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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**DOCUMENTS**

of the

**PREPARATORY COMMISSION  
FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE**

entrusted with the

**PREPARATION FOR THE CONFERENCE  
FOR THE REDUCTION  
AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS**

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**SERIES V**

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**MINUTES**

of the

**Fourth Session of the Preparatory  
Commission for the Disarmament Conference  
and of the  
First Session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.**

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**MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY  
COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.**

*Held at Geneva from November 30th to December 3rd, 1927.*

**LIST OF MEMBERS.**

*President:* His Excellency Jonkheer J. LOUDON (Netherlands).

<i>Argentine:</i>	His Excellency M. José Maria CANTILO.
<i>Belgium:</i>	His Excellency Baron MONCHEUR.
<i>Brazil:</i>	
<i>British Empire:</i>	The Right Honourable Lord CUSHENDUN.
<i>Bulgaria:</i>	His Excellency M. MIKOFF.
<i>Canada:</i>	Dr. W. A. RIDDELL. M.A., Ph.D.
<i>Chile:</i>	His Excellency M. J. VALDÉS-MENDEVILLE.
<i>China:</i>	His Excellency M. TCHENG-LOH.
<i>Colombia:</i>	His Excellency Dr. F. J. URRUTIA.
<i>Cuba:</i>	His Excellency M. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT.
<i>Czechoslovakia:</i>	His Excellency Dr. BENEŠ.
<i>Finland:</i>	His Excellency M. R. HOLSTI.
<i>France:</i>	His Excellency M. PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Germany:</i>	Count BERNSTORFF.
<i>Greece:</i>	His Excellency M. Nicolas POLITIS.
<i>Italy:</i>	General A. DE MARINIS STENDARDO DI RICIGLIANO.
<i>Japan:</i>	His Excellency M. N. SATO.
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Dr. V. H. RUTGERS.
<i>Poland:</i>	His Excellency M. François SOKAL.
<i>Romania:</i>	His Excellency M. N. P. COMNÈNE.
<i>Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes:</i>	His Excellency M. L. MARKOVITCH.
<i>Spain:</i>	
<i>Sweden:</i>	His Excellency M. Einar HENNINGS
<i>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics:</i>	M. Maxime LITVINOFF.
<i>United States of America:</i>	The Hon. Hugh WILSON.
<i>Uruguay:</i>	

## FIRST MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Wednesday, November 30th, 1927, at 11 a.m.*

*President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).*

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### 1. Opening of the Session.

The PRESIDENT. — The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has reassembled for its fourth session. The number of States represented has increased since our last sessions. Two of the new States Members of the Council are added to our number, namely, Canada (represented by Dr. Riddell) and the Republic of Cuba (represented by M. de Agüero y Bethancourt). The members who have left the Council will continue to participate in the work of the Commission, with the exception of M. Guerrero, who has been appointed Foreign Minister of Salvador and will unfortunately no longer be able to give us his active assistance. It is with keen regret also that I note the absence of M. de Brouckère, our eminent Vice-President, who, with his working ability, his lucidity, his practical good sense and vast knowledge, played such an important part in all our discussions. Belgium is now represented by her former Minister in London, Baron Moncheur, whom I am glad to welcome here. Among the champions of disarmament there is one — M. Beneš — who has not been present at our previous sessions and whom we are particularly glad to see at the table. We have, however, lost another champion, Lord Cecil, and I am sure that Lord Cushendun, the representative of the British Empire, will not take exception if I say that though Lord Cecil — who is, I know, one of his friends — is not here, the powerful inspiration which the Commission has received from him is such that we cannot proceed with our work without remembering his courageous and friendly personality. We have greatly gained by the addition of M. Politis, the first delegate of Greece.

The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, invited from the outset of our labours in the same way as the United States of America, who have given us such valuable help, has also sent delegates to our session.

I extend a welcome to all our new colleagues, and I flatter myself that their collaboration, in spite of the different points of view they represent, will be marked by that spirit of frankness and courtesy which has so particularly distinguished our previous meetings. I hope that this collaboration will tend to the advancement of our common end, which is the progressive reduction and limitation of armaments. I say "progressive", for it is evident that it is only by stages and by going forward step by step with moral disarmament and mutual confidence that we shall arrive at the still rather vague ideal of material disarmament in all civilised countries.

In our previous meetings, thanks to the very important work of the sub-committees, we were able to draw up a preliminary Draft Convention for the International Disarmament Conference. Those of you who were not present at our previous sessions will have been able to study our voluminous documentation, and it will therefore be unnecessary for us to recommence our work from the beginning. We will continue our enquiries from the point where we left off.

We recognised last spring — and the Eighth Assembly subsequently expressed its unanimous approval — that the pursuit of these enquiries was hampered by the lack of a general feeling of security, which appeared essential if we were to succeed in fixing a reduced level for armaments. It is true that the reduction of armaments would in itself contribute to security, and that full disarmament would be one of the strongest guarantees of security. One does not need, I think, to be a very deep psychologist to understand that, without a considerable degree of security already acquired — and the Locarno Treaties have undoubtedly increased this security to a certain but still insufficient extent — the majority of States, however firmly bound they may be by their engagements under Article 8 of the Covenant, will at present hesitate to risk making any large reduction in their armed forces.

The Assembly realised this difficulty and, through the intermediary of the Council, instructed our Commission to constitute a special Committee on Arbitration and Security, in order to render it possible for us to continue our work with the second reading of the preliminary Draft Convention. This Committee, according to the resolution of the Assembly is to be composed of representatives of all the States which form part of the Commission and are Members of the League of Nations, and, other States represented on the Commission are to be asked to take part in it if they so desire.

I shall, therefore, shortly ask the first delegates of the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics whether their Governments desire to be represented on the new Committee.

The Committee on Arbitration and Security will be called upon, to examine, on the lines indicated by us, the measures best calculated to give all the States the necessary guarantees in regard to arbitration and security, which will enable them to fix in an international agreement the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figure. This Committee might work parallel with the work of the Preparatory Commission, whose next session is not necessarily dependent upon that of the Committee. In any case, we shall have to fix the date of our

fifth session and to decide, since the special Committee is appointed to hasten the second reading of the Draft Convention, whether it will be desirable or not for the Committee to get to work before the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

There is one point on which I should like to lay special emphasis — not for the first time. I have said and repeated at our previous meetings that, before beginning the second reading of the Convention, it is necessary that those Governments whose points of view are most divergent should seek to harmonise their views by diplomatic preparation. I should like to appeal to the Press, which directs public opinion. I venture to hope that in the present serious state of the problem both Governments and Press will recognise, more than they have done in the past, their duty to act in the sense I have just indicated.

Resolution V of the Assembly lays down broadly the task of the new Committee.

First, it will have to study the measures capable of promoting, generalising and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security, including agreements between States Members and non-Members of the League of Nations. These measures also include the drawing up of a model treaty of arbitration.

Secondly, it will have to pursue the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the Covenant (Article 16 and other articles).

Thirdly, it will have to examine the agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States.

Fourthly, it will decide upon an invitation to be sent by the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region.

According to Resolution IV, the Committee has also to deal with the proposal of the Finnish Government for ensuring financial assistance to any State victim of aggression.

Our first task, and the one for which I have ventured to convoke the Commission to-day, is to constitute the new Committee. We must then give it its instructions and examine the question of its first meeting. Its work will probably be of long duration. The world will have anxious eyes fixed on this Committee, and I therefore recommend that its meetings should be held in public. In such a matter of world-wide interest secret meetings are harmful, and we have nothing to hide. On the other hand, we must not allow public opinion to believe that the Conference for which we are preparing will bring about at once universal disarmament. We have to show to the peoples that their Governments have the firm intention to promote, step by step, by understandings between States which will increasingly guarantee their security and ensure the solution of disputes by conciliation and arbitration, such mutual confidence as will arrest the race in armaments and will render possible the progressive reduction of a crushing burden on the finances and economic life of States.

In this way our work will gradually tend to prevent a renewal of those sanguinary sacrifices which, in spite of the sublime spirit of patriotic sacrifice to which they bear witness, are nothing less than a dishonour to our humanity.

## 2. Election of Vice-President.

The PRESIDENT. — As, to our great regret, we have lost M. de Brouckère as Vice-Chairman, the Commission must now proceed to choose his successor. Unless any delegate desires to make a suggestion, I venture to propose the name of M. Politis, first delegate of Greece, whom, I feel sure, will receive your unanimous support.

*M. Politis was elected Vice-Chairman by acclamation.*

## 3. Adoption of the Agenda.

The PRESIDENT. — I propose to invert the order of the items on the provisional agenda and to begin with Item 2, "Progress of the Work".

I think it is superfluous to read the memorandum of the Secretariat on this subject, as it has already been circulated to the Commission.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I only desire to say a few words with the object of removing a slight misunderstanding regarding a letter which I wrote to the President on November 12th. I am extremely anxious that this misunderstanding should disappear before we begin our discussion.

In the letter of November 12th, in which I acknowledged the President's invitation to attend the present session, I also suggested that the final agenda and material arrangements should allow the possibility of a discussion on the Draft Convention which was drawn up at our third session.

I ventured to add that I considered that such a step would be in conformity with the desire expressed by the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations that we should endeavour to accelerate the technical work with a view to the general Disarmament Conference. I also remarked that we would be taking into account the fact that a number of new members had joined the Preparatory Commission since its third session.

The President understood my letter to mean that I desired to propose a second reading of the Draft Convention for the present session, and he gave me to understand that he did not think such a proposal would be crowned with success.

I must confess, gentlemen, that I was surprised at the interpretation which the public put upon this letter. I had no intention of proposing a second reading of the Draft Convention at the present session.

Our President had made an appeal to the various Governments last April asking them to endeavour by diplomatic means to secure an agreement on the questions which had remained in suspense. It will be of particular interest for us to know the results which have come from that appeal.

The desire which I expressed in my letter, and which I still feel, is that it is desirable to avoid on any formal ground our being deprived of the opportunity for a discussion of the results achieved in disarmament up to the present time.

Seven months have elapsed since the last session of our Commission. We all know that various events of particular interest have occurred in the interval. During the summer negotiations took place on the question of disarmament. In September the Assembly of the League of Nations held its session, and a thorough discussion took place on the question of disarmament. It was decided to appoint a Committee on Arbitration and Security; four members were added to our Commission, and at present we are still ignorant as to the attitude they will take towards the numerous questions before us.

All these reasons, I feel, should lead us to make a concrete examination of the present position of the disarmament problem, of course on condition that my colleagues are of the same opinion. I do not believe that it will be necessary to increase our agenda for this purpose.

Item 2, which has now become Item 1 (and here I may incidentally thank the President for having made this alteration), might, I think, be interpreted in such a manner as to allow an opportunity for the discussion which I venture to suggest. I wish to emphasise even more the point that this discussion is not intended to be a second reading of the Convention. Far from it. It is only intended to give an opportunity to the delegations for expressing the general ideas of their respective Governments in regard to the present state of the problem of disarmament. It is true, however, that we have to fix a date for the second reading of the Draft Convention, but I would like to refrain from discussing that point at present. I was earnestly desirous of removing the misunderstanding which had arisen; the letter which I sent to the President was not intended for publication, and I am informed it was made public through an indiscretion. For this reason I ventured to bring the matter up in order to avoid any misapprehension as to our attitude in regard to the present session.

**THE PRESIDENT.** — I desire to thank Count Bernstorff for the explanation which he has given to the Commission and to myself in particular. I regret that I misunderstood the sense of his letter, and I may assure him that there is absolutely nothing to prevent the delegates from explaining their point of view as regards the state of the work on disarmament with the utmost freedom.

**M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).** — I wish to thank the President for his very kind welcome to our delegation, and to add that the delegation of the Socialist Soviet Republics hopes to be given an early opportunity of laying before the Preparatory Commission its views and proposals on the questions before the Commission.

In the meantime, I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that the only object of the presence of our delegation here is, while fully adhering to our general principles, to contribute by all the means in our power to the cause of peace and disarmament. All steps really tending in that direction on the part of the Preparatory Commission will have the full support of the Soviet Government and its delegation headed by myself.

I wish also to say that I fully appreciate the kindness of the President in agreeing to alter the agenda in the sense proposed by the German delegate.

I permit myself to remind you that, when the Soviet Government accepted the invitation to participate in the Conference on Disarmament and in the work of the Preparatory Commission, there was no question of a Committee on security and other questions which have subsequently been involved. We should find ourselves in great difficulty if we had to take part in a discussion on the formation of this Committee before we had heard anything about the preliminary work of the Preparatory Commission and the views of the various delegations on the fundamental question of disarmament. That is why, I repeat, we fully support the motion of the German delegation, and since this motion has been accepted by you, Mr. President, we have only to thank you for your kindness.

**THE PRESIDENT.** — As no other delegate wishes to speak on the Progress of the Work we will pass to the other item of the agenda, namely, the Examination of the Resolutions of the Assembly and of the Council.

**M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).** — I understood, Mr. President, that you had changed the order of the agenda and had put as the first item the Progress of the Work of the Commission. I understood that the question of the formation of the Committee on Arbitration and Security should come afterwards.

The PRESIDENT. — I entirely agree. I declared the discussion open on the Progress of the Work. You have the memorandum on this question before you, and as nobody desires to speak, I am compelled to pass to the second item of the agenda.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — In that case I desire to speak on the Progress of Work.

The PRESIDENT. — I call on M. Litvinoff to speak.

#### 4. Progress of the Work: General Discussion.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — The Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, having been unable to participate in the three sessions which have already been held by the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, has entrusted its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission to make a declaration covering all questions connected with the problem of disarmament.

I. The Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting upon the removal of the causes giving rise to armed conflicts. Militarism and navalism are essentially natural consequences of the capitalist system. By the very fact of their existence, they intensify existing differences, giving a vast impetus to all potential quarrels and inevitably converting these into armed conflicts.

The people in all countries, however, enfeebled and impoverished by the imperialist world-war of 1914-18, are imbued with the determination to struggle against imperialist wars and for the guaranteeing of peace between the nations.

This is precisely what has made it possible for the Soviet Government to accept the invitation of the League of Nations, the latter having expressed itself in favour of disarmament. In so doing, the Soviet Government demonstrates in the face of the whole world its will to peace between the nations and wishes to make clear to all the real inspirations and true desires of the other States with regard to disarmament.

Despite the fact that the world-war of 1914-18 was called the "war to end war", the whole history of post-war international relations has been one of continuous and systematic increase of armed forces in the capitalist States and of a vast increase of the general burden of militarism. So far none of the solemn promises of the League of Nations has been even partially fulfilled, while in all its activities in this regard the League of Nations has systematically evaded setting the question in a practical light.

All the work done by the Preparatory Commission in this regard has been, so far, of a purely decorative nature. Indeed, the League of Nations only approached the question of general disarmament in 1924. It was decided to call a Conference on general disarmament on May 1st, 1925, but up to the present not only has the matter of general disarmament not advanced a single step but the date of the Conference has not even been fixed.

Likewise, the League of Nations has been fruitlessly engaged upon the question of the limitation of war budgets since 1920.

The reluctance to put into practice the policy of disarmament was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts were made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question, evoking endless and fruitless arguments on so-called military potential, affords an opportunity for the indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question: the actual dimensions of disarmament.

There can be no doubt that by setting the question thus at the coming Disarmament Conference not only will it be impossible to achieve the curtailment of existing armaments but States belonging to the League of Nations may even receive legal sanction for increasing their armaments.

The Soviet Government has systematically endeavoured to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavours have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other States. The Soviet Government — the only one to show in deeds its will to peace and disarmament — was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, devoted to questions of the curtailment of naval armaments. The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference on April 10th, 1922, was rejected by the Conference. Despite this opposition, the Soviet Government has never relaxed in its determined endeavours with regard to disarmament. In December 1922 a Conference was called in Moscow, by the Soviet Government, of representatives of the border States for the joint discussion of the problem of proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet Government agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments despite the fact that this would not affect many great Powers always ready, whether under the obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of the other countries represented at the Moscow Conference should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet State. A definite scheme for the limitation of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet Government. This scheme was, however, rejected.



Despite the sceptical attitude of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics towards the labours of the League of Nations, it accepted the invitation of December 12th, 1925, to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of M. Vorovsky, Minister Plenipotentiary, and the subsequent acquittal of the assassins by the Swiss Court, prevented the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics from attending the previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has authorised it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament.

II. The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is authorised by its Government to propose the complete abolition of all land, naval and air forces.

The Government of the Union suggests the following measures for the realisation of this proposal :

(a) The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces and the non-admittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever.

(b) The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means for chemical warfare and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops or in military or general stores.

(c) The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels.

(d) The discontinuance of calling up citizens for military training either in armies or public bodies.

(e) Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary or recruited.

(f) Legislation prohibiting the calling-up of trained reserves.

(g) The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases.

(h) The scrapping of military plants and factories and of war industry equipment in general industrial works.

(i) The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both on State budgets and those of public bodies.

(k) The abolition of military, naval and air ministries, and the dissolution of general staffs and military administrations, departments and institutions of every kind.

(l) The legislative prohibition of military propaganda and military training of the population and of military education both in State and public bodies.

(m) The legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction with a view to the removal of incentives to the invention of the same.

(n) Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the State.

(o) The withdrawal or corresponding alteration of all legislative acts, both of national or international scope, infringing the above stipulations.\*

III. The delegation of the Union is empowered to propose the execution of the above programme of complete disarmament as soon as the Convention in question comes into force, in order that all the necessary measures for the destruction of military stores be completed in a year's time.

The Soviet Government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case, however, of capitalist States rejecting immediate actual abolition of standing armies, the Soviet Government, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of a practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all contracting States, by gradual stages, during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

National funds, freed from war expenditure, to be employed by each State at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes.

IV. Whilst insisting upon the views just stated, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion of the question of the limitation of armaments whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed.

V. The delegation declares that the Government of the Union fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application to military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately while insisting on an early date being fixed for its ratification by all States,

and considers that, in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it would be necessary to raise the question of the establishment of workers' control over those chemical industries susceptible of being rapidly converted to war purposes in States having a highly developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our programme of disarmament, but realise that its radical and exhaustive nature may make it appear at the first glance complex, difficult of realisation and perhaps even Utopian. This, however, is merely because the problem of complete disarmament has always been treated as a forbidden subject and never yet thoroughly dealt with. We understand perfectly that the realisation of this programme may not be compatible with certain political interests, chiefly those of the great Powers, the interests of war industries or those of the numerous groups of speculators, but I contend that in itself the problem of complete disarmament presents no difficulties and is capable of rapid and easy solution.

It is in any case a great deal simpler, and would require far less time to work out in detail, than the schemes which have so far been used as a basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission. I confess that, on acquainting myself with the findings of this Commission, I was aghast at the complexity, confusion and multiplicity of the questions with which that of disarmament had become involved. The Commission has, in effect, devoted several sessions to the discussion of the enumeration and headings of the clauses to make up an international Convention for limitation of armaments. Unanimity has only been achieved with regard to certain trivial and common points. The overwhelming majority of the clauses — or rather their headings — evoked dissensions which have so far failed to be reconciled either by the Commission itself or by private negotiations between the Governments concerned. If and when, however, these dissensions have been reconciled, the Commission will still only be at the threshold of its real difficulties. The Commission will have to agree to the satisfaction of all as to what constitutes security for each country and, individually, the extent and importance of its international obligations, its geographical peculiarities and other special features, before the level of its effectives, technical armaments, military and air vessels, etc., can be established.

The mere enumeration of these questions will suffice to bring before us the utter hopelessness — more, the Utopianism — of expecting this question to be solved within any imaginable period.

The latest manifestations of international life, various international treaties recently concluded, lead not to the unification but rather to the still further division of the European and non-European countries into political groupings, and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, and do not afford the slightest grounds for optimism as to the outcome of the questions before the Preparatory Commission.

To crown all, attempts are still being made to delay for a long time to come the work of the Preparatory Commission pending the solution of a series of political questions not less confused and complex than those I have already mentioned.

One thing is certain : if the present basis of the Preparatory Commission's work is not changed, it is — even if not exploded by the abundance and weight of its own internal differences — condemned to years, if not decades, of work either completely sterile or productive of quite intangible results.

We live in a time in which the outbreak of fresh wars is no mere theoretical danger. This is not merely our opinion ; many responsible statesmen in capitalist countries have expressed the same fears quite recently. The imminence of war is making itself felt everywhere. If it is to be averted, something will have to be done. In our opinion, the best guarantee of security for all peoples and all countries is immediate complete disarmament. This problem should be faced immediately and solved in the shortest possible time. Those countries postponing the solution of this problem are taking upon themselves an enormous responsibility. I therefore beg to move on behalf of the Soviet delegation the following resolution :

“ Whereas the existence of armaments and the tendency they show to growth by their very nature inevitably lead to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful productive labour and bringing in its train countless disasters ;

“ Whereas armed force is a weapon in the hands of great Powers for the oppression of peoples in small and colonial countries ; and

“ Whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war.

“ The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference resolves :

“ (1) To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft Convention for complete and general disarmament on the principles proposed by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics ;

“ (2) To propose the convocation, not later than March 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided for in paragraph (1). ”

We are fully aware that certain circles will endeavour to stigmatise our programme and resolution as propaganda. We are quite ready to accept this challenge and declare that we are making propaganda for peace and shall continue to do so. If the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is not a suitable place in which to make peace propaganda, then apparently we are here under a misunderstanding. The Soviet Government pursues, and has always pursued, a resolute peace policy which it has always shown, and is still showing, in deeds as well as in words. Only a few days ago, when the clouds of war seemed to be darkening the horizon on the east of Europe more ominously than ever, everything in its power was done by the Soviet Government to avert a calamity. It brought all possible arguments to bear upon the Lithuanian Government to persuade it immediately to declare the cessation of the state of war between Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet Government was also instrumental in persuading Lithuania's other two neighbours to offer the same advice, and steps were also taken by it in Warsaw tending towards the maintenance of peace. This peace policy of my Government gives us a special right to declare that we shall not let a single opportunity slip for making the most intensive propaganda for peace and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT. — You have all heard the interesting draft resolution and speech of the representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It is clear that the difference existing between the point of view of the Soviet delegation and that of the other members of the Commission as it has hitherto appeared consists not in regard to the aim — disarmament, which is exactly the same for all — but in the methods to be used to attain it.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*

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## SECOND MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Wednesday, November 30th, 1927, at 4 p.m.*

*President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).*

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### 5. Procedure.

