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## **THE MYTH OF AMERICAN ISOLATION**

*Our Policy of International Co-operation*

*By*

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# THE MYTH OF AMERICAN ISOLATION

*Our National Policy of International Co-operation*

By PITMAN BENJAMIN POTTER

## THE LEGEND OF ISOLATION AND THE EVIDENCE

One inevitable result of the tradition of American isolation in international relations is to raise the suspicion, now that the question of American participation in some form of international association has become so acute, that any attempt to portray the United States as a leader in the movement for international organization is dictated by a desire to have it so, rather than a candid conviction that such a picture is true to life. Such a presentation may express a hope or, perhaps, a harmless fancy, but how can it be the solid truth? Did not America in her earliest years, and notably in 1823, deliberately take herself out of world politics, saying to Europe: "We shall leave you strictly alone and shall insist that you leave us and our continents and our governments strictly alone?"

It is the purpose of this paper to show that the American nation has from the very beginning led the way in the movement for international co-operation, and that the legend of national isolation as a description of American policy is sheer myth, in part a gigantic national self-deception, in part belied by our professed foreign policies and the corresponding diplomatic activities to which they have led, and in no way supported, but directly traversed, by the very utterances of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe upon which reliance is commonly placed to support that doctrine.

This involves, to some extent, a review of familiar data. Such a review is not without its special point, however, for one of the conclusions which should be emphasized as strongly as possible is that "international co-operation" or "international organization" is not a new reform to be promoted by America in the future, or the name of a new movement which America is asked to join. The formula is here used to refer to the historical growth of certain

governmental organs and practices dealing with matters of common interest to two or more national states. International organization as thus defined may relate to purely political topics, such as would arise in a diplomatic conference, or to judicial or administrative questions such as concern courts of arbitration and international administrative bureaus, or, finally, to commercial relations as embodied in commercial treaties. In any case there may exist merely a practice, such as the negotiation of a network of treaties dealing with the subject in question, or an organized institution, such as a bureau, conference, or court. America has promoted the development of all of these forms of international co-operation in the whole course of her national foreign policy. It is not a new thing, but one aspect of American political life from 1774 to the present day.

In the promotion of a better system of international organization the United States has undertaken two kinds of work, which might be described, respectively, as the work of preparation and the work of construction. America felt it necessary in the beginning to destroy certain obstacles to a better international co-operation and, having done that, she has gone forward to help build up certain institutions and practices for the better management of international relations in the future.

## I. EFFORTS TO DESTROY OBSTACLES TO FREER AND FULLER INTERCOURSE

From the first day of national interest in foreign affairs, 5 September, 1774, when the Continental Congress met in Philadelphia, Americans objected to certain features of current international relations, survivals of the Mercantilist age and the age of court diplomacy, because these practices tended to hamper them from participating fully and freely in world trade and politics. Accordingly, an elaborate and considered plan of action was very soon outlined and action begun looking to the destruction of the obstacles to a freer international intercourse.

One set of obstacles to free international communication was found in the restrictive regulations in force in the end of the eighteenth century governing the rank and precedence of diplomatic representatives, the costume and ceremony of diplomacy, and the use of an elaborate and artificial etiquette of procedure in international negotiations. Against these factors America put forward a program of simple diplomatic establishments, the minimization and final elimination of invidious uniform and costume, equality of treatment for public representatives, and simplicity and informality in procedure.<sup>1</sup> These proposals sprang to some extent merely from the American belief in social democracy, but they were here applied in such a way as to acquire a significance in the field of international procedure and were deliberately aimed at facilitating a freer and therefore fuller international intercourse by securing for republican states—America at large—a better standing in the diplomatic scene. This program—maintained down to the present day—expressed at the time the spirit of the coming age and has now been very largely successful.

In similar fashion, the United States has sought to develop, by treaty agreements, a body of law on neutrality, commercial rela-

<sup>1</sup>See, as typical of these policies, Bayard to Phelps, 2 July, 1885, as quoted in Wharton, *Digest of International Law*, 2d. ed., I, 625, on the question of diplomatic rank, and the opinion of former Secretary J. W. Foster in his *Practice of Diplomacy*, 26, where it is clearly shown that America had opposed the placing of emphasis on rank and distinction because of the inconvenience it caused her, together with her attachment to democratic simplicity, and where the logical solution ("the abolishment of all rank in the diplomatic body") is proposed; on costume, see the celebrated Marcy circular of 1 June, 1853, quoted in Moore, *Digest of International Law*, IV, 763.

tions, naturalization and citizenship, and extradition, and such other subjects as would lend themselves to legalistic treatment, in order to replace the shifty struggle of personal diplomacy, with its weapons of intrigue and chicane, by a system of common law giving each state its due rights without the hazard of competitive negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

### FOUGHT MARITIME RESTRICTIONS

To the obstructive regulations imposed by national states upon entry into their ports, navigation in coast waters, straits and international rivers, and to the efforts of piratical nations to interrupt international trade, America opposed a program of free navigation, free seas and a right of innocent use, calculated to amplify and encourage the system of international intercourse. We used the device of reciprocal concessions in our commercial treaties to break down exclusive navigation laws; we led the way in discarding the harsh treatment of alien merchants inherited from the 18th century. All of these programs were launched in Congressional resolutions on 17 September, 1776, and 7 May, 1784, were embodied in treaties with Sweden and Prussia in 1783 and 1785, and have been continued to the present day,<sup>2</sup> fortified in later years by the use of the most-favored-nation clause.<sup>3</sup> The power of the Barbary pirates we destroyed by force of arms, being unwilling to see these subsidiaries of France and Britain left free to prey on the commerce of weaker nations, and no international action in the matter appearing to be possible.<sup>4</sup> The international rivers of North and South America we sought to have opened to common use and by 1860 we had not only accomplished this pur-

<sup>1</sup>For an expression of the policy of legalism and its object, see the opinion of former Counsellor J. B. Moore in his *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 423, 425.

<sup>2</sup>Texts of treaties of 1799 and 1800, with Prussia and France, in *Treaties between the United States and other Powers*, Malloy ed., II, 1486, I, 496.

<sup>3</sup>Plan for commercial treaties adopted by the Congress, 17 September, 1776, in the *Journals of the Continental Congress*, Ford and Hunt ed., V, 765; instructions to John Adams regarding proposed treaty with the Netherlands, 20 December, 1780, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1206; resolution of Congress of 1784 in *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, Sparks ed., I, 80. The treaties with Sweden and Prussia likewise are in *Treaties*, II, 1477, 1725.

<sup>4</sup>Jefferson to Nathaniel Greene, 12 January, 1785, in *Writings*, Ford ed., IV, 25; to Monroe, February, 1785, *ibid.*, 29. The texts of the agreements embodying the settlements are in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 1, 6, 11 (Algiers); II, 1206 (Morocco); II, 1785, 1788 (Tripoli); II, 1794 (Tunis).

pose to a large extent, but had been instrumental in opening the Danish straits for navigation free from tolls and in promoting a similar treatment for various European rivers.<sup>1</sup>

The national claim to a right to visit and search alien merchant vessels at sea was the most formidable obstacle to be met in this field. It was particularly difficult to secure a renunciation of this right from Great Britain and to make headway against various British and French interpretations of maritime laws the effect of which was to hamper international exchange disastrously. We finally waged war against both France and Britain in this cause in 1798 and 1812. Failing to secure success in treaties with France in 1800 and with Britain in 1794 and 1814 we pressed on,<sup>2</sup> and the conventions with England in 1815<sup>3</sup> and 1818<sup>4</sup> presaged the success which was to come in the middle decades of the century with the British abandonment of the right of visit and search in 1861 and the Declaration of Paris of 1856.<sup>5</sup> The "right" of visit and search was destroyed and a larger freedom for neutral commerce in time of war made secure. In 1909 there was achieved, in the Declaration of London, what was potentially the greatest stroke in history for the cause of freedom of commerce in time of war.<sup>6</sup>

#### SOUGHT COMMERCIAL EQUALITY

The most recent form of the American attack upon exclusive and obstructive national claims is to be seen in the protest against

<sup>1</sup>*Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, Wharton ed., III, 344, 353, 373; IV, 78; and *passim*, for opening of Mississippi; the opening of the St. Lawrence was secured on a basis of reciprocity by the treaty of 1854, and was confirmed by the treaty of Washington in 1871; text in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 778, 700. In 1853, the Parana and Uruguay rivers through Argentina were opened; text of treaty in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 18; in 1858, the Amazon and La Plata through Bolivia, text in *ibid.*, 113 *seq.*, esp. 122; in 1859, the Paraguay and Parana through Paraguay, text in *ibid.*, II at 1365. Text of convention between Denmark and the United States relating to the Sound Dues in *ibid.*, I, 380; text of treaty between Denmark and various powers of Europe in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XLVII, 24. For the campaign of protest waged by the United States in the years before 1857 see the diplomatic correspondence in *ibid.*, XLV, 807, 863, and in Senate Executive Document No. 1, 35th Congress, 1st Session, 25-42.

<sup>2</sup>See diplomatic correspondence in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXIV, 1077; XXXI, 585; XXXII, 433, 565, and correspondence with European powers at outbreak of Crimean War in 1854, in *ibid.*, XLVI, 821, 843, as typical cases.

<sup>3</sup>Treaties of 1794, 1814, and 1815 with Great Britain in *Treaties*, I, 590, 612, 624.

<sup>4</sup>Text in *Treaties*, I, 631 *seq.*

<sup>5</sup>Moore, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 61, 114.

<sup>6</sup>Text and commentary in Higgins, *Hague Peace Conferences*, 256.



attempts at the monopoly of territorial and commercial privileges in the Orient and the Near East. Secretary of State Hay took occasion in September, 1899, in view of recent actions by the powers looking to the distribution among themselves of exclusive spheres of monopolistic privilege in China, to declare for a system of "equality of treatment for all foreign trade throughout China." In the following March the hesitating replies of the powers were considered (*sic*) as final and definitive by the Secretary.<sup>1</sup> The principle has been repeatedly put forward since that time. In the midst of the Boxer affair it was set forth anew in application to China;<sup>2</sup> in 1906 Secretary Root secured its recognition as regards Morocco; in the past two years it has been applied, in the form of the mandate theory, to territories formerly held by Turkey, to Persia and to colonial territories under the League of Nations. In still more recent days America has waged a campaign for free and equitable cable communications unhampered by national exclusions and monopolies of cables and landing privileges.<sup>3</sup>

In two of these episodes the United States acted in such a way as to make it appear that we sought to avoid international cooperation even for purposes which we tried ourselves to serve. Thus, we refused to participate in the international conference which considered the Danish Sound dues on behalf of the European powers and we refused to join in the international act now known as the Declaration of Paris which, in substance, supported certain of our cherished contentions regarding neutral commerce and blockade in war at sea. An examination of the record, however, will show that America refused to join the Sound Dues conference largely because the European Powers were unready explicitly to deny the principle back of the Sound Dues, or to avow the American principle in its own name, and largely because an attempt was made to inject into the conference an element which could not

<sup>1</sup>For the instruction of 6 September, 1899, and the replies thereto, with the final instruction of 20 March, 1900, see *Foreign Relations*, 1899, 129, 143.

