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by

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Much of political science can be thought of as an attempt to understand the connections between individual and group behavior. Such a statement may not provide the most satisfactory beginning for a definition of the discipline; but it does accentuate the concern of political science with both the nature of the individual and the nature of society. Political theorists have traditionally been interested in the state and the statesman, the law and the lawmaker, community and the citizen, historical forces and individual choices. All political theories must be premised on either explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of man and of society, hence the political scientist must be to some extent both a psychologist and a sociologist.

These were the qualities of the traditional political scientists. The most important forerunners of the discipline were also in their time the leading authorities on questions about human nature and the structure of society. Thus, Aristotle and Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were concerned not just with the traits and arts of political leaders, but with the basic nature of man; and in Plato we have some remarkable anticipations of modern psychology. Similarly, traditional political theorists were concerned with more than just

the polity; their interests usually covered the entire web of human relationships. They were remarkably successful in building their systematic political theories out of the best advanced psychological and sociological knowledge available to them, producing a synthesis which related their views about the character of man and society to normative standards and judgments about the design of public institutions. For example, one strand of this Western tradition of political science can be readily summed up under the rubric of reason, an essentially psychological concept. The universe was conceived as rational and man as having the rational power to understand it; given the right sort of institutions man would act rationally according to their enlightened self-interest, and the result would be a happy and harmonious social order.¹ Other systems, of course, were erected on the premise that man's essential nature is brutal, selfish, and inherently evil. Clearly the traditional political theorist did not shrink from psychological considerations; on the contrary, he often permitted his psychological notions to color all aspects of his theories.

The contemporary political scientist wishing to follow in the tradition is confronted with an infinitely more difficult task. The first problem is the extraordinary rate of growth of specialized knowledge about psychological and sociological matters. Many political scientists have come to feel that it is hopeless to attempt to incorporate these intellectual developments into systematic political theories; and therefore, finding it impossible to follow the practice of the earlier political theorists, they have decided instead to expound

¹For an excellent outline of the psychological premises of classical political theory and of the problems posed by modern psychology see: Thomas L. Childs, "Democratic Psychology and Democratic World Order," World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1949, pp. 553-564.

systematically, and with reverence, the works of these earlier thinkers. Those who have sought to continue in the tradition have found a second and more fundamental problem in our new understanding of the basic nature of man which has come from Freud's discoveries. In providing insights into the full dimensions of man's inner nature, Freud made it embarrassingly clear that previous theories about political relationships were generally premised on impoverished and inadequate notions of human nature. The concept of rational man has had to be altered. At the same time Freud held out the promise of a deeper understanding of political phenomena, a promise that has not been readily realized.

It is one thing to suggest that all political theories depend upon some psychological view of man, and quite another matter to relate the insights of psychoanalysis to political analysis. In spite of the enthusiasm of those who are ready to try to enrich political science with Freud's psychoanalytic contributions, it must be acknowledged that the results are often awkward, and at times even grotesque. In what meaningful ways can the political scientist benefit from the contributions of those who, in dealing with our disturbed citizens, have altered our image of man?

In performing the pathbreaking role of applying psychoanalytical concepts to political analysis, Harold D. Lasswell placed the relationship between private motivations and public acts at the center of his approach. He suggested that the dynamics of political action were to be found in the configuration of the individual personality and not just in the grand issues of history. It will be remembered that Lasswell suggested a formula for expressing the developmental aspects of political man: $p \} d \} r = P$, in which p equaled private motives,

d equalled displacement onto a public object, r equalled rationalisation in terms of public interest; P equalled the political man; and } equalled transformed into.¹ Political man is characterized as being moved by private motives which are displaced on public objects and rationalized as being in the national interest. By employing the assumption about the nature of man that dominated psychoanalytical thinking during the 1930's Lasswell was led to the view that release of tension is fundamental to all political behavior, and the key to human action in general. We find him writing that: "Nations, classes, tribes, and churches have been treated as collective symbols in the name of which the individual may indulge his elementary urges for supreme power, for omniscience, for amorality, for security."² And again he stated that: "Indeed one of the principal functions of symbols of remote objects, like nations and classes, is to serve as targets for the relief of many of the tensions which might discharge disastrously in face-to-face relationships."³

Lasswell's efforts to trace the connections between private motivations and public acts represented an attempt to deal, on a systematic basis, with the kinds of problems that political biographers have long sought to untangle: the relationship between the child and the man, between personal peculiarities and political preferences, between private frustrations and public ambitions.

¹Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 74-76.

²Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, New York: Whittlesey House, 1930, p. 39.

³Ibid., p. 73; quoted in Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958, pp. 97-98.

Lasswell's critics have charged that he exaggerated the importance of private and irrational considerations because he so undervalued the significance of political issues and rational choice. On the other hand, Lasswell's critics have generally failed to appreciate that, despite the special attention he gave to psychological matters, he steadfastly maintained a remarkably rigid distinction between the psychological and the political, between the pattern of personality development and the logic of institutional change, between private motivations and public policy.

Thus, in advancing the view that the social process consists of people pursuing values, through institutions by means of available resources, Lasswell implied that the individual and his value preferences are one thing, and social institutions another.¹ Some institutions may be more appropriate than others for maximizing particular values, but in the last analysis institutions are based on functions that involve more than individual preferences. Similarly, Lasswell pointed to the likelihood of certain personality types being more successful in particular political roles, but he rigidly held that the basic character of any political role is determined by its functions in the political process and not for the personality. By posing the problem in these terms, Lasswell avoided the error, frequently made by psychologists, of seeing the homo politicus as a distinct personality type characterized by an inordinate craving for power. He defined instead a variety of political roles and political personality types.² In particular, Lasswell identified particular personality types with the political roles of the administrator, the agitator,

¹Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality, New York: W.W. Norton, 1948, pp. 16, 17.

²Ibid., Chapters II-IV.

and the theorist.¹

Lasswell's method of bringing psychoanalytical considerations to bear on political analysis opened the way to a tremendous growth in empirical studies of factors traditionally considered to be "non-political." (Indeed, some critics have held that "political behavior" studies are nothing more than studies of the non-political, i.e. the social and personal aspects of group behavior.) Lasswell's formulation of the relationship between personality and politics encouraged, for example, studies of the social backgrounds of political elites, the symbols of political identifications, and the informal factors that influence decisions.² The same assumptions about the relationships between personality and politics can be found in most of the studies of voting behavior.³ Implicit in most such studies is the notion that personality and "informal" considerations are largely "irrational" with respect to the logic of public institutions.

There have been numerous attempts to bridge the gap that Lasswell has left between the private and the public, between the dimension of personality and the sphere of politics. In general these attempts may be divided into two categories. First, there are those efforts to find direct correlations between the formation of specific personality types and political behavior. These are attempts to see

¹Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 53-55.

