

LIGUE OF NATIONS

**REDUCTION
OF ARMAMENTS**

DEBATE IN THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY

September 4th to 6th, 1924

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**Information Section,
League of Nations Secretariat,
GENEVA.**

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NOTE.

This brochure contains the verbatim record of the speeches delivered in the special debate of the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations on the subject of the Reduction of Armaments. The debate, under the presidency of M. Motta, First Delegate of Switzerland, opened on the morning of September 4th and concluded on the evening of September 6th.

The Assembly Committees are now in session, considering in detail the relative documents and other points referred to them by the resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

GENEVA, September 11th, 1924.

deliberations, the negotiations, the work and the agreement of the League of Nations.

The danger of supreme importance which is facing us now is that national security should be regarded merely as a military problem and based solely on the predominance of force. For a moment this may serve. For a moment it may lull to sleep. For a moment it may enable large nations and small to believe that their existence will no longer be challenged. But, my friends, there is an evolution in every plan and a consequence of every idea, and if, after all the appalling evidence in history that military force cannot give security, we to-day go back and repeat the follies of our ancestors, then the security we give for the day is only a betrayal of the nation that we lull to sleep under it.

In offering some observations upon this theme and in commenting on various proposals which have been made in connection with it, I wish to assure the Assembly that the fact of my speaking first does not mean that what I am going to say is something thrown at your heads and that you will be allowed to say what you like afterwards. No, my friends, we are for co-operative discussion. We are here to listen to one another. We are here to put our ideas into a common pool, and no delegation is more determined to pursue that policy than the British delegation of which I happen to have the honour to be the head at the present moment.

Now, let us be quite clear upon one thing. The British Government has not given an adverse report upon the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance because it is indifferent to the problem of national security. That is not true.

The British Government feels, as I am sure the whole of the Assembly feels, under the greatest obligation to the men who sat on the Commission that produced that draft Treaty. These things have to be done. Why, my friends, none of us have inherited a tilled soil prepared for peace. I wish we had. Our position rather is the position of the early pioneers who went to Australia, to Africa, and to the very remote parts of the world to find that, within an inch of the landing-place where they set foot, they had to blaze

the trail, they had to fell the forest, they had to dig the ground, they had to uproot the evil roots that were in possession of the ground in front of them. They toiled and toiled and toiled, not for immediate harvest, but in order to make great preparations ; as a result of that preparatory toil, you are shown, when you now go to those regions, their smiling and their peaceful fields. Such is our work. Such is the work of the League of Nations. Such is the contribution to that work made by the Commission which prepared this draft Treaty which the British Government, for various reasons, has stated that it cannot regard as the final word upon this important subject.

Our position briefly is this. We do not believe that military alliances will bring security. We believe that a military alliance within an agreement for security is like a grain of mustard seed. Small to begin with, it is the essential seed of the arrangement, and that seed, with the years, will grow and grow until at last the tree produced from it will overshadow the whole of the heavens and we shall be back in exactly the military position in which we found ourselves in 1914.

Moreover, the British Government, wishing to carry out to the full; every comma, every sentence, of any obligation to which it puts its signature, cannot, will not, put its signature to an indefinite document. If we are going to undertake obligations, if we say we are going to carry them out, we want to know exactly what they are. An obligation based upon psychology, an obligation based upon fear of other people, an obligation that we may have to meet, not because a nation has been faced by enemies sent to beset it by the Devil but because a nation may be beset by enemies on account of its own policy : this sort of obligation we cannot undertake because, if we did undertake it — I want to tell you perfectly honestly — we should find, when we tried to carry it out, that public opinion would make it impossible for us to do so.

Further, if the Assembly will look at the amendments to the draft Treaty which have been proposed and will put them all in, put them all together, it will see that together they destroy the

draft Treaty even when they are offered in support of it. Certain amendments proposed by certain Governments and described as essential were considered and rejected by the Commission, and if they had not been so rejected the Commission would never have obtained unanimity in the preparation of the draft Treaty.

I may be wrong, but I am profoundly of the opinion that, for these reasons, if such an obligation were imposed upon the nations affiliated to the League it would break the League ; great secessions would take place and a large number of nations that would remain in affiliation to the League would do so with such a reserve that the obligation they had accepted would be of no value whatever. The British Government has, therefore, felt that the last word has not been spoken regarding this draft Treaty and it wishes that the matter shall be further considered.

What assistance can we give now to those preparing the way ? Where does the League stand in its pursuit of peace and of the essential conditions under which arms can be reduced ? I think the first problem is the League itself, its composition. This League, if it is to have the authority to give security, must be a comprehensive League. This League will remain inefficient unless it includes not only the threatened nations but the threatening or the so-called threatening nations. Both must be there.

There are our American friends, remote geographically, blissfully and enviably separated from the troubles that lie at our doors. Europe for the last few years has not offered America a very attractive companionship. If, like a beloved partner, America had found us sitting at its fireside, I am not quite sure that its domestic felicities would have been of the very best kind. I, therefore, never believed that America would do anything but leave us alone, but America has in fact rendered us very valuable help. We have never, so far as I know, asked the assistance of America to do *ad hoc* work, but she has come in and royally given us all the support that she possibly can.

In the recent London Conference, which I think has so splendidly changed the European outlook, America played a most helpful part. One day, not because we are going to appeal to her,

not because we are going to bring pressure to bear upon her but because we ourselves shall have been wise enough to render successful our own efforts for peace, America's own heart will incline her to come in, and then she will find that a welcome and an honoured place are awaiting her in our counsels.

But there is Germany and there is Russia. Now, Germany cannot remain outside the League of Nations.

If I may use a formula that may be misunderstood — I hope it will not be — we cannot afford to allow her to remain outside. There is not a single question regarding armaments, regarding the conditions of peace, regarding security, regarding the safety and the guarantee of the existence of the small nations — not a single one — that we can discuss amongst ourselves, with a menacing vacant chair in our midst.

Neither can Germany remain outside in her own interests. Negotiations with an isolated Berlin can never be effective. The London Conference created a new relationship between Germany and the other European States and that relationship should now be sealed and sanctified by Germany's appearance on the floor of this Assembly.

The League of Nations takes upon itself the first task of creating once again a European system, and that European system never will exist until our late enemies have ceased to be our enemies and have come in to take their co-operative part in that system. I hope that, in spite of the difficulties and the technicalities that still, apparently, remain in the way, this will be done at once.

Let us begin a new era for the League, as I hope we are beginning a new era in Europe. I should like very much, sir, if it were possible, during the three or four weeks that the Assembly will continue its session, that this matter should be taken up, not with an idea of postponing it, but with the idea of settling it now, once and for all.

As regards Russia, the situation is somewhat different. The Russian Soviet Government believes in revolutions; it believes in the dissolution of the old as an essential preliminary to the creation of the new. That being so, I can understand that there

is little attraction for them, in the League of Nations. We are evolutionists. The revolutions in which we believe are the organic revolutions to which life has always to respond if it is to remain adjusted to its new circumstances. This is our view.

But even Russia has changed. It is now making Treaties ; it is now pursuing diplomatic methods. I hope that the agreement reached between the British Government and the Soviet Government of Russia is the first, not only of a series of agreements, but the first indication that the Soviet Government itself is prepared to become part of the co-operating European system, and so complete the authority and influence of the League of Nations.

This is what the League itself wants. Now, what about its work ? How are we going to approach this problem of peace and security ? In talking to friends, Mr. President, I am sometimes appalled to find how little outsiders know about the practical work of the League. If, in their minds, the League makes a mistake — say Silesia — it is blazed abroad in every newspaper throughout the world. If the League gets a rebuff — say — well, perhaps I had better not say — you can fill in the blanks according to your tastes and your knowledge — that too is blazed abroad. The quiet work done by the Committees is realised by very few. I hope that, before the month is over, the world will be better acquainted with our magnificent practical work than it is at present.

In connection with the question of peace and security, I want to mention one matter that gives me much concern. Apart from the great national organisation of arms, there is a very active and a growing illegal and illicit private traffic in and export of arms. This is not satisfactory. The understanding is that these shall not exist ; in certain treaties such practice is absolutely prohibited, and, if I may say it, for any of the Allies to wink at it and not to put their feet hard down upon it is not playing the game.

I hope that all the Powers directly or indirectly concerned in this manufacture and traffic will be frowned upon, without the least hesitation, by all the authorities of the League of Nations. The British Government takes a very firm stand in the matter, and I appeal to you for your support.

This, however, is a side-issue, important though it may be. The main problem is the problem of national security in relation to national armaments. Let us face it as realists — not as sentimentalists or as mere idealists, but as scientific realists, who go right to the root of the whole problem. The superficial school, which imagines that, by putting certain phrases upon paper, it will secure an enforceable obligation, is at once met by the impossibility of giving definitions to two simple words. First of all, there is security. What is security? Secondly, there is aggression. What is aggression?

Consider the latter word: What is aggression? Has any wit yet devised an act which of itself makes first aggression absolutely clear? As a matter of fact, everybody who knows their history knows this: that the ability to assign responsibility for aggression is always about the last thing to emerge, and belongs to the historian who studies and writes fifty years after a war and never to the politician who lives through the beginnings of a war.

We can, however, approach the problem very closely.

The one method by which we can secure, the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration, the setting up of a court or, rather, courts — because one court will not suffice for the purpose. There are judicial questions. There are political questions. There are questions that can only be settled by wise and enlightened citizens. There are questions that can only be settled by the trained expert lawyer. A system of arbitration is a system of watching the clouds, a system of warning when a cloud, just the size of a man's hand, appears above the horizon, and the taking of steps at once, not of a military kind but of a rational and judicial kind, to charm it out of existence. The test is, Are you willing to arbitrate? The test is, Are you willing to explain? The test is, Will you come before us and tell us what you propose to do? The test is, Will you expose your commitments? Are you afraid of the world? Are you afraid of daylight, a lover of darkness and timorous lest the world should know what is in your mind? Such is the test, the only test.

We are now passing through a transition period. I do not believe that there is any man in this Assembly, not even my dear good friend Herriot, who feels the burden of that transition period more than I do. We have inherited tremendous responsibilities, God knows that sometimes we feel they are too heavy for us. We have inherited the working of an old system. If we were to issue an instruction that a button should be removed from the vest of some official we should be almost afraid of the result and the repercussion of such a change. The world seems a weary place to us, to those of us who have not the luxury — I hope I shall not be misunderstood — of being Prime Ministers of unitary States, but who have the awful burden of dealing with our own country one day, with a Dominion the next day, with a foreign country the day afterwards, with a mandated territory the day after that, with all the complexities of race, with all the complexities of creed, with all the complexities of historical traditions. There we sit at the same desk day after day, turning at one hour to one question and the next hour to the other — I say, God knows that the burdens of such an office are very often too heavy for a pair of human shoulders to carry.

All the more anxious are we in this transition period to welcome changes. We must hold out one hand to the past and the other hand to the future, and move steadily on, taking the past with us and embracing the prospect of the hopes and comforts which the future gives us.

I must, therefore, be very careful. I am in favour of arbitration. I see nothing else for the world. If we cannot devise a proper system of arbitration, then do not let us fool ourselves that we are going to have peace. Let us go back to the past! Let us go back to competitive armaments! Let us go back to that false, white sepulchre of security through military pacts — there is nothing else for us — and let us prepare for the next war, because that is inevitable!

What is the problem? We must devise more successfully than we have done hitherto the courts that are to operate under a system of arbitration. We must explore more fully than we have

done hitherto the matters that ought to be referred and can be referred to those courts, at any rate to begin with. We must visualise with more accuracy than we have done hitherto the nature of the obligations imposed upon States which arbitrate. For instance, the question has arisen as to whether the Optional Clause in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice would operate in war or in peace. Some of my friends say that it is universal. Others of my friends say: "No, it only operates in peace". That question must be settled and established clearly.

Further, I want to know how far my Government—my colleagues are with me in this—can go, even if some of you do not go so far. Ah, it is that terrible problem of the practical blending of the ideal with the real which presses upon all of us who want to change the mind and the system of Europe.

I should propose that the Article in the Statute of the Permanent Court which deals with arbitration (that is, the Optional Clause) should be very carefully examined by a Commission appointed by us, with a view to its being placed before this Assembly in a somewhat more accurate, expanded and definite form than it now has. It is the desire of the British Government to sign undertakings like the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court, but before so great a step is taken, it is proper that the clause should be drafted in the most specific form possible. I have consulted my colleague and also the Governments of the Dominions with a view to considering the points to which I have referred.

An essential condition of security and peace is justice. Justice must be allowed to speak before passion. That is arbitration.

Parallel with this problem of arbitration is the direct problem of armaments themselves. I am very glad — and I think the Assembly will thank me for taking note of this — to see here my old friend the Prime Minister of Denmark (M. Stauning) whose declaration regarding the army and navy of Denmark has really led the way for sane countries all the world over.

As regards naval armaments, America has taken the first step. We came to an agreement there. Sometimes I have heard

things said about a certain review at Spithead a week or two ago. I wonder what the gentlemen who object to the review would have said if I had kept all those ships in my pocket and assured the world that I had none at all. I challenge this Assembly on this question. We came to an agreement at Washington. We signed that agreement. No country which signed that agreement is fulfilling it in the letter and in the spirit with more accuracy and more determination than Great Britain itself. We have fulfilled that agreement as we fulfil all agreements of that character. I think that we might now go further. I hope that Washington is not "weary in its well-doing". I should be very glad to have further communications so that more explorations can be undertaken on the great problem of naval armaments.

Land armaments, however, are far more difficult to deal with, and they touch us here far more intimately. Let us be realists again. Supposing that this Assembly was here and now to convene an International Conference for the reduction of armaments. What would happen? Absolute failure. Why? Because the preparations for it have not been adequately made. We must prepare the way. We must have an atmosphere. We must have a confidence. We must have a machinery. There lies the opportunity for the League from this very moment onward. The London Conference has helped by restoring a reasonable national policy in Europe. If Germany were in the League what a tremendous help that would be! If we had the beginnings of arbitration, well-devised terms of reference, Courts well considered and the larger Powers subscribing to the declaration, what a substantial step forward that would be! All this can be done this year. Why not? What is in the way? Our own fears and our own suspicions. If we would only take our courage in our hands, if the large nations and the small represented here to-day would only meet, would only create the right commission and inspire it with the determination that we had in London that no obstacles should baulk us, the success of that commission would be assured within a year, and the League of Nations would be able to summon the countries to a conference and then, by careful

handling, by patient work and by reasonable consideration, would obtain a successful issue for that Conference.

One of the essentials is that all the nations must be included in the Conference. Another essential is that it must be held in Europe. It will be prolonged and if the really responsible men are to be present they must be not very far from the seats of their own Governments and be able to keep their hands on their national affairs whilst representing the interests of their countries at the Disarmament Conference.

I have one final proposal — and I apologise for the length of time I am taking in addressing you this morning. My final point is this. The Covenant of the League of Nations contains ample provisions for starting arbitration, for the sanctions that are necessary and for all other eventualities that may arise. Alas, the Covenant was drafted immediately after the war and before statesmen were able to see clearly the precise nature of the problems which the nations would have to face a year or two after the Armistice.

What we require now is that the Covenant itself should be elaborated. We do not want a new foundation. Before it is elaborated, it ought to be understood. I was very much surprised to find that some Members of the League of Nations took the view they did of a reference in the letter sent by the British Government to the Secretariat of the League regarding the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance — the reference to the fact that the Council of the League in military matters could only recommend. I was surprised to find that some people imagined that the British Government was thereby trying to take from the Council some power which it now possesses. This is not true. There was never any such intention. What is wanted is an accurate reading of the Covenant. Those who signed the Covenant, Article 16 for instance, made it perfectly clear that on military matters the Council would only be an advisory body; on economic and other matters the signatories to the Covenant did not even call in the Council, but there and then took upon themselves directly the obligation of acting in a hostile way to nations that did not observe

the provisions of the Covenant. Ah, the Covenant is very much stronger than some of our friends imagine.

The British Government thinks that the matter should now be explored, beginning with the Covenant, applying the Covenant to our present circumstances, and in the spirit of the League of Nations, developing a policy that will give security and reduce armaments.

The British Government stands by the Covenant. The British Government has no wish to reduce the authority of the Council. It rather wishes to extend the authority of the Council consistently with the continued existence and the prosperity of the League. Articles 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Covenant might well form themselves into a charter of peace if we would only apply them and fill them out.

What is the position in which we find ourselves? We are here preparing, as I see it, for the International Armaments Conference. This ought to be our object. If we can remove the obstacles we shall have done a tremendous amount of work — work which, by its very nature, is bound to be permanent, once it is done, because the reason and the morality of the world will stand by it so loyally.

Here, we are going to make speeches. We are going to lay down our views. The people who will speak are responsible men and women. We have a draft Treaty in front of us. We have the various Governments' criticisms upon that draft Treaty. We have, in addition, a most interesting and profitable American plan. Let us take those as our preparations up to date. Let us hand them over to a commission that will prepare for the Armaments Conference and let us see to it that even before we rise, before the Assembly breaks up, some substantial progress shall be made in co-ordinating these ideas and in producing from their apparent diversities some measure of agrèement and consent.

During the next few months let us work in our own countries, hard and sleeplessly, to remove all obstacles; if that is done I am sure that the League will never require to apologise for itself in the eyes of the world. We here are practical men, responsible

for Governments and responsible for the welfare of our nations and there is not a single one of us who will sacrifice national welfare. Fortunately, it is not necessary, because the higher the standard of welfare of any nation, the more valuable is that nation as a co-operator with other nations in the European system. The world expects much of us. Can we not have the courage to give the world what it expects ?

History is full of invasions, full of wars and of aggressions and there have always been pacts, always military guarantees and always military security. The history of the world is a history which shows the nations always ready for war and always at war, and the one is absolutely essentially and organically connected with the other. History is full of the doom of nations which have trusted that false security.

Above all, I appeal to the small nations, to the leaders of the small nations which maintain the frame of historical and personal individuality in a military world. Pacts or no pacts, you will be invaded ; pacts or no pacts, you will be crushed ; pacts or no pacts, you will be devastated. The certain victim of a military age and the military organisation of society, is the small nation which depends upon its moral claims in order to live. Evil will be made upright and entirely free to do its work, if you fling yourselves once more into that security which has never made you secure since the world started.

Our interests for peace are far greater than our interests in creating a machinery of defence. A machinery of defence is easy to create but beware lest in creating it you destroy the chances of peace. The League of Nations has to advance the interests of peace. The world has to be habituated to our existence ; the world has to be habituated to our influence ; we have to embody in the world confidence in the order and the rectitude of law, and then nations — with the League of Nations enjoying the authority, with the League of Nations looked up to, not because its arm is great but because its mind is calm and its nature just — can pursue their destinies with a feeling of perfect security, none daring to make them afraid. This is the outlook,

and this is the policy by which the British Government stands and to which it invites the League of Nations to adhere.

M. SKRZYNSKI

First Delegate of Poland and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen — I must confess that I rise to speak with feelings of deep emotion. Ever since the Assembly of the League of Nations first met, I have encountered each year ever-increasing numbers of my compatriots who look to this platform with heavy but expectant hearts, always hoping to hear words which would be no less than deeds.

In past years this place has been occupied by distinguished men who have one and all kindled a torch of faith, trust and idealisation that lights the way for all who are met here to-day and who share the same noble ideals of peace and justice. The task imposed, however, upon the representatives of countries such as mine, when they rise to speak in this Assembly, is far easier.

There is no need for me to speak on broad and general issues. I wish to explain to you simply and frankly how my country, and public opinion in my country, interpret the abstract words that are on the lips of all ; for even when we agree upon general ideas, we still have to reach agreement as to their application. Only thus can we avoid the error of those peoples who, in ancient days, assembled to erect a tower to the skies, and failed, because they could not reach an understanding.

Again, we cannot possibly offer the excuse that was theirs and plead that we cannot all speak the same tongue. We all speak one tongue—some of us, perhaps, better than others. We are agreed, too, upon general principles.

I trust that my words will be received as the contribution of a humble workman adding some lesser stone to a great building which has been designed and planned by others.

Before explaining the attitude of the Polish Government and of public opinion in my country towards the problem of the

reduction of armaments, I would remind the Assembly that Poland may be said to have had the mournful privilege of being the forerunner of this great idea. Disarmament was the daily topic in every political assembly. We said — and it was a truism — that a disarmed country could not possibly be attacked, since it could not arouse mistrust and ill-will on the part of its neighbours.

That was in the eighteenth century. We came too early into a world that was old. You know what happened.

I will merely remind you that Poland was partitioned by men who had words of peace upon their lips. Frederick the Great spoke of the necessity of Peace, and Poland must be partitioned, it was said, to prevent a war between two empresses about Turkey. There were constant allusions to "equality" but never a word of "law". What was meant was the equality of the shares into which Poland was divided!

My excuse in turning back to history must be that history is, after all, the key to the future. Having said so much of the psychological history of my country, let me now turn to the present.

Before speaking of the Polish Government, I would beg you to realise Poland's position in regard to the question of peace. I will give you a brief survey of what the Polish people think. I will try, in a few words, to picture to you the silence that, above the roar of towns, the clamour of journalistic rivalry, and the din of factories, broods over the field whither the peaceful peasant betakes him day by day at dawn, to till the soil, ready, but only if compelled, to turn soldier—and one of the best soldiers in the world, if we may believe our friends or, for that matter, our enemies.

