition of the gang that executed the raid, further inquiries are being made.

No. 31.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram dated 27th instant. Telegram from Sir H. Deane states that object of Zakka Khel gang which raided Kacha Garhi was to lure out and attack Border Military Police garrison of that place. Gang consisted of Anai and Ziauddin Zakka Khel, with some Aka and Sturi Khel.

No. 32.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My sense of the fundamental objections to a policy of occupation of Zakka Khel territory, which appears founded on assumption that strict limitation of operations to occupying Bazar Valley will be possible, is increased by definite proposals in your letter of 9th instant. It is impossible to regard your present proposals otherwise than as involving a reversal of the policy established by Lord George Hamilton's Despatch of 28th January, 1898.* Discussion of the subject from this wider point of view has not been considered necessary by you, and you have left for consideration after the event the question of what action to take should an Afridi rising, or possibly a general tribal rising on the scale of the 1897 rising, take place. This result the occupation of Bazar would tend to produce owing to the restlessness it would rouse in every tribe along the northern frontier, and the suspicion that it was only part of a scheme for the practical annexation of all of them in turn. His Majesty's Government are not prepared in these circumstances to approve measures inconsistent with the policy laid down in the despatch cited above, which my predecessor confirmed in his Despatch of 28th October, 1904. On that occasion it was decided that no reason for abandoning the principles fixed in 1898 was constituted by fact that certain Orakzai clans had expressed the desire to be taken over by us. You state, I observe, in your letter of the 7th March, that, but for geographical position of Bazar Valley, which made occupation preferable, you would have recommended punitive expedition or blockade. Though they must disallow any policy of permanent occupation or annexation, His Majesty's Government would be prepared, in view of grave situation which incessant Zakka raids have produced, to consider any proposals that you may think it desirable to submit, limited to blockade and punitive measures in Bazar Valley. Combination of blockade with punitive action seems to be favoured by experience of Mahsud operations of 1901. Please refer to telegram of 1st November, 1901, from Lord George Hamilton,† in which sharp sallies, limited to three or four days' duration, in addition to the passive blockade, were sanctioned. Please report for previous sanction terms of communication you think should be made to Afridi jirga regarding conduct of Zakka Khel section, bearing in mind restrictions on operations against Zakka imposed by these instructions; and also that neutrality of Afridis, not their active co-operation, seems to be all we can expect or reasonably claim.

* See Cd. 496 of 1901, p. 5.

† See Cd. 1177 of 1902, p. 246.

No. 33.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 29th instant, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"Peshawar city raided last night by gang of 60-80 men. There is no doubt that gang were Zakka Khel, as it was known they had left Bazar for purpose of raiding, it being given out that Nowshera was their destination. Casualties were: Two chaukidars wounded, one of whom is stated to be dying. Two police constables wounded, one killed. It is reported that property was carried off from house of a banker named Chela Ram, to the value of Rs 1,00,000. Deputation complaining of the great state of insecurity has been sent up by Hindu merchants of the city. No successful action on part of troops and Khyber Rifles, who turned out after raiders, has been reported."

No. 34.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31st January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. Grave situation occasioned by latest raids on railway station at Kacha Garhi and in Peshawar city has been considered by me in Council. Our opinion is unanimous that vindication of our authority without delay and proof of our determination to protect life and property in British administered territory have become absolutely necessary, and that immediate action is required for credit of Government. To influence position by aid of jirga, as our Despatch of 9th instant suggested, is, in our opinion, no longer possible, but we propose that maliks of other sections of Afridis should be assembled, in order that the impossibility of the situation created by the insolence of the raids and unprovoked outrages of the Zakka Khels may be pointed out to them, and that they may be reassured that no injury to other sections of the Afridis, or interruption of our friendly relations with them is in any way intended by our punishment of Zakkas. We propose that, as soon as possible after assembly of maliks, expedition should start for Bazar Valley. Permission for immediate action on above lines is requested. Employment of two brigades from Peshawar and Nowshera respectively, with one brigade held in reserve at Nowshera, would, in our opinion, successfully accomplish operations.

No. 35.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. My telegram of 31st ultimo crossed yours of 30th January regarding Zakka Khels. We do not think punitive expedition can be delayed, as the situation on the frontier is now so acute, and, notwithstanding our strong opinion that steps should be taken to open up Zakka Khel territory in

order to prevent a recurrence of similar events in future, we think the necessity for immediate measures is so great that we must act in any case; and we consider that, however restricted our subsequent action may be, punitive measures should at once be taken. A blockade on lines of Mahsud operations would, owing to geographical position of Zakka Khel territory, be impossible without the entry of our troops into territory of other sections of Afridis, whose friendship we seek to retain, and possibility of a general Afridi rising would doubtless be greatly increased by such action. Our proposals as regards jirga, which appear to be in accordance with your views on the point, were communicated in our telegram of 31st January.

No. 36.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 2nd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel Your telegram, dated 31st ultimo. Subject to restrictions imposed in my telegram of 30th ultimo, viz, strict time limitation on punitive operations in Bazar Valley and no occupation or annexation, I approve your proposal for immediate action. Fact that there is to be no occupation or annexation should facilitate communication to be made to Amir and Afridis. In view of participation of Sturi Khel in raid on Kacha Garhi, it seems question whether communication should not be made to Orakzai jirga on same lines as to Afridis. I shall be glad to receive a statement of the details of operations contemplated as soon as possible. Reference in my telegram of 30th to Lord G. Hamilton's telegram of 1st November, 1901, will not escape your observation. It is a matter for your consideration whether, for purposes of actual punitive action in Bazar, most effective means of carrying out object would not be the employment of a small detachment from force you propose to mobilise, equipped to act with greatest celerity.

No. 37.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated 2nd instant. I would propose that question of summoning Orakzai maliks should be left to discretion of Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, it being intimated to him that Orakzai maliks should be summoned with Afridi maliks, unless there are reasons to the contrary. Instructions regarding communication to maliks in sense of your telegram have been sent to Chief Commissioner, but to inform Amir that we had no intention of annexing tribal territory would in my opinion, not be necessary. As regards proposed military action, great risk of a disaster to our men, which would undoubtedly set whole frontier in a blaze, would, in our opinion, be involved by small sallies of troops unsupported in the Bazar Valley. Fighting strength which Zakka Khel can produce in the Bazar Valley is about 6,000, and we propose to move into the valley at or near China two brigades, consisting of about a similar number of men, with two batteries, sappers, &c, one brigade being held in readiness

to support them should necessity arise. The force in the Bazar Valley, after occupying China, would take such measures, with a view to capture of ringleaders and those implicated in recent raids, as circumstances may require. Passes surrounding valley would be blocked during this period, and we propose that a force of selected Khyber rifles, who we are assured can be relied on for the purpose, should be used to assist in this.

No. 38.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 6th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated 4th instant. You do not, I gather, object to jirga being informed that no annexation of tribal territory is intended. It must be better that Amir should learn this from us at first hand, as it is sure to reach him through tribal sources. That Amir should clearly understand nature of our action against the tribes is plainly to our advantage. An explanation to him of this in friendly terms cannot surely present any difficulty. Employment of proposed force is approved. It must be clearly understood, I repeat, that end in view is limited strictly to punishment of Zakka Khel, and not occupation or annexation of tribal territory, either directly or indirectly, immediately or ultimately. In the event of escape of ringleaders leading to longer duration of operations this should especially be borne in mind, and any announcement of policy that you may make, whether to the tribes or otherwise, should on no account mention capture or surrender of ringleaders in such a way that we are committed to it as a condition of withdrawing. The chances of complications with other tribes will increase the longer you stay in Zakka Khel territory after inflicting punishment. Any opportunity of effecting a settlement with tribe that presents itself during or after operations will no doubt be taken.

No. 39.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports that on the night of the 5th February a gang, supposed to be Zakka Khel, raided Abazai village, in Peshawar District, and looted house of a Hindu, who was shot and stabbed. Raiders carried off a Government rifle.

No. 40.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

On the night of 3rd February last house of a Hindu named Ram Singh at Tirahi Bala, Peshawar district, was looted of cash and jewels, estimated value Rs 800, by gang of Afridis. Ram Singh answered raiders' fire with his snider, and at least one of the gang was wounded. Raid was doubtless work of Zakka Khel, but no definite information on this point.

No. 41.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram dated 6th February, 1908 Amir could easily be informed in a friendly letter that we have no intention of changing present system of administering tribal territory owing to behaviour of Zakkas. As expedition will, we trust, be short, and Amir will we hope see troops withdrawn soon after he gets letter, we think, on the whole, it would be better that no reference as to our future action should be made to him. Instructions for expedition issued by us are precisely as stated by you. Necessity for surrender of leaders is not laid down. We shall come out, after capturing all we can and inflicting as severe punishment as possible.

No. 42.*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Full details of force employed against Zakka Khel and of military operations should be furnished. I quite agree, with reference to your telegram of 9th instant, to Amir being informed in friendly terms that no change in present system of administering tribal territory is intended

No. 43.*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 12th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

I should be glad if reply could be expedited to my telegram of yesterday regarding details of force to operate against Zakka Khel. Estimate of cost of operations should be telegraphed

No. 44.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 12th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Composition of expeditionary force against Zakka Khels as follows:—

Commanding, Major-General Sir James Willcocks, with full political control, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel as Political Officer.

General Commanding First Brigade, Brigadier-General Anderson, with following troops:—

- 1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
- 53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force).
- 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force)
- 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).

General Commanding Second Brigade, Major-General Barrett, with following troops :—

1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.

28th Punjabis.

54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).

45th Rattray's Sikhs.

Divisional and lines of communication troops :—

Two squadrons 37th Lancers (Baluch Horse).

Mountain Division, No 3 Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.

Four guns 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).

No. 6 Company of 1st Prince of Wales's Own Sappers and Miners

Three sections No. 9 Company of 2nd Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.

23rd Sikh Pioneers.

25th Punjabis

19th Lancers (Fane's Horse), cover advance as far as border of Peshawar Valley.

Third Brigade in reserve stationed at Nowshera, General Commanding, Major-General Watkis, with following troops :—

1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers.

1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles

55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).

23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).

Strength of garrison Peshawar increased by 1st Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) from Brigade in reserve.

Troops will move lightly equipped, and followers have been reduced as much as possible. General Willcocks continues to command Peshawar Division during the operations. Information regarding composition of force has not been given out yet to any one. Force probably moves to-morrow, but this depends upon result of discussion with Maliks, of which we have not heard anything as yet from Deane. You will be kept fully posted, and all information will be sent to you before it is given out.

No. 45.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Zakka Khel operations Estimate of cost See your telegram of 12th February. From materials directly available following rough estimates have been framed. It is should be clearly understood that they are necessarily very rough

(1) Something under Rs 10,000,000 if operations are completed within three weeks

(2) Cost will somewhat exceed Rs 20,000,000 if operations extend to two months.

(3) Probably cost will be between Rs 26,000,000 and Rs 30,000,000 if operations extend to three months

No. 46.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel Following received from Political Agent, Khyber, dated 12th February :—“ Most of the Zakka Khel have moved their families, flocks, and moveable property to Ningrahar and the Bara, and have buried their grain. The majority have gone to Ningrahar. Dadai has taken his family to Kahi, Multan to Nakhtarnao, and Usman to the Bara. All fighting men have promised to return at once. Usman has returned the stolen camels to the Sarhang of Dakka. All is quiet on the Khyber road and here ”

No. 47.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Zakka Khel. Chief Commissioner interviewed the Maliks and elders of the Afridi clans assembled at Peshawar on the 12th instant and addressed them to the following effect:—"Maliks and elders, you have seen for yourselves how the Zakka Khels have for some time past raided into British territory, robbing and killing and wounding subjects and servants of Government and carrying off people for ransom. On several occasions during the last four years I have asked you to combine to put a stop to this Government have been very patient and unfortunately you have not succeeded in putting a stop to these raids. I have summoned you here to-day to announce to you that Government have decided to punish the Zakka Khels by force. You yourselves have adhered to your agreements and we have no quarrel with you. In sending troops Government has no desire or intention of annexing the territory of any one. What is desired is that an end be put to this misbehaviour of the Zakka Khels. We look to you to assist us in making satisfactory arrangements for the future. If you choose you can do so, for you can put pressure on the Zakka Khels in Tirah. Since some of you came in here I know that mischief-makers have tried to impress you with lies as to Government's intentions. They will certainly do so again when the troops start. I tell you not to believe them. If you have any doubts in your mind, come and ask me. After seeing you now I shall tell the General he can move the troops, and I advise you to go at once to your clan and assure them as to the intentions of Government and restrain your young men from joining the Zakka Khels against the Government troops. I also advise you to get together the Zakka Khels of Bara and Tirah, and with them make arrangements for future peace with the Bazar Zakka Khels. The sooner satisfactory arrangements are made, the sooner will Government be able to withdraw the troops. We hope to be able to do this quickly." Following received from Political Agent, Khyber, dated Landi Kotal, 13th February:—

"Chief Commissioner's speech to Afridi jirgas has had excellent effect. Maliks and elders reached Kajurai plain yesterday evening from Peshawar, and have gone to Bara valley to-day re-assure their tribesmen. They propose to raise lashkar, take it to Zakka Khel villages in Upper Bara, and put utmost pressure on Zakka Khels. Attitude of younger men not yet known. Several messengers from Bazar arrived to-day and report wholesale exodus *vid* Thabai pass. Reported that Zakka Khels have not gone far, but are living in caves and camps on northern slopes of pass. Weather fine and warm; snow on the hills melting rapidly."

No. 48.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 14th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expeditionary Force. I should be glad if substance of military instructions issued to Willcocks be telegraphed fully to me. I should be glad to be informed at once by telegraph whether troops have been supplied with expanding bullets.

No. 49.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expeditionary Force. With reference to your telegram dated 14th February, Willcocks has received instructions to following effect:—(*Begins*): Full political control is vested in the General Officer Commanding the expedition. He will be accompanied by the Political Agent, Khyber, as Chief Political

Officer who, as such, will in political matters advise and give him every possible assistance. The General Officer Commanding must possess complete authority and responsibility, but the views of the Chief Political Officer as to any question of policy respecting the attitude of any of the Khyber tribes or adjacent country shall be forwarded to the Government of India if the Chief Political Officer, for reasons recorded, so wishes. The punishment of the Zakka Khels is the only object of the expedition, and no annexation or occupation of tribal territory will take place either directly or indirectly now or ultimately. In order to prevent extension of trouble to country outside Bazar Valley every possible precaution must be taken. Without previous reference to Government of India no terms, fine, or surrender of raiders should be imposed on Zakka Khel tribe. (*Ends*) No expanding bullets are kept in store in this country and none have been issued to troops

No. 50.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks telegraphs 15th: "Left Lala China with Barrett's Brigade, half 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles, No. 3 Mountain Battery, and detachment No. 6 Company 1st Sappers and Miners at daybreak. All ranks carried three days' rations, no baggage or supply column accompanied. Arrived Walai near China in Bazar Valley, rear guard coming in at 7 p.m. After passing Tsar Kham our left flank was fired on, and left flank picquets were fired on the whole way into camp, guns covering them. Have no news of Roos-Keppel's column, but hope they have reached China in Bazar, am trying to get into touch with him. Most of Anderson's column is at Chora in fort in village and half battalion remained at Ghora Kotal. Everything tends to show I was not expected till to-morrow. Zakka Khels were taken by surprise and had not time to occupy their strongest position—the hill above Walai called Khar Gumba; 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders' picquets now hold this hill."

No. 51.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 16th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Fort Maude, 16th February. I left Lala China, near Ali Masjid, yesterday morning, with Second Brigade under General Barrett, and half battalion 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, No. 3 Mountain Battery, and detachment Sappers without any baggage, and all ranks carried three days' rations on person. Column reached Walai, near China in Bazar, last evening. Immediately after leaving Malikdin country, at Thar Chanai Kamai, column was opposed on left flank, and this continued through march. Heavy sniping during the night. Simultaneously with my advance, column under Roos-Keppel, consisting of wing 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas and 700 Khyber Rifles marched from Landi Kotal via the Bazar Pass. It is reported from Landi Kotal to have crossed the Bazar Pass without opposition and entered Bazar Valley. I expect to join hands with him to-day. Most of the First Brigade under General Anderson are at Chora. Our rapid advance completely surprised enemy, and enabled us to anticipate them gaining possession of the strongest position in the valley.

No. 52.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 17th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Fort Maude, 17th February. Joined hands with Colonel Roos-Keppel's column yesterday, 16th February. He reached China in Bazar on night of 15th without opposition, but his picquets were fired on during night. He has had no casualties. Moved my camp yesterday near to China in Bazar. 45th Rattray's Sikhs, which formed part of escort for large convoy coming here from Chora yesterday, whilst picqueting hills close to my camp were attacked by enemy in considerable strength. I ordered them to take the hill on which the enemy were posted, supporting them by the Seaforth Highlanders, two guns of No. 3 Mountain Battery, and the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. The hill was carried. Wing of 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, which I had detached on 15th to hold commanding hill on line of communication, report they were sniped that night, but only a few mules wounded.

No. 53.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs from camp east of China in Bazar on 17th February last as follows.—“Sipah Malik Shah Mard and Kamarai Malik Anar Gul write from Bara that Bara Zakka Khels have stated that they will submit to any terms. The Zia-ud-din Zakka Khels have left Shinkadar and most have gone to the Khel country. Large numbers of Bazar Zakka Khel and many Sangu Khel Shinwari volunteers have collected at Thabai and Mangal Bagh passes. Strong lashkar of Zakka Khel assembled on 15th February at Darbund, as it was believed the Landi Kotal column would enter Bazar by that route. The Kuki and Kamar Khel Maliks are collecting their jirgas and assembling at Bukar in the Bara; they have not got in communication with Bazar Zakka Khel. Report of Mohmands joining Zakka Khel is untrue.”

No. 54.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 19th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 18th February. Camps fired into last night. I to-day accompanied column under the command of General Barrett, and destroyed the fortified towers of China. On leaving to return to camp the column was persistently attacked by Zakka Khels

No. 55.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 19th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 19th February. Column under General Anderson to-day completed the destruction of the towers at China. The Zakka Khel opposition was markedly less than it has been hitherto, and reliable information has been received that their casualties have been very heavy.

No. 56.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Expedition against Zakka Khel General Willcocks telegraphed as follows on 19th instant from Bazar Camp east of China "Confirmation received of news that Amir has issued a proclamation by which his subjects are forbidden to join and help Zakka Khel. No signs exist that other Afridis, in any numbers, are joining Zakka Khel. In the fighting of 15th and 16th February Zakka Khel are reported to have lost 8 killed and 17 wounded. Khel Jan (Shinwari), Saminulla and Ghani (Anais), and Khair Jan (Khusrogi) were among the killed. No accurate information has yet been received as to Zakka losses in yesterday's fighting, but they are believed to have been very heavy. No Mohmands have come through Bazar Valley although Zakka have sent messages to Mohmands urging them to rise. Full confirmation received of news that Dadai was dangerously wounded. We have as yet received no news of Kambar Khel and Kuki jirgas."

No. 57.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Expedition against Zakka Khel Arrival at camp, yesterday evening, of Malik Shah Mard Siah, Sipah, and Anar Gul Azam, Kamrai, with 15 elders, is reported by General Willcocks. They state that Kambar and Kuki jirgas are momentarily expected, and that jirga of about 400 Malikdin Sipah and Kamrai has arrived at Halwai. Jirgas have been told to proceed as soon as possible to Chora, all are anxious for peace, with a few exceptions, but, until other tribes interfere, Zakka will continue to resist according to code of honour. It is believed by Maliks that they can obtain assurances from Zakka, which will enable them to guarantee their future good behaviour, if they are given sufficient time to collect jirgas and negotiate with tribe. Before committing themselves to definite pledges they require time for deliberation; and they say that, both for our sake and their own, matter must be settled while the support they have hitherto required is still afforded them by the presence of the troops. When jirga is assembled Willcocks says that he and Roos-Keppel will see them; they both consider tribesmen in a mood to make amongst themselves really binding agreement by which future responsibility for good behaviour of Zakka will be undertaken. Willcocks adds that unique opportunity to obtain lasting results from the expedition is thus offered. Question is only one of days, but elders will be unable to make arrangements, and all efforts on their part will disappear if troops are suddenly withdrawn without warning whilst deliberations are in progress. Instructions are solicited by Willcocks whether present arrangement to retire from valley on 23rd February should, in the circumstances, be adhered to. Telegram from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, states that to act through other Afridi jirgas while troops are still in Bazar is the only hope of effecting settlement with Zakka Khel; and that jirgas are not likely to do anything once troops withdraw. Following instructions have been sent to Willcocks:—"You should not consider yourself rigidly bound to date fixed for evacuation, as the importance of arriving at settlement is so considerable. At the same time this must not be regarded as in any way changing Secretary of State's orders, by which evacuation is required at earliest possible date compatible with as satisfactory results as can be hoped for. Meeting of jirga should be expedited, and early decision pressed for, and you should be very careful that our withdrawal from Bazar without in any way breaking faith with tribes is not jeopardised by these negotiations, should they fail or be unduly protracted." We are not aware what Willcocks considers will be duration of negotiations beyond such a settlement as would enable troops to retire is arrived at. Willcocks

has also been told that to get our troops out as soon as possible must be to advantage of Afridis generally, and Zakka in particular, and that it might be possible, working on this consideration, to arrange with Malik for troops to withdraw when general decision on the subject is arrived at by jirgas, and before all details of an agreement, arrangement of which might take time and much discussion, are formally settled by them. Your views on the situation that has arisen are solicited.

No. 58.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Camp, east of China, in Bazar, 20th February Column under General Anderson moved to-day to reconnoitre Sassobi Pass Towers at Khwar and Surmundo were destroyed Advanced guard was fired on from hills on both sides of pass. Left flanking battalions were attacked by Zakka Khel on hills west of China. No casualties Enemy are mainly in neighbourhood of Halwai and Nikai, where they have strongly sangared positions which I will attack to-morrow.

No. 59.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 21st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel Extension of time limited to purpose named in your instructions to General Willcocks is approved There seems promise of good result in situation. Bearings of discussion of details with jirga should be fully reported to me General Willcocks should be instructed that any report to you on the subject should be repeated direct to me for my information. No operations which could be construed as infringing even debatable Afghan territory should be undertaken

No. 60.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 21st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Camp, east of China, in Bazar, dated 21st February I attacked the enemy's position at Halwai to-day with two columns under command of General Barrett and General Anderson. Barrett seized hills north of China and occupied them with 28th Punjab, sending Seaforths and Khyber Rifles up the Bazar River south of China, the 54th Sikhs being in support Anderson moved up valley north of China hills, and, debouching through Kotal, west of China, delivered combined attack with Barrett. The enemy were in considerable strength and strongly sangared on the high hills over Halwai, but troops carried position without a check, and held them whilst towers were destroyed. On leaving Halwai to return to camp, distant seven miles, enemy were joined by considerable numbers from direction of Thabai Pass, and persistently clung to our flanks and rear to within a mile of camp, but could nowhere make any impression The retirement was carried out with great coolness, particularly by the Seaforth Highlanders, 53rd Sikhs, and 59th Rifles, and was admirably supported by the guns of the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. I attribute our small losses to the high state of efficiency in training which our troops have acquired. From personal observation I am convinced that the enemy lost very heavily. In Major Forbes-Semphill, who was killed during the day, the service has lost one of its best officers He was killed whilst gallantly leading one of His Majesty's finest battalions Troops in excellent health. All wounded doing well.

No. 61.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Expedition against Zakka Khel Instructions have been sent to General Willcocks, in accordance with your telegram of yesterday. Report already received from him states that, in the opinion of Major Roos-Keppel and himself, there is every hope of a satisfactory settlement under discretion now given. Both he and Major Roos-Keppel consider that, as jirga would have no other incentive to settle business once pressure of troops is removed, it is imperatively necessary that any settlement arrived at should be signed and sealed by them before troops begin to move. Full jirga is expected at Chora to-day, and General Willcocks hopes that negotiations may be completed in three days. Supplies for a week are being arranged by him. Following instructions have been sent to General Willcocks in order to avoid delay:—"We give you free hand to make the best terms you can with tribe subject to conditions already laid down. Obliteration of past and guarantee for future have been stated by Sir H Deane to be probably the only practicable line of settlement. If this will secure speedy settlement, which Secretary of State desires, we will accept it."

No. 62.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Zakka Khel expedition Jirga of most important elders has now been collected, according to telegram from General Willcocks of to-day's date. Mulla Saiyid Akbar has gone to Waran in disgust, having failed to induce Afridis and Aka Khel to join Zakka.

No. 63.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 23rd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 23rd February.

The Afridi jirga, totalling about 300, arrived in camp this evening. They include all the maliks and a majority of the representative elders, and form a satisfactory jirga. They state that owing to the expedition they have had no direct intercourse as yet with the Zakka Khel, but that they have received messages from many of them asking them to mediate and to ascertain the terms of Government. I have told them that we do not wish to tie their hands by announcing elaborate terms, and that it is for them to consider and decide the best manner of effecting a real settlement. They are discussing this question to-night, and I shall see them to-morrow. They seem to be in a reasonable and sensible mood and to have confidence in the success of their efforts. They deserve great credit for the way in which they have prevented their young men from joining the Zakka Khel in spite of the incitements of the Mullas.

No. 64.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 24th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 23rd February. Camp was heavily sniped last night. As usual some men pushed close between the pickets. Parties of Sangu Khel and other Shunwaris continue to arrive in Bazar and in Thabai. It is estimated that 500 have arrived to date. During the return to camp from Halwai, on

21st instant, parties of enemy dressed in khaki uniform pushed to within short distance of firing line of Seaforth Highlanders, at least five so dressed being shot close up to the line. As the enemy were observed yesterday to be collecting on the China hills, a column under General Anderson was sent this morning to disperse them. Only slight opposition was experienced, and although the Zakkas pursued their usual tactics in following up our return to camp, they did so in a half-hearted way, and no casualties occurred except two sappers and a follower who were injured during explosion of a remaining tower. Present information fully confirmed previous estimate of heavy losses inflicted on enemy. 300 elders of Afridi jirga are now in camp, including the maliks of the most important sections, and others are reported to be coming in. Propose to interview them to-morrow, and have hopes of satisfactory settlement.

No. 65.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 24th February, 1903.*

(Telegraphic)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 24th February. All quiet since last report. Only few shots fired into camp last night. To-day several columns under Colonel Buchanan, 54th Sikhs, searched country at south-east of Bazar Valley in neighbourhood of Jabagai. Only trifling resistance encountered, and few enemy seen. The column destroyed the low fortified tower at Jabagai, and returned without any casualty. In my message of 21st February, I omitted to mention that General Anderson's column, which made the frontal attack on the hill above Halwai, consisted of Royal Warwicks, 53rd Sikhs, 54th Rifles, and 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, with the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. I interviewed the leading Afridi Maliks to-day. They openly confessed the heavy and merited punishment inflicted on the Zakka Khel, and are desirous of effecting a settlement. But, although I have every hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement, the maliks referred to the necessity of receiving the moral support of the presence of our troops in case the Zakka Khel proved recalcitrant during the preliminary negotiations, as the accession to their strength from the Sangu Khel, reported in my previous telegram, which is now stated to be considerably increased, may possibly encourage the Zakka Khel to hold out for a time, at least against the pressure of the Afridi jirga. The maliks and elders of the other Afridis are most anxious in their own interests to arrive at a definite settlement, as they see trouble and danger to themselves in the future if the situation is prolonged. I consider that as we have called them in to help us in effecting a settlement we are bound to consider their wishes and opinions, and give them such sufficient time for their negotiations as will give a reasonable prospect of success. But for the complication introduced by the accession of strength referred to I should have been confident of almost immediate settlement, and I still hope that this may only cause slight delay. I feel, however, that it is my bounden duty, in the position in which I am then placed, to point out that any premature withdrawal will result in political deadlock and a certainty of renewed trouble on any scale. We are now here in a dominating position, and one in which the presence of our troops has a great influence in completing a satisfactory solution, and I would earnestly deprecate any rigid limitation of the actual number of days required to arrive at a settlement, which I am using every possible endeavour to effect.

No. 66.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 25th February, 1903.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. See telegram of 24th February from General Willcocks. So long as General Willcocks has good reason for believing presence of troops conducive to satisfactory result of negotiations, there is no case for rigid limitation.

No. 67.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Expedition against Zakka Khel We have replied as follows to telegram of 24th February from General Willcocks, which was repeated to you.—“Actual number of days required to arrive at a settlement has not been rigidly limited. Our readiness to accept Sir H Deane’s view of terms, and Secretary of State’s desire for early settlement have been communicated to you. Quick settlement, followed by withdrawal of troops, is the important thing to effect. Within these limits you have been given full discretion.”

No. 68.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 25th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 24th February The Maliks and elders of the Afridi jirga spent last night in discussing the best means of effecting settlement with the Zakka Khel. Roos-Keppel had a long interview with the jirga this morning, and we are satisfied that they are really anxious to come to a lasting arrangement with the Zakka Khel, as they all feel that the continued misconduct of this clan must eventually bring the whole tribe into conflict with Government, and endanger their independence. While all agreeing as to the end, they show much diversity of opinion regarding the means, as the maliks are all jealous of one another, and the clans are strongly influenced by their own politics, the Gar clans, viz., the Kamar and Kuki Khel, desiring to break the power of the Zakkas, to whom they are hostile, while the remaining clans, the Malukdin, Kamri, and Sipah, do not wish to see their own partisans permanently weakened. The jirga are leaving to-morrow morning for Halwai, and have sent messengers there to collect the Zakka Khel. They have asked for four or five days for discussing, and have been told that two days must suffice. It will certainly be necessary to extend this period, but had the first request for four or five days been granted that also would have been extended. They hope to arrange for each of the great Afridi clans to become responsible for the future good behaviour of one Zakka Khel section, the guaranteeing clan taking action against the section in the event of the misconduct of any of its members. If they can arrange this it will give us a very satisfactory guarantee for the future. I am satisfied that the punishment of the Zakkas has been very complete. The Afridi elders are unanimous that no frontier tribe has ever been so sharply, quickly, and effectively punished, and state that the losses of the Zakka Khel in proportion to their fighting strength have been crushing, and that there is not a family in the Bazar Valley which has not lost at least one of its members. The more far-sighted of the Maliks and elders argue that the Zakka Khel have been and are a standing danger to all the Afridis, and that they must in their own interest take this opportunity of placing matters on a satisfactory footing. I have as yet had no direct communication with the Bazar Zakka Khel, but they have been sending messages to the Afridi jirga asking for their intervention. I have to-day received information of a large influx of Afghans, mostly Sangu Khel Shinwaris, into Bazar, and my messengers report that the arrival of these reinforcements has again put heart into the Zakka Khel. It is stated that there are to-day 1,500 outside volunteers in Halwai and Thabai. This is probably exaggerated, but the number is undoubtedly high. The Afridi jirga will have a very difficult and delicate task, and, although they are hopeful, their success is by no means certain. I am satisfied, however, that they will do their best. One point on which all were agreed was the necessity of inflicting tribal punishment upon individual raiders who have amassed wealth by raids into British territory, as they say that to leave these men in undisturbed possession of their booty, while the punishment for their misdeeds had fallen upon the whole community, would

present too great a temptation to individuals to follow their example in the future and thus bring constant trouble upon the guarantors of their sections. Such action is highly desirable, but it is not necessary to delay a settlement for it, as it would require a long time to organise and could be carried out later in communication with the Political Agent, Khyber. I received the Maliks this afternoon and their interview has done much to re-assure those of them who were nervous regarding our intentions towards them

No. 69.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 26th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 25th February. All quiet, no movement made to-day. The Afridi jirga left camp this morning for Halwai, where they were received by the Zakka Khel numbering some 600 men, including the representative elders of the clan. From accounts received up to the present, the prospect of satisfactory settlement appears promising, in spite of efforts of large number of Sangu Khel and other trans-border men, who incite the Zakkas to further resistance.

No. 70.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 26th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 25th February. The Afridi jirga left this morning for Halwai. Roos-Keppel accompanied them beyond the picket line. On parting they put up prayers for the success of their mission. They rested at a shrine between China and Halwai, and were met there by a deputation of Zakka Khel, who conducted them to Halwai. At Halwai they found about 600 Zakka Khel, including most of the representative elders of the clan, who received the jirga well, and took an oath on the Koran that they would abide by the decision of the jirga, and would join the Afridis in punishing the raiders. Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan and Zamar Khan Jabbar Khan have written to the above effect. Their messengers say that the proceedings of the jirga were much disturbed by hundreds of Sangu Khel Shinwaris, who stood round and shouted abuse at the jirga, urging the Zakka Khel to continue the fight. It is fully convinced that well over 1,500 Afghans, mostly Sangu Khel, but including Kuda Khel Mohmands and men from every part of Ningrahar, have arrived in Bazar, and that they are doing everything in their power to induce Zakka Khel to hold out. Shakar, the notorious raider of Hazara has brought a band of 60 well-armed men. The messengers say that the Zakka Khel are themselves becoming afraid of these outsiders, who considerably outnumber them. Kumrgul Amai, a well-known raider and first cousin of Dadai, was present, and took the oath with the rest. He had to leave the jirga suddenly as a messenger came to say that Dadai was dying and wished to see him. Yar Shah, the great raider and Dadai's rival in the tribe, also took the oath. Multan is in hiding, as he distrusts the jirga, and Kaman, who has been slightly wounded, has gone to visit the Afghan commandant at Kahi. Messengers have been sent by the Zakka Khel elders to all men of note who were not present to-day summoning them to the jirga at Halwai to-morrow. I consider that the commencement of these negotiations is promising. I have received a message from the celebrated Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, asking me not to believe stories against him and stating that he has no intention of exciting the tribes

No. 71.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Peshawar City station was attacked 9 p.m., 25th February, by gang said to number 40 Rs. 50 taken, station-master and chaukidar wounded Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports:—

“Everything points to raid on city station being work of Zakka Khel gang. Chaukidar says they were Afridis armed with rifles. A fired Lee-Enfield cartridge was found on the spot, and the gang retired by precisely the same route as that taken by recent city raiders. On receipt of information this very line held by troops, but raiders had passed, as information was not given by station officials until raiders had left; and then only by foot messenger to city police station instead of by telegraph to cantonment station. We had no information of movement of gang from Bazar, but it seems not unlikely that advantage has been taken of lull in operations during negotiations.”

Have called for further report with special reference to apparent absence of police at railway station and arrangements made, or about to be made, for the protection of life and property in Peshawar.

No. 72.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 26th February. The Afridi jirga is expected to return to this camp to-morrow. Their return has been delayed by the hostile action of the lashkar of men from Afghan territory, who are reported now to number about 2,000, under the leadership of the well-known Mulla, the Sufi Sahib of Battikot.

No. 73.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 26th February. The Afridi jirga spent the night with the Zakka Khel at Halwai, and it is reported that they came to terms with them. At 10 o'clock this morning they started to come here, but they perceived a lashkar of all the Afghans in Bazar coming from the Thabai Pass. The lashkar, which is said to be about 2,000 strong, consists of about 100 Mohmands, 900 Sangu Khel Shinwaris, and 1,000 miscellaneous Ningraharis, all Afghan subjects. The jirga accused the Zakkas of treachery in bringing the lashkar, but they swore that they knew nothing of it, and offered to go and turn it back. The other Afridis sent four elders from each tribe to see that there was no treachery, and the Zakka Khel begged the Afghan lashkar not to come further, saying that they had come too late to be of use, and would only now spoil a settlement, which all the Afridis wished to make. The lashkar agreed after some demur to wait at the western end of the Bazar valley until the result of the negotiations of the jirga are known. All this delayed the jirga, and instead of getting to China by mid-day, as they had arranged, they only got there in the late afternoon, too late to come into camp to-day. I expect them here to-morrow.

No. 74.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 28th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 27th February. The Afridi jirga, numbering about 1,100 men, including about 300 Zakka Khel, including all the leading elders, came in to-day. Colonel Roos-Keppel proceeded by himself half-way to China to meet them and brought them in. They deposited their rifles for safe custody without demur. A formal jirga will be held to-morrow. The Sangu Khel lashkar is at Thabai, awaiting the result of the jirga.

No. 75.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 28th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 27th February. All quiet except for continued sniping into camp at night. Afridi jirga with many Zakka Khel came into camp to-day. Sangu Khel and other tribesmen from across Afghan border stood collected near Halwai and Thabai, awaiting result of jirga.

No. 76.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 29th February, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Chora, 29th February. Bazar Valley to-day evacuated by troops. Whole force is now here except 2nd Brigade, which is at Ali Masjid. Owing to snow and hailstorm preventing communication, the following message, which was written yesterday from Camp East of China, could not be sent:—

28th February. Jirga of all the Afridis, including Zakka Khel, spent the night discussing the details of settlement. I received them this afternoon, and a petition to the following effect, to which were appended the seals and signatures of 322 maliks and elders representing every tribe of the Afridis, was laid before me:—"We, the elders and maliks of the whole Afridi tribe assembled in jirga, make humble representation to the British Government that, as we are anxious to end the quarrel between the Zakka Khel Afridis and the British Government, which the former's misconduct has caused, we have agreed and do promise that we Afridis will hold ourselves responsible, jointly and severally, in the following manner for the future good behaviour of every section of the Zakka Khel tribe:—Khyber Pakhail Zakka Khel will undertake responsibility for Bara Pakhail Zakka Khel; Kamarai Khel for Shan Khel of Bara and Tirah; Kamarai Khel for Khusrogis Zakka Khel, except Jawal Khel, Kuki Khel and Nikki Khel Pakhail of Khyber for Mohib Khel half of Anai Zakka Khel; Sipah Khel for Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel; Malikdin, for Paindai, the Jawal Khel Khusrogis and the Sahib Khel half of Anai Zakka Khel. We promise also that we will help one another in punishing these bad characters, when called upon to do so, and the British Government may punish us for the misconduct of the Zakka Khel sections for whom we stand security, by fine, by exclusion from British territory, or in any other way. With regard to the past we pray that the British Government will not complete the ruin of the tribe for the misdeeds of a badly-behaved minority, but will, in its might, take into consideration the losses which the Zakka Khel have sustained by war and by exclusion from British territory. We beg that we, with the help of the Zakka Khel elders, may undertake the punishment of the actual thieves, who have

led the raids into British territory, wherever they may be, and as an earnest that we will punish them in a manner satisfactory to the British Government, we deposit here, as security, 53 rifles, which are worth over Rs 20,000, according to the prices current in our country. These rifles shall not be returned to us until the Political Agent, Khyber, is satisfied that sufficient punishment has been inflicted upon the thieves. We, the Zakka Khel, concur in this petition, and promise in every way to assist the Afridi jirga." The petition ends with an expression of hope that the British Government will show mercy and favour. On behalf of Government, I formally accepted the terms submitted in petition, which, in my opinion, more than meet Government's wishes, and in public jirga, at which all the senior officers of the field force were present, I signed and concluded settlement. Government will, I trust, approve the settlement. Of the tact and ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel in effecting this settlement I cannot speak too highly. I would also bring to notice the invaluable services of his assistant, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum. To-morrow all the troops will evacuate the Bazar Valley

No. 77.

*From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State,
dated 1st March, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp at Chora, 29th February. All the Afridi tribes were fully represented at yesterday's jirga. All the maliks, and a large majority of elders of each tribe were present. The following well-known raiders, besides nearly all elders, were included in jirga of Zakka Khel, who were most strongly represented.—Yar Shah; Miras Khan; Mehr Din, uncle of Multan, Amir Shah; Dadai, and Saidani, Anai; Godai, cousin of Usman, Zafar, Chaman, and Shinkai, Khusrogis. Usman and Multan, fearing that they would be surrendered by jirga, remained at Thabai with Afghan lashkar. Messengers to announce the conclusion of peace were sent by Zakka Khel elders, after settlement had been arrived at, to all sections of the tribe, latter being informed that elders themselves would fire upon them if they attacked the camp or the troops on leaving. Afridi jirga hope that within a month their bad characters will be punished, and securities for their behaviour taken. At local prices, rifles which Afridis have deposited are worth value put upon them; they are all of English manufacture. Most of the sniping into Chora camp is said to be due to Mirza Ali, who is reported to be at Lawata, about four miles south of Chora, with a band of nine Sturi Khel Orakzais

No. 78.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd April, 1908. Received 18th April, 1908.

In our Foreign despatch dated the 9th January, 1908, we stated that the behaviour of the Zakka Khel Afridis had been such as to compel us to take severe measures against the tribe

2. Shortly after the issue of the despatch the Zakka Khel Afridis committed a fresh series of outrages of a peculiarly daring and defiant character, ending with a raid on Peshawar City on the 28th January. On the 31st January, 1908, we asked your permission by telegram to send a punitive expedition into the Bazar Valley. On the 2nd February you agreed to our proposals, but on certain conditions.

3. Of the events in the Bazar Valley you have been fully informed. We now

1. Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 16th March, 1908, with enclosures.

2. Letter to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 24th March, 1908.

have the honour to enclose, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the reports on the political aspect of the operations, together with our orders on them.

4. The punishment inflicted on the Zakka Khel Afridis has been sharp and

severe, and we have every reason to hope that a settlement has been satisfactorily concluded.

5. We have already brought to your notice* the eminently successful manner in which Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., executed the task entrusted to him. We now desire to invite your attention to the remarks recorded by Sir James Willcocks as to the valuable services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force and Political Agent, Khyber. We desire to express our entire concurrence with these remarks.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) MINTO.
 " E. N. BAKER.
 " H. ADAMSON.
 " J. O. MILLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 16th March, 1908.

I have the honour to forward in original a letter dated 4th March, 1908, and its enclosure, from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., which contains the political report on the Bazar Valley expedition by Lieutenant-Colonel G. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force.

2 I cordially endorse all that the General, Sir James Willcocks, says and I consider that Government is to be congratulated on the settlement with the Zakka Khel, effected, as it was, in the face of strong fanatical encouragement from Afghan tribes which threatened to bring about awkward and troublesome complications.

3 In February I was authorised to exceed my grant for presents to Chiefs on the eve of the expedition in order to reward the jirgas of the other Afridi clans. I thought it better, however, to defer such rewards until these jirgas should have demonstrated their sincerity of purpose. Now that they have been working hard in the interests of Government in Bazar, in Peshawar, and now in Tirah and Bara for over a month, doubtless much to their private inconvenience, I propose to reward them suitably and, on the authority of your telegram, I have asked the Accountant-General to place funds at my credit. I trust this action is approved.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Bazar Valley Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 4th March, 1908.

