

LEAGUE *of* NATIONS

Vol. II, No. 4

August, 1919

13

Latin America and the War

By

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN

*Associate professor of history,
Leland Stanford Jr. University*

Published Bimonthly by the
WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston
Price, 25 cents per year

World Peace Foundation

Boston, Massachusetts

*FOUNDED IN 1910 BY EDWIN GINN



The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.—*By-laws of the Corporation.*

It is to this patient and thorough work of education, through the school, the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the World Peace Foundation addresses itself.—Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force can not at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first, some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an *International Guard or Police Force.*—Edwin Ginn.

*Incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, July 12, 1910, as the International School of Peace. Name changed to World Peace Foundation, December 22, 1910.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Published Bimonthly by

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 MT. VERNON STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

The subscription price is 25c. per year in advance.

Prices in quantities on application.

General Secretary, Edward Cummings.

Corresponding Secretary, and Librarian, Denys P. Myers.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Treaty of Peace with Germany. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. 192 p., 23½ cm. (66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 49.)

The quarto print for the Committee on Foreign Relations is Sen. Doc. No. 51.

The reported treaty is Sen. Doc. No. 85.

No American edition with maps is available.

League of Nations. Comparison of the plan for the League of Nations showing the original draft as presented to the commission constituted by the preliminary peace conference in session at Versailles, France, together with the Covenant as finally reported and adopted at the plenary session of the Peace Conference; also the presentation speeches of the President of the United States relating thereto. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. 35 p. 23½ cm. (66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 46.)

League of Nations. American draft of Covenant of the League of Nations, together with the report of the Commission of the League of Nations. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. 25 p. 23½ cm. (66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 70.)

Covenant. A draft of the composite covenant made by the legal advisers of the Commission on the League. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. 8 p. 23½ cm. (66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 74.)

Treaty of Peace with Germany. Report of the conference between members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the President of the United States at the White House, Tuesday, August 19, 1919. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. 56 p. 23½ cm. (66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 76.)

CONTENTS

LATIN AMERICA AND THE WAR

BY PERCY ALVIN MARTIN

Associate Professor of History, Leland Stanford, Jr., University

Two Active Participants	228
Self-preservation an Incentive	229
Clerical Pro-Germanism	231
BRAZIL AND THE WAR	233
Brazilian Indignation Increased	234
Ruy Barbosa's Eloquent Indictment	235
Public Opinion Supported Government	237
Precautions Against Germans	241
Extensive War-Time Measures	243
Added to Allied Food Supply	244
CUBA	245
Political Rivalries Adjourned	247
Propaganda Neutralized	248
ARGENTINA	249
Reasons for Remaining at Peace	251
Resentment Followed Disclosures	254
CHILE	255
Press Showed Changed Attitude	257
THE REMAINING SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS	258
Uruguay's Remarkable Record	259
THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS	261
MEXICO	263
THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA	265
BIBLIOGRAPHY	267
BOOKS ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS	269

LATIN AMERICA AND THE WAR

BY PERCY ALVIN MARTIN

Associate professor of history, Leland Stanford Jr. University

One of the most engrossing and difficult tasks of the future historian of the great war will be the just appraisal of the share each of the victorious belligerents had in the defeat of Germany and her allies. Such a study, if essayed at the present time, would necessarily lack finality. Yet even now it is possible to sketch the broad lines of the picture. The contributions of France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Japan, stand out clearly; their achievements need no heralding. The participation of the United States in the struggle has added imperishable chapters to American history. But while we accord to our European Allies a just meed of praise for their share in the triumph over the Central powers, we are sometimes prone to forget that the United States was not the only independent power of the Western Hemisphere which staked its resources and possibly even its existence on the defeat of the enemies of civilization. In other terms there exists a real danger that our Latin American Allies shall not receive a proper recognition for the share they played in the great world drama whose concluding act has just been completed in Paris. It is the object of this article to present in brief compass some account of the reaction of the great war on our sister republics of Latin America.

When on February 3, 1917, President Wilson announced that diplomatic relations with Germany had been severed he expressed the hope that the remaining neutral states might see fit to follow the example of the United States. There can be little doubt that he had reference to the republics of Latin America. The neutral powers were for the most part in no position to throw down the gauntlet to Germany, while the alignment of China with the Allies caused the greater part of Asia to become involved in the world conflict. And when on April 6 Congress declared war there

was a general expectation that Latin America would soon be found at the side of the United States in the great contest between freedom and despotism.

All things considered, the response of our sister republics was reasonably gratifying. Of the 20 independent states reaching from Cuba and Mexico on the north to Chile and Argentina on the south, eight actually entered the arena of warfare alongside the United States and our European Allies. These nations are: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panamá. It has been contended that the attitude of Uruguay and Perú was tantamount to a declaration of war, but as their action was not so regarded by Germany they could hardly be considered as belligerents.¹ Five republics—Bolivia, Perú, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay—broke relations with Germany; seven—Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela and Paraguay—remained neutral. Or, looked at from another angle, it may be noted that two-thirds of the total area and three-fifths of the total population of Latin America voiced in some official manner their solidarity with the United States and our European Allies. Put on a numerical basis this means that out of nine million square miles and a total population of 90 millions, six million square miles and nearly 50 millions of people could no longer be characterized as neutral.

Two Active Participants

Yet such a classification, though impressive on paper, easily lends itself to misinterpretation. It might easily lead one to draw a too flattering conclusion. Of the actual belligerents only two, Brazil and Cuba, may be said to have taken anything like an active participation in the war; while Argentina and Chile, both members of the so-called A B C powers, carefully preserved a status of official neutrality. Mexico, the most important state north of the Isthmus, likewise falls within the same category. In other words, of the governments of the four Latin American countries of the most consequence three have studiously remained aloof from the war. But the official acts of the various states, signifi-

¹ Yet both of these nations were invited to send representatives to the peace conference and were parties signatory to the treaty of peace with Germany.

cant as they are, by no means tell the whole story. In no sense are they indicative of the attitude and sympathies of the majority of the thinking classes of these countries.

Any appraisal of the official and unofficial attitude of the Latin American republics toward the war must take into account a number of fundamental factors. The first of these is the sympathy of the great mass of the educated classes toward the European Allies and particularly toward France. If racially the Latin Americans of European descent hark back to Spanish and Portuguese origins, in all that makes up their culture and civilization, their debt to France has been immeasurable. This crops out in a thousand ways. French is spoken by all educated Latin Americans; French text-books are used in all the higher schools; French art and literature have served as the standards which Latin American artists and writers have consciously or unconsciously followed. When Latin Americans go abroad Paris is their Mecca; France their second *patria*. Possessed of such cultural and spiritual heritages, most Latin Americans have instinctively felt that the issues of the war ultimately resolved themselves into a struggle between Latin civilization and Teutonic aggression fully as much as into a contest between liberalism and autocracy.

The increasing indignation at the methods of warfare pursued by the Germans proved another factor of prime importance in moulding public opinion. The violation of Belgium and the resultant atrocities, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the bombing of defenseless towns and hospitals, and finally the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare aroused the passionate resentment of all Latin Americans whose judgment had not been warped by prejudice or propaganda. Certain of the republics, the rights of whose citizens had been in no wise jeopardized, broke off relations with Germany largely as a protest against this policy of frightfulness. Such was the case of Bolivia, one of the two entirely landlocked countries of South America.

Self-Preservation an Incentive

Another factor, though one of varying intensity in different countries, was the instinct of self-preservation. Those Latin Americans who could read history aright regarded with intense

anxiety the possibility of a German victory. They were fully alive to the fact that their independence was due in large part to the outcome of the European conflagration following the French Revolution. They had not forgotten that the designs of Napoleon on the Spanish American colonies and Brazil were thwarted by England, and those of Spain and the Holy Alliance on the recently liberated republics by England and the United States. A triumphant Germany dominating Europe and no longer held in check by the British fleet would, in the opinion of these Latin Americans, seize upon the first pretext to flout the Monroe doctrine and menace the sovereignty of certain of the South American states. Such a feeling was particularly strong in Brazil, whose southern states had long appeared on the maps of the Pan Germans as a future outpost of *Deutschtum*. Hence these Latin American nations could hardly regard with composure the defeat of that combination of powers which had enabled them to survive, or at least had protected them from aggression, during the past century.

As a corollary to this instinct of self-preservation was the influence of the United States and the ideals of Pan Americanism. The entry of the most powerful member of the Pan American brotherhood into the great conflict in defense of democracy and with no thought of territorial gain or selfish advantage had a profound repercussion throughout Latin America. In the tremendous struggle between autocracy and democracy many Latin Americans felt that they would be recreant to their highest ideals if they held aloof as neutrals. The Pan American movement, hitherto oftentimes regarded as a platonic sentiment or a subject for debate before international congresses or in after dinner speeches, suddenly took on a new and vital significance. As will be presently pointed out, this feeling of continental solidarity and community of ideals among the democracies of the new world was one of the causes which led Brazil actively to participate in the war.

Yet it would be idle to deny that the force of these factors was in a measure neutralized by a number of others, likewise common to all of Latin America. The first of these was of course German propaganda. This point needs no stressing; during the past four years it has been brought home to us in the United States repeatedly. But in Latin America it has assumed a peculiarly

subtle and sinister form. During the past few decades the countries to the south of us have been subjected to a highly organized and skillfully directed kind of economic and intellectual penetration. German professors and teachers have invaded the schools and colleges; traders and manufacturers have opened up new markets or endeavored to conquer old ones; army officers have secured employment as military instructors, particularly in Chile. These emissaries of *kultur* have copied with fidelity the manners of the Latin Americans, scrupulously observed their etiquette, flattered their *amour propre* and spared no pains to insinuate themselves into their good graces. They have not only struggled to increase the commerce and influence of the Fatherland, but have striven in season and out of season to misrepresent and envenom the relations between Latin America on the one hand and the United States and their European competitors on the other. And after the outbreak of the war German money and diplomacy were freely employed to secure control of the organs of public opinion, bribe officials who could be corrupted, and create dissensions and animosities. These maneuvers have been carried out with an unparalleled cynicism and effrontery, as has been revealed in the Luxburg and Zimmermann dispatches. While much of this propaganda has overshot the mark and recoiled on its authors, it has none the less been a force to be reckoned with.