Of such is the soil of Poland ; such is the psychological foundation of past and present, wherein the roots of the tree of peace are deep implanted.

This being so, no Polish Government can do otherwise than collaborate with the other nations in helping to bring about the reign of peace.

It is in this light that we view the grave difficulties that are menacing the world — the terrible crises in finance, in economics

and in production, that have culminated in an appalling situation, in strife and contention between men who wish to work and cannot.

We feel that we are powerless to give effective aid in the search for a solution of the immense problem of labour. But that does not alter the fact that this problem must be solved, because upon it depends the power that drives the world. The power upon which man's future rests, the power latent in human energy is dependent upon this great problem, which can only be solved in a stable and secure world.

This leads us to the second great problem confronting the world : Disarmament.

Disarmament is impossible unless security and stability are general throughout the world. Only then can work be found for those who cannot use their energies unless they really feel the confidence that is born of complete security and stability.

The picture which I am attempting to present of the problems of to-day would be incomplete without a reference to the red line which divides the map of Europe. On our eastern border, the horizon is still tinged with red. Is it the dawn of a new day, or is it the red glow of fire upon a starless sky ? The collective wisdom of the world must find an answer to the question.

I now come to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. We have, of course, accepted it in deference to the distinguished men who planned it with a view to the practical application of the articles of the Covenant of the League regarding security. We have accepted it, although we consider that there are certain points, in particular, the definition of aggression, which require further precision. How could we reject it ? The draft Treaty, as the British Prime Minister said this morning, is really an attempt to interpret and amplify the articles of the Covenant.

There is one point in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance which may give rise to controversy ; I refer to the complementary agreements. Open to criticism though this part of the Treaty may be, it would not of itself have led us to reject the whole. Pacifists are entitled to argue that we must at all costs avoid setting up anything resembling the international structure of the

past. It is exceedingly difficult to give its due weight to such a controversial matter ; but it is my impression that these complementary agreements can never be considered as a prime factor. They are, on the contrary, simply an effect of the present state of affairs, and the reason for their inclusion, their *fons et origo*, is that universal solidarity has not yet been realised, there are, as yet, no adequate guarantees of peace and security.

When once we have secured moral disarmament, when once the federation of the world is an accomplished fact, these agreements will lose their purpose, but until then a nation that is resolved to endure cannot be expected to neglect its security.

The theme of peace leads us to consider the problem of justice, which was so eloquently expounded by the British Prime Minister this morning. Lest there should be any doubts in your minds, I wish to declare at the outset, on behalf of Poland, that, when some formula has been found by means of which a would-be aggressor can be brought to his knees before the bench of international justice, we shall be ready immediately to sign such a formula.

But what is justice ? Of course there is justice based on a recognised code of law ; but there is another kind which is not based on any recognised law ; it can also be called justice, but it cannot be mentioned where peace is concerned, for justice in the abstract, without law, means revolution.

I look forward with confidence to the day when it will be possible to introduce into international life some such procedure as is practised in national life. The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice is an important move in the right direction. On December 13th, 1920, the Assembly formally approved the Statute of the Court of International Justice. That day was a memorable one in the evolution of international life, for it marked a definite breach with the old traditions by which after the jurists had prepared their cases, the national interests were guided by certain fixed considerations.

There is one other point upon which the British Prime Minister rightly laid stress. All the incalculable political elements which

lead to the outbreak of war must be taken into consideration, and we must see that a system of arbitration is organised here and now to prevent further conflicts arising from the present trend of events, the conflicting interests and the misunderstandings which cloud the atmosphere of Europe.

Arbitration : That is the watchword of the future. We believe in it, we consider it a factor that will make for security and stability. I rejoiced this morning when I heard the British Premier raise arbitration on high and proclaim its inviolability.

Arbitration means clearly-defined situations. We cannot, of course, begin to consider here and now in what manner we are to evolve the rules of international law ; one point, however, we can discern even at this stage, namely, that it will be necessary to apply to international law the principles and ideas which have formed the basis of legal practice, according to the *esprit des lois* ever since the time of Montesquieu, and, first and foremost among these principles, the independence of judges.

What do we mean by the independence of judges ? Not that they are proof against political or material influences ; in that respect they are above suspicion. But the more closely a judge is bound by a fixed code, by an accepted law, the greater his independence.

In certain countries where there is no written code, custom is a yet more powerful law. In international life, however, we cannot rely on custom, for the main purpose of our Assembly is to break with tradition. The international judge, then, must owe his independence to the fact that he is bound by a fixed, recognised and clearly-defined code.

This recognised code is, of course, that constituted by the treaties. But if the peoples are one day unanimously to agree to entrust the settlement of political disputes to compulsory arbitration, and so to consent to transfer part of their sovereign rights to another authority — which must clearly be the Council of the League — they will naturally not do so unless the judge before whom they must appear can base his judgment on a clear and definite code, backed by sanctions, affording a guarantee

to all countries and recognising the inviolability of established treaties and territorial statutes. To do otherwise would simply be to take a leap in the dark.

Such is the case for arbitration.

I may, of course, be told that all this is obvious ; that no one would dream of disputing such matters. I do not maintain that they can be disputed and I am quite willing to admit that they are obvious, that public law is recognised, is valid and that it rests upon treaties which have been signed and are accepted by all. Nevertheless, it may occasionally be said that a treaty was a mistake, or that, in view of the conditions under which it was concluded, it must in course of time be amended. I will venture to cite a high authority, a great statesman at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, at which the affairs of the world were settled for a long time to come. The future was being discussed and he was told that precautions were useless, because the matter in question was obvious. His reply was : " If it is obvious when spoken, it will be still more obvious in writing."

In short, firmly though I believe in a peace based on justice, I do not think that any human tribunal can become a temple of peace unless it is built on the corner-stone that you have laid here in this Assembly.

And why ? Because this temple of peace, to be a temple of justice, must guard within its walls the public law of Europe, the sacred charter written in the blood of soldiers and the blood of martyrs.

I must ask pardon for having detained you so long. I should like in conclusion to summarise the position in a few words.

Our attitude towards the problems of disarmament and peace is as follows :

We are convinced that disarmament will bring lasting benefit to mankind. We desire peace. But what is needed to bring peace and disarmament, what is likewise needed to solve the problem of under-production and the lack of markets, is stability, security.

Our ardent desire is that the nations should unite to solve this problem ; but we are also convinced that, without such unity, we

shall be faced with failure. It is through the League alone that unity will be achieved, the League alone can call the world in council on disarmament.

We must begin with moral disarmament. This League which you have built is like an arch, through which we see in the far but sunlit distance the generations of to-morrow. All can pass beneath the arch, but for no one shall it be the Caudine Forks ; if, and only if, all the world works with a will to build the arch solidly and well, then, I am convinced that the League will become in very truth the arch of a triumphant peace.

Mr. MATTHEW CHARLTON

Delegate of Australia.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen — I intend to be very brief in my remarks, confining myself to the question of disarmament. I have been a strong supporter of the League of Nations from its inception and I listened with pleasure to the eloquent opening address of the Acting President outlining what had been accomplished by the League.

I beg to congratulate the Right Honourable the Prime Minister of Great Britain on the very able address which he delivered this morning. During his few months of office he has done yeoman service in establishing better international relations, and his efforts are greatly appreciated by the people.

Considering the gigantic problems with which it has had to deal, the League has done valuable work during the five years of its existence. It must, however, be remembered that, at the inception of the League, the principal problem which concerned the people was that of disarmament and peace, and we must ask ourselves the question as to how far we have succeeded in this connection, since Europe to-day is a much greater armed camp than it was in 1913, since there are over one million additional men under arms, notwithstanding the fact that the Treaty of Versailles provided for the reduction of armaments in some countries.

This state of affairs means a considerably increased military cost to be borne by the respective nations, in addition to the very heavy load of indebtedness incurred by the recent war, and leads the public mind to doubt whether the League will be able to achieve its object. It is therefore a matter of urgency that something tangible should be done at this meeting of the Assembly to deal with the paramount question of disarmament, which is the foundation upon which all other matters rest.

It is very difficult to solve such a problem when so many nations remain outside the League and it is very doubtful whether, at present, America, Germany, Russia and Turkey would be prepared to join the League if invited. In this connection, I entirely agree with the remarks of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister of Great Britain as to the League issuing an invitation to Germany during the present session. In view of the recent agreement on reparations, she may now be prepared to accept such an invitation.

It is, therefore, the duty of this Assembly to formulate some scheme for the purpose of bringing all nations together to discuss the question of disarmament; it is clear that, so long as certain nations, adjacent to those which are members of the League, are armed to the teeth, all must for their own security maintain a strong military organisation.

In this connection, I agree with the suggestion of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister of Great Britain as to holding a World Conference, but I differ from him in regard to procedure. I am strongly of the opinion that the atmosphere has been created and that this is the psychological moment for the League, which is composed of fifty-four nations, to issue an invitation to all countries to meet at a given date to discuss the question of disarmament.

Such an invitation, in all probability, would meet with a favourable response; representative men would thereby be enabled to present their views, an atmosphere would thus be created which would tend to establish more cordial relations between nations, and bring about that spirit of sweet reason-

ableness which is so necessary if an agreement providing for a scheme of general disarmament is to be reached — a scheme whereby the nations would be relieved of heavy military expenditure and a scheme which might eventually induce all nations to come within the jurisdiction of the League.

Already much has been achieved outside the League. The Washington Conference, which was limited to nations interested in the Pacific, decided on the reduction of capital ships, but this decision does not relieve those nations of military expenditure, inasmuch as additions may be made to the other branches of the navy.

Neither did the Conference take any definite action on the question of air and military defences. These are questions that cannot be definitely settled except by the co-operation of all nations under a general scheme of disarmament.

Recently the London Conference was held under the very able guidance of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister of Great Britain and an agreement was reached in regard to the question of reparations which relieves the position considerably as far as France and other nations are concerned.

One cannot help but sympathise with France owing to the great devastation which she suffered during the recent war, and I can well understand her anxiety regarding her future security — an anxiety which, no doubt, has much to do with France's advocacy of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

This anxiety should be removed if a World Conference were held and provision made whereby every nation would be committed to a general reduction of armaments, leaving all matters of international dispute to be settled by arbitration or any other method that may be devised.

I earnestly appeal to delegates who, I am sure, have a sincere desire to eradicate the barbarous method of warfare and to institute some means of dealing, without recourse to war, with those international troubles which must inevitably occur from time to time.

If this is not done, it will only be a matter of time when the public confidence in the utility of the League of Nations to secure peace will be dissipated and the energy and good work accomplished by those who played such a prominent part in the effort to obviate further wars will be of no avail ; we shall then gradually drift back to the condition of things which existed in 1914, and, should another great war occur, it may end our present-day civilisation.

I want to say to my fellow delegates that I stand here to-day not as a representative of the Government. I have the honour to be the leader of the Australian Labour Party, which is His Majesty's Opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament, and am here by invitation of the Australian Government. The Australian Government has set an example which, I think, should be followed by every country in the world. If you want to secure peace, you must realise that this is no party question but is a matter which should be devoid of all party significance and should be dealt with from a national point of view.

Governments come and Governments go—there are changes day after day—but in regard to this question it should remain for ever ; that can only be done by recognising that every political force should be represented at these particular Conferences. I do not know to what extent this is the case as regards this Assembly. I am a stranger amongst you, but I want to say that, in my view, if the League of Nations is to be a success, you must see that every line of political thought in your different countries is represented here so that all the different parties in your countries will be welded together and common action thereby secured in regard to this particular question.

I want to say, further, that if we are to live up to our promises, if the statements made by leading public men during the war and at its close, to the effect that it was a war to end war, are to be realised, we must act. If the statements then made to the effect that the sacrifices of those who took part in the war would not be in vain are to be realised, something must be done immediately. We cannot permit procrastination. Five years have gone

by and the time has arrived when we should take some definite action. If we do not, we shall see the beginning of the end of one of the best institutions that has ever been created, for already I realise that four or five of your Members are not represented at this gathering.

We find that the cost of defence is increasing in every country and the expenditure of the League is also growing, but, if the latter spent double the present amount, it would be a mere bagatelle if it were able to bring about effective disarmament. The public sees that military expenditure is increasing year after year, and whilst we know that good work has been done and is being done, thanks to the gentlemen who have played such a prominent part in connection with this League, we cannot make the public feel as we feel. The people want to see something tangible done ; they want to see a movement in the direction of disarmament ; they want to see the load which they are carrying removed as far as possible. That can only be done by taking decisive action.

I do not know your form of procedure ; I do not know whether resolutions can be moved here at this meeting, but I say this : It would ill become me, as I do not represent a Government, and have not taken a leading part in your deliberations previously, to move a resolution, but I think that a resolution should emanate in some way from this body calling upon the Council to take immediate steps to invite all the nations of the world to a Conference without delay for the purpose of discussing disarmament. The people in all parts of the world will thereby see that this League is living, that it is attempting something, and that, no doubt, something definite will be decided.

I only put those views briefly before you so that you may know the attitude which is adopted by the Party that I have the honour to lead in Australia. We are in favour of the League of Nations and we want to see it make good. But we do say that if there is to be delay year after year, disaster will overtake the League. This, therefore, is the psychological moment. Let us

strike whilst the iron is hot ! Let something be done towards the convening of a World Conference. You will thereby be laying the foundations of your League, and the questions with which you have been dealing and those with which you have to deal will be resting on a solid foundation. The only solid foundation is disarmament and a universal peace.

JONKHEER VAN KARNEBEEK

*First Delegate of the Netherlands, Minister for Foreign Affairs
and former President of the Assembly.*

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen — The Netherlands Government has twice had the honour of setting forth its views on the problems of security and the reduction of armaments within the scheme laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its willingness to contribute its share towards the solution of this complex and difficult problem is unquestioned. The military organisation of the Netherlands is now being reduced but the Government would welcome an opportunity of reducing it still further and thus lightening the heavy burden of national expenditure.

As regards the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Netherlands Government has every respect for the motives of those Powers whose views are different from its own. It is ready, indeed, to admit the justice of those motives ; but, as it stated in its last note, it cannot support them. My Government has given its reasons and I will not recapitulate them. Most States have stated their views, and the question with which we are faced, the question which has given rise to this debate, is the course which the League is to take in these circumstances.

I do not claim to represent a Power which can produce a solution of the problem. Others, more authoritative and bearing greater responsibilities, have been called upon to show us the way. We have heard some and we have still to hear others, and I earnestly hope that they will point out a fresh road and show us whither it leads.

I do not propose to discuss the League in general terms. My feelings and views in this matter, and those of my country, are well known. The uncertainty which still hovers over the League does not cause me disquiet. The League will last because it lives. It lives because it was bound to be. It was bound to be, because mankind has entered upon an era of inter-relationship, and even States cannot stand aside.

But I venture to address you now because, whatever the practical outcome of our deliberations, we must not allow the nations which are listening to us to think that the Covenant, which is the fountainhead of our powers, the foundation on which we stand, cannot provide the conditions essential to solve the problem of armaments and peace. We cannot allow them to think that the League is unequal to its task. This would be not merely a misfortune, but something worse—an unpardonable blunder.

What is the aim of the Covenant ?

In my opinion Article 12 of the Covenant is the corner-stone around which the whole edifice is built. Article 12 contains the undertaking that no Member shall have resort to war until the dispute in question has been submitted to arbitration or mediation by the Council, and until a period of three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. Such is the law by which we are governed at present, and we must always bear it in mind.

The Peace Conference of 1899 produced a permanent organisation for the peaceful solution of international disputes, and at the same time left the Powers free to avail themselves of it or not at their own discretion.

The second Conference, held in 1907, improved the mechanism of that organisation.

Since that time ideas have progressed, and events have taken place that have awakened international consciousness.

In 1919, the Covenant of the League was drawn up, imposing upon an exhausted humanity the alternative obligations of arbitration and mediation in any dispute likely to lead to a rupture.

Since that time we have therefore been under obligation to find a peaceful solution for all international disputes. Such is the progress we have achieved, and the League of Nations is its symbol. Temporisation, mediation and judicial procedure—these are the means imposed by the Covenant upon the Members of the League in order to prevent war. It is surely our urgent duty to elaborate and develop these means by special treaties.

You will realise, therefore, that even though war is not necessarily abolished in the Covenant, and even allowing for cases where it would still be legally admissible according to the Covenant, yet by virtue of the system established under the Covenant it is subjected to such conditions that there is virtually no longer any possibility of war, provided that the engagement we have all taken is observed and that our promises are kept.

But, someone will say, supposing the engagement is not kept? Article 16 of the Covenant anticipates this case, but is that enough? Is not the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance evidence that some doubt seems to exist on this point?

Permit me to ask a question. Assuming that the Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been accepted, have we reason to suppose that at the very moment when it was to be enforced, the serious obligations which it entails would be fulfilled, and that there would be no breaches and no defections? Why should this Treaty be more immune from those doubts which you considered it necessary to take especially into account in connection with Article 12 of the Covenant? Should we not sooner or later be driven to resort once more to a supplementary agreement? And where would this end?

When we are faced by a problem as vital to mankind as that with which we are dealing to-day, we are entitled to say all that is in our minds. I am afraid that if the Members of the League cannot keep the engagement provided for in Article 12 of the Covenant, no other agreement can save them. This must have been the idea in Lord Balfour's mind when he stated in the House of Lords last spring with reference to the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance: "The draft Treaty, if carried out, was an attempt to

buttress up one treaty with another. If all the signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations acted in the spirit of that Covenant, there would be no war and no danger of war."

The observance of Article 12 of the Covenant will be found to constitute one of the chief guarantees of future international security. "No war without previous appeal to arbitration or mediation"—that is the first commandment; and the second: "After the arbitral award or the report of the Council, wait three months."

Whatever resolutions we may adopt, either at this Assembly or afterwards, whatever efforts we make, there is one thing upon which we are all agreed, namely, that we must be imbued through and through with the spirit of those commandments to which we have of our own free will pledged ourselves. They must be proclaimed aloud, so that all, and especially our children to whom we hand on our heritage, may know the real meaning of the League of Nations, and may hold that knowledge up before those in whose hands their destinies are placed. In so doing we shall be adding weight to the sanctions, for there is and can be no more powerful weapon than an enlightened public opinion.

We are on the hospitable soil of a country where, centuries ago, a solemn oath was taken, marking the beginning of the national liberty and of the common political life of the inhabitants. If at this Fifth Assembly we declare our common determination to respect Article 12 of the Covenant, we take, as it were, an oath to obey its commandments; if, in addition, we all agree to accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as provided for in Article 36 of its Statute, and if, finally, we succeed in enlisting in our ranks all the nations of the world, the Fifth Assembly will not have met in vain, and the world can look forward with renewed confidence towards the reduction of armaments which is laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant.

The Third Committee, which is now meeting again, profiting by the suggestions made in the course of this discussion, will press forward with its all-important work, and will seek to bring conflicting opinions into line and explore new possibilities, thus

bringing nearer the reduction of armaments prescribed by the Covenant.

This is a heavy task—heavier perhaps than is generally realised—but we must never forget all that the Covenant means to us, nor the ground we have already won, nor the pact to which we have set our hands. Not until we look deep into the Covenant do we see its great wisdom and its moderation. The resources which it offers are immense and are adequate to provide, as time requires, all that is necessary to complete that work of peace for which it was created. The outlook affords us every ground for hope.

M. STAUNING,

Prime Minister of Denmark.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen — It is with feelings of keen pleasure that I have attended the first meetings of the Fifth Assembly, and I would like to make a few remarks on the eloquent speech which the Prime Minister of Great Britain delivered this morning.

I regret that I have not been able to prepare my own speech in French or English, and that, owing to the pressure of my public duties, I must leave Geneva to-morrow morning; to my deep regret, therefore, I cannot attend the whole of the discussion on the important question now before us. I therefore crave your indulgence if I speak to-day in my own language.

The pleasure which I feel in attending your meetings is all the greater because I regard the League of Nations as the realisation of the great ideal of peace, justice and international co-operation.

The hopes of all mankind centre around the vital issue which we are now discussing, because the nations throughout the world are hoping to see the horrors and cruelties of war brought to an end for ever.

Like Mr. MacDonald, I hope that we shall soon see representatives of all nations assembled in this hall to solve the great problems of justice, and so to secure world peace.

The serious economic evils that have arisen in every country, even in neutral countries, have in these last years been fraught with most serious consequences. It would therefore be a blessing indeed if all peoples could be brought to discuss these problems together and so find a satisfactory solution.

It gave me great satisfaction to hear the British Premier emphasise so forcibly the principle of compulsory arbitration.

The small States have long cherished the hope that this principle would be generally adopted, and they see in the triumph of this idea the only effective guarantee for their cultural and economic development.

In my own country all political parties have for long been striving to secure the settlement by arbitration of all international disputes ; Denmark, by the treaties of arbitration which she has concluded, has evinced her firm intention of contributing her share towards the realisation of this principle.

In the name of the whole Danish nation, I give my support to the eloquent words that were pronounced from this platform.

The present Government of Denmark, guided by the principle of arbitration which, as Mr. MacDonald has said, forms the only really effective guarantee of peace, has considered the possibility of a complete reform of its military and naval system. I am absolutely convinced that all nations have only one desire, the maintenance of peace. The whole Danish nation is inspired by this desire and the Danish Government, therefore, hopes that Parliament also will acquiesce.