²The most outstanding examples would be the Hoover Institute Studies in the RADIR project which were authored by Daniel Lerner, Ithiel deSola Pool, Robert North, and others.

³Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States, Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The Peoples' Choice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954; and Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954.

the political from the perspective of psychological insights, and they generally concentrated on the dynamics of personality formation during childhood.¹ The second category consists of those attempts to fill the gap between the psychological and the political with other social processes. Instead of seeking to move directly from personality formation to political action, the psychological factor is related to all the other factors which might influence political behavior. The "psychological" dimension thus includes cognitive processes. In the main, this approach has centered on the study of various aspects of the political socialisation process.

Most studies in the first category are contributed by cultural anthropologists and others involved in work on personality-and-culture. In conceiving of culture as the pattern of basic values reflected in all phases of life, the anthropologist has assumed a very close and direct relationship between personality and political behavior. This approach has largely taken the form of national character studies; the names of Ralph Linton, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Geoffrey Gorer, come readily to mind. Historians have, of course, long employed unspecified notions

¹Among the best statements of the methodology of this form of psycho-cultural analysis are: Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," World Politics, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1948, pp. 102-119; Abram Kardiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society, New York: Columbia University Press, 1945; Margaret Mead, "The Study of National Character," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.

about the characteristics of different nations and peoples.¹ Psychoanalytically oriented students of national character have been much more explicit, and consequently, it has been easy for their critics to take exception to particular details.²

Within the category of attempts to relate directly personality and politics are those which seek to establish a connection between specific personality configurations and susceptibility to particular political ideological orientations. The outstanding example of this form of study is, of course, The Authoritarian Personality.³ This monumental study, originally conceived as a search for the possible psychological sources of anti-Semitism, became an attempt to demonstrate congruence between personality type and political ideology. Despite its impressive reception in the social sciences, most students of political behavior have found it difficult to accept its suggestion of a direct correlation between authoritarian personality types and membership in authoritarian political movements.⁴

¹The advantages for historians of the newer insights of psychoanalysis are well stated by William L. Langer in his presidential address to the American Historical Association "The Next Assignment," The American Historical Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 2, January 1958, pp. 283-304.

²David Potter, an historian, has written an excellent and very sympathetic critique of much of the work on national character. See his Peoples of Plenty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

³T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, R. N. Sanford, in Collaboration with Betty Aron, Maria H. Levinson, and W. Morrow, The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. Sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series: Publication No. III.

⁴Herbert McGlosky has continued to search for correlations between political conservatism and a set personality type. See "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1958, pp. 27-45.

A characteristic common to such studies is that the treatment of psychological matters has been methodologically considerably more sophisticated than the political analysis. Subtlety in psychological insights has not necessarily yielded significant knowledge about the political realm. Advances that stem from public opinion research have further encouraged study of intervening social processes that serve to reduce the gap between personality formation and political behavior. These studies which we have classified in the second category, tend to be more influenced by orientations common to social psychology than by psychoanalysis. The shift has also been away from a central interest in childhood development and toward an appreciation of the total immediate social context within which action takes place.

For example, Gabriel Almond in his study of the appeals of Communism in four European countries found it necessary to trace the total process of personality development from the early determinants of personality to the later cognitive developments.¹ By working in terms of political socialization, Almond developed the concept of "political culture." The process of becoming politically involved is seen as being similar to, but distinct from, the process by which an individual becomes a member of his culture. Out of the early childhood experiences, and later influenced by the processes by which he is introduced to the political world, the individual is finally recruited into a specific political role.²

¹Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

²Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1956, pp. 391-409; "Theoretical Introduction," in Almond, et al, The Politics of Underdeveloped Areas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Subjective psychological factors can be treated at all stages in the analysis while, at the same time, objective factors relating to the social and political setting can be given their full weight. Other attempts to narrow the gap between personality and politics are to be found in the works of M. Brewster Smith, Jerome Bruner, and Ruth W. White¹; Herbert Hyman²; Daniel Katz and Irving Sarnoff³; and Harold R. Isaacs.⁴

There are two principal reasons why these various authors have been able to add the psychological dimensions to their studies without grossly oversimplifying basic political considerations. First, they have balanced their analysis of the shaping of the unconscious with explicit treatment of ego-functioning in the total development of the personality. Second, they have related personality factors to the social context of action and, wherever possible, to specific sociological variables. The link between "personality" and political behavior is established by recognizing that personality development depends upon the individual's perceptions of social reality, his emotionally conditioned responses to his environment, and his learned modes of evaluating reality. This approach has led some

¹M. Brewster Smith, Jerome Bruner, Ruth W. White, Opinions and Personality, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956.

²Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization, Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.

³Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, January 1954, pp. 115-124; Daniel Katz, Charles McClintock, and Irving Sarnoff, "The Measurement of Ego Defense as Related to Attitude Change," Journal of Personality, Vol. 25, June 1957, pp. 465-474; Daniel Katz, Irving Sarnoff, and Charles McClintock, "Ego-Defense and Attitude Change," Human Relations, Vol. 9, January 1956, pp. 27-45.

⁴Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches On Our Minds; American Images of China and India, New York: John Day Company, 1958.

scholars to a rigorous search for relationships between attitudes, opinions, and "basic orientations" on the one hand, and social or demographic distinctions on the other. Others, like Erich Fromm¹ and David Riesman², have related more broadly defined personality or character types to the main social or economic configurations of an historical period. A highly original and complex type of analysis has been Daniel Lerner's treatment of the connections between basic aspects of personality and the dynamics of social change in transitional societies.³

The use of this image of personality, largely derived from social psychology, has been extremely rewarding when combined with survey techniques. It focuses attention on the relationship between "personality type," basic social and political attitudes, and the distribution of each according to demographic and socio-economic categories.⁴ But there is some concern among those who have worked with survey techniques that studies built largely upon a psychology of the cognitive processes will give too "flat" a picture, lacking in nuances that depend upon the functions of the unconscious. In order to avoid this problem it may become increasingly necessary to supplement social survey studies with "interviews in depth." These approaches all represent significant advances in the utilization

¹Escape From Freedom, New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1941.

²The Lonely Crowd, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

³Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958.

⁴An outstanding example of such a study is: Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

of psychological theory for political analysis. It would seem, however, that we have yet to arrive at satisfactory methods of exploiting for political studies the full potentialities of psychoanalytical theory. Every now and then there is the rare work, such as that of Nathan Leites¹, which taps this potential and demonstrates what can be realized if the new image of man is truly incorporated in a political analysis. Thus although much has been accomplished in recent years to enrich political science with the insights of modern psychology, we are still seeking new ways of bridging the gap between the dynamics of individual behavior and the developmental forces of history.

