

ELECTORAL AND FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS OF ZILLA PARISHADS AND PANCHAYAT SAMITIS IN MAHARASHTRA



A RESEARCH PROJECT BY
GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
(Deemed University)
PUNE


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MAHARASHTRA

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**ELECTORAL AND FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS
OF ZILLA PARISHADS AND PANCHAYAT
SAMITIS IN MAHARASHTRA**

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FOREWORD

Landmark Amendments to the Constitution (73rd and 74th) were made in 1992 in order to restore the rightful place to the local bodies in political governance of the country. As per these Amendments, State Election Commissions were established in every State for ensuring free, fair and transparent elections to the local bodies.

State Election Commission, Maharashtra has been electing approximately 2.5 lakhs “people representatives” every 5 years since its inception in 1994 in nearly 28,000 local bodies (26 Municipal Corporations, 340 Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats, 34 ZPs, 351 Panchayat Samitis and approx.27,781 Gram Panchayats)

Elections to the local bodies are contested more keenly since they revolve around local issues and have very little elector base per seat unlike Parliament and Assembly elections. In spite of this, it is disheartening to learn that very little research has been done in order to understand the dynamics of these elections.

State Election Commission, Maharashtra, in order to understand the intricacies behind these elections, held series of discussions with Universities and major research institutions.

It is really creditable that Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune has completed the first research project under this initiative of State Election Commission entitled “Electoral & Functional dynamics of Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis in Maharashtra” in a record period of 5 months from December 2015 to April 2016 by engaging 10 researchers and collecting data in 6 districts of the State.

I am happy to learn that Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune is publishing the above research in a book form giving methodology, analysis, suggestions and recommendations both for the State Election Commission and Government. I am sure this publication will be of great use to all the stake holders including Government, Researchers, Zilla Parishads / Panchayat Samitis, political parties, future candidates etc.

It would be really good if similar research projects are undertaken by Universities and other Institutes to create a mass of knowledge not only for understanding the dynamics of these elections but also ensuring their purity which is the soul of democracy and good governance.

I would like to compliment the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, Smt. Manasi Phadke, Yashada and Rural Development Department for making this project successful.

Shri J. Saharia
State Election Commission
Maharashtra

22.06.2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am pleased to be presenting this report titled “Electoral and Functional dynamics of Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis in Maharashtra” to the readers and the discerning scholars of decentralization. The Panchayat Raj Institutions got constitutional status with the passage of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1992. We thus stand on the threshold of the 25th year of empowering Panchayat Raj Institutions. It is an opportune time to examine how the PRIs have fared and what changes may be made in terms of electoral and functional reforms as we go ahead.

Our report carries interesting insights into the role of elected members of the Zilla Parishads as well as Panchayat Samitis. Apart from examining what triggers candidates into local bodies, we’ve also tried to understand the relationships between elected members and the bureaucracy. After more than 200 interviews with stakeholders, we have developed some interesting insights on the functioning of women representatives within the PRIs. The report carries suggestions on electoral reforms which would be pertinent to the State Election Commission, Maharashtra as well as the State Government of Maharashtra.

Let me express my gratitude to Shri Jageshwar Saharia, State Election Commissioner, Maharashtra, for granting this interesting study project to the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. Shri Pradeep Vyas, then Secretary, State Election Commission, Maharashtra, was deeply involved in the project and his guidance was valuable to our entire team. Shri K. Suryakrishnamurty, Assistant Commissioner, State Election Commission, Maharashtra, was a mentor for our team and guided and supported us at every stage of the project right from the design of the survey to writing the report.


I am thankful to the Rural Development Department, Government of Maharashtra which funded the project completely. We are specially thankful to the Yashada officials, who were not only involved in the project as funding agency officials, but guided us through the entire timeline of the project, from questionnaire design and sampling design to participation in the FGD at the Institute. I must express special gratitude towards Shri Hemant Wasekar, Yashada, who generously shared his field experience with us, enriching our insights.

Several Government officials, retired officers, scholars and academicians helped us at various stages of the project. Shri Ajit Nimbalkar, Former Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, Shri Karandikar, Former Divisional Commissioner, Pune, Shri Laxmikant Deshmukh, Former Collector, Kolhapur District and Shri Satyajit Bade, Dy. CEO, Pune Zilla Parishad shared their valuable field insights with us during the course of the study. Dr. Pradeep Apte, Dr. Dhanmanjiri Sathe, Shri Abhay Tilak, Smt. Bhushana Karandikar and Dr. Hari readily participated in our Focused Group Discussion on the issues of ZPs and PSs, and gave numerous suggestions for taking the project ahead.

Shri Pramod Sadolikar was instrumental in designing all aspects of the questionnaire and field survey. His field experience and guidance were crucial for completion of the project.

Lastly but surely not the least, Mrs. Manasi Phadke has served as the Principal Co-ordinator of this project and is also its principal author. She has organised the research team and accompanied it to ensure that the information was collected as accurately as possible and in a timely manner. Her team included Shri Amit Marathe, Smt. Saeer Marathe, Shri Mahendra Wardhalwar, Shri Nilesh, Smt. Suvarna and Smt. Deepa Meshram, who were enumerators for the project. This team did an excellent job in terms of meticulously and enthusiastically covering 6 districts of Maharashtra to interact with more than 200 stakeholders through structured interviews. I'd specially like to commend the efforts of our Research Assistants Ms. Ashwini Velankar and Ms. Vaishnavi Dande, who worked tirelessly on all aspects of digitizing the data, coding it and helping to analyze it. Special thanks are due to Shri Vilas Mankar, for providing excellent secretarial support during the entire project. I also acknowledge the role of our Accounts officers as well as that of all other faculty and staff who helped us in various ways on this project.

Any project involving field work creates a steep learning curve for all the people involved. This project helped us to gain deep insights into the dynamics of local body elections and functioning's of the Zilla Parishads as well as Panchayat Samitis, all of which have been duly presented in the report. I am sure that the report will serve as a useful addition to the existing literature on the subject.



Rajas K. Parchure
Professor & Director
Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics carried out a survey across 6 districts and 12 talukas of Maharashtra wherein nearly 270 stakeholders were interviewed in order to understand the electoral dynamics as well as identify functional issues associated with Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis.

The study finds some interesting results. One of the main objectives of the study was to identify the triggers that lead candidates into contesting local body elections. Why do candidates contest local body elections? Most candidates interviewed replied that they wished to bring about social change, but the fact of the matter is that hardly any candidates had community building experience or experience of serving on a lower tier PRI such as a Gram Panchayat in order to bring about the change. Many of them seem to contest to continue the political influence of their family. Indeed, the study identifies family background in politics to be the chief trigger for pushing candidates into local body elections. Candidates also get pushed into contesting because the seat gets reserved for a particular caste or for women; they also contest just because the party decided to give them a ticket. However, an interesting observation is that parties give tickets to only those candidates which come from political backgrounds! The other criterion often quoted by political parties is financial capacity of the candidates to contest elections on their own, which is again highly correlated with dynasty politics.

The other question into which the study delves is to understand reservation dynamics. Most of the candidates interviewed agree that reservation has helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society; however, while there is agreement on the issue of reservation, there seems to be a lot of angst connected with how the reservations are structured. Candidates have a lot of issues with the rotation of reserved seats and argue that this destroys the relationship between the candidate and the constituency. Rotation implies that the incumbent will not even be eligible to contest elections in the next term and this acts as a major disincentive for the incumbent to create development within his/her constituency. It also shows reluctance of candidates to contest from areas which are not favourable to them.

The study also finds that while Maharashtra has made inroads into ensuring women empowerment, several issues remain. The number of years taken by a woman candidate between joining politics and contesting the first election is often less than 1; this trend implies that women candidates mostly enter politics primarily for contesting a reserved seat for women. In contrast, men take much longer between joining politics and contesting their first election. This trend is further ratified by the fact that majority of women candidates come from political backgrounds; thus it seems to be the case that their presence in the local bodies is just a way of continuing the influence of their family in that area. A majority of them agree to male domination in their decision making process. The study finds that there is a significant difference in the functioning styles of male and female incumbents. While male incumbents mostly take up issues such as creation of infrastructure, building roads etc., female incumbents are more passionate about taking up issues like drinking water, sanitation, hygiene, health care etc.

There are a number of interesting insights on electoral dynamics. It is clearly more expensive to contest ZP elections as compared to PS elections. There is a high correlation between spending less than Rs. 1 lakh during the election campaign and the possibility of losing the election. Most of the election expenses are centred around meetings and travel.

The probability of winning a local body election is significantly affected by the family background of the candidate; a candidate from a political background has 26% higher chances of winning than one without a background. However, community building experience of the candidate is insignificant in terms of explaining the probability of winning the elections. An increase in incremental expenses by Rs. 1 lakh increases the probability of winning the election by 10%. Similarly, contesting elections on a party ticket increases the chances of winning significantly. Thus, the main factors which affect the probability of winning are family background, money and the party. Only if relevant steps are taken to control these factors can a level playing field be created amongst the candidates.

The study gives a number of suggestions to both State Government as well as the SECM. These include suggestions for electoral reform, for enhancing quality of candidates as well as for training the candidates to better their performance.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The 73rd amendment to the Constitution was passed in 1992 and the Panchayat Raj in India got a constitutional status. The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act was amended in 1994 to be harmonious with the 73rd constitutional amendment. The State Election Commission of Maharashtra was formed in April 1994 to conduct rural and urban local body elections in the State.

Since 1994, the State Election Commission of Maharashtra (SECM henceforth) has been continually involved with monitoring and strengthening democracy at its very grass roots. Its initial focus area was drafting orders and notifications to enable conduct of elections at the local body level and over a period of time it shifted its emphasis to strict execution of election laws, bye-laws and orders. Later years saw the SECM work on ensuring voter awareness and better turnout. It also correctly recognized the huge role that IT/ software/ websites could play in terms of disseminating information to the voters. SECM was also the first State Election Commission in India to introduce the concept of NOTA i.e. “None Of The Above”.

Even as the SECM moves ahead in terms of strengthening the use of technology in all aspects of the election process, right from filing the affidavits to use of real-time Google Maps for delimitation of constituencies, it also has been conscious of the fact that its true success lies in making the local governance bodies a dynamic media of change.

If local bodies are to truly become dynamic vehicles of change, more qualified candidates need to contest the elections. Voters need to be sensitized and involved in the process of voting. However, voter apathy or non-involvement seems to be true in many parts of the state. Highly educated or qualified young people seem to stay away from the election process of local bodies. What is it that triggers a candidate into local body politics? Are most of the local body representatives first timers? Or are they people who’ve been involved with some form of community development? How do they come to know about developmental schemes of the government? What was their experience in the earlier elections? Are there suggestions so that electoral processes can be made simpler?

Electoral processes at the Gram Panchayat level as well as at State Legislature level have been studied in Maharashtra. However, very scant level of literature exists on understanding electoral and functional dynamics at the two tiers of Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis. In order to strengthen the PRIs in Maharashtra at every level, it is important that the issues faced by these two tiers also be brought to the fore.

In order to explore possibilities of such a study, the State Election Commissioner Shri Jageshwar Saharia convened a meeting of universities, NGOs and other stake holders on 15th October 2015. The Commissioner was emphatic about the need for academic research to

understand more about the aforementioned issues. Once the issues were identified correctly, the Election Commission could then design interventions at different levels through training programs or sensitization workshops.

Nearly 15 universities attended the meeting in October 2015. Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (GIPE henceforth) gave some research proposals for designing a survey so that the SECM could scientifically study local body dynamics. Some of the proposals were accepted by the SECM after due discussions. GIPE then launched a survey in 6 districts of Maharashtra to study dynamics of local bodies. This report is a culmination of this survey.

Following is a timeline of the process through which the survey was launched.

Table 1.1: Timeline through which the project was executed

Date	Process
15/10/2015	Introductory meeting. The Commissioner explained the need for research in local body elections to representatives of 16 universities across Maharashtra. 4 Universities were asked to form a working group and to submit research proposals for taking matters ahead.
30/10/2015	Presentation by Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics on potential research topics. The Commissioner okayed 4 proposals and asked to submit a detailed proposal as well as costing
6/11/2015	Discussion on details of the proposal. The Commissioner accepted the proposal and sent the proposal to Yashada for funding
21/1/2016	Yashada okayed the proposal and a letter sanctioning the funds was sent by the Rural Development Department to Yashada. GIPE agreed to launch the pilot survey as soon as possible
29/1/2016	Meeting held with Yashada officials to seek inputs in terms of designing the sampling methodology
15/2/2016	Sampling methodology was presented by GIPE. Inputs were sought from Mr. Suryakrishnamurty, Asst Commissioner and Yashada officials to finetune the same
22/2/2016	Sample districts and talukas were finalized
29/2/2016	Pilot survey launched in Aurangabad. Entire GIPE team was on field
17/3/2016	Pilot completed and research tools were tested.
30/4/2016	Survey was completed in all 6 districts. 3 all-Mahila Gram Panchayats were visited for case study purposes.
10/5/2016	Data entry and analysis was completed
16/5/2016	Draft of final report presented to SECM

CHAPTER II
ABOUT GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
PUNE

The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics is one of the oldest research and training institutes in economics in the country. It was founded on the 6th of June 1930 with an endowment offered to the Servants of India Society by the late Rao Bahadur R.R. Kale, Member of the Legislative Council from Satara. The Servants of India Society, founded by the late Shri Gopal Krishna Gokhale, are the Trustees of the Institute. The Institute is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

The object of the Institute is to conduct research into the economic and political problems of India and to train research workers in these subjects. Under the pioneering leadership of the late Professor D.R. Gadgil, its first Director, the Institute set the highest standards for quality research, teaching and training in a number of branches of economics.

Keeping in view the eminence of the faculty, the contribution the Institute has made in teaching, training and research in economics, the availability of physical infrastructure and the potential of the Institute, the Government of India, on the advice of the University Grants Commission, awarded to the Institute the status of a Deemed University on May 9, 1993, the birth anniversary of the late Shri Gopal Krishna Gokhale after whom the Institute is named. The National Assessment and Accreditation Council, after a review to satisfy itself of the merits of the Institute has, with effect from January 08, 2004, given its accreditation to the Institute with a grade of A+ (score 90-95%) for a period of five years.

2.1 RESEARCH

The main thrust areas of the Institute, which have developed over the years, through financial assistance from various sources, are agricultural economics and rural development, population studies, input-output studies for planning and development, microeconomics, macroeconomics, monetary economics and finance, public economics and international economics.

Various ministries and public funding agencies, including the Government of Maharashtra and private foundations like Sir Dorabjee Tata Trust, financed the research activities of the Institute in its early years. Subsequently, in 1954, the Union Ministry of Food and Agriculture established, and has supported since then, the Agro-Economic Research Centre of the Institute. During the early fifties, the Rockefeller Foundation made a substantial grant, spread over several years, for the conduct of a research programme in rural demography. By the time this grant period came to an end, the Union Ministry of Health, which had given grants for conducting some specific

demographic studies in 1954-57, decided in 1964 to strengthen and expand the research work on population by financing, on a continuing basis, a Population Research Centre as an integral part of the Institute. The Ford Foundation gave very generous financial assistance for more than a decade beginning in the year 1956. Later, the Ford Foundation, in collaboration with the Planning Commission, provided a separate grant for research and training in the areas of planning and development, mainly devoted to input-output studies. The Planning Commission has also given an endowment grant to the Institute to establish a chair and a unit at the Institute for promoting teaching, research and informed debate on all issues relating to Planning and Development. The above-mentioned chair is named the 'Professor D.R. Gadgil Chair of Planning and Development'.

In 1962, the University Grants Commission recognised the Institute as a Centre of Advanced Study in Agricultural Economics, and later, in 1964, as a Centre of Advanced Study in Economics. In 1977, the UGC, as a part of its Area Studies Programme, established at the Institute a Centre of Study of the Economies of East European Countries. In the same year, the Reserve Bank of India instituted a chair of finance at the Institute. In 1989, the Ford Foundation gave a generous endowment grant to the Institute to fund a chair and to establish a section in international economics to carry out research activities in international economics and related subjects. The Ford Foundation grant also included support for the post of a Librarian and for acquisition of books and journals. Similarly, in 2005, the Kamalnayan Bajaj Trust has given a generous grant to fund a chair of economics at the Institute.

Recently, the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, has sanctioned the Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy (CSSE & IP) in 2008 for a period of five years (coinciding with the Eleventh Five Year Plan Period) to carry out research and teaching in the areas of social exclusion, discrimination and inclusive policy.

2.2 TEACHING

The Institute was affiliated to the University of Bombay, conducted the M.A. Programme in economics and supervised the work of students working towards research degrees of that University. In 1949, with the establishment of the University of Poona, the Institute became a constituent recognised institute of the University of Poona. Till 1993, the Institute functioned, for all academic purposes, as the Department of Economics of Poona University. With the decision of the University of Poona to establish a separate department of economics at its campus, the Institute, as a Centre of Advanced Study in Economics, was granted effective autonomy by the University of Poona in 1986 in designing courses and in teaching and examination of the M.A. courses in economics. As stated earlier, the Institute has been granted the status of a Deemed University by the Government of India with effect from May 9, 1993. With the grant of this status, the Institute now awards its own M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics. After acquiring the

status of a Deemed University, the syllabi of the courses offered at the Institute were thoroughly revised on the basis of the recommendations of a committee constituted for the purpose. The courses in the M.A. programmes of the Institute are being regularly revised and updated on the recommendations of the Board of Studies and the Academic Council of the Institute.

2.3 TRAINING

In April 1989, the University Grants Commission selected the Institute and extended assistance to it for conducting refresher courses in economics for in-service university and college teachers from the western region of the country. In 1994, a year after the grant of Deemed University status to the Institute, the UGC extended the catchment area of the Institute for its refresher courses to the entire country. Since the inception of this scheme by the UGC, the Institute has been regularly conducting UGC - sponsored refresher courses for university and college teachers from across the country.

2.4 RESEARCH CENTERS AT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute has three research centers established by the Central Government.

Agro-Economic Research Centre (AERC)

The Agro Economic Research Centre (AERC, GIPE), Pune, was established by the Union Ministry of Food and Agriculture in 1954 and has now completed 57 years of its existence. The AER Centre has been a fully integrated part of the Institute right since its inception.

In 1962, on the basis of the quality and extent of work done by the GIPE, its professional reputation and contribution to research in agricultural economics and its potentiality for further development, the University Grants Commission selected the Institute as a Centre of Advanced Study in Agricultural Economics. Two years later the field of study of the centre was expanded and it was re-designed as the Centre for Advanced Study in Economics.

In April 1989, the University Grants Commission selected the Institute and extended assistance to it for conducting Refresher courses in Economics for University and college teachers. The Institute has been regularly conducting UGC sponsored refresher courses and the course on Agricultural Economics is particularly popular.

The Centre also conducts studies allotted to the Institute by various agencies such as the Government of Maharashtra, NABARD and the Planning Commission, Government of India.

The AERC has completed about 160 studies since its inception. The major activities of the AERC are Farm Business surveys, and studies related to Irrigation, Watershed Management, Rural Electrification, Village Surveys, Rural Credit, Agricultural Tenancy, Co-operation, Droughts and Famines, Crop Insurance, Agricultural Marketing, Agricultural Exports, Poverty Alleviation, etc.

A large number of these studies have made significant contributions to the field of agricultural economics and the agricultural development of the country. These studies have been widely recognized by policy makers and academicians even today and serve as benchmarks of excellence in their respective fields.

Population Research Centre (PRC)

The research activities in 'Population Studies' at the Institute predate the formulation of population policy, the establishment of the family planning programme by the Government of India and the founding of Population Research Centres. The Institute has played a pioneering role in conducting demographic surveys in India.

A demographic survey of Kolhapur city in 1945 made a lasting contribution towards evolving and establishing a standardized methodology of demographic surveys. A research centre in demography was set up at the Institute in 1949. This was the first of its kind in the country. The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had given grants to the Institute for conducting specific studies during 1954-57. In 1964, the Ministry decided to strengthen and extend the research work on population by establishing a Demographic Research Centre as a part of the Institute. In 1978-79, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Demography Advisory Committee, the centre was re-designated as a Population Research Centre for the State of Maharashtra. It has earned the distinction of being included in the category of 'fully developed' centres according to the norms of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

In the 'fifties, when no information on demographic events was available, the Centre started its work by conducting demographic surveys and thus contributed in a major way to the area of survey methodology. After the launch of the family planning programme at the official level, the Centre had contributed by actively participating in the implementation of the sterilization programme and by undertaking communication-cum-action studies. Studies on the after-effects of vasectomy camps and on the acceptance of the loop as an IUD gave valuable inputs about the methods of family planning.

Various dimensions of the family planning programme at its different stages, starting with its communication methods and including several of its other aspects such as compulsion during emergency, the adoption of spacing methods, maternal and child health, the withdrawal of the targets, the RCH approach of the programme, RTI/STI, client satisfaction, and unwanted pregnancies have all been studied by the Centre. The

work of NGOs in the field of family welfare has also been evaluated. In recent years, evaluations of the sterilisation bed reservation scheme and of the functioning of family welfare training institutions, ultrasound sonography centres and urban health posts have also been carried out.

In the area of data collection on a wide scale, the Institute has independently carried out or participated in major surveys in the 1980s and 1990s (NFMS, 1980; NFHS, 1992-93; and RCH Baseline Survey, 1998). Apart from evaluative and fact-finding surveys, many analytical studies are carried out in the PRC. Recently, a study on the cost of health care in public hospitals in Maharashtra has been completed at the Centre. The Centre has also just completed two rounds of a World Bank-sponsored research study on quality of health care (client and provider satisfaction) in India/Maharashtra. The demography of India's tribal population is another recently completed research project at the Centre. Currently, the Centre is involved in the activities related to the strengthening of the Health Management Information System (HMIS), the new initiative of the Ministry to provide the district and facility level health data on a monthly basis.

Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy (CSSE&IP)

CSSE&IP is a multi-disciplinary research centre established under the UGC in the year 2008 (as part of the Eleventh Plan) to carry out research and teaching in the areas of social exclusion, discrimination and inclusive policy. The key objective of the Centre is to conceptualize and define problems related to discrimination, exclusion and inclusion based on caste, ethnicity and religion. The Centre proposes to focus on developing an understanding of the nature and dynamics of exclusion and discrimination at both theoretical and empirical levels. Besides these three centers, the Institute also houses four prestigious Chair Professorships.