The plans are not yet complete, but it is intended to effect a radical transformation of our military forces. They will no longer be instruments of war ; the army and navy will be replaced by an arm which will simply maintain the surveillance of the frontiers and territorial waters.

Such is the plan that the Danish Government proposes to submit to the next session of Parliament. We trust that the path that we are about to follow will lead us to the exalted goal towards which all our efforts are directed : disarmament and compulsory arbitration—that is, the end of the regime of wars and victory for the principles of universal peace and justice.

M. EDOUARD HERRIOT,
First Delegate and Prime Minister of France.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen — It is with a profound sentiment of respect for the majesty of this Assembly that I now come before it to speak in the name of France.

More than ever since the recent general election my country has displayed its desire for peace, not only for itself, but for all nations, and more especially for those represented here by their most qualified representatives ; nations which claim the right to work in peace and honour ; nations, all of them, with equal rights, the smallest having the right to the same consideration as the greatest.

Within the family of States leagued together to protect themselves against the terrible scourge of war, France offers her whole-hearted collaboration. Her own destiny has frequently been interrupted by the shock of arms. She knows only too well the sacrifice, the mourning, and, it must also be said, the injustice which result from war. She knows only too well how, if war gives birth to heroism, it also brings in its train immorality ; her one desire, in fulfilment of the solemn oaths which were sworn at the close of the last great conflict, is to see the end of this barbarism.

France, then, is strictly faithful, not only to the letter, but to the spirit of the Covenant which is placed in the forefront of the Treaty of Versailles and is guaranteed by the most honourable signatures in the world : it is a Covenant of co-operation, a Covenant of security, a Covenant of justice, a Covenant of right, founded upon a series of correlated ideas which cannot be separated without mutilating the whole. It is by thinking over and putting in force the articles of this solemn instrument that France seeks for the rules which are to guide her future action and her foreign policy.

First of all let us be just to the work that has been done. As a newcomer among you, I see and appreciate it perhaps better than you yourselves.

The idea of peace is not new. We see it imprinted on the minds of the noblest men of all ages, and, at the end of the great convulsions of history, even on the minds of the most realist of men. The originality of the League of Nations consists in this: that in four years it has rendered important services and has peacefully settled the most critical disputes with an authority which no one has seriously been able to contest.

Undoubtedly, it has not yet attained the zenith of its power, but France believes that to strengthen the League we must observe the laws that govern all organic evolution, that is to say, we must take the greatest care not to destroy the achievements and the hopes that are the outcome of its early years.

When, after a long discussion, the Third Assembly adopted, with the signature of the adherent States, the famous Resolution XIV of the Third Committee, which was the origin of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, its action was based on Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. Thus, disarmament and security are united together in the Covenant itself.

On this idea was founded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which makes a war of aggression an international crime. The Treaty thus marks enormous progress—the introduction into public law of the conception of crime which hitherto had existed only in private law; the creation of a bond among the Powers which are the victims of aggression, provided that they really are the victims and have fulfilled all their international obligations.

I would further observe that Article 3 of the draft Treaty covers not merely actual war but policies likely to lead to war—not merely aggression, but the threat of aggression.

It is an important fact that eighteen countries have already accepted the scheme and that most of the replies have been in favour of the principle of assistance. If there are still some who object, France, so far from being discouraged, feels—and I trust you will agree—that a study of the difficulties before us, if undertaken in that spirit of cordial collaboration to which my friend

Mr. MacDonald alluded yesterday and of which he at once proceeded to set the example, should enable us to go forward and to resolve the deadlock at which, it is suggested in some quarters, we have arrived.

A number of objections have been raised to the draft Treaty. I will deal only with the more important.

One objection is that the guarantees provided by the scheme appear to be inadequate ; another, that the obligations to be assumed by each country are left indeterminate ; a third that, under the terms of the draft Treaty, it is not possible to determine with certainty, or even to determine at all, which State is the aggressor.

I may say at once that, in our view, the most serious of these objections is that concerned with the determination of the aggressor State. It is urged that even the report of the Third Committee itself does not provide a satisfactory definition, and the best proof of this is that M. Benes' admirable work has had to be supplemented by a commentary on the definition of a case of aggression.

The author of the commentary admits his difficulties. Mobilisation has become an extremely complicated affair. The horrible part of modern war, of the possible war that we are anxious at all costs to avoid, is that on the first day on which it raises its head it takes sole and undisputed possession of a country. It demands not merely its men, but even its raw materials ; it seizes its industries, even those which had always seemed adapted only for purposes of peace. In the past the violation of frontiers used to be the sole and final touchstone ; but it is no longer sufficient. There are no frontiers to warfare in the air, not even to the atrocities of chemical warfare.

We admit that it is an extremely intricate and perplexing task to determine which State is the aggressor. For that reason, France was gratified yesterday to observe that Great Britain gave her powerful support to the idea of arbitration—an idea which we ourselves recently urged in London since we were convinced that it was the only means of exploring and solving the formidable problem of reparations.

Our action in accepting the idea of arbitration is wholly in accordance with the peculiar tradition of our country, which was magnificently upheld at The Hague conferences by my eminent friend, M. Léon Bourgeois.

Moreover, as M. Van Karnebeek, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, pointed out yesterday, the notion of arbitration is already embodied in Article 12 of the Covenant, whereby all Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit it either to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council.

We earnestly hope, therefore, that one of the acts of the Fifth Assembly will be to accept the principle of arbitration which will once again settle our difficulties, since henceforth the aggressor will be the party which refuses arbitration.

How can the principle which we have postulated, the principle which is to govern the discussions of the Fifth Assembly, be applied? It is not for me to define its application here or now; that task rests with your Committees. There is still much to be done in this direction, and you may rely upon the co-operation of the French delegates. It is for your representatives to work out a coherent system of arbitration. I do not think that there is any need for a special Committee; your ordinary bodies—the First and Third Committees—are, to my mind, so constituted that the matter can be left to them. Here, again, France remains faithful to her axiom, her golden rule: “Never destroy, but always improve!”

Turning to another subject, I need hardly say that we firmly support all the measures proposed for the control of the traffic in arms with a view to restricting and hampering those secret preparations for war which are our main anxiety at a time when war is so largely dependent upon industry, however peaceful the latter may superficially appear.

Nor do we raise any objection to the reconsideration of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice; I refer to the article which authorises States to recognise the jurisdiction of the Court as obligatory. Mr. MacDonald was quite right in urging that this clause should be amended; but this again.

is a delicate task, requiring detailed work on the part of the Committees.

France therefore, having proposed it in London, views with the utmost satisfaction the extended application of the principle of arbitration, which must henceforth be made the keystone of international public law.

Only the other day we worked in an atmosphere of what I may call brotherly co-operation for the introduction of this principle into a diplomatic instrument. It would be to our credit if at this Assembly we could do something towards the application of the same principle to the solution of infinitely vaster problems, for on their solution depends the future peace of the nations, which it is your duty, at least your moral duty, to assure.

We must speak with clearness and candour, and before this high Assembly, which has assumed such heavy moral responsibilities, it is necessary courageously to face all the elements in the problem of peace.

Arbitration is essential, but it is not sufficient. It is a means, but not an end. It does not entirely fulfil the intentions of Article 8 of the Covenant, which, if I may again remind you, are security and disarmament.

We in France regard these three terms—arbitration, security, and disarmament—as inseparable ; and these three words would be but empty abstractions did they not stand for living realities created by our common will.

At all times and for all peoples war has been a dreadful reality ; we must now make a reality of peace. I use definite terms because I feel that we are now faced by the greatest of all our duties to mankind, if we wish our work to be regarded by posterity as something more than the barren proceedings of some vast and sterile academy. Arbitration must not be made a snare for trustful nations.

If upon the foundation of this trust you desire to establish a final charter to govern international relations, you must, of your free will, afford protection to all countries that loyally observe their bond—if necessary, the smallest country— against the deceit

and menaces of force. A great nation can, if need be, protect itself unaided ; a small nation cannot.

We Frenchmen believe—and in speaking thus I am expressing a moral rather than a political idea—we Frenchmen believe that a nation which accepts arbitration ; which, notwithstanding the uncertainties and risks that still exist in the world, sets this example of willingness to accept the dictates of justice ; we Frenchmen believe that such a nation, be it great or small, has a right to security.

Arbitration, as my friend Mr. MacDonald has said, is justice without passion. In that I recognise the nobility of his mind. But justice must not be divorced from might. Might must not be left in the ruthless grasp of injustice.

In this Assembly, where nothing should be said that is not serious and noble, nothing that is not the outcome of thought and good sense, let me recall to you the sublime thought of Pascal, whose intellect has not only dominated France, but all countries where thought and faith are held in honour.

Pascal said—and his words should, I think, serve as a watchword for the League of Nations : “Justice without might is impotent. Might without justice is tyranny. Justice without might is unavailing, for the wicked are ever with us. Might without justice stands condemned. We must therefore mate justice with might and to that end we must ensure that what is just is mighty and that what is mighty is just.”

To mate justice with might is, I believe, the highest duty incumbent upon us, if we desire to create a work which shall not be merely that of a barren idealism, however excellent its intentions, if we wish to afford the nations that reality which they demand of us with an anxiety born of their losses, their sufferings, their sorrows and their fear of future troubles.

I need no arguments to show that innocent intentions are not enough to safeguard a nation. The proofs are here before our eyes. They speak to us. Let us listen to them !

The great and renowned nation whose guests we are has held aloof from the disputes that have drained the blood of Europe.

Are we to ask that nation to abandon, without compensation, the protection assured to her by the hardy valour of her stout-hearted sons ?

Again, did not Belgium give evidence of her desire to stand apart from the clash of arms ? Did she not endeavour to serve as a link between the great nations of Europe and of the world ? Was she not, by her initiative, her intellect, her nobility and her charm, the chief centre of international life ? But remember the sequel. Can we a second time ask a nation to wait, if necessary, four long years in exile ?

No, we do not believe that force alone can bring security. We do not under-value the importance of the economic and financial sanctions prescribed in Article 16 of the Covenant. We must strive to create in all countries a new spirit which will feel for the public crime of war the same abhorrence as is now felt for the crimes of individuals.

In one of the replies to the draft Treaty—that of the Netherlands, I think—it is stated that the international community must be created. I agree. But the gospel doctrine of peace and brotherhood taught to mankind at the dawn of our era—the kindest, the most potent message ever received—has never yet sufficed to avert the bloodshed of war.

To-day more than ever before, on the morrow of the world war, we are passing—if I may repeat what others have said—through a period of transition and we must observe the utmost caution. To temper realism and idealism with wisdom, to hold the balance between them with calm reason, to adjust them, to reconcile them—this is assuredly one of the most difficult tasks of the League but, to fulfil it, all that we need do is loyally to observe Article 8 of the Covenant. This is what the people of France unanimously desire, most of all those who fought in the war. This is, I am convinced, what all countries desire when they ask you, when they ask us all, to give them, at long last, security to earn their daily bread in peace. Let us, then, give them this daily peace which they have earned in the bitterness of their suffering and the sufferings of past ages.

Arbitration, security, disarmament : the three words are, we hold, closely inter-connected. Without real international solidarity we shall, we believe, never attain that international community which we passionately desire, which we are resolved to create, to perpetuate, to organise conformably with the laws which govern life and being. Without international solidarity there will never be international peace. Through international solidarity alone shall we attain disarmament, which is our goal.

France, too, believes that we must prepare for a general Conference on disarmament ; but, as has rightly been said, such a Conference, hurriedly improvised, is doomed to failure. Whatever we do, we must not repeat the error of those who essayed to build the Tower of Babel. We must prepare the ground if we are to succeed ; it is so easy to do wrong, so hard to do right. In any case, it is essential that this work should be entrusted to the League of Nations, which alone has the necessary organisations to achieve success. No one who reasons logically and clearly can conceive of an international conference on disarmament without—in other words, against—the League of Nations. If—and it is unthinkable — a new institution were created, there would be danger of war between two organisations founded to ensure peace. Could anything be more illogical ?

What arguments can be raised against this plan ? It may be objected that the League is not sufficiently worldwide in character ; on this point, as on all others, France, who desires above all things sincerity and clearness, would like to explain her position frankly.

In the first place, we cannot think that the United States, who recently rendered us such valuable service in London—and I offer them my thanks—will refuse to collaborate with us, especially when they find that the just and pregnant principle of arbitration is now the corner-stone of our policy. Certain distinguished Americans have already submitted to us schemes which merit careful attention.

As regards Germany, our declarations will be clear and unequivocal. In fighting Germany we were combating destructive militarism and that criminal doctrine, openly proclaimed in her Parliament,

the antithesis of all that we who are here affirm and believe, the doctrine that "necessity knows no law". But we have never wished to see the German people in misery. France knows no hatred ; France does not live on hatred, or in hatred.

We are ready to welcome any genuine proof of a desire for conciliation. What we ask is sincerity.

In the last few weeks we have witnessed an important new event. Germany, with whom we have entered into direct negotiations, freely undertook in London to meet her reparations obligations. I may add that Articles 1, 8 and 9 of the Covenant, which presuppose the fulfilment of engagements regarding disarmament, define the conditions under which any State may be admitted into the League. These articles apply to Germany as to all other nations. In our League there must be neither exception nor privilege ; respect for treaties and pledges must be the common law.

This policy of absolute impartiality, this sincere desire for a peaceful settlement, this determination to see at least the unity of Europe restored, if possible—this is the aim of the French Government. It is a clear and definite aim, and I express it without any ulterior motive.

I would say the same of Russia. A lasting reconstruction of Europe is inconceivable without the collaboration of that great nation which has gone through such trial and suffering. The Russian nation often use harsh words to us, or rather, harsh words often reach us from Russia, but we know that hate has never cast out hate. A policy of freedom, a return to normal conditions of life, mutual intercourse and, above all, patience and steady caution must be our weapons in the struggle against excesses, for are not we of the League as much the enemies of civil war as of war between nations ? Our watchwords are : to oppose war in all its forms, to preach peace, unity, freedom. We have but to abide by these in all our international dealings.

Such, ladies and gentlemen, are the guiding motives of France in her collaboration in your work. I said so at the outset ; I say so again at the close. We stand by the Covenant, but we wish

to make it a living Covenant. We simply claim for each nation the rights conferred upon it by the Covenant, no more and no less.

Peace, for the sake of which we are meeting here ; peace, for which we are working, and towards which we have duties—not all of them perhaps fully realised as yet, but for the accomplishment of which we shall later be called to account—this peace must be no abstract notion, no barren desire. To win it calls for courage as great as, perhaps greater than, the courage of the soldier.

Arbitration, security, disarmament—these are, we hold, the three main columns in the temple which you, my colleagues, are called upon to erect. Its foundations must be solid indeed if it is to tower high in the light of heaven.

France, in whose name I speak, offers as her tribute to the common task her heart and her mind, her passionate desire for clearness and frankness and an experience bought at the price of centuries of suffering. She knows the cost of weak frontiers. Her dearest hope is for peace with honour, peace and toil. But she does not think only of herself ; if she did, she would be false to her traditions. Innocent yesterday—yes, I swear it—to-day, still wounded, she stretches a sister's hand to all your countries.

Despite her suffering she is eager to know the sorrows of all the nations of the world so as to bring aid and comfort. She would rejoice if, amidst the wreckage of the war, among her own sorrowing ruins she could see growing, planted by our hands—your hands, my colleagues, and mine—the divine flower of peace.

M. SALANDRA,

Former Prime Minister and First Delegate of Italy.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—The Italian delegation fully sympathises with the sentiments expressed in their speeches by the heads of the British and the French Governments. I am proud to state that we cordially agree with what they have said, and I am convinced that in so doing I voice the thoughts of the Italian Government and people.

We share heart and soul in your common endeavour to ensure, so far as lies within man's power, the maintenance of international peace. Opinions may differ concerning the appropriate means to attain this end ; they are bound to differ on account of the variety of national character and the divergence of national interests, on account of differences of historical tradition and of racial and geographical conditions in our own times. It is, however, of the utmost importance that all of us who have met here should be of one mind. The spirit of concord in itself, if only it be sincere, if only it be persistent—and I do not doubt but that it is so—will gradually lessen and dispel every difficulty in our path.

We are justified in saying that, ever since the Great War, into which Italy was forced by an inexorable, historical destiny, the policy of the Italian Government has been consistently animated and governed by this spirit.

Italy has to-day no other ambition than to maintain the position within her natural boundaries which she has gained by her valour, and to promote social progress and the peaceful expansion of her large and industrious population.

As soon as the war was over, Italy set herself to reduce the strength of her forces on land, sea and air ; this she did to such an extent that protests were raised by some who had become alarmed for the country's safety, and some reconstruction has been necessary.

Further, the Italian Government has made a determined effort to eliminate the various international difficulties which were not fully solved by the Treaties of Peace. Our method has been to conclude direct agreements in which loyal co-operation has been substituted for ancient and perilous rivalries. These agreements, and we have concluded many, deal with territorial as well as political and economic matters, and all have been presented to the League of Nations for registration.

Immediately after the war, the Italian Government actively co-operated in the first-aid measures for the relief of the defeated countries, and it has subsequently played an important part in the beneficial work undertaken with entire success under the

auspices of the League for the financial and economic restoration of some of those States.

The Italian Government is therefore prepared, as always, to collaborate in the practical extension of the principles laid down in the Covenant for the peaceful settlement of all conflicts which may hereafter threaten the peace of the world, and for the progressive reduction of armaments.

The States Members of the League, by the Covenant itself which bears their signature, have already provided for a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and Assistance, which can be both strictly and effectively applied provided that the will to carry it out and the means to apply it are forthcoming. We have, nevertheless, assisted in carefully drawing up more definite agreements and in formulating more concrete rules of procedure, though we have been under no illusion as to the difficulties. These difficulties, briefly described, consist in the danger of entrusting to the Council of the League of Nations a stupendous, a prodigious task for which it is unsuited by its constitution, and also in the danger that special agreements may result in the formation of groups of States that would probably be rivals or perhaps even hostile to one another, with the inevitable consequence that armaments would not be reduced but increased.

Perhaps we shall discover an easier method of rapidly attaining effective results if we extend and define more exactly the principle of compulsory arbitration which is also embodied in the Covenant. Italy is prepared to follow this course and, in so doing, we shall but be true to our traditions, as I will show you in a few words.

The idea of making arbitration the regular practice in international justice was first embodied in the theory and practice of international law in this city of Geneva in 1872, when an arbitral tribunal presided over by a distinguished Italian jurist and statesman, Count Sclopis, decided the famous question of the "Alabama".

As long ago as November 24th, 1873—that is, more than 50 years ago—M. Mancini, one of the most notable pioneers of modern international law, brought forward in the Italian Chamber

a motion which was unanimously adopted. I venture to remind you of the wording of that motion :

“The Chamber recommends that arbitration should be the recognised and regular method of arriving at a just settlement of international disputes in questions which are arbitrable, and that a clause should, whenever expedient, be inserted in treaties, providing for the reference to arbitrators of any questions that may arise in regard to the interpretation and application of such treaties.”

Since then, arbitration clauses have been inserted in numbers of treaties concluded and renewed between Italy and various States, for example, that of 1903 with France and that of 1904 with Great Britain.

Our present task is to discover how far and in what manner arbitration can be made compulsory in questions which, not being of a strictly juridical or technical nature, have hitherto been considered as not judiciable. Our next duty will be to devise some means of assuring that, in every case, the decisions of the arbitrators will be put into execution.

These are difficult problems but they are not beyond the knowledge or the zeal of our lawyers, who only wish to imitate their forerunners, to whom belongs the glory of having inaugurated the reign of uniform and progressive law in the greater part of the civilised world.

If new great international gatherings are convened with a view to attaining a simultaneous reduction of armaments, we will take part in them, as we have already done in the past, with a keen desire to offer an active and sincere collaboration.

We must certainly not lose sight of the fact that it will never be possible, either for us or for anyone else, to renounce the duty of maintaining those forces which are necessary to guarantee the security and independence of each State. In consequence, the problem of disarmament cannot be separated from that of security.

It is possible—since it is always dangerous to entertain illusions—that neither the one nor the other of these problems will be completely and finally settled ; it will always be possible, however,

to arrange by small and rapid steps that these problems shall weigh less upon the life of the peoples.

The Fifth Assembly may be proud of the results obtained if, on this solemn occasion, some progress is made, if the means is found for more effectively adapting to the noble aims for which they have been created the different organisms of a League of Nations, which should unite as soon as possible under its peaceful flag all the civilised nations, and for adapting the provisions which govern the competence and action of these different organisms.

The new Italy, who wishes, for her own good and that of the rest of the world, to serve as an element of justice and peace, proposes to contribute thereto in this spirit of universal solidarity, which does not at all suppress, but reinforces and renders more sublime, that love of country for which our populations have so courageously thrown away their lives and their property.

LORD PARMOOR,

Lord President of the Council and Delegate of the British Empire.

I am speaking to the Assembly under the spell of the great speech which we have heard from M. Herriot, and I desire, on behalf of the British delegation, to express our gratitude to him for stating in such admirable terms many of the great principles in favour of peace.

We must be under no illusion to-day as to the responsibility which rests upon this great meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. It is essential that we should find a remedy for the existing dangers which threaten, not this country nor that, but the whole fabric of European civilisation.

