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
RECORDS

OF THE

Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments

Series D

VOLUME 1



MINUTES

OF THE

LAND COMMISSION

February 27th - June 6th, 1932

Series of League of Nations Publications

IX. DISARMAMENT

1935. IX. 9.

This volume contains the Minutes of the Land Commission, which was in session from February 27th to June 6th, 1932.

The Land Commission was set up by the General Commission on February 25th, 1932, in consequence of the following resolution, adopted by the Conference on the 24th of the same month :

" The Conference,

" Approving the proposals of the Bureau on the action to be taken in regard to the plans and proposals which have been placed before it :

" (1) Decides to transmit to the General Commission these plans and proposals, as well as the draft Convention (with annexes) prepared by the Preparatory Commission, which may serve as a framework for the work of the Conference ;

" (2) Requests the General Commission to proceed to a preliminary study of, and to co-ordinate, the said plans and proposals and the draft Convention ;

" (3) Decides that, without prejudice to the rules of procedure,¹ the General Commission shall be authorised to constitute, as and when the need arises, such commissions, sub-commissions or committees as it may consider desirable, and, in particular, the land, naval, air and national defence expenditure commissions.

" Such commissions, sub-commissions or committees will report to the General Commission on the matters which it refers to them."

The Land Commission appointed the following officers :

President : M. E. BUERO (Uruguay) ;

Vice-Presidents : General J. LAIDONER (Estonia),
M. W. M. VAN LANSCHOT (Netherlands) ;

Rapporteur : M. M. BOURQUIN (Belgium) ;

Secretary : Major M. N. MATHENET, Secretary of the Military Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions ; Member of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations.

¹ Part V of the Rules of Procedure reads as follows :

" V. COMMISSIONS.

" 1. The Conference shall have the right, according to the exigencies of the business on hand and convenience of work, to set up commissions on which all delegations may be represented by a delegate, who may be assisted by advisers, experts and secretaries. Committees may also be set up consisting of delegates of a limited number of countries.

" 2. Each Commission shall appoint its Chairman and its Vice-Chairman or its Vice-Chairmen and shall, at the appropriate time, appoint one or more Rapporteurs.

" 3. The Commissions may themselves set up sub-commissions."

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¹ This resolution is reproduced on page 112, in document Conf.D.122 [Conf.D./C.T.45(1)].

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FIRST MEETING

Held on Saturday, February 27th, 1932, at 10.30 a.m.

The Right Honourable A. HENDERSON in the Chair

1. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

Mr. HENDERSON drew attention to the decision taken by the General Commission on February 25th setting up the Land Commission. He proposed that the Commission should proceed to elect its President, Vice-President or Vice-Presidents and one or more Rapporteurs in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference. Under Article 13 of the Rules, the election was to be carried out by secret ballot unless the Commission decided otherwise.

He proposed that the Commission should elect its President and should then decide whether to elect immediately one or more vice-presidents and one or more rapporteurs.

M. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT (Cuba) proposed that the Commission should only elect its President, and should adjourn the election of the vice-presidents and rapporteurs until the list of members of the Commission had been prepared.

The above proposal was adopted.

On the proposal of Mr. Wilson (United States of America), M. BUERO (Uruguay) was elected President by acclamation.

Mme. LUISI (Uruguay) accepted this nomination on behalf of M. Buero, who was temporarily absent.

SECOND MEETING

Held on Wednesday, March 9th, 1932, at 3.30 p.m.

President : M. BUERO

2. ELECTION OF THE VICE-PRESIDENTS AND OF A RAPPORTEUR.

The Commission appointed two Vice-Presidents — namely, General LAIDONER (Estonia) and M. VAN LANSCHOT (Netherlands).

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium) was appointed Rapporteur.

3. EXAMINATION OF THE AGENDA.

The PRESIDENT recalled that, in accordance with the procedure drawn up by the Bureau and approved by the General Commission, that Commission was alone competent to deal with questions of principle, which could only be referred to the special Commissions after examination by the General Commission.

A certain number of questions, however, had been considered as suitable for examination by the special Commissions, without previous discussion by the General Commission. These questions were contained in document Conf. D.103. Any question of principle which might arise during the discussions in a special Commission would be referred to the General Commission. The above document, therefore, did not in any way prejudice the right of a special Commission to refer a question to the General Commission for a decision.

The President, passing in review the questions which might be examined by the Land Commission without previous discussion by the General Commission, noted that Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention contained certain definitions and a method of calculating average effectives. The Commission possessed, on the other hand, the proposals of various delegations on these two articles and on the tables attached thereto. Some of these proposals were concerned with the method of arriving at the figures, others with the number of figures to be inserted in the tables. It was therefore essential, in the first place, to ascertain exactly what was represented by the figures — that was to say, what classes of effectives were covered by each set of figures. This question was quite separate from those of trained reserves, separate limitation of home and overseas forces, the numbering of officers, professional soldiers, etc.

The Commission should therefore first come to an agreement as to the meaning to be attached to the words used in the Convention; there was no uniformity in the interpretation of the various Governments, and it would therefore be necessary to examine these interpretations and then draw from them the necessary conclusions. The conceptions of the Convention held by the Governments were indicated in their replies, and an examination of these replies would be useful, in order to remove any uncertainty as to the meaning of the articles of the Convention. The replies of the Governments were, however, numerous; and they might be examined either by the Commission or by a sub-committee which would report to the Commission. It would, on the other hand, be essential to get into touch with the other special Commissions with a view to co-ordinating the work and the conclusions to be submitted to the General Commission. The Land Commission should therefore consider the method of obtaining this co-ordination.

Colonel FABRY (France) supported the proposal of the President, which he understood as follows: As there was no question of the good faith and goodwill of the members of the Commission, efforts should be made to arrive as quickly as possible at a result based upon mutual confidence and esteem. The best way to reach this result was to speak the same language. There had been a considerable loss of time at the London Conference which might have been avoided if a preliminary agreement had been reached regarding the definition of certain terms.

In submitting the draft Convention to the various Governments for examination, the Council was well aware that it was making an experiment. It was anxious to know to what extent the preliminary texts would receive a common understanding and interpretation by the various Governments — that was to say, how a final text might be prepared which might be applied in good faith in all States.

An examination of the replies of the Governments showed a very great divergence of views as to the interpretations to be given to these terms; there were also important differences on matters of principle. The best way of coming to an agreement on principles was to avoid from the beginning any ambiguity as to the meaning of the words employed. It must, of course, be understood that, if a sub-commission were appointed, it could not go into the question of the figures; it would in any case be unwise to begin any such discussion until agreement had been reached as to the exact meaning of the words; but the sub-commission might go through the replies of the Governments and ascertain what differences existed as to the interpretation of the texts. The Bureau would thus be in a position to assist in directing the discussions, it being to some extent the task of the sub-commission to prepare the ground for the meetings of the Commission after having heard, if necessary, the representative of each Government as the replies of that Government came under consideration. The formation of a sub-commission would considerably facilitate, and not delay, the work of the Commission, as it would bring to light the divergencies arising to a great extent out of the differences in the naval, air and military systems of the various States. In order to save time, it would be better that the Commission should not wait until the sub-commission had examined all the questions. It could deal with them as and when they were submitted for consideration by the sub-commission. The sub-commission should be a rather small body, and it should, of course, have the power to summon the representative of any Government concerned in order to obtain further information regarding the replies it had sent.

The PRESIDENT pointed out, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that the sub-commission would not make any enquiry into the figures submitted by the Governments in their replies, and would confine itself to an examination of the interpretation placed by these Governments on the text of the Convention.

He considered that co-ordination with other technical Commissions might be effected by notifying those Commissions of results as they were obtained. It was quite likely that the various Commissions would not deal with their respective programmes in the same order. The question of setting up a co-ordinating body might stand over for the present, as any resolutions which might be adopted would be subject to a second reading, at which time account would be taken of the work of the other Commissions.

Colonel LANSKORONSKIS (Lithuania) pointed out that the draft Convention had been adopted as the framework and not as the basis of the work of the Conference. It was therefore possible to introduce amendments on matters of principle. The suggestions which had been made by the Governments were numerous, and both political and technical in nature. Every single paragraph of the Convention, in fact, required a preliminary decision on a point of principle, and these were the concern of the General Commission. It therefore seemed difficult for the Land Commission to begin its examination of the questions referred to it, before the questions of principle had been settled. In his opinion, the sub-commission should, so to speak, draw up a fresh programme of work for the Commission, allocating for immediate discussion all questions in which no matter of principle was involved and excluding all others.

He was also of the opinion that the Bureau, and particularly the Vice-Presidents, should form the co-ordinating body with the other technical Commissions.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) referred to the statement made in the General Commission by Lord Londonderry to the effect that the United Kingdom delegation did not favour the discussion of questions of principle in the special Commissions except on direct reference from the General Commission. He considered that most of the matters which the Commission was discussing were already before the General Commission as

questions of principle, and he was therefore opposed to the reference of such matters to a sub-commission. If it were merely a question of the meaning to be given to the words "effectives" and "days' duty", he had no objection to a discussion in the Commission, but he wished to make it clear that to enquire into the meaning of "average daily effectives" would involve matters of principle. It would, moreover, be a waste of time to discuss now the meaning of phrases which might not even appear in the final form of the Convention. He wished also to point out that a definition might be too precise, and in the present case might well fail to cover the very wide varieties of practice and procedure which existed in the armies of the world. He was in agreement with the Lithuanian delegate in considering that, if a sub-committee were set up, its terms of reference should be very restricted and very strictly defined.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that his delegation entirely concurred in General Temperley's opinion. No question of principle should be taken up until the General Commission had come to a decision.

The PRESIDENT explained that the sub-commission would be asked merely to perform the material work of classifying the documents and preparing the various items of the Land Commission's work. The General Commission had referred to the Land Commission a certain number of questions for examination, and the Land Commission could not refuse to do so. If any question of principle arose during the examination, it would be held over and referred by the Land Commission to the General Commission. It was quite understood that the sub-commission's work would be purely preparatory.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, thought it necessary to add, in order to obviate any ambiguity, that the sub-commission would not be asked to give any definitions or to propose any texts. It would simply examine the way in which Governments had interpreted the terminology used in Articles 2, 3 and 4 and bring out the difficulties they had encountered. He proposed therefore that the Commission should decide to set up a committee of experts to enquire into the way in which the various Governments had, when compiling the information they had sent to the League, interpreted the definitions given in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the draft Convention, and into the difficulties and doubts which had arisen in their interpretation.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) reminded the Commission that M. Beneš had stated in the General Commission that, if a delegation raised objections to the discussion of any point on the ground that it involved a question of principle, the President of the Commission would be free to withdraw such a matter from discussion by the Commission. In his opinion, if a sub-commission was to be appointed, it was essential that it should be a small one. He considered that it would be a waste of time to discuss at the present stage of the proceedings terms to which the Governments gave different interpretations, so long as the fundamental question of principle had not been settled by the General Commission.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) emphasised that it was essential that the sub-commission, and later the Land Commission, should avoid dealing with questions of principle. If that were agreed, the method of work proposed by the President was, he thought, acceptable. He suggested that the Commission might itself hear the explanations of the representatives of the various delegations concerning the way in which their Governments had calculated effectives.

The PRESIDENT, in reply to General Temperley, said that it was definitely understood that, if a question of principle arose, it must be submitted to the General Commission. That was the very basis on which the Commission's work was organised. If during the scrutiny of the replies from the Governments it was found that one of them involved a matter of principle, it would immediately be referred to the General Commission. The sub-commission's work would be merely to clear the ground and obtain explanations.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) was satisfied with the President's explanation.

Colonel LANSKORONSKIS (Lithuania) wondered whether the Commission could depart from the terms of reference laid down by the General Commission when fixing its programme of work. In particular, was it really desirable to ascertain how the Governments had understood the practical application of the Convention? Such a study might have only an historical interest.

In his opinion, it would perhaps be wiser to instruct the sub-commission merely to study the programme closely and to single out those questions which the Commission might take up at once without touching on matters of principle. He admitted that there would not be very many, since each problem had some bearing on a question of method and the fundamental system of the Convention was not very evident for the moment.

The PRESIDENT thought that the Lithuanian delegate's remark related rather to the question of the Commission's agenda.

He noted that the Commission accepted the idea that certain studies should be carried out under the conditions suggested by M. Bourquin.

The Commission would have to decide to what body this work should be entrusted, whether a small committee, the Commission itself or the Bureau, which would have the assistance of the delegates concerned.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) thought that the sub-commission should be as small as possible, and suggested that the work should be done by the Bureau.

Colonel FABRY (France) expressed satisfaction at the Commission's decision to create an instrument of work which would obviate not only loss of time but controversy as well. He had some doubt as to General Temperley's proposal, since, in his view, the problems in question came essentially within the competence of experts with an intimate knowledge of military organisation. The point was to ascertain the difficulties which the States had encountered. He thought that the Bureau might have the assistance of a committee of experts, whose work it would direct, while itself retaining the responsibility. He was particularly anxious that this investigation should be carried out by experts, since that would make it possible, as the Commission desired, to avoid entering into political questions.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) considered that the sub-commission, however small, should include the representatives of the delegations whose opinions differed most widely. This would obviate lengthy discussions in plenary session.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) seconded Colonel Fabry's proposal.

The Commission decided to set up a technical committee consisting of experts belonging to the following countries: United States of America, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the committee to work under the direction of the Bureau.

The Commission further decided that its agenda would be framed by the Bureau, which would consider what questions could be discussed immediately.

THIRD MEETING

Held on Tuesday, April 26th, 1932, at 11 a.m.

President : M. BUERO

4. QUALITATIVE DISARMAMENT: METHOD OF WORK TO BE ADOPTED IN EXECUTING THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22nd, 1932.

The PRESIDENT reminded the members of the Commission of the resolution adopted on April 22nd by the General Commission, to the effect that :

“ . . . The Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians.”

The General Commission was asking the Land Commission for technical information with a view to determining those weapons, so far as land armaments were concerned.

The President pointed out, however, that the Land Commission must be careful not to enter into questions of principle, which were outside its competence, as M. Paul-Boncour had observed in the General Commission.

He enquired what method of work the Land Commission preferred to adopt : it might examine the various proposals which had been put forward by the delegations concerning those arms to which the resolution applied ; it might examine in succession each category of arms, or, lastly, it might endeavour to define the characteristics mentioned in the resolution and decide what weapons presented those characteristics. He invited the delegations to express their views as to the choice of method.

General BONOMI (Italy) was in favour of adopting the first method proposed by the President — *i.e.*, of taking as a basis for discussion the proposals already put forward by the various delegations and examining in succession the categories of arms to which they applied : that method would make it unnecessary to revert to the work of the Preparatory Commission and would save time.

Lord HAILSHAM (United Kingdom) supported the Italian delegate's view that the Commission would be well advised to adopt the President's first suggestion. Two points, he thought, should claim the Commission's special attention: it must be sure not to omit any weapons that could be included under the head of qualitative disarmament, and it must lose no time in reaching its conclusions. The second method put before the Commission by the President would involve an unduly lengthy discussion, not necessarily followed by conclusive results. The third method — the definition of the characteristics of the various arms — was largely theoretical, and it would be difficult to focus the question within the terms of the resolution adopted on April 22nd.

The Co-ordinating Table,¹ however, already contained any suggestions that had been submitted by the delegations, and there appeared to be only four classes that had occurred to anyone as falling within the category of qualitative armaments — namely, heavy artillery, tanks, armoured motor-cars, fortresses. If a fifth class was thought of, it could, of course, be added. The Commission might begin by discussing heavy guns, from the standpoint of mobility, long range, etc.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) supported the suggestions of the Italian and United Kingdom delegations. He thought the Commission should try to establish a single list, and the weapons enumerated by Lord Hailsham could be examined in succession.

M. AUBERT (France) also supported the proposals that had been put forward, but stressed the point that the proposed list of weapons did not exhaust the subject and that other categories of arms might, if necessary, be added.

The PRESIDENT noted that the Commission was prepared to adopt the first method which he had proposed and which had been supported by the Italian, United Kingdom and German delegations. It was understood that, while the proposals already put forward by certain delegations would constitute the basis for discussion, that fact would not exclude new proposals that might be submitted by other delegations. The four classes to be examined might be, as suggested: (1) heavy artillery; (2) tanks; (3) armoured motor-cars; (4) fortresses. It would, however, be necessary, as General Bonomi had pointed out, for delegations to give details on certain points, such as the calibre of guns, etc., and any characteristic features of the material in question.

If the Commission decided to adopt that method, the President would ask the delegations to supply the necessary supplementary information as soon as possible; tables would be drawn up as a basis for the discussion, enabling the latter to be kept within the scope of the resolution of April 22nd.

The President said that he might have suggestions to submit to the Commission concerning the order in which those proposals should be studied, with a view to expediting the work as far as possible.

The Hon. Hugh WILSON (United States of America) enquired whether the intention was that gas warfare should be discussed by the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, or by one Commission only.

The PRESIDENT thought that the question came within the competence of the General Commission; he could not give an answer on the point raised.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) saw no objection to the Commission drawing up its own list and including in it — if it considered this desirable — chemical weapons, even if that point had to be studied again later.

M. SATO (Japan) supported the proposals which had been put forward; he agreed also with M. de Madariaga as regards chemical weapons. He felt some doubt, however, as regards the method of discussion to be adopted by the Commission. Under the terms of the resolution, the Commission's task was to examine weapons from the standpoint of the various characteristics mentioned in the resolution; the same weapon, however, might present two or three of those characteristics. Tanks, for example, could be regarded as weapons of a specifically offensive character or as weapons most efficacious against national defence or, again, as weapons which were most threatening to civilians. It was on those three characteristics that the Commission must give an opinion and also on the degree to which those characteristics were present in each case. He proposed that each delegation should prepare tables and attribute to each of the various weapons studied so many "marks", as it were (from 1 to 10), for each characteristic.

M. POLITIS (Greece) had no wish to open a general discussion in the Commission, but would recall that the latter had been entrusted with a mission which must be carried out as quickly as possible. Under the terms of the resolution of April 22nd, the

¹ Document Conf. D.103, Chapter A, Land Armaments

Commission was entrusted with a work of comparison. The point was not to determine which weapons were offensive in character, but those whose character was the most specifically offensive. It must be made clear that the comparison must be made, not between the different weapons, but between the different characteristics of each weapon. He felt that a comparison of weapons, one with another, would involve unduly lengthy discussions, and that the Japanese proposal would require too complicated calculations. It must not be forgotten that the questions to be discussed were not merely technical but were in the main political, and that the Commission's task was to carry out a general examination, for which the use of coefficients seemed to him superfluous.

The PRESIDENT, reverting to M. de Madariaga's observation arising out of Mr. Wilson's question, insisted on the fact that the resolution of April 22nd did not set any limits on the Commission's task, and that the list submitted to it was in no way limitative.

As regards the procedure to be adopted, M. Sato had proposed a mathematical system which, as M. Politis had remarked, was open to certain objections. The point indeed was not to define the different weapons by means of a general estimate, on the basis of the three characteristics enumerated; according to the General Commission's view, it was not necessary for a weapon to present all three characteristics to be included in the list.

He thought that Lord Hailsham's argument fitted in with M. Politis's suggestions and that, if the Commission had to examine the weapons one by one and not in relation to one another, it would undoubtedly be embarking upon a somewhat lengthy enumeration.

M. POLITIS (Greece) replied that he had simply wished to sketch out a general plan of work. He agreed that the best method would be to study one by one the different categories of weapons, remembering that the list was not finally established and that any delegation could still submit proposals. He thought his remarks were quite compatible with the proposals of the United Kingdom delegate, since he had simply asked that the Commission, instead of comparing arms one with another, should endeavour to decide by categories to what extent each of them possessed the characteristics enumerated in the resolution.

M. SATO (Japan) said that he, too, had had in mind an estimate of the different weapons from the standpoint of the three characteristics enumerated, rather than a general estimate on the basis of the total of coefficients. As he understood it, the Commission's work was to specify the weapons which most clearly possessed one of three characteristics; to facilitate that decision he had proposed the adoption of a mathematical system. If that were considered too complicated, he was prepared to accept any other.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) agreed that the Commission would be wise to take as a starting-point for its work the proposals already submitted by delegations. At the same time, he could only support the proposal put forward by the United Kingdom delegate with certain reservations.

He noted that all the members of the Commission were in favour of taking as a basis for their work the proposals already submitted by delegations, on the understanding that they did not constitute a complete basis and did not exclude the possibility of submitting other proposals as the work advanced.

He wished to remove one apparent cause of confusion in the discussion, and pointed out that the proposals of delegations which were to be taken as a basis for the work of the Commission had each been prepared separately. That necessarily meant overlapping, which might hinder the Commission's work.

He thought it would be preferable for the Commission to take as a basis a plan in which the various proposals submitted by delegations would be co-ordinated in a list of weapons drawn up without any reference to the degree of offensiveness of each weapon. It would be for the Land Commission to determine the characteristics of each weapon within the meaning of the General Commission's resolution. A definite basis for its work would thus be available. The draft might be framed by a Committee of six or ten members selected from among the members of the Land Commission.

M. AUBERT (France) said that he was very much impressed by M. de Madariaga's remarks. It was clear that, if the Commission took as its starting-point the lists of weapons submitted by the delegations, lists which had been framed on empirical lines, re-grouping would be necessary, and that re-grouping must of course be carried out on the lines of the General Commission's proposal, that was to say, with reference to the three criteria laid down in the resolution of April 22nd. For that it would be necessary to have the opinion of the delegations as to the extent to which each weapon presented one or more of the characteristics mentioned in the resolution. How could that be achieved? With the help of a small committee, or by inviting each delegation to forward its suggestions to the President, who would be asked to classify them? It seemed preferable that the Bureau of the Land Commission should be responsible for the re-grouping, so that the Commission could embark on its discussion a few days hence in the spirit of the general resolution.

The PRESIDENT was prepared to adopt whatever method might be recommended by members of the Commission. He expressed the view that the work would proceed more rapidly if the delegations would send him their proposals as soon as possible, in order that the Bureau might begin the work of re-grouping without delay.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) supported the proposal that the re-grouping should be carried out by the Bureau of the Commission.

The PRESIDENT, summing up the discussion, suggested that it should be decided that delegations which had submitted lists of weapons which were to form the subject of special treatment should give fuller details as soon as possible concerning the weapons they had in mind. He expressed the hope that the delegations would send in the necessary material as soon as possible, in order that the Bureau might prepare the table without delay.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, feared that the method of work proposed would not produce rapid results. The Land Commission was in favour of taking as a basis for its work the proposals to be found in the Co-ordinating Table, always with the possibility of supplementing them. The first weapon to be examined would be heavy artillery. The Land Commission was about to ask the delegations to define their proposals concerning that weapon. Would all those proposals fit in with one another? He feared, moreover, that the Bureau might be inundated with documents.

He thought, therefore, that it would be more practical for the President to convene the representatives of delegations which had submitted proposals concerning heavy artillery, in order that they might define their meaning in greater detail. The necessary preliminary work could be got through quickly in a single afternoon. He proposed therefore an exchange of views, instead of written replies.

The PRESIDENT wished, above all, to have the opinion of technical experts; it was of secondary importance whether the information was given verbally or in writing.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) thought that the most practical solution would be for the delegates to bring their proposals to the meeting in writing. The necessary co-ordinating could be done by means of an exchange of verbal explanations.

M. POLITIS (Greece) pointed out that it was essential to choose the most rapid method of work, so as not to suspend the meetings of the Land Commission. He was afraid that written communications might complicate the Bureau's task. It was intended to hold a meeting of the Commission on the following afternoon, and he was very anxious that it should not be adjourned.

He thought that the quickest method would be to ask the representatives of delegations which had submitted proposals to come to the meeting that very afternoon and give fuller particulars. In that way the co-ordinating document could be prepared by the Bureau the following morning and circulated to the delegations in time for the meeting of the Land Commission to be held on the following afternoon.

The PRESIDENT said that if the Land Commission saw no objection and decided to adopt the quickest method, he would propose that the technical experts of the delegations which had submitted proposals should be asked to attend the meeting that afternoon, in order to give the Bureau such details as it might require to enable it to draw up the co-ordinating document, so that the Commission might meet on the following afternoon.

M. SATO (Japan) enquired why the invitation was confined to the experts of delegations which had already submitted proposals. He pointed out that the Land Commission was faced with a fresh factor — the resolution of the General Commission of April 22nd — and expressed the view that all the delegations, even those not mentioned in the Co-ordinating Table, should be given an opportunity of attending the meeting in the afternoon in order to join in the discussion.

The PRESIDENT thought that there was a slight misunderstanding. The proposed meeting with the representatives of the delegations which had put forward the proposals enumerated in the Co-ordinating Table would be in no way exclusive in character. The other delegations could also submit proposals, should they so desire.

The immediate consideration, however, was to obtain fuller details concerning the proposals enumerated in the Co-ordinating Table. Belgium, for example, had proposed special treatment for heavy long-range artillery. What was meant by heavy long-range artillery? Germany had included in her proposals heavy and field artillery above a specified calibre. The Commission must know what that calibre was.

The intention was not to exclude any other delegation that might desire to submit proposals. Any member of the Land Commission that wished might be present at the meeting.

The President insisted, however, that it was important for the Bureau to have fuller details at once as to the meaning of the proposals already submitted, in order that it might be possible for it to arrange the work within the framework of the General Commission's resolution.

The Secretariat had just given him a list of the countries which had submitted proposals, to be found in the Co-ordinating Table. They were: Afghanistan, Austria, Italy, Latvia, Switzerland, Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, Portugal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Turkey, Germany, France, Denmark and the United States of America. He invited the delegations of those countries to send representatives

to a meeting which would be held at four o'clock, to supply any explanations and details concerning their proposals, with a view to organising the Land Commission's work within the framework of the general resolution.

General DE NÁNY-MÉGAY (Hungary) pointed out that other States had submitted proposals which would be found in Part II, "Material", of the Co-ordinating Table, and expressed the view that their representatives should be invited to attend the meeting.

The PRESIDENT assured the Hungarian delegate, as he had already assured M. Sato, that any member of the Land Commission might be present at the meeting.

M. AUBERT (France), summing up, said that he understood that representatives of delegations were invited to supply information simply with a view to the preparation of a list for purposes of study, and that the forthcoming meeting would not adopt any decision on the proposals or in any way prejudice the decisions to be taken by the Land Commission in plenary session.

The PRESIDENT stated that M. Aubert's interpretation was quite correct.

FOURTH MEETING

Held on Wednesday, April 27th, 1932 at 4 p.m.

President: M. BUERO

5. EXAMINATION OF THE CRITERIA PROPOSED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WITH A VIEW TO SELECTING THE WEAPONS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932.

The PRESIDENT announced that, in conformity with the decision taken by the Land Commission at its meeting on April 26th, the Bureau had drawn up a report (document Conf. D./C.T.5) recapitulating and classifying the more detailed information given by certain delegations concerning the criteria which they proposed should be taken in determining the material that was to form the subject of special treatment.

Before drawing conclusions from the report, he wished to thank M. Mathenet, the Secretary of the Bureau, to whom it was indebted for having enabled it to get through the work so quickly.

The first point noted in the report was that a certain number of delegations proposed to establish a distinction between mobile heavy artillery and fixed heavy artillery for permanent fortification works. Certain delegations were of opinion that fixed heavy artillery did not call for any special regime, while others held that it should be made subject to less radical restrictions than were proposed for mobile artillery. The President suggested, accordingly, that the Commission should decide whether a distinction should be established between mobile heavy artillery and fixed heavy artillery. He did not think that it would be difficult to reach an agreement on that point. It would, however, be necessary to define fixed artillery. The Commission might perhaps think it expedient to ask a technical committee to establish a definition. He proposed that the Commission should decide whether a technical committee should be appointed to give the technical definition necessary to distinguish between fixed and mobile heavy artillery. To save time, however, the Commission might, without waiting for the technical committee's conclusions, examine mobile heavy artillery materials, which differed so obviously from fixed heavy artillery that the question of discriminating between them need not be discussed.

M. AUBERT (France), while agreeing that it would be useful to refer the question of a differentiation between fixed and mobile heavy artillery to a technical committee, did not wish it to be assumed, by this fact, that the principle of a differentiation between the two categories was agreed. On the one hand, the opinion expressed by Sub-Commission "A" of the Preparatory Commission made it impossible to come to a rapid decision on that question of principle, and, on the other, the experience of the last war had shown that fixed fortress and coastal defence guns could be made mobile very easily. He felt obliged accordingly to make every reservation regarding the question of principle without, however, offering any objection to its being discussed in the proposed technical committee.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, pointed out that it was not so much a question of deciding a matter of principle as of adopting a procedure designed to facilitate the discussions. The Commission would probably achieve more satisfactory results if the technical aspect of the problem had first been discussed and defined by a technical committee. Pending the conclusions of that committee, the Commission could proceed to examine the question of mobile artillery while still leaving the matter open as regards fixed artillery.

M. AUBERT (France) expressed himself in agreement with the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT proposed, therefore, that the Commission should examine in the first place the question of mobile heavy artillery, leaving the definition of such artillery until later. He observed that certain delegations had proposed calibre limits which were not the same in the case of guns, howitzers and trench-mortars. He feared that that discrimination might lead to some confusion. If a difference was to be made between those three categories of material, it would be necessary to define each of them. Would it not be better to arrive at a single rule for guns, howitzers and trench-mortars alike?

He invited the Commission to express an opinion on the subject, more particularly those delegations which had proposed that a distinction should be made.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) observed that all the members of the Commission were acquainted with the German proposal which made a distinction between guns, howitzers and trench-mortars. He thought that the provisions of the Treaties of Peace which had been drafted by experts might be taken as a basis for discriminating between those several weapons.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) was not quite clear as to the difficulties which seemed to be troubling the Commission. The General Commission had asked the Land Commission to decide which were the weapons whose character was most specifically offensive or most efficacious against national defence, or most threatening to civilians. It was not the absolute character but the relative character of each weapon that the Land Commission had to decide. It was not necessary, therefore, for the Commission to fix any calibre; it was sufficient to say that guns of so many millimetres were more specifically offensive or more threatening to civilians than weapons of a smaller calibre. It would be for the Political Commission to draw the line of demarcation between weapons which should and weapons which should not form the subject of qualitative disarmament.

Moreover, the definition based on calibre was quite artificial from the standpoint of disarmament, which was the one with which the Commission was concerned, since it had to consider what would happen to the armaments that would still remain after the abolition of certain material; such armaments would undoubtedly be more dangerous. It must not be forgotten that this question was purely relative. The Commission must draw up a list of weapons of a more or less offensive character, stating the point at which, in its opinion, the calibre of the weapons rendered them inoffensive.

The PRESIDENT explained that his reason for asking the German delegation whether it insisted on maintaining the subdivision of mobile material into guns, howitzers and trench-mortars was in order that the Land Commission might, if the delegation agreed, concentrate on the question of calibre for the whole category of mobile heavy armaments. Otherwise it would be necessary to define each type, which would be a heavy task.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) observed that there were among the members of the Commission military experts of countries other than Germany which established a distinction between guns, howitzers and trench-mortars. It might be well to ask for their opinion.

The PRESIDENT, adopting M. von Weizsäcker's suggestion, enquired whether the Danish delegation had any observations to offer.

M. KRAFT (Denmark) did not wish to put forward any objection.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) agreed that the three classes of weapons should be taken together, on condition that the lowest calibre — 77 mm. — was adopted for each type.

The PRESIDENT proposed that, in that case, the Commission should examine the proposals concerning mobile artillery, beginning with the proposals which had suggested the lowest calibre.

M. VAN LANSCHOT (Netherlands) thought that, before beginning this examination, the members of the Commission should agree as to the meaning of the General Commission's resolution. Several of his colleagues had spoken on the previous day of three different classes of weapons coming under the terms of the resolution: weapons whose character was the most specifically offensive, weapons most efficacious against national defence and weapons most threatening to civilians. Although the General Commission had

mentioned those three characteristics, he wondered whether the weapons belonging to the first category did not almost always belong to the second also. There was no question of amending the General Commission's resolution; that was not within the Land Commission's competence. M. van Lanschot simply wished to interpret the resolution, by stressing the real meaning, so as to avoid all possible ambiguity. He noted that in almost every case the first and second categories were the same. He observed, moreover, that the second category had been included in Mr. Gibson's proposal, and he seemed to remember that the expression "those most efficacious against national defence" had been inserted more with the idea of defining what was meant by "offensive" in character. It would be useful for the Commission to have the opinion of the United States representative on this point.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) said that, while not wishing to interpret the meaning of the General Commission, it had seemed to him from the debate that there was some ambiguity and that the Land Commission was looking on the first two terms of the resolution as constituting two separate points, whereas Mr. Gibson's intention in suggesting the insertion of the second one had been to indicate a method of defining "offensive" weapons.

The PRESIDENT noted Mr. Wilson's statement, which would be of great value in applying the criteria enumerated by the resolution, when it came to defining the armaments for the purpose of the final report.

Opening the discussion on the question of calibre, he invited the German delegation to state the reasons for which it thought that weapons of a calibre of 77 mm. possessed one or more of the characteristics enumerated in the final resolution.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) feared that, if the report just distributed were taken as a basis for discussion, the multiplicity of the criteria proposed therein might lead to a very lengthy debate. He repeated his proposal that the basis so carefully formulated in the Treaties of Peace should be taken as a basis for the Commission's discussions.

M. SATO (Japan) also foresaw certain difficulties if the Land Commission embarked directly on a discussion of questions of calibre, weight and range, and recommended the constitution of a technical committee to discuss the characteristics of the weapons in question.

The Commission must know first if it could take as a criterion for defining the heavy artillery covered by the resolution of April 22nd, the calibre, weight or range of the guns and whether it must deal with heavy artillery as a whole or subdivide it into three classes: guns, howitzers and trench-mortars. A technical committee was the proper body to give an opinion on both those points. When the Land Commission had that opinion before it, it could decide the characteristics of the different weapons within the meaning of the resolution of April 22nd, and could then forward its conclusions to the General Commission.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom), speaking on a point of order, enquired whether the Commission was discussing the German proposal to take 77 mm. as the calibre limit or the Japanese proposal concerning the appointment of a technical committee.

The PRESIDENT thought that M. Sato's proposal should be examined first and that the Commission should be consulted as to the procedure which it wished to adopt. Should the whole question be referred to the experts, or only the question of calibre?

M. POLITIS (Greece) supported M. Sato's proposal; it was, he thought, essential to appoint a technical committee, which would be asked to indicate the criterion to be adopted by the Commission.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) said that as a non-technical member of the Commission, he had no hesitation in asking for the appointment of an expert committee. He suggested that if, before the committee were appointed, delegations which were in favour of certain calibres could first be invited to explain their reasons for so doing, the Commission would be able to see what the real problem was.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, asked M. Sato whether the committee which he recommended should be a small committee or a general committee. He pointed out that the Land Commission was a general technical Commission. If a small committee were formed, he was afraid that certain views which would not have been expressed in that Committee might be expressed in the Plenary Commission, in which case the discussion would be reopened. He suggested, then, that the Commission should hold a meeting at which the delegations would be represented by their technical experts, though this would not prevent political representatives from attending.

For the moment, M. Bourquin was of opinion that the Commission should, as Mr. Wilson and the President had proposed, invite the delegations which had submitted concrete proposals to give figures and explain them. Such information would help to enlighten the Commission.

Colonel LANSKORONSKIS (Lithuania) thought that each weapon should be examined from the standpoint of the three characteristics enumerated in the general resolution, since it frequently happened that the same weapon presented more than one of those characteristics.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) was anxious to find a *via media* between the proposal of M. Sato and M. Politis and that of M. Bourquin as regards the examination of the technical aspect of the questions before the Commission. He suggested that the Bureau should draw up a new report giving, for example, the exact definition of the material to be examined by the Commission and a list of such material, with indications as to the calibre, power, mobility and method of transport, whether train or motor transport. The Commission could then begin its examination, starting not with weapons of the lowest calibre, but with those of the highest. It would be easier in that way to reach an agreement concerning the offensive character of the material. As the scale of calibres diminished, objections would be raised and it would be for the Commission to fix the point at which the limit of the offensive character of the weapon was deemed to have been reached.

The PRESIDENT pointed out that M. de Madariaga's proposal was similar to one of the three methods which he himself had submitted on the previous day for the Commission to choose from, and that it had been rejected by the United Kingdom delegation as being likely to involve lengthy discussion. He asked the Commission to come to a decision concerning M. Sato's proposal and to say whether it wished the exchange of views on the reasons for which certain delegations had proposed certain calibres to be continued at a plenary meeting or whether it wished to appoint a small technical committee to hear their explanations and draw up a report.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) recommended that the Commission should first hear the delegations' reasons, since some of them might be of a political character; the statement of technical reasons would come next and would be made before a technical committee.

M. SATO (Japan) explained that he was in favour of setting up a technical committee of military experts without stating any special number of members. All the delegations must have the right to delegate a military expert to that committee. The questions to be dealt with by the Land Commission had two aspects: military and political. They should first be studied from the military standpoint by a technical committee and then examined from a political standpoint at a plenary meeting of the Commission.

The PRESIDENT, noting that all the members of the Commission were in favour of hearing the reasons which had guided the delegations in adopting the various calibres given, suggested that the question of appointing a technical committee should be postponed for the moment. He invited the Chinese delegate to state the reasons which had determined the fixing of the calibre mentioned in the Chinese delegation's proposal.

General WHANG (China) explained that the Chinese delegation had suggested 80 mm. as the calibre limit, as it was proposing the abolition of heavy artillery of all kinds, in view of the specifically offensive character of that weapon and of its efficacy against the national defence of the adversary.

General BONOMI (Italy) explained that, in asking for the abolition of artillery of a calibre exceeding 100 mm., the Italian delegation was considering the matter simply from a technical standpoint. It was of opinion that artillery of a calibre exceeding that figure was capable, by reason of its power or that of the projectile fired, of taking the enemy by surprise and overwhelming him, as it could destroy his defences without leaving him time to reply. The object of disarmament being to increase the possibility of defence in the event of attack, the Italian delegation felt that the prohibition of all types of heavy artillery was imperative.

From a purely practical standpoint, the Italian delegation thought that the more specifically offensive characteristics of a weapon were determined by the mobility, power and range of that weapon. It stressed the fact that mobility was a primordial factor in enabling the aggressor to concentrate his forces in order to destroy the defence works of his adversary, as was proved by the experience of the last war.

Again, the weapons which possessed in the highest degree those characteristics of mobility, power and range were also the weapons most threatening to civilians.

Lastly, it was by means of long-range guns that chemical and bacteriological warfare could chiefly be carried on.

The Italian delegation also adduced in support of its proposal a financial argument, for, in view of the fact that the cost of a weapon increased in proportion to its calibre, the abolition of artillery of a calibre above 100 mm. would result in an enormous reduction in the military budgets of States.

Lieutenant-General OMER Khan (Afghanistan) supported the Italian delegation's explanation, while reserving the right to give further details at the next meeting, if necessary.

The PRESIDENT observed that such additional information could be sent to the technical committee.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) explained that Switzerland had attempted to find a criterion which would, as far as possible, be above all discussion. It had chosen 150 mm., that being the figure adopted in the Convention on the trade in arms in establishing a distinction between heavy and light artillery. The same calibre had also been adopted as a criterion in the Convention on the manufacture of arms. Lastly, the artillery regulations of the great Powers all seemed to regard heavy artillery as starting at a calibre of about 150 mm.

M. AUBERT (France) asked the President for further explanations. He understood that the President had suggested appointing a technical committee when the delegations had explained their proposals, and that there would be a full discussion at the next meeting. He did not think the time had come for the technical committee to begin its work. It was necessary first to determine, by means of a general discussion, what questions were to be referred to the committee.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) said that, in selecting the figure of 155 mm. as the single-calibre limit, the United States had been guided by two main considerations — the character of the gun and the use to which it would be put. It had taken those guns which were most effective in breaking down defence (prepared trenches and fortresses) and had taken into account the fact that no division had guns superior to 155 mm. In approaching the problem, the Commission must aim at keeping down costs. If certain types of guns could be eliminated, heavy costs would thereby be eliminated at once, for guns, as they increased in calibre, increased in geometrical ratio in cost. He would go into the question more fully later.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) explained that his country had fixed 105 mm. as the calibre for guns, howitzers and mortars, because there were countries which had no fixed fortifications and which were obliged, in case of war, to erect emergency fortifications which could easily be destroyed by guns of a calibre exceeding 105 mm. Guns with a calibre exceeding that figure might also, in view of their range, constitute a menace to civilians and reach soldiers and civilians beyond the frontier. Lastly, a 105-mm. calibre was regarded in the Treaties of Peace as the limit for heavy artillery. As trench-mortars, on the other hand, had a shorter range, a higher calibre had been authorised for them — namely, 150 mm.

General TABBUK (Austria) supported the Hungarian delegate and laid stress on the distinction clearly established in the Treaties of Peace between heavy artillery and light artillery by the provision of a 105-mm. calibre for guns, howitzers and mortars and 150 mm. for trench-mortars.

Colonel DAWNAY (United Kingdom) said that, in arriving at a calibre of 155 mm., or approximately 6 inches, the United Kingdom delegation had been guided by three main considerations. In the first place, this limit definitely excluded the use of heavy shells capable of destroying heavy fortifications; it excluded guns of a definitely offensive character. Secondly — a point also noted by the delegates of Switzerland and of the United States — the limit for practically all the military nations was 155 mm., or 6 inches; to lower it would mean reorganisation at huge expense. Thirdly, the United Kingdom's own material needs made the retention of a gun of that size very necessary for carrying out her Imperial functions; in some parts of the world a lighter field-gun could not be used, owing to the nature of the *terrain*.

General VAN TUINEN (Netherlands) said that, although the Netherlands delegation had not proposed the abolition of this or that weapon, it was nevertheless prepared to support any proposal for the abolition of armaments that promised to be effective. He was in favour of dealing with the question as simply as possible. He agreed with M. de Madariaga that the distinctions required under the resolution of April 22nd were primarily a question of appreciation.

The Netherlands delegation had fixed a calibre of 155 mm. as the limit between light artillery and heavy artillery, that being the criterion laid down in the Convention of 1925 concerning the trade in arms. This figure had also been adopted as the line of demarcation between the two categories of artillery in the Preparatory Commission's report. Lastly, the Netherlands delegation held that it was above that calibre that heavy artillery became most specifically offensive and most efficacious against defensive works.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) stated that his country demanded the abolition of all weapons of a specifically aggressive character. While admitting the empirical character of that

definition, he thought that it was none the less applicable, and insisted on the point that the offensive character of weapons lay in their range and mobility.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the explanations of the delegations of Sweden, France, the Soviet Union and Belgium should be heard next day. He suggested that, after hearing the representatives of those delegations, the Commission should hold a general discussion and should then appoint the technical committee, to which it could submit any technical points that might emerge in the course of the discussion.

The President's proposals were adopted.

FIFTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, April 28th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President: M. BUERO.

6. EXAMINATION OF THE CRITERIA PROPOSED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WITH A VIEW TO SELECTING THE WEAPONS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 (continuation).

The PRESIDENT recalled that the Commission still had to hear the explanations of some of the delegations which had submitted proposals.

General NYGREN (Sweden) explained that the Swedish delegation had proposed 160 mm. as the calibre limit, but that it would, if necessary, agree to a figure somewhere, between 160 and 150 mm., that being approximately the calibre of coastal artillery. If the calibre of naval artillery were reduced, it would be prepared to agree also to a corresponding reduction in that of coastal artillery. For land artillery it would accept a calibre limit of 105 mm.

M. LANGOVOY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Soviet delegation had proposed the abolition of heavy artillery of great power and long range, the abolition of tanks and the limitation of artillery material to the existing types.

These proposals were an integral part of a whole, and were not a reply to the three points raised in the resolution adopted by the General Commission.

In reply to those three points, the Soviet delegation was of the opinion that all artillery, canon, howitzers and mortars of which the calibre exceeded 100 mm. should be considered as an offensive weapon and efficacious against national defence. It therefore supported the view put forward by the Italian delegation, while adding, however, that it was necessary to take into consideration not only the calibre, but other technical characteristics, such as the weight of the gun in position, the weight and range of the projectile. These data were necessary in order to ensure that the prohibitions to be instituted would not be circumvented by developments which modern technique might devise.

The Soviet delegation was, moreover, always ready to support the most radical proposals, provided that their object was a real qualitative and quantitative reduction of existing armaments.

General NUYTEN (Belgium) stated that the Belgian delegation had not thought it necessary to specify numerically the level of least efficacy for specifically offensive weapons or of least danger from the standpoint of national defence. It had decided *a priori* to support any proposal for the qualitative reduction of artillery material on which agreement could be reached at the Conference.

Although, in its proposals, the Belgian delegation had not put forward any data concerning calibre, it was anxious to help in elucidating the difficult problem referred to the Commission under the resolution of April 22nd. It thought that the Commission should examine land armaments from two standpoints: that of efficacy in attack and that of the danger to civilians, the first and second of the characteristics enumerated in the General Commission's resolution being one and the same.

From the standpoint of efficacy in attack, land armaments might be classed in the following order: mobile artillery, judged by the standards of present-day development and technique; tanks; gases released in waves from the ground or by means of projectiles; armed motor-cars.

From the standpoint of danger to civilians, land armaments might be classed as follows: in the first place, gases, then mobile artillery, considered more particularly from the standpoint of range. This classification would, of course, have to be justified in the report to the General Commission.

The Belgian delegate next explained that he had classed mobile artillery in the first rank of offensive weapons, as it was the most efficacious in breaking down the two principal forms of resistance in any defence — namely, active forces and permanent fortifications.

In order to decide what artillery material should form the subject of qualitative disarmament, it would be necessary to consider the specifically offensive character of each weapon, that being directly proportionate to its power, which was determined by calibre and range. The Commission would be well advised to examine each class of material from the standpoint of range, after having examined it from that of calibre, and then give an opinion as to the degree of efficacy of the material in question.

Though calibre was an important criterion in view of the destructive power it conferred on projectiles, the Belgian delegate would prefer to estimate the more specifically offensive character of a weapon according to the works that it was capable of destroying by reason of its calibre or range. He warned the Commission against fixing unduly narrow limits, and proposed that it should examine the degree of efficacy of the offensive power of artillery material against the means of resistance to attack — in other words, against permanent concrete or armoured fortifications, against emergency field fortifications and against resistance, properly so-called, of the active forces; on the basis of those data, it could indicate the calibres and range of the guns required to reduce the various obstacles.

A comprehensive study established on that basis and covering all the weapons that the Commission had been asked to examine would, he thought, answer the requirements of the General Commission's resolution.

M. AUBERT (France) said that he had been struck by the discrepancy in the figures and reasons already given by the delegations, a discrepancy which was explained by the fact that each delegation was governed chiefly by its national requirements and which made it seem likely that the Commission would not be able to arrive at joint conclusions. That result he thought could be obtained only after a technical study, on the basis of the characteristics enumerated in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd.

He proposed to make a rapid survey of those characteristics with a view to defining the questions to be referred to the technical committee, now that the explanations given had provided the Commission with data for discussion.

As regards the first point — what were the weapons whose character was most specifically offensive? — the experts had already replied in Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission and their replies were in agreement with actual experience. No weapon could be said to be of a specifically offensive character. Any weapon could be used efficaciously for defence as well as for attack. While there were thus no specifically offensive weapons, some material was particularly powerful both for defensive and for offensive purposes, and that power could be determined by the extent of the destructive action and range of the material.

As regards the second criterion named in the resolution of April 22nd, M. Aubert shared the view of the United States and Netherlands representatives that it was not distinct from the first, but had the advantage of being more definite.

As regards the definition of material most efficacious against national defence, he pointed out that Sub-Commission A had defined defensive armaments as permanent or temporary-fortifications. The French delegation did not think that artillery capable of being used effectively against field fortifications should be included in the category of weapons whose character was threatening to national defence. It felt that to do so might put a premium on aggression. After a surprise attack, the invader might entrench himself in the conquered territory. The attacked State therefore must retain the means of driving out the invader. Every State must still have at its disposal the equipment it might require to reach objectives of every kind on the battlefield.

As regards the third characteristic — efficacy against civilians — M. Aubert observed that, in referring to the protection of civilians against artillery, what was obviously meant was civilians behind the battlefield, so that it was necessary first to define what was meant by the battlefield and to ask the experts to give that definition.

The French representative proposed that the following questionnaire which had been proposed by the French delegation should be sent to the technical committee:

“ I

“ 1. What are the materials necessary for effective action against entrenchments and field works, and having the range necessary to reach the normal objectives of the modern battlefield?

“ 2. (a) What is the weight of the projectile (or weight of explosive) necessary for effective action against the essential organisations of modern permanent fortification?

“ (b) What are the technical characteristics, and in particular the calibre, of the corresponding guns?

“ II

“ 1. In modern war, what is the depth over which the troops and their various weapons engaged in the battle are distributed?

“ 2. What are the technical characteristics of the guns capable of firing beyond that depth? ”

He added that, if the question of coastal defence were dealt with by the Land Commission, it would be necessary also to consider whether coastal defence armaments should not be superior to the armament of vessels that might attack the coasts, a point which would raise the problem of interdependence between land and naval calibres.

He wished, however, to confine himself to a definition of the questions already enumerated which were to be referred to the technical committee, that was to say, to the Land Commission itself, but consisting of technical experts.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) stressed the importance of long-range artillery in view of its efficacy resulting from the range of its field of fire.

Referring more particularly to coastal artillery, he pointed out that it was essential to maintain the superiority of defence over aggression and for that reason to allow coastal batteries a calibre equal, if not superior, to that of naval artillery material. He observed that coastal artillery should include coastal guns on railways required for the defence of a long coast line.

