

**THE
SECOND AFGHAN WAR
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT**



CAVALRY AND HORSE ARTILLERY AWAITING AMIR YAKUB KHAN AT GANDAMAK, 6TH MAY, 1879

Frontispiece

THE
SECOND AFGHAN WAR
1878-80
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

PRODUCED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS, INDIA

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

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P R E F A C E

THIS book was originally compiled under the direction of the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., who served throughout the campaign, first with the Khyber Field Force ; next as Chief of the Staff to Sir Frederick Roberts during the advance to, and operations round, Kabul in 1879-80 ; then in the same capacity to Sir Donald Stewart when the latter took over supreme command in Northern Afghanistan ; and, finally, as a Brigadier in the march to Kandahar, and the closing operations of the war in the southern part of the theatre.

In these several capacities he collected a large quantity of notes and documents, and, on his return to England on leave in 1881, he made these over to Captain Pasfield Oliver, late Royal Artillery, who compiled a connected account of the campaign. This account was produced under the orders of Sir Charles MacGregor, who was then Quartermaster-General in India, in the Intelligence Branch of his department, but was treated as a secret work.

Some years later Lord Roberts, when Commander-

in-Chief in India, suggested that a revised edition should be prepared, which could be placed on sale. The revision was accordingly executed by Lieutenant F. G. Cardew, 10th Bengal Lancers, but it was decided that the time had not yet come when it would be advisable to publish an official account of certain of the incidents of the war, which had been the subject of much controversy.

At a later period, however, the Government of India reconsidered the question ; the work was still further revised by Lieutenant (then Major) Cardew, and in the Intelligence Branch, and is now published.

August 1907.

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THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

PART I

CHAPTER I

PREPARATIONS FOR A CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN FROM
THE AUTUMN OF 1876 TO THE 20TH NOVEMBER, 1878.

It is unnecessary in this volume to enter at length into the relations between the Governments of India and Afghanistan during the thirty-six years which elapsed between the first and second Afghan wars. The success of Sir John Lawrence and of Sir Herbert Edwardes in arriving at a friendly understanding with the Amir Dost Muhammad is well known in history, as is also the faithful adherence of the Amir to the terms of that understanding. Unfortunately Dost Muhammad's death was followed by a period of disturbance and civil strife in Afghanistan, and the attitude of the Government of India during this period was too strictly impartial to be altogether pleasing to his son, Sher Ali Khan, who eventually succeeded in establishing himself on the throne of Kabul. The ill-feeling which thus began was gradually increased by various unfortunate circumstances until matters were brought to a crisis by the reception of a Russian Mission at Kabul in 1878. At that moment affairs in Europe were so disturbed that a war between Great Britain and Russia seemed almost inevitable. In these circumstances it was impossible for the Government of India to remain

inactive when the Amir of Afghanistan conceded to Russia a sign of intimate friendship which he had consistently denied to the British. It was decided that after due notice a Mission should be despatched to Kabul at all costs, and that if its progress were opposed the fact must be regarded as equivalent to open hostility. A Mission with a strong military escort was accordingly despatched from Peshawar under Sir Neville Chamberlain in September, 1878. On the 21st of that month an advance party of the Mission, under Major Cavagnari, rode up to Ali Masjid and formally demanded passage to Kabul. This was as formally refused by the Afghan officials, and the Mission then withdrew. In pursuance of the decision previously arrived at by the Government of India an ultimatum was thereupon sent to the Amir, and, no reply having been received within the period of grace which expired on the 20th November, 1879, war was declared against Sher Ali Khan on the following day.

As early as the autumn of 1876 the attitude of Russia, even more than the growing hostility of the Amir, had necessitated the serious consideration of plans for a campaign in Central Asia. At this time and throughout 1877 the contingency of England joining Turkey in the war against Russia was regarded as probable; it was hardly expected that a pacific solution of the Eastern Question would be arrived at; and in the spring of 1878, as Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote in the *Nineteenth Century*, "affairs were in such a critical state that a random shot fired into a British ship from the Russian lines on the shore of the Sea of Marmora might have set the East and West in a blaze."

The danger of a war with Russia, however, passed away, but unfortunately our relations with Afghanistan did not improve concurrently, and in August, 1878, these had reached so unsatisfactory a stage that the Government of India were constrained to call on the Commander-in-Chief for his proposals for a campaign. The points which were referred to Sir Frederick Haines were as follows:

SIR FREDERICK HAINES' PROPOSALS 3

I.—The occupation of the Kurram Valley, and the strength and composition of the force necessary for that purpose, and to form a cantonment near the head of it; from what quarter such a force could most conveniently be drawn, and the time within which it could be assembled at Thal, fully equipped for service.

II.—The strength and composition of a force to occupy Kandahar capable of resisting and overthrowing any force it might be possible for the Amir to collect for its defence; from what quarter such a force could be drawn, and within what time it could be assembled, fully equipped for the field, at Quetta, or at such points on the British border as might be convenient for an advance on Quetta; also the period required for an advance from such position to Quetta.

In estimating for the requirements of this latter force, it was to be borne in mind that it might be required to advance as far as Girishk and the Helmand River on the one side and Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the other, but no farther.

On the 10th August, the Commander-in-Chief replied to this communication. He was of opinion that it would be inadvisable to denude the frontier of troops, and that, in case of offensive operations against Afghanistan, the Punjab Frontier Force should for the most part maintain their usual posts, since at such a period it would not be well to create unnecessary friction with the border tribes by introducing garrisons foreign to the population and unaccustomed to local usages. He gathered that the object of the force to be detailed for the occupation of the Kurram Valley was primarily to make a demonstration, and to occupy a cantonment near the head of the valley.

This being so, it appeared to him important to prevent the possibility of religious or national influences being brought to bear on the fidelity of the troops;

THE FORCES REQUIRED

consequently he recommended that the British, Gurkha, and Sikh elements should predominate in the composition of this force.

In calculating the forces required for the operations, the strengths of the various units were estimated as follows :

British cavalry	350	Field artillery battery .	150
Native cavalry	350	Mountain battery	80
British infantry	700	Heavy battery	80
Native infantry	500	Garrison battery	70
Sappers, per company	100	Native mountain train	75
Horse artillery battery	150		

On this scale the Quartermaster-General (10th August, 1878) estimated the proposed Kurram Force as follows :

Artillery—

1 Horse artillery battery	150
1 Mountain battery	80

Cavalry—

1 Squadron, British cavalry	150
1 Regiment, Native cavalry	350

Infantry—

1 Battalion, British infantry	700
5 Regiments, Native infantry	2,500
1 Company, Sappers	100

Total

4,030

Guns

12

With reference to Kandahar, the Commander-in-Chief urged that the first aim in that quarter should be the reinforcement of the Quetta garrison to such a strength that it could successfully resist any offensive movement on the part of the Afghan troops.

The strength of the force stationed at Quetta was :

Artillery	227
Cavalry	164
Infantry	1,417
Total	<u>1,808</u>

THE KANDAHAR COLUMN

5

This was to be augmented to 5,000 men by a force styled the "First Reinforcement," and composed as under :

<i>Artillery—</i>	
1 Field battery	127
<i>Cavalry—</i>	
2 Regiments and 2 squadrons, Native cavalry	950
<i>Infantry—</i>	
1 Battalion British infantry	540
4 Regiments Native infantry	2,050
Total	<u>3,667</u>
Guns	<u>6</u>

At the same time the troops composing the "Kandahar Column" should concentrate from Karachi and the North-West Provinces on Sukkur, Jacobabad, Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan. This column was to be composed as follows :

KANDAHAR COLUMN.

1st Division.

<i>Artillery—</i>	
1 Horse artillery battery	150
1 Field battery	150
1 Mountain battery and 1 division	106
1 Heavy battery	80
4 Garrison batteries	280
<i>Cavalry—</i>	<u>766</u>
2 Regiments, Native cavalry	700
<i>Infantry—</i>	<u>700</u>
2 Battalions, British infantry	1,400
6 Regiments, Native infantry	3,000
1 Company, Sappers and Miners	100
Field Park, Telegraph, and Pontoon	348
Total	<u>4,848</u>
<i>Guns—</i>	
12-pr. M.L.R.	6
9-pr. "	6
Mountain	8
40-pr. M.L.R.	7
Total	<u>27</u>

THE KANDAHAR COLUMN

2nd Division.