I believe that a remedy can be found in faithfully following the directions of the Covenant. The obligations are stated there in words which cannot be misunderstood, and their application is directed by various articles which appear to me to be exhaustive in their definition and capable of immediate and general application.

I do not approach this question in any pessimistic spirit. I believe in the triumph of right and in the triumph of morality. Although we may have to wait in patience, we can look forward to the certain success of those great principles of Christian ethics and Christian charity which alone can bring peace and comfort to the various nations of the world.

I think it would be convenient for me to deal with the principles enunciated by M. Herriot, mainly with a view to showing how nearly they agree with the principles enunciated by Mr. MacDonald, but not avoiding, as M. Herriot would desire me not to avoid, a perfectly frank reference to those matters on which there may appear to be some little difference of opinion.

Frankness is absolutely necessary. Frankness and courage ought to be the basis of all our discussions. Unless we are frank and courageous, we may agree in words, but we shall go away without agreement on fundamental principles.

M. Herriot, if I understood him aright—and my only desire is to interpret him with perfect accuracy — desires that there should be the same treatment of the smallest country as of the largest. I am in entire agreement with the principle thus enunciated; but I want to say, and to say it with all possible emphasis, that you will never get that equality of treatment if you rely on the basis of military force.

So far as military force is concerned, inequality will always be with us, and the same evil agencies which have wrecked the chances of equality of treatment in the past will wreck any attempt at equality in the future, unless we have the courage to eliminate from our consideration the element of military and unequal force.

I want now to express what I consider to be the only principle upon which we can proceed. I desire not the application of force but the supremacy of and obedience to international law under the constituted authority of an International Court. It is in law that we can find equality; it is in law that we can find justice and equity. In military force we can never find either the one or the other.

If I understand M. Herriot aright — and again I say I desire to interpret him with great accuracy — he has referred with approbation, in the same way as Mr. MacDonald did, to putting into further operation what is known as Article 36 or the optional clause of the Statute which constituted the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. I myself think that there is an absolute and pressing liability upon the more powerful countries to adopt this principle, subject, as I admit, to the reservations made both by Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot to the effect that further enquiry and further definition may yet be necessary.

In adopting this principle let there be no mistake. Let the words be such that the plainest man can understand them. We want to appeal to the peoples of the world and make them understand what we mean when we talk of justice and peace as opposed to violence and war. I find in the proposal to adopt this article the touchstone of sincerity. Here I find a real test ; not a test of words and phrases. I find a real test as to whether the stronger and more powerful nations are prepared really to adopt the policy of equality and in every instance to place justice before force in their relationships with their less powerful neighbours.

It must not be forgotten — and I am sure that the members of the Assembly will not forget it — that numerous countries, mostly what we call the smaller countries, have already accepted the obligation of compulsory reference of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.

The acceptance of the principle of application to this Court means nothing less — and this is of the utmost importance — than taking the first effective steps towards the creation of a great international common law with the same authority over nations as the great common law in England has over her own people. It gives authority to a court which holds the scales of justice evenly and which is blind to all considerations except that of strict impartiality and the supremacy of equity and which does not enquire or know whether the applicant for its jurisdiction

is strong or weak, armed or disarmed, or belongs to the category of the more powerful or the less powerful of countries.

The greatest Chief Justice whom England has ever produced expressed his view of the importance of the supercession of force by law in a much-quoted phrase which I venture again to quote this morning: "Ruat cœlum, fiat justitia". Never mind what else may happen: give justice, and equal justice, to all countries under all conditions.

If we adopt this great principle of the supremacy of international law, I hope that we should ostracise for all time the wastefulness incident to modern warfare and that we should insist — I am now quoting the words of the Preamble of the Covenant — that what are now called the understandings of international law should prevail as the actual rule of conduct in respect of the relationship and intercourse of nations one with the other.

If these results can be obtained — and they can be, as I hope — under the joint influence of the two Prime Ministers who have spoken, one this morning and one yesterday, then there would be a widespread assurance of what is really meant by national security. It would be a national security founded on the experience of all mankind in all civilised countries, a security which, in my opinion, can never be obtained by any form of assurance such as we find in the draft treaties to which reference has been made, and still less in any treaties which require for their success a military basis connected with pre-arranged military plans.

That I think is one of the first points on which I noted the same view expressed by the two leaders and I venture to emphasise my own view in the same direction.

What is the next point? What do we find next in the great statement of M. Herriot? Faith in the Covenant; a foreign policy founded on a recognition of terms of the Covenant. This is a great statement. It is a statement which, if carried out to its logical conclusion, ought to bring about what every man in this Assembly must desire, namely, the substitution, for the old days of arms and force, of the settled principles of peace and

security which we can find, as I believe, within the terms of the Covenant itself.

There is no great difficulty ; there is no great mystery. On the one side, there is the old system which culminated in the terrible and disastrous war of 1914; on the other, a term of the Covenant, a term which every nation signatory to the Covenant is under the most solemn promise to observe to the utmost of its power. Why should not we do so ? What is the difficulty ? What is the obstruction ? If you want peace, go to the Covenant, which gives you what you want, if only, in truth and in sincerity, you will at once accept its terms and promise obedience to the agreements concluded.

No one who has experience of such matters will deny the enormous importance of general arbitration procedure. There is no question as regards the general adoption of this procedure. We were told of its value at the London Conference. Those who know the history of the question can understand the enormous influence for peace which, during the last century, the principle of arbitration has had upon the relationship of nations.

There are two matters on which, as I understand it, some doubt may be felt regarding what is called the basis of security. I want, if I may, to deal with those two questions because they appear to me to be of the utmost importance. You want security in two stages, and these two stages must be kept carefully apart when this great matter is under consideration. First of all you want security, so that when a dispute arises and one party is perhaps ready to go to arbitration, the other party, which is not willing to go to arbitration, can be dealt with, as I think it can be dealt with, under the terms of the Covenant.

What is the position ? Let me adopt M. Herriot's own definition which he put forward so clearly. If this general system of arbitration is adopted, an essential condition is that a nation which seeks to act without applying to the Arbitration Court is an aggressor.

From the moment that a nation becomes an aggressor, under this simple test—I agree myself that the tests such as we find

in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance are entirely valueless—why should not that nation, which has shown itself to be the aggressor by refusing to resort to arbitration, be regarded as an outlaw? Why should it not be regarded as an enemy of the human race? Why should it not at any rate come under the economic sanctions which would be applied to it, *ipso facto*, without any other corroboration than that of the Covenant itself? I can see no reason whatever for doubting that the sanctions contained in the Covenant are adequate and sufficient.

It has occurred to me that in some respects those sanctions go very far, and I cannot doubt that they are ample and sufficient. Suppose that when a nation became the aggressor by failing to apply to the Arbitration Court, then *ipso facto*, without any other act or deed, or without any question of what particular methods may do, the sanctions were applied which are at present contained in the Covenant. They are economic sanctions which mean economic death—sanctions of boycott which mean the suppression of all international intercourse and there are other sanctions of that kind—and I do not believe any nation or country would face them if a proper system of international arbitration was once established.

There is also the other side of this question, which must also be carefully examined. There are those who suggest—and no doubt with perfect *bona fides*—that even if an arbitration is held, without adequate sanctions of a very specific character, sanctions, I presume, which are above and beyond those to be found in the Covenant, there is no security.

Let me answer that objection. If adequate securities are not to be found or if existing securities are found to be inadequate and it is thought that further sanctions are required, the matter must, no doubt, be discussed further.

I want, however, to put this point of view before the Assembly. In the nineteenth century—I am afraid I have not my library here for reference, but I have quoted the figures more than once—there were several hundred arbitrations. I believe there were more

than 700 in all, though I would ask you to accept my caution that the actual figure may not be accurate, nor does it matter. What I want to predicate is this, that in respect of all those arbitrations, many of them dealing with matters of infinite importance to the countries concerned, none of them, as far as I know, providing what we call an adequate force of sanction, I can find no instance whatever—not a single case—in which the award or the decision of the arbitrator has not been accepted by the parties concerned.

I do not desire to make an exhaustive negative go too far, but I say without any hesitation that history shows that people who are willing to accept and have accepted arbitration have always been sufficiently loyal to accept the decision, even when it has not been in their favour.

I do not myself believe in the importance of what are called sanctions in matters of this kind. The important matter is the agreement of the nation to accept arbitration ; when that has once been agreed, the need or necessity for sanctions becomes secondary.

I notice that M. Salandra in his eloquent speech referred to the Alabama arbitration. The Alabama arbitration, as you know, was an arbitration between the United States of America and England. England undoubtedly thought that the award was hard and harsh as regards her interests, but she accepted it ; she carried out the obligations ; and from that day to this not only has the general influence of arbitration been increased but a friendship has grown up between the great United States on one side of the Atlantic and Great Britain on the other, a friendship with which nothing in the future, I hope, can ever interfere.

Arbitrations do not lead to dissension, they do not lead to controversy ; they lead to settlement, to conciliation, to peace ; they are the real substitute for the horrors of war. When I read, as in the Preamble of the Covenant, that all the signatory nations accept obligations not to resort to war, I ask myself whether there is any other alternative but arbitration, as I have indicated, or, what to my mind is still better, a Permanent Court imposing the supremacy of international law ?

There are one or two other matters to which M. Herriot referred in his great speech with which, so far as I can understand them, the British delegation is, I believe, entirely in accord.

M. Herriot spoke of the International Conference and referred to the bad precedent, as I think I may call it, of the Tower of Babel. I, personally, think it essential—perhaps I may try to press this a little further—I think it absolutely essential, if the vigour, authority and influence of the League are to be sustained, that this International Conference should be summoned through the agency of our great international Secretariat. It would be unfortunate, it would not be right, for an International Conference of this kind to come into conflict with the League as if it were an independent and separate authority.

The questions which will come before the Conference are just those which are entrusted to the League and for which the Covenant has provided. I heartily rejoice that M. Herriot, if I understand him rightly, shares this view. Speaking here as one of the great advocates of the League, as one who believes in the League and in its work, speaking, in that connection also as British delegate, I sincerely hope that every one will come to adopt the view that this great International Conference must not be summoned apart from the League but as part of the League machinery and through the agency of our international Secretariat.

Perhaps before I conclude I may be allowed to say a few words with regard to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. I have read that Treaty, and re-read it, with a sympathetic desire to find in it a solution for those questions of disarmament and security.

I think it was Aristotle who said that, whatever else you may command, you cannot command the conclusions which you will reach if you are sincere, logical and courageous in the methods which you adopt. However much I may have desired to feel sympathetically towards the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, my judgment led me to the inevitable conclusion that it was not only valueless, that it was not only founded on wrong principles, that it was not only impracticable in its application, but that—what

is much more important to my mind—it involved the League in a mass of wrong principles and in the mire of militarism.

We all know, of course, that the whole basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is militarism. It is framed on the idea that force, in the long run, is the guiding principle. It is based on the suggestion that, in the limitation and arrangement of force, you may find something like a balance between the Powers involved. Force, and force alone, is at the basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance ; it is no good disguising the fact. Would any advocate of the Treaty here stand up for it for one moment if it were not based on military force ?

In the terms of the Treaty itself, reference is made to “ prearranged military plans ”. I beg the Assembly not to lose sight of this element in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. If you believe in force, I agree that the regulation of that force may have its advantage, but if you disagree with force then the very regulation of it, the very acknowledgment of it as the basis of the relationship, is to my mind absolutely destructive of all that we really care for in the Covenant of the League and in the work of its Council.

I do not know how far you have studied the actual terms of the Treaty itself. What do they say and what do they do ? They elevate the Council of the League, which ought to be the emblem of peace and through whom the golden rule of peace and justice ought to be placed on our standard, into a sort of informal military council, unsuited though it is for the purpose, a council which is not only to direct what is to be done and what Members are to contribute forces, but which has even to take the responsibility—which I, as a member of the Council, could never take—of deciding what Commander should be appointed and how the war should be carried on.

I hope the Members of the League will study this document. I hope they will realise its essential defects, and that when we come to consider what should be the solution of this problem, what solution we should uphold, they will remember what has been said in favour of arbitration. Let us strengthen it in every possible way ; let us promote conciliation wherever we can,

and by that means, and by the supremacy of law, I hope we shall find the solution which we so earnestly seek.

I only want to say one word more on disarmament. I think M. Herriot himself recognised that, if conditions allow it, the question of disarmament is really a question of special terms and instructions. I know, of course, that his view is that arbitration may not be a sufficient basis ; this point I am not going to discuss again. The Covenant itself, however, together with the conditions in the four Treaties of Peace, contains a proposal that, when the time comes, disarmament can properly be placed under the investigation of the Council of the League. That, I think, is satisfactory.

I am not now discussing the question of when the time may arrive. It is a provision of the Treaty, and it is that provision for which endeavour is being made to put into operation, on the initiative of Great Britain with the full co-operation of France, in the case of Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. I do not want to say more than this : It seems to me that our Council might be the general staff of a peaceful world in contrast to its being brought into operation in order to direct military forces and military power.

I think I have dealt with the question to which M. Herriot referred in such splendid terms. Let us think of the great quotation which he made from Pascal. Let us think of the great passages in which he describes so eloquently what the world desires and what the world hopes, and let us take those thoughts to our heart. I say for myself that I am not despondent ; I do not despair. I believe in the divine guidance of the Prince of Peace, and although we may require patience the triumph of peace will certainly come.

M. THEUNIS,

Prime Minister and First Delegate of Belgium.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—On this, the first occasion on which I have had the honour of addressing this Assembly,

I cannot help reviewing the events of the past and measuring the distance we have advanced in the last ten years.

Ten years ago, each one of us, statesman, lawyer, man of business, was familiar with the idea of a league of nations and with the propaganda carried on by some of the most distinguished men of our age on its behalf ; it was then, however, nothing more than a lofty and sublime idea. By many it was considered a mere Utopian ideal.

At length your work has emerged from the realm of academic speculation. It exists. We have seen its earlier achievements ; we hope for greater, more comprehensive, achievements, and, if our hopes are realised, we shall be able to say that the outcome of the most unjust, the most disastrous of wars, was one of the greatest advances in the annals of mankind.

I have spoken of what has been achieved hitherto. One achievement towers above the rest—the creation of a new spirit, the habit, acquired by men who have come together from all quarters of the globe, of striving, if I may say so, to bring a new mind to bear upon the great problems confronting them. What they desire is a deep understanding of the thoughts and feelings of the representatives of other countries and races, while remaining true to the traditions and the good qualities of their own countrymen.

When I rose to speak, I hesitated to enunciate truths which some may consider truisms, but my excuse is that they strike me perhaps more forcibly than they do you, who have been accustomed for some years to move in this international atmosphere that you have yourselves created.

The few years that have elapsed since the formation of the League of Nations have strengthened its authority and enabled it to examine the most intricate and important problems, the solution of which will restore the world to its normal economic condition and to that state of peace which is the aspiration of all the countries represented in this hall.

Such a state of peace cannot be produced merely by signing treaties. Before the world can continue its normal development towards a wider, a loftier civilisation, confidence must be restored

and nations must actually enjoy a feeling of security. Need I explain the special situation of my country in this matter ?

Nature has given us a favourable geographical situation from an economic point of view ; but I need not remind you that, for the same reasons, our country occupies a particularly exposed position in the event of war. If we examine the maps of Belgium drawn up by our National Institute, we shall observe among the various forms of notation used by the cartographers many special signs that are employed to denote the various features of the country. Two small crossed swords are meant to remind us that an important battle was fought at such-and-such a place. For centuries past, Belgium has been one of the principle battle-grounds of Europe.

You know what that means. Our people have always suffered from these conflicts, but, with the increased efficiency of modern weapons, war has assumed an even more terrible aspect than ever before. Apart from the armies engaged, the civilian population is subjected to unimagivable distress. Modern warfare spells total destruction and the complete devastation of the whole country-side in which hostilities take place.

You will readily appreciate how, since the last war, the mere idea of fresh aggression, a new occupation, has become a nightmare to my fellow-countrymen. We are essentially a peaceful nation. Peace is perhaps more vital to us than to any other country, since peace alone can allow our industries and trade to feed our teeming population.

Need I assure you that we cherish no thought of conquest or of territorial aggrandisement ? I need hardly remind you, too, that our finances, over-burdened as they are with reparation expenditure, have only been restored at the cost of heavy taxation ; our military expenditure has been reduced to as low a level as is compatible with the present position in Europe.

This burden is, however, one which cannot possibly be increased and one which we earnestly desire to lighten. I have given you all the reasons why we desire peace, peace in security.

Peace in security, I say, for, besides the ethical motives and

material reasons which impel us to strive for international disarmament, we, like all other nations, have a higher duty, a duty dictated by elementary foresight ; we must look to our security, a duty which, for a nation, corresponds to the instinct of self-preservation in the individual.

If the old order changes, if good-will, collective goodwill, can devise new guarantees of security which shall supersede those on which men have hitherto relied, the whole world will heave a sigh of gratitude and relief. I need not say, however, that the security afforded by these new measures must be a genuine security ; they must not be mere measures on paper, bringing disaster upon those nations which loyally respect the bond contained in them.

In their speeches the British and French Prime Ministers have made an eloquent appeal for co-operation. They have asked us one and all to collaborate in order to find a settlement that is to-day the most fervent desire of man. The British Prime Minister told us of the remedies which he conceived might be effective. In eloquent terms he pointed out how, apart from military action, it would be possible to minimise the risk of war. I wish to deal briefly with some of the points he raised.

Mr. MacDonald made it clear that the London Agreement has relaxed the strain. That is true, and no one is more glad than the Belgian Government. In the words of one of my colleagues, London was a stage on the road ; it acted as a stimulus. Need I say that, like the French Prime Minister, I have but one desire, that we may continue on that road ?

Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot warned us of the danger inherent in the private manufacture of arms and in the traffic in arms. We will give sympathetic consideration to proposals on this particular point.

The British Prime Minister pointed out that the peace of Europe would be advanced if States disarmed simultaneously.

Further, he suggested an extension of the principles of arbitration already laid down in the Covenant ; for instance, all States might adhere to the optional clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. M. Herriot,

this morning, whole-heartedly endorsed this suggestion. I have no doubt that, if the Great Powers are resolved to take this step, it will result in an immense increase of confidence among the nations, and I can assure you that Belgium for one will be ready to follow their example.

General arbitration is an idea which is bound to make a special appeal to small nations. It will be a great advance. The risks of war will certainly be lessened.

But will they be abolished ?

If we, as one of the "threatened" countries, were to give concrete proof that our policy is a peaceful one, what would be the position if a State were to arm in secret, if it sowed in the hearts of its children the seeds of ambition and hate ?

What would be the position if that State tore up its bond of arbitration or if, after stating its case before the Court, the Tribunal or the Council, it derided their award ?

Who among you would dare to say that such an assumption is unreasonable ?

Who would assert that no State will ever again be tempted to resort to force for the satisfaction of its interests or passions ?

I have a firm and confident belief that the work of peace, which is our object, is founded on the growing support of the great masses of people in every country. But how many years will it be before we are free from the fear of sudden outbursts of selfishness, greed or pride ?

Yes, right is stronger than might. Might without right is barbarism, as M. Herriot so eloquently said, but might employed in the service of right, that is the supreme goal towards which jurists have for centuries been striving. It is the very essence of the Covenant.

Allow me to remind you of the words of Woodrow Wilson, of him whom you honour as the founder of the League of Nations, of that just man who passed away early this year. Clearly and lucidly in the last of his fourteen points he defined the very essence of the League of Nations :

" A general association of nations must be formed under specific Covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaran-

tees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike."

This idea has not been omitted from the Covenant, and I support the appeal made by the French and British Prime Ministers and by M. Van Karnebeek to the supporters and opponents of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance not to undervalue what the Covenant has already established.

May I, too, say a few words on the system of sanctions contained in the Covenant? The Covenant provides not only for economic sanctions, which operate automatically and are generally applicable to all States, but also, in case of need, for military sanctions, in which, of course, not all States are required to assist on every occasion, but in which certain States, according to the circumstances of the case, are legally bound to co-operate. What, otherwise, would be the value of the League's guarantee, of that unconditional pledge taken by the States in Article 10, to preserve as against external aggression the political independence and the territorial integrity of all Members?

The Covenant, of course, does not, and could not, make provision for all possible disputes, or specify which States must intervene in every case. The Council, again, can do no more than make recommendations in the matter; but it will be the duty of all Members of the League to give a loyal interpretation of their pledges.

Not only was the legality of their pledges, even on the military side, unanimously recognised by the last Assembly in its resolution regarding the interpretation of Article 10, but also, in Article 8, the Covenant itself stipulates the existence of *international obligations* for the purpose of *common military action*.

This is what the Covenant has to offer us. We value it, we cleave to it and we trust that all Members of the Council will ever keep in mind the duties and responsibilities that it imposes upon them.

But, is it enough?

I must beg your indulgence if once again I evoke the tragic picture of my country. A country of plains and hills, but with

no natural defences, it was overrun by the invading hosts within the short space of a few weeks. Liège fell on the fourth day, Brussels was occupied on the sixteenth, Namur fell on the same day, then Antwerp and Ghent.