Fortress artillery should, he thought, be at least equal in power to mobile artillery, so that the defence might still have a certain superiority over the attack. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that so-called fixed guns mounted on turrets could be dismantled and utilised as mobile pieces by placing them on gun-carriages.

As regards the various calibre limits proposed for mobile heavy artillery, ranging from 100 to 200 mm., the Polish delegate thought it would be difficult to establish a general rule, as the particular situation of the frontiers would have to be taken into account for each country, the efficacy of a weapon being determined by the obstacles which it was capable of overcoming.

In classifying weapons from the standpoint of efficacy against national defence, the first in order would be the most mobile material owing to the facility with which they could be concentrated on a specific point with the object of breaking down the adversary's defences; then would follow the howitzers and mortars, which were more efficacious against entrenchments than long guns.

He pointed out, in conclusion, that the most radical and most logical formula would be the complete abolition of artillery of all calibres, as proposed by the Chinese delegation, provided that that formula was really applied. Since, however, some doubt was permissible on that point and it was necessary to consider the possibility of aggression, a country which was invaded must be left with arms which would be sufficiently powerful to drive out the aggressor which might have entrenched itself on its territory.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) said that the British delegation regarded artillery as of three types: light artillery, medium artillery and heavy artillery.

Heavy artillery was generally recognised as being eminently efficacious in the destruction of means of defence. Again, it seemed to be generally agreed that the calibre of medium artillery was somewhere about 155 mm. The British delegation had hoped that the Commission might choose approximately that figure as the line of demarcation between artillery material which might be authorised and material to be abolished if it were decided to adopt qualitative disarmament. By this means it would have been unnecessary to refer the question to a technical committee and the discussion could thereby have been shortened.

At the same time, if the Land Commission was unanimously desirous of setting up a technical committee, he would agree to the proposal to send to that committee a questionnaire on the lines of that proposed by the French delegation, which dealt with the matter adequately and would give the Commission the data it required for taking a decision. He was in full agreement with the principle of the questionnaire, which had his entire support. He wished, however, to have an opportunity of examining the text, so that he might, if necessary, suggest amendments in regard to details. He would support the suggestion to set up a technical committee, if the Land Commission were unanimous on that point.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) observed that the calibre of the armaments which the States now disarmed had been allowed to retain should be taken as a basis in fixing the calibre of those of other States. It was on this basis that he had proposed 105 mm., which, he thought, should satisfy the requirements of other States, since any aggressor State would only have to face guns of the same calibre as its own.

M. SATO (Japan) supported the French delegation's proposal that a questionnaire should be sent to the technical committee and approved in its entirety the text framed by that delegation. He stated that the Japanese experts were prepared to take it as a basis.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that he had not had time to examine thoroughly the French questionnaire, but thought that it would be necessary to make a few amendments. As regards the first question, he pointed out that the value of field entrenchments depended on many factors and that might equally be the case as regards permanent fortifications. With regard to the second question, concerning the efficacy of projectiles as determined by their weight, he pointed out that a 105-mm. shell could permanently damage even strongly fortified works if it fell on a sensitive spot. Lastly, he thought it would be necessary to define the expression "various weapons" in the second part of the questionnaire.

The PRESIDENT asked whether the Italian delegate was in favour, in principle, of sending to the technical committee a questionnaire, the terms of which would have to be definitely settled.

General BONOMI (Italy) replied in the affirmative.

M. AUBERT (France) said that, if the Italian delegate had no substantial objections to the questionnaire which he had submitted, he personally could accept all his colleague's observations.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) thought that the questionnaire framed by the French delegation was exactly the kind of document that should be submitted to the technical committee, and said that he would be prepared to agree to its being referred to that committee, subject to a few formal modifications. He suggested that the technical committee should come to a decision on the first part of the questionnaire and submit its report at once to the Land Commission, in order that the latter might discuss it without delay.

M. AUBERT (France) saw no objection to instructing the technical committee as to the order in which it should discuss the points; it remained to be seen whether the committee would be able to comply with those suggestions.

General BONOMI (Italy) proposed that a questionnaire should be framed on simpler and more comprehensive lines.

The PRESIDENT suggested that a small drafting committee should be appointed at once to draw up the questionnaire for the technical committee. He proposed as members of the Committee the delegates of: Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yugoslavia. The Committee would be asked to submit its text at a plenary meeting of the Commission to be held on the following morning.

After approving the questionnaire, the Commission would refer it to the technical committee, which could begin its work at once.

The President's proposal was unanimously adopted.

SIXTH MEETING

Held on Friday, April 29th, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President: M. BUERO.

7. EXAMINATION OF THE CRITERIA PROPOSED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WITH A VIEW TO SELECTING THE WEAPONS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932: ADOPTION OF A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR REFERENCE TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.

The PRESIDENT announced that the drafting committee named at his suggestion the previous afternoon had drawn up the following text on the basis of the French proposal:

" I.

" 1. What is meant by fixed and mobile artillery?

" 2. What are the existing possibilities of rendering fixed artillery mobile, and vice-versa?

" II.

" 1. What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against the essential elements of permanent fortifications: (a) weight of the projectile, (b) weight of explosive, (c) calibre, etc.?

" 2. What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield?

" III.

" 1. In modern war, what is the depth over which the troops and services and their equipment engaged in the battle are distributed?

" 2. What are the characteristics of the artillery capable of firing beyond that depth?"

The first part of the questionnaire concerned the definitions of fixed and mobile artillery, points which the Commission had decided at a previous meeting to refer to experts; the remainder of the document embodied the proposals made by the French delegation.

The draft questionnaire was adopted.

The PRESIDENT said that the text as adopted would be sent to the technical committee, which was to meet under the chairmanship of General LAIDONER, the first Vice-President.

SEVENTH MEETING

Held on Tuesday, May 10th, 1932, at 10 a. m.

President : M. BUERO.

8. EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY ON THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

The PRESIDENT extended to the French delegation, and through it to Madame Doumer and the French people and Government, the Commission's deep sympathy on the tragic death of the President of the French Republic. Speaking as representative of Uruguay, he associated the whole Uruguayan nation with the feelings he had just expressed.

M. AUBERT (France) thanked the President. The French delegation much appreciated the Commission's expression of regret, which proved that feelings of sympathy transcended the limits of national frontiers.

The Commission rose and suspended its proceedings for a brief interval as an expression of sympathy.

9. PUBLICITY OF THE MEETINGS : LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS ACCREDITED TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The PRESIDENT read a letter of May 5th from the President of the Disarmament Conference inviting the President of the Land Commission to discuss with the Bureau of the Conference a letter dated May 3rd from the President of the International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations. That letter drew attention to what was described as "a growing tendency toward secrecy in the debates of the Disarmament Conference" and more particularly to the fact that the meetings of the Committee of Experts of the Land Commission had been held in private; it asked that public meetings "be made the rule and not the exception" and that the question of admitting the Press to such meetings as those of the Committee of Experts "be treated as a matter of urgency".

He pointed out that in meeting privately the Committee of Experts had acted in accordance with Article VII of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, which provided that "sub-commissions and committees will as a rule sit in private", and that rule, he said, applied even though all the delegations were represented on a Committee. As regards the future, however, he agreed that wide publicity would further the cause of disarmament, especially at a moment when the Conference was not progressing as rapidly as some might wish. He invited the Land Commission to authorise him to suggest to the Bureau that sub-commissions and committees on which all delegations were represented should hold public meetings unless otherwise decided by a majority vote.

The President's proposal was adopted.

10. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (documents Conf. D./C.T.8, 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c)).

In the first place, the PRESIDENT thanked the Committee of Experts, and particularly the Chairman, for their successful achievement of a difficult task. With the text of the Committee's replies before it — and the grounds for those replies — the Commission could now examine the question referred to it under the resolution of April 22nd.

Having noticed in the various proposals a tendency to distinguish between fixed and mobile artillery, the Commission had asked the Committee of Experts to define the characteristics of both types and to state the existing possibilities of converting fixed into mobile artillery. It was no doubt the duty of the Commission to draw conclusions from the Experts' replies on that point.

Generally speaking, the text of Part I, paragraph 2, of the experts' reply might be taken as summing up the delegations' views — namely, that guns of fixed artillery could be made mobile and that this interchangeability was contingent on two factors — time and the existence of certain stocks of material. Did the Commission think that the distinction

between the two types should be maintained? If so, it must fix the conditions. Or did it feel that it would be impossible to arrive at such a distinction?

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) said that he had nothing to add or to withdraw as regards the experts' replies, which had been reached after long discussion. The Spanish delegation, moreover, had already formulated in the following terms its conclusions on the three criteria referred to the Land Commission by the General Commission:

"All weapons can be used for offensive and defensive purposes. Those most effective for the former are also most effective for the latter.

"Assuming that a certain category of weapons no longer exists, the value of those remaining increases correspondingly. The same effect is produced if no fortifications exist.

"If by *most specifically offensive* weapons are meant weapons which confer on the attack superiority over the material means of defence, it is permissible to regard as such and at the same time as *most efficacious against national defence* weapons which are not less than 150 mm. in calibre and which at the same time are equipped, even in time of peace, with means enabling them to be moved or transported, so that they can accompany the troops and co-operate in a war with a shifting battle front or in siege warfare.

"In the same category may be included tanks and armoured and armed cars.

"The weapons *most threatening to civilians*, who must be presumed to be outside the battle zone, are in reality gases, for whether they are used in the form of waves or fired in the form of artillery projectiles, it is impossible to control their actual range.

"Artillery with a range exceeding 30 km. should also be included in this category, since the extent of the zone in which the projectiles fall makes this weapon unsuitable for use against purely military objectives."

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) agreed with the Spanish representative that no further discussion would add much to their knowledge of the subject, the experts having clearly disengaged the facts with reference to fixed and mobile artillery. He thought, however, that a more serious question was raised by the suggestion that in practice there should be no differentiation between the two types. There could obviously be no question of reducing the calibre of coast-defence guns, so long as the guns of the battleships and cruisers which had to engage them were not reduced; but similarly, if no distinction were made between mobile and fixed artillery, there could be no limitation of the calibre of naval guns. Thus all possibility of restricting or abolishing heavy guns would disappear.

The conclusions to be drawn from the Technical Committee's proceedings were clear — the conversion of fixed into mobile artillery was largely a matter of time, which could be shortened if the necessary material (mountings, etc.) was available. To accept the principle that no differentiation could be established between fixed and mobile artillery would prejudice the whole question of qualitative limitation.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) said that, as a civilian member of the Commission, he was glad to associate himself with the President in congratulating the Technical Committee on having formulated practically unanimous definitions. Any endeavour to define the various points still further would, he thought, tend to vitiate the work of the experts. He shared General Temperley's impression, and thought that the General Commission might feel that, should the obstacles to convertibility (as between fixed and mobile artillery) not appear adequate, it might be necessary to discuss additional agreements of a moral nature to be entered into between States.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that, the German delegation having made a distinction between guns inside and outside fortifications, he felt it necessary to speak on the point. The views expressed by General Temperley and Mr. Wilson were, he thought, very sound. Speaking generally, he felt it would be preferable for the Land Commission to avoid essentially technical discussions. He suggested that it should simply take note of the experts' replies and should determine, on that basis, what land weapons might be considered as capable of qualitative disarmament, so that the politicians might have before them a list of weapons and might pass on to the practical work of filling in the figures.

M. AUBERT (France) observed that the Land Commission, like the Committee of Experts, were faced with certain facts which it could not overlook. General Temperley's statement was a statement of fact — namely, that a relationship could be established between the calibres of land and naval guns through the intermediary of coastal artillery. That fact did not invalidate in any way the Committee's findings in regard to the interchangeability of fixed and mobile guns. Again, the United States of America had raised the important question of control or supervision, and the only solution would be to require States to guarantee that the stocks required for purposes of conversion did not exist in the country. That point must be a subject for future discussion.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, feared that the Committee would be taking an unwise step if it re-opened the discussion of the report of the Committee of Experts. As all the delegations had been represented on this Committee, such action could only lead to repetition and waste of time.

The situation was as follows : (1) the General Commission had asked the Land Commission to say what weapons were in its opinion most dangerous to national defence and to civilian populations ; (2) with the object of supplying this information concerning artillery the Land Commission had submitted to a Committee of Experts a series of technical questions. The Land Commission had received the reply of this Committee and, from the technical point of view, it need only take note of it without entering on further discussion. But the report of the experts, however valuable, merely furnished raw material and it was now for the Land Commission to make use of this material and to work it up, in order to reply to the question submitted to it by the General Commission. In other words, it should endeavour, on the basis of the expert's report, to decide what weapons were the most dangerous to national defence and to civilian populations.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) considered that the Rapporteur's proposal was premature. The Land Commission's decision of April 27th had mentioned tanks, armoured cars and fortifications ; those points must be examined as well as artillery. He would have no objection to taking artillery first, but the reply to the General Commission must eventually deal with all the points raised.

The PRESIDENT explained that the Bureau had discussed the possibility of a preliminary examination of the other arms, but had decided that it would be best for the Commission to proceed with the question of artillery, which had just been examined by the Committee of Experts.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) agreed with the President and Rapporteur that it would be preferable to keep to artillery for the moment. The Commission could adopt the method of " condensation " that employed in the Spanish delegation's proposal, or it could draw up a list of weapons.

The PRESIDENT, summing up, observed that the Commission was in favour of M. Bourquin's proposal. Having taken note of the experts' reply, it would now prepare its own reply to the General Commission.

This procedure was adopted.

M. VAN LANSCHOT (Netherlands) remarked that the Committee of Experts' replies were intended to serve as a basis for the Land Commission's reply to the question formulated in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd. The Land Commission should, he thought, consider not only the text of that question but also the purpose for which it had been put — namely, to achieve some measure of qualitative disarmament, and hence to contribute towards the final object of the Conference. Academic solutions and replies were of no use ; delegates and experts alike must bear in mind the practical aspect of the problem.

The replies to Chapter II of the questionnaire, for example, concerning the different calibres employed according to the objective to be attacked, contained valuable material which would enable the Commission to answer the question : What guns are most specifically offensive in character and most efficacious against national defence?

It was for the Land Commission to draw the necessary conclusions from the experts' replies and that was not an easy task, for the replies, although unanimous, revealed traces of some divergence of opinion. One point, however, appeared to be settled beyond all doubt — namely, that artillery of a calibre higher than 100 mm. — particularly that of about 150 mm., which was the calibre most commonly employed — and up to 220 mm., was capable of effective action against most entrenchments and field works which could be organised and constructed in a short time and with limited personnel and material. But what was meant by a short time? A week? Two months? What was meant by limited personnel and material?

When the time, personnel and material at the disposal of the defence increased — so the experts stated — the degree of resistance of the position might become that of permanent fortifications with slight protection and might require the same means for its reduction — i.e., guns from 105 to 250 mm.

Artillery from 100 to 250 mm. might thus be employed against permanent fortifications with slight protection as well as against the strongest fortifications on the battlefield. Such calibres — to revert to the question asked by the General Commission — were neither exclusively offensive nor exclusively defensive. What reply, then, was the Land Commission to give to the General Commission's question concerning " the most specifically offensive weapons or those most efficacious against national defence? " The question was not to determine the absolute character of the weapons but to make a comparison : the offensive character must preponderate over the defensive character.

A weapon which would be subjected to qualitative limitation on the grounds of its specifically offensive character might in certain cases be necessary for this or that defensive operation, perhaps even for repelling an invader. Should qualitative limitation result, then, in a weakening of the defence? He did not think so. By depriving an aggressor State of specifically offensive weapons, of the weapons most efficacious against national defence, the attack was weakened, but the defence would be strengthened. It was infinitely more important to deprive the aggressor of the means of invading enemy territory than to confer on the defence additional arms wherewith to repel him. The defence — even with only temporary means at its disposal—gained proportionately as qualitative limitation weakened the aggressor.

As regards guns above 155 mm., the possibility of their being used against permanent fortifications with slight protection appeared to constitute their most characteristic feature. On the battlefield, guns having a calibre of 150 mm. were most commonly employed. The experts themselves said so. In certain cases guns of a higher calibre — as much as 250 mm. — would be required ; but, if States were allowed freely to keep such guns in view of their possible use for defensive purposes, the weapons in question would be freely at the aggressor's disposal, thereby endangering the defender's permanent fortifications with slight protection.

The Netherlands delegation held that in establishing the line of demarcation between weapons which were, and those which were not, most specifically offensive and most efficacious against national defence, the Commission ought not to take as its starting-point special situations, but ought to consider rather the uses to which the weapons were most commonly put ; for that reason the line of demarcation ought to be fixed at 155 mm. The Netherlands delegation would, of course, support any practical proposal for fixing a lower level. An exception should, however, be made in principle in the case of fixed artillery in permanent emplacements, more especially those used for coast defence, to which a special system should apply.

As regards the third point mentioned in the resolution of April 22nd, the Netherlands delegation regarded as most threatening to civilians those weapons whose range exceeded the depth of the battlefield, and which were thus able to reach the population beyond that limit. The land weapons threatening to civilians were therefore those above the calibre just mentioned, and they became more threatening in proportion as their range exceeded the depth of the battlefield and as their material effect increased.

In conclusion, the Netherlands delegation submitted the following proposal :

“ The Commission considers that the weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians are, in the case of mobile artillery, guns with a calibre in excess of 155 mm. and with a projectile weighing over 50 kilogrammes.

“ As regards guns forming part of the permanent installations or fortifications of fortified positions by land or sea and mounted on fixed carriages, the Commission is of opinion that they should be subject to a special regime.”

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) thought that the Land Commission, now that it had the Committee of Experts' reply, should decide what guns answered to the criteria named in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd. The Land Commission had already admitted that it was difficult to establish a distinction, in the case of artillery, between the first two criteria. It remained then to decide, first, what guns were most efficacious against national defence and, secondly, what guns were most threatening to civilians.

The answer to the first question would be found in Part II of the experts' reply.

Examining the defensive organisation of the different countries, the latter would be found to fall into two classes: (a) countries protected by permanent fortifications, (b) countries which, not possessing permanent fortifications, would be obliged, in case of attack, to construct improvised fortifications as rapidly as possible. The majority of countries belonged to that second category.

The Commission must decide which of the two categories should serve as a starting-point in determining the weapons which were most efficacious against national defence. The Hungarian delegation thought it was essential, in order to strengthen the security of the different countries, to choose as a starting-point the national defence of a country which possessed no permanent fortifications. Any other procedure would encourage countries

not possessing permanent fortifications to construct them, thus involving heavy material outlay. Such an outcome of the Disarmament Conference was inconceivable, seeing that the object of the Conference was to reduce the financial burdens relating to armaments.

On the other hand, by taking as a starting-point the defence of a country which possessed no permanent fortifications, the Commission would be serving the interests of every country, and that solution, the Hungarian representative thought, might be adopted unanimously.

Finally, the Hungarian delegation proposed that the Commission should consider as particularly efficacious against national defence all guns capable of being successfully used against improvised fortifications, that was to say all guns of a calibre exceeding about 100 mm.

The answer to the second question — the threat to civilians — must be deduced from paragraph 2 of Chapter III of the experts' reply.

Although it had not been possible to obtain, as regards paragraph 1 of Chapter III, that unanimity which was desirable, the Hungarian representative thought that the Commission might come to some agreement when discussing the question of assessment.

Before it would be possible to decide what guns were most threatening to civilians, the Commission must first define the zones of the theatre of operations which were inhabited by civilians.

The presence of civilians on the scene of operations was tolerated to an extent which depended — all the delegations were agreed on that point — on two factors: the presence of the adversary and the dangers resulting therefrom and the extent to which civilians might impede the military operations of the army of their own country.

What had to be determined was the extreme line beyond which were to be found only at considerable intervals important military objectives which would justify artillery bombardment, the line behind which civilians were tolerated as not impeding military operations. That line, it seemed, could not be any other than the line indicated by the Committee of Experts as the extreme limit of the zone over which the troops and the various services taking part in the operations were distributed.

While not unanimous as regards the depth of the zone, the experts had considered that it should be not less than 15 kilometres. The solution thus seemed to be for the Commission to decide on that limit — the lowest on which the experts had agreed. By so doing, the Commission would give satisfaction to countries whose territory was small and which, owing to that fact, could not evacuate their civilian population to an adequate distance.

The Hungarian delegation proposed, in conclusion, that the Commission should regard as weapons particularly threatening to civilians all guns with a range exceeding 15 kilometres and a calibre exceeding about 100 mm., as suggested in paragraph 2 of Chapter III of the experts' reply.

General BONOMI (Italy) recalled that the Italian delegation had already indicated at the meeting on April 27th the heavy artillery material which, in its opinion, answered to the three criteria mentioned in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd — namely, all heavy artillery (guns, howitzers and mortars), whatever the weight, of which the calibre exceeded 100 mm. According to the particular calibre and range of each type of artillery, one or other of the criteria would apply.

The Italian delegation maintained the views which it had already expressed, and desired to state at once that it could not agree to any resolution which failed to take account of them.

Colonel CRERAR (Canada) said that he had followed very closely the proceedings both of the Land Commission and of the Committee of Experts, and that he had been struck by the considerable time that had been required to reach approximate agreement on one only of the points referred to the Commission. He thought that an attempt should be made to hasten matters, and suggested that, in order to submit a clear reply to the General Commission's questions at the earliest possible date, the delegations should try to put on one side their own particular preferences so that it might be possible to arrive at a compromise acceptable to the majority of the Commission.

Having examined the Committee of Experts' reply, the Canadian delegation proposed as a basis for discussion the following formula, on which it thought that agreement was possible: Guns of a calibre exceeding 150 mm. and a range exceeding 20 kilometres should be regarded as answering to the criteria named in the General Commission's resolution.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Soviet delegation supported the proposals put forward by the Hungarian and Italian delegations as being in accordance with its own views.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) said that the Swiss delegation supported the Netherlands proposal.

He directed the Commission's attention to two points which did not appear to have been considered.

1. If, in reply to the General Commission, the Land Commission simply reproduced the text of paragraph 2 of Part II of the experts' reply, it was difficult to see what conclusion the General Commission would be able to draw therefrom. That paragraph said that the artillery capable of effective action against most entrenchments which could be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material was of a calibre between 100 and 220 mm. The experts' reply, he thought, reflected the various conditions that might be encountered, but none the less, it would be difficult for the General Commission to draw any practical conclusion.

The Swiss delegation felt, therefore, that the Land Commission should, in order to accomplish useful work, adopt the Netherlands proposal, which represented a moderate solution.

2. The adoption of a calibre of 220 mm. as the limit above which artillery should be regarded as heavy artillery would result in a general increase in the calibre of field artillery. Indeed, if it were permissible to employ guns of a calibre of 220 mm. against improvised fortifications, it would be to the advantage of the countries not at present possessing such artillery to obtain it. That result would certainly not be in conformity with the aim of the Conference or with the intentions of all those statesmen who had declared that their Governments were prepared to abolish heavy artillery to some extent, and who understood the term "heavy artillery" in its usual sense, that adopted, in particular in military regulations — namely, artillery of a calibre of 150 or 155 mm. and over. The League of Nations Armaments Year-Book, published in March 1932, stated that in certain armed forces divisional artillery included light and heavy artillery, and that the latter consisted of guns of a calibre of 155 mm.

Colonel Züblin felt that the Commission should not help to create a new idea of heavy artillery, inconsistent with the aim in view and with the statements made in the General Commission. The Swiss delegation therefore supported the moderate solution proposed by the Netherlands delegation.

Major-General TCHENG Kai (China) said that, in the Chinese delegation's opinion, the Commission should rapidly reach a unanimous decision and should adopt as a limit the smallest calibre, the least destructive power and the shortest range, in order to give satisfaction to those who desired the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The Chinese delegation considered that the Commission could not achieve practical results by endeavouring to find precise replies to the various points mentioned in the questionnaire. The Chinese delegation had already proposed the abolition of all mobile artillery, the calibre of which exceeded 80 mm., and it felt that the Commission should adopt this limit in its reply to the General Commission's resolution.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) noted that the result of the experts' work corresponded with the proposals made by the German delegation at the beginning of the Conference. Indeed, the experts stated in Part II, paragraph 2, of their reply, that :

"As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield."

It had been pointed out on several occasions that, whatever calibre was contemplated, the offensive character of a gun was only relative. That was true, but it was none the less necessary to fix a figure in the reply to the General Commission. The German delegation proposed the figure contained in the Treaty of Versailles — namely, a calibre of 77 mm. All mobile artillery of a higher calibre should be considered as answering to the three criteria of the resolution of April 22nd.

In order to exclude the possibility of the use of certain fixed artillery by field armies, it was proposed that the States should give undertakings on this matter. The German delegation fully approved this suggestion.

On the other hand, it had been pointed out that fixed guns for coast defence must be of a calibre at least equal to that of the armaments of the naval forces. The principle at the basis of this observation held good for armed land forces as well as for naval forces : the defender must be at least as well armed as the assailant.

Colonel RIAZI (Persia) observed that it would be premature for a country which only possessed sufficient forces for the maintenance of order and internal security to express an opinion concerning the aggressive weapons which should be either suppressed or internationalised. He stated that the Persian delegation was nevertheless disposed to accept the most radical solution which the majority of the Commission would accept, provided that the interests of countries which did not produce arms, ammunition and war material and which loyally observed such undertakings, were fully safeguarded.

APTÜLAHAT Bey (Turkey) pointed out that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on several occasions that Turkey would willingly accept any system and any proposal for as great a reduction of armaments as possible. Maintaining that line of action, the Turkish delegation had stated, during its last observations in the Land Commission, that it considered heavy artillery of all kinds as a specifically offensive weapon. It now supported the Hungarian delegation's proposal for a substantial reduction as regards heavy artillery.

EIGHTH MEETING

Held on Wednesday, May 11th, 1932, at 10 a. m.

President : M. BUERO.

11. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (*continuation*) (documents Conf. D./C.T.8, 8(a), 8(b), 8(c)).

M. SATO (Japan) said that while the Japanese delegation approved the fundamental principle of qualitative limitation, it could not agree with all the opinions expressed on the previous day concerning the types of artillery that answered to the three criteria proposed by the General Commission.

The discussions in the General Commission had exposed the profound error of confounding aggression with offensive action based on strategic reasons. A country engaged in a war of defence might be obliged for strategic reasons to assume the offensive, and it was inevitable that during military operations of this kind entrenchments and provisional organisations established by the adversary would be attacked. Again, it was necessary to contemplate the necessity of attacking the enemy's permanent fortifications. The majority of the speeches of the previous day had revealed a tendency in favour of the extreme limitation of the assailant's artillery power, without taking into account the strength of entrenchments and temporary works or of permanent fortifications. Admitting that the army of the country attacked might then require to assume the offensive, for strategic reasons, it would then be necessary to limit the power of resistance of the fortified works of the aggressor, otherwise the latter would be favoured to the detriment of the country attacked — which was both illogical and unfair.

The Committee of Experts' reply showed clearly that the power of resistance of temporary entrenchments and permanent fortifications differed according to circumstances. That state of affairs had been ignored in some of the declarations made on the previous day, and political considerations had been used as an argument in support of a proposal for drastic and uniform limitation of heavy artillery. The Japanese delegation could not endorse that view.

Present-day technique might confer a high degree of strength on temporary entrenchments and organisations, even during an offensive. If, as some members of the Commission recommended, only guns having a calibre of 100 mm. or less were used against such works, the result would simply be a waste of human life. It was generally recognised that even against earthworks 150 mm. guns were required. To limit artillery to the calibres suggested would be to deny the possibility of any counter offensive and would, indirectly, deprive States of the possibility of defending themselves.

For the purposes of the report to be submitted to the General Commission, the Land Commission must not be carried away by purely theoretical considerations but must arrive at rational conclusions based on the actual situation as regards modern strategy and present-day military technique.

As regards the artillery necessary for effective action against field entrenchments of great strength, the Japanese delegation supported the reply unanimously adopted by the Committee of Experts. It could not endorse the view that that category of artillery should be included among specifically offensive weapons and weapons particularly efficacious against national defence.

M. AUBERT (France) feared that the Rapporteur's wise recommendations not to enter into a technical discussion of the experts' reply had been taken too literally : if

personal empiricism was to take the place of scientific findings, the Commission could not hope to progress towards an agreement as to principles and figures.

Although not all the delegates' replies had been supported by reasons, certain of them had put forward arguments for including weapons having the smallest calibres among offensive weapons, which ignored the terms of the questions referred to the Commission. The Commission had not been asked to say whether artillery of this or that calibre, considered in itself, was offensive in character — on that basis a machine-gun might be offensive — but to decide, in the whole scale of artillery calibres, which were *most* offensive and why.

Again, other arguments in favour of the same thesis had been derived from certain clauses of the Treaties of Peace as if the problem before the authors of the Treaties was the same as the problem now before the Commission — namely, the determination of the weapons most dangerous to national defence and to civilians. The Treaties also prohibited, in certain regions, arms — such as fortifications — which were obviously defensive. It was true, as certain delegates had brought out on the previous day, that the abolition of calibres of artillery capable of destroying permanent fortifications should involve the abolition of such fortifications, since otherwise it would enhance their value and competition in armaments would tend in that direction. That point would have to be discussed when the Commission came to consider whether, as some delegations maintained, permanent fortifications might be offensive in character.

The arguments in favour of the adoption of a medium calibre — 150 to 155 mm. — were of a different order; they were based on the fact that that was the calibre found in many armies, for some of which it was the maximum. Were they to be obliged (the argument ran), on the pretext of a reduction of armaments, to construct weapons of a higher calibre, if these were not prohibited? Was it not better to compromise on that medium calibre, which in certain nomenclatures marked the limit between light and heavy artillery? Supposing that, that limit having been accepted, no one type of artillery could qualitatively outclass another, difficulties would immediately occur; it was sufficient for the moment to mention only one of them: whereas land calibres were to be limited, were coast calibres to be allowed to follow those of the battleships they were intended to engage, when the experts declared that fixed artillery could rapidly be rendered mobile and could thus be transported from the sea to the land frontiers?

The Commission should adhere to the method it had adopted in drawing up the questionnaire for the Committee of Experts, for that questionnaire and the replies to it bore a direct relation to the questions referred to the Land Commission by the General Commission.

The former had been asked, for example, to decide what weapons were most efficacious against national defence, and, in order to be in a position to reply to that question, it had asked the experts what weapons were most efficacious against permanent fortifications; the experts had given a definite reply, mentioning certain calibres. The delegations therefore should ascertain whether they were agreed that the arms most efficacious against national defence included the most powerful artillery weapons capable of being used most efficaciously against permanent fortifications. If the answer was in the affirmative, it would be sufficient, in order to determine the types of artillery concerned, to take the experts' reply to paragraph 1 of Chapter II.

The Commission could then consider which artillery was effective against field works, decide whether such artillery was threatening to national defence, and, if so, define its relevant technical characteristics.

A third question might be examined — namely, whether the Commission considered that the weapons most threatening to civilians were those designed to fire beyond the limits of the battlefield — *i.e.*, of the zone in which military objectives predominated. There again the Experts had supplied the material for a definite reply as to ranges.

Such was the method of work already adopted, and that method alone was calculated to enable the Land Commission to lay before the General Commission replies supported by sufficient reasons to enable it itself to take its decisions.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) explained that, as the Commission had been asked to reply to a definite question and was obliged to accept the three criteria named by the General Commission, the Spanish proposal submitted at the previous meeting began with a kind of reservation, while the third paragraph of that proposal enunciated a condition.

The Spanish delegation would have no objection to accepting a 150 mm. calibre: The reason underlying the Spanish proposal was that aggression would take the form of a rapidly executed attack. If the French proposal for ensuring collective military assistance to a State victim of aggression was not adopted, the only solution would be to make the defence stronger than the attack — at all events so far as material means were concerned. Subject to the conditions stipulated in the Spanish proposal, States could retain their fortress artillery. True, the Committee of Experts had declared that fixed and mobile artillery were interchangeable, but only subject to certain very important conditions, such as the existence of the necessary mountings. The question of mountings was a difficult

one: their construction involved a big outlay, and any nation preparing such a transformation of fixed artillery into mobile artillery — supposing that the Spanish proposal were accepted — would have violated the Disarmament Convention.

Colonel MARTOLA (Finland) felt that the Land Commission had reached a stage in its discussions at which it would be well for every delegation to state its views, so as to reach an equitable solution of the problem referred to it by the General Commission. The Finnish delegation would therefore give its views on the artillery most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians.

The reason, he thought, that the principle of qualitative disarmament had been so unanimously adopted by the General Commission was that disarmament of that kind seemed to be one of the measures most likely to increase the security of nations. The Finnish delegation, however, considered that qualitative disarmament alone was not sufficient, any more than quantitative reduction alone would be. What was necessary, and indeed indispensable, was political and legal guarantees. The fate of qualitative disarmament must thus depend in the last resort on the solutions arrived at for political and legal problems in the General Commission.

The soundest method of work, however, was to proceed by stages, and it was essential to determine for each successive item of the Conference's agenda the best possible solution — always in the direction of disarmament and security — leaving open the possibility of modifying each solution to fit in with the sum total of the results achieved.

The Finnish delegation would be the last to hinder the idea of qualitative disarmament at the present stage, and recommended that the Land Commission should express its technical opinion on the degree of offensiveness of land artillery in such a form that the General Commission might take a decision as regards the prohibition, as far as possible, of the use of heavy artillery.

As regards mobile heavy artillery, calibres above 150-155 mm. should be considered as most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians. Finland, however, would be prepared, like its Eastern neighbour, to support a lower limit, if unanimity could be achieved on that point. A 150 mm. calibre limit had been chosen as representing a medium solution most likely to meet with approval, since it would reduce the force of possible attacks and would not interfere with purely defensive armaments. The opinion had been expressed in the Committee of Experts that a defender State which did not possess weapons of more than 150 mm. in calibre might not be able to repel an invader, and it would be prudent therefore not to deprive a country of legitimate means of defence.

Without anticipating the General Commission's decisions as to whether heavy material should be entirely abolished or placed at the disposal of an international authority, it might be said that a small nation which was not able to build super-strong fortifications would prefer to feel that its organs of defence could not be bombarded with guns having a calibre of more than 150 mm. Countries which were able to maintain more powerful defensive artillery could still employ it as fixed artillery in forts.

For mobile artillery, then, a calibre of 150 mm. might be adopted as the maximum required by States for their mobile defensive land forces.

The Land Commission, in its reply, would no doubt wish to direct the General Commission's attention to the importance of distinguishing between fixed and mobile artillery. Fixed artillery, and more particularly coast defence artillery, obviously depended on the artillery of battleships, and its qualitative reduction must be conditioned by the qualitative reduction of the latter. The General Commission must be warned as to the possible abuse of fixed artillery; that would lead to the question of control and to other political and legal questions.

Lieutenant-General GALET (Belgium) recalled that the Belgian delegation had submitted the following proposal:

“ The Commission considers as specifically offensive or threatening to civilians:

“ (1) howitzers and mortars of a calibre exceeding 220 mm.;

“ (2) guns of a calibre exceeding 155 mm.;

“ Publicity and control of coast artillery having the characteristics mentioned under (1) and (2) above seem indispensable.”

Nevertheless, though Belgium was a small country, in a very special geographical and political position, the Belgian delegation had decided in the Committee of Experts to set aside its own proposal in the interests of unanimity.

In the problem under consideration — the limitation of artillery — qualitative limitation was essential, firstly to protect the defence, and secondly to protect civilians without unduly interfering with that defence.

As regards the first point, two cases might arise: (1) There might be no element of surprise and the defence might then be able to bring its army to the front and to take other

necessary measures ; or (2) the defence might be surprised and have to repel the invader — that had occurred in the last war. With increasing mobility, the use of that second method would also tend to increase. A State could never be persuaded to abandon its anxiety as to its defence, and care must be taken not to deprive it of the necessary means to ensure that defence.

As regards calibres, the Committee of Experts had made a distinction between those for use against field positions and permanent fortifications, respectively ; there was, however, a certain continuity in the scale, and with those data the Commission should be able to arrive at conclusions. In the interests of the defence everything should be done to protect permanent fortifications, and the Belgian delegation proposed the abolition of all calibres capable of being used efficaciously against them. Field fortifications, however, which involved the element of mobility, could still be attacked, even though the 220 mm. calibre stipulated by the Experts for use against permanent fortifications was prohibited.

As regards the second point — the protection of civilians — two zones had been envisaged, the first of which (some 20 km. on either side of the lines) was essentially military in character while in the second zone, beyond it, there were only certain objectives of military importance. The Belgian delegation proposed the abolition of all howitzers and mortars of a calibre exceeding 220 mm. and all guns of a calibre exceeding 155 mm., as being specifically offensive or threatening to civilians ; civilians would thereby be given the greatest possible measure of protection consistent with full freedom of action for the defence.

Derogations would be necessary in respect of coast artillery, and, to avoid abuse, publicity and control of coast artillery of the calibres specified would be indispensable, as had been noted in the Belgian delegation's proposal. No calibre under 155 mm. would be controlled, but measures would be taken to ensure that guns above that calibre could not be rendered mobile.

The Commission must aim at a moderate solution — that aspect of the question had also been stressed by the Canadian representative. It must devise a solution likely to meet with general acceptance.

M. PÜRSCHER (Denmark) said that the Danish delegation regarded the Committee of Experts' reply to the questionnaire as a very good starting-point for deciding what artillery weapons were most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians. In its view, the idea underlying the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd was to discover a way of strengthening the defence by eliminating certain categories of offensive weapons.

The Danish Government — as was clear from the delegation's memorandum of April 13th¹ — regarded mobile artillery having a large calibre and long-range artillery as specifically offensive weapons and considered that it was essential to abolish arms of that category until the lowest possible level of armaments had been reached.

It might still be necessary to discuss what was the most suitable level, but the Danish delegation thought that any conventions to be concluded should maintain the distinction between heavy and light artillery stipulated in the Treaties of Peace.

The level thus fixed was the one to aim at, so as to effect a real reduction of the weapons possessing the specific characteristics under consideration. The Danish delegation accordingly supported the proposal submitted by several other delegations that the maximum calibre for mobile artillery should be fixed at about 100 mm.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) noted that, despite the long discussion in the Technical Committee, the Land Commission was no nearer agreement than when the Bureau had issued its report (document Conf. D./C.T.5) on April 27th. Many delegations were now merely repeating their views. The United Kingdom delegation adhered to the views which it had already put forward ; it believed that it was possible to restrict heavy mobile artillery to a calibre of 155 mm. It had chosen that figure for practical reasons — already stated — and did not regard such guns as specifically offensive. Recognising, however, that there was a difference of opinion on that point and that it might be impossible to draw an exact line above which mobile artillery should be restricted, it had put forward another proposal representing an attempt to frame a unanimous reply to the General Commission which should take into account the differences of opinion in the Land Commission ; it had tried to indicate the main characteristics of heavy artillery and to bring the views of the delegations down to one text.

The text of the British proposal read as follows :

“ Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Technical Sub-Committee to the questionnaire submitted to it (document Conf. D./C.T.7)² the

¹ Document Conf. D.112.

² See Minutes of the sixth meeting.

Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission :

“ (a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but, whereas the lighter natures have a restricted offensive capacity, the offensive element becomes greater as the power of the artillery increases.

“ (b) Leaving aside the question of artillery constituting the fixed armament of permanent fortifications, which raises certain issues more appropriate for separate discussion, the Land Commission is of the opinion that those types of mobile artillery which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of average, or of more than average, strength — that is to say, pieces of calibres from 250 mm. upwards, firing projectiles weighing from 200 kilogrammes upwards, should be regarded as the most specifically offensive and the most efficacious against the national defence.

“ (c) In a second and a lower category of offensive power should be included those weapons which are capable of effective action against lightly protected permanent fortifications or against non-permanent field-works and entrenchments — that is to say, pieces of calibres between 155 mm. and 250 mm., firing projectiles weighing between 50 kilogrammes and 200 kilogrammes.

“ (d) Artillery of natures lighter than those referred to in paragraph (c) above are the least specifically offensive in character.

“ (e) As regards the third element in the resolution of the General Commission, the replies submitted by the Technical Committee to questions (1) and (2) of Chapter III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that artillery material of over 200 mm. calibre, having an effective range of more than 25 km., is the most menacing to the civil population.

“ Pieces of over 155 mm. calibre, having an effective range of more than 20 km., may also be a menace to the civil population, but in a less degree. It should be noted that these calculations apply only to normally constructed guns at present existing.”

That proposal, which it was hoped would meet with the approval of the majority of the Commission, might not perhaps go far enough for delegations that had insisted on a 100-105 mm. calibre ; their preoccupation with the Peace Treaties was very comprehensible, but the Commission had to consider its terms of reference and to decide what artillery was specifically offensive.

No one had spoken yet in support of the new proposal—unless M. Aubert's words might be interpreted as meaning that the French delegation was not entirely opposed. It had only been put forward in a spirit of conciliation, and if it were not acceptable the United Kingdom delegation would withdraw it and go back to its original proposal. If agreement could not be reached, the Rapporteur might perhaps be asked to frame a report reflecting the three main currents of opinion ; some delegations were in favour of a 220-250 mm. calibre limit, others supported a medium view, while a third group advocated with great determination a calibre of about 100 mm. A report on those lines would be the best answer to the General Commission and would represent the views expressed in the Land Commission.

General NYGREN (Sweden) said that the Swedish delegation fully endorsed the Netherlands delegation's proposal, which was in conformity with the suggestions contained in the Swedish memorandum.¹ It was of opinion therefore that mobile artillery of a calibre above 155 mm. should be included in the category of weapons “ whose character is the most specifically offensive ”, but did not think it necessary to repeat the reasons for that opinion.

On the other hand, fixed artillery, even of a calibre exceeding 155 mm., should not, in its view, be regarded as offensive in character, if in time of peace no stock of mobile mountings existed on which such pieces could be placed. It was, nevertheless, necessary to bear in mind the importance of the existence in time of peace of mobile mountings constructed with a view to the rapid conversion of fixed heavy artillery into mobile artillery.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) stated that the German delegation was prepared to give the new British proposal some measure of support. It noted that several delegations had drawn nearer to the figures proposed by the German delegation and wondered whether other delegations might not consider doing the same. Those figures, as he had explained on the previous day, defined the artillery material answering to the three criteria laid down in the General Commission's resolution and they were the figures, moreover, found in the Treaty of Versailles.

The German delegation was prepared to stress that last consideration repeatedly, for, as it understood the Note of June 16th, 1919, the military provisions of the Treaty of

¹ Document Conf. D.110.

Versailles were intended to preclude all possibility of recourse to a policy of aggression. The limits stipulated at that time should thus form a satisfactory basis for the Commission's present task.

Again, the French representative had observed that the Treaties of Peace prohibited certain armaments necessary for national defence. The German delegation would venture to note that point.

M. AUBERT (France) asked the Commission to decide the question of procedure which he had raised at the beginning of the meeting.

The Land Commission, in putting certain preliminary questions to the Committee of Experts, had followed a synthetic method, but the present discussions, in the form of a series of monologues, seemed to show that the Commission now intended to adopt the analytic method. It was very important, however, that it should return to its original synthetic method, as this would facilitate the Rapporteur's work.

For this purpose, the French delegation proposed that each of the three points mentioned in the General Commission's resolution should be discussed successively; it realised the importance of the United Kingdom proposal, which was a step in the direction M. Aubert had just indicated. Considered in this manner and taken as a basis for the Commission's discussions, the United Kingdom proposal was acceptable to the French delegation.

In reply to the German delegate's last observation, M. Aubert stated that he had confined himself to saying that the question which arose during the preparation of the Peace Treaties was not in any sense the same as that which had arisen during the present discussions. The intention in the Peace Treaties had been to prohibit armaments, some of which might be considered, in the present discussion and in the light of the General Commission's three criteria, as defensive. This matter could, however, be discussed at the appropriate time; it was not within the competence of a purely technical commission.

In reply to an enquiry by the President, M. Aubert confirmed that the French delegation suggested that the United Kingdom proposal should be accepted as a basis for discussion, so far as it followed the order of the questions asked by the General Commission. It would seem preferable for the delegations not to deal with all the questions at the same time.

The PRESIDENT asked the Commission first to hear the speakers on his list in order to conclude the general discussion, and then to examine each of the points of the resolution of April 22nd, as the French delegation had suggested.

Colonel TOMBERG (Estonia) said that the Estonian delegation shared the Finnish delegation's point of view and supported its declaration.

General KALEYS (Latvia) stated that the Latvian delegation also supported the Finnish delegation's point of view. He thought, however, that in the opinions of the various delegations there were so many points in common that a final agreement would not be very difficult.

General TARBUK (Austria) thought that artillery material covered by the General Commission's three criteria included all heavy artillery, whether fixed or mobile. The Austrian delegation thought heavy artillery included all pieces (guns, howitzers and mortars) of a calibre exceeding 105 mm. It therefore accepted the Italian and Hungarian proposals. General Tarbuk observed, nevertheless, that while it would not consider itself bound by the definition of heavy artillery to which it had just referred, the Austrian delegation could accept, from the technical point of view, a somewhat higher limit.

The Austrian delegation further considered that all tanks, armoured cars, and armoured trains, and all means of chemical and bacteriological warfare should be placed in the category of weapons "whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians".

General KOSSITCH (Yugoslavia) thought that heavy artillery had been adequately considered from the technical aspect, and that the Commission had the necessary information to reach a conclusion. To prolong the discussion would be to invite proposals similar to those already made and would be a waste of time.

The Yugoslav delegation therefore supported the United Kingdom proposal, as interpreted by the French delegation. In its view, a decision should be taken as quickly as possible with regard to heavy artillery, in order that the Commission might discuss the other questions before it.

General VATEFF (Bulgaria) proposed that the question of artillery material should be considered in the light of each of the General Commission's three criteria.

It appeared that the main characteristic of artillery which could be considered as most offensive was mobility. Field artillery, which had the greatest mobility and could

follow the infantry everywhere, should therefore be considered as answering to the first criterion. The efficacy of this artillery against fortified works on the battlefield was limited, however, which meant that it was not very efficacious against national defence and consequently did not answer to the second criterion.

These two criteria should therefore be considered together, and the Bulgarian delegation thought that artillery material answering to these two criteria was that referred to in Chapter II, Section 1, last paragraph, and Section 2, paragraph 3, of the note by the Committee of Experts — namely, artillery material of a calibre exceeding 105 mm.

As to the third criterion, the threat to civilians, the Commission's reply could be deduced from Chapter III of the note by the Committee of Experts. Weapons particularly threatening to civilians were those with a range exceeding the depth of the active zone of the battlefield — namely, those of a range greater than 15 km. and with a calibre exceeding 105 mm.

Colonel STEFFENS (Norway) said the Norwegian delegation was of the Netherlands delegation's opinion — namely, that artillery of which the calibre exceeded 155 mm. was specifically offensive.

Lieutenant-General OMAR Khan (Afghanistan) said that the Afghan delegation, in view of the Committee of Experts' replies concerning the efficacy of artillery with a calibre exceeding 100 mm. against fortifications and national defence and the menace of such artillery to civilians, fully endorsed the Hungarian delegation's declaration and confirmed its original proposal concerning the limitation of such artillery.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) observed that while the Committee of Experts had supplied purely technical information, the Land Commission should also bear in mind the practical aspect of the problem. It must not lose sight of the final object of the questions referred to it by the General Commission. That object was clearly set out in the resolution of April 22nd: weapons which exceeded the limits indicated by the Land Commission would be examined by the General Commission with a view to prohibition or internationalisation under a general convention.

The Polish delegation thought that, from the standpoint of national defence, those two measures — that was to say, abolition or internationalisation — or placing at the League's disposal — had not at all the same value as guarantees for security.

Internationalisation, or placing at the League's disposal, represented a very important guarantee. It assured a country that was attacked the benefit of the most powerful weapons not specifically prohibited, and in a measure far exceeding the quantities that the country itself could possess.

On the other hand, mere abolition or prohibition, not only did not offer equal guarantees and upset to some extent the present value of the different countries' armaments, but it might involve very serious surprises for a country that was attacked. It was probable that its adversary, not having hesitated to violate the most solemn undertakings not to resort to war, would appear on the battlefield with prohibited weapons, particularly if the industry of the said adversary was sufficiently developed. In other words, abolition or prohibition was, in certain cases, liable to ensure the aggressor a privileged situation in advance.

Any qualitative differentiation between the weapons considered most offensive and those considered less offensive (or, more precisely, between more or less powerful weapons — since all weapons could be used both for attack and for defence) would be of purely relative value, and the choice of the limit would depend to a large extent on the practical object in view. In this connection, the Polish delegation could state at once that it was prepared to support the Belgian delegation's proposal, subject to the fundamental reservation that all artillery exceeding the calibre or range indicated therein should be internationalised under a general convention.

The Polish delegation, as he had already said, was avowedly opposed to the principle of abolition or simple prohibition, but was prepared to support it if the Conference took a decision on those lines. It thought, however, that the level of arms left at the disposal of countries might be made much lower if the Conference decided to adopt the principle of internationalisation.

The Polish delegate regretted having been obliged to add to the series of monologues to which the French delegate had referred, but thought that it was desirable to define his delegation's views.

In order to facilitate the proceedings, the Polish delegation was prepared to accept the United Kingdom proposal as a basis for discussion, subject to the modifications indicated by various other delegations.

M. SATO (Japan) recalled that he had already stated the Japanese delegation's views at the beginning of the meeting. He thanked the British delegation for its efforts towards

conciliation, as embodied in its recent proposal. The Japanese delegation was prepared to accept that proposal as a basis for discussion, subject to certain minor amendments.