(Extract)

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Government, the Political report of the expedition into the Bazar Valley, compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force under my command. The report so fully explains everything connected with the situation that I do not propose enlarging on it. As regards his remarks on the military operations, I leave them as they stand, for they explain the friendly views of a comrade and Political Officer combined, as they appear to him immediately after the events they describe. If our troops have gained an extra respect from an admittedly gallant foe, I hope it may be of benefit hereafter to both parties. I can endorse every word regarding the Khyber Rifles. I have already reported to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the good conduct and discipline of the corps throughout the operations. It has indeed been an object lesson and proves what good leading and example can do in a battalion enlisted from amongst the very people they are sent to fight against. The services rendered by Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum, Assistant to the Chief Political Officer, are deserving of the highest praise. He accompanied me in my first advance from Al-i-Masjid to China, whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel was commanding the Landi Kotal column and his advice at Chora was most useful. As for his services in relation to the Zakka Khel settlement, I entirely agree with the Chief Political Officer in his commendation. I sincerely trust the Sahibzada will receive some substantial acknowledgment of his good work from Government. He is a very hard-working, loyal, and zealous servant of the State. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel's services are well known to Government, but it is a great pleasure to me to be able to state here how impossible it would have been to make any settlement

* See No. 79.

of value with the tribes, regarding the Zakka Khel, without his tact, knowledge, and coolness. When the Afridi jirgas reached China from Halwai on 27th February, they sent word to Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, who went out alone half way to China to conduct them in. Considering it was unsafe for any man to go beyond the picquet line, I consider his conduct deserving of high praise, for, to say the least of it, it was a very risky proceeding. It was further his determined manner which finally persuaded the jirgas that Government meant to have a good sound settlement or none at all, and I cannot speak too highly of his work, and unhesitatingly place on record that the chief credit for the political success of the expedition is due to him

Annexure 2

Political Report of the Bazar Valley Expedition, dated 3rd March, 1903.

(Extract)

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this report, to recount in detail the events which led to the expedition. Suffice it to say that bands of Zakka Khel had for the past three or four years so harried the borders of the Kohat and Peshawar districts that all security of life and property was lost. The other Afridis had behaved well in so far that they had restrained members of their own clans from joining in these raids, but they had made only half-hearted efforts to check the Zakka Khel from raiding and appeared to consider the matter no concern of theirs. It became at last absolutely necessary to punish the Zakkas, but the Government of India were naturally anxious that the punishment should be confined to them, and that, as far as possible, measures should be taken to isolate them and to avoid a general rising, which is always possible when troops move into any tribal territory. With this object the jirgas of all the Afridi tribes, excepting the Zakka Khel of Bazar, were summoned to Peshawar, and it was explained to them that, as Government had no quarrel with them and had no desire to extend its territories at their expense, it behoved them in their own interests to refrain from joining the Zakka Khel, who were about to be punished, to do their best to bring the latter to reason and to obtain from them such guarantees as would ensure their future good behaviour. Simultaneously with the dismissal of the jirgas the Bazar Field Force left Peshawar. The Zakka Khel expected that an expedition would be sent against them, but they counted on some delay and on slow movement on our part. In consequence they deferred the removal to a safe place of their families, flocks, and portable property, until they got news of the actual start of the force which, once started, moved with such rapidity as to reach Walai, a point which commands the entire valley of Bazar, on the third day after the jirga at Peshawar, while the majority of the Zakka Khel were still arranging for accommodation for their families in Afghanistan. The duration of the expedition was rigidly limited by the orders of Government and the problem how, in a very short time, so to punish the Zakka Khel as to induce them to make any submission or to give any guarantees for the future, appeared almost insoluble. Fortunately, we had to deal with a very gallant enemy, who assisted the solution by fighting in so determined a manner on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st February as to suffer very heavy loss. In spite however of the resistance of the Zakka Khel, their "castellos," or small forts, were steadily demolished and large supplies of wood and fodder were obtained from them. The enemy's casualties in the fighting between the 15th and 21st February exceeded those of all the Afridis in the Tirah Campaign of 1897-98. These casualties, their material losses, the hardships suffered by their families, who were enjoying the grudging hospitality of their Afghan neighbours, and their total inability to inflict serious loss upon our force, had their effect upon the Zakka Khel who, though they were too proud to sue for peace, became disposed to welcome the intervention of the other Afridis, which they would have scouted earlier. While the fighting had been going on in Bazar, the Chiefs and elders of the other Afridi clans had been exerting themselves to the utmost to restrain the turbulent element in Tirah from joining the Zakka Khel, and they were so successful that of the whole tribe probably not more than fifty volunteers from the Afridis took part against us. When they were satisfied that they could control their own tribesmen, the Chiefs and elders entered into negotiations with the Zakka Khel and their preliminary overtures were received at least with courtesy. Unfortunately, there exist both in India and in Afghanistan mischief-makers who are never so happy as when setting others by the ears, and the Zakka Khel were in constant receipt of messages from Peshawar encouraging them to hold out as Government had ordered the withdrawal of the force, and from Afghanistan promising them material assistance. These messages, taken with the fact that numbers of Afghan volunteers and large supplies of ammunition and flour were arriving daily at the Thabai Pass from Afghanistan, undoubtedly stiffened the backs of the Zakka Khel, and up to the 25th February the issue of negotiations appeared very doubtful. On that date the Afridi representatives who had assembled in Sir James Willcocks' camp left for Halwai. There they held a consultation with the Zakka Khel which lasted that day and night. Their discussions were continually interrupted by the howls of hundreds of Afghan fanatics, mullas and others, who clustered on the hills around, abusing the jirga and calling upon the Zakka Khel not to listen to "the *feragh's* dogs." In spite of this a working arrangement was come to by which the Zakka Khel elders placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Afridi representatives, details being left for settlement later, and it was decided that the combined jirgas should proceed to China next day, invite the Political Officer to meet them there, and settle the matter. On the morning of the 26th, when the jirgas were about to start, it was seen that a large force was advancing east from the Thabai Pass. It consisted of Afghans (mostly Shinwaris) with standards, who were headed by bands of mullas including some of the most influential in the Ningrahar Province. The Afridi Chiefs and elders believed that they had been deceived and accused the Zakka Khel of treachery, but the latter swore that they had no

knowledge of this reinforcement and that they would do their best to induce it to return to Afghanistan. The Zakka Khel elders went off to meet the Afghan force and as the other Afridis did not place much confidence in them, four elders from each of the other clans accompanied them to guard against any double dealing. The Zakka Khel informed the Afghans that they would have been delighted to see them ten days earlier, but that now that they had decided to make peace their presence was inconvenient. The Afghans were very loth to return, but the Afridis swore that if they did not do so they themselves would attack them in flank. At last it was arranged that the Afghans should return to their own border and there await the result of the negotiations. If these proved unsuccessful their assistance would be welcomed. All this took time, and the jirga arrived at Chora in the evening instead of the morning of the 26th February. They spent the night there, and next day the whole assembly, numbering about eleven hundred men and including about three hundred Zakka Khel, marched into camp. Most of them were armed, and it was necessary for the safety of the camp to disarm them. This was a very delicate task, but it was eventually accomplished. The jirga discussed with the Political Officer and the Assistant Political Officer the whole question of a settlement throughout that afternoon and evening and the following morning (28th February), and at last a draft agreement was arrived at which ran as follows:—

"We, the Maliks and elders of the Afridi tribe in jirga assembled, humbly represent to the British Government that, being anxious to end the quarrel between the Zakka Khel Afridis and the British Government, which has been caused by the misconduct of the former, we have agreed and do promise:—

"That we, the Afridis, will hold ourselves responsible jointly and severally for the future good behaviour of every section of the Zakka Khel tribe; thus—

"The Malikdin Khel Afridis will be responsible for the Sahib Khel half of the Anai, Pazndai, and Jamal Khel Khusrogi Zakka Khel.

"The Kambar Khel Afridis will be responsible for the Shan Khel Zakka Khel of Bara and Tirah.

"The Kuki Khel and Nakkı Khel Pakhai Afridis will be responsible for the Mohib Khel half of the Anai Zakka Khel.

"The Sipah Afridis will be responsible for the Zia-du-din Zakka Khel.

"The Kamarai Afridis will be responsible for the Khusrogi Zakka Khel, excepting the Jamal Khel.

"The Khyber Pakhai Zakka Khel will be responsible for the Bara Pakhai Zakka Khel.

"Also we promise that when we are called upon we will assist each other in punishing these bad characters, and Government may punish us by fine, by exclusion from British territory, or in any other way for the misdeeds of the Zakka Khel sections for whom we stand surety.

"As regards the past we beg that Government in its strength will take into consideration the losses suffered by the Zakka Khel, by exclusion from British territory and by war, and will not complete the ruin of a tribe for the sins of the badly-behaved minority.

"As regards the actual thieves who have been leaders in the raids into British territory we also beg that we, with the assistance of the Zakka Khel elders, may undertake their punishment wherever they may be, and we will punish them to the satisfaction of Government, and in earnest of this we here deposit fifty-three rifles, which are worth, according to the prices current in our country, more than twenty thousand rupees, as security, and these rifles will only be returned to us when the Political Agent, Khyber, is satisfied that the thieves have been sufficiently punished, and we, the Zakka Khel, agree to this petition and promise to assist the jirga in every way.

"Further we hope for the mercy and favour of Government."

This draft was approved by Sir James Willcocks, and arrangements were made for him to receive the jirga at 3.30 p.m. on the 28th February. The rifles mentioned in the petition, which were to be deposited by the jirga, had to be obtained from them and this was a tedious business, as each person was most anxious that his neighbour's, not his own, rifle should be given up. Also efforts were made to induce us to accept arms of local manufacture which have a very small market value. These difficulties were at last got over, and Sir James Willcocks received the representatives of the whole tribe, including the Zakka Khel. The petition of the jirga was read to them in Persian and explained in Pashtu, and at the termination of the reading each Chief rose and formally asked the elders of his clan whether they authorised him to guarantee these terms on their behalf and on behalf of their constituents. The reply being unanimous, Sir James Willcocks accepted and signed the settlement on behalf of Government. When the settlement had been signed, the elders sent messengers to every part of Bazar to inform the Zakka Khel that peace had been made and that they could now bring back their families to their houses. They also warned them that if they discredited the settlement by firing at the troops the Afridi Jirga would attack them. As the weather was very bad some of the Zakka Khel members of the jirga, whose homes were near, asked to be allowed to depart and were permitted to do so. They sent some of their men to Thabai to dismiss the Afghan gathering. Next morning, the 29th February, the whole force marched to Chora. All the jirga accompanied the troops except the Zakka Khel elders, who waited until the rearguard had left camp and then took leave of us in the most friendly manner. Not a single shot was fired at the troops during the march of 29th February to Chora, during the night there, or during the march of the following day to Ali Masjid, a record in the history of frontier expeditions. The campaign has been a most valuable and interesting test of the extent of our control over our border tribes. That the Chiefs and elders of the other Afridi clans should have succeeded in restraining their clansmen from joining the Zakka Khel, with whom they are so intimately connected, is little short of marvellous, and that they should have bound the

Zakka Khel in an agreement by which they themselves accept a very onerous responsibility is hardly less so. The Afridi Chiefs and elders have worked hard and well, they have shown determination and unselfishness and have deserved well of Government. Among so many it is difficult to choose, but I cannot refrain from mentioning the names of Malik Zaman Khan, Chief of the Kuku Khel, Malik Yar Muhammad Khan (Malikdin Khel), Malik Shah-mard Khan (Sipah), and Malik Amaldin (Kambar Khel). Another point of great political interest was the behaviour of the Khyber Rifles. This corps, which is mainly composed of Afridis, including some 350 Zakka Khel, had to take part in an expedition against a people to whom the men were bound not only by race and religion but by the closest ties of blood. Indeed in many cases during the expedition brother was fighting against brother and son against father. The experiment was viewed with mistrust by many and with misgiving by all, but it has been more than justified, as throughout the expedition the Khyber Rifles gained universal praise for their keenness and willingness, not a man deserted, and not a rifle was lost. I mention this particularly in this report, as I consider it of great political importance. The Khyber Rifles were in 1899 merely an armed rabble without cohesion or discipline, and the tribesmen themselves have fully shared the doubts of the authorities as to whether the men could really be employed against their own relatives and countrymen. The political effect of the satisfactory behaviour of the Corps cannot but be considerable, not only among the Afridis but throughout the border tribes. I have made every effort to obtain an accurate estimate of the losses of the enemy, but it is most difficult to get anything like complete figures. I shall know later, but at present I can only say that I know the names of 38 men buried in Bazar between the 15th and 21st February. A good many corpses were taken to Afghanistan for burial and some to Tirah. Also we have to add the enemy's losses on the 21st February, when they are believed to have been heavy, and on the 23rd February, when they are believed to have been slight. Altogether I think that it is safe to say that the enemy have lost not less than 70 killed. As regards the wounded, Afridis are very disinclined to give details of their losses. This is partly owing to pride and partly owing to fear of the evil eye, to which wounded men are particularly susceptible. We shall probably never know accurate details of the enemy's wounded and can only estimate their losses by the usual proportion of wounded to killed which would bring their total casualties to a very high figure. But for these losses it would have been impossible to bring the tribe to reason without a protracted occupation of the country, and it is only the remarkable military success of the expedition which made a settlement feasible. The Afridis, who are no mean judges of hill fighting, express themselves amazed at the handling and conduct of the troops as unlike anything they have seen or heard of, and the fact that they have obtained no loot in mules, rifles, stores, or ammunition, on which they confidently counted to compensate them for their own losses, has given them a strong distaste for expeditions conducted on these novel lines. As regards the punishment inflicted upon the enemy by material loss, every fort and watch tower in the valley has been razed to the ground, large supplies of wood and fodder have been obtained, and the losses due to exposure among the sheep, goats, and cattle (which are always, in Bazar, kept in caves in the winter) have been very great. The Zakka Khel have entirely exhausted their supplies of ammunition and cash and every individual in the tribe has felt the sharp punishment inflicted and will continue to do so for some time. I think that there is no doubt that the Zakka Khel really repent their misconduct, and that they will do their best to prevent further trouble. Thanks to a combination of military skill, political good fortune, and the loyal efforts of the Afridi Chiefs, a settlement of the Zakka Khel question has been arrived at which is more satisfactory than I should have dared to hope for even had our movements been unhampered and the duration of our stay unlimited, and I believe that the settlement will prove a durable one, and that it will improve our relations not only with the Zakka Khel but with all the Afridis. Should Government be satisfied with the political results attained, and should my hopes for the future be justified by the event, I would like to state that such political credit as may have been gained is due mainly to the efforts of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, whose services have been invaluable. The Sahibzada served through the Tirah Expedition and has been since 1898 Assistant Political Officer, Khyber. His knowledge of the Afridis and the real affection and respect which they have for him have given him a power over them which has ever been used for their good. The recent negotiations were complicated and difficult, and we had many a *mauvais quart d'heure* when it looked as if all would be broken off. We were hampered by the necessity for haste, and intriguers from both the British and Afghan borders worked against us, but throughout the negotiations Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum never despaired; nothing could ruffle his imperturbable patience or bend his determination, and that we have made a real settlement is due principally to his influence and skill. I would take this opportunity of bringing his services strongly to notice. In conclusion, I venture to express to Sir James Willcocks my very real gratitude for his kindness, advice, and support, without which his political staff could have done little to serve him.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 24th March, 1908.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 16th March, 1908, with which you forward the political report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Koppel, C.I.E., on the Bazar Valley expedition, with the remarks thereon of Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.

2. The object of the expedition was to punish the Zakka Khel tribe for a series of crimes committed by members of it in British territory, and to obtain satisfactory assurances of their good conduct for the future. This object has been completely fulfilled, thanks to the bravery and high efficiency of the troops and the conspicuous ability with which the military operations and the political negotiations were conducted. The Zakka Khels have submitted and the other Afridi clans have assumed joint responsibility with them for their good conduct, and undertaken to bring individual offenders to just punishment for their offences. Never before in the history of the frontier has punishment so sharp been inflicted so swiftly, with results so satisfactory, and with so little loss to His Majesty's gallant troops.

3 Not the least interesting and re-assuring feature of the recent operations has been the attitude of the Chiefs and elders of the Afridi clans. This attitude was no doubt influenced by the confidence which you inspired at the outset of the operations, when you explained to them in assembly the object of the expedition and the intentions of the Government. The Governor-General in Council desires to acknowledge the services which you rendered at this important juncture. The assistance rendered by Malik Zaman Khan will be specially recognized. To Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, to Malik Shahmard Khan, to Malik Amaldin and to others you will now bestow suitable rewards.

4 The services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks as the General Officer Commanding the expedition have been separately acknowledged. The services which he rendered as officer in supreme political control remain to be acknowledged. The Governor-General in Council desires to place on record his high appreciation of those services.

5. General Willcocks pays a fine tribute to the tact, knowledge, coolness, determination and fearlessness which Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel displayed, and he adds that the chief credit for the political success of the expedition is due to him. In selecting Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel as Chief Political Officer, the Governor-General in Council was confident that all that could be done to effect a speedy and satisfactory political settlement would be done, and he desires to recognise the services rendered by this distinguished officer.

6. The Governor-General in Council also desires to associate himself in the high praise bestowed by General Willcocks and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel on Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum for his invaluable assistance in dealing with the tribes.

7 It only remains to join in the tribute which all concerned have paid and justly paid to the Khyber Rifles, who have once more shown to their own people their loyalty to the British Government, which is not less proud of them than they are of their service. It cannot fail to be gratifying to them to read of the estimation in which they are held by the General under whom they have served, and by the Commanding Officer whom they know so well.

8 The Governor-General in Council trusts that the settlement recently concluded will have important results in securing the peace of this portion of the frontier.

No. 79.

Letter from the Government of India, Army Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 9th April, 1908. Received 25th April, 1908.

(Extract)

Annexed is a copy of Army Department Notification dated 20th March, 1908, publishing a despatch from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force from the 13th February, 1908, to the 2nd March, 1908

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Army Department Notification, dated 20th March, 1908

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the Staff in India, dated the 16th March, 1908, forwarding a despatch from Major-General

Sir James Willcocks, K C M G , C B , D S O , describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force from the 13th February 1908, to the 2nd March, 1908.

The Governor-General in Council concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in his opinion that the able manner in which the operations were conducted reflects great credit on Major-General Sir James Willcocks and the Brigade commanders and Staff working under his orders

His Excellency in Council also shares with the Commander-in-Chief his appreciation of the soldierly conduct displayed by all ranks throughout the operations

Enclosure 2 in No. 79

Letter from the Chief of the Staff, Army Head-Quarters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, dated 16th March, 1908

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatch from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K C M G , C B , D S O , describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force

2 The speed with which the Force was mobilised, and the rapidity of its movement into the Bazar Valley and subsequent operations, contributed very largely to the quick and successful termination of the expedition

3 To secure speed in movement, the troops operated on a much lighter scale of equipment and transport than has been adopted on previous occasions on the frontier; but although the climatic conditions were severe, the health of the Force and the admirable spirit displayed by all ranks left nothing to be desired

4. The losses inflicted on the Zakka Khel were unusually heavy, and were due to the excellent handling of the troops and to their training and efficiency in the field.

5 Lord Kitchener is confident that the Government of India will agree with him in considering that the work done reflects the greatest credit on all concerned

His Excellency desires especially to commend to the notice of Government the excellent services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks, who so ably conducted the operations and brought them so rapidly to a successful conclusion

He trusts also that those who have been brought to notice in this despatch may be considered deserving of commendation

Annexure 1

Letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Bazar Valley Field Force, to the Chief of the Staff, Army Head-Quarters, Calcutta, dated 5th March, 1908.

(Extract)*

I have the honour to submit the following report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the operations of the Field Force under my command in the Bazar Valley.

1 On the 3rd February I received telegraphic orders from His Excellency which informed me that a punitive expedition against the Zakka Khel Afridis had been approved by the Secretary of State for India. It was enjoined on me to keep the matter secret and to arrange that within a few days the troops which were to form the expeditionary force should be ready to move at once on the orders for an advance being issued. I also received written instructions which gave a general idea of what was to be done; with detailed orders for the composition of the Force and a scheme of operations as a guide up to the time the troops entered the country of the Zakka Khel.

The following were the strengths:—

First Brigade.

1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment
53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force), 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force), 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkhas (Frontier Force).

* This despatch was published in full in the "London Gazette" of the 22nd May, 1908. It is reprinted here with the omission of the lists of names of those whose services were specially commended, and of the detailed list of casualties.

Second Brigade.

1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.
23th Punjabis.
45th Sikhs
54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).

Third Brigade (in reserve).

1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).
1st Battalion, 6th Gurkha Rifles
55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).

Divisional Troops.

2 Squadrons, 19th Lancers.
2 Squadrons, 37th Lancers.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
25th Punjabis
No 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
4 guns, 22nd (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners
No 9 Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.

Attached—800 Khyber Rifles.

2 Later on I received instructions to be ready to move forward from Peshawar as soon as the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, had interviewed the Afridi Jirgas, which had meantime been ordered to assemble there

3 During the few days remaining all the railway, transport, supply, medical and other arrangements were completed, mostly by verbal orders. In accordance with instructions from Army Headquarters and in communication with the General Officer Commanding, Rawal Pindi Division, the troops and followers from that division which were to form part of the Field Force were held in readiness. Up to the last moment secrecy was maintained and not until within a few hours of starting were all ranks of the advanced troops equipped with field service clothing, &c.

4 On the 12th February the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, interviewed the Afridi Jirgas. This same afternoon troops began to move forward, and next day the picquets in the Khyber Pass were taken over by detachments of the Field Force, and line of communication posts were established at Jamrud and Ali Masjid. Half a battalion, 5th Gurkhas, marched to Landi Kotal.

5. During the 12th February the 2nd Brigade from Nowshera and other troops from outside the 1st Division area arrived by road or rail at Peshawar, and the Force which was to make the first advance was completed. The troops moving from the above two stations were at once replaced by the Reserve Brigade which arrived by train

6. On 13th February the 1st and 2nd Brigades and Divisional troops left Peshawar and bivouacked at Jamrud. No tents were carried and all officers were on half field service scale of baggage.

7 On 14th February the Force moved to Lala China near Ali Masjid

8 I felt convinced, considering the quiet way in which the Force had been mobilised, and how little was even known of its departure from Peshawar, that by a rapid march into the centre of Bazar we should not only morally surprise the enemy but forestal them in any of the positions they might have selected to defend. Accordingly at dawn on 15th February the following troops, under command of Major-General Barrett, C B, left Lala China:—

With the Divisional Staff I accompanied this column

Strength.

3rd Mountain Battery		45th Sikhs.
Seaforth Highlanders.		54th "
23th Punjabis		Wing 2-5th Gurkhas.
6th Company, Sappers and Miners		

Excepting a very small proportion of water, ambulance and other necessary mules, no transport accompanied this advance and officers and men carried three days' rations on the person. The route taken was by Chora in Malikdin country. The strong fort belonging to Yar Muhammad Khan at this place was occupied by troops from General Anderson's Brigade which moved up from Ali Masjid this same day.

No opposition was met with until after passing Chora when the Zakkas began firing on the advanced guard near Tanda, Tangri and from the high hill Tsapara on to which the 5th Gurkhas were advancing. The column moved on, being fired at regularly from our left flank till we reached Walai, east of China. Only one casualty occurred, a gunner of the 3rd Mountain Battery being wounded.

It was getting late now and a position for the night was selected. The Seaforth Highlanders swarmed up Khar Ghundai, a steep hill 1,000 feet above the bivouac, and established themselves in sangars on the summit. Picquets were also placed round the Walai nala. Heavy firing was kept up throughout the night, but only caused us the loss of one Highlander and one sepoy, 23th Punjabis, killed, both in the picquets. The Highlanders also had an officer and four men struck by rocks hurled from close quarters into the sangars. The Zakkas lost three killed and seven wounded on Seaforth's hill, amongst the latter being the well-known raid leader Dadai, badly hit.

9. The 5th Gurkhas on Tsapara hill were also sniped all night, but had no casualties.

10. Whilst we were marching to Walai, a small column from Landi Kotal, consisting of a wing 5th Gurkhas and 700 Khyber Rifles, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, Chief Political Officer with the Force, moved on the same date, and rapidly crossing the Bazar pass entered the valley without opposition and occupied China itself. The picquets were fired on all night, but no casualty occurred. This column moved without any transport whatever and carried its ammunition and 3 days' rations on the person.

11. Thus within 12 hours of leaving the Khyber the two columns had established themselves in the heart of the Zakkas country. From information since received it is clear that the Zakkas had no idea of our date of leaving Ali Masjid and had made up their minds we should in any case halt at Chora for a day, and in consequence had not time to occupy Khar Gundai, the strongest position in the valley.

12. On the same day as I moved to Walai the major portion of the first Brigade occupied Chora, thus connecting up the line of communications.

13. On 16th February the advanced camp was moved up the Walai stream to a well-protected site where there was a plentiful supply of running water. Here the telephone apparatus of the Peshawar Division was set up and proved most useful, Headquarters being connected with the two Brigades and all important picquets, rendering immediate communication safe and easy.

During this afternoon the Landi Kotal column marched into Walai from China. A large convoy of supplies from Chora also arrived in camp. Whilst this convoy was moving in, the 45th Sikhs who were picqueting the lower spurs of Sara Paal Hill were being annoyed by fire from the crest, which in consequence it was decided to occupy. The leading companies advanced but were brought to a standstill by a heavy fire from what appeared to be a considerable number of Zakkas. The Zakkas endeavoured to push forward, but other companies were sent in support of the Sikhs and by my orders a steady fire of shrapnel was kept up on the enemy who were plainly visible from the guns. Meantime half a battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders arrived from camp and the combined troops soon cleared the hill. The Sikhs had a native officer and a sepoy wounded. The Zakkas lost 5 killed and 10 wounded this day.

14. On 17th February most of the 1st Brigade had reached Walai, and I had sufficient troops to form two columns for daily operations. This became the headquarters from which punitive measures were hereafter carried out in every direction, according to the movements of the Zakkas.

15. Before daybreak on 18th February a column under Major-General Barrett moved out to destroy the towers and enclosures at China. With the Divisional Staff, I accompanied this column.

<i>Strength.</i>		
Seaforth Highlanders.		5th Gurkhas
3rd Mountain Battery		23rd Pioneers.
54th Sikhs		6th Company Sappers

The Seaforths and Gurkhas moving by Surmundo and Khwar and covered by the mountain guns occupied the hills north of China. Lieutenant Macfadyen of the Seaforths was mortally wounded in this advance.

After destroying the main towers and securing a quantity of wood and fodder the column began its return march to camp and the Zakkas at once closed in on the rear-guard and flanks. The troops retired very steadily, the battery and its escort of Seaforths which were in the comparatively open country south of China being specially selected for attack. The 54th Sikhs also on this flank were hotly engaged, some of the tribesmen closing to revolver range. Many Zakkas were here placed *hors-de-combat*.

By 4.20 p.m. the Gurkhas who held the hills above China had moved off them and the Seaforths had also come down from the eastern spurs which they had been occupying.

The column now retired quietly, the Zakkas making brave but fruitless attempts to follow. Their losses this day were heavy and they avoided the open country as far as possible for the future. Our casualties were one British officer wounded (since dead), two British officers, two British rank and file, and four native rank and file wounded.

16. On 19th February a column under Brigadier-General Anderson proceeded to China to complete the destruction of the towers and bring in fodder. No opposition was offered to the advance, but as usual the Zakkas followed up the retirement and were again severely punished. The troops returned to camp by the Jabagai gorge.

17. On 20th February Brigadier-General Anderson again moved out with a column to reconnoitre the Sassobi Pass and the Algad Valley. I accompanied this reconnaissance. The advanced guard was fired on from both sides of the Pass, but a good survey was obtained by Captain Rich, R.E.

Whilst the towers at Surmundo and Khwar were being destroyed, a portion of the column moved up the Algad Valley and from Sarwekai Pass saw a body of Zakkas advancing from the direction of Halwai. A few shells soon scattered them. The retirement to camp was followed with less vigour than on the 18th instant, but the enemy again suffered loss.

18. News had been received for some days that the tribesmen had collected in large numbers at Halwai where they had been joined by many Sangu Khels and other Shinwaris from across the Afghan border. On 21st February I moved with two columns under command of Generals Barrett and Anderson, keeping a squadron of the 37th Lancers with me in case an opportunity for the employment of cavalry presented itself.

<i>Strength</i>		
<i>General Barrett's Column.</i>		
3rd Mountain Battery.		28th Punjabis
500 Seaforths.		4 Companies, 54th Sikhs.
		500 Khyber Rifles.

General Anderson's Column.

22nd Mountain Battery.	400 of 5th Gurkhas
Section No. 9 Company Sappers.	53rd Sikhs.
400 Warwicks	59th Rifles.

The 28th Punjabis of Barrett's Brigade occupied the China heights soon after daylight and held them during the day to cover the retirement; the remainder of this Brigade took the route south of China. The Khyber Rifles and 6th Company Sappers moved by the Bazar naia and destroyed the towers at Kago Kamar. Fire was opened on them by the Zakkas and kept up during most of the day. The Seafortis on our extreme left occupied the Saran hills and kept the enemy to the south and west of Halwai.

Meantime General Anderson's Brigade, moving north of China by Khwar and the Sarwekai Pass, debouched on to the plain north of Halwai. During this movement the Zakkas kept up a dropping fire from the direction of Pastakai. The two columns now advanced simultaneously. The steep hills overlooking Halwai were occupied without a check, the mountain guns making the enemy's sangars quite untenable. Anderson's right was very well protected from any attack from the Thabai or Mangal Bagh passes by the 59th Rifles.

19. The towers and stacks of timber in Halwai were destroyed and the Force commenced its return march to camp. This was, as usual, the signal for numerous parties to come down from the Thabai direction. These opened fire at long ranges, but the Derajat Battery, very well handled, kept them on the move. Both brigades were now moving by the south of China Hills which were held by the 28th Punjabis. By the time the rearmost battalion had arrived abreast of China the Zakkas fire had almost died away, but as the 28th Punjabis began to leave the hills, covered by the fire of six guns, the tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers and closely pressed the battalion. The Punjabis withdrew steadily, but lost one man killed and eight wounded during the operation. Several acts of individual gallantry are reported and I am recommending three men for the Indian Order of Merit.

On our left (facing enemy) the Seafortis and Khyber Rifles were also attacked, the Zakkas advancing to close range, several of them being shot by both corps. It was whilst gallantly directing his rearmost companies at this stage of the fight that Major the Honourable D. Forbes-Sempill, Seafortis Highlanders, was killed.

The 53rd Sikhs who formed the rear centre covered the retirement and were very well handled.

By the time the rear guard had got east of China Hills, the Zakkas drew off and only fired at long ranges. Our casualties were one British officer and one Sepoy killed and ten native rank and file wounded. Not a shot was fired into camp this night.

20. On night of 22nd February the tribesmen tried the effects of sniping from several directions simultaneously, but although they wounded a sergeant in the Warwicks their own casualties are reported to have been a good deal heavier.

21. Next morning General Anderson again visited China with a column and brought away most of the remaining wood and fodder. The Zakkas kept at a very respectful distance, but the mountain guns again did some good work. Whilst demolishing the last tower two sappers and a follower were injured.

During the afternoon the first of the Afridi jirgas arrived in camp and asked for terms and mercy for the Zakka Khel and expressed their eagerness and ability to deal with them in the future. I gave them 48 hours to complete these arrangements and they all left for Halwai. In order that they might meet the Zakka elders I suspended active operations in the Halwai direction for that period.

22. On 24th February Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan, 54th Sikhs, with a small column visited Jabagai and destroyed the towers. The Zakkas offered but a feeble resistance.

23. On 26th February a water escort of 45th Sikhs on Tsapara Hill was attacked in thick scrub jungle and had one Sepoy killed and two wounded.

24. On 27th February the combined Afridi jirgas, about 1,100 men (including 300 Zakka Khels), arrived at China from Halwai with white flags. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, Chief Political Officer, went out alone half-way to China to meet them and conducted them into camp.

Next day I held a public jirga at which they presented a petition, the details of which are known to Government. They deposited 53 rifles of English manufacture as a guarantee of keeping their promise to punish the individual raiders and begged we would now spare the Zakka Khel, undertaking to hold themselves responsible for the conduct of the tribe in future. As in my opinion the terms more than satisfied the demands of Government I accepted them and a formal agreement was drawn up and signed by 322 chiefs and elders, representing all the Afridi tribes, including the Zakka Khel.

25. Before the terms of above agreement were known at Chora on the night of 28th February, the camp at that post was heavily fired into and one Sepoy, 23rd Pioneers, and four Sepoys 45th Sikhs, were wounded.

26. Immediately the terms of settlement with the jirgas had been signed on 28th February, secret orders were issued for the entire force to leave the Bazar Valley at dawn next morning. The Zakka Khels and such others of the jirgas as desired were allowed to proceed to China at once, and this proceeding convinced them that we had no intention of leaving for a few days at least.

27. At daylight on the 29th February Major-General Barrett's Brigade began to leave camp for Ali Masjid *via* Chora, a distance of 15 miles. The transport and baggage of both Brigades had gone by 9 a.m., and by 10 o'clock the rearmost pickets began to withdraw. General Anderson's Brigade covered the withdrawal and his arrangements were very well carried out. I remained with this Brigade at Chora the night and next day marched through to Jamrud, where the entire force was concentrated prior to demobilisation. A battalion and two squadrons were left at Ali Masjid as a temporary guard to surplus stores.

28. From the time we left China till arrival in British India not a shot was fired by the Zakkas. I am glad to be able to add that during the entire operations not a single follower, public or private, was killed or wounded by the enemy, and only one rifle was lost in the Bazar Valley, and that was on a man killed while skirmishing in thick bush.

29. I beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the soldierly conduct of all ranks of the Force. Their good discipline and cheerfulness have been very marked, and it has indeed been an honour to command such a fine division in the field. The fact that Brigades were employed intact under their own generals and staff, as they had been trained in peace time, made the carrying out of all operations a simple matter, and my own share in the work was appreciably lightened by having been allowed to select my staff officers from the permanent divisional establishment.

That the enemy lost heavily whilst own casualties were small is due to the improvement in musketry training and the manner in which the troops work and run up shelter at the shortest possible notice. Sangars and pits quickly covered the bivouacs, and the picquets were secured against a rush at night by wire entanglements, &c. Constant night work now forms a regular part of infantry training, and the results were very plainly visible. As far as hill fighting is concerned our troops had little to learn from the Afridis.

The various departments of the Force were all satisfactory, and especially the transport service, where the discipline and order that prevailed were very noticeable.

The good conduct of the Khyber Rifles, many of whom were actually serving against their own kith and kin, is a remarkable testimony to their efficiency and loyalty. Not a rifle was lost by the corps, nor was there a single desertion.

30. The enemy's losses, as far as can be ascertained at present, have been at least 70 killed, and the wounded may reasonably be put at a much higher figure.

Annexure 2.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

Officers

- 1 killed (Major the Honourable D Forbes-Sempill, 1st Seaforth Highlanders)
- 4 wounded (2nd Lieutenant I C MacFadyen, 1st Seaforth Highlanders, died subsequently).

Non-commissioned Officers and Men

British Troops

- 1 killed (Private R. Fordyce, 1st Seaforth Highlanders)
- 6 wounded

Native Troops

- 1 killed.
 - 27 wounded (two died subsequently)
-

No. 80.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 22nd May, 1908.

I have considered the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 2nd April, 1908, forwarding the reports you have received, through the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the political aspect of the recent expedition against the Zakka Khel Afridis, together with the orders you have issued thereon.

2. I desire to associate myself with the appreciation expressed in these orders of the services rendered by Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K C M G, C.B., D.S.O., as officer in supreme political control of the expedition, by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C I E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force, and by Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, and of the gallant and loyal conduct of the Khyber Rifles.

3. Your letter brings specially to my notice the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, to whose tact, energy, and ability the conclusion of so prompt and satisfactory a settlement with the tribesmen was largely due. I request that Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel may be informed that His Majesty's Government highly appreciate the manner in which he carried out his difficult task.

4. Your letter on the subject of the conduct of the military operations by Major-General Sir James Willcocks, and the troops under his command, is being dealt with in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

No. 81.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 29th May, 1908.

I have considered in Council the letter of your Government in the Army Department, dated 9th April last, and its enclosures, regarding the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force against the Zakka Khel.

2. His Majesty's Government desire to place on record their high appreciation of the Military dispositions made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to give effect to their policy; and to express their entire concurrence in the terms in which, in your Army Department Notification of 20th March, Your Excellency has spoken of the services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks and of the officers and troops under his command.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

No. 82.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Viscount Morley of Blackburn, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 4th June, 1908. Received 22nd June, 1908.

In continuation of our despatch dated the 2nd April, 1908, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter dated the 5th May, 1908, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, enclosing the final political report regarding the carrying out of the settlement made with the Afridis on the conclusion of the Zakka Khel punitive expedition in February last.

2. The prompt and successful manner in which the settlement has been carried into effect reflects much credit on Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel. A copy of our letter acknowledging the report is enclosed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) MINTO.
" KITCHENER.
" H. ERLE RICHARDS.
" E. N. BAKER.
" C. H. SCOTT.
" H. ADAMSON
" J. O. MILLER
" W. L. HARVEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 5th May, 1908.

I have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 30th April, 1908, with its enclosures, from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, KCMG, CB, DSO, forwarding a further report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., late Chief Political Officer, Bazar Valley Field Force, regarding the completion of the settlement effected with the Afridis at Walai on the 28th February, 1908.

2. I concur with Sir James Willcocks that the Afridi Jirgas have, in the thorough manner in which they have insisted on the restoration of the stolen property, indicated a genuine desire to effect a lasting settlement with Government. Though subjected to a severe strain since the Bazar Valley Expedition owing to pressure both from Afghanistan and the Mohmands, they have hitherto stood firm, and if they continue to do so through the present disturbances, Government will have a good guarantee of the sincerity of their desire for peace. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel is to be congratulated on bringing the negotiations to so successful a conclusion.

Annexure 1.

From Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., G.B., D.S.O., to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 30th April, 1908.

(Extract)

I have the honour to forward herewith the final Political Report of the Bazar Valley Expedition received from Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., late Chief Political Officer with the Field Force. In my opinion the efforts of the Afridi Jirgas have (as Colonel Roos-Keppel remarks) been remarkably successful, and I entirely agree with him that the enhanced rewards to them are well deserved. The return to them of the surrendered rifles is the natural consequence of their loyal conduct in bringing the raiders and thieves to tribal justice, and, taken as a whole, the settlement appears to have been very satisfactory, as I anticipated it would be.

Annexure 2.

Report, dated 22nd April, 1908, on the completion of the Zakka Khel settlement made at Wala on the 28th February, 1908

(Extract)

The Afridi Jirga had undertaken at Wala to be responsible for the future good behaviour of the Zakka Khel and to themselves punish actual offenders in recent raids into British territory. This latter clause was suggested by the Afridis themselves as they argued that were individual thieves and raiders allowed to retain and "digest" the booty which they had accumulated, the temptation to others to follow their example and to defy the loose organisation of the tribe would be irresistible. No fine had been imposed by Government and the nature of the punishment to be inflicted was left to the Afridis themselves. After the troops had returned from the Expedition the whole Jirga of the Afridis came to Peshawar to discuss with the Political Agent the nature of the punishment to be inflicted upon the raiders. An unfortunate incident occurred during the visit of the Jirga which nearly broke up the assembly. Some youngsters, Peshawaris, Afridis and others, created a disturbance in the streets in the money-changers' quarter and some exposed money was stolen from the stalls. This was magnified into an "Afridi raid" and a cry was raised that all Afridis were being arrested. Fortunately it proved possible to reassure the elders and to satisfy them that no harm to them was intended. They eventually decided to organise a Jirga of about 600 men, including the Malik and most influential elders of each clan of the Afridis, and to visit the Zakka Khel settlements in turn. On the 8th March the combined Jirga left for the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel country at Shinkamar, and spent about 5 days there; they then moved slowly up the Bara visiting the Shan Khel and Pakhal settlements, thence to Maidan where they spent 20 days, thence to the Bazar Valley, and thence to Jamrud where they arrived on the 3rd April, 1908. At each place they were fed throughout their stay by the Zakka Khel in accordance with tribal custom and this in itself was a heavy punishment to the latter who sent in many messages to the Political Agent begging to be relieved of the burden of these unwelcome guests and to be allowed to settle matters direct. In each place they succeeded in getting hold of the raiders and by beating them and threatening to burn their villages induced them to hand over to the Jirga rifles as an earnest of their promise to disgorge their booty. The Jirga worked with an energy and unity of purpose never before displayed and were extraordinarily successful. They brought to Jamrud every notorious raider in the tribe (with the sole exception of Multan who had taken refuge at Jalalabad) and the amount of loot which they had compelled them to disgorge. This included —

	Rs.	A	P
(1) 4 Martini-Henry rifles taken from the Kohat Border Police at Lachi on the 13th November, 1907, valued at Rs 500 each	2,000	0	0
(2) 2 smooth-bore Martins taken from the Pabbi Police on 16th December, 1907, valued at Rs 100 each	200	0	0
(3) 97 pieces of gold jewellery set with precious stones (mostly rubies and pearls), weight 171 $\frac{1}{4}$, and 221 pieces of plain gold jewellery, weight 345 $\frac{1}{16}$ tolas. The articles cannot be identified from the Police lists, and there is no means of valuing the jewels (a proportion of which may be false). The total weight of the gold settings is 516 $\frac{3}{4}$ tolas, which at the low rate of Rs 25 per tola comes to	12,924	3	6
(4) Loose stones, rubies, pearls, and other miscellaneous stones, weight 34 $\frac{1}{4}$ tolas, value not ascertainable			
(5) 165 pieces of silver jewellery, weight 826 tolas, bullion value	826	0	0
(6) Cash fines recovered in British coin from raiders	5,987	9	3
(7) Cash fines recovered in Kabul coin from raiders, Rs 3,103	1,551	8	0
(8) 49 $\frac{1}{2}$ tolas of brass ornaments and fragments, some set with imitation pearls including some pieces of doubtful and inferior gold. Not valued.			
(9) Some donkeys, clothing, &c., and some sheep returned direct to claimants. Not valued.			
Total	23,489	4	9

To this must be added the value of the jewels in items 3 and 4 which must be at least Rs. 10,000, and the allowances of the Zakka Khel, which are in deposit, making a grand total of Rs. 53,039-4-9, as under—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Loot recovered, as per above list	33,489	4	9
Allowances of Zakka Khels from 1st April, 1906, to 28th February, 1908	19,550	0	0
Total	53,039	4	9

When it is remembered that the fine imposed on the Zakka Khel Afridis for their share of the 1897 disturbances was Rs 9,000, and this was eventually paid for them by the other Afridis, who have never succeeded in recovering any part of it, I think it will be acknowledged that the Jirga has been remarkably successful. As no fine had been imposed at the end of the Zakka Khel Expedition, I should have been satisfied with the mere punishment of the offenders and should have raised no objection to the retention by the Jirgas, as a recompense for their trouble, of the amount which they recovered. As, however, all the loot has been handed over to me, I have accepted it, and have sent it to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, for return to the losers, and I have somewhat increased the rewards which I had decided to give to the Afridi Maliks and elders instrumental in the settlement and in this subsequent punishment of raiders. As regards Multan, who had taken refuge with the Afghans at Jalalabad, the Afridi Jirga demanded that he should come in, make unconditional submission, pay a fine of five thousand rupees and give guarantees for the future. He was at first inclined to agree to these terms, but was persuaded by the Afghans not to submit. The Afridi Jirga have deposited with me one Lee-Metford, eight Martini-Henry, and four snider rifles, roughly valued at five to six thousand rupees, as a guarantee that they will not allow Multan to return to, or to settle in, Tirah until he has been properly punished. The settlement of all these cases was long and tedious, and at one time it looked as if the Zakka Khel were going to break away from the Jirga and defy them and Government, as they put forward a very determined claim to payment of their back allowances, arguing that if they paid up what they owed Government it was only just that Government should pay what was due to them. They were told that their allowances were forfeited as a punishment for their numerous violations of British territory, and they at last gave way with a bad grace. Throughout the stay of the Jirgas at Jamrud they have been pestered by numerous messengers from the Mohmands and from Afghanistan, who have urged them to help the Mohmands by rising and threatening Peshawar. This had, of course, an unsettling influence, and increased our difficulties with the Zakka Khel, but I do not at present apprehend any trouble. Whatever the future may bring forth, the Maliks and elders of the Afridis have fully redeemed their promise of punishing raiders, and they have done far more than I considered was possible. I have therefore returned to them the rifles which they handed over at Walai as a pledge for the carrying out of their promise. Unless the Afridis generally, and the Zakka Khel in particular, become affected by the present agitation among the Mohmands, I have hope that this settlement with the Zakka Khel will prove satisfactory and that we shall have no more outbreaks or organised raiding.