1. RBI Chair Professor of Finance whose unit conducts research and teaching in Monetary and Financial Economics (Funded by Reserve Bank of India)
2. D.R. Gadgil Professor of Planning and Development (Funded by Planning Commission of India)
3. Ford Foundation Professor of International Economics (Funded by Ford Foundation)
4. Kamalnayan Bajaj Chair Professor of Industrial Economics (Funded by Kamalnayan Bajaj Foundation)

2.5 LIST OF PROJECTS COMPLETED BY GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (FROM 2010-2011 TO 2014-2015)

2014-2015

1. "Preparing a data-based scorecard to gauge the performance of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha MPs", Rajas Parchure and Manasi Phadke, sponsored by Pune Municipal Corporation
2. "Using probit models to understand factors that impact probability of getting re-elected: An econometric model on 16th LS elections", Rajas Parchure and Manasi Phadke (On-going Research Paper)
3. "Mapping Parliamentary performance of MPs with constituency performance: A research paper on Political Economy", Rajas Parchure and Manasi Phadke (On-going Research Paper)
4. "Medium and Long-term Farm Impact of Debt Waiver and Relief Scheme", Rajas Parchure, sponsored by NABARD.
5. "Preparation of Pre-Feasibility Report for Nira-Deoghar Irrigation Project: Taluka Bhore, District Pune: Through A Uniquely Designed Public - Private Partnership [PPP] Model", Rajas Parchure and Anurag Asawa, sponsored by MKVDC, Maharashtra.
6. "Socio-Economic Issues in Maharashtra", Rajas Parchure, sponsored by Life and General Associates.
7. "Reversing Son Preference: A Study of Contributory Factors", Anjali Radkar, sponsored by UNFPA.
8. "A Study to Assess the Impact of RGNF Scholarship to SC/ST Students", Prashant Bansode, sponsored by CSSE and IP.
9. "Socio-Economic Inclusion of a Nomadic Tribe: A Case of Malapandaram in Kerala", Prashant Bansode and Abhilash T., sponsored by ICSSR, New Delhi.
10. "Female Domestic Workers and Socio- Economic Inclusion", Sunil BhauBhosale, sponsored by ICSSR, New Delhi.
11. "Preparation of Block Profile of 35 Districts of Maharashtra", Anjali Radkar and Lalitagauri Kulkarni, sponsored by YASHADA, Pune.
12. "Study on Capital Flows, Exchange Rate and Financial Stability", Lalitagauri Kulkarni, sponsored by Reserve Bank of India.

2013-2014

1. "Agricultural Distress and Farmers Suicides in Yavatmal District", Rajas Parchure and Dnyandeo Talule, NABARD, April 2012.
2. "Review of Tariff and Tariff Structure Based on Pricing and Availability of Bagasse for Non Fossil Fuel Based Cogen Plants in Maharashtra", Rajas Parchure and others, Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC), December 2012.
3. "In-depth Study in the Matter of Tariff Determination for the Non-qualifying / Incidental Bagasse based Co-generation Plants in Maharashtra", Rajas Parchure and others, Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC).

4. “Study on Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in India (Case of Maharashtra)”, Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar, Institute for Social and Economic Change, *Bangalore by Competition Commission of India, New Delhi, June 2012.
5. “Innovative Financing for Agriculture and Food Value Chains in India – A Review” Deepak Shah and Rahul Nilakantan, International Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi, January 2013.
6. “Impact Assessment of the Implementation of the Revival Package for Short –Term Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS) in Bihar”, Kailas C. Thaware, NABARD, Mumbai.
7. “Impact Assessment of the Implementation of the Revival Package for Short–Term Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS) in Karnataka”, Kailas C. Thaware, NABARD, Mumbai.
8. “Impact Assessment of the Implementation of the Revival Package for Short–Term Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS) in Andhra Pradesh”, Kailas C. Thaware, NABARD, Mumbai.
9. “Impact Assessment of the Implementation of the Revival Package for Short–Term Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS) in Tamil Nadu”, Kailas C. Thaware, NABARD, Mumbai.
10. “Impact Assessment of the Implementation of the Revival Package for Short–Term Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS) in Maharashtra”, Kailas C. Thaware, NABARD, MUMBAI.
11. “The Development Paradox: A Study of Tribal Villages in Thane District of Maharashtra”, Jayanti Kajale, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, New Delhi.
12. “Safe Adolescent Transition and Health Initiative (SATHI), Midline Evaluation”, Anjali Radkar, Institute of Health Management, Pachod.
13. “Comprehensive Nutrition Survey of Maharashtra”, Anjali Radkar, UNICEF and International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, May 2012.
14. “Regional Growth Strategies for the Region Covered by Development Board (Rest of Maharashtra)”, Naresh R. Bodkhe, Government of Maharashtra, March 2013.
15. “The Labour Force Participation of Secondary-Educated Indian Women”, Suddhasil Siddhanta, Danish Ministry of Finance through Aarhus University, DK., December 2012.
16. “Credit Risk Modelling and Validation of a Major Public Sector Bank in India”, Lalitagauri Kulkarni, Deloitte, February 2013.

2012-2013

1. “Affordable Housing in Maharashtra” (In collaboration with National Institute of Construction Management and Research, Pune) sponsored by Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (Ministry of Urban Development, Maharashtra State), by Rajas Parchure and Anurag Asawa.
2. “Pricing of Electricity Produced from Bagasse by Non-qualifying Sugar Factories for MERC” sponsored by Maharashtra Energy Development Corporation, by Rajas Parchure.

3. “Comprehensive State Agriculture Plan Maharashtra State” sponsored by Department of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries, Government of Maharashtra, by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.
4. “The Study of Quality of Life of Sugarcane Cutter Migrants at Destination and Source Villages” sponsored by Janarth, NGO, Aurangabad, by Prashant Bansode.
5. “Poverty Diagnostic in Maharashtra for NRLM”, sponsored by the Department of Rural Development, Government of Maharashtra, by Kailash Thaware.
6. “A Study to Ascertain the Status of Asset Creation by Beneficiaries of NBCFDC Loans”, sponsored by National Backward Finance and Development Corporation, New Delhi, by Prashant Bansode.
7. “Child Right Situational Analysis of Children of Families Engaged in the Sugarcane Farming in Maharashtra”, sponsored by Save the Children – Bal Raksha Bharat, by DebasishNandy.

2011-2012

1. “Assessment of Biogas Availability for Biomass Power Generation in Maharashtra”, sponsored by Maharashtra Energy Development Corporation, undertaken by Rajas Parchure.
2. “Customer Feedback of SMERA Ratings”, sponsored by Small and Medium Enterprises Rating Agency (SMERA), undertaken by Rajas Parchure and Lalitagauri Kulkarni.
3. “An Evaluation of NBCFDC Schemes in the State of Gujarat”, sponsored by National Backward Classes Finance & Development Corporation (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment,), New Delhi, undertaken by S.N. Tripathy.
4. Safe Adolescent Transition and Health Initiative (SATHI): Midline Evaluation Survey of a Project for Improving the Reproductive Health of Married Adolescent Girls in Five Districts of Maharashtra, sponsored by Institute of Health Management, undertaken by R. Nagarajan, Anjali Radkar and SanjeevaneMulay.
5. “Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) - Ahmednagar District” Under XI Five Year Plan – RashtriyaKrishiVikasYojana, Government of India, Provided Technical Guidance to District Superintending Agriculture Officer, Ahmednagar, in preparation of CDAP, 2010, undertaken by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.
6. “Cultural Capital, Exclusion and the Marginalised”, sponsored by Ya.Di. Phadke Research Centre, Keshav Gore Smarak Trust, Goregaon, Mumbai, undertaken by Prashant Bansode.

2010-2011

1. “Assessing Biomass Availability and its Procurement Price in Maharashtra”, sponsored by Maharashtra Energy Development Agency, Pune, by Rajas Parchure.
2. “Seasonal Migration of Labourers in Maharashtra”, sponsored by Janarth (NGO, Aurangabad), by Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics and Janarth.

3. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Nagpur District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, June 2009, by S.S. Kalamkar and Sangeeta Shroff.
4. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Amravati District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, June 2009, by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.
5. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Aurangabad District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, August 2009, by S.S. Kalamkar and Sangeeta Shroff.
6. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Jalgaon District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, August 2009, by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.
7. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Parbhani District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, September 2009, by S.S. Kalamkar and Sangeeta Shroff.
8. “Evaluation of Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) of Ratnagiri District”, sponsored by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, December 2009, by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.
9. “Comprehensive District Agriculture Plan (C-DAP) – Pune and Satara District” under XIth Five Year Plan – RashtriyaKrishiVikasYojana, Government of India, provided Technical Guidance to District Superintending Agriculture Officer, Pune/Satara in preparation of CDAP, by Sangeeta Shroff and S.S. Kalamkar.

CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

HIGHLIGHTS

1. What triggers candidates into politics/ into contesting an election locally
2. Whether SC/ ST/ BCC reservations have helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society
3. Whether reservation of 50% of the seats for women has led to women empowerment in its true sense
4. Whether Government machinery and elected representatives work smoothly in a co-operative fashion to ensure outcome
5. Whether the election processes such as filing of nominations, election symbols, application of Model Code of Conduct, voting processes etc. function smoothly and whether any changes are required in any of the electoral processes
6. Whether there are training gaps that need to be filled

As has been mentioned before, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, was one of the academic institutes invited by the State Election Commissioner to submit research proposals to look into the dynamics of local body elections.

After a careful study of the existing literature and meetings with several stakeholders, the Institute created 5 major proposals that have been approved by the Commissioner. These are:

1. What triggers candidates into politics/ into contesting an election locally

This proposal is the main area of interest to the Election Commission, since one of the major issues with elections in India at all levels is the quality of candidates which contest the elections. It is largely observed that the more educated classes of the country stay away from contesting elections. Of course, education by itself is not a necessary condition for assuring quality. But in a recent judgement upholding the Haryana State Government's law of setting educational qualification as a pre-condition for elections, the Hon. Supreme Court observed, "It is only education which gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and wrong, good and bad. Therefore, prescription of an educational qualification is not irrelevant for better administration". Hence, it is of some concern that the educated classes mostly stay away from the election process.

Many, who are involved in community participation programs individually or through NGOs too, may prefer to stay away from formalizing their relationship with the community via elections, claiming that the world of politics is way too murky for them to get involved into.

Why does this happen? Does education actually become a hurdle for active political participation? Are young people from politically active families more likely to contest elections? Are they triggered by power that they've seen their elders enjoying? Does exposure to community participation from a younger age bring about political activism? Is lack of funds one of the major hurdles in contesting an election?

Does youth understand the roles and responsibilities of the Panchayat Samiti/ Zilla Parishad? Is it some misunderstanding regarding what they're expected to do that keeps them away from contesting elections? Counterwise, do those candidates who actually contest elections really understand what they are signing up for? Is it some misguided notion of power rather than the responsibilities of that post that motivates them to contest the elections?

These and other relevant questions will be studied under this proposal. Triggers that propel as well as dissuade candidates into/ from contesting elections will be identified.

2. Whether SC/ ST/ OB reservations have helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society

SCs, STs and BCCs have been given reservations as per their proportion in the population. In Maharashtra, the reservation is done through a rotation scheme. Thus, if a ZP constituency is contested by an open candidate, there is a possibility that in the next election, it will be reserved for an SCs, STs and BCCs candidate. This implies that even if the open candidate has helped in creating development for his constituency, he is not even eligible to contest the elections the next time. This creates a disincentive for working towards development. It also creates tensions between political parties and candidates.

How have these equations changed due to the rotation of seats? These and other questions will be studied under this proposal.

3. Whether reservation of 50% of the seats for women has led to women empowerment in its true sense

The 73rd Constitutional Amendment mandates reservation for women which is no less than 33%. But, the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act passed in 1994 gives a 50% reservation to women. What has been the impact of this reservation policy? Do we find that women are participating in a meaningful manner towards local polity? Or is it that a woman member is elected just because her seat is reserved? How many women stay active in politics once the reservation lapses? Do they have political aspirations? Who are their role models?

One of the objectives of the report is to study whether women reservations have really led to women empowerment in the true sense of the term.

4. Whether Government machinery and elected representatives work smoothly in a co-operative fashion to ensure outcome.

If the PRI model is to work smoothly, the relationships between the elected members and the bureaucracy have to be cordial. It is the elected members who have to suggest what development plans are needed within their constituencies, but the actual implementation and financing of the same is done by the CEOs at ZP level and the BDOs at the PS level. Both the functions are interrelated and this interrelation itself could become the cause of frictions between elected members and the bureaucracy.

How is the relationship between elected members and bureaucracy? What kind of issues exist in the day-to-day working of ZPs/ PSs? Can some intervention help in reducing friction, if any, between members and bureaucracy? These are some of the research questions that will be handled under this proposal.

5. Whether the election processes such as filing of nominations, election symbols, application of Model Code of Conduct, voting processes etc. function smoothly and whether any changes are required in any of the electoral processes

Rejection rate of nomination forms is a source of tension within the PRIs in Maharashtra. Why could this be the case? When the candidates file their nomination forms, are they aware about the preconditions for contesting elections? What are the sources through which they get this information? Are these formal sources (Tehsildar Offices, political party offices), or do they come to know about it from hearsay? Are there other bureaucratic/ procedural hurdles in filing the forms? What are the opinions of candidates regarding online filing? One of the objectives of this study is to understand perceptions of candidates regarding ease of filing, as well as to understand how the process can be facilitated so that the rejection rate may reduce.

Do candidates understand the Model Code of Conduct? Is MCC implementation done properly? Has it had any other impact on field?

Under this proposal, candidates will also be questioned about their election experience(s). Did the election process get conducted smoothly? The SECM is especially interested in getting the feedback regarding election processes from the field and in suggestions that candidates or political parties or Government officials may have in terms of bettering the processes.

6. Whether there are training gaps that need to be filled

If grassroot polity has to be improved, candidates will have to be exposed to training quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Training levels across PRIs in Maharashtra are not perceived to be very high. How much training do the candidates really undergo? How does it help them? This study will also do a training gap assessment and will identify areas in which training will have to be given to the candidates.

CHAPTER IV

SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

The results of the survey critically hinge on the choice of sample. Thus, one of the major decisions to be taken in terms of the quality of the survey was to decide which 6 districts are to be chosen for sampling.

The districts should be such that they give us a diverse set of respondents to interview. Thus, the sample ought to include districts that are distinctly different in their political flavour, in their socio-economic indices as well as their geographical spread.

Four socio-economic indicators were considered to profile districts. These are

1. Percentage of rural population to total population
2. Percentage of SC in the population
3. Percentage of ST in the population
4. HDI of the district

Districts were given a score of 0 to 1 for each individual indicator. Thus, the district having maximum rural population percentage would be ranked 1, whilst the one with minimum rural percentage would be ranked 0. Similarly, on criteria 2 and 3, those districts with maximum SC and ST population percentage would be given rank 1 and vice-versa. Districts with the lowest score on HDI were given rank 1 and vice-versa. Each of the indicators was given a weight of 0.25.

Thus, if a district had maximum rural, SC and ST population and the poorest score on HDI, its overall score after applying weights would be 1. The district which was highly urbanized and has the lowest SC and ST populations and the highest HDI score would get an overall score of 0.

To put it rather simply, more underdeveloped districts would get a score close to 1 and the more developed districts would get a score close to 0.

Next, districts were profiled to understand political activity. Following two variables were used to develop the political activity score:

1. Voter turnout ratio
2. No. of political parties represented in the ZP

Again, districts were given a score of 0 to 1 for each indicator. The district with minimum voter turnout was given a score of 1 and the district with maximum voter turnout was given a score of 0. Similarly, district which had very few parties represented in the ZP were given a score of 1 and those with the maximum number of parties were given a score of 0.

Again, to put it rather simply, districts with low political activity would get a score close to 1 and those with high political activity would get a score close to 0.

CONSULTATION WITH SECM AND YASHADA

At this point, SECM and Yashada officials were consulted to get their insights into the sampling methodology. Following insights emerged.

1. In terms of the socio-economic index, proportion of BPL families could be included as an indicator.
2. In terms of the political index, instead of using number of parties getting represented, we could use the number of contestants per seat to understand the level of political activism in the district.
3. The numbers for the socio-economic as well as political index immediately changed, with the socio-economic index now having 5 variables and the political index now having 2 variables, one the voter turnout and the other being number of contestants per seat.

FINAL METHODOLOGY FOR CHOOSING DISTRICT SAMPLE

Following is the final methodology that was used to identify the districts for sampling.

1. All districts were divided into low, middle and high level of socio-economic development sections.
2. In order to understand the socio-economic activity levels, proportion of SC, ST, BPL and rural population to total population as well as the HDI index were used.
3. Each of the variables was given 20% weight.
4. An index was constructed so that 0 would imply high levels of development and 1 would imply low levels of development.
5. All districts were divided into sections; a score of more than 0.7 would mean low development, between 0.4 and 0.7 would mean medium development and less than 0.4 would mean high development.
6. From each section, the district which had maximum and minimum political activity was selected.
7. For building the political activity index, the voter turnout as well as number of contestants per seat were the two variables which were considered.
8. An index was constructed in such a fashion that 0 would imply high levels of political activity and 1 would imply low levels of political activity.
9. Using this methodology, 6 districts were identified (See Table 4.1).
10. For identifying two talukas per district, voter turnout ratios were used. The talukas with maximum and minimum voter turnout ratios were selected for the survey.


Table 4.1: Final District Sample

Division	GIPE Index	Socio-econ	Political
Amravati	Washim	Low	High
Nashik	Nandurbar	Low	Low
Nagpur	Chandrapur	Middle	High
Aurangabad	Aurangabad	Middle	Middle, on higher side
Konkan	Raigad	High	Middle, on higher side
Pune	Pune	High	Low

Table 4.2: Final Taluka Sample

Division	District	Low	High
Konkan	Raigad	Karjat	Pen
Nashik	Nandurbar	Nawapur	Akrani
Pune	Pune	Velhe	Haveli/ Khed
Aurangabad	Aurangabad	Paithan	Soegaon
Amravati	Washim	Washim	Manora
Nagpur	Chandrapur	Gondpipri	Chandrapur

Figure 4.1: Map of Maharashtra showing geographical spread of sample districts



NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS SCHEDULED PER DISTRICT

Following is the number of interviews that were scheduled per district.

Table 4.3: Interviews scheduled per district

Number of respondents	Zilla Parishad	Taluka Samiti
Election officer	1	1
Elected members	6	6
Candidates who contested and lost	4	4
Party officials	4	4
Collector/ Tehsildar	1	1
Political news reporters / academicians	3	1

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Separate questionnaires were designed for elected members (winning candidates), candidates who lost the 2012 elections, party heads, Government officials, Tehsildars and academicians. Personal interviews served as the main research methodology tool. Focus Group Discussions were held towards the end of the survey with State Election Commission officials, political scientists, retired Government officials, Government officials involved in training PRI members, CBOs and other stakeholders in order to create qualitative insights into electoral and functioning issues of the PRIs.

Since the research questions are qualitative in nature, each interview lasted nearly an hour on average. Some interviews stretched for a couple of hours. Most of the questions did not call for an answer in Yes/ No or Agree/ Disagree terms. All investigators were trained and instructed to talk to the respondents even regarding relevant issues that were not necessarily covered in the questionnaire.

SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

A quick word is needed on how the samples were drawn in different districts. The first point of contact for starting the survey process was typically the Dy. CEO at ZPs and the Block Development Officer at the PSs. It was they who facilitated the interviews with elected members.


As far as possible, interviews were scheduled with candidates with diverse backgrounds. Thus, as far as possible, interviews were conducted with open and reserved category members, members working on or designated on committees and those who weren't, males and females, people from entrenched political families and those who had no political history, novices and veterans, so that a heterogeneous sample would be covered within each district. However, the drawn sample did not reflect the composition of the ZP or the PS in the same proportion. For example, in Maharashtra, 50% of the seats are reserved for women. The sample in every district did not necessarily reflect this gender composition.

The next chapter presents a brief socio-economic profile of the selected districts.

CHAPTER V
SOCIO-ECO-POLITICAL PROFILES OF SELECTED DISTRICTS

AURANGABAD DISTRICT

Figure 5.1 Map of Aurangabad



Aurangabad district is the divisional headquarters of the Aurangabad division in Maharashtra. It is the gateway to Marathwada. Marathwada is a drought-prone part of Maharashtra, which nevertheless contributes majorly to cotton, dal and coarse cereals in the state. It has rapidly emerged as a major trading centre.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

In 2011, Aurangabad had population of 37,01,282 as compared to a population of 28,97,013 in the 2001 census, which is a growth rate of 27.76% in the total population. In 2001, Aurangabad's population was 2.99% of the total population in Maharashtra; however in 2011, the Aurangabad District population constituted 3.29% of total Maharashtra population. Nearly 56.23% of the total population resides in rural areas. While 68.7% of the population comprises of Hindus, there is a sizeable population of Muslims (21.25%) as well. The culture of Aurangabad city is heavily influenced by Hyderabad. Its influence is reflected in the language and cuisine of the locals.

Table 5.1 Demographic profile of Aurangabad district

Description	2011	2001
Population	37,01,282	28,97,013
Male	19,24,469	15,05,363
Female	17,76,813	13,91,650
Population Growth	27.76%	30.83%
Area Sq. Km	10,107	10,107
Density/km2	366	286
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	3.29%	2.99%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	923	924
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	858	890
Average Literacy	79.02	72.91
Male Literacy	87.37	84.88
Female Literacy	70.08	60.06

Table 5.2 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	25,45,438	68.77%
Muslims	7,86,677	21.25%
Christian	15,991	0.43%
Sikh	5,142	0.14%
Buddhist	3,09,093	8.35%
Jain	30,981	0.84%
Others	1,005	0.03%
Not Stated	6,955	0.19%

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

- A drought prone region and hence characterized by poverty and backwardness.
- Failed to pull in industrial development due to water supply issues.
- The Marathwada Statutory Development Board, which monitors development work and expenditure for the region, revealed the extent of regional imbalance in Maharashtra in its 2011 report.

Table 5.3 Comparison of industrialization and income across Maharashtra

Region	SME %	Large Industries %	Per Capita Income(Rs)	SEZs	FDI %
Marathwada	7	11	60,013	10	2
Vidarbha	13	14	65,502	10	8
Western Maharashtra	80	75	1,05,488	96	90

- Thus, development of Maharashtra is concentrated in Western region, but Marathwada lags in development.
- However, Aurangabad has developed as an industrial hub over a period of time.
- Presence of Bajaj Auto Ltd. has contributed to its development as an auto hub. And led to generation of jobs.
- It has a good education base, existence of local IT units and low cost of operation.

POLITICAL PROFILE

The district comprises of nine talukas namely, Kannad, Soygaon, Sillod, Phulambri, Aurangabad, Khultabad, Vaijapur, Gangapur and Paithan.


The ZP Chairman and the Vice- Chairman belong to the NCP-Congress combination, even though the influence of Shiv Sena is extremely visible at the Panchayat Samiti levels.

Table 5.4 Political profile of Aurangabad district

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
AURANGABAD	GANGAPUR	9	18	256872	36652	9846	197266	129983	65.89
AURANGABAD	KANNAD	9	18	256864	22177	16181	203618	133394	65.51
AURANGABAD	KHULTABAD	3	6	88706	9419	4215	63351	43252	68.27
AURANGABAD	PAITHAN	8	16	252838	32221	5427	176248	128441	72.88
AURANGABAD	PHULAMBRI	4	8	135357	12702	2303	110245	74862	67.91
AURANGABAD	SILLOD	8	16	247189	20787	22704	181465	129024	71.10
AURANGABAD	SOEGAON	3	6	90142	7952	10456	72095	45952	63.74
AURANGABAD	VAIJAPUR	7	14	222537	27136	10434	178934	122458	68.44
AURANGABAD	TOTAL	51	102	1550505	169046	81566	1183222	807366	68.23

PUNE DISTRICT

Figure 5.2 Map of Pune district



Pune district is one of the most well-developed districts in Maharashtra. Pune ranks the first in terms of being well-developed socio-economically. It is also highly urbanized, with 60% of its population living in the urban areas.

Development invites migration. Pune has seen a huge growth in terms of the population that has come into the district, whether in search of jobs or education. Migration has been such that, the district has witnessed one of the highest population density numbers in the 2011 census. In 2011, Pune had population of 94,29,408 as compared to a population of 72,32,555 in 2001, which is a growth of 30.37% in ten years. Pune District population constituted 8.39 percent of total Maharashtra population in the 2011 census. In the 2001 census, this figure for Pune District was at 7.47 percent of Maharashtra population.