II

It is from such a background of experience as we have just outlined that the political scientist looks for guidance to Erik H. Erikson's Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History.² In what ways can the clinical analyst, who has already made great contributions to ego psychology and to cultural anthropology, assist the student of history?

Erikson is concerned in this volume with the problem of the great men in history, who create the ideologies in which people find their beliefs. He is concerned to clarify how the lone individual, in seeking to find himself and give

¹A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953. For two excellent commentaries on Leites' methods and his analytical assumptions see: Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," World Politics, Vol. X, No. 3, April 1958, pp. 327-365; and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Politics, History, and Psychology," World Politics, Vol. VIII, No. 1, October 1955, pp. 112-123.

²New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1958.

meaning to his own character can give shape and form to a period of history. More precisely, Erikson is interested in the relationship between the identity crisis in the personality development of the reformer and the ideology he creates. Erikson reduces the gap between the public and the private spheres, between the psychological and the political by stressing the connecting links between personal identity and public ideology.

For some time it has not been fashionable for political scientists to grapple with the problem of the great man who tries to change the course of history. Modern political science grew up during a time when the notion of "science" was largely one of a quest for uniformities. This assumption encouraged an orientation that found its highest expression in sociological and economic analyses. Even when the pendulum began to swing back to a greater emphasis upon the individual and, hence, upon psychological considerations, attention still centered largely on aggregates and not on the unique individual. For the search has been mainly for relationships between social and economic factors and personality types. Recent interest in the study of decision-making and of elite roles has centered mainly on the webs of relationships within which individual decision-makers have to fight their way, and not upon the function of the leader's personality. One exception to this tendency that comes readily to mind is Alexander and Juliette George's provocative analysis of Woodrow Wilson's personality.¹

¹Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, New York: John Day Company, 1956.

Before discussing the content of Erikson's study, it is necessary to remark on Erikson as a writer, for his style is a major clue to his method. This is a book that is more the product of a man than of a technique.

On reading this study of Luther one is struck with Erik Erikson's profound and yet subtle qualities of mind. His book reflects both wisdom and a restless search for knowledge. It bears ^{NO} relationship to the kind of superficial and intellectually precocious "psychological interpretations of history" which confuse insight with the cute or the grotesque. Throughout his book Erikson warns of the danger of shallow interpretation and the need "to differentiate psychoanalysis from psychoanalysis, and to realize that the latter is not only a profession recognized among professions, but also a system of thought subject to fashionable manipulation by molders of public opinion." (p. 21) As we shall be noting in detail Erikson differs from the popularizers of psychoanalytical theory who he feels have distorted the profound meanings of Freud's insights.

Erikson is a writer at home in the literary tradition; he knows the importance of style. He is also unmistakably the product of a humanistic tradition, for he communicates on nearly every page his fascination with the unique and the distinctive, with the individual who must be different from all others even as he passes through the common experiences of all men.

To the political scientist Erikson seems the very soul of caution in formulating generalizations. Only in the most tentative way will he suggest possible patterns and universal tendencies. It is, indeed, fascinating for a political scientist to observe the delicacy and care with which the master clinician handles his data. One fact does not suggest a conclusion, but only the need for further

facts. Only after the clinician has established a long-standing acquaintanceship and a deep familiarity with his subject does he arrive at his conclusions.¹

Erikson's work is also a remarkable demonstration of how the clinician is concerned with all the details of a case: in this sense he may be even more conscious of the importance of the unique occurrences of life than the historian. Erikson explains this concern with the total situation by noting that ". . . we clinicians have learned in recent years that we cannot lift a case history out of history, even as we suspect that historians, when they try to separate the logic of the historic event from that of the life histories which intersect in it, leave a number of vital historical problems unattended." (pp.15-16)

On this score Erikson's book is a direct repudiation of those who criticize the behavioral sciences for ignoring reality and the logic of the historical situation in favor of abstract generalization. Erikson has too much respect for his audience to force upon them his own abstractions or theories. More important, he has too much respect for his subject matter to try to force his data into preconceived molds. And finally, he has too much respect for his own creativity to make excessive commitments to his still evolving concepts.

¹ For Erikson's own statement of the clinical method see his Hayden Colloquium Lecture, "The Nature of Clinical Evidence," Daedalus, Fall 1958, pp. 65-87. For a comparison of his methods with those of other investigators see Daniel Lerner, "Preface to the Issue 'On Evidence and Inference,'" Daedalus, Fall 1958, pp. 3-10.

As a writer and a student of the subconscious, Erikson seems to have tremendous confidence in the powers of subjective communication. He refuses to make the explicit, the cold statement; and yet he is confident the reader will grasp the import of his thinking. In dealing with an admittedly subtle subject, he employs subtle forms of communication. Above all else, Erikson relies upon the total impact of his work and not upon the logic of sentences. No doubt Erikson would maintain that one must understand the whole problem and not just isolated parts; and thus it is impossible to take any sentence out of the context of the whole and find complete meaning in it. The result is a style of writing that the political scientist should be able to appreciate, for it is in that tradition of political theory which began with the works of Plato. This also means, however, that it is often extremely difficult to tell exactly what Erikson has in mind. The reader may feel at one moment that he is missing something of significance, while at the next his mind may be led off in directions he is not sure Erikson intended him to take.

As a result, it is quite possible to misinterpret Erikson, or at least to arrive at multiple interpretations of his views. This reader of Erikson's writings, for example, feels that Helen Merrell Lynd has misread the intellectual contributions of Erikson by suggesting that they offer support for a rather

precious view of personality development.¹ It must be acknowledged, however, that writers who refuse to be explicit and rigorously systematic and who are prepared to play freely with the full range of suggestive power of words are likely to be misunderstood.

In Erikson's case there is a compounding of the dangers of misunderstanding, for he is not only the suggestive artist, but also the psychoanalyst, and as Erikson has noted, ". . . psychoanalysis for historical reasons often occupies a position on the borderline of what is demonstrably true and of what demonstrably feels true." (p. 21) What "feels true" is a highly relative matter, and those insights which seem convincing to one person can seem strained, implausible, and even foolish to another; just as a metaphor or simile which seems forceful and illuminating to one reader can seem absurd or trite to another. In this reader's judgment, Erikson's concepts, in the main, do ring true, and they open up new perspectives of great value in understanding political action.

