

DISARMAMENT

(An Analysis of East-West Differences)



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PREFACE

THIS brochure contains an analysis of the various views on Disarmament and presents in an objective manner the progress in disarmament talks ever since the United Nations Organisation had this question on its agenda in 1946.

NEW DELHI;
The 30th May, 1955.

M. N. KAUL,
Secretary.

INTRODUCTION

DISARMAMENT was hopefully foreshadowed in the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1940 in which President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill declared : " they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force ".

In the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1942, Great Britain, United States, the Soviet Union and China announced :

" They will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practical general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period."

After the end of the Second World War, disarmament again became an important topic in international discussions. The United Nations Charter which was drawn up at the San Francisco Conference (June 26, 1945) envisaged disarmament as well as regulation of armaments (Article 11). Article 26 of the Charter provided that the Security Council should devise a system for the regulation of armaments and submit it to all members.

During the past eight years there have been consistent efforts on the part of the big powers to effect a reduction in all armaments including atomic weapons, but no agreement could be arrived at, the principal hurdles being (i) the question of control of atomic weapons and (ii) the extent of reduction to be effected in conventional armaments.

II

EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES OVER DISARMAMENT

[It may be noted that for eight years (1946—53) there had been no change in the attitudes either of the Western Powers or of the Soviet Union towards disarmament. Significant changes in the view-points of the two blocs were noticeable in June, 1954. In October-November, 1954, there was radical change of Soviet policy towards disarmament.]

1946—1953

Western View

The West maintained that conventional weapons and armed forces should be subjected to a balanced reduction to the level required for defence. The figures suggested¹ in May, 1952, were one to one and a half million men each for the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, and 700,000 to 800,000 each for the United Kingdom and France. This would provide approximate equality between the two blocs. Disclosures of figures and international verification were a necessary prelude. Atomic weapons and their manufacture would be prohibited after the establishment of an effective international agency of control. Very small quantities of fissionable material were required for large explosions and control must comprehend management of plant, with the minimum interference with national sovereignty. This proposal originated in the Baruch Plan² (June, 1946) which was accepted by a majority of the United Nations, not including the U.S.S.R.

Soviet View

The Soviet Union suggested² the solution of the question of conventional weapons by an immediate reduction on the part of the Great Powers by one-third. Atomic weapons should be destroyed and their manufacture forbidden. Information would then be submitted about all other armaments. An organisation for international control should follow. This body was envisaged within the frame-work of the Security Council.

¹Proposal submitted by Sir Gladwin Jebb on behalf of the Western Powers at the meeting of the Disarmament Commission held on the 28th May, 1952.

²Plan for the international control of atomic energy submitted by Dr. Bernard Baruch, U.S. Representative on the A.R.C. at the meeting of the Commission held on the 14th June, 1946 (See *Keating's Contemporary Archives*, June 15, 22, 1946, p. 7955).

³*Keating's Contemporary Archives*, June 28—July 5, 1952 (Speech of M. Gromyko at the Second Session of the A. E. C. commenced on June 19, 1946).

East, West Differences

1954

Western View

Soviet View

1. Ban on the use of nuclear weapons :

The Western nations (Britain and France supported by the U. S. A.) proposed⁴ a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. It was believed to be the first time that Western Powers had said that they were willing to make a formal commitment limiting the situation in which atomic weapons could be used.

Soviet Union held⁴ that since the proposal did *not* outlaw atomic weapons, its only result would be to 'relax' vigilance about their danger.

2. Phasing of Disarmament Programme :

Under the Western proposals⁵ put forward by U. K. and France the control organ would decide when each successive phase of disarmament should begin. The proposal of the Western Nations was that, in the second phase, total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons should follow completion of the agreed reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

The Soviet Union accepted⁷ the schedule of phasing put forward in the Anglo-French proposals but disagreed on the timing of the second phase. The Soviet position seemed to be that prohibition should become compulsory from the outset of the second phase and that elimination should proceed throughout the second.

3. Control and Enforcement :

The guiding principle of the Western proposal⁶ was that there should be one control organ whose powers should increase 'pari passu' with the execution of phased disarmament.

The Soviet Union wanted⁸ two control organs: the first would be temporary, and would supervise the first phase; the second would be permanent and supervise the second phase.

The Western nations proposed that (i) agreements on the functions and powers of the control organ should precede the commencement of the disarmament programme and (ii) the control organ's representatives should be stationed on the spot in the various countries and ready to function before the process of disarming began.

The Soviet Union agreed to the first proposal but suggested that the question of stationing representatives should be decided later.

⁴U. N. No. 2 (1954) : Cmd. 9204 (H.M.S.O.) U. N. 3 (1954) : Cmd. 9205 (H.M.S.O.)
New York Times, June 25, 1954.

⁵U. N. No. 3 (1954) : Cmd. 9205.
⁶U. N. No. 3 (1954) : Cmd. 9205.

⁷*New York Times*, Oct. 1, 1954. (Pros. of Disarmament Commission, September 30, 1954).

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Western View

Soviet View

4. Inspection:

The Western Powers held⁹ that the control organ should be adequately empowered to carry out inspection anywhere in the world.