Enclosure 2 in No 82.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 22nd May, 1908.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th May, 1908, forwarding a copy of a letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, giving cover to a report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., regarding the completion of the settlement effected with the Afridis at Walai on the 28th February, 1908.

2 The Government of India concur with you that Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel is to be congratulated on bringing the negotiations so promptly to a successful conclusion. The Governor-General in Council desires to acknowledge the able manner in which Colonel Roos-Keppel managed these difficult negotiations.

PART III.

MOHMANDS: OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th January, 1897. Received 1st February, 1897.

(EXTRACT.)

	Rs.	
* Halmzai ...	8,480	Mohmand clans, over which the Government of India
Kamali ...	2,800	have assumed political control Representative jirgas of
Dawezai ...	1,200	them met Mr Merk, Commissioner of the Peshawar
Utmanzai ...	720	Division, by invitation, early in November. Their
Tarakzai ..	3,600	attitude was good and they accepted the position as

explained to them, they have been allowed to continue to receive river tolls as heretofore, and allowances* aggregating Rs 16,800 a year have been fixed for them in lieu of those heretofore actually or nominally paid by the Amir. The allowances and presents made to the tribes through the Khan of Lalpura, amounting to about Rs 7,000 a year will, at their request, be paid to them direct in future. A slight addition of Rs 325 a year to the old *inam* of Rs 1,000 a year drawn by the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel Pindiali Mohmands has also been sanctioned. We have told His Highness the Amir that arrangements have now been completed with the Halmzais and Tarakzais and certain other sections of the Mohmands in a manner satisfactory both to the Government of India and to the jirgas of the tribesmen; that the allowances which the tribes have received either directly from Kabul or through the Khan of Lalpura will now be paid to them by the Government of India, and that His Highness will be relieved of any concern in regard to them.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 5th December, 1896

(Extract)

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor held a Darbar near Shabkadr to receive the representatives of the "assured" Mohmand clans and thereby openly mark the change in our relations with them which has been effected by the Durand Agreement and the recent negotiations with Mr. Merk. Over 1,000 members of the above clans were so received by His Honour, who conveyed to them on behalf of the British Government the assurance that they had passed under sole British control, and that such grants as they had before received from the Kabul Government would be re-granted to them and maintained by the British Government. The clans were clearly and emphatically informed that in return for these allowances they would be expected to render such service as Government might require from them, and to be faithful and well conducted in their dealings with the British Government. They fully recognised and more than once recurred to the main fact of their having come under our sole control. A copy of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's speech, which was delivered by His Honour in English and afterwards translated to the members of the jirga in Pashtu, is enclosed for the information of the Government of India; and I am to explain, in order to account for some phrases in it which may sound strangely to English ears, that it was prepared with a view to being translated into Pashtu.

Annexure.

Note of proceedings of the Darbar held by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor near Shabkadr on 26th November, 1896.

(Extract.)

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and its Dependencies received representative jirgas consisting of 1,109 men of the Halimzai, Tarakzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai, Isa Khel, and Burhan Khel Mohmand clans in a private Darbar held near Shabkadr on 26th November, 1896. His Honour addressed the assembled clansmen as follows:—

"I have called you here to-day in order that I might explain to you myself that the British Government has agreed to accept and has now assumed sole political control over you. As you know, three years ago a commission of British officers visited Kabul, and by a convention with His Highness the Amir a demarcation of the boundaries of political influence of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir was settled, and in consequence of that agreement you have come on that side of the boundary which is under sole British influence and control. In future therefore your relations will be with the British Government alone, and with no other Government, and I am sure that, as hitherto our relations have been good, so also hereafter the new relations, which I am glad to see have been commenced, will prove entirely satisfactory and will result in the advancement of the prosperity and welfare of yourselves. The British Government is just, and in order that you may not lose by coming under the sole control of that Government it has been decided and I inform you that the allowances which you have hitherto received from His Highness the Amir through the Governor of Jalalabad or the Khan of Lalpura will be continued to you, and the first half year's instalment will be paid to you by the Commissioner immediately. Some of your clans, such as the Utmanzai, the Dawezai and the people of Pindiali, have not received such allowances, but the British Government in its kindness has agreed to give them allowances also. In return for these allowances you will, whenever the Government thinks it necessary, be called upon to do service in such manner as Government considers advisable, and upon the service you render, upon your good conduct, and upon your fidelity to the Government will depend your allowances and the favour which the great British Government will show to you. Also as you were in the habit of receiving presents from the Khan of Lalpura, the Government in its justice will see that you do not lose in this matter. The distribution of these allowances and presents will be settled by my officers, to whom I have given authority for this purpose. Most of you have long known our Government and have dealt with its officers for over 50 years and have received *jagirs* and *mans* from that Government, and you all know that the British Government treats its dependents with kindness and consideration; it is always just, it is strong to reward and to punish; and in return for its kindness and consideration it expects and requires that its dependents show fidelity and service, and I sincerely trust that your new relations with the British Government will lead always to your prosperity and welfare, and that your name will be always well spoken of in the house of the Suzerain."

No. 2.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

On the night of 24th March village Marozai, six miles to the north-east of Shankargarh police station, was raided, two Hindus killed, one wounded. Troops at Abazai and Shankargarh turned out, but raiders escaped. On the night of 24th, Mirzadhar village, two miles from Marozai, was raided, several Hindus' houses looted and burnt, and one Hindu carried off. Burtan Khels Mohmands brought back Hindu, and handed over a Koda Khel Mohmand raider whom they captured. On the night of 30th March a raid was committed at Chikkor, nine miles south-east of Shankargarh, and Hindus' houses looted. All three raids are believed to be the work of remnant of Mohmand lashkar, which collected at the end of Zakka Khel expedition. Military detachments at Abazai and Shabkadr are being strengthened, and military will temporarily take over Moghal Khel Border Military Police post, in order to set free Border Military Police for patrol, as further activity is apprehended from this gang.

No. 3.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. My telegram dated 3rd instant. Telegram dated 14th instant from Political Agent, Khyber, states that Mullas, headed by Hazrat Sahib of Charbagh, have been preaching in Ningrahar, and crossed the river on 10th

instant at Lalpura, their intentions being uncertain; also that Koda Khel at encampments have left their country and have taken refuge with the neighbouring clans. Telegram dated 15th April from Officer Commanding at Landi Kotal, states that on 14th instant Sufi Sahib of Kot, with 1,500 men, left Lalpura for Koda Khel to join force of Hazrat Sahib, total being thus brought up to over 3,000; that villagers are joining in masses, Ghaza being general, with the reported object of delivering an attack on night of 17th April upon Dheri Shabkadr, Malik Gholam Khan, Pindiali, being attacked *en route* because he released Hindu who was captured in Mirzadhar raid and arrested two Koda Khel. Movement to Kamali towards British territory has, according to later information received to-day from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, been made by Mohmand gathering, which now, including some 2,000 Afghan subjects, numbers about 5,000, with Sufi Sahib's son and Hazrat Mulla at their head. Kamali are reported unreliable by Mohmand chief. Attempt made by Halimzai jirga to bring in Koda Khel jirga to discuss matters was unsuccessful. There is, in Chief Commissioner's opinion, a distinct danger of a fanatical outbreak with these influential Mullas present, General Officer Commanding has been asked by him to reinforce Shabkadr Abazai line by sending out more troops there. Everything possible is being done, through Mohmand chiefs, to reassure the clans, the gathering having apparently been caused by a rumour that we intend to invade Mohmand country.

No. 4.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram dated 17th instant Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphed as follows on 19th and 20th instant respectively:—

(1.) "Arrival of Mohmand lashkar at Kamali, with intention of attacking Gholam Khan, is reported from Shabkadr. It is said, however, that Gholam Khan, who has moved to British territory, is with his family at Matta Moghal Khel. About 10,000 is said to be number of Mohmand lashkar. A band of 150 men to watch Kotah, about half a mile outside our border, was sent last night."

(2.) "Mohmand gathering. See my telegram of yesterday. Patrol west of Matta Moghal Khel, inside our border, was fired upon yesterday by band of Mohmands. Patrol did not return fire. Post at Matta was fired into last evening, and firing from both sides of road was directed against a party of troops moving from Garhi Sudda to Matta. One sepoy, 28th Punjabis, and one syce, 19th Lancers, severely wounded, and one man of the Warwicks killed. After consulting me, General Officer Commanding is moving out, under General Anderson, a column of two guns and 1,000 infantry from Peshawar. I have, this morning, advised General Officer Commanding to move to Peshawar a second column which is being held ready at Nowshera in case of need. Every endeavour to prevent further collision will be used by General Willcocks, who has to-day gone to Shabkadr."

No. 5.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram of to-day Mohmands. Following telegram dated 20th instant received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"The longer this gathering under fanatical Mullas remains in its present position, the greater is the probability of a big fanatical outbreak, I am therefore definitely of opinion that a sufficiently strong force should be organised at Shabkadr to assume offensive. In view of trouble spreading to other portions of Peshawar border, I would also urge maintenance at Peshawar of a strong column." Telegraphing on the 20th April from Shabkadr, General Willcocks states that he has ordered two squadrons of cavalry from Nowshera Cavalry Brigade to Shabkadr, and also two guns, Mountain Battery, and one Field Battery, and 800

infantry from Nowshera to Peshawar. He further states that presence of a lashkar about 7,000 strong at Pandiali, of another about 2,000 strong at Kamali, and of a third about 1,000 strong at Alakandi, six miles from Matta Moghal Khel, is asserted by all reports alike; and that large numbers have evidently gathered, though numbers are probably exaggerated. It is reported that at Pandiali a jirga of all big Mullas is to-day assembling. All precautions against attack are being taken by General Willcocks.

No. 6.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmand disturbances. General Willcocks wires 20th:—"Mohmands fired patrol yesterday, west of Matta Moghal Khel inside our boundary. Fire was not returned. Yesterday evening a party moving from Garhi Sadda to Matta Moghal Khel was fired at from both sides of road. Post at Matta was also fired into. Private R G Adams, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion, killed; Private Picard, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion, slight gunshot wound, arm; one Sepoy, 28th Punjabis, and one Syce, 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse) wounded severely. Fire was returned on both occasions. In consultation with Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, am moving out this morning a column from Peshawar of two guns and 1,300 infantry under General Anderson. Another column is being held in readiness at Nowshera in case of need. Am just going out myself and will use every endeavour to prevent further collision." Willcocks wires later from Shabkadr:—"Chief Commissioner strongly recommends in writing that troops from Nowshera be moved to Peshawar at once with a view to further developments and for security communications with Shabkadr. I have ordered two guns, mountain battery, and one field battery, and 800 infantry by road and rail from Nowshera to Peshawar at once. I will be at Matta to-night. Have also ordered two squadrons cavalry from Nowshera Cavalry Brigade to Shabkadr." Troops mentioned by Willcocks left Nowshera for Peshawar last night by road.

No. 7.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram of to-day. Willcocks wires from camp Matta Moghal Khel at 11 a.m. on 21st April:—"No firing last night. Mohmand watch posts, along hills just outside border, visible. I will give no possible cause for Mohmands to attack us. If they do, we are in a position to repulse and punish them. Troops from Nowshera all reach Peshawar by road to-day. Cavalry from Nowshera arrived by night march at Shabkadr this morning. At 8 o'clock this morning a party of Mohmands crossed our border, in open, and fired on our standing patrol, west of camp. Patrol was withdrawn, as I am endeavouring to show that we are here in purely protective advanced position, but, as Mohmands kept in open ground, I fired three shells and dispersed them. Whoever their parties are, they are evidently doing their best to draw us across the border, but they will not do so unless they attack us in force. They have now planted a standard 4,000 yards from camp. Health of troops good, but weather is very hot."

No. 8.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated, Shankargarh, 22nd April, received from General Anderson:—"During the night there was a little sniping into camp, Matta; no casualties resulted. In consequence of occupation of foot hills west of Sadr Garhi,

and about 3,000 yards from Matta camp, by at least 1,000 of the enemy, a strong post was established and occupied at Sadr Garhi by 300 of our men. Flank guard moving to Sadr Garhi was fired on in desultory fashion all morning. Only casualties were two horses wounded. On night of 21st April, telephone wire was cut and carried away. Shankargarh fort, city, and camp on west side subjected to a certain amount of sniping."

No. 9.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of yesterday. Mohmands. Following telegram, dated 21st April, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"Spread of fanatical feeling to Shamoza, Utman Khel, and Bajaur is shown by reports received at Malakand from Nawab of Nawagai, Jihad has been avowed and is being preached by deputies from the Mullahs"

No. 10.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. Your telegram of to-day, repeating Chief Commissioner's telegram of the 21st instant. You will, of course, take such military action as you may consider necessary, bearing in mind the policy of His Majesty's Government on the frontiers. I shall be glad to be kept informed promptly and fully

No. 11.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following reports from Panjkora bridge, telegraphed by Political Agent, Malakand, 22nd instant:—"Mulla Barbara, Inzarai, Doda Jan, Sufi Sahib, Badshah of Islampur, and disciples, and Sheikhs of Hadda Mulla have started for Shabkadr at head of Mamund Salarzais, Mandals Khels, Charmangis, and other Bajis. Men of Asmar, Shigal, Kohistan, Shortan, Kama, and Kunar are coming to join fanatics.

No. 12.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 22nd April, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, regarding Mohmands:—"Desultory long-range fire has been kept up by enemy, who, reports show, are holding low hills from Swat River to Subhan Khwar. One havildar 53rd Sikhs wounded. It is said that Hazrat Sahib and son of Sufi Mulla, with some 3,000 men, have reached mouth of Gundab. Grain, ammunition, and cash are being steadily sent down to Mohmands from Ningrahar, and attitude of gathering is even more aggressive to-day."

No. 13.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Following telegram received from General Anderson, 22nd April, regarding Mohmand disturbances:—"Considerable bodies of enemy now occupy the whole line of foot hills between Swat river and Subhan Khwar. Enemy has kept up desultory firing all day. One havildar, 53rd Sikhs, wounded slightly, and two cavalry horses wounded close to Matta Camp while on patrol, long range fire in all cases. There is no general advance into plain though a few of enemy frequently come down and fire here and there."

Following from General Willcocks, at Shabkadr, dated 22nd April:—"Large following of Mohmands with standards dispersed this afternoon by shell fire. They were advancing from west towards Garhi Sadr, which is opposite to Abazai. Considering that the enemy now evidently mean business, I have ordered following troops from Peshawar to Shabkadr.—18th Field Battery, 2 guns Derajat Mountain Battery, Seaforth Highlanders, and 200 men of 28th Punjabis. When these troops have arrived I shall have following force on line Abazai, Shabkadr, Michni:—2,700 infantry, 520 cavalry, and 12 guns."

No. 14.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

Following telegram received from Intelligence Officer, Peshawar, 23rd April, regarding Mohmand disturbances:—"Last night little firing took place at Shabkadr and Abazai, shown on map as Hajizai, where bridge-head is held by small guard. No news from Matta, to which place telephone is cut, as also telegraph to Peshawar. Last night village of Katozai was raided. On morning of 23rd April, Intelligence Staff Officer rode to Peshawar from Shabkadr."

No. 15.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks telegraphed 23rd April from Shankgarh that an attack by the enemy on bridge-head Abazai on Shabkadr-Peshawar road last night was repulsed, one sowar wounded slightly. Throughout the night enemy fired upon Shabkadr fort and hornwork. Matta was sharply attacked by them, 21st Cavalry had one sowar wounded in head. Excited by the heavy firing, 80 horses of the 19th Lancers and 21st Cavalry stampeded, broke away, jumped intrenchments; many are being recovered to-day, though some are still missing, and others killed in barbed-wire fencing. Village, five miles within our border was attacked and looted by enemy, who, during darkness, crossed our main road from Abazai to Matta. At same time, Garisad post, opposite Abazai on Swat River, where fortified camp has just been established by me, was attacked by the enemy. Attack repulsed with loss to enemy of several wounded and four men killed.

No. 16.*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 23rd April, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram repeating telegram of 20th April from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. In view of large gatherings reported in later telegrams, are you satisfied that maintenance of defensive will not promote big fanatical outbreak? Might not safe policy be to disperse gathering before it becomes larger? It is for you, of course, to judge.

No. 17.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Your telegrams 22nd and 23rd April I have given authority, on representations from Chief Commissioner and General Willcocks, to cross border and assume offensive when necessary, impressing at the same time on General Willcocks observance of policy of Government regarding permanent occupation. Immediate mobilisation of two brigades with reserve brigade and divisional troops has been sanctioned

No. 18.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

The following units have been moved to Mohmand border up to the evening of 22nd April, making a total of 2,700 infantry, 520 cavalry, 12 guns, on the line Michni, Shabkadr, Abazai—Royal Field Artillery, 18th Battery, and 4 guns 80th Battery; 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery, 2 guns, 1st Section 6th Company Sappers and Miners; detachments of 19th Lancers, 21st Cavalry, Guides' Cavalry, 1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 28th Punjabis, 53rd and 54th Sikhs, 59th Sind Rifles. The 1st Battalion Munster Fusiliers and 30th Punjabis have been moved to Nowshera, and the 45th and 54th Sikhs and 55th Rifles to Peshawar

No. 19.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

The telegraph wire between Peshawar and Shabkadr was cut again about 9 30 last night, and has not yet been restored.

No. 20.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Mohmand Force. Following are the names of Commanders—Major-General Sir J Willcocks to command the Force, Brigadier-General C Anderson to command First Brigade, Major-General A. A Barrett to command Second Brigade, Major-General J G Ramsay to command Reserve Brigade.

Following is composition of force:—First Brigade:—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 53rd Sikhs, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 59th Scinde Rifles, Sections A and B No 1 British Field Hospital, No 101 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column. Second Brigade:—1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, Infantry of the Corps of Guides, 28th Punjabis, 55th Coke's Rifles, Sections C and D No 1 British Field Hospital, No 102 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column Reserve Brigade.—1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 21st Punjabis, 22nd Punjabis, 40th Pathans, Sections A and B No. 7 British Field Hospital, No 112 Native Field Hospital, Sections A and B No 113 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column. Divisional Troops.—21st Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry, Mountain Division No. 8 Battery Royal Garrison Artillery, 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, 28th Mountain Battery, No 6 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, No. 1 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, 34th Sikh Pioneers, No. 103 Native Field Hospital Reserve Brigade to proceed to Peshawar. Orders have been issued for all movements, including

following reliefs :—No. 2 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, Roorkee to Peshawar; 33rd Punjabis, Jubbulpore to Nowshera; No. 5 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, Roorkee to Rawalpindi.

No. 21.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram, dated 24th April, has been received from General Willcocks, at Shankargarh, reporting that to-day two columns comprising all available troops simultaneously attacked enemy's position to west of Matta and Shabkadr. Enemy driven from their sangars. Two casualties in Shabkadr column and about sixty casualties in Matta column.

No. 22.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. Following telegram from General Willcocks, 24th April, from Shankargarh :—“Two columns, consisting of all available troops on this border, to-day reconnoitred and searched out enemy's lashkars on foothills two miles west of Shabkadr. Column under Colonel Unwin, 21st Cavalry, one squadron 21st Cavalry, 18th Battery Royal Field Artillery, two guns 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery, 100 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks, 400 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, and 150 28th Punjabis, moved up Gundab Valley as far as village of Shabaz Kor. Enemy's strength was ascertained and position of his sangars. Enemy mostly armed with Lee-Metfords and Martinis. Matta column under Brigadier-General Anderson. Column consisting of 300 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and 200 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks, and 250 53rd Sikhs, and 220 57th Rifles, and 150 59th Rifles, and one squadron 19th Lancers, and one squadron 21st Cavalry, and four guns 80th Battery Royal Field Artillery, moved against enemy's sangared position to the north-west of Matta. Enemy offered determined resistance, but all his positions were gallantly carried by the troops. One sangar was taken by 57th Rifles with bayonet. 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks found enemy escaping through a gorge, and inflicted heavy loss on them with rifle fire. Enemy estimated at minimum of 4,000 men. General Anderson commanded with much dash, and has inflicted heavy blow on Mohmands. Following casualties in both columns, and in sniping into camp. Killed :—British rank and file, 2; native, 5. Wounded severely :—British officers, 4. British rank and file, 10; native, 18. Wounded slightly :—British rank and file, 7; native, 12. Authentic reports received show that enemy lost over 100 killed

No. 23.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram, dated 25th April at Shankargarh, has been received from General Willcocks, reporting that no sign was found of enemy during reconnaissance made this morning beyond Hafizkor village up Gundab valley. Their positions to west of Matta have also been abandoned.

No. 24.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 26th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram received to-day from Willcocks at Shankargarh regarding Mohmands reports that since yesterday everything has been quiet. The condition of all the wounded is satisfactory. There has been no further cutting of wires or raiding.

No. 25.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

My telegram dated the 23rd April. Mohmands. It appears that, in order to prevent Mohmands and Afghans being taken in rear, *vid* Nawagai, Shamozaïs, Salarzaïs, and Mamunds, had collected lashkar to attack and destroy Panjkora bridge. Lashkar has dispersed, Dir riverain Khans and their men having joined levy of reinforcements which had been despatched. Mullas have retired having failed as they hoped to cause rising of Dir and Swat.

No. 26.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Telegram, dated 25th instant, from Political Agent, Khyber, reports continuance of crossing at Lalpura for Mohmand country of parties of 10 to 50 men with flags. General opinion is that lashkars cannot hold out long, and messages asking for more food are constantly received from Mohmand country. No success has so far attended efforts that are being made to get Afridis to rise. Khyber Zakka Khel are full of protestations of loyalty, and Loargai Shinwaris are staunch and reliable

No. 27.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 26th instant, regarding Mohmands, as follows:—"Large number of men are arriving from Mohmand country with killed and wounded according to report of messenger who arrived from Hazarnao this morning. In fighting west of Matta, on Friday last, they own to having 240 casualties. Corpses of Maliks Latam and Deh Bashi, of Khassadars at Dakka, have been brought to Hazarnao by Shakar of Hazarnao, Naib Kotwal of Jalalabad, who has arrived there wounded in the head, and also bringing corpse of his still more notorious brother, Ilm Sadbarhi of the Hazarnao Khassadars. Large number of friends, who have taken this excuse to leave lashkar, accompany each dead and wounded man brought to Ningrahar. Small belated parties are still going on towards Mohmand country, but the people of Ningrahar are much disheartened at these losses. An attempt to induce Zakka Khel to rise is being made by a mulla from Ningrahar who went, *vid* Sassobi Pass, to Bazar Valley on the 24th April. Mulla Saiyid Akbar is reported to have sent messages to Sufi Sahib that he cannot persuade Afridis to rise, but that latter will not oppose lashkar, and many will probably join it, if, instead of attacking Landi Kotal, Sufi will bring his Sangu Khel lashkar to the lower Bara *vid* the Bazar Valley.

No. 28.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Following telegram dated 27th instant received from General Willcocks regarding Mohmands:—"According to most recent information, Mir Sahib Jan Badshah of Islampur Kumar, the leading spirit in Matta fight, has crossed the Indarai pass into Kamali Halimzai limits, and Hazrat Sahib of Bhat Khak, with his lashkar, is still in Khwaizai limits. In addition to their Afghan adherents, each has still a considerable contingent of Mohmands. With exception of the

Tarakzai, a small following of Gholam Khan Isa Khel, and the elders of the Gundab Halimzai, there appears to be little doubt that Mohmands, as a whole, were implicated in recent engagements with our columns from Matta and Shabkadr. The Ambahar Utman Khel, under leadership of Mir Baz, and the Khoda Khel Baizai, under leadership of Mahasal, were the most prominent; Kunaris, a large contingent of Ningraharis, Khwaizai, men of Lalpura, and Khassadars, were included among their Afghan allies."

No. 29.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

We have instructed General Willcocks, after considering Mohmand situation in Council this morning, that an advance should be made with two brigades from Mohmand border, one on Pandiali and the other up the Gundab, to operate in Kamali Ambahar, if jirga does not arrive at once and submit. Offensive measures are considered necessary both by General Willcocks and by Chief Commissioner. Enemy are not yet dispersed though apparently disheartened.

No. 30.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 28th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 27th April You have, I presume, considered carefully how far it is advisable to order what practically is a new expedition into hill country, distant from our border. Might not case possibly be met by blockade and, if necessary, stopping allowances?

No. 31.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 28th April, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

According to news from Bajaur, other Mullas are greatly depressed by action of Sarkanri Mian Mulla, Kunar, who has returned to Afghan territory, in consequence of receiving letter from Amir that this is not holy war now.

No. 32.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 28th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following report, dated 27th instant, received from Political Agent, Khyber, regarding Mohmands:—"Confirmation received of report that enemy's losses in fighting of 24th April were very heavy. No more volunteers are expected to be going in direction of Mohmand country, whence a steady stream of men has been returning for the last two days. Good work is being done, so far with success, by Afridi maliks and elders to counteract efforts of Afghan sheikhs and mullas in Tirah. It is reported that at Girdi, four miles from Dakka, there was a large gathering of between 2,000 and 3,000 last night, but as regards its composition or intentions there is no accurate information. Bhar lashkar of Loargai Shinwaris, some 1,000 strong, of whom about 600 possess rifles, has offered its services."

No. 33.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram of 28th April. Blockade is impracticable owing to interposition of friendly tribes between our border and those implicated. I am most anxious to avoid expedition, but it is necessary to enforce some punishment. I will instruct General Willcocks to do all he can to arrive at reasonable terms when jirga assembles, which will not be for some days. We may be obliged to advance if negotiations fail, but it will only be with intention of returning at once after inflicting punishment.

No. 34.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Following telegram dated 28th instant received from Political Agent, Khyber:—
 "Excitement in Ningrahar is dying and situation is improving. No fresh parties reported going to Mohmands, and all day yesterday boat-loads of men crossed from Lalpura on their return from Mohmand country. Gathering at Girdi has now dispersed; it consisted mainly of men returned from war. Sangu Khels are reported to be dispersing to their homes, and Sufi Sahib to be sick at Drabgai. It is stated that Hazrat Sahib, with about 400 men, has withdrawn to Ucha and Jawan in the Bohai Dag. In order that he may be able to make a demonstration on Friday next on the Shabkadr line, he is sending to Ningrahar for reinforcements, and mullas are proceeding from one village to another calling upon people to join Hazrat Sahib, people, however, return to their homes after going a few miles. It is not believed that those who have returned from Mohmand country will go back to Hazrat, though they have promised him to do so. From Bara, Bazar, and Tirah all reported quiet."

No. 35.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

Telegram received from General Willcocks at Shankargarh, dated 28th April, reports all wounded are doing well. Everything is quiet on the border. None of our camps have been fired at.

No. 36.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th April, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Political Agent, Malakand, telegraphed 28th instant, as follows:—
 "Malik of Kotkai reports that attack upon either Panjkora or Dargai is intended by Ambahar and Laman Utman Khels. As same report has reached Panjkora, I have informed Officer Commanding Malakand Force, but I am doubtful of truth of the report."

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 29th instant, as follows:—"My previous telegram, as to discouragement of people and disinclination for further fighting, is confirmed by numerous reports from Ningrahar. Boat bridge at Lalpura has been dismantled, Kabul River being in flood. The Mian Sahib of Tsappar, near Gandamak, has arrived and is halted at Peshbolak, at the head of a large lashkar of Khugianis. This lashkar is the only one now assembled in

Ningrahar; it is 4,000 strong according to report, but this is probably an exaggeration. Its leaders are at Drabgai with Sufi Sahib. All is reported quiet by Afridis elders and maliks in Tirah, who continue to oppose efforts of Afghan Mullas successfully. Adverting to my telegram, dated 26th April, Afridis have given most discouraging replies to Mulla, who is sounding them on the subject. Several Zakka Khel elders, from Bazar, have been here to say that Zakka Khels have replied to Mullas that they object to and will oppose passage of any lashkar through their country; and Malik Yar Muhammad Khan has sent his son to say that he will oppose any Afghan lashkar approaching Chura.

No. 37.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

I repeat, for information, the following telegrams regarding Mohmands.

(1) General Willcocks telegraphed last night, 29th April, as follows:—
“Mullas’ activity in Mohmand country still continues. On night of 28th instant, Hazrat Sahib was at Koda Khel, whither he has now moved, up Bohai Dag. Hazrat is announcing that he will attack us at Kharappa, and that Sufi Sahib, with a Shinwari lashkar, is on his way to join him, and has reached Lalpura. Hazrat’s movements, however, it may be noticed, are bringing him by degrees nearer home. Have received information of collection in Alikandi Pass of miscellaneous lashkar, consisting of about 300 Mohmands.”

(2.) Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed, also on night of 29th instant, as follows:—“Khugiani lashkar is reported to be 6,000 strong, by a messenger who has just returned from Peshbolak. In addition to above, lashkar was joined at night by following parties of Shinwaris of Safed Koh:—500 Adal and Marjan Khel, 500 Pekhawal, and 700 Sangu Khel.”

No. 38.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphed, 30th April, from Shankargarh, as follows:—
“While nothing definite is known, so far, regarding attitude of other tribes, it seems probable that subsidised tribes will attend jirga on 4th May. Ambahar Utman Khels and Burhan Khels have sent in replies; the latter say that summons to Shabkadr will be obeyed by them. Ambahar do not definitely state that they will come; they say that any settlement Mohmands may make with General Commanding will be followed by them, and that, for the rest, they are Mussulmans. After visit to Khuda Khels, Hazrat Sahib has returned to Khwaizai. Much anxiety to keep this mischief-maker with them is still evinced generally by Baizai and Khwaizai, who say that they will raise another lashkar if Sufi Sahib comes. Reports of gatherings in Alikandi Pass and Gundab are negatived by latest information. Firing was again opened last night on Border Military Police, at Abazai boat bridge, over Kabul River.”

No. 39.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

In spite of efforts of local mullas, acting under advice of Hazrat and Sufi Sahibs, all leading Bajaur Khans remain loyal, according to telegram from Political Agent, Malakand, dated afternoon of 30th ultimo. Loyal attitude also maintained by Dir and Swat.

No. 40.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 1st May as follows:—"At Mian Killi, one of the Peshbolak villages, public prayers were yesterday held by Sufi Sahib. After prayers he was mobbed by members of his lashkar, who are growing discontented; they demanded that either they should be dismissed to their homes or else led against enemy. Villagers give as little food as possible to lashkar, which is billeted on villages round Peshbolak. A consultation was held with leaders, at which Sufi explained difficulties of the situation to the latter, saying that he could not go to Bara, as Afridis, on whose co-operation he had confidently counted, had refused to join him, and that an attack by him on their brethren in the Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal might be resented by Afridis. He further said that, with Landi Kotal strongly garrisoned on one flank and Afridis unfriendly on the other, it would be dangerous to advance towards Peshawar through Bazar Valley. Messenger says that, although supplies are steadily coming in, numbers rise in proportion, so that lashkar will be forced to advance or disperse at once; no decision had, however, been arrived at when messenger left. Ningraharis have been telling lashkar that Landi Kotal is impregnable and very strongly held, whereas members of lashkar, who are mostly from distance, at first believed what mullas had been telling them, viz., that Landi Kotal was very weakly held. All is reported quiet at Tirah by a Zakka Khel Malik of Upper Bara, who has just arrived. Latter states that Mulla Saiyid Akbar has not succeeded in getting even a dozen men, though he has made great efforts to raise a lashkar."

No. 41.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Situation in the Khyber has now become most serious and disquieting. Movement has been made, in two bodies, by the Afghan lashkar, which is variously estimated at from 13,000 to 20,000; it is expected that Landi Kotal will be attacked this evening by the former and better-armed body, or its advance guard, which has passed Landi Khana. It is expected that Chura fort, belonging to Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, who helped us in Zakka expedition, and also Ali Masjid, will be attacked to-night by latter body, which is moving through Bazar Valley. With a view to rendering assistance, troops have been despatched to Jamrud. Position that has now developed, with this invasion of British territory and threatened attack upon a British fort by Afghans, has been considered by us in Council. While we cannot conceal from His Majesty's Government extreme gravity of the situation, we have decided for the present to await events and remain strictly on the defensive. As the replies about the jirga are not satisfactory and Mullas are still active, an immediate advance on the Mohmand side is strongly urged by both General Willcocks and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. We have decided, however, though not insensible to these considerations, that, at any rate, until the situation is clearer, no advance shall be made on Mohmand side. More reassuring news is sent by Political Agent, Malakand, who says that bravery of Government troops is admitted by Mohmands and other tribes, and that excellent military arrangements have astonished and discouraged them. We are telegraphing to General Officer Commanding as follows:—"Government of India have decided on broad grounds of policy, while fully recognising weight due to arguments of yourself and Chief Commissioner, that no advance should at present be made. As regards terms, Government of India are unable, for the same reason, to come to a decision at present. Authority is therefore given to you to open proceedings by calling for an explanation of their conduct from those who attend, saying that what they may have to say in their defence will be considered by you; but you are not to announce any terms to jirga. Until authorised by the Government of India to do so, you will make no definite communication to them. You should lose no opportunity of bringing influence to bear on others to attend the jirga."

No. 42.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Composition of force against Mohmands, as follows:—Commanding, Major-General Willcocks, with full political control, and Major Blakeway as Political Officer.

General Commanding First Brigade, Brigadier-General Anderson, with following troops:—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 53rd Sikhs, 57th Rifles, 59th Rifles

General Commanding Second Brigade, Major-General Barrett, with following troops:—1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, Corps of Guides Infantry, 28th Punjabis, 55th Rifles.

Divisional troops, 21st Cavalry, No 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, 28th Mountain Battery, No. 1 and No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, 34th Pioneers.

Third brigade in reserve.

Commanding, Major-General Ramsay, with following troops:—1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 21st Punjabis, 22nd Punjabis, 40th Pathans.

We have arranged, also, to keep Khyber and Malakand movable column complete. We have also moved the following troops in the hills to stations on the line of rail:—Firstly, a brigade, consisting of 1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas, and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas, to Jullundur, Nowshera, and Ferozepore. Secondly, 21st Kohat Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, and 1st Battalion 6th Gurkhas, to Hasan Abdul; also the 1st Battalion Connaught Rangers, from Dagshai to Rawalpindi.

No. 43.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd May, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphs 2nd May, as follows:—

(1.) "Villages of Khargah and Bagh have been occupied by lashkar which appears to be some 6,000 strong, and can be plainly seen due west of this fort about 4,000 yards off. No serious attempt to attack has been made by lashkar, though it has exchanged shots with our post at Michni Kandao. Enemy are being forced to take southern route, which will bring them against our strongest side, by Loargai Shinwaris, who are holding hills to the north of Landi Khana, and are behaving very well. Mulla had promised men of lashkar that, as soon as they appeared at Landi Kotal, all Khyber rifles would desert, and all the Afridis would join lashkar, men are, however, disheartened, and appear anything but enterprising now that they see no signs of fulfilment of these promises. Messages have been sent by Sufi Sahib, who is in Bazar Valley, and who has promised to send an Afridi lashkar to help lashkar here, summoning whole Afridi jirga to meet him in Bazar Valley. I have received a message from the leaders of Afghan jirga that, if we will give up fort and pay a nagma of Rs. 60,000, they will let us go in safety, as they do not want any unpleasantness. Lashkars are entirely composed of pure Afghans, and contain no tribesmen. I have written to Sarhang of Dakka not to send any more caravans at present, as caravan might be used as stalking horse by enemy. I request that orders to stop caravans may be given in Jamrud and Peshawar."

(2) Same date Later:—"Report from Tirah, by Malik Shah Mard Khan, states that Mulla was unsuccessful in attempt, made on receipt of Sufi's letters, to collect Afridi jirga. No Zakka Khels have joined Sufi, whose lashkar, about 6,000 strong, was seen at Khwar, in Bazar Valley, at noon to-day, by Malik's messenger."

(3.) On morning of 3rd May:—"There was strong attack all night on Michni Kandao. No serious attack here, though heavy firing took place at intervals 'throughout night. All well."

No further news of Mohmands. On Malakand side things are quiet.

No. 44.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd May, 1908*

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks wires from Landi Kotal, 2 40 p m to-day.—“ Arrived here 2 p.m with one squadron of cavalry Ramsay's Indian Brigade with four field guns will be here in one hour Ali Masjid is held by one battalion and two mountain guns General Barrett, with 2½ battalions of infantry, two guns 18th Battery Royal Field Artillery, and 23rd Mountain Battery, should reach Ali Masjid to-day. Enemy are firing few shots from hills west of Landi Kotal ”

No. 45.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Telegram to following effect, dated Shankargarh, afternoon 3rd instant, received from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Field Force :—“ Gundab Halimzai are present as usual. No jirgas are reported on their way other than those of Pandiali Mohmands, viz, Burhan Khel and Isa Khel, which have arrived to-day Date originally fixed for jirga was to-morrow Instructions in your telegram* will now be carried in effect, and, by using members of jirgas now present as intermediaries, it is hoped that attendance of others may eventually be secured in spite of hostile influence of Mullas.”

No. 46.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 3rd May as follows.—“ Most of Zakka Khel having gone to Maidan to sow maize, there are now very few of them in Bazar Valley. A jirga with Sufi was held yesterday evening by those in Bazar Valley; they told him that unless all Afridis agreed to join him they could not do so and would oppose his advance, as they had just made peace with Government for five years and other Afridis had stood surety for them. Messengers begging them to come to him in Bazar Valley have been sent by Sufi to Mullas and elders of Afridis; he apparently fears to advance.”

No. 47.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908*

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 3rd instant, from Political Agent, Khyber.—“ Repeated and determined efforts were made last night by enemy to take Michni Kandao blockhouse, upon which their main attack was concentrated. From 3 p m. yesterday to 8 a m. to-day heavy firing continued. Every attack was driven off and loss inflicted on enemy by Subadar Tor Khan, Khyber Rifles Landi Kotal was fired upon at 10 p m. from north and south, and firing was repeated at short intervals until daylight this morning from all points of the compass. Repeated efforts to take and burn caravanserai were made by enemy, but heavy fire from the blockhouse drove them off on each occasion Shinwaris of Khargali report that they know 17 wounded and three killed among enemy, who have now withdrawn to Khargali and to hills on Afghan border to west Men who took letter to Sarhang

* See telegram from Viceroy, dated 2nd May, 1908 (No. 41).

yesterday met some being carried to Dakka last night, so that their casualties probably exceed above figures. One casualty on our side. Except that a chaukidar's hut at the head of waterworks near Khargali is reported to have been burnt by them, enemy have done us no harm. Parties of them can now be seen retiring to Darband over ranges. Orders are reported to have been sent to lashkar here by Sufi Sahib that, as he wished to attack from south and thus make it appear not a deliberate attack from Afghanistan but an Afridi rising, lashkar should on no account attack the Afghan side; but that orders were disobeyed, lashkar having got out of hand. All attempts of enemy to occupy hills commanding Landi Kotal from the north-west were repelled by the Loargai Shinwaris lashkar, which was engaged at intervals during the night. No Afridis have joined Sufi according to report of Zakka Khel elders who have come to offer their services."

No. 48.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

The present situation in the Khyber is as follows:—At Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid, in support of the Khyber Rifles, are all the 3rd Brigade and half the 2nd Brigade Mohmand Field Force, together with 54th Sikhs, 31st Punjabis, two mountain batteries, six guns, and one squadron of cavalry. An attack was made this morning on lashkar which had entered British territory under Sufi Sahib, and which was not more than 4,000 yards from fort at Landi Kotal, and had been firing three days into fort. Our force consisted of three battalions with two batteries. Enemy fled over border into Afghan territory, where they could not be followed.

No. 49.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks wires from Landi Kotal, 4th May, attacked to-day Sufi Sahib's lashkar, and drove it across Afghan boundary, being careful to keep himself well within our own boundary. Enemy's force, estimated not more than 1,000, had occupied villages of Bagh and Khargali about 4,000 yards directly west of Landi Kotal. Enemy, who did not appear to be well armed, were easily driven from their sangars and friendly Shinwari villages, which they have forcibly acquired possession of. They exposed themselves frequently in the open and must have suffered from our shrapnel and rifle fire. Mulla leading them escaped on horseback early in day. Owing to continuous thunderstorms and heavy rain our troops had hard day. We attacked in two columns, viz., Ramsay's, with 28th Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 40th Pathans, two companies 21st Punjabis on left, 80th Battery Royal Field Artillery, in a position on Landi Kotal, Dakka road. Roos-Keppel, with 50 dismounted 19th Lancers, two companies 21st Punjabis, 500 Khyber Rifles on right. Following casualties occurred:—Lieutenant G. D. Campbell, 40th Pathans, gunshot wound in thigh, slight; 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, No. 6938, Private Edward Lynch, gunshot wound in shoulder, severe. Khyber Rifles, one sepoy wounded slightly. 3rd May, one bugler, 21st Punjabis accidentally killed.