It should also be noted that Erikson does not seek shock effects by

¹Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958.

juxtaposing psychoanalytical, and hence highly private, matters and historical and religious matters. He advances his psychological interpretations in a sober manner, but at the same time he does not pretend that intimate activities are not emotionally charged subjects; there are, as he notes, matters ". . . which in our enlightened day can become conscious only on the level of the bawdy joke: as long as you smile when you say that." (p. 246)

III

In turning to the content of Erikson's analysis we must begin with his key concept of the identity crisis. This is the crisis of late adolescence when the young person, after having synthesized and resynthesized the experiences and reactions of each of the earlier stages of childhood, must move out of childhood and assume a place in the adult world.¹ Erikson has sought significance in all the typical characteristics of this stage of life: the periods of moodiness and sentimentality; the restless spirit but lethargic body; the sense of ambition and the desire to explore and know all possibilities, but also the endless moping and hanging around; and the unexpected vacillations between excessive worldliness and

¹Erikson has developed his theories of ego-identity in numerous writings: Childhood and Society, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950; "Ego Development and Historical Change," in The Psychoanalytical Study of the Child, Vol. II, New York: International University Press, 1946; "Growth and Crises in the 'Healthy Personality'" (for Fact-Finding Committee, Midcentury White House Conference, New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, 1950, and in Kluckhohn and Murray (eds.) Personality in Nature, Culture and Society, New York: Knopf, 1953; "On the Sense of Inner Identity," in Health and Human Relations (Report on the International Conference in Hiddesen, Germany, 1951), New York: The Blakiston Co., 1953; "The Problem of Ego Identity," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol IV, No. 1, January 1956, pp. 56-121.

unbelievable naïveté -- between trying to be more adult than adults, and then being more childish than children. Above all it is the crisis of uncertainty when the youth must commit himself -- usually after many fitful starts -- to a definition of himself that he and others will recognize. Erikson says, "I have called the major crisis of adolescence the identity crisis; it occurs in that period of the life cycle when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be." (p. 14)

Erikson has emphasized elsewhere that the term identity expresses a ". . . mutual relationship in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others."¹ Thus identity formation "arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications, and their absorption in a new configuration, which, in turn, is dependent on the process by which a society (often through subcultures) identifies the young individual recognizing him as somebody who had to become the way he is, and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted. The community, often not without some initial mistrust, gives such recognition with a (more or less institutionalized) display of surprise and pleasure in making the acquaintance of a newly emerging individual. For

¹Erik Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, Vol. IV, No. 1, January 1956, p. 57.

the community, in turn, feels recognized by the individual who cares to ask for recognition; it can, by the same token, feel deeply -- and vengefully -- rejected by the individual who does not seem to care."¹

It becomes immediately apparent that Erikson's concept of ego-identity provides a far more complex and multi-faceted model of the human personality than is customarily used in political analysis. His concept covers not only the individual's constitutional givens and his idiosyncratic libidinal needs, but also the nature of his cognitive processes and the historically specific quantities of information which he has stored in his memory. The concept goes beyond this for it implies that there are systematic relationships among not just these dimensions of the personality, but also the particular mental or physical faculty favored by the individual and best developed, his effective psychological defense mechanism, his successful sublimations and even the degree of consistency with which circumstance has required him to assume particular roles.

The political scientist is not one to pass judgments on the technical aspects of Erikson's concept of ego identity.² In order to appreciate, however, the ways in which Erikson relates the great ideological reformer to his times and to history, it is necessary to understand the outlines of Erikson's theories about the development of the individual. This is because he assumes

¹Ibid., pp. 68-69.

²The political scientist with curiosity about ego psychology may want to read in addition to Erikson's writings: Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, New York: Basic Books, 1952; H. Hartmann, "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation," in D. Rapaport, (ed.), Organization and Pathology of Thought, New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, Chapter 14; H. Hartmann, "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego," in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. V, New York: International Universities Press, 1950, pp. 74-96.

that the way in which the major problems of each consecutive stage in the development of the individual are met will be reflected in the evolving configuration of that individual's identity; and in the case of the great man this means that his peculiar pattern of development will be reflected in his political ideology. Erikson thus implies that there is a minimum but fundamental structure to any ideology which is related to elemental aspects of personality development. Therefore, in reviewing Erikson's theories about the development of the individual we shall focus on those aspects that are most relevant in contributing to the tone and the spirit of ideologies.

It is only in the last chapter of Erikson's book on Luther that he sets forth his theory of the various stages of personality development. Indeed, those readers who have not previously been exposed to his views on the subject may find that they can get more out of his analysis of Luther if they read this chapter as an introduction. For our purpose of summarizing the stages of development and suggesting their relationship to the identity crisis we may rely upon a diagram Erikson has devised.¹ It should be noted, however, that a diagram often suggests well-defined and rigorous relationships without actually articulating their precise nature. This is an important warning, and as Erikson has remarked, such a diagram "can be recommended to the serious attention only of those who can take it and leave it."²

¹Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," op. cit. p. 75.

²Ibid., p. 76.

The diagram is so constructed that the diagonal line of squares reading from the upper left hand corner to the lower right present the major crisis in personality development for each of the stages of growth which are listed in the left hand margin from top to bottom. The basic pattern of personality development from infancy, to early childhood and on through to adolescence and the mature age is outlined along this diagonal. Each crisis is of a dialectical nature, and in the diagram what would generally be considered as the more successful outcome of each crisis is stated first.

The diagram also shows the relationship of the other stages to the critical stage of the identity crisis. The vertical column 5 states the ways in which the identity crisis is foreshadowed during each of the earlier crises. There is thus in each of these earlier ages some aspect of the identity crisis. The horizontal row V outlines the principal implications for the question of identity of the way in which the other crises may be resolved. Thus the horizontal row V should be matched up with the diagonal line of squares, while the vertical column 5 should be related to the age categories.

Thus if we begin with the beginning we have the crisis of basic trust during infancy which corresponds in large measure with Freud's oral stage. Out of this first social relationship between the mothering adult and the mothered child the individual either gains that first and most fundamental of all psychosocial traits, that original "optimism," that assumption that "somebody is there," that treasure of "basic trust." Or, denied the necessary security, he comes to a profound sense of mistrust which will color his entire

existence; he will miss something others can take for granted most of the time, and according to Erikson only psychiatrists, priests and bona philosophers can appreciate how sorely he will miss it. (p. 118) The question of identity at this age takes the paradoxical form of the "positive" development being the lack of differentiation or a sense of "unipolarity", while the "negative" development would be a premature sense of self-differentiation. Erikson's concept of a sense of unipolarity seems to go beyond the more traditional Freudian concept of narcissistic omnipotence which is customarily associated with this age. The infant not only feels that he can command his world, but more fundamentally he feels that the world is for him and he can be for the world. If on the other hand, the infant feels that in his first relationship he is unrelated to the other, that the world can ignore him and he can have no control over it, then the consequence will be a sense of isolation, of premature self-differentiation, of basic mistrust.