Naturally we accept with gratitude the protection which the League of Nations affords us ; it allows us to hope that in the event of subsequent aggression we shall succeed, even though it may be after years of endeavour, in mobilising the conscience of the nations, in recovering all the pristine prosperity of our ruined country. You must realise, however, that we were asking for something more, that, after giving you every guarantee—and did you need a guarantee?—of the sincerity of our peaceful intentions, and before curtailing our preparations for war, which alone, at present, hold an invader in check, we asked for assurances that the other nations whom you represent will give us prompt, effective and whole-hearted support.

In making this request I speak not only on behalf of the Belgian Government but on behalf of the entire Belgian delegation, including as it does the authorised representatives of all our political parties. I speak on behalf of the Belgian people, whom the ordeal of the war has taught to think and feel as one upon the problem of security. In asking you for further guarantees, I believe that I am serving not only the interests of my own country but the interests of other countries and of peace itself, for the tragic events of recent history should have taught the nations that, in the event of a dispute, each may fall a victim to the caprice of military strategy ; and I believe that no better guarantee could be found to assure the maintenance of peace than the certainty that aggression will invariably be opposed by a coalition of the civilised nations.

As I am the first representative of a small country to address you after M. Herriot, I would venture, on behalf of the small countries to whom he just now referred, to thank him for having affirmed in this place their sacred right to life and independence.

In seeking these additional guarantees for which we ask, we do not limit ourselves exclusively to any particular formula.

of the Covenant. Article 16, paragraph 3, refers to mutual support in the application of financial and economic measures. Article 16, paragraph 3, of the present Protocol establishes real economic and financial co-operation between a State which has been attacked and the various States which come to its assistance.

As, under Article 10 of the Protocol, it may happen that both States involved in a dispute are declared to be aggressors, the question arose as to what would be the best method of settling this problem. There were three alternatives: to apply the principle contained in paragraph 1, which is practically equivalent to making a sort of police war on both parties—or to leave the matter to pursue its course, or, finally, to compel States which disturb the peace of the world to desist from acts of war by the employment of means less severe than those indicated in paragraph 1. It is the last method which has been chosen. Only economic measures will be taken against such States, and naturally they will not be entitled to receive the assistance referred to in Article 11, paragraph 3.

Article 12.

Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant provides for the immediate severance of all trade or financial relations with the aggressor State, and paragraph 3 of the same Article provides, *inter alia*, for economic and financial co-operation between the State attacked and the various States coming to its assistance.

As has already been pointed out, these engagements have been confirmed and made more definite in Article 11 of the Protocol.

But the severance of relations and the co-operation referred to necessarily involve measures so complex that, when the moment arises, doubts may well occur as to what measures are necessary and appropriate to give effect to the obligations assumed under the above provisions. These problems require full consideration in order that States may know beforehand what their attitude should be.

Article 12 defines the conditions of such investigation.

It is not expressly stated that the problem will be examined by the Council in collaboration with the various Governments, but the Council will naturally, if it deems it necessary, invite the Governments to furnish such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying out the task entrusted to it under Article 12.

Article 13, paragraph 1.

The above explanation of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, contains many references to Article 13.

As I have already pointed out, in case sanctions have to be applied, it is highly important that there should exist some organ competent to express an opinion as to the best way in which their obligations could be carried out by the signatories. As you are aware, this organ, according to the Covenant, is the Council. In order that the Council may effectively fulfil this duty, Article 13 empowers it to receive undertakings from States, determining *in advance* the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions arising out of the Covenant and the present Protocol.

It is also necessary to emphasise the fact that the means which the States signatories to the present Protocol have at their disposal for the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article 11 vary considerably owing to the differences in the geographical, economic, financial, political and social condition of different States. Information as to the means at the disposal of each State is therefore indispensable in order that the Council may in full understanding give its opinion as to the best method by which such obligations may best be carried out.

Finally, as regards the question of the reduction of armaments, which is the final goal to which our efforts are tending, the information thus furnished to the Council may be of very great importance, as every State, knowing what forces will be available for its assistance in case it is attacked, will be able to judge to what

and to ask permission to add to this memorable discussion a few observations on the work of the past four years.

I have taken part in all this work, and the Third Committee showed its appreciation of my efforts by appointing me Rapporteur when its work at length bore fruit. We have heard the results of that work criticised, and so I now venture to recall the theme which has taken the foremost place in our discussion during these years, while paying due regard, of course, to the personal opinions of my colleagues of the Committee. I will also touch upon the results of the present discussion.

It is four years since the Third Committee of the Assembly first dealt with the question of putting into application Article 8 of the Covenant of the League, by which Article the Members of the League were pledged to carry out a progressive reduction of armaments.

For two years in succession we wrestled with the problem. After prolonged, detailed and sometimes heated discussion, we succeeded in establishing one definite principle which has since played an important part in the policy of the League and, indeed, in European policy. This principle is that the reduction of armaments goes hand in hand with the establishment of some system providing security for countries which have hitherto been obliged to protect their national independence and liberty by means of armaments. In place of this heavy dangerous burden they wish to substitute guarantees of security based on reciprocal engagements between States Members of the League.

Accordingly, the Third Assembly adopted the well-known Resolution XIV, which reads :

“In the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country.”

After thus laying down the principle of the interdependence of security and of the reduction of armaments, Resolution XIV continues as follows :

“Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked...

“This reduction could be carried out either by means of a general Treaty, which is the most desirable plan, or by means of partial treaties designed to be extended and open to all countries...”

The Assembly at the same time decided to request the Temporary Mixed Commission to prepare a draft Treaty on these lines, to be submitted to the Fourth Assembly.

Thus the draft which the Third Committee of the Fourth Assembly was called upon to examine had been prepared in full detail. This draft was discussed at length, amended and finally submitted to the Fourth Assembly.

I had the honour to be Rapporteur of the Committee on that occasion, and you will remember that, when submitting our plan for your approval, I made, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Committee, all necessary reservations. As you will no doubt remember, I said that no one could be more conscious of the shortcomings of the scheme for mutual assistance than the Rapporteur himself and his colleagues on the Third Committee.

The Fourth Assembly passed a resolution to the effect that this draft Treaty should be submitted to the Governments of Members of the League, with a request to communicate their views, so that the Fifth Assembly might be in a position to examine the question again, discuss the replies received, consider the various opinions expressed, endeavour to reach some conclusion and thus to weld the proposals into a general plan for security and to begin at once to devise some definite method of effecting a progressive reduction of armaments.

That is the outcome of four years of work. It forms what I may perhaps term a complete philosophic system, a system of logic by which we have essayed to solve that formidable world problem: the achievement of disarmament and the founding of a lasting peace.

We have already received a number of replies both from States which are and from States which are not Members of the League. We have also heard a number of speeches analysing the question, some in support of, others criticising, the draft Treaty. The speeches of Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot are all-important, because they offer us not merely observations or objections but a complete and comprehensive policy.

Some of the replies state that the draft Treaty prepared last year has so many drawbacks as to render it wholly impracticable and unacceptable.

The Treaty of Mutual Assistance has been criticised for its complicated and clumsy machinery. It is impossible, they say, to define a case of aggression ; the process of determining the aggressor is necessarily slow ; complementary treaties are dangerous, because they are largely a replica of the treaties of the old alliances. It is held that we must seek our future policy either in disarmament pure and simple or in compulsory arbitration, combined, perhaps, with measures of partial or special security, such as the establishment of demilitarised zones and so forth.

Such are, in broad outline, the chief criticisms of the draft Treaty and of the work carried out by the League during the past four years.

Let me examine these criticisms for a moment.

It is said that it would be better to have disarmament pure and simple. But, I ask, how can we adopt this somewhat crude suggestion when we have been discussing the matter for the last four years and have unanimously concluded, after earnest discussion, that disarmament and security must be dealt with as one ? How can we shut our eyes to the fact that the League of Nations was created to prevent war and that the reduction of armaments is only a means to that end ? It is surely just as possible to start a war with reduced armaments as with the armaments of to-day. There are countries with highly-developed industries which, in the event of an unexpected conflict, would be able to prepare for warfare on modern, technical and scientific lines, with armoured cars, aeroplanes and asphyxiating gases, and in the short space of

days or weeks could overwhelm their non-industrialised neighbours. In such a case a reduction of armaments pure and simple would actually prove an immense advantage to them and might even tempt them to embark upon a policy of adventure.

Responsible statesmen will thus think twice before accepting this course, since for them it fails to provide any solution of the problem of disarmament and of the abolition of war.

There is one decisive argument which we must never forget. All the Members of the League of Nations have already signed a document which is of capital importance for all—a document in which they solemnly proclaimed their adherence to the principle of the interdependence of security and the reduction of armaments. I speak of the Covenant of the League, of which M. Herriot spoke this morning with far greater authority than I could speak.

According to Article 8 of the Covenant, Members of the League are required to reduce their armaments to the lowest point, be it noted, consistent with national safety. This article does not, it is true, refer specifically to a combined mutual and general guarantee, but it may rightly be regarded as entitling those States which are asked to reduce their armaments to an extent inconsistent with national safety, to lay claim, by way of compensation, to a corresponding degree of security.

We cannot abandon a principle to which we are committed under the terms of the Covenant, by four years of work and by a unanimous resolution of the Assembly. It is a principle, too, which is vital to the political requirements of a number of countries, which frankly declare that, unless the reduction of armaments is accompanied by some kind of guarantee, they cannot reduce their armaments to any appreciable extent.

I hope you will pardon this somewhat blunt statement of the question. It is essential that, at this important point in our discussions, we should reach the heart of the matter; only by so doing shall we arrive at a true solution. I am particularly glad to note that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, although he has not expressed himself quite so definitely as I have done, does seem to take account of the facts. It is in this sense that

I interpret his statement that the time is not yet ripe for a conference, that we must first prepare the way for the elaboration of a procedure for the reduction of armaments, and that, as regards the guarantees of security in the Covenant, closer definition and further development are necessary.

There is another, an indirect, criticism of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Your Treaty, say its opponents, is an engine of war and destruction, of self-styled "legitimate" warfare. But force will never bring final peace on earth. You must adopt methods of peace, develop the various international organisations which can settle disputes between nation and nation by understanding, conciliation, arbitration. In a word, you must settle disputes not by armed force but by compulsory arbitration.

The establishment of compulsory arbitration is very desirable and very necessary, and I particularly applauded the admirable words spoken on this subject by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, by M. Herriot and by earlier speakers, including our President, M. Motta, and Dr. Nansen. I entirely agree with them. I have said so in my reply regarding the draft Treaty of Assistance, and I have accepted this principle in several treaties which I have signed on behalf of my country.

Nevertheless, I should like to make a few observations on the matter.

First, from the standpoint of theory there are cases in private as in public life, in the relations between man and man, as in those between one nation and another, when it is a crime against morality, to refrain from the use of force to secure the triumph of right. Evil must be resisted, and it is the duty of us all—it is due to our self-respect as men professing the beliefs which unite us in this hall—to resist evil in all places and at all times.

Then there is the practical side of the question. If the Treaty of compulsory arbitration is signed only to be violated, and war breaks out, what will our attitude be? If, as a result of our discussions regarding disarmament, we agree that armaments must be reduced, since we have the guarantee of compulsory arbitration—if, in spite of all that, a weak country is attacked and invaded,

what then ? Are not all of us here, if we have persuaded each other by our desire for peace to reduce armaments and place our trust in pledges—are we not, I say, to some extent responsible if an attack is made upon an unarmed country, and should we not in consequence be under an obligation to come to the help of the victim, seeing that he had only followed our advice and been led on by hopes which we ourselves had encouraged ; seeing, too, that we had given a kind of assurance that our pledged word would be kept ?

In other words, effective guarantees and the promise of assistance are not only a necessary condition but they are also an inevitable consequence of arbitration.

Suppose that a treaty of compulsory arbitration has been concluded and then violated. Does that not call for sanctions ? Is the case not much worse when one country attacks another, having given jointly with other nations solemn promises in writing, than when it is not bound at all and the question at issue is merely some ordinary quarrel or chance dispute affecting national honour ?

From the point of view of international morality the case is much more serious and sanctions are an absolute necessity. The principle of the repression of international crime must also be established, on grounds of public morality as well as on those of practical policy already mentioned, as a necessary consequence of the general adoption of arbitration as the normal means of settling international disputes.

To return to the Covenant : As M. Van Karnebeek and M. Herriot have already told you, it contains all these ideas. We have undertaken to abide by them ; we are solemnly pledged to them. Under the terms of the Covenant, each Member, before resorting to war, must apply to the Council for some means of conciliation, and it is only the application of this very principle of the repression of international crime which gives the Council the right to take severe measures against any Member that does not obey its decisions in matters of war or in disputes.

I might use the same argument with regard to methods of preventing conflicts other than arbitration, such as the establishment of demilitarised zones, the special protection of threatened frontiers, and so on.

The question always takes the same form : What will happen if war breaks out despite pledge and treaty ? We cannot evade the issue. Sanctions must be provided for crimes against international law.

It is clear that neither Mr. Ramsay MacDonald nor M. Herriot nor the other advocates of compulsory arbitration regard the question in any other light, I believe in arbitration ; but, like Mr. MacDonald, I realise that the question is complex, that it must be closely studied, that texts must be prepared and that the competence of the arbitral tribunal must be clearly established. This is a lengthy task, and we should take it in hand at once.

If the larger countries accept compulsory arbitration, the safety of the small is half assured. If effective sanctions could be provided to deal with the violation of the arbitration clause by a great Power in a dispute with a small Power, then, speaking as the Minister of a small country, I acknowledge that the safety of small nations would be assured.

We are, then, practically agreed. Differences of opinion may, of course, arise regarding the fixing of the sanctions, their scope and the question of military sanctions. Lord Parmoor referred to this in his eloquent words this morning. If we are to discuss the question, however, we must do so frankly, determined at all costs to arrive at some concrete result ; we already have, I think, sufficient material for discussion to warrant the hope of agreement.

If we reach an agreement, an immense advance will have been made in our great endeavour to bring about the peace of the world.

Lastly, the objection has been raised with regard to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance drawn up last year that complementary or regional agreements are dangerous. I have said that I acknowledge the shortcomings of these agreements ; but I have also

said that I dare to choose the lesser of two evils. We have to do so in private life, and I feel convinced that in this respect morality in national affairs does not differ from private morality. Treaties of this kind already exist and will continue to exist ; we have no means of preventing or abolishing them, and I would therefore prefer to place them under the control of the League and of international public opinion.

I will not weary you by recapitulating all the arguments in support of these agreements which I brought forward last year and which I still support. The lengthy discussions which took place in the Third Committee are highly instructive.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in speaking yesterday of the fate in store for small nations, was referring in part to the question of partial agreements. I know from personal experience the keen interest Mr. MacDonald has taken in this question for a long time past ; his interest goes back to the days before he had assumed the great responsibilities which he now bears, and to-day that interest is greater than ever. I know from personal experience, too, that M. Herriot, during the war, was one of the men who were most closely associated with the great struggle for the independence and liberty of small nations, and his words this morning show that he is still faithful to that great tradition.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said yesterday that in any great conflagration in the future the small countries would necessarily be devastated and ruined, notwithstanding any treaties they might have signed. Treaties of this nature and military treaties, he said, are not sufficient to ensure the security of nations. If that were so the future lot of the small nations would indeed be an unenviable one, for in politics we must reckon with every possibility, and consequently with that mentioned by Mr. MacDonald. I, however, do not share this view, although I realise that the signatures at the foot of a treaty cannot, of course, alone suffice to ensure permanent security.

Mr. MacDonald is right. We must create a new atmosphere and a new psychology ; we must restore pacific, aye, and friendly, co-operation between all nations, ex-enemy and others alike ;

may arise either to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council. Arbitration therefore remains optional, but if the parties do not agree to have recourse to arbitration they are obliged appear before the Council. The Council makes an enquiry into the case and the dispute is only definitely settled if the Council is unanimous in recommending a solution. A unanimous recommendation by the Council is binding, and a country having resort to war against a State which complies with such a recommendation is regarded as violating the Covenant and incurs the sanctions provided in article 16.

Such, briefly, is the system established by the Covenant. Its imperfections and omissions are self-evident. These imperfections and omissions we have endeavoured to remove and we firmly believe that we have succeeded.

In the Protocol which we submit for your approval a system has been organised which is applicable to all international disputes without exception.

It lays down a certain number of rules which will be compulsorily applied as between States which sign the Protocol.

To begin with, the system will be a two-fold one; there will be the system of the Covenant, which will be applicable between the States Members of the League, and the special system of the Protocol, which will be applicable between the States who have accepted this diplomatic instrument.

There will not, however, always be two systems. It is proposed that the main provisions of the Protocol should sooner or later be converted into amendments to the Covenant according to the normal procedure of revision laid down in article 26.

One of our resolutions invites the Assembly to request the Council to appoint a special Committee to draft the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the terms of the Protocol, which will then be submitted for final approval to the next Assembly.

At the root of all the rules contained in the Protocol there is the general principle that, henceforth, wars of aggression are condemned. Henceforth, no war of aggression will be tolerated;

only acts of legitimate defence or acts undertaken on behalf of or with the authorisation of the community of the signatory States will be allowed, and every private war, every war of aggression, will not only be condemned and regarded as an international crime, but will be attended by sanctions and accompanied by the necessary penalties to prevent it, and in case of need, to suppress it.

In order to secure this result, the Protocol establishes a series of procedures covering every kind of dispute and which, in all cases, result in a definite decision.

This is how the system works. Suppose that under article 15 of the Covenant a dispute which it has proved impossible to settle by judicial means or by arbitration comes before the Council, the Council fails to reconcile the parties, and the latter do not agree, despite a last urgent appeal, to have recourse to optional arbitration. Arbitration then becomes compulsory on the following terms :

Arbitration becomes compulsory first of all if one of the parties demands it. If the parties fail to agree upon the constitution and powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the Council will be called upon to undertake this. Such is the first case of compulsory arbitration provided for in the Protocol.

If either party applies for arbitration, the Council will consider the substance of the dispute and pronounce a decision. This decision can only be taken if the Council is unanimous. It will be binding upon the parties and is attended with sanctions.

If the Council is not unanimous as to the solution to be imposed upon the parties, the dispute will automatically be submitted to arbitration—the second case of compulsory arbitration—the organisation of which is left entirely in the hands of the Council.

You will notice that under the system provided in the Protocol a final and binding settlement is certain to be reached in all disputes either under the first case of arbitration, if requested by either party, or by a unanimous decision of the Council, or under the second case of arbitration, which follows automatically if the Council is not unanimous.

guarantee we shall find that we are confronted by the inevitable law of evolution.

I have given these examples in order to make it clear that in all our efforts on behalf of peace and disarmament we must never lose sight either of the immediate needs of the moment or of the distant goal ; we must strike a middle course and combine these two opposite but equally necessary policies. It is a struggle between realism and idealism, and to ignore either would mean losing both ; it would mean present disaster and nothing but despair for the future.

A moment's thought must surely reveal to us all that, as may be seen in the scheme of assistance drawn up by the American group, when once compulsory arbitration is adopted, the whole system of partial treaties is radically changed, and these treaties, if brought under a scheme of arbitration, at once shed all their defects and are freed from their dangerous elements, while at the same time they retain their advantages ; above all, the guarantees offered by these treaties are additional to those contained in the Covenant or in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

In his admirable speech of yesterday our colleague M. Van Karnebeek pointed out that the Covenant already embodies practically all the principles upon which the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance is based, and can be taken as a solid foundation for security. As has rightly been said, too, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is simply an extension of the Covenant ; thus, interdependence, guarantees, the reduction of armaments, conciliation, sanctions—all these find practical expression in it.

Accordingly, the objection that the Treaty of Assistance would be inoperative on account of the slowness of the Council's method of voting applies with equal force to the Covenant itself.

If, therefore, we wish the Covenant to work satisfactorily, we should endeavour to find some means of remedying this defect.

Several prominent members of this Assembly have already indicated during the discussions—and Mr. MacDonald gave added weight to the assertion by pronouncing himself, as the representative of the British Government, definitely in favour of the

economic and financial sanctions contained in the Covenant - that it would not be found necessary in practice to solve our difficulties by concluding a new treaty. Why, it is asked, cannot we rest content with the one Treaty of Guarantee that we have already concluded and signed, namely, the Covenant itself? Why should we not develop, simplify, explain and consolidate it on the logical basis of its own principles and of the desiderata set forth in the Treaty of Assistance? Moreover, Mr. MacDonald suggests that we could devise a new system by amalgamating the available material, namely, the draft Treaty drawn up last year, the Covenant, and the replies from the Governments, and that this system should include compulsory arbitration. This duty would fall to the Third Committee.

In answer to this proposal I would refer you to what I have already said in the reply from the Czechoslovak Government to the Secretariat regarding the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. We attach no importance to the form and the diplomatic instrument used for embodying the principles that we advocate. The Covenant in itself can be regarded as a Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

To my mind the force of certain articles in the Covenant has, whether tacitly or explicitly, been weakened rather than strengthened in recent years. The events of last year have given rise in various quarters to doubts concerning its effectiveness. We shall, however, be satisfied if it is thought better to increase the efficacy and particularise the scope of the instrument that we already possess, so that with a perfected instrument at our command we may be able to discharge our duties as Members of the League. Nevertheless, I fully realise the difficulties which may be encountered in so doing, difficulties which will become apparent and will require discussion in the debates of the Committee.

