

# *A* LEAGUE *of* NATIONS

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## **“The Staggering Burden of Armament”**

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**WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION**

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# World Peace Foundation

Boston, Massachusetts

FOUNDED IN 1910 BY EDWIN GINN



The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.—*By-laws of the Corporation.*

It is to this patient and thorough work of education, through the school, the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the World Peace Foundation addresses itself.—Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force can not at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first, some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an *International Guard or Police Force.*—Edwin Ginn.

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\*Incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, July 12, 1910, as the International School of Peace. Name changed to World Peace Foundation, December 22, 1910.

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## CONTENTS

"THE STAGGERING BURDEN OF ARMAMENT" . . .	213
I. THE DOOM OF THE TAXPAYER . . . . .	215
Expenditures for armed peace and war . . . . .	216
Growth of military and naval expenditure, 1872-1921 . . . . .	217
Current financial condition of United States . . . . .	218
Growth of armaments after war . . . . .	219
Cost of army per capita . . . . .	220
Growth of standing armies . . . . .	220
II. THE TERRORS OF WAR . . . . .	221
No escape for anyone . . . . .	223
What the new gas does . . . . .	224
What science will do . . . . .	225
III. AMERICAN POLICY DEMANDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE . . . . .	227
Peace Conference declaration . . . . .	227
Others forge ahead . . . . .	228
Policies of threat and fear . . . . .	229
Conference one way out . . . . .	230
Abolish the "nation in arms" . . . . .	231
Reasons for success and responsibility . . . . .	232
America's opportunity . . . . .	233
Realization of duty . . . . .	234
IV. NATIONAL ACTION PROMISED . . . . .	236
"Mutual fear dominates" . . . . .	236
Military effect of fear . . . . .	237
Put policy maker in control . . . . .	238
What the English have done . . . . .	239
Make political, not military, aim paramount . . . . .	240
V. THE NAVAL PROBLEM . . . . .	241
Fleet tonnages, 1914 and 1921 . . . . .	242
Strength of major navies, May 1, 1921 . . . . .	243

Sea coast of the various countries of the world . . . . .	244
Cost of naval vessels . . . . .	245
Cost of aircraft . . . . .	245
What obsolete means in money . . . . .	246
<b>VI. "WHAT IS THE USE OF A BATTLESHIP?" . . . . .</b>	<b>247</b>
The interested parties . . . . .	248
Reasoning in a vicious circle . . . . .	249
What the submarine did . . . . .	250
Do airplanes now control? . . . . .	251
<b>VII. NAVAL POLICY . . . . .</b>	<b>254</b>
"Weight to diplomatic remonstrance" . . . . .	254
Britain's new one-power standard . . . . .	256
Not building against others . . . . .	257
Oceans prevent danger . . . . .	257
3,000 miles of safety . . . . .	258
<b>VIII. THE NEW RÉGIME IN EUROPE . . . . .</b>	<b>259</b>
Military forces . . . . .	260
Armaments . . . . .	261
Conscription . . . . .	261
Fortresses . . . . .	262
Naval . . . . .	262
Air . . . . .	263
Control . . . . .	263
League of Nations provisions . . . . .	263
<b>IX. ABOLISH THE UNLIMITED LIABILITY OF WAR . . . . .</b>	<b>265</b>
Justice the object . . . . .	266
What unlimited means . . . . .	267
The way to reform . . . . .	267
The barometer of policy . . . . .	268
Things are better . . . . .	269
America blazes new trails . . . . .	270
The opportunity ahead of us . . . . .	272

## “THE STAGGERING BURDEN OF ARMAMENT”

“We are ready to co-operate with other nations to approximate disarmament, but merest prudence forbids that we disarm alone.”

Thus spoke President Harding on April 12, 1921, in opening the first session of the Sixty-seventh Congress, putting his Administration at its outset in line with an historical American policy, and showing that he was fully conscious of the responsibility devolving upon the United States. Speaking just a week later before the statue of Bolivar in New York City he recalled the attention of the Americas to the fact that progress made toward judicial and arbitral settlement of international differences by the American nations “presents an example well worthy of earnest consideration and affords us an assurance which will justify our purpose to invite present-day civilization to cast aside the staggering burden of armament.”<sup>1</sup>

Among the clearest results of the war are, first, the decrease in number of the nations with competing armaments, and, second, the concentration of responsibility for armaments upon a few of the victorious nations. The financial ability of the United States to lead in this competition and the present extent of its naval program place upon it a tremendous responsibility for the intolerable burden which it thereby forces upon an exhausted civilization.

There is only one way to carry out the President's purpose, the calling of an international conference.

A conference to reduce armaments will undoubtedly find that its most fruitful opportunities for sound results will lie in the direction of limiting the use of armaments. As methods of pacific settlement of international disputes have increased, it has long been the expectation of peace lovers to see them have a definite effect upon the recognized needs of armament. War and the necessity for it should decrease proportionately to the

<sup>1</sup>On the policy of the United States, see “Milestones of Half a Century,” *League of Nations*, I, 9-42.

development of other means of settling disputes. Here again the United States has a long and honorable history from which lessons can be drawn.

The armament problem is viewed internationally in the following pages. Illustrative facts and figures are, to be sure, largely drawn from national sources; but their purpose is to illuminate international conditions, not to present an argument for national reduction independent of other nations nor to suggest that the problem is of greater importance to the United States than to other countries.

## I. THE DOOM OF THE TAXPAYER

The financial aspect of armament may properly be first considered in connection with the world war. The total direct costs of the war, not counting interest charges, is officially given at \$186,000,000,000 for all belligerents. The capitalized value of human life destroyed, soldiers and civilians, on a conservative basis is given as \$67,102,552,560. The claims for damages against Germany, constituting part of the price she pays for the privilege of using her armament, preferred under the treaty of Versailles by the parties thereto as officially reported to the Reparation Commission, but without review, was \$47,639,092,718, or about a billion a month for the duration of the war. Shipping and cargo losses are given as \$6,800,000,000; loss of production at \$45,000,000,000; war relief and loss to neutrals at \$2,750,000,000.<sup>1</sup> These figures total \$355,291,719, 815.

It may roughly be said that \$350,000,000,000 is the financial handicap that the world has taken on since 1914.

The loss of life is given in a compilation of the Danish Research Society on the Social Results of the War as follows:

	Dec. in Birth Rate	Loss Through Inc. of Death Rate	Among Those Killed in War	Total Loss
Germany.....	3,600,000	2,700,000	2,000,000	6,300,000
Austria-Hungary.....	3,800,000	2,000,000	1,500,000	5,800,000
Gt. Britain, Ireland.....	850,000	1,000,000	800,000	1,850,000
France.....	1,500,000	1,840,000	1,400,000	3,340,000
Belgium.....	175,000	400,000	115,000	875,000
Italy.....	1,400,000	880,000	600,000	2,280,000
Bulgaria.....	155,000	130,000	65,000	275,000
Rumania.....	150,000	360,000	159,000	510,000
Servia.....	320,000	1,330,000	690,000	1,650,000
Europe.....	8,300,000	4,700,000	2,500,000	13,000,000
Russia and Poland.....	20,250,000	15,130,000	9,829,000	35,580,000

<sup>1</sup>Ernest L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the World War*, 299. In the English House of Commons on December 20, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George, replying to Sir A. Shirley Benn said the Government were considering whether a return, showing the cost of the Great War to each nation which had been engaged in it, could be compiled without labor or expense disproportionate to its value. Sir

The worst of these percentages is not their size. The worst of it is that these post-war figures would only be cut about 15 per cent, if the world returned to its former habits. The United States, which just now is setting the pace in armament competition used to spend more than 70 per cent of its total annual budget for war purposes, not in a single year only, but on the basis of the running of the government since 1870. Here are the figures:

#### EXPENDITURES FOR ARMED PEACE AND WAR

	1870-1916 Omitting Spanish- American and World Wars 47 years	1870-1919 Including Spanish- American and World Wars 50 years
Army.....	\$3,956,346,000	\$19,334,031,000
Navy.....	2,594,530,000	6,229,612,000
Interest.....	2,445,865,000	3,294,001,000
Pensions.....	4,906,803,000	5,469,874,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	13,913,544,000 = 71.5	34,327,578,000 = 76.4
All other purposes..	5,543,727,000 = 28.5	10,672,148,000 = 23.6
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total.....	\$19,457,271,000 = 100.0	\$44,937,065,000 = 100.0

The burden of this debt brings it about that every belligerent has such staggering taxation as to hamper all the processes of national and individual life. For the first time in history a nation, dismembered Austria, has gone into the hands of a receiver. Moreover, eleven out of twelve European states, even with tremendous taxation are spending far beyond their income, and three out of four countries in the world are unable to raise the taxes to meet their running expenses. The United States, widely heralded as the richest nation in the world, this year shows an estimated Treasury deficit of \$2,005,037,000 and in 1922 of \$1,448,581,000,<sup>1</sup>

A. Shirley Benn.—Is the right honorable gentleman aware that it is reported that there were 80,000,000 casualties, including 9,000,000 deaths, and that the cost amounted to £50,000,000,000 direct and £67,000,000,000 indirect, and would it not be advisable to have an authoritative statement to hand down to future generations, so that they might know what war meant? Mr. Lloyd George.—These figures are substantially accurate. I agree it would be very desirable, if possible, to get full returns, but it does not depend entirely upon this country. It involves investigations abroad, and in some countries where the losses were very heavy the return would be, at the best, conjecture. In Russia, Austria, and Turkey we could not get anything like accurate estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1920, 278.



## GROWTH OF MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE, 1872-1921

Country	1872	1912	1921	1912 percentage of increase based on 1872	1921 percentage of increase based on 1872
Austria-Hungary.....	\$51,081,000	\$130,557,000	....	155%	....
France.....	111,073,000	259,349,000	\$1,316,130,000	133%	1085%
Germany.....	71,824,000	312,967,000	....	335%	....
Great Britain.....	125,461,000	351,044,000	1,121,318,000	180%	794%
Italy.....	43,971,000	125,143,000	126,52,7000	185%	188%
Russia.....	118,330,000	371,871,000	....	214%	....
United States.....	56,621,000	244,177,000	1,422,752,000	331%	2413%
<b>Totals.....</b>	<b>\$578,361,000</b>	<b>\$1,795,108,000</b>		<b>210%</b>	

HOW EXPENSES EXPAND

taking into account as part of expenditures refunding operations of the fiscal periods. In Europe the situation is so bad that any nation which can even approach normal conditions of solvency regards that as a triumphal accomplishment.

Italy, for instance, after a herculean effort at paring down national expenses proudly announces that this year's deficit has been cut from 14,000,000,000 lire to 10,000,000,000; and the cabinet got a vote of confidence as a result.

The United States is but little better off than Europe. The year after the war, Congress appropriated 92 per cent of the total allotment of money for the year ending June 30, 1920, for purposes of war, leaving eight per cent for the rest of the Government. By a certain amount of luck and a slight disposition toward economy the expenditures fell below the appropriation and the percentage of disbursements for that year was 86.4 per cent for war purposes and 13.6 per cent for the normal activities of civilization.

Meantime, the army and navy had acquired billion dollar habits, and the percentages since then stand as follows:

### CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES

By the United States Bureau of Efficiency<sup>1</sup>

	1921 Appropriations	1922 Estimates
Past wars.....	\$2,838,118,400 <sup>2</sup> = 67.9%	\$1,794,575,915 = 44.10%
National defense		
(Army and Navy)...	855,956,962 = 20.5%	1,548,025,312 = 38.05%
Total, past wars and present defense.....	3,694,075,362 = 88.4%	3,342,601,227 = 82.15%
General purposes (ex- cept Post Office)....	481,744,726 = 11.6%	725,848,630 = 17.85%
Total for all purposes (except Post Office).	\$4,175,820,088 = 100.00	\$4,068,449,857 = 100.00

It is a notable fact that after every war expenditures for military and naval purposes have tended to rise. The reason is not far to seek. The "experts" who before the war explained that their current weapons were absolutely necessary, on emerging from a

<sup>1</sup>Prepared from table of the U. S. Board of Efficiency, Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on H. J. Res. 424, 43.