<sup>2</sup>Hay to Herdliska, 3 July, 1900, *Foreign Relations*, 1900, 288.

<sup>3</sup>For the American demand for the "open door" in Morocco see Root to Speck von Sternburg, 19 February, 1906, in Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, 489; for the policy as applied in Turkish territories, Mesopotamia and Persia and to the mandates of the League of Nations in 1920 see *The New York Times*, 21 November, 1920, p. 3, and *passim*. *The New York Times*, 1920, *passim*, especially 5 October, p. 13, and 9 October, p. 17, gives a summary of the communications problem, and the American attitude in regard thereto.

help the main object in view and which would be likely to create, instead, national divergencies better avoided, namely the question of the balance of power among the nations of Europe.<sup>1</sup> Similarly in the case of the Declaration of Paris: our abstention rested partly upon a desire to go farther than the powers were willing to go,—to the exemption from capture of all private property at sea,—and partly to avoid a certain provision of the agreement which we believed, made for naval militarism and competition in armaments, the clause, that is, which, by suppressing privateering, would make national maritime defense dependent upon the creation of an adequate standing navy.<sup>2</sup>

That America has not invariably rejected the method of conference and joint action may be seen by reference to three widely separated incidents.

In 1780 the American Congress was so impressed with the character and probable effect of the rules of maritime warfare proclaimed on 28 February of that year by the Empress Catharine at the head of the first Armed Neutrality that instructions were given to Minister Dana to “subscribe the treaty or convention” establishing the “neutral confederacy.” The United States was to enter this general alliance if an invitation could be obtained.<sup>3</sup> It can not be maintained, of course, that America contemplated participation in the first Armed Neutrality out of enthusiasm for the idea of international confederation for its own sake. The action was not even dictated by loyalty to the principles of maritime freedom espoused by the alliance, although these principles did later come to constitute an American ideal in their own right. The action was based upon a desire to protect “commerce in behalf of these United States” to the end that the struggle for independence might be successfully prosecuted.<sup>4</sup> The significant aspects of the decision

<sup>1</sup>For declaration of President Pierce embodying this position, see his Third Annual Message, of 31 December, 1855, in *Messages of the Presidents*, Richardson ed., V, at 335.

<sup>2</sup>For policy of United States see President Pierce's Fourth Annual Message, 2 December, 1856, in *ibid.*, V, at 412; see also the MS. instructions to American representatives abroad regarding the declaration and the attitude of the United States relative thereto as quoted in Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VII, 365-583, and the correspondence in *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1861, *passim*, as cited by Moore.

<sup>3</sup>*Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, (Wharton), IV, 201.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, VI, 481, 718.

are its indication of the desire on the part of the Congress to utilize such a method, their belief that such a method was of value to American purposes, and the opposition between the maritime program of the Armed Neutrality and the anti-social policy of Britain in her naval warfare. It was this same program of liberal maritime law that was put forward in the resolution of 7 May, 1784, as a basis for new commercial treaties.

Over a century later the United States was still attempting to secure a liberal reform of maritime law by general international conference and the establishment of an international prize court through the London Naval Conference and one of the conventions signed at The Hague in 1907.<sup>1</sup> And it has already been seen that we have put forth and reasserted the doctrine of the open door by similar methods.<sup>2</sup> Whenever the method of joint international action has seemed promising it has been adopted; where it has been rejected it has been because it seemed calculated to defeat its own purpose.

Thus in many forms, under many names, through many successive years the United States has prepared the way for a general system of free international organization and co-operation by attempting to destroy exclusive national diplomatic and commercial practices standing in the way of such a development.

<sup>1</sup>Texts in *Treaties, Supplement, 1910-1913*, Charles ed., III, 248, 266.

<sup>2</sup>Above, notes to p. 438.

## II. BUILDING FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

### ARBITRATION, PAN AMERICANISM AND ALLIED ACTIVITIES

Not all of the American contributions to the cause of international organization have been of this preliminary or preparatory character, however. Besides destroying obstacles to closer international intercourse the United States has been active in the process of building up positive institutions of world government. This activity may be studied under various titles and may be examined in the texts of certain public documents which serve to summarize American policy regarding the development of international organization and practice.

The United States has made its chief contribution to this movement by supporting the development of the organization and practice of international arbitration. This policy is well set forth by Secretaries of State Hay and Root in 1899 and 1907 in the instructions issued to the American delegates to the Hague Conferences of those years.<sup>1</sup> It was declared in the instructions of 1899, that "it is believed that the disposition and aims of the United States in relation to the other sovereign powers could not be expressed more truly or opportunely than by an effort of the delegates of this Government to concentrate the attention of the world upon a definite plan for the promotion of international justice," and an historical résumé was appended to the text of the instructions to illustrate the peculiar interest which America has always taken in this cause, along with a draft proposal for such a court as we hoped to see created. In 1907 the American delegates were instructed, as the American policy in the conference, to advocate a general treaty of obligatory arbitration to cover all questions "of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties," and to try to secure an improvement in the judicial character of the arbitral tribunals of The Hague.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Instructions by Secretary of State John Hay to delegates of the United States to the International (Peace) Conference at The Hague, 1899, with Annex A, being a Historical Résumé relating to the movement for the pacific settlement of international disputes in America from 1832 to 1899, and Instructions to the delegates of the United States to the Second International Peace Conference, 1907, in Scott, *Hague Peace Conferences*, II (documents), 6, 9, 181.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, *passim*.

## DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL FORMS

These critical and far-reaching professions and purposes have not been unsupported by actual performance in American diplomatic history. Beginning with Articles V, VI and VII of the Jay treaty of 1794 wherein three arbitrations were agreed upon with Great Britain,<sup>1</sup> and Article XXI of the agreement with Spain signed at San Lorenzo in 1795, for a claims arbitration,<sup>2</sup> the United States has shared with England the leadership in this particularly stable form of international organization. This is signaled by the four arbitrations provided for in the treaty of Ghent,<sup>3</sup> the arbitrations arranged with Britain in the conventions of 1818<sup>4</sup> and 1822,<sup>5</sup> the Geneva or Alabama claims arbitration, and the Bering Sea and North Atlantic fisheries arbitrations provided for by the agreements of 1871, 1892, and 1909, respectively.<sup>6</sup> The United States and Great Britain have submitted more claims to arbitration than any other nations.<sup>7</sup> Finally, at the Hague Conferences themselves, the American delegates translated their instructions into action by leading the nations in their advocacy of obligatory arbitration and of the establishment of an international prize court and a general court of justice, in contrast to the already existing arbitral tribunal,<sup>8</sup> and in the year 1920 the plans for the court of justice erected under the League of Nations were drawn up under the leadership of two American jurists, one a former Secretary of State, notwithstanding the reputed American hostility to the League itself.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Moore, *International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party*, I, Chapters I, IX, X; text of treaty in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 590.

<sup>2</sup>Text of treaty in *Treaties*, II, 1640.

<sup>3</sup>Moore, *Arbitrations*, I, Chapters II, III, V, VI.

<sup>4</sup>By Article V of that pact; text in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 631 *seq.*

<sup>5</sup>Text in *Treaties*, I, 634, *seq.*

<sup>6</sup>Text in *ibid.*, 700, 746, 835.

<sup>7</sup>Data compiled by LaFontaine in his *Histoire des Arbitrages Internationaux*, 4-5.

<sup>8</sup>Introduction of the American plan for compulsory arbitration at The Hague in 1907, and the addresses of Mr. Choate in support of the movement in *La Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix*, 1907, II, 883, 884, 889, and 90, 91, 203 *et passim*. See also the American project for a court of justice as presented at The Hague in 1907 and the speeches of Mr. Choate and Mr. Scott in support of this plan in *ibid.*, 1031 and 309, 313, 327.

<sup>9</sup>See press accounts of the work of Mr. Root and Mr. Scott in *The New York Times*, June and July, 1920, *passim*, especially 16 July, 1920, page 10; it will be recalled that these two jurists had held the posts, respectively, of Secretary of State of the United States and American delegate at the time of the conference

Attempts have been made from time to time to represent this American attachment to judicial forms of international organization, and the preference for such forms in contrast to political and diplomatic forms, as betraying a reluctance on the part of the United States to commit herself freely to the program of international co-operation except in its mildest form. The preference has been referred to in deprecation, as in some sort revealing an essential hesitation in this connection on the part of America, for all her fine protestations. Such an interpretation of the American attitude in the premises is not so much erroneous as incomplete; it stops short of the main point. The preference mentioned has been clearly manifested by the United States, and is latent to-day in current criticism of the League of Nations as a political and diplomatic organization giving too little weight to legal institutions and judicial decisions.<sup>1</sup> The preference is based upon the belief that more progress is to be made in international relations by the appeal to law and a judicial application of principles set up by common agreement than by diplomatic and political action, involving, perhaps, military coercion exerted by interested nations or partisan national groups.<sup>2</sup> The cost and danger of such action has seemed prohibitive because of the small prospect of beneficial results. Our feeling is one of positive preference for a more effective promotion of the principal object rather than a desire to avoid responsibility. And no nation has so consistently and strongly advocated this particular form of international organization in which it does believe as has the United States.

There is one form of international co-operation where the influence of the United States has been felt but lightly, namely, in international administration, and the reasons for this fact prove the exceptional character of the case. We have joined few international unions and contributed little to this very practical form of international government because of our geographical position. Whatever be the case regarding our relations to European inter-

of 1907 and that the fine Instructions to the American delegates at that time had been drawn up by Mr. Root.

<sup>1</sup>*American Foreign Policy*, as cited above, note to p. 435.

<sup>2</sup>See the reflection of this in the paragraphs of Mr. Root's Instructions of 1907, which relate to "improvements to be made in the provisions of the convention relative to the pacific settlement of international disputes," cited above, note 1, p. 441.

national politics, our frontiers do not run with the frontiers of France or Germany, railroad trains do not come rolling into our territory from a half-dozen foreign nations, nor does our daily life depend directly upon the close functioning of international adjustments in the spheres of communication, law and business. In the Americas, where such conditions have recently developed, we have engaged rather extensively in just this sort of international administration, under the Inter-American High Commission set up by the First Pan American Financial Conference of 1915.<sup>1</sup>

#### BROADENING PAN AMERICANISM

This Pan American Financial Conference of 1915 marked a change in the character of the Pan American movement which has a special claim to attention at this point. In the beginning, Pan Americanism was confined largely to the political and diplomatic plane of international relations; in the last few years we have seen a change of emphasis leading to the development of a Pan Americanism in the fields of science, law, and economics. Each of these varieties of Pan American international organization deserves attention, the former as it is described in the instructions issued by Secretary of State Clay to the delegates of the United States to the Panama Congress of 1826, the latter as referred to by Secretary of State Lansing in his address to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress in Washington on 27 December, 1915.