Clerical Pro-Germanism

While German propaganda has been an important factor in keeping a large section of Latin America on the side of neutrality, it by no means tells the whole story. As is well known, in certain countries the influence of the clergy on public opinion and politics is still marked; in Chile, for instance, the church has been one of the chief supports of the Conservative party. The evidence seems fairly conclusive that the attitude of the clergy has taken on a pro-German tinge. This is due in part to the influence of the Spanish priests of whom there are a considerable number in South America; in part to the hostility still felt toward France, owing to the anti-clerical legislation dating from separation of church and state. Certain over-zealous prelates in Chile have not hesitated to declare that Germany was the divine instrument

chosen to punish France for her infidelity and atheism. It may also be noted as symptomatic that the Catholics of Argentina welcomed with avidity the peace proposal emanating from the Vatican. It would be a mistake, however, to place too much stress on this factor. It should be recalled that Perú and Ecuador, countries in which the hold of the church is still very strong, both broke off relations with Germany.

Those Americans who expected the republics south of the Rio Grande unhesitatingly to follow the lead of the United States when we entered the war against Germany are prone to overlook an unpalatable but important fact, namely, the suspicion and distrust with which the "colossus of the North" is still regarded in certain circles of Latin America. Not infrequently our motives and actions in the past have been misunderstood and misinterpreted; injudicious remarks of certain of our public men and the unconsidered utterances of certain sections of our press have tended to re-enforce rather than to allay such suspicions. Fantastic as it may seem, there are not lacking many otherwise well-informed Latin Americans who firmly believe that the United States is aiming at the hegemony of the Western Hemisphere. As proof of their assertion they point to the War of 1848, the circumstances under which Panamá was separated from Colombia, and to the recent establishment of quasi-protectorates over certain of the Caribbean and Central American republics. The Monroe doctrine as at present proclaimed has given rise to a certain resentment. And in all conscience it must be admitted that the conduct of the United States in the past has lent a certain warrant to these suspicions. It is this distrust—largely groundless to be sure—which in the case of a number of Latin American republics, notably Colombia, has militated against any closer approximation to the United States even under the stress of the great war.

Finally, it must be admitted in all candor that many Latin Americans have honestly believed that the best interests of their countries could be subserved by adherence to a strict neutrality. Such a decision, if honestly reached, should be no occasion for censure. Our own tardy entrance into the war should make us the more prone to suspend judgment in the case of those countries who elected to remain outside the conflict, especially when the rights of their citizens were in no wise placed in jeopardy.

BRAZIL AND THE WAR

The play and interplay of the various factors just noted may best be studied in the case of the individual nations of Latin America. Our survey naturally begins with Brazil; not only because she is the largest and most populous of all the Latin American states, but also because she has whole-heartedly and without reservation identified her cause with that of the Allies and the United States.

From the very beginning of the war it was clear to which side the sympathies of the Brazilians as a whole would incline; it was taken for granted that the majority of the educated classes, at least, would eagerly espouse the cause of the Allies. And this pro-Ally sentiment, at first largely instinctive, was overwhelmingly strengthened by the invasion of Belgium. As early as August 8, 1914, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved by a large majority the motion of Senhor Ireneu Machado, according to which Brazil went on record as opposed to the violation of treaties and the flouting of international law. Though neither Germany nor Belgium came in for specific mention, the purport of the motion was unmistakable.

Sympathy for the Entente soon crystallized into a powerful organ known as the Brazilian League for the Allies. As president of the league was chosen the distinguished statesman and publicist, Ruy Barbosa. The selection could not have been more fortunate or significant. Ruy Barbosa's claims to recognition date back to the days of the Brazilian Empire, when he won his spurs in Parliament by an impassioned plea for the abolition of negro slavery. Under the Provisional Government which followed the overthrow of the Empire in 1889 he was appointed minister of finance; later he gained an international reputation through his brilliant championship of the right of smaller nations at the Second Hague Conference. As orator, diplomat and statesman his voice has always been lifted up in behalf of justice and the cause of humanity. At the present time he is recognized as one of the most brilliant thinkers of Latin America. The vice-president of the league was, until his death in April, 1916, Brazil's leading literary critic and essayist, José Verissimo. Among its most active members has been Olavo Bilac, foremost living poet.

Leading business men, as well as prominent members of both houses of Congress, have been enrolled within its ranks.

Prior to Brazil's participation in the war the league confined its efforts to creating currents of sympathy for the Allies, to drawing tighter the cultural bonds between Brazil and France, and to the alleviation of suffering in the stricken regions of Europe. It was especially active in raising funds for the Brazilian and French Red Cross. After Brazil had formally entered the ranks of the belligerents the league greatly extended the scope of its activities; possibly its greatest service has been its intensive campaign of public education on the issues of the war.

Brazilian Indignation Increased

As the contest wore on and the purposes and methods of Germany were revealed in all their enormity, the indignation of the Brazilians became more and more unrestrained. The economic crisis coincident with the first two years of the war aggravated the general discontent. At the outset hostilities had seriously dislocated the economic life of Brazil, as it had that of other countries; finances were thrown into disorder; trade and commerce threatened with paralysis. In this connection it should be recalled that a considerable percentage of the public revenues is drawn from custom dues, while one of the chief sources of the country's wealth is the sale of raw material and agricultural products abroad. The British blockade, by cutting off Brazil from all trade with the Central powers, rendered the situation acute; indiscriminate submarine warfare, threatening to deprive Brazil of her remaining European markets, rendered it all but intolerable. It was in fact this submarine menace, culminating in the piratical sinking of a number of Brazilian ships, which finally goaded the nation into severing diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and eventually into a declaration of war. The steps leading up to the open break with Germany are sufficiently important to deserve recapitulation. They not only reveal the patience and forbearance of Brazil under extreme provocation but present a significant parallel with a similar chain of fatal developments in the United States.

Brazil is one of the few Latin American powers possessing a merchant marine of respectable proportions, and with the dearth

of shipping following the outbreak of the war she found it profitable to maintain regular communications with Europe, thus exposing her ships to the peril of German ruthlessness. The inevitable result followed. On May 1, 1915, nearly two years before the official declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, a German submarine overhauled the Brazilian steamship *Rio Branco* off the coast of England and, after shelling her and seizing her papers, sent her to the bottom. The effect on Brazil was instantaneous and profound. The dignified *Jornal do Commercio*, the foremost representative of public opinion in the country, indignantly declared: "The very name *Rio Branco* [Brazil's noted ex-minister of foreign affairs] signifies with us the noblest principles of diplomacy and international law. The German torpedo which sank our ship shattered these principles. Our duty is to protest with the utmost vigor against this brutal and unjustifiable crime." This pronouncement was comparatively restrained. Most of the great dailies of Rio de Janeiro voiced in one manner or another the sentiment of the *Gazeta de Noticias*: "The staff of William of Hohenzollern is a veritable camarilla of assassins and bandits who have declared war on humanity. To combat this infamous Prussianism is the duty of all nations."

Ruy Barbosa's Eloquent Indictment

Despite the belated proffer of an apology with a suggestion of the eventual payment of damages by Germany, in the months which followed the tension in Brazil steadily grew. The adhesion of Portugal, Brazil's former mother country, to the ranks of the belligerents in the spring of 1916 evoked tremendous enthusiasm and brought home to the Brazilians the realization that after all blood is thicker than water. Later in the same year the attitude of Brazil toward the issues of the war was even more clearly defined. In July the Argentine Republic celebrated the centenary of her complete independence of Spain as proclaimed in the Congress of Tucumán in 1816. To the elaborate festivities held in Buenos Aires Brazil sent as her special ambassador her most distinguished citizen and public man, Ruy Barbosa. In an impassioned and brilliant oration delivered before the Faculty of Law in the Argentine capital, Dr. Barbosa defined Brazil's sympathies in the European conflagration with a clarity and precision which

left little to be desired. "No nation can be a law unto itself," he declared in substance. "None can be an indifferent spectator in this world tragedy. Neutrality entails obligations. Between those who destroy the law and those who uphold it, neutrality is not permissible. Neutrality does not mean impassibility; it means impartiality, and there can be no impartiality between right and justice on the one hand and crime on the other. To demand the observance of those precepts on which the conscience of nations reposes, to demand respect for treaties, is not to break neutrality but to respect it."

This speech found approbation in wide circles and its significance was vastly enhanced by the fact that its author was generally regarded as having spoken in his official capacity as the representative of Brazil. Both branches of the Brazilian Congress voted on July 17 by an overwhelming majority, that the speech be published and be preserved as a part of their proceedings.¹

Causes for friction between Brazil and Germany continued to multiply. The growing intensity of the ship famine stimulated sentiment in favor of the seizure of the 44 German vessels, aggregating nearly a quarter of a million tons, interned in Brazilian harbors. The refusal of Germany to make satisfactory settlement for the large quantities of coffee stored in Hamburg and the clumsy maneuvers of German agents and spies in Brazil, added fuel to the flames. And, finally, the announcement by Germany of unrestricted submarine warfare, followed immediately by the

¹ *Jornal do Commercio*, July 18, 1916. In presenting the motion to the Lower House, the deputy, Senhor Moacyr, declared: "We can no longer remain the criminal accomplices of the theories and instruments of might and brutality however powerful they may be. It is absolutely necessary that we align ourselves with the forces of civilization menaced with destruction." In the Upper House Senator Guanabara spoke in a similar strain (*ibid.*).