<sup>2</sup>Includes cost of Federal Control of Railroads in 1921.

war, discover that much of the armament they went in with was a broken reed. The guns did not shoot far enough, the ships were not big enough: and expenses take another jump. A war in which a nation is an onlooker has the same effect. And so, after conflict, "the danger of bleeding to death in time of peace" is increased. The World War is no exception to the rule, as witness these figures:

GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS AFTER WAR

Country	ARMY		NAVY	
	1912	1921 <sup>1</sup>	1912	1921 <sup>1</sup>
Belgium	\$13,119,000	\$107,823,000	No navy	
France	177,656,000	1,148,331,000 <sup>2</sup>	81,693,000	167,799,000 <sup>3</sup>
United King.	134,850,000	710,713,000 <sup>4</sup>	216,194,000	410,605,000
Italy <sup>4</sup>	83,284,000	80,815,000	41,859,000	45,712,000
Japan	47,066,000 <sup>5</sup>	106,285,000	46,510,000 <sup>5</sup>	176,072,000
United States	107,787,000	771,530,000	136,390,000	651,222,000

A member of Congress has figured about the same thing for the United States in the terms of the cost per capita of the army, based on the army appropriation bills. These comparative figures follow:

COST OF ARMY PER CAPITA<sup>6</sup>

Year	Officers and Enlisted Men	Army Appropriations	Per Capita Cost
1909.....	84,133	\$94,371,000	\$1,121
1910.....	84,500	100,459,000	1,189
1911.....	81,363	95,341,000	1,171
1912.....	87,094	92,587,000	1,063
1913.....	91,384	90,907,000	994
1914.....	94,890	94,241,000	993
1915.....	103,403	101,019,000	976
1916.....	105,120	101,959,000	969
1917.....	141,420	267,801,000	1,893
1918.....	1,358,713	1,358,713,000	3,863
1919.....	2,516,719	12,271,868,000	4,876
1920.....	294,015	772,324,000	2,630
1921.....	187,946	392,558,000	2,088

<sup>1</sup>Values of foreign money in dollars calculated on a gold basis, as most nearly representing the burden upon the populations affected.

<sup>2</sup>Figures for year 1920.

<sup>3</sup>Including air force.

<sup>4</sup>Figures for fiscal years 1912-13 and 1919-20.

<sup>5</sup>Figures for the fiscal year 1912-13.

<sup>6</sup>Congressional Record, April 30, 1921, 849.

It is perhaps neither new nor startling to learn that armies have been steadily increasing in size, but the progress toward the military system of universal draft in case of hostilities is not unenlightening. In the following table the years 1800, 1854 and 1870 indicate the current effects of the Napoleonic, Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars. The later years were periods of peace. It will be noticed that in 1921 Germany and Austria had both ceased to be what they long had been, the European pivot of the armament race.

#### GROWTH OF STANDING ARMIES

	1800	1854	1870	1880	1900	1906	1921
Great Britain,	169,428	417,046	302,405	307,494	513,863	445,731	425,000
France,	160,230	260,000	393,500	609,983	672,565	677,581	735,000
Austria,	280,000	539,000	800,000	291,876	375,291	409,638	22,000
Russia,	433,000	677,000	733,000	947,000	1,119,000	1,225,000	1,500,000 <sup>1</sup>
Germany,	220,000	127,000	315,000	427,000	495,000	610,000	150,000 <sup>2</sup>
United States,	5,000	10,000	54,000	25,000	65,000	67,000	222,000 <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Probably not efficient as compared with other armies.

<sup>2</sup>Since reduced to 100,000, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Versailles.

<sup>3</sup>The figures for 1921 were given out by the War Department on February 16.

## II. THE TERRORS OF WAR

The world has just been through a war, a World War, widely and officially called impossible before it happened. A next war will start in where that one left off, plus the advantages of military experience in the interval. To depict that next conflict,<sup>1</sup> if or when it comes, is a fascinating temptation to a vivid imagination. To him who yields to that temptation, only one thing is certain: he will fall short of the mark.

To summarize this past war is a sufficient forecast of these conflicts of the "absolute" type, to use the phrase of Clausewitz, the standard school master of military theory. General Tasker H. Bliss, who was the American member of the Supreme Military Council directing the operations of all Allied armies and then a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, summarizes the situation thus:

**"First. It is a world war, such as we have just passed through, which is necessarily one involving the great civilized powers that constitutes a menace to our existing civilization.**

**"Second. Such a war depends upon a few so-called powers.**

**"Third. A war between any two of them, which formerly created relatively only a ripple on the surface of the great deep, now has an irresistible tendency to draw them all into the roaring maelstrom.**

**"Fourth. To meet this, these few nations must stagger under an increasing burden during years of armed peace solely to train what, if we can find some other method satisfactory for our purpose, is an unnecessary number of men in purely destructive arts; and to accumulate enormous quantities of costly material which does not add a penny to our permanent wealth, and which when used for the only purpose for which it can be used is finally represented by an atmosphere of stinking gas and by the destruction of every form of real and otherwise permanent wealth.**

<sup>1</sup>"The Next War" by Will Irwin is announced for immediate publication by E. P. Dutton Company.

**"Fifth. Such wars, resulting in the application of every ounce of accumulated energy on both sides, must result in the practical destruction of one by the other, even if both are not ruined.**

**"Sixth. Such wars, necessarily characterized by an intensity of national passions heretofore unknown, come to be regarded by each side as wars for life or death, in which each, to save his life, and destroy his adversary, will use every agency of destruction available to him; and, therefore, such agencies as the absolute blockade to starve people who heretofore were regarded as noncombatants, noxious and toxic gases, night and day bombing of cities from airplanes, the submarine, have come to stay until replaced by more destructive agencies.**

**"Seventh. Various causes will operate to draw neutrals into the struggle.**

**"Eighth. When such war comes it will be without warning and everyone must be ready.**

**"Ninth. All of this is due to the acceptance by a few governments of the military doctrine of the nation in arms; to their belief that no way can be found to guarantee their rights except universal preparedness, no guaranty against a general war except a general preparation for it.**

**"And lastly, with all that staring us in the face, the fact that after the last ounce of strength has been accumulated and the last combination of the powers has been made, one side or the other must strike or forfeit every dollar and every hope bound up in its preparation."<sup>1</sup>**

In such a war there will be no "first hundred thousand." General Pershing furnishes this testimony as to numbers: "It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced and independent fighting organization."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 3rd sess., 553.

<sup>2</sup>Letter of July 11, 1917, covering general organization project for American Expeditionary Forces, Final Report of General John J. Pershing, 8.

## NO ESCAPE FOR ANYONE

War is not only colossal in scale and scope henceforth, but it is three-dimensional, whether you view it as military or naval, or take the point of view of the civilian. On land, war is already conducted on, above and under the ground. At sea it is on, above and under the water. Back home, the sons go to the front, civilians turn their industries over to war purposes, and everybody bends every effort to fight the enemy with literally all weapons from dollars to bread crumbs. The noncombatant has been abolished, and war projects itself in time of peace into every nook and cranny of the industrial world in preparation for the next outbreak of hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

The next war will not confine itself to trenches in devastated France. Its impact will not be only on those within range of the guns, even though that range has risen to scores of miles. For every man on the firing line there are four at home furnishing equipment of all kinds to him. But even if that were not true and the distinction between combatant and noncombatant therefore as valid as it used to be, the mobility of warlike operations has so increased that military objectives have completely changed. Aircraft, traveling under ordinary conditions above 100 miles an hour on tracks of their own choice, are responsible for the expansion of warfare to include potentially every human being in the countries at war.

“Gas bombs,” said Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, “were not used in

<sup>1</sup>The duties of the Council of National Defense, established by act of August 29, 1916, and intended to function permanently, are:

“To supervise and direct investigations and make recommendations to the President and heads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference to the frontier of the United States, so as to render possible expeditions, concentration of troops, and supplies to points of defense; the co-ordination of military, industrial and commercial purposes in the location of extensive highways and branch lines of railroad; the utilization of waterways; the mobilization of military and naval resources for defense; the increase of domestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of armies and of the people during the interruption of foreign commerce; the development of sea-going transportation; data as to amounts, location, method and means of production and availability of military supplies; the giving of information to producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the military and other services of the Government, the requirements relating thereto, and the creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.”

Europe, because if one side had started it the other side would have started it and the loss of life among women and children in the back areas would have been terrific. However, that is contemplated as a possible use of the airplane in the future, and we find . . . that we can use certain amounts of certain gases for covering areas and that the gas will continue to be effective for a period of time. If we want to cover an area of ten miles by ten miles such as New York is—New York is a very easy target—we may use about two tons of crying gas once in every eight days. If you want to use mustard gas you would use about 70 tons once in every eight days; if you want to use phosgene gas, 200 tons. This, of course, is very deadly.”

#### WHAT THE NEW GAS DOES

And this is the latest, the quotation being from D. B. Bradner, chief of the Chemical Research and Development Division, United States Chemical Warfare Service:

“The Chemical Warfare Service has discovered a liquid approximately three drops of which, when applied to any part of the skin, will cause a man’s death . . . One plane carrying two tons of the liquid could cover an area 100 feet wide by seven miles long in one trip and could deposit material to kill every man in that area by action on his skin. If the men were not protected by gas masks, which would be the case if the attack were made on a city, the fatal area would be several times as great. . . . The only limit to the quantity of this liquid which could be made is the amount of available electric power, as nearly every nation has practically an unlimited supply of the necessary raw materials. It would be entirely possible for this country to manufacture several thousand tons per day, provided the necessary plants had been built. . . . During the Argonne offensive in the past war the entire first American army of a million and a quarter men occupied an area of 40 kilometers long by 20 kilometers wide. If Germany had had 4000 tons of this material and three or four hundred planes equipped for its distribution the entire first army would have been annihilated in ten to twelve hours. . . . During the past



war, gas produced over 30 per cent of our casualties. In the future the percentage will be far higher. New methods of defense will be devised to meet this particular new development."

In another passage, he speaks of the possibility of providing protective clothing "which will entirely cover the wearer and be impervious to this liquid, still allowing water vapor to pass through; . . . but the problem is an extremely difficult one and it is probable that several years will be required to develop such a material, if it is possible to do so at all."<sup>1</sup>

#### WHAT SCIENCE WILL DO

The gas referred to was invented by W. Lee Lewis, head of the chemistry department of Northwestern University, in a series of experiments costing \$250,000 and conducted during the war by direction of the President. Speaking at West Point on April 20, Professor Lewis is reported as saying:

"We face the possibility in the naval warfare of the future of armor-piercing, toxic and tear shells, smoke screens, toxic smoke clouds and invisible toxic fumes. We also may consider in this connection parallel defensive measures, such as a gas mask for a whole battleship. Gas weapons are capable of a much finer adaptation to purpose than explosive weapons and the future will see worked out a great degree of scientific refinement in the development of gas weapons for all types of military operations. Future battles will not be to the strong, but to the superior in intelligence. Warfare will become less a matter of brute strength and relative man power, and more and more a matter of scientific acumen."

It is considering such probabilities as that which leads General Pershing to say:

"It would appear that recent experiences should be enough to convince everybody of the danger of a renewal of this competition. But one nation can not reduce armaments unless all do. It is time that enlightened people everywhere should undertake to reach some rational agreement which would not only relieve the world of its heavy financial burden, but which in itself would go far toward the prevention of war. We are not a warlike people.

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, 711-712.

We do not wish to expand at the expense of any other nation, and we have no designs on anybody. If other people feel the same toward us and toward each other, it seems unreasonable that they should be unwilling to consent in principle to some limitation of armaments, to be carried out when certain nations succeed in establishing stable governments, and are willing to recognize the wisdom of such a course. **Otherwise, may we not seriously ask ourselves whether civilization is a failure, and whether we are to regard war as a normal and unavoidable scourge that mankind must suffer?"**<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, 601.

### III. AMERICAN POLICY DEMANDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

"In some future years," said Sir Edward Grey in accepting the American invitation of 1911 to negotiate an unlimited arbitration treaty, "the great nations of the world may discover, as individuals have discovered, that law is a better remedy than force, and that, in all the time they have been in bondage to this tremendous expenditure, the prison door has been locked on the inside."

That is the exact truth, and conditions have brought it about that America is found to have the key.

Let us sketch the sequence of events. The World War, no reader needs to be reminded, was widely heralded as a crusade against militarism, as a war for peace. Statesmen called upon their peoples to hold fast, to the end that this agony would not again come upon the world—and the people believed, then. More, the Allied leaders on land and sea believed. Witness Admiral Sims, who as head of the naval forces of the United States in Europe was in continual conference with all the naval chiefs of staff and who, speaking of reducing armaments, says:

Those things were continually discussed, and one of the commonest remarks made was that when we should get done with this war we will all be pretty faulty if we can not find some means by which we can get along peaceably in the world and safely without the enormous expenditures of a country like France, which needed a great army to protect itself from invasion from the east, and countries like Great Britain needing protection on the sea.<sup>1</sup>

#### PEACE CONFERENCE DECLARATION

And the idea did not die when the armistice halted the warriors, and the zero hour of a hoped-for peace was struck. General Bliss bears testimony from the inside of the Peace Conference:

. . . In the conduct of the operations of the Peace Conference a military committee, representing all nations concerned, and particularly the five great powers, was charged with the work of drawing up the military naval and air clauses of the peace terms to be imposed upon

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 642.