The PRESIDENT. — Gentlemen, — You heard this morning the speech of M. Litvinoff and the draft resolution which he submitted. Since then M. Litvinoff has added to his draft resolution a rather long document (Annex 1) which it has been impossible for the Secretariat to have translated and distributed. It would therefore seem useless to begin the discussion of the draft resolution now, all the more so because it is not the practice of the Commission to enter on a discussion of a resolution, or any serious subject, until the Commission has had time to examine it.

Under the circumstances, I propose either to pass to the second part of the agenda or to take up the discussion again to-morrow morning or at a subsequent meeting. In any case I request members to limit their speeches as much as possible.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — The document the President has referred to is a memorandum giving statistics of the losses sustained by the various peoples during the war and of the growth of armaments. I do not think that this document, though I hope it will be of great interest to the delegates, is entirely relevant to the discussion of our resolution. I think you have all the material necessary for its discussion in our declaration and programme of disarmament and in the resolution itself.

If I understand the President to suggest that it would be preferable to postpone the discussion until to-morrow I willingly submit to that ruling, but I should like to point out that the attitude of the Soviet delegation on the question of the Committee on Arbitration and Security will be considerably influenced by the outcome of the discussion of our resolution and the views of the other delegations on the fundamental question of disarmament.

That is why I propose that, if it is impossible to proceed with the discussion of our resolution this afternoon, we should adjourn this meeting until to-morrow morning, when time will have been given to all the delegates to acquaint themselves with all the documents put forward by the Soviet delegation.

The PRESIDENT. — I will simply ask the Commission which course it prefers. Does it, in view of the explanations of M. Litvinoff, desire to adjourn the discussion of this particular point, or to adjourn the whole meeting till to-morrow, or to pass to Item 2 of the agenda now, subject, of course, to M. Litvinoff's right to make any reservation on the decisions which might be taken?

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — Of course, I shall accept the decision of the Commission, but I personally feel that, if we are to discuss the proposals which we have heard this morning, it would seem preferable to do so now in order that we may then be able to appoint the Committee on Arbitration and Security — our essential task according to our agenda — and in order that that Committee may be able to get to work immediately.

The PRESIDENT. — If any delegate desires to speak on the proposals which have been made, I will open the discussion upon them.

## 6. Discussion of Draft Resolution proposed by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — Mr. President, gentlemen, — I confess I would have preferred not to have spoken until I had heard the opinion of those of my colleagues who have certainly an opinion to express on the declarations which we heard this morning. But in view of the lack of speakers I do not feel it possible, if only out of courtesy to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, to pass over in silence the declarations made by their first delegate this morning. I do not believe that the Commission can fail to decide the question whether, by abandoning the methods followed hitherto in favour of those which have been proposed, it does, or does not, intend to follow the agenda of this session. I entirely agree with the point of view expressed by our President when he said that we have a definite task entrusted to us by the last Assembly, namely, to appoint a Committee on Arbitration and Security, which is to begin its work as rapidly as possible.

This morning the first delegate of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, leaving out of consideration the meeting of the Security Committee, made a series of proposals. At the same time he gave us a summary of the work in which we have hitherto been engaged, which was not, to say the least, indulgent. Among the many valuable services which we expect from the new co-operation we are about to receive, one will certainly be that of having a severe critic, who will prevent us from resting asleep upon our laurels. My colleagues will realise that I do not use these words in a spirit of irony; some of them know that I have not waited until to-day to desire this collaboration. I have no complaint to make. It is possible that among all the complexities and difficulties in the technical work, and among the diplomatic conversations which precede or follow our meetings, we might be tempted to lose sight of the goal which we have to reach. Even if merely to justify ourselves against the criticism made this morning, it will be our duty to work with still greater energy.

Nevertheless, I do not think that the criticism is thoroughly deserved. Since coming here we have all sufficiently appreciated the difficulty of the work before us and realised that good will alone — which undoubtedly exists — is not sufficient. In order to accomplish solid results, we have had to tread a long path. We are to-day asked to advance more quickly, and we undoubtedly share that desire.

I quite understand the special situation of my colleagues of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, who are newcomers here. They have come to take part in work which is in the middle of its development. They can very reasonably be tempted to think that the difficulties and complexities of our problems are pretexts for never bringing the work to a successful conclusion. They may be assured that we have all come here in exactly the same mood to which they bore witness this morning, in order to disarm and to disarm as fully as possible.

When, however, we got to grips with this problem something happened to us which will also happen to them. We perceived the difficulties, and we were compelled to solve them one by one. Instead of this long stretch of work, what is it that they propose? They propose something very vast and very simple; indeed, it is too simple. Mankind has for centuries perceived this simplicity and has desired to take such steps as they propose, and the wars which have been repeated, and the after-effects of which are still almost part of our flesh and bones, have not been avoided.

In our opinion the historical value of the League of Nations is that it has started on a totally different basis. It has linked the problem of disarmament to the problem of security, and it has subjected and graduated the reduction of armaments to the minimum compatible with national security and the fulfilment of international obligations concluded for the purposes of common action.

We believe that all this is contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly in Article 8, in virtue of which we have met to-day. This article binds us by a moral and legal undertaking to solve the problem, the basis of which has already been fixed. We have to settle what are the minimum armaments compatible with national security and with international obligations necessary for common action.

Were I not confident that our colleagues themselves who are co-operating in our work will end by recognising and accepting certain aspects of the problem which we have long discovered, I confess that I should be somewhat anxious and disappointed. It is only right to state, as the President said this morning at the end of his very interesting speech, that there are two conceptions and methods which are to some extent antagonistic and incompatible, so that if the Commission adopts one of them it must abandon the other.

Even if I consider that the other method is the better one, I think that when we have reached such a definite stage in our work we should be making the gravest of mistakes if we changed our procedure now. We should, as an old proverb, which probably exists in many languages, puts it, be "changing horses in crossing the stream". In France we have a great thinker who has to some extent affected us all and who more than any other has embodied our virtues and failings. Descartes said that a man who is lost in a forest has just as good a chance of getting out if he always walks in the same direction without going to the right or to the left, and that at any rate he will probably reach a point where he is better than in the middle of the forest.

We think that our position is similar as regards disarmament. The methods which have been adopted hitherto may have had, and have, their inconveniences, particularly in their slowness, but they have at any rate been chosen and tried. We cannot, without grave danger to the cause of disarmament, when we have met for a definite purpose, abandon them in favour of other proposals, however attractive they may appear.

I will go further, and I will speak my full mind on this subject. I will do it briefly, for I am very anxious to pass to the questions for which we have specially met. Nevertheless, out of deference to our colleagues and in order that they may not believe that their words have left any of us, and certainly not myself, indifferent, I will express my full views. Apart from the difficulty that their method is different from that which we have so far adopted, I do not think that their method, judged on its merits, is really as useful as they have claimed. It is extremely simple; it is too simple. To send all the ships to the bottom of the sea and all the aircraft to the skies and to allow all the soldiers to go back to their homes (where, incidentally, they would still continue to be soldiers), is a conception of disarmament which the League renounced on the very day it was founded. It renounced that course for a very simple reason. The Assembly of the League of Nations — and in this Assembly there are not large nations, and small nations which follow their rulings or suggestions; in this Assembly of nations placed on an equal footing the League of Nations expressed the view that disarmament, if it could be practically realised, would always leave the small nations at the mercy of the great ones. It recognised that, supposing you secure total disarmament without any corresponding guarantee of security, you would still have before you the problem of "war potential". The expression is somewhat awkward, but it is clear and generous, and the French delegation is glad to have introduced it into the preparatory work of disarmament. Supposing you had total disarmament, if there were no international organisation taking charge of security, if you had no international force to ensure the maintenance of this security, if you had no international law such as we are endeavouring to lay down here, a powerful and populous nation with great resources would always have the means of imposing its will, when it wished to do so, on a small nation — equally disarmed, but less populous and less well equipped to resist an attack which might be made upon it.

What has caused us a difficulty and what has delayed us is not so much the technical difficulty as the lack of an international spirit. I do not say that the technical difficulties have been solved, but they are recognised and that is something. The time which we have taken in recognising and analysing them is not by any means wasted. If to-day we politicians can make proper use of the work of the technical experts and accept the responsibilities which fall upon us as politicians, we owe this possibility to the technical analysis and examination which have already been made, and because the difficulties of the problem are spread out before us on the table.

But the main difficulty lies in the lack of an international spirit and the fact that States hesitate to undertake the obligations which are necessary to give a State victim of aggression — and owing to the system of arbitration we should clearly know which State was the aggressed — the certainty that it would get back the armaments which it had discarded over and over again by the assistance of those who would come to help it resist the aggressor.

Accordingly, the last Assembly decided to link more closely, not by a new idea but by the progressive realisation of an idea on which our discussions are based, the work of security with the work of disarmament, by appointing within our Committee this Committee on Arbitration and Security to continue the work parallel with our own.

It would not be out of place if I said that the arrival of the delegates of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has filled us with hope. Amidst the difficulties which have caused the delays which you have sternly analysed this morning, I venture to recall that at every moment during our discussions the idea would make itself felt that Russia was not present, and we asked ourselves how we could accomplish the work of European security when this great country did not share our work, our anxieties and our investigations. The Russian delegation is now here, but we must remember that the first step is the most difficult, and involves others. I will also refer to the closing words of M. Litvinoff's speech: "We have come to work with you". Well, I can assure the Soviet delegation that as they co-operate in our work along the lines laid down by us — and they will admit that we had the right to draw up our programme — they will understand it better.

The day when you admit, as has been admitted at the foundation of the League of Nations and in its Covenant, that we cannot effect an international reduction of armaments without an international organisation for security, the co-operation of the great country which you represent in this positive work of the international organisation of security will give an impetus to our labours which will put them above all criticism.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — It is useless for me to say that I am in full agreement with the resolution of the last Assembly. I had the honour of participating in the work of the Third Committee, and I co-operated with my colleagues in drawing up the resolution. In my opinion we should work according to the letter and the spirit of that resolution.

The speech delivered this morning by the first delegate of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics and that delivered by M. Paul-Boncour this afternoon have given me great hope. These two delegates stated that it was necessary to work and co-operate together. It is true that the speech of M. Litvinoff was extremely severe and that his proposals were

very radical, but I would like to remind you that five or six years ago everybody regarded the problem of disarmament in the same manner as the Soviet delegate regarded it this morning. I will remind you, among other things, that in the fourteen points of President Wilson the same idea was expressed. It was said that complete disarmament was necessary, a disarmament which only left States the forces necessary for domestic security. Unfortunately, the progress which was hoped for at the time when that proposal was made has not been achieved.

I agree with M. Paul-Boncour that the severe criticism which we have heard to-day should inspire us to work more quickly. I therefore venture to propose that at this meeting we should fix the date for the second reading of our Draft Convention as early as possible, and that all the questions which have been touched upon to-day should be discussed on that occasion. My proposal is the outcome of the resolution of the last Assembly which urges us to hasten the accomplishment of our technical work.

M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia). — The proposal of Count Bernstorff leads me to say a few words. I think it is necessary that we should follow a practical path and that we should determine the direction which we are going to give to our later work.

I listened with interest to the speeches of M. Litvinoff and M. Paul-Boncour, and I quite agree with M. Paul-Boncour that it is difficult to pass over in silence the proposals of M. Litvinoff, which M. Paul-Boncour has told us are so clear, so radical and so simple. However, I think that it is difficult to open a prolonged discussion on this subject, and for a very simple reason.

Count Bernstorff has just reminded us that the proposal of M. Litvinoff contains certain ideas which have already been expressed. In this connection all those who have taken part in the work of the Assemblies of the League of Nations during the last eight years, and those of the Third Committee, will certainly remember that the same or almost the same proposals were made as those which have been made here. I may consequently say that the proposal of M. Litvinoff is nothing new. When we began to discuss the disarmament problem in 1921, and again in 1922, for two or three weeks we discussed this question at length. Was disarmament to be reached by the clear, definite and simple system which has been proposed this morning, or was the problem first of all to be examined in the light of its different aspects — political, economic, moral, etc. ? We realised from the outset of our discussions the complexity of the problem in the present situation for modern States. In 1922 the Norwegian delegation put before us a proposal which was very similar to that of M. Litvinoff. We then termed it a pacifist proposal, and we discussed the question whether pure and simple pacifism as then contemplated could constitute a practical basis for immediate disarmament. After long discussions we drew up the famous Resolution XIV, in which was stated for the first time the complexity of the disarmament problem, the need to consider it in every light and the necessity to connect it with the problem of security. I venture to recall these facts in order to show you that the problem has already been previously discussed in this light and that the solution which has been submitted to us to-day has already been submitted and discussed at length. Therefore, if we do not immediately proceed to a discussion of the substance of the proposals, it is because this discussion has already actually taken place in the League of Nations.

I should like to make a second observation. The speech of M. Litvinoff severely criticised the League of Nations. I agree with M. Paul-Boncour that that criticism was too severe and therefore unjust. All those who have participated in the work of the Third Committee know that they have not been spared criticism every time the Assembly has met. However, the criticism which we heard this morning was too severe because it did not take into consideration the important work which has been accomplished. M. Litvinoff said that the work of disarmament had not even been begun. This is an unjust criticism, for we have already accomplished a great deal in this field since 1921. We have brought out the various aspects of the problem and have marked the path which it is necessary to follow in order to arrive at a solution. The path is perhaps long, but it is at any rate well defined. I know that M. Litvinoff would appear to be at first sight a little aghast at the material and the documentation which has been amassed. This, however, is entirely due to the complexity of the problem. It is difficult to sweep the ground clear and to get one's bearings, but it is necessary to study the question very thoroughly in order to understand what has been done before one can decide what remains and how it is to be accomplished.

This is the simple statement which I was anxious to make. I could give details on what has been done, but I feel that at the moment it is unnecessary. But, in spite of the criticism which has been directed towards us, and which we had ourselves already made, we have undoubtedly made progress in the field of disarmament.

I now come to the proposal of Count Bernstorff. I consider that we should leave theoretical discussion and proceed to practical work. If we discussed the resolution which was put before us this morning, we should find ourselves involved in a very lengthy task. In any case, I do not feel it is time to reopen the discussion which has already been exhausted. Therefore, in my opinion, we should proceed to the execution of the task which has been entrusted to us by the Assembly and constitute the Committee on Arbitration and Security. I readily associate myself with the proposal made by Count Bernstorff, and I am convinced that the Soviet delegation will realise that the best way to co-operate is for the moment to follow the path which has been marked out and which we have already begun to follow. We may be confident, as we are already approaching the end.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — I should also like to support the proposal of Count Bernstorff, but I would ask him to explain its exact meaning. As I understand it, we are all desirous of working rapidly to achieve results. We all intend to carry out as fully as possible the programme of work put before us by the last Assembly. Count Bernstorff has suggested that the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics should be postponed until we come to the second reading of the draft prepared by the Preparatory Commission.

I understand that there is no question at present of reopening the discussion on a general question. When we have to discuss the Draft Convention, it seems to me that it would be for the Soviet delegation to move its proposal as an amendment, unless in the interval it should have decided to withdraw it. I nourish a firm hope that, if the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics participates with us in this work in the same desire which they have shown to achieve a rapid result, they will themselves be convinced that the path which we are treading is the only one which can lead to practical results.

My friend M. Paul-Boncour has just pointed out how our experience during the past eight years has shown the indissoluble link between the reduction of armaments and security. This idea is, moreover, embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant, the translation of a great law of human society throughout history. There is no human group or society which has not some force at its command. The difference between the various human societies is that some of them are organised and their force is therefore centralised, while others are not organised and their force lies in the hands of their members. There are no States whose members are such angelic beings that they do not need any force at their command. The most civilised States always have some force for the maintenance of public order, and it cannot be otherwise in the League of Nations.

In order that States may agree to reduce the force which they have at present, there must be an international organisation with sufficient force at its disposal to maintain order and thus to save its members from having to perform that duty for themselves. It is this law which history has taught us from the time that human society has existed, that has been introduced in the formula which you know as Article 8 of the Covenant. It is that formula which we are now trying, after eight years of serious labour, to introduce into international agreement.

I have the firm conviction that our colleagues of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will be persuaded that there is no other way to the result which we have at heart. I therefore understand that the proposal of Count Bernstorff means that we should avoid unnecessary discussion at the present time, and that when we come to the second reading of the Draft Convention we should allow M. Litvinoff, as we should allow any other member of this body, to submit a radical amendment like that he has submitted this morning, or any other amendment, the discussion of which, in accordance with parliamentary procedure, would have precedence over the second reading itself.

If that is the sense of Count Bernstorff's proposal, I declare myself entirely in favour of it.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — M. Politis has kindly supported the proposal which I have made and has asked me one question which I should like to answer.

I have already stated this morning that I am quite convinced that it would be impossible to commence a discussion of the second reading of the Draft Convention now, only a few days before the meeting of the Council and the Christmas holidays. Accordingly, when I wrote my letter I never intended this procedure. I have, however, been very much struck by the President's remarks to-day when he stated that, in spite of his appeal, the Governments had not discussed the questions which had been left over. As a representative of a Government, I do not wish to blame the Governments, but I think that the only means of provoking action on the part of Governments is to state that on a certain given date we shall begin the second reading of our draft. Under the circumstances, the Governments will then be led to reflect on what their delegates will have to say on that given date. In my opinion it should be at least five or six weeks after the next meeting of the Council.

Much has already been said of the severe criticism of M. Litvinoff. But I personally hope that it will help us when we come to our second reading. I naturally cannot say whether M. Litvinoff will or will not then alter his proposal. That is his business and not mine. I do not know what he will feel impelled to say on that occasion but he will undoubtedly have liberty to say whatsoever he wishes, and I feel that his criticism will be useful to us.

M. LOUNATCHARSKY (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — We are very glad that M. Paul-Boncour has opened this discussion, although he has told us that he did it with some hesitation and reluctance. We are extremely glad to hear his opinion on our proposal. We do not attach great importance to questions of convenience, but we are extremely anxious to know what is the point of view of the delegations here present. We should greatly regret if M. Paul-Boncour or the whole Commission obtained the impression that our criticism had been levied in order to add to the difficulties of your already complex and very responsible task. We must earnestly protest against such a reproach that we desired to prevent the success of the disarmament work. This statement, which has been made by certain newspapers, is entirely false. But, as the chairman of our delegation has said, we are also firm supporters of disarmament, and when we conscientiously studied this problem we were very surprised to note that it had been surrounded by a perfect mass of difficulties. The

statesmen who have undertaken this heavy task have added to it by being unduly scrupulous. When we saw the difficulties increasing we felt it our duty to show you the real solution of the problem which public opinion regards in the same way as we regard it; *i.e.* complete disarmament. I do not believe that the great Descartes himself — the master of M. Paul-Boncour — could have found anything to object to in that solution. It is possible that there is nothing new in our proposal, as M. Beneš has stated, but we must well retrace our steps, as we have come to a deadlock.

M. Paul-Boncour criticises the excessive simplicity of our proposals. He said that humanity had always felt the need of eternal peace but had never been able to realise it. As a socialist, M. Paul-Boncour should remember that resolutions on these questions have always been passed, not by majorities but, let us say, by the upper classes. This is the first time that a proposal has been made by a workers' Government on this great question which interests all humanity. This fact will perhaps provide us with new hope.

M. Paul-Boncour raised an objection to the substance of our proposals. He said that even after general disarmament it would be possible for a new conflict to arise, as the great nations would always remain big and strong and the small ones weak and at their mercy. If these differences and the danger of their abuse still remain after general disarmament, even that would not make this position worse than it is at present. It would at least allow us to escape some of the crushing burdens which are weighing upon humanity. If certain Powers cynically violated the obligations which have been accepted here, the other Powers would obviously do all they could to prevent it. A union of States will always be stronger than an isolated State, even under conditions of general disarmament. Thus fall the main objections of M. Paul-Boncour, and our proposal is still ready to meet his able criticism.

We now desire to know whether our proposal is purely and simply rejected by the Commission or whether it will be carefully examined during the present session. If there are too many difficulties in the way of this at present, we are ready to support the proposal of Count Bernstorff as he himself has interpreted it.

The PRESIDENT. — I understand that the Commission and the Soviet delegation are agreed upon the proposal made by Count Bernstorff and interpreted by M. Politis. As M. Litvinoff agrees on this point, I now ask the Commission if it desires to close the discussion, it being understood that at the second reading the Soviet delegate reserves the right to return to the proposals he made to-day.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I want to avoid a misunderstanding, and I should therefore like to say that we of the Soviet delegation are prepared to discuss our proposals immediately; but unless other delegations agree there can be no discussion, and then the matter must be adjourned. I cannot agree that the proposals made by Count Bernstorff and M. Politis are the same. We are perhaps ignorant of the procedure of the League, but from what we know of the procedure in parliaments and other assemblies, when a motion is put forward it has either to be rejected or accepted, or to be adjourned until the next meeting. If you do not accept our proposals and do not reject them that means they remain before the Commission, and that at its next sitting the Commission, when it resumes its work, will revert to them.

M. Politis tells us that at the next session we shall have to raise the same question again, but as long as the proposal is not rejected it is before you.

M. CANTILO (Argentine). — As a delegate of the Argentine Republic, I did not intend to take part in this discussion, as my country is not one of those which is taking a foremost part in this serious question. No one will think that the armaments of Latin-American countries constitute a threat to the world's peace. If we achieve success in the course of our present session or in a later session, it will certainly be triumphing over the difficulties which did not have their origin in the South American continent.

I desire to say that we have been convoked here to discuss a given agenda. I consider that we should keep to that agenda. The proposal of the Soviet delegate seems to me to be rather a wish than a proposal properly so-called. Personally, I consider that it has only one concrete point: that we should proceed to draw up a detailed Draft Convention. This is exactly what the Commission will do at its later sessions, but I believe that we should keep our discussion to the items already on the agenda, and we should refer the examination of the proposals submitted to us at the time to the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the discussion of the Convention.