This frank declaration of sympathy for the cause of the Allies by the Brazilian Congress aroused a feeling of deep gratitude in France. At the instance of MM. Clemenceau and Leygues the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, in the name of the French Parliament, sent to the Brazilian Congress a vote of thanks and appreciation, while a committee of French notables, including such names as MM. Paul Deschanel, Maurice Barrès, Henry Bergson, René Doumic, Anatole France and Auguste Rodin addressed an invitation to Ruy Barbosa to cross the Atlantic and "be a witness to the heroism and sacrifices of France in the maintenance of our common ideals and aspirations." Even Belgium sent a special mission consisting of the deputies of Ghent and Namur to bear a letter of greeting and thanks from the Belgian Parliament to the Brazilian Congress for its vote of sympathy and solidarity. (*Le Brésil* (Paris), August 13, 1916.)

severance of relations between the United States and the German Government, stirred public opinion to its very depths. In a dignified reply to the German declaration, the Brazilian Government stated that "it is its duty to protest against this blockade, as in fact it does protest, and therefore it leaves to the Imperial German Government the responsibility for all events which may happen to Brazilian citizens, merchandise or ships as a result of the abandonment of the principles recognized by international law, or by conventions to which Brazil and Germany are parties."¹

The powder train was laid; only a spark was needed to cause an explosion. On April 5, 1917, two days before the United States declared war on Germany, a German submarine sank the Brazilian steamer *Paraná* off the coast of France under particularly brutal circumstances. But one course consonant with her national honor and self-respect remained open to Brazil. On April 11 the Government handed Herr von Pauli, the German minister, his passports.²

Public Opinion Supported Government

It soon became evident, in the case of Brazil as in the case of the United States, that the situation created by the aggression of Germany could not be met by a mere severance of diplomatic and commercial relations. Public opinion and the press had thus far, with striking unanimity, supported the actions of the Government; during the spring and summer national sentiment gradually crystallized into the conviction that Brazil would definitely cast in her lot with the United States and the Allies as a full belligerent. On April 16 a huge demonstration was held in Rio de Janeiro under the auspices of the Brazilian League for the Allies. In the presence of a vast concourse Ruy Barbosa declared, amid tremendous enthusiasm, that all of Latin America would soon be fighting side by side with the United States in defense of the rights of humanity. The Government itself gave intimations that changes in Brazil's status were impending. On May 22 President Wenceslao Braz, in a special message to Congress, suggested that "the Brazilian nation, through its legislative organ, . . . adopt the attitude that

¹Note from the Brazilian minister to Germany to the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, dated February 9, 1917 (Brazilian Green Book, 28).

²Brazilian Green Book, 30.

one of the belligerents [the United States] forms an integral part of the American continent, and that to this belligerent we are bound by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law."¹

On the very day on which this message was delivered word reached Brazil of the sinking of the steamer *Tijuca* off the harbor of Brest.² Four days later President Braz again addressed Congress and, after stressing the gravity of the situation, urged that the 46 German ships lying in Brazilian harbors be utilized as a partial alleviation of the shipping crisis.³ This was done by two decrees, issued July 1 and 2 respectively; the first of these acts also revoked the decree of technical neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany.⁴

The revocation of neutrality was rightly regarded as an event of deep significance in the traditional friendship between Brazil and the United States. The history of the diplomatic relations between the two countries bears frequent witness to this sentiment of cordiality and mutual esteem. It may be recalled, for instance, that in less than two months after the reading of President Monroe's famous message the Brazilian Government issued instructions to its representative at Washington to propose to the United States an offensive and defensive alliance on the basis of the newly enunciated Monroe doctrine, acting on the principle "that it was not in accordance with reason, justice and right that sacrifices, such as those which the United States undertook to make for the other American nations, should be accepted gratuitously."⁵ When the United States and Great Britain agreed to submit the Alabama claims to arbitration, the Brazilian Emperor, Dom Pedro II, was requested to name one of the arbiters. More re-

¹Brazilian Green Book, 40.

²*Ibid.*, 41.

³*Ibid.*, 42.

⁴*Ibid.*, 43, 44. The decree of neutrality had been issued April 25, 1917 (Brazilian Green Book, 39).

Of the 46 German ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 240,000, 30 were subsequently chartered to France for the sum of 110 million francs; the remaining 18 were employed to supplement the existing Brazilian lines, notably the Lloyd Brasileiro. (*The Americas*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 1918), p. 82.)

⁵Baron of Rio Branco, "Brazil, the United States and the Monroe Doctrine," *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio de Janeiro), January 20, 1908. Reprinted in pamphlet form under the same title.

cently, when the attitude of General Huerta caused the United States to withdraw its ambassador from the City of Mexico, American interests in Mexico were intrusted to the Brazilian minister, Senhor Cardoso de Oliveira. And on the present occasion the Brazilian Government was at pains to point out the true import of the revocation of neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany. On June 2 a circular note was sent, through its diplomatic representatives, to all the powers to which the Republic was accredited:

The Republic has thus recognized that one of the belligerents is an integral part of the American continent, and that we are bound to this belligerent by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law.

Brazil never had, and still has not, warlike ambitions, and if she always abstained from any partiality in the European conflict, she could not remain indifferent to it, when the United States were drawn into the struggle without any interest therein but in the name alone of respect for international law, and when Germany extended indiscriminately to ourselves and other neutrals the most violent acts of war.

If hitherto the relative lack of reciprocity on the part of the American republics has withdrawn from the Monroe doctrine its true character, permitting a scarcely well-founded interpretation of the prerogatives of their sovereignty, the present events, by placing Brazil, even now, at the side of the United States, in the critical moment of the world's history, continue to give our foreign policy a practical form of continental solidarity—a policy indeed which was that of the old régime on every occasion on which any of the other friendly sister nations of the American continent were in jeopardy.¹

Cordial Response from America

President Wilson immediately replied by telegram, under date of June 5, to the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs:

I must transmit to your excellency, in the name of my Government, the sentiments of deep appreciation with which the recent

¹ Brazilian Green Book, 48-49. A large part of the Green Book is taken up with the replies to this circular note. A number of these replies are of value as giving in official form a statement of the attitude of governments by which they were dispatched.

act of the Brazilian Congress, with reference to the present struggle for peace and liberty, was received in the United States.

I am sure that I speak in the name of my fellow countrymen when I express my warm admiration for this act, and the hope that it is the forerunner of the attitude to be assumed by the rest of the American states. I face the future with the confident hope in their co-operation in a united movement to put down the German menace.¹

The response of President Braz, sent on June 13, should also be quoted:

I thank your excellency for the memorable words with which you congratulated Brazil, in the name of the People and Government of the United States, for the frankness of her attitude in this historic moment. Brazil, in taking her place once more at the side of the United States, has remained faithful to her political and diplomatic traditions of continental solidarity and, as in the case of the great American Nation, we are not actuated in this step by hatred or interest, but by a regard for international law and the defense of principles which, if they are in dispute or danger in the Old World, must meet with shelter and support among the free peoples of the two Americas. Brazil has settled all her foreign questions; she has no ambition in the present instance, and has not suffered in the past, and prizes as a great boon the friendship of the United States. More than any external manifestations, no occasion could so unite the hearts of Brazil and the United States as the present period of uncertainty and struggles.²

The final and complete break with Germany did not come until the autumn of 1917. On October 24 word reached Brazil that the ship *Macau* had been torpedoed by a German submarine and its captain taken prisoner. On the following day President Braz sent a special message to Congress; after recalling that in all four ships had been illegally sunk, he declared that in the latest instance the gravity of the case was enhanced beyond measure by the capture of the commander. By these acts a state of war had in effect been imposed upon Brazil by Germany; it only remained for Brazil to take such action as was necessary to maintain "un-

¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

² *Ibid.*, 49.

injured the dignity of the nation."¹ On October 26 Congress passed a resolution which recognized and proclaimed "the state of war initiated by the German Empire against Brazil."² The resolution was adopted unanimously in the Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus did Brazil definitely and unequivocally align herself with the United States and the Allies in the defense of democracy.

The time has not yet arrived when the full story of Brazil's participation in the war may be recounted. Much of the necessary data is not yet available in the United States. Many of the exploits and achievements of the Brazilian fighters on land and sea have not been given to the public. Yet it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that in so far as opportunity offered Brazil played a rôle reflecting credit upon herself and her Allies.

Precautions Against Germans

The most pressing and obvious measures had to do with internal defense. On November 16, 1917, a law was passed investing the Government with a number of extraordinary powers, perhaps the most important of which was the authorization to declare in any section of the country a state of siege.³ This provision was particularly aimed at the suppression of possible disorders in the three southern states of Paraná, Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul, where the bulk of the German population was concentrated. Alarmists both within and outside of Brazil had long looked upon these regions as a danger spot in case of a clash with Germany. While plans for the eventual absorption of southern Brazil into a greater German Empire was generally regarded as the vaporings of Pan German chauvinists,⁴ the measured statements of such authorities as Gustav Von Schmoller, perhaps the most distinguished economic historian in Germany, contained food for careful thought. Writing in 1900 Von Schmoller declared:

We must desire that at any cost a German country containing some 20 to 30 million Germans may grow up in the coming century

¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

² *Ibid.*, 88.

³ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁴ Such utterances as those of Otto Hötsch and Tannenburg, printed in *Conquest and Kultur*, 101 and 102.

in South Brazil—and that, too, no matter whether it remains a portion of Brazil or becomes an independent state or enters into close relationship with our empire. Unless our connection with Brazil is always secured by ships of war, and unless Germany is able to exercise pressure there, our development is threatened.¹

From certain points of view the apprehensions of these alarmists seemed not without cause. A population of Teutonic extraction, estimated at from a quarter to half a million, seemed to be firmly entrenched in one of the most fertile and productive regions of the republic. It was well known that German spies and propagandists had long carried on their machinations practically unchecked. During long periods in the preceding century Rio Grande do Sul had been in chronic revolt against the central government at Rio, and the entire energies of the country had been required to put down these uprisings. And while the German elements had hitherto largely held aloof from this civil strife, the question naturally arose, would they not seize the present occasion to embarrass the authorities in every possible way in the prosecution of the war?

If the German Government had hoped that a declaration of war would be a prelude to a revolution in southern Brazil, it was speedily undeceived. Save for occasional protests in the coast towns, notably Rio Grande do Sul, the German sections of the population remained quiescent. This tranquility was undoubtedly due in part to the energetic action of the Government. A considerable portion of the Brazilian army was sent to the disaffected districts; on November 17 the President declared martial law in the Federal District and all the states of southern Brazil including Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Coincident with the suspension of constitutional guaranties came the establishment of the censorship of newspapers and letters and the internment of a considerable number of Germans.² But the forehanded and vigorous action of the authorities did not entirely account for the absence of serious disturbances in southern Brazil.

¹ *Handels- und Machtpolitik* (Stuttgart), I, 36; quoted in *Conquest and Kultur*, 98.

² *The Americas*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January, 1918), 30. Many of these Germans were later set to work on plantations where they were employed in the cultivation of cereals.