<i>Artillery—</i>	
2 Horse artillery batteries	300
1 Field battery	150
	<u>450</u>
<i>Cavalry—</i>	
2 Regiments, British cavalry	700
2 „ Native cavalry	700
	<u>1,400</u>
<i>Infantry—</i>	
2 Battalions, British infantry	1,400
6 Regiments, Native infantry	3,000
4 Companies, Sappers and Miners	400
	<u>4,800</u>
Total	<u>6,650</u>
<i>Guns—</i>	
9-pr. M.L.R.	18

GRAND TOTAL, KANDAHAR COLUMN.

Artillery	1,216
Cavalry	2,100
Infantry	9,648
	<u>12,964</u>
Guns	<u>45</u>

KANDAHAR RESERVE DIVISION.

<i>Artillery—</i>	
1 Horse artillery battery	150
2 Field batteries	300
	<u>450</u>
<i>Cavalry—</i>	
3 Regiments, Native cavalry	1,050
<i>Infantry—</i>	
2 Battalions, British infantry	1,400
6 Regiments, Native infantry	3,000
4 Companies, Sappers	400
	<u>4,800</u>
Total	<u>6,300</u>
Guns	<u>18</u>

Sir Frederick Haines recommended that the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the above should rendez-

vous at Dera Ghazi Khan, and thence should move by the Thal-Chotiali road to the Peshin Valley.

The Reserve Column was to supply troops for the line of communications, to meet demands for garrisoning and holding Kalat-i-Ghilzai, Kandahar, and Girishk, and to provide movable columns for other contingencies.

Sukkur, on the Indus, was to be looked upon as the depot for all troops from Bombay and Madras, whilst the concentration of supply and *matériel* for the Bengal forces was to take place at Dera Ghazi Khan. Carriage was to be collected there, and an effective bullock train, capable of moving the tentage and baggage of a wing of a British battalion one stage a day, was to be established without delay between the terminus of the Punjab and Sind Railway at Sher Shah and Dera Ghazi Khan.

Authority was requested to complete telegraph and pontoon units; and further it was pointed out that a steamer should ply on the Chenab ferry, and every facility by steamer, boats, and bridging should be created for the passage of the Indus.

A transit service by stages, capable of conveying 300 maunds a day, was recommended to be established without delay for the concentration of supplies at Quetta from Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan, while as much grain as possible was to be stored at Quetta, and cover provided there for ammunition and supplies.

At the same time the Commander-in-Chief suggested "that a demonstration should be made early in the operations of an advance by the Khyber, by encamping out a certain proportion of the Peshawar troops, making arrangements with the Khyberis¹ for their passage through the pass, and negotiating at Jalalabad and elsewhere for supplies for 20,000 men, so as to prevent, as long as possible, the ultimate object of our movements being accurately conjectured."

On the 22nd September, 1878, news was received at Simla of the repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission.

¹ Khyberis = Afridi clans of the Khyber.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS

The next day the Viceroy signified his approval of the proposed strength of the Kurram Column; he also sanctioned the despatch to Quetta of the "First Reinforcement," and desired that the 1st Division, Kandahar Column, should be held in readiness to march by the 1st November from Multan, Dera Ghazi, or some other base in that neighbourhood. Orders were issued in detail to the above effect on the 24th September.

On the 2nd October the Government of India sanctioned the augmentation of all native regiments of cavalry north of the Narbudda by 96 men, and of infantry by 200 men.

On the 4th October, 1878, the Government directed the preparation and assembly of a force for field service, and the Commander-in-Chief issued orders on the 14th October giving details of the staff and troops for:—

I. A column to be assembled in the Kurram Valley under Major-General F. S. Roberts, R.A., C.B., V.C.

II. A division to be assembled at Multan under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, C.B.

III. The Quetta command under Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph, R.A., C.B.

Meanwhile the operations to be undertaken towards the Khyber were still unsettled. On the 3rd October the 2nd Battalion 9th Foot and two companies of the 7th Bengal Infantry marched from Peshawar and encamped at Hari-Singh-ka-Burj, 5 miles from the mouth of the Khyber Pass. The next day a detachment of 200 of the 22nd (Punjab) Bengal Infantry, 50 sappers and 30 sowars, 17th Bengal Cavalry, marched to Jamrud and occupied the fort; while on the 5th October the camp at Hari-Singh-ka-Burj was increased by the arrival of the following details:—

I-C, Royal Horse Artillery (with elephant carriage for 2 guns).

13-9, Royal Artillery (three 40-prs. only).

Detachment 81st Foot, 200 men.

14th Bengal Lancers, 1 squadron.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS

9

Detachment 7th Bengal Infantry, 100 men.

Detachment 14th Sikh Infantry, 200 men.

Detachment 20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry, 200 men.

A project was now put forward by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari for the surprise of Ali Masjid fort on the 7th October. It was considered, however, that the force available was insufficient for the enterprise, and the arrival of strong reinforcements of Afghan troops at Ali Masjid on the 6th October necessitated the abandonment of the idea.

On the 7th October, in recapitulating the arrangements which had received sanction up to that date, and having mentioned that some of the regiments ultimately intended for the Kurram Force should be diverted to strengthen the Peshawar garrison pending the arrival there of separate reinforcements, the Government of India adverted to the necessity of strengthening Peshawar without delay in consequence of the arrival of considerable bodies of Afghan troops in and about the Khyber. The letter then proceeds:

“The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council therefore requests that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may be moved to propose a project for the assemblage at Peshawar of a *corps d'armée* prepared to move upon Kabul by the line of the Khyber Pass and Jalalabad, in the event of this operation being hereafter ordered.”

Accordingly, the following project was submitted by Sir Frederick Haines on the same date:—

“4. The nature of the contemplated operations demands:

“1st.—A Division, styled the 1st, intended for the advance through the Khyber, having for its object the gaining of the pass and its stronghold, Ali Masjid, with eventual occupation of Jalalabad.

“2nd.—A Division, styled the 2nd, immediately in support to the above and located in

10 REINFORCEMENT OF PESHAWAR

the Peshawar Valley for its protection, and to meet demands consequent on contingencies which may present themselves in the operations of the 1st Division.

“*3rd.*—The Kurram Column, with the object of menacing Kabul and occupying Kurram.

“*4th.*—The Rawalpindi Division, as reserve to the 1st and 2nd Divisions and the Kurram Column.

“*5.* The operation in the Khyber points to the covering of the heights in the onward progress of the advanced brigades, an action for the possession of Ali Masjid and of the pass as far as Landi Khana, with possibly a turning movement through some of the tributary valleys to secure a favourable position on the line of the enemy's retirement, with the eventual advance of the force to concentrate at Dakka preparatory to further progress towards Jalalabad.

“*6.* With this view, two brigades have been specially told off, one for each side of the pass, with two more and a brigade of cavalry in immediate reserve at Jamrud, or where required, ready to support the advance and follow up its progress.”

These proposals were not, however, immediately adopted, and up to the 12th October the only measures sanctioned on the Khyber line were the reinforcement of the Peshawar garrison to a strength of 5,000 or 6,000, the formation of a small movable column of the Frontier Force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins of the Guides, and the formation of a reserve division, 5,000 strong, at Hasan Abdal.

At length, on the 21st October, the subjoined project for the command and staff of a force to be assembled at Peshawar and Hasan Abdal was submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, and this, with some small modifications, was finally accepted by the Government of India on the 1st November ;

PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE 11

PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE.

Major-General F. F. Maude, c.B., v.c., Commanding, who gave way on the following day to Lieut.-General Sir Sam Browne, K.C.S.I., c.B., v.c.
 Lieutenant F. W. Hemming, 4th Hussars, Aide-de-Camp.
 Major G. W. Smith, Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Major G. E. L. S. Sanford, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Major A. A. A. Kinloch, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Colonel W. J. Williams, c.B., Commanding Royal Artillery.
 Captain G. W. C. Rothe, Adjutant, Royal Horse Artillery.
 Colonel F. R. Maunsell, C.B., Commanding Royal Engineer.
 Major H. F. Blair, R.E., Field Engineer.
 Lieutenant W. Peacocke, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer, Superintendent Field Telegraphs.