General FERRAZ (Portugal) stated that the Portuguese delegation would support the British proposal as interpreted by the French delegation, on the understanding that the Committee of Experts' replies would be taken as a basis for the later work of the Commission.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) wished to define the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation. It shared the views of the Netherlands delegation and of Sweden and would have been prepared to support the Canadian delegation's proposal. Bearing in mind, however, what still remained to be done, it hoped that the proposal it had just submitted might facilitate the Commission's work. That proposal, as the United States delegation had noted, represented a compromise and in the British delegation's view could only be regarded as a makeshift.

General ELIAS (Czechoslovakia) said that, despite the preoccupations to which it had referred during the discussion in the Committee of Experts, of paragraph 1 of Chapter III, the Czechoslovak delegation was prepared to support the United Kingdom proposal as interpreted by the French delegation. That proposal, moreover, did not differ very materially from the one submitted by the Belgian delegation.

Generally speaking, the Czechoslovak delegation was prepared to accept the calibre-limits or range-limits mentioned in those two proposals, subject to the reservation that guarantees should be provided to ensure the execution of any undertakings concluded.

The PRESIDENT declared the general discussion closed, and invited the Commission to choose between two solutions.

The simplest solution would be to frame an objective report reflecting the three currents of opinion revealed in the Commission: one group of delegations was prepared to take as the limit above which artillery would be regarded as specifically offensive a calibre of 100-105 mm., a second group had proposed a calibre-limit of 150-155 mm., while a third group thought that it should be fixed at not less than 220 mm. This solution would be the simplest, as the Rapporteur could, without much difficulty, draw conclusions from the declarations made by the delegations.

The second solution would be to find some common ground in a formula which would reconcile the various points of view to some extent, though still taking into account the different shades of opinion expressed.

The Commission had paid a tribute to the spirit of conciliation exhibited by the United Kingdom delegation in submitting its proposal. That proposal, as well as the Belgian proposal, should give the Commission an adequate basis for establishing an agreed formula.

Delegations which had spoken from a purely technical standpoint could rest assured that a copy of the Committee of Experts' reply would be annexed to the report which the Land Commission was to submit to the General Commission.

If the Land Commission pronounced in favour of the second solution — that was to say, if it agreed to examine the possibilities of a joint reply — it might set about that task at the next meeting, on the basis of the British and Belgian proposals. Any other proposals communicated to the Bureau in the meantime would of course be examined also.

The President hoped that, thanks to the prevailing goodwill and spirit of conciliation, the members of the Land Commission might be able to submit to the General Commission a reply which would serve to facilitate its decision.

NINTH MEETING

Held on Tuesday, May 17th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President: M. BUERO.

12. EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY WITH JAPAN.

The PRESIDENT extended to the members of the Japanese delegation the Commission's deep sympathy on the occasion of the fresh misfortune which had stricken Japan in the death of the Head of the Government, who had just succumbed to a cowardly attack.

M. SATO (Japan) thanked the president.

13. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION AS REGARDS ARTILLERY.

The PRESIDENT recalled that the question on the agenda was the reply to the General Commission with reference to artillery material. Five proposals relating to that reply had already been distributed — namely, the Spanish¹, Hungarian¹, United Kingdom², Belgian² and Netherlands¹ proposals. The Commission also had to consider other proposals — for example, those from the German, Italian and Japanese delegations, in the form of amendments to certain paragraphs of the United Kingdom proposal. In addition, the French delegation had submitted, within the framework of the United Kingdom text, a concrete proposal of which the text was the following :

“ Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire submitted to it (document Conf.D./C.T.7), the Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission :

“ (a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes.

“ (b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission, for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of artillery *most* threatening to national defence comprise those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength — namely :

“ 1. In the case of permanent fortifications of great strength, artillery of a calibre exceeding 320 mm. firing projectiles exceeding 500 kilogrammes in weight.

“ 2. In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre between 250 and 320 mm. firing projectiles exceeding 200 kilogrammes in weight.

“ (c) In a second category of lower power should be included artillery capable of effective action against lightly-protected permanent fortifications or against works on the battlefield, if it has been possible with the time, material and personnel available to give such works a like degree of strength. This artillery includes calibres between 220 and 250 mm.

“ (d) As regards artillery capable of effective action against improvised field works and entrenchments, this includes generally pieces of calibres varying from 100 to 220 mm. inclusive, firing projectiles of from 50 to 200 kilogrammes in weight.

“ Certain delegations regard such artillery as threatening to national defence while others consider it necessary for national defence.

“ (e) As regards the third element of the resolution of the General Commission, the replies of the Committee of Experts to questions 1 and 2 of Chapter III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that, in the view of certain delegations, artillery material of over 200 mm. calibre having an effective range of more than 25 kilometres is the most menacing to the civil population. Other delegations attribute this character even to artillery of a calibre over 100 mm. or with an effective range of over 15 kilometres.

“ Other delegations, on the other hand, think it necessary to include in the zone of the battlefield tactical reserves capable of joining in the battle in a few hours with the aid of motor transport, and which may be 50 kilometres away from the front ; these delegations consider that artillery designed to fire beyond the corresponding range is more dangerous to the civil population than to military objectives, and is consequently the *most* menacing to the civil population. ”

The first question which the Commission would have to decide was which document it would choose as a basis for discussion. The President supposed that the Commission would wish to take for this purpose the United Kingdom draft, which, though not the first in date, had been regarded by a number of delegates as a possible basis, and to which the delegations had been invited to propose amendments. Such a decision, however, could not, in his view, be taken before the authors of the four other original proposals had stated that they had no objection to that procedure. The fact that the United Kingdom draft had been submitted in the form of a reply to the General Commission was a further argument in favour of his

¹ See Minutes of the seventh meeting.

² See Minutes of the eighth meeting.

suggestion, and he would recall that those delegations which were not satisfied with the tenor of the document could always propose amendments.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) accepted the President's proposal on behalf of the Spanish delegation.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) also accepted it.

M. VAN TUINEN (Netherlands) said that, although the United Kingdom draft differed in form from that submitted by the Netherlands delegation, he had no objection to the President's suggestion, but that he would wish in due course to submit the proposals embodied in the Netherlands text.

Lieutenant-General GALET (Belgium) accepted the President's suggestion.

Preamble.

The PRESIDENT read the preamble to the United Kingdom proposal, as follows :

“ Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Technical Sub-Committee to the questionnaire submitted to it (document Conf.D./C.T.7), the Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission.”

The Secretariat had not been informed of any amendments to that text.

Colonel LEITÃO DE CARVALHO (Brazil) stated that the Brazilian delegation, which had followed with interest the discussion on the reply to the General Commission's questions and had only abstained from submitting concrete proposals in order to facilitate agreement, had never lost sight of the object of the resolution of April 22nd. It had always aimed at identifying, for the purposes of the reply to the General Commission, the armaments particularly calculated to strengthen aggressive action, with a view to subjecting those armaments to a qualitative limitation whereby their power would be kept below that of defensive armaments.

The Brazilian delegation would have preferred a reply which, like that of the Belgian delegation, left no doubt as to the characteristics of the artillery material of which abolition would render easier the defence in case of aggression ; a reply on those lines would, it thought, greatly facilitate the work of the General Commission.

Account could not be taken, however, in a text as concise as that of the Belgian delegation of all the tendencies expressed in the course of the debate. The Brazilian delegation accordingly supported the British proposal. The calibres for artillery pieces which the Committee of Experts regarded as capable of destroying the essential parts of permanent fortifications and acting effectively against field entrenchments varied between minimum and maximum limits of 100 mm. and 320 mm. and above. Referring to the Committee of Experts' reply on this point,¹ the Brazilian representative expressed the view that artillery of about 150 mm. — which was the calibre most commonly employed — and upwards was sufficient to destroy entrenchments improvised by the defence in a short time, and that artillery from above 150 mm. to 220 mm. was a weapon extremely favourable to the aggressor. He thought therefore that the limit referred to should be taken as a basis for qualitative reduction.

He thought also that the minimum figures named in the Committee of Experts' reply might furnish a reply to the question concerning the weapons most threatening to civilians. In his view, a depth of 15 kilometres constituted a minimum limit and should be taken as a basis for qualitative reduction.

Having regard to those various considerations, it would be possible to frame a simple and clear reply to the General Commission, taking as a basis the Committee of Experts' figures. He realised, however, that considerations of a different nature might influence the Commission's decisions, and stated that, in the interests of conciliation, the Brazilian delegation was prepared to support the United Kingdom proposal. It was ready, indeed, to accept any solution that might meet with unanimity or at all events obtain a majority vote in the Commission.

The PRESIDENT said that the Commission would note Colonel Leitão de Carvalho's declaration, which related to the British draft as a whole.

The preamble was adopted.

Paragraph (a).

The PRESIDENT read paragraph (a) of the United Kingdom proposal, as follows :

“ (a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but, whereas the lighter natures have a restricted offensive capacity, the offensive element becomes greater as the power of the artillery increases.”

The French delegation had submitted an amendment to that paragraph, to delete the phrase beginning “ but whereas. . . ”

¹ Document Conf.D./C.T.8.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) thought that field artillery, whether light or heavy, had the most specifically offensive characteristics, since it accompanied the infantry everywhere and played an essential part in the attack.

The PRESIDENT asked whether in that case the Spanish delegation wished to withdraw its proposal reading as follows :

“ All weapons can be used for offensive and defensive purposes. Those most effective for the former are also most effective for the latter.”

Did the Spanish delegation feel that the United Kingdom text made its own proposal unnecessary, or did it still prefer to retain it ?

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) replied that, having accepted the United Kingdom text, he withdrew the Spanish proposal, while reserving the right to submit, in the form of an amendment to the United Kingdom proposal, such parts of his original text as he felt should be retained.

M. AUBERT (France) explained the reasons for which the French delegation had asked for the deletion of the last lines of the paragraph (a) ; the first part of that paragraph expressed an idea admitting of no dispute which had already been brought out in the Sub-Commission “A”’s report and the Commission should, in the French delegation’s view, content itself with that statement.

He felt that the second part of the sentence might give rise to unnecessary controversy. The Spanish delegation had observed that the most effective artillery for offensive purposes was also the most effective for purposes of defence. Such being the case, the Commission should not stress the fact that the offensive character increased in proportion to the power unless it said that the same applied also to the defensive character. Much emphasis had been placed, in the proposed text, on calibre and perhaps not enough on range. He asked whether the United Kingdom delegation could agree to delete that part of the sentence.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) regretted that he could not accede to the request, as the United Kingdom delegation attached some importance to the passage in question. While it was true that the defensive character increased along with the offensive character, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the General Commission’s question applied to the offensive power of artillery. The United Kingdom delegation felt that the clause formed a useful preamble to a more detailed study of offensive artillery.

In view of the publicity given to the Commission’s work, it might be well to stress even what appeared self-evident facts, such as the relationship between the offensive character and power. Feeling that it would be well to direct the General Commission’s attention to the fact that the offensive capacity increased with the calibre, the United Kingdom delegation wished the passage under discussion to be retained in the reply to the General Commission. The United Kingdom delegate added that the French delegate would not find him so strongly opposed to the majority of the other amendments put forward by the French delegation.

M. AUBERT (France) appreciated General Temperley’s argument, which answered clearly his own question. He agreed that the General Commission’s question had in view the offensive character of artillery. It was quite certain, however, and this fact was clear from the Commission’s discussions, that the first criterion must be defined in the light of the second. He feared that, in view of the difficulties which had already arisen in that connection, fresh difficulties might be caused uselessly if the Commission reverted to so abstract a problem. He noted that the members of the Commission were agreed as regards the substance of the question, and pointed out that the later passages of the document would illustrate General Temperley’s point by showing that some calibres might be more offensive than others. Fearing, however, that fresh difficulties might be caused in return for what was a very minor gain, the French delegation reiterated its request that the second part of paragraph (a) be deleted in the interests of greater clearness.

He proposed the following text, which was, he said, based on General Temperley’s suggestion :

“ . . . but the offensive character increases proportionately with the efficacy against defensive works and against civilians — *i.e.*, proportionately with the power and range.”

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) accepted M. Aubert’s text.

The PRESIDENT read the new text, drafted as follows :

“ All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but the offensive character increases proportionately with the efficacy against defensive works and against civilians — *i.e.*, proportionately with the power and range.”

Paragraph (a) was adopted.

Paragraph (b).

The PRESIDENT read paragraph (b) of the United Kingdom proposal, as follows :

“ Leaving aside the question of artillery constituting the fixed armament of permanent fortifications, which raises certain issues more appropriate for separate discussion, the Land Commission is of the opinion that those types of mobile artillery which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of average, or of more than average, strength — that is to say, pieces of calibres from 250 mm. upwards, firing projectiles weighing from 200 kilogrammes upwards — should be regarded as the most specifically offensive and the most efficacious against the national defence.”

He stated that amendments to that paragraph had been submitted by the French delegation. There was firstly a formal modification to the first phrase.

The formal modification in question was adopted.

The PRESIDENT observed that the French text involved a further modification by the addition of another category of material to those already included in the United Kingdom text.

M. AUBERT (France) explained that the French delegation's object in proposing the amendment was, on the one hand, to keep more closely to the experts' reply, in which the distinction for which it was asking appeared, and, on the other, to reflect as far as possible the various tendencies exhibited in the course of the Commission's proceedings, in order to increase the likelihood of the Commission being able to come to a unanimous decision, which would have a good effect on public opinion. He thought that the Commission would be well advised to be as explicit as possible.

After a discussion in which General BONOMI (Italy), the PRESIDENT, M. AUBERT (France) and General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) took part, the Commission *adopted* the following text :

“(b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of mobile artillery most threatening to national defence comprise those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength, namely :

“(1) In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre weight exceeding 320 mm., firing projectiles exceeding 500 kilogrammes in weight.”

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) proposed an amendment to sub-paragraph 2 of the French proposal in deference to the findings of the Committee of Experts concerning the calibre for use against permanent fortification of medium strength — namely, a calibre of “about 250 mm.”, which had represented a mean (document Conf. D./C.T.8, Chapter II, paragraph (b)). The words “and upwards” might be added to reflect the second figure (320 mm.) named in the French draft.

The Commission adopted sub-paragraph 2 of the French proposal as amended. The text, as adopted, read :

“(2) In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre of about 250 mm. and above, firing projectiles exceeding 200 kilogrammes in weight.”

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER, speaking on paragraph (b) as a whole, noted that in the text as adopted the first line of the United Kingdom proposal had been suppressed ; he assumed that the reservation embodied in the latter still applied.

The PRESIDENT confirmed that view.

Paragraph (c).

The PRESIDENT read paragraph (c) of the United Kingdom proposal, as follows :

(c) In a second and a lower category of offensive power should be included those weapons which are capable of effective action against lightly-protected permanent fortifications or against non-permanent field-works and entrenchments — that is to say, pieces of calibres between 155 mm. and 250 mm., firing projectiles weighing between 50 kilogrammes and 200 kilogrammes.”

He added that, in addition to the French proposal, amendments to this paragraph had been received from the German and Italian delegations. These amendments were as follows :

German Amendment.

Substitute for paragraph (c).

“ In a second and lower category of offensive power should be included those weapons which are capable of effective action against lightly-protected permanent fortifications or against non-permanent field-works and entrenchments — that is to say, pieces of calibres between about 100 mm. and 250 mm., firing projectiles weighing up to 200 kilogrammes. ‘ About 100 mm. ’ should be understood to mean guns of 77 mm. and over.”

Italian Amendment.

Replace the words :

“ . . . calibres between 155 mm. and 250 mm., firing projectiles weighing between 30 kilogrammes and 200 kilogrammes ”

by the following words :

“ . . . calibres between about 100 mm. and 250 mm., firing projectiles weighing between 15 kilogrammes and 200 kilogrammes.”

M. AUBERT (France) explained the principle underlying the French amendment as embodied in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the French delegation's draft — namely, that a distinction should be made between the category of “lightly-protected permanent fortifications” and “works on the battlefield” and that of “improvised field-works and entrenchments” : that distinction reproduced more closely the terms of the experts' reply.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) agreed.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) endorsed the views just expressed. He proposed further that the Commission should repeat in its text the experts' reference to a 105 mm. calibre for use against lightly-protected permanent fortifications (document Conf. D./C.T.8, Chapter II, paragraph 1 (c)).

M. AUBERT (France) observed that the French delegation's text dealt with “artillery capable of effective action”. The passage in the experts' reply to which the Hungarian delegate had referred simply stated that “variable results” might be obtained with the calibres named ; “effective action” was mentioned in a later paragraph.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) thought it preferable to adopt the experts' text.

General BONOMI (Italy) was in favour of inserting paragraph (c) of the experts' reply, so that the General Commission might have the experts' views before it. He supported the proposal to mention the 105 mm. calibre, a suggestion already embodied in the Italian amendment.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted the experts' statement that variable results might be obtained, and thought that some mention should be made of the fact that the effectiveness of the action might vary.

M. AUBERT (France) proposed, in deference to the last speaker, to add to paragraph (c) of the French text a passage as follows :

“ Variable results may be obtained against the same objectives according to the kind of projectile, the nature of the fire (flat trajectory or high-angle trajectory), thickness of earth or concrete, with artillery of calibres varying from 220 to 105 mm.”

General BONOMI (Italy) thought it preferable to take the experts' reply and to say that in a second category variable results might be obtained according to the kind of projectile, etc.

The PRESIDENT enquired whether the Commission agreed to the sub-division suggested in the French proposal. If so, it would be possible to satisfy the French view and those of the Italian and Soviet delegations and the others by retaining the sub-division and redrafting the French text.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) stated that the Hungarian delegation accepted the sub-division proposed in the French draft, but asked that the Commission should adopt the experts' text, that text having already been accepted by everybody during the earlier discussions.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER agreed that it seemed reasonable to take the text of the experts' reply.

The PRESIDENT suggested that a possible solution might be to make a distinction, as the experts had done, between permanent fortification and entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield.

(The meeting was suspended, in order that a draft text might be prepared on the basis of the views expressed.)

On resuming the meeting, the PRESIDENT noted that the new draft, prepared by several delegations, followed, in the main, the text of the Committee of Experts; it would, he thought, satisfy the views of the Italian and Hungarian delegations. The draft text submitted read as follows:

“ Against permanent fortifications with little protection variable results may be obtained according to the kind of projectile, the nature of the fire (flat trajectory or high-angle trajectory), thickness of earth or concrete, with calibres varying from 105 to 250 mm.

“ As regards artillery capable of effective action against improvised field-works and entrenchments, this includes generally pieces of a calibre varying from about 250 to 100 mm., firing projectiles of from about 200 kilogrammes to 15 kilogrammes in weight.”

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that the German delegation was prepared to accept the new text if by the phrase “about 100 mm.” was meant guns from 77 mm. upwards

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) regretted that the United Kingdom delegation could not accept the text under discussion. It did not consider a 100 mm. calibre effective against field-works; at least a 155 mm. calibre was required. If the findings of the Committee of Experts were correct, paragraph (d) of the new text could not stand. He referred in detail to the terms of the experts' reply, which read:

“ As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

“ Artillery of a higher calibre — particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed — and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield which can be organised and constructed in a short time . . . ”

M. AUBERT (France) agreed with the United Kingdom delegate on the merits of the question. He asked that a decision might be postponed until the discussion of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (d) of the French proposal, when each delegation could state what calibre it thought necessary for effective use against field-works.

TENTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, May 19th, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President: M. BUERO.

14. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (*continuation*).

The PRESIDENT, in response to the request of certain delegates, read the text adopted by the Commission up to date. The text, which had been adopted unanimously, read as follows:

“ Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire submitted to it (document Conf. D./C.T.7),

the Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission :

“(a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but its offensive capacity becomes greater as its effectiveness increases as far as defensive organisations and the civilian population are concerned — i.e., with the increase of its power and its range.

“(b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of mobile artillery most threatening to national defence are those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength — namely :

“1. In the case of permanent fortifications of great strength, artillery of a calibre exceeding 320 mm. firing projectiles exceeding 500 kilogrammes in weight.

“2. In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre of about 250 mm. and above, firing projectiles exceeding 200 kilogrammes in weight.”

A difference of opinion had so far prevented unanimity on the subject of paragraph (c) of the United Kingdom proposal, which had been considered in conjunction with paragraphs (c) and (d) (first part) of the French proposal. It was hoped that a new text submitted by M. Bourquin as Rapporteur would permit of agreement.

Paragraph (c) (continuation).

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, submitted the following amended text :

“In a lower category of offensive power should be included pieces of a calibre between 250 and about 100 mm.

“These pieces, particularly those of about 150 mm., which is the most commonly employed, are capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield which may be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material. On the other hand, variable results can be obtained by the use of the same pieces according to the kind of projectile, the nature of the fire (flat trajectory or high-angled trajectory), thickness of earth or concrete, on permanent fortifications with little protection to which can be assimilated the entrenchments and field-works of battlefields when the time, personnel and material at the disposal of the defence attain a sufficient degree of magnitude.”

He explained that his amendment represented a co-ordination of the elements embodied in the experts' reply. The experts had examined the question of artillery in relation to the various objectives — on the one hand, permanent fortifications of great strength, of average strength, and with little protection, and, on the other, entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield. Those elements had now been regrouped for an immediate purpose — namely, in order that the Commission might examine, in accordance with its terms of reference, the various weapons.

The second category named in the United Kingdom proposal covered calibres of 250 mm. and below (down to 155 mm.), while the calibres indicated by the experts as being capable of being used against permanent fortifications with little protection (105 mm. to 250 mm.) and field-works (100 mm. to 220 mm.) might be conveniently grouped together in one category extending from 250 mm. to 100 mm., as suggested in the new text ; the remainder of the amendment followed the experts' reply.

If the Commission decided to adopt that text, framed in the interests of unanimity, it was essential to state in its report to the General Commission that it had been guided by purely technical considerations and that, when it came to fixing a limit at which artillery became particularly dangerous either to national defence or to civilians — a question which was not of a purely technical character — the existence of three main currents of opinion had become evident [(the [calibres named being [respectively about 100 mm., 150 mm. and 220 mm.).

Only by remaining on technical ground could the Commission hope to reach unanimity — unless it decided to adopt a text so complicated as simply to bewilder the General Commission. An endeavour must be made to reach unanimity, as long as it really reflected the views of the various delegations.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) observed that at the end of paragraph (b) of the text adopted there was a reference to weapons most specifically offensive and most efficacious against national defence. He thought that a similar reference should be made in paragraph (c). While agreeing with the Rapporteur as to the importance of unanimity, he felt that clearness

was even more important, for unanimity might perhaps be achieved only by sacrificing the minority or by adopting a colourless text; moreover, the Land Commission's opinion was not in any case binding on the General Commission.

The PRESIDENT pointed out that the idea of a graduation in the offensive character of weapons, which General Benítez wished to add, was already covered by paragraph (a) where it was said: "but its offensive capacity becomes greater as its effectiveness increases as far as defensive organisations and the civilian population are concerned — *i.e.*, with the increase of its power and its range".

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) thought that the members of the Commission must all be very grateful to the Rapporteur for having endeavoured to find a text to cover their views. He agreed with the Rapporteur that it would be necessary to inform the General Commission that three main groups of opinion existed in the Land Commission.

Commenting on the new text, he stated that the objection which he had felt bound to offer to the text submitted at the end of the previous meeting still existed; from his particular point of view, he could not see that the new text differed very much from the old one. His fundamental objection to both texts was that they stated that guns of a calibre of 100 mm. were capable of effective action against field-works. The United Kingdom delegation did not believe that statement to be true. Most commanders, if given the task of attacking an enemy with field-works and entrenched positions, would ask for guns of at least 150 mm. and would not attack without, or, if they did so, would suffer great loss of life or be unsuccessful in the attack. The United Kingdom delegate could not put his signature or agree to any document sent to the General Commission and containing that statement, a statement which, as a soldier, he did not believe to be correct. True, the Rapporteur's text referred in the last sentence to "variable results", etc., but that sentence told the General Commission nothing that it did not already know. Even if he had to make a reservation for the United Kingdom delegation alone, he could not agree that guns of such a low calibre were effective against field fortifications or entrenchments of the kind in question.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, thanked the delegate of the United Kingdom for his appreciative remarks. The criticism offered applied rather to the experts' reply, for the new text reflected the text of that reply.

The Rapporteur had hoped that the work of the Commission might progress in the technical field, but if unanimity were impossible, the Commission might simply transmit the experts' reply, adding in its report to the General Commission that when it had tried to fix a limit the existence of three groups of opinion had become evident.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) explained that he had interpreted the experts' reply somewhat differently from the Rapporteur. He took Chapter II, paragraph 2 of the reply to mean that artillery of a higher calibre (than 100 mm.), particularly of about 150 mm., was capable of effective action. He did not read it as meaning that artillery of, say, 102 mm. was capable of effective action. By "artillery of a higher calibre" was meant artillery of a *considerably* higher calibre; there had to be a big jump — not just a few points — to make it effective. What he was concerned about was that he did not believe that a gun anywhere in the vicinity of 100 mm. was capable of effective action against the works in question.

As regards transmitting the experts' reply to the General Commission, he pointed out that the questionnaire had been sent to the experts with the object of clarifying the Land Commission's own views. The questions asked by the General Commission were quite different: the Land Commission had to decide what guns were most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence, and most threatening to civilians. It would not help the General Commission to place before it the catalogue arrived at, after much conciliation, in answer to a series of very technical questions which the General Commission had not even asked. It would be well to adopt the Rapporteur's suggestion and to send the General Commission a report, giving the three trends of opinion that existed in the Land Commission.

M. AUBERT (France) thought that some of the difficulties which had arisen were perhaps due to the fact that the Rapporteur had not kept sufficiently closely to the text of the experts' reply. He drew attention to two points in regard to which that appeared to be the case. First, it would be well, after mentioning calibres of 100 mm. and 150 mm., to mention (as in the experts' reply) 220 mm. Further, he thought mention should be made of the fact that the "calibre required may even be as much as 250 mm. when the time, personnel and material available have made it possible to increase the degree of resistance

of the position", the text continuing: "Further, variable results may be obtained, according to the nature of the projectile, with pieces of a calibre between about 250 mm. and 100 mm."

He thought that the text adopted by the Commission would thus be clear and would bring out the fact that the various opinions and tendencies could be grouped round three main calibres. He feared that if the Commission summarised the experts' reply too drastically some misunderstanding might arise.

General NUYTEN (Belgium) recalled that the purpose of the Rapporteur's amendment was to reconcile the United Kingdom and French theses. At the meeting on May 11th the Belgian delegation had stated that it would ask for the abolition of all howitzers and mortars of a calibre exceeding 220 mm. and all guns of a calibre exceeding 155 mm. Despite its spirit of conciliation, the Belgian delegation had not changed its views on that point.

General Temperley had said that the different tendencies apparent during the Commission's debates should be mentioned in the Commission's report. The formula at present under consideration applied to all calibres from 250 mm. to 100 mm. If that formula were adopted, the Belgian delegation would be unable to express its own particular views.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, accepted M. Aubert's text. He proposed to keep even more closely to the terms of the experts' reply and to modify his amendment as follows :

"As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

"Artillery of a calibre higher than about 100 mm. — particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed — and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield which can be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material. The calibre required may even be as much as 250 mm. when the time, personnel and material at the disposal of the defence have made it possible to increase the degree of resistance of the position. Further, variable results may be obtained, according to the nature of the projectile, with pieces of a calibre between about 250 mm. and 100 mm."

He hoped that that modification would meet General Temperley's views, and he thought that, as there was some difference of opinion as to interpretation, it would be better to keep to the experts' text.

General Nuyten had said that the Belgian delegation's views would not appear if the Commission adopted the formula proposed. It was unfortunately not possible, in a joint text, to mention all the figures which had been proposed by the different delegations. The Commission could only keep to the text of the experts' reply and state in its report to the General Commission that agreement had not been reached in regard to the actual figures as regards limits, adding that, despite that divergence of opinion, three main tendencies had been clearly distinguished.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) observed that, while taking into account the relationship between the offensive character and the calibre of artillery, the Commission had entirely neglected the question of mobility. He proposed, in due course, to submit a text on the subject of field artillery.

The PRESIDENT requested General Benítez to hold over his proposal until agreement on the principle had been reached.

Paragraph (c) was adopted.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) accepted the new formula, subject to the objection already put forward by the German delegation regarding 100 mm. calibres, which also applied to paragraph (c).

The PRESIDENT noted the German delegation's reservation.

Paragraph (d).

The PRESIDENT read paragraph (d) of the United Kingdom proposal, as follows :

"Artillery of natures lighter than those referred to in paragraph (c) above are the least specifically offensive in character."

He observed that, in addition to the French proposal, amendments had been received from the German and Italian delegations.

German Amendment.

Substitute for paragraph (d) :

“ Artillery of natures lighter than those referred to in paragraph (c) above are not of a specifically offensive character.”

Italian Amendment.

Replace the words :

“ are the least specifically offensive in character ”

by the following words :

“ are not of a specifically offensive character ”.

The PRESIDENT added that, in his view, paragraph (d) should be deleted.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) pointed out that if it were retained, it would appear to indicate that 75 mm. guns, for example, were regarded as practically non-offensive.

M. AUBERT (France) recalled that the discussion on the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (d) of the French proposal had been postponed.

In view of the amendments made in the preceding paragraphs of the reply to the General Commission, the French delegation wished to amend the text of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (d) as follows :

“ Certain delegations regard artillery capable of effective action against improvised field-works and entrenchments as threatening to national defence, while others consider it necessary for national defence.”

The experts' reply stated that artillery up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive was necessary to reduce field-works. The French delegation could not include such weapons in the category of those most threatening to national defence.

The fundamental reason for this attitude had been repeatedly stated ; the French delegation considered it essential to retain the means of defence required to drive out an enemy who had invaded the country by a surprise attack and entrenched itself in the national territory.

The Netherlands delegate, who was Vice-President of the Commission, had said, it was true, while agreeing that calibres of 220 mm. might perhaps be necessary to reduce field-works, that if such pieces were prohibited, the defence would no doubt be weakened, but that at the same time it would only have to cope with an offensive which was also less well armed.

That reasoning would be accurate if it were agreed that the defence and the attack employed the same weapons and that it was equitable to disarm them simultaneously. There was reason to believe, unfortunately, that the aggressor would not worry about a prohibition which the victim of the aggression had perhaps made a point of observing. The aggressor would tend to concentrate as secretly as possible, not the most powerful, but the most rapid material in the hands of his best troops, and if he entrenched himself on the territory which he had invaded very powerful material would be required to drive him out when he was on his guard. Surprise was a factor in the aggressor's favour.

On those grounds the French delegation held that artillery of a calibre of at least 220 mm., which was necessary to destroy fortifications, could not be included in the category of weapons most dangerous to national defence. It was, on the contrary, necessary for purposes of national defence.

The question of differentiating between weapons which could and those which could not be included in that category having arisen, the French delegate observed that the line of demarcation could not be rigid and absolute. If it were, there would be clear evidence to prove the aggressive nature of certain material, and such material need only be abolished to do away automatically with aggression.

The many and varied conclusions, however, which had emerged from the debates showed that no rigid line could be drawn. All weapons, if placed at the disposal of a country which was itself aggressively-minded, could assume an offensive character. A fleet of battleships, for example, might be destroyed by sloops carrying torpedoes, or other implements might be used which could not at present be brought under any system of regulation. The French delegate thought that the Commission should give up the idea of trying to identify aggression with this or that war material.

It was true that, during the discussions, it had been agreed that certain arms were more dangerous than others, but the idea on which this agreement was based was not purely technical.

In stating that material of a calibre sufficient to destroy permanent fortifications was most dangerous to national defence, the Commission had chiefly had in mind the fact that the aggressor was invading the territory, since he was attacking its fortifications. That introduced an idea which was quite independent of the offensive capacity of the weapons in themselves — namely, the definition of aggression, the establishment of the aggressor's intentions. From these considerations M. Aubert would conclude that, if it were desired to

suppress aggression or at all events to discourage it — which was the fundamental task of the League — it was not sufficient to abolish certain material : it was essential to establish some system of control which would deprive the aggressor of the benefit of surprise and — more important still — to convince the aggressor that aggression did not pay.

The French delegate, reverting to the remarks of the Polish delegate, pointed out, further, that the relative and empirical character of the line of demarcation to be drawn between offensive and defensive weapons would vary according to whether the first-named category were abolished or placed at the service of the League. Abolition would mean embarking on the unknown and upsetting the existing situation in regard to security. The prohibition of certain categories of weapons would be to the advantage of States which did not at present possess them, and the value of the material still remaining would be greatly enhanced, as would any new process or invention that had not yet come under a system of regulation, so that the aggressor could employ the means in question for the purpose of a surprise attack.

If another formula for regulation were adopted, such as internationalisation, as the French delegation proposed, those drawbacks would disappear.

Subject to his observations as regards a higher calibre, the French delegate repeated that it was impossible for the French delegation to regard artillery of 220 mm. and under as most specifically offensive or most efficacious against national defence.

The PRESIDENT noted that the Commission appeared to be in favour of deleting paragraph (d) of the United Kingdom proposal.

He enquired whether the French delegation would agree to its reservation appearing in the form of a footnote.

M. AUBERT (France) reserved his reply on that point until he had heard the observations that other delegations might have to submit. He pointed out that the French delegation's formula was not intended simply to express its own views, since two opposite tendencies were clearly expressed in it.

General BONOMI (Italy) made the following statement:

“ I have followed M. Aubert's interesting statement most attentively, but I would venture to point out that both in the French delegate's proposal and in his statement an idea occurs which exceeds our terms of reference under the General Commission's resolution.

“ The resolution in question states that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions, with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians. That resolution does not, however, authorise us to discuss what weapons are necessary for national defence.

“ I am convinced that if we discussed the proposal submitted by the French delegate we should be acting contrary to the definite instructions given us by the General Commission. I would ask the President, therefore, not to open a discussion on that proposal.”

The PRESIDENT thought that, in view of the lateness of the hour and the importance of the question raised by General Bonomi, it would be preferable to adjourn the discussion to the next meeting.

The President's proposal was adopted.

ELEVENTH MEETING

Held on Friday, May 20th, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President: M. BUERO.

15. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (*continuation*).

Paragraph (d) (continuation).

The PRESIDENT, resuming the discussion at the point at which it had been adjourned on the previous day, noted that, in the course of the debate on the text of paragraph (d)

(second part) of the French proposal, the Italian delegation had raised the previous question concerning the competence of the Commission to examine matters which, in its view, did not come within its terms of reference under the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd. The Commission must first discuss the previous question.

General NYGREN (Sweden) observed that in paragraph (b) the Land Commission had given a direct reply to the General Commission's question by stating that the weapons specified — *i.e.*, the weapons of highest calibre, were the *most* threatening to national defence.

The text of paragraph (c) simply stated, however, that certain other pieces should be included in a second category of lower power; the paragraph then enumerated certain technical facts, but no opinion was expressed on the real problem at issue — namely, whether those weapons, or some of them, should be regarded as specifically offensive, etc. It might simply be concluded that they were less offensive than the ones referred to in (b), but that was self-evident. In view of the actual aim of the Conference, which was to subject certain particularly aggressive weapons to special measures of qualitative limitation and reduction, the Land Commission should give a more direct reply. General Benítez had drawn attention to that point on the previous day, and that view was apparently shared by the French delegation, for, in the last paragraph of its text as amended at the previous meeting, it stated that certain delegations regarded the weapons in question as threatening to national defence. The Swedish delegation thought that text too vague and general.

Since it seemed impossible at present to reach unanimity on the question of which of the weapons in paragraph (c) should be regarded as specifically offensive and threatening, it was preferable to say so frankly, instead of taking refuge behind general phrases, which meant very little.

As regards the Italian observation, the Swedish delegate agreed with General Bonomi. The last sub-paragraph of paragraph (d) of the French proposal should be replaced by the formal statement to the effect that unanimity had not been reached, but that the pieces regarded as possessing specifically offensive characteristics were artillery of a calibre exceeding, in the opinion of certain delegations, 105 mm., in the opinion of others, 155 mm., and in the opinion of a third group of delegates, 220 mm.

M. AUBERT (France), in view of the Swedish delegation's statement, wished to refer to paragraph (a) as adopted¹:

“ All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but its offensive capacity becomes greater as its effectiveness increases as far as defensive organisations and the civilian population are concerned — *i.e.*, with the increase of its power and its range.”

That paragraph, he said, covered all that followed. Paragraph (b) gave the calibres most threatening to national defence, and paragraph (c) would deal with a lower category of offensive power, in regard to which agreement had not been reached: a general statement had seemed all that was possible in the circumstances, but he had no objection to making it more precise if the Commission wished. There still remained the question of “ dosage ”; certain weapons should be regarded as less offensive than others, by reason of the fact that they were required for defensive purposes. A discussion on the “ dosage ” of the offensive and defensive characteristics of weapons was, in his view, quite within the Land Commission's competence.

M. VENTZOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet delegation had not considered it necessary up to the present to intervene in such a way as to disturb the unanimity of the Land Commission, which had, moreover, confined itself to a mere enumeration of the different groups of opinion revealed in the Committee of Experts. M. Aubert, however, had raised a series of questions of principle concerning qualitative disarmament, and it became necessary to explain the Soviet position.

M. Aubert had very rightly stressed the relative value of qualitative disarmament; he had demonstrated that even if modern artillery having a large calibre were abolished, offensive operations could still be pursued with the technical means left intact. For that very reason the Soviet delegation had maintained, in all the Commissions, that qualitative disarmament was useless without quantitative disarmament. If both those operations could be put through together, the offensive capacity of aggressive States would be greatly undermined. The big-calibre campaign had been going on for the past three weeks, and it was by this means that an endeavour was being made to save from “ perdition ” all, or practically all, heavy artillery. Unanimity on such principles, the Soviet delegate felt,

¹ See Minutes of the previous meeting.

would not do much to advance the cause of disarmament. The technique of artillery on which the whole scheme of the weight of projectiles and artillery calibres was based could not be regarded from the standpoint of statics. From the standpoint of dynamics, a consideration of modern artillery tendencies, a cursory glance at military publications and an examination of experimental models showed that each type of new artillery possessed higher technical properties while the calibres remained unchanged. Technical improvements in the form of modifications in the structure of the pieces, in the mounting, in the shape of the projectile, and in other details, permitted of an enormous increase in the range and weight of the projectile, while keeping the same calibre. The Soviet delegation, therefore, maintained that for the purposes of really qualitative disarmament the Commission should (1) select from the Committee of Experts' list the lowest calibres which could be a menace to national defence, and (2) prohibit the qualitative improvement of existing models.

It might be objected that the technique of fortification was also improving. The Soviet delegation did not agree that, to constitute a threat to national defence, the projectile must be capable of penetrating one or two metres into the concrete or of piercing an armoured turret. Few countries could establish so costly a system of defence as that would imply, and for that reason the Soviet delegation still held that all artillery (guns and howitzers) of a calibre exceeding 100 mm., firing a projectile exceeding 16 kilogrammes in weight and possessing a range of more than 15 kilometres were covered by the General Commission's criteria. The passage in the resolution which M. Aubert had brought into discussion should, in the Soviet delegate's view, be framed as follows :

“In the opinion of certain delegations, such artillery might constitute a considerable danger to national defence.”

Was it necessary to add that certain States considered the maintenance of that artillery necessary for national defence? M. Ventzoff thought not, as the General Commission had not asked the Land Commission for a reply to questions relating to defensive weapons.

M. SATO (Japan) agreed in the main with M. Aubert's statement of the previous day. The Land Commission's business was to indicate the weapons which answered to the three criteria contained in the General Commission's resolution. Paragraph (b) designated clearly the artillery types most threatening to national defence. A lower category of offensive power was indicated in paragraph (c), and the question to be settled now was whether that second category was to be regarded as threatening to national defence. In the Japanese delegate's view it should not be grouped with the first; the Commission should simply designate the first category—that was to say, category (b)—as most offensive, and leave it at that.

The Soviet suggestion to abolish heavy artillery, on the principle that all such pieces were menacing to national defence, should logically imply the abolition of light artillery, machine guns and other types. But the idea of defence could not be ruled out when deciding which weapons were offensive, since the same weapon might serve both offensive and defensive purposes.

It was preferable to make no comment on paragraph (c) but simply to say that that second category was of a less offensive character than the first. The Japanese delegation would be prepared to accept a compromise statement to the effect that certain delegations regarded the second category of weapons as offensive, while others considered it necessary for defensive purposes.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) observed that the question which the Commission had to decide, as defined by the President, was whether it should insert in its reply to the General Commission a phrase of the nature suggested by the French delegation and amended by other delegations. That suggestion had raised objections on the part of the Italian delegation, and the German delegation also felt that some of the arguments adduced in favour of the French proposal went rather far. Without going into questions such as control, good faith, internationalisation, etc., which were, he thought, for the General Commission to decide, M. von Weizsäcker felt that certain of the elements mentioned by the French delegate might properly be said to come within the Land Commission's sphere. It had been urged, for example, that to abolish calibres above a certain figure would be to venture into the unknown and would be compromising the idea of security. That idea, however, was already compromised: that was why the Conference had been convened—to re-establish security. Much had been said on the subject of the aggressor and the defender, and the temptation was to strengthen the defence: State A might have to defend itself against aggression on the part of State B, but it was necessary also to take into account the fact that the rôles might be reversed. A and B should be given the same degree of security: there should be no premium on aggression for either State. The French delegation had spoken of relativity, and it would certainly be desirable to take that idea into account in the Commission's resolution or report. The German delegate said that he himself would have had no difficulty in inserting figures in the text—his views on that point were known.

He desired to submit an addition to point (d) of the French proposal, in the form of a text as follows:

"The lowest limit of calibre above which artillery possesses an essentially offensive character is, moreover, a relative one.

"The limit of calibre above which the artillery of a State has an essentially offensive character is lower in proportion as the calibres of the artillery available for the national defence of the opponent are smaller."

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) noted that it was the point under discussion that had led the Spanish delegation to insert in its proposal¹ a reservation relating to offensive and defensive weapons; it had indicated that arms which were most efficacious for purposes of offence were equally so for the defence. He thought that the Land Commission need not go into the question of weapons for offensive and defensive purposes, since paragraph (b) already offered a solution of the problem before it. That paragraph as adopted reads²:

"(b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of mobile artillery most threatening to national defence are those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength — namely, etc. . . ."

If the French proposal³ was not adopted by the General Commission, the defence might have to be strengthened by allowing it to have heavy fixed artillery.

The PRESIDENT thought that the previous question raised by the Italian delegation, relating to the Land Commission's competence, might be regarded as practically settled.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that he would be prepared to accept the French text of paragraph (d) (second part) if the words "necessary for national defence" could be deleted and replaced by the words "more or less offensive".

M. AUBERT (France) regretted that he could not agree to the statement that some delegations considered the artillery in question "more or less offensive": he personally did not so regard it. Further, the phrase "while others consider it more or less offensive" did not at all reproduce the opinion of the second group of delegations — namely, of those who regarded the said artillery as "necessary for national defence."

Each delegation was naturally trying to adapt the text to its own convictions, and unanimity appeared to be impossible. The French delegation desired to submit a proposal amending paragraph (d), as follows:

"(d) It was not possible to obtain unanimity either as to the threatening character in relation to national defence of this second category of artillery (referred to in Section (c) above), nor as to the calibre above which this character exists.

Whilst certain delegations consider that this category of artillery is more necessary for national defence than threatening to it, a first group of other delegations places at about 100 mm. the limit above which artillery is threatening to national defence, a second group places it at 155 mm. and a third group at 220 mm."

M. SATO (Japan) stated, in reply to a question of the President, that while he would have preferred simply to retain the text adopted up to date, he would be prepared, if the majority of the Commission so desired, to accept a paragraph on the lines of the French delegation's proposal. He pointed out, however, that while the Japanese delegation would have no objection to the statement concerning the three groups of opinion in regard to calibre limits, mention must also be made of a fourth class in favour of the 250 mm. limit referred to in paragraph (c): ". . . On the other hand, variable results can be obtained by the use of a calibre between 250 mm. and 100 mm. etc. . . ." The Japanese delegation wished to insist on the fact that a calibre of 250 mm. should serve as a line of demarcation.

The PRESIDENT regretted that it had not been found possible for the Commission to avoid taking a formal decision on the question raised by General Bonomi. The Italian delegation insisted that the Land Commission's terms of reference did not permit of its examining what categories of artillery were necessary for national defence, and stated that it could not accept any text on the lines of the French proposal.

¹ See Minutes of the seventh meeting.

² See Minutes of the tenth meeting.

³ Assistance to a State the victim of aggression.

Although, in practice, the Commission had already answered General Bonomi's question by the fact of having examined the German and French proposals, the Italian delegation asked for a vote.

In order to avoid a majority or minority decision, the President would ask the Commission if it was of opinion that it could examine the amendment proposed by the French delegation.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) pointed out that, as the French delegation's proposal referred simply to the opinion of "certain delegations", the responsibility of the Commission as a whole was not involved, any more than that of the Italian delegation.

General BONOMI (Italy), while admitting the justice of General Temperley's remarks, maintained that the question was one of principle, and reiterated his request that the Commission should state whether it thought it could or could not examine categories of armaments not covered by the General Commission's resolution.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) stated that some years' experience of the League's methods of procedure had shown him that the interpretation of terms of reference was more elastic there than was generally the case in national Parliaments. As a rule international Commissions took the view that a certain latitude was allowed them as regards the development of their work. He thought that in the present case the Land Commission was entitled to supplement its reply to the General Commission, so far as it might think fit, and that if the suggestions which had been submitted were of interest to it, they would be of the same interest to the General Commission.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) asked whether General Bonomi could perhaps submit an amendment to the text under consideration, as that might make it possible to obtain a unanimous vote.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the Commission should examine the French amendment at once, duly noting the fact that the Italian delegation had stated that, for reasons of principle, it could not accept that text.

The President's proposal was adopted.

M. SATO (Japan) stated that the text of the French proposal satisfied his preoccupations and met with his delegation's approval.

M. VENTZOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desired to associate itself with the Italian delegation's reservation.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) accepted the French proposal, but asked whether it would not be well, if it were adopted, to delete the last part of paragraph (c), since the French proposal represented the idea embodied in paragraph (c).

General NUYTEN (Belgium) suggested that it might be possible to reach a unanimous decision by deleting the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (d) now under consideration. The Italian delegation might, perhaps, be able to accept the French amendment in that form.

The PRESIDENT did not think that the Belgian proposal would be acceptable to the Italian delegation; the latter's objection related primarily to the examination by the Commission of the categories of artillery necessary for national defence and not to their danger to national defence.

The text proposed by the French delegation was adopted.

The delegations of Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Germany and China, like that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, associated themselves with the Italian delegation's reservation.

The Commission proceeded to examine the German delegation's proposal.

M. AUBERT (France) said that, if he had rightly interpreted the German delegation's amendment, it meant that the calibre of any given artillery must be determined by the calibre of the enemy artillery. In his view, the calibre of the piece employed was determined not by that of the enemy artillery but by the objectives against which it was to be used.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) recalled the arguments which he had already adduced in support of this amendment.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) observed that the Commission's task was to determine which weapons should be prohibited and not which weapons should be employed by States. Nevertheless, if a country attacked constructed entrenchments in order to protect certain arms, it required for the defence of those entrenchments pieces equivalent to those of the enemy. The solution would be to say what weapons a country must not possess.

M. AUBERT (France) replied that he had not so far interpreted the General Commission's resolution as implying equalisation of armaments. If there were any question of equalising security, he would recall that the original French proposal contained guarantees in regard to this matter; he hoped that that draft would meet with the Hungarian delegation's support.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) thanked M. Aubert for the suggestion that means of defence should be given to States which were disarmed; he wished to be sure, however, that such weapons would be at the disposal of the States concerned whenever they might be the object of aggression.

M. AUBERT (France) noted the views of the Hungarian delegation, which would no doubt be prepared, in order to ensure that rapid assistance might be given to a State victim of aggression, to collaborate in establishing a definition of the term aggression.

TWELFTH MEETING

Held on Friday, May 20th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President: M. BUERO.

16. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (*continuation*).

Paragraph (d) (continuation).

The PRESIDENT noted that the general discussion on the German proposal was closed, and invited the Commission to discuss it paragraph by paragraph.

The first paragraph was adopted without discussion.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) proposed that the word "opponent" should not appear in the text.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) having stated that he had no objection, General NUYTEN (Belgium) proposed that the paragraph should end as follows:

" . . . artillery available for the defender."

M. AUBERT (France) said that he had had no difficulty in accepting the first paragraph of the German proposal, as he had himself developed the thesis of the relativity of the offensive character of artillery. From this relativity he had established two facts: (1) that the offensive character of certain artillery pieces varied according to whether they were used by an aggressor State or by a State defending its own territory; and (2) that the calibre limit to be chosen must depend on the action taken by the General Commission on the Land Commission's reply — *i.e.*, on the choice to be made between the principle of abolition and that of internationalisation or placing at the League's disposal.

The second paragraph of the German proposal brought out two further aspects of this relativity. It should be noted, however, (1) that so far the only question at issue had been the relationship between guns and objectives, and not between the guns of the two parties concerned, and (2) that any attempt to take into account the relative importance of the armaments of States would mean encroaching on the political sphere, and the Commission would be exceeding its terms of reference.