The independent South American republics had greeted the Monroe doctrine with enthusiasm.<sup>2</sup> In 1824 Bolivar proposed an American international conference at Panama to create a confederation for the preservation of peace among the American nations and for a defense of their national rights.<sup>3</sup> When approached by Mexico and Colombia regarding attendance at the proposed conference the Government of the United States was of

<sup>1</sup>On the Pan American Financial Conference of 1915 and the work of the International High Commission (now "Inter-American High Commission"), see *Proceedings of the First Pan American Financial Conference*, published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1915, and an *Appendix to the Report of the United States Section of the International High Commission* on the first general meeting of the commission at Buenos Aires in 1916, published as Senate Document No. 739, 64th Congress, 2d session.

<sup>2</sup>C. A. Rodney to Monroe, 10 February, 1824, in Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 430.

<sup>3</sup>Text in *International American Conference, Reports and Discussions*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890), Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), 159.

divided mind.<sup>1</sup> In the end, commissioners were nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and instructed by Henry Clay, Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup>

The instructions to the delegates of the United States constitute a remarkable exposition of the positive side of the Monroe doctrine, and a fairly complete exposition of our policy regarding international organization as applied to the Americas. The program set forth by Clay included, among other things, the preservation and development in America of the concept of neutrality in international law,<sup>3</sup> the extension and protection of neutral rights in commerce at sea,<sup>4</sup> the general adoption by the American nations of most-favored-nation treatment in commercial conventions,<sup>5</sup> a joint declaration of the principle of the Monroe doctrine,<sup>6</sup> joint support for an isthmian canal,<sup>7</sup> and the development of arbitration among the American nations.<sup>8</sup> The elements in this program were drawn from the characteristic American theory of international relations, and the Secretary fully realized this. President Adams supported him in the movement, although the President seems to have been much less interested in the proposed Congress than his Secretary of State, apart from its bearing on domestic political issues. While he became quite enthusiastic at first hearing of it, and supported it vigorously in messages to Congress, he pays little attention to it in his diary.<sup>9</sup> Both bespoke the con-

<sup>1</sup>For the original invitation, in the spring and fall of 1825, and the reply of the United States thereto, see Clay's report to Adams, 20 December, 1825; Salazar to Clay, 2 November, 1825; Obregon to Clay, 3 November, 1825; Clay to Obregon, 30 November, 1825; Clay to Salazar, same date; in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 835, 836, 837, and 838, respectively.

<sup>2</sup>The nomination was made in a special message to the Senate on 26 December, 1825, to be found in *Messages* (Richardson), II, 318 *seq.*; the resolution of the Senate advising and consenting to the appointments is to be found, together with many documents relating to the proposed congress, and proceedings in the Senate regarding the same, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, *loc. cit.*, 830 *seq.* esp. 877; the instructions are in *International American Conference*, IV, 113 *seq.* The debates in the Senate and House are in the *Register of Debates in Congress*, Volume II, Part 1, 152, *et seq.*, 1262 *et seq.*, and *passim*.

<sup>3</sup>*International American Conference*, as cited, 124 *seq.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 126 *seq.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 129 *seq.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 136 *seq.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 143 *seq.*

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 124, 148.

<sup>9</sup>*Memoirs*, VI, 531, ("This is a grain of mustard seed"), 537; VII, 16, 55, 75, 82 and *passim*; for the messages of 26 December, 1825, and 15 March, 1826, see *Messages*, II, 318, 329.



tinued support of several policies reviewed above as they had long been promoted by the United States. In addition, the instructions inaugurated a new procedure for carrying out these policies, namely, the method of Pan American co-operation, of the international organization of the American republics.

Subsequent years saw changes in the pace and the terms of the Pan American policy, but no permanent setback for the movement. The efforts of 1826 were premature, and in the next generation the United States was engrossed in the domestic problem of slavery and was led by the slave owners, who had raised the chief opposition in Congress to the conference at Panama, into a career of conquest in the southwest which resulted in neglect and tacit repudiation of the Pan American policy.<sup>1</sup>

#### REVIVAL OF FORMER POLICY

After the Civil War, however, there came a revival of the policy, the effects of which have lasted to the present time. Preceded by certain significant events in the diplomatic world, namely, the mediation of the United States which resulted in the settlement of the war between Spain and Peru, Chile and Ecuador, in 1871 and the choice of the President of the United States as perpetual arbitrator, in default of special agreements choosing other arbitrators, by Chile and Colombia, in 1880,<sup>2</sup> the year 1881 saw a reappearance of the idea of American international conferences, with Blaine's invitation of that year.<sup>3</sup> In 1889 came the first International American Conference, held at Washington upon the invitation of Congress. The years 1901, 1906, 1910 saw the meetings, at ever-shortening intervals, of additional international American Conferences of the general type.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>On the relations between slavery in the United States and the annexation of territory formerly Mexican upon the feeling of South American states toward the United States, see the testimony of former Counsellor for the Department of State, J. B. Moore in his *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 376, 380.

<sup>2</sup>Text of the settlement of 1871, signed by the American Secretary of State "in the rôle of mediator," in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traité*s, 2<sup>e</sup> série, III, 475 seq.; treaty of Bogota, 3 September, 1880, in *International American Conference*, as cited, IV, 220, Art. II.

<sup>3</sup>Text of the invitation as sent to various Latin American states on 29 November, 1881, is in *ibid.*, IV, 225-258; the dispatch is a classic statement of the American feeling and policy regarding the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

<sup>4</sup>For the American policy in this series of events, see the invitation to the conference of 1889, in *ibid.*, I, 9; address of welcome to this conference by Secretary of

In 1915 there came a change, more or less complete and permanent, in the character of the Pan American movement. That change was described by Secretary of State Lansing in an address to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress which met in Washington from 27 December, 1915 to 8 January, 1916.<sup>1</sup> Speaking at the plenary session on the morning of the opening day of the Congress, Mr. Lansing began by referring to the original proclamation of the Monroe doctrine, to the development of Pan Americanism as the American international policy corresponding to the doctrine in the nature of the ends sought, and the older type of Pan Americanism cast in terms of "politics" and "diplomacy." He then declared that Pan Americanism now extended beyond that field, concerned itself with "commerce and industry, science and art, public and private law," and "all those great fields which invite the thought of man." He expected that this broadening of the field would give to the Pan American movement an impulse and power it had never known before. So defined, Pan Americanism, he felt, was the most advanced as well as the most practical form of the idea of internationalism.<sup>2</sup>

These words find their justification in the First and Second Pan American Financial Conferences, held in Washington in 1915 and 1920, in the First and Second Pan American Scientific Congresses held in Santiago, Chile and Washington in 1907-1908 and 1915-1916, in the effective operation of the Pan American Union over the period of a quarter of a century, in the work of the Commission of Jurists created in 1906 and of the Inter-American High Commission created by the Financial Conference of 1915. Various fruits in the shape of uniform commercial laws, the compilation and exchange of statistical data and general information of a commercial, industrial, agricultural or still more broadly cultural sort are either already at hand or within the near prospect.<sup>3</sup>

There is presented here a phenomenon of magnitude and significance. Despite a feeling of suspicion aroused by our more State Blaine in *ibid.*, I, 39; address of Secretary of State Root to the Third Conference, 1906, in *Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Third International Conference of the American States*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1907, 62.

<sup>1</sup>*Daily Bulletin*, Second Pan American Scientific Conference, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>On the recent conferences and subsidiary activities see the *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, at dates of events, and the *Proceedings of the Second Pan American Financial Conference*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1920.

recent actions in Panama, in Central America, and in one or two islands of the West Indies,<sup>1</sup> South and Central American nations have, under our leadership, entered into co-operation with each other and with the United States first on political and constitutional questions and later on questions of commercial and private law. The Central American states formed a judicial union, with a federal court, under the leadership of the United States, for the settlement of international disputes, and all of the nations in the Pan American conferences have joined in a system of general arbitration. The leadership has remained with the United States, and our only regret is that the other American nations have hardly been willing to go as far as the United States would wish in the direction of international co-operation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On one aspect of the actions of the United States in Central America and the Caribbean region since 1913, see the articles and documents on Haiti and San Domingo in the *Nation* (N. Y.) for 17 and 24 July, 1920, and dispatches and discussions in the *New York Times* for November–December, 1920, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> On the creation of the Central American Court under the leadership of the United States, see *The Central American Peace Conference, Report of Mr. William I. Buchanan, Representing the United States of America*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1908, especially address of the Secretary of State of the United States, 26, 27, and text of the convention, 43–53. This court failed of the support needed for a renewal of its authority in 1913, because of opposition by Nicaragua and the United States to one of its decisions.

On the reluctance of Latin American states to follow all of the suggestions of the United States looking to increased international co-operation see the opinion of J. B. Moore in his *Principles of American Diplomacy*, at 407.

### III. REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY BELIED POLICY OF ISOLATION

The conclusion of this review of the activities of the United States in destroying the obstacles to a freer and fuller international intercourse and in helping to build up the progressive institutions of modern international organization, however, may well suggest a question whether with all the evidence of American practice of international co-operation we do not have authoritative declarations to an opposite effect. Granting that America has consistently tried to elevate the plane of diplomatic methods and commercial intercourse to the end that a better system of international co-operation may result, has promoted the practice of international arbitration as no other nation has promoted it, and, in the American continents, has led the way in "the most mature system of international organization known to history," as has been said by a competent authority, have we not, nevertheless and notwithstanding, repeatedly declared ourselves for a withdrawal from international political arrangements with Europe and take a pledge to maintain that separation? As it has been put by one celebrated authority: "The attitude of the United States . . . assumed . . . the form of an established rule of policy. Especially was this the case in regard to the political arrangements with Europe, which, as we have seen, were treated as belonging to what was called the European system, while those of the independent nations of America were jealously guarded as belonging to the 'American System.' This distinction the United States, as its author, proponent, and champion, sought not to efface but to impress upon the world as a derivative of the principle of political nonintervention and a pledge of its consistent observance. No other principle has so distinguished the foreign policy of the United States; and while policies are proverbially subject to mutation, it is probable that the ramifications of that principle will not be wholly overlooked in the consideration of any future plan of concert."<sup>1</sup> Is not the record of action denied by such declarations of purpose?

The reply is two-fold. In the first place, the final test of Ameri-

<sup>1</sup>The closing words of Moore's *Principles of American Diplomacy*, words ringing with a careful and not difficult wisdom; *op. cit.*, 444, 445.

can policy is American action, not declarations of ideas and theories. What we have done, not what we have said, reveals our real purposes. We may, of course, have meanwhile been deceiving ourselves concerning our real purposes and professing—to ourselves as well as to others—to be isolationists while in reality we were co-operationists. There is a profound discrepancy—at once pitiful and honorable—between American professions and American practice prior to 1919.