Large sections of the German population remained either loyal to the country of their adoption or of their birth, or at least indifferent to the issues of the war. The bulk of these Germans had lived for nearly three generations in Brazil, frequently insulated from all contact with the outside world, knowing little of what happened in the Fatherland.¹ Only in the coast cities, such as Rio Grande do Sul and Pelotas, where the large business houses are in the hands of Germans, did Brazil's entry into the war cause any strong reaction. Such disorders as arose, including a railroad strike probably fomented by German sympathizers, were put down by the authorities without serious difficulty. In the last analysis the danger of German aggression in southern Brazil was potential rather than actual. A defeat of the Allies and the United States would possibly have spelled for Brazil the loss of her states lying in the temperate zone.

Extensive War-time Measures

Other measures adopted by the Government, as provided by the law of November 16, had as their object: to declare null and void all contracts concluded with Germans for public works; to prevent German subjects or enterprises from acquiring new grants of land; to supervise the activities of German banks and other business and commercial enterprises and if necessary to annul their charters; to take measures to prevent the transference of property during the war; to intern German subjects whose activity was open to question.²

Brazil had hardly become a belligerent before the Government began seriously to consider the eventuality of military participation in the war on a large scale. On December 27, 1917, Congress authorized the president to revise the compulsory military service law of 1908 in order to establish the principle of a national rather than a professional army.³ The result was not only a considerable increase in the size and efficiency of the army, but also a rapid and salutary democratization. A mission was sent to the United States to arrange for close military co-operation and for the pur-

¹ This point is clearly brought out by the French writer E. Tonnelat, in *L'Expansion allemande hors d'Europe*, (Paris, 1908). Cf. especially pp. 91-154: "Les Colonies allemandes au Brésil."

² Brazilian Green Book, p. 99.

³ *The Americas*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (March, 1918), 28.

chase of equipment and machinery which would enable Brazil to augment her production of war materials.¹ Had the war lasted another year and the necessary transportation been available, there is every reason to believe that Brazil would have sent a considerable armed force to the Western front. Colonel Gama, head of this mission, stated in May, 1918, that plans had been made to dispatch troops to France during the course of the ensuing summer, and rumors were later afloat that a Brazilian force had actually landed in France in August.² While these reports, lacking official confirmation, were regarded as premature, it is clear that in the months preceding the armistice Brazil was preparing to assume her full obligations as an active belligerent.

It is an error to assume that Brazil's actual share in the defeat of the Central Powers was a negligible quantity. In December, 1917, the British Admiralty inquired, through the Brazilian legation at London, if Brazil could send a fleet of light cruisers and destroyers to co-operate with the Allies under the command of the British admiral. The invitation was accepted with enthusiasm; before the end of the month the Brazilian Admiralty dispatched to European waters a fleet composed of the scout cruisers *Rio Grande do Sul* and *Bahia*, and the destroyers *Parahyba*, *Rio Grande do Norte*, *Piauhy* and *Santa Catharina*.³ Early in the following year Brazil sent to the Western front a group of ten aviators from the Naval Aviation Corps.⁴ A considerable number of physicians and several Red Cross units have worked in close co-operation with the Allies.⁵

Added to Allied Food Supply

Yet, all things considered, the most important contribution of Brazil toward winning the war has been her successful efforts to augment the food supplies available for the Allies. Under the direction of the Government systematic endeavors were made to increase the nation's agricultural and pastoral products suitable for export. Important results were achieved. During the last

¹New York Times, December 16, 1917; March 10, 1918.

²New York Times, May 26, August 7.

³Brazilian Green Book, 108, 109.

⁴Ibid., 111.

⁵Cf. the statement made in May, 1918, by Admiral Francisco de Mattos, chief of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Europe (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 1918).

year of the war there took place an enormous expansion in areas planted, amounting in certain sections of the great state of Minas Geraes to 500 per cent. The minister of agriculture took the initiative by supplying large quantities of seeds; during the single week of December 31, 1917—January 6, 1918, 24,092,000 kilograms were distributed in 14 states from Rio de Janeiro north to Amazonas.¹ On June 12, 1918, a presidential decree was issued providing for a Commission of Public Alimentation composed of one commissioner and a number of subordinates. This body was empowered to make a weekly inventory of all existing stocks of food stuffs, to secure the purchase and requisition of such quantities as might be necessary to meet both local and war needs, and, finally, if necessity arose, to regulate prices.² Unfortunately statistics for 1918 are not yet available, and it is therefore impossible to state with precision the full results of Brazil's endeavors to increase the world's food supplies. But such data as we have at hand reveal an almost phenomenal increase in the exportation of certain classes of foodstuffs from 1915 through 1917. Thus the exports of beans, which in 1915 had slightly exceeded \$24,000 in value, rose in 1917 to over \$10,000,000; the value of the sugar exports in the same period showed an increase from over \$3,000,000 to \$17,000,000, and, most important of all, refrigerated beef registered an increase in value from slightly over \$1,500,000 to over \$15,000,000.³

From our brief survey it will be seen that from the first Brazil loyally and scrupulously fulfilled her duty as an Ally. Such cooperation and aid as were within her power to give were bestowed whole-heartedly and unstintingly. That her contribution to the common cause was not on a larger scale was due to circumstances beyond her control, the most important of which were absence of adequate shipping facilities and great distance from the seat of military operations. As a striking testimony to the vitality of Pan American solidarity her participation in the war has been of incalculable value.

CUBA

The participation of Cuba in the great war was prompt, spontaneous and effective. In the early days of the struggle the

¹ *The Americas*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (March, 1918).

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (January, 1919).

³ *Commerce Reports*, Supplement No. 40a, February 12, 1919.

sympathies of Cuba, as in the case of her sister republics, inclined strongly toward the Allies. When it became evident that the New World was to be included within the theater of the conflict, public opinion, in so far as it was articulate, made it clear that the United States could count on a sentiment of complete solidarity and loyal co-operation. In response to the German war zone decree of February, 1917, Cuba at once took a stand with her northern neighbor in protesting against the actions of the imperial German Government. On the day following the declaration of war by the United States, April 7, 1917, the Cuban Congress unanimously and enthusiastically adopted, in conformity with the message of President Menocal, a joint resolution that there existed a state of war between the Republic of Cuba and the German Empire. In his message to Congress, President Menocal developed at some length the causes which led Cuba to enter the ranks of the belligerents. In characterizing Germany's violation of international law and the rights of neutrals, the President declared:

Such acts of war without quarter against all nations whose subjects sail the seas . . . can not be tolerated or consented to without accepting them, *ipso facto*, as lawful for the present and for all time. The Republic of Cuba ought not to remain indifferent in the face of such stupendous violations of international law. . . . Nor can she by any means decorously remain aloof from the stand nobly and courageously taken by the United States, to whom we are bound by sacred ties of gratitude and fraternity.¹

In commenting on the declaration of war, President Menocal stated:

The spontaneity and decision of these acts impart to them a very high and patriotic significance. No recommendation of the Government of the United States moved the will of the Government of Cuba nor excited the generous passions of her people. None was necessary. The horror, universally inspired by the haughty and violent attitude by which an imperialistic power, vain of its might, attempted to impose upon the world an intolerable domination, was joined in the Cuban people with the energetic

¹*Official Bulletin*, September 24, 1918, page 15, column 1.

will, the noble ambition, to co-operate with all their strength and with all their resources in the sacred defense of the liberty and sovereignty of all peoples against the malignant and menacing military power.¹

Political Rivalries Adjourned

Not the least significant aspect of Cuba's participation in the war has been the unanimity of public opinion in all matters affecting the foreign policy of the Government. Liberals and Conservatives forgot their former animosities, which a few months previous had threatened to engulf the country in civil war, and vied with each other in their zeal for the common cause. Restrictions, taxes and regulations which normally would have aroused fierce antagonisms were accepted with cheerful equanimity. The attitude of the press throughout the course of the war was irreproachable, while Congress never hesitated to clothe the Executive with extraordinary and far-reaching powers.

The Cuban people, through their representatives in Congress, did not shrink from incurring heavy financial obligations for the prosecution of the war. Shortly after the declaration of hostilities Congress authorized, on the recommendation of the President, a bond issue of 30 million dollars to be used for war expenses, and new taxes were levied which produced an unexpected revenue. On May 15, 1918, a law was passed which granted for the duration of hostilities an annual credit of \$2,400,000 to be employed for the benefit of the victims of the war. The greater part of this sum was assigned to the Red Cross organizations of the United States and the Allies.² The Cuban Red Cross organization also vastly extended the scope of its activities. Under the able direction of Señora Menocal, the wife of the President, sufficient funds were raised to equip and send to the front a hospital unit of one hundred doctors and nurses.³ Finally the Cuban people liberally responded to the various United States Liberty Loans⁴.

¹*Official Bulletin*, September 24, 1918, page 15, column 2.

²*Boletín de Información*, publicado por la Comisión nacional cubana de propaganda por la Guerra y de Auxilio á sus victimas. (Habana, October, 1918), t. 1, num. 2, 51.

³*Current History Magazine*, VII, 318; *Pan American Union Bulletin*, XLV, (November, 1917), 687.

⁴*Boletín de Información*, t. 1, num. 2 (October, 1918), 31.

Although military participation in the war was necessarily restricted, Cuba contributed generously and loyally within the limits of her capacity. On August 21, 1917, by presidential decree, the Government turned over to the American authorities, without compensation, the four German steamships interned in Cuban harbors.¹ An obligatory military service bill was passed on August 3, 1918, and a number of military and naval training camps were established; at the same time reciprocal co-operation was effected between Cuba and the United States in the sending and receiving of troops for military instruction.² The President was authorized to send troops and military missions abroad and in October, 1918, the Government announced its intention of dispatching 25,000 trained officers and men to France for immediate service.³ The Cuban aviation service underwent a great expansion and a considerable number of aviators was sent to France, at least two of whom achieved brilliant records as members of the Lafayette Escadrille.⁴

Propaganda Neutralized

Numerous domestic war measures were adopted and vigorously enforced. In certain cases constitutional guaranties were suspended; means were found to cope with and neutralize espionage and enemy propaganda; a large number of alien enemies were interned. An efficient censorship of mail, telegraphs and cables was established with the assistance of American experts.⁵

All things considered, Cuba's most effective material aid lay in the field of economic co-operation with the United States. In agreement with the American Food Administration, the distribution and supply of food stuffs were subjected to severe regulations. On October 6, 1917, for instance, President Menocal, by executive decree, applied to all exports from Cuba the export regulations in force in the United States. When the sugar supply became a vital question to both countries the Cuban Government not only exercised a control over production and prices, but also worked out a plan for the exportation of the entire crop

¹*Ibid.*, 26; American Year Book, 1917, 51.