The PRESIDENT. — I will briefly reply to M. Litvinoff. I think that we all agree to continue our work and to begin the second reading of our Draft Convention at the next session. The proposal of the Soviet delegation has been made and will be kept in the documents of the Commission. When we meet again the President will ask M. Litvinoff whether he desires to retain it, and, if so, the proposal will then come up for discussion. I believe that we are all in agreement that this very simple procedure should be adopted.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I agree.



Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — An essential part of my proposal was that we should fix a date for the next session. As my proposal has been accepted, I assume that we agree to meet a month before the March session of the Council.

The PRESIDENT. — We have to fix the date of our next session, but I propose to wait until the conclusion of our work before doing so. I propose that we should now pass to the other item on the agenda.

*This proposal was accepted.*

## 7. Appointment of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

The PRESIDENT. — I think that most of the chief delegates at the Preparatory Commission will also be delegates of their Governments on the new Committee, but we ought to have more definite information. I therefore ask the delegations to submit names to the Secretariat as regards their representatives on this Committee.

I also ask the delegations representing States non-Members of the League of Nations, *i.e.*, the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, to inform us whether they desire to take part in the new Committee.

I will first ask the representative of the United States of America whether his Government intends to send a delegate to the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

Mr. Hugh WILSON (United States of America). — I should have preferred, before speaking, that the views of my colleagues on this Commission had been expressed and discussed, but since our President has called upon me, I will venture briefly to explain the views of my Government.

The feeling on our part that we occupy a special position in respect to the subject under discussion is natural. Our remoteness from the problems which are causing apprehension in the minds of the other delegations is, I am sure, clearly understood by all present. Furthermore, former American delegations in this and other conferences have repeatedly explained the historic attitude of our country toward the political problems of Europe. That attitude is simple and consists in our determination to leave to the European States those matters which are peculiarly their own concern. Most of the honourable delegates present will remember that on April 13th last, during the third session of the Preparatory Commission, when the question of the organisation and application of the projected convention came under discussion, my predecessor took occasion to state somewhat fully the views of my Government. It is not my purpose here to reiterate our position with respect to the general question of supervision, but I call attention to the fact that Mr. Gibson felt it necessary, in virtue of the non-membership of the United States in the League of Nations, to point out frankly my Government's inability to accept any such plan of control under that body as might well be acceptable to the other Governments represented on the Commission. (His statements in this regard will be found on pages 273 and 274 of the Minutes of the Third Session of the Commission, document C. 310. M. 109.)

The questions of arbitration and security as now envisaged in the proposed terms of reference to the Committee on Arbitration and Security would seem to raise the same considerations. You will recall that the Assembly, on September 26th, adopted Resolution V on the proposal of the Third Committee, which sums up the Assembly's opinion on the year's work in connection with disarmament. The third paragraph of this resolution states that the duty of the proposed Committee on Arbitration and Security would be to consider, on the lines indicated by the Preparatory Commission, the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement. The resolution continues as follows :

“ The Assembly considers that these measures should be sought :

“ In action by the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalising, and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security ;

“ In the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant ;

“ In agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States ;

“ And, further, in an invitation from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that, in a particular case, either all its forces, or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces, could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the Council's decisions or recommendations. ”

It is thus evident that the situation faced by Mr. Gibson and that which the present American delegation has to meet are very similar, and that the same difficulties are encountered. A further reading of the Minutes of the third session following Mr. Gibson's presentation of our point of view, notably the speeches of M. Paul-Boncour, Lord Cecil and M. de Brouckère, shows a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties confronting the United States. Furthermore, when the broader question of collective security pacts is raised, the geographical and constitutional situation of the United States makes its position still more special, a fact which I trust the present session of the Preparatory Commission will be no less ready to appreciate.

The interest taken by the Government of the United States in seeking a practical solution of the problem of international security has been evidenced in a striking manner. We are party to a pact having for its object the same purposes which will inspire the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. On December 13th, 1921, the Governments of Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States signed what is in effect a security agreement among themselves. It is one of the simplest of all treaties and provides that if a difficulty arises between any two of the four Powers which may not be settled by diplomatic means, the four Powers will meet to discuss it, and, further, that, should an outside Power threaten the rights of these Powers within the limits of this Treaty, the four Powers will similarly meet to decide what measures, separate or joint, might be adopted. The Government of the United States is convinced that, in respect to its interests and rights in the region of the Pacific Ocean, this Treaty is entirely adequate for security, and it cherishes the hope that the other signatories to this Treaty are of the same opinion. If I cite this example, it is not with a view to suggesting that the solution which we have found for our own difficulties should serve as an example to be followed by other States here represented. We are fully alive to the fact that every set of circumstances must bring its individual solution. If I do cite it, I say, it is merely to instance the sympathetic interest which the United States takes in the problem of security — an interest which naturally extends to every endeavour of the States of the world to realise for themselves a satisfactory condition of security.

It cannot, I think, be questioned that the Government of the United States has always championed the idea of international arbitration and conciliation, both in principle and in practice. We have in the past entered into many bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties with various nations of the world. The Government of the United States welcomes the extension of this practice and believes that, if such treaties are observed in good faith, the danger of aggressive war will be reduced to a minimum.

I have described some of the difficulties which confronted us in considering the invitation which was extended to us to participate in the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. While we have every appreciation of the courtesy and the friendliness which inspired this invitation, the American delegation must inform the Preparatory Commission that the Government of the United States cannot co-operate in the labours of this Committee.

In conclusion, however, I should like to emphasise the fact that my Government has every intention and desire of continuing to participate in the labours of the Preparatory Commission and that such time as the Committee on Arbitration and Security, working parallel to this Commission, may submit its recommendations to this body, my Government will be glad, in the light of its traditional historic policy, to take these recommendations into careful consideration. That these recommendations will be productive of fruitful results is, I assure you, our sincere hope.

The PRESIDENT. — I desire to thank the representative of the United States for the observations he has just made.

I now address the same question to the Soviet delegation. Does it desire to take part in the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security?

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — In the opinion of the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the creation of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, occupied with such complicated issues as arbitration, guarantee pacts, the Geneva Protocol, and the like, must inevitably divert attention from the fundamental question of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is convinced that immediate or gradual complete disarmament is the most enduring, real and universally acceptable guarantee of security. The Soviet delegation cannot make itself responsible for tactics which may lead to the breakdown or indefinite postponement of the question of disarmament, the more so as the Committee on Arbitration and Security will base its work upon the discussions and resolutions both of the League of Nations general meetings and the Council of the League, not participated in by the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and arising from a sequence of ideas not shared by the Soviet Government. This is why the Soviet delegation is unable to participate as a member of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

In view, however, of the interdependence which has been established, against the will of the Soviet delegation, between the Committee on Arbitration and Security and the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, the Soviet delegation is prepared to observe and follow with the closest attention the work of the Committee, within such limits and forms as may be permitted by the Preparatory Commission and satisfactory to ourselves.

The PRESIDENT. — I thank M. Litvinoff for his observations. The Commission has now to take a decision on the proposal of the first delegate of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that they send an observer to the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia). — I think that the Preparatory Commission can only be gratified by the presence of an observer of the Soviet delegation on the Committee on Arbitration and Security if, for reasons of principle, that delegation cannot take part in the work of the Committee as a member. It seems to me that, under the circumstances, the Commission can accept the proposal of M. Litvinoff.

The PRESIDENT. — I am personally entirely in agreement with M. Beneš, and I ask the Commission to take a decision in this matter. It seems that there is general agreement, and I therefore consider that the proposal is adopted.

*This proposal was adopted.*

The PRESIDENT. — I hope that the representative of the United States will inform his Government of the decision of the Commission as regards the representation of the Soviet delegation, and I hope that the United States Government will also send an observer to the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

Mr. Hugh WILSON (United States of America). — I will not fail to make this communication to my Government.

#### 8. Procedure and Programme of Work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

The PRESIDENT. — We have now constituted the Committee on Arbitration and Security. You will recall that in Resolution V the Commission is requested to appoint a committee which would be placed at the Commission's disposal and whose duty would be to consider, on the lines indicated by the Commission, the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement. We have therefore to furnish instructions to the new Committee.

We have to know whether the Commission desires to give very general instructions, in other words merely transmit the terms of the resolution, or whether it desires to go further and to give definite instructions to the Committee. We therefore have the choice between the two methods, and I should like the Commission to decide. If you consider it desirable to give more precise directions, you will receive this evening a list of points, prepared by the Bureau, which might provide a basis for the directions which might be given to the Committee.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — I support the President's second proposal.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I think that if we agree to consider the detailed proposals it does not mean that we decide to refer them without discussion to the Committee. We are in favour of a general discussion.

M. HENNINGS (Sweden). — I also desire to say that I am rather inclined to allow the Committee on Arbitration and Security to itself decide those points which it will examine more thoroughly. This does not mean that I am not ready to examine the programme prepared by the Secretariat if the other members of the Commission think it is desirable. But I personally think it would be advantageous to allow the Committee complete latitude in deciding the questions it should examine more thoroughly.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — I think that the Committee on Arbitration and Security should be left free to organise its work. I should like to correct in a very friendly way an interpretation made by M. Hennings. The programme cannot really be traced out by the Secretariat, as it already exists in a resolution of the Assembly, and we agree that the Committee on Arbitration and Security is bound by the terms of that resolution.

M. HENNINGS (Sweden). — It is quite clear that the programme which should be drawn up either in the Preparatory Commission or in the Committee on Arbitration and Security must rest within the terms of the resolution of the Assembly. I had, however, understood the President to speak of a programme drawn up by the Secretariat.

The PRESIDENT. — I referred to a list of points drawn up by the Bureau with a view to their insertion in the programme of the Committee. This list might constitute a basis for the Committee's discussions.

M. HENNINGS (Sweden). — I do not object to the discussion of this list, but I also agree with M. Paul-Boncour that we must leave the Committee the greatest latitude while remaining within the limits of the resolution of the Assembly.

M. SATO (Japan). — I also agree that we should allow the greatest latitude to the Committee. If we give it definite instructions, we shall run the risk of going outside the compass of the instructions which have already been given by the Assembly itself, and we should be wandering from the proper course of our work. I agree with M. Paul-Boncour that we must

transmit the resolution of the Assembly as it is to the Committee. The Preparatory Commission is, however, free to exchange its views on the question of security, and the Committee can take into consideration the discussion which will take place in this Commission which will render its task easier.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — I believe that my remarks have given rise to a controversy. I entirely agree in substance with M. Paul-Boncour that the Committee on Arbitration and Security should be left entirely free to deal with the problem of security. I do not desire to give it too limitative instructions, but I merely wished to point out that the resolution of the Assembly already contained definite indications on four points. However, we must leave the Committee full latitude, even outside these indications, to find suitable means for reaching practical and positive solutions. I therefore understand that the Committee should not limit itself to the points contained in the resolution of the Assembly. If the liberty allowed to the Committee is understood in this way, I agree. If not, I shall have to make reservations.

The PRESIDENT. — There is another course of procedure which we might adopt. The Committee might meet to-morrow and establish a programme of work which it could refer to the Preparatory Commission. We could then, so to speak, ratify it.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — It is not necessary for us to ratify this programme, as we are all agreed that full latitude should be left to the Committee.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — It seems to me that we are all agreed that the best thing to do is for the Committee to meet as early as possible and commence its labours.

I venture to make one reservation on the procedure suggested by the President which would compel the Committee to draw up its programme and submit it for our approval. This would be a great loss of time, particularly as the programme of the Committee does not interest us. Our real interest lies in the results which it obtains. In order to achieve results it will clearly have to determine its procedure and programme of work, but the principal point is that it should begin immediately, since we already have the resolution of the Assembly as a basis. You will recall the difficulties which we surmounted in agreeing to this resolution. I therefore think that the best thing we can do is to use it for the purposes of the work.

The PRESIDENT. — I submit the following proposal to the Commission :

“ The Commission, in accordance with the Council’s request, sets up a Committee consisting of the following :

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.....  
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“ The duty of this Committee is to consider the measures capable of giving to all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement.

“ This Commission transmits to the Committee for guidance in its work the Council’s decision concerning arbitration, security and disarmament dated September 27th and 28th, 1927, the report as approved on this occasion by the Council, and Resolutions IV and V, adopted by the Assembly on September 26th, 1927. ”

M. HENNINGS (Sweden). — I wonder whether it would not be advisable to add to the instructions of the Committee the report of the Third Committee of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — M. Henning’s proposal will be complied with.

The Committee might meet to-morrow at 10.30 a.m. and appoint its president and its vice-presidents.

It must be clearly understood that, as regards procedure, all the rights we possess as Preparatory Commission are also to be given to the Committee on Arbitration and Security. For example, it will be able to summon and hear any person whom it may desire.

The Preparatory Commission will hold its next meeting as soon as the Committee has completed its first session.

*The proposals of the President were adopted.*

*The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.*

### THIRD MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Saturday, December 3rd, 1927, at 11 a.m.*

*President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).*

#### 9. Statement by the President.

The PRESIDENT. — Since our last meeting you have no doubt taken note of the memorandum submitted by M. Litvinoff (Annex 1). Some of you have drawn my attention to the inexactitude of certain of the figures in that document, which, I understand, is not of an official character<sup>1</sup>. Others of my colleagues have pointed out that some of the terms used in the observations attached to it are not in accordance with our usual custom. I am sure that you will agree with me that it is not opportune to discuss this document now, particularly as M. Litvinoff himself has told us that it is not necessary for our discussions.

I therefore propose to pass to the agenda, which contains two points :

1. Communication of the Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security with reference to the work performed by it.

2. Fixing of the date of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission.

*The proposals of the President were adopted.*

#### 10. Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

M. BENEŠ (Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security). — I propose to be very brief, as I think my report is chiefly of a formal character, since almost all of the members of the Preparatory Commission are at the same time members of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and are therefore perfectly familiar with what has happened in the two meetings of that Committee. I will therefore limit myself to a few words on the substance of the discussions and the decisions we took.

As you will have seen, our discussions remained within the scope of the resolutions submitted to the Assembly by the Third Committee. We considered a certain number of these resolutions, and especially Resolution V, which defines the aim and object of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, as well as the questions which it has to study. The Bureau decided to classify these questions and submit a programme of work, which was fairly lengthily discussed at the Committee's last meeting.

During the discussions we touched upon a certain number of questions of substance. I should like to emphasise that one essential point was brought out in our discussion, that the work of the Committee must not consist in theoretical or scientific investigations of the questions of arbitration or of security pacts, nor was it to give rise to long discussions on the interpretation of the articles of the Covenant. Great importance was laid on the necessity of ensuring that the Committee should reach practical and concrete proposals to establish a new balance-sheet of security, which would lead to proportional disarmament.

As I have already said, the Bureau put before the members of the Committee a method of working which classified the questions into three main groups. The first of these deals with treaties of arbitration, the second with security agreements and the third with the examination of the various articles of the Covenant, so that we may see what practical measures we may take with a view to increasing security. The first two groups, though separated for purposes of work, are closely connected.

Three Rapporteurs were then appointed by the Committee, which decided that the work on the first two groups should be co-ordinated either by the Committee or by the collective work of the Rapporteurs, the Bureau and the Secretariat.

In conclusion, I should like to draw particular attention to the preparatory work which will be entrusted to the Secretariat. The Secretariat will first of all have to prepare the material necessary for the work of the Rapporteurs and the Committee, it being understood that this documentation will be neither unduly voluminous nor of too theoretical a nature. We have asked the Bureau and the Rapporteurs to make a choice out of the documentation submitted, in order that we may only have the most interesting documents before us in the plenary meeting.

I have asked the Bureau to distribute to my colleagues on the Preparatory Commission the documents containing the proposed method of work. This will not be laid down in any hard-and-fast manner, but will consist of indications to the Rapporteurs, to the Bureau and to the Secretariat. The Preparatory Commission clearly retains full liberty to add other questions to those mentioned in the proposals of the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to thank M. Beneš for the exposé which he has just made.

<sup>1</sup> See Annexes 2 and 3.

## 11. Fixing of the Date of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission.

The PRESIDENT. — As no one desires to speak we will now examine the question of the date of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission.

Before any suggestions are made, I would ask the Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security to state his views as regards the dates which might be fixed for the next session of this Committee. Such information would serve as a guide to our discussions in fixing the date for our own session.

M. BENEŠ (Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security). — As you are aware, we began yesterday in the Committee on Arbitration and Security to discuss the question of fixing dates. We were not able to reach any conclusion, because we realised that the date of the session of the Committee was, to some extent, bound up with that of the meeting of the Preparatory Commission.

I will therefore reply to the questions which the President has asked me by stating the programme which I had the honour to submit yesterday to the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

The Bureau of that Committee considered that December would be needed by the Secretariat for collecting the documents and beginning the preparatory work. The work of the Rapporteurs of the Bureau of the Committee would take approximately the whole of January. The delegations have expressed the desire to have these documents in their hands at least a fortnight before the meeting of the Committee. We therefore felt that the first half of the month of February would be needed for the distribution of these documents and their examination by the members.

I have accordingly drawn the conclusion that the earliest date on which the Committee could meet would be approximately February 20th, 1928. These are the proposals which I had the honour to submit yesterday to the Committee on Arbitration and Security. I have repeated them in order that they may serve to guide the discussion in the Preparatory Commission as regards fixing the dates for its own meeting.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I remember, Mr. President, that at the first sitting of the Preparatory Commission you expressed the view that the Preparatory Commission and the Committee on Arbitration and Security would run parallel, and that there would be no interdependence of their work. I notice, nevertheless, that in the speeches of many of my colleagues it has been stated on the contrary that the date of the next session of the Preparatory Commission should be made dependent upon the outcome of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, and that is exactly what M. Beneš, as far as I understood his remarks, has just said. In the declaration which I made here at the beginning of our work, I stated the Soviet delegation's attitude with regard to the Committee on Arbitration and Security. I will not repeat what I then said, but I think it is clear that we do not regard the work and the results of the Committee as indispensable for decisions on the questions which are before the Preparatory Commission.

I have listened with great interest to what has taken place in the Committee, and I must confess that the opinions which I expressed at the first sitting of the Preparatory Commission, far from being shaken, have been confirmed by what I have heard. Indeed, a considerable part of the programme drawn up by the Committee consists in the interpretation, enlargement and extension of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

You are aware that some States which are not Members of the League of Nations and are not parties to the Covenant participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission; therefore, by the nature of the very complex questions before the Committee and by the fact that the constitution of the two bodies is quite different, any interdependence between those bodies would make it very difficult to reach agreement. I think we must be clear on that point — to what extent, in taking part in the work of the Preparatory Commission, we have to subscribe also to the decisions which will be taken in the Committee on Arbitration and Security. I wish to give expression, in brief, to the opinion of the Soviet delegation on this point by moving the following resolution :

“ The Preparatory Commission, taking into consideration the complexity of the problems confronting the proposed Committee on Arbitration and Security and the slowness and protracted nature by which its work must inevitably be characterised, as well as the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament, in itself the most effective guarantee of security, by no means demands as its prerequisite the discussion or solution of the questions before the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

“ Resolves that the uninterrupted continuance of direct work on the question of disarmament and the date of calling the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference can by no means be made dependent upon the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security or its results. These dates should be precisely fixed during the present (fourth) session of the Preparatory Commission. ”

I should like to say that in our opinion a new fact should be taken into consideration in fixing the date of the next session; this new fact is the introduction by the Soviet delegation of a new programme of disarmament. While the Preparatory Commission had before it only one programme (the so-called Convention which has already passed its first reading),

it was necessary to await the results of the various negotiations between the Governments on the points which had aroused dissension in the Preparatory Commission, but now the Commission can meet at any date without waiting for the results of those negotiations. It can occupy itself with the new programme introduced by us, which will need extended discussion, and perhaps with the drawing up of a new convention. This situation allows us to fix a date much nearer than was originally envisaged, and we on our part would propose that the next session of the Preparatory Commission be fixed not later than one month hence, *i.e.*, about January 10th.

The PRESIDENT. — I note that M. Litvinoff proposes January 10th as a definite date.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I should like to apologise to my colleagues for not having distributed copies of this resolution previously. I was reluctant to introduce this resolution, and I did so only after the speeches made by M. Beneš.

The PRESIDENT. — The discussion is therefore upon a definite proposal.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I should like to say that there is a certain point in the resolution with which we cannot be in agreement. We accepted the resolution of the last Assembly, and I feel we should keep this resolution as a firm basis for our activities.

The date suggested — January 10th — seems to us rather too early, but otherwise we are more or less in agreement with M. Litvinoff. We should like to have sufficient time to put forward an amendment to this resolution.

M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia). — I should like to say a few words with regard to Count Bernstorff's remarks. We have before us a resolution and a proposal for a date. I should like to distinguish clearly at the outset between these two points, as Count Bernstorff has already done. The reasons given in the resolution are in complete contradiction with the resolution of the Assembly, which we have rightly taken as a basis for our work, as we are an organ of the League of Nations. I therefore feel that it would be very difficult for the Commission to accept a resolution which completely refutes the whole of the decisions on which its work has been based.

I regard the question of the date as an entirely separate matter from the reasons in the resolution. I do not consider that it constitutes a question of principle but that it is merely a matter of practical expediency, and it is from that point of view that I desire to examine it.

The PRESIDENT. — As Count Bernstorff has asked for time to prepare an amendment, the meeting will be adjourned for a quarter of an hour.

*The Commission adjourned from 12.5 to 12.20 p.m.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I shall be ready in a few moments to put before you the amendment proposed by my delegation. In the meantime I should like to explain the reasons which have led up to it, and I am particularly anxious to reply to the remarks of M. Beneš.

In my opinion the proposal before us is of great importance. I fully understand the desire which has been expressed that we must by means of the Committee on Arbitration and Security reach a point where it will be possible for all States, as recommended by Resolution V of the Assembly, to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figure in an international disarmament agreement.