Average literacy rate of Pune in 2011 was 86.15% compared to 80.45% in 2001. And gender wise, male and female literacy were 90.84 and 81.05 respectively. For the 2001 census, same figures stood at 88.34 and 71.89 in Pune District. High literacy rates partly have to do with the education culture of the district. The district headquarters Pune city is called as the Oxford of the East and hosts numerous renowned research and training institutes and colleges.

Table 5.5 Demographic profile of Pune district

Description	2011	2001
Population	94,29,408	72,32,555
Male	49,24,105	37,69,128
Female	45,05,303	34,63,427
Population Growth	30.37%	30.73%
Area Sq. Km	15,643	15,643
Density/km ²	603	462
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	8.39%	7.47%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	915	919
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	883	902
Average Literacy	86.15	80.45
Male Literacy	90.84	88.34
Female Literacy	81.05	71.89

Table 5.6 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	80,90,254	85.80%
Muslims	6,73,704	7.14%
Christian	1,34,192	1.42%
Sikh	27,090	0.29%
Buddhist	3,40,404	3.61%
Jain	1,27,786	1.36%
Others	9,873	0.10%
Not Stated	26,105	0.28%

SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE

The importance of the Pune region in the State of Maharashtra has been steadily growing over a period of time.

- In 2010, the Pune division was the second largest contributor to the State Domestic Product. Its share in the Maharashtra State Domestic Product was nearly 21% in 2010.
- The recent Economic Survey claims that the contribution of Pune district to the State GDP is second only to the contribution by Mumbai and Thane districts.
- The city is known as the “Oxford of the East”. Host to a number of research and educational institutes such as the Haffkine Institute, the Bhandarkar Institute of Oriental Research, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics and Fergusson College etc.
- Pune is also a tech-city. IT exports of Pune crossed Rs. 30,000 crores last year.
- Presence of engineering and auto majors.
- Presence of agro- and food-processing is very strong too.
- Pune is logistically convenient because it is placed centrally to a number of prosperous markets such as Mumbai, Nasik, Nagpur, Aurangabad etc.

POLITICAL PROFILE

Administratively the district is divided into 14 talukas namely, Junnar, Ambegaon, Khed, Maval, Mulshi, Velhe, Bhore, Haveli, Purandar, Pimpri-Chinchwad, Indapur, Daund, Baramati and Shirur. Pune city is the administrative headquarters of the district. There are about 1,866 villages in the district.

There are 18 Vidhan Sabha constituencies in this district which are Junnar, Ambegaon, Khed-Alandi, Maval, Mulshi, Haveli, Bopodi, Shivajinagar, Parvati (SC), Kasba Peth, Bhavani Peth, Pune Cantonment, Shirur, Daund, Indapur, Baramati, Purandhar and Bhore. The 4 Lok Sabha constituencies of the district are Pune, Baramati, Shirur and Maval (is shared by Raigad district).

The Pune District is under proposal to be divided so that separate Baramati District can be carved out of it. The proposed district includes eastern parts of Pune such as Shirur, Purandar, Daund, Baramati and Indapur talukas as well as Phaltan taluka.


In keeping with the well-documented logic that higher development implies lower political activity, Pune Zilla Parishad elections registered a voter turnout of only 64.91%, one of the lowest numbers in the state. Similarly, the voter turnout for Panchayat Samiti elections turns out to be 64.96%.

5.7 Political profile of Pune district

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
PUNE	BARAMATI	7	14	321518	41796	2301	493018	327060	66.34
PUNE	BHOR	4	8	153833	6375	3076	254380	176113	69.23
PUNE	DOUND	7	14	299184	39546	5994	437220	296428	67.80
PUNE	HAVELI	10	20	433703	47388	8133	767728	428762	55.85
PUNE	INDAPUR	7	14	326821	48044	3058	478642	348520	72.81
PUNE	JUNNAR	8	16	345065	14132	69200	472814	308092	65.16
PUNE	KHED	7	14	325649	11866	38095	501618	291784	58.17
PUNE	MAVAL	5	10	214870	9946	18760	317440	211886	66.75
PUNE	MULASHI	3	6	131591	9621	5430	209298	139682	66.74
PUNE	PURANDHAR	4	8	184739	10834	3748	299010	205088	68.59
PUNE	SHIRUR	6	12	283591	19336	6951	437862	292236	66.74
PUNE	VELHA	2	4	55874	2773	1439	84752	62604	73.87
PUNE	TOTAL	70	140	3076438	261657	166185	4753782	3088255	64.96

NANDURBAR DISTRICT

Figure 5.3 Map of Nandurbar district



Nandurbar is an administrative district in the northwest corner, within the Khandesh region of Maharashtra state in India . It is predominantly a tribal district.

Initially, Nandurbar was part of the larger Dhule district. Khandesh district consisted of the districts Nandurbar, Dhule and Jalgaon. Nandurbar shares the same history as of Khandesh and Dhule. Nandurbar now comprises of 6 talukas namely, Akkalkuwa, Akarni Mahal (also called Dhadgaon), Taloda, Shahada, Nandurbar and Navapur.

Nandurbar is divided into two broad physiographic parts. One is the hilly terrain of Satpuda ranges prominently dominated by tribals i.e. Akarni, Akkalkuwa and Taloda. The second part is Tapi river basin, which is comparatively more fertile and has good irrigation facilities.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

In 2011, Nandurbar had population of 16,48,295 as compared to a population of 13,11,709 in the 2001 census, which shows a growth rate of 25.66%. Nandurbar District population constitutes 1.47 percent of total Maharashtra population. In 2001 census, this figure for Nandurbar District was at 1.35 percent of Maharashtra population. The district shows extremely poor levels of urbanization. According to the 2011 census, 83.29% of the district population resides in rural areas

Table 5.8 Demographic profile of Nandurbar district

Description	2011	2001
Population	16,48,295	13,11,709
Male	8,33,170	6,63,511
Female	8,15,125	6,48,198
Population Growth	25.66%	23.45%
Area Sq. Km	5,955	5,955
Density/km2	277	220
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	1.47%	1.35%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	978	977
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	944	961
Average Literacy	64.38	55.78
Male Literacy	72.17	66.16
Female Literacy	56.47	45.18

Table 5.9 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	15,21,618	92.31%
Muslims	96,182	5.84%
Christian	8,467	0.51%
Sikh	685	0.04%
Buddhist	4,969	0.30%
Jain	6,191	0.38%
Others	2,907	0.18%
Not Stated	7,276	0.44%

SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE

- A study by the MSME Development Institute reveals that the extent of industrialization within the district is extremely low.
- Cumulatively upto 2012, the district shows the presence of only around 520 MSMEs and 9 large industries.
- These large industries mostly operate in segments such as food processing, forest produce and textiles. All the 9 large units only operate in the Shahada taluka.

POLITICAL PROFILE

There is one Lok Sabha constituency in the district which is Nandurbar (ST) reserved for ST. There are four Maharashtra Assembly seats namely Akkalkuwa (ST), Shahada (ST), Nandurbar (ST), Nawapur (ST).

Sakri (ST) and Shirpur (ST) assembly seats from Dhule district are also part of Nandurbar Lok Sabha seat.


Nandurbar boasts one of the highest voter turnout ratios, whether it be for ZP elections or for PS elections. In both cases, the voter turnout is as high as 69%.

Table 5.10 Political profile of Nandurbar district

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
NANDURBAR	AKRANI	8	16	195754	2258	187806	98925	63389	64.08
NANDURBAR	TALODA	5	10	133291	2165	115378	82462	55088	66.80
NANDURBAR	SHAHADA	13	26	346352	16203	213203	217701	143049	65.71
NANDURBAR	NANDURBAR	10	20	256409	8544	153774	172445	121751	70.60
NANDURBAR	NAWAPUR	9	18	237645	1863	223671	165741	127158	76.72
NANDURBAR	TOTAL	45	90	1169451	31033	893832	737274	510435	69.23

CHANDRAPUR DISTRICT

Figure 5.4 Map of Chandrapur district



Chandrapur district was formerly known as *Chanda District*. In 1964, it was renamed as Chandrapur. It was the largest district in India until it was split into separate district of Gadchiroli.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

In 2011, Chandrapur had a population of 22,04,307 as compared to a population of 20,71,101 in the 2001 census. Thus, in a period of 10 years, the population of Chandrapur grew by 6.43%. According to the 2011 census, Chandrapur constitutes 1.96% of the total population of Maharashtra. In 2001 census, this figure for Chandrapur District was at 2.14 percent of Maharashtra population. 64.82% of the population in this district resides in rural areas.

Table 5.11 Demographic profile of Chandrapur district

Description	2011	2001
Population	22,04,307	20,71,101
Male	11,23,834	10,62,993
Female	10,80,473	10,08,108
Population Growth	6.43%	16.88%
Area Sq. Km	11,443	11,443
Density/km2	193	181
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	1.96%	2.14%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	961	948
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	953	939
Average Literacy	80.01	73.17
Male Literacy	86.79	82.94
Female Literacy	72.97	62.89

5.12 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	17,80,085	80.75%
Muslims	92,297	4.19%
Christian	10,701	0.49%
Sikh	5,251	0.24%
Buddhist	2,86,734	13.01%
Jain	3,861	0.18%
Others	23,188	1.05%
Not Stated	2,190	0.10%

SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE

- Vast reserves of coal and limestone have helped in industrialization within the region. Due to coal abundance, it is called as the Land of Black Gold.
- It is famous for its Super Thermal Power Plant, one of the biggest in Asia.
- Many cement factories like L&T (now UltraTech Cement), Gujarat Ambuja (Maratha Cement Works), Manikgarh, Murli Cement and ACC Cement present in the district.
- Presence of about 6000 small and big scale industries.

5.13 Political profile of Chandrapur

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
CHANDRAPUR	BHADRAVATI	4	8	97815	12920	22253	75255	50609	67.25
CHANDRAPUR	BRAMHAPURI	4	8	122279	17549	10555	86339	67974	78.73
CHANDRAPUR	CHANDRAPUR	6	12	154347	28104	22104	116863	66774	57.14
CHANDRAPUR	CHIMUR	6	12	161031	24181	52107	115338	83654	72.53
CHANDRAPUR	GONDPIPRI	3	6	74559	11510	14069	53390	42129	78.91
CHANDRAPUR	JIWATI	2	4	54976	11605	16680	34431	24942	72.44
CHANDRAPUR	KORPANA	4	8	113180	12026	28387	83565	56423	67.52
CHANDRAPUR	MUL	3	6	88135	6052	15763	61315	47586	77.61
CHANDRAPUR	NAGBHID	5	10	124425	16720	23374	90418	65521	72.46
CHANDRAPUR	POMBHURNA	2	4	47906	3473	13482	37051	27222	73.47
CHANDRAPUR	RAJURA	4	8	103519	17284	24126	71785	51834	72.21
CHANDRAPUR	SAOLI	4	8	104686	10210	16212	75627	56809	75.12
CHANDRAPUR	SINDEWAHI	4	8	106275	13523	30543	74223	55964	75.40
CHANDRAPUR	WARORA	4	8	118782	9398	28881	87704	63064	71.91
CHANDRAPUR	TOTAL	55	110	1471915	194555	318536	1063304	760505	71.52

RAIGAD DISTRICT

Figure 5.5 Map of Raigad district



Raigad is a socio-economically well developed district which lies in the Konkan division of Maharashtra. It is a district of contrasts; there are hilly and tribal populations (Katkaris and Thakurs) that co-exist with a cosmopolitan culture which proximity to Mumbai has created. There is a strong industrialization pattern, even if urbanization is yet in its nascent stages.

In 2011, Raigad had a population of 2,634,200. This implies that the population of Raigad increased by 19.31% that is, nearly 20% in the past 10 years. In 2011 census, Raigad district population constituted 2.34% of the total population of Maharashtra. In 2001 census, this figure for Raigad District was at 2.28% of Maharashtra population. Kolis & Adivasis from Sahyadri Ranges are important components of the population alongwith other communities. 63.17% of the population in Raigad resides in rural areas.

Table 5.14 Demographic profile of Raigad

Description	2011	2001
Population	26,34,200	22,07,929
Male	13,44,345	11,17,628
Female	12,89,855	10,90,301
Population Growth	19.31%	20.99%
Area Sq. Km	7,152	7,152
Density/km2	368	309
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	2.34%	2.28%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	959	976
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	935	939
Average Literacy	83.14	77.03
Male Literacy	89.13	86.15
Female Literacy	76.92	67.75

Table 5.15 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	22,39,370	85.01%
Muslims	2,27,465	8.64%
Christian	17,452	0.66%
Sikh	7,477	0.28%
Buddhist	1,21,791	4.62%
Jain	12,260	0.47%
Others	1,159	0.04%
Not Stated	7,226	0.27%

SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE

- Has a cosmopolitan touch due to proximity to Mumbai.
- Industrial policy of the state is to encourage developed and underdeveloped areas.
- Industrial development is found to be concentrated in the areas of Khopoli, Karjat, Panvel and Talaje – Panchnad.
- There are 228 medium and large scale industries and 1632 cottage industries distributed all over the district.
- One of the most important small scale industries is the making of Ganesh idols in Pen taluka, which are sent to other parts of Maharashtra.

POLITICAL PROFILE

There were major changes in administrative setup of Raigad from over a period of time. For administrative efficiency, there are three sub divisions viz. Alibag, Panvel and Mahad within Raigad. In 1992, fourth Manganon sub-division was formed. Currently, Raigad district has 14 talukas classified into 4 sub divisions.

Table 5.16 Political profile of Raigad

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
RAIGAD	KARJAT	5	10	153750	1452	39729	111082	87969	79.19
RAIGAD	KHALAPUR	4	8	124940	2569	22820	88811	62129	69.96
RAIGAD	MAHAD	5	10	162245	3438	7800	119725	80563	67.29
RAIGAD	MANGAON	5	10	152270	4781	10733	121061	77915	64.36
RAIGAD	MHASLA	2	4	61010	1263	5009	41984	26200	62.40
RAIGAD	MURUD	2	4	59494	984	11685	44308	31539	71.18
RAIGAD	PANVEL	10	20	318464	7271	33822	251922	175110	69.51
RAIGAD	PEN	5	10	146480	1245	26192	118804	87852	73.95
RAIGAD	POLADPUR	2	4	54301	1935	2298	38446	24792	64.49
RAIGAD	ROHA	5	10	142679	2626	24794	109780	70481	64.20
RAIGAD	SHRIWARDHAN	2	4	69885	2009	8536	48505	31739	65.43
RAIGAD	SUDHAGAD	2	4	62852	2408	15582	52468	35140	66.97
RAIGAD	TALA	2	4	42869	2102	5018	33086	20805	62.88
RAIGAD	URAN	4	8	117100	2617	8493	81601	62552	76.66
RAIGAD	TOTAL	55	110	1668339	36700	222511	1261583	874786	69.34

WASHIM DISTRICT

Figure 5.6 Map of Washim district



In 2011, Washim had a population of 1,197,160 as compared to a population of 1,020,216 as per the 2001 census. There was change of 17.34 percent in the population compared to population in 2001. Washim District population constituted 1.07 percent of total Maharashtra population. In 2001 census, this figure for Washim District was at 1.05 percent of Maharashtra population. Urbanization is at a very nascent stage; 82.34% of the population lives in the rural areas.

Table 5.17 Demographic profile of Washim District

Description	2011	2001
Population	11,97,160	10,20,216
Male	6,20,302	5,26,094
Female	5,76,858	4,94,122
Population Growth	17.34%	18.32%
Area Sq. Km	4,898	4,898
Density/km2	244	208
Proportion to Maharashtra Population	1.07%	1.05%
Sex Ratio (Per 1000)	930	939
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 Age)	863	918
Average Literacy	83.25	73.36
Male Literacy	90.55	85.43
Female Literacy	75.48	60.57

Table 5.18 Religion based data

Description	Total	Percentage
Hindu	859949	71.83%
Muslims	1,42,672	11.92%
Christian	1,707	0.14%
Sikh	518	0.04%
Buddhist	1,79,330	14.98%
Jain	8,476	0.71%
Others	381	0.03%
Not Stated	4,127	0.34%

SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE

- Agriculture is the main activity in this region.
- Since Washim is a water run-off zone, underground water tables are normally poor. This hampers variety in crops as well as industrialization.
- Being a producer of cotton, the industrial activity in Washim is largely cotton-based.


Table 5.19 Political profile of Washim district

DISTRICT	PANCHAYAT SAMITI	ADMISSIBLE SEATS		CENSUS POPULATION 2001			TOTAL VOTERS	TOTAL VOTES	VOTER TURNOUT
		ZP	PS	TOTAL	SC	ST			
WASHIM	MANGRULPIR	8	16	144225	31882	9926	102636	71314	69.48
WASHIM	MANORA	8	16	156344	19594	22121	106972	69554	65.02
WASHIM	MALEGAON	10	20	189051	37549	25804	128177	88332	68.91
WASHIM	RISOD	9	18	173409	40680	8711	118233	86399	73.08
WASHIM	WASHIM	9	18	176801	41424	5738	117816	88840	75.41
WASHIM	TOTAL	44	88	839830	171129	72300	680530	404439	59.43

**CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE TRENDS**

The survey to understand the dynamics of electoral and functional processes within Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis was launched and carried out between 29th February 2016 and 30th April 2016. 6 Zilla Parishads and 12 Panchayat Samitis were covered under the framework of the survey.

As has been mentioned before, the survey was designed so as to get a 360 degree view on the electoral and functional processes within the PRIs. To this end, following stakeholders were interviewed in every district.



Following is the number of interviews with the stakeholders conducted per district

Table 6.1: No. of interviews held with various stakeholders per district

Sr. No.	District	Candidates (Those who won as well as lost)	Political parties	Government Officials	Academicians / Political news reporters
1	Nandurbar	29	12	6	6
2	Washim	30	12	6	7
3	Aurangabad	22	3	6	5
4	Chandrapur	30	12	6	5
5	Pune	27	9	6	12
6	Raigad	23	10	6	4
7	Total	161	58	36	39

Thus, a total of 294 stakeholder interviews were carried out in order to get a complete view of the electoral and functional processes within ZPs and PS. Of these, 161 interviews were conducted only to gauge candidate perceptions about the electoral and functional processes.

This chapter is divided into 2 sections. Section I presents a profile of the sample graphically. In this section, personal as well as political profiles of the candidates are presented.

Section II highlights the main observations and finding of our study.

SECTION I: SAMPLE PROFILES

A. Personal Profile of Candidates (Winners and Losers)

Table 6.2: Gender-wise distribution

Gender	% sample
Male	52
Female	48

Graph 6.1 Gender-wise distribution




Table 6.3: Age distribution

Age	Sample%
20-40	45.83
40-60	50.69
Above 60	3.47

Graph 6.2 Age distribution




Table 6.4: Education profile within sample

Education	% Sample
Less than Std V	6.67
Std V to Std IX	20.67
Matriculate	14.67
Std XII pass	16.67
Graduate	26.00
Post Graduate	12.67
Blank	2.67

Graph 6.3 Education profile within sample





Table 6.5: Occupation Profiles within the sample

Occupation	Sample%
Farming	69.23
Business	21.00
Housewife	8.46
Others	1.31

Graph 6.4 Occupation Profiles within the sample



B. Political profile of candidates within sample

Table 6.6: Percentage of candidates with CBO/ NGO/ lower tier PRI experience

Have CBO/ lower PRI tier/ NGO experience	% sample
Yes	20
No	80

Graph 6.5 Percentage of candidates with CBO/ NGO/ lower tier PRI experience




Table 6.7: Percentage of open/ reserved candidates within sample

Type of candidature	Sample%
Open	33
Reserved	67

Graph 6.6 Percentage of open/ reserved candidates within sample




Table 6.8: Percentage of winning and losing candidates within sample

Election result	Sample %
Lost	38.00
Won	62.00

Graph 6.7 Percentage of winning and losing candidates within sample




Table 6.9: Percentage of candidates who contested on party ticket and who contested independently

Candidature	% sample
Independent	12
Party ticket	88

Graph 6.8 Percentage of candidates who contested on party ticket and who contested independently





Table 6.10: No. of years taken from start of the political career to first election

Years taken	% of sample
Less than 1 year	28.09
1 to 5 years	28.09
6 to 10 years	15.73
11 to 15 years	17.98
More than 15 years	10.11

Graph 6.9 No. of years taken from start of the political career to first election



SECTION II: OBSERVATIONS

This Section outlines the main observations from the study. Observations have been aligned to the objectives of the study for the ease of the reader. Observations pertain mainly to identifying the triggers as to why candidates contest local body elections, whether caste reservations have helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society, whether women reservations have led to women empowerment, whether elected members face functional issues vis-a-vis bureaucracy, identification of issues pertaining to elections, and to identifying training gaps that may be filled to raise the quality of the elected members.

I. What triggers candidates into politics/ into contesting an election locally

HIGHLIGHTS


- To contribute to social development or farmer welfare
- Due to a political background within the family
- Because the party gave a ticket
- Because the seat got reserved; even within the caste factor, the dynasty factor prevails

One of the main objectives of the survey was to identify the factors that triggered candidates into contesting local body elections. Winners and losers were interviewed to identify the triggers for contesting local body elections. Following emerged as the most powerful triggers.

Table 6.11: Identification of triggers (as stated by candidates) for contesting elections

Triggers	% candidates
For bettering social outcome	49
Dynasty	24
Party gave a ticket	16
Reservation	13


Graph 6.10 Identification of triggers (as stated by candidates) for contesting elections



Trigger 1: To bring about social development

- An overwhelming 49% of the candidates cite their desire to contribute to social development as the main reason for contesting.
- However, this could be a politically correct answer. In an interview situation, any elected member would like to say that he/she decided to contest elections for creating social outcome. The answer is not verifiable and hence, there is no pressure on the candidate to defend what he/ she says.
- One way in which the intent could possibly be verified was by looking at the past behaviour of the candidate. The reasoning was that a candidate desiring to create some social development at the level of elections must have taken some steps towards it prior to the election as well. These could include participation in a Community Building Organization (CBO) or an NGO. Else, it could imply that the candidate already had some grassroot experience as a member of a Gram Panchayat or a milk co-operative etc.
- However, only 25% of the total candidates have grassroot or an NGO experience; more pertinently, of all the candidates who quoted that they wished to create desirable social outcomes, only 20% had any grassroot or NGO experience at all.

Graph 6.11 Candidates and association with CBO/lower tier experience



- Another rather interesting finding was that of all the people who quoted social development as their main objective, 56.3% of the candidates had contested more than 1 election i.e. they had political experience backing them or they were politically suave. While it is a bit ambitious to stake a causality claim at this point, it is tempting to reason that politically experienced candidates give politically correct answers in interview situations.
- Of the candidates who wished to create change, 69.3% emerged winners.
- Winners who quoted that they wished to create social change were profiled next. Only 18% of these have CBO association. Further, only 16.5% contested on an independently i.e. 83.5% contested on a party ticket. 50% had contested more than 1 election i.e. they were politically experienced.

Table 6.12: Profiles of winners wishing to create social change

Profile	Percentage
CBO association	18%
Independent	16.5%
Are politically experienced	50%

- Thus, elected members of ZPs and PSs who wished to create development have strong party affiliations and weak NGO and lower level of PRI affiliations.
- Paradoxically these are features which may not really propel them into working towards development outcomes.