²*Official Bulletin*, September 24, 1918, page 16, column 1.

³*Current History Magazine*, IX (first part), 318.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Official Bulletin*, September 24, 1918, page 16, column 1.

for 1918, estimated at three and one-half million tons, the greatest annual yield in the history of the island.¹

An evidence of Cuba's moral support of the United States and the Allies, and of her enthusiasm for the cause of freedom and democracy, is to be seen in her proclamation of the 4th, 14th and 24th of July, as national holidays in honor of the United States, France and Belgium respectively.² Surely the American people may feel that they have reaped a rich reward for their generous and disinterested policy toward Cuba during the last two decades. History offers few examples of a more spontaneous manifestation of loyalty and gratitude than that afforded by Cuba voluntarily placing her man power and her material resources at the service of the United States and the Allies in the world struggle between liberty and despotism.³

ARGENTINA

Of the nations of Latin America whose recent material progress and cultural achievements have challenged world-wide attention, Argentina stands in the vanguard. As the largest and most influential Spanish-speaking country of South America, her attitude toward the war was naturally regarded with anxious interest by both groups of belligerents. Of the popular sympathies of the great mass of the Argentines there had never been any real question. Early in the struggle the tide set in strongly in favor of the Allies. It was natural and fitting that this should be so. Commercial and financial relations with Great Britain had been intimate and of long standing; as is well known British capital, particularly in railroads, had powerfully contributed to Argentina's phenomenal economic growth. The thrifty and respected

¹*Boletín de Información*, t. 1, num. 2 (October, 1918), 27.

²*Ibid.*

³The attitude of the Cuban people toward the United States under the stress of the Great War appears clearly from the tenor of the speeches made in the Congress at Havana. Deputy Dr. José Manuel Cortina, in an eloquent address delivered on April 7, 1917, declared: "We go to fight as brothers beside that great people who have been ever the friends and protectors of Cuba, who aided us during the darkest days of our tragic history, in moments when opposed by enormous strength we had nearly disappeared from the face of the earth, when we had no other refuge, no other loyal and magnanimous friend than the great North American people." Quoted in an article by L. E. Elliott, "Latin America and the War," *Pan American Magazine*, XXVI, No. 1, November, 1917.

Italian elements, constituting over one-fourth of the total population, were profoundly moved by Italy's entry into the war, and early championed the cause of *Italia irredenta*. And to the Argentines in general, nurtured in the civilization and traditions of Latin Europe, the recent manifestations of German *kultur* could make but a scant appeal. On the other hand, the sufferings and heroism of Belgium struck a responsive chord in the hearts of a people peculiarly susceptible to generous emotions. Above all the admiration and affection for France became almost a passion among the Argentine intellectuals. In somewhat extravagant words one of the Argentine writers declared shortly after the outbreak of the war: "In our literary circles, in our artistic coteries, in the scientific academies of the universities, and in the mansions of the aristocracy, France is revered as was Athens in the days of Pericles."¹

Yet contrary tendencies were at work. In Argentina even more than in Brazil, the emissaries of *kultur* kept up an insidious but tireless propaganda. Prior to the entry of the United States into the war, a flood of carefully edited cable dispatches emanated from the New York branch of the German Press Bureau and were furnished gratuitously to such newspapers as would print them. When the two great representatives of the metropolitan press, the Buenos Aires *La Prensa* and *La Nación*, showed themselves staunchly pro-Ally, a Germanophile organ, *La Unión*, made its appearance in the capital to be followed by a flood of profusely illustrated periodicals distributed broadcast through the country. With headquarters in Buenos Aires, German propaganda invaded the whole southern portion of the continent. No element of the population was neglected. For the benefit of the Italian colony the Central Labor Exchange of Berlin launched the publication of a periodical *Il Lavoro*, which, well-edited and written in excellent Italian, enjoyed a large circulation. Among the educated classes the seeds of German propaganda had been sown by distinguished German scholars who had long held chairs in the Universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata; the harvest appeared when a small but influential group of writers and publicists openly espoused the cause of Germany.

¹W. S. Robertson, "Argentina's Attitude Towards the War," *The Nation* (New York), March 1, 1917.

Reasons for Remaining at Peace

During the first three years of the war there was little likelihood of Argentina's departure from neutrality as long as no national interests were placed in jeopardy. In fact, there were excellent reasons for remaining at peace. When the first economic readjustment had taken place, the Argentines discovered that the war might prove exceedingly profitable. The country had gained by the enormously increased value of her staple exports, grain, meat, wool and hides, which the Allies purchased in immense quantities. German agents likewise bought up for future delivery such supplies of raw materials as they could lay their hands upon. Even the submarine crisis of the winter of 1917 did not cause any change in the attitude of the Government. The German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare merely led to the platonic declaration that Argentina would "adjust her conduct, as always, to the fundamental rules and principles of international law."¹ To be sure, on the entry of the United States into the war, the Argentine Government, in a note dated April 11, 1917, went so far as to voice its approval of the policy of the United States while recognizing the justice of the cause which led to the declaration of war against Germany.² But, at the same time, it gave no intimation that it would depart from its policy of strict neutrality, and in this course it apparently could count on the support of public opinion.³

¹American Year Book, 1917, 54.

²The text of this note, delivered by Ambassador Naón to Secretary Lansing on April 11, is as follows: "The Government of the Argentine Republic, in view of the causes which have prompted the United States to declare war against the Government of the German Empire, recognizes the justice of that decision, founded as it is upon the violation of the principles of neutrality, established by the rules of international law which have been considered a definite accomplishment of civilization."

³Yet there were not lacking distinguished and influential public men who regarded the course of the Government as both injudicious and unpatriotic. Chief among these was Señor Luis María Drago, the well-known publicist, former minister of foreign affairs, and author of the Drago doctrine. In a carefully prepared statement published in *La Razón* on April 10, he declared: "As I advised our Government we should have followed the United States when it broke relations with Germany. Such action was justified by the German notification that it prohibited all ships from crossing a war zone arbitrarily established on a free sea against all conception of international law. The situation is aggravated to-day. The war between Germany and America is a struggle of democracy *versus* absolutism and no American nation can remain neutral without denying its past and compromising its

Events were soon to reveal on what a slender foundation this official neutrality rested. Before the end of April a German submarine sank the Argentine bark *Monte Protegido*. The latent but wide-spread hostility against Germany came quickly to a focus. Excited mobs paraded the streets of Buenos Aires demanding a declaration of war; the German legation and consulate and the offices of the subsidized newspaper *La Unión* were attacked. In a peremptory note the Government demanded satisfaction on the penalty of severance of relations. A belated promise of reparation was quickly followed, however, by the sinking of two other Argentine ships, the *Oriana* and *Toro*, on June 6 and 22. A further exchange of notes resulted in an apparent triumph of Argentina. Germany not only promised to modify her blockade to the extent of granting free passage of Argentine ships carrying foodstuffs, but also agreed to allow full indemnities for all losses suffered. On August 30, 1917, Berlin was informed that the Argentine Government considered the incident closed.¹

Thanks to the revelations of the Department of State of the United States Government the hypocrisy and effrontery of the imperial German Government in this transaction have been revealed in all their enormity. On September 8, 1917, were published a number of intercepted telegrams sent by Count von Luxburg, German chargé d'affaires to Argentina, to the Berlin Foreign Office through the medium of the Swedish minister at Buenos

future. How can Argentine break the bonds of solidarity with its Latin brothers and abandon its traditional policy to remain in an isolation which nothing would justify? We ought then to prepare to range ourselves as soon as possible with those who are opposing the oppression of an absolute government. We should constitute the material and moral union of this continent for the defense of law and democratic principles in international relations."

¹ A curious side-light is thrown on the character of Argentina's diplomatic "victory" by the revelations contained in the second instalment of the Luxburg dispatches, those revealed by Secretary Lansing on December 20, 1917. The dispatches of the German chargé would indicate that a confidential understanding existed between Luxburg and President Irigoyen which provided that Germany would spare Argentine ships on condition that the President use his best efforts to prevent these vessels from entering the barred zone. This agreement was necessarily to be kept secret "on account of other neutrals and of military considerations." In justice to President Irigoyen it is only fair to add that on the publication of these telegrams the Argentine minister of foreign affairs stated that they showed "a number of inaccuracies so surprising that no epithet would fit them, as they are at complete variance both in substance and form with the terms in which the negotiations were entered into, carried on and brought to a conclusion" (*Current History Magazine*, VII (second part), February, 1918, 322-3).

Aires. Although these dispatches have been frequently reprinted their historical importance warrants their inclusion here.

The first message reads:

May 19, 1917, No. 32. This Government has now released the German and Austrian ships in which hitherto a guard has been placed. In consequence of the settlement of the *Monte* [*Protegido*] case there has been a great change of public feeling. The Government will in the future only clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. [Las Palmas is one of the Canary Islands, a possession of Spain.] I beg that the small steamers *Oran* and *Guazo*, January 31 [meaning, which sailed on this date] 300 tons, which are now nearing Bourdeaux, with a view to changing flags, may be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left (*spurlos versenkt*).

LUXBURG.

The second message reads:

July 3, 1917, No. 59. I learn from a reliable source that the acting minister of foreign affairs, who is a notorious ass and Anglophile, declared a secret session to the Senate that Argentina would demand from Berlin a promise not to sink more Argentine ships. If not agreed to relations would be broken off. I recommend refusal, or, if necessary, calling in the mediation of Spain.

LUXBURG.

The third message reads:

July 9, 1917, No. 64. Without showing any tendency to make concessions postpone reply to Argentine note until receipt of further reports. Change of ministry probable. As regards Argentine steamers, I recommend either compelling them to turn back, sinking them without any trace, or letting them through. They are all quite small.

LUXBURG.