### EARLY INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY

It should be remembered that in her earlier years America played no retiring rôle in world politics. On the contrary, America began her career in the arena of international negotiation. She was born on the stage of diplomacy. Because of the nature of their objects the "United Colonies" in 1774 were forced to begin by trying to get in touch with the British Government on one hand, and their potential friends—France, Russia, Spain and the minor powers,—on the other. Reconciliation or independence, and especially, recognition and assistance, were objects to be sought, not in America, but in European capitals.<sup>1</sup> The members of the Congress, recognizing the character of the situation, immediately took steps to meet it.<sup>2</sup> Colonial agents in London were converted into representatives of the new Union<sup>3</sup> and an ever-increasing number of diplomatic agents was sent out to the courts of Europe.<sup>4</sup> Treaties of commerce were sought everywhere, loans were sought in Holland and France, alliances were sought in France, Holland and Spain.<sup>5</sup> As is well known, an alliance was obtained with France on 6 February, 1778, "to maintain the . . . sovereignty and independence . . . of the . . . United States," and that nation played a decisive part in the war, a part not dissimilar to that played by the United States in the recent European War; American independence was, in the crisis, the product of international

<sup>1</sup>Compare the situation in 1775-1776 with that between the Union and the Confederacy in the spring of 1861.

<sup>2</sup>*Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789*, Ford and Hunt ed., I, 104.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>4</sup>*Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, Wharton ed., II, 78, 162, 296, 359, 360; *Journals*, VII, 10, VIII, 502, 518.

<sup>5</sup>*Rev. Dip. Corr.*, II, 78, 162, III, 352, IV, 224, 636; *Journals*, XV, 1113, XVIII, 1204; XXI, 876.

co-operation, the fruit of an alliance of the classical type.<sup>1</sup> Thus down to 1783 America had made every effort not to go it alone in the war with Britain but so to place herself, by diplomatic means, in the international system of the day as to accomplish most effectively her objects of permanently entering that system as a recognized member of the family of nations, with political allies and friends and commercial friends and creditors wherever they were needed. This program of alliances is not to be understood as in itself a form of international organization or co-operation in its better or true sense, and it is not here so presented. It signifies here simply that the United States did not seek to refrain from participating in the international political system of the day. The policy of 1774-1783 was later to be regarded as one inimical to international co-operation and peace.<sup>2</sup> Of course there were at the time those in Congress who would have preferred another policy, a policy of going it alone. But the more experienced leaders succeeded in demonstrating that recognition and aid from other nations were necessary in the fight with Britain and that the American colonies were intimate parts of the world state system of the day.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, it would actually appear that this policy was pursued only too enthusiastically.<sup>4</sup>

And, in general, we have pursued this policy ever since. That is to say, when we have had definite interests to defend or objects to promote, we have taken action without regard for any *a priori* theory of abstention. If the only thing required by the legend is that we abstain where we have no interest that we can do, have done, and naturally would do, even without any preconceived principle of action to protect us. If it is meant that we should abstain at the expense of our interests as they arise, that would be poor statesmanship and, as a matter of fact, we have never acted so foolishly.

<sup>1</sup>Text in *Treaties*, I, 479.

<sup>2</sup>Below, note 2, p. 467.

<sup>3</sup>*Journals*, Introduction, sec. 26; Trescott, *Diplomacy of the Revolution*, 16, 27.

<sup>4</sup>*Rev. Dipl. Corr.*, Introduction, Secs. 17, 18.

#### IV. FALSE INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY

The second reply to the contention that American declarations deny and destroy the significance of American actions is that those American declarations which are supposed to deny the policy of co-operation do not in point of fact do anything of the kind, but constitute, on the contrary, declarations of a policy of co-operation which have been distorted into declarations of a policy of isolation by the opponents and enemies of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe, and repeated ever since 1825 with parrot-like insistence. This will appear to any student who re-examines the documents of the time, beginning with 1789 and coming down to the present. Neither the policy of neutrality, nor that of no alliances, nor the Monroe doctrine, as declared by their authors, were policies of withdrawal and isolation but programs of increased American participation and co-operation in international affairs.

The policy of neutrality first made its appearance in 1790 with the threat of war between England and Spain over the Spanish seizure of the goods of certain British subjects in Nootka Sound.<sup>1</sup> In spite of the sympathies felt in America for the respective nations in the quarrel, including France, then an ally of the court of Madrid, and especially, in spite of the intimate manner in which American interests were involved, Jefferson and Hamilton, late in August, 1790, advised against participating in the expected war.<sup>2</sup> This position was taken in reply to the British suggestion that "the United States would find it to their advantage to take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain."<sup>3</sup> And John Adams also advised a firm policy of neutrality, a position of defensive inaction, if it may be so described.<sup>4</sup> Washington, ostensibly waiting on the advice of the cabinet, had already formed a decision for a neutral policy and had so expressed himself in a letter to Lafayette on 11 August.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>John Adams, *Works*, Adams, ed., VIII, 497 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup>Jefferson, *Writings*, Ford ed., V, 198; Hamilton, *Works*, Lodge ed., IV, 20.

<sup>3</sup>Hamilton to Washington, ca. 8 July, 1790, Hamilton, *Works*, IV, 6.

<sup>4</sup>Compare note 1, above.

<sup>5</sup>Washington, *Writings*, Ford ed., XI, 493, 496; this letter does not seem to have been noticed before as it deserves to be.

After this it was not surprising that the neutral position was adopted in 1793 when the arrival of Genêt from France, with the mission of securing aid in the war with England, raised a similar problem. Although much attention has been given to a cabinet consultation on 18 April and the proclamation of 22 April, it should be noted that already, ten days before, on 12 April, Washington had, as in the Nootka Sound episode, decided the question in his own mind before consulting the cabinet and had personally instructed the Secretary of State to enforce a policy of neutrality. In a letter to Governor Lee of Virginia, dated 6 May, Washington declared that he saw the necessity for a neutral policy on the instant of receiving news of the outbreak of war, which had come to him at Mount Vernon; this refers to the letter of 12 April, without doubt.<sup>1</sup>

The action of 1793 is ordinarily interpreted as an effort to remain aloof from European politics and to attend solely to cis-Atlantic affairs. Thus, it has been said that "it really represented not merely an intention to keep out of the war then in progress, but also the national determination to resist the centripetal forces of European politics, and to be left free to work out our national development."<sup>2</sup> Those who sponsored the policy had nothing of the sort in mind. Washington declared that "as soon as the war in Europe had embraced those powers with whom the United States had the most extensive relations there was reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might be interrupted" and that *to prevent this* he was led to adopt the policy of neutrality.<sup>3</sup> He had in mind the maintenance of closer and more harmonious relations with the nations of the world, a continuation of that commercial intercourse into which America had entered so eagerly. In the address of 3 December, Washington had declared that "*the connection of the United States with Europe* [my italics] has become extremely interesting," and that he would inform Congress of the matter in a subsequent communication. Carrying out this pledge, the President, in a special message, dated 5

<sup>1</sup>Washington to Jefferson, 12 April, 1793, *ibid.*, 278; *ibid.*, 286. For the consultation see the questions of 18 April, *ibid.*, 279, and the proclamation of 22 April, *ibid.*, 281.

<sup>2</sup>Fish, *American Diplomacy*, 2d ed., 100-101.

<sup>3</sup>*Messages*, I, 139. So the letter to Lafayette cited note 1 above. So Washington to the Earl of Buchan, 22 April, 1793, in *Writings*, XII, 282, at 283; to Hamilton, 5 May, *ibid.*, XII, 235; address of 3 December, 1793, *Messages*, I, 138, 168.



December, pictured the way in which our communications with Europe had been interfered with by French and British naval forces.<sup>1</sup> Washington had in mind a policy of diminishing the total amount of international dissension, of preserving a maximum of international contacts. It was a policy of greater intercourse, not less.

There were those whose policy of neutrality was purely negative. John Adams seems to have conceived neutrality not so much as a positive strategical attitude as a coat of mail or a bomb proof shelter.<sup>2</sup> The reception accorded by the Congress to the President's utterances shows that that body, however, did not differ from his view of the matter:<sup>3</sup>

And it is just as useful to-day in its contemporary aspect; whatever power for good in international relations has been enjoyed by America since 1914 has been due to her refusal to be grouped diplomatically with one set of European powers or the other and to her insistence upon pursuing, not as an ally but as an associate, a policy quite distinctly differentiated from that of Paris and London. The United States, as a result, was the only power not inhibited, at the close of the war, from entering into some measure of understanding and accommodation with all the powers of Europe, allied, enemy and neutral.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, 140, 145, 147.

<sup>2</sup>See Adams' presentation of his views in the Nootka Sound episode, in his *Works*, as cited, *sup.*, note 2, p. 452. Later, when Adams had become President, even he portrayed neutrality in a message to Congress on 16 May, 1797, in warmer and richer tones, as a policy of justice to all belligerents and co-operation with other neutrals, *Messages*, I, 233, esp. 238.

<sup>3</sup>*Messages*, (Richardson), I, 142-143, 144-145, 160.

## V. FALSE INTERPRETATION OF NO-ALLIANCE POLICY

But the Adams school was soon able to attach their peculiar views to another item in American policy. As early as 1774 there had been persons who protested against any foreign connections for the United States.<sup>1</sup> After 1783 these doubters grew more skeptical still. The Congress gave evidence of much feeling of this sort.<sup>2</sup> Several utterances of Washington dating from 1788 to 1793 seemed to confirm their doctrine.<sup>3</sup> In the end came the warning against "permanent alliances" on 1 March, 1797.<sup>4</sup> Four years later Jefferson, leader of the other great party in the nation, proclaimed a policy of avoiding "entangling alliances."<sup>5</sup> Thus was developed what has looked like a powerful case for the school of national isolation.

Here likewise the legend will not stand the test of scrutiny. Washington on 1 March, 1797, was propounding a policy of friendliness, not of remoteness, *of increased co-operation, not of national withdrawal*. He feared "partial" alliances precisely for their disruptive and divisive effect on international concord. He advised American abstention from European alliances not as a means of disentanglement for safety by flight but as a more effective method of promoting international solidarity. In summarizing his advice to America on this point, in his Farewell Address, he said (my italics): "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. *Cultivate peace and harmony with all . . .* In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent inveterate *antipathies against particular nations* and passionate *attachments for others* should be excluded and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings *toward all should be cultivated. . . .* "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with *any portion of the foreign world. . .*

<sup>1</sup>Above, note 3, p. 451.

<sup>2</sup>Report of a Special Committee to the Congress, 12 June, 1783, in *Rev. Dipl. Corr.* (Wharton), VI, 481; Instructions to the Peace Commissioners from the Congress, 29 October, 1783, *ibid.*, 717.