Trigger 2: Continuation of political dynasty

- The second big trigger for contesting local body elections identified by the survey is that of family background in politics. 24% of the interviewed candidates identify their political background as their main trigger for contesting elections.
- More than half of the candidates interviewed came from a political background. This implies that more than half of the candidates either were from a family active in politics, or had some relative in the earlier generation, say, father or father-in-law or maternal uncle who had been Sarpanch or a PS member etc.

Table 6.13 : Whether candidates are from a family with a political background

Political background	% Sample
No	43.5
Yes	54
No response	2.5
Total	100.00

Graph 6.12 Percentage of candidates with political background




- The candidates who had a political background mostly spoke about the “respect” and “power” they had seen their relatives enjoy, while holding active roles in politics. It was this thirst for “respect” and/ or “power” that spurred them to contest the elections.
- The power dynamics at village level work differently. Once a member from a family gets into politics and in a position of power, it is not only accepted by the people that the next generation will opt for the same kind of a profile, but it is also expected of the next generation to do so. Some candidates actually claimed that they did not have a choice but to contest elections. This response gets borne out by the fact that amongst “other reasons” to contest elections, around 5% of the candidates interviewed claimed that they contested elections because “people insisted” that they do.

- Candidates who had lost the elections provided a completely different way of viewing political continuation through dynasty politics. Once a family is in power in an area, it becomes the sanctioning authority for development projects in the area. This creates a nexus between those who are in power, and those who beget the contracts because of that power. It is the latter lobby that actually needs the family in power to continue; political continuation is a necessary condition for business continuation. Thus, it is the contractors themselves who coax the next generations into politics; when the next of kin contest elections, the money, manpower and propaganda required for getting this candidate elected is provided by the influential contractors in that area.
- In the interviews with political parties, party officials mentioned that one of the factors contributing to electoral merit of a candidate is whether he/ she can be self supporting in terms of raising the money that is required for contesting. Earlier observation implies that people from political dynasties have a large support from business classes they help to nurture over a period of time. This automatically creates the money power required to contest the election; thus, candidates with political backgrounds are seen to have higher electoral merit than those without it and political parties themselves give a ticket to such candidates.
- It was also explored whether dynasty politics plays a differential role in areas with differential socio-economic development. Some rather interesting trends come up. It was found that dynasty politics plays a heavy role in areas with high levels of development; 86% of candidates from developed areas come from families with a political background. However, this percentage falls to just 45% and 40% in the regions with low and medium socio-economic development respectively.

Table 6.14: Does importance of dynasty differ with socio-economic development?

Level of socio-economic development	% sample
Low	0.45
Medium	0.40
High	0.86

Graph 6.13 Percentage of candidates with political backgrounds across regions



- This observation seems to support the statement made earlier. In well-developed areas, the contract amounts and “rent-seeking” amounts are higher and accordingly the stakes are higher. The nexus between business classes and politically powerful families would be that much thicker.
- However, it is important to note that the backward regions where the survey was carried out were Nandurbar, Washim, Chandrapur and Aurangabad. Large tracts of Nandurbar come under PESA, due to which at least 50% of the seats are reserved for STs. Similarly, in Washim, Chandrapur and Aurangabad, the proportion of SCs to the total population is higher and hence, more seats get reserved for these candidates in both of these zones. (See table 6.15) That implies that in the socio-economic backward areas, the main electoral merit of the candidate is actually the caste factor. But, it is interesting to note that within the caste factor, the dynasty factor definitely plays a role. Of all the elected members who contested from a reserved seat in Washim, Nandurbar, Chandrapur and Aurangabad, 40% candidates hail from a political family.

Table 6.15: Proportion of SCs and STs in sample districts

District	Proportion of SCs	Proportion of STs
Nandurbar	2.3%	77.9%
Washim	11.2%	4.7%
Chandrapur	20.3%	7.8%
Aurangabad	11.2%	4.7%
Raigad	2.1%	1.3%
Pune	8.1%	6.3%

Trigger 3: Party gave a ticket

- 16% of the candidates decided to contest the elections only and only because the party gave them a ticket.
- What were the characteristics of these candidates, who by themselves wouldn't have been interested in contesting elections, but decided to do so with a ticket from the party?
- 64% of these have a political background. Thus, political lineage does count during ticket distribution. However, when we interviewed political parties to understand the criteria based on which they distribute tickets, only 9% of party officials said that political backgrounds play a role in ticket distribution.
- 72% of the candidates who decided to contest only because the party gave them a ticket do not have a CBO/ lower PRI tier experience. Clearly, parties do not place major weightage on earlier CBO or lower PRI experience. However, in interviews, 30% of party officials claimed that earlier community experience is an important criterion for judging electoral merit.
- Also, it is interesting to note that 98% of these candidates with a ticket and no earlier experience are reserved candidates. Caste seems to play a role in terms of ticket distribution.
- Further, amongst all candidates who contested only because they were given a ticket, 73% are reserved candidates. Again, caste seems to be a significant factor in determining who gets a ticket.
- Interestingly, party officials give a different view. Only 11% of the party officials admitted to caste being a criterion for giving a ticket. They opined that even if the seat was reserved, the other criteria such as financial capacity, social network, party affiliation etc. were always considered by parties before giving tickets.
- There were candidates who had contested more than 1 election, who also quoted that their main trigger for contesting was the fact that the party gave them a ticket. Of such candidates, 83% of the candidates have a history of *not* changing political parties before. This indicates that political parties have high preference for loyalty of candidates. This view was supported by our interviews with political party officials, who opined that loyalty is rated highly when it comes to ticket distribution.

Table 6.16: Differences in weightage given to ticket distribution criteria as per party officials and as per data trends

	What party officials say	What data reveals	
Selection criteria for ticket distribution	(% of party officials claiming that the factor matters)	Of the candidates who contested only because the party issued a ticket, how many exhibit following profiles	Remarks
Dynasty	8.7	64.00	64% of said candidates hail from political families
Political image	41.3	NA	NA
Political acumen	39.13	NA	NA
Social work	30.43	28.71	Only 29% of said candidates have CBO experience
Loyalty	33.33	87.00	87% of said candidates have a history of not changing parties
Education	21.73	70.00	70% of said candidates are at least matriculate
Should have financial resources to contest	8.69	56.80	57% of said candidates quote that 80% or more of the election expenses are funded personally
Youthfulness quotient	0.43	53.44	53.44% of said candidates contesting on a ticket are less than 40 years
Caste	10.86	73.00	73% of said candidates belong to reserved category
Whether politically young	NA	73.00	73% of ticket holding candidates have contested less than 2 elections

Graph 6.14 Criteria relevant for ticket distribution as quoted by party heads




Table 6.17: Comparison of ranks of criteria to gauge Electoral Merit as per party officials and as per data trends

Selection criteria for ticket distribution	Rank as per political party officials	Rank as per data trends
Political image	1	NA
Political acumen	2	NA
Loyalty	3	1
Social work	4	7
Education	5	3
Reservation	6	2
Should have financial resources to contest	7	5
Dynasty	7	4
Youthfulness quotient	8	6
Whether politically young	NA	2

- Thus, party officials may claim that political image matters and that social work of candidates is greatly valued by them, but data reveals some radically different traits in ticket distribution.
- Data shows that loyalty is greatly valued in gauging electoral merit; however what is valued thereafter is whether the seat is reserved or not as well as whether the candidate is politically young. Tickets are given to reserved candidates and to those, who may not show very aggressive leadership styles because of their younger political age. As has been said above, 73% of the tickets are distributed to those who've contested 1 or maximally 2 elections.
- Interestingly, data shows a very positive trend. Even if party officials may have ranked it at no.4, education is increasingly playing a bigger role in ticket distribution. 70% of ticket holding candidates are seen to be at least matriculate.
- On the negative side, a lot of lip service is paid to social work done by the candidate; but data reveals that only 28% of ticket holding candidates have any prior CBO or lower PRI tier experience.
- The interviews with different political party heads revealed differences in the criteria that are considered by different parties while gauging the electoral merit of a candidate.

Table 6.18: Criteria used by different parties to assess electoral merit

Party	Chief criteria used to assess electoral merit
BJP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Age ✓ Education ✓ Contribution to society
INC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Loyalty of the candidate ✓ Political acumen ✓ Capacity of the candidate to deliver social outcomes
NCP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Political image of the candidate ✓ Loyalty to the party
SS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Is the candidate a team player ✓ Visibility/ Involvement at all party events ✓ Financial capacity to contest
PWP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Financial capacity to contest elections ✓ Past contribution to society ✓ Grassroot connections

Trigger 4: Reservation of the seat

- 13% identify this factor to be the trigger for entering politics. 79% of these are women.
- In Maharashtra, there are reservations for SCs, STs as well as BCCs. Similarly, 50% of seats within all caste categories as well as within open seats are reserved for women.
- Of all the men and women candidates who contested on reserved seats, 22.5 % of the candidates quoted that they contested the elections merely because the seat was reserved. 86% of women go on to say that they would not have contested the seat, were it not for reservations for women.
- Understanding the impact of reservations on the polity is a major objective of this study; observations pertaining to reservations are explicitly given in the next section.

II. Whether SC/ ST/ BCC reservations have helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society

HIGHLIGHTS

- 92% and 54% of reserved and open category candidates “completely agree” that the reservation policy has helped in mainstreaming candidates
- However, candidates have mixed opinions about the rotation policy
- 63% believe that the rotation policy has changed the equations between individual politicians and political parties
- While rotation may give opportunities to the weaker sections, it is equally true that it discourages good politicians and politicians lose their will to develop their constituency


The 73rd Constitutional Amendment has made provisions for reserving seats for SC and ST candidates based on the proportion of SC and ST population to the overall population of the given area. In Maharashtra, further reservations exist for BCC candidates as well. Have these caste based reservations really helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections?

- One of the questions asked to candidates was whether they agree that caste reservations have made a difference. They were asked to give an answer either as “completely agree”, “somewhat agree” or “completely disagree”.
- It is seen that this answer varies across open category candidates and reserved category candidates. 92% of reserved candidates “completely agree” that reservations help in mainstreaming, whereas 54% of open category candidates “completely agree” with the opinion. Thus, both reserved and open category candidates seem to agree that reservations have helped in mainstreaming, though the percentage of open candidates who subscribe to that view is lesser.

Table 6.19: Opinion of open and reserved candidates on whether reservation has helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections

Opinion on Reservation	% Open	% Reserved
Completely disagree	14	3
Agree to an extent	25	3
Completely agree	54	92
Didn't say	7	2

Graph 6.15 Opinion of open and reserved candidates on whether reservation has helped in mainstreaming the weaker sections




- Reservation gives representation to people who normally may not have participated in active politics. Thus, the issues of this group get represented. However, in the interviews with the reserved category candidates, many said that the benefit of reservations was not only limited to giving representation to their issues. When a few candidates from reserved category become people's representatives, other people from that category feel that the polity has become more approachable for them. They connect better to the political system, feel more included and become more confident.
- An interesting finding is that 53% of reserved category candidates hail from families with political background. Thus, when tickets are given to reserved candidates, political parties also look at the backgrounds in order to decide who is to be given the ticket.

Table 6.20 Political background and candidature type

Political background	Open%	Reserved%
Yes	54	53
No	46	43


Graph 6.16 Political background and candidature type



- Open category candidates were not so accepting about the positives of reservations. Many of them opined that reservations have created negativity amongst open category candidates. Even if there is an open category candidate who is better placed to deliver social outcomes, parties are forced to give tickets to inexperienced, lesser educated reserved category candidates. Does the success of democracy lie only in representation, even if it is at the cost of delivery of outcomes, is a question raised by many an open category candidate.
- Some open category candidates were candid in expressing that since the tickets were given to reserved candidates based only on their caste merit, these candidates were often inexperienced and hence, would rely on their open category counterparts to take decisions. Their dependency on more experienced open or reserved category candidates is normally extremely high. Further, if their educational qualifications are low, their decision making ability is already compromised. Their dependency on higher powers within the party suits the latter and hence, political parties too take advantage of the reservation process to give tickets to inexperienced candidates, who would follow the party's orders immaculately. Some open category candidates hence said that parties be asked to give tickets only to those reserved candidates, who had at least some minimum level of education.
- However, it is not the reservation per se, but the system of rotation of seats that has truly become a bone of contention across all candidate classes. The roster or rotation system truly disturbs the relationship between the elected member and the constituency. When there is a rotation of seats every term, the incumbent finds no merit in developing the constituency, because he/she knows that they will perhaps not even be allowed to contest the seat in the next term. Thus, rotation of seats lowers the level of development that gets ushered in by the candidate.

- Assume that there is an open category male candidate who is elected. In the next term, the seat will automatically get reserved for women. It may further get reserved for SC or ST or BCC candidates, which is unknown. Thus, on one hand, the candidates at their personal level are disincentivized from working for their constituency and on the other, the party starts becoming more powerful as it gets the power to distribute tickets once the reservations get declared. It distributes tickets based on caste as an electoral merit, rather than the work put in by the candidate. Thus, the system has made individual politicians weaker and the political parties stronger.
- The sample shows that 63% of the candidates agree that the “roster” or rotation system of reservations has really changed the political equation between candidates and political parties.

Graph 6.17 Effect of roster system on political equations



- The next question probed into what kind of impact the rotation system had on the overall polity. The following data shows that 57% of the candidates support the fact that there is “good impact” whereas only 26% of the candidates feel that rotation has a “bad impact.” Of course, the discerning reader may note that this bias may also be due to the fact that 66% of the sample consists of reserved candidates. Amongst the good points of the rotation, candidates were emphatic about the fact that it gives opportunity to those who otherwise would not have contested elections at all. Some opined that the policy is good for women. However, there is also the ugly side to the rotation system. As has been said earlier, it makes even good politicians ineligible to even contest elections, thereby driving good politicians out of the system. Further, it is important to note that many candidates, who are actually eligible to contest from other open seats, are quite reluctant to move and do not want to contest outside their preferred area.

Table 6.21: Impact of reservation on polity: Good or bad?


Impact of reservation	Details	% sample (details)	% sample (Impact)
Good impact on the polity	Gives an opportunity	34	57
	Good for women	23	
Neutral impact	Nothing changes	17	17
Bad impact on polity	Good politicians get discouraged	22	26
	Forces people into independent candidature	04	

- It takes time for mainstreaming the weaker sections of the society. As the reservation system has set into the Indian polity, more and more empowerment is being witnessed amongst these candidates. Even though reserved category candidates may exhibit higher dependency on dominant members (as has been stated above), there are a few reserved candidates who are now contesting their second or third election and have hence, started understanding the ropes. They understand the system properly and are able to deliver better in terms of expected outcomes. This trend is reflected in the fact that only 38% of the candidates believe that there is a difference in efficiency of open and reserved candidates.

Table 6.22: Do open category and reserved candidates show a difference in efficiency levels?

Difference in functions	Sample %
Disagree	48.67
Agree	38.00
(blank)	13.33

Graph 6.18 Do open category and reserved candidates show a difference in efficiency levels?




- The above points show how open and reserved category candidates view the reservation process. It'll be pertinent to understand how political parties view the same. What is the impact that the reservation policy has on party dynamics?
- Most party heads opined that reservation creates a problem for parties because the most efficient of their candidates may not be allowed to contest elections and hence, parties have to constantly search for new prospective candidates.

Table 6.23: How reservation is viewed by political parties

Effects of reservation on political parties	% party heads who cite this effect
Candidates change constituencies	70.40
Difficult for the party but gives a chance to new candidates	23.91
Parties lose efficient candidates and struggle to find suitable ones	30.43
No clear effect	23.91

Graph 6.19 How reservation is viewed by political parties



CONCLUSION

It can thus be concluded that reservation has definitely led to mainstreaming the weaker section of the society. However, even amongst reserved candidates, it is people from political dynasties which dominate. Further, the study also shows that reserved candidates are not chosen on any other electoral merit but caste. This can lead to a choice of candidates without any community building background or with lower educational qualification, which could have an effect on the quality of polity and development that this system ushers.

III. Whether reservation of 50% of the seats for women has led to women empowerment in its true sense

HIGHLIGHTS

- 40% women believe empowerment has taken place
- 86% women say they wouldn't have contested election, if the seat was not reserved
- Only 5% women contest as independents
- Time taken from joining politics to contesting first election less than one year for women
- 60% women quote male interference in decision making


As has been mentioned earlier, even though the 73rd amendment mandates no less than 33% reservation to women, the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act has given 50% reservation to women. This was done with the objective of mainstreaming women into Panchayati Raj and to give voice to the issues that matter to them. In the past 22 years since the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act was passed, has the reservation really created women empowerment? One way of gauging this is by looking deeper into data trends.

- 40% of women believe that empowerment has definitely taken place, whereas 36% women support that empowerment has happened to an extent. Reverse trends were seen in the responses given by male candidates. Only 17% males believe that women are definitely empowered whereas 51% of males believe that they are somewhat empowered.

Table 6.24: Are women empowered due to women reservation?

Gender	Definitely	To an extent	Not at all	Didn't say
F	0.40	0.36	0.08	0.16
M	0.17	0.51	0.25	0.08

Graph 6.20 Are women empowered due to women reservation?




- Women candidates mostly hail from political backgrounds; a feature, that may have some impact on the kind of empowerment they experience. Whereas only 45% of male candidates were from political backgrounds, 61% of female candidates came from politically inclined families. This quantifies a well-known fact that when the seat becomes reserved for women, families or male members simply ask their wife to contest the election. She is but the face of the PS or ZP, the true control lies in his hands.

Table 6.25 Gender and political background

Political background	Males%	Females%
Yes	45	61
No	53	34

Graph 6.21 Gender and political background




- One of the questions asked to women in power was whether they would have contested the elections if the seat had not been reserved for women. The answer is rather discouraging. 86% of the women quoted that they would definitely not have contested if the seat was not reserved for them. Supporters of reservation would use this statistic to hail the inclusivity that women reservation brings in. However, this also indicates that even today, most elected women members do not participate in ZPs or PSs by their own free will; it is not by studied choice but by chance that they participate in active politics. If that is indeed the case, then the decision making capacities of women and the outcomes they are able to deliver could be lower than that of their male counterparts.

Table 6.26: Would women contest if there were no reservations?

Would you contest if seat not reserved	Sample %
No	85.94
Yes	14.06

Graph 6.22 Would women contest if there were no reservations?




- The sample chosen further reveals that when quizzed about the number of years required by the candidate from actively joining politics (as a party worker, propaganda machinery etc.) to contesting their first election, a majority of women quote that they took less than a year. This actually points to the fact that they joined politics because the party gave them a ticket; their entry to politics coincides with their entry into elections. Note that the proportion of men who've spent less than a year between joining politics and contesting first election is very low.
- Only those women who spend more than, say, 5 years waiting to contest their first election may be said to be truly interested in a political profile and hence, truly empowered and politically suave. The proportion of such women candidates is only 41%; corresponding proportion in male candidates is 64%.

Table 6.27: No. of years between joining politics and contesting first election for male and female candidates

No. of years	% Males Candidates	% Females Candidate	% Total Candidate
0-5	29	55	39
5 to 10	29	17	25
10 to 15	25	21	23
15 to 20	10	03	08
20 to 25	06	00	04
25 to 30	00	03	01

Graph 6.23 No. of years between joining politics and contesting first election for male and female candidates




- Apart from the fact that higher proportion of women immediately contest elections on joining politics, there is yet another fact that points to the fact that women in general have not become as politically confident as men in PRIs. A very minor percentage of women contest on independent tickets; contesting as an independent candidate really indicates that the candidate is extremely confident about her political prospects, has understood the system thoroughly and is wishing to be a part of it despite no party support. An overwhelming 95% of women candidates contest on a party ticket; only 5% are independents within the sample. In contrast, 20% of male candidates in the sample are independent.

Table 6.28: Proportion of male and female candidates contesting as independent and on party tickets

Gender	Independent	Party
Females	5	95
Males	20	80

Graph 6.24 Proportion of male and female candidates contesting as independent and on party tickets



- 75% of women members were not able to give estimates about expenses incurred for elections; they were generally not able to give bifurcated estimates of how much expenses are required for meetings (sabhas), for pamphlets, for travel etc. In contrast, only 38% of male candidates were unable to handle the questions pertaining to expenses. Similarly, 57% of women do not have an opinion on whether SECM expenditure limit for elections is enough. In contrast, only 26% of male candidates do not have an opinion on the issue. This indicates that women have not really got a complete grip on their overall election campaign; it also could be the case that women


are unable to answer these questions because for a large proportion of women members, this is the first time they contested elections. In either case, there is a huge potential to introduce training so as to sensitize women candidates to the financial aspects of elections.

- Apart from diffidence pertaining to finance which women spoke about during the survey, many of them also spoke about diffidence pertaining to decision making abilities. Many quoted interference by male members of families in their decision making processes.

Table 6.29: Proportion of women elected members who claim that males interfere in their decision making process

Do the males in your family influence your decisions	% Sample
No	45.21
Yes	60.27

Graph 6.25 Proportion of women elected members who claim that males interfere in their decision making process




- In many of the Panchayat Samitis or even Zilla Parishads, male members of families of the women elected members are regulars. In PS offices, it is not unusual to find the husband of the woman member arguing with or discussing some issues with the BDOs. During the survey we undertook, at many places, the women members themselves insisted on their husband being present during the interviews. There are many issues associated with this feature of women members.

- Many male members opined that the political parties should issue strict warnings to male members that their interference in their wives' work would not be tolerated. A culture change is not easy to achieve and unless there is strong political will to change the current state of affairs, women empowerment can only progress at a snail's pace.
- Many expressed the view that BDOs should not allow the presence of family members during Panchayat Samiti meetings. They should also be strict about not discussing decisions pending at the Samiti or discussing anything pertaining to PS processes with family members of the elected representatives. Once the women representatives are forced into the decision making process, they will understand the ropes and will learn about the various developmental issues over a period of time.
- Women were quizzed about whether they would be more comfortable working with a female Government official (BDO or Tehsildar). Most women opined in favour of female Government officials. Many women members shared that it was not too much of a problem working with male BDOs or Tehsildars, but perhaps they would have a greater comfort zone with female officials, if they had to, for example, travel to see some ZP officials with the BDO.

Table 6.30 Do women candidates find it easier to communicate with female officials?

Do women candidates find it easier to communicate with female officials?	% sample
Yes	67
No	33

Graph 6.26 Do women candidates find it easier to communicate with female officials?




- However, there was also a rather novel counter-argument to the above points presented during the course of this survey by a veteran woman party leader. She opined that in India, political decisions are anyway taken not by an individual, but by a family. In a country in which political dynasties are more rules than exceptions, even the male scions of the families consult with the more experienced members in the family. However, when male scions consult with the elders, it is fondly said that the family is protecting political traditions. When females do that, it is seen to be a sign of male interference in the decision making process of the female. Thus, while it cannot be neglected that females are not allowed to come into their own as political decision makers, it is equally true that the political culture of the country does not allow any individual to become the sole decision maker in the family.
- The second rather novel point raised by this woman leader was regarding why husbands of women members are regulars at PS offices. The first important fact is that in all probability, the woman member is a home-maker and not a working woman. This implies that she is not really used to leaving her home to head for work and in all probability does not own a vehicle to reach the PS office. Assuming that she does not stay within walking distance of the PS office, she will be probably be dropped off at the office by her husband. Now, if there is a small meeting that will last for an hour or so, the husband prefers to stay with her at the office till such a time that the meeting is done. This, many a times, explains why the men folk tend to be regulars at PS offices. That they use this time to hobnob with the BDO and other visitors is again a cultural spin-off, which will be extremely difficult to control unless there is sharp political will.

Table 6.31: Do women and men members differ in their working style?