Cynicism could hardly have gone to greater lengths. The accredited representative of the German Empire, while enjoying the hospitality of a neutral and friendly country, deliberately urged the cold-blooded murder of Argentine citizens on the high seas in order that the disappearance of Argentine ships without trace might forestall diplomatic complications between the two countries.

Resentment Followed Disclosures

The popular resentment which followed the Luxburg disclosures was widespread and intense. The Argentines rightly felt that they had been both insulted and duped by the minister of an ostensibly friendly power; the real character of their diplomatic "triumph" in the submarine controversy was painfully apparent. The prompt disavowal by Berlin of Luxburg's actions did little to relieve the tension; on September 12 the German chargé d'affaires received his passports with the clear intimation that he was *persona non grata*. On the same night anti-German riots occurred in Buenos Aires, the German Club was set on fire, and a number of German houses, including the offices of *La Unión*, were destroyed. Three days later there was held a great public demonstration in favor of an immediate break with Germany. On September 20 the Senate by a vote of 23 to 1 passed a resolution in favor of severance of diplomatic relations, while the Chamber of Deputies on September 25, by a vote of 53 to 18, adopted a declaration of similar intent. It was everywhere assumed that the Cabinet and President would take immediate steps to bring Argentina in line with the United States and the Latin American nations united in common action against Germany. Nothing of the sort occurred. President Irrigoyen professed himself as fully satisfied with Germany's explanation of the Luxburg incident and intimated that he saw no reason to depart from a course of strict neutrality. A nation-wide railroad strike, temporarily paralyzing the economic life of the country, diverted popular attention from foreign affairs and conveniently absorbed the attention of the Government. By the end of October it was clear that Argentina would remain within the ranks of the neutral states of Latin America.¹

Up to the present time no satisfactory explanation has been

¹ All of the British residents of Argentina as well as many others were convinced that German machinations and German money were behind the railroad strike. As was stated by the correspondent of the *London Times*: "There has existed, and still exists, in the minds of 99 out of every 100 men outside of the ranks of the strikers themselves, the conviction that German intrigue, German money and German designs were at the root of the strike. The coincidence between the declaration of both houses of the Argentine Congress in favor of a rupture of relations with Germany and the outbreak of a general strike was too marked, especially when the analogy of similar strikes at critical moments in Spain, in the United States and in Russia is taken into account." *The Times History of the War*, XV, 19 (1918).

advanced for President Irrigoyen's attitude, so out of harmony with that of the bulk of the thinking classes of Argentina. The statement has been made that his sympathies have inclined toward the cause of Germany. It is impossible to prove the charge, although the Luxburg revelations would seem to lend a certain color to this view. Again the suggestion has been offered that he deprecated any action which might imply that his country was merely following in the wake of the United States.¹ Finally in the absence of any definite data we are bound to assume that the President was merely obeying what he regarded as the dictates of patriotism and sound domestic policy when he threw the whole force of his influence in favor of the preservation of neutrality. Both as a private citizen and as chief of the Radical Party he had long been the advocate of a series of far-reaching social and economic reforms; he may well have been convinced that the absorption of Argentina's energies and resources in the world-wide conflagration would have indefinitely delayed the consummation of such a policy. The future will doubtless reveal the falsity of this parochial point of view; history will probably bear record that Argentina missed the golden opportunity of companionship with the great democracies of the world in the final conflict between despotism and liberty. Yet it is heartening to recall that the Argentine people, in so far as their voice was articulate, declared themselves unequivocally in favor of the cause of freedom and democracy.

CHILE

The neutrality of Chile in the war was from the first looked upon as a foregone conclusion. A variety of circumstances conspired to keep her aloof from the struggle. With her outlook upon the

¹ President Irrigoyen is reported to have stated in an interview on September 28, 1917, "that Argentina can not be dragged into the war by the United States and the nation must take the place it deserves on the American continent" (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 1, 1917). On two different occasions he attempted to arrange for a congress of neutral Latin American states for the adoption of a uniform policy in regard to the war. On this point, as on many others, the Luxburg revelations shed a rather sinister light. For instance on August 1, the German minister wrote: "The President has at last made up his mind to conclude secret agreement with Chile and Bolivia regarding mutual rapprochement for protection *vis-à-vis* North America before the conference idea is taken up again." Only in Mexico did the idea of a Latin American congress meet with any great degree of favor.

Pacific she was furthest removed of all the Latin American powers from the center of hostilities; at least, such was the case after the two great naval engagements fought in South American waters in 1914. Though Chile possesses a merchant marine of respectable proportions, few if any of her ships were plying on the European run; hence no material interests were placed in jeopardy by the declaration of the barred zone and the policy of German ruthlessness. While her economic life was temporarily dislocated in the early days of the war, the tremendous demand for Chilean nitrates on the part of the Allies soon ushered in an era of prosperity. To many Chileans neutrality seemed both logical and profitable.

For our purpose the importance of the last four years of Chilean history lies in the gradual but none the less striking change in sentiment toward the two groups of belligerents. There can be little doubt that at the outbreak of the war the tide of popular feeling ran strongly in favor of Germany. The reasons are fairly obvious. German propaganda had probably taken deeper root in Chile than in any other South American country. The Chilean army had been trained largely by German officers; important posts in the higher institutions of learning had been filled by German scholars, while many Chilean teachers had completed their education in German universities. An industrious and fairly homogeneous German population, concentrated in the southern portion of the Republic, maintained affiliations with the Fatherland. Almost unlimited funds seemed available for the furtherance of the German cause. In the first months of the war the friends of Germany founded in Santiago, the capital, a Germanophile organ, *El Tiempo*. The so-called Chilean-German League (*Liga chileno-alemana*) organized by a certain Dr. Munich, kept up a continuous agitation. Finally, certain elements among the clergy whose interests have always been closely identified with the powerful Conservative party, more or less openly espoused the cause of the Central Powers.

As the larger issues of the war gradually unfolded themselves, a healthy reaction began to set in. To those familiar with the best traditions of the Chilean people this change in sentiment occasioned no surprise. The method of warfare employed by the Germans became increasingly repugnant to the educated classes. If the

Chilean army inclined in sympathy toward the Germans, the same was not true with the navy. The Chilean navy, trained according to English ideals of seamanship, with a long and honorable history reaching back to the exploits of Lord Cochrane in the Wars of Independence, was from the first pro-Ally. Naturally German submarine ruthlessness intensified this feeling. The decided stand taken by a number of sister republics raised the whole problem of continental solidarity. The entry of the United States into the war, with no thought of material gain or national aggrandizement, caused a profound impression and did much to dissipate lingering suspicion of the motives and policy of the Government at Washington.

Press Showed Changed Attitude

This change in attitude is most clearly reflected in the press. By all odds the most important newspaper in Chile is *El Mercurio*, published daily both in Santiago and Valparaiso. During the first two years of the war its sympathies had on the whole inclined toward the Allies; when in the winter of 1917 the shadow of war was projected across the Atlantic, it took its stand unreservedly on the side of the enemies of Germany. On February 5, the day following the announcement of the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, *El Mercurio* declared that for all neutral nations the principles supported by the United States were of vital importance and that these nations can not without protest witness the employment of barbarous and inhuman methods of warfare. "The nations of South America, bound to the United States by historic bonds and by the intellectual relations which are being daily perfected, are to-day more than ever obliged to sustain the cause which President Wilson defends." Other prominent organs of the press, notably *La Nación* and *El Diario Ilustrado*, rallied to the same point of view.

A growing number of intellectuals expressed themselves in a similar vein. Professors Montaner and Guerra of the department of international law of the University of Santiago, publicly stigmatized Germany's submarine policy as a monstrous violation of international law. Professor Molina, the distinguished dean of the law faculty of Concepción, zealously defended the cause of the Allies and the United States. Examples of this attitude might be multiplied almost indefinitely.

The Chilean Government, keenly jealous of the honor and self-respect of the nation, made on February 8, 1917, a vigorous and dignified reply to Germany's announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare. "The acceptance by Chile of the measures adopted by Germany would be a departure from the course of strict neutrality which she has followed during the actual European conflict. Hence in regard to all her rights Chile reserves the liberty to claim respect for them at whatever moment an act of hostility is performed against her vessels."¹

Thus while Chile remained officially neutral, her people can hardly be said to have remained passive spectators to the world drama. Through the fog of propaganda and misrepresentation the Chileans descried with increasing clarity of vision the real issues at stake. Toward the end the avowed apologists of German *kultur* dwindled to a negligible minority. If further proof of Chile's conversion were needed it could be found in the unrestrained, and in certain quarters almost delirious, joy with which the final victory and the signing of the armistice were acclaimed.²

THE REMAINING SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Of the tier of South American nations facing the Pacific, Perú is most closely bound to the United States by traditions of friendship and good will. In various international conferences she has always championed the cause of Pan American unity. It was no occasion for surprise therefore when President Pardo in his message to the Congress on July 28, 1917, proclaimed the adherence of Perú to the principles of justice and right set forth in President Wilson's war message. On September 8 the Senate declared that the international policy of Perú must be inspired by the principle of the solidarity of the American continent, in harmony with the ideals of international justice proclaimed by President Wilson. Partly in pursuance of this policy; partly as a result of Germany's failure to grant satisfactory reparation for the sinking of the Peruvian bark *Lorton* on February 5, 1917, Congress on October 5 passed a resolution severing diplomatic relations with Germany,

¹W. S. Robertson, "Chile and the European War," *The Nation*, (New York) March 15, 1917.

²Compare, for example, the account of popular manifestations given in *El Mercurio* on November 12, 1918.

the vote being 105 to 6. Dr. Paul, the German minister, was handed his passports the same day. There can be no doubt that these acts clearly reflected the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the Peruvian people. In fact numerous elements were in favor of a declaration of war against Germany. It is not improbable that had the war continued Perú would have entered the contest as a full belligerent.¹

Ecuador, fronting like her southern neighbor, Perú, on the Pacific, was far removed from the area of hostilities. She possessed no merchant marine and hence was unaffected by the proclamation of the barred zone. Nevertheless, on December 17, 1917, Ecuador broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. This step was taken partly as a protest against the German methods of warfare in general and more specifically against the improper conduct of a German agent, Herr Müller, who sought to impose upon the Ecuadorean Government his recognition as chargé d'affaires; partly through the desire to proclaim Ecuador's allegiance to the principles of Pan American solidarity.