Shifting next to the subsequent consequences for identity formation of the basic trust crisis (1,V), the main issue according to Erikson is that of the relationship of the individual to time. With trust comes a sense of time perspective, an optimism about the future, a feeling that good things will come with waiting, that stress will soon be relieved with pleasure. On the other hand, a failure of the ego function to maintain this perspective is related to an early inability to develop satisfactory expectations about need-tensions and their satisfactions. Time diffusion is a basic mistrusting of time: every delay appears as deceit, every need to wait becomes an experiencing of impatience, every hope a signal of danger, every potential

provider a probable traitor.

To go beyond the level of individual identity to that of ideological formulations, the crisis of basic trust is related to the role of faith. With a perspective on time and a powerful sense of trust, Utopias become possible, planning and programming give hope and meaning, and loyalty is in itself rewarding. When the efficacy of faith must be denied, planning and policy must lose all meaning and deceit is seen in all actions. Presumably a political ideology might meet the needs of some who have not had the full measure of basic trust. But according to Erikson, "Of all the ideological systems, however, only religion restores the earliest sense of appeal to a Provider, A Providence. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, no prayer indicates this more clearly than 'The Lord make His Face to shine upon you and be gracious unto you. The Lord lift up His countenance upon you and give you peace.'" (p. 118) What was to Freud the oral stage has become with Erikson that which also makes the "face" so important in human affairs: "face-to-face relationships," "face the facts," "face the future," "face up to life," "let's face it."

The next age of early childhood, comparable to Freud's anal stage, brings the crisis of autonomy as against shame and doubt. From this stage comes that element in the sense of autonomy ". . . which can and does mean independence, but does and can also mean defiance, stubbornness, self-insistence." (p. 122) What is basic faith in the earlier age becomes human will, "in its variations of will power and willfulness;" (p. 255) and what is basic mistrust in the oral stage becomes shame and doubt in the second stage.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|--------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|---|
| I INFANCY | Trust vs Mistrust | | | | Unipolarity vs. Prema- ture self- differentia- tion | | | |
| II EARLY CHILDHOOD | | Autonomy vs Shame, Doubt | | | Bipolarity vs Autism | | | |
| III PLAY AGE | | | Initiative vs Guilt | | Play Identi- fication vs. (Oedipal) Phantasy- Identities | | | |
| IV SCHOOL AGE | | | | Industry vs Inferiority | Work Id- entification vs Identity Foreclosure | | | |
| V ADOLESCENCE | Time Perspective vs Time Diffusion | Self-Certainty vs Identity Consciousness | Role-Experi- mentation vs Negative Identity | Anticipation of Achievement vs Work-Paralysis | Identity vs Identity Diffusion | Sexual Identi- ty vs Bisexual Dif- fusion | Leadership Polarization vs Authority Diffusion | Ideological Polarisation vs Diffusion of Ideals |
| VI YOUNG ADULT | | | | | Solidarity vs Social Isolation | Intimacy vs Isolation | | |
| VII ADULTHOOD | | | | | | | Generativity vs Self- Absorption | |
| VIII MIDDLE AGE | | | | | | | | Integrity vs Dispair |

Shame is different from and quite as important as guilt in Erikson's view. Shame is "the loss of social innocence, the blushing awareness that one can 'lose face,' have 'too much cheek,' and suffer the wish to be invisible, to sink into the ground. Defiance obviously, is shame's dialectical opposite: and it makes sense that the willful exposure of the behind came to mean a defiant gesture of shamelessness . . ." (p. 122) With respect to the later identity crises, the issue of autonomy versus shame will be resolved either in favor of a sense of self-certainty, a sense of autonomy with will and purpose, or with a crushing sense of self-consciousness and a defiant need to claim a self.

It is impossible to summarize accurately Erikson's extremely subtle interpretation of young Luther's experiences during these first two crises of his life. It must be recognized that we are doing Erikson an injustice when we reduce his analysis to the bare statements that: first, Luther obtained an extraordinary reservoir of basic faith from his mother, and thus always had a deep understanding of the dynamics of faith. However, "Martin was driven early out of the trust stage, out from 'under his mother's skirts by a jealously ambitious father who tried to make him precociously independent from women, and sober and reliable in his work. Hans succeeded but not without storing in the boy violent doubts of the father's justification and sincerity; a lifelong shame over the persisting gap between his own precocious conscience and his actual inner state; and a deep nostalgia for a situation of infantile trust. His theological solution -- spiritual return to a faith which is there before all doubt, combined with a political

submission to those who by necessity must wield the sword of secular law -- seems to fit perfectly his personal need for compromise." (pp. 255-256)

These are the origins, as Erikson sees it, of that combination of faith and wrath, of the belief that behind a God that shames and a God that is demanding there is still the possibility of mutual recognition, of the face-to-face meeting of personal salvation. As Erikson puts it, "It would be much too easy (although some stalwart opponents of all interpretation would consider even this easiest and most obvious explanation far fetched) that Hans's son was seeking in religion what he would not find in Hans." (p. 115)

We have gone into detail with these first two stages, in order to give a feeling for Erikson's mode of analysis. We must treat the other stages in more summary fashion.

The third crisis, that of initiative versus guilt, covers more than the Freudian concept of the Oedipus complex. Erikson reflects his personal values, and above all, his ability to be hard-headed and yet sympathetic, without being precious and sentimental, when he writes of the Oedipus complex. For example, he says, ". . . we . . . most certainly . . . would ascribe to Luther an Oedipus complex, and not a trivial one at that. We would not wish to see any boy -- much less an imaginative and forceful one face the struggles of his youth and manhood without having experienced as a child the love and the hate which are encompassed in this complex: love for the maternal person who awakens his senses and his sensuality with her ministrations, and deep

and angry rivalry with the male possessor of this maternal person. We would also wish him with their help to succeed, in his boyhood, in turning resolutely away from the protection of women to assume the fearless initiative of men." (p. 73)

Clearly, Erikson does not minimize the Oedipus complex, and yet it is not a dominant theme in his total analysis. The influence of the initiative versus guilt crisis on the subsequent identity crisis depends upon whether the individual resolves his Oedipus complex by turning outside of the family to seek his future development, and thus envisioning the possibility of experimenting with other roles. The alternative would be a sense of negative identity, that is, a need to become what one has been warned not to become, which is something one can only do with a divided heart. Since there seems to be a need to protect one's wholeheartedness those who have a sense of negative identity cannot even be steadfast rebels.