Difference in working styles of men and women	% sample
Disagree	18
Agree	70
(blank)	12
Total	100

Graph 6.27 Do women and men members differ in their working style?



- 70% of the candidates in the sample were emphatic in saying that women members have a different style of functioning as compared to the male counterparts. The most common refrain heard during the course of the survey was that male members normally are more focussed on delivering infrastructure to their constituencies, whereas the female members are more interested in social outcomes. Thus, men are passionate about getting funds sanctioned to put up roads and archway entrances to villages, whereas women automatically focus more on getting funds for Anganwadis and primary health care centres and sanitation. Women are more passionate about raising issues regarding drinking water and sanitation as compared to men. However, many women themselves revealed that in the initial 2-3 years, they were not confident about raising any of these issues at the ZP or PS meetings. By the time they start getting more confident, it is time for next elections. The roster system and a 50% woman reservation implies that the constituency will necessarily not be reserved for women the next time around.
- Hence, many of the women candidates interviewed expressed a view that women be given reservation for at least 2 terms. This would help them to truly participate in the political decision making process as empowered representatives.
- This study compares the profiles, decision making abilities, financial literacy of females vis-a-vis their male counterparts and hence, may give an impression that women empowerment is but a myth. But to get a true picture, it is important that women today be compared not only to their men counterparts, but also to their women counterparts from the past.
- Many political scientists and observers shared that in their view, a startling level of change has happened in the way women representatives carry themselves and conduct their work. They feel that women have definitely become bolder, politically more


suave and better-informed over a period of time. The initial period in the wake of the 73rd amendment from 1993 to about 2000 was perhaps the time when it was really difficult to get the society to even approve the idea about women in power. There was no social and cultural acceptance of this phenomenon in rural areas, women were ridiculed and at times, shamed for opting for a political career. The period from 2000 to 2007 saw the idea getting more accepted throughout Maharashtra. But perhaps, it is only after 2007, with the explosion of social media, that the attitudes of society towards women representatives and more importantly, their own attitudes towards themselves and their own work changed significantly.

- There are no data points to prove these arguments. Any cross-sectional study, such as the present one, will naturally have only one benchmark to compare women members with, and that will be the male representative in PRIs. And hence, any study will be biased towards showing that 25 years into reservation, women empowerment remains a myth. However, the softer undercurrents suggest that changes are coming through. As has been said earlier, cultural changes take a long time. And perhaps, now that women in politics is an idea that is well accepted, it could become a reality over a period of time.
- Perhaps an interesting and positive trend which supports this fact is that 73% of women candidates have political aspirations, even if they are still novices in the Indian political system.

Table 6.32: Percentage of women candidates with political aspirations in the future

Political aspirations	% sample
No	26.87
Yes	73.13

Graph 6.28 Percentage of women candidates with political aspirations in the future



IV. Whether Government machinery and elected representatives work smoothly in a co-operative fashion to ensure outcome.

HIGHLIGHTS

- 66% report smooth relationship with bureaucracy
- Frictions between elected members and Government officials increase as we move from low to high socio economic development
- Women report lesser friction
- Common causes of friction are lack of understanding of roles and powers of elected members at ZP and PS


The objectives of this study are mani-fold; it strives to not only study electoral processes of the ZPs and PSs, but also the functional processes therein. One of the objectives of the survey was to bring out the relationship between bureaucracy and the elected members at ZP and PS levels.

- There were mixed experiences in the different districts surveyed. On being asked whether bureaucracy enjoys an upper hand in the relationship, 60% of the candidates replied in the negative.
- The next question was about candidates' experience about bureaucracy. Nearly 67% of the sample reported friendly or good experiences.

Table 6.33: Candidates' experience about bureaucracy

Experience about bureaucracy	Sample %
Good	66.67
Bad	13.33
(blank)	20.00
Total	100.00

Graph 6.29 Candidates' experience about bureaucracy




- However, an interesting data trend is that regions which are socio-economically more well developed report higher level of stress in their relationships with the bureaucrats.
- Thus, 21% of the elected members from Pune and Raigad report stressed relationships, whereas in areas with medium and low socio-economic development, percentage of candidates reporting the same falls to 18% and 10% respectively.

Table 6.34: Is friction between elected members and bureaucracy related to socio-economic development?

Socio economic scores	% sample reporting stressed relationship with bureaucracy
High	21
Medium	18
Low	10

Graph 6.30 Is friction between elected members and bureaucracy related to socio-economic development?




- Many candidates reported that the true reason for friction arises with respect to legal provisions, which the elected members do not understand well. Thus, elected members may want to spend funds on a particular expense item, but the CEO or BDO refuses to sanction the expenditure because that expense item is not allowed legally under the provisos of the funding. This trend also indicates an important training gap; most candidates as well as bureaucrats opined that the level of frictions can actually reduce drastically if candidates start understanding the legal provisos properly.
- It is interesting to note that women candidates report lesser friction with bureaucracy. There are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost, many women representatives are even today, not really independent to take their own decisions; they are helped in their decision making process by some dominant male member of the family, typically their husbands. This reduces the dialogue that they initiate vis-a-vis bureaucracy and hence, the reported friction levels reduce significantly.
- One of the more positive trends is that at some places, the BDOs take special efforts to explain schemes and budgets to the female members. At such places, the level of friction is genuinely lesser.
- Male members have more political experience as compared to female members. Hence, they are used to a certain way of working. If the CEO or BDO is transferred or if the rules in which schemes are run change, they are unable to adjust quickly to the new person or rules and this creates ego issues between them and the officials. These/ such issues are found in lesser proportion with women members.

Table 6.35: Relationship of male and female members with bureaucracy

Gender	Cordial	Frictions	Can't say
F	0.47	0.11	0.42
M	0.48	0.22	0.30

Graph 6.31 Relationship of male and female members with bureaucracy



- V. Whether electoral processes such as filing of nominations, election symbols, implementation of Model Code of Conduct, voting etc. function smoothly and whether any changes are required in any of the electoral processes.**

HIGHLIGHTS

- Clearly more expensive to contest ZP elections as compared to PS elections
- Meetings and travel emerge as biggest components of spending; own funds biggest source of funds
- Expenditure limits need to be raised and benchmarked with inflation indices
- Implementation of expenditure control done by candidates not satisfactory
- 70% of candidates cite no issues in filing nominations
- MCC is well understood but not well implemented
- Tehsildar offices overburdened with “round the clock” elections

This section is divided into two parts. Analysis of election expenses and sources is presented first. Insights pertaining to electoral processes follow in part B.


A. Election expenses and sources of funds

- A comparison of total expenditure on elections done by candidates contesting ZP elections and those contesting PS elections reveals some interesting trends
- More candidates contesting PS elections quote spending between Rs. 10000 and Rs. 1 lakh on elections as compared to those contesting ZP elections
- Thus, 48.75% of candidates contesting PS elections were in the less than Rs. 1 lakh category as compared to 26.32% of candidates contesting ZP elections
- As the expense amounts increase, percentage of ZP candidates becomes greater than the percentage of PS candidates

Table 6.36 Total expenditure made by ZP and PS candidates

Total expenditure on election	PS	ZP
Rs 10,000-Rs 1 lakh	48.75	26.32
Rs 1 lakh-Rs 2 lakh	18.75	21.05
Rs 2 lakh-Rs 5 lakh	11.25	18.42
Rs 5 lakh-Rs 6 lakh	8.75	10.53
Cant disclose	8.75	5.26
More than Rs 6 lakh	3.75	18.42

Graph 6.32 Total election expenses reported by candidates




- A deeper look into ZP election expenditure, when correlated with winners and losers, reveals interesting insights. 42% of the candidates who spent less than Rs.1 lakh lost the elections, whereas only 25% of the people who spent between Rs.1 lakh and Rs.2 lakh lost the elections. Of the people who spent between Rs.2 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh, 30% won the elections. Thus, the amount of expenses incurred seem to show a positive correlation to the outcome of the election. In the next chapter, a probit model has been run to quantify the impact of election expenses on the probability of winning the elections.

Table 6.37 Expenditure made by lost/won ZP candidates

Expenditure	Lost	Won
Rs 10,000-Rs 1 lakh	41.67	16.67
Rs 1 lakh-Rs 2 lakh	25.00	16.67
Rs 2 lakh-Rs 5 lakh	0.00	29.17
Rs 5 lakh-Rs 6 lakh	8.33	12.50
Cant disclose	8.33	4.17
More than Rs 6 lakh	16.67	20.83

Graph 6.33 Expenditure made by lost/won ZP candidates




- A similar analysis is next done for PS election expenses. A huge 65.63% of candidates who spent less than Rs. 1 lakh lost the elections as compared to only 2.2% of the candidates who lost elections when they spent more than Rs. 6 lakh.

Table 6.38 Expenditure made by lost/won PS candidates

Expenditure	Lost	Won
Rs 10,000-Rs 1 lakh	65.63	33.33
Rs 1 lakh-Rs 2 lakh	18.75	20.00
Rs 2 lakh-Rs 5 lakh	0.00	20.00
Rs 5 lakh-Rs 6 lakh	3.13	13.33
Cant disclose	6.25	11.11
More than Rs 6 lakh	6.25	2.22

Graph 6.33 Expenditure made by lost/won PS candidates



- There are significant differences between electoral profiles and expenditures quoted by candidates contesting from socio economic zones with low, medium and high level of development.

Table 6.39 Comparison of electoral profiles of candidates across different socio-economic zones


	Sample districts (High development)	Sample districts (Medium development)	Sample districts (Low development)
Criteria	Pune/ Raigad	Aurangabad/ Chandrapur	Washim/ Nandurbar
Average age	41	40	41
% candidates with political background	80%	37%	5%
% candidates with high loyalty quotient	78%	86%	85%
% candidates with CBO association	71%	18%	10%
% candidates who contest an election within a year from joining politics	30%	13%	33%
% candidates spending <1 L on elections	22%	40%	53%
% candidates spending > 10 L on elections	14%	10%	0%
% candidates attending the training	82%	52%	50%
% candidates who claimed that SECM should increase election expense limit	61%	64%	81%

- The category under which most expenses are booked is that of travel and meetings. Candidates quoted that door to door campaigning meant a lot of travel; travel expenses go up in remote areas or hilly areas as compared to the other parts of the districts. Food and other expenses of volunteers is also seen to be a major expense category, followed by expenditure done on propaganda.

Table 6.40 Expenditure made on propaganda

Expense Heads	%
SMS/pamphlets	14.44
TV and newspapers	10
Meetings	24.24
Travel	24.4
Volunteers	22
Others	4.92

Graph 6.34 Expenditure made on propaganda




- An interesting view was presented by a few candidates who claimed that if a true level playing field was to be created for all candidates, advertisements through newspapers and radio and TV channels should not be allowed at all. All candidates do not have financial muscle to advertise and this creates an unfair advantage to those with money power.
- Many candidates informally opined that even though the SECM has created expenditure limits so as to limit expenses and to create a level playing field, the monitoring and implementation of this limit needs to be done properly. Further, 43% of candidates responded by saying that the expenditure limit sanctioned by SECM was not enough and it needed to be revamped and benchmarked to some inflation index as well.

Table 6.41 Is the SECM limit enough?

Is the limit enough	Sample %
No	42.67
Yes	16.00
No opinion	41.33
	100.00

Graph 6.35 Is the SECM limit enough?




- 68% of the funds needed for elections are raised by the candidates themselves. Party contributions come a remote second; only 23% of the funds required for elections are given by political parties. Donations account for a meagre 7.5%. This implies that candidates with money power would have a great advantage over candidates from a humble background.

Table 6.42 Sources of funds

Sources of funds	%
Own	68
Donations	7.5
Party	22.8
Others	1.7

Graph 6.36 Sources of funds




- Manpower management is a big issue during campaigning. Volunteers are required in great numbers to reach out to people, to run door-to-door propaganda campaigns, to help in arranging meetings etc. How do candidates wishing to contest the ZP and PS elections get the required manpower? A majority of the respondents said that party volunteers form the biggest component of their HR machinery. 37.25% of the candidates stated that popularity of the candidate brings in volunteers whereas 17.65% of candidates claimed that it was social networks from which they managed to raise their manpower requirements.

Table 6.43: How candidates get the manpower required during the campaigning phase

Components	%
Popularity of the candidate	37.25
Party volunteers	38.24
Social network	17.65
Past work	5.88
Commitments	1.00

Graph 6.37 How candidates get the manpower required during the campaigning phase




B. Issues pertaining to electoral processes

- A rather heartening trend is that 70% of the candidates interviewed do not report any issues with filing nomination forms. Further, a high proportion of the candidates stated that officials helped in filing the nominations. They got to know about the conditions regarding elections either from pamphlets issued by SECM, or from Tehsildar offices or from party meetings (if they were contesting on a party ticket).

Table 6.44: Experience of filing nomination forms

Experience of filing nomination forms	Sample %
No issues	70.67
Issues	5.33
Someone else filed	11.33
Blank	12.67

Graph 6.38 Experience of filing nomination forms



- Of the candidates who said that they had faced some problems in filing nomination forms, the most common refrain was that the validation and scrutiny of the forms is not done immediately. Some candidates reported that they had to travel long distances together with their attorneys to answer and close the queries that came up during the scrutiny process, a week after they had filed the nomination forms. Immediate, across the counter scrutiny and validation of the forms was the major demand from most candidates.
- Another feedback was that private lawyers, who help candidates in filing the forms, cannot always be trusted. There were a few candidates who reported that their own attorneys had filled up the forms wrongly, causing their nomination to get rejected. These candidates, who had faced such problems in the past, suggested that certified Government lawyers be made available to candidates for filing nomination forms.

- The level of understanding of candidates regarding the provisos of Model Code of Conduct seemed to be reasonably good. An interesting connection between a provision of the MCC, timings of elections in Maharashtra and development outcomes was raised by a few candidates. The election code hinders the government or ruling party leaders from launching new welfare programmes like construction of roads, provision of drinking water facilities etc. In Maharashtra, the ZP and the PS elections for a particular district may be held together; however, some or the other Gram Panchayat election keeps happening throughout the year. Add to this the state level and national level elections, and one can imagine how the quoted proviso of the MCC can be detrimental to development outcomes. If some development work such as construction of a road that cuts across several talukas is to be undertaken, the work cannot be started even if one of the areas is to get into election mode.
- Provisions of MCC are quite well understood by the candidates; however, most candidates as well as political news reporters expressed their disappointment at the implementation of the same. Distribution of money and liquor is rampant in many parts of the state and hence, more attention needs to be given to revamping the machinery in charge of implementing the MCC.
- Candidates and party leaders both spoke about the voters getting misled due to candidates having similar sounding names as well as similar election symbols. Election symbols granted to the candidates ought to be totally different from each other, so that voters do not get confused.
- It is the Collector office that is in charge of the actual election process and hence, interactions with the Collectors, Tehsildars, senior clerks at Tehsil offices etc. gave some interesting insights. Most of the staff opined that there is constant pressure on them to oversee some election process or the other because in Maharashtra, the system is that the election is held whenever 5 years in office of the elected representatives comes to an end. Now, this means that some village or some taluka level election activity is always on the cards and this causes a burden to the existing machinery. When Lok Sabha elections are held, they are held at a go across the country and the same system needs to be implemented in Maharashtra, seemed to be a common refrain on the field.
- The Tehsildars as well as the staff members also claimed that handling the preparation of the voters' lists and then handling the disputes regarding the same and putting up new lists was a very cumbersome and time-consuming job. This, together with the regular work created operational inefficiencies. Many also opined that the payments given for facilitating the LS elections was much higher than the payments given for facilitating the lower level elections and this too created grudges from a HR standpoint.

VI. Whether there are training gaps that need to be filled

HIGHLIGHTS

- 30% of candidates have not availed training
- Women attendance higher than that of male members
- Veterans likely to attend lesser trainings than those holding posts for the first time
- Huge need for training identified


The final objective of the survey was to identify key areas of training in order to strengthen the workings of the PRIs. Following are some of the training related insights created by the survey.

- Nearly 30% of the interviewed candidates had never availed of training by Yashada. Reasons for not attending training included less frequency of training, the fact that training is only arranged in Mumbai or Pune, lack of conveyance allowance for attending training, etc. Women especially cited problems associated with travelling afar for training and requested half day seminars at taluka places so that they could get back home after undergoing training during the day.

Table 6.45: Did candidates take any training arranged by Yashada or any other organization in their present term?

Response	Sample%
No	30.00
Yes	46.67
No answer	23.33
Total	100

Graph 6.39 Did candidates take any training arranged by Yashada or any other organization in their present term?




- 64% of female candidates undertook training as compared to 57% male candidates. Most of the women candidates are first time contestants. Hence the need to be inducted into the political structure arises. On the other hand, most of the male contestants have political ties, earlier experiences or certain political aspirations which make them confident. This might have a direct link to the lower numbers of participation.

Table 6.46: Percentage of male and female candidates who've undergone training


	Yes	No
Men	57	42
Women	64	35

Graph 6.40 Percentage of male and female candidates who've undergone training



- It is seen that the attendance for training programs rapidly declines as the number of elections contested by the candidates increase. Thus the percentage for training attended is lower in political veterans and high in political novices.

Graph 6.41: Political experience and training attendance



- During interviews with candidates, a number of suggestions for training came up. Some of these are related to understanding electoral processes better, whereas others are about enhancing the functional efficiency of the candidates.

POTENTIAL TRAINING TOPICS

- ✓ Understanding the main provisions of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act
- ✓ Understanding roles, powers and functions of ZP and PS members
- ✓ Understanding how reservation of seats is done in Maharashtra
- ✓ Budgets of ZPs and PSs
- ✓ Sources of funds and allowed expenses
- ✓ Information pertaining to different schemes of the Government that can be implemented at district level
- ✓ How funds are to be optimally distributed amongst different developmental needs of the district
- ✓ Current affairs in the country
- ✓ Creating a work order
- ✓ Maintenance of basic accounts
- ✓ Understanding the local political history of the district
- ✓ Analysis of what was done and completed/ left incomplete by the earlier elected members
- ✓ Behavioral skills and effective communication methods

VII. Additional observations

HIGHLIGHTS

- ZP members understand their role quite well
- PS members feel that PS is a defunct tier of the PRI
- Planning is top down, fund disbursement is done by BDOs, hardly any work left for the elected members

- Elected members at the Zilla Parishad were fairly articulate in terms of explaining their roles or the directions they could give to the constituency.
- Most of them were well versed with the kind of funds that would be available for developing their constituency and were aware about what kind of development schemes could be run with those funds.
- Most also agreed to the fact that funds, per se, were not the problems in terms of implementation of the schemes. But many were vocal about the lengthy procedures involved in terms of using the funds, creating work orders etc.
- There was a great angst about the role of the Panchayat Samitis. A couple of elected members of the PS actually said that PS as a PRI tier is defunct for all practical purposes and hardly any work actually happens at that tier. One impression we got on field was that the Gram Panchayats or the Sarpanches have direct contacts with the ZP members and are also sensitive to the fact that the fund disbursement happens at that level. Hence, many completely bypass the PS level and take demand for funds to the ZP directly. Only once the work is sanctioned and the funds reach the PS tier that they are interested in networking with the PS.
- Again, the fund disbursement from the PS is done by the Government officials such as the BDOs, and hence the elected members did not have a role to play in this entire exercise. A couple of respondents actually claimed that they were completely frustrated with the lack of work at the PS level and recommended that the level be done away with, from point of view of elections. However, they maintained that the present bureaucratic structure of the BDO and the officers who work under him would be necessary to see to the day-to-day working at the block level.

- However, a few PS members also said that whether the PS can come into its own as a layer of the PRI largely depends on the people manning the Samiti. Just as Gram Panchayats can approach the ZP directly, there is nothing that can really stop the PS from approaching the ZP, provided elected members are visionary and are able to create concrete plans at the block level. But, the culture over a period of time has become such that the PS has been perceived only as a fund-disbursing agency and not as one that actively plans for common development of all villages in the block.

CHAPTER VII

WHAT AFFECTS THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING OR LOSING? AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

HIGHLIGHTS

- ✓ Age, gender, education and caste are not significant in explaining the probability of winning
- ✓ A candidate having a political background has 26% higher chances of winning the elections as compared to a candidate without a political family background
- ✓ A candidate with a high loyalty quotient towards a political party has 25% higher chances of winning an election as compared to candidates who have changed parties in the past
- ✓ Election expense is the most dominant electoral variable affecting chances of winning. With every Rs. 1 lakh increase in election expenses, the probability of winning rises by 10%
- ✓ A candidate contesting on a party ticket has 4.8% higher chances of winning elections as compared to an independent candidate
- ✓ Interestingly, more the number of elections contested, lesser are the chances of winning. With every additional election contested by a candidate, there are 5.5% lesser chances of winning the election.

This chapter contains econometric analysis of the factors that affect the probability of a candidate winning elections.

The survey helped to create an empirical database on the profiles of the candidates. Information pertaining to age, gender, open or reserved category, education level, family background and earlier lower tier PRI and NGO experience of the candidate had been collected. Similarly, other pertinent election information such as number of elections that the candidate had contested, number of candidates who contested for the seat, whether the candidate contested on a party ticket or as an independent, how much amount was spent on the election was recorded. Winning candidates were given code 1 and losing candidates were given code 0.

The basic research question was what affects the probability of winning or losing. We ran 5 different probit regressions.

1. $P(\text{Winning}) = f(\text{Age, Gender, Education, Caste})$
2. $P(\text{Winning}) = f(\text{Family background, Loyalty Quotient, earlier CBO or PRI experience})$
3. $P(\text{Winning}) = f(\text{Number of elections that the candidate had contested, number of candidates who contested for the seat, whether the candidate contested on an independent or party ticket, amount of funds spent on elections})$
4. $P(\text{Winning}) = f(\text{Number of elections that the candidate had contested, number of candidates who contested for the seat, whether the candidate contested on an independent or party ticket})$
5. $P(\text{winning}) = f(\text{All personal and political factors included above})$

Why Probit?

When the dependent variable values are only 0 (lost elections) and 1 (won elections), that is, the dependent variable is a binary or a dichotomous variable, running a regular regression is not possible because the entire scatter of data points gets aligned to only two values (0 and 1) on the Y-axis. Secondly, and more importantly, since we want to understand what affects the probability of winning or losing the elections, the combination of X variables or independent variables have to yield a value which lies between 0 and 1. Probit regressions are used for such cases.

Interpreting probit results

The significance of the co-efficients can be understood by using the simple p-values. We posit a null hypothesis that the X variable does not affect the probability of winning. A low value of the null indicates rejection of the null hypothesis and hence indicates that the X variable has a significant impact on the probability of winning.

All the variables which have a significant impact have been highlighted and have an asterisk marked on them.

Once the significant variables are identified, the next task is to look up the “slope at mean”. When all other X variables are held at their respective values, and the value of one independent variable is increased by 1 unit, by how much does the probability of winning increase is indicated by the slope at mean. More on this is given in the interpretation section under every slope at mean calculation.

Understanding Goodness of Fit

The regular regression models use a measure called as R^2 to assess the goodness of fit of the models. However, this measure fails under a probit framework. To assess the goodness of fit for probit models, we use “number of cases correctly predicted”. When the actual value of the dependent variable is “0” i.e. the person lost the elections, does the model predict value 0 or 1? Similarly, when the actual value of the dependent variable is “1”, does the model predict value 0 or 1? This is used to assess the goodness of fit.

HYPOTHESIS 1:

Does the probability of winning depend on the personal profile of the candidate? Does age, gender, caste, education affect the probability of winning?