Bolivia is one of the two land-locked countries of South America. No national interests were imperiled therefore by Germany's submarine policy. But on the severance of relations with Germany by the United States the Bolivian minister of foreign affairs stated on February 5, 1917, that "the Government of Bolivia considers entirely proper the noble and lofty attitude assumed by the Government of the United States, and which is in accord with the rights of neutral countries to safeguard their own interests and those of civilization and humanity. The Government of Bolivia therefore frankly indorses the stand taken by the United States." In less than a week after the declaration of war by the United States the Bolivian Government handed the German minister his passports. As in the case of Bolivia's neighbor, Perú, the official attitude was in entire harmony with the wishes of the educated classes of the country.

Uruguay's Remarkable Record

Although the smallest of the South American republics, Uruguay is rightly regarded as one of the most progressive and enlightened

¹Cf. Juan Bautista de Lavalle, "The Severance of Diplomatic Relations between Perú and Germany," *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1918.

members of the Latin American family of nations. While the cultural bonds between Uruguay and the Latin states of Europe, especially France, have always been close and intimate, the foreign policy of Uruguay, owing to her highly vulnerable position as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil, has necessarily been dominated by South American rather than international considerations. At the same time Uruguayan statesmen have been quick to recognize the larger obligations of Pan American cooperation. In no country have appeals for a more vital community of interests among the republics of the New World met with a more ready response.

From the very outbreak of the war the sympathies of the Uruguayans were overwhelmingly pro-Ally. The entry of the United States into the struggle was hailed with great satisfaction; on June 16, 1917, the Uruguayan Government issued its now famous decree defining its attitude toward the American belligerents. After reciting that "the Government of Uruguay has proclaimed the principle of American solidarity as the criterion of its international policy," the decree set forth that "no American country, which in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent." Perhaps the best commentary on the spirit animating this decree was the enthusiastic welcome accorded the United States squadron on its visit to Montevideo at the end of July, 1917.

From this benevolent attitude toward the foes of Germany to the severance of relations was but a step. Although Uruguay, unlike her neighbor Argentina, had no definite act of Germany against her citizens or their property to resent, public opinion was not satisfied with the maintenance of even a technical neutrality. On the other hand, as long as Brazil's attitude remained undefined there existed the possibility that the severance of relations might be followed by an armed raid of Germans from the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. By the end of summer all reason for hesitancy had vanished; on October 7, 1917, a joint resolution of both houses of Congress in favor of the rupture of relations was adopted by 106 votes to 6. From the moral point of view this act was freighted with unusual significance. With no national interest jeopardized, at the behest of no other power, this

proud-spirited and highly cultured nation voluntarily abandoned neutrality both as a protest against Germany's method of waging war and as an evidence of her belief in the principles of democracy and American solidarity.

The three remaining South American republics—Paraguay, Colombia and Venezuela—held themselves entirely aloof from the war. The first of these countries, land-locked in the heart of the continent, was, relatively speaking, but little affected by the war. Although the sympathies of the educated classes inclined toward the Allies and the United States, the Government saw no reason for a declaration in favor of either group of belligerents. In Colombia the still smoldering resentment against the United States for her share in the train of events leading to the creation of the Republic of Panamá precluded any possibility of a departure from neutrality. In Venezuela German intrigue and propaganda were unusually active among the official classes; the attitude of President Gómez may be gauged by his arbitrary suppression in August, 1917, of two newspapers favorable to the Entente and the United States. But in both of these northern republics, as elsewhere in South America, public opinion, in so far as it existed, showed itself in general opposed to the policies and methods of Germany.

THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS

Of the six Central American Republics, five declared war against Germany. These were Panamá, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. One, Salvador, maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the United States and the Allies. In view of the close economic and even political relations existing between certain of these countries and the United States a strictly neutral position was hardly to be expected. Yet the alacrity and eagerness with which all but one of these nations aligned themselves with the foes of Germany refute the charge that they were subjected to pressure and untoward influence.

Panamá, like Cuba, defined her position immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war. On April 7, 1917, the Panamá Congress declared war on Germany. In a proclamation to the people of Panamá issued the same day the President declared: "Our indissoluble duty in this tremendous hour of history

is of a common Ally, whose interests and existence as well are linked indissolubly with the United States. As the situation creates dangers for our country, it is the duty of the Panaman people to co-operate with all the energies and resources they can command for the protection of the canal and to safeguard national territory."

Guatemala, despite the activities of German emissaries who swarmed over the frontier from Mexico, broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on April 27, 1917: this act was subsequently interpreted by President Cabrera as a declaration of war. It could hardly have been less. In a statement presented to Secretary Lansing by the Guatemalan minister, announcing the severance of relations, the latter declared: "Guatemala takes the greatest pleasure in offering to the United States of America her territorial waters, her ports and railroads for use in common defense, as also all elements which may be available for the same purpose."

Honduras closely followed the course adopted by her neighbor Guatemala. Relations with Germany were broken on May 17, 1917; on July 19, 1918, war was formally declared. Nicaragua took the same steps on April 18, and May 8, 1917; Costa Rica on September 21, 1917, and May 23, 1918. This action on the part of Costa Rica is the more worthy of note as the present administration has not been recognized by the United States.

Although Salvador has been technically classed as a neutral the Government on various occasions expressed its sympathy with the cause of the Allies and the United States. Of special significance is the note of August 24, 1917, in which the minister of foreign affairs stated that the Government of Salvador would permit the vessels of the United States to enter or remain in Salvadorean ports irrespective of their condition of armaments.

Of the three Caribbean republics, Cuba as we have seen, was an active participant in the war. Haiti declared war on Germany July 12, 1918. During July, 1917, the Dominican Republic withdrew the exequaturs of the German consular service in that country. As Germany was without diplomatic representation this action has been generally regarded as tantamount to a severance of relations.

MEXICO

At first sight the attitude of Mexico toward the great war and its issues seems something of an enigma. Had our southern neighbor taken counsel from the dictates of enlightened self-interest she would have associated herself with the Allies and the United States at least to the extent of adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality. So it seems at least to the disinterested observer. She had just emerged triumphant from a revolution the avowed purpose of which was to destroy an autocratic and tyrannical government. A declaration of sympathy toward the Allies and the United States would not only have been in harmony with her professed ideals but would have paved the way for an amicable solution of certain embarrassing financial and economic problems. Had Mexico severed relations with Germany she could at once have enjoyed the privileges and financial benefits from which neutrals were necessarily debarred.

But Mexico chose otherwise. From the first her Government elected to follow the course of neutrality. What part a latent but not less real suspicion of the United States played in this decision it is impossible to estimate. The official explanation was to the effect that the nation needed to conserve all its energies for reconstruction after over half a decade of revolution. With such a point of view, if loyally adhered to, other nations could properly have no quarrel. Unfortunately the Government of Mexico was responsible for certain acts and policies which could easily have been interpreted as inimical to the Allies and to the United States. A case in point was President Carranza's proposal of February 11, 1917. With the ostensible purpose of hastening the advent of peace, he suggested that an embargo be placed by neutral nations on all supplies being sent to the belligerents. It is obvious that the adoption of such a policy would have been disastrous to the Allies. As is well known the refusal of the United States as well as the chief Latin American powers to lend countenance to this project caused its abandonment.

The extent and virulence of German propaganda in Mexico, especially after the United States entered the war, shed a somewhat sinister light on the attitude and professions of the Mexican Government. The suspicion that Señor Carranza and several

members of his cabinet had pro-German leanings was heightened by the publication of the infamous Zimmermann dispatches in which Mexico was invited to attack the United States as an ally of Germany. The failure of Mexico to resent this invitation, which if acceded to would have spelled irretrievable ruin, was to say the least disquieting. It was not surprising that in the first few months following our entry into the war the tension between the United States and Mexico became increasingly acute. There were not lacking pessimists who predicted an open break between the two republics.

Fortunately contrary influences were at work. Mr. Fletcher, the American ambassador, was untiring in his efforts to allay irritation and promote more friendly feelings. At the same time he endeavored to interpret to the Mexicans the motives of the United States in the great war. As was to be expected, German propaganda overshot the mark and a reaction set in. The Mexican Government on several occasions explained that its attitude was not dictated by any hostility toward the United States. Finally by the summer of 1918 public opinion began to veer strongly away from Germany. The visit at this time of a delegation of prominent newspaper men to the United States resulted in a marked decline of Germanophile influence. The majority of the important newspapers of the capital now openly championed the cause of the Allies. In fact, the most widely-read member of the metropolitan press, *El Universal*, edited by Señor F. F. Pallavicini, had from the first recognized the real issues of the war and at all times did yeoman's service in behalf of the Entente and the United States. The approaching collapse of the Central Powers brought the activities of the German propagandists to a close; the German minister, the notorious Von Eckhardt, left Mexico under circumstances which point to pressure from the Mexican Government. With the signing of the armistice the last stronghold of German influence and intrigue in the New World had crumbled.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

It would be an error to pass judgment on Latin America's share in the war merely on the basis of the material assistance rendered the United States and the Allies. It will freely be conceded that neither the shipments of food stuffs—extensive as they were—nor the military and naval aid rendered, especially by Brazil and Cuba, were determinant factors in the final triumph over Germany. Yet the action of 13 of the Latin American states, whether they actually declared war against Germany or merely severed diplomatic relations, was not without tangible results. It tended to complete the moral and diplomatic isolation of the German Empire; it helped to reveal and to neutralize the force of German propaganda and intrigue; it contributed to the undoing of the work of years of economic penetration. But these results, whatever their relevancy or importance, tell only part of the story.

Time alone can reveal the full effects of the great war on the destiny of the states of Latin America. Yet, whatever the future may have in store, it is already abundantly clear that a majority of our sister republics will never completely revert to their prewar status in either national or international life. As to the people of the United States, the last two years brought also to our southern neighbors a period of anxious heart-searching and rigorous self-appraisal. The reaction with them as with us has been salutary. There have come a graver sense of national responsibility, a more sober consciousness of national dignity. The public conscience has been aroused; public opinion has been invested with a power and influence hitherto unsuspected. Possibly the most important result of this quickening of the currents of national life has been the strengthening of those forces which make for a more real democracy.