No. 50.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Gundab Halimzai and Pandiali jirgas were interviewed on 3rd May by Political Officer, Mohmand border, who told them that no communication could be made to them, as they were not a representative jirga of Mohmand and other tribes,

and as General Willcocks was absent. Political Officer agreed to proposal made by them that they should go to other sections in jirga and persuade them to obey the summons; he told them at the same time that information of the result of their mission must be sent in by night of 8th instant. They have been given clearly to understand that, if information as to the jirga's intentions is not sent by the 8th May, or if the jirga fails to arrive by the 10th instant, Government reserves the right to act as may seem fit

No. 51.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

News received from the Political Agent, Malakand, yesterday, is summarised as follows:—An endeavour to raise a hostile lashkar in Upper Swat is being made by Sartor fakir; it is, however, opposed by Maliks. Loyal messages have been sent by Nekpi Khels, and Khan Khels of Thana refuse to listen to Mulla. It is at present their desire, as well as that of Khan of Dir and Dir chiefs, to employ their own tribal lashkar to deal with any trouble. A message sent to them by Viceroy expressing high satisfaction at their loyal conduct has greatly encouraged all of them. Refusal to join Afghan Mullas, on the ground that it is against the will of the people, has been repeated by Palam Ba of Dir

No. 52.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires 5th May from Landi Kotal, 1.30 p m. "All quiet here, Lashkar has disappeared over Afghan boundary. Authentic reports state they had about 60 casualties yesterday, including three mullas killed by a shell."

No. 53.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 6th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated 5th instant from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand border, reports departure, post haste, on afternoon of 4th instant, of Pandiali and Halimzai jirgas for the purpose of visiting other sections; he feels confident that utmost endeavour to bring in absentees will be made by them. Except for a few Sheikhs, Mir Sahib and Hazrat Sahib are now without a following. Mir Sahib has returned from Chamarkand near Nawagai to Sufi limits, and Hazrat Sahib has left Khwaizai limits with the intention of going to Ningrahar. Telegram dated the same evening, from Political Agent, reported that at Panjkora bridge all was quiet, and that a relative had been sent by Sartor Fakir to state that he does not intend to rise against Government, though he had received many letters from Afghan Mullas urging him to do so, unless tribes of Swat and Upper Swat are ready to join him

No. 54.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 6th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, has reported following news:—On the 4th instant Sufi Sahib was still at China, his lashkar in Bazar being scattered about in adjacent villages and reduced to some 1,000 men. Great efforts were made by him to induce the Zakka Khel and other Afridis to join him. All respect for Sufi Sahib vanished upon arrival of a messenger with report of the annihilation of his Landi Kotal lashkar while Sufi was holding a jirga; he accordingly returned to Afghanistan with his following at nightfall. No members of either lashkar remained in Khyber Agency on the 5th May. Return of Sufi Sahib and his lashkar either to Bazar or to Landi Kotal is considered improbable by Political Agent

No. 55.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Major H. Coape-Smith, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers, Commandant, 50th Camel Corps, killed at Ali Masjid on 6th May in attempt to recover transport animals carried off by raiders.

No. 56.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. General Willcocks telegraphs from Landi Kotal, 6th May, orders have been issued for the return to Peshawar to-morrow of troops in Khyber with the exception of two guns, 28th Mountain Battery, which will be left at Landi Kotal, and 54th Sikhs at Jamrud.

No. 57.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated 6th May from the Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Border, reported that a general jirga to discuss question of attendance at Shankargarh was to be collected in Halimzai limits on May 6th or 7th, at which all Mohmand Sufis and Utman Khel were to attend. Hazrat Sahib has gone to Chaknawar on Kabul River, having abandoned all hope of again rousing fanatic Mohmands. According to a credible report the Amir has recalled Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, who has also returned to Kunar. Corroboration of this news is provided by information sent by Bajaur Khans to Political Agent, Malakand, to the effect that principal Afghan Mullahs have received urgent orders to return immediately to Afghanistan. Telegram dated the evening of 6th May, from Political Agent, Khyber, reports that it is generally believed that, even if he wished to do so, Sufi could not reassemble his lashkar, which has dispersed in all directions. Political Agent adds that excitement appears, generally speaking, to be subsiding in Ningrahar.

No. 58.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Anderson wires 7th May from Shankargarh all reported quiet this morning on border from Abazai to Michni.

No. 59.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires on 8th May from Peshawar:—"Arrived yesterday. Ramsay's Brigade reached Ali Masjid yesterday and arrives Peshawar to-morrow, 9th May. General Barrett with Seaforths, Guides, and 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, arrived Peshawar this morning 54th Sikhs remain in garrison at Jamrud, and two guns 28th Mountain Battery are at Landi Kotal."

No. 60.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated the night of 7th May from the Political Agent, Khyber, states that things continue to quiet down in Ningrahar. Arrival of Hazrat Sahib at Kama is reported. It is generally believed that Mullas are being recalled, though purport of communications is not known for certain. On the Shabkadr and Mohmand side there are no further developments.

No. 61.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Report from Political Agent, Malakand, dated last night, states that tribesmen begged Hazrat Mulla, who was returning, under the Amir's orders, to Afghanistan, to remain until settlement is arrived at, and at their request he has remained at Khwaizai, Mohmand country. News that all Afghan subjects who had crossed frontier had been recalled by the Amir is confirmed by reports from Asmar.

Telegram dated evening of 8th May, from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Border, reports refusal to obey our summons to jirga on the part of Khwaizai and Baizai, who have sent a letter saying that "bygones are bygones" must be the basis of any peace we may wish to make with them. Attendance has also been declined by Utmanzai Dawizai Sufi and Ambahar Utman Khel. Pandiali Mohmands say they will come in whenever required, but only Kamali and Gandab Halimzai are present at Shankargarh.

No. 62.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 10th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. You are aware that two periods were given to them, in which to assemble in jirga summoned to meet Sir J Willcocks on our frontier, in hope that a punitive expedition into the Mohmand country might thus be avoided. Yesterday

was the date on which the time allowed expired, and I am very sorry to say that news reached us this morning of refusal of Mohmand Maliks to come in, and of the receipt of insulting replies from some of them. The prompt restoration of order on this part of the frontier being imperatively necessary, I have, pending your approval, to-day authorised the Commander-in-Chief to send troops into Mohmand limits. Major Godfrey has consulted friendly tribes, who agree that the expedition is necessary. Spirit of your instructions in regard to Zakka Khel will be strictly followed. The force would consist of two brigades and one in reserve, and should advance immediately. Your early sanction is very anxiously awaited.

No. 63.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th May, 1903.

(Telegraphic)

Your telegram of to-day's date. Your directions to Commander-in-Chief as to Mohmand expedition, to be carried through on the lines of the Zakka policy, have my entire approval.

No. 64.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 10th May, 1903.

(Telegraphic.)

There is no change in the position. Swat is steady and Ningrahar quiet. The Upper Mohmands say they will fight. Sartor Fakir, according to report, has reached territory of Azzi Khel, but his arrival there is not acceptable to Dabuzis.

No. 65.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 11th May, 1903.

(Telegraphic.)

Following further telegram, dated 4th May, from the Political Agent, Malakand, is repeated for information in continuation of my telegram dated 5th instant:—"The Khan of Dir and the chief of the tribes are all at the Panjkora bridge, the message of the Viceroy has been communicated to them. They all assembled immediately with the native officers of Dir levies, and made unanimous request that an assurance of their loyalty to the British Government should be conveyed to Lord Minto, to which they added statement that threefold strength and determination to keep any disloyalty to the Government of India in check has been given to them by the Viceroy's kind notice. Khans of Swat were much gratified by the Viceroy's message, of which I went to Chakdara to tell them."

No. 66.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 12th May, 1903.

(Telegraphic.)

According to telegram dated the night of 11th May, from Political Agent, Khyber, all was quiet in Ningrahar, and no sign of anyone going to join Mohmands. After visiting Governor of Jalalabad, Hazrat and Sufi Sahib have returned to Charbagh and Drabgai. According to telegram from Political Agent, Malakand, an attempt to incite tribesmen to ghaza is being made by Sartor Fakir, who is at Manglaor. Ranizais, in Major Godfrey's opinion, can and will hold their own

against him, and so far he has not met with much success. A warning to be in readiness to attack Drosh is reported by the Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, to have been sent to Padshah of Kunar, a disciple of the late Hadda Mulla, who had incited the people of Asmar and Kafirstan to join the Mohmand lashkar. In view of Mulla's want of success in Kafirstan and elsewhere, Assistant Political Agent thinks that the chance of aggression by Padshah is remote. The necessary precautions have, however, been taken.

No. 67.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 12th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

The advance into the Mohmand country will begin to-morrow. All posts on the Mohmand border are now held by the 3rd Brigade, whilst the 1st and 2nd Brigades are concentrated at the mouth of Gundab Nullah.

No. 68.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks has been instructed as follows:—"Instructions as to objective of expedition against the Mohmand tribes have already been received by you. The policy of Government is the same as that announced in the case of the expedition against the Zakka. Punishment and the reduction of the Mohmands to submission as soon as possible are the objects of the expedition. The absence of all desire or intention on the part of the Government to annex Mohmand territory or to interfere with the *status quo* in respect of the general relations between Government and the Mohmands should be made widely known by you. In bringing offending sections to submission you will lose no opportunity of securing assistance of other sections. You should treat with indulgence sections who have shown a disposition to submit. No terms should be announced by you to any section without previous reference to Government of India. Complications with tribes or sections of tribes who may be settled on Afghan side of the Durand line must be avoided."

No. 69.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 2nd May. Composition of force. Owing to sporadic cholera following changes have been made: First Brigade, 22nd Punjabis replace 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, Second Brigade, 54th Sikhs replace Queen's Own Corps of Guides; Third Reserve Brigade, 1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles replace 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers and 2nd Punjabis. Queen's Own Corps of Guides have been added to divisional troops. First and Second Brigades as now constituted will advance into Mohmand country. Queen's Own Corps of Guides and one battalion from Third Reserve Brigade will hold lines of communication in advance of Shabkadr. Remaining three battalions of that Brigade will hold posts on Mohmand border and lines of communication back to Peshawar. 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles are being brought up from Hasan Abdal to complete the Malakand Moveable Column in place of 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles. When reported free from infection, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers return to Peshawar, and 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers go to Nowshera as a temporary measure.

No. 70.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 13th May. Following further changes have been made in composition of force:—Third brigade:—19th Punjabis replace 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, moved into camp on account of cholera. 21st Punjabis is regiment from third brigade holding lines of communication in advance of Shabkadr. The 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, who replaced 54th Sikhs at Jamrud (see my telegram of the 8th May), are being withdrawn to Peshawar. The composition of fourth brigade:—1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles replace 1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and 19th Punjabis.

No. 71.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs 13th May from Shankargarh:—"All quiet on Mohmand border. 26 fresh cases of cholera in 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, and one in 40th Pathans. Nine deaths and 29 cases in 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers to date"

From Camp Dand, Gundab Valley, 13th May:—"First brigade and divisional troops arrived here to-day. Road has been improved for camel transport. Second brigade at Hafizkor. Flying column advances to-morrow without transport; remaining troops follow as far as Ghalanai. Second brigade will come to Dand. Heliographic communication may be difficult, but Officer Commanding Ghalanai will report."

No. 72.*From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Arrived Nahaki yesterday with two battalions, four guns, two squadrons. Kharappa and Nahaki Passes not held by enemy. Reconnaissance up the Khapak Pass fired on. Remainder of First Brigade and Second Brigade arrive here to-day from Ghalanai.

No. 73.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs from Nahaki, 15th May, 7 a.m.:—"Arrived here yesterday with part of Anderson's Brigade. No opposition experienced by main portion of column, but reconnaissance to Khapak Pass and patrol in this valley fired on; also some sniping here last night. No casualties. Health troops here excellent. Heat very great during day, but nights cool."

No. 74.

From Chief Staff Officer, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Further reconnaissance of Khapak Pass carried out to-day, and found to be held in strength. Reconnaissance also carried up valley to N.E. Nahaki, where enemy was found in small numbers. 1st and 2nd brigades will be concentrated at Nahaki to-morrow. Casualties during day, three sowars, 21st Cavalry, slightly wounded.

No. 75.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General, lines of communication, telegraphs 16th May, 1908, from Shankargarh:—All reported quiet this morning from Michni to Abazai.

No. 76.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th May, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

General, lines of communication, wires to-day:—"All reported quiet on Mohmand border from Michni to Abazai"

General Willcocks wires from Nahaki—"Anderson reports determined attacks were made last night on his camp picquets at Darwazagai, during severe thunderstorm. Picquet of 22nd Punjabis had to be reinforced between 10 and 11 p m. Enemy was beaten off about 2 a m, leaving many dead bodies on hills round the picquets. Our casualties were:—22nd Punjabis, one native officer, seven rank and file killed, four men dangerously wounded, five men wounded severely, five men wounded slightly; 57th Rifles, one man wounded slightly, 59th Rifles, one native officer killed, one native officer wounded slightly, total, two native officers and seven native ranks killed, one native officer and 23 native ranks wounded"

No. 77.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 17th May, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

Determined attacks were made last night on picquets of Darwazagai camp during a severe thunderstorm, picquet 22nd Punjabis being so hard pressed that it was necessary to reinforce it. Enemy beaten off at 2 a m, leaving many dead bodies on hills round picquet. Our casualties during 17th, and night 16th-17th, including those reported in my telegram of yesterday, were:—22nd Punjabis, one native officer and seven sepoy killed, four sepoy dangerously, five sepoy severely, and five slightly, wounded, 59th Rifles, one sepoy slightly wounded, 57th Rifles, one native officer killed, one native officer wounded, one sepoy dangerously, five sepoy severely, two sepoy slightly, wounded. Both Brigades were occupied to-day in destroying towers of villages of Kandahari Sufis and recalcitrant Halimzais. First Brigade destroyed 14 towers to north and north-west of Darwazagai, while Second Brigade destroyed those of Gum Batai, Lachi, and Khawaja Kin. Quantities stacked grain also destroyed. Brigade camps as yesterday

No. 78.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Intelligence received from Political Agent, Khyber, 16th May. Following is summary:—Mohmands from Afghan territory, to number of 400, have gone to join those within our limits. They have not been joined by any Afridis. A farman from Kabul has been received by the Sarhang of Dakka. He has publicly announced that the Amir disapproves of his subjects joining the Mohmands. The Hakim of Lalpura has made similar announcement. Sarhang has had orders that various Afghan officials who took part in the first Mohmand outbreak and joined in the invasion of Khyber are to be sent by him to Kabul.

No. 79.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding lines of communication telegraphs from Shankargarh, 18th May:—"All reported quiet this morning on Mohmand border from Michni to Abazai"

No. 80.*From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

First Brigade after punishing most southernly of the Kandahari Sufis has returned to Nahaki. Second Brigade has proceeded up the Bohai Dag to destroy Khan Beg Kor, which was latterly the headquarters of Hazrat Mulla. Casualty, one sepoy, 59th Rifles, slightly wounded

No. 81.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks wires from Nahaki last night that First Brigade has returned to Nahaki from operations against Kandahari Sufis. Second Brigade has proceeded up the Bohai Dag Kor. Casualty, one sepoy, 59th Rifles, wounded slightly.

No. 82.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic)

Camp of First Brigade was attacked last night at Nahaki by about 500 men, said to be Utmanzai and Darwazai lashkar. Enemy came on from three sides, advancing encouraged by shouts of Mulla and tom-toms playing. Attack was not pushed home, being checked by fire of picquets, though sniping continued during the night. Our troops were thoroughly well entrenched and covered in village, and casualties were very slight. One sepoy, 22nd, and one transport driver slightly wounded, and some horses and mules hit. Report just received from General Barrett that Second Brigade, *en route* to Khan Beg Khor, met with strong

opposition yesterday from Khwaizais, Baizais, and others, near Zarawar China, the hills on both sides of the valley being held. From these they were dislodged with heavy loss, the 58th taking the spurs on the north, and the 28th those on the south, with great dash. While 34th Pioneers were destroying towers of Zarawar China, one party was charged by 12 ghazis, who were all bayoneted after killing three and wounding two Pioneers. The village of Khan Beg Khor was reached and destroyed, the troops camping for night at a tank two miles east. Enemy's loss heavy, estimated at 60 killed. Five prisoners, with rifles, taken. Enemy were estimated at 2,000, and fought well. Our casualties were:—Lieutenant Ivens, 26th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs, dangerously wounded, Captain Finlay, 58th Rifles, attached 57th Rifles, and Lieutenant Sparling, 57th Rifles, both slightly wounded. 28th Punjabis:—1 sepoy killed, 1 sepoy dangerously, 1 sepoy severely, 2 slightly, wounded. 54th Sikhs:—1 sepoy severely, 1 slightly wounded. 57th Rifles:—1 sepoy killed; 2 severely, 1 slightly, wounded. 34th Pioneers:—3 sepoys killed; 2 severely wounded. 55th Rifles:—1 sepoy killed; 3 severely, 1 slightly, wounded. 23rd Mountain Battery:—1 sepoy slightly wounded. 21st Cavalry:—1 sowar slightly wounded. 28th Mule Corps:—1 mule driver slightly wounded. Total, 3 British officers wounded. Rank and file, 6 killed, 18 wounded. Second Brigade retiring to Nahaki to-morrow, and First Brigade moves north towards Lakari. Field Force Headquarters will accompany this Brigade.

No. 83.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th May, 1908

(Telegraphic)

My telegram of the 14th May. 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, being free from cholera, have replaced 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment in Fourth Brigade.

No. 84.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 20th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Nahaki camp of First Brigade here was again attacked in force last night from 9 to 12. The enemy showed much daring and crept up to close quarters through the many ravines in vicinity of camp. Some were bayoneted on the breast-works. Though the firing was heavy and continuous, I am glad to be able to report that casualties were small. One sepoy, 22nd Punjabis, killed; one sowar, 21st Cavalry, wounded. Several transport animals were also killed and wounded. Second Brigade, yesterday, destroyed the towers of the village of Kung, and has, to-day, returned to Nahaki. First Brigade moved, to-day, to Umra Killi. May be out of touch for next four days, during which time General Barrett will communicate with you. Following casualties, Second Brigade, since night, 18th:—One man, 21st Cavalry, severely wounded; Seaforth Highlanders, No 9546 Private John White, accidentally killed; 54th Sikhs, one man killed, two men dangerously wounded, and three men severely wounded; 54th Rifles, one man severely wounded.

No. 85.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 21st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

We yesterday found enemy holding village of Umra Killi, a deep and very intricate nullah behind, and hills beyond, in considerable strength. From these they were dislodged by First Brigade after stubborn resistance, during which their

leaders frequently led charges with swords. Enemy consequently lost very heavily, probably over 200, very many dead bodies being counted by our officers; but even then they closed in on the entrenchments as night fell and made several half-hearted attacks during night. Towards evening numbers could be seen leaving their main body, carrying dead and wounded. The lashkar was composed of Dawazai, Utman Khel, and Sufis. To-day I will destroy Utmanzai and Sufi villages and quantities of corn, which is stored all over valley.

Casualties —

Killed.—Lieutenant Soole, 21st Cavalry, and Lieutenant Archibald, 82nd Punjabis, attached 57th Rifles. Slightly wounded.—Lieutenant Bruce, 53rd Sikhs.

Killed.—One native officer, 57th; one sepoy, 57th; one sepoy, 53rd. Wounded.—One gunner, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and one gunner 81st Heavy Battery, employed as signaller; one subadar, three sepoy, 53rd; six sepoy, 57th; two sepoy, 59th; two sowars, 21st Cavalry; three followers.

Total.—Two British officers killed, one wounded; native officers, one killed, one wounded, rank and file, two killed, 15 wounded. Several horses and mules killed and wounded.

55th Rifles and two guns, 28th Mountain Battery, join this column for present operations.

No. 86.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 22nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday and to-day have destroyed towers and grain of Kandahari Sufi village between Nahaki and Lakarai, that section having refused the very moderate terms offered them. In consequence of punishment meted out to Kandahari sections the Zulbuz and Masand section of Sufi tribes have now come in and accepted terms. Enemy held very strong position on Lakarai Kotal in great strength, but, when we occupied pass, they put up a white flag and sent in jirga. Casualties: Captain O'Grady, 59th Rifles, gunshot through thigh, severe. All quiet at Nahaki.

No. 87.

From General Barrett, Commanding Second Brigade, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 23rd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

I reconnoitred to-day towards Shabai Pass, remaining out till 3 p.m. No guns heard from Wilcocks' direction. But few enemy seen. My casualties nil. Health troops here remains good.

No. 88.

From General Barrett, Commanding Second Brigade, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 24th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Wilcocks heliographs to-day:—"We are now close to Kargha, in front of which about 2,000 Utman Khels had taken up a regular sangared position, but after shelling them they have cleared and now do not mean fighting. We reach Mulla Killai to-morrow." I reconnoitred to-day to within three miles of Mulla Killai. No opposition. Regret to report death of Major M. C. MacLachlan, Seaforth Highlanders, accidentally shot in camp to-day.

No. 89.*From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th May, 1908.*

(Telegraphic.)

Report from General Willcocks states that terms were not accepted by Sufi jirga which came in on the 21st or 22nd instant. Upon resumption of punitive operations against them, payment of the whole Sufi fine was undertaken by Gurbaz Masaud Sufi. Sufi and Musa Khel Mitai jirgas made submission on the 23rd instant, the terms being the demolition of Bagh and of one village in Lakarai, and a fine of Rs 4,500. As regards the settlement arrived at, Sir J. Willcocks, who says that negotiations were full of difficulties, commends the skill and great patience of the Political Officer, Major Blakeway.

No. 90.*From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 25th May, 1908*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Kargha, 24th May. First Brigade moved yesterday from Lakarai to Shato Khel with only slight opposition. Casualties: one sepoy 55th, and one 57th, wounded. To-day advanced to this place. Enemy held strongly entrenched position at entrance to Ambahar, about 2,000 strong from all Utman Khel sections, with men from Bagura and Nawagai. Their left flank was turned, and they were heavily punished, the cavalry pursuing and completing the rout. Enemy left over 100 killed on the field. Our casualties were slight, two native ranks killed, and nine wounded. Moving to-morrow to Mulla Killai, where troops will have a well-earned rest of two days, while I hope to clear up political situation. Heat intense, but health of troops good.

No. 91.*From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 27th May, 1908*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Mulla Killai, 26th May. Enemy's casualties on the Ambahar have now been ascertained as 140 killed, and large numbers wounded. Reached this place yesterday, with opposition, with First Brigade, and joined here this morning by portion of Second Brigade with convoy of supplies. First Brigade leaves for India, *via* Pandiali, on the 28th. I proceed, with Second Brigade, to settle certain questions with Baizai and Khwaizai, and hope to recross one border, *via* Gandao Valley, on 1st June. Heat very trying, wounded doing well, and health of troops good.

No. 92.*From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 27th May, 1908*

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Nahaki, 27th May. Marched to-day from Mulla Killai with portion Barrett's Brigade to bring further pressure on recalcitrant Utmanzai and Dawazai sections. Presence of our troops at Yakdand proved sufficient to bring both to terms, and since my arrival here the Khwaizai have also sent in jirga and submitted. There only remains now the Baizai section recalcitrant, and I am dealing with them to-morrow and following day. Hope all troops will have crossed border by 31st. Sick and wounded doing well, and general health good in spite of great heat and arduous marching.

No. 93.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 29th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

Proceeded yesterday with Second Brigade from Nahaki to Khan Beg Kor. As only the Bazar section of Mohmands has refused to submit after being given every opportunity of doing so, and as they have taken part in many fights against us, I considered it necessary to punish them before leaving Mohmand country, and consequently visited their headquarters at Khuda Khel to-day, where I have destroyed all their towers and large quantity of grain and fodder. Second Brigade returns to Khan Beg Kor to-day, and to Galanai to-morrow, 30th. First Brigade proceeds to-day from Dag to Lagham. All troops will leave Mohmand country by 31st

No. 94.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 30th May, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Following casualties occurred in fighting with Khuda Khel yesterday:—Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs, gunshot wound, abdomen, dangerous Havildar, 5 sepoy, 54th Sikhs, and 4 sepoy, Guides' Infantry, wounded 2nd Brigade withdrawn over Khapak and Nahaki Passes respectively to Galanai in Gundab Valley without a shot being fired 2nd Brigade moves to-morrow to Hafiz Kor 1st Brigade to-day moves to Nafgal Khel and proceeds to Peshawar 31st instant

No. 95.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 30th May, 1908

(Telegraphic)

Regret to report death to-day from wound received in action of Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs

No. 96.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic)

General Willcocks wires from Hafiz Kor, 31 May, following casualties are reported during night 29th-30th and withdrawal picquets evening 30th May:—One private, 1st Seaforth Highlanders, 4 sepoy, wounded

No. 97.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Last troops Mohmand Field Force crossed border at 2 p.m. yesterday. No shots fired since leaving Khwaizai country

No. 98.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Punitive measures having concluded, General Willcocks and staff returned to Peshawar 31st May. First Brigade re-crossed administrative border on 30th May, and Second Brigade on 31st May; lines of communication troops on 1st June. Demobilisation is now proceeding as rapidly as possible

No. 99.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks has informed you from time to time of progress of military operations against Mohmands. In now reporting conclusion of operations I send following summary of results achieved. Punitive force reached hostile territory on 15th May last, and the punishment of sections commenced after Willcocks had announced there was no intention of annexation or interfering with maintenance of *status quo*. Mitai Musa Khel section of Baizai were first to submit, and were on 19th May ordered to pay fine of Rs. 2,000 and surrender 6 rifles. Sufis, whose towers had been destroyed on 17th May came in on 20th May, but refused to accede to demands. After further punishment they agreed to fine of Rs. 4,500. Pandialis on 22nd May accepted fine of Rs. 2,000 and 6 rifles. Kamali Halimzai submitted on 25th, but were to be exempted from fine as they had been severely punished by destruction of towers. Utmanzai and Dawazai agreed on 27th May to fine of Rs. 1,000 each, while Khwaizai submitted same day, but were not fined as they had suffered severely. Utman Khel received heavy punishment, losing 140 killed at Ambahar on 24th May, but were not further proceeded against. By 28th May all sections had submitted except Baizai of Bohai Dag and had either paid fines or furnished hostages for prompt payment. Announcement was made on 28th May that account with them was settled, that allowances outstanding would be forfeited but that payment would be resumed forthwith. This announcement has been received with satisfaction. Baizais whose attitude had been contemptuous throughout were duly chastised, and by 30th May entire force was well on way back. Combined jirga of assured tribes and Khwaizai met Willcocks at Galanai on same day and delivered request signed by Maliks that Government might be informed of their intention to refuse passage to Baizai raiders. Willcocks reports they harbour no ill will towards us and ascribe their misfortunes to Baizai. All fines were paid in by 31st May and hostages released. Entire force is now back in Peshawar district. We consider the result of expedition highly satisfactory, and that it reflects much credit on General Willcocks and his Chief Political Officer, Major Blakeway, who were working under great difficulties. We also consider that great credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Godfrey, Political Agent, Dir, Swat, &c., whose management of Bajaur, Dir, and Swat tribes during recent expedition contributed largely to localisation of the disturbances. We have already intimated our high opinion of the value of Colonel Roos-Keppel's services in keeping the Afridis quiet.

No. 100.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy dated 4th June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

His Majesty's Government share the satisfaction you express in your telegram of the 2nd instant at the result of the expedition against the Mohmands, and offer their congratulations to yourself and to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I request that General Willcocks and the other officers named may be informed of my entire concurrence in the tribute which you pay to their services.

No. 101.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Frontier operations. Cost of Zakka Khel expedition. It is not yet possible to obtain final figures, as it will take time to determine the exact extent of replacements. But at present £57,000 is estimated cost. Mohmand and connected operations Estimate is £150,000, but this is wholly provisional. Excess of cost over that for expedition against Zakka Khel is due to the precautionary movements made in view of prevention of possible developments, to the outbreak of cholera among the troops, and to the longer duration of operations. Provision for batta is also included in the estimate. The Gazette casualties are as follows:—(1.) Expedition against Zakka Khel. Native troops: one killed, two died of wounds, two died of disease, 25 wounded, none taken prisoner. British troops: two killed, one died from wounds, nine wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost 70 killed and 130 wounded; no prisoners were taken. (2.) Kargha. No casualties among British troops. Native troops: two killed and nine wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost 120 killed and 200 wounded. Five prisoners were taken and released, with the exception of two mullas and one man long wanted for crimes in the Peshawar district. The mullas will also shortly be released. (3.) Mohmand. British troops: eight killed, two died of wounds, 39 died of disease, 33 wounded, none taken prisoner. Native troops: 22 killed, four died of wounds, 12 died of disease, 142 wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost a large number wounded, and between 300 and 400 killed, five prisoners were taken who have since been set at liberty.

PART IV.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

List of Raids and Outrages committed on the North-West Frontier from July, 1899, to July, 1906.
(Prepared in the Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of the Staff Army Head-Quarters in India)

(1)—KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER

Date	Nature of outrage	Clan or section implicated	Reparation exacted.
1899.			
26th September ..	Gurkha picket at Michni Kandao fired on One man wounded	Shinwaris (led by Shakar)	
September 1899 to February 1900	Constant raids and counter-raids across the Afghan border	Khusrogis of Bazar and Shinwaris of Ningrahar	
1899.			
28th October ...	Murder of a man in Shinpokh	Shulmans	Fine imposed.
2nd November ...	Two horses stolen from Peshawar, cavalry lines	Shinwaris	
15th November ..	Eighty Commissariat goats raided at Landi Kotal	Khusrogis	Goats recovered by Khyber Rifles
17th November .	Attack on Khyber Rifle picket at Michni Kandao	"	Four Khusrogis killed; one wounded.
30th November...	Three Government bullocks stolen from Peshawar.	Shinwaris of Ningrahar.	
1st December ...	Two Hindus kidnapped in Peshawar District.	Khusrogis.	
2nd December ...	Convoy fired on in the Khyber	Khusrogis	Houses of leaders burnt.
1900.			
7th January ..	Cattle of the village of Achini, Peshawar District, raided	Khusrogis and Shinwaris	Booty recovered by pursuing party.
9th January ...	Sepoy of Khyber Rifles wounded at Jamrud.	Kuki Khel sepoy of Khyber Rifles	
26th March ..	Murder of Mr Gunter at Shabkadr	Kuki Khel Afridi...	Executed.
15th April ...	Murder of Lieutenant Green, R E Village of Phandu, Peshawar District, attacked	Aka Khel	
19th April ...	Sentry of Khyber Rifles murdered	Kuki Khel <i>hamsaya</i>	Fine of Rs. 1,500 and a rifle imposed
Ditto ...	Telegraph wire cut between Peshawar and Hari Singh	Khusrogis	
1st May ..	Two Kuki Khels shot at Tarkhal Bala	Villagers	Compensation paid
7th August ..	Sepoy of Khyber Rifles murdered on Khyber road	Unknown	Rs 1,200 fine imposed on neighbouring villages
3rd September ...	Attempted cattle theft in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	One man captured and tried. Sentence not stated
20th October ..	Donkeys raided near Ilm Gudr	Kuki Khel.	
27th October ..	Donkeys raided near Ohora	"	Leader imprisoned and released on giving security
—	Several raids in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	Four months' allowances cut
9th December	Naik of Khyber Rifles wounded near Jamrud	Aka Khel	
1901.			
6th January ..	Three Khyber Rifles' rifles stolen	Unknown	
January ...	Two mules stolen from Peshawar	Mullagoris	Rs 200 fine. Mules recovered
" ...	Ten camels stolen from Peshawar	"	Camels recovered
February ...	Sheep raided in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	Fine of Rs 50. Sheep recovered
2nd March ...	Shinwari sheep raided	Hasarnao gang	
16th ..	Bullock stolen from Peshawar	Khusrogis	Recovered
4th April ..	Aka Khel cattle raided on Kajuri plain	Kuki Khel	
3rd May ..	Convoy fired at in the Khyber	Khusrogis	Offenders imprisoned
28th " ...	4 rifles stolen from Khyber Rifles	Shinwaris, including 2 sepoy.	Sepoys sentenced to three years' imprisonment
8th June ..	Six hundred sheep raided from Ningrahar	Sangu Khel refugees	Sheep restored
June ...	Two horses stolen on Kohat road	Fandai Zakka Khel	Horses restored Fine of Rs. 250 paid
2nd July... ..	Four men murdered close to Landi Kotal	Shinwaris	Rs 1 000 fine imposed
8th August ...	Sowar of Khyber Rifles murdered on Peshawar road	Unknown	
9th August ...	Hindu kidnapped on Kohat road	Aka and Zakka Khel.	
17th October ..	Mare stolen from Nowshera	Shinwaris	Mare recovered
1st December	Trading party attacked near Hasarnao	Khusrogis	
1st ..	Sheep raided in Shulman	Zakka Khel	Recovered.
3th " ...	Two ponies stolen from Peshawar transport lines	Ningraharis	Recovered by Khyber Rifles
16th " ...	Two Sepoys of Khyber Rifles fired at near Ali Musjid	Kuki Khel	Fine of Rs. 75 imposed.
23rd " ...	Sheep of village of Sangu raided.	Khusrogis	Houses of leaders burnt; fine imposed

KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1902.			
6th January	Two daktaites in Peshawar District ...	Aka Khel and others ...	Fine of Rs. 8,000 (Kabul) imposed.
January ..	Some shots fired near Khyber road ...	Pakhal Zakka Khel ...	Fine recovered by tribe.
February - March	Several raids and counter-raids ...	Shinwaris of Loargai and men of Dakka.	
17th March	Border Military Police sepoy shot near Iim Gudr.	Unknown ...	Sepalis of Ibn Gudr fined Rs. 2,000
4th May ..	Banna of Landi Kotal robbed ...	Afghan Khassadars.	
5th July...	Sangu Khel murdered in the Khyber ...	Zakka Khel sepoy of 20th Punjab Infantry.	Fine of Rs. 500.
14th ,, ..	Ningrahar: traders robbed near Torkham	Zakka Khel... ..	Property recovered and thieves captured by Khyber Rifles
August	Several raids on the Kajural plain ...	Aka Khel	
1903			
20th February ..	Khyber Rifle picket fired on ..	Khusrogi .. .	House of leader burnt.
2nd May and following days.	Khyber Rifles at Smatzai fired on ..	Koda Khel Mohmands.	
26th May ...	Afghan post at Durbaba fired at ..	Anai Zakka Khel.	
July-August ...	Continuous unsuccessful attacks on the Sha Orakzai.	All Afridi and Sunni Orakzai sections.	
22nd August	Women of Landi Kotal carried off through Afghan territory.	Zakka Khel.	
14th November...	Malikdin Khel women seized close to Jamrud.	Kuki Khel	Women released by Political Agent.
1904			
20th January ...	Telegraph wire in the Khyber cut ...	Unknown.	
4th March	Ditto ditto ..	" ..	
21st "	Attempt to murder Colonel Finnis, R.E., at Peshawar Railway Station	Aka Khel Afridi	Executed.
9th June	Police man murdered and attempt to attack British soldiers	Mulla of Kunar	"
15th "	Cattle stolen from village of Mashu Khel, Peshawar District	Shinwaris and Zakka Khel	Cattle re-captured by Malik Far Muhammad.
3rd September ...	Raid on the village of Darahi Khel, Kohat District.	Zakka and Kambar Khel ...	Tribe forced to take action. Several ringleaders killed; others expelled.
7th October	Rafts on the river near Loi Shilman fired on.	Mohmands.	
2nd December	Attempt to murder the Sub-divisional Officer in charge of the Mullagori road.	Unknown.	
4th December	Raid on the village of Pabn. One man killed and two wounded. Property valued Rs 4,000 stolen.	Residents of District ...	Some local residents arrested and Rs. 350 worth of property recovered
9th December	Peshawar Railway station entered and cash stolen from booking office	Local bad characters.	
1905			
10th January ...	Afridi outlaws fire on Khyber Rifles at Sanghakai Pass and Karawal hill. One sepoy killed and one wounded.	Sipah Afridis	Two killed and two wounded.
1st February	Raid on Akhora Bazar Two constables and two villagers wounded and one chankidar killed.	Hazarnao gang	One rader killed, others believed to have been wounded.
February	Border Military Police post surprised at Banda Dand Shah, Teri, Kohat. Six rifles stolen.	Zakka Khel Afridis	
23th February ..	Attack on the Matanni police post	Peshawaris, Afridis and the Hazarnao gang	
8th March ...	Raid on the village of Sherdad Garhi ..	Kuki Khel and others ...	Sahibgul, Kuki Khel, arrested.
10th March	Raid on <i>dharmaala</i> in Peshawar City. Cash box said to contain Rs. 25,000 and large amount of property stolen	Jafar, Torai and other Hazarnao outlaws with 12 Afridis.	Afridi <i>yaga</i> paid fine of Rs. 1,000, the Bawa and chankidar imprisoned.
13th "	Attempt to steal rifles from station cells at Kohat, two sepoys wounded.	Basti Khel Afridis... ..	Three captured and imprisoned. Basti Khels fined.
22nd April	Twelve women carried off from Landi Kotal. One wounded	Khusrogi	Women returned on payment of ransom of Rs. 105 each.
24th April	Raid on Jamrud. No details ..	Hazarnao gang	Special references made to the Amr regarding the Hazarnao gang.
25th April	Attack on the tonga <i>chanki</i> at Matanni. Five ponies stolen.	"	"
26th April ...	Tonga pony station at Matanni raided ...	The Hazarnao gang, etc.	
9th May ...	Khassadar post at Smatzai attacked ..	Afghan Khassadars.	
9th June	Border Military Police, Kohat, fire on gang of outlaws. 1 captured.		
9th September	Murder on the Mullagori road ...	Mullagoria.	
September ...	Attack on grass-cutters at Matanni, one man killed, one rifle taken.	Zakka Khel Afridis.	

KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted
1905— <i>cont.</i>			
20th September	Villagers of Matanni robbed	Aka Khel and Sturi Khel.	
16th December ..	Lieutenant Mackie fired on near Jamrud	Mullagoria.	
22nd " ..	Raid on village of Banamari	Zakka Khel and outlaws ..	One outlaw shot.
31st " ..	Mullagori sepoy of Kohat Railway murdered near Jamrud	Two Mullagori sepoys ...	Seven years' imprisonment inflicted
January	Attack on the shop of a Hindu in Kohat District, Ram Singh, the owner, wounded.	Nine men led by a Zakka Khel.	
1906			
3rd March ...	Kuchi sheep raided in Ningrahar ..	Sangru Khel refugees and Zakka Khel.	Settled through Malik Yar Muhammad
21st March ..	Raid on village of Jogan. Theft of property valued at Rs. 15,700.	(1) Outlaws and others, resident in Afghanistan, and (2) Tarakzai Mohmands	Amir informed regarding (1) Mohmands surrendered 20 persons of whom 7 detained for trial.
9th April ...	Raid on village of Tangi	Zakka Khel, Mohmands, Utman Khel and others.	Utman Khel fined.
26th " ..	Mullagori contractor murdered in Railway Camp.	Mullagori	Murderer sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000
28th May ...	Attack on village of Shahab Khel	Zakka Khel	

(2).—KURRAM.

1899.			
29th November	Raided a small flock of sheep belonging to Ghilzai <i>hameayaha</i> living in Kurram.	Khoedad Khels, Khojal Khels.	
1900.			
3rd March ...	Cutting telegraph wire, two posts torn and 20 yards wire carried off	Khani Khel Chamkanna.	
10th August ...	Shots fired at night into Sadda village ..	Masuzai	
16th August ..	Sepoy of Kurram Militia shot	Kuki Khel, Afridia ...	Brother, and two other relatives, of murderer arrested, July 1901.
September ..	About 400 men raided village of Kharan near Matun, two villagers killed and 800 cattle and 2,000 sheep and goats carried off.	Wazirs and Dauris.	
14th September	25 cattle carried off from Bonzala grazing-grounds	Khoedad Khels.	
October	Small party carried off some cattle belonging to a Tur, near Darwasagai.	Jajis.	
October	Carried off seven flocks of sheep from some Ghilzai encampments near Matun.	Mohmt Khel, Wazirs.	
7th November ..	Large gang of raiders attacked some Ghilzais at Tor Obo in Khoat, one killed on each side	Wazirs.	
November ..	Raided Khaduzai, in Khoat; 60 cattle carried off	Mohmt Khel, Wazirs.	
December ...	Stole three mules from main road in Kurram.	Mastu Khel, Masuzai.	
8th December ...	Carried off flock of sheep from a Ghilzai encampment at Tor Obo, in Khoat.	Hassan Khel, Wazirs	
8th December ...	Carried off 80 sheep and eight donkeys from Shekhan, in Khoat.	Mohmt Khel, Wazirs.	
1901.			
February ...	Carried off 120 cattle and 100 sheep from Gurbas, in Khoat.	Mahsud Wazirs.	
22nd February ...	Party of 80 men cut telegraph wire near Sada	Mastu Khel, Masuzai.	
26th February ...	Carried off 400 head of cattle from some Ghilzais near Matun; one Ghilzai killed.	Wazirs.	