Germany and the other central powers. It was originally intended to embody these terms in a preliminary treaty. The committee in a short time agreed upon those terms and submitted them to the conference. After a good deal of delay they were finally approved; but the delay, although there was some difference of opinion as to the character of one of the terms, was mainly caused by the intervention of other matters. The peace terms as drawn up by the military committee prescribed what it was proposed to impose upon Germany for the purpose of destroying the military machine which she had built up and completely destroying the military system which alone enabled that machine to exist and operate. When the Peace Conference accepted these terms, it agreed upon the introduction of a preamble to them, the exact words of which, as I now recall them, are as follows:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

That preamble was signed without hesitation by the representatives of 34 nations, including those of the existing five great powers, and in addition by those of the central powers.<sup>1</sup>

### OTHERS FORGE AHEAD

The soldier-statesman might have gone farther. He might have said that therein the victors had given the first real gage of battle to the god of war, for in cutting down the arms of the vanquished they one and all pledged themselves to do likewise. What would have happened if the President of the United States had bent sufficiently to let the "associated power" participate to the extent of its judgment in the peace, that none can say with certainty. As the association of nations that won the war thus lost its strongest partner, the condition of Europe went from bad to worse, and throughout the world for 21 months after the peace was signed no man knew in the morning what that day's Gethsemane would bring. Worst of all respecting armaments, the United States followed logically the stand of aloofness she had taken. The rest of the effective world was bound by certain understandings, pledged to talk before they fought, pledged to aid each other under certain conditions, pledged to substitute law for force. To be sure, the United States had done these things previously, had in fact blazed the trail, but all the other victors had

<sup>1</sup>Hearings of the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 552.

forged ahead of her by signing a single document at one and the same time. Consider the mathematics of it: When one nation makes a treaty with another, two states are bound; but when several states make a treaty each is bound to all the others, and its equivalent in single, bipartite, treaties becomes surprisingly large. There are 34 signatories to the treaty of Versailles, by which the signers pledge themselves "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." The signature of each binds it to all; that is, 34 are bound to 33. Or to multiply it out, the total number of cords in the net work of engagement is 1122. But the United States kept out, so that there are at present 33 x 32 engagements, or a total of 1056.

#### POLICIES OF THREAT AND FEAR

Having been kept out by internal dissensions, the United States—a nation surrounded by wide oceans, friendly or impotent neighbors—proceeded with an extensive naval program of several years' standing because "our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace nor to enforce its policies in war."<sup>1</sup>

Putting it that way immediately shocks the patriotic American, who knows full well the honorable and generous history of his country; but in the matter of armament rivalry, involving the life or death of nations, it is not the domestic opinion, though true, that counts abroad, but the international effect of the country's action. International suspicion is deeply ingrained in the historical sense of nations, and the procedure of the United States has been viewed in that light. This is not an academic or a theoretical assertion. General Pershing had this colloquy at the Capitol:

Fred A. BRITTEN. . . . Do you feel that all of the nations of the world that are combined in the League of Nations could successfully, through their disarmament commission, go ahead with a disarmament program without America?

General PERSHING: I doubt if they could.

Mr. BRITTEN: Why not, if they do not fear us? You say that they should not fear us, because we are not a nation of conquest. Just why should not all the nations in the world that are combined in the League

<sup>1</sup>Memorandum, General Board of the Navy, November 9, 1915, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915, 76.

of Nations, having established a commission on disarmament, go ahead with their disarmament program if it is really their desire to disarm?

General PERSHING: For the same reason that we would not desire to curtail our armament while any of the other leading nations continued to provide armaments.

Mr. BRITTEN: Then, the other nations must have some fear of America.

General PERSHING: I have very little doubt that they have.

Mr. BRITTEN: Did you observe on the other side any feeling of fear that we might develop into a military power and become a nation of conquest rather than of peace?

General PERSHING: There has been such a thought in the minds of the military men of a good many nations. I think that is conceded—that is, that they have a fear that America as a result of this war might develop into a great military power with aggressive tendencies.

Mr. BRITTEN: Just because of the results of the war, and not because of any former action of ours?

General PERSHING: Possibly it is cumulative.<sup>1</sup>

#### CONFERENCE THE ONE WAY OUT

However unreal such a fear may be, it exists, not only against us, but with us against others. Being more or less intangible it is one of the most difficult things to dissipate. There is only one way to do it, to drag all the mutual fears into the open and let the sunlight of reason and publicity dissipate them, so that there remains only the legitimate requirements of defense, all the better for being understood, instead of misunderstood.

The one way to do this is to call a conference. A conference is the sunlight of international relations. General Bliss analyzes the result of such a meeting from the point of view of the United States:

“I know you gentlemen are thinking of the interest of the people of the United States. You are asked to appropriate large sums for preparedness, and when representatives of our military agencies come here to tell you what they need the money for, they do not tell you that they desire to build up our military system for any vague purposes, but that it is necessary to do so in order to protect our own nation. They tell you that they fear something and, if you ask them what it is, they will probably tell you

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 595-6.

exactly what it is they fear. If they do they will tell you the same thing that has been told every Government for 50 years. For 50 years they have been bleeding their peoples white to get the money necessary to prepare not, as they say for aggression, but for defense. And so you, like their Governments, have been, I suppose, told what it is that we fear and whom we are afraid of. But neither you nor they have yet been told what the peoples really fear. And I do not think that either you or they will ever know until there is a conference, such as has never yet been held, in respect to which the peoples of all the nations will know, day by day, exactly what the representatives propose to do and why they propose to do it. The result of such a conference will enable us, for the first time, to actually know what nation or nations, if any, we must prepare ourselves against. If in such a conference we should make a reasonable proposition tending to remove mutual fear, we would know that any nation which declines to accept it is likely to be, as far as we are concerned, the next Germany whose aggression we must be prepared to resist. You can then go to the people of the United States with a clear conscience and demand their billions for defense against such a nation.

#### ABOLISH THE "NATION IN ARMS"

"If reasonable men settle this question, they will not insist that each of the five nations shall do identically the same thing in the matter of limitation of armaments. The main thing is to secure some reasonable modification of the system which is now resulting in a civilized world consisting of 'nations in arms.' As long as that system remains unmodified, the danger of world wars will be the greatest, and when those wars occur they will be the most terrible. I do not know whether the result of a free conference would be to make any change in this system. Nor does anyone else. We can only tell by having the conference.

"Mr. BRITTEN. If the present rate keeps up you think there is liable to to be produced five giants in the place of one that was knocked down.

"General BLISS. Yes.

"Now, if the real problem is to minimize the chances of another world war, which will necessarily be a war between the great civilized powers, the problem can be solved only by getting these

few nations together for a full and free conference. In order to determine to what extent present armaments are necessary so as to attain their respective aims, it has been my opinion that such a conference could best be held in Washington where the representatives of other nations would better realize what confronts them if they force the United States into a real competition with them in the matter of armaments. If a fair abstract of the daily proceedings of such a conference were made—a statement of the various propositions put before it, the arguments in favor of those propositions and the objections against them, and, above all, who make these objections, so that every man in the five great powers, at the plow and at the work bench, knew what was going on in this conference day by day—I believe that the common peoples of the nations represented would not permit that conference to adjourn until at least one definite step toward a general limitation of armaments had been taken.”<sup>1</sup>

#### REASONS FOR SUCCESS AND RESPONSIBILITY

“Of course, until we have a conference,” said Secretary Daniels, “each nation will declare, and declare truly, that it will not reduce unless others reduce, and you have a vicious circle. And you have to let them sit down around the table and you have to try to bring about an agreement.” And again:

“ . . . And there are three reasons why I believe the nations would send their delegates and be willing to cooperate. The first is that all these nations, except Japan, ratified what is known as the Bryan treaty, which compelled delay before going to war. The second and more important reason is that in the peace conference they all agreed to Article VIII. The third is that less than two months ago, at Geneva, all these nations declared their desire to secure a reduction of armaments by international agreement and asked the United States Government to send a representative *de facto* to sit in on the hearings. I believe the time is ripe; I believe most of the nations sincerely desire it. I am confident most of them are compelled by their financial situation to stand for some reduction of expense, and I believe if the President-elect were to call such a conference looking to a reduction of arma-

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 555, 561, 563, 554.



ments that we would arrive at some decision that would bless the whole world before next December.

“Not being in the League of Nations, we have no opportunity at this time to discuss the question with the representatives of other nations. The other nations are saying that America is building a great navy and maintaining a large standing army, and that unless an agreement can be reached with America looking to disarmament this boon to mankind to which the nations have been looking forward for 2000 years is doomed. If we do not make some practical and earnest and early effort to reduce armament the world will lay the blame of huge military expenditures upon our shoulders, and we can not relieve our conscience of the responsibility. If we invite this conference, it will give the nations an opportunity to come to a better understanding than they have ever had before, and the world can not say that America was deaf to the appeal for disarmament.”<sup>1</sup>

#### AMERICA'S OPPORTUNITY

In the matter of international leadership respecting this question America to-day is curiously in the position which the German Empire was at the beginning of the late Kaiser's reign. It was a true word which the elder Liebknecht spoke in the Reichstag on May 6, 1890, when he said: “If the German Empire—and its position in Europe would make the thing easy—resolved to convoke an international congress to search out methods for reducing military charges, it could then be said with reason that Germany marches at the head of civilization.”<sup>2</sup> She paid the penalty for neglecting her opportunity.

But there is no likelihood that the United States, being in the key position in the world respecting the reduction of armaments, will fail to act up to its full responsibility. Congress has been

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 537, 538, 579.

<sup>2</sup>The original German reads: Wenn als Ergänzung jenes Kongresses von der deutschen Regierung ein internationaler Kongress berufen würde, welche sich mit der Aufgabe zu beschäftigen hat, den Völkern die Militärlast abzunehmen, dann würde die deutschen Regierung mit Recht sagen können: das deutsche Reich marschirt an der Spitze der Zivilisation,—was bis jetzt nicht mit Recht gesagt werden konnte, obgleich es oft und emphatisch gesagt worden ist.” (Stenographische Berichte des Reichstags, VIII. Legislaturperiode, I. Session, 1890-91, I, 104B.)

pushing the matter and the President himself has spoken. As far back as 1916 the United States took its stand by making these provisions a part of the appropriation bill authorizing the naval building program now under way:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided. It looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase of armament throughout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative standing in military strength.

In view of the premises, the President is authorized and requested to invite, at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe, all the great Governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal, to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred to adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question of disarmament and submit their recommendation to their respective Governments for approval. The President is hereby authorized to appoint nine citizens of the United States, who, in his judgment, shall be qualified for the mission by eminence in the law and by devotion to the cause of peace, to be representatives of the United States in such a conference. The President shall fix the compensation of said representatives, and such secretaries and other employees as may be needed. Two hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated and set aside and placed at the disposal of the President to carry into effect the provisions of this paragraph.

If at any time before the construction authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for there shall have been established, with the co-operation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals competent to secure peaceful determinations of all international disputes, and which shall render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals may be suspended, when so ordered by the President of the United States.

#### REALIZATION OF DUTY

Nor was this the first similar declaration of policy. Besides a sympathetic assistance of all such moves wherever they fell within America's range of international relations, Congress had taken the

same stand in a joint resolution of June 25, 1910.<sup>1</sup> The United States has a historical policy of forwarding international disarmament.

Now that the responsibility is fairly upon us, the Government has shown a realization of its duty. By a vote of 58 to 0 the Senate on March 1, 1921, passed an amendment to the bill which eventually failed to make appropriations for the naval service in these words:

The President is authorized and requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval building program of each of said Governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which conclusion is to be reported to their respective Governments for their approval.

The same text was reintroduced in the Senate on May 4 by Senator Borah.

<sup>1</sup>The resolution reads:

"That a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States to consider the expediency of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement, and of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of government for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war: Provided, That the total expense authorized by this Joint Resolution shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars and that the said commission shall be required to make final report within two years from the date of the passage of this resolution."

On the earlier action generally, see *A League of Nations*, I, 9-42.