The French delegate therefore had a double objection — on technical and political grounds — to the second paragraph of the German proposal.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) said that he did not feel very well qualified to speak on questions of relativity, but that he wished to direct M. von Weizsäcker's attention to one difficulty which had occurred to him. There might conceivably be more than one aggressor to be considered in the case of certain countries. That was the case, for example, with the British Empire, which had frontiers on several continents. For each of the countries concerned, the calibre limit would have to be selected by reference to the strongest artillery among all the possible aggressors, and relativity would thus no longer play a very important part.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) explained that the second paragraph of the German proposal was simply intended to bring out the meaning of the first paragraph, which might otherwise not be properly understood.

In reply to the political objection raised by the French delegate, he would be quite prepared to accept a different formula, in which the words " a State " did not appear.

As regards M. Aubert's technical objection, he agreed that so far the only question at issue had been the relationship between guns and fortifications. It would be well, however, in his view to take into account the fact that the defender might or might not possess big calibre artillery. The defence was protected both by fortified works and by gun fire, and it was to the interest of the defender to be able to keep the aggressor at a distance with guns of a range corresponding to that of the aggressor's artillery. That question came directly within the purpose of the General Commission's resolution.

The German delegate declared lastly that General Temperley's preoccupation would cease to exist if an equal basis could be found for all States.

M. AUBERT (France) thought that if the Commission intended to go into such considerations it would be necessary to find a formula reflecting all the different meanings of relativity referred to during the debate. It might be well to show the General Commission how very relative the replies to its questions were bound to be.

The PRESIDENT submitted to the Commission two formulas, one of which had been framed by the Rapporteur and the other, based on the same idea, by the President himself. Either of those formulas might perhaps permit of agreement being reached.

The President's formula was as follows :

" The calibre limit above which the artillery of a State is essentially offensive becomes lower in proportion as the power of the means of national defence at the disposal of the defender also becomes lower."

The formula prepared by the Rapporteur was as follows :

" The calibre limit . . . bears a relationship to the extent of the means of defence at the disposal of the State against which the weapons in question might be used. "

M. AUBERT (France) insisted on the importance of being perfectly clear. He did not think that the General Commission could get any clear idea from an answer such as was proposed.

It was essential, in his opinion, to avoid any confusion between aggression and the offensive, since a country that was obliged to drive the enemy out of its territory might have to take the offensive.

If the Commission meant to go into the question of relativity, it must proceed very carefully and must give explanations for the different cases. The French delegation could only support a formula that complied with those conditions.

The PRESIDENT, with the German delegation's consent, proposed to suspend the discussion on that delegation's proposal, owing to the difficulty of drafting a text during the meeting. He invited the Commission to continue its examination of the United Kingdom proposal.

Paragraph (c) (continuation).

The PRESIDENT observed that the United Kingdom delegate had proposed to delete the last sentence of paragraph (c), in view of the new paragraph (d).

The Commission decided to delete the last sentence of paragraph (c), from the words : " On the other hand"

Paragraph (e).

The PRESIDENT read paragraph (e) of the United Kingdom proposals, as follows :

" (e) As regards the third element in the resolution of the General Commission (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)), the replies submitted by the Technical Committee to questions (1) and (2) of Chapter III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that artillery material of over 200-millimetre calibre, having an effective range of more than 25 kilometres is the most menacing to the civil population.

" Pieces of over 155-millimetre calibre, having an effective range of more than 20 kilometres, may also be a menace to the civil population, but in a less degree. It should be noted that these calculations apply only to normally constructed guns at present existing."

He added that, in addition to the French proposal,¹ amendments had been submitted by the German, Italian and Japanese delegations :

¹ See Minutes of the ninth meeting.

German Amendment.

Substitute for paragraph (e):

“As regards the third element in the resolution of the General Commission (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)), the replies submitted by the Technical Committee to questions (1) and (2) of Chapter III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that artillery material of over 105-millimetre calibre, having an effective range of more than 15 kilometres, is the most menacing to the civil population.

“It should be noted that these figures apply only to normally-constructed guns at present existing.”

Italian Amendment.

Replace the words “pieces of over 155-millimetre calibre having an effective range of more than 20 kilometres, etc., by the following words: “Pieces of over 105-millimetre calibre having an effective range of more than 15 kilometres, etc.”

Japanese Amendment.

Replace the first sub-paragraph from the words “. . . lead to the conclusion that artillery material of over 200-millimetre calibre . . .” by the following text:

“It may be considered that artillery material having an effective range of approximately more than 55 kilometres is the most menacing to the civil population.”

The PRESIDENT stressed the essential difference between the French and British proposals. The first was an endeavour to frame a unanimous reply to the Land Commission, while the second was designed to show exactly the position of the different delegations. The Commission would have to choose between those two methods.

M. SATO (Japan) observed that the Japanese proposal substituted for the calibre limit of 200 millimetres in paragraph (e) of the British proposal a range limit of 55 kilometres. The Japanese delegation had always considered that it was desirable to fix the depth of the battlefield at 50 kilometres. Its object in now proposing 55 kilometres as the range limit was to follow logically its own arguments. Since, however, the experts' reply did not reveal unanimity of opinion as regards the depth of the battle zone, the Japanese delegation now thought it preferable to adopt the method suggested by the French delegation.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) pointed out that the United Kingdom delegation had simply submitted its proposal in a spirit of conciliation. If agreement could not be reached on that formula, it was obviously better not to waste time, but to drop the proposal and adopt the French formula.

*The Commission decided to accept General Temperley's suggestion and to take as a basis for discussion paragraph (e) of the French proposal.*¹

The PRESIDENT thought that there was no need to allude in that paragraph to the experts' reply, and proposed that the first sub-paragraph be drafted as follows:

“(e) As regards the third element of the resolution of the General Commission, certain delegations consider artillery material of over 200-millimetre calibre having an effective range of more than 25 kilometres as the most menacing to civilians. Other delegations attribute this character even to artillery of a calibre of over 100 millimetres or with a range of over 15 kilometres.”

The experts' reply would, of course, be annexed, for purposes of information, to the Land Commission's reply.

General BONOMI (Italy) proposed to substitute in the first sentence for the words “having an effective range of more than 25 kilometres” the words “or with a range of 25 kilometres”, in order to make the two sentences of the sub-paragraph uniform.

M. AUBERT (France) explained that the difference in form between the first and second sentences in the sub-paragraph reflected a divergence of view among the experts. In the first case, there were two simultaneous conditions, whereas, in the second, there was simply an alternative.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that he would not insist on his proposal, but pointed out that there was a likelihood that guns might be constructed in the future of a calibre of under 200 millimetres but with a range of above 25 kilometres; such guns, he said, would obviously be menacing to civilians.

¹ See Minutes of the ninth meeting.

The PRESIDENT noted that the present drafting corresponded to the terms of the experts' reply, as follows :

“ Considering the minimum distance as 10 per cent of the range, and considering the effective range of normally constructed guns at present existing, it is to be observed that :

“ (a) Only guns of more than 105-millimetre calibre have a range of 15 kilometres beyond the front line ;

“ (b) Only guns of over 155-millimetre calibre have a range of 20 kilometres beyond the front line ;

“ (c) Only guns of over 200-millimetre calibre have a range of 25 kilometres beyond the front line. ”

The President pointed out, in order to reassure General Bonomi, that to the Land Commission's reply would be annexed the experts' reply, the last sentence of which read :

“ This would also be necessary in order to ascertain what general restrictions should be imposed to prevent abnormal ranges being obtained with any calibre. ”

M. AUBERT (France) proposed, in deference to General Bonomi's suggestion and in order that the two sentences in the first sub-paragraph might be uniform, to replace in the second sentence the words “ or with a range ” by the words “ having a range ”.

General BONOMI (Italy) did not think that the new formula would reflect the views of certain delegations or indeed of the experts.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) asked for the deletion of the word “ even ” in the second sentence of paragraph (e).

This was agreed.

The Commission adopted the following text for the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (e) :

“ (e) As regards the third element of the resolution of the General Commission, certain delegations consider artillery material of over 200-millimetre calibre having a useful range of more than 25 kilometres as the most menacing to the civilian population. Other delegations attribute this character to artillery of a calibre of over 100 millimetres or with an effective range of over 15 kilometres. ”

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) would have preferred to delete in the last sub-paragraph of paragraph (e) an argument which appeared to put the interests of civilians after military requirements.

If the text were retained, he would ask for a passage to be inserted between the two sub-paragraphs stating that certain delegations were of a different opinion.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) thought that the last few lines of paragraph (e) were inaccurate, in view of the fact that the effective range of guns — that was to say, the distance at which they could sight certain objectives accurately — differed appreciably from the maximum range.

M. AUBERT (France) stated, in reply to the German delegate, that, in his view, the interests of civilians were given an important place in paragraph (e), and, in reply to General Benítez, that the risks incurred by civilians varied according to the proportion between the military objectives and civilian establishments in the zone in question. The French proposal had simply been intended to indicate that, beyond 50 kilometres, there was more likelihood of gun-fire hitting civilian establishments than military objectives. The “ corresponding ” range was, in point of fact, the “ effective ” range.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) had no objection to paragraph (e) being retained. He thought, however, that a reference to a gun firing “ effectively ” at 50 kilometres meant that the range of the projectile was in this case sufficiently accurate to hit specific objectives. The chief danger to civilians consisted in the fact that, when a gun was fired at maximum range, the extent of the zone in which the projectile fell was such that civilian establishments might be hit even involuntarily.

The PRESIDENT noted the importance of General Benítez's observations. He enquired of M. von Weizsäcker whether, after M. Aubert's statement, the German delegation wished to insist on a draft amendment giving priority to the protection of civilians.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) explained that he desired to have inserted in the French proposal a passage from the experts' reply stating that certain delegations

were in favour of adopting the figure named, as it was impossible under existing conditions to indicate a limit beyond that distance. He suggested the following text :

“ . . . they would not go farther than this figure, seeing that beyond that distance are situated objectives of military importance (places for the assembling of reserves, with motor transport, railway stations, airports, armaments factories, etc.) for which, as regards the distance from the battle front, it is impossible, in existing circumstances, to indicate a limit, and that it is therefore necessary that, in this zone, the protection of the civil population should be regarded as more important than military requirements. ”

M. AUBERT (France) said that he would raise no objection to the German proposal, as every delegation must be given an opportunity of expressing its own particular views in the text to be forwarded to the General Commission.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) accepted the German proposal.

The PRESIDENT declared *the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (e), as supplemented by the German proposal, adopted.*

The second sub-paragraph of paragraph (e) was adopted.

Fixed Artillery.

The PRESIDENT asked what procedure the Commission wished to adopt in regard to fixed artillery, the consideration of which had been held over. Did it wish simply to forward the text of its report to the General Commission, that the latter might note the question?

M. AUBERT (France) thought that the Land Commission should simply send its own report to the General Commission, together with the text of the Committee of Experts' reply.

This proposal was adopted.

Paragraph (d) (continuation).

The PRESIDENT observed that the Commission had suspended its examination of the German amendment on the relativity of calibres. He announced that the Commission now had before it a French proposal designed to satisfy the views of the German delegation and more complete in form than the text submitted by the latter. It read as follows :

“ *Paragraph 1. — (Unchanged.)*

“ *Paragraph 2. — The limit of calibre above which artillery need be regarded as possessing an essentially offensive character depends on the power (calibre and range) of the artillery capable of resisting it ; it also depends on the nature and the protection of the objectives on which it is to fire, and more generally on the whole of the activities brought to bear on the one side and on the other. This limit also depends on the strategic situation then existing, which situation generally varies according as the offensive is launched by a defender by way of counter-attack on an aggressor who has penetrated the defender's territory, or is undertaken by an aggressor with the intention of invading the territory of another State. Lastly, the limit in question also varies according to the nature of the system to which artilleries of higher calibre may be subjected. ”*

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, at first sight, the amendment appeared to him to be of a political character and to go beyond the Land Commission's competence.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) stated that he could not express an immediate opinion. It seemed to him that the French amendment went rather beyond the Land Commission's powers, since the President himself had said that the latter's task was simply to indicate to the General Commission certain categories of weapons which should form the subject of special measures. He would give a definite reply later.

M. AUBERT (France) pointed out that the Commission could not pass over the fact that the questions put to it had been asked with the object of bringing about regulation in the form of abolition or internationalisation. He did not think that the French delegation's amendment contained any new element or that the Land Commission, by accepting it, would be exceeding its terms of reference.

The continuation of the discussion was adjourned to the next meeting.

THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held on Monday, May 23rd, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President : M. BUERO.

17. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932: CONSIDERATION OF THE TERMS OF THE REPLY TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION AS REGARDS ARTILLERY (*continuation*).

Paragraph (d) (continuation).

The PRESIDENT said that the Commission would continue the consideration of the German proposal and the French amendment to that proposal submitted at the last meeting. The Italian delegation had submitted another amendment on the same point which read as follows :

“ The limit of calibre above which artillery possesses an essentially offensive character is lower in proportion as the power (calibre and range) of the artillery of the side under attack, the strength of its defences, and the resources at its disposal in general are smaller. ”

He proposed that the basis of the discussion should be the German proposal which came first in date, and he recalled that the first paragraph in that proposal had been adopted at the previous meeting.

General NYGREN (Sweden) recognised that the German proposal was based on sound reasons. Nevertheless, as he had pointed out at a recent meeting of the Air Commission, it would be wise not to lose sight of the object of the Commission's work — namely, qualitative limitation. With a view to that limitation, the members of the Commission must determine the limit above which certain arms might form the subject of special restrictions.

That being so, it was, he thought, extremely difficult to take into account considerations of relativity or of the variable character of the different objectives. It would be better to take as a basis the special characteristics of the various weapons irrespective of the difference in value they might have for one country or another, since that would complicate the Commission's later work. He thought that neither the German nor the French nor the Italian proposal should be adopted. In view of the pertinency of the German delegation's remarks, reference might perhaps be made to them either in paragraph (a) of the resolution or in the report to the General Commission, so that the latter's attention would be drawn to the important question of relativity.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) thought that General Nygren's proposal might perhaps simplify the Commission's work. He would prefer his delegation's proposal to be introduced in paragraph (a) of the resolution rather than in the report.

Nevertheless, it was, he considered, necessary for the Commission to make some reference, not only to the relation between arms and objectives, but also to that between the arms employed and certain other important factors.

If the form which the German delegation had proposed for the reference to the question of relativity was not acceptable to the Commission, it might be possible to revert, as a compromise, to that suggested by the President, which read :

“ The calibre limit above which the artillery of a State is essentially offensive becomes lower in proportion as the power of the means of national defence at the disposal of the defender also becomes lower. ”

This text was, he thought, sufficiently wide to allow of its acceptance by the Commission.

The PRESIDENT noted that the remarks of the last two speakers showed that the Commission could perhaps agree to the passage under discussion being embodied in the resolution under paragraph (a) instead of under paragraph (d). The Italian and German proposals were very close to that which he had himself submitted at the last meeting.

M. AUBERT (France) made a reservation as to the place in which the text to be adopted by the Commission would be inserted. It would, he felt, be dangerous to decide on its position before the formula itself was known, since, if the Commission decided to insert it in a section which had already been adopted unanimously, it might nullify the advantages of the agreement obtained.

The PRESIDENT wished to reassure M. Aubert; he also thought that it would be wiser to agree on the wording of the text to be inserted before determining the place of insertion. The Commission must first decide whether it desired to mention the question of relativity or to make no reference to it at all. In the former case, it would then have to agree on a text, and decide later the place of insertion.

The President supposed that General Nygren's idea was that the first sub-paragraph should be taken as maintained, the point in dispute being, not the affirmation of the principle of relativity, but its definition.

M. AUBERT (France) said that he could not regard the first sub-paragraph as adopted unless it was accompanied by the commentaries which, in the view of the French delegation, completed it.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany), noting that, even if he withdrew his proposal, the Commission would not achieve unanimity, maintained his request that the passage concerning relativity should appear in the body of the resolution.

The PRESIDENT asked whether the French delegation could accept a text other than that which it had itself presented.

M. AUBERT (France) replied that the French delegation could only agree either to the total omission of any reference to the question of relativity or to a complete definition comprising all the points it had itself suggested. The question of relativity might perhaps be referred to another Commission, but, if the Land Commission took it up, M. Aubert considered that it must be treated exhaustively.

The PRESIDENT thought that it would be possible to find a wording similar to that which the Commission had already employed, stating that certain delegations had expressed such and such an opinion on this matter, whereas others had expressed themselves differently.

M. AUBERT (France) urged that it would be essential to accompany the affirmation of the existence of relativity with commentaries.

The PRESIDENT still thought that it would be possible to find a compromise formula indicating the divergence of opinion in the Commission.

General VAN TUYNEN (Netherlands) referred to his delegation's proposal,¹ which had been withdrawn from the agenda on May 17th because the United Kingdom delegation's proposal had been taken as the basis of discussion.

The Netherlands delegation's suggestion had been based on the idea that the Land Commission's task was to give concrete replies to the questions raised by the resolution of April 22nd. There were still certain outstanding difficulties which, he thought, prevented the Commission's replies from being given a concrete character. Furthermore, there was no clear dividing line between the task of the Land Commission and that of the General Commission, since questions such as that of relativity cropped up in discussions which were supposed to be purely technical in character. This question of relativity was open to a variety of views; in fact, all arms might have an offensive character.

It had been argued that to abolish certain heavy artillery would be to confer a premium on the aggressor. It might be replied that competition in armaments conferred a premium on the country which was defending itself. If such considerations were to be advanced, it was hardly possible to expect to attain the object set before the Conference, which could only be reached by a long road marked by numerous milestones. The Netherlands delegation's proposal was intended to mark a first milestone, and the Commission knew what was the significance of that proposal.

The PRESIDENT reminded General van Tuynen that the Netherlands proposal had only been withdrawn with the consent of the Netherlands delegation, at the time when the Commission had decided to take the United Kingdom delegation's text as a basis of discussion.

¹ See Minutes of the seventh and ninth meetings.

M. VENTZOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made the following declaration :

“ The Soviet delegation contends that the Commission must remain within the framework fixed by the General Commission. On the basis of the mandate received on April 22nd, the delegation declares itself resolutely opposed to any proposal concerning the relativity of qualitative disarmament.”

In the event of the Commission's accepting the text proposed by the President, M. Ventzoff asked that the following words might be added :

“ Finally, other delegations were against any mention of relativity.”

The Soviet delegation should appear in this category.

The PRESIDENT, while agreeing that every delegation had the right to have its views mentioned in the text adopted by the Commission, wondered whether the Soviet proposal did not conflict with the German proposal, and whether it would not be necessary to revise the first sub-paragraph if the Soviet proposal were accepted.

He proposed to adjourn the meeting, to enable the Bureau to prepare a text of paragraph (d).

On resuming the meeting, the PRESIDENT read the following text framed by the Bureau :

“ The lowest limit of calibre above which artillery possesses an essentially offensive character is, moreover, a relative one.

“ Certain delegations consider that the limit of calibre above which the artillery of a State is of an essentially offensive character is lower in proportion as the means at the disposal of the defender are weaker.

“ Other delegations consider that the problem is more complex. In their opinion, the limit of calibre above which artillery need be regarded as possessing an essentially offensive character depends on the power (calibre and range) of the artillery capable of resisting it ; it also depends on the nature and the protection of the objectives on which it is to fire, and more generally on the whole of the activities brought to bear on the one side and on the other. This limit also depends on the strategic situation then existing, which situation generally varies according as the offensive is launched by a defender by way of counter-attack on an aggressor who has penetrated the defender's territory, or is undertaken by an aggressor with the intention of invading the territory of another State. Lastly, the limit in question also varies according to the nature of the system to which artilleries of higher calibre may be subjected.”

He observed that the text took account of the question of relativity specially noted by the German delegation.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) pointed out that relativity had from the beginning formed the basis of the Commission's discussion on guns and defences.

General BONOMI (Italy) noted that the main points of the French proposal appeared to be covered by the Bureau's text.

M. AUBERT (France) expressed his gratification that a general agreement appeared to have been reached on the basis of the essential elements of the French proposal. None the less, it was well to be perfectly explicit and to stress the importance attached by the French delegation to the words “ on the one side and on the other ”. The point to bear in mind was that the questions of attack and defence could not be regarded as absolute.

The PRESIDENT, observing that the text of the Bureau was designed to reflect the various tendencies in the Commission, said that he understood that the Soviet delegation's views would be met by the insertion of a footnote to the first paragraph, to the effect that, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, no reference was required to the question dealt with therein.

M. VENTZOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) replied that the President's suggestion gave the Soviet delegation entire satisfaction.

The Bureau's text was adopted, with the footnote suggested by the President.

The PRESIDENT enquired whether the Commission wished to insert the new text in paragraph (a), as suggested by General Nygren, or at the end of paragraph (d), in accordance with the German delegation's suggestion.

M. AUBERT (France) thought it preferable not to disturb the unanimity which existed as regards the earlier part of the Land Commission's reply to the General Commission. A text on which there was not unanimity would fit in better after paragraph (d).

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) agreed.

The Commission decided to insert the Bureau's text after paragraph (d).

18. APPLICATION TO ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED.

The PRESIDENT recalled that the question of tanks, armoured cars, etc., had been held over for later consideration. The Commission must now decide on the procedure to be adopted in this matter.

When artillery material was under consideration, the Commission had held a general discussion in plenary session, and this had led to the appointment of a committee of experts to draw up a questionnaire. This committee had taken a proposal by the French delegation as a basis and had submitted to the Commission a questionnaire, to which the latter, meeting as a committee of experts, had given replies. After a fresh discussion on the basis of a proposal by the United Kingdom delegation, the Commission had concluded that part of its work.

The President thought that a similar method might be adopted in regard to tanks. The Commission would avoid a long preliminary discussion if, as in the case of artillery, a technical committee were instructed to draw up a questionnaire and replies to the questionnaire. He proposed accordingly that a committee consisting of a few members should be set up to prepare a draft questionnaire, which might be considered by the Commission sitting as a committee of experts, but in public session.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) thought that, while a committee had been indispensable in the case of artillery, which raised many questions with regard to calibre, it was not necessary to have one for tanks.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) considered the President's proposal as to procedure admirable. He did not think that the Commission could discuss the question of tanks without frequently consulting technical experts, more especially upon questions of definition. He thought that it would save time if that method were adopted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) also supported the President's proposal and agreed with Mr. Wilson. He thought that, after the Commission had drawn a precise distinction between, for instance, armoured cars and tanks, it would be necessary to consult experts. Nevertheless it was not, perhaps, absolutely essential to set up a committee to draft a questionnaire. The United Kingdom delegation, basing itself on the work of the artillery experts, had prepared a questionnaire which it was ready to submit to the Commission and which would perhaps make it unnecessary to set up a committee of experts.

M. AUBERT (France) said that, following the precedent set for heavy artillery, the French delegation too had drawn up a draft questionnaire on tanks. The French text differed very little from the English one.

The PRESIDENT thanked the United Kingdom and French delegations assistance for their and submitted to the Commission the two following draft questionnaires prepared by those delegations :

Draft Questionnaire proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation :

- " 1. What is the definition —
 - " (a) of a tank?
 - " (b) of an armoured car?
- " 2. What are the special characteristics required in a tank for the penetration of :
 - " (a) a permanent system of fortification of great or average strength?
 - " (b) improvised entrenchments or field works ?
- " Is there any type of tank unable to penetrate either (a) or (b) ?
- " 3. Is an armoured car capable of acting effectively against 2 (a) or (b) above?
- " 4. Are there any characteristics of tanks or armoured cars which make them specially menacing to the civil population?
- " 5. To what extent and in what time can commercial vehicles be converted into (a) tanks or (b) armoured cars? "

Draft Questionnaire proposed by the French Delegation.

" 1. Is it technically possible to make a distinction between the different categories of mobile armoured appliances such as :

- " (a) armoured cars of all kinds ;
- " (b) tanks of various categories ;
- " (c) mobile armoured cupolas ;
- " (d) armoured trains of all categories ?

" 2. In the affirmative, what are the technical characteristics of each of these categories of appliances ?

" 3. What is the effectiveness of the various categories of mobile armoured appliances on permanent fortifications ?

" 4. What is the effectiveness of the various categories of mobile armoured appliances against field works ?

" 5. What are the capacities of the various categories of mobile armoured appliances outside the battle zone ? "

The President asked the United Kingdom and French delegates to be good enough to prepare a joint text for consideration at the next meeting.

FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held on Tuesday, May 24th, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President : M. BUERO.

19. APPLICATION TO ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : ADOPTION OF A QUESTIONNAIRE.

The PRESIDENT observed that the Commission had to consider the following draft questionnaire framed by the French and United Kingdom delegations :

" 1. What are the general characteristics of :

- " (a) tanks ;
- " (b) armoured cars of all kinds ;
- " (c) mobile armoured cupolas ;
- " (d) armoured trains ?

" 2. What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against permanent fortifications ?

" Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the latter ?

" 3. What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against field works ?

" Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the latter ?

" 4. Are there any characteristics of armoured fighting vehicles which make them specially menacing to the civil population ?

" 5. To what extent and in what time can any vehicle be converted into :

- " (a) a tank ;
- " (b) an armoured car ;
- " (c) an armoured train ? "

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to submit an observation on the procedure to be adopted for examining the question of tanks.

The tank was a recently invented weapon which had assumed great importance since the world war as a powerful aid in infantry operations and for use in independent offensive operations.

The Soviet delegation feared that paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the draft questionnaire would involve too long discussion, and proposed that those paragraphs should be deleted and that the Land Commission should reply to the General Commission's questions, as regards tanks and armoured cars, after having exhausted the programme laid down in paragraph 1 of the questionnaire. In view of several proposals which had been put forward, that procedure would seem to be simpler, especially as some ten delegations had, during the general discussion, already pronounced in favour of the total abolition of tanks.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) urged upon the Commission the necessity for sticking to realities. During the world war, tanks, originally of large dimensions, had gradually evolved towards a lighter type, which was the type chiefly found at the present time. The Commission should examine the existing types from the standpoint of the three criteria named in the General Commission's resolution; it should not engage in theoretical speculations as to the future.

The PRESIDENT, with the assent of the Soviet and Spanish delegations, invited the Commission to examine the draft questionnaire paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1.

Paragraph 1 was adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 2.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the characteristics referred to in paragraph 2 would be defined by the replies to the questions in paragraph 1. He asked that paragraph 2 be deleted.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) saw no objection to deleting paragraph 2, which did not seem necessary from the standpoint of the replies to the General Commission's questions.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) thought that, even if the characteristics referred to in paragraph 2 were covered by paragraph 1, they should still be expressly mentioned. He did not see why a special paragraph should not be devoted to them.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) observed that, if the Commission decided to delete paragraph 2, for the reason indicated by the Soviet delegate, it would also wish to delete paragraph 3 and the paragraphs following.

General LAIDONER (Estonia), Vice-President, pointed out that the Committee of Experts appointed to answer the questionnaire on artillery material had repeatedly come up against difficulties due to the fact that certain questions had not been put with sufficient precision. The clearer and more explicit the new questionnaire was, the easier it would be to reply to it.

General NUYTEN (Belgium) thought that the question of efficacy against permanent fortifications should be examined, as in the case of artillery material. The Commission, he felt sure, would come to the conclusion that tanks could be used against permanent fortifications.

The PRESIDENT noted that several delegations thought it preferable to mention expressly in the questionnaire the various elements which should make it possible to determine the more or less offensive character of tanks and armoured cars. The Commission must decide, then, whether it wished to retain paragraph 2 as it stood, always with the possibility of incorporating it in paragraph 1, in deference to the Soviet delegation's suggestion.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he would not insist upon his proposal.

The Commission decided to retain paragraph 2.

General DE NÁNY-SY-MÉGAY (Hungary) pointed out that, in the French text of the second sentence of paragraph 2 — “*Existe-t-il des types de ces engins incapables de franchir et réduire ces organisations ?*” — the conjunction “*et*” should be replaced by the conjunction “*ou*”, unless the two conditions were regarded as simultaneous.

M. AUBERT (France) explained that the United Kingdom and French delegations had been held up for some time by the difficulty of finding a satisfactory translation for the

expression "break through" in the English text. He thought that the expression "*franchir et réduire*" was a fairly accurate rendering. He had no objection, however, to adopting the solution proposed by the Hungarian delegate.

The Commission agreed to replace the conjunction "et" by the conjunction "ou".

General NUYTEN (Belgium) directed the Commission's attention to the word "incapable" in the second sentence of paragraph 2. That word had, no doubt, been deliberately chosen; but at first sight it seemed that the Commission's task was rather to determine what appliances were capable — rather than incapable — of breaking through the field-works of the defence.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) thought that he could explain that point. It was quite true, as the Soviet delegate had said, that certain delegations wished for the abolition of all tanks. Other delegations thought, however, that a distinction should, if possible, be drawn between tanks of a specifically offensive character and those regarded as purely defensive, with a view to abolishing the first-named category and keeping the second. That was why paragraph 2 consisted of two sentences, the first being designed to cover appliances capable of effective action against permanent fortifications and the second to cover appliances which were incapable of such action.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, suggested that the first sentence of paragraph 2 covered all the various preoccupations to which expression had been given. The Commission, sitting as a Committee of Experts, was going to examine, for each category of appliances, what capacity they possessed against permanent fortifications; that would show which appliances were "incapable". The second sentence of paragraph 2 having given rise to difficulties — in particular, a difficulty of translation — he proposed that it be deleted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) thought that it would facilitate the Commission's task if the second sentence of paragraph 2 were retained, as the Commission could then state that appliances of this or that category were *incapable* of effective action against permanent fortifications. At the same time, he appreciated the logic of the objection put forward, and would not oppose the deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 2 if the majority of the Commission so desired.

M. AUBERT (France) pointed out that the Commission had been instructed to establish distinctions and to classify the capacity of the various weapons. It seemed to him that the second sentence of paragraph 2, alluding to appliances which were incapable of breaking through permanent fortifications, gave a useful supplementary indication. The Commission must not be afraid of being precise.

The PRESIDENT stated that the Rapporteur did not propose to insist on his proposal; further, he understood that the Belgian delegate had been satisfied by the United Kingdom delegate's explanation. He thought, then, that paragraph 2 should be retained, the conjunction "*et*" in the French text being replaced by the conjunction "*ou*".

Paragraph 2, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 3.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the word "*énumérées*" be inserted after the words "*des différentes catégories de matériel ci-dessus*".

The foregoing amendment was adopted, and also the amendment, in the last sentence, replacing the conjunction "et" by the conjunction "ou".

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) wished to direct the Commission's attention, before it came to examine paragraph 4, to the importance of paragraph 5 of the French delegation's draft questionnaire¹:

"What are the capacities of the various categories of mobile armoured appliances outside the battle zone?"

Some countries possessed no fortifications, and tanks could cross their frontiers and carry out a surprise attack.

The Hungarian delegation proposed that the foregoing paragraph be inserted after paragraph 3 of the questionnaire.

¹ See Minutes of the previous meeting.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) supported the proposal, which he considered very sound.

General TARBUK (Austria) also supported the Hungarian delegate's proposal.

M. AUBERT (France) explained that, in order to shorten the questionnaire, the text of paragraph 5 of the French delegation's draft had been deleted, since it was held to be covered by paragraph 4 of the new draft. The French delegation would have no objection, however, if the United Kingdom delegation agreed, to inserting both formulas in the new questionnaire, in the interests of greater precision.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that paragraph 5 of the original French draft questionnaire had been deleted on account of the difficulty of determining the depth of the battlefield. The new draft appeared to cover all the criteria named in the General Commission's resolution, and it would be better to keep paragraph 4 of that draft and not revert to the very complicated question of the depth of the zone in question.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) admitted the justice of the last remark. He thought, however, that the Commission should consider the possibility of the battlefield being less extensive than that of the world war. Tanks and, more particularly, armoured cars might carry out a flanking movement or attack the adversary in the rear.

General BONOMI (Italy) agreed with the Hungarian delegate that a distinction must be made in the questionnaire between capacity against fortifications and capacity against national defence when no fortifications existed and tanks could carry out a surprise attack.

General NUYTEN (Belgium) recalled that, when discussing the question of artillery, the Commission had examined the effectiveness of such material against permanent fortifications and also against improvised fortifications on the battlefield; it had not been necessary to consider its effectiveness against active means of defence. That, however, was not the case for tanks or armoured cars, which, owing to their great mobility, could carry out flank attacks and might prove very effective against national defence, on account, in particular, of the moral effect produced by their appearance, quite apart from their effectiveness against civilians.

The Belgian delegation proposed, therefore, that paragraph 5 of the original French draft be inserted in the new questionnaire.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) feared that, if the Commission adopted that course, the discussion would become interminable. If it considered all the possibilities of a surprise attack, when no fortifications existed, it must necessarily apply the same criterion to all other arms, such as cavalry, or even infantry. The Commission could not examine every arm and every form of transport; it must confine itself to studying the means of action against national defence and against civilians.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) agreed that an endeavour must be made not to complicate the task of the Commission. National defence, however, included elements other than permanent or improvised fortifications, and he wished, accordingly, to support the Hungarian delegate's proposal.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, noted that the formula employed in the questionnaire on artillery material, in paragraph 2 of Part II,¹ was wider than that found in paragraph 3 of the draft now under consideration. He proposed the insertion of that wider formula in paragraph 3, the first sentence of which would read:

“ 3. What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield? ”

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) accepted that proposal.

M. AUBERT (France) said that it had, at all events, the merit of being clear. The Commission must confine itself to the battlefield. Tactical manœuvres could not, by definition, be carried out outside the battlefield, the limits of which were, in point of fact, defined by those manœuvres as a whole.

¹ See Minutes of the sixth meeting.

Further, as the United Kingdom delegate had pointed out, a surprise action might be carried out by any arm. If the Commission were going to take account of that fact, it would have to examine all the existing arms one by one.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) was prepared to accept the Rapporteur's proposal, but asked that it might be completed by the words: "and other elements of national defence".

The PRESIDENT said that he, naturally, did not desire to oppose the last suggestion, but pointed out that the Commission had endeavoured hitherto to maintain a certain symmetry between the questionnaire under consideration and the questionnaire on artillery material. If the vaguer notion of national defence were introduced, some confusion might arise.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that he would be prepared to accept the Rapporteur's proposal, on the understanding that any region in which tanks or armoured cars were operating should be regarded as forming part of the battlefield.

He pointed out, however, that, if the Rapporteur's proposal were adopted, it would be necessary to redraft the second sentence of paragraph 3, as the word "field-works" could not be employed to describe all the objectives of the battlefield. He suggested replacing the word "field-works" by the words "elements of national defence".

M. AUBERT (France) was afraid that the attempt to introduce greater precision might place the experts in a difficulty. The words "elements of national defence" opened up a limitless expanse, especially if the Commission did not confine itself to the zone of the battlefield. The introduction of the idea of mobility would necessitate a detailed examination of all existing arms.

The French delegate thought that the Commission should resist the tendency to allow its work to cover too many questions; it should confine itself to examining the objectives and the specific characteristics of the weapons.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, thought that his suggestion should satisfy M. Aubert's views, as it gave more precision to the questions put to the experts. The Hungarian delegate, however, wanted the Commission to go even further. The characteristics of tanks, however, from the standpoint of their action outside the battlefield, appeared to be confused with their characteristics from the standpoint of danger to the civilian population. This was, for example, the case as regards an attack against the seat of Government.

The Rapporteur proposed that paragraph 3 should refer merely to the battlefield. In paragraph 4 the problem could be considered from a more comprehensive standpoint.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) pointed out that armoured cars could rapidly traverse the battlefield and attack certain objectives of national defence, and that such action could not be said to be directed against the civil population.

The PRESIDENT thought that M. Bourquin's suggestion to adopt for the questionnaire the model followed for heavy artillery was very sound. Any ideas or reservations not taken fully into account in the questionnaire to be referred to the experts could be embodied in the Commission's reply to the General Commission.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) hoped that the Commission might reach agreement on the lines of M. Bourquin's suggestion, subject to a drafting amendment to elucidate the connection between the two clauses of paragraph 3. He observed that the members of the Commission were inclined to go into the question of mobility, whereas the question referred to them concerned the offensiveness of certain weapons.

The PRESIDENT noted the United Kingdom delegate's point and the stress laid by the Hungarian delegate on the question of the elements of defence situated outside the actual battlefield. He invited the Commission to accept a text for paragraph 3 framed as follows:

"What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield?"

"Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the element of national defence referred to above?"

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) expressed himself in agreement with the text.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) said that this text did not express the idea he had in mind. He desired to see mentioned in the text both the elements of national defence situated on the battlefield and those outside it. Swift tanks and armoured cars could act 50 kilometres behind the battlefield on ammunition dumps, railway stations, etc., which were not necessarily objectives of artillery, so that the terms employed in the questionnaire on artillery no longer applied. He wanted the experts to pronounce on the offensiveness of such arms outside the battlefield, in a zone which only became a battlefield when the armoured cars reached it.

The PRESIDENT assured the Hungarian delegate that his idea could still be introduced, either in the Committee of Experts' report or in the report to the General Commission, and pointed out that it would naturally assume some prominence, in view of the present discussion. The questionnaire under discussion was intended to indicate a line of conduct for the experts, and over-meticulous drafting might tend to limit the scope of their proceedings. He referred again to M. Bourquin's suggestion that the Hungarian delegate's point might be taken up in discussing paragraph 4.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) accepted the text submitted by the President, which would, he thought, give full scope to the experts. He hoped that the latter might be able to supply the Commission with some information on the subject of the weapons which could be used against tanks.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) accepted the President's text. He said that he shared the Hungarian delegate's scruples, since, wherever a tank was in action, a battlefield might be said to exist.

M. AUBERT (France) suggested that the Hungarian delegate's views might be met by redrafting paragraph 4 as follows :

“ Are there any characteristics of armoured fighting vehicles which make them specially menacing :

“ (a) To the civil population ;

“ (b) To military objectives outside the zone of the battlefield properly so-called? ”

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) thought that that text would not cover the real issue — namely, the mobility of motor vehicles and the use of motor transport in general for military purposes. He suggested that an entirely separate paragraph be inserted in the questionnaire on the following lines :

“ What is the effect of the mobility of motor vehicles on national defence? ”

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) pointed out that that last text corresponded to his own original suggestion. The French delegate, however, had found a satisfactory solution by adding a paragraph (b) to paragraph 4.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that paragraph 4 could not be said to cover the case, since it referred to armoured fighting vehicles. He maintained that the same results could be obtained by means of commercial lorries or omnibuses conveying troops.

Paragraph 3, in the amended form submitted by the President, was adopted.

Paragraph 4.

The PRESIDENT enquired whether paragraph 4, the drafting of which had determined the acceptance of paragraph 3, could be allowed to stand, notwithstanding the fact that it failed to take certain vehicles into account. He enquired, in particular, whether it met the United Kingdom delegate's views.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) replied that he did not think that the Commission would get a correct answer to the real question at issue without including non-fighting vehicles in the text. He repeated his suggestion that it might be necessary to include an entirely separate paragraph, a separate question, on the subject of mobility and national defence.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) said that the French delegation's text for paragraph 4 met his views. He agreed that it would be well if the experts could give their opinion on non-armoured vehicles ; it would be better, however, to embody the suggestion made by the United Kingdom delegation in a separate paragraph.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that he would have preferred a separate question, so as to have a clear answer. If, however, the Commission preferred the French delegation's text, he hoped that the experts would give a definition of a fighting vehicle ; a motor vehicle with troops and machine-guns was as much a fighting vehicle as a tank or an armoured car.

Paragraph 4, as amended by the French delegation, was adopted.

Paragraph 5.

Paragraph 5 was adopted without discussion.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet delegation was unable to approve the questionnaire, but that it would not oppose its adoption. The document appeared to him remarkably complicated, as was evident from the amount of discussion it had required.

The questionnaire to be submitted to the Committee of Experts was adopted in the following form :

“ (1) What are the general characteristics of :

- “ (a) Tanks ;
- “ (b) Armoured cars of all kinds ;
- “ (c) Mobile armoured cupolas ;
- “ (d) Armoured trains ?

“ (2) What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against permanent fortifications ?

“ Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the latter ?

“ (3) What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against entrenchments, field-works and other objectives of the battlefield ?

“ Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the elements of national defence referred to above ?

“ (4) Are there any characteristics of armoured fighting vehicles which make them specially menacing :

- “ (a) To the civil population ;
- “ (b) To military objectives outside the zone of the battlefield properly so-called ?

“ (5) To what extent and in what time can any vehicle be converted into :

- “ (a) A tank,
 - “ (b) An armoured car,
 - “ (c) An armoured train ? ”
-

FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held on Tuesday, May 31st, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President : M. BUERO.

20. APPLICATION TO ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS.

The PRESIDENT opened the general discussion on the reply of the Committee of Experts (document Conf. D./C.T.34) to the Land Commission's questionnaire concerning tanks, armoured cars, etc. That reply would serve as a basis for conclusions which the Land Commission would submit to the General Commission in conformity with the resolution of April 22nd ; the experts' document would be annexed to the Land Commission's report to the General Commission.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) stated that the United Kingdom delegation wished to add its name to those of the German and Finnish delegations as supporting Note 2 to the reply to Question 2, as follows :

“ While the destruction and neutralisation of the fortified works and artillery of the defence are the task of the heavy and super-heavy artillery, it is for tanks to assist the infantry in attacking troops and other objectives distributed in front of the fortifications and between them.

“ This being so, as regards the attack of permanent fortifications also tanks take on a character menacing to national defence, which increases in proportion to their weight and capabilities.”

Baron VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands delegation also supported Note 2 to the reply to Question 2.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) acceded on behalf of the Hungarian delegation to Note 2, as well as to Note 3 appended by the Netherlands delegation to the same reply, as follows :

“ The Netherlands delegation is of opinion that the preparation of a complete system of artificial obstacles, as here described, against attack by tanks would, in a number of cases, be impossible in a line of permanent fortifications situated in cultivated country. In such cases, even a modern system of fortifications would, at the beginning of a war, be very vulnerable to attack by tanks.

“ Furthermore, the addition to a system of permanent fortifications of artificial obstacles to attack by tanks would involve supplementary expenditure which would often be very considerable.”

General NYGREN (Sweden) stated that the Swedish delegation supported the note submitted by the German and Finnish delegations (Note 2).

General TARBUK (Austria) acceded on behalf of the Austrian delegation to Notes 2 and 3.

General BONOMI (Italy) stated that the Italian delegation supported the views expressed by the German, Hungarian and United Kingdom delegations.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) observed that the reply of the Committee of Experts failed to give a clear definition of tanks, having tied up the definition of tanks with that of armoured cars in such a way that the General Commission would be unable to distinguish between them and to adopt a separate regime, if it so desired, for the two arms. He felt that the very purpose which had led the Land Commission to request the Committee of Experts for elucidation was nullified by the assumption, on the part of that technical body, of political considerations.

Instead of answering a technical question, the experts had become involved in political theses, and, in attempting to amalgamate tanks and armoured cars, they had brought a technical report into discredit.

The man in the street would have no patience with the inability of some forty technicians to distinguish between two objects, which a child could tell apart, probably by

their appearance and certainly by their performance. The tank was fully armoured and armed and capable of transit over the roughest *terrain* and over obstacles. The armoured car, while armed and lightly armoured, must confine itself to roads or very smooth going across country, and its chief military use was for scouting. In American experience, the armoured car was little used in military operations, and the United States Army possessed less than a score of such vehicles, the remainder of those existing being used for police purposes and for the transport of gold.

Both tanks and armoured cars were comparatively new instruments of warfare. New things required new definitions, and the use of a word in a general treaty or its acceptance by an international gathering such as the Disarmament Conference would establish for all time a definition on which the future use of the word might be based.

The Committee of Experts, instead of clarifying the General Commission's task, had allowed itself to confuse the issue and endanger the very possibilities of qualitative disarmament. Should the Commission decide to accept the experts' reply, with its confession of failure to differentiate between types which all the budgets of the world found it expedient to tell apart, the United States delegation would make a reservation defining the difference between the two types on the basis of their purpose and their performance.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) stated that the United Kingdom delegation had been much struck by the divergence of opinion that existed, not only as to the actual capabilities of armoured fighting vehicles, but even as to their nomenclature. Tanks had only emerged during the later stages of the great war, when they were largely experimental; they had evolved since then, and differing experiences and differing problems made it difficult for the Commission to arrive at any agreement upon which particular type was most efficacious against national defences.

The Committee of Experts had succeeded in reaching agreement on several important points. It would be best, however, where wide differences existed on matters of principle, to draft a report stating frankly the view of each group of delegations. The Land Commission would greatly facilitate the work of the General Commission if it refrained from obscuring the real issue by trying to arrive at a common text in terms vague enough to cover up real differences of opinion. He proposed shortly to submit, in the name of the United Kingdom delegation, a draft reply embodying its views; such portions of that reply as differed from the views of important groups of other delegations could be embodied intact in the Commission's final report.

The United Kingdom delegation had supported throughout the principle of limiting the power of the aggressor and was prepared to make its contribution in that respect in the matter of armoured fighting vehicles. The danger of such vehicles to national defence lay in their power to carry out a surprise attack, with the intention of delivering a rapid knock-out blow. They possessed, in a varying degree (according to their types), high speed, wide radius of action, capacity to cross and overcome obstacles, heavy armour and ability to carry powerful weapons. Those qualities affected the weight, and weight was the determining factor by which, in the United Kingdom delegation's view, an armoured fighting vehicle must be judged; the heavier the tank, the more it might possess the qualities upon which its offensive power depended. That issue had been obscured in the Technical Committee by the assertion that even the lightest tanks had virtually the same capacity to cross obstacles on an organised battlefield, when such obstacles had been sufficiently damaged by shell-fire; that would mean that all tanks, and even armoured cars, were approximately equal in offensive capacity, except that the bigger ones carried heavier armament. The heavy tank alone, however, could cross undamaged trenches without preliminary bombardment and thus effect the surprise attack necessary for a rapid knock-out blow.

Surprise must not be imputed solely to armoured fighting vehicles; it was possible so to armour a commercial vehicle as to afford some measure of protection to its occupants and enable it, while carrying troops armed with rifles and machine-guns, to pierce far into an enemy country. Surprise, formerly the rôle of cavalry, had to some extent passed to the internal-combustion engine and might be successfully undertaken by vehicles which could not be described as armoured fighting vehicles.

While, therefore, a rigid classification of armoured fighting vehicles might not be possible, experience had proved that the varying types might be grouped in three main categories — namely, (a) heavy tanks from about 25 tons upwards, heavily armed and armoured, with considerable capacity for crushing obstacles and a power of crossing wide trenches which increased in proportion to their size; (b) medium tanks from about 20 to 10 tons, less heavily armed and comparatively lightly armoured and with a considerably restricted capacity to cross trenches; their range and speed rendered them of great value as a mobile reserve and in counter-attacks against troops which had pierced a defensive position

(c) light tanks below 10 tons — with which might be included armoured cars — constituting lightly armed and armoured scouting vehicles essentially designed for reconnaissance. It was difficult to draw an accurate technical distinction between light tanks and armoured cars. The former might be said to possess a higher degree of power to move across country, due particularly to the use of tracks, while the latter were not specially designed for utilisation on an organised battlefield.

The third criterion in the General Commission's resolution — the degree of menace to the civilian population — depended primarily upon whether the action of the weapon was discriminating or indiscriminating in its effects, and that again depended substantially upon the intention of the individuals handling the weapons. Provided that the rules of war were adhered to, the United Kingdom delegation did not consider that any type of armoured fighting vehicle was a special menace to the civil population.

The United Kingdom delegate desired to preface the definite proposals of his delegation by two general observations. First, the question of armoured fighting vehicles could not be taken as standing by itself. Certain nations had large effectives; if, by the substitution of machines for man-power, certain other nations had reduced substantially the number of their effectives, the abolition of all such vehicles must involve a corresponding increase in their forces in terms of man-power. That applied specially to nations with great responsibilities in colonial and mandated territories, where the lighter type of tank and armoured car had permitted of economies in man-power and in money. Secondly, modern armies were dependent for their mobility upon transport obtainable from commercial sources, and the dependence of armies upon mechanical and tracked vehicles became greater as time went on.

The United Kingdom delegation proposed that the Land Commission should recommend to the General Commission that the armoured fighting vehicles possessing the most definitely offensive characteristics were those from approximately 25 tons upwards. Below that tonnage (about 20 tons), their characteristics became markedly less offensive, and armies should be allowed to retain such weapons as a means of economising in man-power and expenditure. The United Kingdom delegation believed that the elimination from the battlefield of the future of the specially destructive type of weapon referred to would substantially strengthen the defences in relation to the attack and constitute a substantial contribution to the cause of disarmament.

In conclusion, Lord Stanhope proposed the following draft reply to the General Commission :

“ The Land Commission, having examined the qualities and characteristics of the various types of armoured fighting vehicles in the light of the criteria established by the resolution of April 22nd, 1932, offers the following recommendations for the consideration of the General Commission :

“ 1. *With regard to tanks and armoured cars.* — Having regard to the first and second criteria, which may be considered together, the Land Commission is of the opinion that the greatest danger of armoured fighting vehicles to the national defence lies in their power to carry out a surprise attack, with the intention of delivering a rapid knock-out blow. For this purpose, they possess, in varying degree according to their respective types, the characteristics of speed and radius of action, capacity to cross or to overcome obstacles, armour and ability to carry weapons. These qualities each materially affect the weight of a vehicle, which is the principal standard by which the capacity of an armoured fighting vehicle can therefore accurately be gauged. In other words, the heavier the tank, the more it may possess those characteristics upon which its offensive power depends.

“ While it is not possible to distinguish by precise technical definitions between the various classes of armoured fighting vehicles, it may be said that those vehicles fall, for purposes of general classification, into three main categories :

“ (a) Heavy tanks of a weight from about 25 tons upwards. These are heavily armed and armoured vehicles of sufficient weight and solidity to give them great powers of crushing obstacles and with comparatively wide trench-crossing capacity, which increases in proportion to their size.