Erikson's analysis moves without interruption from this stage on into the crisis of industry and inferiority. In this fourth stage the individual's "budding will to phantasy, play, games and early work" are all related to the occupational and technological ideals which the child perceives in his environment. What for Freud was the phallic stage becomes with Erikson a period of systematic learning and of collaboration with others. "The resolution of this stage decides much of the ratio between a sense of industry or work completion, and a sense of tool-inferiority, and prepares a man for the essential ingredients of the ethos as well as the rationale of his technology

. . . In Martin's case, the tool was literacy, Latin literacy, and . . . he was molded by it . . . and later he remolded, with the help of printing, his nation's literary habits. With a vengeance he could claim to have taught German even to his enemies." (pp. 258-259) A major dimension of personality formation in Erikson's view is the learning of a craft or a skill, and the development of proficiency in manipulating particular tools, instruments, or symbols.

Next comes the identity crisis, the principal one in Erikson's analysis, in terms of which his book on Luther is written. The last three crises -- those of intimacy versus isolation, generativity versus self-absorption and integrity versus despair -- are fairly self-evident and need no further elaboration here. We need only note that in Erikson's view the "integrity crisis, last in the lives of ordinary men, is a lifelong and chronic crisis in a homo religiosus. He is always older, or in early years suddenly becomes older, than his playmates or even his parents and teachers, and focuses in a precocious way on what it takes others a life-time to gain a mere inkling of: the question of how to escape corruption in living and how in death to give meaning to life." (p. 261)

IV

It has been considerably easier to set forth Erikson's views on the "metabolism of generations" than it will be to state his theory about the dynamics of the great man in history. In this volume Erikson is still experimenting with his theory, and thus he is extremely reluctant to use any direct propositional statements. We can only outline what seems to be the direction

of his explorations.

The story of the great man, ideologically speaking, is the story of an individual striving to find his own identity. By following the peculiar logic of that struggle, he gives, without necessarily intending to, a sense of identity and meaning to a people at a particular juncture of history. The individual pattern of development may be extremely complicated, but Erikson suggests that there are certain uniformities. In particular,

he makes comparative references to the lives of Freud, Darwin, G. B. Shaw, and Hitler.

The beginning point, and indeed the central theme, of the development of the great man is his need to settle a personal account on a large scale and in a grand context. This involves far more than the idea that public life provides the opportunity for reducing psychic tensions. In Erikson's view the great man must have some score to settle with others and the score must be of such grand proportion that there is an appropriateness in seeking a public arena. The problem must be far more than just the sting of the Oedipus complex. Erikson elsewhere has commented that, "Whoever has suffered under and identified with a stern father, must become a stern father himself, or else find an entirely different means of moral strength, an equal measure of strength. Young Martin Luther's religious crisis is a transcendent example of the heights and depths of this problem."¹

¹Erik Erikson, "The First Psychoanalyst," Yale Review, Autumn 1956, p. 50.

This magnitude of the personal problem and the compelling need to resolve it seems to produce a deep sense of ambivalence: a feeling of sinfulness on the one hand, and a feeling of being chosen on the other. The great man may come to seek greatness, to believe in his own destiny, and yet he can be consumed with a fear of failure, a precocious fear which may arise at a very early age. Erikson indeed suggests that such men often fail as children, in that they are people with lost childhoods -- people who place excessive demands upon themselves from a very early age. In their lives the identity crisis is likely to involve a conflict between a sense of aliveness and a feeling of nothingness. The fear of failure becomes a dread of non-existence, and the individual vacillates between a sense of nothingness and a sense of being everything. Erikson is convincing when discussing the thin line that separates the feelings of omnipotence and of insignificance.

A key element in the identity crisis (but something which may last through life) is the "moratorium." Erikson attaches considerable significance to the need of all individuals for a period of moratorium: a withdrawal from full involvement, a time of loneliness and uncertainty, a time during which psychic growth may catch up with physical development. Most societies have institutionalized in varying degrees this moratorium, in the sense that they withhold responsibility from young people who are physically as developed as adults. During the moratorium the young person generally develops some skill or technique which will either subsequently become central to his identity or give him the necessary sense of discipline so that he will be

able to employ more effectively some other faculty or skill. Luther's moratorium was spent in the monastery; Freud's "monastery" was his medical and scientific training; G. B. Shaw spent his moratorium in a business house; Darwin spent his in medical training and two years aboard the Beagle; for Winston Churchill it was the Indian Army. Erikson suggests that the common pattern of the ideological innovator is one of coming upon his life work without prior planning or design. Disciplined training is in one area, and creative innovation in another.

To achieve his sense of identity and break out of his moratorium, the great man must rely upon some dominant faculty, some special gift. In Erikson's reading of history, there is also likely to be at this juncture some technological innovation which can peculiarly complement the special qualities of the great man and thus become the bridge in linking him to his times. In the case of Luther it was his understanding of the Word and Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. Erikson has some subtle things to say about playing with words, and about the importance people will attach to isolated words and characters, to doctrines and pronouncements, to the Word and to the Good Book. Even more important is Erikson's appreciation of compulsions that lie behind the need of the great ideological innovators to talk, to manipulate words. Above all else, such people do not need simply to talk: they need to talk back. It is not at the level of the content of their words, but at a much deeper level, that they really mean what they say. This is the need to settle their score; this is the real "Meaning of Meaning It."

Erikson suggests that the great man may find his identity and make his mark on history, but this is likely to be only a moment of balance, and then the inner conflict must go on again. While Luther was "In the cloister all three factors -- his sense of identity, his potential for intimacy, and the discovery of his generative powers -- were stubbornly engaged in the life-or-death struggle for that sense of total justification which both the father and The Father had denied him, and without which a homo religious has no identity at all." (p. 149) Once he did find the main executive of his identity, the Word, he was soon caught up again in the conflict between a sense of nothingness and an urge for fame.

This conflict can result in the collapse of the innovator and even in his becoming in time the very thing he fought. But this is only part of the problem. The leader may also realize to himself that he really did not intend to do what he did on the grand scale; he may come to recognize that it was only a private score he had to settle. "The crisis of an ideological leader naturally emerges when he must recognize what his rebellion -- which began with the application of a more or less disciplined phantasy to the political world in the widest sense -- has done to the imagination, the sense of reality, and the conscience of the masses. The fact is that all walks of life, revolutionized but essentially leaderless, exploited Luther's reformation in all directions at once. They refused to let him, and a few people like him, settle down in parsonages as the representatives of the praying orientation in life, and otherwise accept the estate and occupation in

which, as he claimed, God had placed there. The princes became more absolute, the middle-class more mercantile, the lower classes more mystical and revolutionary; and the universal reign of faith envisaged in Luther's early teachings turned into an intolerant and cruel Bible-quoting bigotry such as history had never seen. As Tawney put it, 'the rage of Luther . . . was sharpened by embarrassment at what seemed to him a hideous parody of truths which were both sacred and his own;' (p. 242)