## IV. NATIONAL ACTION PROMISED

Moreover, and most important, the President has spoken. In his address to Congress on April 12, 1921, he said:

**“The Government is in accord with the wish to eliminate the burdens of heavy armament. . . . We are ready to cooperate with other nations to approximate disarmament, but merest prudence forbids that we disarm alone.”**

Again, in his address at the unveiling of the Bolivar statue at New York on April 19, President Harding stated that the progress that the Americas had made toward judicial and arbitral settlement of international differences “affords us an assurance which will justify our purpose to invite the present-day civilization to cast aside the staggering burden of armament.”

This intention is entirely to the good, because the pressing matter of reducing armament is a problem for statesmen, not for legislators, to settle. Legislators may reflect the opinion of the people, and may be encouraged to do so; but it is not theirs to appraise the international political elements that must be considered in deciding when and in what way to initiate the necessary conference.

In the conference, also, the President will have to determine the place of the military. “I would not allow military men to represent their Governments and have the final decision in their hands,” flatly declared General Bliss before the House Committee on Naval Affairs; and General Pershing, asked if he thought that was a good suggestion, replied:

Yes; I do, because the average military man or naval man, on account of his training, would be a little bit too reluctant to yield a point here and there in the discussions. I should think that it should be composed, perhaps, of both civilians and military men.<sup>1</sup>

### “MUTUAL FEAR DOMINATES”

General Bliss, a little later, told exactly what he had in mind when he asserted that the very best statesmen should undertake

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 599-600.

the task of running the conference. Military and naval officers are, he said, "men whose sole business is to think in terms of war," and continued:

They are the concrete expression and representation of the mutual fear dominating their respective countries. And yet, as a matter of fact, although the military men are dominated by this mutual fear, it is the statesmen themselves who inspire the fear in their respective peoples. It is the statesmen who must get together, either on a committee of the League of Nations or elsewhere, and decide whether they can do any thing to allay this fear, and there is no hope of progress unless this fear can be allayed.<sup>1</sup>

#### MILITARY EFFECT OF FEAR

The condition depicted by the former chief of staff of the United States army is one well worthy of careful consideration. As he suggests, mutual international fears subtly work to the increase of armament beyond the needs of nations. The business of a foreign office is to settle disputes and to adjust differences depending in the long run upon the element of force provided by the army and navy, in case of need. The business of the military is to employ its force when called upon, and to have the proper force to use in case of need. The point of view is fundamentally and properly different. In the early spring of 1917, Secretary of State Lansing made a public statement that the United States was in danger of war. In New England, where the British blockade of Germany and interference with neutral trade had proved very exasperating to business concerns, that statement was generally interpreted as referring to Great Britain. Naval men, then engaged in assigning gun crews to armed merchantmen to run the blockade, tended to the same conclusion. Neither the public nor the naval experts were aware that the United States and Great Britain were under pledge to each other not to declare war or begin hostilities until any dispute of any nature whatsoever had been referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission of their own appointment, and that the report might take a year to complete. It therefore followed that, whatever the situation between the two countries, the Secretary of State could not in his senses have referred to Great Britain. There is no particular reason why a naval officer should have known that fact. On the other hand, there was every reason why a naval officer, viewing

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, 560.

the fundamental changes which naval practice was undergoing at the hands of the Allied powers and the inconvenience of the United States, should thus identify a possible belligerent.

In the high theory of military and naval circles, war games, as a form of strategical exercise, are the normal and inevitable things. For the purpose of working out a problem, an assumption is made that the United States is at war with France or some other friendly country. The officers at the Naval War College then intensively study the naval situation of the two countries, their possibilities of attack and defense, and work out a mimic campaign with model warships under command of officers. There develop in the course of such an exercise certain advantages of a French type of vessel, which exists in no other navy, over an American one. The result, before the next Congress, may well be an insistent demand that a certain change shall be made in construction. All of which is valid from a technical point of view. But it is invalid from the political point of view because it does not take into consideration the practical impossibility of war between the two states involved.

#### PUT POLICY MAKER IN CONTROL

It is obvious that policy must take some account of military conditions—in the United States the subordination of the military to the civil is constitutional owing to the provision that “the President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy.” It being equally obvious that military requirements are dependent upon policy and that estimating the dangerous element in policy is a primary duty of the Department of State, it would seem that there should be the closest co-ordination between the conductor of the nation’s foreign affairs and the military and naval branches of the Government. But, aside from whatever discussion takes place in cabinet meetings, nothing of the sort seems to occur. In fact, before the war there were highly organized and exceedingly efficient Divisions of Military and Naval Intelligence and nothing similar in the Department of State. Now there exists in the latter a Division of Political Intelligence, the principal business of which is to co-ordinate the various elements of foreign policy for the use of those who conduct the daily work of the Department. From the point of view of armaments, this still leaves something to be desired. The President, the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and possibly the chairmen of the corresponding com-

mittees of the two Houses of Congress ought to be constituted a national defense commission.<sup>1</sup>

#### WHAT THE ENGLISH HAVE DONE

So far as is recalled, Great Britain is the only state with anything like the commission suggested. In that country the Imperial Defense Committee dates from 1904, having been organized under the chairmanship of the premier as a result of a report on the organization of the War Office.<sup>2</sup> Previous to that time Lord Rosebery's ministry had attempted something of that sort; in 1895-96 a Cabinet Committee of Defense was organized and failed, and the next preceding attempt had been in 1903. The Imperial Defense Committee of 1904 still continues. As stated by the Duke of Bedford in Parliament on June 21, 1904, its purpose "is to foresee imperial strategical requirements, to harmonize naval and military policies, to co-ordinate imperial defense in relation to such different departments of state as the Admiralty, the War, Foreign, Colonial and Indian Offices."<sup>3</sup> It will be noticed that this committee does not afford to the political elements of the ministry the opportunity of having an effective say. It is believed that strategical considerations have overwhelmingly characterized its deliberations. In fact, it would seem that its results have been to co-ordinate technical military and naval matters rather than to bring them into direct connection with the political elements of the national position. Sir John Colomb indicated this in the House of Commons on August 2, 1904, when he approved the formation of the committee as being a step in advance and cited an instance of what he hoped would be a thing of the past:

He remembered a representative of the War Office calmly stating that if our fleet was damaged or inefficient for the space of three weeks there would be no difficulty in the way of France throwing 150,000 men upon our shores, and when he saw Lord Randolph Churchill swallow such a statement as that without question he wondered how long this sort of thing was going to continue.

<sup>1</sup>This proposal is distinct from the duties of the Council of National Defense created by the act of August 29, 1916, consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, and the purpose of which is "the co-ordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare."

<sup>2</sup>Report of the War Office Reconstruction Committee. Parl. Paps., 1904, VIII, 101, 121, 153, 157. Cd. 1932, 1968, 1968-1, 2002.

<sup>3</sup>Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, 136,649.

**MAKE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY, AIM PARAMOUNT**

The contention advanced here is based on the recognized fact that war is simply the pursuit of political aims by violent means. If Clausewitz is correct—and the best authorities on war admit this—the military elements in a government should be distinctly subordinate, so far as their programs are concerned, to the political.<sup>1</sup> Technically of course, they should be in full control. Such is not now the case, as is shown by this testimony:

**JOHN A. PETERS:** May I ask the attitude of the State Department toward the size of the navy?

Acting Secretary of State **DAVIS:** We feel that the judgment of the Navy Department is more valuable on that matter than ours.

**Mr. PETERS:** You have no judgment to express on that?

**Mr. DAVIS:** No.

**Mr. PETERS:** As to the relative or the actual size of the navy?

**Mr. DAVIS:** No.<sup>2</sup>

The Department of State should have an opinion about the size of the navy, and also of the army. Aside from the President, it is the only one that should have such an opinion. It should not, on the other hand, have any opinion as to whether a navy should be made up of battleships, or submarines or any other technical type.

<sup>1</sup>"Under all circumstances war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument."—Clausewitz, *On War*, translation by J. J. Graham, I, 25.

Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele professor of military history at Oxford, says (*War and Policy*, 180): "[Clausewitz] proclaimed first that war is always in all circumstances nothing but a chapter of national policy; its ends are those of the statesman, the only difference between that chapter and the one that precedes it being that when the page of war begins the instrument used is force; when force has done its work, the thread, continued in the next chapter, is the same that ran through the blood-stained passages called war."

<sup>2</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3d sess., p. 526.



## V. THE NAVAL PROBLEM

So far as the United States is concerned, the chief problem in the reduction of armaments is naval.

The oceans increase mutual fears. It is easily possible to be friendly with a neighbor nation, and there is a natural democratic deterrent to building up a great army from among a peaceful folk because of the sheer number of men required. But a navy needs comparatively few men, and it is easy to fear nations far away. "I can't hate a man I know," once said Charles Lamb.

Navies are more closely allied in the public mind with foreign relations than armies. Differences between nations that are contiguous to each other are comparatively few; they alone raise a question of employing armies. All other differences have had the navy in the background as a final resort. And there is a notable tendency on the part of the naval men to bank on that circumstance: "Our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace," according to the American General Board of the Navy.

Time was when that attitude was unquestioned and when the number of naval powers was great enough to justify it in some degree. But the situation has changed. The World War has given the naval rivalry an entirely new aspect. Just before it some figures were carefully compiled with the object of showing the monetary investment of the world in navies. It was found that the then eight powers had combined fleets with a conservatively indicated worth of \$3,958,327,000, while the 12 other powers having fleets of any size could value them only at \$397,931,000, or substantially one-tenth. Obviously, any possible rivalry then was confined to the leading eight. But after the World War there emerge but five powers with major fleets, and their naval armament is relatively larger than before the war, in comparison with the minor fleets. In fact, on the basis of tonnage, Great Britain in 1914 had the only fleet as big as the total minor navies, while to-day four out of the five majors each outranks all the minors together. Not only has the discrepancy between majors and minors increased, but the differences among the majors have become notably large. The war, generally speaking,

effected great reductions in tonnage by rendering ships obsolete, so that only Great Britain and the United States show increases from 1914 to 1921. For comparison, the figures are:

FLEET TONNAGES, 1914 AND 1921

MAJOR			
	1914	1921	Percentage of 1921 to 1914
Great Britain.....	2,188,250	2,412,146	114
Germany.....	951,713	Minor	...
United States.....	765,133	1,196,281	156
France.....	665,748	514,584	77
Japan.....	519,640	492,652	94
Russia.....	270,861	Dispersed	...
Italy.....	285,460	145,891	51
Austria-Hungary.....	221,526	No navy	...
	5,868,331	4,761,554	81
MINOR			
Argentina.....	120,760	59,680	49
Brazil.....	117,591	46,600	39
Chile.....	113,508	38,630	34
Denmark.....	37,197	?	...
Greece.....	55,950	41,004	73
Germany.....	Major	94,964	...
Netherlands.....	95,907	4,766	04
Norway.....	39,288	1,623	04
Peru.....	19,122	7,000	36
Portugal.....	21,919	1,846	08
Spain.....	117,819	46,804	39
Sweden.....	89,179	1,880	02
Turkey.....	70,560	7,000	09
	898,800	351,791	39

What the war did to fleets was to send practically everything of any age to the junk pile or to the intermediate purgatory of being out of commission. The British naval list of March, 1914, gives 76 battleships; the United States Naval Intelligence now credits her with 26, while the British return to Parliament of March, 1921, accounts for only 22. Statistics of current value are discrepant, showing the doubts in the minds of the experts.

The British return referred to arranges ships according as they do or do not embody war lessons; Rear Admiral A. T. Long, Director of Naval Intelligence, writes that "it is not possible to state definitely what vessels embody the lessons learned at Jutland, but the Office can furnish you with what is believed to be the correct numbers of total ships in the various classes. This statement follows:"

## STRENGTH OF MAJOR NAVIES, MAY 1, 1921

	Great Britain	United States	Japan	France	Italy
Battleships, 1st line.....	26	16	6	7	5
Battleships, 2d line.....	6	16	4	10	3
Battle cruisers, 1st line....	6	..	4	..	..
Battle cruisers, 2d line.....	4	..	..	..	..
Cruisers, 1st line.....	2	..	..	..	..
Cruisers, 2d line.....	4	10	5	7	3
Light cruisers, 1st line....:	45	..	8	4	5
Light cruisers, 2d line.....	14	3	1	1	3
Destroyer leaders.....	20	..	..	..	..
Destroyers, 1st line.....	237	286	35	10	14
Destroyers, 2d line.....	16	21	12	36	29
Submarines.....	147	102	?	62	23
Aircraft carriers.....	6	..	..	..	..