<sup>3</sup>So in the letter to Lafayette already referred to: "unentangled in the crooked policies of Europe," above, note 1, p. 453; so to Jefferson, 1 January, 1788: "For our situation is such, as makes it not only unnecessary, but extremely imprudent, for us to take part in their quarrels," in *Works*, XI, 203, 204.

<sup>4</sup>*Messages*, (Richardson), I, 213, esp. 223.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 321, esp. 323.

" . . . We may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

"*Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences. . .*"

Thus Washington did not condemn alliances or participation in general international relations but fixity and partiality in the direction of American policy.

The two paragraphs most frequently quoted in representation of the isolation doctrine are the following (Washington's italics):

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities."

#### OPPOSED ARTIFICIAL GROUPINGS

By the term "political" Washington was referring again to partial alliances of policy. The preference for commercial or other nonpolitical (judicial) forms of international co-operation manifested in later American foreign relations derives in part from this source, but in part from a desire to avoid action which would defeat the cause of international co-operation, as has already been pointed out. He is also making his conclusions depend, for their validity, upon the *de facto* absence of identity between European international questions and American concerns; by implication he would urge American intervention and participation where this condition was different, for in this case the probable war would be, to use a phrase of Jefferson's of later date "not her war, but ours." Finally, it is really against "*artificial*" *diplomatic groupings* which

tend to disrupt *general* international co-operation that Washington protests.<sup>1</sup>

This theory or policy was expressed to the British Foreign Office in admirable terms some 25 years later by the American minister in London: "Would not such a step [a proposed Anglo-American diplomatic action] wear the appearance of the United States implicating themselves in the political connections of Europe? Would it not be *acceding*, in this instance at least, *to the policy of one of its leading powers in opposition to the projects avowed by other powers?* This heretofore had been no part of the system of the United States. Their foreign policy had been essentially bottomed on the maxim of *keeping peace and harmony with all powers without offending any* [my italics]."<sup>2</sup>

The conception was again vividly expressed by Mr. Roosevelt in a letter to the Kaiser in 1906 sent through Secretary Root and Ambassador Sternberg. In this letter the President said that he would gladly drop the whole question of Morocco and German and French rights there "in which our traditional abstention from the political affairs of Europe forbids the United States *to take sides* [my italics]."<sup>3</sup>

Still another expression of the same principle is found in President Wilson's demand of 1918 that there must be no special alliances within the general family of the League of Nations in his addresses of 4 July at Mount Vernon and of 27 September at New York City. The demand was made by Wilson—as by Washington—not out of antagonism or opposition to international organization but out of zeal for a greater measure of international co-operation. As he had put the matter in his address of 22 January, 1918, "I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act . . . with the same purpose all act in the common interest . . ."

<sup>1</sup>The relevant parts of the Farewell Address are paragraphs 29-40, as given in the *Messages*, I, 221-223.

<sup>2</sup>Rush to Adams, 19 September, 1823, in Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton ed., VI, 378-379.

<sup>3</sup>Root to Sternburg, 1906, in Bishop, J. B., *Theodore Roosevelt*, I, 493.

## DECRIED ALLIANCE WITH SINGLE STATE

Likewise, Jefferson put forward his policy of "no entangling alliances" with the same purpose. Before 1790 Jefferson spoke of alliances with no animus against them as an institution; then there is a gap in his utterances on this subject for seven years; then follow several utterances in 1797, 1798, 1799 and, finally, in 1801, in which he denounces alliances as such.<sup>1</sup> What had happened in the interval? The French alliance had proved a delusion and a snare. Accordingly, Jefferson now inveighs against alliances as defective devices, harmful in international relations, and harmful precisely because they tend to attach single nations to each other to the exclusion of others and to the harm of the general concord of nations: "Better . . . haul off from Europe as soon as we can and from all attachments to *any portions* of it" (writer's italics). It ought to be noted, in this connection, that the term "none" in the formula of 1801 is usually employed by Jefferson in its normal sense, the singular number; he was opposing not relations with the European nations but alliances with any (one) of them. It should also be noted that Jefferson was less precise on this point than Washington and that, consequently, he did not remain very firm in this ideal but freely entertained the idea of alliances and ententes later.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, Jefferson, like Washington, feared especially the influence on domestic republican politics of such alliances with "favorite" nations as much as any results in the international relations of the nation; the significance of this on the scope of the policy will be evident at once. As in 1793 so in 1797 and 1801 the thought of Washington and Jefferson was not of national exclusiveness or seclusion but of increased and more fruitful national participation in international relations. The principle was: no per-

<sup>1</sup>To Franklin, 13 August, 1777, in *Writings*, II, 132; to . . . ? . . . 8 June, 1778; *ibid.*, 157; Memorandum on foreign policy, 1785, *ibid.*, IV, 130; Report on foreign policy, December, 1790; to G. Morris, 1790, *ibid.*, 224; Instructions to Carmichael, 1790, *ibid.*, V, 227. To Edward Rutledge, 1797, *ibid.*, 154; to John Taylor, 1798, *ibid.*, to T. Lomax, March, 1799, *ibid.*, 374; First Inaugural Address, 4 March, 1801, *Messages* (Richardson), I, 321. The formula "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," was one item in a long enumeration (paragraph 4 of the Address as compiled by Richardson) of "the essential principles of our Government," as Jefferson saw them.

<sup>2</sup>To John Taylor, 1798, to Robert Livingston, April, 1802, in *Writings*, VIII, 145; to Monroe, 24 October, 1823, Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton ed., VI, 391.

manent alliances to entangle us with one part of Europe to our exclusion from another part, but an active co-operation with all nations on a general basis of equality. There must be no private alliances within the general family of nations. Not because international connections are to be discouraged in general, but because partial alliances obstruct the development of the common organization.

## VI. MONROE DOCTRINE FALSELY INTERPRETED

The crowning event in the enunciation of the policy of isolation, as things are usually represented, was the declaration of the Monroe doctrine. The declaration of 2 December, 1823, is commonly taken as the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Added to the earlier declarations regarding neutrality and political alliances, the pronouncement of President Monroe has been held to reverse all the diplomatic activity of the Revolutionary period and after, and to deprive subsequent activities for international co-operation of all significance.

The writer believes that such an interpretation is totally unsupported by the record. The use of the term "isolation" to describe either the policy of 1823 or the practice of American diplomacy before or since that time is sheer legend-mongering. It would be strange, indeed, to find America withdrawing from participation in international relations with European powers, and retiring to a position of isolation, only eight years after 1815 when she had stood forward so prominently for the development of arbitration, freer commercial exchange and so on. But we are not compelled to rely on general considerations such as these. The documents speak for themselves. They show that the action of 1823 constituted not a decreased but an increased participation in international politics, not a withdrawal from, but an intervention on the part of America in, the world system of the balance of power comparable in importance and quality only with the action of 6 April, 1917.

The causes bringing about this step may be briefly recalled.

A change had come over the character of the wars in Europe.<sup>1</sup> From 1789 to 1815 there had been no question of principle of any bearing on American interests involved, except, perhaps, at the very first, in 1789-95. There are frequent references to these wars as mere capricious and selfishly competitive quarrels, and as involving principles foreign to American interests, as expressed in the following paragraphs:

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or

<sup>1</sup>As Monroe and Calhoun pointed out in a cabinet meeting on 21 November, 1823; John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs*, Adams ed., VI, 196.

a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.

" . . . Why . . . entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?"<sup>1</sup>

#### NEUTRALITY WHERE THERE WAS NO MORAL ISSUE

In these conflicts of dynasty and commercial rivalry the attitude of neutrality was ethically permissible and, being permissible, was good business policy. It is somewhat of a shock to realize the way in which Washington and Jefferson rejoiced over the prospect of profit for American business by our remaining neutral and selling supplies to needy belligerents. Thus Washington wrote to Jefferson on 1 January, 1788, that "whenever a contest happens among them [the powers of Europe] . . . we may be benefited [in trade] by their folly;" and to Lafayette, on 11 August, 1790, that it was our policy "to observe a strict neutrality and to furnish others with those good things of subsistence, which they may want." Such a position could only escape from being the most degrading sort of camp-following, of making profit from others' bloody sorrow on the assumption that there was no moral issue involved in the wars in question. There are further utterances betraying a similar feeling of superiority and commercial advantage in our peace policy in Jefferson's message of 17 October, 1803.<sup>2</sup> Even as late as 1822 Monroe could still say, in his message of 3 December: "if a convulsion should take place in any of those countries it will proceed from causes which have no existence and are utterly unknown in these states," thereby suggesting a continuation of the policy of neutrality.<sup>3</sup>

But Monroe went on to add to his words as quoted: "[In these states] in which there is but one order, that of the people, to whom the sovereignty exclusively belongs";<sup>4</sup> and these words bring to light a new element in the situation. The wars of the period fol-

<sup>1</sup>Paragraphs 35 and 37 of Washington's Farewell Address, in *Messages*, I, 222-223; Adams to Rush ("quarrels"), 28 July, 1823, Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 359.

<sup>2</sup>Letters of Washington in *Writings*, XI, 203, 496; Jefferson's message in *Messages* I, 361.

<sup>3</sup>Message of 3 December, 1822, paragraph 32, in *Messages of the Presidents*, Richardson ed., II, 193, 194.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 194.



lowing 1815 resulted from efforts on the part of the powers to put down active revolutions in southern Europe. Now these wars were comparatively irrelevant to America also, but they were so only because she, on the one hand, had achieved her independence already and because, on the other, she would not help in the work of oppression. Jefferson says, somewhere in his correspondence, that having become free ourselves, we shall certainly not help to prevent others from imitating our example. The departure which she might be led to make,—and it was in this direction that action was eventually taken,—was to assist the revolutionary movement, as she might have done in the years following 1789 if circumstances had been otherwise: that is, if the American internal situation had been more coherent, public opinion more united, and the nation more powerful at sea; if the French revolutionists had been more circumspect at home and abroad; and, especially, if the Federalists had not dominated the American political scene.

Hence Monroe could and did couple with these remarks on the American position warm hopes for the success of the revolutionary Greeks and of the revolting Spanish colonists:

“A strong hope was entertained that peace would ere this have been concluded between Spain and the independent governments south of the United States in this hemisphere. . . . We still cherish the hope that this result [peace with recognition] will not long be postponed.”

“The mention of Greece fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feelings of which our nature is capable. . . . It was natural, therefore, that the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so signally displayed throughout the United States. A strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth.”