As I have already said, I do not insist on the text of the draft Treaty prepared by the Third Committee. I am prepared to accept any other solution which would attain the same purpose. Quite recently a group of distinguished Americans has submitted another important and interesting draft.

But, pending concrete proposals for defining the scope of the

Covenant, I shall adhere to the conclusions reached as a result of our four years' work. I would prefer a treaty of assistance based upon the Covenant to any kind of new treaty.

Let me speak quite candidly. We must show public opinion in all countries whether or no the present League of Nations is able to solve the problem of international co-operation by an undertaking to furnish assistance in case of unprovoked attack, and the problem of the repression of crime against international law.

In the political world to-day there are two categories of men who consider the problem to be altogether insoluble.

The one category, seeing in the League differences in social, political, economic and ethical conditions, differences of race, geographical differences and, generally speaking, different degrees of civilisation, considers that in these circumstances it will be almost impossible to adjust the sacrifices to be made by some to the advantages to be derived by others from a general undertaking of mutual assistance.

Obligations of this nature might well entail risks that were too heavy for certain States and that might prove an obstacle to the success of such organisations in the world to-day. Some States, again, fear lest such obligations, if accepted, might be disregarded at the critical moment. Their view shows prudence and foresight, but, in my opinion, an excessive scepticism, although it has some justification in certain special cases.

Another class of thinkers considers the question in a different light. They say quite frankly that our discussions are idle and illusory, that human nature is selfish, ruthlessly selfish, often cynical, and that, after all, ever since the beginning of human society, force has always been, and always will be, the deciding factor in international relations. They make no secret of their opinion: they profess it openly and draw the logical conclusions.

I have always been opposed to this doctrine of force, just as I am, and always have been, opposed to the excessive scepticism of the first category of men to whom I have referred. I stand for the happy medium. We cannot, to my mind, disregard the special circumstances of certain countries and nations; we must

not disregard those, and they are many, who persistently preach the doctrine of force.

In this matter I am a practical idealist ; I believe that we shall succeed in discovering a means of adjusting the advantages enjoyed by some to the sacrifices made by others. I believe a check can be found for those who are ever ready to make an unwarrantable use of force. I think that the work of the League and the statements that we have heard here give us every reason henceforward to cherish this belief. If it were not so it would be better to say so openly.

I believe that an illusion that is shared by many is invariably the cause of peril, and is no less perilous than the hope of finding salvation in armaments. The old adage runs : *Si vis pacem para bellum*. Both are equally illusory.

If I speak at some length, I feel, as I have said, that it is my duty to do so, since I acted as Rapporteur for the Treaty of Mutual Assistance drafted last year.

Such is the doctrine that I have upheld during the discussions of the last four years, and such is the doctrine on which the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Covenant are founded. The debates that have been held in this Assembly and the criticisms that have been levelled against the Treaty demanded, in my opinion, candour and plain speaking.

But, although the theory I have advanced is a precise and definite theory, do not imagine that I am merely a doctrinaire. If I contrast the two more or less separate arguments that have been advocated in this hall, I realise that they can be reconciled and combined and that the one is bound to be the complement of the other.

This morning M. Herriot emphasised in striking and eloquent words the close connection between three great principles. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald developed the same ideas, viewed from a different angle. If I attempt to summarise their statements and those of M. Salandra, M. Theunis, Lord Parmoor and others of my colleagues, I think that we can even now describe the main features of the work that we have to do.

In India we have a frontier problem of exceptional difficulty and complexity. Our border line stretches from the Indian Ocean near Karachi to the confines of China and Siam. Much of that frontier is peopled by hardy and turbulent tribes owning no law but the blood feud, no higher ambition than to raid the peaceful dwellers in the plains. These tribes are saturated with arms and ammunition imported from Europe and, despite costly preventive measures, this illicit traffic has, as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald told us, not yet been brought fully under control. They contain within their clans some of the finest fighting material in the world.

Other sections of the frontier consist of dense and almost pathless jungles occupied by restless tribes, who, if they have not the exceptional military qualities of those of the North-West, are nevertheless a considerable military pre-occupation.

Not in our time can the serious menace to the security of India contained in the frontier position be mitigated by the use of economic sanctions or the spread of the principle of arbitration ; we are bound to take account of this in fixing our standard of military strength at the minimum point which will ensure the safety of India.

There is a further consideration to which I must invite the attention of the Assembly. Whilst we hope that the present cordial relations with our neighbours may long continue, yet the fact remains that all are not Members of the League of Nations, and all are not, consequently, susceptible to the moral and economic pressure which the League may be in a position to exercise.

Again, the nations of Asia which are Members of the League are so situated geographically that even if they accepted the responsibilities proposed under the draft Treaty, commanded the means to give India effective assistance, and had the will promptly to use them, they are not in a position to render to India that immediate effective assistance which would be essential to her security with a reduced military establishment. The immediate effect of a reduction of armaments in India would, therefore, be to weaken the guarantees for the security of the Indian people.

On these general and specific grounds, therefore, we have been driven to follow the action of the Government of the British Empire in rejecting the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance. But because we do so, I would not have this Assembly or any member of this Assembly conclude that we are behind any nation in the world in our desire for peace. We harbour aggressive designs towards none. We desire nothing more than to be allowed to work out our destiny undisturbed by the shock of war or the threat of war; by instinct and tradition we are a pacific people.

I have stated our position frankly because of my conviction that if we ignore facts we shall not ensure peace, but rather induce the feeling of insecurity which may lead to war. But, subject to the recognition of the conditions which I have sketched—a recognition essential to the discharge of our responsibilities for the security of 319,000,000 of people, or one-fifth of the entire human race—we associate ourselves wholeheartedly with the principle of arbitration and with any measures which this Assembly may take for the reduction of armaments, for the establishment of the rule of law, and for guaranteeing to the nations of the world the untold blessings of a secured peace.

M. GARAY,

Foreign Minister and First Delegate of Panama.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—We statesmen and diplomats from America who believe that our national interests, of which we are the guardians, are in no way incompatible with the wider interests entrusted to the stewardship of the League of Nations, do not, when sent by our Governments to represent them at the Assembly of the League, confine ourselves merely to our official instructions. Before setting out for Geneva, we endeavour to get into close touch with the main currents of public opinion at home. Each time we do so, the good sense and judgment which we everywhere find are a source of pride and gratification.

These bodies can only give opinions which will in no way be binding upon the parties. The settlement recommended by the Council will only become binding subject to the consent of both parties.

Lastly, it is agreed that the final resort to conciliation contemplated in article 11 will only be applicable in cases where the substance of the dispute has not been examined. In all cases, however, in which a final decision has been taken upon the substance of the dispute, whether by the Council, by the Court or by arbitrators, article 11 is inapplicable.

Only one more stone was wanting to complete the structure which we had attempted to build. The Protocol condemns wars of aggression and offers all parties in all cases a pacific procedure involving a final and binding decision which is enforced by sanctions. With a view to the immediate and infallible application of the sanctions we had to decide which was the State originally responsible for a war of aggression, — in other terms, to define and determine the aggressor in each case.

This definition is an easy matter and we found it without difficulty.

It is sufficient to say that any State is the aggressor which resorts to war in violation of the engagements contracted by it either under the Covenant or under the Protocol. It is however extremely difficult to apply this definition in each particular case. Once war has broken out, once hostilities have commenced, the question of determining which side began them is a question of fact concerning which opinions may differ.

The first idea which occurred to the members of the Committee was to make it the duty of the Council to determine who was the aggressor in each case, but it was soon realised that intervention by the Council would be attended by many disadvantages, whether that body were given the right to take decision unanimously or by a majority.

The Committee accordingly attempted to devise an automatic procedure which would obviate any discussion whatever and would make it possible to determine forthwith by a combination

of various external criteria which was the State originally responsible for a war of aggression.

We believe that we have found a solution by means of a system of "presumption."

Our proposal is that you should say that there is a presumption, which shall hold good until the contrary has been established by a unanimous decision of the Council and which arises in a series of hypotheses the importance of which I recommend to your most particular attention.

These hypotheses are three. The first is that of a State which resorts to war after refusing arbitration or refusing to submit to the decision by which the dispute was finally settled. The next hypothesis is that of a State which resorts to war in violation of the provisional measures enjoined by the Council during proceedings for a pacific settlement. The third and last hypothesis is that of a State resorting to war in disregard of a decision recognising that the question in dispute is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the other party, or by failure to employ the last chance of conciliation offered in article 11 of the Covenant.

It will be noticed that there is an essential difference between the first two and the third hypotheses. Whereas in the first two a presumption of aggression exists if the state of war is accompanied merely by a single condition, in the third hypothesis two conditions are required, first, that a State has disobeyed a decision which recognises that the question is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of another State and, secondly, wilful failure to take advantage of the special provision contained in article 11 of the Covenant.

This difference is due to the consideration that in the matter of defining aggression it is necessary to render article 15, paragraph 8 of the Covenant more flexible by showing a State which has been non-suited that it still has in article 11 of the Covenant a last resource for obtaining conciliation. We had therefore to find some means of reconciling the article in the Protocol which contemplates the application of article 15,

What do our people say when we ask them their views on the Assemblies of the League of Nations and the part which we are to play in them ? They say this : Do not let us interfere in matters that are of no real interest and of no practical concern to us ; there is no occasion for us to intervene in a discussion on questions which affect only other continents.

In asking leave to speak on the schemes proposed for disarmament and for treaties of guarantee or mutual assistance, which are the subject of our discussions, I do not think that I am exceeding the instructions of my Government or assuming a role for which I have no warrant in expressing the wishes of my country.

These questions are of supreme importance for the whole of mankind, and indeed my country is one which is fully conscious of the perils of isolation and the disadvantages inherent in a policy of national egotism.

Twenty-one years ago, in 1903, the newly founded Republic of Panama concluded with the Government of the United States the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla. That Treaty is something more than an agreement for the construction of the inter-oceanic canal ; it is a political treaty of guarantee. According to Article 1 the United States, in return for concessions made by the Republic of Panama in the subsequent articles, undertook to guarantee and maintain the independence and sovereignty of Panama. Accordingly at the time when my country became a part of the community of nations, the vital problem of its security was solved.

The Government then decided to free the people from the burdens and dangers involved in the maintenance of a standing army ; it commenced disbandment within a few months after the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee with the United States of America and the promulgation of our political constitution. All that was retained was a gendarmerie, an armed police for the needs of our internal security and for the maintenance of public order.

The sums thus released from the public treasury have been employed in the development of the education, in the construction of new roads and in different public works. Our policy has been

to rid the country of militarism and to instil in the people the love of peace and the spirit of industry.

There was nothing in the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty or in our Constitution compelling us to adopt the policy of moral and material disarmament that we have followed from the first. On the contrary, our Treaty with the United States provides for the free passage through the Canal of all ships, troops and munitions of war belonging to Panama. In the same Treaty Panama undertakes not to impose compulsory military service on persons employed by the Government of the United States on canal services or on the auxiliary railway. Our country has thus preserved freedom of action as regards military preparations and, if we have disbanded our army, we have done so without constraint and of our own free will.

Our Constitution lays down, in the chapter on the armed forces of the State, that all citizens of Panama shall be called to the colours in case of political emergency, that the conditions of exemption from military service shall be determined by law, that the military and police services shall be organised by law, that the country shall have a permanent defensive force, that offences committed by soldiers serving with the colours shall be tried by courts-martial and military courts, and that the Government has the sole right to import and manufacture arms and munitions of war.

When, therefore, in May 1923, my distinguished colleague, who is with us to-day, M. A. de Mello-Franco, chief of the Brazilian delegation, in a stirring speech delivered at one of the last meetings of the Fifth Pan-American Conference of Santiago, extolled the example set by Panama in the matter of disarmament and added that our Constitution forbade us to maintain an army, I felt I must correct him and state that we had waived the exercise of our Constitutional right to maintain a standing army, not by virtue of a provision in a treaty or of an article in our Constitution, but of our own free will and in application of our sovereign rights, by a free and spontaneous decision which adds to the merit of our action.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has told us of his warm approval of the Danish Government's proposals for the reduction of that country's armaments and the Danish Prime Minister has himself confirmed this most gratifying report. I feel that the Assembly may also be interested to know, not what Panama proposes to do, but what she has actually achieved, since in the matter of disarmament she has anticipated by more than twenty years the boldest steps yet taken by any Power, great or small, in any continent.

Though we have long since solved the fundamental problem of our security and its corollary, disarmament, that is no reason why we should ignore the troubles of other nations or turn a deaf ear to the countries that are still groaning beneath the burden of taxation imposed upon them by the armed peace and the fear of further aggression.

Far from it. Our delegation, fully conscious as it is of its duties of co-operation and solidarity, will closely follow the proceedings of the Third Committee and will endeavour by all means in its power to hasten the dawn of a new era of justice and international confidence that shall gradually dispel the tragic memories of imperialism and war.

M. POLITIS,

former Minister for Foreign Affairs, First Delegate of Greece.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—At the point which we have now reached in this important discussion, after the lofty and eloquent speeches that you have heard, there is no need for oratory. Allow me, however, to submit a few general remarks which will, I hope, help to elucidate the two principal points that appear to have emerged from the discussion.

The first of these two points is that we must take into account the text of the Covenant. The second is that there is a general desire—I trust a unanimous desire—to employ arbitration and international justice as the basis on which to erect our edifice of peace.

We are unanimous in thinking that first and foremost we must bear in mind what is written in the Covenant. But whereas some regard its provisions as a complete and perfect charter of peace, giving every desirable security and guarantee, others consider that the Covenant only provides an incomplete system, which must be strengthened if—to use M. Herriot's expression—the Covenant is to be made a "living" thing.

This divergency of views is more apparent than real, nothing more, in fact, than a simple misunderstanding, for we have only to read the Statutes by which we are governed, without adding anything to them and without omitting anything from them, to realise the truth in the matter.

The Covenant of the League of Nations does not, as is commonly supposed, forbid all wars. It does not abolish the right, which States have long considered to be their elementary right, to resort to force of arms. The Preamble of the Covenant merely states that the High Contracting Parties accept obligations not to resort to war. Thus the Covenant does tolerate certain wars, namely, wars declared three months after the expiry of the moratorium imposed by Article 12. If such wars are tolerated, others are expressly forbidden ; for instance, wars which constitute a breach of the Covenant in disregard of the obligations established in the conditions laid down in Articles 12, 13 and 15.

Thus, only some wars, not all wars, are prohibited and it is against such wars that the Covenant provides for certain sanctions.

The problem is, therefore, twofold : Should we extend to all wars the prohibition laid down by the Covenant with reference only to certain wars ? Are the sanctions that it lays down against those wars which it does prohibit, really adequate ?

These sanctions are firstly economic sanctions, those mentioned in Article 16. Proof has already been given, and there is no need for me to repeat it, that, useful as they are, these sanctions are far from adequate. We may even visualise the possibility of the aggressor State being rich in raw materials, a country with vast exports, on which many other countries depend ; in this case, the enforcement of economic sanctions would, I consider, be

liable to do more harm to the country enforcing them than to the country against which they were enforced.

In addition to economic sanctions the Covenant provides for certain military sanctions. This is a point which we must not overlook.

The Covenant establishes the principle of these sanctions in what I will call the kernel of the matter, namely, the clause in which the countries are invited to consider in what way they can reduce their armaments. In determining the lowest point to which armaments can be reduced Article 8 takes account not only of the requirements of national safety but also of the execution of the obligations imposed by common action.

In the second paragraph of Article 16, again, provision is made for the military forces to be contributed by the States Members of the League to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League.

Lastly, and most important of all, Article 10 which is a vital article, enjoins mutual respect and guarantee for territorial integrity ; it invests the Council with power to advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Without concrete rules for its enforcement, the capital obligation established in Article 10 is far from being effective in practice. When, in the discussions in this Assembly last year, we attempted to sift the meaning of this article, the interpretation accepted by the majority of the States was that the Council only had power to recommend, and that the final decision upon the expediency and extent of the military support to be furnished by the members to the Council fell within the sovereign competence of the States.

In these circumstances can it be said that the system of economic and military guarantees provided for in the Covenant furnishes adequate security to make it possible to invite the States to abolish or reduce their military forces ? I am quite certain that no State which felt that it was actually threatened would be in a position to accept so shadowy a guarantee in return for that afforded by its own resources.

It can therefore be concluded that, on the basis of the Covenant alone, there is complete and entire justification for the conception of a treaty of mutual assistance which is intended to make the Covenant an effective and a vital instrument.

That is the first observation that I wish to make.

Proof that we are unanimous in thinking that the Covenant in its present form is inadequate, and that we all consider that it must be completed to allow for the claims with regard to security, is to be found in the advocacy in all quarters of the idea of compulsory arbitration and judicial procedure.

I was extremely glad when I heard the distinguished heads of the Governments of the Great Powers represented here declare that they were prepared to accept compulsory arbitration. I was extremely glad, I say, when I heard these noble words upon their lips, for the nations must be brought to follow the path of justice. But, at the same time, I could not help wondering if it would not be wise to sift this idea a little more closely, if it was not our duty to ascertain whether this magic formula contained a genuine reality. I myself feel it my duty to do so, because I realise that in pacifist propaganda the notion of arbitration has often proved a mirage which has prevented even men of sound judgment from seeing the facts confronting them.

Let us speak out with candour and conviction. There is nothing more misleading for men, and especially for nations, than to indulge in high hopes ; hope has too often plunged us in the perilous slough of illusion.

What, now, do we mean when we advocate compulsory arbitration ? How far does our plea imply amendment of the Covenant ?

Arbitration is not new to the Covenant. Article 12 introduces it : Article 13 provides the machinery. By combining these two provisions we shall gain a clear idea of the manner in which the system works.

Whenever a serious dispute arises between two Members of the League, they are bound to submit it to pacific procedure. The nature of the procedure varies according to the nature of the dispute. If the dispute is of a legal nature the States are recom-

mended to resort to arbitration. If the dispute is of a nature other than legal they are invited to appear before the Council, and to accept its good offices and mediation.

Observe with what caution, with what prudence and wisdom, Articles 12 and 13 were worded. Even in the case of a juridical dispute the Covenant does not *ipso facto* bind States to compulsory arbitration. The obligation only comes into play if both parties agree as to the legal nature of the dispute.

Four years ago, at the time when the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was being drawn up it was proposed that we might build up the breach in the wall left unfilled until then, in view of the caution shown in this matter by those who drafted the Covenant. The eminent jurists who were entrusted by the Council with the elaboration of the preliminary draft Statute unanimously agreed to include in it the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

The Council, however, was averse to so bold an innovation, and, notwithstanding the cogent pleas advanced in the 1920 Assembly, the advocates of compulsory arbitration were obliged to accept a compromise, optional jurisdiction, supplemented by the compensatory clause contained in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute. This article lays down that there should be an open Protocol whereby the States would undertake to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for the three classes of legal disputes mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant.

What has happened? Three years have elapsed since this clause entered into force. Only fifteen States have accepted the optional protocol on compulsory jurisdiction and not a single great Power is included in the number. In saying this I do not mean to criticise, I wish merely to record the fact before asking the following question. After all the hesitation, the uncertainty and the apprehension that the States have shown in regard to compulsory arbitration, can we in a single day cover the long road that lies ahead before we can reach our final goal, namely, justice through the enforcement of the obligation on all States and in all cases?

I sincerely wish it were possible, but I strongly doubt it.

When, the other day, I had the pleasure of listening to the masterly speech of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, I was extremely glad to hear him declare that he was prepared to accept the jurisdiction of a court before which all nations would be able to explain their policy and to reveal their most secret wishes. But whilst I warmly approved his statement, I could not but wonder of what judges this Court could be composed? On what basis would a Court entrusted with this solemn duty render its award?

An allusion dropped by Mr. MacDonald has, I believe, enabled me to perceive what was at the back of his mind. He alluded to the possibility of setting up several courts of different kinds and of varying composition to be entrusted with this mission of peace and mediation. It seems to me that the practical result of this suggestion would be the following: there would be an organ—a court, if you will—before which any country that felt itself menaced would be entitled to summon its presumptive adversary; and if the latter failed to appear, or if he appeared but refused to comply with the decision or recommendation of that body he would *de jure* be considered the aggressor and would be held responsible for subsequent disturbances of the peace.

It is a most valuable idea. The proposed system is an attractive one. It is, I believe, also a practicable one. But though this be so, it has nothing to do with arbitration or with justice; it is purely a system of mediation and conciliation; and if I have read aright what was in the mind of the author of this felicitous proposal, I would ask you another question. How do you propose to reconcile this system with that set forth in Article 12 of the Covenant? Are you determined to transfer to a new body powers of mediation at present vested in the Council? I merely ask a question; I am not raising an objection.

I have one more point, the most important of all.

Whether the system we are discussing consists of arbitration or of mediation, is it in itself an adequate system? Are not

sanctions required ? Are there not guarantees to be observed ? What would happen if a State that was cited refused to appear before the international court, or refused to conform to the award rendered ?

Lord Parmoor told us yesterday that guarantees were of but little importance to us, since history shows that arbitration has been tested and found sufficient in itself, and since it had the peculiar property of enforcing its awards by the will of the parties. He added that in the long list of awards given during the nineteenth and at the beginning of the present century, there is no single instance of refusal to accept the arbitrator's decision.