That agreement, however, does not yet exist, and it will only come into existence when the Preparatory Commission has planned it out. However, the lowest possible figures cannot really be laid down until the scheme which will include them is ready. I very sincerely hope that at the appointed time M. Beneš will be able to submit results permitting the fixing of very low figures, but it is necessary to have beforehand a contract in which they may be included. It is for this reason that the Preparatory Commission and the Committee on Arbitration and Security have been kept quite separate, and I consider that the former can well get to work before the latter is able to submit results. These results will not really be needed save by the Conference itself. My colleagues will therefore agree that there will be at least six months between the end of the work of the Preparatory Commission and the first disarmament conference, for we shall have to forward the results of our work to very distant States and give them time to examine the documents in question. We therefore feel that the Preparatory Commission ought to meet as soon as possible. If it does not do so, we shall be running counter to the recommendation of the Assembly, which expressly states that the Assembly "accordingly requests the Council to urge the Preparatory Commission to hasten the completion of its technical work and to convene the Conference on the limitation and reduction of armaments immediately its work has been completed".

At the present moment I am not speaking from the point of view of my own country. I have often spoken of the debt contracted towards us as regards disarmament; it has been recognised time and again by many of our colleagues, who have termed it a moral and a legal obligation. At present I have only in mind the prestige of the League of Nations, which demands that we should do what the Assembly has recommended and nothing else. It is

accordingly essential that we should push with the utmost haste the work of the Preparatory Commission.

I know the objection which will be raised ; I shall be told that a failure of the Preparatory Commission would be still worse and would be nothing less than bankruptcy. But if we do not state that the Preparatory Commission must follow the Assembly's recommendation and get to work as soon as possible without concerning itself with the progress of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security which will permit the fixing of the lowest figures when, later, the Conference on Disarmament is convened, I can only state with regret that bankruptcy has already come. If we do not follow the directions of the Assembly we shall, if I may say so, shatter the prestige of the League of Nations throughout the world. The one question of particular interest to public opinion in the work of the League is that of disarmament, and if the League's reputation has already fallen, it is only because the question of disarmament has been dealt with so slowly.

I therefore propose the following resolution :

“ The Preparatory Commission :

“ Taking into account, firstly, the complex nature of the questions with which the newly formed Committee on Arbitration and Security has to deal, as well as the inevitable slowness of the work of that body, and considering further that the solution of the problem of disarmament in itself affords the most effective guarantee of security, and that the first step towards general disarmament does not therefore require as its premises either the discussion or the solution of the problems with which the Committee on Arbitration and Security has to deal ;

“ Taking into account Resolution V of the Assembly :

“ Decides that the immediate preparation of the scheme on questions of disarmament, based on the present conditions as regards security, as well as the date for the convening of the next session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, can in no sense be made to depend on the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and its results, and that the next session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament should be fixed at the earliest possible date by the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission. ”

M. HENNINGS (Sweden). — I should like to say a few words on the subject which is before the Commission. Previous declarations which have been made by the Swedish delegates at the last Assembly show that my Government feels it desirable that the Preparatory Commission should pursue its work as quickly as possible. My Government considers that questions of security are of the utmost importance, and that they should therefore be the object of very careful study. At the same time, however, such a study should not unduly delay the work of the Preparatory Commission.

Having thus reminded you of the opinion of my Government, I venture, however, to ask the Commission whether it really feels it desirable to discuss once again a question which was debated at length at the last Assembly, and whether we ought now to submit draft resolutions which are really nothing but mere formulæ.

In my own view, we should do better not to continue a discussion of principle, but we should get on to the purely practical field and restrict ourselves to fixing the date of the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

In this connection I wish to point out that I shall raise no opposition if certain delegates think it desirable or necessary for the work of the Commission to hold a session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security before our next session. It seems to me that this is purely a question of convenience, and that a delay of one or two months before the meeting of the Commission is of no great importance, provided that the work of the Commission, when taken up again, is brought to a successful conclusion.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — I think I agree with almost every word that has just been said by the last speaker, and suggest that we are in danger of being led into a discussion about a matter of no practical importance whatever. It is merely a question of logic. M. Litvinoff has proposed a resolution about which there may very legitimately be differences of opinion. He lays down the proposition that the Preparatory Commission and its work are not dependent on the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, and I understand Count Bernstorff takes the same view. I do not feel that we are called upon to express any opinion on that at all. It may or may not be thought that the one committee is dependent on the other. For the sake of argument, let us agree with M. Litvinoff that the Preparatory Commission and its work are not dependent upon the Committee on Arbitration and Security or upon any conclusions to which that Committee may come. The question we have to decide is merely a matter of convenience. I entirely agree with Count Bernstorff that our object is to get on as quickly as we can with the question of disarmament.

M. Beneš has detailed to us a very considerable amount of preparatory work, and, whether the Preparatory Commission is dependent or not on the Committee on Arbitration and Security, I think everyone will at least agree that it might assist the Preparatory Commission if it had before it the results of the investigations of the Committee as a matter of convenience.



That appears to me to be the only question we have now to decide. It has been suggested by M. Beneš, for reasons which he gave (very convincing reasons, I think), that it would be convenient if the Committee began its work on February 20th. I think that proposal, which probably satisfies the preoccupations of Count Bernstorff, will lead most rapidly to a solution of our problem. I do not believe we shall gain anything by accepting the proposal of M. Litvinoff to begin on January 10th. He did not give us any reasons for thinking there was any practical advantage in that, and the only reason for that proposal which I could extract from his speech was apparently that it would emphasise the fact that the one committee is not dependent on the other. But as a matter of convenience, and in order to get on with our work, it appears to me we should reject both the proposal of M. Litvinoff and the amendment proposed by Count Bernstorff, not on account of disagreement with any principle there stated but merely as a practical means of getting on with our work as quickly as possible.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — After the two speeches which we have just heard I should like once again to explain my position.

I should not have spoken had a proposal to which I must refer not been submitted, and were I not strictly bound by the instructions of my Government.

I do not wish in any way to discuss principles. Those are already laid down by Resolution V, and have been accepted. For me it is a practical question which arises, namely, shall we have the first Disarmament Conference in the year 1928 or not? If we begin the work of the Preparatory Commission late, we shall not be able to hold that first Disarmament Conference next year. In our opinion, however, that Conference should be held during 1928. The only reason for which I have spoken is that I feel that only if we begin our work very shortly will that Conference be possible in 1928.

I should like to know whether it is correct that there is some idea of fixing March 15th for the session of the Preparatory Commission. I have heard rumours to that effect. It may appear strange that we should hold a long discussion on this resolution, which turns round a difference of date of four weeks only. Nevertheless, if we examine the dates on the calendar we shall see that if we do not begin until after the Council's March session, the result of its work will only come before the Council's June session.

I therefore think that, if we are to hold our Conference in 1928, the only solution would be to convene a special meeting of the Council. I do not know whether there is any intention of doing that. It has been mentioned. May I say once more that the question is not in any way one of principle but purely of practical business? Shall we or shall we not hold the first Disarmament Conference in 1928? The German delegation feels that, unless the meeting of the Preparatory Commission is arranged at an early date, this first Disarmament Conference will not be held next year as it should.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — As M. Beneš has just stated, we are faced with two entirely different questions, and which are of entirely different importance to my mind.

The first question is that of the date of the next session, and here I have no opinion other than that of the Bureau. It is the Bureau which is in a position to know when the necessary preparatory work will be completed, and if it is to be completed a fortnight hence, let us have the meeting a fortnight hence. If, on the other hand, it is to be ready by February 20th, I should agree to that. It is after all the Bureau which must tell us what is the most convenient date, and I would accept whatever date the Bureau proposes.

Then we come to the other question, which is of far greater importance, and on this point I am in agreement with M. Hennings. It is not in the interests of our work that we should revive the discussions which have been, I may say, broached on previous occasions (I cannot, unfortunately, say that they have been completed, because they failed to bring us on to common ground) and which have only served to mark out the position of the various parties as clearly as can be done. This second question is that of the interdependence of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and that of the Preparatory Commission. The chief delegate of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics recently put forward the view that disarmament could be obtained by separate action, and would be in itself sufficient to ensure security.

May I say to my colleague that we have discussed these matters so often that we should feel a certain weariness in resuming them if it were not for the fact that we have in the Commission newcomers who may not be as convinced as we are of the soundness of the lines which we have been compelled to take.

We have before us the representatives of a country which, in matters of security, and particularly in matters of continental security, can more than any other country bring us the guarantees which are necessary for us to proceed properly with real disarmament. I remind you of the conditions under which we meet, under which the work of the Preparatory Commission has been carried out. I can assure my colleagues of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that I have put before them a correct outline of what has happened when, to our regret, they were not here.

The work of the Preparatory Commission was begun at the instance of the French delegation, and accepted by the other delegations in the Assembly of 1925. What was the situation at that time? What was the atmosphere? The position was that we were profoundly convinced that a covenant which, we admit, certainly afforded a greater

measure of security than that which existed prior to 1914 (and that was not saying much) was, nevertheless, quite insufficient, as M. Markovitch has said, to convince the nations that if they were the victims of unjust aggression they would find in international relations the security which they would have renounced as a nation by proceeding to disarmament. It proved impossible to apply the Protocol.

Nevertheless, a partial and regional application of the Protocol was in process of being discussed and about to succeed. This has been shown by the Locarno Agreements. On the initiative of the French delegation, and with the full agreement of the other delegations, we considered that this partial and regional application of the Protocol and the Agreements of Locarno then being prepared would at least provide, in a certain part of Europe, a sufficient measure of security to enable us to begin the preparatory work for disarmament.

We therefore started the work, and we drew up the questionnaire on which our work was based. I would remind my colleagues of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that in this questionnaire there was one express question without which I may say we should not have secured the attendance at the Preparatory Commission of a certain number of States, particularly small States. I refer to Question V, which is to the effect that the reduction of armaments is to be made proportional to the guarantees of security which are afforded in return. That link has been set up in the questionnaire, and we cannot break it now, as it is the very basis of and reason for our present meeting.

In the meantime the League of Nations remained somewhat inert and the diplomats took to their old habits. No progress has been made since Locarno, although there are plenty of other points of friction in Europe, and for the removal of this friction we have not dared to use the machinery of security which was set up under the Locarno Treaties and in agreement with the principles of the Protocol.

When we met last March and April — and none of us will forget that meeting — the least I can say is that we had no confidence. There was a lack of that atmosphere which is necessary for the success of disarmament work. It is not true to say that we gave up on account of technical difficulties. That was only the excuse. The technical difficulties were more or less solved in the long work of the technical committees which have now finished their labours. It is now our duty as politicians to do our part and accept our responsibilities.

In March and April it became perfectly clear that, apart from the technical difficulties, it was a very real fact that certain nations did not feel sufficiently secure. May I say here that I am not referring to my own country? It is true that we are here to look at questions from the international point of view and not from that of particular countries. We do look after the interests of our own countries in order to see that their rights are respected, but we really approach the question on international lines in order to lead to the successful conclusion of our work in security and disarmament. Regional agreements had been concluded in a certain region of the world. I will not say special agreements, because it is not the same thing. Bilateral agreements cannot replace agreements entered into by several States. Without such agreements, the nations to which I referred did not feel really secure. We continued our work, and as a result of it we were enabled to establish a preliminary draft Convention which, though it contains many blanks, has much which is already filled in in black and white, and which contains concrete matter which might be included in an extremely interesting first Convention on the limitation of armaments.

What happened at the last Assembly? Certain nations which had traditionally accepted the ideas of the League on the necessary connection between disarmament and security only accepted them in a spirit of conciliation due to the international Assembly which they were attending. They were not as deeply convinced of that interdependence as ourselves, and here I refer in particular to the Netherlands nation. These nations asserted that it was necessary to return to the principles of disarmament and security based upon arbitration — in other words, the Protocol, which I have to mention.

The Third Committee met and took up its work. Without going back to what cannot be resurrected at the present time, but without yielding to the diplomatic tendency to have recourse to solutions not exactly in line with the policy of the League as exemplified by the Locarno Treaties, the Third Committee decided to create a Committee on Arbitration and Security working directly under the Preparatory Commission. That Committee would endeavour to find the mean between the Protocol, which was for the moment rejected, and the partial agreements which are not sufficient, in order to enable the League of Nations to provide what was expected of it, namely, to create conditions of security and the disarmament which would be their consequence.

Practical solutions have now been envisaged and Rapporteurs appointed. The services which they have already rendered and their personal traditions are a proof that they will quickly do something which will take us out of the rut into which we fell last September. I therefore implore my colleagues not to compromise the useful work which we are about to do on a question of dates, which oddly vary from January 10th to March 10th. I would urge them to recognise that they have come, I feel sure, with a sincere determination to work with us, and I feel sure that they will go through all the stages that we have gone through. However, they will go through them much more rapidly, as they have shown us that in certain matters their country does not need to progress step by step.

I realise that there may be some who feel that this machinery for security may serve to screen a desire that this work should not be a success. I feel confident that this idea is not

in the mind of any of us, and I assure my colleagues that, were I convinced of such an idea, I should not stay any longer. I am sincerely convinced that it is not out of mere caprice but because they have taken account of the true psychology of Europe and of the world that the two terms have been linked together.

We do not wish in any way to delay the solution. I entirely agree with Count Bernstorff that we must do our best in order not that the Preparatory Commission but the first Disarmament Conference may be convened before the end of next year in order to establish a first Convention for general reduction of armaments. I do not for a moment believe that it is materially impossible, but I am sure that it would be quite impossible if our next meeting of the Preparatory Commission were a failure. It is because I am so anxious that we should succeed and because the Commission and my own country are so anxious that this work should be carried through successfully that I am prepared to agree in advance to any date which the Bureau may propose.

The PRESIDENT. — I think that there is no need to prolong the discussion ; we now know the views of the different delegations. Before calling on the three remaining speakers I would like to remind you that we have only one point on the agenda, namely, the fixing of the dates of the next session. In the first place, we have to take into account the amendment proposed by Count Bernstorff modifying the draft resolution submitted by M. Litvinoff. May I suggest that we divide this amendment into two parts ? It seems to me unnecessary to continue to discuss the principle contained in the first four paragraphs of that resolution, as it is a question of the principles which have already been debated at length in the Preparatory Commission. Should we not rather confine ourselves to the last paragraph, which deals with the fixing of the date ?

As no one has raised any objections to this proposal, I conclude that we are all agreed to confine ourselves to the question of fixing a date. I think, moreover, that we also agree as regards the last paragraph of the amendment, which reads as follows :

“ The date of the next session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament should be fixed at the earliest possible date by the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission. ”

*This text was adopted.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I should like to ask one question in order that we may be quite sure as to the point before the Commission. Is there any definite proposal by the Bureau ?

The PRESIDENT. — It is understood that the Commission has agreed to the last paragraph of the proposal of Count Bernstorff, which replaces the resolution of the Soviet delegation.

Under the circumstances I have put a definite proposal before you and suggest that the Preparatory Commission should hold its next session on March 15th next.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I would like to ask a question on one point. I was extremely glad to hear M. Paul-Boncour say that he is also of the opinion that we must have the first Disarmament Conference during 1928. Our delegation feels that that is absolutely necessary. I should also like to ask the President and the Bureau whether they think it is technically possible to call the Conference for 1928 if all goes well if we convoke the Preparatory Commission only for March 15th.

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to say in reply to Count Bernstorff that the Bureau feels that if all goes well, as the German delegate put it, the Disarmament Conference can undoubtedly be held before the end of 1928.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — The debate is closed on the question of principle, so I shall not indulge in any further comments in that connection. We are not here to argue but to get down to some practical work, and as the question of disarmament is a big one we want to see if we cannot, by starting from different angles, try to come to some arrangement which is worth trying. We introduced our resolution because the question of principle was raised by other members of the Commission. We accepted the invitation of the Disarmament Commission, and our Government said that, since we had not taken part in previous sessions of the Commission, through no fault of our own, we should not be bound by the decisions taken in our absence.

After the eloquent speech of M. Paul-Boncour, I think there will be no doubt left in the minds of the Commission as to who wishes to enlarge upon the discussion of principles. We have only one view in mind, namely, to try to come as soon as possible to practical results on the question of disarmament. We know that the Preparatory Commission will have its own difficulties, and as we do not want to add to them the difficulties of other bodies, we proposed January 10th next in preference to another date. So far as we are concerned, we could continue to work now, but we must take into consideration the convenience of other members. We know that in a few days the Council of the League of Nations will be sitting here ; then there will be the holidays. That is why I proposed the earliest date after the holidays. Now that the President has proposed March 15th, I shall permit myself to ask why that date has been chosen in preference to an earlier date. The sooner the Commission proceeds with their work, the sooner will disarmament become a fact, if it ever becomes a fact.

I cannot agree with the remote date proposed by the President, and I see no reason for postponing our work. I do not insist on January 10th; I have no objection to January 12th or 13th, but the delay between January and March is too great, and therefore I must object to the postponement.

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to reply to M. Litvinoff that the Bureau has carefully thought the matter over before making its proposal. It is a matter of judgment. We took account of the various objections which had been made, certain questions of personal convenience and the fact that the several delegations would have to consult their Governments. The Bureau therefore feels that the date of March 15th is the most suitable.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany).— It is extremely difficult for me in view of my instructions to accept the date of March 15th, but after what M. Paul-Boncour has said and after the President's assurance that it would be materially possible for the Conference to be held in 1928, I am prepared to accept the proposed date.

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to thank the German delegate for his remarks, which I have noted. It is therefore understood that the Preparatory Commission will meet on March 15th.

*The next session of the Preparatory Commission was then fixed for March 15th, 1928.*

## 12. Close of the Session.

The PRESIDENT. — We have now come to the end of the session. The fourth session of the Preparatory Commission has been a brief one, but it has been none the less important. We have appointed the Committee on Arbitration and Security, and we have accomplished an essential duty in setting that Committee to work. We have also fixed the date of our next session. We have decided to continue the work of the Preparatory Commission according to the methods hitherto followed, which we believe to be sound. In order to reach results, we recognise, I think, or at any rate the majority of us recognise, that we must not allow ourselves to build on dreams but on reality, in spite of the obstacles which lie in our path. Some of us have at any rate ideas as to the method which should be followed. But I said the other day, and I think I may repeat it in closing the session, that the method which we follow is a thing of secondary importance. The essential thing is that we should be unanimous in striving towards the same object, namely, the cause of disarmament.

It is extremely gratifying to be able to realise from the speeches made during the debates that all of us without exception are agreed that we ought to give our fullest assistance to the cause of peace and disarmament and to support to the limit of our power the measures which really have that aim in view. It is with this satisfying declaration that I declare our discussions closed, and I only have to thank you and congratulate you on our most recent efforts.

## 13. Date of the Convocation of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

M. BENEŠ (Chairman of Committee on Arbitration and Security). — After listening to the discussion which has taken place in the Commission I think I may confirm the proposal which I made yesterday and state that the Committee on Arbitration and Security will meet about February 20th, 1928.

*The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m., and the session was closed.*

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## ANNEXES.

### ANNEX I.

#### MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS.

As an addition to the declaration made at the first meeting of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission, and with the object of stating clearly its general view of the present international situation in relation to possibilities of war, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics desires to bring the following facts and ideas to the notice of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

It is needless to go into the question of the responsibility of any particular Government which was concerned in the imperialist war of 1914. Discussions, all more or less barren, are still proceeding on this subject.

To the Soviet Government, which is estranged from the ex-belligerents in that war, the general reasons that led to the cataclysm from which mankind has still by no means recovered are perfectly clear.

The world war was the utterly inevitable outcome of competition among the great capitalist States, driven as they were to extend their colonial possessions and the markets for their greatly increased output; but the capitalist State endeavours to find as a cause for the war not the real origins from which it arose but some mere pretext.

Under pressure of public opinion, which is for the most part horrified by war and the ruin it entails, imperialists — among whom Governments may be included — are seldom willing to admit frankly the true aims of war. Those aims are concerned with economic competition; and therefore economic competition is the true cause of war.

Governments refrain from presenting the question in all its naked brutality because they fear to shock the public, and because they wish to foment that frenzied nationalism which is indispensable if all the citizens of the belligerent country are to take part "wholeheartedly" in the war.

If we consider pacifism during the war, we may fairly say that it played the most lamentable part, and the most disastrous to mankind. Liberal pacifism allowed itself to be carried away by the most superficial and declamatory theory, which masked the true aspect of the war.

Liberal pacifism conscientiously said over and over the fatal words: "This is the last war; this is the war to end war. It will end in the extermination of the war-makers. It will lead to the abolition of armaments. It will establish international peace."

The enthusiasm with which pacifists diffused these catchwords helped to numb hundreds of thousands of consciences.

Was this just the most incredible credulity, or was it tacit consent? Or was it even a quite voluntary co-operation with the true authors and devisers of that monstrous destructive cataclysm of war which was let loose upon mankind?

However we may judge the war-makers, there are two things we must all recognise — facts and figures. Facts we must recognise, fatal as they were to the masses; figures we must recognise, making as they do a total of blood and tears. These facts and these figures are beyond all circumvention.

The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics thinks that this may be a good opportunity to cite figures impartially compiled to illustrate the ruin and disaster caused by the late imperialist war. These figures should be constantly before the eyes of our generation. Here they are:

#### CASUALTIES.

Country	Population (in millions)	Killed	Wounded	Prisoners (in thousands)
Germany . . . . .	65	1,887	4,248	778
Austria-Hungary. . . . .	51	1,200	3,200	448
Turkey. . . . .	23	437	408	104
Bulgaria . . . . .	5	101	1,159	11
France . . . . .	40	1,359	4,200	454
French Colonies. . . . .	55	67	—	—
Great Britain . . . . .	45	744	1,693	—
British Dominions and Colonies . . . . .	376	202	420	65
Italy. . . . .	36	507	950	1,359
Belgium . . . . .	7.5	267	140	10
Roumania. . . . .	7.2	339	—	116
Serbia . . . . .	3	707	350	100
Greece . . . . .	4.6	15	40	48
United States of America . . . . .	91	107	246	5
Russia . . . . .	166	2,753	4,950	2,500

In France the total number of men at least 10 per cent disabled is 1,900,000.