Comments on the hypothesis

The earlier chapter documents the fact that political parties look at the youthfulness quotient of candidates while distributing tickets. Voters too have been increasingly vocal about their preference for younger candidates. More educated candidates would normally have better understanding of issues, better communication and persuasion skills and better image, all of which are important for winning elections. Caste and gender have increasingly become important since there are reservations for both features. Hence, the hypothesis is that personal characteristics of a candidate may affect the chances of his winning the election.

Probit results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p-value</i>
const	0.235013	1.10973	0.2118	0.83228
Caste	0.295625	0.364542	0.8109	0.41740
Age	-0.0142648	0.016038	-0.8894	0.37377
Gender	-0.13398	0.301624	-0.4442	0.65690
Education	0.194886	0.211244	0.9226	0.35624

Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 71 (67.0%)

Interpretation

The above results show that none of the personal characteristics are significant in explaining the probability of winning or losing. It is not necessarily the case that younger candidates have higher chances of success, or that more educated candidates have higher chances of winning.

HYPOTHESIS 2:

Does the probability of winning depend on the background of the candidate? More specifically, do candidates with political family background, with high loyalty quotients to particular parties and with CBO or lower rung PRI experience in the past stand a higher chance of winning the elections?

Comments on the hypothesis

The earlier chapter has given details about how continuation (See table 6.13, table 6.20 and table 6.25) of dynasty politics is a major trigger for candidates in contesting local body elections. Dynasty politics is deeply entrenched in India in general and in Maharashtra, in particular. Can it be the case that candidates with a political background have higher chances of winning the elections? There are a number of ways why this could be possible. As has been mentioned earlier, culturally, scion of political families are quickly accepted by the people. Political families have deep ties with the business networks in that area and hence, candidates from such families find it easier to raise funds for their campaign. They also understand power structures better and having been part of the system gives them a comfort zone during campaigning, which adds to their chances of winning.

Political background of a candidate does not only imply that the candidate hails from a political background; it also could imply that the candidate has a loyal relationship with a particular party. Candidates with high loyalty quotients are akin to family within the rural power structures. Hence, the hypothesis also includes loyalty quotient as an explanatory variable in the regression. We gauge the loyalty quotient of a candidate by examining whether he has changed parties in the past.

Last but not the least, the background of the candidate also includes the experience that the candidate has in terms of community building, or participation in a Gram Panchayat etc. The hypothesis is that candidates with CBO or Gram Panchayat experience ought to have higher chances of winning the elections.

Probit results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	
const	-0.47991	0.378335	-1.2685	0.20463	
Family	0.747167	0.266153	2.8073	0.00500	***
CBO	-0.193519	0.325769	-0.5940	0.55249	
Loyalty quotient	0.656203	0.383202	1.7124	0.08682	*

Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 77 (72.6%)
 f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.362
 Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(3) = 11.7454 [0.0083]

		Predicted	
		0	1
Actual	0	10	26
	1	3	67

Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 8 (CBO)

Interpretation

The above results show that family background is highly significant in terms of explaining the probability of the candidate winning the elections. Apart from the family background, the loyalty quotient of the candidate also matters. Candidates who have not changed parties in the past have higher chances of winning the elections.

In order to understand the quantitative impact of family background as well as the loyalty quotient on the probability of winning, it is useful to examine the slopes at mean. Following are the results.

Slope at mean analysis

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>Slope</i> [*]
const	-0.47991	0.378335	-1.2685	
Family	0.747167	0.266153	2.8073	0.267639
Loyalty	0.656203	0.383202	1.7124	0.252206
CBO	-0.193519	0.325769	-0.5940	-0.0715214

Interpretation

Slopes at mean for family background as well as loyalty quotient are both positive and stand at 0.26 and 0.25 respectively. Following are the interpretations of the numbers.

The slope at mean for family background is at 0.26. This implies that a person from a political family has 26% higher chances of winning the elections as compared to a person without a family background.

Similarly, slope at mean for loyalty quotient stands at 0.25. A candidate who has not changed parties and has a history of loyalty to a particular party would enjoy a 25% higher chance of winning the elections as compared to a candidate with a history of changing parties.

Unfortunately, CBO experience or Gram Panchayat experience of a candidate does not significantly affect the chances of winning at all. In the earlier chapter, criteria for assessing electoral merit of a candidate as revealed by political parties have been stated (See table 6.6). In these criteria, almost all parties talk about how the social work done by the candidate really matters and how dynasty is not really important from perspective of ticket distribution. However, these impressions shared by the political parties are completely nullified by the probit results.

HYPOTHESIS 3

Does the probability of winning depend on number of elections contested by the candidate, the number of candidates contesting the seat, whether the candidate contested on a party ticket or as an independent, and on the amount he spent on the election.

Comments on the hypothesis

The earlier hypotheses tried to check the influence of personal attributes and background of the candidate on probability of winning. This hypothesis checks the impact of different electoral variables on the probability of winning.

There ought to be an effect of the election expenses on the (See table 6.37 and table 6.38) chances of winning; more the election expenses, more ought to be the chances of winning. Similarly, number of contestants and political experience of the candidate would tend to affect the chances of winning. Following are the probit results.

Probit Results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	
Const	0.152222	0.566339	0.2688	0.78810	
Number_of_elections_contested	-0.157936	0.114379	-1.3808	0.16734	
Number_of_contestants	-0.0450796	0.0625398	-0.7208	0.47102	
Independent/ Party	0.0979585	0.378726	0.2587	0.79590	
Amount_spent	0.255415	0.116814	2.1865	0.02878	**

Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 54 (66.7%)
 f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.392
 Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(4) = 7.72974 [0.1020]

	Predicted	
	0	1
Actual 0	17	18
1	9	37

Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 4 (I_P)

Interpretation

The results show that only election expense is significant in terms of explaining probability of winning elections. None of the other variables are significant.

In order to understand the quantitative impact of election expenses on the probability of winning, let us take a look at the slope at mean.

Following are the results.

Slope at mean results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>Slope</i> [*]
const	0.152222	0.566339	0.2688	
Number of elections contested	-0.157936	0.114379	-1.3808	-0.0619422
Number of contestants	-0.0450796	0.0625398	-0.7208	-0.0176801
Independent or Party	0.0979585	0.378726	0.2587	0.0386051
Amount spent	0.255415	0.116814	2.1865	0.100173
Evaluated at the mean Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 54 (66.7%)				

Interpretation

An additional higher expense of Rs. 1 lakh on elections increases the probability of winning by 10%. None of the other variables show any significance at all.

This was surprising, because many of the variables included as explanatory variables in the above model were individually significant in terms of explaining the probability of winning. Sometimes, when in the presence of a dominant variable, other variables turn insignificant. It was decided to run another probit model, this time by excluding the dominant variable i.e. the expenses done on elections.

HYPOTHESIS 4

Does the probability of winning depend on number of elections contested by the candidate, the number of candidates contesting the seat, and on whether the candidate contested on a party ticket or as an independent.

Probit results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	
const	0.384191	0.597073	0.6435	0.51993	
Number of elections contested	-0.211043	0.110233	-1.9145	0.05555	*
Number of contestants	-0.0861961	0.06798	-1.2680	0.20481	
Independent or party	0.911827	0.461368	1.9764	0.04811	**

Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 72 (67.9%)

	Predicted	
	0	1
Actual 0	9	27
1	7	63

Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 10 (Number_of_contestants)

Interpretation

It is interesting to note that in the absence of the dominant variable, the other variables start showing significance. Whether the contestant contests as an independent or on a party ticket is significant at 5% whereas the number of elections contested by the candidate is significant at 10%.

In order to understand the quantitative impact, lets take a look at the slopes at means

Slope at mean analysis

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>Slope*</i>
const	0.384191	0.597073	0.6435	
Number of elections contested	-0.211043	0.110233	-1.9145	-0.0764934
Number of contestants	-0.0861961	0.06798	-1.2680	-0.0312421
Independendeent or Party	0.911827	0.461368	1.9764	0.350788

*Evaluated at the mean
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 72 (67.9%)

Interpretation

It is interesting to note that number of elections has a significant but negative impact on the chances of winning elections. Thus, with every additional election that a candidate contests, there is a 7% lesser chance of winning the election.

This can be interpreted in different ways. One obvious interpretation is that voters vote more for younger candidates and hence, more the number of elections one contests, lesser the chances of winning. It could also be the case that with more elections (assuming that the candidate wins), scams and inefficiencies come to the fore and one has lesser chances of winning next elections. An extremely interesting case could be that the candidate who contests multiple elections could be one who lost the earlier ones, and is inherently a weak candidate with lesser chances of winning.

The other extremely interesting result here is that a candidate contesting on a party ticket has 35% greater chances of winning the elections as compared to the candidate contesting independently.

Clearly, the candidate contesting on a party ticket has an upper hand in the elections. Some of the candidates had expressed the view that 30% of the votes garnered by a candidate actually are garnered because of the party. This result implies that more will have to be done by the SECM in terms of creating a level playing field for the independent candidates.

HYPOTHESIS 5

Does dynasty politics become a defining factor in terms of affecting probability of winning or losing?

In the exercise done above, probability of winning the elections has been regressed separately on personal variables and political variables. What happens when we consider all variables together? Do we still find the predominance of dynasty politics?

Probit results

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	
const	0.671749	1.05016	0.6397	0.52239	
Type of candidature	-0.228305	0.399427	-0.5716	0.56761	
Age	-0.00430226	0.0207077	-0.2078	0.83542	
Education	-0.188017	0.110896	-1.6954	0.08999	*
Gender	0.0933957	0.391023	0.2388	0.81122	
Expenses	0.130859	0.0966356	1.3542	0.17569	
Number of elections contested	-0.173291	0.123775	-1.4001	0.16150	
Family	0.655703	0.310044	2.1149	0.03444	**
Loyalty Quotient	0.398103	0.342636	1.1619	0.24528	
Association with CBO	0.0550455	0.337574	0.1631	0.87047	
Independent or Party	-0.219639	0.385821	-0.5693	0.56917	
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 58 (65.2%)					

Interpretation

The results suggest that family is the strongest determinant in terms of probability of winning. Education too is significant, but with a negative sign, thereby indicating at higher education levels are associated with lower probability of winning. The other two variables which may be considered to be having an impact at higher levels of significance could be number of elections contested as well as election expenses.

To confirm understand the order in which the independent variables impact the chances of winning, all variables were converted into standard normal variables and a simple OLS was run on the same.

Following are the results

OLS regression on Standardized Normal Variables

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	4.1E-17	1.0E-01	4.0E-16	1.0E+00
Type of candidature	-0.07	0.14	-0.52	0.61
Age	-0.02	0.13	-0.12	0.90
Education	-0.19	0.12	-1.62	0.11
Gender	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.88
Expenses	0.14	0.11	1.24	0.22
Number of elections contested(actual figure)	-0.16	0.12	-1.36	0.18
Family	0.22	0.11	1.97	0.05
Party Change Y/N	0.12	0.11	1.09	0.28
Association with CBO Y/N	0.02	0.11	0.16	0.87
I/P	-0.07	0.12	-0.58	0.57

Interpretation:

The results re-inforce what has been said above. Undoubtedly, it is family background which is the most important variable that affects the chances of winning. Other variables which affect the probability of winning are education, number of elections contested, election expenses and the loyalty quotient, necessarily in that order.

It may thus be said that electoral dynamics within PRIs are affected by dynasty, money and party, necessarily in that order.

These results assume significance for the SECM, which has been trying to prioritize creation of a level playing field for all candidates. Amongst the suggestions and recommendations given towards the end of the report to the SECM, many suggestions find their genesis in these econometric results.

CHAPTER VIII

SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the survey insights, suggestions got from the field and detailed discussions with various stakeholders and Government officials, a list of suggestions was prepared for the SECM as well as for the State Government. Following are the suggestions we have prepared for the State Government.

FOLLOWING ARE OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STATE GOVERNMENT

Suggestions Pertaining to Reservations

1. The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act mandates that 50% reservation be given to women and SCs and STs be given reservation as per their proportion in the population. The survey reveals that the main problem is not reservation per se, but the system of rotation of seats through which the reservation is granted (See graph 6.17 and the analysis following it).

25% of the 160 candidates interviewed during the course of the survey felt that the system of rotation discourages good politicians (See table 6.21). Rotation implies that there is no hope of continuity for the incumbent and hence, he/she loses interest in carrying out developmental works for the constituency. We recommend that the State Government change the system of reservations from a roster-based rotation system to a lottery driven system.

Experts in the field of public policy have opined in various papers and on various fora that while rotation may strengthen the roots of women's reservations or may strengthen representation given to the weaker sections of society, it could reduce the accountability of elected members to their electorate. Rotation policy could make a politician completely dependent on his party managers for a ticket as he might no longer be able to build a long-term relationship with his constituency. The Telegraph reported that Pratap Bhanu Mehta, president of the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, said: "What rotation does is hurt independent grassroots politicians. It strengthens the party leadership and leaves individual politicians completely at their mercy."

In the same report, there was also a comment by Rajeev Gowda, who heads the centre for Public Policy at IIM Bangalore, that candidates worried about losing their seats to the quota may start focusing their time and resources on neighbouring seats that they hope to be fielded from the next time.

2. Optionally, if it is not possible to change the system of rotations, then we recommend that the rotation of seats be done after two terms rather than one so that the candidate develops a longer term view of the development process.

Candidates who win elections for the first time from reserved seats do not get adequate opportunity to gain in experience and grow in stature by getting re-elected. Often, proxy candidates are put up, who serve a term, after which the seat gets de-reserved and becomes available to the existing powerful groups and individuals. Moreover, the rotation after one election cycle often leads to an unhealthy attitude of the elected, having little hope for re-election. During our survey, respondents, especially women representatives opined that they get into system of governance only due to the reservation of seats. It takes them 2-3 years to start understanding their roles and powers. By that time, however, next elections are due and they are forced to exit the system just when they've begun to understand the ropes.

Suggestions Pertaining to Electoral Process

3. Payments to the tehsildar offices are made sometimes 5-7 years after the elections are done. This implies that the funds for election processes have to be spent out of their pockets, whereas the money comes in much later. This has created great resentment at the local levels. Funds for running election expenses have to be sanctioned prior to the elections.

Further, manpower which is used for running the election processes of local bodies is not paid enough. This further creates resentment and lethargy to work on the elections properly. The payment made for local body elections should be at least half of that made for national level elections. It should be indexed to inflation and revised periodically.

Suggestions for Enhancing the Quality of Candidates


4. In view of the legislative role of elected members, it is important that they be at least educated up to the seventh standard. Hence, a minimum education level should be actually made into a precondition for contesting elections. One of the major observations in our survey is that 100% of the candidates interviewed, men and women, open category and reserved, those with education upto 7th Standard and graduates, have all unanimously supported the fact that educational qualification should be made a must for contesting elections.

A profile of candidates interviewed during our survey is shown below. It reveals that 27% of elected members randomly selected are not even matriculate.

Table 8.1 Education profile within sample

Education	% Sample
Less than Std V	6.67
Std V to Std IX	20.67
Matriculate	14.67
Std XII pass	16.67
Graduate	26.00
Post Graduate	12.67
Blank	2.67

Graph 8.1 Education profile within sample



Can some level of education (say matriculation or atleast Std. VII) be made into a pre-condition for contesting Panchayat Raj Institutions? This will have to be considered carefully because it will have an immediate impact on a quarter of the currently elected members, who would not be able to contest elections in the next round. Further, there are legal issues regarding such a proviso.

In states where these kind of conditions were imposed by the State Legislatures, a lot of controversy has been created. For example, in Haryana, the “minimum” education required for eligibility to contest in a panchayat election is completion of matriculation in case of general candidates; completion of Class 8 for a woman candidate or a candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste; and completion of Class 5 pass for a Scheduled Caste woman candidate contesting for the post of ‘Panch’. The law leaves 68 per cent of the Scheduled Caste women and 41 per cent of the Scheduled Caste men in Haryana ineligible to contest panchayat elections.

However, in what could well become a precedent for other states, the Hon. Supreme Court in December 2015 upheld the Haryana State Law citing that basic education would “enable the candidates to effectively discharge duties of the panchayat.”

In Maharashtra, following are some of the literacy statistics.

Table 8.2 Literacy statistics in Maharashtra


Category of population	Literacy rate
Total population	82.34%
Males	88.38%
Females	75.87%
Rural	77.01%
Urban	8.69%
Rural males	85.15%
Rural females	68.54%

Thus, if education is made a condition for contesting Panchayat Raj elections in Maharashtra, 23% of the total rural population will become ineligible to contest elections. The decision would exclude 15% of rural males and 31.5% of rural females from contesting the local elections.

However, it is equally true that rural Maharashtra has made more progress in improving literacy as compared to urban Maharashtra in the 10 year period from 2001 to 2011. If the same trend continues, the percentage of people that will be excluded if education is made a qualification, will definitely be lesser in the next election cycle.

Table 8.3 Change in literacy levels from 2001-2011

Category	2001 census	2011 census	Change
Total	76.9%	82.34%	5.4
Rural	70.4%	77.01%	6.6
Urban	85.5%	88.69%	3.1



Source: Census India 2011, Director of Census Operations, Maharashtra

Based on what the survey revealed, the data trends for Maharashtra and most importantly, the judgement given by the Hon. Supreme Court in December 2015, we feel that there is a case to make education a precondition for contesting elections in Maharashtra.

In case the Maharashtra State Government is not immediately willing to take this step, there could be a via media in the form of a referendum. If Government machinery, say the Collector or Tehsildar Office, in a particular village or taluka or district carries out a referendum on whether the people themselves want education to be a criterion or no, and if majority of the local residents of the said area sign the petition, then education could be made into a precondition for elections only in that area. Necessary changes to the Act will be required to facilitate this. If such an exercise is carried out in a few areas, it will create precedence for other areas. Public opinion will be built and that will make it easier for the state government to pass the legislation in some more time.

- Currently, only 46% of candidates have availed of training from YASHADA (See table 6.45). The State Government needs to take steps to make training compulsory for all elected members of ZPs as well as PSs. The State Government

could make it mandatory for all elected members to undergo a training of minimum 6 hours in the first 6 months of them getting elected. Pending this, they would not be allowed to attend meetings of the ZP or the PS for the next 6 months. After the first 6 months, a minimum training of 4 hours could be made compulsory for all elected members every 6 months. Pending this, they should not be allowed to attend meetings of the ZP or the PS for the next 6 months. Yashada should design special half-day training modules for women members at taluka places. Yashada should directly send the training certificates to the BDOs or CEOs, who can then monitor training participation of the members.

6. For this year, except for those candidates who are contesting for the very first time, the SECM may, through a guideline, ask all candidates to just declare and self-attest the total hours of training that they undertook in their last elected terms whilst filing nomination papers. Next election onwards, these declarations will have to be supported by training certificates issued by Yashada. Over a period of time, the State Government may make at least 20 hours of training in the earlier term into a pre-condition while filing nomination papers.
7. Monetary awards should be declared by State Government for those ZPs or PSs, where members are pro-active about training. Visibility can be given to the “Most trained Panchayat Samiti” and “Most trained Zilla Parishad” through web portals or monetary awards. Just like the Gram Sevak award, the State Government could introduce awards at levels of Gram Sevaks, BDOs and CEOs for being pro-active in terms of getting all members to attend training programs.
8. The true spirit of the 73rd constitutional amendment lies in devolution of funds, functions as well as functionaries. In Maharashtra, out of the 29 subjects mentioned in Schedule XI, only 11 subjects have been fully devolved to the local bodies and 5 have been partially devolved. In the Devolution Index 2015 as prepared by TISS, Maharashtra is ranked high in terms of devolution of functionaries, but it does not get a high rank in terms of devolution of funds and functions (See Appendix B). The State Government needs to create an internal timeline after due discussions with the Government officials as well as elected members of the Panchayat Raj Institutions to achieve full devolution of funds and functions.

FOLLOWING ARE OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SECM

Suggestions pertaining to electoral processes

1. Online filing of nomination papers has already been introduced by the SECM for civic elections. Eventually, this facility will be extended to the PRI elections as

well. However, there are a lot of villages or talukas where power supply is an issue. Further, the population in many of the tribal villages is not really IT-savvy. Hence, even if online filing of nomination papers is introduced, let it be introduced concurrently with physical filing of papers.

2. While most elected members knew about the conditions for contesting elections, many knew about the same from hearsay. This increases the possibility of the nomination form getting rejected. Tehsildar offices should hold camps for contesting candidates to explain the conditions for contesting elections. SECM can issue guidelines to political parties so that attendance by the contestants becomes mandatory. Separate camps ought to be held for women candidates, where women officers may explain the conditions for filing the nominations.
3. SECM could ask the State Government to instruct the CEOs of Zilla Parishads to print and display posters regarding conditions for contesting elections at all ZPs and PSs for at least 3 months prior to the elections.
4. Steps could be taken to introduce immediate scrutiny and validation of the nomination papers filed by the candidates. This can be facilitated by Government lawyers recruited by the SECM at taluka place. Optionally, SECM could ask NGOs like ADR or Lokniti to facilitate this process. The said Government lawyers should undergo compulsory training at Yashada so that they can handle the process properly.
5. The Collector offices and tehsildar offices are under tremendous strain throughout the year because in Maharashtra, elections are held when the term of the incumbents is about to end. Now, the terms end at different times of the year and so, it so happens that the Collector offices keep on running electoral processes constantly. These include creation of wards, resolving complaints about the delimitation of constituencies, arrangements pertaining to polling stations etc. This continual workload stretches the available manpower considerably and puts pressure on the other regular workload of the employees. It also reduces the seriousness with which the officials view the election process.

So, if all ZP, PS, GP elections in a district scheduled within a year are to be held at one time in a year, rather than hold elections as and when the 5 year term comes to an end, it'll ease up matters considerably. The results will be declared immediately after elections; but the elected members may start their duties when the term of their predecessor comes to an end.

6. While declaring election dates, the SECM needs to not only look at the date on which the term of the earlier elected representatives lapses, it should also look at weather criteria.

7. During the survey, many candidates shared their feedback that the implementation of election expenditure limit is not done properly. Hence, candidates with money power spend much more than the limit (See table 6.41 and table 6.42). A lot of this additional spending is done on propaganda. TV channels and radio stations are used aggressively in campaigning. This puts candidates without money power at a major disadvantage and distorts the level playing field that the SECM wishes to create. One way of creating a true level playing field would be to prohibit all candidates from advertising on TVs and radios. Another way could be to follow steps taken by the Election Commission of India and ask Doordarshan and AIR to give equal air time to all candidates on only these two channels.
8. Independent candidates are at a further disadvantage because their election symbols are relatively unknown to the voting public. To really create a level playing field, all candidates should be asked to have individual election symbols and no candidate be allowed to use the symbol of the party he belongs to.
9. All election symbols should be granted by SECM authorities in such a fashion that no two symbols may resemble each other.

The bench of the SECM which grants symbols locally should also have a complaint redressal unit, wherein aggrieved candidates may be allowed to complain about similar symbols granted by the officials. If such a complaint is received by the bench, the redressal should happen within 3 working days of receiving the complaint.

10. There are many cases where candidates with similar names contest the elections. Their election symbols also may be similar to each other. This confuses the voters, since the EVMs only display the names of the candidates and their symbols. These issues can be resolved if the EVMs display the photographs of the candidates.
11. There were cases of rigging in Raigad despite the fact that there were surveillance cameras installed in the polling stations. The cameras were trained on the voters who had queued up to cast their votes. When the voters reached the first polling officer, their identity was checked. The second officer marked their finger with indelible ink. However, once the voter actually reached the polling booth, some other person cast the vote on the EVM. Camera installations are thus, not always effective for prevention of rigging. Presence of observers is crucial to the election process, especially in sensitive areas. Optionally, cameras, which record faces of the voters casting the votes, could be installed inside the polling booth.