The Soviet Union accepted¹¹ the principle that supervision must be adequate to ensure detection but offered no powers of inspection for its temporary control organ and did not make clear whether the permanent control organs would have ubiquitous powers of inspection.

5. Sanctions :

The Western view¹⁰ was that in certain cases which would not be held to constitute threats to peace, the control organ could itself apply enforcement measures without reference to the Security Council (where the Veto rule would apply).

The Soviet Union wanted¹² all enforcement measures to be sanctions imposed by the Security Council.

6. Reduction of armed forces :

The Western Powers proposed balanced reductions, on a sliding scale, according to relative position in different countries. This, the Western nations maintained, would get rid of the existing disequilibrium which was markedly in favour of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union maintained its stand for proportional reductions

⁹ & ¹⁰ U. N. No. 3 (1954) Cmd. 9205.

¹¹ & ¹² *New York Times*, Oct. 1954.
(Pros. of Disarmament Commission
September 30, 1954).

III

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PLAN

(MAY 10, 1955)

ON the 10th May the Soviet Union proposed a world disarmament plan under which international control groups would keep a watch in all nations to prevent war preparations. The Russian proposal was published by the official news agency 'Tass' in the form of three resolutions for the consideration of the United Nations. The Russian plan for disarmament (Appendix IV) calls for :

1. The full prohibition of the use and production of nuclear weapons as well as of other weapons of mass destruction and of stores of atomic weapons.
2. A "considerable reduction" in the armed forces and weapons of conventional type.
3. The establishment of an international control organ "set up on the territories of all states concerned" with control points in "large ports, railroad centres, roads and airfields". The aim of the organ would be to prevent "dangerous concentrations" of military, air and naval forces and "sudden attacks" by states on each other.
4. The control body would have authority to demand evidence from the various nations that they were reducing arms and military forces and would have the right of access to all materials "concerning the budget assignments of states for military purposes".
5. The disarmament convention should come into force in two stages covering the years 1956 and 1957.
6. During the first stage in 1956 the states signing the convention should promise not to increase their armed forces, including atomic weapons, above the level of December 31, 1954.
7. At the same time, the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Britain and France should provide the disarmament commission with information on their armed forces within one month of entry into force of the convention.
8. Limits for the numbers in the armed forces of the United States, Russia and Communist China should be a figure between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men and for Britain and France, 650,000.
9. During 1956 these five powers would reduce their armed forces by 50 per cent of the amount by which they exceeded the proposed levels.
10. During the first half of 1956 a world conference on disarmament should be called.
11. During the first stage, the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons should cease, and an international commission should be set up to report to the Security Council and General Assembly of the observance of this undertaking.
12. All states should make "a solemn declaration not to use nuclear weapons" before the entry into force of an agreement banning such weapons.

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13. During 1956 states which had military, naval or air bases on the territory of other countries should undertake to liquidate them.
14. During the second period—1957—the five big powers would make the second half of reductions in their armed forces to the agreed level. They would also cease production of atomic and nuclear weapons and reduce the budget expenditure on military needs.
15. Finally, steps would be taken to liquidate foreign military bases.
16. The question of the obligations of Communist China as a partner member of the Security Council should be examined with the participation of the Communist Chinese Government.
17. The proposal would allow use of nuclear weapons "for purposes of defence against aggression when an appropriate decision is taken by the Security Council" pending their abolition.

Reactions of Western Nations

2. The text of the Russian disarmament plan¹ which was accompanied by a document advocating general measures for the reduction of world tension was handed over by Mr. Malik, Chief Soviet delegate on May 10, 1955 at the session of the sub-committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission which was holding talks in London. Mr. Malik suggested that the documents should be passed on to the General Assembly.

Mr. Nutting, Chief British delegate, said on May 11 that the Russian declaration marked a significant advance on several major points which the Western delegates had been advocating for several weeks. It was encouraging to see the Soviet Government adopting a number of proposals originally put forward by the West and hitherto criticised by the Russians. Mr. Nutting said that whereas on March 22 Mr. Gromyko had revived in the sub-committee the old Russian proposal for a flat one-third cut in the forces of all major States, the new Russian declaration accepted the Anglo-French proposal that the American, Russian and Chinese armed forces should each be reduced to between one million and 1,500,000 men, and the British and French to 650,000 each. On the question of when to start prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons the Russians had now accepted the Anglo-French compromise solution that this should be started after 75 per cent of conventional reductions had taken place; hitherto the Russians had insisted that it should start after 50 per cent.

According to Mr. Nutting the Soviet views on international control were still obscure. They did not seem to have accepted all the conditions for effective control, and in particular had not made it clear how much freedom of movement they envisaged for the control body. Mr. Nutting further said that the declaration on disarmament although it was irregular and gave credit to Russia for proposals that were not hers was at least a distinct improvement on Mr. Gromyko's biased and distorted disclosures on March 25, 1955.*

*The Soviet delegate to the Disarmament Conference released to the *Tass*, Soviet News Agency on March 25, 1955, the text of the secret proposals for a quota system of arms cuts put forward by him at the Conference.