When we consider that a million and a-half men are left disabled for life, we shall see that, out of 2,636,000 men between the ages of 20 and 40, French agriculture has lost 710,000 by disablement; industry has lost 387,000 out of 2,226,000; trade and transport have lost 200,000 out of 1,220,000.

In addition to direct war casualties, we have also to consider losses through the fall in the birth rate and the rise in the death rate among the civil population.

Here are the essential figures for the chief towns :

Towns	1913		1918	
	Birth rate	Death rate	Birth rate	Death rate
London . . . . .	24.6	14.3	16.0	19.2
Paris . . . . .	17.2	15.7	10.5	17.3
Berlin . . . . .	19.4	13.5	9.3	20.7
Moscow . . . . .	33.2	23.1	14.8	24.3

The loss of man-power due to the fall in the birth rate is 500,000 for Great Britain; 833,000 for France; 2,600,000 for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The following table shows the material losses :

Country	National wealth in milliards of dollars	National income in millions of dollars	Cost of the War
United States . . . . .	200	33	23,159
Great Britain . . . . .	70.5	11	33,481
France . . . . .	58.5	6	31,324
Russia . . . . .	60	6.5	25,522
Italy . . . . .	22.8	4.5	15,636
Belgium . . . . .	15	1.3	1,387
Japan . . . . .	11.7	1.7	40,000
Germany . . . . .	80.5	10.5	46,323
Austria-Hungary . . . . .	40	3.6	24,858
Turkey . . . . .	4	0.5	1,802
Bulgaria . . . . .	4	0.5	732
British Dominions . . . . .	—	—	4,198

In addition to this direct war expenditure we must count indirect material damage.

Losses to private owners in Europe, 29,960 million dollars. Losses of tonnage, 15,398,000 tons, or one-third of the pre-war tonnage, representing a money value of 6,800,000,000 dollars.

The losses due to diminished output amount to 45,000,000 dollars, and the expenditure on relief and subsidies to 1,000,000,000.

The economic loss to neutral Powers is 1,750 million dollars, to which must be added the consequences of the destruction of an enormous working power, amounting to 67 milliard dollars, which represents future losses to production.

The total debts of European countries rose from 191,835 million gold marks in 1914 to 1,078,800 million gold marks in 1919.

Is it possible at this stage for anybody still to say : " Notwithstanding the immense burden of the losses caused by the war, we can at least console ourselves with the certainty that there is no further danger of future war, that the imperialist war was the last in the history of mankind, and that we have now entered upon an era of peace " ?

There is no need to point out that the present situation as expounded by certain far-seeing sociologists, economists and publicists gives the lie direct to this assertion; nor need we refer to the disturbed state of the Press and the public. One single fact is enough — the frenzied piling-up of armaments.

When we look at this fact, which proves at the very least the extreme apprehension felt by every Government for the future of its country (even if it is not the intention of some of them to take active steps to bring about a war in order to share out the earth again in a manner that suits them better), we are strongly reminded, by the method which the League of Nations has so far followed in the matter of disarmament, of war-time pacifism, with its efforts to divert the public conscience from the terrible and inexorable reality by empty promises and chimerical hopes.

We may here give a few illustrations of the contemporary growth of armaments.

In 1913, at the zenith of pre-war militarism, the great Powers had 5,759,000 men under arms. In 1925, 5,232,000 men were under arms, exclusive of the armies of new States such as Iraq, Syria, Arabia proper, Northern Morocco, etc., and exclusive of 1,000,000 soldiers under arms under the orders of the Tsuchuns of various Chinese provinces, who did not recognise the Peking Government.

If we remember that the figure of 5,759,000 men included 1,129,000 soldiers belonging to the countries which were defeated in the imperialist war (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria) — countries which have now 198,000 men under arms or 931,000 fewer than before the war — and if we also remember that, instead of the 1,350,000 soldiers of the old Tsarist Russia we have now 562,000 men of the Soviet Union, then we shall see that the

victorious and neutral countries, having crushed German imperialism, have been induced by the pressure of fresh and constantly growing competition to increase their armies by 1,183,000 men.

A comparison of the military budgets of the principal countries for the same period reveals the same state of affairs.

In 1912, the military budgets of the principal countries, including Russia, amounted to 4,744 million roubles. The expenditure of these same States in 1924-25 totals 5,300 million roubles — that is to say, an increase of 536 millions.

Taking into consideration the decrease in the military budgets of Germany and the Soviet Union, it will be seen that the expenditure of other countries has increased by 1,442 millions. These two facts suffice to prove the utter inconsistency of every speech made by bourgeois pacifists concerning the decrease of military expenditure in bourgeois countries after the defeat of Germany.

Let us consider naval expenditure alone. In 1913, the naval budget of the five principal maritime Powers was £100,500,000. In 1925 it amounted to £230,600,000. The difference is striking. Meanwhile the naval budget of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has decreased from the £26,000,000 budget of Tsarist Russia in 1913 to £3,400,000.

The naval construction programmes of the principal bourgeois countries are quite in keeping with these figures. In spite of the 1922 Washington Convention for the limitation of naval armaments, we see the same, if not a greater, frenzy of construction, the only difference being that, instead of the forbidden capital ships, there is a feverish construction of smaller craft (cruisers, torpedo-boats, submarines, etc., and seaplane flotillas).

The following information throws some light on the magnitude of armaments: this year, the five most important naval Powers (Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan and Italy) are constructing 87 vessels; they have also decided to construct 181 others, that is to say 268 vessels in all.

As for us, we have not up to the present constructed, nor are we engaged in constructing, any new war vessel; we have merely repaired existing vessels.

Air fleet figures tell the same tale. At the present time the following are the figures for the military air forces in the leading countries; France, 6,114 aeroplanes; Great Britain, 3,460; Italy, 1,700; United States, 3,800; Poland, 498; Roumania, 257.

It is not superfluous to add a few details regarding the qualitative improvement of the means now being devised by the military Powers for a new massacre of humanity, which bids fair to eclipse completely the horrors of the last war. Let us quote a few very characteristic figures:

In France the number of machine-guns to one division of infantry in war-time was 24 at the beginning of the war. At present it is 483. In the United States at the beginning of the war the number was 24; at present it is 947. The artillery of the United States — like that of France — has increased in the same proportions simultaneously with an increased length of range.

It will be sufficient to quote the case of the American 8-inch gun, the range of which has increased from 11.5 km. to 17 km.; or — an even more striking example — the successes of the French artillery, whose 240 mm. gun had before the war a range of 16.5 km., whereas it now has a range of 53 km. Or again, the 340 mm. gun, which before the war had a range of 22 km., now 150 km.

The definite antipathy shown — clearly and forcibly shown — by public opinion towards the various forms of chemical and bacteriological warfare is compelling certain Governments to say that these forms of warfare must be renounced or limited. As a matter of fact, unceasing labour in the chemical laboratories on which the principal Powers are spending enormous sums of money has undoubtedly since the war produced "positive results".

As an example, we may quote General Frey's statement that "an aero-chemical bomb weighing 450 kilos and charged with luisite can render ten districts of New York uninhabitable; 100 tons of luisite launched from fifty aeroplanes could render the whole of New York uninhabitable for at least a week".

Scorning the hypocrisy of European militarists, the Americans quite frankly defend the use of chemical weapons in the next war. In March 1927, for instance, an American writer expressed the following views: "The Senate has wisely reserved our right to use poisons in warfare. I hope that the Senate will maintain this policy and give its support to every new method of warfare. I also hope that the Senate will reserve its right to utilise infectious bacteria in warfare. 'A la guerre comme à la guerre', for war is not a tiresome game played according to rules . . ."

The American *Infantry Journal* writes:

"There is no doubt that chemical methods of warfare will be much more frequently employed in the next war than in the last. The advantages of this weapon are so great, so enormous, that any leader who does not utilise them in future battles will have to bear the consequences . . ."

“ On every side offensive and defensive chemical warfare is being feverishly prepared and perfected. To refuse to employ gases in warfare would cause appreciable prejudice to our (i.e. the American) combative power and would therefore be an act of incredible folly. ”

“ Chemical warfare makes it possible for highly developed peoples to employ an excellent arm, makes it possible for them to become a dominating world power. ” (*Le Gaulois*, April 1927.)

We could give numerous examples of the increasing power of engines of destruction in air and naval warfare. We will, however, refrain from quoting any further instances, because no one can dare to deny the increase of armaments, both in quality and quantity.

We repeat that the enormous increase in armaments should in itself suffice to prove that the world is in imminent danger of becoming once again the victim of imperialist warfare.

Let us now consider the sensitive points of international politics which may lead to armed conflict. Let us merely consider Europe. The points are innumerable. Each is acutely sensitive and the cause of nearly all of them lies in the extremely irrational bases of the Treaty of Versailles.

Even the least important questions are dominated by a mistrust between the victors and the vanquished in the last imperialist war.

On the admission of such a statesman as Lord Cecil, the results of the last Disarmament Conference between the great naval Powers are fraught with danger.

This proves that the various countries either cannot or will not solve these most serious problems by negotiation; it also proves that negotiations of this kind often result in strained relations between the participating countries. Under such circumstances, the fear that a gigantic war may break out is amply justified. There is no doubt that the next war will be the cause of far, far greater disasters than any which suffering humanity has ever known.

The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is expressed in the declaration which the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics submitted for discussion to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

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#### ANNEX 2.

#### LETTER FROM THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION REGARDING THE MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS (See Annex 1 above).

With reference to the remarks made by the President of the Preparatory Commission at the meeting of December 3rd, 1927, regarding the first table which appears in the Memorandum of the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Annex 1), I would point out that the figures given in that document for Italy's losses in the war differ very considerably from my Government's official figures.

The latter are identical with those given on page 252 of the *World Almanac* 1926, which were compiled by the War Department of the United States of America.

These figures are as follows :

Killed and died . . . . .	650,000
Wounded . . . . .	947,000
Prisoners and missing . . . . .	600,000
Total losses . . . . .	<u>2,197,000</u>

(Signed) A. DE MARINIS.

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#### ANNEX 3.

#### NOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS REGARDING ITS MEMORANDUM AND THE LETTER RELATING THERETO SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY (See Annexes 1 and 2 above).

The Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics desires to state that the memorandum which it presented on the effects of the war of 1914 (Annex 1) was designed to afford a general impression of the destructive effects which the war had upon the world.



It is, of course, impossible to obtain detailed and absolutely accurate figures in this connection; the figures are bound to vary according to the sources from which they are derived. For that reason the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics does not feel that it need insist upon the details given in its memorandum, particularly as these were taken from foreign sources. The delegation admits that it is possible to produce different figures according to the statistics from which they are taken and the method of calculation employed. Such figures may to a certain extent differ from those given in the Soviet memorandum.

The Italian delegation now produces figures for Italy based on the statistics of the United States War Department (1924).

They are as follows :

Total number of men mobilised. . . . .	5,615,000
Killed and died. . . . .	650,000
Wounded. . . . .	947,000
Prisoners and missing . . . . .	600,000

While offering no opinion upon these figures, which in any case do not in the least affect the argument of the Soviet memorandum regarding the enormous losses caused by the war, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics desires that the above figures given by the Italian delegation should also be published as additional to its memorandum.

(Signed) B. STEIN,  
Secretary-General of the Delegation.

II.

**MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON  
ARBITRATION AND SECURITY**

*Held at Geneva on December 1st and 2nd, 1927.*

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LIST OF MEMBERS.

*Chairman* : His Excellency Dr. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia).

<i>Argentine</i> :	His Excellency M. José Maria CANTILO.
<i>Belgium</i> :	His Excellency Baron MONCHEUR.
<i>Brazil</i> :	—
<i>British Empire</i> :	The Right Honourable Lord CUSHENDUN.
<i>Bulgaria</i> :	His Excellency M. MIKOFF
<i>Canada</i> :	Dr. W. A. RIDDELL.
<i>Chile</i> :	His Excellency M. J. VALDES-MENDEVILLE.
<i>China</i> :	His Excellency M. TCHENG-LOH.
<i>Colombia</i> :	His Excellency Dr. F. J. URRUTIA.
<i>Cuba</i> :	His Excellency M. A. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT.
<i>Czechoslovakia</i> :	His Excellency Dr. BENEŠ.
<i>Finland</i> :	His Excellency M. R. HOLSTI.
<i>France</i> :	His Excellency M. PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Germany</i> :	Count BERNSTORFF.
<i>Greece</i> :	His Excellency M. Nicolas POLITIS.
<i>Italy</i> :	H.E. General A. DE MARINIS STENDARDO DI RICIGLIANO
<i>Japan</i> :	His Excellency M. N. SATO.
<i>Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes</i> :	His Excellency M. Lazar MARKOVITCH.
<i>Netherlands</i> :	Dr. V. H. RUTGERS.
<i>Poland</i> :	His Excellency M. François SOKAL.
<i>Roumania</i> :	His Excellency M. N. P. CÔMNÈNE.
<i>Spain</i> :	—
<i>Sweden</i> :	His Excellency M. Einar HENNINGS.
<i>Uruguay</i> :	—
<i>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</i> :	M. Maxime LITVINOFF (Observer).

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FIRST MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Thursday, December 1st, 1927, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia).

1. Election of Chairman.

M. LOUDON (President of Preparation Commission for the Disarmament Conference). — The Committee on Arbitration and Security was set up yesterday and has now met in view of the decision taken by the Preparatory Commission from which this new Committee has emanated. As President of the Preparatory Commission, I ask you to proceed immediately to the election of a Chairman.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — I have great pleasure in proposing that M. Beneš be requested to accept the position of Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I should like warmly to support Lord Cushendun's proposal. All those who, like myself, took part in the work of the Third Committee under the Chairmanship of M. Beneš, realise that his chairmanship over this Committee will be of great value and will greatly facilitate its work.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — I should like to say that even before Lord Cushendun had made his proposal it was such an obvious one that I had understood it and given it my support.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — Although it is quite superfluous to do so at the present time, I should like to support the proposal as a tribute of friendship towards M. Beneš. I am sure that no one could preside over the Committee on Arbitration and Security in a more authoritative manner than M. Beneš.

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — I warmly support the proposal of Lord Cushendun. The well-known ability of M. Beneš as Rapporteur to the Council on all questions affecting disarmament, and as Chairman of the Third Committee of the Assembly, shows that he is particularly qualified to preside over our work.

M. URRUTIA (Colombia). — I should be extremely glad to see M. Beneš appointed Chairman of this Committee, as he has rendered such eminent service to the cause of disarmament and peace, both in the Assembly and in the Council.

M. RUTGERS (Netherlands). — I heartily support the proposal made by Lord Cushendun. The services which M. Beneš has rendered to the cause of disarmament are, as you know, appreciated in my country and in all others which are Members of the League of Nations.

M. SATO (Japan). — As a representative of one of the eastern countries, I should like to express my warm satisfaction in seeing M. Beneš appointed Chairman. I am extremely glad to note that this appointment is an immediate assurance of the success of the work of this Committee.

M. SOKAL (Poland). — It is my pleasant duty to associate myself with the expressions of praise and congratulation which have been addressed to M. Beneš, and I heartily support the proposal of Lord Cushendun.

M. LOUDON (President of the Preparatory Commission). — M. Comnène has also asked to speak, but it is obvious that the Committee is unanimous in electing M. Beneš as Chairman.

M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia). — I am quite overwhelmed by this display of friendship and confidence in myself. As you know, the task of this Committee is highly responsible, for we may consider this work as that which will enable us to reach the goal towards which we are striving.

I should like to thank you very heartily for the confidence you have shown in me. It is unnecessary for me to tell you that I shall do everything in my power to satisfy you and to ensure that the problem before us will be solved. You have done a great honour to my country and to myself in calling upon me to be your Chairman. I venture to ask you to be indulgent to your Chairman and to give him every assistance in the accomplishment of the very important task which has fallen to him.

2. Election of Vice-Chairmen.

The CHAIRMAN. — We will now proceed at once to the nomination of the Vice-Chairmen.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — I have the honour to propose as Vice-Chairmen, firstly, M. Urrutia, who has given such striking proof of his devotion to the League of Nations, and, secondly, M. Undén, the representative of Sweden, who is not here at present but who, in historical circumstances, gave undeniable proof of his devotion to the League of Nations and to the high ideals which it has before it.

The CHAIRMAN. — Gentlemen, you have heard the proposal made by M. Politis, in which he has set forth the merits of the two candidates. I feel sure that all our colleagues would like to support this proposal.

M. URRUTIA (*Colombia*) and M. UNDEN (*Sweden*) were unanimously elected Vice-Chairmen.

M. URRUTIA (*Colombia*). — I should like to thank M. Politis for his proposal, the Chairman for his kind words and the Committee for accepting the proposal.

I am profoundly touched by the honour which has been done to me. It is useless for me to assure you that I shall give my devoted co-operation to this work of peace to which I have already devoted several years of my life since the foundation of the League of Nations.

M. HENNINGS (*Sweden*). — In the absence of M. Undén, who is the representative of Sweden on this Committee, I should like to express my profound and respectful thanks to the Committee and to M. Politis for the proof of friendship and confidence which they have shown towards my country by appointing M. Undén as one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

### 3. Programme and Method of Work of the Committee: General Discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. — The task which we have before us at this session is in the first place to decide on the programme of our work, the order of the various items and the method to be applied in dealing with them.

Without wishing to prejudice the decisions of the Committee or the opinions of my colleagues, I propose to indicate why this Committee has been appointed and what its task is. In this way we shall see better how to direct our work, the objects of which have been clearly laid down by the resolution passed by the Third Committee and by the Assembly.

In 1921 we began the study of the problem of disarmament in the Third Committee of the Assembly. In 1922 we examined for the first time the problem of security in relation to that of disarmament. We then noted the close connection existing between the idea of disarmament and that of security. At that time we drew up the famous Resolution XIV as an expression, firstly, of the need for disarmament, and, secondly, of the close connection between disarmament and security. On the basis of Resolution XIV we were able in 1923 to draw up the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. We all know what was the effect of those proposals.

In 1924, the scope of the discussion was enlarged and a third problem was joined to those of disarmament and security in the shape of arbitration. This was done in order to join security with arbitration and security and arbitration together with disarmament. You know the reasons why the proposal voted in 1924 proved impossible of realisation. The study of the problem of security has been continued. It was thought that, though it might not be possible to provide security for all by means of a single scheme, we might nevertheless provide security progressively and locally in different parts of Europe.

After 1924 we see the number of treaties of arbitration in Europe and in other continents greatly increased. At the same time an attempt was made to provide at least a system of partial security. I refer to the Locarno Agreements, which have, to a certain extent, increased the security of different parts of Europe.

In 1925, the Assembly of the League of Nations waited for the realisation of these arbitration and regional security agreements.

In 1926 the discussions in the Third Committee of the Assembly placed on record the results achieved.

In 1927, as Count Bernstorff has told us, we studied the resolution asking the Preparatory Commission to appoint this Committee and to give it instructions for the work which it has to accomplish.

This is the history of the constitution of the Committee. I think it will have to follow the path which has been traced out for it. The lines of our work and its objects will be better understood if we take into account what has been done hitherto and if we remember the manner in which our programme has been drawn up. I now come to the resolution of the Assembly of 1927, which comprises the broad lines of our plan of work. You will note the text of this resolution. The last four paragraphs define the task of the Committee. They indicate the various questions that they will have to study, as well as the measures to be taken to increase the present state of security.

As I have already said, I do not wish to anticipate the results of the decision which you will take as regards the method of work of the Committee, or the definite lines along which we shall have to proceed; nor do I desire to indicate how the task is to be shared out among the various Rapporteurs. However, in order to facilitate an exchange of views between the members of the Committee, I take the liberty of suggesting in an entirely general way a method of work which we might follow.

In the four final paragraphs of resolution No. V we find the problems with which we have to deal. We may, first of all, classify them and note that in reading these paragraphs the whole problem is a very vast one. In the first place, we have the questions referring to special arbitration and security agreements. Then come the different treaties of security already concluded, and then the problems affecting the different articles of the Covenant.

A thorough and very practical examination has been made as to how Article 11 of the Covenant could be applied, to allow the Council to carry out its duties most rapidly, thus giving the greatest guarantee of security possible. We have also a certain number of questions concerning the action of the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalising and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration or security.

These are roughly the four categories of questions which, in my opinion, will have to be examined more or less separately. These problems are, however, connected in such a way that the Rapporteurs will have to co-ordinate their work. The Bureau might then classify results in order to put concrete proposals before the Preparatory Commission for further discussion. The latter, having studied the technical questions and drawn up the texts of the disarmament agreements, might join its results to those of the Committee and submit the whole of the suggestions to the Disarmament Conference.

I should like to add that, in the course of this work, we shall have to make considerable demands on the Secretariat of the League for the preparation of the necessary documentation.

As I have already told you, a large number of arbitration treaties have already been concluded. After studying these treaties thoroughly, the Secretariat might draw up a synopsis in tabular form, which would allow us to draw our conclusions and perhaps to elaborate either a model treaty of arbitration or an optional convention for compulsory arbitration, like that suggested by Dr. Nansen at the last session of the Assembly.

The same methods may be followed as regards treaties of security. We have at present a large number of them which we ought to try to include within the framework of the League of Nations. There will be a great deal of work to do in order to provide the Rapporteurs with all the documentation they will need when they begin to prepare their report. When each of us has carefully studied these vast and complicated questions, we shall need a certain period of time to prepare definite proposals to submit to the Committee. After this preparatory work, the Chairman can convoke a committee which can immediately get to work. These, in my opinion, are the broad lines on which we ought to work.

I should like to repeat that I have no wish to anticipate the results of our discussions. I will ask you to express your ideas in order that public opinion may recognise from our discussions that we have really got to work and have proceeded to a serious classification of the questions before us and that we have also chosen a rapid and scientific method of work because we are determined to reach speedy results.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — I quite agree in principle as regards the method of work indicated by the Chairman. However, the subject of our work is so complex and difficult that it seems to me we shall have to give these points some more detailed examination within the broad lines traced out by the Chairman.

I will, first of all, briefly discuss the origin of the question.