KURRAM—continued.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1901—cont.			
3rd March ...	Ineffectual raid on Ghilzai flocks near Tor Obo, in Khost, two Ghilzais and three Wazirs killed.	Hassan Khel, Wazira.	
7th March ...	Ineffectual raid on Hassan Khel, Wazir flocks, one Wazir killed.	Ghilzais.	
9th March ...	Party of Turis, carrying salt, attacked on road between Turkas and Thal.	—	
March ...	Carried off 20 head of cattle from Khapanga, in Lower Kurram.	Hassan Khel, Wazira.	
13th March ...	Ineffectual raid on Turi cattle near Dar wasagai.	Jajis	Governor of Khost informed and requested to prevent recurrence.
25th March ...	Carried off Rs. 1,000 in cash from a Ghilzai <i>hajira</i> in Khost.	Hassan Khel, Wazira.	
28th March ...	Strong gang completely looted Hindu caravan between Matun and Dawar, two Afghan sepoy, and one Hindu killed.	Wazira.	
13th March ...	Carried off 100 sheep from Lakand, in Khost.	Madda Khel, Wazira.	
28th March ...	Raided 20 head of Turi cattle from Darwasagai.	Jajis	Governor of Khost notified.
27th June ...	Raided 40 head of cattle from Faiwar villages.	Do.	
2nd July... ..	Raided nine bullocks and 14 sheep from Turi village of Kunj Ahizai.	Muqbilas.	
July	Attack on Ibrahimzai village; some villagers carried off.	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
16th August ...	Attacked party of Khostwal residents of Inzra, in lower Kurram, one Khostwal killed and remainder looted of all they had.	Mohmit Khel, Wazira.	
7th October ...	Carried off 128 sheep from Balamun . .	Jajis	Governor of Khost notified.
November ...	Raided 10 head of cattle and some sheep from Tanni villages in Khost.	Kabul Khel, Wazira.	
1902.			
8th February ...	Cutting telegraph wire in Kurram ...	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
13th March ...	Ditto	Ditto.	
28th March ...	Raided 32 sheep from Turi village of Bugdi	Mangala	
19th April ...	Ineffectual raid on Turi cattle near Laka Tiga post.	Jajis.	
20th April ...	Large <i>lashkar</i> fired on labourers at work on Laka Tiga post.	Do.	Governor of Khost notified.
23rd April ...	Raided 23 head of cattle belonging to malik of Balamun.	Do.	
3rd May	Ineffectual attempt to raid Turi cattle close to Kharlachi post.	Jajis	
19th May ...	Gang of 80 men raided large number of cattle and sheep from Turi villages of Jalma and Chashawan, most of animals recovered and 8 Jajis killed.	Jajis.	
July	Raided flock of sheep from Dargai, in Khost.	Mahmud Khel, Wazira.	
8th August ...	Large gang attempted to raid cattle from Turi villages of Kharlachi and Shungak, 3 Turis, and 4 Muqbilas, said to have been killed.	Muqbilas	Governor of Khost notified.
August	Raided about 200 cattle from Khadizai, in Khost.	Wazira.	
30th August .	Raided into Kurram and carried off over Rs. 3,000 worth of property, killing one man.	Jajis, Muqbilas.	
9th September ...	Raided 9 Turi bullocks	Jajis.	
September ...	Samana rifles patrol fire on raiders. One wounded and captured.	Khojal Khel Tori Khel.	
29th September...	Affair with Kurram Militia near Wali Chuna.	Jajis.	
1903.			
January	Raided 20 camels from Ghilzais in Khost	Wazira.	
3rd February ...	Large gang attempted to raid Ibrahimzai and Sadda villages; met Militia patrol from Sadda post on whom they fired, were finally driven off after engagement lasting 3 hours.	Masta Khel, Mamaszais.	
15th March ...	Attacked party of Ghilzais on road between Chapri and Thal and carried off 180 sheep.	Zaimukhta.	
March	Attacked a Ghilzai camp in Khost, killed the Ghilzais and carried off 4 rifles and 120 camels.	Mahmud Khel, Wazira.	

KURRAM—continued.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1903—cont.			
20th April ..	Carried off a Hindu woman from just outside Sadda village and kept her till Rs 1,100 was paid as ransom	Mastu Khel, Massuzais.	
4th August ...	Raided 80 sheep from Mulla Bagh in Kurram; 2 Turis seriously wounded.	Ningraharis... ..	Naib-Hakim of Ningrahar informed.
September ..	Raided 300 cattle and sheep from Ningrahar	Chamkannis.	
September ..	Raided a Shinwari village, killed and wounded several villagers and drove off some cattle	Khami Khel, Chamkannis.	
26th September .	Raided 12 head of Turi cattle	Jajs.	
1904.			
11th February ..	Cut telegraph line between Ibrahimzai and Balush Khel	Mastu Khel, Massuzais.	
8th March	Attempted to break into Sadda village, damaged parapet walls of new Sadda bridge	Ditto	
May	Carried off 4 Hindus, 1 Hindu woman, 1 mare, 9 donkeys laden with merchandise from main road near Chapri	Mastu Khel, Massuzais ...	Four Hindus returned through efforts of <i>Jirga</i> .
7th September ...	Raided 15 donkeys from Turi wood-outrage	Muqbils	
1st December ..	Raided 16 sheep from (Wala China) Turi village.	Jajs	Pursuit party caught 1 bullock belonging to Jajs
8th December ..	Raid on cattle at Samir, one herdsman killed, one wounded	Parochamkannis	<i>Vide</i> entry against 11th May 1905 below
28th December ..	Deshera Dandar village raided, 40 donkeys looted.	Kurram outlaw and Jajs	Kurram outlaw reported to have been arrested by Governor of Khost, but not confirmed.
1905.			
January	Raided 40 Turi donkeys.	Jajs.	
18th January ...	Telegraph wire cut at Ibrahimzai Attempted burglary of village-shots fired at Survey camp	Parochamkannis .. .	<i>Vide</i> entry against 11th May below.
16th March ...	Raid on Turi cattle at Shabak ...	Khattak outlaw and Khost-wals	Two raiders killed subsequently 4 arrested by Governor of Khost
22nd March ..	Mill burnt at Samir; five telegraph poles broken and telegraph wire carried off.	Chamkannis... ..	<i>Vide</i> entry to 11th May below.
20th March ...	Raided 7 Turi donkeys and two raids on Kandahar Nasti Kot.	Muqbils	One raider killed
21st March ...	Damaged bridge on main road, 2 miles from Parochinar, and cut telegraph line	Chamkannis	<i>Vide</i> entry to 11th May below.
26th March ...	Raid on cattle at Chapri	Zaimukhts	Two raiders captured.
4th April ...	Travellers raided at Kaddam Sapper ...	Afghan sepoy.	
5th April ...	Damaged Sadda bridge	Parochamkannis	<i>Vide</i> entry to 11th May below.
6th April ...	Shakar Kot raided	Jajs.	
8th April ...	Maru Khel raided	Jajs	
12th April ...	Raided 10 head of cattle from Ahmadi Shama, in Lower Kurram.	Saifali, Wazars.	
16th April ...	Ibrahimzai village surprised. All firearms, 2 boys and 1 woman carried off.	Massozais	<i>Jirga</i> called on to restore and pay fine of Rs. 1,000 (fine subsequently deducted from tribal allowances).
26th April ...	Raided 12 Jaji cattle and wounded some Jajs	Turis.	
11th May ...	Cut telegraph line, and destroyed large number of newly-planted young trees. Saad Abbas Ziarat.	Chamkannis	Many Chamkannis captured by <i>baranta</i> , fines paid.
18th May ...	Two women carried off to Khost from Ahisa.	Khostwals, who had been residing in British territory.	
5th June ...	Sultan village raided, 1 man killed, 1 mule stolen.	Jajs	Gang arrested by Governor of Khost and sent to Kabul in chains.
10th June ...	Attempt to raid Taida village. 1 villager wounded.	Muqbils	Raiders repulsed.
15th June ...	Attempt to drive off cattle from Zehran.	Kharotis of Ningrahar ...	Ditto.
28th June ...	4 telegraph poles uprooted, telegraph wire broken, 400 young trees along road destroyed.	Parochamkannis and Gharbinas.	<i>Vide</i> entry to 11th May.
July	Raid on cattle at Gram and 2 men kidnapped at Alamsher, between Sadda and Ibrahimzai.	Parochamkannis and Gharbinas.	<i>Vide</i> entry to 11th May.
1st July	Attempt to raid Hunza Khel encampment	Jajs	Raiders repelled, 1 killed.
21st July ...	1 boy carried off from Mata Sanga ...	Muqbils.	

KURRAM—continued.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1905—cont.			
1st August ...	Large gang raided Turi hamlet of Mahmud Kala, killing several villagers and carrying off many women and children.	Mughbils.	
8th August ...	Raid on wood-cutters at Ahmadzal ...	Jajis	Orders issued to arrest any of the gang who enter Kurram.
13th August ...	Raided 47 Turi cattle	Jajis.	
18th August ...	Raid on crops at Sadda	Alsherzal	One raider wounded, maliks called on to give redress.
23rd August ...	Kurram Militia attacked by 70 armed Masuzai, after having arrested some armed thieves who fired on them. Between Ibrahimzal and Sadda.	Mastu Khel, Gar Masuzai	Masuzai ordered out of Kurram and prisoners dealt with according to law.
2nd September .	Attempt to raid Kunj Alizai	Mughbils	Raiders repelled.
5th September .	Raid on encampment at Alifai, 8 men killed and 2 mules carried off	Khatak outlaw and Khoetwala	Governor of Khoet addressed, no result.
15th September ..	4 Bangashes fired on at Khatak Dand ...	Jajis.	
15th September...	Attempt to drive off cattle from Mahura	Jajis	Raiders repelled.
26th September..	House broken into at Bughdi ...	Jajis.	
27th September	2 Turis killed by raiders at Wali Ohina...	Jajis.	
28th September...	2 men kidnaped at Shulozan	Sami Masuzai	Jirga called on to have the men released. Result apparently not reported.
1st October ...	Massuzai murdered at night outside Bistun.	Jajis	
3rd October ...	Attacked Survey party near Shabak ...	Wazirs.	
6th October ...	Attempt to raid Tangai	Khoetwala	1 thief killed, 1 wounded.
18th October ...	Attacked Survey party near Shabak ...	Khoetwala	Governor of Khoet notified.
20th October ...	2 men kidnaped from Sadda	Zakka Khel, Afridis	Both escaped.
October ...	2 men kidnaped from Zeran	Parochamkannis	Many Chamkannis captured by <i>baranta</i> , fines paid.
31st October	Raid on woodcutters, 4 donkeys carried off, Tor Ghar Hill.	Jajis.	
16th November...	Raid on Bakhtawar, 40 goats and some property carried off.	Jajis	Parent party shot 1 raider and recovered goats.
November ...	Reported that despite letters to Governors of Aryob and Khoet the Afghan subjects on the Kurram border persist in pulling down cairns and flag posts erected by British survey parties		
15th December	Attacked Survey party near Kotkai ..	Jajis.	
31st December ...	Raided 20 Turi donkeys	Mughbils.	
1906.			
6th February . .	Raided 600 sheep and goats from Mangal Kurris in Lower Kurram	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
20th February .	Cut telegraph line and destroyed young trees near Ibrahimzal.	Ditto.	
17th April ...	Raided 150 Turi sheep and goats, and killed 1 man and 1 woman.	Jajis.	

(3).—DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL.

1899.			
1st July	Two Levy sepoy, escorting postal runners, attacked on the Laora pass, wounded them and took their rifles.	Guzars of Nar.	
17th September ..	A ferry-boat, carried down by flood, burnt at Matkanai.	People of Matkanai (Utman Khela).	Fined.
29th " ...	Lee-Metford and sporting rifle stolen from the relief (Chitral) column at Chak-dara.	Unknown (probably Adin-sai).	
9th October ...	Three Levy sepoy, escorting post, attacked. 1 killed; 1 wounded.	Najim, a robber, and others (probably Adinai).	
12th " ...	5 cattle drivers attacked at Shakot, wounded 4 (1 died afterwards) and robbed them of their money but left cattle.	Six men of Mardan subdivision, dependents of Sarbuland Khan of Fala.	

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—continued.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted
1899—cont			
1st November ...	The Chitral mail attacked near Minjavar, wounded 1 and killed another escort sepoy (one rifle taken)	Swat valley men (probably) (Nawab of Dir is supposed to be at the bottom of these raids on mails to throw suspicion on the Khan of Nawagai).	Neighbouring villages fined
7th " ...	Attacked the Chitral mail between Sado and Robot. Two Levy sepoys of escort killed.	Unknown (Tor Lalai supposed to be implicated.)	
11th December ...	Two thousands maunds of grass of a Commissariat agent burnt at Batkhela.	Unknown.	
16th " ...	Broke into a widow's house near Dargai, killed her and her 3 children and looted the house.	One Badrai of Shakot and four men.	Badrai and another man executed.
30th " ...	Stock of 1,000 maunds of grass burnt at Khar camp.	Unknown.	
1900.			
29th January ...	Attacked Afghan traders, killed 1 and wounded another near Totekan	Totekan robbers	Four captured, 1 executed.
31st " ...	Madras sapper shot at Chakdara while on sentry at 2 a.m. rifle and bayonet stolen.	Unknown.	
About 16th February,	Robbed the house of a zemindar, in the Talash valley.	Fourteen men, some of them servants of the Nawab of Dir.	
23rd February ...	Shot at and wounded a Sikh sentry of 26th Punjab Infantry at Khar, and escaped.	Rifle thief, tribe unknown.	
31st March ...	Killed Gul Mohammad Khan, Akhundzada of Munda at Mian Killi. A servant of Sahibzada Badahan Jan pursued him and was shot	Tor Lalai (the outlaw) and 12 men.	Nawab of Dir ordered Utman Khels to give up Tor Lalai, but they refused. Tor Lalai murdered 5th July, 1900
11th July ...	Made an attack on Ganbat and was repulsed.	Malik Akhan.	
24th " ..	Maram-Henry rifle stolen from the Nawab's workshops at Dir.		
27th August ...	Robbed Khataks of their salt, 10 miles west of Sado.	Shamozai Utman Khels ..	Salt subsequently returned.
25th September .	Shot Malik Pauda Khan of Nasafa in the Talash valley.	Villagers of Badwan.	
1901.			
28th January ...	Robbed 2 Madras Sappers of their rifles on the road between Khar and Malakand	Two Swat Kohistanis from Kalam.	Thieves caught.
2nd May... ..	Various quarrels between Palas and Than, crop stealing and fighting	Khan Khels	Parties fined Rs 500 each. Leaders kept at Malakand.
2nd " .. .	Crop-outhing, fighting and village burning	Nawab of Dir's Jirgas and the Shamozais.	Nawab confide says he will make proper settlement and punish his representative who broke an old compact with the Shamozais.
May	Stole 8 bayonets, 60 rounds small arms ammunition, and some uniform, from Kushalgarh.	Mamunds	One coat and 1 bayonet recovered.
4th July... ..	Stole a bag of flour and other articles from carriers of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chitral contractor, near Pans Kot.	Men of Dir (probably).	
July	Fighting ending in submission to settlement. The Jirgas came in the leader of one side was wounded while asleep and under British protection.	Aladand Khels	Sargand Khan, his brother, a nephew of Ghulam Haidar Khan of Dargai and several followers fined and imprisoned
2nd September ...	Fought with men of Barun, killed Hamid Jan and 2 of grandsons of Fahm Jan of Barun, in Panjkora.	Shahzadai men (of Subah Khan).	Paid fine of Rs 16,000 and allowed to return.
24th " ...	Carriers of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chitral contractor, robbed near the Laora pass.	Gujars	Nawab of Dir ordered property to be restored and offenders punished.
17th October ...	Captain James, 42nd Gurkhas, robbed of belt, sword, field glasses at Drosk	Unknown.	
21st " ...	Martini-Henry rifle stolen from sepoy of 26th Punjab Infantry while doing hospital guard at Chakdara.	"	
12th November... ..	A <i>darwa</i> 's shop robbed at Khar, and <i>darwa</i> wounded (shot through lung) the chankidar who fired to catch them. The chankidar died.	Servants of Maliks of Khar and Batkhela, also Hakim Khan, a refugee, from Kharki in Mardan.	
14th " ...	A bayonet stolen from 37th Dogras at Dargai.	Unknown.	
19th " ...	Mail attacked above Sado, and again near Wazrak, but robbers repulsed.	Robbers (tribe unknown).	

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—continued.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated	Reparation exacted
1901—cont.			
November ...	Continued fighting between Nawab of Amb and the Amozai.	Nawab of Amb and Amozai	Warned by Commissioner and terms of peace arranged.
30th November .	Fight close to British camp (and killed 1 and wounded 10 men) over a land question.	Men of Dargai (rival factions).	Fathes kept at Malakand, village fined 50 guns.
About 16th December.	The Native Assistant for Sam Ranizai robbed.	Kadir (a robber) and a gang	Captured and shot by the Dheri Alladand Jirga. Sharif Khan, who harboured the gang, sent to Peshawar to be under surveillance.
1902.			
7th January ...	Chitral mail fired on. A Levy sepoy killed and the runner wounded	Ausa Khel and Nasruddin Khel.	Driven off, Nawab told to put a stop to this.
18th March ...	A Sikh chankdar murdered . . .	Mohmands from Peshawar district employed as coolies in Supply and Transport.	
13th April ...	Khatak coolies, who were quarrying for the bridgework, attacked and cattle taken	Chakdara villagers (likely Ali Khels).	Cattle returned and Nawab asked to punish them. He fined them.
5th June ...	Badshah Khan of Landai (near Sado) shot dead.	Some of his relations (probably).	Nawab of Dir fined them, confiscated their lands and told Badshah's son to take the customary revenge
15th " ...	A levy sepoy of Sado post, while he was on leave, shot dead in Arangi village.	Three Shamoza Utman Khel of Naranj.	(Trouble caused by holy men, who refuse to perform funeral rites—frequent occurrence.)
5th July ...	A Punjabi Musalman, who had been a coolie working at Chakdara, but was now going about begging, murdered on road near Malakand Levy Post	Unknown	
6th " . .	The Hindu's <i>dharma</i> pulled down, their well filled up; their religious books destroyed. Rs. 900 worth of damage done.	Mullas of Sam Ranizai . .	Security taken against future disturbance. <i>Jirgas</i> summoned and warned.
4th August ...	The 37th Dogras' washing stolen ...	Ghuzas from the nomad camp near Thana.	Pursued, dropped their loot: 7 were subsequently captured.
30th " ...	Came into 37th Dogra camp fired on, but escaped, 1 hit.	Robbers (tribe unknown).	
5th September . .	Three Adinzai travellers robbed, killed 1 and another wounded.	Probably men of Dir.	
11th & 12th September,	A crop watchman murdered and the father of one of our Levy Jemadars shot at next night, also Chitral contractor's carrier attacked and robbed.	Khan Khels.	
29th September	A 31st Punjab Infantry Rifle stolen ...	Mohmands (probably).	
4th December ...	Post runners fired on . . .	Unknown.	
1903.			
13th February ...	Gul Mohammed Shah of Sado killed ...	Shamoza	Nawab asked to deal with it.
August ...	A trader attacked, robbed and wounded ..	Unknown	Nawab of Dir fined village.
"	Went out armed to enforce their water claims in spite of Levy Jemadar warning them.	Khar villagers ...	Weapons confiscated
8th September ...	The house of a Dir Levy sepoy set fire to	A Mulla of Kana Ghurband	
21st " ...	A trader's house broken into at Mian Killi	Dakats from Jhar .. .	Explanations required from Nawab of Nawagai, etc.
9th November ..	The Chitral postal escort attacked. A Dir Levy sepoy shot.	Gang of armed men of Kilagai and Charming	
20th " . .	Attacked the Chitral postal escort, but were overpowered and caught.	Four Utman Khels and a Mohmand of Usakai.	
15th "	Rs. 3,000 abstracted from the guard treasure box at Malakand.	Usakai	Thieves caught.
December ...	Hindus of Khar and others robbed on the road between Munda and Jhar.	Shamoza	
" ...	Broke their promise and began faction fighting, killed and wounded several, including a small girl.	Ranizai villagers ...	Guns confiscated. <i>Jirga</i> decided that blood money could not be taken as fight was factional. Security taken.
1904.			
15th January ...	A house broken into and one man shot at Mian Killi.	Shamoza.	
16th March ...	Raid on Jalala; destroyed the head of the main water-channel in Thana.	Musa Khels and Shamoza	A revenue collector of Dir, who headed the raid, removed.
27th July ...	Raiding on the Chitral road near Sado and theraebants.	Mingral Jan, son of the Nawab of Dir.	Nawab of Dir went out to punish him, but forgave him, under pressure from Agent; takes the Adinzai district from his son.

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted
1904— <i>cont.</i>			
31st October ...	Three Hindu and 2 Mussalman merchants robbed, killed and their bodies thrown into a well, at Shakrat.	Shamozai servants of Miangu Jan.	
23rd November ...	Nawab of Nawagai comes to help Miangu Jan, and breaks his agreement with British Government by attacking Dir territory, but is beaten	Nawagai men.	
16th December ...	Starts raiding on the death of the Nawab of Dir, his brother-in law.	Sayyd Ahmad Khan.	
1905.			
8th January ...	Two murders in Khan Khel limits ...	Khan Khels	Found guilty and shot by the Jurga.
December 1904 January 1905 April ...	Raids and counter-raids, and general disturbance due to the death of the Nawab of Dir, 8th December, 1904.	Numerous tribes.	
April			
April .. .	Fight over wood and grass near Thana, 8 casualties.	Musa Khels and Khan Khels.	
May	Houses of two <i>Mahks</i> burned for receiving allowances from Government.	Gud Mulla	
July	Robbery and violence on the Dir road ...	Dir Levy sepoy concerned	Case handed over to Khan Khel Jurga.
August .. .	Robbery under arms, between Dargai and Malakand.	Three men (tribe unknown)	Culprits escaped.
24th August ..	One of a party of traders attacked, robbed and killed in Sam Ranisai country	Unknown	
30th August .	Raid on granars at Rumber, Chitral. 200 sheep and goats carried off.	Thieves from Afghan territory.	Amir's representative written to: result not reported.
8th September .	Destroyed a telegraph pole and broke the line.	Unknown, probably Mians	Damage only charged against villages, because their first offence.
2nd October ...	Rifle bolt taken from the Chitral reliefs.	Unknown	
8th " ...	Faction fighting at Batkhela; several <i>maikhs</i> killed; road traffic stopped to Malakand.	" ...	
16th " ...	Lee-Enfield rifle stolen from 1st Gurkha camp.	" ...	Steps taken to prevent its leaving the country.
16th " ...	Cash box extracted from the post chest ...	" ...	Villagers fined and box handed by them almost intact.
31st " ...	Rifle stolen from 1st Gurkhas on the march.	Pathan rifle thief	Dargai fined.
3rd November ...	The mail attacked; 3 Dir Levy (escort) men killed.	Gujars from Asmar ..	1 killed, rest escaped.
th December ...	Quarrelled and killed 4 and wounded 9 ..	Shamozais and Swatis ...	Fined.
1906.			
31st January ...	Theft of timber from a bridge	" ..	Fined.
29th " ...	Bags of grain stolen from railway enclosure.	" ..	
29th " ..	3 buffaloes stolen from the Military Bazaar.	" ..	Thief tried by jurga and shot.
31st " ...	Caused a fire in a Hindu's house and great loss.	Robbers,	
8th March ...	Fired on an unarmed deputation of Sultan Khels.	People of Agra, Utman Khels.	
March ...	Faction fighting continued between Badahah Khan (Khan of Dir) and his uncle, brother, and others (January 1905).	Numerous tribes.	
April ...			

APPENDIX II.

LIST OF RAIDS COMMITTED BY ZAKKA KHELS DURING THE SIX MONTHS FROM AUGUST, 1907, TO FEBRUARY, 1908.

(1.) In the Peshawar District (prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Serial No.	Raids, attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom and to whom communicated.	Action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	Distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
1	Raid at Papwar Bala.	24th October, 1907.	No information received	Nil.	Mathra Police Station, 1½ miles District police proceeded to the spot immediately upon receipt of report to investigate Border Military Police at Shahgai distance about 8 miles, were not informed of the raid until 8 hours after the raid. Interception impracticable, Taru Police Station, 8 miles Information reached Peshawar at 6 p.m. 40 Police Constables were at once despatched in tumtums to Baddher to intercept raiders. Border Military Police posts were warned by telephone and the outer line Fort Mackeson to Bara was patrolled. The Police party, which also started from the city towards Baddher, encountered the raiders about 1½ miles beyond the city on the Baddher road at about 1 a.m. Two Constables were wounded and one was killed. One raider was mortally wounded. All stolen property (save some cash), viz., two horses and clothing, value Rs 7-10-0, was recovered.	Nil.	No co-ordination possible in this case Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss, Rs. 52 worth.
2	Raid at Pabbi	27th October, 1907.	Ditto.	NIL.	Upon receipt of first report Military authorities were informed, and as a result reinforcement of the Military detachment at Pabbi was despatched by the 7 o'clock evening train. Sergeant Cranford, 1st Mule Corps, encamped at Pabbi, took 10 sepoy of the 45th Sikhs, with three Police Constables, and pursued the raiders, but without success. On receipt of further information at 9 p.m. that the raiders intended to attack another village, military assistance was invoked. 30 sepoy were sent in tumtums to Phandu, 15 to Pakha, and 15 down the Grand Trunk Road. These started about 11 p.m. Detachment of Gordon Highlanders at Jalozai arranged escort for mail tonga between Jalozai and Pabbi.	Sergeant Cranford, 1st Mule Corps, encamped at Pabbi, took 10 sepoy of the 45th Sikhs, with three Police Constables, and pursued the raiders, but without success. On receipt of further information at 9 p.m. that the raiders intended to attack another village, military assistance was invoked. 30 sepoy were sent in tumtums to Phandu, 15 to Pakha, and 15 down the Grand Trunk Road. These started about 11 p.m. Detachment of Gordon Highlanders at Jalozai arranged escort for mail tonga between Jalozai and Pabbi.	See columns 6 and 7.
3	Affair at Bara Fort.	30th November, 1907.	On 30th November, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, telegraphed to Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Agent, Khyber, informed Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, by letter that the Zakka Khel gang was meditating a raid in the Peshawar District. No precise information was received as to the direction in which the raid might be expected to take place.	All Border Military Police posts were warned to be on the alert. The District Police were similarly informed.	Bara Fort Border Military Police, 200 yards from scene of affair Firing was heard at Sarband village, about one mile distant from Fort. Border Military Police party turned out of post at once, and was waylaid at a bridge 200 yards from the Fort. In the fight which ensued one Lance-Naik and one sowar were killed and two sepoy were wounded out of 16 men. One raider was wounded and subsequently succumbed. Raiders retired towards Ilm Gndr pursued by Border Military Police party and village <i>chikha</i> . On receipt of news of affair in Peshawar by telephone three Native Officers and 30 sepoy of the Border Military Police were despatched at 8 p.m. by tumtums to Bara to reinforce post and to assist in pursuit. Raiders made good their escape in the darkness.	None invoked, as not practicable.	No property was carried off

4	Raid near Matanni	25th November, 1907.	No information received but for some days previously vague rumours had been received that an attempt upon the Burj Ladaur Border Military Police post was possible	The strength of the Burj Ladaur Post was increased from 7 to 19 men on 21st November, 1907, and the neighbouring Border Military Police posts and Matanni Police Station were warned to be on the alert	Matanni Police Station, 3 miles The raiders appear to have formed two parties One party carried off a large number of goats from the Maira in the afternoon. This was not reported till later. The other party attacked the Burj Ladaur Post about 7 p.m. The post replied and succeeded in keeping the raiders at bay, no loss occurring on either side, until the arrival of a Border Military Police party from Fort Mackeson, the village <i>ohigha</i> of Matanni and Adezai, and some Police from the Matanni Police Station. Whole party, including another Border Military Police party from Garhi Jani, pursued the raiders, but the raiders made good their escape in the darkness	None invoked, as no news of the attack was received till the following morning.	73 goats were recovered by their owners on ransom from Zakka Khels in Bazar Valley. Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss of goats
5	Raid on sheep of Achini Payan	8rd December, 1907.	Nil	Nil	Burj Hari Singh Police Station and Kacha Garhi Border Military Police, each about 4 miles. No report of the raid was received till the next day, so no action was possible. The village <i>ohigha</i> had gone in pursuit, but never came up with the raiding party	Nil	Political Agent, Khyber, informed of the loss of 70 sheep.
6	Raid at Masho Khel	5th December, 1907.	Nil. It was generally rumoured that Mullan and his gang were bent on raiding as usual.	As a result of the Bara affair of 20th November, 1907, one company of the 57th Rifles under two British Officers had been located in the Bara fort since 25th November, 1907. One company of a Native regiment was also at Baddher for training. Two other companies of Native troops were ready in Peshawar in case of need. Signalling communication between Bara and Baddher and Peshawar was arranged.	Bara Fort, 3 miles The raiders attacked a Hindu's house at about midnight. The Hindu was shot dead. The village <i>ohigha</i> with 15 Government rifles pursued the raiders. A party of the 57th Rifles and some Border Military Police on hearing the firing turned out of the Bara Fort and proceeded towards Masho Khel, leaving two pickets at certain places. This party met the village <i>ohigha</i> , and by an unfortunate mistake in the matter of recognition the <i>ohigha</i> fired two shots at the party, wounding one Lance-Naik. The party then went on in pursuit of the raiders towards Ilm Gudar, but the raiders had escaped in the darkness	See column 6	See columns 6 and 7. Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss, which was insignificant.
7	Raid on Transport post at Jalozai.	8rd January, 1908	Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar and Superintendent of Police, Peshawar, received information from Political Agent, Khyber, and Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, respectively on 2nd January, 1908, that a strong party of raiders was likely to enter the Peshawar District. This information was confirmed by informers in Peshawar, and it was said that Kaggawalla, a village near Baddher, was likely to be attacked.	All Border Military Police posts and Police Stations were warned. 80 Police Constables were despatched to Kaggawalla. The Khyber Rifles sent a strong detachment to the Kajural plain. The arrangement referred to in this column under No. 6 had been abandoned by General Officer Commanding's orders	This raiding party came unexpectedly across 41 Government mules at Jalozai and attacked the post, wounded one Duffadar and one Drabi, and carried off all the mules at about 8 p.m. They made off in a south-easterly direction towards Shamshatki Border Military Police Station, distant 7 miles See column 7	Invoked at 11 p.m. upon receipt of information. Available at about 1.30 a.m. A squadron of Cavalry proceeded to Matanni and two companies, Native Infantry, picketed the Kohat and the Bara roads. Failure to intercept raiders due in the main to lateness in receiving information, the first information being a deferred telegram despatched from Pabbi at 9.17 p.m. by the Zaildar	89 of the 41 mules were recovered through the Aka Khels and the Border Military Police.

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Serial No.	Raids, Attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom and to whom communicated.	Action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	Distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
8	Attempt at Kaacha Garhi	24th January, 1908.	Nil	Nil.	Kaacha Garhi Border Military Police Post, 600 yards from Kaacha Garhi Railway Station. The raiders attacked the Kaacha Garhi Railway Station intending to ambuscade the Border Military Police party which it was anticipated would turn out of the post on hearing the shots. The Border Military Police post contained 11 men only, and consequently, and in accordance with orders, did not turn out. The raiders then made off across the border. Owing to the telephone between Kaacha Garhi and Peshawar being out of order, information of the raid was not received until a Railway telegram from the Station Master reached the Deputy Commissioner at 12.10 a.m. The Station Master was also unable to get a telegram through to Jamrud until still later. The Khyber Rifles turned out by 1.45 a.m., but it was then too late to intercept the raiders. Failure was due to the temporary non-working of the telephone and the difficulty the Station Master experienced in getting his Railway telegrams through to Peshawar and Jamrud.	Nil	Nil.
9	Raid on Peshawar City.	28th January, 1908.	On 28th January, 1908, Political Agent, Khyber, reported verbally that he had definite information that the Zakka Khel gang had spent the previous night at a marat near Dag Ismaili Khel, and that the gang intended to raid the house of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan at Badraahi, a village close to the Nowshera Cantonment.	Political Agent, Khyber, himself went down to Nowshera and made arrangements with the General Officer Commanding there for the troops to turn out immediately any firing was heard. In Peshawar the whole of the road from Peshawar City to Kohat Pass was picketed by the Military. Ditto the Peshawar-Bara road. Border Military Police held the Railway line and the Grand Trunk Road about 8 miles below the City Station. Police held the country between the City Station and Nusatta road.	The City Police Station, distant 220 yards from the scene of the raid. So far from a raid occurring at Badraahi, the gang attacked the Andarsbahr quarter of the Peshawar City shortly before midnight. The City Police were under strength owing to other arrangements made in view of the report that Badraahi would be attacked. Some 50 Police from the stations, patrols and fixed posts came to the scene. Firing was heavy upon both sides. Three Constables were shot, of whom two subsequently died. The nearest City gates were held in force, but the raiders escaped through the famous Mohabbat Khan Mosque, and by the aid of ladders escaped over the city wall. A party of Border Military Police of 1 Subadar and 18 men came to the scene from the Border Military Police lines, but arrived too late to be of any assistance. With the exception of the Military Cavalry patrol down the Peshawar-Jamrud road (see column 7), it was impossible to attempt to intercept the raiders, as the Military garrison, the Police and Border Military Police were all reduced to very low numbers by the arrangements described in column 5.	See column 5. The arrangements detailed there were made and carried out by sunset. In addition 100 sowars of the Native Cavalry were held in readiness to proceed before sunrise to Kistami. In addition, upon information of the raid being received, the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police obtained the assistance of 160 sowars of the Native Cavalry, who turned out by 3 a.m. and picketed the Peshawar-Jamrud road, endeavouring to intercept the raiders. The Khyber Rifles at Jamrud were informed by urgent telegram by the Superintendent of Police by 3 a.m. The Khyber Rifles sowars turned out and attempted to intercept the raiders, but did not come upon them.	See columns 5, 6, and 7.

10	Raid at Tirahi Bala.	3rd February 1908	Nil.	Nil.	Police Station Mathra, 6 miles. No report of the affair was made till 9 a.m. the following morning. Consequently no steps could be taken towards intercepting the raiders. One raider was shot, and died subsequently in hospital.	Nil.	Nil.
11	Raid at Adezai	5th February, 1908.	Nil.	Nil.	Matanni Police Station, 3 miles Raid took place at 1 a.m. Report was not made to Police Station, Matanni, till 5 a.m. Border Military Police at Fort Mackeson heard firing, and at once proceeded to try and cut off raiders at Tota Khan Talab, but saw nothing of them.	Nil. News was not received in Peshawar until 2 a.m., when it was too late to invoke Military assistance	Nil.

PESHAWAR,
The 17th February, 1908.

(2.) In the Kohat District (prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat).

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Serial No	Raids, attacks, &c	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid by whom and to whom communicated.	The action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	The distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return with cause of failure	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property
1	Raid on Samara village.	5th October, 1907.	Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, received information of the intended raid from the Subadar-Major of Samana Rifles, who was in Tirah, 24 hours before the occurrence, and communicated to the Commandant, Samana Rifles. From subsequent enquiries it appears that the raiders had actually entered the district before the Deputy Commissioner received notice of the intended raid. They had in all probability concealed themselves on the Ghosar hill south of Hangu and Ibrahimzai.	The Commandant, Samana Rifles, and Border Military Police and Samana Rifles posts were warned to be on the look out for the raiding party. All the available men of the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police were turned out and held likely routes in to the district	Border Military Police and Samana Rifles turned out, but did not come across with the raiders. The nearest post is Hangu, 13 miles distant from the scene of the attack. The time of the raid was 7 p.m., but information did not reach Hangu till 10 a.m. on the following morning, too late to admit of the raiding party being intercepted, although pursuit parties of Border Military Police and Samana Rifles were sent out from Hangu. The raiders apparently retreated with the greater expedition, crossing the border between the Muhammadzai and Ahzai posts at an unexpected point, just missing the Border Military Police of Kohat and of the Muhammadzai Post, who were holding the Oblan Pass 2 miles or so to the north.	Not invoked	

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Serial No.	Raid, Attack, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom, and to whom communicated.	The action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	The distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
2	Raid at Lachi ...	18th November, 1907.	No information was received	—	200 yards from Police Station, Lachi The villagers, the Police, and a party of Border Military Police opened fire on raiders and dispersed them.	The 56th Rifles picketed the line near Hangu and shot one raider dead on their retreat.	Property worth Rs. 25-12-0 recovered through 56th Sikhs
3	Daoolty at Kachi Marai.	28th November, 1907.	Political Agent, Khyber, informed Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, of the intended raid two days before the occurrence. The information was of a very indefinite nature, being merely to the effect that 50 Zakka Khels intended to raid in the Kohat District. Nothing was said as to the probable objective.	A party of 15 Samana Rifles was sent to each of the posts at Marai and Kachi, and half troop of 23rd Cavalry to Marai and another half troop to Ahsai. Villagers also were warned to turn out <i>chighas</i> if they heard firing.	The Samana Rifles, Border Military Police and Military drove the raiders back towards the hills west of Marai with the result of two casualties of raiders. One <i>Fase-made</i> Martam also was captured from the raiders.	See column 5	See column 5. The ornaments taken from the women were found in a leather bag which had been dropped by the raiders.
			The raiding party was first seen in the broken country between the Kachi and Marai posts. They were then engaged in looting some women of their ornaments. A Border Military Police sowar in <i>mas/ta</i> rode up to them, and on seeing what was going on turned and galloped to the Kachi Post. Information was sent from there to Marai, and the garrisons of both posts and a detachment of Cavalry which had been stationed at Marai, together with <i>chighas</i> from both villages, turned out in pursuit, and succeeded in cutting off some of the raiders, who would probably have been destroyed to a man had night not come on.				

EAST INDIA (AFGHANISTAN).

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EAST INDIA (AFGHANISTAN)

PAPERS

REGARDING

HOSTILITIES WITH AFGHANISTAN, 1919.

No. 1.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 1, dated 29th Jamad-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 3rd March, 1919.

(Translation.)

After compliments.—I am desirous of informing my friend, His Excellency the Viceroy of the great and mighty British Government in the Indian Empire, with much despair and regret, of the particulars of a crime full of poignant grief, namely, the crime of the unjust and unlawful assassination of my late father, His Majesty Siraj-ul-Millat-wad-din Amir Habibulla Khan, King of the Government of Afghanistan, who was killed by a pistol shot at 3 a.m. in his royal bed on Thursday, the 18th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra, corresponding to the 20th February 1919, during his stay at a place called Kalla Gosh in his royal dominions by the hand of a treacherous perfidious traitor. I have no doubt that Your Excellency, my friend, will be much touched by the news of this painful event, for the observance of all the conditions of neutrality and the upright conduct and friendly relations displayed during the past and present by His Majesty my late father, the martyr, towards my esteemed friend's mighty Government were clearly proved and require no mention. I, Your Excellency's friend, had been appointed by order and command of His late Majesty, my assassinated pious father, as his plenipotentiary in the capital of Kabul, and consider myself in every way his heir and successor as Amir and the rightful caller to account and avenger at this time of my father's blood. The people and populace of the capital of Kabul and its surroundings, Sayyads, Ulemas, military and civil classes, traders, artisans, Muhammadan and Hindu subjects of Afghanistan itself, as well as all foreign subjects who were in the capital, unanimously and unitedly, with great enthusiasm and of their own free will and consent, swore allegiance to me, your friend, and putting my trust in God I placed on my head the crown of the Amanship of my Government of Afghanistan in the capital of Kabul amid the loud acclamations of the people and troops. And this by the grace of God. Later on our Government Armies in camp at Jalalabad also took their stand on the path of Right, which was wholly on our side, and proved their fidelity and loyalty by deposing and divesting of office my uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan, who had as usurper declared himself Amir without any right at Jalalabad, and by submitting to me their oaths of allegiance. Thereupon my uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan abdicated the throne of the kingdom, and my brothers Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family, who had sworn allegiance to him, considered that allegiance illegal and submitted their oaths of allegiance to me at Kabul and acknowledged and recognised my succession as Amir and King. Therefore relying upon the friendship and sympathy that exist and will continue to exist between us, I have considered it necessary to do myself the great honour of informing my friend.

Nor let this remain unknown to that friend that our independent and free Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready and prepared at every time and season to conclude, with due regard to every consideration for the requirements of friendship and the like, such agreements and treaties with the mighty Government of England as may be useful and serviceable in the way of commercial gains and advantages to our Government and yours.

For the rest kindly accept considerations of my friendly esteem

Usual conclusion.

No. 2.

Proclamation by Amir Amanulla Khan.

(Undated.)

(Translation.)

In the name of God, most merciful and compassionate.

O high-minded nation!

O courageous army!

This weak creature of the Creator of the Universe, viz., your Amir, Amir Amanulla, gives you joyful tidings that thank God—again thank God—the Government of this great nation of ours and the sacred soil of our beloved country have in a very admirable way remained peaceful and safe from the horrors of such a disturbance as was calculated to make our enemies—near and far—happy and joyful and our friends much concerned. And this by the grace of God.

Listen, the facts are as follows:—

You have already been informed by proclamations, *firmans* and notices of the details of what has happened.

The happy news now is this. The bold and courageous army of our Government at Jalalabad displayed the greatest sense of honour and courage in the discharge of all their obligations. On Thursday the 25th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra (27th February 1919), all the officers and soldiers who had accompanied His late Majesty, my father, the martyr, assembled on the parade ground of the cantonment at Jalalabad, swore allegiance to me with the band playing, a salute of guns and great rejoicings. Thereafter they arrested and imprisoned all persons who were entrusted with the safeguarding of His late Majesty and who were on special duty in the Royal bedroom at the time of the assassination and demanded their being called to account and punished by my uncle, who, without any religious or worldly right, had acted as usurper and declared himself as Amir. Since no false claimant can establish his illegal claim, my uncle, who had no right, voluntarily abdicated the Amirship and recognised me as Amir. The deeds of his allegiance and those of my brothers, Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family have been received by me. Copies of these are herewith sent for your perusal and information.

O high-minded nation of Afghanistan! Let us offer thousands of thanks and praises most humbly to the imperishable God of the Earth and Heavens with our burning hearts and bleeding eyes that He has saved our sublime Government from the horrors of commotion and confusion and has inspired our Islamic Government with more strength, power and freedom. Please do not for a moment think that this King of yours expresses his thankfulness for his success in securing the throne. No, I express my thankfulness to God for safeguarding peace and prosperity of yourselves, my beloved nation, for saving the Muslims of the great nation of my beloved country Afghanistan at these perilous and hazardous times from various troubles and misfortunes and their painful consequences and for giving us a new lease of life.

O courageous army of the Government of Afghanistan! I offer thousands of thanks and endless praise to God, the Most Holy—Glory be to Him—that your soul-consuming bullets and your heart-piercing steel spearheads which were kept ready for the protection of the honour of the faith and nation of our country have by the grace of God been prevented from being used for our self-destruction and against each other. Understand it well and carefully realise that this is due to the special favour and mercy of God Almighty and the spiritual blessings of the Prophet which have been showered on our Government and nation. It is the eternal will of the unchangeable Creator—Exalted be His Glory—that all hardship and oppression may be removed from the heads of your nation, and that Afghanistan may be protected from the mischief of enemies of the faith and the country.

O nation with a nice sense of honour.

O brave army.

While my great nation were putting the Crown of the Kingdom on my head, I declared to you with a loud voice that I would accept the Crown and throne only on the condition that you should all co-operate with me in my thoughts and ideas. These I explained to you at the time and I repeat here a summary thereof.—

(1) *Firstly* that the Government of Afghanistan should be internally and externally independent and free, that is to say, that all rights of Government that are possessed by other independent Powers of the world should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan.