The main provisions were that States should reduce their armaments, armed forces and Military Budgets by 50 per cent. of agreed quotas within six months or one year. It was also suggested by the Soviet Union that a world conference on disarmament should be called this year, inviting also the countries outside the United Nations. Another proposal was for a provisional international control agency to be set up under the Security Council to supervise disarmament.

1. The Soviet delegates disclosed that the Western Powers desired the establishment of a permanent international control agency, with powers to carry out inspections, before measures had been taken to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Soviet Disarmament Plan

3. On the 13th May, 1955 the U. S. State Department published all documents that were submitted to the London talks of the sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Conference between February 25 (the day the sub-Committee met) and May 9, 1955 (the day before the release of the Soviet plan). The publication of the documents follows the Russian disclosures of the plan.

The documents reveal that in a joint resolution submitted to the London Disarmament Conference on April 21, 1955, the Western nations (Canada, France, Britain and the U. S. A.) proposed to Russia that an international control organ must have "full responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of all the provisions" of a world disarmament treaty.

The Western resolution on control states that :

International officials of the control organ must be granted the right :

1. To be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament agreement ;
2. Of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating States, and unrestricted access to all installations and facilities required by them for effective performance of their responsibilities and functions ;
3. Of unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities ; and
4. Of inviolability of person, premises, property and archives.

The Western resolution also demands that "the control organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed. "

It stipulates that the control organ "must be in a position and able to carry out its tasks effectively before each phase of the disarmament programme begins. "

The resolution asks for the control organ to be given these powers :

1. To determine details of methods and processes of supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of the various phases of disarmament.
2. To supervise and verify the disclosures of information at each stage of the disarmament programme with respect to all armaments, armed forces and related installations and facilities.
3. To ensure that installations, facilities, equipment and materials, including nuclear stocks, are disposed of or used in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty.
4. To organize and conduct field and aerial surveys to determine whether the disclosures of installations and facilities are complete.
5. To conduct research to keep itself up to date in nuclear knowledge and so "be fully effective in eliminating destructive uses of nuclear energy, so that such energy shall be used only for peaceful purposes.

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6. To report and provide information to the U. N. Security Council, the General Assembly and the signatory States and to make recommendations for appropriate action by them in the event of any violation of the disarmament treaty.
7. To take necessary measures to deal with any violations of the disarmament treaty pending action by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the signatory States ; to call upon the party concerned and its agents to comply with such measures, without prejudice to its rights, claims or position.

Soviet and Western Proposals Analysed

4. The Western disarmament plan is in three stages while the new Soviet proposals are in two. The new Soviet plan makes two major concessions to the West :

1. It agrees to the West's figures for the reduction levels of the armed forces of the five major powers. The West had proposed that the armed forces of the U.S.A., Russia and China be limited to between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 and those of Britain and France to 650,000 each.
2. The Soviet Union has now agreed to compromise the Western proposal that the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons should begin when 75 per cent of the conventional reductions have been accomplished. The West had originally proposed that the ban should not come before 100 per cent fulfilment, while the Soviet Union wanted it to become operative after 50 per cent.

The Western critics point out that the Soviet proposal is vague on the subject of production controls. They further point out that under the Soviet plan the control organ would not have the power to take independent action, but only to make recommendations to the United Nations Security Council, where the Soviet representative could delay or block matters by exercising the veto power. In their opinion the April 21 resolution could empower the control organ to "take such measures provided for in the treaty as may be necessary to deal with violations" until the Security Council, General Assembly or the signatory nations took action. At the start of the London talks Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet representative proposed that all armed forces and military appropriations be frozen at the levels of Jan. 1, 1955, while States with atomic and hydrogen weapons should destroy them completely. This proposal, the Western critics contend, would have left the Soviet Union's 175-division army intact while leaving the United States to wipe out its nuclear stockpile, the only area in which the West has an advantage. Rejecting the initial Soviet plan in a joint declaration on March 11, the four Western powers said no disarmament plan could be accepted that did not "apply equally to all the elements of the military power of a state". "Any disarmament plan, to be acceptable, must be drawn up in such a way that each of its stages increases the security of all parties and not the security of only one of the parties at the expense of the others", they contended. "It must provide for genuine and effective international control and inspection, fully competent to ensure its effective execution"

APPENDIX I

Chronology of Developments in the United Nations Organization

- January 24, 1946 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution which established a Commission "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy." The commission was ordered to prepare specific proposals "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions."
- June 14, 1946 The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission held its first session. During this session the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union submitted their proposals for the international regulation and control of atomic energy. The Americans proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority which would have managerial control over all atomic work with potential military uses. In addition, the Authority would have power to inspect and license all other uses of atomic energy, and the duty of furthering research and development designed to make atomic energy available for peaceful uses. An important point was the American demand that any national veto power should be abolished in order to make possible prompt and automatic punishment of any nation that violated its agreements by producing weapons. The U. S. A. proposed to place her atomic bombs at the disposal of the new International authority and offered to cease manufacture as soon as an adequate system of international control had been established.
- The U.S.S.R. proposed an international agreement which would prohibit the production or use of atomic weapons, and commit its signatories to destroy atomic bombs already in existence. The U. S. S. R. further proposed that two international committees should be set up: one to supervise the exchange

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scientific information about atomic research among nations and the second to prevent the use of atomic energy in ways detrimental to humanity. The second committee was to devise an adequate system of sanctions to be employed against a nation which turned the new resource to military purposes.