After the work pursued in different Assemblies, we arrived in 1924 at the positive conclusion which many of us still remember — that there was a close connection not only between disarmament and security but between security and arbitration. In 1924, we endeavoured to solve this problem in its three aspects by the Protocol. You know why the Protocol, the principles of which nevertheless remain, could not be realised in practice.

We had hoped that what we had attempted to realise in 1924 by a collective universal agreement might have subsequently been obtained by means of regional agreements which, by their extension, would re-establish the equilibrium aimed at in the Protocol. After two years' experience we saw that the path was long and complex, and it might perhaps lead to doubtful results. We also saw that, in the space of two years, the immense output of arbitration treaties had been such that to-day they constitute a forest, a very dense forest, in which it is difficult to find one's way.

It is desirable to know exactly where we are and to take stock of the position as regards arbitration and security resulting from arbitration. We may then consider the possibility of co-ordinating the separate ideas in order to reach a more general agreement capable of replacing that which was attempted in 1924. I said, and I cannot lay sufficient emphasis on the point, that the principles which we laid down in 1924 remain intact. I do not think in all sincerity that we can ever do better than what we tried to do by the Protocol of Geneva, and I ask all my listeners to believe that I do not speak from any feelings of pride as the author, but in the deep-seated conviction resulting from a continuous study I have made of this question that we shall never achieve anything better finished than was the Protocol of Geneva.

The problem with which we are confronted to-day compels us to study very closely the reasons for which the Protocol was not accepted. It also compels us to examine how we can remove those objections and succeed in dissipating the various misunderstandings and fears which were formulated against it. I do not wish at present to enter into a detailed examination of these reasons; I merely indicate three points which I think sum up the capital objections which were raised against the Protocol.

The first objection refers to arbitration. The Protocol appeared to some countries difficult to accept owing to the principle of absolutely universal arbitration which was proclaimed. A second objection, which appeared decisive to some Governments, lay in the system of the automatic definition of the aggressor. The third objection resulted to

some extent from the second. Some States felt that it would be difficult for the peace of the world to admit the automatic enforcement of sanctions after the aggressor had been automatically determined.

I think that we must examine the extent to which these objections are, I will not say sound, but to what extent they correspond to realities. In this way we may find out how to obtain general agreement on what we are about to do. It does not seem to me impossible. I think it is possible by giving greater flexibility to the definitions of the three great principles which we tried in 1924. If we try to do this, the lines on which we must take action are clearly laid down in Resolution V of the Assembly, dated September 26th last. The Chairman has just mentioned them. I should like to take them up once more to show you how they can be classified.

In the first direction you have it provided that the League of Nations is to take action calculated to promote, generalise and co-ordinate special or collective agreements on arbitration and security. You will notice that in this first point the Assembly has, I think, justly made no separation between arbitration and security; one might conceive, as the Chairman recently indicated, the idea of a separate study of arbitration and security, but these two studies really appear as two branches of the common subject. They should lead to the practical result of maintaining the connection between arbitration and security in order that this very connection may provide the substructure necessary for the reduction of armaments we all desire.

The second point refers to the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League with a view to enabling the members to perform their obligations under the different articles of the Covenant. That is a very different idea from the idea in the first paragraph. This part of the resolution was clearly inspired by the very fruitful ideas so well developed by M. de Brouckère at the Third Committee. It is that we should examine one by one the various articles of the Covenant from the practical point of view, to see what we can obtain from them to facilitate our common work for the maintenance and consolidation of peace.

The third provision concerns agreements which states Members of the League may conclude among themselves irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States. This idea is related to the first paragraph dealing with arbitration and security and I think it will perhaps make it possible for us to graduate our obligations, which, however, should form a harmonious whole, in order to provide the needed additional guarantees of security in the various regions.

Then you have a fourth provision which is connected with the first and completes the third. It is an idea due to the happy initiative of the British delegation. It is an invitation from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures they would be prepared to take irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant to support the decisions or recommendations of the Council in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that in a particular case either all its forces or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the decisions or recommendations of the Council. I would remind you that that idea, so happily submitted by the British delegation and readily accepted by the Third Committee, only reproduces an idea already in the Protocol, that is to say, the offers of assistance grouped into a system for the practical application of sanctions.

The four ideas which I have just summed up may be divided into two main groups. You have first of all the group dealing with arbitration and security and, in addition, the question of regional agreements and offers of assistance, and in the other group the methodical examination of the articles of the Covenant. It seems to me that these two groups of ideas should be studied separately. It might be wise to appoint two sub-committees in this Committee, each of them being requested to make a special study of the questions involved in one of these two groups.

This complicated question demands minute and methodical preparation, and I entirely agree with the Chairman that it is necessary, with the valuable assistance of the Secretariat, to establish complete documentation in connection with each of these groups. The Chairman recently spoke of a tabular synopsis of treaties of arbitration and security. I think that we should not confine ourselves to such a synopsis, but we should, on the other hand, put forward the question as a whole. The synopsis may well be a summary of that documentation, but I have personally a certain mistrust of such tabular synopses. They are of rather too subjective a nature, and here especially we have to begin with a particularly objective question. I venture to say, not for the first time, that if the work of 1924 was one which called for great enthusiasm, that which we have now before us is a heavy and difficult scientific task for which we must have an extremely solid documentation.

I therefore think that we want not only a synoptic table of the provisions of these arbitration treaties concluded since the existence of the League of Nations, but the full texts as well. We want also the texts of the various treaties of security, and by this I mean those treaties which directly or indirectly are intended to increase or guarantee the security of States. I mean treaties of non-aggression, treaties of security and similar treaties concluded for such purposes; not only treaties concluded and put into force but treaties which were concluded but never put into force. There is also another precious element of documentation

in all the plans which have been drawn up by learned societies or individuals which are calculated to throw useful light on the organisation of security for States.

In this connection I would draw your particular attention to the treaty which was long discussed by the representatives of American Republics and which was the object of discussion some months ago at Rio de Janeiro. This treaty is also to be brought up for discussion by the official conference to be held in Cuba. We should take advantage of the work pursued in another hemisphere. We must not forget that the movement for arbitration did not begin with the League of Nations. It existed before it and there are certain very useful documents which we must certainly have in view. I refer to those of the Second Hague Conference.

In 1907, in the Third Committee of the Second Peace Conference — that Third Committee which was an important diplomatic body, and which was presided over by our deeply regretted colleague, M. Léon Bourgeois — the question of compulsory arbitration from the point of view of a collective treaty was thoroughly examined. I speak from knowledge of the facts when I say that anything which may be put forward in favour of or against compulsory arbitration by collective or universal treaties was said in 1907, with a knowledge and appreciation of facts which I think will be difficult to surpass. There were men there whose names are worthy of mention here. On the one hand, we had my distinguished master, M. Louis Renault, and, on the other, an illustrious German man of science, Marschall von Bieberstein. I think it is very useful for us to refer to this historic work, all the more so because most of the proposals studied in that assembly came from the British delegation. It was the British delegation which, in the face of the difficulties which were before the Third Committee in 1907, endeavoured to find a flexible formula in which all the goodwill could be united in favour of a collective arbitration treaty. We should retain the idea of the list and the tables which it was intended to annex to the Arbitration Convention. In 1920 we made use of those tables when we completed the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice by adding the famous Article 36, concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. I do not think that that idea has yet been exhausted. I think that by use of it we might perhaps find the necessary elasticity to make possible concessions in a general arbitration treaty to meet the objections which were raised to the Geneva Protocol.

I would ask that this long and complicated documentation be collected by the Secretariat. I feel that they will have no difficulty in meeting our request. I have only one regret, that the official who was the backbone of the disarmament work will no longer be in immediate collaboration with the Secretariat. But I hope that, even at a distance, he will be able to give enlightenment and advice to those who devote themselves to this work.

I come, therefore, to the conclusion that we must study the problem as a whole, take the difficulties one by one, and classify them into two main groups, each group to be studied by a sub-committee, and before the next session, which is bound to be long, we must endeavour to prepare the work, firstly, by the documentation provided by the Secretariat, and, secondly, by the effective use of such documentation as might be entrusted to the Bureau with the help of the Rapporteurs.

In this way, when the Committee meets — I hope soon — it will have before it not only an immense amount of documentation, but definite proposals from its Bureau. If we proceed in this way we shall have very considerable chances of reaching practical results.

The CHAIRMAN. — Before asking certain other speakers to come forward, I would like to define some of the ideas expressed by M. Politis.

In the first place, I agree with him as regards the preparatory work of the Secretariat. There is clearly no question of the simple preparation of synoptic tables. The necessary documentation must be put at the disposal of all, either by individual distribution, or by its being placed in the Secretariat, where it can be consulted at will. The Secretariat has already collected part of this documentation, particularly as regards treaties of arbitration.

I should like to say a few words as to the sub-committees suggested by M. Politis. I have just had a talk with him, and I may say that we are entirely agreed on the subject. I think that we ought to have probably two sub-committees, but I think that those sub-committees cannot be formed until the Committee on Arbitration and Security has met, and that then the Rapporteurs with the documentation of the Secretariat will have been able to make proposals to the sub-committees.

In order to reach rapid success, I think that this preparatory work may either be done by the Secretariat or by the Bureau, and the Rapporteurs.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL. — As regards the documentation which M. Politis has asked for, the Secretariat has in preparation, and hopes shortly to send to press, a second edition of a volume which was published in 1926 containing the texts of treaties relating to arbitration, conciliation and security. The new edition of this volume will contain all the treaties of this nature which have been registered with the Secretariat, *i.e.*, in fact the treaties which have been made and come into force since the establishment of the League. It can probably be put at the disposal of the Committee in about three weeks to a month's time. It would raise obvious difficulties to attempt to add to the material in the volume all the draft treaties

which may have been drawn up by Governments but which have not been ratified or have not been registered.

As regards projects for treaties of arbitration or conciliation or security put forward by private associations or individuals, it will perhaps be sufficient for the Secretariat to include in the Committee's documentation any of these drafts which the Rapporteurs or members of the Committee may think deserving of consideration and bring to the attention of the Secretariat for inclusion in the documentation. To endeavour to include the texts of all such projects would, I fear, involve an enormous documentation, the undertaking of which would be apt to delay the work of the Committee.

M. SATO (Japan). — After the eloquent speech of M. Politis, I find it difficult to address you. I would nevertheless like to express my views in regard to this question.

The resolution adopted by the last Assembly will form the basis of the programme which the Committee will have to examine. I do not need to repeat here the words of those resolutions. I merely wish to observe that they may be interpreted in different ways.

If we analyse the problem of security we may say that it contains two principal elements, — firstly, collective action organised by the League of Nations to prevent or impede any recourse to war, and, secondly, to afford effective protection to any State victim of aggression. In my opinion the Committee's essential duty is to seek out the best way for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and for giving effective aid to a State victim of aggression.

As far as concerns security, there already exist the provisions of international conventions. I might quote, in the first place, the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Bilateral treaties have been concluded, and their number increases daily. They provide either the specific settlement of disputes which might arise in the relations between Contracting States, assistance in case of aggression by a third party or the respect for political independence and territorial integrity in the mutual relations of the Contracting States.

According to this analysis of the question of security and the present situation, the Committee should, in my opinion, first concentrate its attention on the study of the provisions of existing agreements, in order to determine the present conditions of regional and general security, as mentioned by Resolution V of the last Assembly.

The Committee should then examine the case of every country which claims a higher degree of security, and decide whether its claim is justified with regard to the present political situation. If the Committee concludes that this request is legitimate it will then have to draw up concrete proposals in order to give them satisfaction.

It has not been my intention in making these observations to define any line of conduct for the Committee different from that indicated by our Chairman. On the contrary, I entirely accept the procedure which he has laid down. I merely wish to define the spirit in which the Committee should interpret the directions furnished by the Assembly and accomplish the task which has been assigned to it.

M. RUTGERS (Netherlands). — I have listened with great interest to the speech delivered by the Greek delegate. I venture to submit certain observations on that speech.

My first remark refers to the sub-committees mentioned by M. Politis. I wish to ask one question. If it is premature, it may be ignored. In the first place, I recognise that, in order to speed up our work, it is necessary to create sub-committees, but will these sub-committees be composed of part of the members of our Committee, or will they include representatives of each delegation? I should personally prefer the second choice, for I suppose that most of the delegations, if not all, will be interested in all the questions studied by these sub-committees.

My second observation refers to the Optional Clause in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In reading Resolution V of the Third Committee of the Assembly, one feels some doubt as to the competence of our Committee regarding the study of that clause. I personally feel that this doubt is unjustified and that we should be failing in our duty if we did not study this optional clause as well as arbitration properly so-called.

My third remark deals with the documentation mentioned by M. Politis. I confess that I was rather aghast when he said that it would be immense. I cannot accept that description as commendable. The Secretary-General has told us that the preparation of such a documentation would take a certain amount of time and that the work would consequently be delayed. I would add that the members of the Committee must be allowed the time, not necessarily to read the documentation, but at any rate to take note of all of it. My parliamentary experience has shown me that too extensive documentation often has unfortunate results, in that even the members who speak on a particular question have not taken note of all the documents which had been submitted. We must limit our documentation. The delegate of Greece recently spoke his praises of the Protocol of Geneva. I may say that this Protocol was drawn up in a few weeks and without any voluminous documentation being submitted to the Assembly or the members of the Committees.

I think, however, that a solution might be found. The Bureau, with the help of some of the members of the Committee perhaps the Rapporteurs of the future sub-committees, might appoint a small commission which, would decide with the Secretariat upon the



documentation to be prepared. This Commission should not forget that the Committee does not want its next session put off for too long. I think we must fix a date for the next meeting and the amount of the documentation will depend on the length of time allowed. In conclusion, I hope that the Committee will adopt my suggestion that we entrust the Bureau and Rapporteurs with the task of providing the necessary documentation with the help of the Secretariat.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — As regards the question of procedure, I venture to ask for time for reflection. We have heard the different and interesting proposals. We shall have to examine them when they come before us in writing in order to gain a correct idea of the progress of our work. I should like the minutes of the discussions which have taken place this morning to be distributed as soon as possible in order that we can examine the proposals, particularly as regards those of M. Beneš and M. Politis, as they were the two speakers who particularly dealt with the question of procedure and manner of work. Subject to my right to reconsider the question after a closer study, and speaking only of the points which have impressed me in the speeches delivered, I think it would be inconvenient to begin our work only by preparing documentation. We are snowed under with documentation. We know the terms of most of these treaties. In any case, as the Secretary-General has just told us, a second edition is in course of preparation and will be automatically communicated to us. What we are really interested in is positive, constructive work. We are all agreed that documentation is necessary, but it must be for the purpose which the Committee will have before it. The mere piling up of documentation will not mean that we have added new guarantees for security which is the purpose for which we have been called together.

As regards the choice between the proposal of M. Beneš to appoint Rapporteurs who would themselves constitute a sort of more complete Bureau of the Committee, and that of favouring sub-committees suggested by M. Politis, I cannot make a decision without having time to reflect. In any case, I could not support what I have just understood to be the declaration of the delegate of the Netherlands. The sub-committees could not include representatives of all States on the Committee. I feel that these sub-committees cannot but be extremely limited in number. I should like their numbers to be chosen not because they represent a certain country, but because they possess definite competence in a particular class of questions.

I am in substance in agreement with what has just been said by M. Sato. We must not forget that we are here not in order to draw up legal instruments, but in order to reply to a definite question in the questionnaire of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, a questionnaire which to some extent constitutes the Covenant on which we have agreed to take part in this work and to participate later in a Disarmament Conference.

This questionnaire, which was the object of long and delicate discussion and on which agreement was finally reached — and I hope agreement will be reached on a preliminary Draft Convention, which will be a second step — includes question No. V, which makes the reduction of armaments proportionate to the guarantees of security.

The Preparatory Commission has not even begun this question. In order to begin upon it the last Assembly expressed the view that a special Committee should be appointed which would be called the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Everything that has to be done must be looked at in the light of the final object, which is to allow nations taking part in the Conference for the reduction of armaments to fix at the lowest possible level in exchange for collective guarantees of security the figure for the armaments which they consider necessary for their security.

All our work, in short, consists in establishing two columns of figures; one will be the column of assets and the other the column of liabilities.

We must add to one column something which will enable us to make a deduction from the figures of the armaments considered necessary for security. In this connection I find it unnecessary to tell M. Politis how fully I am in agreement with him. I am convinced that the Protocol and its provisions constitute the best solution which can be reached as regards collective guarantees of security. The reasons why the Protocol has not come into international operation are well known and there is no need to repeat them. We are here in order to examine whether we cannot find in the very terms of the resolution of the last Assembly means for increasing the present guarantees of collective security. That resolution has clearly traced out the different paths where we have not to enter but to continue.

For want of the Protocol, *i.e.*, of a general treaty of mutual guarantee based on arbitration, we have turned to the field of special agreements. Many of those who are now present, including myself, regard these agreements as makeshifts. They have no enthusiasm for them, and I fully appreciate the dangers involved; for want of a better plan, however, we were obliged to resort to them. However, to the extent that these treaties increase in number, we are bound to note that their diversity and their contradictory ideas would put almost insuperable difficulties before the Disarmament Commission when it tries to establish its security balance sheet.

I also agree with M. Politis in calling for a clear and well-defined table of these special agreements, but I also ask for details. I want to know exactly what results have been attained regarding collective guarantees of security. This is the first task which will have to be undertaken by the Rapporteurs or the sub-committees. The more we enter into these special agreements in the absence of a general treaty of mutual guarantee — which alone could give me an assurance of the maintenance of peace in the world — the more we feel their limitations,

which are quickly reached. One cannot but notice all the dangers which may slip into these systems of old diplomacy, of alliances and counter alliances, which seem to be, or are, within the framework of the League of Nations. The resolution of the last Assembly contemplated something of a rather fuller nature. This is gathered by the last two paragraphs of the resolution, which refers to a more general agreement between a certain number of Powers bound by geographical or other considerations and which accept, without imposing on others, the more precise provisions which the Protocol added to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League is an excellent document, which is our hope and our confidence, but which is far from being sufficiently precise to allow a nation to know exactly what and how much security it can rely upon in time of danger. The idea I have mentioned gives rise to two other ideas. Such a result may be obtained either by an agreement between a certain number of nations, united as I have said, by geographical or other ties, which would strengthen its solidarity, or it might be obtained by the action of the League. The League might endeavour with delicacy to produce a system and a new line of ideas to which the Commission may devote its activities, though the action of the League would have to be taken with extreme delicacy as it would risk offending the susceptibilities of States. The second aspect of the question includes an examination of the means by which the League of Nations might call forth explanations and definitions on the nature and extent of the security which States might be able to offer to a given State in given circumstances.

I must ask the Committee to excuse me for having reminded it of what I feel sure it had no need to be reminded. I felt, however, that such a reminder was necessary at the outset of our work and that I should tell you that if we take our eyes from the aim of our labours, which is to increase the balance of security and to decrease the armaments which are admitted by the nations, we shall have only academic discussions.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — I have no intention of attempting an oration on the important questions which we are examining, nor have I any desire to cover more than a very small portion of the ground of the work before us. I wish to deal with practical suggestions rather than with general principles.

Perhaps I may be forgiven, however, as I am here to-day for the first time, if I preface my observations by a remark of a more or less personal nature. I am quite sure that all who have been engaged on this work hitherto are very sensible of the loss they have sustained through the absence of my friend, Lord Cecil. I can assure you that I am fully alive to that sense of loss and of my personal inferiority, for work of this character, to Lord Cecil. At the same time, I should like to give the assurance that the policy of the British Government remains exactly as it was. To express that in a single sentence, I need say no more than that that policy is to promote, to encourage and to assist in every possible way in our power the great causes which we are here to discuss : disarmament, arbitration and security among nations. The only questions which we have really to discuss are how those great causes are best to be promoted and how the particular difficulties of one nation or another can be overcome with a view to the accomplishment of a common purpose.

After listening to the very interesting debate and eloquent speeches of our Chairman, M. Politis, and M. Paul-Boncour, there is left upon my mind a certain feeling of apprehension lest we fail to arrive at practical propositions which we can ultimately discuss and bring, if necessary, to the test of an aye or nay. That appears to me to be something at which at some time or other we shall have to arrive.

It is proposed that we should embark upon a very extensive study of these questions, and that a large number of documents should be prepared for that study. I confess I agree in this respect with M. Paul-Boncour, that we are in danger of having an avalanche of documents, possibly some of them not very relevant to our discussions, and such an amount of material to study that it will be an immense discouragement to us to arrive at a very clear notion of what can be done and of what may or may not be practicable.

I am a little bit alarmed about one or two things that have been said relative to this study. Being, I hope, a person of discretion, if I had been the first speaker I should have been very careful to be silent in regard to one particular word ; there is one word I should scrupulously have avoided — the word " Protocol " ; but I find that that word, to some a blessed word, to some perhaps a dangerous word, has been uttered by M. Politis and endorsed by M. Paul-Boncour. In this great mass of documentation are we going to have a great amount of literature on the subject of the Protocol ?

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that we must take account of what has hitherto taken place ; we cannot leave out of account the past. The past, among other things, contains a certain number of *choses jugées*, and M. Politis, after describing what he took to be the main objections entertained to the Protocol, which I will not now discuss (whether I altogether agree with his summary of the objections or not is not now relevant), said that we should study how far these objections corresponded to reality. I am not going to raise any formal objection to that study being undertaken and carried out, but I do not think that that study will advance us very much on the road to a definite proposal to lay before the Preparatory Commission. I have heard long periods mentioned as being necessary for our study. I think if we are to go into the objections which may be entertained to the Protocol, to rediscuss them and examine how far they correspond with reality, I may express the hope that we may all live long enough to see the end of our investigations, and I would seriously ask you whether embarking upon discussions and investigations of that sort is not likely to retard the practical outcome of our labours.

I throw that out as a suggestion, repeating that I make no formal objection to any study which any of my colleagues think will be useful for the purpose we have in view.