(2) *Secondly* that you should unite with me with all your force in avenging the unlawful assassination of my late father, the martyr, who was spiritually a father to all of you.

(3) *Thirdly* that the nation should be free, that is to say, that no individual should be oppressed and subjected to any highhandedness or tyranny by any other individual. Of course obedience to the sacred law of Muhammad and Civil and Military laws is looked upon as a glorious honour for which we, the great nation of Afghanistan, are by disposition and nature well-known.

I would not accept your Crown except on these conditions. All of you, members of the high-minded strong nation, accepted these conditions with enthusiasm and acclamation, and I also put that great supreme Crown on my head with extreme honour and with determined resolution and purpose thus putting my head under the heavy weight of "*imamat* and *amarat*" (religious leadership and rulership). I hope that you, my faithful prudent and high-minded nation, will pray to the Creator of the Earth and the Heavens to favour me with strength to be successful in my undertaking and in doing all that may be necessary for your welfare and

prosperity; and that you will co-operate with me manfully in the execution of my thoughts and ideas. O nation! at present I abolish at the outset the system of "begar" (unpressed labour) in the country. Henceforward no labour will be impressed and not a single individual will be employed by force from among you on making roads, working on public works, tree cutting, etc., and by the grace of God our sublime Government will adopt such measures of reform as may prove serviceable and useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may make a name and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place among the civilized Powers of the world.

For the rest I pray to God for His favours and mercy and seek His help for the welfare and prosperity of you Muslims and all mankind. From God I seek guidance and the completion of my wishes.

[Seal of Amir Amanulla]

No. 3.

Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to Amir Amanulla Khan, dated 15th April, 1919.

After compliments.—I have received from you with deepest regret the lamentable news of the untimely death of your revered father His Majesty the late Amir Habibulla Khan Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din. United from of old by ties of friendship, the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan are now united in a common sorrow. For while Afghanistan mourns the loss of a great ruler who ever sought the welfare of his countrymen and by his wise statesmanship preserved it from the horrors which the war, just ended, has brought upon so many nations, the British Government mourns the loss of a staunch friend who throughout his reign maintained firm the alliance between the two Governments.

I thank you for informing me that you have been unanimously acknowledged as Amir by the populace of Kabul and its surroundings, Saryads, Ulemas, Military and Civil classes, that your uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan has abdicated, and that your brothers Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family, together with the troops at Jalalabad, have sworn allegiance to you.

I note with pleasure that you say that you have sent me this information relying upon the friendship and sympathy which exist and will continue to exist between the two Governments. That friendship is based on the treaties and engagements concluded with the British Government by the late Zia-ul-Millat-Wad-din and confirmed by the late Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din, and I understand from what you say that the Government of Afghanistan intends to act upon them as in the past.

You say moreover that the Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready at every time and season to conclude with due regard to the requirements of friendship such agreements and treaties with the British Government as may be to the commercial advantage of the two Governments. From this it seems possible that the commercial requirements of Afghanistan are thought to call for some agreement with the British Government subsidiary to the treaties and engagements above-mentioned. At this period of mourning I refrain from pursuing the matter further. But the Government of Afghanistan may rest assured that I shall be prepared at all times to invite His Majesty's Government to give careful consideration to anything it may wish to put forward and that it will be my constant endeavour in the future as in the past to foster friendly relations between the two Governments. *Usual conclusion.*

No. 4.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd April, 1919.
(Received 25th April.)*

(Telegraphic.)

British Agent at Kabul reports "In Durbar held 13th April Amir made speech in which he declared Afghanistan independent internally and externally, and he personally made this fact known to me particularly. He has appointed a certain Muhammad Wali Khan as Afghan Safr to Bokhara; latter is about to leave. Am informed by reliable sources that question of appointing Safr to Persia is under consideration."

No. 5.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 27th April, 1919.
(Received 29th April.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province.—*Firman* quoted below has been sent under seal of Abdul Qudus Khan to the Governors of Jalalabad, Laghman, etc., by Amir whom the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar has sedulously primed with sensational accounts of disturbances in India.—"The people in India, in the Punjab and in Peshawar have risen in rebellion against the British Government on account of certain new laws passed by the Government. I therefore direct you to warn the officers under you to be on the alert

against the commission of some foolish act in British Territory by any Afghan subject. Saiyid Mir Jan Badshah also should give the necessary instructions to his Mullahs, and you are therefore to communicate this order to him." Amir's agents in Peshawar have received *firman* forbidding them to issue passports to Kabul to any British subject, whether Mohammedan or Hindu, who has participated in riots in India, except with Amir's prior sanction. Application had already been made for passports which they could use in event of trouble, by some of the Peshawar Union Committee.

No. 6.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd May, 1919.
(Received 7th May.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Speculation in regard to Amanulla's intentions has been aroused on frontier by arrival at Dakka of Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Saleh Muhammad Khan, with 2 companies of infantry and 2 guns, and by exaggerated accounts of troubles in Punjab. Officer of Khyber Rifles was told by Saleh Muhammad himself that his intention was to inspect whole frontier of Afghanistan. Letter of 26th April from British Agent, Kabul, contains mention of similar speculation there in regard to this tour by Commander-in-Chief, and the fact that late Commander-in-Chief has been sent to Khost with a force; by some these movements are put down to natural precautions in view of dissatisfaction at findings in regard to murder of late Amir, and by others they are ascribed to anti-British intentions. Former view, which is inherently the probable one, is held by Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province.

No. 7.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th May, 1919.
(Received 5th May.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, sends following two messages, dated 3rd May.—

No. 1.

Saleh Muhammad Khan, Afghan Commander-in-Chief, has left Dakka, where his escort, however, remains, for Jalalabad.

Party of Khyber Rifles escorting caravan to Landi Khana was met this morning in disputed area between Tor Kham and Landi Khana by armed Afghan pickets, who threatened to fire if party advanced; latter were firm and proceeded to usual point without any incident arising. So far as can be ascertained there were no Afghan troops or military force among Afghan pickets, who were apparently acting in concert with tribesmen under notorious Zar Shah Ningrahar is much out of hand, and it is possible this incident is only a piece of impudence by Zar Shah; against this view it is possible Zar Shah's action was taken under instructions, this incident being first step to revive old dispute about boundary. If present attitude is persisted in by Afghans, is it Government's wish that escort should continue to be sent as far as Tor Kham, which is extreme limit to which we lay claim, force being employed if necessary, or is it preferred that we should not go beyond Landi Khana, thus avoiding trouble? The stretch of nullah bed, which is in dispute, is less than a mile long and has no value in itself, but is important in that Afghans might be given a claim to Bagh villages by its possession. Dispute ought to be settled by a Boundary Commission, but when settlement has been attempted by us in past Amir has made excuses and failed to send commissioners. In Peshawar there are rumours that Nasrulla Khan has died of poison in jail. Kurram reports rumours of trouble in Afghanistan are very rife and that apprehension of attack exists among Turis, who are always very nervous. Political Agent, Tochi, telegraphs that movements of troops are rumoured. Reaction against Amanulla is undoubtedly increasing in districts of Afghanistan and in Kabul considerable amount of apprehension without doubt exists.

No. 2.

Political Agent, Khyber, has received letter from Sarhaddar, Dakka, warning him of passage of *tashkar* under Zar Shar. Warning sent too late on purpose. Sarhang's intention is to cover himself. It is now quite obvious that Zar Shah is acting under orders. We have got in touch with him and he says Sipah Salar sent him on to commence hostilities, but that pending arrival of Afghan troops he will do as little as possible. Last night his gang killed five coolies on the water-works. He has given us a lithographed copy of a *firman*, apparently undoubtedly genuine, bearing Amir's seal, text of which will be telegraphed as soon as possible. It begins by referring to Indian unrest, and to faithful loyalty of Indians to British Government throughout the war being now rewarded by cruelty and injustice, repetition of usual denouncement of Rowlatt Bills follows, and exhortation to Afghans to follow orders of the new Commander-in-Chief, Saleh Muhammad Khan, who will give full explanation of Amir's orders and intentions (Commander-in-Chief has been talking quite openly of Holy War); conclusion is exhortation to all to win favour of God and obey will of the Prophet which, although actual word is not used, is clearly an incitement to *Jehad*. 245 copies are said to have been sent to Peshawar, and letters of very inflammatory tone to the tribes. Abdur Rahman, the new Afghan envoy, and the Afghan

Postmaster have done all they can to influence Amr by their reports to take this course. Letter, who has had many interviews with Union Committee in Peshawar, is now at Jalalabad in conference with Sipah Salar (Afghan Commander-in-Chief). Probably we should find many compromising documents if we were to arrest him at Landi Kotal on his return journey and were to search Afghan post office in Peshawar, but reprisals on British Agent would presumably be made by Afghans. Shinwaris and Mohmands are flocking into Jalalabad, where distribution of rifles and ammunition is said to be taking place. Tone of Khyber Rifles, Shinwaris and Afridis is good. From Kurram there are reports of activity by Afghans on Peiwar Kotal and some panic among Turis. I do not propose to send Expeditionary Force to Landi Kotal until situation is much worse, as movement would have disturbing influence in Peshawar, but I have asked G. O. C. to evacuate German and Austrian prisoners as soon as possible and to have Khyber column ready.

No. 8.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1919 (Received 5th May)

(Telegraphic)

Following is translation of Amr's *firman*, wording of which is about as bad as possible, though loophole is still left for hope that he has not definitely committed himself.—

"I send this order to all my subjects of the Eastern circles, Saryids, Sheikhs, Khans and Motabars. This is to tell you that there is great unrest in India. Practically all, Muhammadan or Hindu, have remained sincere and faithful to Government, and proved themselves to be loyal subjects, but they have been rewarded by all kinds of cruelty and injustice, affecting their religion, honour, and modesty. This is a pity. The latest news received by Amr Amanulla, your King, is very distressing, and there is nobody but must lament and hate such deeds of injustice. To be brief, the account received of these injustices shows that nobody, whether Hindu or Muhammadan, will have any right to own his land or his property or power to speak; nor may more than three men stand together in one place; nor may they go to their mosques nor Hindus to their temples, if they do go there and assemble together they will be punished at the mere word of the Criminal Investigation Department and without any investigation of the matter. There are other examples of orders and rules of the same kind, contrary to the rights of humanity. Of all these things I inform you. I am prevented by international law from interfering with the internal policy of the British Government, and I have nothing to do with it, but from the point of view of Islam and mankind, I dislike unfair laws and, in my view, Indians, in rising and creating disturbances, are right. But these risings and disturbances are not confined to India, in Afghanistan also their bad effects are seen. It is, therefore, your King's duty to warn his faithful subjects to remain united and ardent. Do not scatter but catch fast the rope of God. Act upon the order of God and do not become disunited. For God the Creator has laid this order upon us that casting aside all pride, distinctions and differences in such time of disorder we help one the other. Sympathy and kindness to the poor are virtues of the children of Adam and Eve. All are God's children, Jews and Christians, Hindus and Muhammadans. It is a pity that, excepting themselves, no one is considered a human being by the British. What will be the result of these things we do not know, nor are they any concern of ours. But in pursuance of one of my duties as King of Afghanistan, I appoint to be Commander of the Eastern Circle, with military and civil powers, Saleh Muhammad Khan, our Commander-in-Chief, in whom are all soldierly and righteous virtues. I give him full powers to protect and benefit the Eastern Circle, and honestly, prudently and courageously to preserve its unity and community. I lay upon him the duty of watching carefully the frontiers and of keeping my subjects informed of all intentions, thoughts and orders of me, your King, which shall be for the benefit of our country and for its religion, and which shall make us united to achieve this sacred end. So you may win the favour of God, and obey the will of the Prophet and remain sincerely obedient to your King to the end. For upon these things depends the good of this world and the next. God be with you." *Firman* bears the seal of Amanulla.

We are preparing a message from the Viceroy to the Amr, and meanwhile impressing on Chief Commissioner that it is of vital importance to avoid any frontier incident at Tor Kham or anywhere else, and are inviting him to consider whether it would not be advisable for Abdul Qayum to try and arrange a meeting on the frontier with Afghan Commander-in-Chief.

No. 9.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May. (Received 7th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has sent four telegraphic reports, first three dated 4th May, last dated 5th May.

I. Following information has been received from Kabul by Afghan Post Office in Peshawar:—The Amr called a special Durbar, at which, weeping bitterly, he read letters received from India, and said: "See the tyranny exercised upon our brethren in India; and, more, tyranny has seized Baghdad and the Holy Places. I ask you. Are you prepared for

Holy War? If so, gird up your loins, the time has come." All replied that they were prepared, whereupon Amir Amanulla said that he would collect no more revenue, but all present should collect grain for the holy war, and the rich should purchase rifles and ammunition from the arsenal, which would issue them on security to the poor. Orders were given to Ghilzais to collect the Shinwari camels to take supplies to the Khyber and Kurram frontiers. Amanulla paid a visit to Nasrulla and Inayatulla to ask them to join, but, on the ground of their respect for the late Amir Habibullah's judgment, they declined. Last Friday a proclamation was read in the Hadda Mulla Mosque describing the cruelty exercised by British authorities at Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar, and describing the Rowlatt Bill. The Mullas all voted for *Jehad*. Kazi Abdul Jalil has been sent with three Turks to Tirah to raise the Afridis, Mir Jan Badshah to the Mohmands, to whom also Chaknawur Mullah has been sent by Sipah Salar. I have asked G.O.C., Kohat, to be ready to support Kurram if necessary, as situation there is more threatening, and Turis are leaving their villages near the border.

II. During night of 3rd May party of Afghan soldiers or *khassadars* in uniform, 150 strong, occupied Bagh and Kafirkot. Their C.O. sent an oral message that his action was precautionary measure against raids by Zar Shah. Afghan camp has been pitched at Bagh, and all inhabitants of village have fled to the hills or to Landi Kotal. This act is a clear challenge to us, and the tribes so regard it. It is impossible for us to send caravan escort while Afghans hold hills above Landi Khana ravine without it being practically certain to be ambushed. I have, therefore, instructed Political Agent in Khyber to send Sarhaddar, Dakka, a letter in reply to his,* thanking him for the information given and pointing out that in precautionary measures he has taken he has, possibly by error, encroached on British territory, and requesting that, if it is an error, his men be withdrawn from limits of Bagh, but that if it is intentional act, responsibility for any trouble arising will rest on Sarhaddar; and adding, that so long as the situation remains disturbed the Khyber will be closed to caravans. Orders of Government are requested as to ejecting Afghans by force from Bagh. Conflict would be precipitated thereby, but this appears inevitable any way, and worst effect on tribes will result from irresolution and inaction. Afridis have received letters from Amir, and Zakka Khel were shown one by Yar Muhammad Khan, who tried to get them to accompany him to Dakka, they refused, saying their action would depend on decision of tribe as a whole. Great quantities of supplies are being sent to Dakka and open declaration of *Jehad* in a week is rumoured locally.

III. Force at Bagh consists of 100 Afghan regulars, 200 *Khassadars* and some Shinwari tribesmen. They are commanded by a colonel who is very nervous and has been appealing for more troops: these have been promised him. G.O.C. will send emergency column to-morrow to Landi Kotal to strengthen Khyber Rifles at my request. Copies of Amir's *firman*† have reached Afghan post office in Peshawar, and large numbers have been distributed through Peshawar; many copies also are said to have been sent to India in various directions. This puts its authenticity beyond question. Afghan Postmaster returned to-day to Peshawar from his conferences with Sipah Salar at Jalalabad. Main to Tangi water supply has been plugged by Afghans at Bagh, and short supply of water at Landi Kotal is serious.

IV. Afghan Post Office has distributed in Peshawar large number of copies of Amir's *firman* previously mentioned. Pretence that it is a forgery is no longer possible. Revised version containing additional information that Abdul Qudus is in command of Western Afghanistan at Kandahar has also been received. Mohammed Tarzi must be in power at Kabul if Qudus can be spared from capital in present crisis. Afghan Postmaster has returned from Jalalabad yesterday bringing with him a motor-car load of leaflets which had been printed at his Kabul press, and which are extremely violent in tone, alleging that India and Egypt have risen in successful rebellion and that war has been resumed by Germany. They end with "cursed be the English tyrants."

Pending receipt of replies to Khyber Political Agent's message to Sarhaddar, Dakka, and Viceroy's letter to Amir, Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has been instructed to avoid any steps tending to precipitate matters.

No. 10.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May. (Received 7th May.)
(Telegraphic)

Authenticity of Amir's *firman* is reported by Roca-Keppel to be beyond doubt. On 5th May Afghan Postmaster in Peshawar, accompanied by a motor-car load of printed leaflets of most inflammatory nature, ending with curses on British, arrived back from Jalalabad. On same day there arrived at Bagh three Afghan regiments with two guns; reinforcements are said to be on their way, and accordingly despatch of troops from Peshawar to eject them from their position has been authorised. Kurram reports panic among Turis following on arrival in Khost of late Commander-in-Chief Nadir Khan, with additional regular troops and *laskhars* of tribesmen, including several thousand Ghilzais, three Afghan regiments, with two guns, and large Kunar *laskhars*, led by Mullahs, have left Jalalabad for Mohmand country. It is clear from reports from our Agent in Kabul that Amir's enquiry into circumstances of murder of late Amir has caused deep dissatisfaction among populace. Finding his position impossible to maintain and under encouragement derived from accounts of Indian disturbances, grossly exaggerated, he has been led to proclaim a Holy War, coupled with promises of easy conquest

* See No 7.

† No. 8.

of India, in order to avert a rebellion against himself. The tribes' attitude will constitute a most important factor in situation, and Chief Commissioner has been instructed to endeavour to secure their adhesion and authorised to spend money without stint to achieve this. Already he has been approached by Mohmands, who have promised to stick to us, provided military support is given them, and have given hostages for their good faith. We have instructed Roos-Keppel to give the assurances they require. On Baluchistan frontier there is no anti-British feeling, and absence of any information that Amir's *firman* has been sent to Kandahar.

No. 11.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May (Received 7th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Letter of which text is given below was despatched to Amir on 4th May by special messenger. Agent in Kabul has been instructed by wire to obtain audience of Amir at once and explain situation in Punjab to him fully and frankly. Letter is as follows —

"I am informed that one Zar Shar, a Shinwari, of Ningrahar, who has previously been concerned in raids in the Peshawar district, is stirring up trouble on Khyber border. He has interfered with Khyber Rifles in British territory, and impudently states that Sipah Salar has sent him ahead to commence hostilities. Nor is this all. He is parading a *firman*, declaring that there is great unrest in India, that loyalty of our subjects has been rewarded by my Government by cruelty and injustice in connection with their religion, honour, and modesty, and that they are right in rising and creating disturbances.

"Though I am informed *firman* bears your seal, I cannot but believe it is a forgery, set in circulation by some enemy of Afghanistan and of yourself. For it contained misrepresentations of the state of India so gross that no statesman could have believed them. Its object is so palpably to incite the hot-headed frontier tribes against the British Government (whose power has now been demonstrated by the crushing of the strongest power in the world) that no friendly Afghan could have penned it. In short, it is so grave a menace to the secure position you are now consolidating for yourself after the troubled history of the last few months, that it can only be the work of some enemy of yourself who seeks your overthrow. In your letter to me, No. 1, dated 29th Jamadi-ul-awal, 1337, Hijra, you wrote of the friendship that exists between the two Governments, and in the letter just received† inform me that you have sent Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan to be your envoy. You wrote of the necessity for friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between nations. Relying, therefore, on the sincerity of your words, I request you to issue stringent and immediate orders for the arrest of the said Zar Shah and to make it known along our common frontier that the *firman* which he has distributed broadcast is an outrageous forgery, based on lying rumours. Of the true state of the Punjab, which is rapidly subsiding to normal conditions, I am directing the British Agent, Kabul, to inform you. Your envoys, incoming and outgoing, will be able to corroborate his reassuring accounts from their own experience.

"I trust you will agree with me that the matter is of too serious character to permit of action being delayed, and that you will lose no time in informing me that you have taken such action as it requires. *Usual ending* (Signed). CHELMSFORD"

No. 12.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 7th May (Received 7th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel reports that feeling in Peshawar City is bad and at present is getting worse; city is full of wild rumours. From Afghan Postmaster information has been obtained that Afghan plan of campaign is, in outline, establishment of three fronts, Dakka, Khost and Quetta, under command respectively of Saleh Mohammed, Nadir Khan and Abdul Qudus Khan. Simultaneous attack on all three fronts will be launched on a date which will be announced within 10 days, by hordes of Ghazis, with regular troops in support. At same moment riots immobilizing troops will break out all over India.

No. 13.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 8th May (Received 8th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Report received from one of the escort attached to British Agent, Kabul, that troops left Kabul on 26th April for Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar. Informant, who left Kabul (which is covered with inflammatory posters) on 30th April and Jalalabad on 4th May, states that between Jalalabad and Dakka country is full of parties of Ghazi tribesmen. He was told at Dakka that strict injunctions had been issued by Amir that till he gave the word no advance should be made. Consul-General, Meshed, reports that on 25th April Commander-in-Chief and Governor

* No. 1

† Not printed. Letter of credentials to Envoy

at Herat were suddenly arrested by a senior military officer on authority of Kabul *firman*, which presumably was sent off from Kabul before Durbar held there on 13th April at which Musahiban were acquitted. From Kurram arrival of troops is reported to have led to great improvement in feeling Tochi report. Khoist elders not inclined for war though younger men are enthusiastically for it.

No. 14.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th May. (Received 9th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Report dated 8th May, from Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, states: Large enemy reinforcements arriving; enemy positions advanced to Ash Khel heights, from which Landi Kotal is commanded. This advance is deliberate invasion of British territory. Behaviour of Afridis good; they are sitting on fence with slight inclination towards us. Report from Baluchistan states that Abdul Qudus Khan, who seems to have gone on ahead of his troops in order to raise the tribes, reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai on 5th May. In Kandahar *Jehad* is now generally reported. On 8th May Peshawar city was surrounded by cordon of troops and martial law proclaimed. Effect on city reported to be excellent. Afghan postmaster, who has engaged himself actively in Afghan propaganda, gave himself up, together with three notorious Indian agitators and post office staff. Crowd in city was menacing and police were roughly handled; one Indian official was dangerously wounded by stabbing, but there were no fatal casualties. McLoughlin, the last European employé in Afghanistan, reached Landi Kotal 5th May.

No. 15.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th May, 1919 (Received 10th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday morning our advanced forces drove Afghans from their positions in neighbourhood of Landi Khana, with co-operation of aeroplanes, who bombed Dakka with good effect. Our casualties slight. Enemy still hold positions near Khar Ghali to westward. General disposition of our forces yesterday was, 1st Division between Landi Kotal and Kach Garhi, 2nd Division moving into Peshawar area.

No. 16.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th May, 1919. (Received 12th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Report from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, indicates that up to 10th tribes all along border were remarkably quiet, but that yesterday they showed signs of wavering. We need to have success at early date to keep them steady. A *lashkar* is at Chura, on the Afghan side of the border, 300 or 400 strong, under a malcontent Malik, who has sent Political Agent in Khyber a letter threatening to cut our line of communication. Situation through Peshawar district has been much improved by arrest of all principal Afghans in Peshawar City and leading agitators, bad spirit still shown by some villages in district. A great deal of inflammatory literature and about a lakh of rupees, presumably for purposes of propaganda, have been found in Afghan Postmaster's house. Yesterday, a declaration of war by Amir was posted up in Peshawar City, but we could not obtain a copy as it was torn down at once. From Baluchistan reports received of several officers having passed through Kandahar from Herat for Kabul; they are believed to be Bolshevik emissaries. We are sending Afghan envoys in India back to Afghanistan.

No. 17.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 16th May (Received 16th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Announcement is being spread through tribes by Afghans that negotiations for armistice are pretence and device to gain time. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, regards situation generally as very favourable, though some of the young men of Afridis are getting out of hand. There have been frequent desertions from Khyber Rifles at isolated outposts and concentration of corps at Landi Kotal is in hand. There has not been a single desertion from Frontier Constabulary or Police, both of whom have done magnificently.

No. 18.

From the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 16th May, 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to your telegram of to-day,* which contains the only information I have received as to Afghan request for cessation of hostilities, and telegraph without delay circumstances in which request was made Has Amir Amanulla yet replied to your letter to him of 4th inst.† or is any further evidence of his complicity available?

No. 19.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18th May, 1919 (Received 21st May)

(Telegraphs)

Following received by wire from G O C, Peshawar — "Report dated 17th May, 7 p.m., on situation at Loe Dakka. Attacks delivered on 16th from west and south-west by Kabulis, they were driven off, and except for some sniping night was quiet Our casualties were 130 "Morning of 17th May enemy on ridge west of Dakka were attacked by 1st Brigade At "7 a.m. 1st Division sent to Dakka H Q, 3rd Brigade, with one M G Company and two "battalions, one section 45 howitzers and one section 37 howitzers By 3.50 p.m. General "Skeen had captured hills; no report yet received of our casualties, but it is believed 35th "Sikhs had considerable losses. Enemy force, eight battalions, with guns, according to indications of Political Officer's report Night of 16-17th May some sniping at Fort Maude "17th May 4th Brigade moved with guns and machine guns to Ali Masjid, without meeting "opposition, for purpose of clearing hills to south of that point. All quiet at Bannu and "Kohat Nearly 12 cwt of explosives were dropped on Basawal, on ridge to west of Dakka, "and on Jalalabad" There has been increase in number of desertions from Khyber Rifles, and probably we shall have to give orders for greater part of the force to be disbanded Baluchistan reports situation unaltered Some unrest amongst Achakzais near Chaman, in British territory Five hundred Afghan troops reported by Jaji Maidan Malik in their country; reinforcements expected Mohmands, Waziris, Zaimukhts, Orakzais and Afridis maintain good attitude in general Information received points to intention of Afghans to move some troops, as nucleus for Afridi *lashkars*, into Bazar Barker and Hoare are names of two lieutenants of R.A.F. taken prisoners in Bazar, tribesmen are treating them well Swatis and Dirwals are still fighting each other No operations reported in Bajaur and Mohmand country up to 15th May, but Mullahs and agents still show activity

No. 20.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18th May (Received 18th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Swatis are being kept fully occupied by Nawab of Dir Situation in Wano reported normal by Political Agent, and distribution of allowances taking place Zhob Militia desertion reported of 15 cavalry near Akhtarzai, mostly Ghilzais In view of alarming increase in number of desertions from Khyber Rifles, Roos-Keppel reports that yesterday he instructed Commanding Officer to have corps concentrated at Jamrud and Landi Kotal and ask each man whether he wished to be discharged or to remain with corps 600 out of 700 at Landi Kotal asked to be given discharge, men at Jamrud are expected to act similarly This practically amounts to disbanding the force. It will have an adverse effect on Afridi tribe as a whole, but there is a considerable difference between calling on young men of Afridi in Khyber Rifles to fight for us and leaving the tribe to sit on the fence with steady influence of elder men To-day Afridi *yrga* is reported to have decided to take no steps till Amir supplies them with food and arms and ammunition, and the Chief Commissioner expects that the result of the operations round Dakka, which are being watched with close attention, will be decisive factor in their behaviour Much the same may be said of the Orakzais, and the attitude seems to be common to all the tribes The Mohmands are quiet and have informed Haji Turangzai that if he tries to come through their country he will be opposed; they are said to have thoroughly looted rifles, etc., in Afghans' camp after Dakka was bombed.

No. 21.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18th May. (Received 19th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following is text of letter from Afghan Commander-in-Chief to Political Agent, Khyber, asking for armistice:—"Sir,—As regards outbreak of war between Afghanistan and Britain, I

have the honour to inform you that British officers commenced an unlawful war without any declaration of war on any side and by this aggressive step inflicted heavy losses on civil population and Army of Afghanistan by throwing bombs from aeroplanes. I am informed by His Majesty (the King of the Independent Kingdom of Afghanistan) that His Majesty has received a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy of India and in consequence of that I am ordered to suspend war (thus unlawfully begun by your side) until further orders. You are accordingly informed that war has been suspended until final decision has been reached by correspondence between His Afghan Majesty and His Excellency the Viceroy." Reuter has already telegraphed above. Message is insolent and so obviously a device to gain time, as reported by us on 16th May,* that orders were given to Political Agent to send reply that he had no authority to answer it, and that Amir should address himself to the Viceroy through channel of G.O.C. in charge of operations, if he wanted peace. Roos-Keppel has telegraphed rough translation of Amir's letter of 10th May† which reached Peshawar on 17th. General tenour, revealing Amir's complicity beyond doubt, is clear from following salient passages, though message is very obscure and in parts corrupt:—"At a time when all India and all Mohammedans are united against the Government of India's tyrannical enactments and Afghans are in sympathy with them especially on the frontier, it would be unreasonable and inadvisable to arrest Zar Shah. It is possible that he may have had papers printed somewhere and possibly they do bear my seal. You accuse me of stirring up the Afghans. Their combination is spontaneous. Your great delay in answering my first letter to you surprises me and I am surprised that your reply should be such as to give my heart no joy. There is much danger in the present state of affairs and your duty is to remove tyrannical laws, to remove tyrannical treaties and not to forget that Afghanistan is independent."

PNO. 22.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18th May. (Received 19th May)
(Telegraphic.)

Roos-Keppel reports under date 16th May that he has intercepted four letters from Amanulla dated 10th May (a) An invitation to Kazi Abdul Wali, a Peshawar agitator who was till recently member of the Bolshevik Committee there and escaped to independent territory before city was surrounded, to come to Kabul: (b) Letter to Afghan Postmaster instructing him to use means employed by Afghan Envoy to deliver to Haji Turangzai letter (c) which is promise to Haji to help with troops and ammunition. (d) copy of letter to Abdur Rahman, the Afghan Envoy, commending his services in Peshawar and stating Amir has received from him two letters from Haji Turangzai. Originals are being posted to Delhi 16th May. As has been reported already Abdur Rahman during short time he was in Peshawar had intimate dealings with Bolshevik Committee there. Envoy's post bag has been intercepted: it contains number of copies for distribution of inflammatory leaflets and also a letter of 28th April from Commissary for Foreign Affairs instructing Envoy to obtain from Hindus and Mussulmans deeds of allegiance to Amir and instructing him to put exciting announcements in the Press as good opportunity will soon arrive.

No. 23.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 19th May. (Received 20th May)
(Telegraphic.)

Strong influence on Afridi opinion in favour of British is reported by Roos Keppel as result of our success at Dakka on 17th. Afridis had previously been influenced by Afghans' apparent success, and on 16th were gradually inclining towards Jihad. City of Peshawar is quiet and every Agency and district in North-West Frontier Province reports all well. Mohmands are ostentatiously friendly. As further result of our success of 17th Chief Commissioner reports good effect on Khyber Rifles, of whom more wished to remain with us; but after consulting fully with Political Agent, Khyber, and officers of Corps, he feels that in present strained state of religious feeling reliance can no longer be placed on it, and its disbandment is therefore being proceeded with. 200-300 men are being retained as messengers for political work. Agent in Baluchistan forwards report of 12th May received from Kamar-ud-din-Karez that orders had reached Governor of Wazikhwah in Sulemankhel country to issue rifles and ammunition to all who had none, that every one must prepare for Ghaza and that every second man is to be taken forcibly if the people do not volunteer. Copy of manifesto found at Thal has reached us to-day. It is most violently written and is issued by the "Provisional Government of India," bearing seal of Faqir Hassan, Secretary, and signature of Obaidulla, Wazir. Following extract is typical:—"A compact has been entered into with the forces of invasion by the Provisional Government. Your real interests would be destroyed by fighting against invaders; you should, therefore, not do this. But rather use every possible means to kill British, continue to tear up railways and cut down the telegraphs and refuse to help the British with men and money. Supply the armies of the invaders with provisions, thus shall you earn peace at their hands and obtain *sandaks* of honour."

* See No 17.

† See Report of the Hon. Mr Justice Bowditt's Sedition Committee, 1918 para. 164

† See No 31.

No. 24.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 20th May. (Received 21st May)

Following is an extract from letter of 10th May from Amanulla to Haji Turangzai mentioned in our message of 18th*.—“ We pray God you may remain firm on the path of Holy war. You will know our ideas from proclamations printed and circulated. We have appointed Commander-in-Chief, who will advise you and supply you with ammunition ” On 7th May the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar wrote letter to Amanulla, of which following is an extract —“ Hearing Post Office was to be searched I ordered armed resistance as whole of my correspondence went against British Government. If necessary I would begin holy war in haven of city. Hearing of this, about 8,000 Peshawaris, both Hindus and Moslems, came to help to sack. That night 2,000 villagers from outside offered their assistance. I said I would invite them when the time came. Sikh regiments have assured Hindus that they look on Moslems as brethren and will not fire upon them. Government has not sufficient troops in India and often moves about one regiment consisting of two or three companies to make display. In spite of many telegrams sent by Chief Commissioner no regiments have arrived by train. British subjects will not supply recruits. There are disturbances throughout India and troops if sent for from England will not arrive in time. It has been given out in public meeting that Amir and Ghazis are ready to help Indians, and if war is delayed people will be displeased with Amir. They cried with one voice they could not forget oppressions and tyranny of British Government. If after sealed leaflets have been circulated Sipah Salar especially refrains from invading India, Hindus and Moslems will be much displeased. It is not expedient to delay and give time to the English to collect troops.”

No. 25.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 20th May. (Received 21st May)
(Telegraphic)

Consul-General, Meshed, reports that up to 10th May Herat was quiet, and without news from any quarter, even including Kabul, in regard to war; rumour was prevalent that Amir did not any longer desire friendship with us and people were pleased at reports of Indian riots. As regards Meshed, Grey states Governor-General is at our disposal with his resources, that expressions of sympathy with British are common and outspoken, and that there is no pro-Afghan feeling worth speaking of. Kurram is much disturbed by expectation of approach of Nadir Khan with *lashkars*, reported 12,000 strong, in addition to four regular battalions and guns; large numbers of Ghilzais are reported to be collected at Ali Khel and Gardez and Jaji Maidan tribesmen are having arms distributed to them. Enemy are using propaganda to endeavour to shake Turis from their loyalty. All other districts and Agencies of North-West Frontier send satisfactory reports. From Roos Keppel report received yesterday that a big Afridi *jirga* was held on 18th, at which it was decided to send to Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Jalalabad a small deputation (which, incidentally, would look out the Afghans' weak spots in case of decision to loot their camps) to take message similar to that sent by Orakzai, that the Afridis have no quarrel with British Government and would certainly refuse to rise against them unless given a large amount of food, arms and ammunition. Afridi feeling is liable to daily changes, but they do not seem at all likely to rise at present. Mohmands have sent message that they and many Ningrahar tribes would join Yakub Khan if he has any chance of the Amir's throne. Roos Keppel's messengers are all being killed one by one, and he finds it increasingly difficult to get news from enemy's country.

No. 26.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 21st May (Received 22nd May)
(Telegraphic)

Following telegraphic message, dated 20th May at Sarwekai, received from Political Agent, Wano, by Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, who repeated it to us to-day.—“ Yesterday information reached me from Russell at Wano that reports of arrival of Afghan troops at Urghun from Gardez had been received from Urghun. I got no reply to my wire to Garratt asking him to confirm. Later report from Russell indicates it is correct that 2,000 infantry, with seven batteries and 60 cavalry have arrived, object presumably being attack on Wano. Political Assistant is going to try and get news from Durand Lane. G O C. Waziristan force has been informed, and told that he should at once make any preparations that he needed to make. He was instructed by me to represent matter to you if there was any probability at all of attack being made, as North-West Frontier cannot spare any considerable force and is not disposed for reinforcement of troops up Gomal. Your instructions as to measures to be taken are therefore solicited.” Roos-Keppel continues:—Information in my opinion indicates probability of

* No 22.

† G O C Northern Front

attack on Tochi rather than Wano, but whichever is correct, it is necessary clearly to define our policy. Following instructions sent to G O C Waziristan and Wano after conference between self and G O C, indicate latter's views. "If Afghan forces enter Wano district and are joined by tribes evacuation of Sarwekai, Gomal posts and Wano will be necessary, as it is not possible to hold line of communication to Wano through Gomal. Evacuation should be effected in time to let any of garrisons who remain loyal have chance of getting away safely to Murtaza or Zhob. Everything of value in posts should be destroyed before evacuation. Political Agent, Wano, is being informed of these instructions by Chief Commissioner. As regards Tochi, in respect of all posts above Miranshah these orders apply. Decision as to moment for evacuation will rest with Senior Officers, Tochi and Wano Agencies." In conformity with above, following message of instructions as to action to be taken on development of emergency contemplated has been sent by me to Political Agents in Wano and Tochi — *Wano* You are to hold on to Sarwekai and Gomal posts for so long as seems reasonably safe to you and Commandant, South Waziristan Militia, with whom you should consult. In preparing to withdraw give yourself time to destroy everything useful to enemy. If there are any friendly Mahsuds and Waziris left, hand over posts to them; you can promise them ample reward for looking after them. Question of withdrawing men from various posts to Wano or Murtaza, latter if possible, left to your discretion. Act similarly in regard to Wano, whence you should retire to Zhob if circumstances demand. It is out of question to relieve Wano, so there is no use holding on there to the end. Our operations on Dakka and Jalalabad front have had so much success that Afghans' whole plan of campaign may be upset, you should, therefore, hang on so long as there is fair chance of safety, but if you and Senior Military Officer think position so bad that you may be besieged, you should quit, destroying all you can before departure; take all men who remain loyal, and with rations sufficient for journey to Zhob, make your way there. *Tochi*. If position becomes critical all posts above Miranshah should be evacuated and men withdrawn, as G O C directs, posts being either abandoned or given over to any friendly Waziris that may remain: you may promise generous rewards for safe custody of posts. Everything useful to enemy to be destroyed, whether posts are given over or abandoned. I cannot avoid putting on you and Crosthwaite a heavy responsibility in giving these orders, but I realise its weight your accurate sizing up of position is main factor in situation. It is possible that attack on Tochi or Wano may not come off, as Afghans' schemes have been quite upset by our military successes near Dakka; but, on other hand, there is no possibility of relieving garrison if besieged and you must, therefore, not hang on too long, thereby, perhaps, giving enemy success in capture of garrison. Political Officer, Wano, has authority to tell all men of South Waziristan Militia who remain loyal, if retreat becomes necessary, that their loyalty will be handsomely rewarded and that they will find lucrative work here. Keep me fully informed by wire of developments."

No. 27.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May (Received 23rd May)

(Telegraphic.)

Two messages, dated 20th May, received from Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province — "Afridis deputation under Mullah Said Akbar met Kahi Commandant on their way to Jalalabad, and in reply to demand for money, food, arms and ammunition were told that Afghans could put no trust in Afridis after their treachery in last war against Afghanistan, and would only give them ammunition now, keeping back other things demanded till after they had definitely risen. Afridis replied by accusing Afghans of having betrayed them in 1908, and earlier in 1897. Enormous quantities of ammunition are being distributed in Kahi and Afridis are flocking there. It is said that Afghans are giving away all their ammunition, of which they probably have unlimited supply, because they are sick of fighting and want by this means to get tribes to do the fighting for them. On Kurram frontier Afghans still making warlike preparations, but made no move yet. Elsewhere all quiet. Information received that factions engaged in internal warfare in Bajaur have been reconciled by Mullahs, who are getting *lashkars* together for an attack next Friday on Mohmand border. Possibly information is premature, as the Hindu women and children in Shabkadr, whose invariable custom is to leave when trouble threatens, have not done so, and the lower Mohmands are full of confidence, though they are prone to alarm." Later report from Roos-Keppel — "Latest information from Mohmand country indicates large *lashkar* of Afghans from Kunar at Ghalana under leadership of Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, supported by 3 Afghan regiments and 6 guns, and large number of Ambahar Utman Khels, Mohmands, Salarzais and Bajauris. Upper Mohmands have not joined, and Haji Turangzai has stayed behind to raise them. Force is considered by locals at Shabkadr to consist of unreliable troops, who may perhaps disperse on arrival of guns and aeroplanes. Four regiments are reported by Political, Zhob, to be at Wazikhwah, about 60 miles north of Kamaruddin Karz, occupation of which, as he points out, could be effected without difficulty and with very disturbing effect on Zhob Valley. Afridis of Kohat Pass are quiet and came in as usual for their allowances. Mahsuds remain quiet."

No. 28

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May
(Received 23rd May)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following dated 21st received from Roos-Keppel —“ Letter has been received by Amir of Hindustani Fanatics from Black Mountain tribes, asking for instructions, as they had heard *Jehad* had been commenced. He replied that he did not want to have anything to do with them, as they had failed to help him on previous occasions when he needed help, and that he has no intention of rising, as he has been well treated by Government and is on amicable terms with Government at present. Deputation sent by Afridis failed to reach Jalalabad and have returned deeply annoyed at manner in which Afghans received them, and dispersed to their homes in Tirah. All very quiet in Bazar and Chura, no gatherings. *Jehad* is being preached among Orakzai by Mullah Mahmud Akhuzada, but in half-hearted way, as he is telling them not to rise openly for present, but only damage railways and telegraphs in their neighbourhood. Political, Kurram, reports good sign in whole Zaimukht *prga* coming in in response to summons to see him: situation unchanged. Arrival reported by Tochi of Nadir Khan at Almerai with 3 regiments of infantry, one of cavalry and 16 guns (estimated number), one of which is heavy and has elephant transport. No more information as to advance on Wano. All quiet reported from Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, Kohat, Bannu. These four districts, reporting independently, are unanimous that though Mullahs are no doubt stirred by Amir's proclamations which have reached all points of country, feeling for *Jehad* is practically non-existent now that Afghans are up against the real thing. Public opinion has been affected very favourably by our Dakka success and Commander-in-Chief's request for cessation of hostilities. People may not be loyal, but at any rate hope is general that invasion of Afghans may be prevented by crushing defeat of Amir.”

No. 29.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May.
(Received 23rd May)*

(Telegraphic.)

Roos-Keppel telegraphs 21st May as follows —“ Letter received 10 a. m. to-day in Dakka camp from Sardar Abdur Rahman, Afghan Envoy, addressed to G O C. British Forces. Letter is dated Shaban 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 20th May, 1919, and translation runs. —‘ I was deputed by Foreign Secretary to Government of India, while I was at Simla, to journey to Afghanistan, the God-granted Kingdom, in order to remove the misunderstandings existing between the military officers of Afghanistan and Great Britain. I therefore hastened to Afghanistan, and with all speed paid my respects to H.M. the King of Islam, to whom I represented matters, explaining that there were certain responsibilities by which both sides were bound. I am now, accordingly, in Jalalabad, whither I have been sent deputed to commence this important affair, and request that you will advise the Foreign Secretary of this as soon as possible by telegraph, and ask that a delegate may be appointed and a place fixed for a meeting and discussion of the matter by both parties. If God so pleases, this great question shall be settled, and a great name gained by you and me for ourselves thereby. I should be grateful, with your permission, to meet you for a friendly interview, and for this purpose can come to any place you may select. Till a settlement of the matter is concluded, both parties must cease from the commission of unfriendly-acts. Will you please send me an acknowledgment that this letter has been received.’ A letter, of which the text will be telegraphed as soon as possible,* has been received from the British Agent in Kabul, that he is at Jalalabad on his way to Simla bearing indisputable information of the readiness of the Government of Afghanistan to come to terms. He asks that bombardment of Jalalabad should be discontinued, but relaxation of our pressure is not, I consider, advisable.”