Some political party officials also shared with us feedback regarding the efficacy of cameras in politically sensitive areas. One party official opined that there were 16 cameras running at different polling booths in Rave, a village in Pen taluka of Raigad district, but 4 of those weren't in proper working condition. Violence

erupted and when they called the police officers in charge, the officers weren't able to locate the problem due to the non-working cameras. Even after they did locate the area in which violence had erupted, it took them a very long time to reach the station at which the problem had started.

Our suggestion is that in politically sensitive areas, observers also be stationed at police stations so that the time taken by the police officials to reach a sensitive areas can be monitored. SECM could submit a list of sensitive areas to the State Government, wherein the State Government would have to take the responsibility of arranging for continuous power supply to run the cameras during the election. Secondly, the State Government could be asked to arrange funding for the cameras etc. which are additionally needed in such areas prior to the elections. Thirdly, in those areas which have had history of violence in the past, getting police personnel from other districts and in extreme cases, from other states will help in loosening the nexus between the candidates and the police forces.

Suggestions for increasing voter participation

12. If it is allowed by the Election Commission of India at a later stage, the linking of Adhar with the voter id may prove useful in a number of ways. For example, whilst applying for a Government job, candidates who have exercised their right to vote could be given a preference. It could also be linked to a small monetary reward; for example people who've voted could be made eligible for a discount in the court fee stamp whilst applying for a birth/ death certificate. This will prove to be very useful in terms of increasing voter turnout ratios. The SECM could take up this suggestion with the State Government.
13. A major issue that is affecting voter turnout ratios in the rural areas is the problem of migration. People migrate to urban areas either for education or for jobs and hence, are not physically present in their constituencies to cast a vote for the PS or ZP elections. Political parties normally make arrangements to bring their voters back, since they recognize that the turnout has a bearing on their chances of winning or losing elections. However, this is a problem that will turn more acute in the days to come as urbanization picks up pace across all districts of Maharashtra.

Over a period of time, Adhar cards can be used to establish identity of voters who are away from their constituencies and can be used so that they can cast their vote even from a remote location.

For enhancing the quality of candidates

14. We feel that there is a definite case for making some level of education into a precondition for contesting elections. The justifications and some supporting data for this have been included in the suggestions to the State Government. SECM could open these talks with the State Government.
15. For this year, except for those candidates who are contesting for the very first time, the SECM, through a guideline, could ask all candidates to just declare and self-attest the total hours of training that they undertook in their last terms whilst filing nomination papers. Next election onwards, these declarations will have to be supported by training certificates issued by Yashada. Over a period of time, at least 20 hours of training in the earlier term can be made into a pre-condition while filing nomination papers. Since this implementation also involves the State Government intervention, this point has been mentioned in the suggestions made to the State Government as well.
16. Most of the ZPs as well as PSs have access to internet infrastructure. Training can be arranged through virtual classrooms for elected members and especially for women, who very often are reluctant to travel for training purposes. SECM may also access certain channels such as Lok Sabha Television, which is a Parliament channel, which telecasts live proceedings of the Lok Sabha. Apart from this, it also telecasts a whole range of programmes of general interest on issues relating to democracy, governance, social, economic and constitutional issues and citizens' concerns. Optionally, the SECM may also think about having a dedicated channel for training. This channel may be used to host programs regarding electoral processes, Model Code of Conduct, filing of nomination papers, election analysis, debates on various issues etc.
17. Issue guidelines to political parties to issue at least 5% of their total tickets to women to contest in the constituencies not reserved for women.

The current scenario, wherein certain constituencies are reserved only for women, leads to “women getting ghettoised and fighting elections only against other women,” says Madhu Purnima Kishwar, Professor, CSDS. This denies them the legitimacy of being mainstream politicians. Secondly, under the current system, the male incumbent is forcibly denied even a right to contest elections and hence, asks his wife or mother to step in. The election in reserved constituencies, is thus, a contest between shadows of two dominant male contestants in the region. The women fail to or sometimes are not even interested in getting into the electoral processes; they fail to come into their own as representatives of people.

This will stand changed when a party has to allocate a ticket to a woman for a constituency that is not reserved for women. This will force the party to look for

genuine leaders within women; it will create a momentum of getting women with community development backgrounds to the fore; the women will learn to campaign and contest against traditional male dominations and will emerge more empowered, which is the objective that lies behind reserving 50% of the seats for women.

18. SECM can have a dedicated portal for giving visibility to those elected members who have tried some local experiments creatively. Thus, if some elected members create a tanker-free ward or constituency, the SECM can flash that experiment across through its website. This may encourage more replicability of successful experiments.

SECM could also have a part of this portal dedicated towards identifying exceptional women representatives in PRIs. State Governments could ask CEOs and BDOs to nominate one or two women members from ZPs or PSs to the SECM, if they feel that these ladies are doing some extraordinary work. If SECM creates a small documentary on 10 such women in Panchayat Raj every year, it can give a huge thrust to women empowerment.

BACKDROP TO THE 73RD CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Life in a village is unique, as are the development issues, political tensions and social problems associated with it. It would be not only over-zealous, but impractical to think that Centrally-devised schemes can be implemented with a one-size-fits-all principle at the village level.

After having followed a top-down approach to development for a long time through the various Central Plans, Indian policy makers increasingly started feeling the need to develop a bottoms-up approach that would allow more inclusion to the small villages and towns, whose development needs are extremely uniquely tuned in to the socio-economic, cultural and political parameters of the specific areas.

A greater recognition of the fact that villages should and could serve as the basic block of governance led to the acceptance of the fact that local bodies or the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) should be given a constitutional status. This would enable the villagers to elect their own representatives, who would be able to identify development gaps, plan and implement the required schemes of the Government and would be given more financial powers as well.

There have been several study groups and committees since independence, the recommendations of which eventually contributed to giving the Panchayat Raj Institutions a constitutional status. Notable amongst these have been the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957), the G. V. K. Rao Committee (1985), and the L. M. Singhvi Committee (1986).

The suggestion of giving panchayats constitutional status was opposed by the Sarkaria Commission, but the idea, however, gained momentum in the late 1980s especially because of the endorsement by the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who introduced the 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill in 1989. The 64th Amendment Bill was prepared and introduced in the lower house of Parliament. But it got defeated in the Rajya Sabha as non-convincing. In 1989, the National Front government introduced the 74th Constitutional Amendment Bill, but it could not become an Act because of the dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha.

The extent of rural poverty in India continued to haunt policy makers in 1991. It was felt that the top down approach of planning had failed to reach the grassroot economy, which is the driving force of the Indian system. There was ideation about changing the Indian polity to enhance the Indian economy. The Constitutional (73rd Amendment) Act, passed in 1992 by the P. V. Narsimha Rao government, came into force on April 24, 1993. It was meant to provide constitutional sanction to establish "democracy at the grassroots level as it is at the state level or national level"

And thus, the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts of 1992 were passed and came into force in 1993. Whilst the 73rd amendment aimed at strengthening the PRIs, the 74th aimed at strengthening municipal bodies and urban local bodies.

Under the 73rd amendment, Part IX of the constitution was introduced which consisted of provisions from 243 to 243O. These provisions create a decentralized way of governance and provide for transfer of responsibilities and tax powers from the state government to rural bodies created at district, block and village level.

Some of these provisions are statutory. These include

1. Creation of a State Elections Commission to conduct elections to PRIs,
2. In order to review the financial position of the PRIs, each state to set up a State Finance Commission for five years.
3. Tenure of PRIs fixed at five years and, if dissolved earlier, fresh elections to be held within six months,
4. Creation of a three-tier Panchayati Raj structure at the zila, block and village levels,
5. The minimum age for contesting elections to PRIs to be 18 years,
6. Reservation for women in panchayats (chairman and members) up to one-third seats,
7. Reservation of seats for SC/ST in panchayats (chairman and members) in proportion to their population,
8. Indirect elections to the post of chairman at the intermediate and apex tiers,
9. All posts at all levels (with two exceptions) to be filled by direct elections, and
10. Organisation of gram sabhas.

However, some of the provisions are voluntary. These include

1. Voting rights to MPs and MLAs in these bodies,
2. Reservation for backward classes,
3. Financial powers,
4. Autonomy of the panchayats, and
5. Devolution of powers to perform functions of the Eleventh Schedule and planning.

It is very interesting to note that Schedule XI contains 29 subjects that the states may *voluntarily* decide to devolve on the PRIs, after taking into account the unique circumstances at the state level.

The Eleventh Schedule lists the following 29 subjects:

1. Agriculture including agricultural extension.
2. Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conser-vation.

3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development.
4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry.
5. Fisheries.
6. Social forestry and farm forestry.
7. Minor forest produce.
8. Small scale industries, including food-processing industries.
9. Khadi, village and cottage industries.
10. Rural housing.
11. Drinking water.
12. Fuel and fodder.
13. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication.
14. Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity.
15. Non-conventional energy sources.
16. Poverty alleviation programme.
17. Education including primary and secondary schools.
18. Technical training and vocational education.
19. Adult and non-formal education.
20. Libraries.
21. Cultural activities.
22. Markets and fairs.
23. Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries.
24. Family welfare.
25. Women and child development.
26. Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded.
27. Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
28. Public distribution system.
29. Maintenance of community assets.

STATE OF PANCHAYAT RAJ IN MAHARASHTRA

In accordance with the 73rd amendment, the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 and Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 were amended in 1994. However, even 22 years post-amendment of the Maharashtra ZPs and PSs Act, certain issues still prevail.

According to the CAG Audit Report (Local Bodies) for the year ended March 2015 (2015:4), allocations to local bodies in Maharashtra stood at only 19.48% (with 15.16% being allocated to PRI) as against the 40% devolution that was recommended by the second Maharashtra State Finance Commission. Out of 29 subjects listed in the XI schedule, only 16 had been transferred to the PRIs. Out of these, 11 functions have been fully transferred, whereas 5 have been partially transferred to the PRIs.

Devolution of powers to local bodies does not merely imply transferring the functions indicated in Schedule XI. Devolution of functions, functionaries as well as funds creates a true level of devolution as envisaged by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. According to the Devolution Index Report prepared by TISS at the behest of the Ministry of Panchayat Raj (MoPR), Kerala, Sikkim and Karnataka are the top 3 states which show effective levels of overall devolution. Maharashtra is ranked at no.4.

A look at the components that go into the making of the index show that Maharashtra ranks higher in terms of devolution of functionaries (rank 2), and it gets the third rank in terms of creation of infrastructure (amenities available at Panchayat offices), governance and transparency issues (maintainance of records and audits, websites for dissemination etc.). However, it is ranked no.5 when it comes to devolution of functions. Finally, in terms of financial devolution, Maharashtra gets the eighth rank. Clearly, more improvements are needed in the areas of devolving more functions to the PRI and providing them with more financial autonomy to truly drive growth at the local level.

Ranking of States in the component and aggregate indices of Devolution in Policy

State	Functions	Functionaires	Finances	IGT	Aggregate
Kerala	1	1	3	1	1
Karnataka	8	12	1	8	2
Maharashtra	5	2	8	3	3
Sikkim	2	11	4	4	4
West Bengal	3	22	10	2	5
Tamil Nadu	6	7	7	13	6
Rajasthan	7	4	16	9	7
Madhya Pradesh	23	6	2	19	8
Odisha	11	15	9	17	9
Himachal Pradesh	22	5	15	6	10
Manipur	25	3	5	22	11
Chhattisgarh	6	16	22	15	12
Telangana	9	24	12	11	13
Andhra Pradesh	9	17	24	10	14
Punjab	17	14	14	12	15
Gujarat	18	19	11	18	16
Tripura	21	20	17	7	17
Uttar Pradesh	16	13	21	16	18
Jharkhand	20	23	6	20	19
Haryana	24	21	13	14	20
Uttarakhand	15	10	20	21	21
Assam	19	25	18	5	22
Bihar	12	8	25	23	23
Jammu and Kashmir	13	18	19	24	24
Arunachal Pradesh	14	9	23	25	25

Source: Devolution Index 2015, TISS Report

CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN ELECTIONS IN ZPs: SOME POLITICAL DYNAMICS


In the 2012 ZP elections held in many of the districts, Congress and NCP did not vie for the seats through a combined arrangement. NCP got into some kind of seat sharing arrangements locally with the Shiv Sena in many areas and hence, in many of the ZPs, the Chairman and Vice Chairman seats went to the NCP and/ or the Shiv Sena.

In 2014, the political mood changed throughout the country even as BJP swept the polls in the national elections. It was hence largely felt that when the elections for the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the ZPs would take place in 2014 when the two and half year tenure of the earlier incumbents would lapse, Zilla Parishads too would show a power balance in favour of the BJP.

However, the NCP got into a seat sharing formula with the Congress and the NCP-Congress duo showed considerable prowess in the 2014 elections for Chairman and Vice Chairman in 26 out of 36 ZPs that conducted elections. BJP and Shiv Sena simply failed to repeat the Lok Sabha performance in the Maharashtra ZPs.

- In Raigad district in Konkan, there is a huge domination of the Peasants and Workers Party (PWP). The other dominant party is Shiv Sena. In the 2014 ZP elections, PWP and NCP jointly defeated the Shiv Sena.
- In Satara, Sangli, Solapur and Pune districts within the Pune division, NCP single-handedly won both the posts of President and Vice President.
- In the Pune division, only in Kolhapur did Congress candidates win both the posts.
- Within the Nashik division, in Ahmednagar, NCP joined the Congress to win seats. The 2012 elections had seen NCP tie up with BJP and Shiv Sena.
- In Nashik district itself, NCP won election to the posts of President and Vice president.
- In naxal-infested Gadchiroli, NCP bagged the post of zilla parishad president while Congress won the vice president's post.
- In Buldhana, notorious for farmers' suicides, Congress candidates won the president's post while the NCP nominee bagged the vice president's post.
- In cotton-rich Yavatmal, NCP and Congress won both the posts. NCP broke its ties with saffron parties here.
- In Nanded and Latur, both traditional Congress party bastions, the Shiv Sena-BJP combine was defeated by the Congress-NCP alliance.

- Similarly, in the adjoining Parbhani district, NCP candidates won with flying colours. In Aurangabad, where Shiv Sena has made sufficient in-roads, Congress and NCP won both the posts.
- However, in Ratnagiri district, Shiv Sena-BJP retained its supremacy.
- Also, in Jalgaon, which is a major banana-producing are, saffron parties defeated the Congress-NCP.



गोखले राज्यशास्त्र आणि अर्थशास्त्र संस्था
(अभिमत विद्यापीठ)
पुणे - ४११ ००४

निवडणूक प्रक्रीया अभ्यास प्रकल्प (मार्च २०१६)
उमेदवारांसाठी प्रश्नावली

विभाग I - पुरुष व महिला उमेदवार दोघांना हे प्रश्न विचारावेत

उमेदवारीचा प्रकार - खुली जागा अनु. जाती राखीव
अनु. जमाती राखीव महिला राखीव

अ. उमेदवाराची प्राथमिक माहिती

१. नाव _____

२. वय _____

३. पुरुष स्त्री

४. जात _____ ५. धर्म _____

६. शैक्षणिक पात्रता _____

७. व्यवसाय _____

८. निवडणूक लढवलेल्या मतदार संघाचे नाव _____

९. निवडणूक जिंकले हरले

१०. उमेदवारांच्या कुटुंबाची राजकीय पार्श्वभूमी

अनु.क्र.	व्यक्तीचे नाव	उमेदवाराशी नाते	पक्ष	निवडणूक लढवलेली संस्था	हुद्दा
१					
२					
३					

११. उमेदवाराच्या राजकीय कारकीर्दीतील पक्षाचे सदस्यत्वाचा तपशील

वर्ष पासून	वर्ष पर्यंत	पक्ष

१२. जर पक्ष बदलला असेल तर त्याची कारणे

१३. निवडणूकीत विजयी झालेल्या उमेदवारांसाठी -

धारण केलेले पद	केव्हांपासून वर्ष	कधीपर्यंत वर्ष

१४. उमेदवार जर सामाजिक / सांस्कृतिक संस्थांशी संबंधित असेल तर त्याचा तपशील -

वर्ष पासून	वर्ष पर्यंत	कामाचे स्वरूप	संस्था प्रकार

ब. निवडणूक लढण्यास कारण ठरलेल्या घटकांविषयी

१. आपण निवडणूक लढवण्याचा निर्णय का घेतलात?

२. निवडून आलो तर साध्य करू शकू अशी कोणती दोन उद्दिष्टे तुमच्या डोळ्यासमोर होती ?

३. आपण राजकारणात प्रवेश कधी केलात ? त्यावेळेस कोणते पद मिळाले होते ?

४. राजकारणात प्रवेश केल्या पासून पहिली निवडणूक लढवे पर्यंत किती वर्षांचा काळ लागला ?

५. पहिली निवडणूक लढवताना ती लढवावी असे का वाटले ?

६. आज पर्यंत आपण किती निवडणूका लढवल्या ?

७. गेली निवडणूक लढवण्याचा आपला अनुभव कसा होता ? (उदा. पक्षाकडून तिकी ट मिळणे, खर्चाची तरतूद, मतदारांचा पाठींबा)

८. गेल्या निवडणूकी निकाल काय लागला ? विजय पराजय

९. गेल्या निवडणूकीतील जय/पराजयाची कारणे द्या

१०. जर विजयी झाला असाल तर कोणते घटक विजयासाठी कारणीभूत ठरले ?

११. जर पराभूत झाला असाल तर विजयी उमेदवाराच्या फायद्याचे ठरले असे घटक कोणते ?

१२. गेल्या निवडणूकीत आपल्या जागेसाठी लढत किती उमेदवारांमध्ये झाली ?

१३. मतदानाची टक्केवारी काय होती ?

१४. मतदानाची टक्केवारी कोणत्या घटकांवर अवलंबून असते ?

१५. अपक्ष म्हणून निवडणूक लढवणे किंवा पक्षाच्या तिकीटावर निवडणूक लढवणे यांपैकी काय चांगले असते ? कारणे

१६. पक्षाचे तिकीट मिळविणे हे सुध्दा खर्चिक काम झाले आहे अशा परिस्थितीत अपक्ष म्हणून निवडणूक लढवणे परवडते असे वाटते का ?

१७. (अपक्ष उमेदवारांसाठी) अपक्ष उमेदवार म्हणून निवडणूक लढवतांना आपणास कोणत्या अडचणींचा सामना करावा लागला ?

१८. एखादी जागा अनु. जाती / अनु. जमाती किंवा महिलांसाठी राखीव झाल्याने राजकीय समीकरणे बदलतात का ? तुमच्या बाबतीत असे कधी झाले का ?

१९. अनु. जाती / अनु. जमाती व महिलांसाठी जागा राखीव ठेवण्याबाबत आपले मत काय –

पूर्णतः सहमत

थोडाफार सहमत

मत नाही

थोडाफार असहमत

पूर्णतः असहमत

२०. रोस्टर प्रमाणे आलटून पालटून मतदार संघ राखीव होतात: त्याचे संभाव्य उमेदवारांच्या निवडणूक लढवण्यावर काय परिणाम होतात ?

२१. जि.प. / पं.स. मध्ये महिलांचा सहभाग वाढल्यामुळे त्या संस्थांच्या कार्यपध्दतीवर काय परिणाम झाला ?

२२. महिलांसाठी जागा राखीव करण्याने महिलांचे सक्षमीकरण झाले असे वाटते का ?

२३. खुल्या संघातून निवडून आलेले आणि राखीव संघातून निवडून आलेले यांच्या कार्यपध्दतीत फरक जाणवतो का ?

२४. तसेच महिला निर्वाचित सदस्य आणि पुरुष निर्वाचित सदस्य यांच्या कार्यपध्दतीत फरक जाणवतो का ?

२५. निवडणूक लढवण्यासाठी पात्रतेचे निकष कोणते आहेत ?

२६. जि.प./पं.स. यांच्या जबाबदाऱ्या काय आहेत ?

२७. (फक्त निर्वाचित उमेदवारांसाठी)

आपण निवडून आल्यानंतर, जी दोन उद्दिष्टे ठरवली होती ती पूर्ण करण्यात आपण किती यशस्वी झालात ? कारणे,

२८. प्रचार व निवडणूकीतील इतर कामांसाठी लागणारे मनुष्यबळ आपण कसे उभे केलेत ?

२९. प्रशासनाबाबतचा आपला अनुभव कसा आहे ?

३०. प्रशासन आणि पदाधिकारी यांचा परस्पर संबंध जि.प./पं.स. मध्ये कसा असतो ? प्रशासन वरचढ ठरते का ? कोणत्या बाबतींमध्ये ?

३१. शासनाच्या विविध विकासाच्या योजनांबाबत आपण माहिती कशी मिळविता ?

३२. योजनेची चांगली कार्यवाही झाल्यास राजकीय कारकीर्दीसाठी फायद्याचे ठरते का ?

३३. आपण निवडून आल्यानंतर पक्षाने / शासनाने / राज्य निवडणूक आयोगाने आयोजित केलेल्या प्रशिक्षणाला गेला होतात का ? होय नाही

३४. जर गेला नसाल तर का गेला नाहीत ?

३५. जर गेला असाल तर त्या प्रशिक्षणाचा अनुभव कसा होता ? प्रशिक्षणात काय शिकवले ?

३६. कोणत्या बाबींचे प्रशिक्षण तुम्हांला घ्यायला आवडेल जेणेकरून निवडणूक प्रक्रिया समजणे व पार पाडणे सोयीचे होईल ?

३७. राजकारणाच्या गुन्हेगारीकरणावर आपला अभिप्राय – निवडणूक प्रक्रियेवर त्याचा होणारा परिणाम कसा व किती आहे ? या प्रश्नांची सोडवणूक व्हावी यासाठी कोणत्या उपाययोजना सुचवाल ?

क. निवडणूक खर्चाविषयी

३८. आपणाला निवडणूक लढवण्यासाठी किती खर्च झाला ?

३९. पुढील बाबींवर एकूण खर्चाच्या किती टक्के रक्कम खर्च झाली.

बाब	एकूण खर्चाशी टक्केवारी
पॅम्प्लेट, सीडी, एसएमएस	
टीव्ही व वृत्तपत्रात जाहिराती	
सभा, कोपरा सभा	
प्रवास	
कार्यकर्त्यांचा खर्च	
अन्य (स्पष्ट करा)	

४०. निवडणूकीसाठी लागणारा पैसा आपण कसा उभा केला ?

४१. कृपया ज्या स्रोतांतून पैसा अभा केला त्याची टक्केवारी सांगा

स्रोत	टक्के
स्वतःचे पैसे	
देणग्या	
पक्षाकडून मिळाले	
अन्य (स्पष्ट करा)	

४२. राज्य निवडणूक आयोगाने किती खर्चाची मर्यादा घालून दिली आहे ?

४३. ती पुरेशी आहे का ? नसल्यास ती किती रक्कमेपर्यंत वाढवावी ?

ड. निवडणूक प्रक्रियेसंबंधी

४४. उमेदवार अर्ज भरतानाचा तुमचा अनुभव कसा होता ? काही अडचणी आल्या का ?

४५. उमेदवारी अर्ज भरण्याची प्रक्रिया सुलभ व्हावी यासाठी कोणत्या सूचना कराल ?