The war has not only revealed the republics of the New World to themselves; it has revealed them to each other. Pan Americanism has ceased to be a mere rallying point, a diplomatic shibboleth. Under the stress of war it became a dynamic force. The American nations became acutely conscious of a common heritage of ideals of democracy and liberty which the war had imperiled. In this fellowship of republics the United States necessarily played a determinant part. As long as she remained neutral no other

state would have incurred the risk of breaking with Germany, however great the provocation. But with the entry of the United States into the struggle in defense of democracy the situation changed; her prestige and influence were enormously enhanced; she now stood embattled in front of her sister republics to fight the common enemy. By thus enormously enlarging the community of interests between the United States and the remaining republics of the western hemisphere the war has greatly strengthened the bonds of Pan American solidarity and invested the Monroe doctrine with a new and vital significance. It is now possible for the doctrine to become American in the full sense of the term drawing its sanction and support from all the republics of the New World.

But Latin America has not only been drawn into a closer comradeship of democracy with the United States; she has entered upon a new relationship with Europe as well. Who could have prophesied half a decade ago that the Republics of Uruguay and Perú would tender the use of their ports to European monarchies; that nine Latin American states would be represented at the Peace Conference at Paris?¹ To these states is no longer applicable the half-contemptuous charge made a few years ago that they stand on the margin of international life. The traditional New World isolation in South as well as in North America is a thing of the past. A group of our sister republics emerge from the war with their authority and prestige greatly augmented. They have a pride and satisfaction which spring from participation in a great and lofty enterprise. They are prepared to accept their new international responsibilities and acquiesce in the new international order. The appeal for a League of Nations evokes a generous response from those states which have at length attained their political majority.

To us in the United States the new dispensation in Latin America has brought a full quota of opportunities and responsibilities. While we are perhaps too prone to embrace the former and ignore the latter, it is natural and fitting that we should view the future with optimism. At no time have the relations between

¹The Latin American states represented at the Peace Conference and signing the German treaty were: Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú and Uruguay.

North and South America been as cordial as they are at the present moment. Points of contact, both cultural and economic, are rapidly multiplying. Distinguished South American diplomats and publicists, such as Brazil's foremost historian, Oliveira Lima, are loyally carrying out the self-appointed task of interpreting to Latin America the rôle of the United States both in the war and at the Peace Conference.¹ New horizons are opening to our bankers and exporters; the enormous trade expansion brought about by the war seems in a fair way to become permanent. But if American influence is to increase and bear fruit in still closer recognition of the important place recently won by certain of our sister republics in the comity of nations, in our zeal for trade and commerce we must cease to regard Latin America as a mere geographical expression on the maps of our exporters. The attitude of patronizing condescension, which still lingers in certain quarters, must everywhere give way to an appreciation and sympathy based on wider knowledge. Otherwise much of our zeal for "linking the Americas" will come to naught.

¹Cf. "O Problema do Paz e o papel dos Estados Unidos," by M. de Oliveira Lima, *A. B. C.*, (Rio de Janeiro), March 1, 1919.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Brazil, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. *The Brazilian Green Book, consisting of Diplomatic Documents Relating to Brazil's Attitude with regard to the European War, 1914-1917. . . .* Authorized English version, with introduction and notes by Andrew Boyle. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1918. 126 p. 22 cm.

II. BOOKS

- Kirkpatrick, F. A. *South America and the War, being the substance of a course of lectures delivered in the University of London, King's College.* London, 1918.
- Lavalle, Juan Bautista de. *El Perú y la gran guerra.* Lima, 1919.
- Lugones, Leopoldo. *Mi beligerancia.* Buenos Aires, 1917.

Silva Valdósola, Carlos. *Le Chile et la guerre*. Paris, 1917.

Translated from the Spanish by Cardozo de Bethencourt.

South American Opinions on the War: I. *Chile and the War*, by Carlos Silva Valdósola. II. *The Attitude of Ecuador*, by Nicolás F. López. Translated from the Spanish by Peter H. Goldsmith. Washington, 1917. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 14.)

The Times History of the War. London, 1918. Vol. XV, ch. cccxii ("South America, 1914-1917").

III. ARTICLES

Barbosa, Ruy, "Brazil in the Hour of Victory: How the News of the Armistice Was Proclaimed in the National Senate," *Inter-America*, February, 1919.

Barrett, John, "The War and the New America. The New Pan America," *The World Court*, November, 1917.

"Causes which Led Cuba to Enter the War, Reviewed in Detail," *The Official Bulletin*, September 24, 1918.

Calderón, Ignacio, "Consecration of the Western Hemisphere to Democracy," *The World Court*, November, 1917.

Díaz Leguizamón, Héctor, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the War," *Inter-America*, February, 1919.

Elliott, L. E., "Latin America and the War," *The Pan American Magazine*, November, 1917.

RECENT WORKS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

"Latin America and the Great War," *The South American*, September, 1918.

Lavalle, Juan Bautista de, "The Severance of Diplomatic Relations between Peru and Germany," *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1918.

Luquiens, Frederick Bliss, "Latin America and the War," *The Century*, October, 1918.

O'Leary, J. E., "Paraguay in the Presence of the World War," *Inter-America*, April, 1918.

Pérez Verdéa, B. J., "La situación internacional de la Argentina ante la diplomacia y el derecho," *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, October, 1918.

BOOKS ON A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Barker, Ernest. *A Confederation of the Nations. Its Powers and Constitution.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1918. 54 p. 19½ cm.

Brailsford, Henry Noel. *The Covenant of Peace.* An essay on the League of Nations. With an introduction by Herbert Croly. New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919. 82 p. 18½ cm.

Carrancá y Trujillo, Camilo. *La "Liga de Naciones."* Estudio de derecho internacional. Merida, Imprenta "Hidalgo," 1919. 93 p. 19 cm.

A sympathetic study. Respecting Mexico he says: "El ingreso de México en la Liga de Naciones no es algo que deba procurarse a toda costa porque el no conseguirlo signifique un entorpecimiento en su vida internacional; pero el hecho de no haber sido invitado tiene mucha importancia, porque revela el concepto que acerca de nuestro país existe formado en el exterior, y debemos esforzarnos por hacer evolucionar ese concepto en un sentido favorable."

Corbett, Sir Julian. *The League of Nations and Freedom of the Seas.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1918. 15 p. 18½ cm.

Duggan, Stephen Pierce, editor. *The League of Nations. The Principle and the Practice.* Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919. xvii, 357 p. 21½ cm.

Contents: Part I, History, Philosophy and Organization of a League of Nations. Chapter I, Introduction, by Stephen Pierce Duggan; Chap. II, The Historical Background of the League of Nations, by Carlton J. H. Hayes; Chap. III, The Making of International Co-operation During the Great War, by Joseph P. Cotton; Chap. IV, Some Essentials of a League for Peace, by John Bassett Moore; Chap. V, The League of Nations and the National State, by Lindsay Rogers; Chap. VI, The League of Nations: Its Organization and Operation, by A. Lawrence Lowell; Chap. VII, International Sanctions and the Limitation of Armaments, by Frederic Austin Ogg; Chap. VIII, International Administration, by Francis Bowes Sayre.

Part II. International Co-operation, as Applied to Concrete Problems. Chap. IX, National Self-Determination and the Problems of the Small Nations, by Harry E. Barnes; Chap. X, The League of Nations and Economic Internationalism, by Glenn Frank; Chap. XI, The Problem of Backward Areas and of Colonies, by Edwin M. Borchard; Chap. XII, International Control of International Waterways, Railways, and Highways, by Joseph P. Chamberlain; Chap. XIII, Labor in the Peace Treaty, by John B. Andrews; Chap. XIV, The Freedom of the Seas, by Raymond Garfield Gettell.

Part III. America and the League of Nations. Chap. XV, The United States and the Policy of Isolation, by Henry F. Munro; Chap. XVI, The Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations, by Everett Kimball. Appendices; Bibliographical Notes.

Erzberger, Mathias. *The League of Nations.* The way to the world's peace. Translated by Bernard Miall. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1919. vii, 328 p.

The book was published in Leipzig just before the armistice under the title: *Der Völkerbund, Der Weg zur Weltfrieden.*

Fayle, Charles Ernest. *The Fourteenth Point. A Study of the League of Nations.* Prepared for the Garton Foundation. London, John Murray, 1919. xii, 140 p. 19 cm.

Henderson, Arthur. *The League of Nations and Labour.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1918. 13 p. 18½ cm.

Heyde, Ludwig. *Social-Politics in the Peace Covenant and the League of Nations.* Translated by M. Elizabeth Benedix. Amsterdam, S. L. Van Looy, 1919. 85 p. 24 cm.

The author is general secretary of the Society for Social Reform, which is the German section of the International Association for Labor Legislation.

The International Review. London, The International Review Office, 1919. Published on the first of each month since January, 1919.

Succeeds *War and Peace; The International Review.*

Lawrence, Thomas Joseph. *The Society of Nations, Its Past, Present, and Possible Future.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1919. xi, 194 p.

Lectures of a historical and legal character by a well-known writer on international law.

Leroy, Maxime. *L'Ère Wilson. La Société des Nations.* Paris, M. Giard et E. Brière, 1917. 242 p.

Contents: Le problème de la paix; De l'organisation régalienne des Etats à la notion de l'interdépendance et de l'égalité des nations; L'étranger; La société des nations. Préliminaires; Les pouvoirs et fonctions. Généralités; Le congrès des nations; Le pouvoir exécutif international; Le pouvoir judiciaire international; La cour internationale; Les sanctions.

Morrow, Dwight Whitney. *The Society of Free States.* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1919. vi, 224 p.

"The writer spent most of the year 1918 in Europe, in the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, where he had the opportunity to see the great difficulties in securing effective international co-operation even at a time when the Allied Governments had the strongest self-interest in working together."—*Foreword*, iii.

The New Europe; A Weekly Review of foreign politics. London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917—.

Contains numerous articles on the subject.

Ollivier, Sir Sydney. *The League of Nations and Primitive Peoples.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1918. 16 p. 18½ cm.

Pollard, Albert Frederick. *The League of Nations in History.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1918. 14 p. 18½ cm.

Pollock, Sir Frederick. *The League of Nations and the Coming Rule of Law.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1918. 15 p. 18½ cm.