December, 20, 1946 . . . The Atomic Energy Commission approved the basic points of the United States Plan for international atomic control. Soviet Union abstained from voting.

December 30, 1946 . . . The Atomic Energy Commission adopted its first report to the Security Council by 10 votes to none (Poland abstaining and U. S. S. R. not participating in the vote).

February 13, 1947 . . . The Security Council adopted the resolution establishing the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

March 10, 1947 . . . The Security Council after consideration of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission resolved to refer the matter back to the Commission with the request for continued study for preparation of a draft convention.

August 12, 1948 . . . The Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted the following resolution defining conventional armaments :—

“The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to advise the Security Council,

1. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above,

2. that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition.”

September 10-11, 1948 . . . The Atomic Energy Commission discussed and adopted its second report to the Security Council. Soviet Union voted against the report; Poland abstained.

Appendix

- May 17, 1948 . . . The Atomic Energy Commission adopted its third report to the Security Council. This report contained a recommendation for the suspension of the Commission's activities until such time as the permanent members of the Security Council should find, by prior consultation among themselves, a basis for agreement on the International control of atomic energy.
- June 11, 1948 . . . The Security Council considered the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. An American resolution approving the proposals which had found favour with a majority in the Commission was defeated by the veto of the U. S. S. R. The three reports were transmitted to the General Assembly.
- November 19, 1948 . . . The General Assembly adopted a resolution requiring the Security Council to pursue by means of its Commission for Conventional Armaments, the question of the regulation and reduction of armaments.
- November 4, 1948 . . . The General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing deep concern at the impasse which had been reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and calling upon the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to meet together and consult in order to arrive at an agreement.
- February 10, 1949 . . . The Security Council referred the resolution of the General Assembly to the Commission on Conventional Armaments (This Commission adopted on 1-8-1949 a French plan for the collection and verification of information about armaments).
- October 14, 1949 . . . U. S. S. R. vetoed the proposal for the approval of the French plan.
- July 29, 1949 . . . The Atomic Energy Commission failed to find a basis for agreement.
- September 16, 1949 . . . The Security Council adopted a resolution to apprise the General Assembly about the failure of the Commission.
- November 23, 1949 . . . The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the six permanent members of the A. E. C. to resume their talks.
- December 5, 1949 . . . The General Assembly approved the proposal of the Commission on Conventional Armaments concerning the submission of information.

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- December 13, 1950 . . . The General Assembly approved a proposal that a committee of 12 should consider the possibility of establishing a new disarmament commission by a merger of the A. E. C. and the Commission on Conventional Armaments.
- November 16, 1951 . . . U. S. S. R. proposed that the General Assembly adopted a resolution banning unconditionally the use of atomic weapons.
- November 18, 1951 . . . The Western nations proposed that the existing Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions should be amalgamated to form the Disarmament Commission having the same membership. This conference was to prepare a treaty for submission to a general international conference.
- January 11, 1952 . . . The General Assembly approved the Western proposal.
- March 14, 1952 . . . The U. N. Disarmament Commission began its work.
- August 29, 1952 . . . The U. N. Disarmament Commission adjourned without reconciling the opposing viewpoints of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union.
- April 23, 1953 . . . Against the opposition of the Soviet group, the General Assembly adopted a 14-nation resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to continue its work.
- November 28, 1953 . . . The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the Disarmament Commission to "continue its efforts to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned."
- December 9, 1953 . . . President Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly. He stressed the appalling destructive powers of atomic weapons and pointed out that the dread secret was now known not only by the West. His main concern was the peaceful application of atomic energy under the United Nations Control.
- April 9, 1954 . . . Sir Pierson Dixon, United Kingdom delegate at the United Nations, proposed private discussions between Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Appendix

- May 13, 1954 The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission met in private in London with a view to finding an "acceptable solution to the problem of disarmament".
- June 11, 1954 Britain and France supported by the U.S.A. proposed a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. This proposal was made by France and Britain as a compromise towards ending the eight-year East-West controversy on whether atomic bomb production was to come before or after the setting up of international control. The British-French proposal was in line with the Western theory that atomic control and general disarmament must be synchronized and must proceed step by step. This theory was endorsed by the majority of the United Nations but was rejected by the Soviet Union.
- The British-French proposal was not accepted by the Soviet Union on the ground that it would legalise the bomb. At the end of the private talks the Sub-Committee issued a brief statement declaring that it would make its report public at the U. N. Headquarters.
- June 22, 1954 The Sub-Committee concluded its talks without arriving at an agreement.
- June 28, 1954 Sir Selwyn Lloyd, the British Minister of State, made a statement in the House of Commons about the meeting of the Sub-Committee and the Anglo-French proposal of June 11, 1954.
- July 20, 1954 The U. N. Disarmament Commission took up consideration of the report of the Sub-Committee.
- July 27, 1954 The Chairman of the Disarmament Commission suggested that new proposals on disarmament be put forward at the next General Assembly.
- September 30, 1954 . . The Soviet Delegate to the U. N. General Assembly (M. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky) offered new disarmament proposals. [Positive and negative elements in Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals, as analysed by the *New York Times* in its issue dated the 2nd October, 1954 were on the following lines :—
- Positive.*—The Soviet Union acknowledge now that atomic and conventional disarmament are related to parts of the same problem ; they no longer insist on immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and concede a step by step solution,