Medical Department.

Surgeon-Major J. Gibbons, Army Medical Department.

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. V. Hunt, Assistant Commissary-General.

<i>1st Infantry Brigade.</i>	<i>2nd Infantry Brigade.</i>	<i>3rd Infantry Brigade.</i>
Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, c.B., v.c., Commanding.	Colonel J. A. Tytler, c.B., v.c., Commanding.	Colonel F. E. Appleyard, c.B., Commanding.
Major H. T. Jones, Brigade-Major.	Major A. H. A. Gordon, 65th Foot, Brigade-Major.	Captain W. C. Farwell, Brigade-Major.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.	1-17th Regiment.	81st Regiment.
4th Gurkhas.	Guides Infantry.	14th Sikhs.
20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.	1st Sikh Infantry.	27th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
No. 4 Mountain Train Battery.	11-9 Royal Artillery.	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.	3rd Company, Sappers and Miners.	
	<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>
<i>4th Infantry Brigade (Reserve).</i>	Colonel C. J. S. Gough, v.c., c.B., Commanding.	1-C, R.H.A.
Colonel W. B. Browne, 81st Foot, Commanding.	Captain B. A. Combe, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major.	E-3, R.A.
Captain A. Browne, 13th Bengal Lancers, Brigade-Major.	2 Squadrons, 10th Hussars.	13-9, R.A. (Heavy).
51st Foot.	Guides Cavalry.	
6th Bengal Infantry.	11th Bengal Lancers.	
45th Bengal Infantry.		

Engineers.

Ordnance Park.
 Head-quarters and 3 companies, Sappers and Miners.
 Field Park.

12 PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE

HASAN ABDAL RESERVE.

Major-General R. O. Bright, C.B., Commanding.
(Staff from Rawalpindi.)

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. E. Michell,
C.B., R.A.
Captain A. R. Abadie, 9th Lancers,
Brigade-Major.
9th Lancers.
10th Bengal Lancers.
13th Bengal Lancers.

Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B.
Major N. X. Gwynne, 63rd Foot,
Brigade-Major.
1st Battalion 25th Foot.
24th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
28th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
2nd Gurkhas.
Mhairwara Battalion.

Artillery.

H-C, Royal Horse Artillery.
D-4, Royal Artillery.

The only changes from the above were the withdrawals of the 13th Bengal Lancers and the 28th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry from the reserve, the former being retained for duty at Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan and outposts, and the latter posted to the Kurram Valley Force. This last arrangement was in consequence of the uncertainty as to what steps had been taken by the Amir for the occupation of the Paiwar Kotal and of Khost, which induced the Commander-in-Chief to place at the disposal of Major-General Roberts a further force, consisting of—

Head-quarters and wing of the 72nd Highlanders.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ G-3, Royal Artillery.
28th Bengal Infantry.

Since, however, this would leave Kohat insufficiently garrisoned, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the following moves :

1st Bengal Infantry from Benares to Mian Mir.
2nd (Queen's Own) Bengal Light Infantry from Mian Mir to Kohat.
2 Companies of the 3rd Bengal Infantry from Dinapore to Benares.

The garrison of Kohat then consisted of—

Wing 72nd Highlanders.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ G-3, Royal Artillery.
2nd (Queen's Own) Bengal Light Infantry.

AN ULTIMATUM THREATENED 13

On the 7th November the Government of India intimated that an ultimatum was about to be sent to the Amir, and that failing a satisfactory reply by the 20th idem, the Amir was to be treated as the declared enemy of the British Government; in consequence of this the troops were ordered to be held in readiness to cross the frontier at all points on the 21st November, and detailed instructions as to the movements of the various columns were issued.

On the 19th November the columns were finally detailed in a General Order as follows:—

	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH. ¹		
	Officers.	Men.	Guns.
I.—THE KURRAM VALLEY COLUMN, under Major-General F. S. Roberts, C.B., V.C.	116	6,549	18
II.—THE MULTAN DIVISION (subsequently 1st Division, Kandahar Column), under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, C.B.	187	7,117	60
III.—THE QUETTA REINFORCEMENT (subsequently 2nd Division, Kandahar Column), under Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph, C.B.	78	5,482	18
IV.—THE PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE, under Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., V.C.	325	15,854	48
Total	706	35,002	144

In addition there were assembled subsequently—

V.—KANDAHAR COLUMN, RESERVE DIVISION, sanctioned 27th November, 1878	53	3,817	24
VI.—PUNJAB CHIEFS' CONTINGENT, December, 1878.	7	4,471	13 ²
Total	60	8,288	37
GRAND TOTAL	766	43,290	181

British troops were armed with Martini-Henry rifles and natives with Sniders.

Railheads were at Jhelum and Sukkur.

The medical arrangements did not go beyond a system of regimental hospitals.

¹ These numbers are taken from note added to letter of Colonel C. C. Johnson, Officiating Quartermaster-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 7A, Field operations Kabul dated September, 1879 (Summary of Preparations).

² The strength of the contingent furnished by the protected Sikh States in the Punjab was as follows :

Meanwhile on the 17th October, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief, the Foreign Department—there being no Military Intelligence Branch—was asked to submit the latest information regarding the feelings of the tribes in the Khyber Pass, and at the same time to forward the latest statements available (1) of the disposition of the Amir's forces and (2) of the military resources of Afghanistan (see Appendix L). From this information it appeared that the Amir's regular army consisted of less than 20,000 men of all arms in the Kabul province, and about 6,000 in Kandahar, 25,000 more being quartered in the Herat and Turkestan provinces. The artillery, of which he had 132 field guns, 108 mountain, 42 drawn by bullocks, and 12 carried on elephants, or 324 in all, only provided 10 horse or field and the same number of mountain batteries, besides two elephant batteries on the Kabul side, and one mountain and two field batteries near Kandahar. The arms in the hands of his infantry and cavalry consisted chiefly of Enfield rifles and Tower muskets, with only about 5,000 English Sniders given by the British Government and some 4,000 locally manufactured, which were nearly all in the hands of the Kabul division of the army. The report added that, "in case of war with the English, most of the troops at each action will either come over to us or else disperse." The irregular forces at the Amir's disposal were calculated at 100,000 armed men in the Kabul province. The Amir was said to have 30,000 firearms stored as a reserve in Kabul. All, both regular and irregular, were

	British officers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.
Bahawalpur Contingent	1	94	328	—
Patiala "	1	307	833	82
Nabha "	1	203	543	60
Jhind "	1	202	499	108
Kaparthala "	1	110	499	77
Sirmur "	1	—	201	—
Faridkot "	1	60	261	—
Total	7	976	3,164	327

practically untrained and badly led by their officers, except perhaps the artillery.

The period between the repulse of the Mission and the Declaration of War was also utilised by Major Cavagnari to conclude an arrangement with the Afridis inhabiting the Khyber Pass and its vicinity and the Shinwaris of Loargai or Landi Kotal, under which the free use of the pass for British troops and convoys was guaranteed. These tribes were poor, and the right-of-way through their country was almost their sole patrimony. The Afridis had behaved well in conducting Major Cavagnari's advance party of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission to Ali Masjid, and in giving warning of the reinforcements and disposition of Sher Ali's troops and levies in the neighbourhood. Major Cavagnari was therefore instructed to come to a friendly understanding with them, and to arrange for the passage of troops through the Khyber defiles at certain rates.

Major Cavagnari based his estimates of the money payments to be made to the headmen of the tribes on the sums paid by Colonel Mackeson for the same purpose during the latter period of the First Afghan War. This had been popularly supposed to have amounted to R1,25,000 per annum, but it was found on examination that a considerably less sum was paid. However, Major Cavagnari was enabled to offer liberal terms to the *maliks*, which were willingly accepted by them, as follows :

		R	
(1) Kuki Khel	} Afridis	1,300	(a) Sultan, chief of Malikdin Khel, extra R2,000 per annum personal allowance.
(2) Malikdin Khel (a)		1,300	
(3) Zakha Khel (b)		1,300	
(4) Sipah		1,300	(b) Khawas, chief of Zakha Khel, extra R1,200 per annum personal allowance.
(5) Kamar Khel		500	
(6) Kamarai		250	
(7) Shinwaris		1,300	

TOTAL 7,250 × 12 = R87,000 per annum.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS OF THE PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1878.