I have no desire to quibble on matters of detail ; it is a fact, however, that there have been cases of refusal, sometimes justifiable but sometimes entirely unjustifiable. There was one case, which took place not long ago—a few years at most—in the New World. In this case one of the States was obliged to resort to force to ensure the execution by the other State of the award pronounced against it. It is the exception, however, that proves the rule. Lord Parmoor's statement is correct. In the vast majority of cases, arbitral awards have been loyally accepted. And why ? What is the explanation of this loyal observance of arbitral decisions ? Simply that arbitration was an optional matter.

What is optional arbitration ? It is a suit brought on the basis of a special agreement which is known as a *compromis* or arbitration clause and which only becomes operative after the inception of the dispute, that is to say, at a time when the Governments concerned are in a position to know the responsibilities which they will incur by going to law. It is an agreement by which the States pledge themselves, with their eyes open, loyally to accept the judgment of the court. When judgment has been pronounced, perhaps some weeks or months later, a State cannot honourably evade obligations of such recent date. In optional arbitration, guarantees are needless because they are useless.

Is the position the same as regards compulsory arbitration ? What do we mean by compulsory arbitration ? Here the pledge

to submit disputes to the tribunals is given before any dispute arises. It is given in anticipation of future disputes. The Contracting States, when concluding their treaty, have no idea when the conflict will break out, how it will arise or how serious it will be. They agree to a kind of lottery, if you will excuse the word ; and they display a remarkable amount of confidence in international justice. A long time may elapse between the date of the arbitration treaty and the date when an award is delivered. Very likely the same men will no longer be in power. Public opinion will have changed. There will no longer be that sense of newness which adds weight and sanctity to the pledge. The determination to abide by it weakens and wavers—and the door is opened to a refusal to carry out the award.

I am not merely theorising ; I will give you a characteristic example of the necessity for proceeding with caution along the road to compulsory justice. A few years ago the five republics of Central America, at the suggestion of the Great Republic of the United States, concluded a treaty establishing a Court of Justice for a period of ten years in the first instance, the period being renewable at the end of that time. The Court had powers of compulsory jurisdiction to deal with every conceivable case, without exception, both for political and juridical questions. Eight years later a political dispute arose between two of these republics and a third over a treaty which the latter had made with another Power. The first two republics maintained that the treaty entailed a serious infringement of their rights, and asked the third not to ratify it. As they did not receive satisfaction in this respect they brought their complaint before the Court.

The Court did its best. The case proceeded with a wealth of legal argument and judgment was eventually given against the signatory of the treaty. The State concerned refused to carry out the award and as a result the Court was entirely discredited and thereafter left alone ; on the expiration of the first period of ten years its mandate was not renewed.

The sequel was that the States concerned, realising that they had been too ambitious and had aimed too high, made a new

treaty at the beginning of last year, establishing a new tribunal with a much more limited jurisdiction.

This is a lesson of the first importance, and it bears out the theories which I put before you just now. It shows that when arbitration is optional guarantees are useless, but that when arbitration is compulsory, they are indispensable.

Moreover, the power of imposing sanctions in international judicial procedure is not inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant. At the end of Article 13 the Covenant states—in somewhat vague and indefinite terms, it is true—that the Council is competent to adopt measures for ensuring that the awards are carried out. There is here a system of sanctions which is barely outlined but which will undoubtedly develop in the future.

In the International Labour Organisation the idea has reached a somewhat later stage of development, and it is laid down in Article 419 of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the corresponding articles in the other treaties of peace, that Members of this Organisation are entitled to carry out reprisals—which are a kind of sanction—against any country which refuses to accept an adverse decision.

This idea stands as a landmark to guide us on our road, and it is my profound belief that this idea will develop into a system of sanctions, commensurate with the obligations assumed.

Why, after all, should the principles of international law differ from those of national justice? Why should justice as the hand-maiden of international peace, possess some higher virtue enabling it to dispense with those safeguards which have at all times and in all countries been considered as indispensable for the preservation of internal peace and order?

A few more words, and I have done.

Whatever aspect of the problem we examine, we find that it is impossible to lay a solid foundation for international peace unless the nations are sure of the necessary security, and we realise that the structure of the League of Nations cannot be different from that of other human societies. In no human society, at no time and in no country have men been able to trust to the dictates

of moral virtue or the force of law alone to safeguard their lives their honour, their property and their freedom. In primitive times the savage armed in self-defence against his neighbour ; only by degrees could he venture to trust to other than his own resources, as in the process of time the community, by its organisation, that is to say, its laws, its judges and its police, substituted its collective force for that of its individual members.

The same holds good with regard to the League of Nations. No State which has a proper regard for its life, its dignity and its honour, will ever consent to surrender the guarantee it holds in virtue of its own power, unless and until the community of nations can offer it an equally sure guarantee.

The League provides us with the framework of an international organisation, but, unlike the goddess of old, it has not sprung fully armed from the brain that conceived it. The power it can offer us is not as yet sufficient to justify us in surrendering our own power. But at any rate it ought to coordinate the individual forces of States, so that, with those combined forces, some adequate guarantee may be provided which will induce States to give up at any rate part of their own armaments.

It is not sufficient that the splendid tower of peace which we are one and all working with eager hearts to erect should be given, the good and solid foundations of justice.

It is necessary in order that it may bear the weight of that burden of armaments which one day we shall place upon the summit, that the walls, should be strongly built of the granite stone of security.

M. DE MELLO-FRANCO,

Ambassador and First Delegate of Brazil.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—There is a natural inequality among nations, due to chance variations in geographical or technical conditions or to the fact that they have reached different stages of civilisation. But there is one factor which

places all on the same level and requires each of them, great or small, strong or weak, to show the same respect for all the others. This factor is that they are all alike in being sovereign nations.

Some nations may be more cultured, more wealthy or more powerful than others, but the world is no longer divided, as in mediaeval times, between an all-powerful aristocracy of States on the one hand and, on the other, an almost nameless multitude of countries whom the stronger States merely allowed to exist on sufferance.

Through that great organisation, the League of Nations, weaker States have at length found a platform from which to address the whole world.

We are to-day the witnesses of a great achievement : each one of fifty-four States can ask the opinion of all the others upon a draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which is considered the *sine qua non* for the reduction of armaments, and this reduction in its turn has become one of the essential conditions of peace, as is recognised and proclaimed by Article 8 of the Covenant.

It is clear from the replies already received from Governments and communicated by the Secretariat that the idea of the formation of a body capable of establishing general security for all the States has, in principle, gained their support. The whole world, in fact, is eager for peace and condemns war in so many words as the most heinous of international crimes.

On the other hand, every Government has made reservations regarding the draft prepared by the Temporary Mixed Commission on the basis of the proposals submitted by Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel Réquin. Several countries have rejected it altogether. It may therefore reasonably be claimed that this first attempt does not appear likely to succeed. But the idea itself has in no way suffered from this setback. Fortunately, as the Prime Minister of Great Britain declared in his eloquent speech on Thursday, the great Powers have not said their last word on the subject, and it is they who are most directly responsible, for the maintenance of world peace. It is they, too, who have most urgent need of relief from the crushing burden of the military machine.

The Members of the League of Nations have undertaken to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of each one of their number. In the draft Treaty, however, an attempt was made to devise some organic form for this mutual assistance and the obligation to assist a State in the event of attack was, in principle, restricted to other States in the same continent. This restriction, which would have left Australia without assistance, would also have rendered the Treaty inoperative as far as the American States are concerned. This becomes strikingly evident when we remember that the United States do not belong to the League.

Moreover, the American countries that are Members of the League are not armed, and would in the event of aggression be unable to give any assistance to the country attacked, whoever the aggressor might be.

It is also absurd to imagine that any American State would attack another American State. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that it were possible, the assistance upon which any American State could rely in the event of attack would clearly be negligible. Such assistance would necessarily depend upon the period of mobilisation of the assisting State, its transport facilities, the organisation of its supplies and the existence of special bases of operation. But as a general rule the American States could not fulfil these requirements, and in the absence of the necessary resources it would be impossible on practical grounds for them to render any assistance at all.

As regards naval assistance, the American countries, with the exception of the United States, could give none, for few of them possess even a small navy. Several, indeed, are specifically bound by special treaties not to maintain a navy. How then could they be expected under the terms of a general treaty to give naval assistance, seeing that many of them possess no naval forces whatever ?

The same may be said with regard to the air. It is generally regarded as an axiom of air warfare that military aircraft must, to operate effectively, start from aerodromes situated within

250 kilometres of their objective. This arm cannot be used for greater distances unless its transport and supplies have previously been organised for that purpose. Immediate action from the point of view of defence is essential in order to prevent the passage of the enemy's bombing machines and, from the point of view of attack, to prevent a concentration of these machines. Thus, in view of the topographical conditions obtaining on the American continent, the air forces available will usually be limited to those which can be supplied by neighbouring countries. Obstacles such as the gigantic and almost impassable wall of the Andes would obviously render it impossible, in most cases, for American countries to afford each other assistance in the air.

I do not intend to enter upon a criticism of the draft prepared by the Temporary Mixed Commission, but I would like to remind you of the statements made by delegates of my country in previous years on certain aspects of the question.

In our opinion the great merit of the draft is that it defines the guarantees provided for in Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant with regard to the economic, financial and industrial assistance to be rendered to the State attacked. Unfortunately, however, the promise of military assistance would not prevent the opening of hostilities. This assistance, as conceived by the system adopted in the draft, could not become effective until the actual development of military operations ; it could not prevent the first attack or invasion.

Such a method would have brought us no nearer to our ideal of abolishing war ; all we should have done would have been to bring into action by degrees the forces necessary to win a war.

These defects in the draft Treaty can only be remedied by means of partial or regional treaties supplementing the original treaty. But there are numerous objections to partial treaties. It is claimed, in particular, that they are closely akin to the old treaties of alliance which were a source of mistrust, which led to reprisals in the form of counter-treaties of the same kind and gave rise to competitive armaments and so bred wars.

This draft is admittedly imperfect as regards general assistance, since Article 6 expressly states that in order to make that assistance immediately effective the contracting parties may conclude, either as between two of them or as between a larger number, agreements complementary to the Treaty, exclusively for the purpose of their mutual defence and intended solely to facilitate the carrying out of the measures prescribed in a general treaty, determining in advance the assistance which they would give to each other in the event of any act of aggression.

Whatever the dangers and drawbacks of partial treaties, it is undeniable that, when a State examines the possibilities of future wars, it can, within certain limits, foresee which opponent is likely to attack it, and it accordingly organises its armaments with an eye to the nature and gravity of the danger to which it is exposed on any given frontier. For the same reason, a State will take care to conclude regional treaties in order to secure the support of other States with a view, in particular, to the protection of its most threatened frontier.

Thus, even though we object to partial treaties from the psychological standpoint, the essence of the problem before us is, after all, to assure national security, and it would be most unreasonable to reject such a solution altogether without finding some other means of offering security to threatened States and of allaying their anxieties by affording an effective guarantee of peace and an assurance of protection against external aggression.

Failing such security there can be no disarmament and without disarmament it is impossible to remove for ever the perils of war.

For four years we have been vainly seeking a solution of this problem, but this does not mean that it cannot be solved. The long-sought solution will, nay, must be found in time as we draw nearer to those lofty ideals which guided the illustrious authors of the Covenant. It will be found in a new world conscience and a moral atmosphere more favourable to the development of those institutions—chief and greatest among which is this Assembly—which have so profoundly modified the structure of the former international law.

When we search the horizon to-day, the one light that we see to guide us towards the goal of peace is our faith in justice. Justice indeed is the primary condition for security both in our private life and in our relations as citizens of the same nation, in the community of men that forms a State and in the community of States. Without justice we can have no security.

That is why we must encourage States to resort to arbitration. The evolution of States must be such as to increase the number of those which accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. To do this they must bind themselves by a special declaration in conformity with the motion submitted by the Brazilian delegate, M. Raul Fernandes, to the Third Committee of the 1920 Assembly; that motion had previously been presented by the Swiss delegation at the Hague Conference of 1907.

Brazil has consistently pursued this policy in international affairs.

Having settled the more serious of her frontier disputes by arbitration, Brazil inserted in paragraph 11 of Article 34 of her Constitution a provision by which the Federal Congress can only authorise the Government to declare war in cases where recourse to arbitration would be inadmissible or in cases where this procedure has been tried and failed. Again, Article 88 of the Constitution provides that the United States of Brazil shall in no case embark, either directly or indirectly, upon a war of aggrandisement either on its own account or by virtue of an alliance with another nation.

Allow me to add that Brazil has concluded arbitration treaties with more than thirty States. I may remind you of the circumstances in which the Brazilian delegate, who was a member of the Third Committee of the First Assembly, rendered valuable assistance when, faithful to the traditions of our international policy and animated by the spirit of our Federal Constitution, he proposed an amendment to the draft approved by the Council, which was based on the preliminary draft of the international Committee of Jurists appointed to draw up the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

You are aware that the preliminary draft provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for all Members of the League and that the Council, considering that this measure was too extreme, proposed optional jurisdiction. It was at this point that the Brazilian delegation, through M. Raul Fernandes, suggested in the Third Committee that the Members of the League and the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant should be permitted to declare that they recognised the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, but only in relation to another Member of the League or another State accepting the same obligation.

This collaboration on the part of our delegates with a view to increasing the prestige of the Court is evidence of our faith in the success of that institution. It should, however, be observed that the Statute does not invest the Court with powers to render awards in all disputes between States. In accordance with the spirit of the Covenant the States retain the right to decide, by virtue of their sovereign rights, questions which are not strictly juridical in nature.

Compulsory arbitration, the essential principles of which are contained in Article 13 of the Covenant, is a necessary premise to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court ; compulsory arbitration may, however, exist in such a form that it does not include the compulsory submission to arbitration of all kinds of questions which may arise between States.

Article 15 of the Covenant also conferred upon the Council the duty of arbitrator, and, in the exercise of this high duty of mediation, the Council can render great service to the cause of peace.

No one, however, can fail to recognise the truth of the formula enunciated with such energy and such deep appreciation of the realities of life by the Prime Minister of France.

Compulsory arbitration, to be practicable and effective, requires a court endowed *de jure* with competence to hear all questions provided for in the arbitration clause ; and the organisation of the Court would remain imperfect so long as its decisions could not,

in case of need, be carried into effect by the forces placed at the disposal of the law.

Only by this method shall we obtain the security of the law, which is the final aim of the arbitration system.

It is, therefore, indeed true that arbitration, security and disarmament are the three essentials of peace.

Brazil has signed the optional clause recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in questions of a juridical nature defined in Article 13 of the Covenant ; and the only condition which she makes to the ratification of the clause is that it shall be approved by at least two of the Powers permanently represented on the Council.

The important statements made by the representatives of the Great Powers during the present debate are proof of the development of this valuable doctrine in the last four years. We may, perhaps, regard these declarations as the beginning of its final transformation into a splendid reality.

Our eminent colleague, the first delegate of Italy, reminded us of the treaty signed at Washington on May 8th, 1871, to settle the serious dispute between the United States and Great Britain with regard to the "Alabama", which was armed in English ports by the Southern Confederacy for service against the North.

The award promulgated here at Geneva on September 14th, 1871, was also signed by a Brazilian, Viscount Itajuba, who was one of the five arbitrators appointed, and the name of Brazil is thus linked with those of the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Switzerland in what is one of the most important documents in the legal history of arbitration.

Brazil was the first American State to ratify the Continental Treaty signed at Santiago de Chile in May 1923, by which eighteen American nations pledged themselves to submit to the examination, investigation and opinion of a Commission constituted under the Treaty all questions which for any reason might have arisen between two or more of the High Contracting Parties and had not been solved by diplomatic means or submitted to arbitration.

This Treaty, which was ratified by several other States, including the United States, really renders it needless for the American States to adhere to the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee as a protection against the danger of an act of aggression in that continent on the part of an American country.

Notwithstanding this circumstance, so fortunate for the American continent, Brazil is willing to render every assistance in the preparation of a general formula of mutual assistance and guarantee, and we trust that we are thereby giving proof of our devotion to the League of Nations.

Moreover, we are not forgetting what is most essential—the establishment, either with or without complementary regional treaties, of a treaty of mutual assistance and guarantee between all nations. This is a condition which is vital for disarmament. It is, in fact, not enough that this assistance and guarantee should be based entirely upon continental systems. They must be based on a world-wide organisation, for the right to security—to that real security which should now be the final object of our endeavour—is the sacred right of all the peoples of the earth.

Mr. DANDURAND,

Minister of State, First Delegate of Canada.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—I am not going to discuss to-day the merits of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. I have listened from the beginning of this debate to the many objections which have been formulated. I feel that a solution of the problem which has been submitted to us will perhaps not be reached speedily. So I am thinking of the present moment and the peril of this hour.

What are the guarantees for to-morrow? Before the departure of the official representatives, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, it has seemed to me that it would perhaps be well to express an opinion. Although I am a newcomer among you, I may have some qualifications for presenting it. The thought

which it contains is not a growth of yesterday—it is of long standing. But I have been struck by the manifestation of Thursday last, which appeared to show that this idea was shared by the whole Assembly.

When the two Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France entered this hall, they were greeted in respectful and attentive silence ; it was only at the moment that they shook hands that loud applause broke out. I understood that you were acclaiming therein a clear evidence of the existence of the “ Entente Cordiale”.

The world has lived through three years of anguish. We have been asking ourselves to what shores we were drifting. Now the agreements reached at London have given widespread satisfaction. What was our joy when we realised that a good understanding had been re-established there. So far as I can see there is no possibility of peace in the minds of men in Europe to-day without the continuance of that friendly understanding.

Fifteen years or so ago I had the opportunity of hearing a very distinguished Hungarian orator, whom I am glad to see with us to-day, state that war never achieved any final settlement, and that one bloody chapter in the record of history always called for a sequel. Now, ladies and gentlemen, we desire to put a full stop to this barbarian fatalism. Is it not our imperious duty, in the years that are to come, to seek to appease the passions, to bring back peace into men’s hearts ?

How are we to obtain that end ? It seems to me that the great nations face a duty—the duty of setting an example. Misunderstanding between them cannot but postpone and compromise peace ; misunderstanding between them must arouse and maintain evil hopes. For three years now, every eye has been turned anxiously toward London and Paris. If a fog appear in the English Channel, immediately we feel a depression of spirit ; but when the sun of the “ Entente Cordiale ” clears it away the whole world is delighted. I said the whole world ; but I do not include in that term the spirit of evil which thrives only upon discord.

As one who comes from afar, I recognise that the problem which besets us is mainly a European problem. But it is also a world problem. I come from North America, and have the distinguished honour to represent here the North American continent. There as elsewhere we feel that safety can only come through a good understanding among the Great Powers.

I know that it is often difficult to reach agreement. Each of us has his special interests, his nerves, his idiosyncrasies. But there come to my mind some words out of a sermon which I heard an old *curé* give at Thun some years ago : " I am not going to preach to you any great virtue that will make saints of you ; I am going to suggest to you one little domestic virtue which may add to your happiness. In the morning one feels keenly the burden of the task of the day. I am going to ask you, living among friends as you do, to remember to greet with a smile the first person you meet after getting up in the morning. Smile, and the smile will call forth a smile in answer, and the temperature will become distinctly milder."

I believe that if these great nations, conscious of their responsibilities, realising that they must blaze the way, determine to maintain peace and the spirit of peace in Europe, they can succeed.

Canada is inhabited by people of two races, living harmoniously side by side. A considerable proportion are of French blood. In the words of one of our most illustrious statesmen, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, I may declare : " I love France which gave me life ; I love England which gave me liberty."

We are grateful to Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot, who have re-established a good understanding between these two great countries. I believe that I have the right to ask of our two mother-countries, Great Britain and France that they remain linked together for the well-being of the Canadian family and for the good of all humanity.

M. QUIÑONES DE LEÓN,

Ambassador in Paris and First Delegate of Spain.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—If I venture to speak in a debate to which so many distinguished statesmen have lent the weight of their authority, I do so in order to state the views of my country briefly but with the sincerity and goodwill which Spain has ever shown and will always show in promoting the course of justice and peace.

Though Spain is among those who have raised objections to the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee communicated to the Governments by the Fourth Assembly, she has not done so from indifference or from desire to evade her international obligations. No one who knows the traditions of my nation could credit that for a moment.

There are among us in this hall many masters of international law, all of whom will tell you that the creative conception of international law on which the League of Nations was founded sprung from the brains of those Spanish jurists whom Grotius, with the characteristic modesty of great men, acknowledged to be his teachers and forerunners.

It is and always has been recognised that we owe to those Spanish jurists the clear distinction that is made between a just war and an unjust war, a distinction which is the chief canon in international life, and is now at last, thanks to the League of Nations, restored to its place among our articles of faith. Spain remains true to the doctrine of her ancient masters, that without this distinction there can be no real peace. For these reasons Spain desires to associate herself with those countries which have declared the only basis for peace to be the Covenant of the League of Nations, a charter which is the fruit of the wisdom and ripe thought of men who combined the highest idealism with tried political experience.

Spain, who of her own free will signed the Covenant, will loyally observe her pledge ; she considers that the nations will find that

the best guarantees of security consist in a strict application of its principles.

She also believes—and her long historical experience entitles her to speak with authority—that institutions, whether international or national, can only be developed with time.

The letter of the law must be slowly quickened by experience before the spirit can enter into possession.

M. Herriot has hit the mark ; we must endeavour to make the Covenant a living thing. Only so can it be made effective.

Arbitration is a policy that commands our entire approval.