In connection with fleets as a whole, one of the most frequent arguments used is the necessity of defending coast lines. At first glance it seems clear that the relation between sea exposure and sea power is fundamental; but on closer examination no such conclusion follows. The character of a coast—the number, size and contour of its harbors, for instance—may throw theory awry. On our own Atlantic seaboard there are several good harbors to one on the Pacific. The British Atlantic coast includes not only the British Isles, but portions of Africa, North and South America and the West Indies. The Dutch colonial coasts are 24 times the length of that of the Netherlands itself and thousands of miles away from the métropole, etc. So it would seem that no general conclusions can be drawn from such figures; but as they have not been published<sup>1</sup> they are presented herewith for what they are worth:

<sup>1</sup>The statistics are rearranged from a photostat chart of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Office, with additions from its Serial No. 22.

SEA COAST OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD  
Statute Miles

	Pacific	Atlantic	Indian	Arctic	Totals
Argentine Republic.....	....	2,418	....	....	2,418
Belgium.....	....	71	....	....	71
Brazil.....	....	4,007	....	....	4,007
Central American states...	904	887	....	....	1,791
Chile.....	2,883	58	....	....	2,890
China.....	3,604	....	....	....	3,604
Colombia.....	1,002	1,071	....	....	2,073
Cuba.....	....	2,855	....	....	2,855
Denmark.....	....	2,503	....	1,842	4,346
Ecuador.....	835	....	....	....	835
France.....	2,291	4,941	3,017	....	10,250
Morocco.....	....	1,082	....	....	1,082
Germany.....	....	1,989	....	....	1,989
Great Britain.....	11,487	15,303	17,394	5,320	49,504
Greece.....	....	1,301	....	....	1,301
Crete.....	....	415	....	....	415
Haiti.....	....	737	....	....	737
Holland.....	12,506	607	4,698	....	17,811
Italy.....	....	2,815	1,347	....	4,163
Tripoli.....	....	1,048	....	....	1,048
Japan.....	5,286	....	....	....	5,286
Korea.....	1,393	....	....	....	1,393
Liberia.....	....	1,082	....	....	1,082
Mexico.....	3,777	1,675	....	....	5,452
New Hebrides and Santa Cruz Islands.....	449	....	....	....	449
Norway.....	....	1,559	....	794	2,353
Oman.....	....	....	1,520	....	1,520
Persia.....	....	....	967	....	967
Peru.....	1,762	....	....	....	1,762
Portugal.....	282	2,320	1,825	....	4,427
Rumania.....	....	138	....	....	138
Russia.....	7,210	2,637	....	10,571	20,417
San Domingo.....	....	668	....	....	668
Spain.....	....	3,025	....	....	3,025
Sweden.....	....	1,458	....	....	1,458
Tonga (Friendly) Islands..	311	....	....	....	311
United States <sup>1</sup> .....	2,410	10,467	....	....	12,877

<sup>1</sup>Tidal shore line, unit measure 3 statute miles, for United States and possessions. The general coast line of the United States proper is: Atlantic, 1888; Gulf, 1629; Pacific, 1366; total, 4883.

Alaska.....	15,132	....	....	15,132
Philippine Islands.....	10,850	....	....	10,850
Porto Rico.....	362	....	....	362
Guam.....	84	....	....	84
Hawaiian Islands.....	810	....	....	810
Panama Canal Zone....	....	....	....	29
Samoa Islands.....	91	....	....	91
Uruguay.....	345	....	....	345
Venezuela.....	1,330	....	....	1,330

The cost of a navy is constantly rising and the types of vessels multiplying. The latest figures for naval matériel as given in House and Senate hearings in January and February follow:

#### COST OF NAVAL VESSELS<sup>1</sup>

Battleship, with ammunition.....	\$43,145,000
Battleship, without ammunition.....	38,500,000
Airplane carrier, 35,000 tons.....	28,600,000
Airplane carrier, 25,000 tons.....	21,600,000
Cruiser, 10,000 tons.....	9,900,000
Submarine chaser.....	5,900,000
Fleet submarine.....	4,000,000
Transport.....	4,000,000
Mine-laying submarine.....	2,500,000
Destroyer.....	2,000,000
Gunboat.....	1,100,000

#### COST OF AIRCRAFT<sup>2</sup>

(Heavier than air)

Ships' spotting planes.....	\$41,000
Ships' fighting planes.....	38,910
Torpedo planes.....	87,400
Reconnaissance planes.....	84,540
Pursuit planes.....	34,980
Practice planes.....	40,090

(Lighter than air)

Non-rigid airship.....	\$160,000
Small touring airship.....	60,000
Kite balloons.....	15,000
Free balloons.....	5,000

<sup>1</sup>Testimony of Rear Admiral David W. Taylor, Chief, Bureau of Construction and Repair, House Hearings, 547, 767, 769.

<sup>2</sup>Hearing before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 1921, 67.

Another phase of naval costs is deterioration. Vessels are retired after a period of service which is constantly decreasing in length. A battleship can not be expected in these days to hold its place more than 10 years, though it may not be written off completely for a much longer time. German battleships, by the treaty of Versailles, may not be replaced for 20 years. In time of peace, "obsolete" is the cause of death of naval vessels. The very special character of naval craft is illustrated by the fact that they are worth practically nothing except for their designed purposes. The following table, drawn from British sources because American figures seem not to be available, shows that 10 years ago the junk value was negligible:

**WHAT OBSOLETE MEANS IN MONEY**  
**British Warships Sold in 1909-10**

Name	Year of Completion	First Cost	Sale Price	Value of Gear Removed
Rodney.....	1887-88	\$3,741,825.78	\$103,761.00	\$25,680.24
Collingwood ...	1886-87	3,431,534.22	93,340.00	2,629.26
Snap.....	1872-73	43,944.12	4,568.40	466.56
Anson.....	1888-89	3,525,570.36	103,032.00	15,969.96
Benbow.....	1887-88	3,765,484.26	103,032.00	18,543.70
Thunderer.....	1877-78	2,151,070.02	94,770.00	8,733.42
Defiance II ...	1861	304,979.58	6,925.50	106.92
Hornet.....	1894-95	181,768.86	5,832.00	3,353.40
Torpedo boat ..	1887-88	81,432.28	1,458.00	340.20
Submarine.....	1907-08	234,567.90	83,623.88	53.46
Gladiator.....	1899-1900	1,397,757.44	73,507.50	...
Lee.....	1900-1901	277,885.08	315.90	10,045.62
Mooring Lighter				
No. 77.....	1827	Not known	73,507.50	...
Harpy.....	1845-46	83,557.98	972.00	...
Daisy.....	1878-79	6,546.70	315.90	...
<b>Totals.....</b>		<b>\$19,227,914.58</b>	<b>\$676,207.38</b>	<b>\$85,922.74</b>

Total receipts from sale.....	\$762,130.12
Expenses of sale.....	2,721.84
	\$759,408.28

Percentage of net receipts to first cost, 3.8%

## VI. WHAT IS THE USE OF A BATTLESHIP?

Admiral Sir Percy Scott, who "is considered to be the greatest naval brain that we have," writing in the *London Times* of March 15 said:

"I have asked the question, 'What is the use of a battleship?' and have received one direct reply. A midshipman has told me, 'She is no damned use at all.' I sincerely hope to-morrow that some member of the House will elicit from the Government where we shall stow away our battleships in the event of our going to war. Shall we construct a safe harbor for them in Iceland?"

Admiral Scott had repeated this in half a dozen letters in one of those famous discussions of public affairs conducted by the *London Times*, extending from November to February. In an early letter he put the English case against the battleship:

"You must admit that in the war we were nearly forced to submission by starvation.

"You must admit that the German battleship played no part in reducing us to a state of starvation."

"You must admit that if our battleship superiority had been double what it was they could not have protected us from starvation."

"You must admit that the dominant arm of the war was the submarine.

"Strange as it may appear, I believe that this blunder [of building the wrong weapons to combat the submarine] won the war for us. Looking over some German correspondence of 1914, which has reference to my letter in your paper proclaiming that the battleship was dead, I believe that the Germans with their skewed minds thought that I was not sincere. . . . So they went on with their program and did not build submarines.

"'Flag Officer' reminds us of the fact that before the advent of the submarine, the battleship did not feel very comfortable by night owing to the possibility of attack by torpedoes, but when the submarine came on the scene, she did not feel comfortable either by night or day. The new weapons have entirely revolutionized naval warfare and up to the present they have

avored defense much more than they have offense. They have given power to a weak country and taken it away from the strong. . . . The rulers of our navy must call in a doctor and get some medicine that will cure them of that terrible complaint, pigheadedness.

### THE INTERESTED PARTIES

"The submarine has adopted the tactics of all birds and animals. The brain of these creatures, I suppose, tells them that the greatest security against attack is not to be seen. I venture to think that it is not a bad idea. By experience, I have found that the animal very often imposes his will of not wishing to be dead on the sportsman who wishes him to be dead. How clever the animals are! I wish they could speak, for they might be able to tell me what the use of a battleship is."

And again, he says:

The building of battleships will be supported by all the battleship builders of the world because it is the bread whereby they live. Look what a paying concern it is; would not any of your readers like to get a nice fat contract for (say) only five battleships at \$5 millions of golden sovereigns? In these circumstances we must expect the construction of battleships to be backed by many people possessing strong political interest, commercial interest, and the support of capital. We must also expect the necessity of battleships to be supported by all the navies of the world; for naval men do not commit suicide; and battleships are vital to their profession and vital to their comfort. To be captain of a battleship is the ambition of every naval officer. Who else in the world travels about with the same comfort as the captain of a battleship? He has a large drawing-room, a dining-room in which he can seat 25 or 30 guests, a commodious bed-room with bath-room attached, and spare bed-rooms.

All these points will naturally be taken into consideration, or, at any rate, they will flit through the mind of every naval officer before he decides to vote for "not building battleships." These points will also have to be taken into consideration by the taxpayer when he is asked to put his hand in his pocket to pay for the super-battleships, their nurses and other accessories.

The other accessories must not be ignored, for they mean a lot of golden sovereigns from the taxpayer. Obviously we must have a safe harbor to put our battleships in; they must be immune from underwater attack and from air attack. The super-battleships will necessitate all our docks being enlarged, and a multitude of other expenses, running, I should think, into hundreds of millions.



This, Sir, is the last time that I shall trespass on your space, because I know that no one can answer my question of "What is the use of a battleship?" and I know that we shall not build any more battleships.

### REASONING IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE

The British first lord of the Admiralty in the statement explanatory of the navy estimates for 1920-21 had said that "in our opinion the capital ship remains the unit on which sea power is built up." But it significantly added, after a discussion of the value of airplanes and submarines and of countermeasures against them, that "it is even possible that the present battleship will change to one of submersible type, or even of a flying type." In other words, that the battleship, the capital ship, of the future might not be a battleship at all, but a submarine or an aircraft. Having defended the battleship in theory, the Admiralty suavely turned to the building of real airplane carriers.

The American General Board of the Navy cited the British Admiralty in its annual report of September 24, 1920, with complete approval, and added battleship credentials of its own. On February 2, 1921, The General Board, on behalf of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, again reached the same conclusion in a report which was based on the historical fact that "the general principle of concentration of power in ships that can take and keep the sea at all times and in all weathers, that can deliver and receive the heaviest blows, and that can overcome the strongest ships that may be brought against them will continue as long as navies exist." The report assumed, by an oblique criticism of other craft, that these qualities were permanently inherent in the present type of battleship. It asserted that during the war "it was upon the potential fighting power of these ships that the activities of all other naval craft was based," and then explained that it was the "sea power vested and latent" in battleships stationed at Scapa Flow or thereabouts which destroyed "by inaction" the offensive power of the German fleet. The report repeated the 1920 quotation from the British Admiralty, but did not mention the current British policy respecting capital ships, which had been stated by the chancellor of the exchequer in Parliament two months before, on December 9, 1920:

While determined to maintain the navy at a standard of strength which shall adequately secure the safety of the Empire and its maritime

communications, the Cabinet, before sanctioning a program of new construction, are bound to satisfy themselves that the lessons of the war have been definitely ascertained, more particularly as regards the place and usefulness of the capital ship in future naval operations. They have therefore decided—and I am glad to say the Admiralty welcome the decision—that the Committee of Imperial Defense should institute at once an exhaustive investigation into the whole question of naval strength as affected by the latest development of naval warfare. They will present no program for capital ship construction to Parliament until the results of this inquiry have been considered.