As we have seen, it was not until the 1st November that the Government of India finally decided to assemble a force in the Peshawar Valley to operate on the line of the Khyber. On the same evening the command was offered to Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C., commanding the Lahore Division, but then at Simla, where he was officiating as Military Member of Council. The offer was at once accepted, and Sir Sam Browne started a few days later for Peshawar, where he arrived on the 9th November. On the 7th the following instructions were issued by the Governor-General in Council:



I.—PESHAWAR LINE.

* * * * *

“2. On receipt of the order to cross the frontier, a column formed from the troops now assembling at Peshawar and Hasan Abdal will advance on the Khyber and expel the Amir's garrisons from the pass. The advance on this line will be limited to Dakka, or such position as may be selected by the General Officer in command for the defence of the western *débouché* of the pass.

“3. As soon as the pass shall have been cleared, and the necessary force established in position at the western extremity, the bulk of the troops will be withdrawn to British territory.

“4. The troops posted for the defence of the pass



ALI MASJID, FROM VALLEY BELOW THE FORT.

should be, as far as possible, selected for local knowledge and frontier experience. The Guides should form part of this force, which will be under the command of Colonel Jenkins, to whom, if necessary, the local rank of Brigadier-General will be given.

“5. The protection of our communications through the pass will be provided for, as far as possible, by levies raised among the local tribes. These will be under the command of Colonel Jenkins, who, in subordination to the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, will be responsible for the military arrangements for the safety of the pass.

“6. Major Cavagnari will be attached to the General Officer in command of the column, as Political Officer,¹ during the operations against the Amir's troops in the Khyber. When these are concluded, he will remain with the head-quarters of the officer commanding in the pass, and, under the direct orders of the Government of India, will have charge of our political relations with the surrounding tribes and of any necessary communications with Kabul.

“7. It will be desirable, after our troops shall have taken possession of the pass, to lay down a telegraph line between Peshawar and the head-quarters of the officer commanding in the pass.”

The Peshawar Valley Force was assembling when General Browne arrived there on the 9th November. Some of the corps were encamped in different places about the Peshawar Valley, others were still echeloned along the Grand Trunk Road, and considerable labour was required to concentrate and organise the force. The greatest difficulty encountered was that of equipping it with tents, supplies of every description and transport, for the stores and magazines of Peshawar had already been drained by the Kurram Column, and

¹ Major Cavagnari had full political powers on the Peshawar line, and corresponded direct with the Foreign Department of Government. On the Kurram and Quetta lines Generals Roberts and Stewart were vested with supreme political authority, and the political assistants were under their orders.

but little remained for the Khyber Line Force, which, although destined to be the first in the field, was the last whose organisation received the sanction of Government. But the orders were peremptory that operations were to commence on the 21st November, and by means of energetic exertions the column was concentrated at Jamrud two days previous to that date. The key to the Khyber was the strong position of Ali Masjid, and against it were to be directed the first operations of the force. On the 23rd October the country east and north-east of that place had been reconnoitred by Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins with a party of the Guides, and a further reconnaissance of the position itself was made by Sir Sam Browne on the 16th November.

The fort of Ali Masjid stands on a detached hill some 450 feet in height which rises precipitously from the right bank of the Khyber River about 6 miles from the mouth of the pass and 9 miles from the fort of Jamrud. It formed the centre of the Afghan position, of which the right rested on a ridge connected with lofty hills to the north. Due east from this ridge, and making with it an angle of 45° , ran a line of entrenchments broken by three peaks, each of which commands the fort. Between the eastern peak and Ali Masjid, distant from the latter about 500 yards, there is a deep gorge. Immediately opposite the fort, across the river, extending eastwards from a cliff above the left bank, ran a sort of covered way with entrenchments for some 600 yards along the precipitous face of one of the spurs of the Rhotas Mountain. In the fort itself were eight guns; two more were placed on a cliff about 40 or 50 yards below, and another a few feet above the stream. Along the breastworks of the ridge on the right were eight pieces of artillery; three were placed on the cliff above the left bank, on the right of the covered way, while two mountain guns were in position on commanding points of the same entrenchments. The Afghan garrison was estimated at 3,700 men.

The pass at Ali Masjid is very narrow, and the

approach from the south was completely commanded by the guns of the Afghan entrenchments. But the weakness of the position lies in the height of the neighbouring ground. To the east, north, and north-east it is overtopped by the spurs and cliffs of the Rhotas and neighbouring hills. The scheme of attack therefore arranged by Sir Sam Browne aimed at the establishment of his troops on these commanding points.

The reconnaissance of the 23rd October was made with a view to a turning movement of this sort, and it disclosed the fact that Panaipal, about 7 miles north-east of Ali Masjid, whence the Rhotas heights and the Khyber above Kata Kushtia were comparatively easy of access, could be reached from Jamrud by way of Gudar and Lashora. The distance is from 12 to 13 miles; from Panaipal to Kata Kushtia is about 4 miles. The road, though rough, is not very bad, with the exception of about one mile between Lashora and Panaipal and between the last-named place and Kata Kushtia, where the descent is extremely bad. Colonel Jenkins estimated that the road from Jamrud to Panaipal could be marched in three hours, but of course its difficulty would be increased fourfold if it were attempted by night.

After the reconnaissance of the 16th November the following plan of attack was determined on by Sir Sam Browne, and was fully explained to all the staff officers and brigadiers on Tuesday, the 19th November:

Two brigades were to proceed *viâ* Gudar and Lashora to the "Sapri peak," and on arrival there some 200 rifles were to be detached to hold Multani Sir, with instructions to rejoin their brigade towards evening.

From Sapri one brigade was to move on to the Rhotas peak, where it was reported that *sangars* had been constructed by the enemy. Thence it was cautiously to feel its way to any point covering Ali Masjid, but not to show itself, if possible, to the enemy. Here a good position was to be selected, whence fire could be opened with effect, both from a

mountain battery and from rifles. The other brigade was to advance from Sapri peak towards Kata Kushtia, and to take up a position to command the Khyber Pass where it opens from the Ali Masjid defile. The main column was to proceed by the pass road, and the whole was to be in position about noon or 1 p.m. on the 21st November, at which hour the attack was to be commenced by the three guns of the heavy battery and the field battery opening fire from the Shahgai ridge.

Simultaneously the brigade on the Rhotas was to come into action ; and should the enemy have occupied Shahgai, or made any move such as might prevent the guns with the main column from coming into action at the time agreed upon, the brigade on the Rhotas was not on that account to delay commencing an attack.

Under cover of the fire of the guns, the infantry brigade with the main column, together with the battery of horse artillery in the pass, was to advance and take up a position as close as possible and come into action, while further advances were to be made as opportunities offered.

Should the enemy attempt to escape by the defile, they would in debouching come under the fire of the brigade at Kata Kushtia.

The main column (infantry, battery of horse artillery, and six squadrons of cavalry) was to follow through the defile, on clearing which and reaching the open valley the cavalry was to push on quickly for Landi Kotal. It was most important that this pass should be occupied as soon as possible ; but if the cavalry was unable to push on, owing to any operation on the part of the enemy or difficulties in the road, it was to take up a good position and to await the arrival of the infantry.

It was left to the discretion of the brigadier-generals commanding the detached brigades to descend into the pass or to continue along the ridges ; to help the main column in the defile or to descend farther on into the

Lala Beg Garhi Valley. If time and the condition of the men would admit, both the detached brigades were to push on to Landi Khana, on the western side of Landi Kotal; but if too late in the day, and should the men be exhausted, the brigades were to bivouac in any suitable position. One regiment of native infantry was to be left in a commanding position at the end of the defile to cover and protect the baggage on the morning of the 22nd November.

All these movements were subject to any subsidiary orders; but the foregoing was a general exposition of the intended operations, as far as they could be decided on beforehand.

The two detached brigades were to take with them three days' cooked provisions and extra *pakhals*;¹ and since any further supply of water would be difficult or impossible, the quantity taken was to be issued with care.