“ (b) Medium tanks of a weight between about 20 tons and about 10 tons. These are less heavily armed and comparatively lightly armoured vehicles with considerably restricted trench-crossing capacity and limited crushing power. Their special characteristics of range and speed render them of great value as a mobile reserve and in counter-attack against troops which have pierced a defensive position.

" (c) Light tanks (below 10 tons in weight), with which may be included armoured cars. These are lightly armed and armoured scouting vehicles essentially designed for reconnaissance. While it is difficult to draw an accurate technical distinction, which would be generally acceptable, between light tanks and armoured cars, it may be said that the former possess a higher degree of power of moving across country and of crossing trenches, due particularly to the use of tracks, whilst the latter are not specially designed with a view to their utilisation on an organised battlefield. Some armoured cars are, in fact, largely confined to movement on roads, although others of a different type may be capable of moving across country.

" The nature of defensive organisations likely to be encountered on the modern battlefield must also be considered, as well as the frontier defences, which vary greatly in strength as between different States. Having regard to these as well as to the qualities of armoured fighting vehicles referred to above, the Land Commission is of opinion that the heaviest category — namely, tanks of a weight of from approximately 20 to 25 tons upwards — possess offensive qualities to a degree which should render them liable to qualitative disarmament within the meaning of the resolution of April 22nd.

" For the reasons stated, armoured fighting vehicles of the lighter categories are definitely less offensive in character. Moreover, it would in any case be useless to attempt to apply the restrictions of qualitative disarmament to the lighter types of tanks or to armoured cars, in view of the ease with which vehicles possessing the essential qualities of tanks and armoured cars can be improvised in a very short space of time by the conversion of commercial, agricultural or other civil vehicles in general use in many countries. Indeed, it would be possible in a few hours so to armour a motor omnibus or other vehicle as to accord a considerable measure of protection to its occupants. Such a vehicle could transport infantry armed with rifles and machine-guns far into an enemy country, and be no less specifically offensive than a light tank or an armoured car. Yet it could by no means be described as either one or other of these vehicles.

" As regards the third criterion in the resolution, the Land Commission considers that the degree of menace of any particular weapon to the civil population depends primarily upon whether the action of that weapon is discriminating or indiscriminating in its effect. The short range of their weapons and the fact that these will normally be employed only against visible targets render the action of armoured fighting vehicles essentially discriminating. Thus armoured fighting vehicles can be employed to attack military objectives, even outside the zone of the battlefield, with the minimum of accidental risk to the civil population. For this reason, notwithstanding the special faculty which armoured fighting vehicles admittedly possess, in common with other forms of mechanical transport, to effect surprise and to penetrate the territory of an opposing country, the Land Commission does not consider that these vehicles can be held to constitute a special menace to the civil population or that they should be subject to qualitative disarmament upon that ground.

" 2. *With regard to mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains.* The offensive capacity of mobile armoured cupolas and of armoured trains, and the efficacy of these weapons against the national defence and their menace to the civil population, depend entirely upon the range and the power of the artillery or other weapons with which they are armed. They do not therefore appear to come within the scope of qualitative disarmament as defined by the resolution of April 22nd, in virtue of any inherent characteristic which they possess."

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the Soviet delegation had disapproved of the adoption of a questionnaire as a basis for the experts' work, on the grounds that a resolution on the concrete subject entrusted to the Land Commission by the General Commission did not necessitate a detailed discussion. The experts' reply only confirmed the Soviet view that no unity of opinion existed in regard to tanks. Every chapter had been liberally amended by various delegations, and the whole document gave the impression that the authors had been endeavouring to prevent the inclusion of armoured vehicles in the list of weapons to be made subject to qualitative disarmament.

The Soviet delegation had already proposed the abolition of all tanks. Every new model of that weapon showed an improvement in its characteristic properties in particular, horse-power, weight, armament, mobility, radius of action and armour. A further point was the immense increase in the number of armoured vehicles and the fact that tanks were now included in modern infantry units. Tanks constituted the essentially offensive feature of modern armies. The experts' reply, however, instead of bringing out clearly the

fighting and offensive properties of armoured vehicles, was marked from beginning to end by a tone of reticence designed to cast doubt on their offensive character. Certain experts, indeed, anxious to avert the danger of disarmament in that sphere, had raised the alarm in regard to agricultural tractors which, they maintained, might constitute a far greater menace than those little toy tanks of varying dimensions, weight, speed and armed capacity. Wheeled agricultural tractors capable of 6 kilometres an hour were the danger! What was the latest Renault tank? What could be done with the Skoda combined wheeled and tracked tanks? What were all the other tanks compared with agricultural tractors? Agriculture, not disarmament, was what the delegations were at Geneva to talk about!

The Polish delegation had done useful propaganda in favour of the Soviet Five-Year Plan. The 140 tractors a day turned out by the Stalingrad works were a real conquest, but the Soviet delegate would never have thought of comparing phenomena of that order with the intensive import of armoured vehicles of every kind that was going on in certain countries bordering on the Union. Most of the Soviet-manufactured agricultural tractors were wheeled tractors of the "International" 16 horse-power type, capable of 5 to 6 kilometres an hour. Could they be compared with the latest types of tanks in certain countries? Could they be converted into really useful tanks? Not that the Soviet Union, if its frontiers were violated, would hesitate to employ those industrial implements. The Soviet delegation protested energetically against the system which consisted in the avoidance of the main issue. The question under discussion was tanks and not tractors, and the General Commission had asked the Land Commission whether tanks were or were not offensive weapons. The Soviet delegation insisted that the Land Commission, instead of repeating the Committee of Experts' vague conclusions, should say "Yes" or "No" to that very simple question. It desired to have put to the vote a resolution which would constitute a direct reply to the General Commission. That resolution was as follows:

"Having taken cognisance of the replies given by the Committee of Experts, the Land Commission affirms that all armoured vehicles (tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains) are weapons specifically offensive and threatening to the national defence."

The PRESIDENT said that the vote on the Soviet proposal would be held over until the conclusion of the general discussion.

General GALET (Belgium) stated that he had two observations to offer on the experts' reply. The first concerned the definition given in answer to the first question. The Belgian delegation had itself submitted a simple definition of tanks and armoured cars, the former weapon being, in its view, by far the more important. It supported the observations of the United States delegate, feeling, as it did, that the experts' reply must inevitably tend to complicate the General Commission's task. The experts would have done better to keep to the main terms of the definition, without going into all the possible secondary uses to which tanks and armoured cars might be put.

The second observation concerned surprise attacks. The questionnaire had envisaged the action of tanks and other armoured vehicles against permanent fortifications, field works and objectives beyond the zone of the battlefield properly so-called. But one point — already emphasised by the United Kingdom delegation — had not been brought out sufficiently clearly — namely, the question of surprise attacks immediately after the declaration of war, when no battlefield existed and the forces were not yet in position. At that stage, the use of armoured vehicles was a great menace, especially to small countries, whose defences might be completely annihilated. The Belgian delegation endorsed the view expressed by the United Kingdom delegation and proposed that the Land Commission make a specific statement on the subject of surprise attacks, in the form of an amendment to the draft reply to the General Commission proposed by the United Kingdom delegation, as follows:

"Insert in the second paragraph, after the first sentence ending 'knock-out blow':

"'In particular, they give to a surprise attack at the outset of an aggressive war, wherever there are no permanent manned fortification, nor organised battlefield, an effectiveness, a depth of penetration and considerably increased chances of success.'

"The beginning of the next sentence should read:

"'For the purpose of a surprise attack, they possess . . .'"

General BENÍTEZ (Spain), commenting on the United States delegate's very strong criticism of the experts' reply, observed that the Committee had made a praiseworthy effort to obtain unanimity. The experts were capable of distinguishing between a tank and an armoured car, but had tried to go further and to establish a definite line of demarcation. Their efforts had revealed the difficulty of achieving unanimity on any but a somewhat

colourless text. One example — noted by the Soviet delegate — would illustrate his point : from the results achieved by tanks in the last war, those weapons would seem to be essentially offensive ; but the fact remained that they were not capable of effective action against fortifications. That illustration alone showed how difficult it was to define the situation in a few words.

M. AUBERT (France) said that his delegation was anxious that all possible consideration should be given to the report of the experts, whose competence it appreciated. It could not accordingly associate itself with the criticisms formulated by the United States delegation. The distinction between tanks and armoured motor-cars was not, in its opinion, so easy as the United States delegate had argued. Both tanks and motor-cars could be armoured and travel across country, and it was not possible to make a distinction between them on the basis of weight. Only the use made of them might differ.

In France, armoured motor-cars were regarded as the real reconnaissance arm of the future, and as being bound to replace cavalry.

The divergence of views to which Lord Stanhope had drawn attention would be accentuated still further if an attempt were made to define the limits between light tanks, medium-weight tanks and heavy tanks. There could be no technical reason for saying that a twenty-five-ton tank was a defensive weapon, but that a thirty-ton tank was " specifically offensive ". Such a distinction would be purely arbitrary.

With regard to the use of armoured vehicles for surprise attacks, the remarks which applied to attack held good for surprise tactics as well. Just as troops on the defensive had to make use of the counter-attack and consequently needed the arms required for the attack, so the defender, no less than the aggressor, was obliged to attempt surprises.

A tactical surprise must not be confused with the initial strategical surprise carried out by an aggressor. Tanks were weapons of tactical surprise. They could not carry out a strategical surprise any more than any other machine for the speedy conveyance and concentration of troops or fighting material.

Further, armoured vehicles were unquestionably a sign of progress, because they economised personnel and rendered the combatants less vulnerable.

When so much was heard of the humanisation of war, when there was so strong an opposition to the organisation of peace by concerted action against aggression, it was paradoxical to attempt to restrict the use of a weapon which might make it possible to economise human life in battle. France certainly would not hesitate to concentrate on measures which were really capable of ensuring peace rather than seek arbitrarily to find " specifically offensive " characteristics in machine-guns and armoured field-guns which were moved from place to place with their armour, whereas the same weapons, if not armoured, would be " specifically defensive ".

M. Aubert read the French delegation's draft reply to the General Commission :

" The following recommendations, based upon the conclusions (document D./C.T.34) contained in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire addressed to it by the Land Commission (document D./C.T.33),¹ are submitted to the General Commission for consideration :

" A. No armoured fighting vehicle of the nature of those contemplated for armies in the field is capable of assaulting a modern fortified work of even medium strength. Only tanks specially designed for this purpose and of a minimum weight of 70 tons could be effective against permanent fortifications. The same applies to armoured trains carrying artillery capable of similar effective action — *i.e.*, of a calibre exceeding 250 mm.

" B. Apart from tanks and armoured trains possessing the above defined characteristics, there is no technical reason for stating that armoured fighting vehicles are more specifically offensive, more efficacious against national defence or more threatening to civilians than any other means of warfare.

" 1. As regards efficaciousness against national defence, armoured fighting vehicles are used not only by an aggressor desiring to invade the territory of another State and penetrating more or less far into that territory according to the mobility, speed and radius of action of the said vehicles, but also in counter-offensive operations conducted by a defender on the front, flanks or rear of an aggressor who has penetrated into his territory and entrenched himself there. The characteristics as regards armament, armour, mobility, the power of crossing obstacles and the radius of action of these vehicles, most of which are primarily intended to accompany the infantry and to save it from losses, correspond to the prevalent conditions in both cases.

" The use of armoured vehicles, particularly tanks in the course of a defensive action, is, moreover, tending to become more and more important :

" (a) In order to support a counter-attack when it is difficult to provide artillery support owing to ignorance of the exact position of the assailant and the point of departure of the infantry making the counter-attack ;

¹ See Minutes of the fourteenth meeting.

“(b) Because the anti-tank weapons which are being perfected can easily, in an organised position, be arranged so as to provide a complete and effective system of defence, whereas it is much more difficult for them to accompany an offensive, so that troops which are attacking are more vulnerable to the armoured vehicles of the defenders than troops established in a defensive position are to the tanks of the attackers ;

“(c) In the defence of a permanent system of fortification, to act as mobile fortresses capable, thanks to prepared routes, of advancing to any points which are particularly threatened or of stopping any breach which may be made by the assailant in the defensive arrangements.

“The fact that the last-mentioned use is strictly defensive, requiring heavily armed and armoured tanks, which are consequently very heavy and can with difficulty be moved away from the area prepared for their action, suffices to show that any discrimination between armoured vehicles according to weight, designed to prove that the heaviest tanks are most offensive, would not be technically justified. It is, moreover, impossible to make distinctions based upon the question of weight, as it is well known that very light tanks have been able to exercise effective action against important battlefield constructions. On the other hand, if tanks are exposed to the action of anti-tank weapons or enemy tanks, it may be necessary for their own protection, whether passive (armoured) or active (armament), that their weight should be considerably increased if they are to be usefully employed on the field of battle, without reference to the offensive or defensive character of such employment.

“Finally, armoured cars, which are more and more designed so as to be able to move across country and which, from the standpoint of technical characteristics, are tending to become assimilated to tanks, are useful in reconnaissance operations, in delaying an aggressor and in maintaining order in overseas territories where it is necessary to economise the use of effectives.

“Armoured fighting vehicles of less than 70 tons in weight and with armaments of a calibre inferior to 250 mm. cannot therefore be regarded as being offensive rather than defensive in purpose, and cannot be included among the weapons most menacing to national defence.

“Moreover, it would in any case be useless to endeavour to apply the restrictions of qualitative disarmament to the above-mentioned armoured fighting vehicles, owing to the ease with which vehicles possessing their characteristics can be improvised in a very short period by the transformation of commercial vehicles, especially if such transformation has been contemplated when the said vehicles were constructed. If the armoured fighting vehicles under consideration were to be subjected to measures of qualitative disarmament, it would confer an advantage upon States possessing a powerful metallurgical industry and incite them to encourage the construction, by their private industries, of tractors and lorries possessing characteristics which would be represented as corresponding to technical progress for non-military purposes, but which, in fact, would enable them to be effectively and speedily transformed into fighting machines.

“2. As regards the characteristic of being threatening to civilians, armoured vehicles, with the exception of armoured trains, as to which the reply must depend upon the artillery which they carry, should be regarded as among the weapons least menacing to civilian populations. The small range of their guns and the fact that they are normally only employed against visible military objectives enable them to concentrate entirely on the objective, with the least risk of accident for the neighbouring civilian population.”

General NYGREN (Sweden) agreed that the most powerful tanks were the most specifically offensive, but thought that, owing to their great value in the attack, all tanks should be regarded as specifically offensive and particularly threatening to national defence. The unchallengeable fact that these arms could also serve for the national defence in a counter-attack was not a strong enough argument for their maintenance.

He recognised that certain civil vehicles could be converted, within a comparatively short time, into tanks and armoured cars, particularly if at the time of manufacture provision had been made for conversion. Such vehicles, however, were, generally speaking, less useful for military operations than real tanks. The possibility of conversion, therefore, should not prevent the abolition of tanks properly so-called, which the Swedish delegation had proposed in its memorandum (document Conf. D.110).

The Swedish delegation considered, on the other hand, that armoured motor-cars, equipped only with ordinary wheels, had only a very limited value for an attack upon military objectives not in the immediate vicinity of a road, and that they should not be regarded as being specifically offensive or threatening to national defence.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) said that, in principle, the Polish delegation was quite prepared to include tanks and armoured motor-cars among the arms which could be dealt with under the resolution of April 22nd. It thought, however, that this problem could not be considered apart from another — namely, the possibility of using certain civil vehicles, in particular agricultural tractors, as tanks and of utilising in time of war the factories where such tractors were made for the manufacture of armoured cars.

The Polish delegate, who had come to Geneva as his country's representative with a sincere desire to co-operate in the organisation of peace, was not referring, when he mentioned tractors, to low-powered tractors, but only to those equipped with an engine of 50 to 60 horse-power or more, mounted on tracks and capable of conversion into comparatively effective fighting vehicles.

The question of conversion would be less important if the supply of tractors and the degree of development of the industry manufacturing them were appreciably the same in the different countries. Unfortunately, that was not the case. In some countries where, like Poland, their production had not been encouraged, whether for economic or social or military reasons, the supply was insignificant. In others, among them some of Poland's immediate neighbours, the position was entirely different. In one of them, the annual output of tractors, which had been 41,500 units in 1930-31, represented something like three or four times that number at the present time.

There could be no doubt as to the possibilities inherent in that position in the case of war, and the Polish delegate had already referred to that matter in the Committee of Experts.

Further, the fact must not be overlooked that the countries in question had a large number of specialists who were accustomed to handling these machines.

The Polish delegate did not offer these observations in any spirit of criticism, but purely in order to show the Commission that the question of tanks differed in aspect in the different countries. He considered that, if qualitative disarmament were to be applied to tanks, the Commission should also take steps to prevent the conversion of tractors and tractor factories in war-time.

In conclusion, while some of the neighbours of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were importing tanks, a larger quantity of those machines had been seen during the review of the troops at Moscow on May 1st than was possessed by all the countries adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) said that, in the Committee of Experts, he had stated that a separate definition would have to be found for each of the two classes of armoured vehicles. That procedure would facilitate the decisions to be taken by the Land Commission and the General Commission for the purposes of qualitative reduction.

He had proposed that the definition suggested by the Belgian delegate should be taken as a basis of discussion. That proposal had not been adopted, and the Commission was now faced with difficulties which could, in Colonel de Carvalho's opinion, have been avoided.

The Brazilian delegation accordingly associated itself with the remarks of the United States and Belgian delegates.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that the members of the Commission would remember that the German delegation had never been very strongly in favour of submitting the question of armoured vehicles to the Committee of Experts. He hoped that the fact that his delegation had taken part in the Committee's work had not been construed as meaning that Germany had dropped its proposal for the total abolition of tanks. The results of the experts' work were not very satisfactory and were not calculated to expedite the Commission's task. M. von Weizsäcker associated himself with the criticisms expressed by the United States delegate and M. Lounatcharski.

In the Treaty of Versailles, tanks, armoured cars, etc., were mentioned, but were not specially defined. He did not see why it had been necessary to devote a long discussion to finding a definition which had not been considered necessary in the Treaty of Versailles.

He drew attention to certain passages in the experts' report. The experts had said that very light tanks might be effective against strongly organised battlefields. The experience of the last war had shown that tanks were a particularly offensive weapon. Why was that fact contested now?

Certain delegations had stated that tanks, on an organised battlefield, and certain armoured cars, in the case of improvised or disconnected field-works, might be particularly effective against a defence which did not possess sufficient anti-tank weapons or tanks.

The experts' report further stated that even light tanks could cross trenches and make breaches in the barbed-wire defences on the battlefield. If that were so, tanks could operate against national defence objectives outside the battlefield, in the strict sense of the term, and become a danger to the civilian population. The German delegation considered that the civilian population could not be protected against tanks, and that these

weapons accordingly came not only within the first two criteria but within the third as well.

Again, the conversion of agricultural tractors into tanks was feasible given the necessary material, personnel and time, but the value of such converted vehicles was less than that of ordinary tanks.

The German delegation considered that tanks possessed the characteristics mentioned in the General Commission's question. It failed to understand why mention had been made of the "humanisation" of war in connection with tanks. The soldiers in the tank might perhaps benefit by such "humanisation", but that did not apply to the enemy forces.

In view of the divergencies of opinion, the German delegate considered that the only solution would be to say that all tanks were specifically offensive, and he maintained his delegation's proposal. He supported the Soviet delegation's remarks and, in particular, the Hungarian delegation's proposal.¹

General BONOMI (Italy) said that his delegation could not accept either the proposal made by the United Kingdom delegation or the conclusion of the French delegate as to the use of armoured cars in the defensive. He had twice already made a reservation on that point and he renewed it now.

The Italian delegation pointed out that, if, by the use of armoured vehicles, it was possible to economise personnel, they offered, by that very fact, the possibility of increasing an army's striking force without adding to its effectives.

The Italian delegation reiterated the statements contained in its memorandum² and in its proposal of May 7th, 1932³ — viz., that it considered it desirable "to include, among the arms that were most specifically aggressive and most effective against national defence or against the civilian population, tanks and armoured motor-cars of all kinds". It desired to complete those statements by the addition of the following words: "even when such vehicles are procured by the conversion of other vehicles".

While it could accept the Soviet delegation's proposal, the Italian delegation supported the Hungarian proposal.¹

General NÁNÁSY-MEGAY (Hungary) recalled the lesson of the last war — that there was no possible defence against a successful surprise attack. Offensive strategy based on surprise was considerably strengthened by armoured vehicles, and the Hungarian delegation considered that tanks, armoured motor-cars and all similar machines capable of being used for fighting purposes were particularly powerful weapons for a surprise offensive.

The extraordinary fighting efficiency of these weapons enabled the aggressor to squash at one blow any attempt at defence on the part of the adversary.

Other arms — for instance, infantry transported in motor-cars, or cavalry — also took part, in surprise operations, but their fighting value could not compare with that of armoured fighting vehicles, since, although infantry could be relatively quickly

¹ See below.

² Document Conf.D.106.

³ The document which the Italian delegation submitted on May 7th, 1932, read as follows:

"With reference to the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, the Italian delegation considers it desirable to include, among the weapons which are most specifically offensive and are most efficacious against national defence or against civilians, tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds.

"These weapons, which have great mobility and great power to attack and crush obstacles, are particularly suited for offensive purposes, for taking by surprise and destroying defences (barbed-wire entanglements, trenches, breastworks, etc.) constructed by the defender.

"As the world war showed, these weapons were only employed against defences, and in all cases with the object of launching an attack.

"Armoured and armed cars of all kinds are suited for surprise actions, which are particularly employed by an aggressor. In view of their wide range of action and their mobility, they may also be used for offensive raids into the interior of a country, and are thus particularly threatening to civilians. Consequently, they fulfil the first and third conditions laid down in the above-mentioned resolution.

"On the other hand, tanks are particularly suited to shock actions and for crushing opposition with the object of opening the way for attacking troops and making conditions as favourable as possible for them as against the defending troops. Consequently, they fulfil the first and second conditions of the resolution.

"In the Italian delegation's opinion, if the use of these categories of armaments in warfare were abolished, the offensive would be robbed of much of the probability of success, and the defence could be made more effective.

"Moreover, tanks are particularly costly weapons and are constantly being improved, so that their abolition would considerably decrease military expenditure.

"Accordingly, the Italian delegation, taking the above criteria as a basis, proposes the abolition of tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds."

transported in motor-cars, the fact that it could not then use its own arms, and was far more vulnerable than armoured vehicles to attack by any other arm, placed it in a definitely inferior situation as compared with the armoured vehicles. Again, cavalry could not move as fast, and the trooper and his horse were far more vulnerable than armoured fighting vehicles to attack by any other arm. It was therefore plain that armoured fighting vehicles were an essential part of any surprise operation.

In the Hungarian delegation's opinion, an exhaustive knowledge of the strategic importance of armoured fighting vehicles was sufficient in itself for such vehicles to be deemed to be covered by the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd.

Notwithstanding these facts, the Hungarian delegation was prepared to take part in a technical enquiry by the Land Commission regarding the importance of armoured fighting vehicles.

The first question was: Which armoured fighting vehicles were the most effective against national defence? The Hungarian delegation, basing its view on the opinion of the Committee of Experts, held that all tanks, and those categories of armoured motor-cars which were capable of effective action against battlefield entrenchments, were to be regarded as the most effective against national defence.

In the matter of the armoured fighting vehicles which were the most threatening to the civilian population, the Hungarian delegation again based its view on the experts' reply; while it recognised that the experts had also stated that the fire of tanks and armoured motor-cars was extremely precise, with a consequent reduction in the risk to the civilian population, it considered that the power of armoured vehicles, directly they appeared to create a new battlefield so rapidly that the civilian population was incapable of seeking refuge in time — that fact alone answered entirely to the criterion of a threat to the civilian population and hence that all very mobile tanks and armoured motor-cars and similar machines might be regarded as among the arms most threatening to the civilian population.

Those arms could therefore be regarded, not only as most efficacious against national defence, but also as most threatening to civilians.

The imminent danger of such arms, which was due mainly to their extraordinary suitability for surprise attack, obliged the countries threatened to maintain their frontier defences — even in time of peace — at a level sufficiently high for them to be in a position to repel an attack immediately and without previous mobilisation.

The very existence of those arms might force countries to adopt measures of security which would figure among the heaviest items of expenditure on national defence.

The fact that, at a later stage of the war, those arms might also be of great use to the defenders could not, in the Hungarian delegation's view, nullify and could, indeed, hardly attenuate the immense danger which they represented.

The Hungarian delegation submitted the following draft resolution for adoption by the Land Commission:

“Whereas the conduct of offensive war, based largely on the art of surprising the enemy, constitutes a considerable threat to national defence and to the civilian population;

“Whereas the conduct of such war is greatly facilitated by the armoured weapons enumerated below:

“The Land Commission considers that tanks, armoured cars, or any other similar appliances answer to the three characteristics laid down in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, and that, consequently, they should be inserted in the list of arms which are most specifically offensive, which are most efficacious against national defence and which are the most threatening to civilians.”

The PRESIDENT thought that, to obviate any misunderstanding, it would be desirable to point out that the report by the Committee of Experts was intended to be used by the Commission only in so far as the latter found it helpful. If the majority of the members were not satisfied with its conclusions, the Commission was entirely free to adopt and submit other conclusions to the General Commission. This explanation had appeared necessary because certain delegations seemed to think that the experts' report was binding on the delegations, whereas, in fact, it was only submitted to the General Commission for its information.

M. AUBERT (France) desired to reply to the German delegate's remark, with reference to the experts' report, that the tanks employed during the last war had been an offensive weapon. France could not agree that an arm which she had used for the defence of her territory against an enemy which had entrenched itself on her soil could be regarded as having an offensive character.

General LAIDONER (Estonia) said that if the experts' report, against which certain criticisms had been made, indicated certain divergencies of opinion, he had been obliged to notice that there were even wider divergencies in the Land Commission.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that the Land Commission's task was purely technical, and that the question submitted to it should be discussed from that point of view alone. If speakers entered on the political field, the German delegate would have other observations to offer.

M. AUBERT (France) said that his observation was to be taken as purely technical. It was intended as an illustration of the argument he had advanced to the effect that tanks were a weapon for the purposes of counter-attack.

SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held on Wednesday, June 1st, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President : M. BUERO.

21. APPLICATION TO ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932 : CONSIDERATION OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The PRESIDENT observed that the divergence of views which had appeared in the Committee of Experts¹ had been confirmed in the Land Commission, and that it seemed useless to try to reconcile the theses of the different delegations. He suggested that, on the conclusion of the general debate, the Commission should ask M. Bourquin, as Rapporteur, to prepare a report describing the situation.

The delegations appeared to be divided into some five groups, and the Bureau had prepared a classification which would be submitted to the Land Commission later. The Rapporteur might be asked to state that unanimity had been found impossible and might then proceed to enumerate the main trends of opinion : some delegations were in favour of the abolition of tanks ; a second group made a distinction between tanks and armoured cars ; a third group wished to classify tanks ; a fourth was in favour of maintaining all armoured cars, and a fifth had put forward a suggestion that a distinction be established according to whether the vehicles moved on four wheels or otherwise.

A report on those lines would help the General Commission to take a decision as to which were the most offensive weapons. The Land Commission, however, must provide a definition of the terms "armoured car" and "tank", in order that the General Commission might have a clear basis for its decision.

General VAN TUINEN (Netherlands) stated that the Netherlands delegation on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had always been in favour of the abolition of tanks ; that point had been stressed by the Netherlands delegate in a speech on April 9th, 1927,² containing the following passage :

"In conclusion, I desire to support the suggestion submitted by the delegate for Sweden, that, if the direct limitation of all categories of armaments suggested in the German proposal is unacceptable, limitation should be applied to heavy guns and tanks. The latter, I might point out, constitute an essentially offensive form of armament. They constitute the real weapon of aggression, the real weapon of attack. By reason of their dimensions, their armour-plating and their suitability for mass attack, tanks form, as it were, the fighting squadron of the land army, and big tank units will constitute one of the chief means employed by the aggressor to break down enemy resistance. Since the war, competition in tank armaments has increased. Several States the nature of whose country would permit of the use of tanks are taking steps to procure them, and to increase their number or improve their quality. Other States are thus obliged to do the same. This is quite logical, for in future the tank alone will be a match for the enemy tank. Every effort is being made to prevent chemical and bacteriological warfare. It is surely essential to prevent, or at all events to limit, tank warfare, which is certainly easier to supervise than chemical warfare. One might ask why, if the limitation of capital ships was brought about at Washington, it should not be possible to bring about the reduction of armoured land-ships, and even to prohibit them entirely."

¹ Document Conf.D./C.T.34.

² Minutes of the third session of the Preparatory Commission, page 219.

In the Committee of Experts, the Netherlands delegation had supported the text which had been adopted concerning the possibility of action against objectives of the battlefield, since, in its view, it appeared from the text that even seven-ton tanks possessed specifically offensive qualities. That applied also to the action of tanks against permanent fortifications; hence the Netherlands delegation's note to the answer to question 2 in the Committee of Experts' reply.¹

When one came to consider the possible action of tanks — even six or seven ton tanks — permanent fortifications which could not, throughout their whole length, be provided in time of peace with accessory defences against such weapons would be particularly exposed, especially at the beginning of a war. On that point, the Netherlands delegate supported General Galet's view. He accordingly endorsed General Nygren's suggestion for the abolition of all tanks and special armoured cars capable of being used on the battlefield.

The Netherlands delegation thought that such weapons, answering as they did to the criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd, should be made subject to qualitative disarmament. It had therefore submitted the following proposal:

“ Tanks and armoured cars, provided with special appliances to enable their use on the battlefield, should be considered as having the most specifically offensive characteristics and the greatest effectiveness against national defence.”

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, in the interests of simplification, the Soviet delegation desired to support the Hungarian proposal submitted at the close of the last meeting and to withdraw its own.

Referring to the Polish delegate's last speech, he maintained, while agreeing that the development of industry undoubtedly increased a country's war potential, that the importance attached to agricultural tractors as a potential weapon had been greatly exaggerated.

APTÜLAHAT Bey (Turkey) observed that the Turkish delegation had already submitted to the Conference a proposal advocating the abolition of tanks and armoured cars. Those weapons, it considered, possessed the three offensive characteristics named by the General Commission. Tanks, in particular, possessed great mobility and a wide range of action and were capable of attacking and destroying defensive works. The weapon in question was continually being perfected and constituted a great menace in the hands of an aggressor, especially in surprise attacks; it might also be a menace to the civil population if employed for incursions into the enemy's territory.

The Turkish delegation associated itself with the Italian delegation's observations,² the object of which was to include armoured cars among the weapons most specifically offensive and most threatening to civilians. It assimilated mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains to tanks and armoured cars.

The discussions on the subject, both in the Committee of Experts and in the Land Commission itself, confirmed the soundness of the Turkish thesis.

General TARBUK (Austria) observed that the Austrian delegation had already submitted its observations when defending the proposals embodied in document Conf.D.102 of April 26th, and that it had repeated those observations on May 11th.³

He recalled that, on May 20th, 1932, his delegation had submitted the following proposal, to which he wished to add certain considerations:

“ The Land Commission states that, apart from its proposals regarding artillery, all tanks, armoured cars, armoured trains and all methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare must be classed in the category of weapons ‘ whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians ’.”

In the world war, after the stabilisation of the fronts, in the various theatres of military operations, all the belligerents had endeavoured to adapt themselves to the new war of “ positions ” — i.e., of general defence. Numerous offensives had shown the impossibility of breaking down the enemy's resistance with the weapons available at the beginning of the war, and new weapons were accordingly created, designed primarily to increase the offensive power. In addition to the strengthening of mobile and fixed heavy artillery, bombing planes and tanks were constructed, the latter being, in the

¹ Document Conf.D./C.T.34.

² See Minutes of the previous meeting.

³ See Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Land Commission.

Austrian delegation's view, the weapon of aggression *par excellence*, apart from the element of surprise and the moral effect which it produced. The same consideration explained the use of armoured cars and poison gases.

While armoured cars and armoured trains had existed before the war, tanks had actually been created during that period.

Definitions of tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains were given in the experts' reply. All those weapons, without exception, were prohibited as offensive weapons in certain armies employed simply for the defence of the national frontiers, and such armies possessed neither tanks, armoured cars, nor armoured trains.

The abolition of specifically offensive weapons — weapons most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians, and without which an offensive on a big scale was impossible — constituted the most urgent requirement of international security.

In conclusion, the Austrian delegation supported the proposals of the Hungarian and Netherlands delegations, which were on the same lines as its own.

M. PÜRSCHEL (Denmark) stated that, as regards tanks and armoured cars, he supported the view of the Swedish delegation.

The Danish delegation had been somewhat concerned at the turn which the discussions in the Technical Commissions had taken, and which had undoubtedly aroused all over the world profound scepticism as to the results of the Conference as a whole. That statement implied no reproach as regards the Technical Commissions themselves, which had endeavoured, with highly laudable zeal, to go into all the technical details of the questions submitted to them. The Commissions had, however, ended by admitting that the terms "offensive" and "defensive" were relative — a fact which was undeniable, but which, if over-emphasised, would undoubtedly be fatal to the work of the Conference.

What was the object of the Conference? That was clear from its title: the reduction and limitation of armaments. That object was, however, secondary and was of no value in itself, except from a financial standpoint. What really conferred any value on the reduction and limitation of armaments and what really constituted the purpose of the Conference was the lessening of the danger of war and of the prospects of war. How could a reduction of armaments contribute towards that result? First, by the abolition of weapons and means of combat capable of rapidly crushing an adversary. History contained examples of bombardments carried out with the assistance of the fleet. Historians of future wars would have to concern themselves with the aerial bombardment of big cities, employed as the means best calculated to break down a people's power of moral resistance.

Undoubtedly, the possibility of the League and of public opinion exercising any influence in the direction of pacification and mediation would increase in direct proportion to the time at their disposal. A reduction of the possibility of sudden aggression would, in the Danish delegation's view, afford a not inconsiderable guarantee of peace.

The Commission must not lose sight of the object which had presented itself more or less clearly in the minds of all the speakers during the general debate, when the declarations of the big Powers in particular had aroused the highest hopes. It would find then that it would be easier to decide which weapons should be abolished. The Danish delegate proposed to refer simply to heavy artillery, but parallels could, he said, be drawn for tanks and various other weapons and means of combat.

To consider the beginning of the great war: what would the situation have been if mobile heavy artillery had not existed, a weapon which was later employed also by those fighting on their own territory — *i.e.*, for purposes which might be described as defensive? Undoubtedly, the permanent fortified defences of certain small countries, for example, would have offered a much higher degree of resistance, and certain marches depending on the swift reduction of those defensive works could not have been carried out. From this it was justifiable to draw the conclusion that, at the moment when war broke out — and this was the moment which was of the greatest interest since it was of preponderating importance from a psychological standpoint — it was mobile heavy artillery that made it possible to reduce the permanent defensive works; that factor was calculated to encourage any intention to disturb the peace, the absence of those weapons, on the other hand, being calculated to frustrate such an intention. True, if war broke out notwithstanding, and the aggressor invaded the territory of the country which he was attacking, that country might find itself without any heavy artillery, as indeed if it wished to carry out a counter-attack. That defect, however, would simply have to be admitted; it was the price of success, and the price was infinitesimal compared with the object in view.

The decision now called for was not a technical one, but a political one. It was essential that the limit fixed should be low. Once it had been fixed, and provided the control was effective, military experts could easily construct permanent fortifications and improvised defensive works sufficiently powerful to withstand the aggressor and to constitute less tempting objectives! The lower the limit, the less armaments would cost.

The Danish delegate desired to submit one further observation. While the League of Nations had given the smaller States — particularly when grouped together for concerted action — an opportunity greater, no doubt, than ever before of influencing decisions of importance to the fate of the world and of modern civilisation, those decisions none the less always depended primarily on the big Powers. That statement, if it were desired to summarise it, might perhaps be expressed in a brief formula : the power was in the hands of the big Powers ; power implied honour, and honour implied responsibility.

General BRIND (India) stated that the delegation of India could not support the draft resolution submitted by the Hungarian delegation, since it disagreed with that resolution in three vital particulars. First, it did not consider that it fully or accurately answered the questions put to the Land Commission by the General Commission ; secondly, it considered that the resolution was based on a purely local and special point of view ; and, thirdly, it disagreed with the conclusions formed as regards the civil population.

As regards the questions put by the General Commission, the Land Commission had been asked to examine land armaments with a view to selecting those weapons which were the most specifically offensive, the most efficacious against national defence and the most threatening to civilians. It was, in the view of the delegation of India, neither helpful nor correct to say that all tanks and armoured cars were the most offensive, etc., when it was known that the offensive quality varied enormously with the size and type. It must be obvious to the Land Commission that a vehicle heavily armed and armoured, which could surmount almost any obstacle, was a more offensive weapon than a lightly armed and armoured vehicle which could go across country only with difficulty, and that a moderately armed and a moderately armoured cross-country vehicle was more efficacious against national defence than a light one which was confined to roads. In short, it seemed to the delegation of India to be absolutely incorrect to say that all armoured vehicles were the most offensive when it was known that some were more offensive than others, and, as the United States delegate had pointed out, that some were only of use for police work.

As regards the second objection — that the Hungarian resolution was based on a local and special point of view — the delegate for India noted that the General Commission's resolution to which the Land Commission was endeavouring to find a reply was based on a previous resolution, which said that the General Commission declared that the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant were to be applied, that armaments were to be reduced to the lowest possible limit consistent with national safety, and that account had to be taken of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State. That fact must not be forgotten.

Hitherto, the delegations had been viewing the problem from their own point of view and most speakers had visualised a European picture. The Persian delegate had given a glimpse of a more Eastern picture, and it was necessary that the delegation of India should express its point of view, which was based on conditions in some respects not unlike those referred to by the Persian delegate.

India had two main problems to consider in connection with the maintenance of order within her own frontiers : a frontier problem — *i.e.*, defence against tribes living within her own frontiers — and the maintenance of order in the interior of the peninsula.

To consider first the frontier problem. There existed within the frontier a belt of unadministered, mountainous tribal territory several hundred miles long and some sixty miles across. The tribes inhabiting that belt were numerous ; they were warlike, (mostly) skilful and well armed. They liked war, or rather raiding, they were not interested in disarmament conferences, and their rifles were their most cherished possessions. By degrees roads, which had a civilising influence, were being constructed through that belt, but the work was difficult and expensive and progress was slow. For the maintenance of order in that area, armoured cars and light tanks were essential, and were used for reconnaissance in place of cavalry patrols, for communication and liaison, for escorts and sometimes for rapid reinforcement.

As regards the rest of the peninsula, it must be remembered that the country was as large as Europe without the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that it had a population of 350 millions consisting of as many races as there were in Europe, and that across the racial differences ran a great religious distinction which was the cause of constant strife between the communities from one end of the peninsula to the other. To maintain order in that vast country, troops were constantly employed to support the police, but the army was small for the task and was scattered ; mobility was essential and armoured cars were of immense value in those police duties. Their rôle was much the same as on the frontier, though rapid reinforcement of the police or of the troops should come first in order of

importance — with liaison and escort work next in order — and then, in the case of disturbances on a greater scale (which unfortunately occurred from time to time and had occurred quite recently), reconnaissance and cavalry work. Far from being a threat to the civil population, armoured cars actually prevented different sections from killing each other, and had been found most effective in stopping communal strife. India had of recent years been compelled, for financial reasons, to reduce effectives and expenditure, and any reduction of armoured cars or light tanks would involve a considerable increase in effectives and expenditure.

The third objection noted by the delegate of India to the Hungarian resolution was that, as regards the alleged threat of tanks and armoured cars to the civil population, the statement was not only incorrect, but was at variance with the very carefully worded report on the subject drawn up by the Committee of Experts. In all the early discussions on the subject, the weapons which were criticised as being a menace to the civil population were bombing-aeroplanes, submarines and long-range artillery. Tanks had never been included in that category, and the speaker knew of no example in war of their having been so considered. Neither tanks nor armoured cars could be considered in the same category as aeroplanes or heavy artillery, for the following reasons: Quite apart from the possible indiscriminate use of the weapon, and with the best intentions in the world, an airman or an artilleryman might miss his target, and at great heights and long ranges very frequently he must miss it. In the case of tanks and armoured cars it was not the inaccuracy of the weapon or its long range that had to be considered, nor was it the weapon itself that might be a menace, but rather the personnel and the discipline of the personnel. If the discipline were bad, the case was analogous to that of a cavalry division or force of infantry conveyed in lorries whose discipline was bad, but in the case of tanks and armoured cars the numbers concerned were probably less.

For the various reasons put forward, the delegation of India was definitely opposed to the Hungarian delegation's resolution. On the other hand, it supported the resolution of the United Kingdom delegation, because that resolution, in its view, answered the question asked, in that it differentiated between the armoured vehicles which were the most specifically offensive and those which were less so — its conclusions were sufficiently broad to apply to situations and circumstances outside the limitations of Europe — and the problem dealing with the menace to the civil population was accurately and clearly stated; while, finally, it made a definite and genuine contribution towards the cause of disarmament.

General KALEYS (Latvia) stated that the part played by armoured cars and armoured trains was not clearly brought out by the Commission's discussions.

The efficacy of such armaments varied from country to country. Latvia, a small country unsuspected of aggressive designs, had no armaments industry. Indeed, her armaments were not sufficient to meet the needs of her national defence. Should she be forced into war, she would have to resort to improvised weapons, as had been the case during the war for her independence. For such a country as Latvia, with her slender resources and with the possibility of vast stretches of front very variable in character, armoured cars and trains would constitute useful armaments; they could, however, only be employed for national defence.

It had been stated that all defensive armaments could become offensive, since tactics necessitated continual changes from the defensive to the offensive in the form of counter-attacks, etc. Nevertheless, neither for offence nor for surprise attack had armoured cars and trains the importance that had been attributed to them. The part they could play was limited to the opening stages of an attack, and was smaller than the Commission seemed to think. These arms were linked to lines of communications — roads and railways. They could not operate at any great distance from the troops to which they were attached, and they constituted no threat to civilians, as they were rather for reconnaissance, patrol, or even liaison purposes. Further, they did not usually carry heavy guns.

In conclusion, he would point out that these weapons could never, alone, be used decisively in battle; the Latvian delegation considered them purely defensive.

Colonel MARTOLA (Finland) supported General Kaleys. In his view, neither armoured cars nor armoured trains could be considered as weapons most threatening to national defence or most dangerous to civilians. Armoured cars, which in wooded country and marshy districts could only operate along roads, and which were armed with small-calibre guns only, were mainly used for reconnaissance purposes. They were necessary in many countries for the maintenance of order. It was true that they were relatively easy to improvise.

As the experts had pointed out, the use of armoured trains was dependent upon the existence of railways. They could only be used by the defending State and could not venture far from their base, as the slightest obstacle could put them out of action. For these reasons, his delegation supported General Kaleys' statements.

Colonel TOMBERG (Estonia) also agreed with the Latvian delegation on the subject of armoured cars and armoured trains. Such arms were a means of defence for small countries unable to construct expensive fortifications to protect the key-points of their communications. They could scarcely be used for offence, since a handful of men or a few kilogrammes of explosives were sufficient to put an armoured train out of action. They could be used to the full in defence only; it was in any case impossible to use them for surprise attack, since roads and railways were guarded.

The Estonian delegation therefore considered that tanks and armoured cars could not be regarded as one of the most specifically offensive means of warfare.

Colonel RIAZI (Persia) reminded the Commission that he had already stated why, in his opinion, it was impossible to consider armoured cars as offensive weapons. In Persia, such cars were used for purposes of liaison between the different police posts and bodies of troops responsible for the maintenance of order. This would be the case until such time as Persia was equipped with an adequate railway system.

The Committee of Experts had acknowledged that this view was sound, recognising that certain of the machines in question were not intended for use on the battlefield.

The Hungarian delegate had stated that the draft resolution submitted by his delegation had been drawn up in the spirit of the Committee of Experts' report, and this draft resolution covered tanks and armoured cars of an aggressive nature and not less powerful or less heavily armoured machines not constructed for use on the field of battle.

Hence the Persian delegation was prepared to vote for either the Hungarian draft resolution or the Netherlands proposal.

Lieutenant-Colonel CRERAR (Canada) stated that the Canadian delegation supported the draft reply proposed by the United Kingdom delegation at the last meeting; it also agreed with the text proposed by the Italian delegation¹ to the effect that the measure of effectiveness of an armoured fighting vehicle was dependent upon "offensive power (armament and weight), protective efficacy (armour), speed, radius of action and capacity to move over ground". As each of these factors was largely dependent on "weight", weight was a logical basis for determining the effectiveness of tanks in their possible operation against field entrenchments and other elements of national defence.

If the Land Commission was not prepared to suggest to the General Commission that the factor of weight could usefully be applied as a measure of qualitative disarmament, the only alternative conclusion must be to ask that all tanks should be prohibited or that none should be.

The discussions had shown clearly that the dividing-line between commercial all-track, semi-track and wheeled vehicles and the military pattern tank or armoured car could not be clearly defined or recognised. As mechanical transport became more perfect, this distinction would become even more difficult to draw. The Land Commission would therefore be obliged to suggest that neither tanks nor armoured cars should be abolished, which would be regrettable.

For these reasons, the Canadian delegation supported the United Kingdom proposal, which expressed in some detail a useful and sound principle — namely, that the weight of a tank was a measure of its offensive capacity.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) stated that, subject to the reservation already formulated and bearing in mind the Committee of Experts' views, the Spanish delegation considered:

- (1) That light tanks constructed for co-operation with infantry in all phases of battle and over any kind of ground should be classed among the most specifically offensive weapons;
- (2) That they were efficacious against national defence if the country attacked had no fortifications;
- (3) That they were not threatening to the civil population;
- (4) That the most powerful tanks, such as those quoted in the experts' reply, should be considered as specifically offensive and efficacious against national defence;

¹ Document Conf.D./C.T./C.E. 52.

(5) That armoured cars carrying machine-guns, such as accompanied cavalry, should not come under any of the three heads given in the General Commission's resolution ;

(6) That mobile turrets, if armoured cupolas were understood as such, were fixed elements forming part of the permanent fortifications ;

(7) That in view of the number of trains necessary for the transport of even a single division — seeing that the guns carried by an armoured train were never of large calibre, that the train could not leave the railway line, and that it was a very expensive weapon — it could be concluded that it was scarcely worth considering such trains as offensive armaments ;

(8) That motor vehicles adaptable in varying degrees of perfection to military ends formed part of the potential war strength of each country.

The Spanish delegation considered that the question of the prohibition or non-prohibition of the armaments in question was within the competence of the General Commission.

M. SATO (Japan) stated that his delegation thought :

(1) That tanks and armoured cars should not be considered threatening to civilians unless employed in a way contrary to the rules of international law relating to war.

(2) Since the offensiveness of mobile cupolas and armoured trains depended upon the arms which they carried, the Japanese delegation considered that these vehicles did not come into any of the three categories mentioned in the General Commission's resolution. It therefore held that these vehicles should not be included among the arms to which qualitative limitation should be applied.

(3) From the purely military point of view, the Japanese delegation agreed with the French delegation on the subject of the efficacy of tanks and armoured cars against national defence. Nevertheless, it considered that it would be well further to study the question of the minimum weight of such tanks and armoured cars.

(4) The Japanese delegation could not endorse the arguments raised in support of the total abolition of armoured vehicles, since it considered that these arguments were based on a confusion between the character of the material and its strategic use, or on considerations relating to the possibility of their illegal use, in violation of international law.

General FERRAZ (Portugal) drew the Commission's attention to the declarations made by his delegation during the plenary meetings of the Conference. His delegation was ready to support any proposal likely to lead to a reasonable reduction in the offensiveness of all armoured vehicles the characteristics of which rendered them specifically threatening to national defence and civil populations. The Portuguese delegation further considered that special measures should be taken to prohibit the improvisation of tanks of any kind whatsoever.

M. STEFFENS (Norway) said that his delegation considered that all tanks and armoured cars were essentially offensive weapons and among those most efficacious against national defence. In view of the fact that surprise attack constituted a grave danger for small countries possessing few means of defence — as the Belgian and Hungarian delegates had already explained — and since such attack could place these countries in a particularly disadvantageous position until such time as the organs of the League of Nations could come into operation, the Norwegian delegation was ready to support the Belgian amendment.¹ It could not, however, support the British proposal, in which only tanks weighing over twenty-five tons were considered specifically offensive.

The Norwegian delegation could have supported the Netherlands proposal submitted earlier in the meeting, which had been accepted by the Swedish delegation, if that proposal had not omitted armoured cars not equipped with caterpillars. The Norwegian delegation considered that armoured cars were very effective offensive weapons against surprise attack. His delegation did not consider armoured trains essentially offensive, since their radius of action was limited by the existence of railway lines.

The Norwegian delegation considered that the Hungarian delegation's proposal¹ was the most nearly in accordance with its point of view and would thus vote in its favour, in spite of doubts as to the offensive character of armoured trains.

¹ See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.

General VATEFF (Bulgaria) said the Bulgarian delegation felt that, in view of the reasons which had led to their construction in the world war, their special features and their method of action and use, tanks were exclusively offensive weapons. Moreover, their great mobility favoured surprise attack, particularly at the beginning of the war.

The Bulgarian delegation was of opinion that tanks were most efficacious against national defence, because they could destroy temporary constructions, and because they could, by crushing obstacles, open passages for the attacking troops and, with their armament, could protect the advance of these troops. The heavier the tank, the more offensive and dangerous it was against national defence.