#### AIDING CAUSE OF LIBERTY

Indeed, not nearly enough attention has been devoted to this whole movement in American policy, which has been called the “American interest in popular government abroad” as a quali-

fication of our reputed policy of isolation.<sup>1</sup> Later, in June of 1823, Monroe wondered whether America could not take a bolder attitude toward the situation in Europe than we had in 1793, whether we could not "afford greater aid to that cause [of liberty] than we then did." In the action of 1823 the democratic forces were thus doing what they had failed to persuade the government to do in the early days of the popular movement in Europe.<sup>2</sup>

With this program in the back of his mind, and aware of at least the general direction of current Franco-Spanish policy, Monroe felt a ready sympathy with British proposals for a joint declaration in support of Spanish-American liberty when they came from the American minister Rush in the fall of the year. He felt that we ought to "meet the proposal of the British Government."<sup>3</sup> Jefferson was of like mind, declaring: "I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed," and Madison agreed that "there ought not to be any backwardness . . . in meeting her in the way she had proposed."<sup>4</sup> Here was a chance to develop an entente with increasingly liberal England in opposition to the Holy Alliance, the enemy of liberty and national independence. Here was an opportunity to influence the course of international politics for the cause of national liberty. Madison added, in his letter to Monroe: "Will it not be honorable to our country and possibly not altogether in vain to invite the British Government to extend the avowed disapprobation of the project against the Spanish Colonies to the enterprize of France against Spain herself; and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks?"<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, the British had come to the conclusion that it was necessary for them to act at once,—and alone, if necessary,—to protect their interests. In the beginning of October Canning "began by saying that our conversations . . . on the 26th of

<sup>1</sup>Messages, II, 192, 193; E. B. Greene in *War Information Series*, No. 8, of the Committee on Public Information, Washington, September, 1917.

<sup>2</sup>Monroe to Jefferson, 2 June, 1823, *Writings*, VI, 309-310.

<sup>3</sup>The record of the proposal and ensuing negotiations is to be found in the documents published in Monroe's *Writings*, *loc. cit.* 345 *seq.* The original proposal is to be seen on 361-366. Madison's reaction is expressed in his letter to Jefferson under date of 17 October, *ibid.*, 324.

<sup>4</sup>Jefferson to Monroe, 24 October, *ibid.*, 91, 393; Madison to Monroe, 30 October *ibid.*, 394-395.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 395.

September having led him to conclude that nothing could be accomplished between us . . . he had deemed it indispensable, as no more time was to be lost, that Great Britain should herself, without any concert with the United States, come to an explanation with France." Thus Great Britain, refusing to meet the American counter-demand for recognition of the South American states by Britain as a condition prior to any joint pronouncement on the question of intervention in those regions by the Holy Alliance, was the first party to modify the plan for a joint declaration.<sup>1</sup> In conferences beginning on 9 October, 1823, Canning notified France of the opposition of Great Britain in case the alliance should move against the former Spanish colonies.<sup>2</sup> The American Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, had expressed a preference for separate declarations of policy in any case and the attitude and action of Great Britain in October now left no alternative, although up to the very last day of November Adams was still planning for this "glorious example of power, animated by justice." He declared that ". . . this Government is willing to move in concert with Great Britain."

#### QUESTION OF AUTHORSHIP

The decisive factors in bringing about a separate declaration were not, therefore, Adams' more or less pronounced preference for that mode of action but the cessation of British overtures and the occurrence of the opening of Congress. In his letter to Rush on 29 November (*only three days before the message was delivered*) Adams is still planning for a joint declaration with Britain and, in any case, his preference as declared was merely for separate overt actions based, as he indicates again to Rush in instructions

<sup>1</sup>Rush to Adams, 26 November, 1823, *ibid.*, 401; 10 October, 1823, and 9 February, 1824, *ibid.*, 389 and 429.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 402; a fairly full account of the Anglo-French conference is to be found in a Memorandum of Conference, printed in Monroe's *Writings*, VI, 413-419; this would appear to have been given to Rush by Canning on 13 December (see Canning to Rush, 13 December, *ibid.*, 413) and by the latter forwarded to Adams, although I find no record of the date of its receipt by Adams. Great Britain had already declared her unwillingness to participate in any effort to restore the Spanish colonies to the mother country (Instructions to Duke of Wellington, British representative in the Congress of Verona, 27 September, 1822, in *British and Foreign State Papers*, X, 4, 5); she now intimated that she would be opposed to such action by others. It seems possible that Monroe and Adams were cognizant of the instructions to Wellington, so far as they went.

dated 30 November, on a "confidential concert of opinions and operations." Thus Adams very probably regarded the action which was actually taken as, in some sort, co-operation with Britain; he counted on "the co-operation of Great Britain" in any case. The very slight amount of attention given by Adams in the *Memoirs* to the message upon its delivery and his neglect to mention Rush's dispatch of 26 November, telling of the Anglo-French conference of 9-12 October, when he received this dispatch, together with his preoccupation with the academic incident with the Russian minister suggest that he attached less importance to the doctrine itself and to the manner of its being declared than to his private plans. They certainly belie any picture of the action of 2 December as a dramatic and sharp triumph for Adams.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly with the question of the "authorship" of the message of 1823. In spite of the narrowness of view which characterizes his treatment of the subject, Mr. Ford has clearly shown that Adams had a preponderant share in the *literary authorship* of the message. That he was a legitimate father to the policy in *spirit and purpose*, however, it is impossible to maintain in view of the contributions of Canning, Rush and the—to all New England Federalists distasteful—party of philosophical republicans of Jefferson's school. On the very day of its delivery he paid little attention to it, as has been seen. It was rather a nuisance to him in his own plans, and in the result it was the element contributed by Adams which later hardened and shriveled the doctrine from a generous and statesmanlike policy to a mean and shortsighted program of isolation and imperialism. Just so had another Adams reduced Washington's lofty concept of neutrality to a petty rule of "safety first."<sup>2</sup>

At all events, Monroe declared to the world on 2 December, 1823, that we should consider any attempt on the part of the allied powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.<sup>3</sup> The American

<sup>1</sup>Adams to Rush, 29 and 30 November, *ibid.*, 407, 410; *Memoirs*, VI, 203, 223, *seq.*, 244; *Writings*, VI, 401; *Memoirs*, 189 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup>"John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," in *American Historical Review*, VII, 676 *seq.*, and VIII, 28 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup>The declaration is in *Messages*, II, 207, 220, esp. 209, 218. I have omitted mention of the anti-colonization theme in the message, not because it is not part of the doctrine, but because it was then, and is—to a greater extent—now subordinate to the anti-imperial theme.

nation thus took up a definite position in the most critical diplomatic situation of the day, in direct relations, respectively, of opposition to and co-operation with the powers of Europe. We had entered the lists, as we were destined to do again a century later, to make the world safe for the practice of political self-government in the face of threats of a military autocracy. An observer wrote from Buenos Aires: "The weight of our moral character as a nation in the scale of Europe is equal to armies in the field" and in 1826 Webster described the action thus: "That people [of the United States] saw, and they rejoiced to see, that on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty."<sup>1</sup> This is not isolation, but intervention!

In order to substantiate this view of the declaration and bring out its full meaning reference will be made to several related facts.

#### IN EFFECT A JOINT DECLARATION

As first proposed the declaration was to be a joint diplomatic *démarche* by England and America, and as such was acceptable and welcomed by the President, his most sympathetic advisers, his Secretary of State and his minister to London. Rush had written Adams: "I had no hesitation in saying [to Canning] that, under their warrant [his general powers] I would (if Britain would recognize the independence of the former Spanish colonies) put forth with Great Britain the declaration to which he had invited me." In this connection it is well to remember that Rush was an especially careful and competent representative, not given to rash actions.<sup>2</sup>

In the event the effect was to "group" America and England clearly and in a spectacular position in the diplomatic scene; no French or Spanish observer had any illusions on that score. In effect it *was* a joint declaration. It might even be hazarded that Europe saw the significance of the declaration more clearly than did anyone in America except the group about the President. The French foreign minister suspected actual collusion between

<sup>1</sup>Rodney to Monroe, Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 430; *ibid.*, 443.

<sup>2</sup>Above, note 1 p. 464; Rush to Adams 19 September, in Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 377, 388, esp. 382; Moore, *Principles*, 241.

Britain and America. Later Canning, in an effort to curb America in her Pan American leadership, destroyed this grouping.<sup>1</sup>

In the second place, the American action has had the effect of maintaining and even creating relations on the part of America with Europe regarding the former Spanish colonies which would not otherwise be there. Instead of letting the colonies drop off into comparative obscurity with no comment made, here was a new fabric of relations between the old and new worlds to take the place of the otherwise vanishing tie of colonial dependence. Ever since 1823 the doctrine has constituted an added subject in American diplomatic relations to Europe, especially in the diplomacy of the United States. It has entailed active diplomatic intervention and the danger of war whenever it has had to be enforced. It constituted, in effect, a guaranty by the United States, *contra mundum*, of the territorial integrity and political independence of some twenty Latin American republics—not a step adroitly calculated to take the United States out of active international life! In its earlier days (1826) it was accordingly regarded in Congress as a dangerous liability which ought to be repudiated as likely to defeat the friendly policies of Washington and Jefferson.<sup>2</sup> It did not relieve us from, but involved us still more deeply in, international politics.

#### TO PROTECT REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS

Finally, the primary object of the Monroe doctrine was to protect American domestic republican institutions and related not at all to American foreign relations outside of that object. Apart from the emphasis on this idea in the message itself, Monroe reverted to it in his message to Congress a year later, on 7 December, 1824 (my italics): "The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incidental thereto, *especially in the very important one of instituting their own government*, has been declared. . . . It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere

<sup>1</sup>For Spanish and French opinion see Robertson, "Monroe Doctrines Abroad in 1823-24," in *American Political Science Review*, VI, 546-563, esp. 551 seq.; *ibid.*, 551 and 461-562.

<sup>2</sup>See the debates in the House of Representatives in connection with the Panama Congress in 1827, as quoted in McMaster, *History of the United States*, V, 454; the quotation is from the *Register of Debates in Congress*, Vol. II, Part 1, *passim*.

in their concerns, *especially in those alluded to . . .* without affecting us." The same conclusion has been strikingly set forth by a recent writer under the title *The Origin, Meaning, and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine*: "It was at this point of *distinction between the ideas of government* on the part of the monarchies of Europe and those that had sprung up in the midst of the new and independent nationality established upon this side of the ocean that the peoples of the two continents began to draw apart (my italics)." The author notes that along with this went an increase of international relations apart from the governmental connection.<sup>1</sup> Finally, Canning had described to Rush the character of the separation which they had all witnessed by the phrase: "So far as the tie of political dependence was concerned," and this is the meaning of Adams' expatiations on "right," "liberty," and "independence," also I take it.<sup>2</sup>

This object also lay back of the no-alliances program of 1797-1801 and determined its scope. Thus, in his message of 17 September, 1796, Washington said (my italics): "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of *republican government*." Note that Washington went on: "But that jealousy to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it."<sup>3</sup>

#### NO BAR TO ACTIVE INTERCOURSE

According to this interpretation the declaration offered no bar to the most active relations between the new states and Europe, or between the United States and Europe so long as that primary object be safeguarded. Nothing shows this so clearly as does the willingness of the American Government to entertain the idea of an international conference on the subject of the former Spanish colonies provided those states be invited to attend and the con-

<sup>1</sup>*Messages*, II, 260; Charlemagne Tower, in *American Journal of International Law*, XIV, 1-25.