The baggage of the whole force was to remain at Jamrud and move on to Ali Masjid, and thence to Landi Khana, on the morning of the 22nd November; but no baggage of any sort was to enter the pass on the 21st November.

No one was to be allowed to enter any of the villages; and any marauding or maltreating of the villagers was to be most strictly prohibited and most severely punished, for it was expected that the Afridis in the pass would be either friendly or neutral, and it was therefore necessary that nothing should be done to irritate them against the troops; whilst it was to be impressed on the men of the regiments of the 1st Division that, in accordance with the Declaration of War, the force was not acting against the people of the pass but against the troops of the Amir only.

The 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades were detailed for the march by Gudar and Lashora to Sapri, the former being ordered to detach *en route* a party of 400 rifles *via* Tabai to the Rhotas ridge, and on arriving

¹ *Pakhals* are large water-skins, used for carrying water on pack-animals.

at Sapri to move south-west along the Rhotas ridge until it crowned the heights above and a little in rear of Ali Masjid, where the Khyber Pass begins to open out and is about 100 yards wide. The 2nd Brigade was to take up its position near Kata Kushtia.

The remainder of the 1st Division of the Field Force was to march, as described above, by Mackeson's road into the Khyber Pass, and the attack was to commence at about 1 p.m. on the 21st November. The 1st Brigade was allowed nine hours to get into position, and the 2nd Brigade eighteen hours, in consequence of which Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne was authorised to move the latter portion of his force after sundown on the 20th November.

No reply having been received from the Amir Sher Ali Khan to the Viceroy's ultimatum, the Government decided, on the 20th November, 1878, to order the advance of the British troops into Afghanistan and issue the Declaration of War.¹ Accordingly authority to move was communicated on the same date to Sir Sam Browne, commanding the Peshawar Valley Field Force, and at 5.20 p.m. the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the 1st Division of that force (with the exception of 11-9, Royal Artillery), under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, C.B., V.C., marched from the camp at Jamrud across the border and commenced the campaign.

The fighting strength of the column amounted to 43 British officers, 591 British and 1,105 native rank and file. They marched with great-coats only, and with one day's cooked rations in their haversacks; accompanying them were two days' rations, uncooked, on bullocks. The following was the order of march:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) The Guides. (2) 1st Battalion 17th Foot. (3) 1st Sikhs, less one company. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (4) Commissariat supplies. (5) One company 1st Sikhs, escort and rear guard. |
|---|---|

¹ See Appendix II. for the text of the Declaration of War.

The night was dark, the road tortuous, rocky and broken, passing for a considerable distance through heavy grass jungle up the bed of the Lashora stream, which was crossed by the column about twenty times. Twice the road was missed by the native guide, when the column had to retrace its steps for some distance; on another occasion, owing to the darkness, the touch with the advance guard was lost, thus causing further delay. After 7 miles Lashora was reached by the whole column at 10.30 p.m. on the 20th November, where it bivouacked, but fires were not allowed to be lighted, and the European portion of the force, whose boots and socks were wet through from so often fording the stream, suffered particularly from the bitter cold of the night, and passed most of the hours of the halt in walking up and down to keep themselves warm.

Towards dawn, however, fires were permitted in order to make tea.

As soon as day broke (6.15 a.m.) on the 21st the column resumed its march in the same order, the 1st Infantry Brigade arriving just as the 2nd Brigade moved off. The road now became exceedingly difficult, consisting of a series of very steep ascents and descents, the column being forced to move in single file along the entire route. The heat was considerable, while no water could be obtained after the first 2 miles from Lashora until Panaipal was reached, where the main body of the brigade did not arrive till 1.30 p.m. on the 21st in a state of considerable exhaustion from exposure, heat, and want of water. The commissariat bullocks, with the rations for the next two days, were still far behind. From Panaipal two roads lead down to Kata Kushtia, the direct one being a narrow and precipitous gorge quite impracticable for bullocks; while the other, or Tortang Pass road, was so circuitous as to render it impossible for the column to reach Kata Kushtia before night.

Brigadier-General Tytler considered it imprudent to march the exhausted British soldiers without food along

a road where their supplies could not follow them. Had the rations come up, however, before 4 p.m., it was his intention to have pushed on, for the men of the 17th Foot, though much exhausted, were in excellent spirits and most anxious to advance. Meanwhile, however, the Brigadier sent on Colonel Jenkins with the Guides and 1st Sikhs at 2.30 p.m., ordering him to proceed to Kata Kushtia by the direct route; this detachment reached its destination at 4 p.m. Brigadier-General Tytler remained with the 1-17th at Panaipal, and, the commissariat train not arriving, bivouacked there that night.

No sooner had the Guides and the 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, taken up a position on the hill opposite the village of Kata Kushtia, which completely commanded the Khyber Pass, here some 600 yards broad, than a party of the enemy's cavalry, about fifty in number, was perceived at 4.30 p.m. leisurely making their way up the pass. To make the garrison of Ali Masjid realise that their retreat was cut off, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins ordered his men to open fire upon these Afghan horse at a range of about 500 yards. Several were dismounted, and the rest galloped away, some back to Ali Masjid and some up the Khyber Pass. As it began to grow dusk, a larger body of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by a small party of infantry, came from the direction of Ali Masjid, riding hard for their lives as they passed the place where the troops were posted, from which it was evident that the retreat from Ali Masjid had commenced. This body of Afghans came under fire of 200 or 300 rifles within 300 to 500 yards' range, and suffered some loss. As darkness closed in, the Guides and the 1st Sikhs lay down on the rocks about 100 feet above the bed of the stream, and no large body of the enemy passed during the night, although, doubtless, men moving singly or in small parties escaped.

Meanwhile, at 2.15 a.m. on the 21st November, the 1st Infantry Brigade, under command of Brigadier-

General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., marched from the camp at Jamrud in the following order and followed in the track of the 2nd Brigade, which had preceded them by eight hours and forty minutes :

- | | | |
|------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| (1) 250 men 4th Gurkhas. | | (3) Remainder of 4th Gurkhas. |
| (2) Hazara Mountain Battery. | | (4) 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade. |
| | | (5) 20th Punjab Infantry. |

The fighting strength of the brigade amounted to 43 British officers, 569 British rank and file, and 1,345 natives of all ranks.

Marching under the same conditions as regarded equipment and supplies as the 2nd Brigade, this column reached Lashora in four and a quarter hours, although the 20th Punjabis made a slight *détour* by mistake.

On reaching the foot of the Tabai spur, leading to the Rhotas ridge, about 6 miles from Jamrud, four companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry, amounting to 243 men, commanded by Major Gordon, were detached to occupy the Tabai ridge below the Rhotas summit, and there to await the arrival of the remainder of the brigade on the main ridge leading to the enemy's *sangars* on the summit, when a simultaneous attack would be made on it about noon. The Rhotas peak was to be occupied, if possible, and heliographic communication established with Jamrud, for which purpose four signallers were attached to this detachment.

As has been seen, the 2nd Brigade was just moving off as the 1st Brigade arrived at Lashora, and it became necessary for the 1st Brigade to halt for an hour to allow Tytler's column to get clear. But at 7.30 a.m. Macpherson's force resumed its march, ascending a tolerably easy path from the bed of the river and crossing the ridge to the left into the Lashora Nala. Above Lashora the path wound through a narrow rocky ravine, overhung by precipitous and rugged hills, where the progress of the column was much impeded by the baggage animals of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, many of which (bullocks and buffaloes) were quite unfit for

26 THE TROOPS MUCH EXHAUSTED

such service. These animals can never move but at a very slow pace, and in difficult places often come to a complete standstill.

The 1st Infantry Brigade, however, pushed rapidly on through this obstruction, and the head of the column arrived at the Sapri plateau at 11.30 a.m., facing the Multani Sir, with the peak of Tartara nearly due west. When the rear of the column closed up, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, the advance was resumed, until at 3 p.m. a running stream was reached. Here the Brigadier-General decided to bivouac for the night of the 21st November, as nothing was to be heard of the rations of the Rifle Brigade, and there was no certainty of finding water farther on, while, owing to the steep ascent and want of water, the troops were very much exhausted and unfit for further exertion.