Tanks were more or less threatening to civilians according to the strength of their armament and the belligerents' respect for international treaties.

The Bulgarian delegation considered that armoured cars, which were very mobile and had a wide radius of action, were particularly suitable for offensive action. They could make surprise attacks and constitute a threat to civilians by invading the territory of the country. Finally, the Bulgarian delegation considered that armoured cars were not very efficacious against defence organisations.

Lieut.-General OMAR (Afghanistan) said that the Afghan delegation, in conformity with its proposal¹ and with its statement made previously, was of opinion that tanks and armoured cars were the most specifically offensive weapons, the most efficacious against national defence, and the most threatening to civilians. It therefore approved and supported the Hungarian² and Netherlands draft resolutions.

General DIMITRESCO (Roumania) pointed out that, in its report, the Committee of Experts had unanimously agreed that it was possible rapidly and easily to convert agricultural tractors or other vehicles into tanks or armoured cars.

The value of these vehicles converted for military purposes might be greater than that of old model tanks or armoured cars, and their use *en masse* by the armies of the countries in which a large number was available was certainly dangerous and very efficacious against national defence.

The Roumanian delegation was therefore of opinion that, in providing for the limitation, reduction or prohibition of tanks or armoured cars, it should be borne in mind that agricultural tractors or other vehicles could easily and rapidly be converted into tanks or armoured cars.

The Roumanian delegation did not intend, in making this remark, in any way to suggest that the development of the agricultural industry should be hampered. It merely desired to draw attention to the importance of bearing this fact in mind, as in the case of civil aviation.

The Roumanian delegation proposed that a special committee should be set up, at a suitable moment, to study this question, as had been done in the case of civil aviation.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) simply desired to state that the Swiss delegation intended to support the Netherlands proposal.

The Swiss delegate thought that armoured cars which could circulate only on roads should not be considered as more specifically offensive than a lorry for the transport of troops armed with machine-guns or guns.

The Swiss delegation could not accept the Hungarian proposal, nor did it consider that armoured vehicles were particularly dangerous to civilians. It did not feel that the danger of surprise attack should be attributed to armoured cars, since a strategic surprise attack depended not only upon tanks but also upon infantry. Obviously, an infantry battalion with machine-guns was as dangerous to civilians as an armoured vehicle.

Apparently, the Hungarian delegation had considered the danger to civilians in a somewhat different light from the General Commission, which understood it to cover the risks run by the population outside the field of battle. Surprise operations would inevitably create a new battlefield, but the same would apply to other material as well as to armoured vehicles.

Colonel Züblin felt that the question of tractors was rather within the General Commission's competence. It would be useful, however, if the Land Commission could bring it to the notice of the General Commission, in order that the latter might bear it in mind in discussing limitation or reduction. Colonel Züblin said that, in this sense, he could support the Roumanian proposal to set up a committee to consider tractors.

¹ Document Conf.D. 116.

² See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.

The Swiss delegate supported the President's proposal, and thought it impossible to draw general conclusions from the various views that had been put forward. He felt that, with regard to the distinction between tanks and armoured cars, the Commission should confine itself to saying that armoured cars could move only on roads, whereas other tanks could move across country.

Dr. RUIZ GUIÑAZÚ (Argentine) stated that the Argentine delegation maintained its previous statements and would support any proposal to prohibit tanks and assimilated weapons.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) noted that Mr. Wilson had criticised the Committee of Experts somewhat severely because it had been unable to define tanks and armoured cars.

He pointed out that the United Kingdom delegation had submitted a proposal to the Committee of Experts, which that Committee had not accepted. In response to the President's appeal, he again submitted a proposal which would perhaps meet, if not with unanimous approval, at least with the approval of the majority of the Commission.

Colonel Züblin had suggested an extremely simple definition, but one which was perhaps inadequate, for the ability of armoured cars to move across country depended on the country they had to traverse. In the vast, flat plains of the United States and Canada, it was as easy to move across country by car as to take the road.

Lord Stanhope read the United Kingdom delegation's draft definition to replace the third paragraph of its original proposal submitted at the beginning of the previous meeting.

That amended text read as follows :

" The Committee of Experts did not find it possible to arrive at precise definitions of the various types of armoured fighting vehicles. It is recognised that it is difficult to make such definitions applicable to all cases owing to the fact that there is no clear technical distinction between light tanks and armoured cars. Generally speaking, however, it may be said that :

" A tank is a fully armoured, armed self-propelled vehicle designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks, and to overcome obstacles encountered on the battlefield. It is primarily intended for employment actually on the battlefield.

" Armoured cars are armoured wheeled fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with the possible addition of limited cross-country capacity conferred by multi-wheels, four-wheel drive or semi-track device. Their chief characteristics are great range and speed on roads, but they have practically no capacity for crossing trenches. Like the light tank, their rôle is reconnaissance, and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position.

" Armoured fighting vehicles might be further classified under three main categories."

He added that the United Kingdom delegation could accept the Belgian delegation's addition to the second paragraph,¹ as it improved the text.

Mr. WILSON (United States of America) paid a tribute to the President's efforts to draw up a definition making the discussions more clear.

He also thanked the United Kingdom delegation for making similar efforts. He would be wanting in gratitude if he did not immediately say that he readily accepted the United Kingdom proposal and the Belgian proposal with regard to surprise attack.

General WHANG (China) pointed out once again that his country was in favour of the abolition of tanks and armoured cars. With a view to the adoption of a reply to the General Commission, the Chinese delegation supported the Hungarian proposal.

Colonel LANSKORONSKIS (Lithuania) said that Lithuania was one of the countries which not only possessed no permanent fortifications but had no fortifications of any kind. Her frontiers were all open and were exposed to surprise invasion. Bearing in mind the statements it had heard with regard to the danger of surprise attack by armoured vehicles, the Lithuanian delegation supported the Hungarian proposal, on condition that the words " any other similar appliances " did not include armoured trains, for the Lithuanian delegation

¹ See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.

did not consider these trains as offensive appliances, since their radius of action was limited by the existence of railways.

M. AUBERT (France) asked that, without prejudice to the draft previously submitted by the French delegation, the following declaration, the object of which was to facilitate a comparison of the diverse views, should be inserted in the report.

“ 1. While in many respects tanks possess fighting qualities superior to those of other means of combat, they are nevertheless not capable of being used efficaciously, independently of other weapons, particularly of the infantry.

“ 2. Tanks and armoured cars are essential factors in the defence forces of certain countries whose geographical situation exposes them to immediate invasion, whose human resources are limited, who, further, are responsible for maintaining order in vast oversea territories, and whose security depends to a great extent upon materials enabling them to economise their effectives.

“ 3. Tanks and armoured cars are among the weapons least threatening to civilians, as, owing to their precision of action, they must be directed at military objectives.

“ 4. Tanks and armoured cars are therefore not (a) the most specifically offensive; (b) the most efficacious against national defence; (c) the most threatening to civilians.

“ 5. In all cases the weight above which tanks could be considered as answering to the criteria (paragraph 4 (a) and (b) above) should be not less than the weight necessary to ensure adequate protection against appliances specially constructed to destroy them.

“ 6. The reduction and limitation of the weight of tanks and armoured cars do not come within the Commission's present terms of reference, as they involve questions of principle which must first be discussed by the General Commission.”

M. Aubert pointed out that Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were based on the statements of the United States, United Kingdom and Japanese delegations in the Naval Commission relating to capital ships, and that No. 5 was similar to a statement made in the Naval Commission by the French delegation (see pages 5 and 7 of the Naval Commission's report)¹.

General BURHARDT-BUKACKI (Poland) stated that he supported the Roumanian proposal, particularly as interpreted by the Swiss delegation. He asked that the following declaration be inserted in the report :

“ The Polish delegation points out that, should the General Commission decide to apply certain measures of qualitative disarmament to tanks, it would be absolutely essential to take simultaneous action with a view to preventing :

- “ 1. The conversion of agricultural and other tractors into tanks ;
- “ 2. The utilisation of tractor factories for the manufacture of tanks. ”

General KOSSITCH (Yugoslavia) also supported the Roumanian proposal with regard to the conversion of agricultural tractors. He did not think it necessary, however, to set up a special committee. It would suffice, in his opinion, to make suggestions to the General Commission, as Colonel Züblin had said.

Lieutenant-Colonel NEMEČEK (Czechoslovakia) associated himself with the declaration made by the Polish delegate.

The PRESIDENT asked the Czechoslovak delegate whether he fully concurred in the Roumanian proposal, and whether he had any opinion to express on the idea to regard armoured fighting vehicles as answering to the three criteria contained in the resolution of April 22nd.

Lieutenant-Colonel NĚMEČEK (Czechoslovakia) replied that he accepted the proposal of the Polish and Roumanian delegations as regards the transformation of agricultural tractors.

So far as the offensive character of tanks was concerned, he did not desire to make any special declaration, seeing that the Czechoslovak army did not at present possess any tanks with the exception of a few such machines for instruction purposes.

¹ See document Conf. D./C.N.30.

The PRESIDENT, summarising the discussion, stated that twenty-six delegations had made declarations giving the information necessary for preparing the report. Two delegations were in favour of the procedure proposed by the President for the report to be sent to the General Commission. As no delegation had raised any objection, the President concluded that the Commission accepted his proposal.

The report, which would shortly be submitted to the Commission, would therefore contain a statement of the various points of view expressed by the delegations. The Rapporteur proposed, if necessary, to get into touch with the various delegations in order to ascertain their exact position.

The President noted that the various statements with regard to tanks could be divided into four classes, according to the extent to which they recommended that tanks should be classified among the arms answering to the three criteria of the General Commission's resolution: this was the only task before the Commission. The latter was not required to express its views as to the limitation or abolition of these weapons: that was within the competence of the General Commission.

The President proposed that the Commission should consider at the next meeting the definition of tanks and armoured cars proposed by the United Kingdom delegation.

Agreed.

SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, June 2nd, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President: M. BUERO

22. APPLICATION TO ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932: CONSIDERATION OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION (*continuation*).

The PRESIDENT reverted to his suggestion of the previous day that the Commission should endeavour to define tanks and armoured cars, as certain delegations considered such a differentiation necessary. In this connection he recalled that, at the close of the previous meeting, the United Kingdom delegation had proposed an amendment to paragraph 3 of its original draft reply to the General Commission, submitted at the fifteenth meeting. The proposed amendment had been supported by the United States delegation, and the President proposed that his colleagues should now express their opinion regarding it. If the majority of the Commission approved this new definition, it might be incorporated in the report.

General GALET (Belgium) accepted the proposal that the definition of tanks and armoured cars submitted by the United Kingdom delegation be inserted in the report to the General Commission. That definition was identical in substance with a proposal already made by the Belgian delegation in the Committee of Experts.

General TARBUK (Austria) proposed that the definition of armoured cars be completed by the insertion of the words "self-propelled" before "fighting vehicles".

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) said that the Hungarian delegation supported the United Kingdom definition and was in favour of inserting it in the Commission's report. He suggested, however, that the words "Like the light tank" in the last paragraph but one be deleted.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) observed that the differentiation between tanks and armoured cars was not of capital importance to countries wishing to abolish both weapons. The German delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition, subject to the Austrian amendment, and also supported the Hungarian delegation's suggestion to delete the words "Like the light tank".

General NYGREN (Sweden) observed that the important point was not to adopt this or that country's definition, but to make sure, when employing a technical expression, that all the delegations meant the same thing.

In the Swedish delegation's view, the simplest and the clearest definition would be to describe tanks as any fighting vehicle so equipped as to be able to move across uneven *terrain*, and armoured cars as any other armoured vehicle provided only with four ordinary wheels.

The Swedish delegation felt that the United Kingdom proposal would make it much more difficult to establish an exact distinction between two types of vehicle; it was prepared, however, to accept the United Kingdom definition, if the Commission was in favour of adopting it. The previous day's discussion had clearly demonstrated the Commission's mistake in not defining the terms "tank" and "armoured car" at the outset. A group of armoured vehicles evidently existed which, in the opinion of certain delegations, were tanks and in that of other delegations armoured cars.

It was impossible to agree on a joint text or even to compare different texts if the terms employed were not interpreted in the same way. The Land Commission might, however, obtain unanimity by saying that, in this or that text or document or reply, the terms "tank" and "armoured car" had been used in a specific sense.

Baron VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (Netherlands) stated that the Netherlands delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition. It thought, however, as regards armoured cars, that there was some inconsistency between its terms and the reference in the Experts' reply to the capacity of armoured cars to cross trenches. He would suggest amending the United Kingdom proposal to read "only a very limited capacity for crossing trenches" instead of "practically no capacity for crossing trenches".

Referring to the definition of a tank, he suggested adding, after the word "tracks", the words "enabling it to cross intact trenches of at least 1.50 metre in width".

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) stated that the Swiss delegation was prepared to support the United Kingdom delegation's text. The Netherlands delegate's observations concerning that text were perhaps rather too detailed, and the United Kingdom delegation's second document might be held to cancel its previous text. The Land Commission had not been asked to state all the technical possibilities of tanks and armoured cars, and it was sufficient to describe their main characteristics. Tanks were intended primarily for use on the battlefield and armoured cars for use on roads. Both those points were clearly brought out in the United Kingdom document.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) said that the Brazilian delegation supported the definition proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom; it recognised, nevertheless, that it was impossible to find formulas which were strictly applicable to every case, but it was essential to define at least the most characteristic tanks, as had been done in the British amendment. The Brazilian delegation also agreed that this definition should be inserted in the report.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation accepted the text proposed by the United Kingdom delegation, subject to the deletion of the phrase "Like the light tank". That reference seemed out of place, especially as the tank was designed to cross rough ground and to overcome obstacles on the battlefield.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) stated that, in accordance with the definition the Commission was about to adopt, a tank was a fully armoured, self-propelled vehicle, designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks. It was primarily intended for employment on the battlefield. In the opinion of several delegations, such implements were capable of effective action against entrenchments, which they could generally cross and destroy, and were particularly useful for opening up infantry attacks. They were, in consequence, a means for reinforcing offensive action, and thus possessed the first two characteristics mentioned in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd.

The Brazilian delegation agreed that tanks could also be used for the purposes of a counter-offensive by the defender on the front or the flank or in the rear of an aggressor which, having invaded the national territory, had entrenched itself — a point very rightly brought out in the French draft reply. In view, however, of the fact that the use of such weapons considerably increased the offensive power of the attacker and that they were intended for purposes of attack while serving also for the defence, the Brazilian delegation was of opinion that all tanks, irrespective of weight, were specifically offensive and efficacious against national defence.

In the Brazilian delegation's view, tanks could not be included in the category of weapons threatening to civilians, since they were employed on the battlefield.

As regards armoured cars, which, according to the United Kingdom delegation's definition, were armoured, wheeled, fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with a limited cross-country capacity but only a medium capacity for crossing trenches, the Brazilian delegation was of opinion that they were not specifically offensive or threatening to national defence, as they could be stopped more or less easily on roads if they penetrated far into the territory, while in the open they possessed no great capacity for crossing trenches. Further, such weapons were necessary for police purposes in peace-time, especially in countries of great territorial extent and with a scattered population in which the maintenance of public order might require the rapid transfer of forces to a considerable distance.

The Brazilian delegation was of opinion that armoured cars could not constitute weapons threatening to civilians, unless they were employed in violation of the rules of international law.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom delegation would be glad to rectify an omission and to accept the Austrian proposal to insert the words "self-propelled" in the definition of armoured cars. It was also glad to accept the Netherlands proposal to amend "practically no capacity for crossing trenches" to "only a slight capacity for crossing trenches". It was not prepared, however, to accept the further amendments that had been proposed. The Hungarian delegate had suggested omitting the reference to the light tank in the paragraph concerning armoured cars, but the light tank, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, did possess the power of reconnaissance, and it was essential that that point should be mentioned. If the Land Commission decided to embody the British text in its report to the General Commission, the Hungarian delegation might perhaps wish to submit a reservation.

Referring next to the Netherlands proposal that mention should be made of the capacity of tanks to cross trenches up to 1.50 metre, the British delegate observed that it was inadvisable to make the definition too concrete — as it would be if definite figures were inserted; it might, indeed, be misleading, since tanks were still changing. The first paragraph stated that the Committee of Experts had not found it possible to arrive at precise definitions of the various types of armoured vehicles, and that statement might serve to define the scope of the remainder of the document. The British delegation did not claim that its text offered a complete technical description, but hoped that the Commission might be able to accept it without too much further amendment.

Colonel TOMBERG (Estonia) stated that the Estonian delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition of armoured fighting vehicles, subject to the amendments approved by Lord Stanhope.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) suggested that the Commission might agree to adopt a proposal of Mr. Wilson to separate tanks and armoured cars entirely. The British delegate accordingly proposed adding, at the end of the second paragraph of its proposal the words "but tanks of a lighter pattern are also employed for reconnaissance", while the omission in the third paragraph of the words "Like the light tank" would make the words following — "their rôle, etc." — apply exclusively to armoured cars.

M. AUBERT (France) said that the French delegation would be prepared to adopt the distinction between tanks and armoured cars if it thought that that would mean a difference in the treatment of those two weapons. It felt, however, that, without unduly forcing technical facts, it was not really possible to establish a distinction; the experts had said so, and, according to the United Kingdom document, there was no virtual difference between the two types of vehicle. The only difference that could be established was between the use of those vehicles, and it behoved the Commission to be careful, for if one of the two categories were prohibited, a premium would be put on the other, and armoured cars could rapidly be converted, by means of a semi-track device, for use on the battlefield. There was no guarantee against their being so used, and unless the Commission adopted for armoured cars a restrictive definition, saying that such vehicles could not leave the road, there seemed no object in endeavouring to establish a distinction, as it would not really serve the purpose in view.

General DE NÁNY-S-MÉGAY (Hungary) observed that his amendment, which the United Kingdom delegation had accepted, was simply designed to rectify the text.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that the German delegation endorsed the views of the United Kingdom delegation and accepted the latter's text with the amendments approved by Lord Stanhope.

Baron VAN VOERST TOT VOERST (Netherlands) withdrew his second proposal; he thanked the United Kingdom delegate for his explanation and for accepting the first proposal he had made.

The PRESIDENT thought that it would be possible for the Rapporteur to establish a distinction, in his report, between tanks and armoured cars. He suggested that the first paragraph of the United Kingdom definition might stand, and that it might be added that the experts had not been able to agree more fully, but that certain delegations had reached an agreement. That would assist the General Commission in arriving at a conclusion.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that he entirely agreed with the President's suggestions. He felt that all the delegations would wish to thank the President, whose personal efforts and pertinacity had enabled the Commission to reach an agreement.

General GALET (Belgium) stated that the Belgian delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition of armoured fighting vehicles.

M. BOUQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, reverting to the question of tanks and armoured cars, requested those delegations which had acceded verbally to any formula that had been proposed, subject to reservations or amendments, to forward such reservations or amendments in writing, in order to avoid any possibility of mistake.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation had only accepted the definition of tanks and armoured cars included in the British proposal. As regards the remainder of the document, it adhered to its declarations of the previous day.

The Spanish delegation requested the President to have the following declaration inserted in the Minutes :

" The Spanish delegation is of opinion that both light and heavy artillery should be included among the most specifically offensive weapons, for reasons of even greater force than apply in the case of tanks, since the said artillery, which is better 'armed' than tanks, is capable, owing to its mobility, of accompanying the infantry and co-operating at any stage of the battle. It is, moreover, intended for that purpose.

" The aforesaid artillery does not constitute a weapon most efficacious against national defence, if the country attacked possesses fortifications.

" Nor is it most threatening to civilians, if employed at a useful range, since the accuracy of its fire enables it to be directed exclusively against selected military objectives. "

23. FORTIFICATIONS : DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE AND DRAFT REPLY SUBMITTED BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

The PRESIDENT stated that the German delegation had submitted the following questionnaire concerning fortifications and draft reply :

" *Draft Questionnaire.*

" (1) What are the characteristics of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the maximum size of their organisations) which must be considered as offensive and which constitute a threat to the national defence of the neighbouring State ?

" With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration :

" (a) The possibility of accommodating troops and material for the purposes of an attack ;

" (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery ;

" (c) Distance from the frontier.

" (2) What are the characteristic features of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the maximum size of their organisations) which constitute a threat to the civilian population of the neighbouring country ?

" With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration :

" (a) The moral effect on the population of the neighbouring country in peace-time ;

" (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery, with special reference to populous territories and to dense populations and to their vital centres and centres of communication ;

" (c) Distance from the frontier.

“(3) What is the influence of the characteristics mentioned under 1 and 2, when :

“(a) The opponent has no permanent fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works or has only weak fortifications, etc. ;

“(b) The opponent can rely only on prepared or improvised field fortifications for the defence ?”

“*Draft Reply.*

“1. The Land Commission considers the ‘extreme limit’ of the organisations of a fortress to be the points at which the most advanced organisations of any kind capable of firing are situated.

“(a) Any fortress, owing to its considerable possibilities for lodging and protecting troops, enables men and material to be held in reserve. It follows that, in addition to its defensive importance, it must be regarded as having offensive possibilities, which are the more important in proportion as the frontier is near.

“(b) If the range of the artillery in the fortress is sufficient for effective fire across the frontier of the neighbouring State it will prejudice that States’ defence. The effect against that defence is naturally increased in the case of guns of large calibre.

“(c) If a fortress is so close to the frontier that the troops assembled there can rapidly cross the frontier of the neighbouring State by starting from the extreme limit of the fortress, and if the range of the artillery enables it to fire across the frontier, the fortress must be regarded as specifically offensive and threatening to national defence.

“2. (a) The qualities referred to under (1) are sufficient to be a considerable menace to the population of the neighbouring State. The mere idea of a sudden and unforeseen attack by the troops of the aggressor and the fear that the national defence may be paralysed produces an unfavourable moral effect upon the civilian population.

“(b) This menace is all the greater when, owing to the range and effectiveness of the fortress’s artillery, the life of the civilian population of the neighbouring State, its residential and business places and its centres of communication, are threatened and when the frontier territory in question is densely populated or industrial.

“(c) As regards the distance of a fortress from the frontier, the remarks contained under 1 (c) also apply as regards the threat to civilians.

“3. (a) When there are no permanent fortifications or even weak fortifications on the frontier territory of the neighbouring State the qualities referred to under (1) and (2) are all the more important in proportion as a surprise attack from a fortress close to the frontier, meeting with no prepared resistance, might penetrate deeply into the country ; it would thus be not only most efficacious against national defence but also particularly threatening to civilians.

“(b) The same remarks apply where the other party has only prepared or improvised field fortifications, since the defensive power of such fortifications is much less than that of permanent fortifications ; the former, owing, in particular, to the possibility of a surprise attack by a fortress close to the frontier, must be distant from the frontier and cannot be completed, occupied and put in a state of defence within the time necessary.

“*Conclusion.* — It follows from the above that fortresses possessing such characteristics are of an offensive nature, that they are specially efficacious against national defence and particularly threatening to civilians.”

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) stated that, by way of introduction to the questionnaire concerning fortifications, he desired to refer to the observations by which the German delegation had prefaced its proposals to the Conference.¹

Those proposals, it had explained, were not exhaustive, but were intended to render possible an effective reduction and limitation of armaments extending to all important factors of armaments. They included, in particular, measures of fundamental importance in regard to the prevention of aggression. With that object, the German delegation had included a paragraph relating to fortifications, framed as follows :²

“The construction and maintenance of fortresses, field works and works which, owing to their proximity to the frontier, constitute a direct menace to the neighbouring country and might possibly obstruct measures taken for the prevention of war, shall be prohibited.”

¹ Document Conf.D.79.

² *Idem*, “C. Fortifications”, paragraph 8.

In its resolution of April 22nd, the General Commission had asked the Land Commission which weapons were most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians; its further decision of April 26th covered the German proposal relating to fortifications. The German delegation desired to state, in order to avoid all possible misunderstanding, that it had in mind those fortresses which, owing to their nearness to the frontier, constituted a menace to the neighbouring country. The General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War (September 26th, 1931) laid down in Article 3 that, in certain given circumstances, lines should be fixed beyond which the forces of the parties to the dispute might not pass. Some limit was necessary if a fortress was to be considered of a solely defensive character, otherwise the stipulation of Article 3 would be inoperative. The German delegation, in its draft questionnaire and draft reply, had endeavoured to direct the Commission's attention to various important points, and hoped that by so doing it had done something to further the aims of the Conference. He suggested that the Commission should proceed immediately to consider the two texts before it.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) observed that the question of fortifications was not of very great interest to his country owing to the particular geographical configuration of the United Kingdom. He had expected the German delegate to quote historical instances proving that the existence of fortifications close to the frontier constituted a danger to the neighbouring countries. Fortresses, he said, did not come into play except in case of attack, being essentially non-mobile. The German proposal, moreover, concerned not so much the fortresses themselves as their garrisons and armaments. Again, fortresses were not the only military works capable of sheltering troops, which might be hidden in barracks or in woods, or indeed anywhere. As regards armaments, the Commission had already expressed its views on the different calibres of artillery pieces. The United Kingdom delegate thought, then, that it was unnecessary to revert to the question of garrisons and artillery. The German delegation would perhaps agree to withdraw its questionnaire, since the examination of that document would take up a great deal of the Land Commission's time and would not be of any very real value to the General Commission.

M. AUBERT (France) endorsed Lord Stanhope's remarks. The fundamental idea underlying the German delegation's draft reply was that the existence of a fortress close to the frontier constituted a presumption of aggression. That idea was quite correct if, behind the fortress, there existed an absolutely empty stretch of country, but, generally speaking, fortifications were designed to cover regions which were thickly populated. The situation of fortresses was thus determined by the existence near the frontier of vital centres which it was important to protect. They must then be situated close to the frontier.

Secondly, it would appear from the German delegation's questionnaire that the actual characteristics of fortresses constituted a presumption of aggression, in that they possessed a garrison, arms, munitions, etc. There were, however, a thousand ways of bringing troops and arms up to the frontier for purposes of aggression. Indeed, it was preferable, if it were desired to protect them, not to shut them up in a fortress, but to hide them in woods or to make use of other natural places of shelter. If the existence of fortifications constituted a presumption of aggression, the term aggressive might just as well be applied to a policy of building roads, motor roads and bridges close to the frontier. Artillery might just as well be kept in fortresses as in barracks; its range was quite independent of the existence of a fortress close to the frontier.

As regards the German delegation's argument concerning the Convention to improve the Means of preventing War, the French delegate thought that the application of its provisions depended on the good faith of the signatory States.

In conclusion, M. Aubert did not think that any useful purpose would be served by maintaining that the existence of concrete fortresses was proof of a spirit of aggression. It was much more important to consider the feelings that might exist on either side of the frontier, and the League's duty was to see that, in case of conflict, such feelings were not allowed to lead to irreparable consequences.

The PRESIDENT thought he might add to the British delegate's remarks that the German delegation might rest assured that, should the Land Commission decide to postpone the discussion of the question of fortifications, that question could be brought up again when the General Commission came to discuss the problem of demilitarised zones.

M. von WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) reserved his reply to the two speeches which had just been made, but enquired whether the Land Commission proposed to remove from its agenda a question which had been definitely included in it. If that were the case, he would ask that a vote be taken.

As regards the possibility of reverting to the question of fortifications in connection with the examination of the problem of demilitarised zones, the German delegate stated that, had he intended to discuss the question of such zones and their effects, the questionnaire would have been much more comprehensive.

The PRESIDENT enquired whether the British delegation wished the Land Commission to take a vote on the previous question. Lord Stanhope's proposal was to the effect that no discussion be held on the question of fortifications for reasons which the French delegation supported.

M. AUBERT (France), while still endorsing the British delegate's views, said that he would be prepared to discuss the question if the German delegation so desired.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) observed that his suggestions referred only to the questionnaire submitted by the German delegation. He repeated that the problem of fortifications was not of immediate interest to the United Kingdom.

The PRESIDENT thought that he would be interpreting the feeling of the Commission if he proposed that no decision be taken yet and that the question be referred to a later meeting, unless the German delegation insisted on an immediate discussion.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) stated that his delegation did not insist on an immediate discussion.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) observed that one of his reasons for suggesting that the Commission should not examine the German questionnaire was that it must avoid all possible delay if it wanted its report to the General Commission to be ready in due time. If the question of fortifications were to be discussed, the British delegation would prefer the debate to be held there and then, or at latest on the following day.

The PRESIDENT replied that he hoped to be able to settle the question of procedure after consulting the German delegate privately. If, as a result of their conversation, it became necessary — though this he did not anticipate — for the Commission to discuss the problem of fortifications, a meeting would be held before the following Monday.

Lord STANHOPE expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement.

EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held on Monday, June 6th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President : M. BUERO.

24. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT REPORT¹ TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The PRESIDENT invited M. Bourquin, Rapporteur, to address the Commission on the subject of his draft report to the General Commission under the terms of that Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained the structure of his draft report, which, after recalling the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd and the Land Commission's interpretation of that resolution, set forth the Land Commission's conclusions in regard to artillery and armoured fighting vehicles.

For the artillery, the Land Commission had unanimously adopted a common text which embodied all the essential features of the different views expressed. It had thus only been necessary for the Rapporteur to quote the text adopted by the Land Commission on May 23rd.

When he came to deal with the question of armoured vehicles, however, no unanimous text existed and a whole series of opinions had had to be classified in order to bring out the main currents. It had seemed advisable, for the purposes of the General Commission, to

¹ Document Conf.D./C.T.45. Addenda : Documents Conf.D./C.T.45(a) and (b).

differentiate between tanks, armoured cars, armoured trains and armoured cupolas, and to state separately the conclusions reached for each of those categories.

Secondly, it had been necessary to explain somewhat fully the considerations on which the various conclusions were based. It was not possible merely to state the conclusions, as they were not unanimous and as in consequence the General Commission, whose duty it would be to take a decision regarding them, would need to know the arguments on which they were based. Further, certain delegations had sent in full written statements, so that, in the interests of impartiality, it had been judged advisable to state in the report the arguments formulated in support of the opinions expressed by other delegations.

Thirdly, in classifying the main groups of opinion, the Rapporteur had refrained from saying which delegations were represented in those groups, since the Land Commission had intentionally abstained from adopting the vote as part of its procedure. To specify the States which were in favour of any particular thesis would have been tantamount to recording their votes, and, as some States had not expressed their views on certain important points, to mention those which had done so would have given a false view of the Land Commission's attitude; the names of delegations had only been mentioned in exceptional instances, for special reasons.

The Rapporteur explained that certain omissions which he had overlooked, owing to the limited time at his disposal, had now been made good in document Conf. D./C.T. 45 (a), consisting of an addition, and in document Conf. D./C.T. 45 (b) amending the order of a couple of paragraphs.

The PRESIDENT expressed the Commission's sincere thanks to the Rapporteur for the impartiality, competence and precision which characterised his report.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made the following statement:

"The present report, instead of giving direct answers to the questions put by the General Commission, merely enumerates the opinions of the various groups of delegations, as formulated by the experts when questions concerning artillery and armoured vehicles were under consideration.

"The Land Commission had instructions to determine what calibres of artillery and what classes of armoured vehicle answered to the three criteria laid down by the General Commission on April 22nd. The Land Commission was to answer these questions; it was to say whether these classes of armament should be subject to qualitative reduction, and, if so, to what extent.

"Instead of answering the questions, the Land Commission, by repeating the opinion expressed by the Committee of Experts in an interminable series of technical arguments, is still further complicating the task of the General Commission. Land armaments, especially armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, offer sufficient material to be submitted to the General Commission for its decision in regard to qualitative disarmament. The Land Commission's voluminous report is full of arguments about the relative value of different calibres of artillery, the impossibility of making an absolute distinction between a tank and a motor vehicle, and the efficacy of artillery and tanks against permanent fortifications; but all this is merely preparing the ground for bringing the whole principle of qualitative disarmament into question. Public opinion is beginning to realise this, and numerous protests are now being heard from every side against this tendency, which is visible in all the Commissions.

"The Soviet delegation quite realises that this total absence of positive results is not due to any bad work on the part of the experts. The experts are only expressing the ideas and wishes of their respective delegations. Be that as it may, the Soviet delegation cannot associate itself with this refusal to give any specific reply to the questions put, and is therefore unable to pronounce in favour of the report.

"While making this general reservation, the Soviet delegation proposes to continue to uphold its own view in the General Commission, maintaining that the following classes of arms should be subject to qualitative disarmament: all guns and howitzers of calibre exceeding about 100 mm. firing shells weighing more than 16 kg. and having a range exceeding 15 km., and all armoured vehicles — tanks, cars and trains."

Lieutenant-Colonel SERRANO (Bolivia) observed that the Land Commission's report was an historical document and that every country must bear some measure of responsibility for the proposals and arguments set forth in it. The Land Commission's views must be accurately portrayed before being placed before the General Commission, and if a true picture were to be given, some things must be made to stand out more distinctly than others; accordingly, each section of the report should, he thought, bear the names of the delegations whose views it represented. The Hungarian proposal, for example, concerning tanks had been supported by some twenty States.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, assumed that the Soviet delegate's criticism was directed against the Commission rather than against the Rapporteur, whose report was simply intended to reflect the Commission's work.

He repeated his reasons for not thinking it desirable to specify the names of the delegations who had supported the various groups of opinion: some countries had not stated their precise attitude, and any record of names would thus have been incomplete.

The PRESIDENT, endorsing the Rapporteur's view, explained that he had himself been to some extent responsible for the procedure adopted by the Commission. The latter's work was in a sense a preparation for that of the General Commission; there still remained a long work of negotiation, and it had seemed to him preferable not to record the formal vote of any delegation, so as not to bind it to any particular opinion from which it might find it difficult to depart. He hoped that the Bolivian delegate would not insist on his point.

Lieutenant-Colonel SERRANO (Bolivia) stated that he did not insist.

The PRESIDENT invited the Commission to examine the draft report paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1.

Paragraph 1 was adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 2.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) pointed out that the Land Commission had never taken a decision to the effect that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might be held to form one single criterion. The Rapporteur had suggested at a previous meeting¹ that "they might examine each weapon under each of the three heads specified in the General Commission's resolution, or they might take the series of weapons mentioned in the experts' replies and decide if those weapons should be included under one or more of those heads". He would prefer to amend the opening phrase of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 which now read: "It was of opinion — without desiring to attribute to its interpretation a more general bearing — that for land materials . . ." to read as follows: "It was of opinion that generally . . . etc."

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, observed that, although no formal decision had been taken, the Commission had taken a virtual decision in the light of M. van Lanschot's and Mr. Wilson's statements at the meeting in question. He saw no objection to the proposed amendment, however, and suggested also deleting the words: ". . . without desiring to attribute to its interpretation a more general bearing . . .".

The PRESIDENT read the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 as amended to read:

"It was of opinion that generally for land materials the weapons which are 'most efficacious against national defence' should be considered as being those whose character is 'the most specifically offensive', and that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might thus be held to form one single criterion."

Paragraph 2 as amended was adopted.

Paragraphs 3 and 4.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 were adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 5.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany), reverting to a previous statement of the German delegation, asked for the insertion, after the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (c) of the experts' report (embodied in paragraph 5 of the draft reply under consideration), of a sub-paragraph to the effect that the German delegation included under the terms "about 100 mm." guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, enquired whether the German delegation would be willing for that statement to appear as a footnote, as the text of the experts' report had already been adopted.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) agreed to the Rapporteur's suggestion.

¹ See Minutes of the seventh meeting (May 10th, 1932).

Paragraph 5 was adopted, with the addition of the following footnote :

" The German delegation includes under the terms ' about 100 mm. ' guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over."

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 were adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 9.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed an amendment in the definition of tanks : " tanks of a light type " to read " the lighter types of tanks ". He pointed out, as regards armoured cars, that in the latter part of the definition which had already been approved by the Commission and which in the draft report read " . . . but they have only a very limited capacity for crossing trenches. Like the light tanks their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position " should read : " but they have only a slight capacity for crossing trenches. Their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position."

. *Paragraph 9, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraph 10.

Paragraph 10 was adopted without discussion.

New Paragraph.

Following a suggestion of M. AUBERT (France), a new paragraph was inserted after paragraph 10, as follows :

" Certain delegations consider that if a distinction was sought between tanks and armoured cars it should be sought rather in the direction of a difference of use than in that of a difference of definite technical characteristics. These delegations point out that in such circumstances, in the absence of effective means of control, it will always be possible to use these weapons for purposes different from those for which they were theoretically designed. In the opinion of these delegations, the only category of armoured vehicles of combat in regard to which a sufficiently definite technical distinction could be established would be that of armoured motor-cars which have not more than four wheels, only two of them being driving wheels, to the exclusion of caterpillars, and which are obliged to keep to roads."

Paragraph 11 (New Paragraph 12).¹

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed that paragraph 11 which now read as follows :

" The general characteristics described by the Committee of Experts as regards mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains encountered no objection "

should be modified as follows :

" The replies of the Committee of Experts relating to the characteristics of mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains received general endorsement from the Commission."

Paragraph 11, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 12 (New Paragraph 13).

Paragraph 12 was adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 13 (New Paragraph 14).

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the " One group of delegations " referred to in the first sub-paragraph had numbered some twenty delegations. He thought that fact should be brought out.

General BONOMI (Italy) endorsed M. Lounatcharski's observations, which, he said, represented the Italian delegation's views.

General TEMPERLEY (United Kingdom) observed that, if account were taken of the Soviet delegate's suggestion to differentiate more clearly between the views of the various groups of delegations in connection with tanks, a similar differentiation should also be made in connection with artillery : some fourteen delegations had been in favour of a 150 mm.

¹ The numbers in parentheses correspond with those in the final text of the report (document Conf. D. 122).

calibre limit. If the size of the groups were qualified in the one case, it must be qualified in the other.

General VAN TUINEN (Netherlands) supported General Temperley's observations as giving a very accurate picture of what had happened in the Commission.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, suggested that the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 13 should read: "A large number of delegations is of opinion . . ." etc. Paragraph 15 could then read: "A second large group of delegations . . ."

The proposals of the Rapporteur were adopted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed a slight amendment in the English text. He also proposed the removal, in the second sentence of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 13, of the brackets, and the substitution, for the words "by means of cars, etc.", of the words "by means of motor vehicles of all kinds".

Lord Stanhope's proposals were adopted.

The PRESIDENT observed that the following additions proposed by the Rapporteur after the distribution of the draft report referred to paragraph 13.

(a) *To be inserted between the second and third sub-paragraphs of paragraph 13:*

"Several of them point out that even modern fortifications are exposed to the attack of tanks because, while it is always possible to protect fortified works sufficiently to resist those attacks by the use of natural or artificial obstacles, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the action of tanks may strengthen considerably infantry attacks against troops and objectives placed at intervals either in front of or between those works, and, on the other hand, that the establishment, which is always very costly, of a complete system of artificial obstacles for the protection of forts is impossible in peace-time in certain districts, such as those under cultivation.

"Certain delegations point out, moreover . . ."

(b) *To be inserted at the end of paragraph 13:*¹

"It has been pointed out within the same group of delegates that, whatever the utility that tanks might sometimes offer for defensive purposes,² the menace which they constitute to the defence within the hands of the aggressor outweigh the advantages which they might confer on the defence, and that in any case such a menace was sufficiently serious to be regarded as decisive."

These two additions were adopted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) noted that several delegations had supported the United Kingdom opinion that tanks could only cross trenches if the latter had already been partly destroyed by artillery fire.³ He proposed that a sentence on the subject be included in paragraph 13.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that paragraph 13 set forth the views of delegations which considered that all tanks should be included among weapons which were most specifically offensive. The present text, which had been taken from a note submitted by the German delegation, reproduced that view exactly. The opinion to which Lord Stanhope had referred, however, represented the views of another group of delegations, and the Rapporteur feared that, if it were introduced in the paragraph describing the views of the first group, the very difficulty which he had wished to avoid might arise—namely, an impression of a series of replies and counter-replies. That explained the second addition which the President had just read. The sentence suggested by the United Kingdom delegate might perhaps be inserted as a footnote to show that the Committee of Experts was not unanimous on the point.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) expressed his agreement with that suggestion.

Paragraph 13, with the above additions and amendments, was adopted.

Paragraph 14 (New Paragraph 15).

Paragraph 14 was adopted without discussion.

¹ The addition of the above sub-paragraph to paragraph 13 necessitates the suppression of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the draft report.

² The Italian delegation, reiterating a reservation which it had already put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material, expressed the opinion that any decision as to the arms required for the purposes of national defence was outside the Land Commission's competence.

³ See footnote 2 to the reply of the Committee of Experts (Question(3)) concerning Armoured Fighting Vehicles (document Conf. D.122, Appendix 2).

Paragraph 15 (New Paragraph 16).

Paragraph 15 was adopted, subject to the amendment already adopted in connection with paragraph 13 — namely, to replace the words “ A second group of delegations ” by “ A second large group of delegations ”.

Paragraph 16 (New Paragraph 17).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion, at the end of the sentence, of the following :

“ They hold, however, that this power of surprise is not confined to tanks, but is shared by armoured cars and even by commercial motor vehicles converted to military uses.”

Paragraph 16, with the above amendment, was adopted.

Paragraph 17 (New Paragraph 18).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) pointed out that the sentence just inserted at the end of paragraph 16 made it necessary to replace the words “ That explains, they add, why tanks possess ” at the beginning of paragraph 17 by the words :

“ For the purposes mentioned above, tanks, they add, possess ”.

Paragraph 17, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 18 (New Paragraph 19).

General BONOMI (Italy) thought that paragraph 18, which simply gave the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation, might appear in the form of a footnote, as had been decided in the case of the German delegation's observation relating to paragraph 5.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, pointed out that paragraph 18 did not, strictly speaking, represent the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation alone. That paragraph was required in order to explain the conclusions arrived at by the delegations belonging to the second group and to explain more particularly the figures “ 20 to 25 tons upwards ” in paragraph 19 of the draft. The Rapporteur had used the expression “ which the United Kingdom more particularly defines as follows : . . . ”, as it was not quite certain whether the various delegations in the second group accepted all the arguments set forth in paragraph 18. The conclusions derived from those arguments had, however, been adopted by all the delegations in question.

On the proposal of General BONOMI (Italy), the phrase quoted by the Rapporteur was amended to read as follows :

“ . . . which some delegations define as follows : . . . ”

Paragraph 18 as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 19 (New Paragraph 20).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion in the second sub-paragraph, after the words “ tanks of a lower weight ”, of the words “ are definitely less offensive in character and . . . ”

Lord Stanhope's proposal was adopted.

General BONOMI (Italy) thought that the limit of 20 to 25 tons upwards mentioned in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 19 was not sufficiently precise and not in harmony with the preceding paragraph, in which the figures “ 25 tons ” and “ 20 tons ” referred respectively to heavy tanks and medium tanks.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that he had simply reproduced the texts submitted by delegations. He did not claim that the limit of 20 to 25 tons was very precise or that it was quite in harmony with paragraph 18, but he was not entitled to alter the figures given by delegations.

General BONOMI (Italy) thought that the General Commission might be perplexed by the lack of harmony between paragraphs 18 and 19 ; he did not, however, insist on that point. He proposed the addition, at the end of paragraph 19, of the words “ in time of peace ”.

General BRIND (India) thought that the addition would serve no useful purpose, as public order had to be maintained in time of war just as in time of peace.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, in the Soviet delegation's view, the question of police measures should not be dealt with in the report, as that question was outside the Commission's terms of reference. The Soviet delegation had repeatedly expressed the same view in the Preparatory Commission and in the Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Arms. It accordingly proposed the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 19. If that were not agreed to by the Commission, it would ask that its protest be noted in the report.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, thought that the last-named solution should be adopted, for certain delegations had referred to the use of tanks for police purposes, and the report should duly note that point. Similar reservations, moreover, had already been included in the report, such as the Italian delegation's opinion that it was not within the Land Commission's competence to specify the weapons required for national defence.

General BONOMI (Italy) endorsed the Soviet delegation's reservation and withdrew his own proposal relating to the amendment of the last part of paragraph 19.

It was agreed to add as a footnote to this paragraph the reservations made by the Soviet and Italian delegations.

Paragraph 19, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 20 (New Paragraph 21).

Paragraph 20 was adopted, subject to various drafting amendments.

Paragraph 21.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation's opinion might have been given simply in the form of a note. It was not quite accurately interpreted in the present text, and he proposed accordingly that the following text be substituted :

“ The Spanish delegation is of opinion : (1) that light tanks, designed to co-operate with the infantry at any stage of the battle and on any terrain, should be regarded as specifically offensive weapons and, when no fortification exists, as particularly efficacious against national defence ; (2) that heavy tanks fulfil these two conditions unreservedly ; (3) that no tank is threatening to civilians.”

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that paragraph 21 had been inserted in the report as the result of an interpretation of the statement made by the Spanish delegate and appearing in the Minutes of the sixteenth meeting. The paragraph might accordingly be deleted entirely.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) agreed to the deletion of paragraph 21 and withdrew the text he had proposed.

Paragraph 21 was deleted.

Paragraph 22 (New Paragraph 22).

General BONOMI (Italy) proposed that the contents of paragraph 22 appear in the form of a footnote, since the paragraph in question represented the opinion of a single delegation.

M. AUBERT (France) observed that the Italian delegation had concluded, from the fact that the Commission had decided to insert the German observation relating to paragraph 5 in the form of a footnote, that any opinion expressed by a single delegation must appear in that form. The French delegate did not think, however, that there was any analogy between the two cases. Paragraph 5 embodied a text which had been adopted by the whole Commission, and the German delegation had simply wished to explain its interpretation of that text. The part of the report now under discussion, however, described in succession the various opinions which had been expressed, and as paragraph 22 concerned one of those — the French delegation's opinion — the French delegate was opposed to the procedure proposed by General Bonomi, for which he thought there was no justification.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, repeated that he had made a point of not mentioning the delegations by name save in certain exceptional cases when special circumstances rendered it necessary. As the French delegate had maintained, the paragraph under discussion concerned one of the theses put forward, one of the various systems between which the General Commission would have to decide. It was necessary that the thesis in question should be set forth in the report and, since it represented the opinion of one delegation, that delegation had had to be mentioned expressly by name.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that, if he remembered rightly, other delegations had supported the French thesis ; he suggested that it might be possible to employ the formula adopted for paragraph 18 and to say “ certain delegations ”.

He did not wish to insist on his proposal, but pointed out that otherwise the French delegation would be the only one expressly mentioned by name in the whole report.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the Bureau should ascertain whether certain delegations supported the French delegation's thesis. If that were the case, the formula "certain delegations" would be adopted; otherwise the French delegation's name would remain.

The President's proposal was adopted.

Subject to the foregoing reservation, paragraph 22 was adopted.

Paragraphs 23 and 24.

The PRESIDENT recalled that the Commission had agreed to the Rapporteur's proposal to replace paragraphs 23 and 24 by a text to be inserted at the end of paragraph 13.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Soviet delegation supported the Italian delegation's reservation, which appeared in the form of a note to the second addition proposed by the Rapporteur; it had supported the same reservation which the Italian delegation had put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material.

Paragraphs 25 to 28 (New Paragraphs 23 to 26).

Paragraphs 25 to 28 were adopted, subject to various drafting amendments with the object of bringing the French and English texts into line.

Paragraph 29 (New Paragraph 27).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion of the words "colonial or mandated" between the words "vast" and "territories" at the end of paragraph 29.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, pointed out that the last sentence of paragraph 29 met the situation of certain countries such as Persia, to which the addition proposed by Lord Stanhope did not apply.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) withdrew his proposal.

Paragraph 29 was adopted without any change.

Paragraphs 30 and 31 (New Paragraphs 28 and 29).

Paragraphs 30 and 31 were adopted without observations.

Paragraphs 32 to 36 (New Paragraphs 30 to 34).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed that the last five paragraphs be preceded by a sub-heading such as "Miscellaneous".

The sub-heading "General Remarks" was adopted.

Paragraphs 32 to 36 were adopted.

General Reservation by the Soviet Delegation.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked that the general reservation which he had made at the beginning of the meeting should be annexed to the report.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the reservation should be inserted as a footnote to the chapter "Introduction", on the sole responsibility of the Soviet delegation.

The President's proposal was adopted.

The draft report as a whole was adopted.¹

25. FORTIFICATIONS: ADOPTION OF A TEXT TO BE INSERTED IN THE REPORT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The PRESIDENT stated that the Commission still had to examine the question of fortifications. He recalled that, following on the communication from the German delegation,² he had requested the delegations to send in any observations on the subject to the Bureau. Eight delegations had submitted observations in writing.

The President now proposed, after having consulted the German delegation, that the Rapporteur should draw up a text, which would form the third part of the report to the General Commission, describing the facts and explaining that the Land Commission

¹ For the final text of the report, see document Conf. D.122.

² See Minutes of the seventeenth meeting.

had realised that it would be difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions in regard to fortifications and that it had decided simply to forward to the General Commission the German delegation's communication and the observations in question.¹

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) thought that that was the most practical solution and thanked the Commission for its action in the matter. He asked that two supplementary passages might be added by way of explanation.