The United States and Japan are, therefore, the only present builders of battleships.

### WHAT THE SUBMARINE DID

It is proper, without going into technicalities as to sea power, to set forth some of the salient facts respecting the use of battleships when there was a war to fight. Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo in a paper<sup>1</sup> describing the work of the navy during the war has stated when the various elements of the navy were pressed into service. He gives dates which, arranged chronologically, show us that the battleship was the next to the last type of ship to get into the fight:

March, 1917, merchant ships armed; gun crews assigned from navy.

April, 1917, destroyers sent to Europe.

June, 1917, cruiser convoys established.

September, 1917, decided to send battleships to Europe.

November, 1917, 14-inch naval guns assigned to land forces.

November, 1917, battleships sent to Europe.

April, 1918, mine layers began work.

It is admitted that the battleship was not able to participate actively in combating the U-boat. The Germans during the war had in commission 399 submarines. They never had as many as 200 in commission at any one time. A total of 207 submarines, worth at the outside \$500,000,000, were sunk.<sup>2</sup> Only 10,000 men were employed in the German submarine forces, of whom not

<sup>1</sup>See the book, *What Happened at Paris*, edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour.

<sup>2</sup>A statement issued by the German Government (*London Times*, December 10, 1920) gives the following facts as to construction and sinkings:

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	Total
Built.....	3	62	95	180	81	371
Sunk.....	5	20	30	72	80	207

more than 1500 were adrift at any one time.<sup>1</sup> Against this force was opposed the navies of England, France, Italy, Japan and the United States, with a personnel of at least 1,000,000 men and there were daily pitted against the Germans 5,000 anti-submarine craft. The shipping loss of the World War ran to 12,750,000 tons, valued with cargo at \$7,000,000,000. Our own navy built more than 750 vessels to fight the submarines. "It is obviously absurd," says Admiral Sims in his book, "to say that a belligerent which was losing 800,000 or 900,000 tons of shipping a month, as was the case with the Allies in the spring of 1917, was the undisputed mistress of the seas."

### DO AIRPLANES NOW CONTROL?

"A little study of this subject will give to some people who talk glibly about 'control of the sea' a fundamental knowledge of the subject," asserts Rear Admiral Fullam before the Senate committee.

"Subsequent to the armistice and two years after Admiral Sims went to England a new naval force, then in its infancy, has been rapidly developed—the naval air force. And to-day this force operates with other forces to decide who shall and who shall not control the sea. . . . The 'backbone' needs still more assistance. The surface fleet in the hitherto easy task of 'controlling the sea' needs another ally—a force above it as well as a force below it. Without these two forces—if the enemy possesses one or both—the surface fleet can 'control' nothing."

As to the airplane, Admiral Sims, fresh from the World War, is in little doubt:

Mr. VENABLE: Admiral, as I understand the discussion and the facts and the arguments that have been presented by you, your position is this, that it is not only important, but absolutely vital, that the possibilities of aviation as applied to naval warfare, should be determined at the earliest possible date; that there is a possibility, and indeed, a probability, that the development of aviation may revolutionize the type of the fleet and the type of fighting units, with particular reference to our larger and more costly ships, and that, therefore, it is not only important, but absolutely vital, that experiments should be carried on to determine the possibilities of aviation, and that that should be done now. Taking that as a predicate, I want to ask you whether or not it is

<sup>1</sup>Admiral Fullam, Senate Hearings, 116.

your opinion that it would be a wise course, if we are to have economies anywhere in naval construction, in view of the financial condition of the United States and of the world, to cut our expenditures on the large ship construction, and pursue a liberal policy of appropriation with reference to aviation?

Admiral SIMS: Absolutely.<sup>1</sup>

And another admiral, widely known for the virility of his navalism, is even more positive:

Admiral FISKE: Well, I am sure—I can put it this way: If there was to be a fight out on the ocean between an airplane carrier on the one side and two battleships on the other side, and I had to be on one side or the other, I would go on the airplane carrier rather than be on the two battleships.<sup>2</sup>

The value of the airplane, based on what is in reality a capital ship, a 35,000-ton airplane carrier, is equally evident to the layman. As a weapon its encounter with a battleship would be a foregone conclusion, dollar for dollar. The battleship costs \$39,000,000 without ammunition; the fighting plane costs \$39,000. A thousand airplanes for a single battleship. The airplane travels five times as fast as the capital ship, carries six 1000-pound bombs, and fires them by letting them drop. The bombs "will penetrate all decks down to the protective deck, and then explode with such force as to destroy or put out of action any ship now built or designed." Or, acting as a depth charge, they "will sink or put out of action any ship if they fall in the water within 60 feet of her hull." The plane is relatively immune from anti-aircraft guns, whose record of hits is 1 in 1,000 on land and still less at sea. Admiral Sims concludes from all the facts and claims that an airplane carrier "would be unharmed, and few if any of her planes would be shot down," while a duel "would inevitably result in the destruction or disablement" of the battleship.

But the admiral's war game contemplates one airplane carrier, with only 80 planes aboard. Such a vessel costs \$28,600,000, and its 80 planes \$3,120,000. So that for \$31,720,000, it is expert judgment that \$39,000,000 can be knocked out.

The real purpose of a battleship is to carry explosives to a point where they can be delivered most certainly at the enemy from its deck as a gun platform. It has 12 16-inch guns in the

<sup>1</sup>House Hearings, 663. See the very impressive article of the admiral, "The Battleship and the Airplane" in the *World's Work*, May, 1921.

latest models, firing 1-ton shells up to 200 discharges, a total, say of 5,000,000 pounds of explosives for the enemy. Then the guns are worn out. The monetary equivalent of the capital ship, 1,000 airplanes, can carry 6,000,000 pounds of explosives on one trip. They have no rifling to wear out; they lose but one craft out of 1,000 on each trip by direct fire; and they can make five times as many trips as the fastest surface ship. Efficiency would seem to lie with the flying ship.

## VII. NAVAL POLICY

At the present time the United States has the most rapidly expanding navy. The Navy Department has rejected every effort to halt construction on the 1916 program of 156 warships, and it is being fulfilled practically intact, with the exception of the substitution of two airplane carriers for 18 smaller vessels. Great Britain is at a standstill, and Japan is trying to find resources for a so-called "8-8" program, that is, eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. France is standing still, and Italy, the other power, is really no longer in the rivalry.

What, then, is the policy behind the three largest fleets?

The General Board of the Navy Department on November 9, 1915, made the report which establishes both the basis and the purpose of the current building program. In this report it is stated:

"The navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of development year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not later than 1925."

The General Board is convinced of the great advantages, both military and economic, which will follow upon the acceptance of the general principle of a building program extending over a period of years. . . . On one hand a continuing program enables the Navy Department to plan with greater foresight than is possible with an annual noncontinuing program. The military end to be reached at the close of such a period is thus made clearly evident by the Navy Department to Congress and to the country. On the other hand, a degree of financial security is offered the industries of the country by the foreknowledge which they thus obtain as to probable naval expenditures. This will encourage them to invest money in enlarging their plants for naval shipbuilding and all its allied industries. At the same time, the strong probability of continued work throughout the period of the program, will tend to reduce contract prices.

### "WEIGHT TO DIPLOMATIC REMONSTRANCE"

The General Board believes that the course of the present war in Europe affords convincing reasons for modifying the opinion which it has expressed for the past 11 years as to the proper size of the navy.

A navy in firm control of the seas from the outbreak of the war is the prime essential to the defense of a country situated as is the United States bordering upon two great oceans. A navy strong enough only to defend our coast from actual invasion will not suffice. Defense from invasion is not the only function of the navy. It must protect our sea-borne commerce and drive that of the enemy from the sea. The best way to accomplish all these objects is to find and defeat the hostile fleet or any of its detachments at a distance from our coast sufficiently great to prevent interruption of our normal course of national life. The current war has shown that a navy of the size recommended by this Board in previous years can no longer be considered as adequate to the defensive needs of the United States. Our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace nor to enforce its policies in war.<sup>1</sup>

A resolution was passed by the Senate on January 25 calling upon its Committee on Naval Affairs "to report to the Senate whether, in its opinion, it is practical and also a sound policy to suspend our naval building program, now in progress, for the period of six months, to the end that a full investigation and free discussion may be had as to what constitutes a modern fighting navy—a navy with the types of ships and with the air and submarine weapons that would be most effective in the strategy and tactics of future war on the sea; and also to the end that we may avail ourselves in the matter, both as to economy and efficiency, of any possible agreement between naval powers providing for the reduction of armaments."

The committee on February 9<sup>2</sup> reported that in its opinion "it is not practical and is not a sound policy to suspend the naval construction program of the United States now in progress, for a period of six months, nor at all." This decision was based on a memorandum report from the General Board of the navy.

The British situation is far different. Walter Long, first lord of the Admiralty, last December recalled that at one time Britain had a naval policy of maintaining a fleet equal to the next three; then, during the period of German activity, equal to the next two; and now, as a result of changed relations due to the World War, equal to the strongest. That is, exactly what the General Board of the American navy says. This significant, not to say

<sup>1</sup>Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1915, 75-76.

<sup>2</sup>Congressional Record; Senate Report 766, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess.

revolutionary, change in British policy has stood through two years, practically unnoticed by America.

#### BRITAIN'S NEW ONE-POWER STANDARD

Walter Long, first lord of the British Admiralty, speaking in the House of Commons, March 17, 1920, first stated it:

Before the war various Governments had to consider what the strength of the possible enemies on the sea opposed to them might be, and there were various standards taken. But I think it was generally accepted that our strength ought to be equivalent to that of the two next strongest powers. . . . The Germans, who were the cause of this war, who brought so much suffering upon humanity, who were so proud of their navy, who built it at such immense expense to themselves and thereby entailed very great expense upon us too, the Germans are to-day without a navy. . . .

Looking round the world to find what are the navies which at this moment can compare in strength with our own, we find that the only one is the navy of the United States of America. I believe it is a fact that the naval policies of all past Governments, whichever party they represented, have at least included this common principle, that our navy should not be inferior in strength to the navy of any other power, and to this principle the present Government firmly adheres. We are very fortunate in the fact that the only navy approximating in strength to our own is that of the United States of America, with whom we are associated in such a way that the idea of competition in armaments between us is one that is, to put it mildly, repugnant to us all; and we here—and I speak now, not merely for the Board of Admiralty, but for the Government—hope and believe that if there is to be any emulation between the United States of America and ourselves, it is likely to be in the direction of reducing that ample margin of naval strength which we each alike possess over all other nations. That is the foundation of the naval policy of His Majesty's Government.<sup>1</sup>

A memorandum on naval policy issued by the present first lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, on March 12, 1921, contains these important statements:

Estimates can only be based upon policy, and the naval policy of the Government, as announced by my predecessor, in the House of Commons, on March 17, 1920, is to maintain a "one-power standard"—*i. e.*, that our navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other power. The duty of the Admiralty is to carry out that policy, as economically as possible, giving full weight to the special geographical,

<sup>1</sup>Parl. Deb., 5th series, Vol. 126, 2300-01.



international and other considerations which have arisen since the war. This they are doing—in no mechanical spirit nor with insistence upon “numerical equality”—and, recognizing to the full the necessity for reducing expenditure to the lowest limits compatible with national security, the Admiralty have effected drastic economies, and agreed to assume risks which, in ordinary circumstances, they would regard as difficult to reconcile with the full maintenance of the Government’s declared policy.

### NOT BUILDING AGAINST OTHERS

It can not be too strongly emphasized that, in making this long-delayed beginning with the replacement of obsolete ships, the Government neither commits itself to, nor contemplates, any building “programs” in answer to those of any other power. Indeed, it trusts that it may be possible, as a result of frank and friendly discussion with the principal naval powers, to avoid anything approaching to competitive building, either now or in the future. But meanwhile it would be a dereliction of duty on the part of the Admiralty to allow the efficiency, training, or *moral* of the Royal Navy to deteriorate through neglect to provide it with *matériel* which is equal to the best and in which it can feel confidence.

Japan’s policy is described in an interview of January 22 with Takashi Hara, premier of that country. As quoted in the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, he said:

Although Japan to-day is recruiting larger navy plans, she is not ambitious to attack any other nation. The press stories asserting that Japan is building a navy against a hypothetical foe, and that that foe is America, are fantastic nonsense. Even with the present program completed, Japan’s naval strength still will be far less than required for an attack on America. The Pacific Ocean is wide, America is rich, distant and powerful, and should Japan hope to attack the United States she must build a navy far greater than America’s. Even those who ascribe the most aggressive motives to Japan on account of her naval construction must know that the present Government simply is executing an old program. The purpose of our building is obvious and simple. It is for the defense of our commerce and coasts, and nothing more. Our naval experts believe the present navy is insufficient for this purpose, and hence we must continue building.