It has been further suggested, and I entirely agree, that it would be useful to have before us the treaties of arbitration which have been concluded, not merely a list of the treaties but a view of their contents and of the character of the disputes which are covered by those treaties. I noticed that the Secretary-General intimated that it would be possible to have a view of those treaties which have been registered with the League of Nations, and some other speaker referred to the treaties which have been concluded since the League of Nations came into being. I entirely agree with that; I think that would be very useful material, but in that connection there is one point which I should like to reserve. It is probably known to many that arbitration, so far as my country is concerned, is no new thing. We have many important arbitration treaties dating long before the war, long before the League of Nations was ever thought of. If it were necessary I could, of course, unfold to the Committee, and at the proper time would be prepared to do so, the very important national interests which long years ago the British Government submitted to arbitration, thereby, as I hope I may claim, not only giving a lead to the world, but showing their anxiety and determination to resort to arbitration rather than to war. It may be desirable, when the proper time comes, when we have before us the treaties which have been concluded in recent years, that I should call attention to the larger field which has already been covered by the practice of my own country.

I still feel that this study alone is not going to lead us much closer to a practical result. I would suggest that what we really want, without making any practical suggestion as to the precise method by which it should be done, is something of this sort. We have those four paragraphs at the end of Resolution V, which forms the basis of our work, and what I think we want is something like a series of short resolutions or proposals put forward by different members of the Committee, or its Bureau or sub-committees. I merely desire that a number of different minds should be brought to bear upon these clauses and put into the form of definite propositions what they think can be done, what practical measures can be taken, because the Assembly uses the word "measures"; and to my mind that term implies some actual practical step, not merely a pious resolution or a statement of general methods.

I want to know what measures my colleagues think should be adopted for carrying out each of these four clauses. If we had these propositions before us, coming from different minds, there might be a great many that would prove to be impracticable; and which we should decide presented difficulties which could not be overcome. But we might here and there have suggestions which at sight would seem practicable, and which we could decide to discuss.

I am always struck by the fact that, unless you get some definite, tangible, practical proposition to discuss — as long as you keep to generalities, to wide statements of general principles — you make no progress at all, and I am most anxious that we should arrive at some real big result which we can show to our Governments and to the world, and it is in that spirit, and in that spirit alone, that I have made these remarks.

I hope I shall be forgiven if I have spoken strongly, but it is with the sincere desire to assist in the work which we have in view that I venture to lay these suggestions before the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. — I think that we are all agreed with Lord Cushendun in thinking that we should pass as quickly as possible to the practical side of our work. We have to examine how we are going to pursue our labours. In his speech M. Paul-Boncour asked that proposals should be made in writing and as clearly as possible. In this I entirely agree with him.

I therefore propose that we suspend our work for this afternoon. To-morrow morning we will have before us clearly formulated proposals, and we can then examine how to reach the practical conclusions the necessity of which Lord Cushendun has emphasised.

I should also like to raise two points. I venture to say to the honourable delegate of the Netherlands that at the League of Nations these sub-committees which have been appointed have always been limited in order that they might work as quickly as possible.

I would add that it seems to me most desirable to appoint the Rapporteurs first and the sub-committees afterwards. However, I have no desire to make any final suggestion. The discussion to-morrow will settle the matter for us.

*The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.*

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SECOND MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Friday, December 2nd, 1927, at 10.30 p.m.*

*Chairman: M. BENEŠ (Czechoslovakia).*

**4. Programme and Method of Work of the Committee: General Discussion (continuation).**

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — I should like to say a few words as regards the method of working which we ought to adopt.

The document containing the proposals of the Bureau in this matter (Annex 1, page 55) has just been distributed, and I have not yet had time to read it.

The first of the suggestions made yesterday referred to the documentation necessary for the proper perusal of our work. In this matter I share the preoccupations of Lord Cushendun and M. Rutgers, that a too voluminous documentation might endanger our practical work and lead us into purely theoretical fields. Moreover, the Secretary-General has pointed out the difficulty there would be in amassing too much documentation. I think that his proposals are wise and acceptable, and that the volume prepared by the Secretariat, which will contain the treaties of arbitration, conciliation and security registered with the League of Nations, would be sufficient for a study of the problem contemplated.

As regards the plans for treaties of arbitration, conciliation and security put forward by learned societies or private individuals, I think that we should merely confine ourselves to those plans which the Rapporteurs may consider worthy of being taken into consideration.

As regards the question as to who will draw up this documentation, I find myself in favour of the idea that this task might be entrusted to the Bureau working in concert with the Secretariat and the Rapporteurs which the Committee will appoint.

As regards the choice of the Rapporteurs, I entirely agree with M. Paul-Boncour that they should be appointed not by reason of their nationality but from a consideration of their particular competence to deal with the questions involved.

The question then arose whether to appoint the sub-committees and when, and how they would be appointed. M. Rutgers thought that all the delegations ought to be represented on them, as it is true we are all interested in closely following their investigations. I am, however, fully in agreement with the representative of France that sub-committees consisting of a large number of delegates would not facilitate the progress of our work, and, though I recognise the justification for the anxiety of the honourable representative of the Netherlands, I would prefer the number of delegates appointed on these sub-committees to be as limited as possible.

On the other hand, it should be clearly understood that, before the committee holds a plenary meeting to study the documents prepared by the sub-committees, all the delegates should be put in a position to study them sufficiently, in order to take proper part in the plenary discussions. This is a definite proposal which I wish to submit to my colleagues.

I think that we might well constitute the sub-committees immediately. They might thus get to work rapidly and let us have results at a suitable time. In this way the Committee might meet two or three months later. This procedure would be particularly desirable if the number of members of the sub-committees is very limited — if the Committee thinks fit, reduced to the number of Rapporteurs.

These are the observations I desired to present to the Committee, and I would once more draw its attention to the fact that we must have the documents in our hands before the plenary meeting where they are to be discussed.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — I will refrain for the moment from speaking of the procedure to be followed by the Committee. I merely propose to put forward a few ideas as regards its programme of work.

We have just received the proposals of the Bureau, and, though I have naturally not had sufficient time to study them thoroughly, after a brief perusal I can see that they rather weaken the first impression which I had yesterday in listening to the first speakers. The substance of their speeches reminded me, if I may say so, of meetings of legal experts discussing purely academic points. In my opinion, the task which the Assembly of the League of Nations has entrusted to the Preparatory Commission and to the Committee on Arbitration and Security, is of a totally different nature, for it is a purely practical task. After the speech of M. Paul-Boncour and the very wise remarks of the British delegate, I thought that all the discussion would turn towards the search for practical means for guaranteeing the security of the nations, and enabling States Members and non-Members of the League of Nations to attain at least a relative state of disarmament. In the arguments invoked by these two speakers I find a confirmation of those ideas which are also held by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. I will venture to add a few words to those statements.

I consider that the problem of security is, in the first place, a practical problem. I am astonished that it has not yet been stated that the problem of security is clearly a political one the solution of which is to be found by political and not by legal means and that this

truth must dominate all the work of our Commission and of our Committee. You must not believe that I take exception to jurists who frequently appear in places where politicians and statesmen ought to have the first word. Such an idea is far from my thought, as I am myself a jurist and a Professor of Law. I think, however, that law ought to take a back seat when we endeavour to constitute the framework and define the truths established in the political and practical field. Accordingly, if we begin by purely legal investigations and leave aside practical and political questions, we shall find ourselves in a road without an end. What is the essential task of our Committee ?

Reading the resolutions of the last Assembly and those of previous Assemblies, we find certain principles on which we ought always to rely, but which have unfortunately not been mentioned so far. These resolutions are continually referring to the political conditions of security, and I venture to lay great stress on these words. The task of our Committee, then, is to examine these political conditions of security, and to find others which will be more effective. I support the very wise arguments of the British delegate, who yesterday reminded us that the resolution of the last Assembly spoke of "measures". That resolution certainly makes it our duty to look for measures which will ensure the security of the peoples and not to make legal investigations. We must therefore not leave this practical field. In my opinion, the question of security is of a purely practical and essentially political nature. It is a problem the solution of which depends on real and practical measures being taken. Now what are measures? Measures are means of action, the practical enforcement of a desire. They are not legal formulæ. I have the greatest respect for the science of jurisprudence, but our work is bound to be political. I assume that this Committee is composed not of jurists but of politicians looking for a political solution.

That being so, I regret that I am not very favourable to the suggestions which have been made by the Bureau. I am sorry that I have not had the time to study them thoroughly, but in looking them over I obtained the impression that they provided a programme for a conference of jurists. This might contribute towards the development of international law, but that, after all, is not the task of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, nor of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Our duty is to devise measures by which we can increase the present state of security of all countries. I understand the idea of devising means and measures to mean that, when the results of our work are put into practice, a greater state of security will follow and the nations will therefore be placed in a position to proceed to disarm.

I apologise if I speak in somewhat different terms from those which are usual in Committees of this kind, but I think the question of security is of such fundamental importance for disarmament that we must do everything possible to get clear upon it and to speak the whole truth. I am going to speak still more definitely; I am going to tell you the whole of my thoughts upon the matter and to quote examples. I hope that you will not take exception to what I say, for the League of Nations is a political institution where questions dealing with present international life may suitably be discussed. I am going to refer to my own country as an example.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes recently signed a treaty of arbitration and friendship with France. This agreement was constructed within the spirit and scope of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is on the lines recommended by the League. Obviously our aim was to increase our security. We recognised that the security guaranteed by the League was appreciable but insufficient. In the absence of something better, as M. Paul-Boncour said yesterday, we endeavoured to obtain another guarantee.

To take a purely theoretical case, suppose that Italy had also placed its signature to that treaty. Such a three-fold agreement would have given still greater security to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, for security guaranteed by three is better than that guaranteed by two. Italy did not do this and I regret it.

Let us take another example, purely theoretical. Supposing Great Britain, whom no one will suspect of wishing to provoke war, had also signed the treaty. Our security would have again been increased. However, Great Britain is pursuing a different policy and has no desire to bind herself by agreements of this kind, but relies entirely upon the League of Nations.

This will serve to show that a country like mine, devoted to the League of Nations, armed, as many maintain, finds that its security is in danger and has tried to sign special treaties. How could you ask such a State to disarm when it does not consider its security sufficiently assured with its present armaments? We must therefore create new conditions of security for that country in order to persuade it to disarm.

I will give you yet one more striking example. I venture to mention a State which is not represented here — Albania. As you know, Albania has signed two agreements with Italy — the Treaty of Tirana and a recent treaty of alliance. Now Albania is a Member of the League of Nations and enjoys all the privileges of a Member of the League. In addition to this, the independence of Albania is specially guaranteed by a decision of the League, and furthermore there is a declaration by the great Powers which lays down the action to be taken in the event of the independence of Albania being threatened. Yet the Albanian Government does not consider these guarantees as sufficient and what is more, its opinion is shared by another great Power, Italy. I may say that, as far as my own country is concerned, there is no political party, no statesman and no citizen who would ever even dream

of threatening the independence of Albania. There is no difference between us. Nevertheless, as you see, the Albanian Government, which decides its own policy, has taken the view that it is necessary to seek to protect itself by a treaty of this kind.

By these two examples, which I have taken merely from the Balkans and not from other parts of Europe, you will see what the conditions of security are at present. If you think that by this theoretical investigation which you propose to make you are going to improve the conditions of security, I must confess that I am not so credulous.

The first principle which I would suggest should guide the work of the Committee and its sub-committees is that the political element should everywhere predominate. I refer to that "practical element" which the English tell us about. We must not bury ourselves in formulæ; though you find the best formula in the world, international life will remain unchanged. But if you devise effective measures which will offer real though perhaps incomplete guarantees of security, there will come about a change in international relations, and the position as regards security will be entirely changed. Then alone will you have the right to ask the peoples to proceed to disarm.

I now come to my second observation. Are we to allow our search for practical measures to be unlimited, or are we to remain within the framework of the League of Nations? Personally, I find myself in support of the views of the British delegate that we should remain strictly within the scope of the Covenant of the League. I do not think that the provisions of the Covenant are ideal, but I do feel that our work must necessarily be capable of practical realisation. If we go outside the scope of the Covenant we shall run the risk of our work not being accepted by the Governments. If we remain within it, leaving apart ideal but impractical solutions, we shall have accomplished something useful. The provisions of the Covenant are very elastic. The reproach has often been made that the clauses of the Covenant are too elastic in character. I think that it is an advantage, for this elasticity will enable the Members of the League, if they work honestly, to create serious and sufficient guarantees of security. However, we have not only to place our good will and our energy at the service of the League, but we have also to put force at its disposal to carry out its decision. If we succeed in finding real and effective means which can be applied, if need be, by the League to all countries whether great or small, we shall have solved the problem of security within the scope of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

My third proposal is that the Committee should have full freedom within the Covenant of the League, and that it should not be tied down to the suggestions contained in the resolution of the last Assembly and in the recommendations of the Council. We must bear in mind those recommendations, but we must also look for other measures outside their scope.

If you will permit me, I propose to say a few words regarding the four suggestions made in the resolution of the last Assembly. The first paragraph of that resolution refers to arbitration. I suggest that we should not bury ourselves in an investigation of the various treaties of arbitration, because I do not think it would be useful. As my British colleague has rightly reminded us, the question of arbitration has already been discussed, and its principles are now clearly established. The only question which remains is whether or not States are ready to apply arbitration. Why should we go into deeper study? Why should we make further recommendations? We have only to ask States the definite question whether or not they are prepared to accept compulsory arbitration. I will admit frankly that I do not imagine a minute study would lead us to the discovery of a model treaty. Of what use would this be? I might perhaps say that there is a model idea which is waiting to be applied, and which consists in compulsory arbitration in all international disputes.

The second point refers to the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations, with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant. I think that these points are placed in the wrong order. In my opinion, the essential point consists in Resolutions II and III, which concern the obligations of the Members of the League. How are these obligations to be carried out? If the Members of the League are willing to carry out their obligation in a serious manner, and if the Council and Assembly are determined to impose settlements, we shall very soon find practical means for carrying out these obligations. Why should we burden the organs of the League of Nations with the duty of defining such means when we have not yet settled the question whether the Council and the Members of the League intend to impose a settlement on those who do not respect the obligations of the Covenant. We must not sidestep the question, but we must remain and face realities. I propose that we should concentrate our attention on Resolutions II and III, which refer to the obligations of the Members of the League and to the working of the Council and the Assembly in times of crisis.

In the final paragraph of the resolution there is the very successful application of an idea which I have laid before you, and it is the only part of the resolution which is couched in specific terms. It refers modestly to an invitation

"from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region."

This is the only positive and concrete thing in the resolution, but why do we limit it in this way? Why do you not put this question as generally as possible? I therefore propose that we put the question frankly. The great Powers which we know are the founders of the League of Nations must undertake their duties, if I may say so, conscientiously. The force which M. Politis mentioned yesterday, and which is indispensable for the respect of law, must be sought for where it is to be found.

I now come to the third point of the same resolution which refers to

“agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States.”

I think this question ought to be cleared up. There are a host of agreements and treaties and covenants, and I think our Committee ought to say what kind of agreement it is desirable to conclude under the terms of this recommendation. In this connection I may perhaps be allowed to read a passage of the Report of M. de Brouckère, whose absence we all regret. It is taken from his Report submitted to the Assembly in the name of the Third Committee :

“With regard to the final paragraph of the resolution, the Committee desires to point out that the agreements therein mentioned are not in any way to be confused with such alliances as it was possible for countries to contract for political purposes of one kind or another before the Covenant of the League of Nations established general principles and obligations which introduced a special harmony into international life. The agreements referred to in the resolution are to be regarded as means for enabling States which wish to enter into closer mutual agreements than are provided by a Covenant to help each other to discharge more effectively, so far as they are concerned, the obligations embodied in the Covenant itself.”

I think that this is a very sound idea. Our Committee should take up this question and not confine itself to recommending States Members of the League of Nations to conclude agreements and treaties of friendship and arbitration. I think we ought to give more definite indications. The Covenant itself makes a distinction between different kinds of treaties; some of them are compatible with the Covenant of the League, and others may be entirely incompatible with it. I feel that it would be impossible to contemplate taking the authority of the Covenant to ask the League of Nations to register a Treaty incompatible with the Covenant itself. Has the League of Nations the right to examine a Treaty? This is one of a series of questions which our Committee will have to examine. It will have to state clearly what kind of agreements it recommends to States, and it must state openly that there is no question of pre-war alliance.

I have ventured to make these observations merely out of a desire that the work of the Committee should be carried on on lines which will lead to practical results. I do not wish in any way to force my opinions or that of my delegation on the Committee. But I do think that I have put before you extremely objective considerations which are taken from the provisions of the Covenant itself, and from the very nature of the question with which we are now dealing. I think that they are worthy of consideration by the Committee on Arbitration and Security and by the Preparatory Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. — Before calling upon the next speaker, I desire to remove a misunderstanding.

M. Markovitch said that he had the impression when reading the proposals of the Bureau that we were going to embark on an immense field of purely theoretical study. I should like to explain that nothing was further from our thoughts when we drew up those proposals. We merely grouped the questions which have been submitted to us by the Assembly of the League. We entirely agree with M. Markovitch that we are to go directly forward towards a practical and clearly political object. It is for this reason that we systematically used the words “enquiry into the measures”, “measures for their promotion”, “suitable means of co-ordination and generalisation” in the proposals we submitted. The work of the Rapporteurs and of the sub-committees will naturally consist of the practical work to which M. Markovitch referred.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — After hearing the statements of the speakers who have preceded me I desire to state the point of view of my country in regard to the problems with which we are concerned. The discussion in which we are engaged has enabled us to note some interesting points of view, together with an agreement in regard to fundamental conceptions, on which we may congratulate ourselves.

I agree with M. Politis that it will be indispensable for us to have ample documentation, but, like M. Paul-Boncour, M. Rutgers and Lord Cushendun, I am also convinced that, in collecting these documents, we must avoid dealing with anything that is not strictly necessary for the purpose of our work. Moreover, I would not desire that this documentation should be restricted to the collection of treaties, it should also cover the other half of our field of labour — the Covenant. I shall be very grateful if the Secretariat would be good enough to provide us with a collection of documents covering all the resolutions of the Assembly, the Council, all special Committees and particularly the awards of the Permanent Court of International Justice, so far as they contain interpretations of the articles of the Covenant. The

interpretation of the Covenant and the development of all which its articles contain in juridical and political treasures not yet brought to light, is, in my view, a task of the very highest importance, and I attach value to that work, which is not inferior to other aspects of our problem. In this connection I would observe that, when the honourable delegate for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes referred just now to the great importance of developing Articles 18 and 20 of the Covenant, I hope that, in future, he will not forget to mention also Article 19.

As regards the procedure to be followed, I agree with those who spoke yesterday when they said that our work ought to be prepared by a small committee chosen from among our members, and it is of little moment whether this work is done by the Bureau or by Rapporteurs appointed for the purpose, provided it is understood that the direction of the work shall be retained entirely in the hands of this Committee. I assume that the Sub-Committee will be furnished with instructions from ourselves, which have to be laid down later. Without a general discussion, the value of the preparatory work accomplished by sub-committees would be purely academic if it did not extend beyond a collection of documents.

I now come to the problem itself. As regards my opinion on the relations which exist between disarmament and security, it is not necessary to repeat it, because it is sufficiently well known and in conformity with the letter and spirit of the resolution of 1927. I will only remark on the problem of security itself.

As M. Stresemann has already explained in the League of Nations Assembly, Germany is ready to co-operate in a positive manner in the solution of the problem of security, and it is glad to have the present opportunity of having this important problem subjected to a detailed examination. The question of security presents various aspects, and I am in agreement with those speakers who stated yesterday that it will be indispensable to study them all and to arrive at a solution of the problem. I attach less importance to the various sub-divisions which have been submitted to us at the last meeting. There are others which might be added to the number, but they would not bring us very much farther on the way. It is essential that the problem should be considered in its entirety.

As regards the point of departure of our labour, I am convinced that there is only one possible point of departure, and I have reached this conviction by means of a very simple process of reflection, namely, by asking what is the aim we wish to attain.

It is to prevent wars and guarantee peace; in other words, war must be abolished as a means for settling international disputes. In making these observations, we must have before us the fact that we shall never be able to prevent disputes from arising, for such disputes will never cease to arise. The important point is that we must find some other means than war for solving these disputes when they do arise. The Committee on Arbitration and Security must begin by studying the means which are at its disposal to guarantee the pacific settlement of existing disputes, or disputes which may come into existence. I consider that the opportunities which offer themselves are not entirely brought up by the Covenant of the League of Nations or by the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. We must find supplementary means and methods. I will not go into the details and the methods now, as they will come within the scope of the juridical experts. The essential point is that our work should be governed by a creative spirit which will form constructive ideas, for it is those ideas alone which will lead to a solution of our problem; it is this creative work which must be the task of the Committee. Let us beware of treating the symptoms; we must go to the root of the evil and make every effort to find a procedure which is capable of guaranteeing the pacific settlement of all international disputes. Once that is found, the subject of other related problems will follow almost automatically.

The above is the first task which falls to the Committee on Arbitration and Security, and it is in that task that the German delegation hopes to co-operate.

M. J. VALDES-MENDEVILLE (Chile). — I desire to make a few brief remarks about the proposals of the Bureau, and I will begin with those which deal with the appointment of Rapporteurs.

After reflecting on the speeches made yesterday, I came to the conclusion that we might adopt the procedure followed in the Committee for the Codification of International Law, namely, that we should appoint two Rapporteurs for each group of questions. The Rapporteurs might perhaps represent different schools of opinion. I do not however, raise any fundamental objection to the proposals of the Bureau. I entirely agree with M. Paul-Boncour that the Rapporteurs appointed by the Committee should be chosen for their special qualifications and not as representatives of countries or groups of countries.

As regards the division of the work, I agree to the proposal of the Bureau that it should be classified in two main groups, of which the first would again be sub-divided.

I also agree as to the importance, the immense importance, of regional and special agreements, which have on several occasions and in several ways been referred to by the resolutions of the Assembly. Some reference is also made in the last paragraph of Dr. Nansen's proposal for a draft Arbitration Convention, recommending that it would be made sufficiently flexible to allow the contracting States to graduate their obligations, having regard to their special position. You will not be surprised to hear a representative of Chile making such observations. My country, since the far-off days of the Temporary Mixed Commission, has not



ceased to support the system of regional agreements with a view to preventing recourse to war. Our delegation recalled this again at the last Assembly in discussing Resolution V of the Third Committee.