The first of those passages, endorsing the interpretation of the General Commission's questions which appears in the report of the Naval Commission to the General Commission,² was as follows :

“ The German delegation took as a starting-point for its discussions the following interpretation of the questions raised by the General Commission : Supposing one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy or those operations to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion ? ”

The second passage was as follows :

“ The German delegation desires to direct the Commission's attention to the following passage in the report³ of Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference :

“ ‘ The category of organisations which can only be used for territorial defence cannot be said to include :

“ (1) Organisations the principal purpose of which is obviously to enable long-range artillery or air attack to be brought to bear on the communications of a neighbouring country or its exposed points near the frontier, and which are not indisputably justified by the necessity of protecting specially exposed points in the country concerned ;

“ (2) Naval or air bases the principal object of which is not to defend the territory or vital communications of the State to which they belong, but

“ (a) Either to cover the assembling of supplies, materials for repairs, etc., in order to extend the striking range of the naval or air forces ;

“ (b) Or to command for the benefit of a single country certain routes used by international sea-borne trade. ’ ”

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, read the following text, which he proposed adding at the end of the report under the heading “ Fortifications ” :

“ The German delegation submitted a note expressing its point of view on this question to the Land Commission.

“ Certain other delegations also submitted, in writing, their observations on this proposal.

“ The Commission, realising that it would be extremely difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions for the time being on this point, decided to forward to the General Commission the above-mentioned documents for purposes of information.”

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) asked that the words “ for purposes of information ” might be replaced by the words “ for any necessary action ”.

The text, with the foregoing amendment, was adopted.

26. CONVOCATION OF A MEETING OF THE BUREAUX OF LAND, NAVAL AND AIR COMMISSIONS TO COMPARE THEIR REPORTS TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The PRESIDENT stated that the Bureaux of the three Technical Commissions would meet in order to compare the reports of those Commissions and to endeavour to bring them into line. Should any amendments to the Land Commission's report be deemed necessary, the President would convene a meeting of the Commission, so that the latter might express its views in the matter. Otherwise the report would be forwarded direct to the General Commission.

¹ For the text of the observations, see document Conf. D.122, Appendix 3.

² Document Conf. D.121.

³ Document C.739.M.278.1926.IX, page 142.

DOCUMENTS OF THE LAND COMMISSION.

Conf.D./C.T.I.

Geneva, May 23rd, 1932.

REVISED LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE LAND COMMISSION,
FEBRUARY 27TH — JUNE 6TH, 1932.

President: M. E. BUERO (Uruguay).

Vice-Presidents: General LAIDONER (Estonia); M. VAN LANSCHOT (Netherlands).

Rapporteur: M. M. BOURQUIN (Belgium).

Country	Members	Substitutes
<i>Afghanistan:</i>	Lieut.-General OMAR Khan.	M. A. Husein AZIZ Khan Captain Mohamed ALI Khan. YUSUF Khan.
<i>Union of South Africa:</i>	Major F. F. PIENAAR.	Mr. H. CAMP.
<i>Albania:</i>		
<i>United States of America:</i>	The Hon. H. R. WILSON.	
<i>Sa'udi Arabia:</i>	Sheikh HAFIZ WAHBA	M. E. DUSSAC.
<i>Argentine Republic:</i>	Dr. Enrique RUIZ GUIÑAZÚ.	Lieut.-Colonel E. FLORIT. Major E. FORCHER.
<i>Australia:</i>	Mr. J. G. LATHAM, or Sir G. DE LAUNE RYRIE	Mr. F. G. SHEDDEN.
<i>Austria:</i>	General TARBUK.	
<i>Belgium:</i>	M. DENS.	General GALET. Major-General NUYTEN. M. BOURQUIN.
<i>Bolivia:</i>	Colonel V. F. SERRANO.	M. OSTRIA-GUTIERREZ.
<i>Brazil:</i>	Lieut.-Colonel E. L. DE CARVALHO.	Captain E. DE MACEDO SOARES E SILVA.
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:</i>	Lord HAILSHAM. Lord STANHOPE. General TEMPERLEY.	Colonel DAWNAY.
<i>Bulgaria:</i>	General VATEFF.	Colonel MARINOFF.
<i>Canada:</i>	Lieut.-Colonel H. D. G. CRERAR.	Mr. T. A. STONE.
<i>Chile:</i>	M. SAAVEDRA.	
<i>China:</i>	General Moo Song WHANG.	Major-General TCHENG-KAI. M. Lone LIANG.
<i>Colombia:</i>	M. A. J. RESTREPO.	
<i>Costa Rica:</i>	M. V. FIGUEREDO-LORA.	
<i>Cuba:</i>	M. G. DE BLANCK.	Captain E. A. PRIETO.
<i>Czechoslovakia:</i>	General ELIAS.	Lieut.-Colonel NÉMEČEK.
<i>Denmark:</i>	M. PÜRSCHEL. M. J. SIMONSEN. M. KRAFT.	Vice-Admiral H. W. WENCK. Captain A. C. C. SORENSEN.
<i>Egypt:</i>		
<i>Estonia:</i>	General J. LAIDONER.	Colonel R. TOMBERG.

Country	Members	Substitutes
<i>Ethiopia:</i>	The Badjironde Zelleka AGUEDÉOU.	Ato Tasfaé TAGAGNE.
<i>Finland:</i>	Colonel MARTOLA.	M. HOLSTI. General OESCH.
<i>France:</i>	M. PIETRI. Colonel FABRY.	M. R. MASSIGLI. M. MOYSSET. M. AUBERT.
<i>Germany:</i>	Baron VON WEIZSÄCKER	General VON BLOMBERG. General SCHÖNHEINZ.
<i>Greece:</i>	General A. Mazarakis AINIAN. M. N. POLITIS.	M. R. RAPHAËL. Major DIMAKIS.
<i>Guatemala:</i>	M. MATOS.	
<i>Haiti:</i>		
<i>Honduras:</i>		
<i>Hungary:</i>	Count A. APPONYI General DE NANASY-MÉGAY. Colonel G. DE SIEGLER.	Lieut.-Colonel BELDY. Captain FABIAN. Captain KUNDER.
<i>India:</i>	H.H. the AGA Khan.	The Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel HOARE Sir Henry WHEELER. Major-General J. E. S. BRIND. Colonel D. B. ROSS.
<i>Irish Free State:</i>	Mr. S. LESTER.	Mr. J. J. HEARNE.
<i>Italy:</i>	M. GAZZERA.	General BONOMI. General DE MARINIS.
<i>Japan:</i>	M. N. SATO. General I. MATSUI.	M. S. YADA. General Y. TATEKAWA.
<i>Latvia:</i>	General A. KALEYS.	M. FELDMANS.
<i>Liberia:</i>	Dr. A. SOTTILE.	
<i>Lithuania:</i>	Colonel LANSKORONSKIS.	
<i>Luxemburg:</i>		
<i>Mexico:</i>	Colonel Othon LÉON.	Major MERCADO.
<i>Netherlands:</i>	M. VAN LANSCHOT. General VAN TUINEN. Baron VAN VOORST TOT VOORST.	M. WILMAR.
<i>New Zealand:</i>	Sir Thomas WILFORD.	Mr. C. KNOWLES.
<i>Norway:</i>	M. E. COLBAN.	Colonel STEFFENS.
<i>Panama:</i>	M. Narciso GARAY.	
<i>Persia:</i>	Colonel A. RIAZI.	Major BAHAR-MASTE. Captain M. A. MOAREFI.
<i>Peru:</i>		
<i>Poland:</i>	General BURHARDT-BUKACKI.	M. T. KOMARNICKI. Colonel T. BLESZYNSKI. Experts: Major SKRZYDLEWSKI. Major ZAKRZEWSKI. Captain PONCET DE SANDON.
<i>Portugal:</i>	General Ivens FERRAZ. Rear-Admiral J. DE SOUZA E FARO.	Professor Lobo D'AVILA LIMA.
<i>Roumania:</i>	M. Constantin ANTONIADE.	General Th. DUMITRESCO. M. V. V. PELLA. M. A. CRETZIANO. Colonel STOICESCO. Lieut.-Colonel ALINESCO. Major TEODORINI. Major Elie TONESCO.
<i>Siam:</i>	Prince PRIDI.	Rear-Admiral Phya RAJAWANGSAN.

Country	Members	Substitutes
<i>Spain:</i>	M. CASTRO. M. Leopoldo PALACIOS.	M. S. DE MADARIAGA. M. ARAQUISTAIN. M. García BENÍTEZ.
<i>Sweden:</i>	M. K. DE HAMMARSKJÖLD.	M. N. R. WOHLIN. General O. NYGREN. M. MÖLLER.
<i>Switzerland:</i>	Colonel A. ZÜBLIN.	M. E. PERRIER. Colonel O. BRIDLER.
<i>Turkey:</i>	Necmeddin SADIK Bey	APTÜLAHAT Bey Expert: Colonel NURI Bey.
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</i>	M. LOUNATCHARSKI.	M. VENTZOFF. M. LANGOVOY. M. Boris STEIN.
<i>Uruguay:</i>	Dr. BUERO.	M. COSIO.
<i>Venezuela:</i>	M. D. ESCALANTE.	M. Chacin ITRIAGO.
<i>Yugoslavia:</i>	M. C. FOTITCH. General KOSSITCH.	Adviser: M. I. ANDRITCH.

Conf.D./C.T.2.

Geneva, March 11th, 1932.

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT.

The Chairman of the Technical Committee of the Land Commission has the honour to request the technical expert on land questions of your delegation to be good enough to attend the meeting of the Technical Committee of the Land Commission which will be held on Monday, March 14th, 1932, in Room L.

At 10.30 a.m.

Afghanistan
South Africa
Germany
Argentine Republic
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
United Kingdom
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
United States of America
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary
India
Irish Free State
Guatemala

At 3.30 p.m.

Italy
Japan
Latvia
Liberia
Lithuania
Mexico
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Persia
Poland
Portugal
Roumania
Siam
Sweden
Switzerland
Czechoslovakia
Turkey
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

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[Conf.D./C.T./Experts 2(1).]

Geneva, March 16th, 1932.

REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE DEFINITIONS CONTAINED
IN ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

The Technical Committee was asked by the Land Commission "to examine how the different Governments, in drawing up the particulars they have sent to the League of Nations, have interpreted the definitions given in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the draft Convention and what difficulties they encountered and doubts they had in interpreting them".

The Committee first of all confined itself to examining the definitions contained in Articles 2 and 3. For the purposes of this examination, it adopted the following questionnaire, which served as a guide to each of the experts in giving information as to the manner in which his Government interpreted these definitions.

"What meaning have you given to the word 'effectives'? Theoretical, budgetary, legal, actual or other effectives?"

"What have you counted as days of presence? (Short leave, long leave, illness, travelling, early discharge, etc.)"

"(a) For an officer;

"(b) For a professional soldier;

"(c) For a conscript serving with the colours;

"(d) For a militiaman, reservist, etc., undergoing a period of service, or attending a drill, a training lecture, an annual muster-parade or a kit inspection."

"What have you counted in your effectives? (Different services, missions, persons attached to civilian services, etc.)."

"(a) Officers;

"(b) Professional soldiers;

"(c) Men called up with the annual contingent; militiamen, reservists;

"(d) Young men subject to compulsory pre-regimental training (soldiers' sons and orphans educated for a naval or military career), etc."

After hearing each of the experts members of the Committee, the latter invited the experts of the other delegations to make similar statements. A number of them responded to this invitation, and the result of the enquiry is given below.

From the replies received, it appears that three conceptions of the term "effectives" have been adopted, either separately or jointly, by the Governments in supplying the information requested—viz., "theoretical or legal effectives", "budgetary effectives" and "real or actual effectives".

The Committee proposes in the present report (1) to give for each of these three conceptions a list of the Governments which have adopted them in supplying information on their effectives, at the same time making clear the differences between the definitions; (2) to define the categories of persons which the several Governments have included or excluded from the general term "effectives"; (3) to reproduce certain general observations made by some of the experts on the methods and definitions contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention.

I.

The Committee has not attempted to give a precise definition of the different meanings of the word "effectives", applicable to all the individual cases and covering the different interpretations. It confines itself to reproducing as briefly as possible the essential points of these interpretations. Nevertheless, for greater convenience and for a better understanding of the replies given by the experts, an endeavour has been made to give a general idea of the three conceptions of effectives, legal, budgetary and actual, without attempting a precise definition.

LEGAL OR THEORETICAL EFFECTIVES.

Generally speaking, legal or theoretical effectives are expressed in terms of numbers fixed by the army law or regulations or numbers obtained by a full application of the legal provisions

concerning the personnel subject to military obligations and the duration of these obligations. These numbers, therefore, essentially represent a maximum, and hence they naturally do not, as a rule, take into account purely temporary and unforeseen absences.

1. The following countries have taken legal effectives as a basis in giving their information, and the manner in which they have applied this term is explained in each individual case. All the effectives shown in these countries' returns are calculated according to the method fixed in Article 3 of the draft Convention and they therefore represent average daily effectives.

Belgium. — The effectives are calculated on the assumption that the men regularly serve the period prescribed by law, leaving out of account absence for illness, leave, early discharge. Effectives of officers are fixed numerically by the law on cadres, and their presence has been reckoned at 365 days per annum. To this figure have been added the days of presence of reserve officers called up for periods of training.

Finland. — The professional personnel, officers and N.C.O.s, has been regarded as maintained throughout the year at the level fixed by the law relating to cadres. The average strength of a certain category of active officers in the reserve who have undergone a period of training and the average daily number of an annual class of reserve officers undergoing a period of training have been added to the number of officers.

In the case of other ranks, it was assumed that the actual number of conscripts found fit for service had accomplished the legal period of service. The actual number of cadet officers and the average effectives of a class of reservists undergoing training has been added to them.

No deduction has been made for absences or early discharge.

France. — The definition given is as follows: by legal effectives are meant the average strength which the armed forces can attain on the basis of the complete application of the legal provisions in force governing the conditions of service of military effectives (officers, men, and officials assimilated to them), whether volunteers or called up for service, during the first period of service or during subsequent periods of instruction, whatever the capacity in which those periods are served (as recruits, militia, reservists, territorials, etc.).

This definition has been applied to the whole of the personnel (active and reserve). The entire active personnel has been counted at the rate of 365 days of presence per year. Reserve personnel has been counted as undergoing the total legal days of training.

Greece. — The legal effectives given represent the figures that would be attained if the law on recruiting were fully applied. The number of professional soldiers is fixed by law. No deduction has been made for absences.

Italy. — Same definition as that given by the French expert. In furnishing particulars it has been applied solely to the conscript contingent, without deductions of any kind.

Japan. — Same definition as that given by the French expert. It has been applied to the personnel whose strength varies according to the budgetary resources, like the reservists, no deduction being made for absences.

Norway. — The average legal effectives have been calculated by taking the annual contingent fixed by law and the period of service fixed each year by Parliament, without any deduction for absences. Officers serving with the colours are regarded as present for the whole year, officers on restricted service and reserve officers being regarded as present only during the periods of service.

Roumania. — The legal effectives have been calculated on the assumption that the active personnel is present during the whole year, except in the case of officers' long leave exceeding six months and the usual short leaves granted to other ranks.

Czechoslovakia. — The legal effectives have been calculated without deductions of any kind on the basis of the legal possibilities for the year 1930. Details of the calculation are given in document C.654.M.266.1931.IX.

Yugoslavia. — The term "average legal effectives" applies solely to conscripted soldiers, no deductions of any kind having been made.

2. *Definitions of Legal Effectives given by Other Experts.*

The experts of the following countries, whose Governments did not base their data upon the legal effectives, have given the following definitions:

Argentine Republic. — In the case of officers the legal effectives represent the maximum number authorised by law. The theoretical effectives are the personnel shown in the table of peace-time establishments, on the basis of which the actual effectives are distributed among the various corps and services.

Austria. — The theoretical effectives consist of the number of persons liable to military service, of whatever kind and duration, and who have received military training.

Brazil. — The legal effectives represent the maximum which the number of troops present at any time of the year can attain.

United States of America. — The term "legal effectives" means the maximum number allowed by the law on national defence.

Persia. — The theoretical and legal effectives are the number of troops of all kinds, with the exception of municipal police, which the Government proposes to attain under its ten years' programme, in accordance with the recruiting law.

Poland. — Same definitions as that given by the French expert.

BUDGETARY EFFECTIVES.

Generally speaking, budgetary effectives mean either the number of personnel on which the budgetary estimates are based, or the number which can be maintained with the credits opened in the budget. The budgetary effectives are therefore an estimated or probable average of the number of days' maintenance. In countries in which the budgetary effectives may be exceeded, the examination of the final accounts shows whether they have actually been exceeded. When this happens, the accounts must be regularised by means of supplementary credits. In other countries, if in the course of the year it is anticipated that the budgetary effectives will be exceeded, this is remedied by means of the early discharge of conscript personnel so as to remain within the limits of the credits allotted.

1. The following countries have based their information on the average budgetary effectives, according to the definition and methods of application given by each:

Germany. — No deduction has been made for absences and sickness. The figures given cannot be exceeded either as regards appropriations or as regards the number of men.

Spain. — No deduction is made for absences, with the exception of early discharge when the leave exceeds two months.

Hungary. — The budgetary effectives are the same as the legal effectives.

Italy. — The definition given is as follows: the budgetary effectives of the armed forces are the average daily effectives which the armed forces can muster, calculated on the basis of the special credits for which provision is made each year in the budget law.

The Italian Government has given the average budgetary effectives for officers, N.C.O.s, professional soldiers and men called up for training. These budgetary effectives are based on the number of days' pay. The following have been excluded from the days of presence: in the case of officers and professional soldiers, days of special leave for personal reasons; in the case of reservists called up, days of leave, sick leave, early discharge.

Portugal. — The average effectives given are based on the budgetary effectives and the authorised number of days of presence. The budget fixes the number of effectives, and the days of presence according to the category of personnel. No deduction has been made for absences, except early discharge of the contingent.

Turkey. — The effectives given are the budgetary effectives based on the average days of presence in summer and winter. Officers are regarded as permanently present. No deduction has been made for absences, short leave, and sickness in the case of other ranks. Reservists have not been included in the budget.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. — The effectives given are the maximum effectives corresponding to the number of rations (pay and provisions) provided for in the budget: this maximum may be exceeded, the accounts being regularised by means of supplementary credits. In practice, however, it has not been exceeded. Reservists of all kinds called up, and among them non-permanent effectives belonging to militia units to which special credits may be assigned, are not included.

Yugoslavia. — The budgetary effectives have been given for reserve officers and reservists. No deduction has been made for absences.

2. Definitions of Budgetary Effectives given by Other Experts.

The experts of the following countries whose Governments did not base their information on budgetary effectives have given the following definitions:

Argentine Republic. — By budgetary effectives are meant the personnel included in the actual budget according to the sums placed at the disposal of the Ministry of War under the head: "Pay".

Austria. — The budgetary effectives are the effectives which can be attained according to the budgetary estimates for each year. An absolute figure is fixed for officers and N.C.O.s and an average figure for other ranks.

France. — Budgetary effectives are calculated in France from the basic effectives which are for any given year the average daily effectives corresponding to the degree to which it is possible to apply the legal provisions during that year.

The budgetary effectives are arrived at from the basic effectives by applying co-efficients of reduction called "co-efficients of absence".

The actual effectives may be higher than the budgetary effectives, which are only an estimate. When this happens, supplementary credits are asked for.

Greece. — The budgetary effectives vary according to the credits voted, and leave granted by the Minister is taken into account.

Persia. — The budgetary effectives are made up of the total strength of troops and services whose expenditure is provided for in the State budget.

ACTUAL OR REAL EFFECTIVES.

Speaking generally, real or actual effectives are the number of persons performing a day's duty. The number may be recorded on a given day, and we then have the actual effectives on that day, or it may be obtained by taking the average number of persons performing days of duty over a certain period, and we then have the average actual effectives for that period. The differences of interpretation are the result of differences in the definition of a day's duty.

I. The following countries have adopted the system of real effectives in giving their information and have applied it in the manner explained in respect of each of them.

South Africa. — The number of effectives given is the average number of daily effectives based on the total number of days' duty. The permanent personnel is regarded as performing 365 days' duty a year without deduction for absences of any kind. In the case of militia, days passed in camp are counted as days of duty, and the non-continuous periods of training are included on the basis of six drills being equivalent to one day's duty.

The Argentine Republic. — The number of effectives is equal to the average number of days' duty in the course of the year of all officers and men attached to units. All days passed with the colours are regarded as days of duty without deduction of any kind.

Australia. — The average daily effectives based on the total days of presence of the regular forces, and of the militia forces, without any deduction for absence. The professional personnel is counted as being present for 365 days per annum. For officers and other ranks of the militia forces, are counted—the days of continuous service in camp and non-continuous service on the basis of 6 hours' exercise equivalent to a day's presence; are also counted—certain voluntary all-day courses of instruction which N.C.O.s are encouraged to attend. Attendance at voluntary lectures and rifle matches is not counted.

Austria. — The number of effectives given is the actual number of effectives on December 31st, 1930. It includes all officers and men without exception who are entered on the lists with the exception of men who are on early discharge after six years of active service.

Brazil. — The number of effectives is that of the average effectives for the year of the permanent personnel and of the annual contingent actually incorporated without deduction for any absences except, as regards the contingent, days of absence resulting from early discharge.

British Empire. — The number of effectives given is the average of twelve numbers representing the average actual effectives of each month. This figure of average monthly effectives is obtained by taking the arithmetical average of the strength on the first day of a given month and on the first day of the following month. The number of days' duty is obtained by counting 365 days' duty per annum for all men inscribed in the registers of the regular army without any deduction for absences. As regards the territorial army, whole days passed in instruction camps are counted as days of duty; parades and lectures are counted on the basis of six drills being equivalent to one day's duty.

The British Government also gives the number of actual effectives calculated in accordance with the same definition of a day's duty on April 1st, 1931.

Bulgaria. — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of all the personnel at the disposal of the military authorities without deduction for any absences except the days of early discharge for reasons of health, discipline, etc.

Canada. — The number of effectives given is the number of average daily effectives without any deduction for absences.

China. — The same as Canada.

Denmark. — The same as Canada.

Estonia. — The number of average daily effectives is based upon the total number of days when officers, professional soldiers, conscripts and reservists are at the disposal of the military authorities, excepting only days representing early discharge.

United States of America. — The number of effectives given is the average number of actual effectives on the last day of each month of the year. All the personnel inscribed in the registers is counted as performing a day's duty, whatever the status of the individual and without any deduction for absences.

As regards the National Guard, the number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives calculated according to the method described in Article 3, days passed in instruction being counted as days of duty and periods of training of less than a day being counted on the basis of eight hours' training being equivalent to one day's duty.

India. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of the personnel registered in the armed forces either with the colours or in the reserve, days of duty being counted as follows: in the case of regular officers and professional soldiers, 365 days a year; in the case of reservists of the Indian territorial force, one day's duty for every day of service; in the case of the Indian auxiliary force, one day's duty for four hours' training; and in the case of the forces organised on a military basis, one day's duty for each day's service. No deduction is made in respect of leave of absence, sick leave, etc.

Italy. — The number of actual effectives is the average daily number of effectives actually present and performing duty. The number of days' duty is calculated on the basis of the actual presence of the individual, and consequently days of leave of absence or of sick leave, days spent in travelling or days of absence resulting from early discharge are not counted as days of duty. The Italian Government has applied this definition in calculating the average effectives of the conscription contingent for a period of five months in winter and seven months in summer. The average effectives for the year are obtained by multiplying the first figure by five and the second by seven, and by dividing the total by twelve.

Japan. — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of effectives for the year without deduction for absence, except in the case of early discharge. Muster-parades have not, however, been counted as days of duty.

Latvia. — The average daily effectives have been calculated by strictly applying Article 3 of the draft Convention for the twelve months of the year. The days of presence are in the case of the whole personnel, the days during which that personnel is at the disposal of the military authorities.

New Zealand. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives calculated on the basis of 365 days' duty per annum for all ranks of the regular forces, six drills of one hour or four drills of an hour and a-half being counted as one day's duty in respect of the non-regular forces, without deduction for temporary absences.

Netherlands. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty in the year. Days of sick leave, days of absence resulting from discharge and days of leave of absence exceeding four weeks in the case of officers and two days in the case of men, are not counted as days of duty.

Persia. — The number of real effectives is the number of officers, N.C.O.s and men inscribed in the register of the War Minister. Each day in respect of which the personnel receives either presence pay or availability pay is counted as a day of duty. In the case of recruits and reservists, duty is counted as beginning on the day of arrival at the barracks. Days of leave of absence without pay and days of absence resulting from early discharge are not counted as days of duty. Days of sick leave are counted as such.

Poland. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty for 1930. No deduction is made for absence except in the case of early discharge for days of actual absence. As regards professional soldiers, days of absence are not counted as days of duty if the period of leave of absence exceeds six months.

Siam. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty in the course of a year. No deduction is made for absences in counting the number of days' duty.

Sweden. — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of effectives based on the number of days' duty. Days passed in hospital or on leave with pay are counted as days of duty. Days of absence with reduced pay are not so counted.

Switzerland. — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based on the total number of days' duty throughout the year. Men on sick leave are only counted as absent if they are sick for more than six days, if they then leave the unit to enter hospital.

Yugoslavia. — The actual number of effectives has been given in the case of officers and professional soldiers on active service. No deduction has been made for absences.

2. Definitions of Actual Effectives given by Other Experts.

The French expert, whose Government has not employed the system of actual effectives, defines it as follows:

France. — The number of actual effectives is based upon the number of day's pay by category of soldiers, distinguishing presence or availability pay from absence pay—that is to say, in practice half-pay.

Days on half-pay are converted into days on full pay and added to the latter. We thus obtain the total number of days on full pay.

The average number of actual effectives is then calculated as follows:

(a) In the case of officers and N.C.O.s in receipt of monthly pay, the total number of days is divided by 360, pay being issued to the said soldiers at monthly intervals of thirty days;

(b) In the case of men in receipt of daily pay, the number of days is divided by 365.

II. OBSERVATIONS BY VARIOUS EXPERTS ON THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL COUNTED AS EFFECTIVES.

I. COMPOSITION OF EFFECTIVES (COMBATANT PERSONNEL AND AUXILIARY SERVICES: PERSONNEL DETACHED ON CIVILIAN DUTY: CIVILIAN PERSONNEL).

(a) *The following are included in the effectives:*

South Africa. — All the permanent personnel and the members of the citizen forces receiving military training, including civilian medical personnel serving in the army.

Germany. — All persons are counted as officers whom Germany is obliged by the treaties to count as such: doctors, chemists, veterinary surgeons, officials having the rank of officer. This also applies to N.C.O.s.

Argentine. — The military personnel of combatant units and services (medical, administrative, etc.), including the personnel detached from the army properly so called.

Australia. — Personnel which is in military employment for one day of twenty-four hours in the case of the regular forces, and, in the case of the militia forces, for a period of not less than six hours, either all in one day, or in a night, or in half-day parades aggregating this minimum period.

Austria. — Officers of administration (supply) are counted in the effective of officers. Men of the administrative, medical and veterinary services and bandsmen are counted amongst the other ranks.

Brazil. — The permanent personnel of units and services and the contingent enlisted or recruited by conscription.

Bulgaria. — All the personnel with the colours, including recruits, men of the auxiliary services, and bandboys.

Canada. — All the personnel belonging to the armed forces of Canada and of the Royal Mounted Police.

China. — All the fighting personnel and services.

Denmark. — Officers detached for duty with the Ministry are included in the effectives.

Estonia. — All personnel present with the units, including personnel seconded for the training of the civic guard or to the Ministry of Education.

United States of America. — All the personnel mentioned on the rolls—without exception.

Finland. — Officers and persons graded as officers, professional N.C.O.s and persons graded as such, men of the regular army, including the General Staff, the Ministry of Defence and organs dependent thereon.

France. — Officers and men of all services, including those seconded for missions or to civilian services; all those assimilated to the rank of officer in the medical services, including those detached from their units in order to carry on the health services of civilian populations overseas, officials of the supervisory service, officers of the intendance service, including those of the Pensions Civil Service, the personnel of the physical training service, the officers of the fire brigade of Paris.

Men employed in the auxiliary services who are unfit for armed service and receive only such training as is strictly necessary for internal discipline are included in the effectives of the other ranks.

Greece. — All the personnel performing military service and which is amenable to military jurisdiction.

Hungary. — Only the combatant army.

India. — All officers (British and Indian) and men serving on staffs or in units or services of the regular army (active and reserve), the Indian Auxiliary Forces, the Indian Territorial Army and the Indian State Forces.

Italy. — The following are included in the effectives: Officers on permanent effective service, of the budgetary complement or recalled from leave for training, including doctors, veterinary officers, chemists, employees of civilian offices, officers carrying out budgetary missions; professional

soldiers; soldiers belonging to the conscription contingent, including cadet officers and N.C.O's; soldiers called up for training.

Japan. — All the personnel present in the army, including personnel detached on duty or to civilian services.

New Zealand. — Commissioned officers, warrant officers, N.C.O's and men of the regular and non-regular forces.

Netherlands. — Personnel of all ranks seconded for duty to civilian services is included in the effectives.

Poland. — The effectives include officers and other ranks detached for duty or employed in the various services, as well as officers of the intendance service, treasury department, administrative staff, barracks personnel, and military chaplains of various creeds.

Persia. — All the personnel legally armed by the State and participating in the maintenance of order and security, in return for payment, reduction of taxation or a similar privilege.

Portugal. — All the permanent personnel and the men of the contingent during their periods of instruction.

Roumania. — All the personnel of the army, including medical, administrative and inspection services; also personnel detached or seconded, and auxiliary personnel.

United Kingdom. — All officers (including military chaplains) soldiers, and reservists serving in accordance with the definition given by the British Government (see actual effectives), except personnel detached for service with the Air or Colonial Ministries and shown in the returns supplied by those departments.

Enlisted boys in the regular units below the military age, as tailors, drummers, etc., who will become soldiers on reaching the prescribed age, are included.

Siam. — The personnel of the armed forces and various services of the Ministry of National Defence, excluding reservists.

Sweden. — All the personnel performing actual service; in particular, men of the contingent, of whom about one-quarter do not receive any military instruction, save what is indispensable for internal discipline, and who serve as military labourers, are included.

Switzerland. — All the personnel performing service in any capacity.

Czechoslovakia. — All soldiers, without exception, of the combatant units and services.

(b) *The following are not included in the effectives:*

India. — Nurses, civilians and "followers".

Yugoslavia. — Military personnel detached for civil duty.

2. CADETS AND PUPILS IN MILITARY SCHOOLS.

(a) *The following are regarded as part of the effectives:*

The pupils in military schools in the following countries: *Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Roumania and Sweden.*

(b) *The following are not regarded as part of the effectives:*

Australia. — Young volunteers receiving cadet training.

India. — Cadets in the Prince of Wales's Military College and King George's Military School.

Japan. — Cadets of the military Prytannée.

Portugal. — Cadets in the Military College and in the Military Orphanage.

United Kingdom. — Cadets in the military colleges or in officers' training corps, since they are not liable for service in peace or in war.

3. YOUTHS UNDERGOING COMPULSORY PRE-MILITARY INSTRUCTION.

(a) *The following are regarded as part of the effectives:*

Belgium. — Pupils over 16 years of age in the military orphanages (children of soldiers killed or disabled in action).

(b) *The following are not regarded as part of the effectives:*

Spain. — Youths undergoing compulsory pre-military instruction, which is at present in its infancy.

Estonia. — Pupils in the highest classes of secondary schools undergoing military training, seeing that they are not mobilisable.

France. — Pupils in the higher civil schools of the State; pupils in schools for children of soldiers, seeing that they are not available for active service.

Italy. — No information is given as regards youths subject to compulsory pre-regimental instruction, owing to the reservation made in regard to preparatory military training by the Italian delegation at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (document C.690.M.289, Section 194).

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS BY VARIOUS EXPERTS ON THE SYSTEM OF LIMITATION AND THE DEFINITIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

Belgium. — In the view of the Belgian Government, Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention aim primarily at determining a *maximum limit* of the effectives of the armed forces and the formations organised on a military basis.

Secondarily, in order to fix a common standard of calculation for these forces, the draft Convention has adopted the *average daily effectives*, which it defines in Article 3 and has distributed the troops among various categories.

In our opinion, therefore, it was important in the first place to fix the limit which our effectives might *not exceed*, and for this purpose it appeared to us natural to take as a basis for our calculations the maximum permitted under our legal provisions on the subject. In other words, we took as a basis the legal effectives.

In so doing, we have not met with any difficulty or had any hesitation; we attribute this to the fact that we have adopted the method which appeared to us to be the simplest and clearest. This method has enabled us to steer clear of the danger of submitting to an international agreement data regarding effectives which might in fact be exceeded by a strict application of our legal provisions.

France. — The French Government was not sure what kind of effectives should be included. Should it be the effectives serving with the colours whatever the position of men in active service, whether present or absent? Should it be the effectives shown in the returns upon which pay and allowances of all kinds were allotted? Should it be the effectives immediately available—namely, the aforesaid effectives less the men in hospital—or should the effectives actually serving with the armed units be taken—that is to say, the aforesaid effectives less all absentees whatever the reason for their absence—leave, sickness or travelling?

Finally, it was considered that the Conference alone would be in a position to choose the best means of assessing effectives in order to take into account the various military organisations. But the meaning of the term “legal effectives” is extremely important from the point of view of limitation. It would not be understandable to States which had undertaken to limit their effectives under the terms of an international convention to a specified figure, to reserve the possibility of increasing them under their national laws. For this reason, France has stated the legal effectives—that is to say, those which can be attained in execution of the law. In the Convention, these legal effectives might of course be reduced, if the Conference decided not to include among effectives certain categories of absentees such as men in hospital or on long leave (the minimum duration to be fixed), men travelling for long periods (minimum duration to be fixed).

New Zealand. — It seems to New Zealand necessary that the terms “effective” and “day’s duty” should be defined.

Owing to the different methods employed in the various countries, I hesitate at this stage to make a suggestion for the definition of effective, especially as in drafting such a definition Article 31 of the draft Convention would have to be taken into consideration, and, in this article, the term “youth” has not been defined.

In defining the term “day’s duty”, two points seem to require consideration:

(1) Whether, in the case of non-regular forces, only complete days under military training (in camp, at courses of instruction, etc.) should be reckoned as days of duty, or whether drills, parades and attendances should be brought into the reckoning and, if so, how many or what duration of these should be considered as the equivalent of a day’s duty;

(2) In the case of regular and full time forces, whether or not periods of temporary absence (on leave, in hospital, etc.) should be counted as days of duty.

The terms "effective" and "day's duty" not having been defined in the draft Convention, my Government adopted a form of reckoning which seemed to it fair.

Portugal. — In the opinion of the Portuguese delegation, the principle of limitation on the basis of the effectives on a given date cannot be accepted without reservation by certain States. Theoretic effectives must be contemplated on account of the necessity of counterbalancing obvious deficiencies which make the reduction of armaments incompatible with national security and the execution of international obligations.

United Kingdom. — The system of making no deduction for absences was more convenient from the administrative point of view. If the General Commission decided to reckon these deductions, this would necessitate somewhat complicated calculations, and the British expert thought that it would be preferable to provide for an average number of absences. He pointed out that, generally speaking, there would always be differences of interpretation as between the different military organisations and that those difficulties could not be settled by the same formula. The best thing would be to take into account the special features of each army, assuming that they did not vary.

United States of America. — The United States Government felt some difficulty as to the National Guard, which is not a Federal armed force. It had considered it as being on the same lines as the trained reserves of countries with conscription and as regards the calculation of its effectives had treated it in the same way as the said reserves.

Norway. — The "average daily effectives" was an incorrect expression when applied to militia armies such as that of Norway, in which there were hardly any permanent units. Nevertheless, there had been no difficulty in stating the figure in accordance with the method indicated; this figure, however, was not regarded as expressing the situation of the army on each day of the year, but as expressing the relative weakness of the Norwegian army as compared with the large armies.

Switzerland. — The special system on which the Swiss army was based gave rise to fundamental difficulties for the Swiss Government in furnishing particulars as to effectives, owing to the fact that the conception of average daily effectives was not adapted to the militia system. The essential feature of the militia was not so much that the men served only for short periods, but rather that there were no units serving permanently. The number of effectives might vary very considerably from one year's end to another; there were even periods during which there were no effectives serving. The conception of average daily effectives accordingly gave quite a false idea of the militia army; the Swiss Government had therefore the intention, before applying the system recommended in Article 3, to give separately the number of recruits undergoing training during the year and the number of men who had followed refresher courses.

Conf.D./C.T.5.

Geneva, April 27th, 1932.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATERIALS IN VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
GENERAL COMMISSION OF APRIL 22ND, 1932.

(Document Conf.D./C.G.28(2).)

REPORT BY THE BUREAU.

The Land Commission decided at its meeting of April 26th to ask delegations which had made proposals for special treatment in the case of certain categories of armaments to state exactly what arms they had in view, taking into account the three specific characteristics enumerated in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd. A certain number of delegations have replied to the Commission. Their replies deal with artillery material, tanks, armoured cars, fortifications and gases.

Certain delegations have explained the reasons for which they have adopted this or that limit in discriminating between materials, or the extent to which the materials they have in view possess one or more of the characteristics specified in the General Commission's resolution. The Bureau is of opinion that such explanations can be better made in the course of the Commission's discussions, and has accordingly confined itself in this report to recapitulating the means of discrimination proposed without giving the reasons submitted in justification of such discrimination.

I. *Artillery Material.*

1. In the first place, a certain number of delegations have proposed to distinguish between mobile material and fixed material for the armament of permanent fortification works:

(a) The delegations of the following countries are of opinion that this category of artillery material does not call for a special regime: United States of America, Denmark, Italy (which

restricts the proposal to coastal defence artillery in naval fortifications), the Netherlands, Persia, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden.

The delegations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden make reservations in the case of permanent fortification works which, owing to their proximity to a frontier, have an offensive value or are armed with material enabling them to fire across the frontier.

(b) Other delegations would impose certain restrictions on fixed artillery in permanent fortifications—viz., the German and Austrian delegations, which propose maximum limits of 150 mm. for guns and 210 mm. for howitzers and mortars.

2. A second distinction between artillery materials is made by certain delegations in accordance with the nature of such materials, the latter being classified for the purpose into three classes: guns, howitzers and trench mortars.

Maximum calibre limits are fixed for each of these categories. The German, Danish and Hungarian delegations propose a limit of 77 mm. for guns, 105 mm. for howitzers and 150 mm. for trench mortars. The Austrian delegation proposes a single limit of 105 mm. for guns and howitzers and a limit of 150 mm. for trench mortars.

3. A single calibre limit is proposed in order to distinguish materials calling for special treatment by the delegations of the following countries (which are arranged in the order of the calibres they propose, from the lowest to the highest): China, 80 mm.; Afghanistan and Italy, 100 mm.; Switzerland, 150 mm.; United States of America, United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands, 155 mm.; Sweden, 160 mm.; and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 204 mm.

Of these delegations, the Swiss delegation states that the limit it proposes is only given as a general guide, for the reason that it is essential to avoid fixing a limit which would involve certain countries in the obligation to replace at heavy expense arms of a slightly larger calibre than the limit fixed by new material below the limit. The Swedish delegation would be prepared to reduce its limit to 150 mm. or even lower, if the maximum calibre of warship artillery were reduced, since this would make it possible to reduce the calibre of coastal defence artillery. The Soviet delegation retains a free hand for the definition by another calibre of what it understands by long-range guns and high-powered guns.

4. Two delegations propose to distinguish between material by means other than the calibre—namely, the Swedish delegation, which refers to artillery the weight of which exceeds 4 tons in action, and the Soviet delegation, which refers to artillery with a range of over 15 kilometres.

5. Lastly, a certain number of delegations have replied without specifying figures. The Belgian delegation considers that discrimination between materials should be based on the power of such materials, as constituted by calibre, mobility and horizontal field of fire. The Belgian delegation would accept any definition of calibre or range unanimously decided by the Conference.

The French delegation considers that the material covered by the General Commission's resolution is heavy mobile artillery material of sufficient power to destroy permanent fortifications, and artillery material of sufficient range to reach civilian populations beyond the limits of the battlefields; the characteristics of these materials to be stated giving the reasons on the basis of the provisions of the current French regulations.

The Persian delegation is prepared to agree to the most radical proposal put forward, subject to guarantees in regard to the fulfilment of obligations assumed.

The Portuguese delegation proposes to abolish long-range artillery, but does not define the latter.

The Turkish delegation similarly proposes to abolish heavy artillery of all kinds, but does not define the latter.

II. *Tanks.*

The delegations which have proposed that tanks should be placed under a special regime have drawn no distinction between different types of tank. The United States and Netherlands delegations, however, have given the following definition of a tank: An armed and armoured vehicle, mechanically propelled, designed and constructed to move over uneven ground and obstacles. The Netherlands delegation adds that by "obstacles" are to be understood those which agricultural tractors cannot normally pass over. The United States delegation has specified that this definition does not include armoured cars.

III. *Armoured Cars.*

The delegations which have proposed the abolition of armoured cars, and to which has been added the Austrian delegation, have made no distinctions in this category and have proposed no definition.

Hungary has proposed the abolition of armoured trains.

IV. *Fortifications.*

Nothing more specific has been added on the question of fortifications. The Austrian delegation, however, has joined the delegations which propose that fortresses capable of threatening a neighbouring country should be abolished.

V. Gas.

Nothing more specific has been added on this question. It should be mentioned, however, that the Hungarian delegation has proposed the abolition of flame-projectors.

Conf.D./C.T.9.

Geneva, May 7th, 1932.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ON THE ABOLITION OF TANKS
AND ARMoured CARS.

With reference to the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, the Italian delegation considers it desirable to include among the weapons which are most specifically offensive and are most efficacious against national defence or against civilians tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds.

These weapons, which have great mobility and great power to attack and crush obstacles, are particularly suited for offensive purposes, for taking by surprise and destroying defences (barbed-wire entanglements, trenches, breastworks, etc.) constructed by the defender.

As the world war showed, these weapons were only employed against defences, and in all cases with the object of launching an attack.

Armoured and armed cars of all kinds are suited for surprise actions, which are particularly employed by an aggressor. In view of their wide range of action and their mobility, they may also be used for offensive raids into the interior of a country, and are thus particularly threatening to civilians. Consequently, they fulfil the first and third conditions laid down in the above-mentioned resolution.

Tanks are particularly suited to shock actions and for crushing opposition with the object of opening the way for attacking troops and making conditions as favourable as possible for them as against the defending troops. Consequently, they fulfil the first and second conditions of the resolution.

In the Italian delegation's opinion, if the use of these categories of armaments in warfare were abolished, the offensive would be robbed of much of the probability of success, and the defence could be made more effective.

Moreover, tanks are particularly costly weapons and are constantly being improved, so that their abolition would considerably decrease military expenditure.

Accordingly, the Italian delegation, taking the above criteria as a basis, proposes the abolition of tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds.

Conf.D./C.T.II.

Geneva, May 10th, 1932.

MEMORANDUM BY THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION RELATING TO THE
QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF TANKS, ARMoured CARS AND ARMoured TRAINS.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Commission on April 22nd, 1932 (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)), the Hungarian delegation proposed to the Land Commission that the following arms should be included in the series of weapons which are of the most specifically offensive character, are most efficacious against national defence, and are most threatening to civilians: tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains.

The Hungarian delegation submits the following arguments in support of its proposal:

No one who, in the light of the experience of the world war, has studied the problems connected with the conduct of modern warfare and is thus capable of forming an idea of what war will be in future can doubt the very important part which will be played by surprise attacks.

The supreme lesson of the great war must be obvious to everyone: "Against a successful surprise attack there is no defence".

We are absolutely convinced that any State which has decided to embark upon a war will do everything possible—and even what is almost impossible—to surprise its adversary and thus expedite a favourable issue.

The conduct of offensive warfare, which is based *par excellence* on the art of surprising the enemy, is considerably facilitated by armoured weapons. We witnessed their appearance—when they were partly used for different purposes—during the great war. But since then, thanks to technical progress, they have ceased to be of use solely for tactical purposes, and are now capable of employment for strategical purposes also.

In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, armed tanks and armoured cars and trains are particularly powerful weapons for the conduct of offensive warfare based on the element of surprise, and these weapons are called upon to play an almost decisive part on the outbreak of war.

With the help of these weapons, the aggressor is capable of hurling himself on his adversary and thus at once strangling any attempt at defence.

Consequently, these weapons can be regarded, not only as the most efficacious against national defence, but also as the most threatening to civilians, since they are brought into action by surprise on the outbreak of war and ravage ground on which it has necessarily been impossible as yet clearly to separate the civil and military elements.

The imminent danger of these arms, which is chiefly due to their extraordinary aptitude for attack by surprise, makes it necessary for threatened countries to maintain frontier defences—even in peace time—at a sufficiently high degree of efficacy to be capable of repulsing a sudden attack without previous mobilisation.

The very existence of these weapons forces countries to take protective measures which are among the most costly items of national defence expenditure.

The fact that at a later stage of the war these arms can also be of great utility for the defence cannot—in the Hungarian delegation's opinion—counterbalance or even mitigate the immense danger which they represent.

No military counter-measures at the disposal of the defence can ever repair the damage to the national and private property of a country caused by an effective attack by the aggressor.

Conf.D./C.T.44.

Geneva, June 2nd, 1932.

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT.

Pursuant to the discussion on procedure which took place at the meeting of the Land Commission on June 2nd, 1932, with reference to fortifications, the President of the Land Commission, considering that the question of fortification is on the Agenda of the Commission and that it is to the interest of the Commission and of the Conference itself to expedite the work as much as possible, is of opinion that it would be advisable if written procedure were substituted for the oral discussion.

Consequently, the President requests the delegations who wish to submit observations on the question of fortifications kindly to send them in as soon as possible, and at latest on the afternoon of Saturday, June 4th. The observations submitted will be transmitted to all the delegations and to the Rapporteur. The President will submit proposals to the Land Commission on subsequent procedure.

The next meeting of the Land Commission has been fixed for Monday, June 6th, at 4 p.m.

Geneva, June 7th, 1932.

REPORT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION OF APRIL 22ND, 1932.
(Document Conf.D./C.G.28(2).)

Rapporteur: M. BOURQUIN (Belgium).

INTRODUCTION.¹

1. The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, at its meeting on April 22nd, 1932, adopted the following resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)):

"In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.26(1)), the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."

2. The Land Commission met on April 26th in response to the request thus addressed to it.

It was of opinion that generally for land materials the weapons which are "most efficacious against national defence" should be considered as being those whose character is "the most specifically offensive", and that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might thus be held to form one single criterion.

3. The Commission rapidly decided that, instead of dealing successively with the whole series of land armaments, it would, without prejudice to the question, be effecting a considerable saving of time if it confined its examination to certain of those armaments already designated as requiring special treatment under the concrete proposals submitted to the Conference.

That was the case as regards: (1) artillery, (2) armoured vehicles, (3) certain fortifications, (4) chemical warfare gases.

The General Commission having decided, at its meeting on May 10th last, to entrust the study of that last item to a special committee, the Land Commission was able to confine itself to the first three categories of armaments.

I. ARTILLERY MATERIAL.

4. The general discussion which took place on the subject soon revealed the necessity of entrusting to a committee of experts the preliminary examination of certain technical aspects

¹ The Soviet delegation makes the following reservation with regard to the present report:

"The present report, instead of giving direct answers to the questions put by the General Commission, merely enumerates the opinions of the various groups of delegations, as formulated by the Experts when questions concerning artillery and armoured vehicles were under consideration.

"The Land Commission had instructions to determine what calibres of artillery and what classes of armoured vehicle answered to the three criteria laid down by the General Commission on April 22nd. The Land Commission was to answer these questions; it was to say whether these classes of armament should be subject to qualitative reduction, and, if so, to what extent.

"Instead of answering the questions, the Land Commission, by repeating the opinion expressed by the Committee of Experts in an interminable series of technical arguments, is still further complicating the task of the General Commission. Land armaments, especially armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, offer sufficient material to be submitted to the General Commission for its decision in regard to qualitative disarmament. The Land Commission's voluminous report is full of arguments about the relative value of different calibres of artillery, the impossibility of making an absolute distinction between a tank and a motor-vehicle, and the efficacy of artillery and tanks against permanent fortifications; but all this is merely preparing the ground for bringing the whole principle of qualitative disarmament into question. Public opinion is beginning to realise this, and numerous protests are now being heard from every side against this tendency, which is visible in all the Commissions.

"The Soviet delegation quite realises that this total absence of positive results is not due to any bad work on the part of the Experts. The Experts are only expressing the ideas and wishes of their respective delegations. Be that as it may, the Soviet delegation cannot associate itself with this refusal to give any specific reply to the questions put, and is therefore unable to pronounce in favour of the report.

"While making this general reservation, the Soviet delegation proposes to continue to uphold its own view in the General Commission, maintaining that the following classes of arms should be subject to qualitative disarmament: all guns and howitzers of calibre exceeding about 100 mm., firing shells weighing more than 16 kg. and having a range exceeding 15 km., and all armoured vehicles—tanks, cars, and trains."

of the problem. That Committee, on which all the delegations were entitled to be represented, had to consider a questionnaire, to which it replied in the terms appearing in the documents attached hereto (documents Conf.D./C.T.8, 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c).

5. The report of the Committee of Experts having been communicated to the Land Commission, the latter employed the material which it contained for the purpose of informing the General Commission. The discussion which took place on those lines resulted, on May 23rd, in the unanimous adoption of the following text:

" Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire submitted to it, the Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission:

" (a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but its offensive capacity becomes greater as its effectiveness increases as far as defensive organisations and the civilian population are concerned—*i.e.*, with the increase of its power and its range.

" (b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of mobile artillery most threatening to national defence are those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength, namely:

" (1) In the case of permanent fortifications of great strength, artillery of a calibre exceeding 320 mm., firing projectiles exceeding 500 kg. in weight.