The main column of the 1st Division, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Cavalry Brigade, and the artillery, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, moved off from camp at Jamrud at about 7 a.m. on the 21st November.

A party was pushed on in advance, consisting of some signallers under Major H. P. Pearson, D.A.Q.M.G., together with the head-quarters of the Royal Engineers and the Sappers of the Engineer Park. On arriving at the mouth of the Khyber Pass the latter began to improve the road, while the signallers, ascending the Surkhai hill, sought to establish heliographic communication with the Shahgai heights, as soon as that position should be occupied by the column. This they succeeded in doing by 11 a.m.

The main column marched from Jamrud in the following order :

- | | | | |
|--|---|---|--------------------------|
| Advanced guard,
commanded by
Brigadier-Gen-
eral Appleyard. | { | (1) 250 men 14th Sikhs | } 3rd Infantry Brigade ; |
| | | (2) 250 men 81st Regiment | |
| | | (3) 2nd and 3rd Companies | } Sappers and Miners. |
| | | (4) 40 sabres 10th Hussars. | |
| | | (5) 1-C, Royal Horse Artillery. | |
| | | (6) 11-9, Royal Artillery (mountain battery). | |
| | | (7) Remainder of 14th Sikhs. | |

Main column .	(1) Remainder of 81st Regiment (2) 27th Punjab Infantry	{ 3rd Infantry Brigade ; remainder.
	(4) 13-9, Royal Artillery (heavy battery, 40-prs.).	{ 4th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General W. B. Browne.
	(5) 51st Light Infantry	
	(6) 6th Bengal Infantry	
	(7) Guides Cavalry, 2 squadrons, under Major G. Stewart.	{ Cavalry Brigade, under Brigadier- General C. J. S Gough, v.c.
	(8) 10th Hussars, 2 squadrons, under Major E. Wood.	
	(9) 11th Bengal Lancers, 2 squad- rons, under Major R. E. Boyle.	

Three days' rations accompanied each unit, and each company of Sappers had with it its light equipment on six mules with two barrels of powder.

The advance guard pushed on by the Shadi Bagiar road into the Khyber Pass, and from a point a little short of Mackeson's Bridge a detachment of 200 men of the 81st Regiment and of the 1st Sikhs, with the mountain battery, was despatched up the bed of a ravine on the right, with the object of reaching the high ground beyond, so as to have the command of the Shahgai heights in case any opposition should be offered at that point.

Mackeson's Bridge was reached at 9.20 a.m., and from near there, at 10 a.m., the first shot was fired by a detachment of the 81st Regiment against a picquet of the enemy's cavalry, which was seen on the low hills above the bridge, and which retired slowly as the column advanced.

At 11 a.m. the head of the advance guard arrived at the Shahgai ridge. Thence two companies—one from the 51st Light Infantry and one from the 81st Foot—were detached to occupy the ridges intervening between the Shahgai and the Rhotas ridge, which latter was seen to be held by a large body of the enemy; and the detachment remained on this duty until the turning movements of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades caused the enemy to retire during the afternoon. At the same time detachments were sent out to either

flank and to a ridge in front of the column so as to cover the working parties employed in improving the road.

The Shahgai ridge had been occupied for an hour and a half, when about noon the garrison of Ali Masjid opened fire from the fort and from a gun on a peak above, as well as from three others below, which were invisible to the attacking column. This fire was continued until dark, except for a short interval about 1.30 p.m., the practice made being fair, for the ranges were well known to the Afghan gunners.

Meanwhile I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, was brought into action at a range of some 2,300 yards, and fired about ten rounds of shrapnel per gun, after which the descent from the Shahgai hill into the bed of the stream having been made practicable, the battery advanced to a road to the right front of its former position, at which latter place it was relieved by the heavy battery with three 40-pr. B.L. guns and by E-3, Royal Artillery. These batteries came into action at 2,800 yards, and continued their fire with apparently good effect till nightfall. Throughout the afternoon the cavalry remained under cover of the Shahgai heights in support of the heavy and field batteries.

At 2.30 p.m. an advance was ordered of part of the 3rd Infantry Brigade under General Appleyard, consisting of the 14th Sikhs, seven companies of the 27th Punjab Infantry, and half of the 81st Foot. These formed the left attack; and they were directed to descend and cross the Khyber stream at Lala China, to work round under cover of a spur towards the right of the line of the enemy's entrenchments, and to seize the heights which formed the key of the Afghan position.

Simultaneously part of the 4th Infantry Brigade was ordered to advance to the ridge in front of Shahgai, forming a right attack consisting of two companies of the 51st Light Infantry and part of the 6th Bengal Infantry and 45th Sikhs.

The advance of the left attack was made under cover of the outer slopes of the ridges, which, however,

did not succeed in preventing the Afghan force from keeping up a continuous fire of round shot and musketry against Appleyard's movement. By 4 p.m. the 3rd Brigade had approached the gorge at the top of the ridge occupied by the enemy. The advance, led by Captain J. G. Maclean with the 14th Sikhs, was half in skirmishing order and half in support, the latter reinforcing the fighting line half-way. Next in order followed six companies of the 27th Punjabis under Major H. H. Birch, while five companies of the 81st Regiment under Colonel R. B. Chichester formed a reserve. Captain Maclean led the skirmishers of the 14th Sikhs nearly up to the conical hill on the left of the enemy's advanced position, the men firing briskly as they went, and evoking a sharp reply in the shape of a cross-fire not only from the several entrenchments, but also from a series of *sangars* in front of them, as well as from the conical hill redoubt on which the guns of 11-9, Royal Artillery, were now playing.

The left attack was further supported by I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, which, following the 3rd Brigade, advanced with an escort of the 10th Hussars and No. 6. Company Sappers up the pass to a point where a somewhat sharp bend brought Ali Masjid in view. Here the battery came into action, four guns on the left bank of the stream opening at 1,200 yards, while the right division crossed to the right bank and advanced to within 1,000 yards of the fort. In this position I-C continued in action until all the ammunition in the limbers was expended, when the battery had to withdraw, as the wagons had been left in rear at their original position.

Meantime two companies of the 51st Light Infantry and one of the 6th Bengal Infantry were detached to occupy the right and rear ridges protecting the Shahgai hill, relieving parties of the 81st Regiment and 14th Sikhs previously posted there, who were sent to join their regiments.

In the right attack the detachments of the 4th Brigade were soon in sharp conflict with the enemy.

As has been described, the left of the latter's position occupied the inaccessible face of a cliff, and was strengthened by one gun. The attack was supported by 11-9, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery), with an escort of the 45th Sikhs under Major Cook and a company of the 81st Foot, which opened fire on Ali Masjid at 1,500 yards with common shell and shrapnel. This was replied to by an advance of the enemy's skirmishers to within 430 yards of the guns, notwithstanding the fire of the escort and a few rounds of shrapnel from 11-9, Royal Artillery. After about two hours in action, during which time it became apparent that an assault of the enemy's position on this side was impossible, the battery was withdrawn, covered by two companies of the 51st Light Infantry, and, ascending the ridge behind, it opened fire on the conical hill redoubt then being attacked by the 3rd Brigade.

While the attacks were in progress as above described, the British leaders looked in vain for some signs of the 1st and 2nd Brigades having completed their turning movements. The afternoon drew to a close; the enemy abated not the vigour with which they defended their formidable positions. The right attack had turned out impracticable, and at length, at 5 p.m., the General determined to avoid a further sacrifice of life by abandoning the final assault. Orders were reluctantly given to cease firing and to retire. But before these orders had reached Brigadier-General Appleyard, the 27th Punjab Infantry and the 14th Sikhs had already pushed well up the steep slope leading to the Afghan posts, entrenchments, and *sangars*, with which they were actively engaged. On receiving the order to abandon the attack the skirmishers fell back on their supports, but in doing so suffered severely. Here Major Birch, Lieutenant T. O. Fitzgerald, and four sepoy of the 27th Punjab Infantry were killed and six wounded, whilst eight of Captain Maclean's Sikhs had already fallen, and he, with sixteen others, was wounded.



ACTION NEAR ALI MASJID

20TH AND 21ST NOVEMBER 1878.