<sup>2</sup>Rush to Adams, 19 August, 1823, Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 361-365, esp., 363; Adams to Anderson, 27 May, 1823, *ibid.*, 355, and draft of reply to the Russian minister, 27 November, 1823, in *Memoirs*, VI, 211.

<sup>3</sup>*Messages*, I, 222.

ference go upon their independence as a prior assumption. So with the invitation to join the Holy Alliance; the refusal was based on the difference between the internal domestic political principles of the United States and the Allies. The real object of the conference proposed in 1823 was clearly seen to be the "calming" of the former Spanish colonies and the restoration of the principles of authority—*Spanish* authority—in them. It was not the idea of international conference that was resented and which caused the United States—and Britain also—to refuse to attend, but that of Europe exercising "jurisdiction over communities now of right exempt from it," "unsolicited by the latter and against their will."<sup>1</sup>

In this connection it should be recalled that the reciprocal pledge which Monroe gave was that the United States would keep out of the *domestic* affairs of European states. He declared: "Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."<sup>2</sup> The whole problem in discussion was that of domestic self-government. And, in the result, there was created a numerous group of free republics in this hemisphere which were allowed to go forward to the development of the Pan American system of international cooperation, a thing which never could have come about if Latin America had become, like Africa, part of the European colonial world.

Again, if it be said that such a threat of intervention on the part of America promised more than we could actually perform in our naval weakness at that time the effect is directly to admit the intention of the declaration while denying the power to carry it out, which is not in question here. Just so had Washington and Jefferson desired naval power in 1796 and in 1800 for America to enable her to intervene in the European area. Washington desired a naval force to protect our trade in the Mediterranean. Jefferson had the same thing in mind and also action against the patrons of the Barbary pirates, in the West Indies; back in 1788 he had written Washington that "a maritime force was the only one by which

<sup>1</sup>Adams to Rush, 30 November (!), 1823, in Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 409-413, esp. 412; Adams to Middleton, 5 July, 1820, *ibid.*, 349-350; Rush to Canning, 27 August, 1823, *ibid.*, 379-380, and Rush to Adams, 9 February, 1824, *ibid.*, 428.

<sup>2</sup>Message of 2 December, 1823, in *Messages*, II, 218-219.



we can act on Europe."<sup>1</sup> Here also the effect of three thousand miles of water was not so much to keep Europe out of America as to keep America out of Europe; and it was these three thousand miles of water and not a policy of isolation that did keep America out of Europe.

### INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS

This interpretation of the character and purpose of the declaration of 1823 is confirmed by the utterances of various statesmen in Europe and America at the time. Later in December, Monroe wrote Jefferson concerning the general subject, and himself the author of the message and therefore best qualified to speak of its intention and purport, portrayed the message as an intervention by America in world politics in co-operation with Great Britain to preserve a wholesome basis for international relations in opposition to the imperialism of the Holy Alliance.<sup>2</sup> Lafayette praised the action as a blow to Bourbonism in the cause of liberty.<sup>3</sup> Metternich bemoaned the calamity put upon the world by republican America.<sup>4</sup> Reactionary publicists feared the United States as a new factor in the game of European politics.<sup>5</sup> The doctrine maintained and extended the characteristic American program of participating fully in international politics to the extent necessary to its own interests. The action of 1823 depended largely upon the conviction that, though of interest to Europe and hence (by implication from the utterances of 1797 and 1801) not of interest to us by the provincial theory of European-American relations, this in fact was an American question as much as, and at the same time as, it was a European question. Had we not, indeed, acted as sponsors in attempting to have the South American states received into the family of nations? Canning had said to Rush that this question "was also, to the full, as much American as European"; he later told the French that he could not understand "how a European congress could discuss Spanish-American affairs with-

<sup>1</sup>Message of Washington of 7 December, 1796, in *Messages*, I, 201; Jefferson, *Writings*, IV, 83-84, and letter of 4 December, 1788 in *ibid.*, V, 58.

<sup>2</sup>Monroe to Jefferson 4 December and (?) December, in *Writings*, VI, 342-345.

<sup>3</sup>To Monroe, (?) March, 1824, quoted in Monroe, *Writings*, VII, 14, note 1.

<sup>4</sup>Robertson, *op. cit.*, 560, quoting Public Record Office letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Canning, 21 January, 1824.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 563.

out calling to their councils a power so eminently interested in the result as the United States of America, Austria, Russia and Prussia being comparatively so much less concerned in the subject," and the Prince de Polignac apparently saw the point.<sup>1</sup>

We were in 1823 intervening in world politics and doing our best to establish a basis of international relations more generous than that of the 18th century and more conducive to free and hearty international co-operation.

<sup>1</sup>Rush to Canning, 23 August, 1823, in Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 366. So in the Message itself, in *Messages*, II, at 218; so Adams to Nelson, 22 (28?) April, 1823, in Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 351-352; to Rush, 30 November, 1823, *ibid.*, at 411; to Browne, 23 December, 1823, *ibid.*, at 422-423; memorandum of Conference as cited, *ibid.*, at 418.

## VII. THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1825-1900

### MISINTERPRETATION OCCURRED

So matters stood in 1825. From that date until recent times three conditions prevailed. ;

In the first place the misinterpretations of the policies of Washington and Jefferson and Monroe, which had appeared so early and had found such powerful advocates, came to be accepted as true statements of those policies. The negative aspects of those policies were treated as the essential parts thereof—or rather as the whole thing. This development was stimulated by the wave of Western democratic Americanism which set in with Jackson in 1828-29, and by the growing consciousness of national power which came with the expansion of the country and the increase in national wealth and power. But it was caused fundamentally by the fact—and this is the second of the three prevailing conditions of 1825-1900—that Europe let us alone. Europe was at peace from 1825 to 1850 and the wars of the next two decades did not develop into general conflagrations. If they had it may be conjectured that America could not and would not have stood out of them. And it is the critical periods in international relations which must be taken for testing American policy, not the quiet periods. Our foreign trade had not reached proportions sufficient to lead us actively into international affairs on that ground. It was quite natural that we should be inactive internationally. But this was due to external causes, not to a definite policy of abstention. Whenever the occasion arose for us to act, we acted and acted vigorously—as has been seen in the earlier parts of this paper. We even acted in some cases—all the while professing to be isolationists—in encouraging political movements abroad in a way which was far from reticent and reserved, and which was to be duplicated only by the propagandist activities of certain governments and parties in 1917-1919. It is probably true that the United States, even in this period, undertook more active steps in international relations *over and above those called for by the needs of the immediate defense of national interests*, more crusading *démarches*, than the average European state.

The third line of development to be noted in this period is the expansion of American trade and the natural expansion of inter-

national relations in general until by 1900 we were no longer being let alone and could not expect to be let alone in the future. Then came the need for more action in the field of diplomacy for the defense of particular national interests as occasion demanded, in addition, presumably, to the continued promotion of certain general aims to which we had been attached from the beginning. Then a curious thing happened. The doctrine of isolation which, though preached so vigorously during 1825-1900, had not prevented much actual diplomatic action in support of ultimate and general ideals, was now invoked to limit action in defense of immediate and particular interests. And in our day the doctrine, still built upon false interpretations of Washington's and Jefferson's and Monroe's declarations, and re-enforced by the continued repetition of those false interpretations for the past hundred years, has been invoked to prevent continued action of the former type.

#### EVENTS TOO STRONG FOR MYTH

Events have proven too strong for the myth, except in a few notable and important—on the whole the most important—cases. Just as in 1825-1900 our practice diverged from our proclamations, so since 1900 we have had increased evidences that the real American policy, as revealed by our actual practice in critical situations, is one of participation and co-operation, not isolation; is one of promoting freer and fuller international intercourse, not of seeking to have that intercourse restricted and reduced and pitched upon the plane of nationalistic competition, rather than international co-operation. One or two illustrations of this will suffice.

In the autumn of 1900, after the troops of the United States and the European powers had relieved the besieged legations in Peking, the United States stepped into the rôle of leader and declared that certain conferences must be held to clear up the situation.<sup>1</sup> The basis of discussion, we insisted,<sup>2</sup> must be Secretary Hay's note to the powers of 3 July which contained two

<sup>1</sup>Adee to Conger, 22 August, 1900; Conger to Hay, 12 September, 1900; Rockhill to Hay, 1 October, 1900; President McKinley to the Emperor of China, 18 October, 1900; in *Foreign Relations*, 1900, 197, 200, 204, 295; other dispatches *passim*.

<sup>2</sup>Hill (acting Secretary of State) to Conger, 29 September, 1900; Hay to Conger, 19 October, 1900; *ibid.*, 204, 217.

principal doctrines for application in the Chinese situation, namely, concurrent international action, whatever the objects to be attained should be, and equality among the nations of commercial privilege in China.<sup>1</sup> We further insisted that, in discussing indemnities and punishment, the proposals put forward must commend themselves to all parties by their justice and moderation, and opposed proposals from certain quarters which were expressions of sheer vindictiveness and military passion and which aimed at exclusive national profit at the expense of China and the other powers. German and French representatives urged exemplary and extreme punishments for guilty Chinese officials and they desired to exact large punitive indemnities for each nation with the right to occupy Chinese territories until these indemnities should be paid; the United States, supported by Great Britain, opposed punishments which would create new passions among the nations by appearing to be excessive and unjust, and opposed the cutting up of China under any pretext.<sup>2</sup> In short, the American policy was one of conference, of co-operation and of general justice in opposition to the forces of exclusive national military action.

### THE MOROCCAN INTERVENTION

In the Moroccan affair this policy was brought to bear even more forcibly. France, in 1904, attempted to strengthen her position in Morocco by agreements with Spain and Great Britain providing for French "assistance" to the sultan in matters of police and finance. Thereupon Germany espoused the Moroccan cause and seemed to threaten war on the Entente just when France was quite unprepared and Russia reeling from the effects of the war with Japan. It was in the following spring that William II paid his visit to Tangier and declared that he "had decided to do everything in his power to safeguard German interests in Morocco, considering the sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign."<sup>3</sup> At this juncture President Roosevelt wrote to the Kaiser, as a private individual, ostensibly, but obviously expressing the idea at the bottom of American policy in all such cases, and "sug-

<sup>1</sup>Hay to Herdlika, 3 July, 1900, *Foreign Relations*, 1900, 99.