The final result is that the ideological leader produces consequences that are quite the opposite of those he intended. "Consider for a brief moment certain great names of our time, who pride themselves on a dominant identity enhanced by scientific truth. Darwin, Einstein, and Freud -- excluding Marx, who was a conscious and deliberate ideological craftsman -- would certainly deny that they had any intention of influencing, say, the editorials, or the vocabulary, or the scrupulosity of our time in the ways in which they undoubtedly did and do. They could, in fact, refute the bulk of the concepts popularly ascribed to them, or vaguely and anonymously derived from them, as utterly foreign to their original ideas, their methodology, and their personal philosophy and conduct. Darwin did not intend to debase man to an animal; Einstein did not preach relativism; Freud was neither a philosophical pansexualist nor a moral egotist. Freud pointed squarely to the psychohistorical problem involved when he said that the world apparently could not forgive him for having revised the image of man by demonstrating the dependence of man's will on unconscious motivation, just as Darwin had not been forgiven for demonstrating man's relationship to the animal world,

or Copernicus for showing that our earth is off-center." (p. 177-178)

In summary, the great man in seeking to settle his own inner problem strikes out against his environment. He is both destructive and constructive; indeed, without a capacity for destruction he cannot be truly constructive. It is through leveling blows against the existing system that the great man first wins his audience. His public must also feel some uncertainty over the times, some loss of identity. Then comes the role of charisma, the bases of a new mode of communication, and the beginnings of a new sense of identity for both the leader and the followers. The particular faculty and the particular technology provide the foundations for institutionalizing the relationship of charisma and for giving structure to the new sense of identity. Then comes the extremist reactions: first the leader overdoes it, and then the followers overdo it.

V

What is Erikson's purpose in this book? And what special value does the study have for political scientists? In making his point that the consequences of ideological leaders are often the opposite of their intended purposes, Erikson presents a remarkably insightful comparison of Luther and Freud. There is considerable significance in each of the points he makes about Luther, who came at the end of the age of absolute faith, and Freud, who came at the end of the age of reason. We are, however, particularly struck by the following:

Both men endeavored to increase the margin of man's inner freedom by introspective means applied to the very center of his

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conflicts; and this to the end of increased individuality, sanity, and service to men. Luther, at the beginning of ruthless mercantilism in Church and commerce, counterpoised praying man to the philosophy and practice of meritorious works. Subsequently, his justification by faith was absorbed into the patterns of mercantilism, and eventually turned into a justification of commercialism by faith. Freud, at the beginning of unrestricted industrialization, offered another method of introspection, psychoanalysis. With it, he obviously warned against the mechanical socialization of men into effective but neurotic robots. It is equally obvious that his work is about to be used in furtherance of that which he warned against: the glorification of "adjustment." Thus both Doctor Luther and Doctor Freud, called great by their respective ages, have been and are apt to be resisted not only by their enemies, but also by friends who subscribe to their ideas but lack what Kierkegaard called a certain strenuousness of mental and moral effort. (p. 252)

Here and there throughout the book Erikson criticizes the popularizers of Freudian analysis. At the surface level he is particularly critical of their soft-headed and sentimental qualities and of their lack of appreciation for the high costs and the self-discipline that must go into any form of human excellence. Erikson repeatedly reminds us of a point that some popularizers of psychoanalysis ignore, which is that Freud did not merely seek to help the individual adjust to his environment, but that he also demanded that the individual make the "environment" adapt to him. The difference is extremely important for political analysis. A peculiar set of biases, largely favoring static analysis and equilibrium concepts, is likely to predominate if it is assumed that the individual must either adjust to and be molded by "society" or revolt against society. A radically different outlook comes from picturing the individual as not only adapting to others, but also in turn changing and

controlling his surroundings. With such an orientation initiative, creativity, and the basic dynamics for the system do not come from anything as abstract as "society" but rather from particular individuals. All people are to some extent creative, for all people must shape their worlds in finding their identities.

At a deeper level Erikson's concern over what he considers to be the popular misinterpretations of Freud involves another problem which is left largely unarticulated, but which colors much of the analysis. This is the problem of the proper relationship of the disciple to his ideological father. How can one find one's own identity while remaining true to one's leader and mentor? Here, of course, is the problem that provides the dynamic element behind all controversies about who is perpetuating the true faith, and who is deviating from it. This has been the problem of those who took their inspiration from Luther and also of those who took theirs from Freud. Erikson is known as a Freudian and yet he has quite possibly done more original and innovational work than any of the neo-Freudians. (Freud only used the term "identity" once, and with a rather different meaning than that of Erikson's.) A clue to Erikson's method in becoming both the complete follower and the creative innovator is to be found in the following words that he once used to sum up his appraisal of Freud:

Freud, before he went into medicine, wanted to become a lawyer and politician, a lawmaker, a Gesetzgeber. When, in 1938, he was exiled from his country, he carried under his arm a manuscript on Moses, the supreme law-giver of the people whose unique fate and whose unique gifts

he had accepted as his own. With grim pride he had chosen the role of one who opens perspectives on fertile fields to be cultivated by others. As we look back to the beginnings of his work, and forward to its implications, we may well venture to say: Freud the physician in finding a method of healing himself in the very practice of emotional cure has given a new, a psychological rationale for man's laws. He has made the decisive step toward a true interpenetration of the psychological with the technological and the political in the human order.¹

Erikson thus claims that Freud was centrally concerned with the larger order of human relationships and that such historical studies as this one of Luther should belong at the heart of the intellectual revolution sparked by Freud. The insights of psychoanalysis should not be treated as marginal ideas that may add novelty to otherwise completed studies; instead Erikson would hold that these are insights which must be placed at the center of political analysis and become an integrated part of research. Erikson, however, is quick to recognize that this will be a difficult development because there is such widespread misconception about what Freud's contribution really was. This is why Erikson is so critical of the superficial popularizers of psychoanalysis. He also acknowledges that psychoanalysis has ". . . developed a kind of originology . . . a habit of thinking which reduces every human situation to an analogy with an earlier one, and most of all to that earliest, simplest, and most infantile precursor which is assumed to be its 'origin.' Psychoanalysis has tended to subordinate the later stages of life to those of childhood. It has lifted to the rank of a cosmology the undeniable fact that man's adulthood contains a persistent childishness: that vistas of the future always reflect the

¹Erikson, "The First Psychoanalyst," op. cit., p. 62.