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starting with reduction of conventional weapons and providing for international organs of inspection and control ; they drop the previous demand on admission of the Peking Government and abolition of foreign bases and also propose an International Disarmament Convention based on the Anglo-French proposals of June, 1954.

Negative.—The Soviet proposals to start disarmament by an overall reduction of armaments and armament budget not on the basis of balance of power (as wanted by the West), but according to agreed norms based on the existing levels (the paper thought this was merely a new version of the previous Soviet proposal for a flat one-third reduction of conventional armaments. This had been rejected on the ground that, with the ban on atomic weapons, this would give the Soviets military advantage) ; the Soviet proposal put the initial inspection and control under the Security Council, where they have the veto.

- October 5, 1954 . . . The Steering Committee of the U. N. General Assembly agreed to recommend the inclusion on the agenda the Soviet proposal on disarmament and international atomic energy control.
- October 8, 1954 . . . The Political and Security Committee decided to take up the Disarmament Commission's Report on the negotiations as the first item on its agenda. The Committee also decided that discussion should proceed concurrently with a debate on the new Soviet proposals which accepted as the basis for a treaty providing for 'Substantial' disarmament and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
- October 11, 1954 . . . Debate on the disarmament proposal opened in the Political and Security Council.
- October 22, 1954 . . . The Soviet Union agreed to join with Britain, France, Canada, and the U.S.A. in sponsoring a resolution, calling for renewed five-power talks on disarmament.
- October 25, 1954 . . . The Indian delegation introduced a resolution calling upon the Disarmament Commission to study ways and means of establishing an "armament truce" pending agreement upon a comprehensive system for disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

October 27, 1954 .

Appendix

. Political and Security Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approved unanimously a resolution calling for a new attempt to reach agreement between East and West on disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The resolution was sponsored jointly by the United States, Britain, France, Canada and the Soviet Union. It was the first proposal combining Western and Soviet sponsorship since the resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission, which was adopted by the Assembly in January, 1946. Under the joint resolution, and under other resolutions approved by the Political and Security Committee the Disarmament Commission would be requested to take into account or consider :

1. The 1954 report of the Disarmament Commission, containing the British-French and United States proposals, both of which were rejected by the Soviet Union in June, 1954.
2. The Soviet proposals, submitted to the Assembly on September 30, 1954.
3. The Indian resolution, which asks the Disarmament Commission to study "ways and means of establishing an 'armament truce'" pending agreement on the international convention that would determine the amount of disarmament and the steps by which nuclear weapons would be prohibited, and the means by which compliance could be determined.
4. An Australian resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to ask the United Nations Secretariat to prepare, as soon as practicable, a "documentary presentation" of the positions of the great powers on the various aspects of the disarmament problem.
5. The transcript of the debates on the disarmament question in the Political and Security Committee.

The Soviet Union also joined the four Western powers in submitting a second joint resolution referring the Indian resolution to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate study.

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- November 4, 1954 . . . The United Nations General Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution asking the United Nations Disarmament Commission to revive the sub-committee which met in London in June, 1954 for private talks. The five Powers represented on that sub-committee were Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the U. S. A. and Canada.
- By a vote of 57 to 1 (Nationalist China) the Assembly approved the recommendation of the Political Committee referring to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration the Indian suggestions for the study of ways of bringing about "armaments truce" pending agreement on a disarmament convention.
- February 2, 1955 . . . In a statement broadcast by Moscow Radio, the Soviet Union called upon the United Nations to convene a conference this year to reduce armaments and ban the atom and hydrogen bombs. In this statement it was proposed that the nations should pledge themselves : (i) to destroy all stock-piles of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons ; and (ii) not to increase their armed forces or armaments or their military budgets above the level of January 1, 1955. The Soviet Union also proposed the setting up of an appropriate international control for the supervision of these decisions.
- February 25, 1955 . . . The Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission began its session in London. The meeting was opened by Mr. Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs as Chairman. The Sub-Committee adjourned to meet again in private on March 1 and continue its work.
- March 26, 1955 . . . Mr. Anthony Nutting, British delegate to the five-power disarmament talks, said that the most important point agreed to so far was that international control should apply to the first phase of a world disarmament programme. This first of the three stages proposed in the Anglo-French plan for disarmament provided for a preliminary "freezing" of armaments at existing levels until agreed reductions could be carried out. Mr. Nutting further disclosed that the Western powers had agreed to the Russian demand that

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each of the succeeding two phases in the disarmament programme which provide for the reduction of armed forces and the phased elimination of nuclear weapons should not take more than one year. But he felt that the "Control Organ" should have some discretion to extend the period, if necessary.