No. 30.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May.
(Received 23rd May)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Roos-Keppel dated 21st May —“ I consider that another proof is afforded by overtures from Abdur Rahman† of Afghans' bad faith, and I think it my duty to point this out to Government. We know from his intercepted correspondence and from his intrigues in Peshawar too much of his conduct in India to have great confidence in his sincerity. As regards Amir, he would have sent a letter signed by himself if he were in really repentant mood. Afghans have harmed us all they can and are pouring inflammatory messages and letters, money, arms and ammunition into tribes in our territory. Failure of tribes to rise has clearly seen a disappointment to them. Abdur Rahman has no credentials, and so can always be

* See No 32.

† No 29

repudiated by Amir, this leads me to conclusion that this half-hearted overture for peace is a device to gain time in hopes that tribes may still rise, which they certainly will do if we cannot display some definite success. I suggest that, without our ceasing to harry Afghans in Ningrahar, and while we use greater speed than ever in preparing advance, Abdur Rahman should be met at Dakkâ or Peshawar by Political Agent, Khyber, with brief reply in sense that, as he has no letter from Amir Amanulla, no recognition as accredited envoy can be accorded." Situation all along frontier is so critical and time is such vitally important consideration, that we are instructing G.O.C. to give Abdur Rahman following intimation, at same time inviting him to meet him:—'Amir Amanulla Khan has wantonly, deliberately and without provocation violated British territory, he has incited the tribes to take up *Jehad*, he has made nefarious attempts, of which we possess documentary proof, to tamper with the allegiance of the loyal subjects in India of His Majesty the King, Emperor of India. In view of these facts, the British Government must secure guarantees that the wicked folly of a handful of evil counsellors shall not again jeopardise the peace of the frontier and the welfare of Afghanistan, before they can cease from hostilities. Till then Amir can best prove his sincerity by at once ordering his troops on all fronts to return to their peace stations, sending to the G O C, under his own signature, a signed copy of orders to that effect. His Excellency the Viceroy is unable to instruct the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in India to order the officers in command of operations to refrain from further action till the return movements of Afghan troops are made.'"

No. 31.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.

(Telegraphic)

We have now received in Simla and carefully translated the letter from Amanulla referred to in our telegram of 18th May.* The translation received from Peshawar did not clearly bring out Amanulla's admission that the *firman* inciting the tribes was authentic. We do not understand Amanulla's reference to letter No 3, which we have not received, though present letter is numbered No 4.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to H.E. the Viceroy, dated 10th May, 1919. (Telegraphic version received in London 23rd May, 1919)

(Translation.)

It is made known to the mind of His Illustrious Excellency my friend His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India of the Great Government of Britannia.—

Your Excellency's letter, dated 4th Shaban 1337 Hijra, corresponding to the 5th May, 1919, has been received.

With regard to what you have written about Zar Shah, that he should be arrested, I regret to say that at such a time when all the people—Hindus and Muslims—of India have combined against the tyrannical law which the Government have considered it advisable to enforce on them and the Muhammadan and Hindu subjects of the sublime Government of Afghanistan, especially the people of the frontier, owing to sympathy and racial nearness have displayed a desire to participate in this union, Zar Shah's arrest at this time is for that reason inadvisable and difficult. As regards the statement that Zar Shah Afghan has exhibited certain leaflets, he might have obtained from somewhere the printed manifesto bearing this friend's Royal seal and expressing my Islamic sympathy and human feeling towards mankind, and the abhorrence of my Royal mind of things affecting the faith and religion, and freedom and liberty of human beings. In the same manifesto has been mentioned my unwillingness to interfere with the internal affairs of the dominions of that friend or to have any concern with them. By rousing the Afghan tribes my object is not such as has been apprehended by Your Illustrious Excellency. Nay, the object is to make them unite and co-operate with each other in safeguarding the rights of the independence and rule of their country, nation and the Government of Afghanistan, in maintaining peace on the frontier and in guarding and protecting it from the effect of the quickly approaching revolutions.

Your Illustrious Excellency has written to inform me of the receipt of my first and last Royal letters and of your becoming acquainted with the appointment of the Exalted Abdur Rahman Khan as the Envoy of my sublime Government at the court of that friend's Government, &c. It is a matter for great surprise that His Illustrious Excellency the Viceroy wrote a reply to our first letter after great delay and that reply was not such as might have made our heart happy. As regards our second communication, which contained the credentials of our Envoy, it was essential for the Envoy himself to present it personally to His Excellency the Viceroy, but you had demanded that also before the Envoy's arrival at Simla. The Envoy had, however, left for Simla before the receipt of your telegram demanding the said credentials. Without talking to our trusted Envoy Abdur Rahman Khan, you have made reference in this last letter of yours to our third Royal letter and have done so in terms of intimidation conditional on certain things the accomplishment of which was difficult, as mentioned above.

We have fully explained our objects in those letters, and if you ask our Envoy for explanations he will furnish them clearly in detail. While Your Excellency should

* No. 21.

have recognised our Government as one of the absolutely independent Governments with all honour and dignity, in view of its important geographical and political situation, it is to be regretted a thousand times that it appears from Your Illustrious Excellency's letter and intentions as if those hopes of ours which we had in the friendship and unity of the Government of Your Illustrious Excellency were considered to have been dispersed. Our sublime Government of Afghanistan, in view of the acquaintance and neighbourliness which it has had from long times past with the Exalted Government of Britannia by way of India, has already expressed and now expresses its willingness to conclude treaties and have friendly relations with Your Exalted Government. Relying on the great respect and consideration which have for long times past existed between both parties, I hope that that friend will use his best and well-meaning endeavours and efforts to avert this very grave and dangerous state of affairs, with great prudence, by abolishing tyrannical laws and recognizing the absolute independence, equal rights and freedom in all respects of the Government of Afghanistan, which is ready to conclude treaties and engagements in every way beneficial to each other, so that doors of calamity may not be opened upon the world, for it is right to demand right and it is not right to shed blood without right in the path of right. The truth is that no delay is admissible. I hope confidently that Your Illustrious Excellency will inform this friend without delay that that kind friend will take the necessary measures in this matter.

For the rest may the days of friendship endure for ever
 No 4 Dated 9th Shaban, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 10th May, 1919
 (Seal of Amir Amanulla)

Your friend,
 AMIR AMANULLA

No. 32.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.
 (Received 24th May)*

(Telegraphic)

Following is text of British Agent's letter* to Officer Commanding at Dakka, dated 20th May, in camp at Jalalabad, transmitted by Roos Keppel by wire on 21st May—"Sir, Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, lately Envoy for Afghanistan in India, has addressed to you a letter in Persian which you will receive and in which I entirely agree. I am staying at the Ark (*i.e.*, Government House) in Jalalabad on my way to India, and from here I have since morning watched your airships continuously bombard the city and the Ark. I had a narrow escape from them, for a few bombs exploded not many yards from the room where I am. I have received reliable and authentic information that the Afghan Government is ready to come to an understanding with the British Government and I ask you, Sir, kindly to take immediate steps to lay before the Foreign Secretary this letter and the Persian letter from Envoy Sardar Abdur Rahman who is here with me in Jalalabad also, and meanwhile until you receive the Government of India's orders on the matter, and let us know the result, please stop utterly the bombardment of the city of Jalalabad and the Ark in it, for we are both using our best endeavours to repair as soon as possible the position and have taken measures through the authorities of the district and by other methods to prevent and cool the excitement and fanatic spirit of *Ghaza*, unwelcome word, and to prevent the foolishness of Ghazis near your camp and at other places on the British border from being hostilely active till both parties come to an understanding." Roos Keppel points out that as Agent does not mention present whereabouts of Amanulla, who is said in reports repeatedly received by military intelligence officers to be in Jalalabad, it is clear that the letter was written under compulsion.

No. 33

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.
 (Received 24th May)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following received from Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, dated 21st:—Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphs that the late Envoy, Sardar Abdur Rahman, who has brought a letter from our agent, written at Jagdalak, stating that Amir has recalled him to Kabul, has arrived at our camp at Dakka to obtain answer to his letter †. He is accompanied by Col. Ahmed Ali Sarhaddar and Nazir Habibulla Khan, and whole party is being kept, pending further instructions, at Dakka camp by orders of G.O.C. there. None of these men have any credentials and G.O.C. objects to the visit as probably being for espionage purposes, and to their return to enemy's country after our arrangements have been exposed to their observation. With this view I entirely agree, and suggest that they should be brought in to Peshawar Fort as they have transgressed the customs of war. They can be honourably treated there and at same time, if they have gained any information, prevented from using it. There

* See No 29

† See No 29.

does not seem to be any reason why we should not keep them as hostages, which is apparently Amanulla's intention in regard to British Agent." We have given instructions to keep Abdur Rahman's two companions for the present, but to let him himself deliver his message and after giving him the G.O.C.'s reply* to put him across the frontier, with an oral message that before any further representations can be entertained, the British Agent must be released.

No. 34.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May. (Received 24th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following report, dated 21st May, has been received:—"W/T station at Tashkend last night sent to Lenin and Foreign Minister at Moscow message that two sealed letters, both dated 7th April, addressed to the President of the Russian Republic, had been received from Kabul, one from Amanulla, Amir of Afghanistan, the other signed by Mahmud, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter expresses hope that friendly relations with Bolshevism will be established on permanent basis. Amanulla, in his letter, says that hitherto Afghanistan has stood apart from all other nations, but now that Russia has raised the standard of Bolshevism he hastens to declare that she has earned the gratitude of the whole world, and that he seizes the occasion of his accession to throne of Afghanistan to announce to Republic of Russia that he strongly adheres to the principle of equality among all men and peaceful union of all peoples: he expresses hope that the honoured President of Russian Republic will not refuse his friendly greeting. Tone of letter, which is signed "Your friend Amanulla," is subservient and not of kind to which we are used. Tashkend asks what replies should be made and says originals will be kept there till direct communication with Moscow is established. In telegram to Eastern Propaganda Department Bravin asks that reminder be sent to Barkatullah of his promise to write a pamphlet on Bolshevism in the Koran, and that the work be hastened on, and 100,000 copies in Persian and Hindustani printed and sent by special courier with all speed." Yesterday morning, in response to challenge, Afghan envoy showed letters, dated 7th April, which Amanulla had had addressed, but not actually sent, to Japan, Turkey, Persia, France and U.S.A., in which he announces his accession, requests that Government addressed in each case should accept his respects, and explains that owing to certain causes, as he says, Afghanistan had not previously been able to have relations with Governments of other great States.

No. 35:

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May. (Received 24th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports on 22nd May as follows.—"Political Officer, Wano, telegraphs that there is no foundation for rumour that enemy are at Muss Nika. He says Mullah Fazl Din, who has arrived from Kabul disappointed, has quarrelled with and is working against Mullah Hamzulla, who is trying to induce Mahsuds to rise. Large numbers of Mahsuds are coming in to Sarwekai to get their allowances; they do not seem disposed for war and temper seems excellent. Telegraphic report from Tochii states that force under Shar Wali Khan has now reached Urghun, consisting of 400 infantry, 100 cavalry, one gun, 2 machine guns, with 3,000 Ghilzai reinforcements expected, as against previous garrison of Urghun reported as 3,000 men and 12 guns; Shah Wali Khan expected to reach Lawara to-morrow. Nadir Khan in Khost is still delaying and has announced that he will fix date for advance after spending some days in interviewing *jirgas* at Nariza, in Turi country. Kohat reports all quiet in district and on border, except for despatch of deputation from Biland Khel Wazirs to Khost *jirga*. Kurram reports that Nadir Khan in Khost has just sent orders to Muhammad Alam, commanding Kharlachi front, to withdraw his tribesmen, as former is not yet ready to fight. About a thousand have been withdrawn, and force now left in front of Kharlachi consists of 2 guns, 300 regulars, 300 local tribesmen, 400 Ghilzais; total, about 1,000. Situation unchanged in Peiwar. Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada is said to have visited Para Chanakannis urging them to be ready, but they urged they were so insignificant they would be glad to be excused. No gatherings reported from Orakzai and Tarah Afridis; all quiet. Black Mountain, Swat and Dir show no signs of trouble. Peshawar district report: large gatherings of Mohmands, with Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, reported in Gundab Valley. Baura Mullah, in Pindiali, had not succeeded in getting any followers up to last night. In Buner *jirgas* are being held, Mullahs said to be very active, but tribesmen are still disinclined for *Jehad*. Enemy may attack to-night or to-morrow morning, unless orders received from Jalalabad countermanding advance. On whole, I consider situation is improved."

No. 36.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 24th May

(Telegraphic)

Please take steps to translate and circulate on frontier following message from Aga Khan who is also telegraphing a message for circulation among his followers in India direct to President of Ismailia Council in Bombay —“ Without a shadow of excuse, and at a time of profound peace, forgetting the wise statesmanship of the great Abdurrahman and the loyal and honourable example of King Habibullah, breaking sacred treaties, some misguided people have attacked wantonly and foolishly British India. Of course the great King-Emperor who overthrew German militarism can break these people, but for us our sacred duty is to help His Majesty the King-Emperor, because his cause is just, because his treaties are sacred, because it is only by every one of us whether great or small, loyally doing his duty, that the cause of peace and prosperity and religious and civil freedom's triumph in Mid-Asia can be assured. I wish and pray that all my dear children should, like myself, not only remain staunchly loyal, but do their utmost to open the eyes of others to their and mankind's interests.— Aga Khan.”

No. 37

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May (Received 25th May)

(Telegraphic.)

On 22nd Jutogh W/T Station intercepted following message sent out apparently from Kushk to all Eastern Stations —

“ Pursuant to telegram from Moscow, No 1473, according to official advice from Kabul, the new Government of Afghanistan is endeavouring to rally mountain tribes of the frontier with a view to securing an exit to sea and to gain possession of port of Karachi.”

No. 38.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May (Received 25th May)

(Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel's report of 23rd May. —Wano agency, no news. Tochi telegraphs that Nadir Khan is still at Matun and taking no action Tirah all quiet Villagers are making their way back to Lalpura, 400 families have already returned and more are *en route* Usman Khan, eldest son of refugee Khan of Lalpura, Extra Assistant Commissioner posted at Dakka, is in communication with village and states inhabitants will gladly send in supplies. Small numbers of Afridis are going to fetch ammunition from Kahi and Jalalabad Reports have been received that Mohmands have been sent messages by Amir instructing them to start fighting without delay so as to draw our troops away from Dakka front, many men are reported going to Mohmand border from Kunar Bajaur reports that on morning of 22nd May Salarzai *lashkar* started for Shabkadr Enemy force on Mohmand border, of which bulk is at Gandab, and outposts at Hafiz Nor and Dand, remains curiously inactive Our Lower Mohmands and people of the district show no signs of enthusiasm for *Jehad* Malakand reports Swatis driven out of Shamozai by Nawab of Dir's *lashkar* Swatis will have no thoughts for *Jehad* so long as pressure from Nawab is maintained Political Agent, Kurram, telegraphs estimate of enemy at Peiwar Kotal as 1,500 or 2,000 regular troops and *lashkars* of strength unknown. All districts reported quiet Position generally shows no change Lieuts Hoare and Barker, R A F, prisoners of war, have been brought in by Zakka Khel Maliks, who have made no demand for ransom Recent reports from Jalalabad show that air raid of 21st May caused great confusion and town is practically deserted Several Government buildings were set on fire and citizens, Afghan officers and majority of Afghan troops fled in panic Afridis and other tribesmen who had gone to the town to get ammunition, looted town and Army stores freely, in spite of Mullahs' attempts to prevent them

No. 39.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May (Received 26th May.)

(Telegraphic)

Report received from Chaman that on 21st there was great activity in Kandahar in military preparations and great excitement. Abdul Qudus Khan had not arrived Roos Keppel reports, 24th May. —Abdul Majid, Sarbaddar of Dakka, is now in Dakka Fort and Political Agent, Khyber, has got possession of his official diary, which is being examined, and which contains an entry of his organising raids into British territory in accordance with orders received. Diary is very voluminous.

No. 40.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (Received 26th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following report, dated 23rd May, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province —“Reply of Government of India” was communicated to Afghan envoy last night and Abdur Rahman left for Dakka, a.m., 23rd. Two of his colleagues, all three of whom are detained in fort here, asked to have interview with me. Their names are Sardar Habibulla Khan, nephew of Muhammad Zi, and grandson of Gul Muhammad Khan Zi, and he is, according to his own account, Master-General of Telegraphs in Afghanistan; Col Ahmad Ali, brother of Col. Ali Ahmad, and grandson of Sardar Mahomed Rafiq Khan Lodi, and Abdul Majid Sarhaddar of Dakka. I did not see the last-named, but had long conversation with other two this morning. I saw them separately and they had no communication between themselves between their interviews with me. They both said that Nasrulla Khan is in strict confinement but well, and that Inayatulla Khan, who is also well, is under surveillance. Habibulla Khan is about 50 years old, with far greater intelligence and more polished manners than the average of Afghan Sardars, he lived in Turkey for many years, he is pleasant to deal with and we had a long conversation full of interest. He produced a *firman* signed and dated ‘Amir Amanulla, Sihshamba, 19th Shaban, 1337’—and reading as follows —‘To Habibulla Khan, Superintendent of Post Offices, and to Col Ahmad Ali Khan, Supervisor. As I have been informed by Abdur Rahman Khan, who was appointed to be Envoy to the Government of India, and has returned from that post, and who informed me at the time of his departure, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India discussed with him the question of ceasing from hostilities and of opening the way for peace. You are therefore deputed and authorised to proceed to the British camp on the field of battle and discuss the terms (*Mugarrarat*) of peace, and to inform me if you find the terms of peace favourable. It is necessary, and I authorise you to take these steps.’ I told Habibulla at the outset that I had no authority to negotiate and could only discuss things in a friendly manner with him and, if he had anything he wished to say, represent it to Government. He started by taking the line that the commencement of hostilities was due to a misunderstanding, the responsibility for which must rest with the British; but finding this line impracticable, he had recourse to the argument that faults had been committed on both sides. He said that Saleh Muhammad Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, had been arrested and sent back to Kabul; but I believe that, as a matter of fact, his reason for returning to Kabul was simply that he was too severely wounded to carry on on duty. Habibulla says he and Col Ahmad Ali are authorised to negotiate, and that Abdur Rahman came intending to go on to Simla; he argues that Abdur Rahman has never given up his appointment there, and that he went back to Kabul at the request of the Foreign Secretary to give private assurances to the Amir. This is an ingenious argument, affording explanation why Hafiz Saifulla Khan, British Agent, is kept at Kabul on grounds that a state of war cannot exist between British and Afghan Governments: till written declarations of war have been exchanged, that the events on various sections of the frontier are no more than local incidents, and that the two envoys should stay at their posts, as we are still technically at peace with Afghanistan. I told him the Government of India did not share his view, and he undertook at once to write and ask Amir to send British Agent down from Kabul at once, as his remaining there was misunderstood. I strongly advised him to do this, and he said he must first consult his colleague, but would do as I advised. I pointed out that, although Amir had not sent us formal declaration of war, his troops had encroached on our boundaries, and had fought inside them at Lairdi Kotal, and at this very moment were on the Kurram and Mohmand borders, inside our tribal territory, that at three different points armies had come down to the frontier and were making lavish distribution to our tribes of arms and ammunition, obvious purpose of which was use against us, and that Afghan officials in India had engaged in violent propaganda against British for some time before hostilities actually broke out, and that we had been waiting for written evidence of their complicity in this direction. Habibulla said he knew nothing of the propaganda in India, which was not his department, and that some of the military movements in Afghanistan were merely *defensive* measures due to our bombing Jalalabad and Dakka, and others were due to misunderstandings easily corrected. He explained that his mission was the suggestion of an armistice, while enquiry into reasons for the outbreak of war and arrangement of terms of peace would be for a mixed commission to accomplish. He admitted quite openly that bombing of Jalalabad had had very great effect and practically whole place was in ruins. Col Ahmad Ali, the other envoy, is a younger man, and inclined to be aggressively argumentative; he is a rather typical Afghan official. He stuck to the point that hostilities had been wantonly begun by us, and I did not consider this a point worth arguing with him. Habibulla and he request to be sent to Simla. Military authorities want to get them out of the fort and be rid of them, but no opportunity of communicating with Peshawar City can be admitted and they cannot be allowed to be at large here.” Both these men are now being told that there is no additional message for them beyond that already given in writing to Abdur Rahman, and they are being conducted across the border.

No. 41.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May (Received 26th May)
(Telegraphic)

Yesterday's report from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province —No report received to-day from Bannu, all other districts report all quiet Amanulla's *firman*s preaching *Jehad* reached Hindustani Fanatics at Samasata about 14th May and were distributed among tribes of neighbourhood Amir of Fanatics preached a sermon two days later strongly opposing *Jehad* and telling his adherents that he would wait about two weeks, giving time for the crops to be cut and for Swat and Buner to show their hands, and then consider questions afresh Presumably he is waiting for reply (which is being sent) to his message* to Abdul Qaiyum The Hasanzai held a full *jirga* on 19th and decided to take no hostile action at all They sent Amanulla a message that they had received good treatment from Government of India, with whom they were on good terms, and they would not only decline to take part in *Jehad*, but would oppose any Ghazi force crossing their limits of territory in attack on Government They added with some humour that when Attock fell to the Amir they would give question of joining his forces fresh consideration *Jirga* was held by tribes of Black Mountain, who decided to wait lead from Buner and Swat Swatis have their hands full with harvest and fighting with Nawab of Dir. Buners are reported to be holding tribal *jirga*, but quiet Mohmand border no enemy movements Attack has been expected for yesterday or to-day from direction of Hafizkor, but last night information reached Khyber Agent that enemy in Mohmand country were in retreat This morning's air reconnaissance reports confirm this, indicating that enemy on that front is in full retreat in north-west direction in two columns, first of which has already passed Nahakki. Mohmand militia, 1,500 strong, have had less than 30 cases of desertion, they have stood the strain well and shown themselves keen, Tirah. Abdul Qaiyum reports all quiet. We seem definitely to have got past danger of rising among Afridis, all sections of whom are sending deputations to Political Agent, this is rather embarrassing, as Khyber villages get filled with armed men and misunderstandings might arise Political Agent has told them that if they want to send a whole *jirga*, it will be seen at Peshawar, but must not come into Khyber, and that they had better go back and only come in small numbers to see him More details have been received of looting of Jalalabad on 21st by Afridis, Mohmands and Shinwars. Afridis returning to Tirah are bringing very large amount of loot Attempt was made by some Afghan regulars to protect Government property, they fired on tribesmen, who replied, and after casualties on both sides drove the regulars off Mullah Sayid Akbar, then at Hadda, was summoned to persuade tribesmen not to loot, he did all he could, but had to retire, as they fired on him too Afridis of Kohat Pass obtained a big quantity of ammunition at Kahi and Jalalabad, pretending they were going on *Jehad*, and are now selling it at great profit, they are quite quiet, and this is largely due to Commander-in-Chief's action in releasing men of 130th Baluchi Regiment I have been lent by Government of Punjab services of Mr Douglas Donald, C.I.E., I.C.S., who knows well Orakzai and other tribes of Kohat border, and am giving him charge of that section. Biland Khel Wazirs are leaving for Khost, it may be they are going to fetch ammunition, but if they join enemy's *lashkar* I shall have their village burned Distribution is being made from Khost of leaflets of the "Provisional Government of India," of which copies sent you already † Mullah of Karbogha has refused to have any share in agitation for *Jehad* or allow his sons to Following received by wire from Mehtar of Chitral —"Am glad to inform you we have defeated Afghans in Bashgul, we crossed Bashgul River, taking Istorgats and bridge there. We are rebuilding bridge at Istorgats, which enemy had burnt Casualties: ours, one killed, two slightly wounded, enemy, 20 or 30 killed and wounded" Extra-Assistant Commissioner Usman Khan crossed Kabul River on 23rd to Lalpura, where he had very good reception, supplies at moderate prices brought in from Kam Dakka and Lalpura in considerable quantities Kurram report no change Tochi report Nadir Khan has sent six guns to Bari, with stores and ammunition, Bari is three miles from Charkhai, on Durand Line Large *lashkar* being sent to Kartu and other *lashkars* to other points, he is issuing tribesmen with ammunition Information received gives impression that attack is not to be expected immediately Wano report *jirga* of Mahsuds to be held on 26th at Kaniguram to discuss letters inciting to *Jehad*; meanwhile payment of allowances at Sarwekai going on satisfactorily. No further reports of enemy advance in direction of Wano Confirmation now to hand from several sources that Mullah Fazl Din will preach neutrality and keep Mahsud boundary neutral against us and Afghanistan Political situation of whole North-West Frontier shows daily improvement

No. 42.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 26th May (Received 26th May)
(Telegraphic)

Report for 25th May from Roos-Keppel —Military authorities are deporting‡ Sardar Habibulla Khan, Col. Ahmad Ali and Sardar Abdul Majid to-morrow from Peshawar A certain Sultan Muhammad Khan arrived at Dakka with letters for Abdur Rahman, ex-Envoy, whom he seems to have missed on the road, and the Afghan delegates. He

* No 28.

† No 23.

‡ See No 40.

is being detained at Dakka and will be put across frontier with the others. Situation favourable. Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, is to see Mohmand *jirgas* to-morrow at Shabbadr, and if he confirms reports I have already received of their conduct, allowances forfeited since 1915 will be restored. Our Mohmands, Burhan Khel, Isa Khel, Tarakzai and Halimzai have behaved very well and enemy's decision to withdraw was largely contributed to by their hostile attitude to enemy and *lashkar* from Upper Mohmand country. Peshawar district: a certain amount of unrest in Charsadda sub-division; am dealing with this. All other districts quiet. Bajaur *lashkars* have gone home, as they were too late to reach Afghan force in Mohmand country. Tirah reported quiet. Afridis are now friendly, but a serious danger for future is constituted by their possession of large number of rifles and ammunition brought in from looting of Jalalabad; meanwhile they are submissively bringing in to Abdul Qaiyum arms taken away by deserters from Khyber Rifles. Afridis of Kohat Pass, Orakzais and Zaimukht quiet. Wano report, dated from Sarwekai: Abdur Rahman Khel Mahsuds inclined to cause trouble over old claim for special allowances, but I have arranged matter. Mahsuds' *jirgas* are believed to be sending reply to Afghans not to come into their country, but adding that if Afghans take Khyber, Kurram and Tochi, they themselves will take Jandola and Sarwekai without help from anybody else. Tochi report: no fresh news. Kurram report: minor incident reported, Afghan picket firing on party of militia, who replied, killing three Afghans. Desultory firing from enemy. Turis in confident mood.

No. 43.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 27th May. (Received 28th May.) (Telegraphic.)

Meshed reports, 26th May, all quiet in Herat up to 21st May. Baluchistan report, 26th May. Zhob, Fateh Khan and other Saraz headmen have sent Jacob a letter in which they express their loyalty and say they do not intend to give any trouble, but are too afraid of Afghan authorities to come in. All quiet in all country round Zarmelan. North-West Frontier Province report for 26th May. (First Message) All well to-day in northern half of frontier, and situation through whole Province was all one could wish up to yesterday, when Afghan forces on all fronts seemed to be stationary if not retiring, and there seemed to be no sign of trouble and tribes were in good mood. But news has just reached me of withdrawal by G.O.C., Tochi, of garrisons of all posts on Thal-Idak line and in Upper Tochi. Afghans seized Spinwam, and Mahsuds and Waziris at once occupied and burned upper posts. At 6.45 p.m. on 25th, Political, Wano, telegraphed that all was well, that Mahsuds' and Waziris' attitude was good, and that Mullah Hamzulla, disappointed with former's attitude, had gone home and troops also rapidly leaving. Second wire, timed 1.15 a.m., 26th, received from him stating that he had heard Tochi posts had been evacuated and that news was bound to affect Mahsuds, though they showed no signs yet of change and were quite quiet. Third message, timed 10.25 a.m. to-day, received, in which he says that with concurrence of Commandant, South Waziristan Militia, and Assistant Political Agent, he had decided it was necessary to evacuate posts at once, as they all consider Mahsuds and Waziris will rise as soon as they hear Tochi news. Political Agent, Kurram, telegraphs that Kabul Khel Waziris have patched up their private feuds and promised Afghans to join them if they enter Waziri country. Political situation in southern half of Province, which was "set-fair," has thus shifted in a single night to "stormy," and we must be ready for probable general rising of Mahsuds and Waziris, spreading possibly to Sheranni, Bhitanni and even Zhob; we may assume General Nadir Khan will move now, for up to present the great mistake in the enemy's plan of campaign has been their inability, up to now, to raise the tribes. (Second Message) I have already reported Tochi and Wano situation, but later information received of Afghan advance from Spinwam to point less than seven miles from Idak, on the Tochi road, and that *lashkars* of Waziris from Khaisora direction are assembling for attack on Miranshah. Political, Kurram, reports Gabar Mangals' *lashkar* has started to join Nadir Khan in Khost. Bajaur Khans, with their own and Salarzai *lashkar* started from Mohmand country, but returned on meeting messengers who told them Amir had asked for peace. All quiet elsewhere. Abdul Qaiyum has given handsome rewards to Zakka Khels of Bazar Valley, who brought in the two captured officers of R.A.F. without asking ransom. Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, saw *jirgas* of Burhan Khel, Halimzai, Isakkel and Tarakzai Mohmands, and tells me their behaviour throughout recent disturbances has been excellent. *Lashkar* in Gandab would certainly have attacked if they had joined it or Afghan troops, but latter's nervousness about their line of retreat, combined with steadiness of our Lower Mohmands, and effect of messages describing destruction of Jalalabad, induced enemy force to forego attack and retire. On 28th I intend to see full *jirga* of our Mohmands in Khyber Agency at Shabbadr. Afridis have taken on task of guarding as far as possible road from Ali Masjid to Jamrud and have placed pickets of tribesmen 1,000 yards in advance of our pickets to prevent passage of enemy snipers.

No. 44.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 28th May. (Received 29th May.) (Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel reports, 10 a.m. 27th May:—Inevitable effect on North Waziristan Militia, who had till now remained keen and staunch, of abandonment of Tochi posts is now visible.

They and tribes disbelieve stories of our successes on Mohmand and Khyber fronts, and regard our sudden withdrawal as great victory for Afghans. Reports show militia at Miranshah to be excited and restless, and at many posts garrisons are deserting. Report, giving no details, received that Miranshah Serai has been burned. Commandant, Waziristan Force, wires that he received following from Sarwekai by W./T. —“27th, 7 34 p.m. Everything being destroyed, no messages can be got through after this. Nili Kach ordered to evacuate, after destroying all stores and ammunition, and join party at Spinwam. Sarwekai party retiring to Murtaza; Wano party to Zhob.” Bannu road is seriously threatened, and above shows we have lost all Waziristan and Miranshah beyond it. Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, has been told by Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan to hold Sheranni posts up to last possible safe moment. General quietness of tribes had led me to believe that danger of attempts at concerted risings in Agency and district rumoured in contemplation for third night of Ramzan was past, but it will probably be revived by Tochi affair, which is looked on as Afghan victory. We may presume that Amir will put up stiff resistance. G.O.C., Frontier Force, is taking steps to reinforce Tank and Bannu. It is possible Mahsuds and Waziris will be contented with their success in freeing Waziristan of British, but they may take offensive; in that case will probably first attack Jandola, Tank and Murtaza, cutting either railway. Baluchistan wires to ask whether force at Tank is enough to keep Mahsuds and Waziris busy, or whether it is likely they will have time to make attack in force on Fort Sandeman. Even if they turn their attention to Zhob, they will probably not do so for some time, and it is hardly likely they will make an expedition to Fort Sandeman unless Zhob rises and asks their help. Even in that case, I am not sure they would leave limits of Waziristan. Bhattanis will have to join Mahsuds if they overrun their country, though they do not like them. Sherannis are likely to rise.

Khyber Agency. Political Agent reports all well, tribes assisting to guard road and offering to do any sort of service. Political Agent gave liberal reward to Zakka Khels who brought in airmen prisoners, they went away very pleased at treatment received, and ask as a favour that if it can be avoided aeroplanes should not fly over Bazar Valley.

Shinwaris from Sangar Khel attacked party of 200 Afridis, mostly Kuki Khels, who were returning with loot from Jalalabad, and killed or wounded 20, including six Kuki Khel elders; their own losses were about 20 also. Abdul Qayum thinks this will lead to bitter feud between Afridis and Shinwaris of Ningrahar, separating Afridis from Afghanistan.

Kurram reports slow fire all day by mountain guns at Utsar, on Pelihar mountain, at targets not ascertained. Militia at Chapri had rush attack made on them by tribesmen led by a Mullah. Militia, under Capt Wilson, killed Mullah and three others and repulsed attack. Kurram militia and Turis showing excellent spirit generally. I shall see Mohmand *journa* to-morrow they have sent in long letter (of which translation is being forwarded to you) setting forth their services. Lower Kurram and border tribes between Sadda and Hangu, Masozai, Alisherzai and Zaimukht, Kabul Khel and Tori Khel Waziris, are bound to be affected by events in Tochi; most of Lower Kurram is Sunni, but Upper Kurram is Shiah and solid for us, only Sunnis being Peiwar Mangals resident in Kurram, and they are fighting on our side. It is likely that communication between Thal and Sadda will be temporarily interrupted, but Turis will fight so long as there is force remaining in Upper Kurram, and as there are plenty of supplies there, I have no great anxiety on that score. Orakzai and Afridis are quiet and intend to remain quiet, but effect of Tochi events will spread from Lower Kurram tribes to them and excitement will inevitably revive under latest news from South. Donald's appointment* to Kohat border, where he has gone to-day, will, I hope and expect, have great effect on Orakzai, with whom he has much influence. He went through Kohat Pass to Kohat this morning, and reports traffic conditions normal, roads undamaged, and villagers most friendly. All other districts quiet and report no news.

No. 45.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 28th May. (Received 29th May.)

Following from Roos Keppel —See my message of 25th.† Following are translations of letters delivered by Sultan Ahmad at Dakka for Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibulla Khan — (*First letter.*) “Be it known to the respected Abdur Rahman Khan, Envoy of the God-granted Kingdom of Afghanistan, Col Ahmad Ali Khan, Col Abdul Majid Khan, and Habibulla Khan, that Abdul Aziz Khan, the late Envoy, had the honour of an interview yesterday, Friday 22nd May, and delivered to me your message in regard to the cessation of hostilities, and we, therefore, at once issued orders urgently to the various regions and frontiers of Afghanistan to break off fighting. But it is strange that while the British Government ask the Government of Afghanistan to cease from fighting, they on the other hand themselves sent their aeroplanes to-day, Saturday, at 6 a.m., which bombed Kabul, our capital, and then returned. It is regrettable that what they do should be contrary to what they say and this should not be the case. Great excitement has been caused in the city and suburbs

* No. 41

† No. 42.

of Kabul by the bombardment, and the Afghan nation will not readily be subdued by fighting if this line of action is persisted in. We, therefore, request that you will clearly inform the British of this. For the rest, by the grace of God all is well and you may rest assured. P.S.—The message which Abdul Aziz Khan delivered that hostilities should cease was only verbal, but it was from you and, as stated above, we accordingly issued orders to stop hostilities. But now that Kabul has been bombed, I write to instruct you that if the British really want no truce, you should obtain from them and send on to me a formal letter to that effect, and if they decline to give you a formal letter, you should inform me of the fact so that I may take action accordingly."

(Second letter, which is of earlier date) "Be it known to the faithful and respected Abdur Rahman Khan, envoy of the God-granted Kingdom of Afghanistan, and to Col. Ahmad Ali Khan, Habibulla Khan, and Abdul Majid Khan. We received and understood your message sent through Abdul Aziz Khan, lately Afghan Envoy, that the British Government had intimated to you that they had stopped hostilities and that Afghanistan should do likewise. As the British Government have done so, we also have issued orders to our forces on various frontiers that hostilities should cease pending the conclusion of a final settlement. We have dispatched urgent letters to this end, and we inform you also of our orders; but as there is no communication by telegraph in Afghanistan our information cannot reach over the whole country and to its frontiers in a single day. You are to continue the duties with which you have been entrusted. We pray to God for the well-being of Afghanistan and all its nations, and fervently beseech Him that success may crown our efforts. The rest remains with Him."

No. 46.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 29th May. (Received 30th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

North West Frontier Province report for 28th May. Political Agent, Malakand, reports by wire receipt of news from Jandol that Chitralis' force drove Afghans down the Kunar River as far as Narai, 10 miles above Asmar, which latter evacuated and Chitralis now threaten, though Salarzal *lashkar* is collecting in effort to anticipate them if possible in its capture. Ex-Nawab of Nawagar's eldest son has made written offer of his services. No reliance can be put in him, but his action is favourable symptom. Aka Khel and other Afridi elders have been visiting Abdul Qayyum to make excuses for members of their tribes taking part in sniping at Ali Masjid. They blame Yar Muhammed Khan entirely; and have undertaken to recover rifles which deserters from Khyber Rifles took away. Political Agent, Khyber, also reports that Upper Mohmands have threatened to attack Afghans if they retire through their country, and that some fighting is rumoured to have taken place, during the retirement, between Afghans and Mohmands. At Shabkadr this morning I saw full *yirga* of Isa Khel, Halimzai, Tarakzai, and Burhan Khel Mohmands, who are very proud of their services in keeping their tribesmen from joining with Afghans and claim that they have now definitely proved efficacy of last year's settlement. There is no doubt they have done very well. I restored their allowances, forfeited since 1915. They show much delight and reliance can, I think, now be placed on them. Conduct of Mohmand Militia has also been very good. The new telephone line from Peshawar through Mullagori country and Shilman to Dakka is erected as far as Shilman Ghakhai, and tribal guard has been arranged. For rest of its length to Dakka, Kam Dakka villagers will afford protection. Guarding of Mullagori road for transport by tribes has also been arranged. Baluchistan wires that it is considered that very great effect in Kandahar and whole of Afghan-Baluchistan frontier will result from fall of Fort Baldak, which had reputation of being practically impregnable and certainly strongest fort in Afghanistan. Mutilated message, dated 27th, from Political Agent, Kurram, states that Nadir Khan has written urgently to Mulla Mahmud Akhonzada to summon Orakzai *yirga*; that troops under Kazi Shah Buzurg on Lakatiga Border have moved south to Thal and that reports are confirmed of large increase in numbers of Afghan regulars on Kurram flank. Remainder of message could not be translated. Following two reports from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat:—(1) Dated 27th, at Hangu. Afghans have occupied and looted Thal town. Police safely evacuated Thana. Constabulary have orders to hold post. On his own initiative Jamadar Khaibat Shah removed to post two lakhs of treasure. (2) Dated Hangu 28th. Enemy occupied Thal town, mission hospital and police station. During night 27th/28th Thal Fort was attacked several times by Nadir Khan, but without success. Efforts will be made to-day to relieve constabulary who held out against several attacks during night. Necessary to evacuate constabulary and police posts at Torawari, Manzalli, Gurguri and Karbogha. Wire received dated Moghal Kot, 27th May, reporting arrival there in evening of about 450 other ranks and followers from Upper Gomal and Wano posts; these will be all the men remaining loyal to Political Agent, Wano, who retired to Murtaza from Sarwekai and Lower Gomal posts; he reported 61 desertions during evacuation, but total numbers brought in not yet reported. There is no more news available.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 31st May (Received 1st June)
(Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel's report for 29th May.—Assistant Political Officer at Dakka has met *yurga* from Basawal, Kam Dakka and Loe Dakka, who are showing friendly attitude and bringing in supplies. Shinwaris are returning to Khar Gali and Bagh, and will bring in to Landi Khana Brigade *bhoosa* and other supplies available when they have reaped their crops. Political Agent, Khyber, reports that full *yurga* of Afridis is being hastily called for meeting at Maidan on 30th, presumably to consider developments in Khost Khoda Khel Mohmands (on Afghan side) are furious at failure of Afghans' expedition in Mohmand country and are threatening to attack Mohmands of Lalpua, who have entered into relations with us. There is very active enemy propaganda among tribes and in districts. Lane taken is that Powers of Europe are determined to crush all Islamic kingdoms and that Government of India, taking advantage of recent incidents due to Amanulla's youth and lack of experience and turning deaf ear to his request for peace, is attempting to annex Afghanistan and tribal territory. Propaganda is having considerable effect. Donald reports from Hangu that Mullah Mahmud Akhonzada, who has recently come back from Kabul, promised Amri that Orakzai and Afridis would join his forces if General Nadir Khan attacked and captured Thal. Other sources confirm this report. Thal town has been gutted and alarm has been spread by Hindu merchants fleeing into Kohat district. On other hand it was believed that Hindus would have received special protection in view of union of Hindus and Mussulmans, and therefore news has done much to deprive Afghans of sympathy locally. Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, reports excitement in district and town since news of Tochi events received. Zhob reports safe arrival of 500 South Waziristan Militia and followers under eight British officers. Both mountain guns at Sarwekai were made useless before place was evacuated, and all ammunition, powder, bombs, shell, etc., soaked in petroleum and set on fire. Explosions went on all night and place must have been quite gutted. At all lower posts ammunition was destroyed prior to evacuation. Crosthwaite brought into Murtaza 450 rank and file, with 45 followers, loyal remainder of militia, with 11 Pathan officers and two British officers. Political Agent, Kurram, reports that Turis, Upper Kurram, show excellent spirit and Lower Kurram full of panic, Zamuht up to present show good attitude. Telegrams for Parachinar have to go through Thal, where wireless telegraph installation damaged; there is great congestion of messages and communication very irregular.

No. 48.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 1st June (Received 1st June)
(Telegraphic.)