४६. उमेदवारी अर्ज भरण्यासाठी मदत करण्याची जबाबदारी कोणत्या अधिकाऱ्यांवर आहे ?

४७. निवडणूक प्रक्रियेमध्ये रिटर्निंग ऑफीसरची भूमिका काय असते ?

४८. पोलींग ऑफीसरच्या भूमिकेपेक्षा रिटर्निंग ऑफीसरची भूमिका कोणत्या बाबतीत वेगळी आहे ?

४९. निवडणूकीचे नियम / प्रक्रिया समजून घेण्यासाठी आपण एखाद्या पोलींग ऑफीसर / रिटर्निंग ऑफीसर अथवा अन्य शासकीय अधिकाऱ्याला भेटला होतात का ?

५०. आपणाला निवडणूकीचे नियम समजावून सांगण्यासाठी शासनाने / निवडणूक यंत्रणेने काही प्रयत्न केले का ?

५१. निवडणूकीच्या पात्रतेसंबंधी अथवा आदर्श आचारसंहिते संबंधीची माहिती आपण कशी मिळवलीत ?

५२. निवडणूक प्रक्रिया सुलभपणे पार पडली का ? ती अधिक सुलभ व्हावी यासाठी कोणत्या सूचना कराल ?

इ. फक्त महिला उमेदवारांना विचारावयाचे प्रश्न

१. तुमच्या निवडणूकीच्या विजयावर घरच्यांच्या काय प्रतिक्रिया होत्या ?

२. तुमचे नातेवाईक व मित्रमैत्रीणींच्या काय प्रतिक्रिया होत्या ?

३. तुम्ही महिलांसाठी आरक्षित जागेवर निवडणूक लढलात का ?

४. ही जागा महिलांसाठी राखीव नसती तरी सुध्दा तुम्ही निवडणूक लढला असतात का ?

५. राखीव जागांच्या धोरणामुळे महिला राजकारणात आघाडीवर आल्या असे वाटते का ? कसे ?

६. तुम्हांला राजकारणात करिअर करण्याची ईच्छा आहे का ? होय अथवा नाही असे कोणतेही उत्तर असल्यास कारण

७. राजकारणीतील तुमचे आदर्श कोण आहेत ? का ?

८. जि.प. /पं.स. च्या निर्णय प्रक्रियेत महिलांचा क्रियाशील सहभाग असतो का ?

९. प्रशासनाकडून पुरुष सदस्यांना व महिला सदस्यांना मिळणाऱ्या वागणुकीत फरक जाणवतो का ?

१०. महिला अधिकाऱ्यांशी समन्वय करताना जास्त सोयीचे जाते असे वाटते का ?

११. राजकीय पक्षांचा महिला उमेदवाराविषयीचा दृष्टिकोन कसा असतो ?

१२. आपणाला कोणत्या बाबतीत प्रशिक्षण मिळावे असे वाटते ?

१३. घरातील पुरुष सदस्यांचा तुमच्या निर्णय घेण्यात हस्तक्षेप होतो का ?



गोखले राज्यशास्त्र आणि अर्थशास्त्र संस्था
(अभिमत विद्यापीठ)
पुणे - ४११ ००४

निवडणूक प्रक्रीया अभ्यास प्रकल्प (मार्च २०१६)
पक्ष पदाधिकाऱ्यासाठी प्रश्नावली

अ. प्राथमिक माहिती

१. नाव _____
२. वय _____
३. पक्ष संघटनेतील हुद्दा: _____ ३अ. पक्ष: _____
४. शैक्षणिक माहिती

अनु.क्र.	शैक्षणिक पातळी	वर्ष	विशेष
१	१० वी		
२	१२ वी		
३	डिग्री / डिप्लोमा		
४	पदव्युत्तर		
५	व्यावसायिक		
६	अन्य (स्पष्ट करा)		

५. राजकीय कारकीर्द किती वर्षे ? _____

६. राजकीय कारकीर्दीचा तपशिल

वर्ष पासून	वर्षे पर्यंत	पक्ष	हुद्दा	कामाचे स्वरूप

ब. राजकीय पक्षांचा उमेदवारांविषयीचा दृष्टिकोन

१. या जिल्ह्यात आपला पक्ष कोणत्या वर्षांपासून निवडणूक लढवत आहे ?

२. पक्षाच्या दृष्टिकोणातून या जिल्ह्याचे महत्त्व किती आहे ? सोदाहरण स्पष्ट करा

३. या जिल्ह्यातील सदस्य पुढे जावून आमदार / खासदार झाल्याची उदाहरणे आहेत का ? स्पष्ट करा

४. सभासदाला निवडणूकीचे तिकीट देताना पक्ष कोणत्या गोष्टी विचारात घेतो (वय, शिक्षण, घराणं इत्यादि)

५. अपक्ष लढण्यापेक्षा राजकीय तिकीटावर निवडणूक लढवण्यात कोणते फायदे होतात ?

६. जे अपक्ष पूर्वी जिंकले आहेत अशांना पक्षातर्फे तिकीट देवून निवडणूक लढवण्यास प्रवृत्त करण्यासाठी पक्षातर्फे प्रयत्न केले जातात का ?

७. लायक उमेदवारांचा शोध घेणे कठीण जाते का ?

८. एखाद्या उमेदवाराला निवडणूक लढवण्याची इच्छा कोणत्या कारणांमुळे होते ?

९. संभाव्य विजयी उमेदवाराचा शोध घेण्याची पक्षामध्ये काय पद्धत आहे ?

१०. निवडून येण्याची क्षमता (Electoral Merit) म्हणजे काय ? तुम्ही या संकल्पनेचे वर्णन कसे कराल.

११. घराणेशाहीचा Electoral Merit वर काय परिणाम होतो ?

१२. निवडणूकीपूर्वी आणि नंतर पक्षाकडून उमेदवारानां कोणत्या प्रकारची मदत केली जाते ?

१३. तिकीट वाटपाचा निर्णय पक्षाच्या पातळीवर कोण घेतो ?

१४. एका तिकीटासाठी अनेक इच्छुक असतील तर मार्ग कसा काढला जातो ?

१५. उमेदवाराच्या प्रचार मोहिमेवर पक्षाचे नियंत्रण असते का ?

क. आरक्षणाचे परिणाम

१६. एखादी जागा अनु. जाती /जमाती अथवा महिलांसाठी राखीव झाली तर संभाव्य उमेदवार निवडीवर पक्षाच्या दृष्टिने कोणता परिणाम होतो ?

१७. रोस्टर पद्धतीने जागा राखीव करण्याचय धोरणामुळे पक्षातील अंतर्गत समीकरणावर व पर्यायाने संभाव्य उमेदवाराच्या निवडीवर काय परिणाम होतात ?

१८. महिला उमेदवारांशी आणि पुरुष उमेदवारांशी व्यवहार करताना काही फरक जाणवतो का ? स्पष्ट करा

१९. महिला उमेदवार / सभासद पक्षाकडे मोठ्या प्रमाणात यावेत यासाठी तुम्ही काही विशेष प्रयत्न केले आहेत का ? सोदाहरण स्पष्ट करा

ड. राजकीय पक्ष आणि मतदानासंदर्भातील मुद्दे

२०. निवडणूकीपूर्वी व प्रत्यक्ष निवडणूकांच्या दिवशी पक्षातर्फे सावधानतेचे कोणते उपाय केले जातात ?

२१. राजकीय पक्षांना आचारसंहिता समजावून सांगण्यासाठी निवडणूक अधिकाऱ्याडून कोणते प्रयत्न केले जातात ?

२२. आदर्श आचार संहितेबाबत आपले मत काय आहे ?

२३. आचार संहिते संदर्भात आपल्या काही सूचना आहेत का ?

२४. गेल्या निवडणूकीत शासकीय यंत्रणेने ज्या प्रकार निवडणूका अंमलात आणल्या त्याबाबत आपले मत-

२५. गेल्या निवडणूकीत मतदानाची टक्केवारी किती होती ?

२६. मतदानाच्या टक्केवारीवर परिणाम करणारे घटक कोणते ?

२७. राज्य निवडणूक आयोगाकडून निष्णूकातील मतदान वाढावे यासाठी प्रयत्न केले जातात. आपणास या प्रयत्नांची माहिती आहे का ?

२८. गेल्या निवडणूकीत आपला उमेदवार विजयी झाला का ?

२९. उमेदवाराच्या विजयाची / पराजयाची कारणे काय होती ?

इ. प्रशिक्षणाची गरज

३०. नोकरशाहीकडून राजकीय पक्षाना कशी वागणूक दिली जाते ? नोकरशाहीशी व्यवहार करताना काही अडचणी जाणवतात का ? कोणत्या -

३१. आपल्या पक्षाने उमेदवारांसाठी इच्छुकांसाठी निवडणूक प्रक्रिये बाबत प्रशिक्षणाचे आयोजन केले होते का ?

३२. आपल्या पक्षाने उमेदवारांसाठी नव्याने निवडून आलेल्या सदस्यांसाठी प्रशिक्षणाचे आयोजन केले होते का ?

३३. जर उत्तर होय असेल तर कोणत्या प्रकारची व विषयांवर प्रशिक्षणे घेतली याचा तपशील द्या.

३४. निवडून आलेल्या सदस्यांसाठी कोणत्या बाबतीतील प्रशिक्षण दिले जावे असे वाटते.

३५. जेणे करून आलेले सदस्य आपल्या जबाबदाऱ्या व भूमिका समजून घेवू शकतील अश्या प्रकारच्या प्रशिक्षणाची सोय सध्या उपलब्ध आहे का ? असल्यास कोटे ?

३६. राजकारणाच्या गुन्हेगारीकरणावर आपला अभिप्राय:

निवडणूक प्रक्रियेवर त्याचा होणारा परिणाम:

या प्रश्नाच्या सोडवणुकीबाबत तुमच्या सूचना:



गोखले राज्यशास्त्र आणि अर्थशास्त्र संस्था
(अभिमत विद्यापीठ)
पुणे - ४११ ००४

निवडणूक प्रक्रीया अभ्यास प्रकल्प (मार्च २०१६)

शासकीय अधिकाऱ्यांसाठी प्रश्नावली

१. नाव _____
२. हुद्दा _____
३. गेल्या ५ वर्षांत धारण केलेली पदे

अनु.क्र.	कालावधी (वर्षे)	ठिकाण	हुद्दा
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४. आपण निवडणूक लढवावी अशी प्रेरणा एखाद्या व्यक्तीला होण्यामागे कोणते घटक कारण ठरतात ?

५. गेल्या निवडणूका झाल्या त्यावेळेस आपण याच जिल्ह्यात जि.प./पं.स. कार्यरत होतात का ?

६. जर होय असेल तर निवडणूकात निवडून आलेल्या सदस्यांच्या गुणवत्ते विषयी काय अभिप्राय द्याल ?

७. निवडून आलेल्या सदस्यांची गुणवत्ता(येथे/इतरत्र)काळाच्या ओघात सुधारली असे वाटते का ? असल्यास कारणे द्या

८. निवडणूक लढवण्यासाठी पात्रतेच्या ज्या अटी आहेत त्याबाबत उमेदवारांना माहिती असते का ?

९. गेल्या निवडणूकीत किती राजकीय पक्ष सहभागी झाले ?

१०. कोणत्या पक्षाला सर्वाधिक जागा मिळाल्या ?

११. जिल्हा / तालुका पातळीवर मतदारांमध्ये जागृती व्हावी तसेच मतदानाची टक्केवारी वाढावी यासाठी कोणत्या सूचना कराल ?

१२. आपल्या जि.प./पं.स. मध्ये सध्या विजयी झालेले अपक्ष उमेदवार किती आहेत ?

१३. अपक्ष उमेदवार आणि पक्षाचे उमेदवार या दोघांमध्ये कार्यपध्दती, गुणवत्ता या संदर्भात कोणते फरक आढळून येतात ?

१४. अनु. जाती / अनु. जमाती तसेच महिला यांच्यासाठी राखीव जागा ही आता जि.प./पं.स. निवडणूकीतील नित्याची बाब झाली आहे. अशा राखीव जागांवरील सदस्य व अन्य सदस्य यांच्यामध्ये कार्यपध्दती, कार्यतत्परता (efficiency) या संदर्भात कोणते फरक जाणवतात ?

१५. शासनाच्या विविध विकास योजनांची निवडून आलेल्या उमेदवारांना माहिती असते का ?

१६. जिल्हा / तालुका पातळीवर विकास योजना राबवण्यामध्ये निर्वाचित सदस्यांची तत्परता कशी असते ?

१७. एखाद्या योजनेची माहिती घेण्यासाठी निर्वाचित सदस्य आपणहून आपणाशी संपर्क साधतात का ?

१८. योजनांची तसेच कार्यक्रमांची माहिती व अंमलबजावणी याबाबतची माहिती निर्वाचित सदस्यांना देण्यासाठी प्रशासनाकडून कश्या प्रकारचे प्रयत्न होतात ?

१९. निर्वाचित सदस्यांची कार्यपद्धती सुधारावी यासाठी कोणत्या बाबींवर त्यांना प्रशिक्षित करण्याची गरज जाणवते ?

२०. निर्वाचित महिला सदस्यांचे कार्यपद्धतीत सुधारणा व्हावी यासाठी त्यांना कोणत्या बाबींवर प्रशिक्षण देण्याची गरज जाणवते ?

२१. राजकीय दबदबा असलेल्या घराण्यातील व्यक्ती जर निवडून आली तर प्रशासन आणि पदाधिकारी यांच्या परस्पर संबंधांवर काही परिणाम होतात का ?

२२. जि.प./पं.स. मध्ये निर्वाचित महिला सदस्यांची संख्या वाढल्यामुळे प्रशासन आणि पदाधिकारी यांच्या परस्पर संबंधांमध्ये काही बदल झाले का ? सोदाहरण स्पष्ट करा

२३. राजकारणाच्या गुन्हेगारीकरणावर आपला अभिप्राय निवडणूक प्रक्रियेच्या गुणवत्तेवर त्याचा कसा आणि किती परिणाम होतो ? या प्रश्नाची सोडवणूक व्हावी यासाठी कोणत्या उपाय योजना सूचवाल ?

२४. जि.प./पं.स. पातळीवर निवडणूक अधिकाऱ्यांना मदत करण्याबाबत स्थानिक प्रशासन किती तत्पर असते ?

२५. स्थानिक पातळीवर निवडणूक प्रक्रिया सुलभ व्हावी यासाठी कोणते उपाय सूचवाल ?

२६. स्थानिक प्रशासनाचा नियुक्त सदस्यांबरोबरचा संपर्क व एकत्रित कार्य करण्याची शैली सुधारावी यासाठी कोणत्या प्रकारचे प्रशिक्षण प्रशासनाला देण्याची आवश्यकता वाटते ?



गोखले राज्यशास्त्र आणि अर्थशास्त्र संस्था
(अभिमत विद्यापीठ)
पुणे - ४११ ००४

निवडणूक प्रक्रीया अभ्यास प्रकल्प (मार्च २०१६)
तहसिलदारांसाठी प्रश्नावली

१. नाव _____
२. हुद्दा _____
३. गेल्या पाच वर्षांतील विविध निवडणूकांमधील सहभाग

अनु. क्र.	निवडणूकीचे वर्ष	निवडणूक प्रकार (जि.प. / पं.स. / ग्रामं)	कामाचे स्वरूप
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४. आपण निवडणूक लढवावी अशी प्रेरणा एखाद्या व्यक्तीला होण्यामागे कोणते घटक कारण ठरतात ?

५. निवडणूक लढवणाऱ्या उमेदवारांच्या गुणवत्तेबाबत आपला अभिप्राय

६. उमेदवारांच्या गुणवत्तेमध्ये (येथे/इतरत्र) सरत्या काळात सुधारणा झाली असे वाटते का ?

७. निवडणूक लढवण्यासाठी आवश्यक पात्रतेच्या निकषांबाबत उमेदवारांना माहिती असते का ?

८. गेल्या निवडणूकीत किती राजकीय पक्ष सहभागी झाले ?

९. कोणत्या पक्षाला सर्वाधिक जागा मिळाल्या ?

१०. पंचायत राज संस्थांच्या निवडणूकामध्ये राजकीय पक्षांचा सहभाग वाढण्यामागची कारणे कोणती असावीत ?

११. राजकीय पक्षांना आदर्श आचार संहितेची माहिती असते का ?

१२. निवडणूक प्रक्रिया सुरळीत व्हावी यासाठी राजकीय पक्षांना कोणत्या प्रकारचे प्रशिक्षण देण्याची आवश्यकता आहे ?

१३. गेल्या निवडणूकीत मतदानाची टक्केवारी काय होती ?

१४. मतदानाच्या टक्केवारीवर परिणाम करणारे घटक कोणते वाटतात ?

१५. जिल्हा / तालुका पातळीवर मतदारांमध्ये जागृती व्हावी तसेच मतदानाची टक्केवारी वाढावी यासाठी कोणत्या सूचना कराल ?

१६. राजकारणाच्या गुन्हेगारीकरणाबाबत आपला अभिप्राय त्याचा स्थानिक पातळीवर प्रशासन करताना होणारा परिणाम काय ? त्याची व्याप्ती किती ?

१७. निवडणूक प्रक्रिये दरम्यान स्थानिक प्रशासनाचा सहभाग कसा असतो ?

१८. निवडणूक अधिकारी आणि स्थानिक अधिकारी यांच्या दरम्यान अधिकाराच्या कक्षेबाबत काही प्रश्न उद्भवतात का ?

१९. निवडणूक प्रक्रिया सुलभ होण्यासाठी स्थानिक नोकरशाहीला कश्या प्रकारचे प्रशिक्षण द्यावे याबाबतच्या सूचना

२०. मतदान केंद्रासाठी जागा ताब्यात घेताना उद्भवणारे प्रश्न

२१. उमेदवार / राजकीय पक्ष यांच्या प्रचार पद्धतीमुळे कश्या प्रकारचे प्रश्न निर्माण होतात ?

२२. आदर्श आचार संहिता लागू करताना कोणत्या समस्यांना तोंड द्यावे लागते

२३. मतदानाचे दिवशी कायदा व सुव्यवस्थे संदर्भात कोणत्या प्रश्नांना सामोरे जावे लागते ?

२४. राजकीय जाहिरातबाजीमध्ये आढळणारे सध्याचे चित्र आपला अभिप्राय

२५. उमेदवारांकडून निवडणूकीसाठी सरासरी किती रक्कम खर्च केल्याचे सांगितले जाते ?

२६. आवश्यक कागदपत्रे सादर करण्यासंदर्भात उमेदवारांचे सहकार्य कसे असते ? याबाबत कोणत्या अडचणींचा सामना करावा लागतो ? (जसे की उमेदवारी अर्ज, जात पडताळणी दाखला, स्थावर जंगम मालमत्तेचा जाहीरनामा, निवडणूक खर्चाचा तपशिल)

२७. मतदान केंद्रावरील व्यक्तींसाठी कोणत्या प्रकारचे प्रशिक्षण गरजेचे वाटते जेणेकरून मतदानाची प्रक्रिया सुरळीत होण्यास मदत होईल ?

२८. राज्य निवडणूक आयोगाने अन्य कोणत्या बाबींवर प्रशिक्षण अथवा अन्य उपाययोजना करण्यात लक्ष घालावे असे वाटते ?

२९. निवडणूक प्रक्रिया सुलभ व्हावी यासाठी अशा कोणत्या बाबी आहेत ज्यावर राज्य निवडणूक आयोगाकडून स्पष्ट मार्गदर्शक सूचना / निर्देश मिळणे आवश्यक आहे ?



गोखले राज्यशास्त्र आणि अर्थशास्त्र संस्था
(अभिमत विद्यापीठ)
पुणे - ४११ ००४

निवडणूक प्रक्रीया अभ्यास प्रकल्प (मार्च २०१६)
सामाजिक संस्थांसाठी प्रश्नावली

१. प्रतिसादकाचे नाव _____
२. हुद्दा _____
३. संस्थेचे नाव _____
४. प्रतिसादकाचा सार्वजनिक कार्यातील अनुभव _____
५. संस्थांची स्थापना कोणत्या वर्षी झाली ? _____
६. संस्थेची महत्वाची कार्यक्षेत्रे कोणती ?

७. एखाद्या शासकीय योजनेची अंमलबजावणी करण्यासाठी संस्थेने जि.प./पं.स. यांच्या बरोबर पूर्वी काम केले आहे का ?

८. जर उत्तर होय असेल तर अशा एकत्रित कामांचा तपशिल द्या.

९. जि.प./पं.स. यांच बरोबर काम करण्याचा तुमचा अनुभव कसा आहे ?

१०. तुम्ही ज्या योजना शासनाबरोबर राबवल्यात त्यामध्ये पदाधिकाऱ्यांनी हीरीरीने भाग घेतला का ?

११. विकासाच्या कामांची बीज रूपाने सुरवात पदाधिकारी करताता का सामाजिक संस्थानाच पुढे यावे लागते.

१२. आपल्या संस्थेतील एखाद्या कर्मचारी / सदस्याने यापूर्वी निवडणूक लढवली आहे का ?

१३. उत्तर होय असल्यास ते जिकले का ?

१४. त्यांच्या जय/पराजयाची आपल्या दृष्टीने करणे काय होती

१५. संस्थेत काम केल्याचा निवडणूक लढवताना आपोआप फायदा होतो असे वाटते का ? सोदाहरण स्पष्ट करा

१६. एखाद्या व्यक्तीला निवडणूक लढवण्याची प्रेरणा कोणत्या कारणांमुळे होते ?

१७. ज्यांनी गेली निवडणूक लढवली त्यांच्या गुणवत्तेबद्दलचा आपला अभिप्राय

१८. निवडणूक लढवणाऱ्यांची गुणवत्ता (येथे/इतरत्र) काळाच्या ओघात वाढली आहे असे वाटते का ?

१९. राजकीय कारकीर्द सुरु करण्यासाठी एक माध्यम म्हणून सामाजिक संस्थांकडे पाहिले जाते का ?

२०. ज्यांच्या घराण्याला राजकीय वारसा आहे अशांकडूनच सामाजिक संस्थांची स्थापना होते असे वाटते का ? प्रथम प्राधान्य कशाला दिले पाहिजे सामाजिक संस्था कि राजकीय चळवळ

२१. सामाजिक संस्थांना योजनांच्या अंमलबजावणीमध्ये सामील करून घेण्याबाबत नोकरशाही किती तत्पर असते ?

२२. सामाजिक संस्था आणि पंचायत राज संस्था यांच्या सहकार्याची महाराष्ट्रातील चांगली उदाहरणे

२३. राखीव जागांच्या धोरणामुळे (अनु. जाती/जमाती, महिला राखीव) पंचायत राज संस्था यांच्या काम करण्यावर कश्या प्रकारचा परिणाम झाला ?


२४. महिला आरक्षणाच्या धोरणामुळे जि.प./पं.स. यामध्ये महिलांचे सक्षमीकरण झाले असे वाटते का ?

२५. उत्तर नाही असेल तर या बाबतीत सामाजिक संस्था कोणती भूमिका अदा करू शकतील

२६. निवडून येणाऱ्या प्रतिनिधींचा कार्याचा आलेख सुधारावा यासाठी त्यांना कोणत्या प्रकारचे प्रशिक्षण देण्याची गरज आहे?

२७. या संदर्भात महिला सदस्यांसाठी काही विशेष सूचना

२८. नोकरशाहीच्या संदर्भात आपल्या काही सूचना आहेत का ?



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