Mr. Nutting said that under the western proposal Britain would reduce her Armed Forces by 250,000 men. The maximum strength for Britain as for France would be 650,000. For the U. S. A., Russia and China the figure would be between 1 million and 1½ million each. This proposal, Mr. Nutting stated, was however rejected by the Soviet Government. They had revived their demand for one-third cut all-round. Such a proposition, Mr. Nutting contended, was unacceptable to the Western countries inasmuch as this would leave the Communist Powers with their present vast preponderance of armed forces.

As regards the "Control Organ" Mr. Nutting announced that the Soviet delegation had refused to discuss the vital question of the creation of a Control Organ which would see that the disarmament agreement was being faithfully implemented. Mr. Nutting said he envisaged an organization of several officials drawn from all over the world who would have absolute access wherever they wished and absolute power to stop any "cheating". This would, in fact, be a supra-national body.

May 10, 1955

The Soviet Union proposed a World Disarmament plan under which international control groups could keep a watch in all nations to prevent war preparations. The Russian proposal was published by the official news agency *Tass* in the form of three resolutions for United Nations' consideration.

May 11, 1955

Mr. Nutting, Chief British delegate, stated in the Sub-Committee of the U. N. Disarmament Commission meeting in London that the Russian declaration marked a significant advance on several major points which the Western nations had been advocating for several weeks. Mr. Nutting further stated that the declaration on

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disarmament although it was irregular and gave credit to Russia for proposals that were not hers was at least a distinct improvement on Mr. Gromyko's biased and distorted disclosures on March 25 1955.

- May 13, 1955. . . . The United States made public the entire documentary record of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission meeting in London, from February 25 to May 9, 1955. It was stated on behalf of the State department that the texts of resolutions and memoranda were being made public in view of the Soviet disclosures. The documents published indicate that on the control question the East and West are far apart although the Russians in their latest proposal did adopt Western ideas on force levels, the phased eliminations of nuclear weapons and some lesser points.
- May 18, 1955 The Five-nation Disarmament Conference adjourned its three-month-old secret talks to meet again in New York on June 1, 1955.

APPENDIX II

Text of the Anglo-French Proposal submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on June 11, 1954.

The French and United Kingdom Delegations submit the following proposals as a possible basis for compromise :—

1. The States members of the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. They recommend that the Disarmament Treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this memorandum. They further recommend that the obligations assumed by the Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State should be accepted by all signatory States not members of the United Nations.

2. The draft Disarmament Treaty prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to the World Disarmament Conference should include provisions covering the following :—

- (a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.
- (b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments.
- (c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

3. After the approval of the draft treaty by the World Disarmament Conference this instrument would be open to signature and adherence by all States. The treaty would enter into force immediately it had been ratified by those of the signatories who would be specified in the treaty.

4. The treaty should provide that the disarmament programme should be carried out as described below.

5. After the constitution and positioning of the Control Organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect :—

- (a) Overall military man-power shall be limited to December 31, 1953, levels.
- (b) Overall military expenditure, both atomic and non-atomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending December 31, 1953.

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6. As soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect :—

- (a) One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect.
- (b) On completion of (a) the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons shall cease.

7. As soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect :—

- (a) The second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect ;
- (b) On completion of (a) :—
 - (i) The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes shall be carried out ;
 - (ii) The total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons shall be carried out.

8. It is to be hoped that when all the measures enumerated above have been carried out the armaments and armed forces of the Powers will be further reduced to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

9. The Control Organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed.

APPENDIX III

*Text of the Resolution on Disarmament approved by the General Assembly
on the 4th November, 1954.*

The General Assembly reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem, conscious that the continuing development of armaments increases the urgency of the need for such a solution, having considered the fourth report of the Disarmament Commission of July 29, 1954, and the documents annexed thereto and the Soviet draft resolution concerning the conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction :

1. Concludes that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinate proposals to be embodied in a draft International Disarmament Convention providing for :

A. The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments ;

B. The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes ;

C. The establishment of effective international control through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of this resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference;

3. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission reconvene the sub-committee established in accordance with Paragraphs six and seven of the General Assembly resolution 715 (8) and

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress has been made.

APPENDIX IV

Text of the resolution proposed by the Soviet Union for United Nations consideration on the conclusion of an international convention on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons (May 10, 1955).

Security Council Resolution

The Security Council, striving to save mankind from another devastating war, to ease tension in relations between States, relieve the peoples from the heavy tax burdens they are bearing as the result of the continuing arms race,

Desirous of ensuring the possibility of using the released resources to raise the living standard of the peoples and to render extensive assistance to the economically underdeveloped countries,

Instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to draw up and submit for approval in the Security Council a draft of an International Convention on Reduction of Armaments and Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Such a convention, aimed at strengthening peace and international security, should envisage :

A. Complete prohibition of the use and manufacture of both nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and the employment of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes ;

B. Substantial reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments ;

C. Establishment of a control agency with the right, powers and functions guaranteeing in relation to all states equally effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

In conformity with this, the convention should contain the following basic principles pertaining to measures for reduction of conventional national armaments :

Prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and the procedure for the implementation of these measures, during two periods.