Chief Political Officer with General Barrett wires from Peshawar, 31st May, that he has just received a letter from Amanulla, dated 28th May, addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy, of which rough summary of first translation is given below, full translation to follow by wire. Tone is satisfactory, indicating sufficient "climb down." "We were led, by our alarm at disorders in India, to take steps to protect our eastern frontier, and thus led to misunderstandings on our side and the British Government's. They invaded our country and war was forced on us, though our envoy at Simla understood that war was not wanted by the British Government. On this we suspended proclamation of *Jehad*, and National Council of Afghanistan decided to send our envoy back to Simla to prevent bloodshed and explain the matter. But, in spite of this, you sent your aeroplanes, by which Jalalabad and the Royal Palace at Kabul and the tomb of my forefathers were bombed. It causes us regret to see the example of Germany followed by the British. Yet, in spite of all, we do not wish to break our long-standing friendship or see enmity grow from bloodshed, and in proof of our good intentions we send this friendly letter, enclosing certified copies of orders sent to our commanders to stop movements of troops and cease from hostilities. I assure Your Excellency, with the utmost sincerity, that it was never the intention of my Government that our friendship should be severed, what we desire is an honourable peace beneficial to both parties. Let matters be settled thus—let each side select some person to meet at Peshawar or Landi Kotal, the earlier the better for both sides, to discuss and settle matters."

No. 49.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 1st June (Received 2nd June)
(Telegraphic.)

Full translation,* received from Peshawar by wire, of letter from Amir Amanulla reads as follows.—

"May it be known to friendly mind of his illustrious Excellency, my friend His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, of the Government of Great Britain. While

* See No. 48.

friendly communications were passing between our two exalted Governments and our trusted envoy, the exalted Sardar, Abdur Rahman, was deputed to your Court for strengthening relations and raising high the connections, certain unpleasant events happened owing to some misunderstanding. These led to strain of relations and resulted in bloodshed between us. Consequently I was obliged by considerations of humanity and obligation of rights of civilisation to use my endeavours as far as possible to prevent bloodshed amongst mankind, which is a sign of barbarity, and to pay no heed to personal slight which has been caused from your side. Firstly, it is necessary to offer certain explanations of misunderstanding which has occurred. At the time our envoy arrived at Peshawar he could only be summoned to Simla after much delay owing to disturbances and disorders which had occurred in that country. These disturbances and disorders had created such a panic that railways and telegraph lines between Simla and Peshawar were cut, though only temporarily, and much bloodshed and disorder occurred so that delay occurred to departure of our envoy, perhaps due to these causes, while at Peshawar itself Muhammadans and Hindus who have intercourse with Muhammadans and Hindus of our country held meetings and made demonstrations to such an extent that news of such an event compelled us to despatch number of troops to mark and control frontiers of our own country under the orders and commands of certain trusted officers of ours, so that they might inspect and protect line of frontiers. Sipah Salar Saleh Mohamed Khan, who was deputed to Eastern frontier of our country, started to make certain defensive preparations as precautionary measures. Since the feelings of our frontier and trans-frontier hillmen had been excited, these preparations appeared to be necessary. The other cause of these preparations was that on the 8th Shaban 1337 Hijra (9th May, 1919), your aeroplanes made a flight into the air of our country with certain threats, and the reply to our letter was also delayed. I am very sorry that certain undesirable events also occurred on both sides in the meantime which very nearly caused a breach of old friendship of long years past between you and us. As we had given orders to our Commandant to inspect and protect the frontier he considered certain points as included in his own territory according to the map and plan which he had in his possession and proceeded to carry on some digging as a precautionary measure. Without the exchange of any written communication on the face of the earth between terrestrials on subject, matters came to such a pass that aerial operations resulted in bomb throwing, which wounded our Commander-in-Chief. Your troops, moreover, violated our territory. We were therefore obliged to issue general order declaring war. In Kabul and surroundings of Kabul the Afghans, Saikhs and Sheikhs, every one of whom commanded influence amongst thousands of Afghan Mussulmans, assembled and created excitement. In the meantime our Envoy Abdur Rahman, who was permitted by you to come away, reached Kabul, and it became quite clear from his statements and explanations that the Foreign Secretary of high dignity discussed with him with great emphasis the necessity of desisting from war, which was injurious, and had clearly asked that hostilities should be stopped. It became apparent that events and movements which had taken place were accidental and undesirable. Consequently the duties of humanity made it necessary before anything that an attempt should be made to put matters right. Accordingly we put off the publications of the proclamations of holy war by the Islamic Sheikhs of Afghanistan, and referred matter to the Exalted National Council who decided that our envoy should be sent again to your Exalted Side to offer explanations and to stop fighting and bloodshed. A day had hardly elapsed after the departure of our envoy from your camp when one of your aeroplanes flew over Kabul and bombed our Royal Palace, thereby causing great excitement and panic among our loyal people. The machines bombed the sacred mausoleum of my great grandfather His Majesty Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, may he rest in peace, and certain other quarters were bombed. Similarly at Jalalabad also the sacred grave of my revered father, His Majesty Sirej-Ul-Millat-Waddin, on whom be peace, who discharged the obligations of friendship toward you to the extreme during his lifetime, and many other favourite buildings in our official quarter and in unprotected town were bombed. It is a matter for great regret that the throwing of bombs by Zeppelins on London was denounced as a most savage act and the bombardment of places of worship and sacred spots was considered a most abominable operation, while now we see with our eyes that such operations were a habit which is prevalent amongst all civilised people of the West. Notwithstanding this, it is not our desire that the century-old friendship between you and us should be broken and that bloodshed should occur between us which would again lead to perpetual enmity, hatred and malice between these two nations in such a way that it would be impossible to extinguish these feelings, because once a nation prepares for death and thirsts for revenge, it becomes impossible to restrain it. In this respect, singular proof of our Royal good intentions is the despatch of this friendly letter to Your Excellency. At the same time we have sent our Royal commands to our Commandant to suspend movements of troops in different directions and to stop hostilities and a certified copy of said *firmans* is forwarded herewith for Your Excellency's perusal. Relying on this, I state to Your Excellency with great sincerity intention that our sublime Government has never had any idea of severing friendly relations with illustrious Government of Great Britain, is in no case whatever desirous of upsetting old obligations and old relations. On the contrary it is desirous of honourable and dignified peace that may be advantageous to both parties at present and in the future enable Afghanistan to acquire honourable and dignified existence. And it is possible to settle the question in this manner that some personage on behalf of your Illustrious Government and some on behalf of our Sublime Government may be selected and nominated to assemble at Landi Kotal or Peshawar to discuss the matter and to conclude an honourable and dignified peace for both parties. The earlier action is taken in this affair the better it will be for both parties. For the rest may the days of friendship endure for ever.

Noted 28th May 1919 — Amir Amanullah "

Enclosure—“ May it be known to our Exalted and Dignified brother Dost Muhammad Khan, Naib Salar, Eastern Side According to information received by us in these days from the Exalted Government of India it appears that fighting has taken place between the troops of the two sides owing to some misunderstanding You should suspend hostilities until the door of discussion and communication is opened As we had no intention of fighting with this old friend and were obliged to take defensive measures, now that he is also desirous of peace we order and command you to keep back your regular troops, tribes, Mujahidin and Ghazis, for whom we are liable to be responsible, with your masterly effort and wait for further orders You should, however, keep in view defensive and offensive preparations If the result of discussion between Your Sublime Government and the Illustrious British Government is the conclusion of peace or otherwise I shall inform you That is to say you should suspend action until further orders. Dated 27th May, 1919.—Amir Amanulla.”

No. 50.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd June (Received 3rd June) (Telegraphic.)

At the beginning of the Afghan trouble I wrote personally explaining the situation to all ruling princes and chiefs. All important rulers have in their replies offered their resources to Government and have expressed unswerving loyalty to the Throne and detestation of the Amir's action. Necessary measures have been taken by the Nizam, the Begum of Bhopal and other rulers to ensure that the real circumstances of the Afghan attack are fully understood by their Mohammedan subjects and that latter realise that no question of religion is involved. In placing his Imperial Service Troops and resources at the Government of India's disposal, the Nizam of Hyderabad has specially asked me to convey to His Majesty the King his humble and respectful offer. The rulers of Baria, Ratlam, Patiala and Dholpur are among those who have offered personal service. Staff appointments in the field have been given to the Nawab of Loharu's two sons, including the heir apparent. We are considering other offers. Sir Partap Singh was eager to go, but, in view of the importance of his duties as Regent of Jodhpur, I discouraged him.

Units have been offered by all ruling princes and chiefs who maintain Imperial Service Troops. These units have in some cases only just returned from the front. We have selected for active service or garrison duty in India contingents of infantry, cavalry, artillery, sappers, etc., from Gwalior, Faridkot, Jaipur, Indore, Khairpur, Kashmir, Patiala, Maler Kotla, Sirmur, Tehri and Rampur. We are considering employment of Imperial Service Troops of Bikaner, Nabha and Kapurthala. We are receiving and accepting offers of camels, motor-cars, and money for providing comforts for the troops engaged in the campaign.

Assistance was offered by the Nepalese Government in February last on the death of the late Amir. I asked the Prime Minister for a Nepalese contingent at the outbreak of hostilities, and, in spite of the great difficulties of moving troops through Terai in the hot weather, he promptly agreed. Arrangements for their reception in India are being made.

Chiefs and governors of the Gilgit Agency, Khan of Kelat and tribes in Baluchistan have also sent offers of assistance and loyal messages. Active assistance in repelling raiding parties has been given by the Mehtar of Chitral. The Nawab of Dii has expelled all Afghan agents who were in his country and has offered his son's services.

No. 51.

Letter from H. E. the Viceroy to Amir Amanulla Khan (dated Simla, 3rd June, 1919, despatched from British Lines 6th June, 1919 telegraphic version received in London 3rd June, 1919.)

After Compliments

I have received your letter dated 28th May* and learn with pleasure that you are now sincerely anxious for a cessation of hostilities and the renewal of the friendship between our Governments. For, as your envoy was told in Simla, nothing could be more entirely opposed to traditional policy and sentiment of the Government of India than war with Afghanistan. I cannot, however, pass by in silence your allegation that what has happened is due to an unfortunate misunderstanding. There has been no misunderstanding on my part. If there has been any misunderstanding on yours, it was a misunderstanding of the political situation in India of which you were completely misinformed, and a misunderstanding of the temper and power of the British Government. Let me state the facts clearly in order that there may be no doubt as to the responsibility for this war. On the 3rd May, Zar Shah, a notorious frontier marauder, brought a tribal gathering to the frontier near Landi Kotal and killed five coolies on our water-works. He gave out openly that your Sipah Salar had sent him ahead to commence hostilities and produced a *firman* under your seal in support of his assertion. On the 4th May a party of 100 Afghan regulars, 200 Khassadars and some Shinwari tribesmen occupied Bagh and Kafir Kot and cut off one of the water supplies of our frontier post at Landi Kotal. On 5th May two guns and three regiments arrived at Bagh and 300 to 400 regulars occupied Tor Sappar and Spina Suka. By 8th May about 4,000 men and 8 guns were holding positions stretching from Tor

* No. 49.

Sappar to Bagh, further invading unquestionable British territory, while large reinforcements were held in readiness at Dakka. On 11th May my troops ejected your army by force of arms from British territory. The causes of the war are revealed in your own admissions. You admit in your present letter that you sent troops to the frontiers. You admit in your letter of 10th May that you roused the Afghan tribes. In the same letter you admit the authenticity of the inflammatory *firman* circulated by your commandants among the tribes to the effect that the loyalty of our Indian subjects had been rewarded by cruelty and injustice in connection with religion, honour and modesty, and winding up with an incitement to *Jehad*. And finally in your present letter you admit that a proclamation of *Jehad* was actually on the eve of publication. Even at the eleventh hour, after British territory had been wantonly and deliberately violated, I sought, as the friend of your late lamented father, to furnish his son, who had only just come to the throne, with an honourable retreat from the inevitable consequences of these foolish-actions. I invited you to arrest Zar Shah, who in violating British territory had announced that your Sipah Salar had sent him ahead to British territory to commence hostilities. And I invited you to repudiate as a forgery the inflammatory *firman* which had been distributed broadcast along our common frontier. To my sorrow you refused the hand of forgiveness and friendship thus extended to you. In your letter of 10th May you said that Zar Shah's arrest would be inadvisable, and so far from repudiating the *firman* you affirmed its authenticity and even sought to justify it. The fact is that days before the first shot was fired, plans were laid in Kabul for a deliberate attack upon the British Government. Of the many proofs in my hands I will refer you to one document only—letter dated 27th Rajab 1337 Hijra (corresponding to 29th April, 1919)—from your Commissary for Foreign Affairs to your Envoy at Simla, ordering him to obtain deeds of allegiance from the Hindus and Muhammadans of India, to put excitement into the Indian newspapers because a good opportunity was drawing near, and to keep in touch with the Commander-in-Chief and the War Minister and Sardar Muhammad Nadir Khan. In spite, however, of ample justification for carrying this war to its logical conclusion, I am anxious to meet your overtures in a friendly spirit. In this I am actuated partly by a knowledge of your youth and inexperience, partly by a knowledge that you have been misinformed and led astray, and because I share your desire to avoid further useless bloodshed. Moreover, I am not unmindful of our obligations to your father, the late Siraj ul Mulla Wa-ud-Din (on whom be peace), who was not only a faithful friend and ally to the British but also a great patriot. Intense love of his country, coupled with wise statesmanship, led him, in the face of much opposition, to restrain his country from plunging into a great war to her certain ruin. Respect for his memory prompts me to deal as leniently as possible with the country and the people he so loved. To this end my Government are prepared at once to agree to an armistice on the following terms.—

1. That you should at once withdraw all your troops from the frontier. No Afghan troops are to be located within 20 miles of the nearest British force.
2. That the British troops should remain where they now are in Afghan territory with freedom to continue such military preparations and precautions as may be deemed necessary. The troops will, however, take no offensive action whatever, so long as the terms of this armistice are observed by your side.
3. British aircraft will not bomb or machine-gun Afghan localities or forces so long as the armistice is observed, but they will have freedom of movement in the air to reconnoitre and observe positions of Afghan forces in order to ensure against any concentration or collection of Afghan troops or tribesmen in contravention of the armistice, further, that you undertake that your people will not fire upon or molest British air craft and will return without delay, unhurt, British aircraft and airmen who may have been forced to land in Afghan limits, and to use your utmost endeavour to ensure the safety of any British airmen who may be forced to land in tribal territory.
4. That you should at once send urgent messages to the tribes both on your own side and on our side of the Durand frontier into whose limits your troops have advanced, or who have been excited by your agents and proclamations, stating that you have asked the Government of India for a cessation of hostilities, and that you will not countenance further aggressive action on their part against the British Government, if they take such action it will be at their own risk, and they will receive no support from you, and find no asylum in Afghanistan, from which they will be ejected if they come.

Now, my friend, I would ask you to consider these terms carefully, and you will realise how very lenient they are. I avoid all humiliating conditions. If you are wise, you will accept them in the friendly spirit in which they are offered. If you do not accept them the consequences must rest with you. And in all friendliness, let me point out to you that, with the unlimited resources of the British Empire, which has just issued triumphantly from a struggle with the greatest military power the world has ever seen, those consequences can only mean one thing. If you accept terms offered, orders will at once be issued accordingly to the British General Officers Commanding operations, who will be authorised to arrange meetings with the Officers Commanding your troops and to sign armistice agreements to the above effect. Thereafter I shall gladly appoint selected officers to meet officers selected by you to discuss and arrange final terms of peace and once more to establish and strengthen friendly relations between our two Governments. As regards a place of meeting, I do not consider that either Landi Kotal or Peshawar are suitable places for negotiations of this kind. I have fixed upon Rawal Pindi, which, though not on the frontier, is sufficiently near to be convenient. In the

meantime I should be glad to know the names and designations of the delegates whom you propose to send and the earliest date on which they can reach the frontier. I agree with you that the earlier action is taken in this matter the better it will be for both parties. You may rely on there being no delay on my side. I earnestly hope that I shall very shortly receive such a reply from you as will pave the way to a renewal of old friendship between our Governments.—*Usual ending.*

“ (Signed) CHELMSFORD.”

No. 52.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd June. (Received 4th June.) (Telegraphic.)

Officers Commanding Forces have been instructed that to avoid prejudicing armistice negotiations bombing operations by air against Afghan towns are to be suspended. Continuation of operations against the tribes will not be affected by armistice negotiations. Applications has been made by Nadir Khan, under instructions from Amir, to G.O.C., Thal, for hostilities to be suspended. Reply was to give him 24 hours to commence withdrawing his forces inside Afghan frontier, operation to be completed within 96 hours. Yesterday we attacked and captured enemy position on low hills two miles north-west of Thal.

No. 53.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 5th June. (Received 5th June.) (Telegraphic.)

In event of Amir accepting our proposals for negotiations at Rawal Pindi,* British representative selected is my Foreign Secretary, Sir Hamilton Grant, who will have as his Political Adviser, Mr. J. L. Maffey.

No. 54.

From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 10th June, 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

I approve proposals contained in your telegram† of 5th inst. for British representatives at discussion of terms of peace. I presume military adviser, in addition to political adviser, will be attached to Sir H. Grant.

No. 55.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 6, dated 12 Ramzan 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 11th June, 1919. (Telegraphic version received in London 15th June.)

(Translation.)

May it be known to his illustrious Excellency my friend the Governor-General of India, of the great Government of Great Britain. I have received the friendly letter of my gracious and kind friend dated 4th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 3rd June, 1919, regarding the discussion of peace, and containing lenient terms of the cessation of hostilities, sincere well-meaning sentiments on your part, desire to avoid further useless bloodshed, and appreciation of him who reposes in the tomb of martyrdom, His Majesty Siraj-ul-Millat-wa-ud-din, my illustrious father, whom God has taken into His mercy and who was in friendly alliance with the British Government for many years. We are impressed by the natural peace-loving inclinations of Great British nation, whose high functionaries have honourably made this the principle of their diplomacy in other places of the world. And we are grateful for the expression of sincere friendly regard and esteem towards the sublime Afghan Government.

You have, by alluding to events mentioned in previous letters, pointed out our misunderstanding of the temper and power of the exalted British Government. My kind friend, I consider a repetition of matters previously discussed is only to prolong uselessly a subject which is far from the object in view. I refer to your expressions of certainty and to your eulogy of the unlimited resources of British Government, and to our hinting at the internal power of the sublime Government of Afghanistan, which, notwithstanding its defects of organisation, has repeatedly been a cause of destruction and ruin to foreign power on its sacred soil, and to our alluding to the fact that, firstly, the Islamic Afghan nation really looks upon fighting with non-Muslim nations as a cause of revival of its existence and as a means of its awakening notwithstanding its terrible damages and the probability of numerous losses and injuries, secondly, that it is in the Muslim nature of Afghans to prefer visible death to subordination to a Foreign Power and to consider it as its perpetual life; and, thirdly, that the spirit of freedom and of natural individuality and national liberty, with its wonderful and surprising world-wide electric and magnetic power of inspiring peace, has caused the withered hearts of the depressed classes of humanity to expand and blossom in every part of the world, and has by an extraordinary force brought into being conferences loving peace and equality, and has nearly brought to its death-agonies oppression and domination among different nations.

We shall, therefore, leave these matters and turn to the real object in view, which is the conclusion of peace and cessation of hostilities between the Exalted Governments of Afghanistan

* No 51.

† No 53.

and Great Britain. Regarding this you have made certain impossible demands such as the removal of the Afghan troops to a distance of 20 miles from British troops and the free movement in the air of British aeroplanes over Afghan territory without any hindrance by the people, as well as an undertaking by the Afghan Government for the protection of aeroplanes and aircraft in their country. Your overlooking of points so manifest and apparent is a matter for surprise, for the only definition of the military forces of the sublime Afghan Government is that the military and civil forces of Afghanistan are identical. How, then, is it possible to move thousands and thousands of individuals and tribal people from their villages and winter-camping grounds in places opposite British lines? I overlook those matters also which are impossible to accomplish and devote attention to the possible and correct terms of armistice worthy of the dignity of honoured and exalted governments. The essential object of the armistice is the suspension of hostilities by both sides for the discussion and settlement of peace. Nothing more than the cessation of hostilities and peace of mind which is its inevitable result are required. That has already taken place as communicated in my letter dated 27th Shaban, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 28th May, 1919, to my honourable friend. The best way to secure a discussion of peace with due consideration to the honour of both parties is that the troops of both Governments should remain in their present positions and enjoy mutual respect until the settlement of terms of peace. With regard to aeroplanes it is evident that their movement in the air in our exalted dominions is an illegal violation and interference, for the feelings of our nation who do not have aeroplanes are bitterly excited by seeing your aeroplanes. In every house and with every man are arms, rifles and ammunition, and it is impossible to restrain people even if we wish to do so. Moreover, it is possible owing to a change in the attitude of friendship between the two Governments an ignorant, mischievous or designing person may fire at them, thus leading to a rupture in the friendship and the postponement of peace between the two exalted Governments, the consequences of which will not be advantageous but injurious to both Governments. In my former letter I mentioned Landi Kotal or Peshawar as the meeting-place of officers of both exalted Governments appointed for the conclusion of peace. Now you have in your present letter, for certain reasons, perhaps, fixed on Rawal Pindi as a suitable place of meeting. We also, in order to secure your pleasure and to safeguard the dignity and honour of Illustrious British Government, agree with it. We have selected and appointed the following officers for the discussion and argument of the terms of peace and the establishment of friendship between the two exalted Governments. They will, please God, be ready to start for Rawal Pindi on the 28 Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 27th June, 1919. I do not hesitate to mention here that we must not fail to keep in view the advantage of friendship and avoidance of hostilities between the exalted Governments of Afghanistan and Great Britain, particularly at a time when such critical circumstances have arisen in Asia and Europe for our old friend the British Government. Your Excellency will see a signal proof of my good intentions in my receiving your terms of armistice in a reasonable manner. If Your Excellency will overlook the past you will see a bright future for both parties in the establishment of friendly relations between the two exalted Governments. Its advantageous results will be mentioned by our selected representatives in course of discussion and communication—(1) Our exalted and honoured brother, Ali Ahmad Khan, Commissary for Home Affairs, President of Peace Delegates. (2) Civil General Sardar Muhammad Yunus Khan. (3) Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Commissary for Commerce. (4) Civil Colonel Abdul Aziz Khan, former Envoy of the Sublime Afghan Government at the Court of the Government of India. (5) Muhammad Rafiq Khan, Amir's Ulmu Abilah, Superintendent of Correspondence. (6) Doctor Abdul Ghan Khan, Rais-idar-ul-Muwalla'in, Chief of the Compilation Department. (7) Civil Colonel Diwan Niranjan Das, Sardafar-i-wajuhat, Head of Tax Department. (8) Abdul Hadi Khan, Chief Clerk. (9) Civil Colonel Mirza Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Mir Munshi, Foreign Department. I hope Your Excellency will appoint the representatives of your Government for the management and settlement of the question by the time of the arrival of the said officers at Rawal Pindi. For the rest, may the days of your honour and prosperity endure for ever. Dated 12 Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 11th June, 1919. Signed, Amir Amanulla

No. 56.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd June, 1919. (Received 22nd June.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following letter to Amir Amanulla Khan issued yesterday, 21st June.—

"I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your friendly letter,* No. 6, dated 11th June, 1919, corresponding to 12th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra. You say 'Your Excellency will see the signal proof of my good intentions in my acceptance in a reasonable manner of your terms for armistice.' At the same time you point out your difficulties in carrying out literally the first and third terms. My friend, I appreciate those difficulties. But you have misunderstood what was meant by first term. All I demanded was that your regular troops be removed from frontier to a distance of 20 miles from nearest British force. I understand you have given practical effect to this provision except in vicinity of New Chaman, where I must ask you to do so at once. Further, I am informed there are still some Afghan troops on our side of frontier, notably in vicinity of Peshawar Kotal. These must be immediately withdrawn. So long as a single Afghan regular soldier remains on our side, peace negotiations are out of the question and there can be no alternative but a resumption of hostilities. I said nothing in the first term of armistice regarding removal of villagers and tribesmen from their homes. But I must ask you to issue orders against

any gatherings of such tribesmen in vicinity of our military forces. Should such gatherings occur and threaten our forces, I have authorised my Generals to take the necessary steps to disperse them.

"2 As regards third term, what you say regarding your difficulties has been understood by me. Nevertheless my aeroplanes must continue to reconnoitre in order to secure my troops against such hostile gatherings of tribesmen. I look to you to issue strict warning to your people against molesting them, and I have every confidence that your orders will be effective. If our aeroplanes are molested they will retaliate.

"3 You do not mention fourth term. I assume from this that you have done what is necessary. If not I must ask you to do so without delay. For at a time when peace negotiations between us are pending it is impossible to leave tribes in a state of doubt and excitement, and it lies with you, whose actions have excited them, to warn them on the lines laid down.

"4 Finally, I must make it plain to you that His Majesty's Government will not allow any further modification of armistice terms. I sincerely hope, therefore, that you will now accept what I have written, and carry out what I have asked, in a spirit of genuine friendliness, for on this must depend initiation of peace negotiations between us. On this understanding I shall be glad to issue orders for reception of delegates your name at Rawal Pindi.

"5 I have appointed Sir Hamilton Grant, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to be chief of British delegation, and, assuming that you accept my conditions, I shall be glad if you will kindly inform him of the full numbers of party you are sending, and the date on which they will reach British lines. Arrangements will then be made for their conveyance to Rawal Pindi. The names of other members of the British delegation will be intimated to you in due course.

"6 I also on my part look forward, please God, to a bright future in the re-establishment of friendly relations between two Governments.

"(Signed) CHELMSFORD"

No. 57.

*Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th June, 1919
(Telegraphic version received in London 27th June, 1919)*

(Translation.)

No. 7, dated 20th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 19th June, 1919. *After compliments* In these days reports have reached me that persons from Independent Territory are committing raids in the Eastern districts in your camp in the limits of Dakka. It is probable that these persons from Independent Territory may gradually induce some persons in our territory to join them and take part in raids, and it will be very difficult to restrain them, since the presence of your troops and camps in Afghan Territory is causing extraordinary agitation and excitement among the people on this side, which is leading to difficulties. As negotiations for an armistice and peace are at present going on between the two exalted Governments, I think it necessary to offer Your Excellency friendly advice as a well-wisher and say that it will be advisable during this period of armistice for your troops to return to their former limits, pending settlement of the peace terms, as it will also remove the cause of my anxiety.

As the peace meeting will shortly take place, I have considered it necessary and essential to write to Your Excellency on the subject in a friendly manner. For the rest Your Excellency will take such steps in the matter as you may deem fit in your own interests—*Usual conclusion.*

No. 58.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd July (Received 2nd July)

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to my telegram of 1st June* containing Amir's allegations that the tomb of Amir Abdur Rahman and Royal Palace at Kabul, and the grave of Amir Habibulla at Jalalabad, and open quarters of town of Jalalabad had been bombed. Facts are as follows. Kabul bombing was limited to the arsenal workshops and the Ark or citadel, which is used, not for residential purposes, but as subterranean magazine. The tomb of Abdur Rahman is in grounds outside the Ark, and it is possible that area of burst of bombs might include it. Jalalabad our information shows that Amir Habibulla has been temporarily interred in a grave on the golf course; no bombs have been dropped on any grave that could be recognised from the air as such. The Palace was bombed, it was being used as military headquarters. Damage was undoubtedly done by bombing to the town about which troops were billeted.

No. 59.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th July, 1919.
(Received 5th July)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following letter from Amir Amanulla Khan has been received and transmitted on 3rd inst. by G.O.C. North-West Frontier —

“*After compliments.* Your Excellency’s friendly letter dated 22nd Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 21st June, 1919, was received by me on the 26th Ramzan, corresponding to 25th June, and was source of augmentation of friendship and concord. I invite Your Excellency’s attention to my friendly and well-meaning ideas. The sole object of the two exalted Governments is to re-establish relations of friendship and concord between the two parties. Thus, when it is the intention of both parties in their mutual interest to try and establish peace honourable to both Governments, it is necessary that both should devote attention to healing up of former wounds and to make an attempt to bring about a state of affairs that may help to remove former misunderstanding and to re-establish firmly new friendship and unity, so that both parties may benefit by it. Your Excellency’s last letter, however, which has been quoted above, has not tended to confirm the above views, and, as it does not correspond with the exigencies of the times, it has caused me some perturbation of mind and disturbed me. I have, therefore, considered it necessary to invite Your Excellency’s attention to my wishes as to the armistice and to acquaint Your Excellency with what I, as a well-wisher, consider desirable and advisable.

“As regards the first term that Afghan troops be removed to a distance of 20 miles from the nearest British force, I write to say that as I considered Your Excellency’s idea, and first statements as expressing a desire for peace and showing it was your Excellency’s object to avoid bloodshed between the two exalted Governments, I believed and was convinced that Your Excellency’s intentions were good and rightly reasonable. I therefore became desirous of peace and asked for an armistice. At the same time, as I saw that Your Excellency was determined that Afghan regular troops should be removed to a distance of 20 miles from the nearest British force, I gave practical effect to this provision in most parts of my territory, notwithstanding the fact that I had made no such promise in my letter to Your Excellency. I also gave orders to the troops on Chaman and Peiwar Kotal frontiers to take up their positions at a distance of about ten miles from your forces until the settlement of peace terms. Thus, in this manner, this request of Your Excellency was practically complied with in full. But, in response to my action in ordering my troops to be removed to a distance of ten miles in the limits of Peiwar Kotal and Chaman and to a distance of 20 miles on my other frontiers, I consider it is necessary and advisable that the regular troops of the illustrious British Government should also be removed by Your Excellency from the new fort in the direction of Chaman to Chaman and from limits of Dakka to Landi Kotal and stationed at the former limit until the settlement of peace terms in order to avoid trouble of frontier raids, to allay extraordinary excitement prevailing amongst Afghan subjects and to prevent them from fighting. It is the rule of the world that when armistice and peace are arranged between two Governments the interests of both parties are kept in view, so it is not incumbent on one party to agree entirely to what the other party says. This is far from justice nor is it the law of the world. It is necessary for Your Excellency to consider this matter carefully. What need is there for Your Excellency to insist on this? Prolongation of correspondence and distortion of the subjects in such trifling matters will only lead to disturbance of feeling of both parties and have an effect, result of which would be that affairs will assume a different course and lead to misunderstanding and mischief. With due consideration to the good intentions of and friendship between the two Governments, I do not consider that it is proper that such matters should be delayed.

“As regards movements of aeroplanes of Your Excellency’s Government in Afghan territory, this is not at all necessary, as there seems to be no advantage in it to the illustrious British Government. As requested by Your Excellency, stringent orders to the frontier tribes of Afghan Government have been issued, strongly warning them that during the period of armistice no aggression or attack should be made by people within our country upon your troops. Your Excellency may entirely rest assured. The advent of your aeroplanes is certain to cause extraordinary excitement amongst our people, who will fire at them in spite of our strict orders not to. The aeroplanes will then bomb them, as mentioned by Your Excellency. This will result in loss of life and property, the consequences of which would be very bad. Thus there will be no armistice or peaceful settlement. Since both Governments consider the conclusion of peace desirable and necessary in the interests of both parties, what need is there for bringing about such a state of affairs, and why does Your Excellency insist on this matter so much, as it does not appear to be of any importance? As the sole reason for the British Government sending aeroplanes is to reconnoitre and acquire information regarding the state of affairs in different directions round their camp and nothing else, this can be fully attained by flying aeroplanes above your own camp. If this is done, all agitation and excitement amongst our people and exchange of shot and bomb between our people and your aeroplanes will be avoided, and both parties will remain in peace and safety.

“In view of the safety of both parties, I do not consider movement of your aeroplanes over parts of Afghan territory is advisable in any case whatever.

“As regards frontier tribes being inflamed and excited, and the demand that if they seek an asylum in Afghan territory they should not be allowed to remain there and should be ejected, I have understood this. I now write to Your Excellency that I was not particularly the cause of their being inflamed and excited. It is possible in some cases some of frontier officials of our Government did some things in opposition to certain actions of Your Excellency’s frontier

officials, but in compliance with Your Excellency's earnest desire they have been warned to abstain from these ideas, and to take no such action in future.

"As regards frontier tribes and others taking refuge in Afghan territory, it has been always the prevailing practice of the world that the extradition of persons taking refuge from territory of one Government into that of another is not allowed and an asylum is given to them. I would strongly urge Your Excellency to consider carefully how it is possible for me to expel and surrender such persons when this action is opposed to law of nations and of humanity. Moreover, according to law of Islam it is quite unlawful to refuse asylum to, and expel from country of Islam, people of any religion whatever who take refuge in it. These are matters for discussion in the peace meeting, which is to be convened between the two Governments, and it will be better to settle them there.

"I may point out to Your Excellency that it is no advantage and only a waste of time to get involved in such matters at such critical juncture. If it is intention of British Government to conclude peace what necessity is there then for worrying about such trifles? If there is no intention of making peace I request that I may be so informed so that we may understand each other. It has caused me much surprise that on one hand Your Excellency has indicated delight in agreement and unanimity, expressed a desire for the strengthening of relations, stated that you are looking forward to a bright future, and given me glad news of re-establishment of friendly relations between two exalted Governments, while on the other hand you insist so strictly on unimportant matters referring to terms of temporary armistice which have no apparent advantage to Your Excellency's Government as compared with friendship of Government of Afghanistan. This has made me somewhat uneasy at unexpected turn that affairs have taken. I write to Your Excellency with regret to say result of this state of affairs will be the avoidance of peace on my part also, otherwise I am not at all willing that the relations of unity and friendship which the sublime, independent Government of Afghanistan has for many years maintained with the illustrious British Government should be severed and converted into conflict and hostility. It is my earnest endeavour that relations of friendship and unity between the exalted Governments should be established more strongly than ever with honour to both parties.

"I am glad to hear of appointment of Sir Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary, as chief of delegates of illustrious British Government, and trust that Your Excellency will communicate names of other delegates also for my information. The delegates of the sublime Government of Afghanistan whose names have already been communicated to Your Excellency are ready to start so that they may discuss matters with delegates of the illustrious British Government with a view to removal of the confusion and misunderstanding which has arisen between the two parties. The establishment of a clear understanding advantageous to both and the settlement of affairs in a manner honourable to the two exalted Governments. The numbers of persons who will arrive in India with my exalted honourable and dear brother Ali Ahmad Khan Sahib, Commissary for Home affairs of the sublime Government, will be 150, including attendants and military escort as follows: military, 30 cavalry, 50 infantry, attendants, 70.

"I hope Your Excellency will fix the date of their arrival so that they may arrive on frontier of illustrious British Government on that date. *Usual conclusion*"

No 60.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th July. (Received 5th July)
(Telegraphic)

We propose to address following reply to Amir in reply to his letter transmitted to you in my preceding telegram of to-day* —

"I am glad to learn how sincerely anxious you are for the restoration of peace. But my friend, both the whole tone of your letter and your advice that the British troops should now be withdrawn from Afghan territory on the Dakka and Chaman fronts force me to the conclusion that you fail to appreciate your true position. You appear to forget that it was the Afghan Government that started this war and that it is the Afghan Government who are now suing for peace, and that it was for these reasons that armistice terms were laid down by my Government. You do not seem to realise His Majesty's Government have been very gravely affronted by what has occurred, and that British people are indignant that a great Power should thus have been attacked. When I wrote to you of my desire for the renewal of the long-standing friendship between our Governments I did so on the assumption that having asked for peace you sincerely regretted what had happened and accepted your proper position in the matter. I agree with you, however, that there is no advantage in prolonging this correspondence and that best course will be for our respective delegates to meet as soon as possible. Will you therefore please direct your delegates and their party to present themselves at the British lines before 10 a. m. on 22nd July. They will thence be honourably conducted by my officers to Rawal Pindi where arrangements for their entertainment will be ready. I shall be obliged if you will let me know as soon as possible that you have issued the necessary orders in order that necessary arrangements may be made on this side. In this connection you appear to suggest that your delegates will be accompanied in India by an escort of cavalry and infantry. This, however, is contrary

to practice and is not permissible. Every precaution for the safeguarding of your delegates will be taken by my officers. In these circumstances number of attendants can doubtless be reduced, and I trust that you will limit their number to 50 persons.

"In addition to Sir H Grant, Chief of British Delegation, I have appointed following to be my delegates.—Mr Maffey, my Private Secretary, Brig.-Gen Moberley, General Staff, Nawab Sir Mir Shams Shah and Sir Gurbaksh Singh, Bedi."

No. 61.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 7th July

(Telegraphic.)

The terms of reply to Amir proposed in your telegram of 4th inst * are approved, subject to insertion of following sentence after sentence about indignation of British people "Moreover, it is for this reason that, as I have already informed you, His Majesty's Government will not allow any modification of armistice terms"

No. 62.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 21st July, 1919 (Received 21st July)

(Telegraphic.)

The following is complete translation of a letter from Amir Amanulla Khan which we have received by telegram to-day from the Chief Political Officer, North West Frontier.—

"No 9 dated 19th Shawal 1337 Hijra *After compliments.* May it be known to my illustrious friend His Excellency the Viceroy of the mighty Government of India in the British Empire that Your Excellency's friendly letter† of 9th Shawal 1337 Hijra corresponding to 8th July 1919 has reached me, and I have been made acquainted with its contents which are full of friendship and which refer to past hostilities and in which it is stated there is nothing to be gained by further lengthy correspondence, and you should therefore think it advisable that all past misunderstanding should be removed by meeting of Peace delegates. You also wish for their presence at the place appointed on 23rd Shawal 1337 Hijra corresponding to 22nd July 1919 You also express your unwillingness to the attendance of military escort in India by assuring us of safety of our delegates, and you have also informed me of the delegates which Your Excellency has been pleased to approve the appointment of for this settlement. The friendly sentiments expressed by Your Excellency gave us great pleasure, but to reply to each point separately in detail appears unnecessary and would simply lengthen letter unduly. We will therefore be brief.

"With reference to arrival of peace delegation on the 23rd Shawal at the appointed place, as proposed by Your Excellency, we desire to say that deputation under our noble and dear brother Al Ahmad Khan, Minister of Home Affairs, will arrive at selected place on the 25th of the month above mentioned, and they trust that Your Excellency will accordingly expect their arrival on that date As Your Excellency expresses certain apprehensions in connection with military escort, which we proposed to send with our deputation, we accept your views. Our military escort will only escort deputation as far as we consider it advisable for their safety.

"We have made ourselves acquainted with rank and names of those delegates now appointed by Your Excellency, and we agree to them; Your Excellency is the person who knows best who should be appointed.

"On our part we have appointed Abdul Rahman Khan, our newly appointed envoy to India, as an additional member of our peace deputation.

"We trust now that, God willing, peace with honour to both the friendly Powers will be established in near future, and the honourable object of both parties will be attained."

No. 63.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th July, 1919. (Received 25th July.)

(Telegraphic.)

Afghan delegates arrived Rawal Pindi this morning.

* No. 60.

† No. 60.

No. 64.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 29th July, 1919. (Received 31st July)

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to my telegrams of 27th* and 28th May†: evacuation of Upper Tochi posts, Shawa and Spinwam. As regards Upper Tochi posts, desertions and signs of uneasiness among their militia garrisons led Area Commander to despatch a small column of all arms on 24th May from Daidoni to Mahomet Khel in order to restore the garrisons' confidence or, if necessary, to support their withdrawal. G O C in C, however, was not aware of G O C., Bannu's intention to move to Mahomet Khel as he omitted to report this and it was not till after column had marched from Daidoni that Gen. Barrett heard of it. Latter also was led by information before him to believe that General Nadir Khan was expected to commence operations before 27th May, and on these grounds decided that mobile column from Daidoni should be ordered to return there; following instructions were therefore sent by General Barrett to G O C, Bannu, on 25th May, and repeated to G O C Waziristan Force "Information from reliable source points to likelihood at any moment of simultaneous attacks on Miranshah and Kurram: mobile column should return to Daidoni immediately." G.O.C., Bannu was of opinion that crisis would inevitably be precipitated by withdrawal of mobile column and that wholesale desertions of militia would result, with the object, therefore, of concentrating his force and saving the loyal elements in the militia with their arms, ammunition and other Government property, he ordered that the posts should be evacuated at once. We consider that he was justified in this action as G O C in C's instructions left him no discretion in regard to mobile column's withdrawal.

As regards evacuation of Shawa and Spinwam, a consultation was held on 24th May between G O C., Bannu Area and Political Agent, Tochi, at which it was decided that as the situation contemplated in instructions from G O C in C might develop before information could reach O.C. at Daidoni, the decision whether or not to evacuate these posts must be taken, in accordance with circumstances, by officers on the spot. On 24th May, therefore, G O C, Bannu sent out orders that garrison at Shawa was to retire to Spinwam in event of gathering of enemy on Kaitu, and that Shawa and Spinwam garrisons should fall back together to Sheratalla in event of enemy making actual advance. During night of 24th-25th May information was received that General Nadir Khan's force was advancing on Spinwam and both garrisons accordingly were promptly withdrawn. The Afghans occupied Spinwam on following day, 25th May. In view of the isolation of these posts, it was unavoidable, in our opinion, that they should be evacuated.

Adverse criticism of these withdrawals is easy after the event, but it is an open question whether we should not have found ourselves more seriously embarrassed had these isolated posts been invested by the enemy. The situation facing the officers responsible was critical and fraught with many difficulties; we are confident they took a deliberate review of the position before exercising their judgment as they did.

No. 65.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 8th August, 1919 (Received 8th August)

(Telegraphic)

Peace with Afghanistan was signed 11 this morning.

No. 66.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August, 1919 (Received 9th August.)

(Telegraphic)

Following from Grant, dated 8th August --*Begins*. Peace Treaty was signed to-day at 11 o'clock. Full text is as follows. *Begins*. Following is text of peace treaty signed this morning. Treaty of peace between the illustrious British Government and the independent Afghan Government concluded at Rawal Pindi on the 8th August 1919 corresponding to the 11th Ziqad 1337 Hijra.

The following articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government --*Article 1*. From date of signing of this treaty there shall be peace between the British Government on the one part and the Government of Afghanistan on the other. *Article 2*. In view of the circumstances which have brought about

the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan the British Government to mark their displeasure withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition, or warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan. *Article 3.* The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore confiscated and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir. *Article 4.* At the same time the British Government is desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are on their part sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after 6 months for the discussion and amicable settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis. *Article 5.* The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British commission of the undermarked portion of the line to the west of the Khyber where the recent Afghan aggression took place and to accept such boundary as the British commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present positions until such demarcation has been effected. *Ends.*

Afghan delegation leave Rawal Pindi on Monday night

No. 67.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August. (Received 10th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of to-day. Sir H. Grant reports that after signature of Peace Treaty he handed Afghan delegate following letter "You asked me for some further assurance that the Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan in external or internal matters. My friend, if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care you will see that there is in it no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me that the Government of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla Khan, agreed to follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain in matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan, without reserve. I have therefore refrained from pressing this matter of which the Treaty of Peace contains no mention. By the said Treaty and this letter, therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been cancelled by this war"