Arbitration, that is to say, broadly speaking, the pacific and equitable settlement of disputes, has long been a rule in the diplomatic relations of my country. We are bound by arbitration treaties with several countries in Europe and America.

The Spanish Government is therefore convinced that we may work in this direction, that with agreements of this nature, in which States pledge themselves to compulsory arbitration, we may pave the way for the brotherhood of man and strengthen the Covenant which is its symbol.

We must, the Spanish Government considers, persevere in the work that has been begun. It offers its wholehearted co-operation in the attainment of the ideal before us, namely, that the passions of war must be checked at the outset by united action. This will be the most valuable and the most effective guarantee of peace.

It was with this intention that the Spanish members of the Temporary Mixed Commission, among them my eminent friend the Marquis de Magaz, suggested, as long ago as June 1923, several amendments to the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee proposing that aggression should be defined as a refusal to accept arbitration. In view of the importance attached by the Fifth Assembly to this idea, I will venture to quote the principal passages in these amendments :

“At the request of any Member of the League of Nations, the Council... may declare that the political situation between the two States Members is such that precautions with a view

to preserving peace are indispensable. The following precautionary measures may be applied :

“ (a) Both Parties may be asked to withdraw their troops to a certain distance, to be determined by the Council, on both sides of the frontier ;

“ To abstain from flying over a certain neutral zone between the two countries ;

“ To abstain from allowing their navies to enter the territorial waters of the other State.

.....

“ Shall be presumed to be the aggressor :

“Any State which has refused to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to the Council of the League of Nations the dispute which is the cause of the state of war ;

“Any State which has refused to take the precautionary measures stipulated above when the Council has recommended their application.”

Accordingly, Spain fully endorses the proposal to strengthen the Covenant by the application of arbitration. The League of Nations can rely on our loyal co-operation in any special work which may be thought desirable for this purpose.

Lying between two countries to which she is bound by age-long ties of friendship and kinship, Spain has no fear of surprise attack or invasion ; but this is not the reason why she takes an impartial view of the problems by which Europe is tormented to-day.

Situated on the edge of Europe, facing towards the new continent, Spain will always be prepared to do her share in the work of international collaboration from which the Powers across the Atlantic cannot hold aloof. I allude to the United States and the other American Republics, particularly those whose help we specially appreciate on account of their Spanish origin, not only those which are already Members of the League but also those which, we hope, will join the League ere long.

Spain, need I remind you, has repeatedly responded to your call. In the future, as in the past, she intends to pursue a policy of peace because she has consistently pursued a policy of good-will.

M. VILLEGAS,

Former Prime Minister and First Delegate of Chile.

Ladies and gentlemen—The Chilean delegation has followed with keen interest this important debate in the Fifth Assembly. The part taken in it by the distinguished statesmen who are with us to-day has lent lustre to our discussion, but it is of special significance because we all feel that we must reach some conclusions which will hasten the approach of the long-awaited hour when peace shall have a permanent abiding place on the earth.

We all realise that this debate on arbitration, security, disarmament, and mutual assistance in cases of unjust aggression, although, of course, of universal interest, is at the present time of more immediate and urgent concern to Europe.

The Chilean delegation does not therefore propose to discuss the fundamental questions involved, but to restrict itself to the statement that the Government and the people of Chile, conscious of their responsibilities as a Member of the League, will collaborate with faith and good hope in the task of discovering a formula which, while taking into account the legitimate interests and no less legitimate fears of each country, will finally establish the principle of the settlement of disputes by arbitration on the basis that every State shall have a reasonable amount of security and shall effectively disarm, both from a military and from a moral point of view.

As Chile is one of the three countries in South America that possess both land and sea forces of relative importance, I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate the declarations made by the Chilean delegation at previous Assemblies regarding the reduction of armaments.

This problem, so far as our continent is concerned, differs both in aspect and in urgency from the problem confronting Europe. Statistics show that there is not a single State in South America the strength of whose armaments is out of proportion with the area of its territory, its population and its internal

requirements. We in South America need agreements for the limitation of armaments rather than agreements for the reduction of armaments.

I may remind you in this connection that Chile and Argentina were the first two countries in contemporary history to conclude an agreement of this nature. In 1902 our two Governments signed a treaty concerning the equivalent strength and the limitation of their naval armaments, which was warmly approved by the other South American countries and has been loyally observed by the countries concerned.

The Governments of Brazil and Chile also took part in the special meeting of the Naval Sub-Committee of the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League, which was attended by countries not represented on the Sub-Committee and was held at Rome in February of this year. The subject under discussion was the limitation of the naval armaments of countries not signatory to the Treaty of Washington. The declarations made by the representatives of these two countries at the Rome meeting and the semi-official statements which appeared in the Argentine Press encourage the hope that the limitation of the naval armaments of these three great countries is not a particularly difficult problem to solve. As representative of Chile I desire to express our ardent hope that an agreement on this question may soon be reached under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Our delegation notes with great satisfaction the declarations concerning arbitration which have been made by the heads of the Governments of the principal European Powers. We fully appreciated their importance. They constitute, we believe, a decisive advance towards that moral disarmament which must necessarily precede the material disarmament that we all desire.

The explanation which the distinguished delegate of Brazil gave to the Assembly concerning the special position of the South American peoples, both as regards the immense area of their territory and the inadequacy of their military and naval forces to guarantee the execution of treaties of mutual assistance of

the kind contemplated for the European countries, makes it unnecessary for me to set forth in detail our own view on this question, since our opinions, both on this matter and on the principle of arbitral jurisdiction, are identical with those expressed by my Brazilian colleague.

I would remind you on this important occasion that the most serious problems that have confronted South America in the last forty years have been settled by arbitration. At the beginning of the present century the King of England graciously accepted the position of arbitrator and settled the long-standing and serious frontier dispute between Chile and the Argentine Republic. In 1922 the Governments of Chile and Peru signed a protocol submitting for decision by the President of the United States of America difficulties in the execution of one of the clauses of the Treaty of Ancon, which terminated the War of the Pacific. The Governments of Ecuador and Peru have just taken similar action to solve their long-standing frontier dispute.

Although the Brazilian delegate has already referred to the Treaty signed in a friendly spirit of co-operation by sixteen American States at Santiago in May 1923, I would venture again to draw your attention to this Treaty, which may be said to mark a definite stage on the road towards the pacific settlement of international disputes. Under this Treaty, which is due to the initiative of that eminent Paraguayan statesman, M. Gondra, each signatory undertakes not to mobilise or concentrate its troops on the frontier of the other party, nor to commit acts of hostility nor acts preparatory to hostilities, as soon as arrangements have been made for convening a Commission of Enquiry consisting of five members appointed under the auspices of certain permanent commissions which have been specially set up with full guarantees as to impartiality and competence. The Commission of Enquiry may be convened at the request of any one of the countries concerned.

The fact that this Treaty has already been ratified by the United States of America, Brazil, Paraguay and other American States gives it very special significance, and I would venture

to point out to the Assembly that the Third Committee might advantageously study it, hoping as I do that some of the ideas contained in it may be of real help in the task entrusted to the Committee by the Assembly.

I make this proposal the more readily in that this Treaty would appear to offer an example, that might well be followed, of that equality between great and small Powers which was so eloquently advocated by M. Herriot.

Equality between great and small Powers is the fundamental principle underlying the pan-Americanism which unites the republics of America, great and small, in their pursuit of a common ideal.

This ideal is in all respects in keeping with that of the League of Nations and no more striking proof of this could be found than the fact that many American States are represented here and are actively and wholeheartedly co-operating in the work of this Assembly, the most important that the League of Nations has yet held, perhaps the most important Assembly that the world has ever seen.

M. URRUTIA,

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, First Delegate of Colombia.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—The discussions held in our recent meetings are of good omen not only to the League but, I venture to think, to the entire world, which has followed our proceedings with the keenest interest and has moment by moment received the solemn words that have been spoken from this platform.

We cannot fail to recognise that the elevation of the principle of compulsory arbitration to be the keystone of international law, enunciated by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain—the two great liberal Powers of Europe who have done so much to advance the civilisation of the world—is a fact of the first importance, the most important fact, perhaps, in the history

of international relations since the League of Nations founded the Permanent Court of International Justice.

As I listened to Mr. MacDonald's eloquent appeal for compulsory arbitration, I called to mind those memorable days a century ago when Canning, another Prime Minister of Great Britain, opposed the schemes of the Holy Alliance and enunciated the right of American countries to sovereignty and independence, and prophesied that the group of free nations that had arisen in the New World would one day have the mission of restoring stability in the old.

I called to mind, too, the words which Gladstone spoke in connection with the historic Alabama Treaty.

He said that arbitration is the solemn consecration on international ground of that feeling of justice which has made men seek for a better means of settling disputes between States than the ruthless decision of the sword.

When, again, I heard M. Herriot proclaim here the right of the small nations to life and independence on equal terms with the great, my whole heart went out in homage to France and her noble traditions, France who has proclaimed the rights of man, who has consistently and vigorously defended the loftiest principles of right and justice in Assemblies where the nations have met together.

As representative of a country which, ever since the first days of its independence, has made arbitration an article of its creed, I cannot refrain from mentioning the immense satisfaction with which the statements to which we have listened in the last few days will be received by the Colombian people. I venture, too, to believe that the speeches of the delegates of Chile, Brazil and other American countries are the strongest evidence that this sentiment is shared by all the American States, which place implicit reliance upon the principle of arbitration. From the earliest day of our independence to the last Conference of Santiago, where the principle of arbitration was solemnly confirmed, arbitration has been for us Americans not a vague doctrine but a living reality, a reality whereby we have been able to put an end to a

number of international disputes, particularly boundary disputes. By arbitration we have settled almost all our disputes ; two very important disputes have been submitted to arbitration during the last two years, and in this way the moral unity of the continent has been restored and justice, liberty and democracy have become the first canons of our political faith.

Gentlemen, in our Committees we shall be able to discover formulas enabling us to develop the ideas that have been outlined here and to reconcile conflicting views. We shall discover the means of realising our hopes. For the moment, however, we should let nothing diminish those hopes.

Let us pay a solemn tribute of gratitude to the statesmen who have come to take part in our proceedings and to share in our responsibilities, thus lending added lustre to the prestige of the League of Nations.

After the speeches we have heard during the last few days, we may make bold to think that those who assert that the work of the League of Nations has failed and those who still hope that it will be a success in the future cannot deny that it has taken a great step forward along the path of international justice. After all the declarations we have heard we may claim to have made a definite advance towards peace and justice, towards the abolition of the use of brute force which has brought misfortune and disgrace on the community of nations and death and untold misery upon the peoples—and when I say the peoples, I am thinking first and foremost of those who toil and suffer in time of peace and who, when war comes, still toil, still suffer, and give their lives for their country.

**Resolution submitted by the French and British Delegations
and adopted by the Assembly.**

The PRESIDENT ·

The discussion is closed. I will now read to the Assembly the resolution submitted by the French and British delegations. We will then consider how far Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure

applies to this resolution ; after that I will call upon the first delegate of Great Britain and the first delegate of France to explain the resolution. I will then ask the Assembly to take a decision regarding it.

The resolution reads as follows :

" The Assembly,

" Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,

" Decides as follows :

" With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergencies between certain points of view which have been expressed and, when agreement has been reached, to enable an international conference upon armaments to be summoned by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment :

" (1) The Third Committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared in pursuance of Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans prepared and presented to the Secretary-General since the publication of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require.

" (2) The First Committee is requested :

" (a) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes ;

" (b) To examine within what limits the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice might be rendered more precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause ;

and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States."

Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure reads as follows :

“ 1. Resolutions, amendments and motions must be introduced in writing and handed to the President. The President shall cause copies to be distributed to the Representatives.

“ 2. As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the Assembly unless copies of it have been circulated to all Representatives not later than the day preceding the meeting.

“ 3. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments, or of motions as to procedure, without previous circulation of copies.”

We have, therefore, to determine whether the third paragraph of Rule 17 applies to the present case. I think that this can be decided in the affirmative because, though the questions involved are of supreme importance, the resolution proposed really does no more than refer them to certain Committees of the Assembly. The reference to the summoning by the League of an international conference on disarmament is merely a premise of the resolution. If the Assembly accepts the resolution it will not definitely bind itself to summon a conference.

In these circumstances I think that paragraph 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure does apply, and the discussion of the proposed resolution which I have just read is therefore in order.

Accordingly I call upon Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister of Great Britain and First Delegate of the British Empire, to address the Assembly.

Mr. Ramsay MACDONALD.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—By agreement between our French friends and ourselves the Assembly has now before it a resolution which we believe will give effect to the debate that has been continued during the last days on the question of the reduction of armaments. Briefly, the resolution assumes

that a Conference will be summoned by the League of Nations to deal with armaments, that, in preparation for that Conference, the Third Committee will consider all the documents that have been produced through the activities of the League and its various Committees and that the First Committee will be charged with the consideration of the form of that clause regarding arbitration which was embodied in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The resolution ends with a prayer that thus might be strengthened the solidity and the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States.

Mr. President, I am going to add nothing to the discussion. It has been admirable. It has exposed the needs of States in very varying conditions and no agreement by the League of Nations, however good it may be upon paper, however desirable it may be morally, can be satisfactory unless it relates to the actual facts of the situation in which each State finds itself.

It has been our business to face with courage but with caution recondite problems that have taken the nations of the world generations and generations not to settle but to face honestly, as we at last are doing here.

The question of peace : What are the conditions of peace ? The question of national security : What is national security ? The question of arbitration : What is the scope of arbitration ? The question of disarmament : Under what conditions is disarmament safe ?

Sir, they say that " the mills of God grind slowly " : the mills of Man grind still more slowly.

I see in front of me an old master though a new friend, M. Léon Bourgeois. I was young and my hair was black when M. Léon Bourgeois, honouring his own name and the name of the nation to which he belonged, proposed, at an International Conference, that the question of arbitration should be scientifically discussed.

Here are we assembled to-day. The years have gone, disputes have accumulated, wars have been fought, millions of precious lives have been sacrificed, thousands of millions of treasure have

been dissipated, and my friend, grown old and grey in the cause of international peace, still sits considering this question in its very first stages. It is a disgrace to us all.

Sir, if this meeting of the Assembly could only be recorded in the pages of history as the Assembly which, for the first time gave not only lip-service to peace, but brain-service, it would be distinguished above all the assemblies of mankind that have met hitherto.

My friend M. Herriot delivered an admirable speech yesterday. M. Herriot and I very often start on the same road, on the same journey, he on one side of the road and I on the other. The road is the same, the end is the same, and as we are good friends we do not go very far before we move together and continue our journey arm-in-arm in the middle of the road. It is not that our opinions have been reconciled; it is that the meaningless difference in distance and in position has been bridged by our commonsense and our desire for human companionship.

The French Premier, M. Theunis, Dr. Benes, M. Van Karnebeek especially, but others also, delivered speeches yesterday characterised by that calm, faithful sagacity which is so essential in councils like this. We dream our dreams. We have our visions. Ah, my friends, that is not enough. We have to discover the way. We have to find how we are going to get through all the forests that lie between us and our destinies, how we are to remove barriers, how we are to destroy obstacles.

I wish to give the assurance to my friends that so far as the British Government is concerned it has no intention whatever of shutting its eyes to obvious dangers in order to indulge in a pleasant gesture—it desires no traps for the small nationalities in matters of disarmament, no weakening of their opportunities to live, no sacrificing of the security which I consider to be their best security, namely, their liberty to express themselves, their liberty to be, their liberty to enjoy themselves in possession of their historical traditions which they are glorifying and beautifying by the contributions which they are now making to those traditions.

We have just the fear—and I express it quite sincerely—we have just the fear that we may slip back. Let me explain. You find upon old roads, unused for generations and generations, that the ruts get deeper and deeper, and the habits of those who pass along them become more and more ingrained ; every other road becomes haunted with ghosts, with fears, with terrors and then something happens that shows that the old road is not a safe one—a war revolution, a great disturbance comes and stops it up for a moment. You know that when the wheels begin to go round on the top of a rut the great danger is that unless the hand that guides is a steady hand steering towards the new and the better, down you may go into the rut, and another war and another revolution are necessary to enable you to get out of it. This, frankly, is the fear that we have in our hearts—lest we go back. But, sir, this resolution, and the material that will be produced by the carrying out of this resolution, will secure us against falling back into those methods of almost superstitious security which really have no reality associated with them at all. I hope, ladies and gentlemen, that this resolution is going to be carried with unanimity and that the whole of the Assembly will do what I appealed to it to do two days ago.

The world expects much from us. Let us have the courage to give it that much by adopting this resolution, by carrying on the work, by seeing to it that we shall not sleep until we have discovered the way to secure peace. We shall then be writing the name of this Assembly in letters of gold for the history of mankind.

M. HERRIOT.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,—I shall not detain you long. The best of all speeches is action ; and it is an action that I wish to perform here in following my dear friend Mr. Ramsay MacDonald upon this platform.

We both arrived here only a few days ago with a deep sense of our responsibilities and a keen anxiety to know whether we could

be useful or not to the great cause of peace of which we, like all of you here, are the devoted servants. We have both spoken freely. We have explained our ideas, our fears, our methods and our conceptions of the way in which your work should be carried out. But, while we explained our ideas, we were both actuated by the desire, I would even say the determination, not to leave this Assembly without having achieved complete unity of understanding, without setting the example of two men with heavy responsibilities joining hands in an effort to effect an agreement which will prove of value to all. This agreement is contained in the resolution we have submitted to you.

I could wish that we might have had time for fuller and longer consultation. All that I have been able to do myself is to ensure the concurrence of my very dear friends from Belgium, who authorised me to speak on their behalf, and of my no less dear friends from Italy, who have been so good as to grant me the same permission.

But, my dear colleagues, my words are addressed to all of you, and I am sure that in a short while you will one and all unanimously respond to our President's appeal.

It would indeed have been—I will no longer say it would be—deplorable if the great debate which has lasted here for three days had been nothing more than an academic discussion. It would have been, as it was termed just now, a disgrace. At the very least, it would have been a matter for keen regret.

We have heard, in turn, the broad views of Lord Parmoor, inspired by a lofty and wide philosophy, the recommendations so eloquently put forward by some of the highest authorities in Europe or the world—you will excuse me if I only mention a few of them—M. Van Karnebeek, Dr. Benes, M. Theunis, M. Salandra, M. Politis, who spoke this morning, and many others whose cogent pleas we shall certainly not forget.

We must now come to a conclusion. The conclusion is the joint note which we have the honour to submit to you. I believe that we have chosen the right way. It would have been deplorable

if years of endeavour had had no result. Once you have adopted our text, the Committees of the Assembly will be in a position to continue the work and to embark on those arduous enquiries, which my friend MacDonald described just now in vivid terms, on the problems of assistance and of solidarity, for which you must find the solution that can alone give reality and life to the international brotherhood that we hope to create.

I can assure you that as head of my Government I shall take leave of you to-night full of hope, faith and gratitude towards you, my dear colleagues. We were at the most critical moment in the existence of the League of Nations. I ventured to tell you yesterday that we must in our work conform to the laws which govern all organic development. As we know, the most critical time in organic development is always the period of early growth. We were precisely at the point where we had to decide whether we were to continue indefinitely to discuss first principles, as has so often been the case in regard to the problem of peace, or whether we were to adopt resolutions and pass on to actions leading to real results.

In a few minutes we shall, I hope, have passed the reef.

What more can we wish? Certainly not, my dear colleagues, that your Committees will possess the necessary courage. That we know they will have; we know that you will find among you men whose intelligence and knowledge will find solutions for the problems which confront us, solutions which will not perhaps be altogether perfect, but which the nations will accept with gratitude and to which they will subscribe because they emanate from the highest authority that the world has ever known.

What I wish—and I speak for us all—is that we should one and all have the will and the patience to complete this great work which has just made so decisive an advance.

The road of which my friend MacDonald spoke just now is still a long road, but we shall advance along it, he and I, together, arm-in-arm, at one in our thoughts and in our efforts.

I feel sure that you all, my dear colleagues, share our ambitions, our resolve to co-operate in a spirit of brotherly love. On resuming

the direction of my country's affairs I shall not cease to be present among you and, whether far or near, to give you the support of my complete confidence in your work and, let me add among my last words, of my whole faith.

For in order to achieve a task so great as that which now awaits its conclusion, the intellect, however it may strive, is not enough. You will agree, my dear colleagues, that we shall need a robust faith. Nothing can be done in any sphere without great faith. Without this belief and the will which is born of it, without the determination to triumph over all obstacles, to sweep aside objections—without this ambition and this resolve we can never attain the goal.

The French delegation will work with you in this spirit, and I am sure that in a few weeks the nations will rejoice to learn that the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations has made a decisive step forward, by which our century will be marked off from those long, long centuries of misery when war was the only final argument of nations. Although we have many difficulties to overcome, many rivers to cross before we arrive at the end of our journey, we shall be a little nearer than we are to-day to that bright horizon which we are striving to reach by the close and brotherly collaboration which I have for a few hours been privileged to witness. I take away with me such precious comfort that my last word to you must be a word of thanks.

The resolution was unanimously adopted on Saturday, September 6th. The Committees met on Monday, September 8th, and are still in session.

September 11th, 1924.

PRINTING SONOR S. A. — GENEVA.