<sup>2</sup>Dispatches, Conger to Hay, in *ibid.*, *passim*, especially at 237 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup>Text in Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, Appendix, 479, 481.

gested that a conference of powers be held to discuss the Moroccan difficulty and to agree upon terms for a peaceful adjustment."<sup>1</sup> This plan was apparently accepted by the Kaiser and returned to the President, in the guise of a German proposal, by the German ambassador in Washington in a letter dated 5 April, 1905: "On April 5th he [Speck von Sternburg] wrote me again. This time he maintained . . . that he must insist upon a conference of the powers to settle the fate of Morocco."<sup>2</sup> The demand was simultaneously pressed upon Europe from Berlin. Roosevelt thereupon urged France most vigorously to "accept" the proposal as made by Germany. The French resisted this demand for a conference, now put forward by Germany, as requiring them to submit a national affair to international discussion. Apart entirely from the idea that Roosevelt had proposed the conference originally in defense of France it is hard to agree in principle to the opposition to conference on what was obviously a matter of some interest to the whole group of powers. France yielded, in the end, and agreed to a conference.<sup>3</sup> When things appeared blocked because of disagreement upon a basis of discussion, he provided a formula acceptable to both France and Germany,<sup>4</sup> the Kaiser meanwhile promising to defer to Roosevelt's opinion in any disputes arising with France in the course of the conference.<sup>5</sup> Throughout the sessions, in January-April, 1906, the American representatives, present at the conference in virtue of our participation in the general international convention of 1880, regarding Morocco,<sup>6</sup> lent all the weight of their comparatively independent and neutral influence to that proposal or set of proposals which seemed to promise a settlement most satisfactory to all parties. As matters stood that meant, in most cases, opposing the intransigent

<sup>1</sup>Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 228. Roosevelt told Mr. Thayer of this action himself. There is no text of the letter available in any printed collection and Bishop makes no mention of it in his recently published work; indeed no one except Mr. Thayer seems to have any knowledge of this action.

<sup>2</sup>Roosevelt to American Ambassador in London, Whitelaw Reid, 28 April, 1906, in Bishop, I, 467-503, at 468.

<sup>3</sup>Tardieu, *op. cit.*, 65, note 2. For Roosevelt's own account of how he prevailed on France to accept the idea of a conference and Bishop's estimate of this action, see Bishop, *op. cit.*, at 467 and 477. Bishop has said that Roosevelt was here acting "at the insistent request of the Kaiser", *Scribner's Magazine*, April, 1920, 392.

<sup>4</sup>Roosevelt to Reid, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 485.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 487.

<sup>6</sup>Text in *Treaties* (Malloy), I, 1220.

demands of Berlin and Vienna. The French never recovered from their resentment at the proposal and promotion of the conference in the first place, however, and Tardieu explains the American action at Algeciras as due, not to any friendship for France but, on the contrary, to solicitude for the stability and justice of international relations in general.<sup>1</sup> The American plan was put forward when the conference appeared to be permanently deadlocked and was accepted by France and—after strong insistence from the President—by Germany. As Bishop has said, “the President drew up the terms of settlement which were adopted and . . . fairly compelled the Kaiser to give his unwilling assent to them.” On 10 July, 1905, the German Government tendered to Roosevelt its recognition and appreciation of what he had done “to bring about speedy and peaceful solution of the questions at issue.”<sup>2</sup> This solution may be summarized as opposing the French claim to exclusive control in Morocco on the basis of her agreements with England and Spain; the recognition by France and Spain of responsibility to the rest of the world for their behavior in Morocco through the acceptance of a mandate from the powers, involving a pledge of the open door and equal opportunity in the mandate territory, and of provisions for supervision, verification and inspection to check the execution of the mandate.<sup>3</sup> Apart from the substance of the solution we aimed at settlement by peaceful conference rather than by war. As Secretary of State Root put it: “Our chief wish was to be of service in promoting a peaceful settlement of the controversy”;<sup>4</sup> in a secondary way we promoted the doctrines of the open door.

#### RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR MEDIATION

Finally, the President's part in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese war deserves notice. Roosevelt proposed a conference

<sup>1</sup>Tardieu, *op. cit.*, especially 249 *et seq.*, 297-298, 335, 446. On the peculiar strategic value of the American position in the conference see *ibid.* at 63; Tardieu's opinion is at 461.

<sup>2</sup>Roosevelt to Reid, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 490 *et seq.* Bishop in *Scribner's Magazine*, *at cit.*; Tower to Adee, 10 July, 1905, in *Foreign Relations*, 1905, 668, 669.

<sup>3</sup>Root to Speck von Sternburg, 19 February, 1906, in Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, 490; also summary on 496. This appears to be the origin of the institution of territorial mandates.

<sup>4</sup>Same to same, 17 March, 1906, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 499.

to terminate the war as soon as it appeared to him that the interests of Japan and Russia and of the rest of the world demanded it.<sup>1</sup> This effort came to nothing. On Japanese invitation he resumed this task after the defeat of Rozhdestvensky's fleet.<sup>2</sup> He followed up the acceptance of Russia of the principle of a conference by making sure that the conference actually met, in spite of Russian obstructions.<sup>3</sup> He compelled agreement in the conference on a formula of his own.<sup>4</sup> The steps taken assisted Japan at the beginning by relieving her of the dangerous opportunity of continuing the war, but the Japanese demands in the conference at Portsmouth had, in turn, to be restrained by counsels of moderation. Roosevelt did not relish the task and undertook it out of a sense of duty to the general welfare.<sup>5</sup> Peace seemed to be the primary object. But beneath the questions of relative national advantage or disadvantage, and beyond the idea of peace and potentially in conflict with it, lay the fundamental principle of all the actions just reviewed. That principle may be stated thus: International issues ought to be settled whenever possible by the method of conference and according to the standards of justice, not by military action in direct pursuit of exclusive national advantage irrespective of legal right or the consent of the world.<sup>6</sup>

It is not to be inferred that Roosevelt would always have favored the method of general conference for settling international disputes. In the Russo-Japanese case he was distinctly opposed to such a method of action, insisting on a Russo-Japanese conference pure and simple—with, perhaps, a few contributions from himself alone. He felt that the object of international adjustment could be better served, under the circumstances, by such a step, and, as was the case with the American policy toward the Danish Sound Dues conference, preferred the object to the form of international co-operation. That object was, as it has always been in American foreign policy, peace based upon justice achieved

<sup>1</sup>Roosevelt to Taft, 25 April, 1905, *ibid.*, 380.

<sup>2</sup>Roosevelt to Lodge, 16 June, 1905, *ibid.*, 382.

<sup>3</sup>Same to Meyer, American ambassador in St. Petersburg, 16 June, 1905, and Meyer to same, 17 June, 1905, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 390, 391.

<sup>4</sup>Roosevelt to Emperor William II and to the Mikado, 28 August, 1905, *ibid.*, 410.

<sup>5</sup>See correspondence quoted *ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>6</sup>For Roosevelt's purpose in this action see his *Autobiography*, and a letter to Douglas Robinson of 31 August, 1905, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 365, 143; also letters in an article on *Roosevelt, Peace-Maker*, in *Scribner's* for September, 1919, at 259 *et. seq.*



through mutual consent.<sup>1</sup> Now it can not be denied that the literary evidence in support of the tradition of isolation during the period 1825-1900 and even since that time is very strong. Similarly, it can not be denied that the literary evidences of the period previous to 1825 carry a superficial appearance of the same sort. Accordingly, if the reader turns back to the addresses and declarations of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe, or runs through the utterances of Polk, Cleveland, Olney and others in later years, he will immediately be struck with the apparent clearness and definiteness of the policy of isolation there stated. For one thing, we have been so schooled, and have grown so accustomed to the tradition, that the delicate psychological mechanism of critical reserve and analytical appreciation which should come into operation whenever we are confronted with diplomatic and political documents ceases to function at sight of the familiar formulas, and it does not, naturally, occur to us to re-examine the words to see whether they carry the meaning which is ascribed to them. Furthermore, for the period of 1825-1900 it is literally true that a policy of nonparticipation was proclaimed in so many words, time and time again. At the risk of some repetition the reply which should be made may be repeated: for the period 1825-1900 the declarations are empty words, mumbled over and over because of the force of habit and tradition and patriotic feeling, which are denied in the actual practice of American diplomacy and which are not needed to explain such inactivity as did exist; for the period before 1825 and the utterances of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe, a closer scrutiny will show that these statesmen did not say what they are reputed to have said, that the words usually quoted in support of the doctrine of nonparticipation must be read in combination with other words and phrases which qualify, and even reverse, their meaning as ordinarily represented, and that the speakers were deliberately preaching a policy the very opposite of that which their opponents succeeded in fastening upon their utterances and handing down to posterity as the teachings of the Fathers for the future guidance of the country.

<sup>1</sup>Letters to Hay of 30 March and 2 April, 1905, in Bishop, *op. cit.*, 377-378.

## VIII. THE LEGEND BELIED BY AMERICAN HISTORY

It may be useful to summarize the conclusions reached in this study. It is submitted: first, that America from the very beginning has made deliberate and elaborate and persistent and, on the whole, widely successful efforts to destroy certain obstacles in diplomatic method and commercial practice to the free development of the system of international intercourse; that, in the second place, she has not only attempted to eliminate certain mechanical and nationalistic obstacles and to substitute a régime of simplicity and equality in diplomacy and of freedom and equal treatment in commerce and navigation, but she has also led in the promotion of the organization and practice of arbitration and judicial settlement, and in the development of a system of co-operation among the American republics which is even now assuming still more promising forms of usefulness and significance. As against this record it is ineffective to urge the tradition of isolation built upon the utterances of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe. *For the policies of neutrality and of no-alliances were adopted specifically to prevent America from being isolated from the rest of the world, by being grouped diplomatically with this, that or the other power.* And Monroe's declaration was in effect a diplomatic co-operation with England, an intervention in the system of the balance of power strictly parallel to the action of 6 April, 1917. That declaration in no sense pledged us to remain out of international relations with Europe, Latin America, or the rest of the world, but has in fact been the chief single cause and principle of our participation in world politics ever since. And the attitude of the United States in the Boxer episode and the Moroccan affair may be accepted as characteristic of our policy in all our foreign relations.

There is one sense in which it is strictly accurate to say that the United States has not participated in general international relations and has professed her intention not to so participate. She has not desired to enter the international contest for colonies, protectorates and concessions, nor played the game of international power politics on a general footing with, and through the same methods employed by, the other nations of the world. Until very recently the United States had done none of these things and

she has made a few awkward steps in that direction recently only as the result of fundamental changes in her financial life, and through the incidental results of a war undertaken with other objects in view. And this policy of abstention was largely dictated by aversion to practices which made for international strife and conflict. As in the case of the policies of neutrality and no-alliances, we abstained from one form of international activity that we might more effectively co-operate in the general and beneficial forms of international life. We refrained from imperialistic competition in the interest of international accord. But to picture that policy as a program of isolation from the good as well as the bad is like saying of a man who refuses to touch poison ivy that he will have nothing to do with growing plants. What is more to the point, it is historically inaccurate. Whatever one wishes to believe about the past or would prefer to have America do in the future the record stands clear: the United States has never professed and practiced a policy of national isolation but has, on the contrary, professed and practiced a policy of international organization and co-operation to a degree not equaled by any other nation.