### OCEANS PREVENT DANGER

Neither the British nor the Japanese fleets are menaces to the United States. Admiral Sims in testimony said on February 4:

It is not a question in my mind of a second-class navy or a first-class navy. If we have no ideas, as I understand we have not, and we never have had, of extending our territory, and have no policy of aggrandizement at all, then we do not need as large a navy as our enemies that are 3,000 miles away. If you will refer to any competent writer, for instance, from Admiral Mahan up and down, you will see what I mean. I have a book of Mahan's . . . and you will see in there a discussion of the matter of the relative importance of the distance that your enemies are away from you. I do not hesitate to say that a British navy twice as great as ours could not successfully carry out any aggression against our coast, particularly in view of the modern weapons that we have now. Without going into a discussion in detail, my opinion is this, that if the enemy nation is 3,000 miles away, they have not any ships at all that can come over here and go back again without being coaled. She has got to have a base on this side. She has no destroyers at all that can come across the ocean at anything like fleet speed, and they must have bases for them. There is no base on this side, and there never will be one on this side, adequate to take care of a fleet of that kind and keep it in repair. They could not maintain a fleet on this side and keep it in repair. Now, it is up to us to decide, if we want to be on the defensive and have no idea of going across the ocean with our fleet to attack anybody else, as to what size the fleet should be. That is not the sort of thing to get into a quarrel about, but it is something that must be gone carefully into by competent military people.

Mr. OLIVER: Admiral, I have been led to believe from what you and other naval officers said that there is no such thing as a defensive navy, but a navy to have strength must have offensive power.

Admiral SIMS: Yes, sir.

Mr. OLIVER: In other words, if we should have war, it would be in the interest of this Government to shorten the war, and you could not shorten the war if your navy were built for purely defensive purposes?

### 3,000 MILES OF SAFETY

Admiral SIMS: I do not think you understood what I meant. I did not mean that the navy should be built purely for defensive purposes; but if it is your policy, and I do not say that it is, that you will never go across the ocean with aggressive designs, then you would want to have a navy strong enough to oppose any navy that could come 3,000 miles to attack you. . . . If you got into war with a country 3,000 miles away because they insisted upon doing something to you, and they come over here to attack you, it would be foolish for you to go 3,000 miles from your operating base to attack him at his base.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 645, 647, 648, 646.

## VIII. THE 'NEW REGIME IN EUROPE

The armament problem was inevitably one of the subjects to be considered in the settlement of the World War. There were two possible points of view at the time of the armistice. One was to arrange for a change at the time and the other was to arrange for the future. The Allied and Associated Powers, the victors, decided not to change their own status at the moment, except to record in the several treaties of peace that the armament clauses there set forth were imposed upon the enemy "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." In other words, limitation was made a price of defeat, and the moral effect of a self-denying ordinance on the part of the victors was carefully avoided. Clinging to armament at a time when it could very easily be relinquished is one of the easiest things that civilization does.

Looking to the future, the Allied and Associated Powers were not quite so cautious. Their mutual engagement, which was framed for the immediate participation of neutrals, and now is binding upon 48 states, is to be found in Articles 8 and 9 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In those articles are positive injunctions from which something must come if good faith exists in the world. The details will be fully discussed forthwith, but it is for the moment desirable to see how the enemy powers, which before the war were undoubtedly the pivot of armament increase, have been treated in this respect by our victory over them.

Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey had their level of armaments set for them at Paris, and in each country military, naval and air commissions of the victorious powers are now established with the sole duty of seeing that the imposed conditions are fulfilled. It should be understood in reading the following summary of the treaty provisions that they have been revised to accord with the undisputed facts secured from Allied sources. Looking at the situation as a whole, none of the enemy states except Germany and Turkey are under suspicion of non-fulfilment, and the treaty with Turkey is not yet effective. As to Germany, the outstanding matters in dispute are technically rather than actually important from the present armament point

of view. For instance, by the note of January 29, "there remain to be surrendered, in accordance with certain estimates, 1,400 airplanes and 5000 motors." This demand was accompanied by a ruling that "Germany shall accept the definitions established by the Allied powers which shall distinguish civil aviation from military forbidden by Article 198." Inasmuch as such definitions had not previously been put into effect, it is not clear whether the demand was a result of them. Germany had previously surrendered 16,000 airplanes and 25,000 motors. It is not to be doubted but that the disarmament of Germany under the treaty is as complete as the very technical conditions of fact permit.<sup>1</sup> The following summary of the existing conditions is official, revised from official documents.<sup>2</sup>

*Military Forces*—The German army strength may not exceed 100,000 including 4000 officers,<sup>3</sup> with not over seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, to be devoted exclusively to maintenance of internal order and control of frontiers. The divisions may not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs. The German Great General Staff is abolished. The army administrative service, consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives, is reduced to one-tenth the total in the 1913 budget. Employees of the German states, such as customs officers, forest guards and coast guards, may not exceed the number in 1913. Gendarmes and local police may be increased only in accordance with the growth of population. None of these may be assembled for military training. No reserve of officers with war service is permitted. The high command confines itself to administrative duties.

<sup>1</sup>The following testimony is in point:

"FRED A. BRITTON: I have seen reports that there were thousands of guns hidden in various parts of Germany, and that the Germans might rise and commit great destruction. It was wondering whether there was any truth in reports of that kind.

"General PERSHING: I should be inclined to think that any such statements as that would be greatly exaggerated. I can hardly conceive of Germany undertaking another war in the immediate future." (Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 600.)

<sup>2</sup>The provisions summarized are Part V, Articles 159-213, of the German treaty; Part V, Articles 118-159, of the Austrian treaty; Part IV, Articles 64-104, of the Bulgarian treaty; Part V, Articles 102-143 of the Hungarian treaty; Part V, Articles 152-207, of the Turkish treaty, as signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920.

<sup>3</sup>Turkey, 50,700 officers and men; Hungary, 35,000; Austria, 30,000; and Bulgaria, 20,000.

*Armaments*—All establishments for the manufacturing, preparation, storage or design of arms and munitions of war, except those specifically excepted have been closed and their personnel dismissed.<sup>1</sup> The exact amount of armament and munitions allowed Germany is laid down in detail tables, all in excess to be surrendered or rendered useless. The manufacture or importation of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids is forbidden, as well as the importation of arms, munitions and war materials. Germany may not manufacture such materials for foreign governments. No reserves of munitions may be formed. No tanks nor armored cars shall be manufactured or imported. The Germans are obliged to notify to the principal Allies for approval the names and situation of all factories manufacturing munitions, together with particulars of their output. The German government arsenals are suppressed and their personnel has been dismissed. Munitions for use in fortified works will be limited to 1000 rounds apiece for guns of 10.5 cm. caliber and under, and 400 rounds for guns of a higher caliber. Germany is prohibited from importing armaments and munitions.

*Conscription*—Conscription is abolished in Germany.<sup>2</sup> The enlisted personnel must be maintained by voluntary enlistments for terms of 12 consecutive years, the number of discharges before the expiration of that term not in any year to exceed five per cent of the total effectives. Officers remaining in the service must agree to serve to the age of 45 years, and newly appointed officers must agree to serve actively for 25 years. No military schools except those absolutely indispensable for the units allowed shall exist. No association such as societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, educational establishments or universities may

<sup>1</sup>The Krupp works at Essen and the famous Skoda works are now both devoted to industrial manufactures. Cf. Commerce Reports, April 29, 1921.

<sup>2</sup>The text of the act abolishing conscription in Germany as passed by the Reichstag on August 21, 1920, is as follows:

"1. The German defense force consists of the state army and the state navy, formed of volunteers and noncombatant officials. All members of the defense force must be of German nationality. Conscription (*allegemeine Wehrpflicht*) is abolished. All decrees to the contrary are rescinded.

"2. The number of men in the state army from January 21 next will be 100,000, and in the state navy 15,000. In addition, there will be the requisite medical and veterinary officers.

"3. Any man wishing to enlist in the defense force must undertake to remain uninterruptedly in the state army or navy for 12 years.

occupy themselves with military matters. All measures of mobilization are forbidden.

**Fortresses**—All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory within a zone 50 kilometers east of the Rhine are dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications there is forbidden. A few fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers remain.

**Naval**—The German navy is allowed six small battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats and no submarines, either military or commercial, with a personnel of 15,000 men, including officers, and no reserve force of any character. Conscription is abolished, only voluntary service being permitted, with a minimum period of 25 years' service for officers and 12 for men. No member of the German mercantile marine will be permitted any naval training. All German vessels of war in foreign ports, the German High Sea Fleet, 42 modern destroyers, 50 modern torpedo boats, and all submarines, with their salvage vessels were surrendered, and all war vessels under construction, including submarines, broken up.<sup>1</sup> War vessels not otherwise provided for were placed in reserve or used for commercial purposes. Replacement of ships, except those lost, can take place only at the end of 20 years for battleships and 15 years for destroyers. The largest armored ship permitted is of 10,000 tons. Material arising from the breaking up of German warships may not be used except for industrial purposes, and may not be sold to foreign countries. Except under specified conditions for replacement, Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships, and the construction or acquisition of any submarines whatever is

"4. Before promotion to officer's rank a candidate must undertake to remain uninterruptedly in that rank for 25 years from the day of promotion.

"5. Members of the former army, the former navy, the former defense corps (*Schutztruppen*), the provisional state army and the provisional state navy, will be paid according to the provisions of the army pay act and the budget act.

"Officers of both forces must agree to remain in the service until they have completed their 45th year.

"Noncommissioned officers retain their former insignia of rank, but may not claim to be given employment consonant with their former rank.

"6. This act comes into force on the day of its publication."—Translation from *Economic Review*, September 10, 1920.

A revised law was passed on March 19, 1921, in compliance with an allied demand.

<sup>1</sup>For disposition of the German and Austro-Hungarian fleets, see *League of Nations*, III, 302-303.

prohibited. Vessels of war have a fixed allowance of arms, munitions and war material. All excess of arms, munitions and war material was surrendered, and no stocks or reserves are allowed. All German fortifications in the Baltic defending the passages through the Belts have been demolished. Other coast defenses are permitted, but the number and caliber of the guns must not be increased.

*Air*—The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigibles shall be kept. The entire air personnel is demobilized. No aviation grounds or dirigible sheds are allowed within 150 kilometers of the Rhine or the eastern or southern frontiers, existing installations within these limits to be destroyed. The manufacture of aircraft and parts of aircraft was forbidden for six months. All military and naval aeronautical material under a most exhaustive definition was surrendered within three months.

*Control*—Interallied commissions of control are seeing to the execution of the provisions for which a time limit is set. Their headquarters are at the German seat of government—and they may go to any part of Germany desired. Germany must give them complete facilities, pay their expenses, and also the expenses of execution of the treaty, including the labor and material necessary in demolition and destruction of surrendered war equipment.<sup>1</sup>

### LEAGUE OF NATIONS PROVISIONS

The articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations referring to the subject appear in the treaty of Versailles in this form:

ARTICLE I, 2. Any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony

<sup>1</sup>Marshal Foch reported German deliveries of arms on December 31, 1920, as follows:

Cannon (complete) .....	41,000
Cannon (barrels) .....	29,000
Machine guns (complete and barrels) .....	163,000
Rifles .....	2,800,000
Airplanes .....	16,000
Airplane motors .....	25,000

The German commissioner for disarmament of the population announced totals of arms, voluntarily delivered, purchased or confiscated up to January 10, 1921, apparently additional to the above, as follows:

952 cannon; 18,067 machine guns; 2,201,584 rifles and carbines; 78,325 revolvers and pistols; 85,616 hand grenades; 3,553 pieces of firearms; 246,357 pieces of machine guns; 312,905 pieces of rifles; and 4,624,189 cartridges. (*Le Temps*, January 15, 1921.)

not named in the annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guaranties of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments

**ARTICLE VIII.** The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each Member, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every 10 years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

**ARTICLE IX.** A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military, naval and air questions generally.



## IX. ABOLISH THE UNLIMITED LIABILITY OF WAR

Grotius, the father of international law, laid down the definition of war which has not been extended in the intervening three hundred years. "War," he said,<sup>1</sup> "is the state of contending parties, considered as such." But he added a most important thought which has scarcely been mentioned since: "Justice is not included in the definition of war, because the very point to be decided is, whether any war be just, and what war may be so called. Therefore we must make a distinction between war itself and the justice of it." Nevertheless, the Romans had regarded war as an institution of law, that is, of justice. But that was, as it were, by default of organization. Sir Edward Creasy gives the reasoning in a few words: "When states had been formed, inasmuch as they acknowledged no common superior who should decide such differences as arose between them, the only possible mode for an injured state, which could not obtain redress by persuasion, was to seek it by war . . . carried on according to such rules as the general opinion and consent of civilized mankind should from time to time ordain—that is to say, according to *jus gentium*, understood as the law common to all civilized nations."<sup>2</sup>

Yet the only Roman conclusion from that reasoning was that compliance with the formalities prescribed gave the belligerent the right to call his contest a "perfect" war instead of an "imperfect" war.<sup>3</sup> And a "perfect" war was one of unlimited liability, in which the conquered lost their lives, their freedom and their property, though the conquerors must be duly enrolled soldiers who were forbidden to show bad faith or treachery.