REFERENCE

- British Force { Night of 20th Nov^r..... ■
 5 p.m. 21st Nov^r..... ■
- Afghan Force 5 p.m. 21st Nov^r..... ■

- 1 & 6. B^r General Tytler (2nd Brigade)
2. Colonel Jenkins (Guides & 1st Sikhs)
3. B^r Gen. Appleyard (3rd Brigade)
 - 14th Sikhs
 - 27th P.I.
 - 4 Co^s 81st Foot
 } in reserve
 I.C. R.H.A.
4. B^r Gen. Browne (4th Brigade)
- 5 & 8. B^r Gen. Macpherson (1st Brigade)
7. Remainder of Gen. Sir S. Browne's Force.



During this final advance of the 3rd Brigade on the left, Colonel Maunsell, Commanding Royal Engineer, finding himself the senior officer on the ground about the valley of the Khyber stream, and observing the loss to the troops involved by the determined resistance of the enemy, ordered up three companies of the 81st Regiment, part to reinforce their regiment, which was acting as a reserve to the attack, and the remainder to hold the gorge of the valley in support. The reinforcing party of the 81st Regiment did not succeed in reaching the advanced part of their regiment before the retirement commenced; but as they fell back they reached a convenient position to repel any advance of the enemy along the valley. Here they were joined by a part of the 51st Light Infantry, which was posted under cover of the hill above. A portion of the 14th Sikhs and 27th Punjab Infantry, ordered to retire from the left attack, where they had gallantly pushed farthest to the front, also joined this force without any of their British officers, all of whom, they informed Colonel Maunsell, had been killed; these detachments were placed in rear and in support of the parties of the 51st and 81st. Seeing the importance of guarding the position held here, Colonel Maunsell sent a detachment of the 8th Company of Sappers at about 5 p.m. to occupy a tower on the left, and to throw out a picquet in advance to cover the whole left of the valley, and ordered up the Sappers then in the rear to reinforce them.

The force bivouacked for the night as follows :

Cavalry Brigade. 13-9, Royal Artillery. E-3, Royal Artillery.	}	on or about the Shahgai heights.	{	(1) 2 companies, 81st Regiment. (2) 2 companies, 14th Sikhs. (3) 1 company, 27th Punjab Infantry. (4) 1 company, 6th Bengal Infantry. (5) 11-9, Royal Artillery.	}	on ridge in advance.		Remainder 3rd Brigade on left. Remainder 4th Brigade on right.
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I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, with escort, on left bank of stream.

THE FORT OCCUPIED

The casualties during the day were as follows :

	Killed.			Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.
I-C, Royal Horse Artillery	0	1	I-C, Royal Horse Artillery	0	4
51st Foot	0	1	11-9, Royal Artillery	0	5
14th Sikhs	0	8	51st Foot	0	1
27th Punjab Infantry	2	4	14th Sikhs	1	16
TOTAL	2	14	20th Punjab Infantry	0	1
	=	=	27th Punjab Infantry	0	6
			TOTAL	1	33
				=	=

The artillery ammunition expended was :

	Shell	
I-C, Royal Horse Artillery	168	shrapnel, 35 common.
E-3, Royal Artillery	98	48
11-9, Royal Artillery (mountain)	31	59
13-9, Royal Artillery (43-pr. B.L.R.).	—	128

During the night dispositions were made by the Lieutenant-General for the renewal of the left attack, and at daybreak on the 22nd the 3rd Brigade was reinforced by 11-9, Royal Artillery, which crossed the Khyber at the place where I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, had crossed on the previous day, and opened fire on the enemy's position. As no reply was elicited the battery ceased fire, the brigade advanced, when both fort and entrenchments were found to have been evacuated.

The camp was yet standing, and there was every evidence of precipitate flight, nothing whatever having been carried away. Ghulam Haidar, with the Mir Akhor and the greater part of the enemy, seemed to have escaped by the Bazar Valley by way of Chora and over the Sissobi Pass to Pesh Bolak, with the exception of a few who took the Khyber road, some of whom had been made prisoners by the 2nd Brigade. They were much harried and looted by the Afridis of the Bazar Valley.

The enemy's works were found to be of great extent, and to have been skilfully and formidably

STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY 33

designed. Had they been manned by a sufficient force, and measures taken to counteract flanking movements, the position, if properly defended, might have proved almost impregnable; and, even against the garrison available, an attack in front could only have been successful after great loss of life. The artillery practice of the Afghans was fair, and had they fired shell instead of solid shot it would have proved more destructive.

The strength of the enemy's garrison was :

Cavalry	200
4 Batteries artillery	320
6 Regiments of infantry	3,000
<i>Khasadurs</i> (levies)	600
Total	4,120

Their loss could not well be estimated, as the killed and wounded were scattered in distant and remote portions of the defences. Twenty-four pieces of ordnance were captured.

The arrival of part of the 2nd Brigade under Colonel Jenkins at Kata Kushtia and the first signs there of the evacuation of Ali Masjid on the evening of the 21st have been described. As day began to break on the 22nd November the party was aroused by the approach of Afghan infantry coming up the pass in retreat from Ali Masjid. Colonel Jenkins directed a company of Guides to fire a volley to bring them to a halt, but with the result that only a few of the party stood their ground, the remainder scattering, some scaling the rocks on the farther side, and others running back down the pass. One of the men who halted appeared to be an officer, and Colonel Jenkins sent a prisoner, taken the previous evening, to order him to collect his men and make them lay down their arms, on condition that neither they nor their private property would be injured. On this about 300 prisoners were collected and disarmed.

At 11 a.m. Brigadier Tytler arrived from Panaipal with the rest of the column, except a small detachment which had been left to bring on the rations. Notwithstanding peremptory orders sent back by the Brigadier the rations had not yet come up, nor did any food reach the column until the evening of the 22nd, when seventeen sheep were sent to Kata Kushtia from Ali Masjid. It afterwards appeared that it had been impossible to get the supplies beyond Sapri plateau by the morning of the 22nd. Seeing this, Brigadier-General Macpherson appropriated half of them for the 1st Infantry Brigade, which had bivouacked on the plateau, and of which the rations were also not forthcoming.

During the morning of the 22nd the detachment of the 2nd Brigade left at Panaipal was cut off from communication with Kata Kushtia by the large numbers of Afghans in full retreat from the Rhotas heights. These parties of the enemy were also met by Major H. W. Gordon and the four companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry, which had been detached on the previous day from Tabai. Major Gordon had reached the crest of the northern spur of Rhotas peak on the evening of the 21st, and advancing towards the summit next morning rejoined his brigade, which had recommenced its march towards the ridge about 10.30 a.m., having been informed by the signallers of the 2nd Brigade that Ali Masjid had been captured.

As it was reported that the track over the Rhotas ridge to Ali Masjid was impracticable for mules, the Hazara Mountain Battery, escorted by Major Gordon's detachment of the 20th Punjabis, was directed to descend into the Khyber Valley by the Tortang route. The first quarter of this march was over down-like hills, with grass very abundant; but the character of the country lower down changed to sharp and precipitous ridges. The track was here very bad, and considerable time was spent in making it practicable. Some Afridis, who came to assist in finding a way, expressed their astonishment at the mules being able to come down

this track. The last gun of the battery reached the Khyber stream at nightfall; but the mules with the men's great-coats and food, and the grass-cutters' ponies with the light baggage of the battery, did not arrive in camp that night.

The 1st Infantry Brigade continued its march to the top of the Rhotas peak, in which direction some of the enemy were still seen. General Macpherson considered that, to fulfil his instructions, the peak should be crowned, and this was done by the Rifles at 2 p.m. This advance guard found the *sangars* unoccupied, and from the peak the heavy battery on the Shahgai heights was discernible.

As the 1st Brigade returned to the Tortang Valley, Captain W. H. Meiklejohn and four companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry captured 50 Afghans, who had fled down another spur, whilst the 4th Gurkhas also captured a supply of ammunition. The whole column now descended the Tortang route with great difficulty on account of the darkness, the descent not being completely effected till midnight; the baggage guard and the men's great-coats were, however, even then left behind.