First Period Measures to be Carried out During 1956.

The following measures shall be carried out during 1956:

(1)

The state signatories to the convention undertake, as the first step forward reduction of armaments and armed forces not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments above the level of armaments and armed forces on Dec. 31, 1954.

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They also undertake not to increase their appropriations for the armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons above the level of the expenses made for these purposes during the year which ended on Sept. 31, 1954.

The aforesaid measures shall be carried out within two months after the corresponding agreement enters into force.

The United States, the U.S.S.R., China, Britain and France shall submit to the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the convention enters into force, full official figures regarding their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditure for military needs.

(2)

An agreed level is fixed for which the armed forces of all states exceeding this level shall be reduced so that no state should possess armed forces which might present a serious threat to international peace.

The armed forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, Britain and France shall be reduced substantially. To this end the aforementioned five powers undertake to reduce the numerical strength of their armed forces so that they should not exceed the following levels :

The United States—From 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men.

The U.S.S.R.—From 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men.

China—From 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men.

Britain—650,000 men.

France—650,000 men.

The five powers undertake to reduce correspondingly their conventional armaments as well.

The aforesaid five powers reduce within one year their armed forces and armaments to the extent of 50 per cent of the difference between the level of their armed forces and armaments on Dec. 31, 1954, and the reduced levels of the armed forces and armaments of each of these states, fixed according to the obligations assumed by each state, as outlined above.

The appropriations of the states for the forces and conventional armaments are reduced accordingly.

(3)

To convene not later than during the first half of 1956 a world conference for general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, with the participation of state members of the United Nations with and states which are not members of the United Nations with the object of determining the reduction of armaments and armed forces by other states and prohibition of atomic weapons.

The strength of the armed forces the other states will be allowed to maintain shall be in all cases considerably lower than the levels fixed for the five permanent members of the Security Council.

In fixing the reduction of armaments by states, including the permanent members of the Security Council a count should be taken of simple agreed criteria, including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors, having in view the strengthening of general peace and international security and the lessening of the threat of aggression.

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(4)

As one of the first measures in carrying out the program of reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, the states possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons undertake to discontinue the tests of these weapons.

An international commission shall be established for supervising the fulfilment of the aforesaid obligation by the states and it shall submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(5)

Simultaneously with the commencement of measures for reduction of the armaments and the armed forces of the five powers by the first 50 per cent of the agreed reduction to the established levels, the states, prior to the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of the atomic weapons, assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons which they consider as prohibited for themselves.

Exceptions from this rule may be allowed for purposes of defence against aggression when an appropriate decision is taken by the Security Council.

(6)

The states possessing military, naval and air bases on the territories of other countries undertake to dismantle these bases.

The question as to what bases are to be dismantled during the first period should be additionally agreed upon.

The implementation of these measures should consolidate the necessary trust between states and make it easier to carry out the measures for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons envisaged for the second period.

Second-Period Measures to be Carried out During 1957.

The following measures shall be carried out during 1957 :

(1)

The production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be stopped immediately and national budget appropriations for military needs shall be cut correspondingly.

(2)

The United States, the U. S. S. R., China, Britain and France shall reduce during the year their armed forces and armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the difference between the levels of the armed forces and armaments of each of the aforesaid five states on Dec. 31, 1954, and the reduced levels of the armed forces and armaments of each of these states, fixed according to the obligations assumed by them under the convention.

These states shall reduce correspondingly their appropriations for the armed forces and conventional armaments.

Measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces of other states in the amounts fixed for them at the world conference are also completed during this period.

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(3)

After the armed forces and conventional armaments are reduced by 75 per cent of the total reduction envisaged by the convention, complete prohibition of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction will enter into force. Removal of these weapons from national armaments and their destruction, reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments by the remaining 25 per cent of the agreed reduction shall begin simultaneously.

Both these processes shall be completed within definite time limits in 1957. All atomic material will then be used solely for peaceful purposes.

The states shall undertake to promote broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This co-operation will also cover the free exchange of information on the employment of atomic energy in industry, agriculture, medicine and other fields of economy and science. Special attention should be given to the rendering of assistance to economically under developed countries.

Such assistance should not be made conditional upon any demands of a political or military nature.

The states shall strive to devote part of the savings from disarmament on a world scale and the removal of nuclear weapons to the broad utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

(4)

Measures for dismantling all foreign military, naval and air bases on the territories of other states shall be completed.

Upon the carrying out of all the aforementioned it is desirable that the powers further reduce their armaments and armed forces to levels absolutely essential for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

The question of the obligations of China, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council following from the convention on Reduction of Armaments and prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and other weapons of Mass Destruction, should be examined with the participation of the People's Republic of China.