I recognise that one of the directions of the Assembly touching on a second aspect of the question is, as M. Paul-Boncour rightly said, a delicate task. It is that of inducing countries to sign special agreements. The Committee will doubtless have to move here with the greatest circumspection.

I was very glad to hear M. Politis refer yesterday to the treaties concluded in the American continent for the pacific settlement of disputes as a particularly valuable element in our work. Generally speaking, I would say that it is necessary, in my opinion, to take account, not only of the scheme which is being studied, but above all of the attempts already made and of the results obtained in Latin America for the prevention of war and the encouragement of the settlement of disputes by conciliation, arbitration and judicial procedure.

I will not state my views on the second group of questions, which concern the special examination of the articles of the Covenant. It is a fact that the Assembly has recommended this, but the enumeration of the articles of the Covenant as a basis for our studies must be restricted to those indicated by the Bureau; I insist on this. When the substance of this question comes before the Committee, the Chilean delegation will express its point of view on the problems raised.

Our delegation is sincerely desirous of assisting in the general solution of this problem within the limits of its means and ability. Other Chilean delegates with more authority and experience than mine have pointed out the special nature of our situation, and have shown that, though we are convinced of the necessity of subordinating the reduction and limitation of armaments to the requirements of security these problems present themselves in very different aspects in Latin America, and are not nearly so acute as in Europe. This, however, does not prevent our Government from giving our full assistance to the settlement of the great problems which we are now discussing. They are of fundamental importance for Europe, and will not fail to have their effect in every corner of the world.

M. COMNÈNE (Roumania). — It is not necessary for me to repeat my unshakable confidence in the successful issue of the work of this Committee, for I know that we have all come here in good faith and with the desire to succeed. I am convinced that the limitation followed by the reduction of armaments is a possibility if we can succeed, as I feel sure we shall, in organising a maximum security by the methods of the League of Nations. The time has come when we should no longer waste our time in mystical studies of the question of security. We have received our instructions and our only duty remains to carry them out.

I have, so far as possible, studied the interesting document which has been put before us by the Bureau, and I am personally entirely in favour of these suggestions. It seems to me that they are very suitable; as they give satisfaction up to a certain point to all the different opinions expressed. I think I may have one amendment to make to them, but I imagine it will be possible to do so when we examine each of the points of this programme of work. The second part of the proposal appears to me particularly satisfactory as the text is extremely flexible. I would particularly refer to the expression "without limiting the future field of action of the Committee in these matters" and if I rightly understand the author's meaning this expression leaves it open to the Committee to consider other hypotheses than those submitted by the Bureau.

I think that the investigation and establishment of suitable measures for the possible enforcement of Articles 10, 11, 16 and 17 of the Covenant will give us the maximum of essential security which we continually demand and which it is the duty of the League of Nations to assure if disarmament work is to succeed. I find in Article 10 as regards the question of aggression most important provisions which might be studied, and whose application we must organise if we are to provide proper measures for preventing war. Article 11 offers the Council and the Assembly a vast field of action. The application of Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant would give us considerable guarantees against aggression, provided that the application of these articles is thoroughly organised and the signatories of the Covenant are prepared to honour their signature, for we must not deceive ourselves. We must remember that we have now reached a time when we must know whether the Covenant is or is not of real value. The peoples of the world are entitled to know if the Covenant is worthy of credit and every country must accept its own responsibilities. In conclusion, I would like to point out what is probably a slight omission in the articles which we are to give the sub-committees to study. In paragraph B (2) of the proposals of the Bureau, reference is made to the study of existing treaties of security with regard to their use by the Council for the application of Articles 10, 11, 16 and 17 of the Covenant. Further down in the enumeration of the articles of the Covenant, reference is made to Articles 8, 10, 11 and 16, but Article 17 is omitted. I venture to ask you to add Article 17 and to refer to it in the same terms as are used for Article 16, namely, that "the study of Article 17 in conditions similar to those which have been applied to the study of Article 11".

The CHAIRMAN. — There are no further speakers on the list and the discussion is therefore closed. We will now proceed to our practical conclusions. We have to fix the date for the next session and to take a decision as regards the proposals of the Bureau and the appointment of Rapporteurs.

The first question which I wish to put before you concerns the proposals of the Bureau. You have examined them and have seen that they do not differ as regards the substance of

the question from the resolutions of the Assembly. We have suggested a procedure for you to follow, and, if I have rightly understood the various speakers who have touched upon this subject, the Committee as a whole will accept this procedure. I should like to emphasise, however, that we have not a hard-and-fast text before us but a suggestion as regards the preparatory work. The Committee is clearly at all times free to determine its own procedure and to decide on the substance of the proposals put before it.

The different speakers have suggested that, in the course of our work, we might examine other questions. If the point should arise, the Committee will take a decision. As we have divided our work into two groups, of which the first is sub-divided, we feel that there would be three memoranda to draw up and, therefore, three Rapporteurs to be appointed. Those of our colleagues who have remarks to make and observations to submit will do well to co-operate with the Bureau and the Rapporteurs. I therefore ask them to submit their texts to the Bureau before January 1st. We feel that this date is a suitable one, because of the amount of work which will have to be done by the Secretariat and the Rapporteurs in connection with these texts, and also in view of the date of the next session, for which I will propose a date later.

My third practical proposal concerns the appointment of the Rapporteurs. I have consulted several of my colleagues, and some of them whose competence would have been extremely valuable to us found some difficulty in undertaking the task. We have received the following proposals and suggest the following appointments. With regard to the question of arbitration we suggest M. Holsti, delegate of Finland, with regard to the question of security, M. Politis, delegate of Greece, and with regard to the articles of the Covenant, M. Rutgers, delegate of the Netherlands.

I would ask the Committee to take a decision on the different proposals.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — I have noted the statement of the Chairman that when the Bureau drafted the proposals before us it intended to establish the work of the Committee and the sub-committees on the practical basis recommended by M. Paul-Boncour and Lord Cushendun, with whom I am fully in agreement. If, however, that declaration is intended to be interpreted as outlining the character of the work of the Committee, I agree with the programme subject to one small modification, which I am about to suggest.

We have just listened to the declaration of the representative of Germany, who insisted on the necessity of finding some other means of settling disputes than by resort to war. I think we all agree that this means consists either in arbitration or in judicial settlement. However, apart from this means, and in case of an aggression taking place in spite of the recommendations and undertakings, we also have the system of guarantees and sanction provided for by the Covenant. The proposals submitted by the Bureau do not contain any reference to the second resolution of the Assembly, which deals with the elaboration of the decisions of the Council. This I fear is an essential point, and I venture to ask whether the omission of the examination of this question was made by design or in error. I personally feel that this question comes within the class of problems which are very directly related to security. I therefore ask that Resolution II be added to the series of problems which the Committee will be called upon to examine.

The CHAIRMAN. — I should like to make a few explanations in view of what M. Markovitch has said. I agree with him as to his first declaration and I think these proposals should be understood as designed to lead to practical measures and concrete results.

As regards his second observation concerning Resolution II, I will give the following explanation. Resolution II confirms the work which has been done during the past year as regards Article 11 and which has already been summed up in a resolution of the Council. In our proposals, we referred to it in connection with Article 11 and in the following terms: "Study and co-ordination of the results of the work at present being examined by the Transit Organisation as regards communications in an emergency". If this does not appear to be sufficiently explicit, I see no difficulty in its being more closely defined and completed if M. Markovitch so desires.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). — That would give me entire satisfaction.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I understand that we are now speaking of the document which we received this morning. I should like to make two small observations regarding Article 11. We think that the work of the Committee has been too greatly limited and that this article should be dealt with as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. — The Committee is agreed that satisfaction should be given the Count Bernstorff in this matter.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — Then this point is settled.

As regards Article 8, I consider that that article, at any rate as it has been dealt with here, is within the competence of the Preparatory Commission. The last paragraph is indeed the essential point in the question of disarmament. All disarmament depends on the fact that in the future there must be no secret between the States regarding their armaments.

This is the first step towards disarmament, and, as the Preparatory Commission has a Military Sub-Commission at its disposal, we consider that this point is within the exclusive competence of the Preparatory Commission. We attach much importance to the study of this paragraph of Article 8, since we consider it as the most essential point in the whole disarmament question.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France). — I have only a few observations to make. In the first place, I accept the proposed plan from the same point of view as that indicated by M. Markovitch, *i.e.*, that we are not to make merely theoretical investigations but we are to aim at positive and practical proposals. Practical proposals, however, must first of all be studied, and I am therefore compelled to accept the programme which has been submitted. I confess that this programme first of all appeared to me to call for one objection, because it makes some distinction between the study of treaties of arbitration and that of treaties of security. Pushing this distinction still further, the Chairman even proposed that these questions should be dealt with by separate Rapporteurs. I am, however, reassured, as I understand we agree to accept in full the meaning of the paragraph on procedure which says : " The two memoranda on points I and II (*i.e.*, on arbitration and security) will be co-ordinated by the three Rapporteurs with the help of the Chairman ". This paragraph means that the distinction in question is only for the purposes of work, and that there will be no separation of arbitration and security as regards the positive measures which we shall have to take. We have met to endeavour to increase the guarantees of security. Many of us believe that security can be increased by arbitration supported by guarantees and sanctions but not without them.

My third remark is that, while I very naturally differ from the views of M. Markovitch. I venture to believe that what is really at the base of our work is the resolution of the last Assembly. I should personally raise no objection to its being given an extended interpretation, but I am somewhat bound towards my colleagues, with whom I reached agreement after some difficulty at the end of the last Assembly. We must clearly endeavour to respect the terms of the resolution and we must avoid endeavouring to twist them so as to meet our own personal views. This resolution is, moreover, the basis of the scheme of work on which we have agreed. It has the advantage that it fully meets the objections of our colleague in calling not for theoretical study but for practical results. It provides measures which will increase the present conditions of security, which, I agree with you, are quite insufficient.

My fourth and final remark is that, as regards the enumeration of the articles of the Covenant, we agree with our colleagues that there is no question of attempting to define them, but that we merely have to devise means for their effective application. I agree with Count Bernstorff that Article 8 — or at least that part of it which is quoted and concerns the exchange of information as to effectives and military material — concerns the Preparatory Commission and not the Committee on Arbitration and Security. This is a matter not only of theoretical but of practical interest. Certain States members of the Preparatory Commission are not, to our regret, members of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. It therefore follows that, on the day when the International Disarmament Convention is signed the exchange of information or supervision which may be established will affect not only the Members of the League but also the States signatories of the Convention who may or may not be Members.

LORD CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — I fully agree with what the Chairman has said with regard to the bringing of this stage of our proceedings to a conclusion. I wish, however, to express my thanks to the Bureau for the document they have put before us this morning, to some extent in response to a suggestion which I made yesterday. This document supplies us with the sort of sketch which I desire to have as a guide to our future work. It is a very large programme and it has given rise to a certain amount of friendly criticism and examination in this room this morning. I find myself in general agreement with what has been said by my colleagues with regard to this study.

It is a very large question, and I hope when we come to examine it in detail it will be recognised that no part of the subject is excluded from examination. I hope it will also be recognised that we are not in any way committed to any proposition which may have been placed before us by the Bureau or which may be placed before us in memoranda sent in to the Bureau. We want to approach the examination of the question with completely open minds and without being in any way committed to any particular solution of any part of the problem.

A very large and difficult question arises, in my opinion, on the very meaning of the word "security". I was struck by what M. Paul-Boncour said just now, that he was a little alarmed or disturbed at the apparent separation of the examination of treaties of arbitration from treaties of security. I think it would be well that some careful examination should be made of what is meant by "security". As I see it, security as applied to nations varies enormously with the circumstances, geographical position, and possibly the constitutional government of each nation. It will not help us very much if a too rigid definition is attempted of a generalisation to include all the different circumstances of different nations. If we try to draw the line too closely we shall lose the elasticity of interpretation which seems to me to be essential.

That is all I have to say at this stage, and, if I understand the proposal aright, that we

should now accept this document and that there should be no further sitting, I am in agreement with that suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. — The Bureau accepts the suggestions of Count Bernstorff and M. Paul-Boncour concerning Article 8. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the proposals of the Bureau thus amended are adopted by the Committee.

If there are no objections, I shall also consider the proposal regarding the Rapporteurs as adopted by the Committee.

*The Committee adopted these proposals.*

## 5. Fixing of the Date of the Next Session.

The CHAIRMAN. — I now propose to give you a few indications as to the dates in connection with our work.

In order to satisfy the desires expressed by certain delegations, the Bureau will do its best to circulate the various documents prepared by the Rapporteurs and by itself fifteen days before the meeting of the Committee.

I now come to the question of the date of our next meeting, and I ask M. Loudon to take his place by the officers of the Committee, as this question is closely connected with the meeting of the Preparatory Commission. The preparation of the material necessary for the study of the problem will take up a certain amount of time. We have given the various Governments until January 1st to submit their memoranda. The Rapporteurs will then have the month of January at their disposal to deal with the material. We must also provide about a fortnight for the circulation and study of the documents by the delegations. Under the circumstances, I think we might fix the date of February 20th for the next meeting of the Committee. Our meeting would be followed by that of the Preparatory Commission.

In making these proposals, I have the agreement of M. Loudon, President of the Preparatory Commission.

COUNT BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I should be very grateful if the Chairman would not decide the question of the date of the next session to-day, but would leave it until the meeting of the Preparatory Commission to-morrow. If you will allow me to say so, the Preparatory Commission is really the mother of this Committee, and it is natural that such a decision should be taken by the Preparatory Commission. We must not forget that the fixing of this date raises a number of questions of principle to which it is impossible to say "yes" or "no" at the last minute. I personally could not agree to discuss the fixing of the dates in this way at the last minute.

The chief reason for which I asked you not to hasten this decision that is we have a moral obligation to the Assembly to hold the first Disarmament Conference on the basis of the present conditions of security in the year 1928. We cannot present ourselves before the Assembly without having done our utmost to secure the holding of that Conference next year. If it should be impossible, we should have to have a good reason for not having done so. Otherwise, I do not know what attitude I should take at the next Assembly. I therefore ask you not to open the debate immediately and to allow us to discuss the matter to-morrow.

The CHAIRMAN. — I will endeavour to explain this point. The proposal of Count Bernstorff seems to me to raise the question of principle as to the relations of two committees. The dates of their respective meetings are practically bound together. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the Committee should have the right to decide when it will meet. It is, however, impossible for it not to take into consideration the decisions of the Preparatory Commission. If our colleagues agree not to take a decision immediately as to the date of our next meeting, we might await the results of the discussions of the Preparatory Commission in this matter. When their decision is known, we might fix the date of the next meeting of the Committee. If you would agree to leave it to your Bureau to decide when they know the decision of the Preparatory Commission, it would be possible to do so without having to call a meeting to-morrow.

*The Committee adopted this proposal.*

## 6. Declarations by the Rapporteurs.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — I rise to express my warm thanks to the Committee for the great honour which they have done me in appointing me as Rapporteur on the question of security. I do not conceal from myself the enormous difficulty of the task or the considerable responsibility which I accept in taking it up.

The exchange of views which has taken place yesterday and this morning in the Committee will to some extent facilitate my work. It seems to me that our discussions clearly show that one thing is to be definitely excluded from the work we are about to undertake: I mean the idea of seeking to erect some theoretical structure which would have no chance of success. On the

contrary, our efforts must be confined to an attempt to devise practical means along the four lines indicated in Resolution V of the last Assembly. I am particularly grateful to the honourable delegate of the British Empire, who has put this matter beyond all doubt, and to all my colleagues who supported him in that point of view.

Our task will be all the greater because, according to the time-table the Chairman has proposed, we shall have to work very quickly, particularly at a time when the Christmas festivities will add various duties to those of us who are already busy with their normal occupations.

In view of the absolute necessity for success and the fact that we must submit a practical result to the Committee at its next session, we must make every effort to accomplish something in the short interval which is given us.

I am placing great reliance on the way in which our Chairman is going to direct our work, and on the devotion which he has shown to the League of Nations for so many years. But let me also count upon the invitation which he made to you just now, when he asked you to submit to the Bureau before January 1st any suggestions, indications or memoranda which may be useful for our work. This will be an extremely great help for us, and I shall be very grateful if there is a large recompense to the invitation of the Chairman.

M. HOLSTI (Finland). — I should like to express my most respectful thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Committee for the great honour you have done me in appointing me Rapporteur.

M. RUTGERS (Netherlands). — I also desire to thank the Committee for the honour which it has done me in appointing me Rapporteur. If M. Politis feels a sense of responsibility in this matter, I have all the more reason to feel the same, because I do not possess his long and brilliant experience. I did not venture to refuse to accept the work which you have conferred upon me, but I only assume it relying upon the direction which the Chairman can give me and the devoted co-operation of the Secretariat of the League.

#### 7. Convocation of the Preparatory Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. — The President of the Preparatory Commission asks me to inform you that this Commission will meet at 11 a.m. to-morrow morning.

#### 8. Close of the Session.

The CHAIRMAN. — The work of the present session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security is now at an end. I wish to thank you very warmly for your co-operation, and I declare this session closed.

*The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.*

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1.

#### PROPOSALS BY THE BUREAU RELATING TO THE PROGRAMME AND METHOD OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION AND SECURITY.

##### I. PROPOSAL REGARDING THE PROGRAMME OF WORK.

###### *First Group of Questions.*

Arbitration and security agreements.

Study of measures enabling the League of Nations to promote, generalise and co-ordinate special or collective agreements on arbitration and security (Resolution No. V, page 3, paragraph 4).

###### A. *Treaties of Arbitration.*

1. Measures for their promotion.

Resolution of the 1926 Assembly: Recommendations to States Members and offer of the Council's good offices.

2. Suitable means of co-ordination and generalisation.

Two methods may be indicated:

(1) An analytical study of existing treaties for the purpose of extracting the substance common to all of them on which a model convention might be based;

(2) A study of the draft optional convention for the obligatory arbitration of disputes, submitted to the Third Committee by Dr. Nansen on behalf of the Norwegian delegation taking into account the following recommendations of the First Committee of the Assembly.

(a) Means should be sought for encouraging and promoting the acceptance of the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the conclusion of special treaties for judicial settlement, arbitration and conciliation.

(b) In any investigation into the methods of pacific settlement of disputes between States, special attention should be paid to the procedure of conciliation, which is of the utmost importance.

(c) Very special attention should also be given to the question of the relations between the Council's and the Assembly's mediatory action and the procedures of arbitration and conciliation.

(d) In studying a general convention for compulsory arbitration, enquiry should be made as to how the convention could be given sufficient flexibility to permit the contracting States to adjust the obligations assumed to their particular circumstances.

###### B. *Security Agreements.*

1. Measures for their promotion.

Resolution of the 1926 Assembly: Recommendations to States Members and offer of the Council's good offices.

2. Suitable means of co-ordination and generalisation.

Study of existing security treaties from the point of view of their use by the Council for the application of Articles 10, 11, 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

Study of agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States (Resolution No. V, No. 3, paragraph 6).

Study of the procedure to be followed by the Council to give effect to the last paragraph of the Assembly resolution, which proposes that the Council should invite States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that, in a particular case, either all its forces or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the Council's decision or recommendations (Resolution No. V, No. 3, paragraph 7).

*Second Group of Questions.*

Systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant (Resolution No. V, No. 3, paragraph 5).

Though there is no desire to limit the future sphere of action of the Committee in this matter, the programme may forthwith be extended to the following articles :

*Article 8.* — Study of the means of applying the last paragraph of Article 8, which requires States to exchange information regarding their armaments, either by development of the Military Year-Book published by the League of Nations and its periodical consideration or by any other means.

*Article 10.* — Study of the criteria by which aggression may be presumed.

*Article 11.* — Investigation and co-ordination of the results of the work at present being examined by the Transit Organisation as regards communications in an-emergency.

*Article 16.* — Study of Article 16 under conditions similar to those applied to the study of Article 11.

Study of the scheme of financial assistance to be given to States threatened with aggression, and particularly of the preliminary points raised by the Financial Committee.

(a) Study of the criteria by which aggression may be presumed and the procedure of the Council in this matter.

(b) Right of participation by States (the question of States not Members of the League).

*Proposal regarding Procedure.*

The Bureau contemplates a procedure consisting of two stages.

First stage : period between the first session of the Committee (present session) and the second session (date to be fixed).

The Secretariat, acting on the instructions of the Bureau and the Rapporteurs mentioned below, would prepare the necessary documentation, regard being had to the indications given at the meetings.

During this period, certain Rapporteurs would prepare memoranda on questions in the programme described above, which would serve as a basis for the discussion to be held during the second session.

The Bureau considers that three Rapporteurs might be appointed : One for Question I (A) — arbitration agreements ; one for Question I (B) — security agreements ; one for Question II — articles of the Covenant.

The memoranda prepared by the first two Rapporteurs would be co-ordinated by the authors in conjunction with the Chairman of the Committee and would thus constitute a general memorandum on point I.

The two memoranda thus obtained on points I and II respectively would also be co-ordinated by the three Rapporteurs in co-operation with the Chairman of the Committee, so as to submit to the Committee the final memoranda in the form of an organic whole. This could serve as a basis for the work of the Committee.

Second stage of the procedure :

On the basis of the above-mentioned memoranda, the Committee would examine the question with a view to preparing a report for submission to the Preparatory Commission. The Committee would then have to decide whether this investigation should be conducted entirely in plenary session or whether the Committee's task ought to be facilitated by the creation of sub-committees (and if so, what number). In either case the final decisions as to the terms of the report to be submitted to the Preparatory Commission would, of course, be taken by the Committee at a plenary meeting. It is, indeed, only at that moment that questions relating to the constitution of these sub-committees (if required) could be usefully discussed.

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**ANNEX 2.**

**PROGRAMME AND METHOD OF WORK ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE  
ON ARBITRATION AND SECURITY.**

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The text adopted was that proposed by the Bureau (Annex 1 above), with the following amendments :

*Second Group of Questions :*

The paragraph relating to Article 8 is omitted.

The paragraph relating to Article 11 reads as follows :

“ *Article 11.* — Study of this article, taking into account the work already done and at present being examined. ”

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