" (2) In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre of about 250 mm. and above, firing projectiles exceeding 200 kg. in weight.

" (c) In a lower category of inferior power should be included pieces of a calibre between 250 and about 100 mm.¹

" As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

" Artillery of a higher calibre—particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed—and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield, which can be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material. The necessary calibre may even reach 250 mm. when the time, personnel and material available have permitted the increase of the resisting power of the position.

" (d) It was not possible to obtain unanimity either as to the threatening character in relation to national defence of this second category of artillery (referred to in Section (c) above), nor as to the calibre above which this character exists.

" Whilst certain delegations consider that this category of artillery is more necessary² for national defence than threatening to it, a first group of other delegations places at about 100 mm. the limit above which artillery is threatening to national defence, a second group places it at 155 mm. and a third group at 220 mm.

" The lowest limit of calibre above which artillery possesses an essentially offensive character is, moreover, a relative one.³

" Certain delegations consider that the limit of calibre above which the artillery of a State is of an essentially offensive character is lower in proportion as the means at the disposal of the defender are weaker.

" Other delegations consider that the problem is more complex. In their opinion, the limit of calibre above which artillery need be regarded as possessing an essentially offensive character depends on the power (calibre and range) of the artillery capable of resisting it; it also depends on the nature and the protection of the objectives on which it is to fire, and more generally on the whole of the activities brought to bear on the one side and on the other. This limit also depends on the strategic situation then existing, which situation generally varies according as the offensive is launched by a defender by way of counter-attack on an aggressor who has penetrated the defender's territory, or is undertaken by an aggressor with the intention of invading the territory of another State. Lastly, the limit in question also varies according to the nature of the system to which artilleries of higher calibre may be subjected.

" (e) As regards the third element of the resolution of the General Commission, the replies of the Technical Committee to questions 1 and 2 of Section III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that, in the view of certain delegations, artillery material of over

¹ The German delegation includes under the terms " about 100 mm." guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over.

² The delegations of Afghanistan, Germany, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Italy, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics make a reservation in regard to this phrase on the ground that the terms of reference of the Land Commission, as defined in the General Commission's resolution, do not include the examination of the weapons necessary for national defence.

³ The Soviet delegation makes a reservation on this point on the ground that no reference should be made to this question of relativity.

200 mm. calibre having an effective range of more than 25 km. is the most menacing to the civil population. Other delegations attribute this character to artillery of calibre over 105 mm. with an effective range of over 15 km.; they would not go further than this figure, seeing that beyond that distance are situated objectives of military importance (places for the assembling of reserves, with motor transport, railway stations, air-ports, armament factories, etc.), for which, as regards the distance from the battle-front, it is impossible, in existing circumstances, to indicate a limit, and that it is therefore necessary that in this zone the protection of the civil population should be regarded as more important than military requirements.

"Other delegations, on the other hand, think it necessary to include in the zone of the battlefield tactical reserves capable of joining in the battle in a few hours with the aid of motor transport and which may be 50 km. away from the front; these delegations consider that artillery designed to fire beyond the corresponding range is more dangerous to the civil population than to military objectives, and is consequently the most menacing to the civil population."

II. ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES.

6. The Commission adopted for this category of material the same procedure as for artillery. A Committee of Experts was first requested to answer a series of technical questions relating to: (a) tanks, (b) armoured cars, (c) armoured trains, (d) mobile armoured cupolas. Its replies form the subject of document Conf.D./C.T.34 attached hereto (Appendix 2).

7. The question was then discussed in the Commission itself, with a view to extracting from those replies positive and practical conclusions which might be submitted to the General Commission.

Since, however, a very marked divergence of views had been apparent from the outset and since that divergence had diminished but little during the discussions, it seemed impossible to arrive at a unanimous vote in the matter, and the Commission deemed it preferable to state the main groups of opinion into which it was divided.

8. A first difficulty arose as regards the distinction to be established between tanks and armoured cars.

The Committee of Experts expressed itself on the subject as follows:

"Tanks and armoured cars are armoured and armed self-propelled vehicles. Although it is not possible to draw a precise technical distinction between tanks and armoured cars, it may be said that tanks possess to a higher degree the power of moving across any terrain (due particularly to the use of tracks) and that they are capable, to a degree varying with the particular type, of crossing trenches and overthrowing obstacles. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are not specially designed with a view to their employment on an organised battlefield. There are two kinds of armoured car: one which keeps to the road, the other capable of moving across country.

"Some types of tanks, and especially armoured cars, are capable of great speed and a considerable radius of action."

9. A large number of delegations were of opinion, however, that it is possible to establish between the two categories of vehicles a clearer and more definite distinction. In their view, while it is difficult to find for such vehicles definitions applicable to all cases, owing to the fact that there is no clear technical distinction between light tanks and armoured cars, it may, however, generally speaking, be said that:

"Tanks are fully armoured, armed, self-propelled vehicles designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks, and to overcome obstacles encountered on the battlefield. They are primarily intended for employment actually on the battlefield, but the lighter types of tanks are also utilised for reconnaissance.

"Armoured cars are armoured, self-propelled, wheeled fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with the possible addition of limited cross-country capacity conferred by multi wheels, four-wheel drive or semi-track device. Their chief characteristics are great range and speed on roads, but they have only a slight capacity for crossing trenches. Their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position."

10. Some delegations pointed out that, failing a perfect scientific definition of the two categories of material under consideration, it might perhaps be possible to agree on a conventional definition, sufficient to specify the obligations to be assumed in regard to them.

11. Certain delegations consider that if a distinction was sought between tanks and armoured cars, it should be sought rather in the direction of a difference of use than in that of a difference of definite technical characteristics. These delegations point out that, in such circumstances, in the absence of effective means of control it will always be possible to use these weapons for purposes different from those for which they were theoretically designed. In the opinion of these delegations, the only category of armoured vehicles of combat in regard to which a sufficiently

definite technical distinction could be established would be that of armoured motor-cars which have not more than four wheels, only two of them being driving wheels, to the exclusion of caterpillars, and which are obliged to keep to roads.

12. The replies of the Committee of Experts relating to the characteristics of mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains received general endorsement from the Commission.

13. The Commission was, however, divided on the fundamental point as to whether, and if so to what extent, the different kinds of armoured vehicles answer to the criteria named in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

Various opinions, sometimes very divergent from one another, sometimes differing only on minor points, were expressed. In order to convey a faithful picture of them, and one which would at the same time be of practical assistance to the General Commission, the best plan would seem to be to consider in succession the four categories of vehicles with which the discussion dealt, and to note for each of those categories the main currents of opinion which appeared.

(1) *Tanks.*

14. A large number of delegations is of opinion that all tanks should be included in the list of weapons to which the resolution of April 22nd applies.

They consider that the possession of such vehicles considerably facilitates offensive operations based on surprise, operations which are in the highest degree dangerous to national defence. While recognising that other factors (such as the transport of infantry by means of motor-vehicles of all kinds) may also play a part in surprise operations, supporters of the above-mentioned opinion consider that the danger presented in this respect by tanks is incomparably greater.

Several of them point out that even modern fortifications are exposed to the attack of tanks because, while it is always possible to protect fortified works sufficiently to resist those attacks by the use of natural or artificial obstacles, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the action of tanks may strengthen considerably infantry attacks against troops and objectives placed at intervals either in front of or between those works, and, on the other hand, that the establishment, which is always very costly, of a complete system of artificial obstacles for the protection of forts is impossible in peace-time in certain districts, such as those under cultivation.

Certain delegations point out, moreover, that if, as the Committee of Experts¹ has stated, even light tanks can usually cross trenches and make breaches in the usual wire entanglements of the battlefield, while they are capable of effective action against certain strong organisations of the latter, that statement is particularly disturbing to countries which do not possess the necessary anti-tank weapons, or do not possess any tanks.

It has been pointed out within the same group of delegates that whatever the utility that tanks might sometimes offer for defensive purposes,² the menace which they constitute to the defence within the hands of the aggressor outweigh the advantages which they might confer on the defence, and that, in any case, such a menace was sufficiently serious to be regarded as decisive.

15. All the delegations belonging to the first group agree that tanks, of whatever type, are particularly efficacious against national defence and should, in consequence, be regarded as specifically offensive. These delegations cease to be unanimous, however, when it comes to deciding whether tanks should be included among the weapons most dangerous to civilians. Some delegations affirm that that is the case. They point out that tanks, owing to their mobility, enable the aggressor, either by stealing a march on the adversary or by outflanking his defences, to penetrate deep into the country invaded and not only to expose the civilian population to grave material danger but also to produce so intense a psychological effect as seriously to cripple the defence and even in the end to render it impossible.

Others, on the contrary, are of opinion that tanks, considered in themselves, and unless the party employing them can be credited with an illicit intention of terrorising the civilian population, do not constitute particularly dangerous weapons, since their action can be regulated with precision and confined to the military objectives deliberately selected.

16. A second large group of delegations establishes between tanks distinctions based essentially on the criterion of weight and includes among the weapons to which the resolution of April 22nd applies only tanks exceeding a certain tonnage.

17. Those delegations—like the delegations belonging to the previous group—admit that the principal danger of armoured fighting vehicles to the national defence lies in their power to carry out a surprise attack with the intention of delivering a rapid knock-out blow. They point out that, with the help of tanks, for example, a surprise attack carried out at the beginning of a war of aggression, when neither occupied permanent fortifications nor an organised battlefield

¹ The United Kingdom delegation in the Committee of Experts dissented from this statement unless the trenches had been previously damaged by shell-fire.

² The Italian and Soviet delegations, reiterating a reservation which they had already put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material, expressed the opinion that any decision as to the arms required for the purposes of national defence was outside the Land Commission's competence.

exist, acquires a greatly enhanced degree of effectiveness, power of penetration and chance of success.

They hold, however, that this power of surprise is not confined to tanks, but is shared by armoured cars and even by commercial motor-vehicles converted to military uses.

18. For the purposes mentioned above, tanks, they add, possess, in varying degrees, the characteristics of speed and radius of action, armour, and a capacity for carrying arms and for passing over or reducing obstacles. Each of those factors affects the weight of the vehicle, weight thus constituting the principal element whereby the power of the latter may be determined with any precision.

19. On the basis of this criterion distinctions may be established, which some delegations define as follows:

(a) Heavy tanks of a weight from about 25 tons upwards. These are heavily armed and armoured vehicles of sufficient weight and solidity to give them great powers of crushing obstacles and with comparatively wide trench-crossing capacity, which increases in proportion to their size.

(b) Medium tanks of a weight between about 20 tons and about 10 tons. These are less heavily armed and comparatively lightly armoured vehicles with considerably restricted trench-crossing capacity and limited crushing power. Their special characteristics of range and speed render them of great value as a mobile reserve and in counter-attack against troops which have pierced a defensive position.

(c) Light tanks (below 10 tons in weight), with which may be included armoured cars. These are lightly armed and armoured scouting vehicles essentially designed for reconnaissance.

20. Taking account of these observations and taking account also of the nature of the defensive organisations likely to be encountered on a modern battlefield, as well as of the frontier defences, which vary very greatly in strength as between different States, the delegations belonging to the second group are of opinion that the heaviest category—namely, tanks of a weight from approximately 20 to 25 tons upwards—possess offensive qualities to a degree which should render them liable to qualitative disarmament within the meaning of the resolution of April 22nd.

On the other hand, they are of opinion that tanks of a lower weight are definitely less offensive in character and should not come under such a regime. Certain delegations stressed, in this connection, the police purposes for which light tanks are employed in some countries and their great value in the maintenance of public order.¹

21. In the view of delegations belonging to the second group, tanks, whatever their type, are not particularly dangerous to civilians. They can, on the other hand, be employed for attacking military objectives, even beyond the battlefield, with a minimum of accidental risks for the said civilians.

22. The French delegation expressed its views in the following terms:

* The following opinion, based upon the conclusions [(document Conf.D./C.T.34) contained in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire addressed to it by the Land Commission (document Conf.D./C.T.33), is submitted by the French delegation to the General Commission for consideration:

* A. No armoured fighting vehicle of the nature of those contemplated for armies in the field is capable of assaulting a modern fortified work of even medium strength. Only tanks specially designed for this purpose and of a minimum weight of 70 tons could be effective against permanent fortifications. The same applies to armoured trains carrying artillery capable of similar effective action—*i.e.*, of a calibre exceeding 250 mm.

* B. Apart from tanks and armoured trains possessing the above defined characteristics, there is no technical reason for stating that armoured fighting vehicles are more specifically offensive, more efficacious against national defence or more threatening to civilians than any other means of warfare.

* 1. As regards efficaciousness against national defence, armoured fighting vehicles are used, not only by an aggressor desiring to invade the territory of another State and penetrating more or less far into that territory according to the mobility, speed and radius of action of the said vehicles, but also in counter-offensive operations conducted by a defender on the front, flanks or rear of an aggressor who has penetrated into his territory and entrenched himself there. The characteristics as regards armament, armour, mobility, the power of crossing obstacles and the radius of action of these vehicles, most of which are primarily intended to accompany the

¹ The Italian and Soviet delegations are of opinion that the question of the utilisation of tanks for police purposes and the maintenance of order is outside the competence of the Disarmament Conference.

infantry and to save it from losses, correspond to the prevalent conditions in both cases:

" The use of armoured vehicles, particularly tanks, in the course of a defensive action is, moreover, tending to become more and more important:

" (a) In order to support a counter-attack when it is difficult to provide artillery support owing to ignorance of the exact position of the assailant and the point of departure of the infantry making the counter-attack;

" (b) Because the anti-tank weapons which are being perfected can easily, in an organised position, be arranged so as to provide a complete and effective system of defence, whereas it is much more difficult for them to accompany an offensive, so that troops which are attacking are more vulnerable to the armoured vehicles of the defenders than troops established in a defensive position are to the tanks of the attackers;

" (c) In the defence of a permanent system of fortification, to act as mobile fortresses capable, thanks to prepared routes, of advancing to any points which are particularly threatened or of stopping any breach which may be made by the assailant in the defensive arrangements.

" The fact that the last-mentioned use is strictly defensive, requiring heavily armed and armoured tanks which are consequently very heavy and can with difficulty be moved away from the area prepared for their action, suffices to show that any discrimination between armoured vehicles according to weight, designed to prove that the heaviest tanks are most offensive, would not be technically justified. It is, moreover, impossible to make distinctions based upon the question of weight, as it is well known that very light tanks have been able to exercise effective action against important battlefield constructions. On the other hand, if tanks are exposed to the action of anti-tank weapons or enemy tanks, it may be necessary for their own protection, whether passive (armour) or active (armament), that their weight should be considerably increased if they are to be usefully employed on the field of battle, without reference to the offensive or defensive character of such employment.

" Armoured fighting vehicles of less than 70 tons in weight and armoured trains with armaments of a calibre inferior to 250 mm. cannot therefore be regarded as being offensive rather than defensive in purpose, and cannot be included among the weapons *most* menacing to national defence.

" 2. As regards the characteristic of being threatening to civilians, armoured vehicles, with the exception of armoured trains, as to which the reply must depend upon the artillery which they carry, should be regarded as among the weapons least menacing to civilian populations. The small range of their guns and the fact that they are normally only employed against visible military objectives enable them to concentrate entirely on the objective, with the least risk of accident for the neighbouring civilian population."

(2) *Armoured Cars.*

23. Certain delegations declared themselves in favour of including armoured cars of all types in the list of weapons covered by the resolution of April 22nd. They point out that, like tanks, armoured cars considerably facilitate surprise actions, that they may sometimes prove effective against field-works and, furthermore, that their suitability for rapid penetration into the interior of a country makes them threatening to civilians.

All these delegations belong to the group which classes all tanks among the most specifically offensive weapons. It should be noted that the converse is not true.

24. Some of the delegations, which hold that all tanks should be subject to qualitative disarmament, adopted the formula submitted by the Netherlands delegation according to which armoured cars should only be regarded as most specifically offensive when they were " provided with special appliances rendering them capable of being used on the battlefield ".

25. Other delegations, finally, while in favour of including all tanks in the list of specially offensive weapons, unreservedly excluded armoured cars.

26. This is naturally the conclusion arrived at on the latter point by those delegations which refuse to include tanks in the category of weapons covered by the resolution of April 22nd, or which include only the heaviest tanks weighing from about 20 to 25 tons or more.

27. It was urged in support of this view that the effectiveness of armoured cars against organisations of the battlefield is very limited; that it is usually easy, when armoured cars are confined to the road, to paralyse their offensive action by cutting the routes they have to use; that they cannot go far away from the troops with which they are operating; that they are only lightly armoured, and, finally, that certain countries regard them as essential for maintaining order in the vast territories under their jurisdiction.

(3) *Mobile Cupolas and Armoured Trains.*

28. According to the Committee of Experts, the above "are only effective against entrenchments, field-works, etc., in so far as the guns which they carry are able to reach them". In the Committee's opinion, "mobile cupolas are not capable of any action outside the battlefield. As regards armoured trains, their possibilities of action against military objectives outside the battlefield and against the civil population depend on the range of their artillery and the action of any personnel they may carry."

29. Generally speaking, the Commission adopted this view and therefore concluded that neither armoured trains nor mobile cupolas correspond to the criteria laid down in the resolution of April 22nd. Some delegations, however, took the opposite view.

(4) *General Remarks.*

30. The Committee then discussed the difficulties which might arise if motor-vehicles normally used for agricultural or commercial purposes could be converted into armoured fighting vehicles.

31. Some delegations felt that it would be useless to prohibit or restrict the light classes of tanks and armoured cars, in view of the ease with which these could be replaced, after effecting a few changes, by certain vehicles used for economic purposes.

32. Other delegations applied the argument to all armoured fighting vehicles. They urged, further, that, if these vehicles were subjected to qualitative disarmament, countries possessing a powerful metallurgical industry would be given an advantage and might possibly have an incentive to encourage the construction of non-military vehicles containing certain features which, it might justifiably be said, would enable them more adequately to discharge their pacific mission but which were really planned with a view to facilitating their conversion to military purposes.

33. Other delegations held that, though industrial development undoubtedly enhanced the military potentialities of a country, the importance attached by some parties to the agricultural tractor as a possible weapon was highly exaggerated. Such a vehicle would always be definitely less effective than an appliance specially constructed for fighting purposes.

34. Certain delegations asked that the attention of the General Commission should be drawn to this point. In the words of the motion submitted by the Polish delegation, they held that:

"Should the General Commission decide to apply certain measures of qualitative disarmament to tanks, it would be absolutely essential to take simultaneous action with a view to preventing:

"(1) The conversion of agricultural and other tractors into tanks;

"(2) The utilisation of tractor factories for the manufacture of tanks."

III. FORTIFICATIONS.

The German delegation submitted a note expressing its point of view on this question to the Land Commission.

Certain other delegations also submitted, in writing, their observations on this proposal. The Commission, realising that it would be extremely difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions for the time being on this point, decided to forward to the General Commission the above-mentioned documents for any necessary action (document Conf.D./C.T.46 attached) (Appendix 3).

Appendix 1.

Conf.D./C.T.8, 8(a), 8(b), 8(c).

REPLY BY THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE LAND COMMISSION
CONCERNING ARTILLERY.

I.

(1) *What is meant by fixed and mobile artillery?*

Fixed artillery includes all artillery which, in view of its special technical construction, cannot, without the use of special appliances or materials, be used outside the fortified land or sea frontier position in which it was originally placed.

Mobile artillery includes all artillery except artillery which is covered by the above definition.

(2) *What are the existing possibilities of rendering fixed artillery mobile and vice versa ?*

Generally speaking, the guns of fixed and mobile artillery can be made interchangeable. The convertibility of fixed artillery to mobile use depends primarily upon the mount required for mobile use. The time element involved depends upon the kind and amount of preparation, the size of the gun, the existence storage and distribution of the mounts, and the availability of means of handling the material. This time element varies from a few hours, if mobile mounts are in existence, to two or three months if no prior preparation has been made (assuming that the country concerned has sufficiently developed metallurgical industry). In the absence of such an industry, rapid conversion would not be possible unless the necessary material were already in store.

II.

(1) *What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against the essential organs of permanent fortifications (a) weight of the projectile, (b) weight of explosive, (c) calibre, etc. ?*

Field artillery of all calibres may be employed in attacking fortified works; it may be used against the intervals between forts and, in particular, against unprotected personnel or material, or it may, in exceptional cases, produce some effect on the armament of one of the works—for example, by a fortunate direct hit on or in an embrasure.

But in order to break down a system of permanent fortification, it is indispensable to destroy at least a certain number of its essential works. The efficacy of artillery against the permanent fortification therefore depends on the degree of strength of the essential works of such fortification and the penetrating power of the projectiles which may be employed for the purpose.¹

Taking these two factors into account, the following may be distinguished:

(a) Permanent fortification of *great strength* (thickness of concrete about 2 m., armouring or organisations under rock). — In order to act effectively against the essential elements of such fortification, use must be made of projectiles weighing more than 500 kg. and calibres over 320.

(b) Permanent fortification of *average strength* (thickness of concrete about 1 m., or depth of earth of more than 2 m.). — The characteristics of the guns required to act effectively against the essential elements of this fortification are, in accordance with the data given in the artillery rules of various States as a result of experience, at least the following:

Weight of projectile about 200 kg.
Weight of explosive about 35 kg.
Calibre about 250 mm.
Range at least 10 km.

(c) Permanent fortification with *little protection* (thickness of concrete less than 1 m., or thickness of earth less than 2 m.). — Against this kind of permanent fortification variable results may be obtained according to the kind of projectile, the nature of the fire (flat trajectory or high-angle trajectory), thickness of earth or concrete, with calibres varying from 105 to the calibres defined in paragraph (b) above.

(2) *What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield ?*

As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

Artillery of a higher calibre—particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed—and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield which can be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material.

When the time, personnel and material at the disposal of the defence are increased, the degree of resistance of the position may be that of permanent fortification with little protection (II, 1, c), and require the same means for its reduction.

¹ As an indication, we may mention that the 155 projectile, weighing 43 kg., has a penetrating power in concrete of only 45 cm.; the 280 projectile, weighing 200 kg. with 36 kg. of explosive, penetrates only 65 cm. into concrete. The armoured cupolas can be effectively attacked only with the 320 at least. Finally, to reach a depth in the ground of 2 m. in average soil, at least 220 is required.

III.

(1) *In modern warfare, what is the depth over which the troops and services and their equipment engaged in battle are distributed ?*

(a) *Reply of the Belgian Delegation :*

In modern warfare:

(1) The depth of the field of battle may extend to about 20 km.;

(2) The depth over which troops and services and their equipment capable of being engaged in the battle within one day are distributed is 50 km. or more.

(b) *Reply of the Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, Italian and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Delegations :*

The depth over which the troops and services and their equipment to be regarded as engaged in the battle are distributed is 15 km. and may extend to about 20 km. on either side.

Beyond that distance are situated objectives of military importance (places for the assembling of reserves, with motor transport, railway stations, air ports, armament factories, etc.) for which, as regards the distance from the battle front, it is impossible, in existing circumstances, to indicate a limit.

(c) *Reply of the following Delegations : Brazil, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, United States of America, Yugoslavia :*

The troops engaged in the battle are distributed over a depth of about 20 km.

Beyond that distance and up to about 50 km. from the front line there may be essential military objectives such as tactical reserves, which, if motor transport is available and roads are practicable, may be placed 50 km. from the line, while still being capable of use at a required point within five or six hours. Depots, and especially ammunition dumps, are normally at similar distances.

To sum up, the depth over which the troops and their services and equipment engaged in the battle are distributed is 15 to 25 km., if one does not include tactical mechanised reserves and munition depots, and may reach 50 km. if one includes them.

(2) *What are the characteristics of the artillery capable of firing beyond that depth ?*

For firing beyond the depth over which the troops and services and their equipment engaged in a battle are distributed, it is necessary to have guns with a range amounting to that depth plus the distance of the gun emplacements of one of the parties from the front line of the other party. This distance is at least 10 per cent of the range. This distance may be as much as 10 km. in the case of guns on railway mountings, or when practicable means of communication are insufficient, or when the artillery must be distributed in depth, particularly when on the defensive.

Considering the minimum distance as 10 per cent of the range and considering the effective range of normally constructed guns at present existing, it is to be observed that:

- (a) Only guns of over 105 mm. calibre have a range of 15 km. beyond the front line;
- (b) Only guns of over 155 mm. calibre have a range of 20 km. beyond the front line;
- (c) Only guns of over 200 mm. calibre have a range of 25 km. beyond the front line.

As regards ranges of 50 km. beyond the front line, there is no technical obstacle to the construction of a gun with such ranges.

If the characteristics of such a gun, which is not a current model, had to be determined, it would be necessary to consult specialists in artillery construction. This would also be necessary in order to ascertain what general restrictions should be imposed to prevent abnormal ranges being obtained with any calibre.

LETTER FROM GENERAL VAN TUINEN, EXPERT OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION, TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OF THE LAND COMMISSION RELATING TO
QUESTION 2, SECTION II OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONNAIRE.

In order to avoid holding up our work, I will not raise any objection at the moment to the reply given to Question 2 of Section II.

I should like to state, however, that in my opinion this reply differs to an appreciable extent from the question asked and is too similar to the reply given to Question 1 of this same Section. Question 2 does not, I think, refer to the organs of permanent or semi-permanent fortifications, but merely to temporary works constructed on the battlefield—that is to say, more or less hastily. There is thus a clear distinction between the artillery necessary for effective action against those objectives and the artillery intended to be used against fortifications of a permanent or semi-permanent character.

In my opinion, it is not necessary to contemplate the destruction of concrete shelters on the battlefield selected by the aggressor, as, including the time needed for their construction, it would take four or five weeks for the concrete to harden sufficiently. Field works with such elaborate entrenchments which could withstand the aggressor's fire to that extent could not be made in time in an invaded territory. In such a case, therefore, we should only have to deal with constructions organised in *war time* on the national soil—which means that they would be of a purely defensive character—and against which a strengthening of the means of aggression would be contrary to our efforts in the matter of disarmament.

Consequently, I am of opinion that the characteristics of the guns necessary for effective action against entrenchments, etc., of an improvised character to which, I think, Question 2 refers, are: 155 mm. maximum calibre, 45 kg. maximum weight of projectile, with 9 kg. of explosive.

NOTE BY THE DELEGATIONS OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN CONCERNING THE REPLY OF THE
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO SECTION III, QUESTION 1, OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONNAIRE.

The delegations of Norway and Sweden consider that:

The words of the questionnaire "engaged in the battle" should not be interpreted as meaning "capable of becoming engaged in the battle" and should only refer to troops situated on the battlefield itself;

The depth over which these troops are distributed is generally from 15 to 20 km. on either side, according to the number of troops engaged; and

Troops situated at such a distance from the battlefield that they could not be engaged in the battle without motor transport—the possibility of which depends in any case on the road system and the state of the existing roads at a given moment—should not be regarded as "engaged in the battle".

Nevertheless, those delegations, recognising that in its summary the text of the majority of the delegations states that the depth of the true battlefield is from 15 to 25 km. if these more distant troops are not reckoned, and wishing to facilitate as far as possible unanimity among the experts, have thought it proper to accept this majority text.

Appendix 2.

Conf.D./C.T.34.

REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE LAND COMMISSION
CONCERNING ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES.

(1) *What are the general characteristics of:*

- (a) *tanks,*
- (b) *armoured cars of all kinds,*
- (c) *mobile armoured cupolas,*
- (d) *armoured trains ?*

(a) and (b). Tanks and armoured cars are armoured¹ and armed self-propelled vehicles. Although it is not possible to draw a precise technical distinction between tanks and armoured

¹ The Committee agreed that the word "armoured" must be reasonably understood by "as well armoured as possible". In other words, the given definition could not apply to a partially-armoured vehicle. The United Kingdom delegation would have preferred that this idea should be conveyed by the words "fully armoured", but the word "fully", which is not as strong as "completely", would have been difficult to translate into French. In these circumstances, in order that the two texts should correspond, the United Kingdom delegation has agreed to withdraw its proposal, subject to the present explanation being given.

cars, it may be said that tanks possess to a higher degree the power of moving across any terrain (due particularly to the use of tracks) and that they are capable, to a degree varying with the particular type, of crossing trenches and overthrowing obstacles. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are not specially designed with a view to their employment on an organised battlefield. There are two kinds of armoured car: one which keeps to the road, the other capable of moving across country.

Some types of tanks and especially armoured cars are capable of great speed and considerable radius of action.

(c) *Mobile armoured cupolas.* — As distinct from armoured cars, mobile cupolas have remarkable characteristics as regards armour and equipment, but their mobility is very limited.

They are, in short, a kind of heavy tank with very limited mobility.

Like heavy tanks themselves, they are specially suitable either for filling the gaps in the permanent defensive organisation or, in the defence of a position, for blocking up a breach in which the enemy may have penetrated.

(d) *Armoured trains.* — Armoured trains are very powerful, armed and strongly equipped weapons; but instead of being able to cross any ground their movement depends upon the existence of a railway. They are particularly suitable for the defence of land frontiers and sea coasts.

(2) *What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against permanent fortifications? Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the latter?*

No armoured machine of the nature of those contemplated for armies in the field is capable of assaulting a modern fortified work of even average strength.

Moreover, any modern system of fortification exposed to attack by tanks can be rendered almost invulnerable to their attack by the use of natural obstacles or by the construction of artificial obstacles or defences (deep, wide ditches, blocks of concrete, mines, etc.).

In answer to Question II (a) and (b), therefore, it may be said that no armoured fighting vehicle will be effective for assault against a permanent system of fortifications provided that a complete system of natural or artificial obstacles exists.

As regards armoured trains, their action is no more and no less than that of the artillery which they carry.

Notes.

1. The French delegation consider that the attack of permanent fortifications can only be attempted by tanks armoured powerfully enough to be proof against projectiles shot by weapons mounted in first-line fortifications.

They consider that such tanks would weigh at least 100 tons; the lowest weight of tanks of this kind, making very ample allowance for possible technical improvement in construction, may be put at 70 tons.

2. The delegations of Austria, United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden add the following explanation to the reply given by the Committee:

While the destruction and neutralisation of the fortified works and artillery of the defence are the task of the heavy and super-heavy artillery, it is for tanks to assist the infantry in attacking troops and other objectives distributed in front of the fortifications and between them.

This being so, as regards the attack of permanent fortifications also, tanks take on a character menacing to national defence which increases in proportion to their weight and capabilities.

3. The delegations of Austria, Hungary, Italy and Netherlands add the following explanation to the reply given by the Committee:

The preparation of a complete system of artificial obstacles as here described against attack by tanks would in a number of cases be impossible in a line of permanent fortifications situated in cultivated country. In such cases, even a modern system of fortifications would, at the beginning of a war, be very vulnerable to attack by tanks.

Furthermore, the addition to a system of permanent fortifications of artificial obstacles to attack by tanks would involve supplementary expenditure which would often be very considerable.

(3) *What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield? Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the elements of national defence referred to above?*

Tanks are capable of effective action on an organised field of battle, and some armoured cars are capable of such action where the organisations are improvised or not continuous.¹

Even light tanks can usually cross trenches and make breaches in the usual wire entanglements of the battlefield. It is asserted that very light tanks (7 tons) have been capable of effective action against strongly organised battlefields.

If, however, tanks are exposed to the fire of anti-tank weapons or enemy tanks, their own protection, whether passive (armour), or active (armament), may involve a considerable increase in their weight if they are to be used effectively in defence as well as offence on the battlefield.²

Armoured cupolas and trains are only effective against entrenchments, field works, etc., in so far as the guns which they carry are able to reach them.

(4) *Are there any characteristics of armoured fighting vehicles which make them specially menacing:*

- (a) *to the civil population;*
- (b) *to military objectives outside the zone of the battlefield properly so-called?*

(a) and (b). — If we exclude the hypothesis of direct and deliberate action, contrary to international law, against the civil population, tanks and armoured cars could only be specially menacing to them if, when acting against military objectives, they risked at the same time injuring the civil population.

On the contrary, since they can act only at very short range and generally against visible objectives, which makes them as accurate as can be desired, they can attack military objectives even outside the zone of the battlefield with less risk to the civil population than is represented by aeroplane and artillery projectiles, which can much more easily fall on some point other than the objective aimed at. This characteristic, together with their speed and radius of action, makes certain armoured fighting vehicles particularly suited to attack military objectives outside the battlefield, and enables the battle to be extended to the rear and flanks of the forces engaged. All motor-driven vehicles³ of similar speed and radius of action which are able to carry troops also possess this quality in varying degrees. The essential quality to carry out such missions is the mobility of the vehicle. So long as the fire-power can be conveyed to the place required, it is immaterial whether the conveyance is itself armoured and armed or not.

Mobile cupolas are not capable of any action outside the battlefield. As regards armoured trains, their possibilities of action against military objectives outside the battlefield and against the civil population depend on the range of their artillery and the action of any personnel they may carry.

(5) *To what extent and in what time can any vehicle be converted into:*

- (a) *a tank;*
- (b) *an armoured car;*
- (c) *an armoured train?*

¹ The German, Hungarian and Soviet delegations add to this paragraph that this applies particularly in the case of a defence which does not dispose of adequate anti-tank weapons and tanks.

² The United Kingdom delegation substitutes for the first three paragraphs the following text:

"The effectiveness of tanks against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield depends upon their ability to cross ditches and trenches. As the object of the question is to elicit the performance of these vehicles without the assistance of other weapons, it is assumed that the ditches and trenches have not already been partially destroyed by shell-fire. The following are examples of the capacity of different types of tanks:

"A tank of about 35 tons is required to cross a gap from 2.4 to 3 metres wide. A tank of 16 tons could, under favourable circumstances, cross a gap 2.2 metres wide. A tank below 10 tons in weight is not capable of crossing a gap more than 1.5 metre wide.

"It will be seen from the above that tanks below 10 tons are incapable of crossing any but the most narrow field entrenchments. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are usually incapable of crossing any undamaged trench."

³ The German and Soviet delegations make the following observations as regards the end of this paragraph, from the words: "All motor-driven vehicles":

"It is impossible to make a comparison between an ordinary motor conveyance and tanks or armoured cars. It is of decisive importance that tanks should be armoured, that they should be able to move off the roads, that they should possess weapons always in readiness for firing, and that all these qualities should be contained in as small a space as possible.

"The same may be said in a lesser degree of armoured cars the effectiveness of which is very much greater than that of any other motor-car.

"The possibility of attacking military objectives outside the battlefield properly so-called and of extending thus the battle to the rear and flanks of the forces engaged in front depends, taking into account purely military considerations, on the protection which can be given to convoys of troops by tanks and armoured cars."

These delegations interpret in this sense the last two sentences of the second paragraph.

(a) and (b). — There exist in many countries a considerable number of vehicles, tracked or otherwise, which could rapidly be turned into tanks or armoured cars.

A converted tractor would be less efficient than a tank constructed as such.¹ For constructional reasons they are unlikely to be fitted with turrets, unless special arrangements have been made for this purpose, and therefore all-round fire would not be practicable.

Armoured cars could be improvised to a degree of effectiveness comparable to that of an armoured car designed for the purpose. The road speed and fighting capability would possibly be less, but, as armoured cars are primarily vehicles for reconnaissance, improvised cars would adequately fulfil this duty.

It is understood that the possibility of effecting the conversions mentioned above, and the effectiveness of such converted vehicles, depends essentially on the industrial resources of each country.

The time required for conversion would depend upon the existence of semi-skilled labour, engineering resources and suitable armour in stock. The manufacture of bullet-proof plate is a lengthy process, but even if none were available, ordinary mild steel plate, which can readily be obtained commercially, might be employed as an improvised measure and, by increasing the thickness, sufficient bullet-proof protection could be achieved. A certain amount of protection can be given to a vehicle in a few hours if the necessary technical preparations have been made beforehand.

As a general rule, the time is less for a given vehicle in proportion as:

(a) More complete arrangements have been made at the time of its construction to facilitate the conversion;

(b) The conversion has been more completely prepared especially as regards the stock of essential parts and necessary engineering resources.

Under favourable circumstances, the production in quantity of tanks, improvised on these lines, could commence within three weeks, and that of armoured cars within a week or ten days.²

If engineering resources and the necessary armour-plating are available, a train could be armoured within a few weeks. However, the organisation of an armoured train, specially equipped with powerful artillery, would require a longer time and a considerable previous stock of special material.

Appendix 3.

Conf.D./C.T.46.

EXAMINATION OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION OF APRIL 22ND, 1932 (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)): DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE AND DRAFT REPLY CONCERNING FORTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

Introduction.

The German delegation has taken as the basis of its draft questionnaire and replies, given below, the following general question:

"Supposing one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy, or those operations, to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion?"

The delegation was, moreover, guided by the following paragraph of the report of Sub-Commission A to which it desires to draw the attention of the Land Commission:

"The category or organisations which can only be used for territorial defence cannot be said to include:

"(1) Organisations the principal purpose of which is obviously to enable long-range artillery or air attack to be brought to bear on the communications of a neighbouring

¹ Some delegations consider that certain types of tractor, however, may be more efficient after conversion than tanks of old patterns.

² The Italian delegation is of opinion that, in view of the great variety of ordinary vehicles that may lend themselves to conversion into armoured fighting vehicles, which in turn vary greatly in the multiplicity of their characteristics, it does not seem possible to fix exact or even approximate limits for the possibility of such conversion and the time it will require.

country or its exposed points near the frontier, and which are not indisputably justified by the necessity of protecting specially exposed points in the country concerned."

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Questionnaire and Replies.

Question 1. — What are the characteristics of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the extreme limit of their organisations) which must be considered as offensive and which constitute a threat to the national defence of the neighbouring State ?

With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration:

- (a) The possibility of accommodating troops and material for the purposes of an attack;
- (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery;
- (c) Distance from the frontier.

Reply. — The Land Commission considers the " extreme limit " of the organisations of a fortress to be the points at which the most advanced organisations of any kind capable of firing are situated.

(a) Any fortress, owing to its considerable possibilities for lodging and protecting troops; enables men and material to be held in reserve. It follows that, in addition to its defensive importance, it must be regarded as having offensive possibilities, which are the more important in proportion as the frontier is near.

(b) If the range of the artillery in the fortress is sufficient for effective fire across the frontier of the neighbouring State, it will prejudice that State's defence. The effect against that defence is naturally increased in the case of guns of large calibre.

(c) If a fortress is so close to the frontier that the troops assembled there can rapidly cross the frontier of the neighbouring State by starting from the extreme limit of the fortress, and if the range of the artillery enables it to fire across the frontier, the fortress must be regarded as specifically offensive and threatening to national defence.

Question 2. — What are the characteristic features of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the extreme limit of their organisations) which constitute a threat to the civilian population of the neighbouring country ?

With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration:

- (a) The moral effect on the population of the neighbouring country in peace time;
- (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery, with special reference to populous territories and to dense populations and to their vital centres and centres of communication;
- (c) Distance from the frontier.

Reply. — (a) The qualities referred to under 1 are sufficient to be a considerable menace to the population of the neighbouring State. The mere idea of a sudden and unforeseen attack by the troops of the aggressor and the fear that the national defence may be paralysed produces an unfavourable moral effect upon the civilian population.

(b) This menace is all the greater when, owing to the range and effectiveness of the fortress's artillery, the life of the civilian population of the neighbouring State, its residential and business places and its centres of communication are threatened, and when the frontier territory in question is densely populated or industrial.

(c) As regards the distance of a fortress from the frontier, the remarks contained under 1 (c) also apply as regards the threat to civilians.

Question 3. — What is the influence of the characteristics mentioned under 1 and 2, when

(a) The opponent has no permanent fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works or has only weak fortifications, etc.;

(b) The opponent can rely only on prepared or improvised field fortifications for the defence ?

Reply. — (a) When there are no permanent fortifications or even weak fortifications on the frontier territory of the neighbouring State, the qualities referred to under 1 and 2 are all the more important in proportion as a surprise attack from a fortress close to the frontier, meeting with no prepared resistance, might penetrate deeply into the country; it would thus be not only most efficacious against national defence but also particularly threatening to civilians.

(b) The same remarks apply where the other party has only prepared or improvised field fortifications, since the defensive power of such fortifications is much less than that of permanent fortifications; the former, owing in particular to the possibility of a surprise attack by a fortress

close to the frontier, must be distant from the frontier and cannot be completed, occupied and put in a state of defence within the time necessary.

Conclusion.

It follows from the above that fortresses possessing such characteristics are of an offensive nature, that they are specially efficacious against national defence and particularly threatening to civilians.

Observations by the Afghan Delegation.

The Afghan delegation, in its declaration of April 26th, stated that:

"Although, generally, fortifications on the frontier lines of countries are constructed for defensive purposes, those which may be situated opposite countries which have no means of defence and no fortifications comparable with those of their neighbouring countries can more directly command the other's frontiers, and should be counted within the sphere of aggressive means and measures."

At this time, when all the resolutions adopted by the Land Commission are in course of being collectively submitted to the General Commission, the Afghan delegation reaffirms its previous statement and emphasises that the very existence of strongly protected fortresses, with their connected means of communication near the frontiers of a less-protected country with no possible means of adequate communications, is efficacious against national defence and threatening to the civilians of that neighbouring country, and this danger is further increased by the possibility of a sudden attack being launched from such fortifications.

With this point of view, the Afghan delegation supports the above draft reply submitted by the German delegation.

Observations by the Argentine Delegation.

The Argentine delegation does not consider it necessary to formulate, for its part, observations on the questionnaire submitted by the German delegation on the subject of fortifications near frontiers, as the Argentine Republic has no permanent fortifications on the frontiers which it has in common with Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay, respectively.

The Argentine Republic, faithful to its pacific sentiments, signed a treaty with the Republic of Chile on July 23rd, 1881, delimiting their frontiers in the south, and in that treaty perpetual neutrality and the free navigation of the Strait of Magellan for all the flags of the world are established in the following terms:

"To secure this freedom and neutrality, no fortification or military defence work capable of endangering the object in view shall be constructed".

Observations of the Belgian Delegation.

1. The Belgian delegation is of opinion that no permanent fortification is to be regarded as particularly offensive or as representing a threat to the defence of the neighbouring State.

The military power of a State consists of two factors: its field army and its fortresses.

In order to conduct an offensive war and threaten the defence of the neighbouring State, it is necessary to invade the territory of that State. In such an operation, only the field army is concerned; fortresses, being fixed, have no appreciable influence.

On the other hand, in the conduct of a defensive war, the fortresses have to be reduced by the aggressor just as much as the field army, and hence represent a factor highly favourable to the national defence.

Fortresses are almost valueless in offensive warfare, but most valuable in defensive warfare, because their reduction immobilises large attacking forces.

Consequently, the more purely defensive are the intentions of a country, the greater will be the proportion of its resources that it devotes to fortresses; and, on the other hand, if its intentions are aggressive, it will keep almost all its resources for the field army.

2. The Belgian delegation is further of opinion that the fortifications of a State do not constitute a threat to the population of a neighbouring State unless the range of their artillery enables it to fire across the frontier.

It must be observed that modern fortifications are provided with artillery only in very small quantities, owing to its high cost, and that the calibre of such artillery seldom exceeds 105 millimetres—i.e., the calibre of light field artillery.

Naturally, the sense of security of the civilian population of frontier areas is always less great than that of the civilian population of the interior; but this is due, not to the frontier fortresses, but to the assembling of the opposing field army, which is rendered possible by the proximity of the frontier, and to the relative strength of that field army.

Concentrations of troops and material can be carried out under the protection of frontier garrisons with a speed and to an extent depending not on the fortresses but on the system of communications leading up to the frontier.

Conclusion. — It follows that all fortresses are of a specifically defensive character, that they favour the national defence, and that they are not intrinsically threatening to the civilian population of the neighbouring State unless their artillery can fire across the frontier.

Observations of the Danish Delegation.

On the subject of fortifications, the Danish delegation would make reference to page 2, paragraph 3 of its Memorandum of April 13th last (document Conf.D.112), in which the delegation explains its views.

Observations of the Spanish Delegation.

Sub-Commission A, in its report (document C.P.D.28, page 141), unanimously specified the armaments which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State's territory. The location of fortifications depends on topographical considerations, more especially the position of the junctions and lines of communication between two neighbouring States.

Fortifications, considered in themselves, are defensive in character, but they may indirectly favour the offensive by making it possible to economise forces in the fortified area and use them *en masse* elsewhere.

The position of the most advanced forts, based on the above considerations, may be close to the frontier, so that the range of their artillery may enable them to fire on points in the territory of the neighbouring country.

These possibilities are, generally speaking, reciprocal.

Observations of the French Delegation.

1. As the experts of Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission unanimously recognised, "the following can only be used on the spot for the defence of a State's territory: all parts of defensive systems which are in the nature of obstacles and cover for troops; permanent works for the use of armaments, such as gun-platforms; and, in exceptional circumstances, certain armaments which are in turrets or cupolas".

It is therefore not possible to attribute *a priori* a "specifically offensive" character to a permanent defensive system. The question can only arise as applied to the artillery in such a system if that artillery should have a calibre greater than the limit fixed for "specifically offensive" artillery, regard being had to the possibility of rendering fixed artillery mobile.

2. Permanent defensive systems situated in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers—as they generally are, because their normal purpose is frontier defence—could not be "specifically threatening" to the national defence and civilian population of the neighbouring country unless they were designed for that purpose.

The sites on which permanent defensive systems are constructed are determined, however, by quite different considerations:

(a) They depend upon the ground, and are therefore placed where the ground is most favourable to the defence;

(b) Their location depends primarily on the point (a large and important city, a vital centre of communications, an industrial area, etc.) which they are intended to protect. If this point is very close to the frontier, the system designed for its protection is also necessarily close to the frontier.

3. The possibility of action by the garrisons or armaments of permanent defensive systems on the territory or against the civilian population of a neighbouring State is undoubtedly less than the possibility of action of troops that can be brought up into the frontier zones only when needed. A State contemplating an attack, whose best chance of success would be surprise, would have every interest in using, not the known and located means of action in permanent defensive systems, but means of action brought up at great speed with the aid of lines of communication prepared for that purpose, especially motor transport.

4. Consequently, permanent defensive systems are not:

- (a) The most specifically offensive,
- (b) The most threatening to national defence,
- (c) The most threatening to civilians,

within the meaning of the terms of reference given to the Land Commission by the General Commission.

Observations of the Italian Delegation.

1. Any fortification, fortified town or fortified work (with special reference to the exterior limit of its organisation) situated close to the frontier should, as a general rule, be regarded as

defensive in character, seeing that its main object is to prevent the aggressor from crossing the frontier, and that it thus constitutes a real obstacle intended to bar the most dangerous lines of approach to the territory.

As a general rule, the fortifications of the two neighbouring countries are situated on such lines of approach, owing to the fact that their situation is determined by the geographical configuration of the frontier line.

2. In order that these fortifications may be considered exclusively defensive in character, it is necessary, however, that the two neighbouring countries should possess approximately the same number of fortifications, that the latter should be approximately equal in power and that they should be situated, on either side, close to the frontier.

3. The defensive character of a country's fortifications becomes modified and the latter gradually assume an offensive character when the fortified works of the neighbouring country are much inferior in power, even to the extent of being non-existent, or when, for special reasons, the said fortifications are so distant from the frontier as to leave a completely undefended zone of territory outside the range of action of their armaments.

4. The offensive character of the fortifications does not, of course, lie in the whole system of concrete or steel works, in view of their absence of mobility, but consists, on the other hand, of the two elements contained therein—namely, the artillery or the troops for which they may furnish a safe shelter during the process of concentration, a favourable *point d'appui* for an offensive or counter-offensive and a base for the subsequent development of operations.

5. Excluding the case referred to in number 2, in which it is clear that each system of fortifications assumes a defensive character as against the action of the other, the offensive character of a fortification is determined:

(a) By the effective protection of the process of concentration and the support of troops to be employed in the offensive or counter-offensive;

(b) By the action of its own artillery of different calibres designed primarily to destroy with ease the adversary's works with a low power of resistance and, secondly, to support effectively (owing to the strong protection thus ensured) troops that are to be used in the offensive;

(c) By actions designed as a menace to civilians when the fortress or fortified works are so close to the frontier that their artillery can reach the closely populated industrial centres or important centres of communication in the neighbouring territory.

To sum up:

1. Fortifications or permanent fortified works are, generally speaking, defensive in character.

2. Frontier fortifications may, on the other hand, be regarded as more or less offensive in character, and hence more specifically efficacious against national defence, when the territory of the neighbouring State possesses no fortifications or permanent fortified works whatever, or only possesses field works or improvised works, or possesses fortified works situated so far inland as to be unable to protect the frontier zone over a given depth.

3. Frontier fortifications may be particularly threatening to civilians when the fortress or fortified works are so close to the frontier that their artillery can reach those zones in the territory of the neighbouring State over which thickly populated industrial centres are scattered and which are also indispensable for the military organisation.

Observations by the United Kingdom Delegation.

The following observations upon the German proposal regarding fortifications are submitted by the United Kingdom delegation:

They draw attention to the speech of the United Kingdom delegate on June 2nd, which pointed out that the German proposal was, in effect, not a question of the abolition of fortresses near the frontier, but of a restriction of the right to station troops or guns in its vicinity. The technical aspect of guns and their offensive possibilities has already been fully dealt with by the Land Commission.

For these reasons, the United Kingdom delegation sees no utility in discussing the questionnaire, nor do they find themselves able to accept the German proposal regarding fortifications. They suggest that the latter should either be put to the vote without further discussion, or that it should be forwarded to the General Commission with the names of such delegations as find themselves able to support it.