Second Assembly Resolution

Regarding international control over reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons :

Recognizing the great importance of, and the need for instituting effective international control over the fulfilment by states of their obligations under the Convention on Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces and Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons.

The General Assembly notes that at present the necessary conditions are lacking for the institution of such control as would enjoy the trust of all states and would fully conform to the requirements of international security.

It is possible to ignore the fact that at present there is considerable international tension and distrust in relations between states. This is what explains the fact that in the existing situation of distrust between states all kinds of obstacles are raised even to the mutual exchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations.

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Such a situation makes difficult the reaching of agreement regarding the admission by states to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in war production, of foreign controllers who could inspect the enterprises.

In the existing situation, when many states display legitimate concern for their security, it is difficult to expect that these states would trustfully give other states access to their industrial and other resources which are of vital importance for their security.

Inasmuch as the necessary trust between states is now lacking, a situation may arise in which the adoption of a decision of international control will actually be reduced to a mere formality failing to achieve the purpose.

This is all the more inadmissible because in the present situation the greatest apprehensions of the peace-loving peoples are aroused by the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons as regards which the institution of international control is especially difficult.

This danger follows from the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be utilised for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials and moreover in ever greater quantities.

This means that states having enterprises for the production of atomic energy are able, in violation of their respective agreements, to accumulate big quantities of explosive material for the production of atomic weapons.

The danger of such a situation becomes still more understandable if account is taken of the fact that, given the corresponding quantities of explosive atomic materials, the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs as such is a matter fully feasible technically and can be organized on a wide scale.

Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for circumventing this control and organizing the secret manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control.

Under such a situation the security of the state signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed in so far as the possibility would be open for the potential aggressor to stockpile atomic and hydrogen weapons for sudden atomic attack on peace-loving states.

Any agreement on the institution of international control, so far as there is no atmosphere of peace, can only lull the vigilance of the peoples.

It can create a false sense of security while in reality there will be the danger of manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons and hence the danger of a sudden attack and the unleashing of atomic war with all its horrible consequences for the peoples.

Account must also be taken of the fact that preparation for another war, the danger of which has been greatly aggravated by the emergence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, is inescapably associated with the need to concentrate at definite points large military formations with big quantities of conventional armaments: aircraft guns, tanks, naval vessels and so forth.

Such a concentration of big contingents of ground armed forces, the Navy and Air Force and their transfer can be effected only through big junctions, ports and airfields. With the present military techniques the significance of such points for preparing aggressive war, far from declining, on the contrary rises.

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In the event of a war breaking out, besides atomic and hydrogen weapons, for all their destructive power, armies of many millions and huge quantities of conventional armaments which are of decisive significance for the outcome of any big war would inevitably be drawn into military operation.

All this must be taken into account in deciding the question of instituting international control over the fulfilment by states of their obligation under the Convention on Reduction of Armaments and Prohibition of Atomic Weapons.

The question of establishment of international control and the rights and powers of the international control agency must thus be examined in close connection with the implementation of the aforesaid measures for reduction of international tension, consolidation of trust between states and the carrying out of other measures as regards the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

Proceeding from the above, the General Assembly constitutes an international control agency with the following rights and powers :

(1)

For the first period of carrying out the measures for reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons :

A. With the object of preventing sudden attack by one state on another state, the international control agency shall set up on the territories of all the respective states along reciprocal lines control posts in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes.

The task of these posts shall be to watch that there should be no dangerous concentrations of ground forces or of air and naval forces.

B. The international control agency shall have the right to demand from the states the necessary information on the implementation of the measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces.

C. The control agency shall have unhindered access to materials pertaining to national budget appropriations for military needs, including all decisions of legislative and executive bodies of states on this question.

The states shall submit periodically within the fixed dates information to the control agency on the implementation of the measures envisaged by the convention.

(2)

For the second period of implementing the measures on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons :

The implementation of measures envisaged in the abovementioned declaration and of the measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces and for prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons envisaged for the first period will create the necessary atmosphere of trust between the states.

Thereby the appropriate conditions for extending the functions of the international control agency will be insured.

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In these conditions the international control agency shall have the following rights and powers :

A. To exercise control, including inspection, on a permanent basis, on the scale necessary to insure the implementation of the above convention by all the states. The international control agency shall exercise these functions, enjoying also the right to demand from states the necessary information on the carrying out of measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Inspection shall be carried out by personnel selected on an international basis.

B. To have permanently in all countries signatories to the convention its staff of inspectors, who, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, would have unhindered access at any time to all objects of control.

With the object of preventing sudden attack by one state on another the international control agency specifically shall have on the territory of respective states their reciprocal control posts in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes.

C. The control agency shall have unhindered access to materials pertaining to national budget appropriations for military needs, including all decisions of legislative and executive bodies of states in the question. The states shall submit periodically within the fixed dates information to the control agency on the implementation of the measures envisaged by the convention.

(3)

The control agency makes recommendation to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression as regards violators of the convention on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

(4)

The above proposal of the Soviet Government was submitted by the U. S. S. R. delegate, J. A. Malik, for consideration by the sub-committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in London on May 10, 1955.

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