The publicists have missed a good deal between that point and the one where they resume their discussion. The full force of

<sup>1</sup>The Rights of War and Peace, I, cap. 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup>First Platform of International Law, 371; citing Digest, book 1, title 1, sec. 5, where the jurist Hermogenianus is quoted. Creasy also quotes a suggestive passage from the Commentary of Cujacius, the 16th century French jurist.

<sup>3</sup>There is another set of alternatives, namely "general" and "limited," that is, engaging a whole or only a part of the citizenry. Cf. Moore, Digest of International Law, VII, 155.

Montesquieu's declaration that "nations ought to do each other as little harm in war as possible, without prejudice to their true interests,"<sup>1</sup> has been largely lost. And as a consequence, the text writers and the practitioners of international relations have devoted themselves to laying down what constituted "just" wars—as if anybody could really know that until after the affair was started beyond recall; to inventing rules for the conduct of war—outside the range of military science; and to determining with meticulous care how far the abnormal condition of war infringed on the normal rights of states, belligerent or neutral, and their nationals. All of these avenues of inquiry have been bounded by the dictum that "the object of war is peace," another of the remarkable paradoxes which cloud clear thinking on the armament problem.

#### JUSTICE THE OBJECT

War's object should not be peace, and armament should not be an instrument of peace. The object of war should be justice—which is what? An abstract definition is obviously of no use in seeking a solution to the armament question. Concretely, justice can best be defined as the balance of interests between the parties. Justice can be said to exist between them when neither is able to overbear the other by the resources of reason and argument. The result of such a balance may not be ideally satisfactory to either, but is the best to be had at the given time. The outcome may not be alike in two cases.

Can armament be employed in war as an instrument of justice? It can. The human race has developed a considerable body of moral sense which it has successively applied to individual, municipal, national, and international relations. In every case the procedure is the same. Individuals who fail to adjust their interests between themselves call on a third party—a court usually—to do it for them. If that fails to solve their problem and they attack each other, we jail them for the good of the community. Internationally, we are just at the point where states have agreed to let the community of nations treat any of them which refuses to use the third party as an outlaw. But they reserve a fairly extensive right to decide whether the third party shall be a deciding court or an advising board of inquiry;

<sup>1</sup>De l'Esprit des Loix, livre I, chap. 3.

and in the latter case they gain their freedom to fight unless the report of the board is unanimous. If we take account of the flexibility of mankind in applying technicalities to its own advantage, and assume that the possibilities of war are still larger, so that states can find other avenues for getting through the rules into war, justice would be a pretty dubious quantity.

#### WHAT UNLIMITED MEANS

But let us assume that all the rules have been complied with, and that there is war. There would, of course, be a cause—a piece of territory, the confinement of a citizen, or something like that. State A is defeated. In the past has victor B taken the disputed territory, released the citizen or recovered any other object of disagreement, and quit? It has not. The victor has invariably entered a war on a limited grievance and placed the victim under an unlimited liability in the end. The settlement of any war has been regarded as too good a chance to be overlooked for the victor to improve its position, to settle old scores, to straighten out kinks of relationship. Apply the principle personally. A and B get into a fight over a watch when the police are not around. B, who is A's rival in love and business, wins. As a result he secures the watch, forces A to hand over the engagement ring and sign over his business. Intolerable among persons; merely patriotic among peoples! If the affair remained outside the jurisdiction of courts by some fluke of justice, the neighbors would say that the watch was not the cause of the dispute at all.

#### THE WAY TO REFORM

That situation is so normal in the case of war between nations that apparently no publicist has ever even considered it. The remedy is, of course, simple. Let nations agree in discussing the political phases of disarmament that, in the event of war, they will obligate themselves to take no more at the peace than what they have declared in advance to be the *casus belli*.

The machinery for preventing nations from reaching the point where they have a *casus belli* which they can put to the trial of war, without arraying the rest of the world against them, as happened to Germany, is pretty well developed. But if that point is reached, why not confine the fight strictly within the limits of the declared object?

First, that would give real substance in practise to Montesquieu's correct thesis that "nations ought to do each other as little harm in war as possible, without prejudice to their true interests," affording at the outset a firmer basis for appraising the justice of the affair than has ever existed.

Second, that would deprive no nation of any right to which it was entitled, for none would be able to claim honestly that it was justified in making a war whose object it could not define in advance.

Third, that would give the world a perfectly definite criterion for determining when the object was attained and for judging the peace.

Fourth, that would eliminate a great deterrent to the development of international law, namely, that the suspension of treaties during war has always given the victor the opportunity to gain advantages by imposing new commercial and other terms on the vanquished as an incident to re-establishing peace, thus setting precedents which the world has been prone to live down to.

Fifth, that would practically eliminate "perfect" or "general" war—that is, the nation in arms—from the field, the wars that would occur being of the "limited" character.

### THE BAROMETER OF POLICY

The armament problem is simply stated—policy and fear. The world has passed beyond the stage where any nation maintains armament as a mere hobby. But what is not understood is that armament is not kept for itself. It is impossible to fight a war without armament and it is even more impossible to get into war unless policy leads there. Armament is the barometer of policy. There will never be any employment of armament which is not enjoined or dictated by policy. That is the cardinal point which has been so signally disregarded by all nations that not one of them has ever done the essential thing of making those who conduct their foreign relations primarily responsible for determining the level of preparations for war. Instead of that perfectly simple effort, the peoples have permitted their governments to whip up their fears, and have rewarded the politicians who invented the biggest bugaboos. There has been enough real cause of fear in the world; but it has been so generously mixed with imagination that peoples have seldom been able to

distinguish the false from the true. The real dangers to national life are, or should be, properly met by facing the determined facts, with the public responsibility placed upon those who direct the national policy rather than left to those who have undertaken the technical duty of seeing to preparations for defense.

Right up to the present there has been practically no attempt to determine in any effective way what nations should fight about, and what they should not. Behind the whole fabric of international relations up to and through the World War was the recognition that war was something that a state took on at its own election. Grotius piously admitted the right of a state to wage a "just war." But that kind of dictum, suspended in the national and international fogs of emotionalism and selfish interests, means nothing; because it takes no account of the ability of the human mind to translate evil into good. The Germanic powers began the World War with justice on their side, according to their own statements at the time.

### THINGS ARE BETTER

The situation is somewhat improved. In fact, during the last 20 years there has grown up a certain number of restrictions upon war and certain tests of its correctness.

The second Hague Conference produced a convention signed on October 18, 1907, by which the contracting powers "recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning"; and that the existence of the state of war shall not take effect in regard to neutral powers until after the receipt of the notification. These provisions were somewhat vitiated by the provision that an ultimatum or a conditional declaration of war might operate as such a notice. Subsequent conflicts have seen that privilege applied in 24- and 48-hour ultimatums.

Another restriction was established in a Hague convention of the same date by which the "contracting powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its nationals." Arbitration

was specified as the proper method of settling such claims, failing the application of which, the restriction itself would not hold.

As early as June 23, 1874, the United States Senate passed a resolution recommending "the adoption of arbitration as a just and practical method for the determination of international differences, to be maintained sincerely and in good faith, so that war may cease to be regarded as a proper form of trial between nations." The realization of that sound doctrine in practice has taken great but halting steps in the intervening 47 years.

Advance did not prove to be by the arbitration route. The development of that method encountered two rocks. The first was the exception from its jurisdiction of questions of "national honor," which is a thing as intangible in the international system as the Austro-Hungarian "prestige," which hamstrung every effort to get that country to discuss her ultimatum to Serbia.<sup>1</sup> The second was the impossibility of establishing arbitration as an organic system, owing to failure to agree on a method for selecting a workable court.

#### AMERICA BLAZES NEW TRAILS

But the United States nevertheless blazed new trails. First, President Taft avoided the fetish of "national honor" by a new division of international disputes into "justiciable" and "non-justiciable." In 1913 Secretary of State Bryan made the proposal which completed the circle. He proposed that all disputes not otherwise settled should be submitted to inquiry by permanent commissions and the contracting powers—28 of them now—"agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report."

So the right—fully recognized in political science—of a state to make war on any account in its own discretion—or lack of discretion—is gradually being foresworn by a world which has been curiously averse to deny itself the privilege of blowing itself up.

The restrictions have grown. The World War begat the

<sup>1</sup>"A war for the *prestige* and position of the monarchy indeed for its very existence cannot be avoided for any length of time. . . . Half measures putting forth demands, with long discussions to follow and a rotten compromise at the end would be the heaviest blow Austria-Hungary's *prestige* in Serbia and its position as a great power in Europe could experience." (Baron von Giesl, Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade, to Count Berchtold, July 21, 1914. Austrian Red Book, Official Files pertaining to Prewar History, I, 90, 91.)

general conviction that war and its necessary instruments were suppressible by concerted action, and that, above all, agreements to that end should be enforceable. The Peace Conference point of view is clear to that effect:

**Mr. PADGETT:** If the terms of the agreement are not kept by one nation they must be enforced by the use of the forces of the civilized powers who are parties to the agreement.

**HENRY WHITE:** (Member of American Commission to Negotiate Peace): I do not see how it could be otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

It is not surprising, therefore, that 48 nations have now agreed among themselves "that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or inquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council." They further agree "that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League [of Nations] which complies therewith." In respect to cases submitted to inquiry, "if the report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report." In the case of a state not a Member of the League, if an invitation to accept the obligations of membership for the purposes of the dispute is refused and it shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the sanctions applicable to members of the League shall apply to it and if any Member of the League resorts to war in disregard of these provisions "it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League" which undertake to apply the so-called economic boycott.

In the summer of 1920, Elihu Root, former Secretary of State, was selected as one of a dozen of the world's foremost international jurists to work out at The Hague a draft scheme for a permanent Court of International Justice. The work, for the first time in history, was successfully accomplished. In December it was voted at Geneva by the representatives of 40 nations,

<sup>1</sup>Hearing of the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 590.

acting officially, and the ratifications of several states to the resulting treaty have already taken place. Only one question respecting it is outstanding, that of compulsory jurisdiction. The states participating in the adoption of the plan could not bring themselves to agree to be cited into court—at least not all of them. Yet they all did agree to prepare a protocol, which, upon being separately signed, accomplishes that result.

### THE OPPORTUNITY AHEAD OF US

On March 2, 1907, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, premier of Great Britain, published a letter in the *London Nation* with the purpose of urging that the question of reduction of armaments should be placed on the program of the second Hague Conference, then about to be held. "The idea of the peaceful adjustment of international disputes has attained a practical potency, and a moral authority undreamt of in 1898." And, then he went on:

I suggest that only upon one hypothesis can the submission of this grave matter to the conference be set down as inadmissible; namely, that guaranties of peace, be they what they may, are to be treated as having no practical bearing on the scale and intensity of warlike preparations. . . . It would amount to a declaration that the common interest of peace, proclaimed for the first time by the community of nations assembled at The Hague, and carried forward since then by successive stages with a rapidity beyond the dreams of the most sanguine, has been confided to the guardianship of the admiralties and war offices of the powers.

The time is now ripe, overripe, to restrict war; the burdened taxpayers cry out against its cost and its preparation. They are in the mood of the British statesman. America needs to turn only to her own history to find guaranties of peace full and effective enough to have the most practical bearing on the extent of armaments. And fate has brought to America the responsibility of being the strongest among the armament competitors left by the World War. Having through her history developed substitutes for war, can she now do less than call a conference to reduce armaments, fulfilling in these latter days Washington's farewell injunction to "give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence?"



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