... of a mixed past, that apparent progression can harbor partial regression, and firm accomplishment, hidden childish fulfillment. . . . We must grudgingly admit that even if we were trying to devise, with scientific determinism, a therapy for the few, we were led to promote an ethical disease among the many." (p. 15-19)

Erikson's answer to this problem is that Freud's great contribution was not certain formulas about personality development, but a technique of observation. Throughout his book Erikson says that if we are to understand, analyze, and appreciate those who shape history, we must really look at them and observe them as full individuals. Our ability to see others clearly depends, however, upon our readiness to take a hard introspective view of ourselves. This, of course, is where the argument becomes delicate and even sticky. Erikson, however, does not imply that only those who have, under the guidance of others, taken such a long introspective view are capable of sensitive and complete political analysis. Rather he is warning us that we should be especially careful whenever we feel that we are being especially "honest," "objective," or "open-minded." We must recognize that some of our claims to being "objective" may be prompted by a desire to protect ourselves from an honest look at reality. We must be prepared, as Erikson says, "to relinquish the security of seemingly more objective methods."¹ There are times, of course, when the problem for the

¹Erikson, "The First Psychoanalyst," op. cit., p. 60

individual social scientist must become even more complex. In the words of Erikson:

An adult studying a child, an anthropologist studying a tribe, or a sociologist studying a riot sooner or later will be confronted with data of decisive importance for the welfare of those whom he is studying, while the strings of his own motivation will be touched, sometimes above and sometimes well below the threshold of awareness. He will not be able, for long, to escape the necessary conflict between his emotional participation in the observed events and the methodological rigor required to advance his field and human welfare. Thus, his studies will demand, in the long run, that he develop the ability to include in his observational field his human obligations, his methodological responsibilities, and his own motivations. In doing so, he will, in his own way, repeat that step in scientific conscience which Freud dared to take.¹

Erikson's basic criticism of the popularizers of psychoanalytical concepts is that they have given to the social scientist a set of phrases which have become mechanical and wooden formulas, and which in turn have become the devices which shield those who use them from the painful tasks of introspection and of honestly viewing reality. It is not surprising that intelligent, sensitive, and knowing people have found dubious value in studies which seek to make a direct connection between the nursery and world affairs, between crib and cabinet.

The primary contribution of Erikson's work for the political scientist is the reminder that Freud's main contribution was a technique of observation, and that observation is the key to the study of human relationships as it is the key to all sciences.

What about the particular theories and concepts that Erikson has developed? He has created a model of personality development which can be of great interest to the political scientist. It is, however,

¹Ibid.

such a complicated and subtle one that it can probably only be used to full effect by its creator. At this level, Erikson's contribution is likely to be mainly one of making us more sensitive to a wide range of emotional nuances and of subjective relationships in human development and behavior.

Erikson's concept of identity can have a more specific impact on political research. It becomes an exciting and illuminating concept when applied, for example, to the problem of political development in the newly emergent countries. These are societies whose peoples, in spite of babbling slogans of nationalism, lack a sense of identity. When old forms and customs lose their binding, their sustaining, and their reassuring powers, the people must restlessly search for new personal identities and for a new sense of collective identity. The arena is prepared for the ideological reformer; for, in Erikson's terms, the great man of history. In this setting it is all too easy for the shallow charismatic leader to appear, for a moment, as a prophet. Those who are facile with words may have great appeal, for the people need the word to find a new way. It is a time in which words are fundamentally more important than actions. It is also a time in which words become cheap and action becomes impossible. The setting is right for the politically anxious to try out -- possibly with enthusiasm, but certainly without true commitment -- all manner of ideological forms. Before the nation can develop leaders must emerge who have found integrity in their own quests for identity, and who can hence speak in terms that will bring meaning to other people's search for identity. The need is

for that set of shared orientations which force a people to face steadfastly reality, and which makes it impossible for them to run from reality. This is the meaning Erikson gives to ideology.

Erikson's concept of identity thus suggests that the problem of consensus in transitional societies runs deeper than mere agreement over political forms and over the appropriate ends and means of political action; it involves the creation of an inner coherence of values, theories, and actions for the entire polity. The implication is that in underdeveloped countries there is a vicious circle at the subjective level that is more crucial to the problem of national development than the more manifest vicious circle of poverty, ill-health, and illiteracy. Those who articulate the hope that national identity can come from modernization cannot escape the depressing psychological fact that modernity, in their mind, has always been the monopoly of precisely those who were their former masters. If they hated their colonial rulers then they cannot expect to find their identities by following the same path. If they did not hate their former rulers there might still be the problem of preferring dependency to autonomy which would confuse the quest for identity. National identity cannot be built upon doing less well what one's former master excelled at. Similar psychological roadblocks appear when identity is sought among the recorded but forgotten remnants of a distant history, for such a search becomes, psychologically, a constant reminder of national impotence in recent history. These are only some of the subjective problems which impede the solution of the more objective problems in the underdeveloped countries, and which cannot

be resolved until a sense of national identity is achieved.

The readily apparent utility of Erikson's concept of identity to the problems of the underdeveloped countries suggests that it must have a much broader value. Specifically, his concept can give focus to all forms of study which are concerned with the development of the political actor. By stressing the individual's need to find coherence in his self-image, Erikson suggests that we should see the process of political socialization not as a series of random experiences, but rather as a trend in development in which there is always a central theme, an element of unity. There is an inner logic or coherence in the way in which people come to their political orientations. Our search should thus be for more than connections between isolated attitudes and opinions on the one hand, and particular demographic characteristics on the other; it should be for the more complete pattern, the total configuration, the full style, of political actors.

By demonstrating that the gap between the private and the political can be effectively bridged by the relationship between personal identity and political ideology, Erikson helps the political scientist with more than the problem of the psychological aspects of behavior. He also offers an approach for studying ideologies themselves. For some time political scientists have known that the logic of ideologies is not encompassed by mere reason. There has, however, remained the problem of a systematic method for treating the non-rational components. Erikson in suggesting that political ideologies are an expression of the total character of the human personality has provided us with an analytical

framework to understand the inner structure of ideologies. Psychoanalytical theory can be a guide for comprehending more than just individual patterns of behavior. Nathan Leites has shown how extremely rewarding it can be to examine an ideology -- or in his phrase, an operational code -- according to the insights of psychoanalysis. Leites chose to leave his theory implicit; Erikson has stated his theory in more detail. Both have worked at the creative stage in the development of a promising approach, and the next stage will have to be one of increased precision in the statement of propositions and increased rigor in empirical testing.

Erikson is able to challenge and stimulate the thinking of political scientists because he combines so effectively in himself the qualities of both the scientist and the artist. Like a great artist he evokes in others an urge to imitate him. Also, like a great artist, he makes us sensitive to the wonders of what we had taken to be mere commonplaces. In referring to his own youth Erikson once noted, "I was an artist then, which is a European euphemism for a young man with some talent, but nowhere to go."¹ In going far since then, Erikson has not lost the genius of the true artist.

¹Ibid., p. 40.

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