During the 22nd November the Peshawar Valley Field Force remained at and near Ali Masjid, while arrangements were made for an advance up the pass on the following day. On the 23rd the head-quarters of the division with the 10th Hussars, I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, Guides Cavalry, and 14th Sikhs marched to Landi Khana, the 4th Brigade with E-3 and 13-9, Royal Artillery, and the 11th Bengal Lancers remaining at Ali Masjid, the 1st and 2nd Brigades at Kata Kushtia. The advance of the main body was continued on the 24th to Dakka, 2 miles outside the northern mouth of the pass, whither Major Cavagnari had ridden in advance on the previous day. The defences of Landi Khana were found to be entirely deserted. The Mohmand Khan of Lalpura, as well as several headmen of Dakka, came in and gave his submission; and the

chiefs of the neighbouring districts were generally friendly, though they seemed quite unable to control the bands of robbers who infested the Khurd Khyber Pass between Dakka and Basawal and several times annoyed the rear of the column as well as outlying sections of the force left behind at Ali Masjid.

At Dakka, where there was camping-space for a large force, the column halted for three weeks whilst all available transport was sent back to Peshawar for supplies. During this halt the health of the troops improved considerably. The cavalry were employed in reconnaissance work, the Sappers in improving the roads, and efforts were made to check the looting in the Khyber Pass, which was still carried on, chiefly by Zakha Khel Afridis. With this object the general commanding at Peshawar was called on by Sir Sam Browne to furnish troops for post work and convoy duty in the pass.

On the 30th November a messenger from Kabul came into camp, bearing a letter from the Amir addressed to the Viceroy. This letter, though dated the 19th, was believed to have been re-written after the taking of Ali Masjid. It repeated the list of Sher Ali's grievances against the British Government, and declared that he was still ready to receive a friendly Mission "with a small escort not exceeding 20 or 30 men"; but it entirely evaded all the points required by the Viceroy's ultimatum, and could not therefore have been accepted even if it had arrived before the 20th November. A reply to this effect was wired to the Viceroy by the Secretary of State.

December opened with a punitive raid made by Major Cavagnari with an armed body of Kuki Khel Afridis, supported by mountain guns, against the Zakha Khel Afridis, and with a reconnaissance from Dakka into the Mohmand country, where the general attitude of the tribesmen was friendly. At the same time the 1st Brigade pushed on to Basawal, in order to reconnoitre, to give confidence in the country, and to

get supplies, none being obtainable in the vicinity of Dakka. Brigadier-General Macpherson conducted a reconnaissance from Basawal to Pesh Bolak in the hope of seizing the Mir Akhor, who however escaped.

Early in this month pneumonia broke out amongst the 14th Sikhs, who, having been moved into camp at Loi Dakka with no good result, were sent back to Peshawar. No hospital arrangements as yet existed beyond those of units, but by degrees the Field Hospital system was gradually initiated during the operations.

After the fall of Ali Masjid the Sappers were employed first in improving the road to Landi Kotal and afterwards in repairing the dilapidated Afghan fort at Dakka and constructing outposts for the picquets there. Two boats were also constructed at Dakka of six and fifteen tons respectively for ferrying the river.

Meanwhile the reserve division under General Maude was moving forward from Hasan Abdal, and part had already arrived at Peshawar. At the end of the first week in December a redistribution of brigade commands was decided on as follows: a new brigade under Colonel Jenkins of the Guides was formed with the No. 4 Mountain Battery, the Sikhs, and the Guides; the 4th Brigade was amalgamated with the 3rd under Brigadier-General Appleyard, and remained at Ali Masjid and Shahgai, the troops at which places now became part of General Maude's division; Brigadier-General W. B. Browne, who had commanded the 4th Brigade, was directed to proceed to Peshawar and there to await further orders.

On the 10th December Government approved of the advance being continued to Jalalabad, provided that Sir Sam Browne considered the force at his disposal sufficient to hold Jalalabad and keep open his communications.

On the 17th December the head-quarters of the 1st Division marched towards Jalalabad, General Tytler remaining in command at Dakka. Previous to this it

had been ascertained that the Amir had abandoned all intention of defending Jalalabad, and the only open hostility in the neighbourhood, which was the result of the presence of the Mir Akhor amongst the Shinwaris at Pesh Bolak, disappeared on the approach of a detachment of cavalry, when the Mir Akhor fled to the Safed Koh. Some outrages by the Mirzan Khels, a section of the Shinwaris, were promptly punished by an expedition which destroyed their principal fort at Chura without meeting with any resistance.

After an uneventful march of four days Sir Sam Browne's column reached Jalalabad on the 20th December; it included Macpherson's (the 1st) Brigade, which joined it at Basawal, and the 2nd, or Frontier Force, Brigade.

Jalalabad was found to be a miserable town and in a state of considerable decay, the walls dilapidated, the houses wretchedly constructed of mud, the streets and lanes ill paved, rough, tortuous and dirty. The city was now perfectly quiet, and the merchants of the place were rapidly returning and re-opening their shops. The inhabitants generally were friendly, and considered the presence of a British army a protection. The only danger was from discontented tribesmen and fanatics, such as are ever to be found in Afghan towns.

Great efforts were made to cleanse the town and make it wholesome. On arrival at Jalalabad of Nos. 2, 3, and 6 Companies Sappers, the first works undertaken were road-making and drainage of the camp under Lieutenant A. C. Talbot, R.E. The camp was on the east side of the town facing the south, with a sandy tract lying in front of it; and protection was afforded by a watercourse, eight or ten feet wide, along the right flank and rear.

Meanwhile, on the 9th December, Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer, had expressed his opinion that the conduct of the Zakha Khels of Bazar and Bara necessitated military chastisement, and an expedition into the Bazar Valley was consequently determined on.

A force composed of troops from the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, from Jamrud under Lieutenant-General Maude, was to carry out this operation in co-operation with the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, from Dakka, under Brigadier-General Tytler; and as it was important to cut off the enemy's retreat from the Sissobi Pass, the troops from Dakka were to move through this defile.

2nd Brigade, 1st Division.

	Men.	
Artillery	{	11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns—Captain A. Broadfoot 50
	{	½ 8th Company Sappers and Miners 42
Infantry	{	1-17th Foot—Colonel W. D. Thompson 300
	{	27th Punjab Native Infantry—Captain J. Cook 263
	{	45th Sikhs—Lieutenant H. N. M'Rae 114
		Total <u>769</u>

} Under Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler.

2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force.

Cavalry	{	11th Bengal Lancers, 1 troop 40	
	{	13th Bengal Lancers, 1 troop 40	
Artillery	{	½ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns on elephants } Captain J. R. Slade	} Under Brigadier-General J. Doran.
	{	11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns—Captain A. E. Duthy	
Infantry	{	1-5th Foot (Fusiliers)—Colonel T. Rowland 300	
	{	51st Light Infantry—Colonel C. Acton 200	
	{	2nd Gurkhas—Colonel D. Macintyre 500	
	{	Mhairwara Battalion—Major F. W. Boileau 400	
		Total <u>1,529</u>	

Both columns moved on the 19th December, and effected a junction at the village of Walai in the Bazar Valley on the morning of the 21st. No opposition had been encountered, but the people of the valley did not offer their submission or comply with the terms tendered them by the Political Officer. Two villages and a number of towers were accordingly destroyed, after which, on the morning of the 22nd, the columns commenced their retirement, and General Maude's force reached Ali Masjid without incident. General Tytler's Brigade, however, was exposed to a sharp attack by

the tribesmen in the Sissobi Pass, and experienced a loss of one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally.¹

On arrival of the head-quarters of the division at Jalalabad it was ascertained that news had reached there of Sher Ali, by which it appeared that the Amir had left Kabul on the 13th of December.

This news was confirmed on the 20th December, on which day Major Cavagnari telegraphed from Ali Boghan the receipt of authentic intelligence that the Amir had fled from Kabul to Afghan Turkistan. He was accompanied by the remaining members of the Russian Mission; and Sardar Yakub Khan had assumed charge of Kabul. The news was brought by Ghulam Nakshband Khan, a pensioned *ressaldar* of the Guides Cavalry, then resident at Kabul. Before his departure the Amir appeared to have lost all authority at Kabul, while his army had been weakened by numerous desertions. The country between Jalalabad and Kabul was described as being in a state of anarchy.

The year ended with numerous reconnaissances through the country round Jalalabad, with the object of obtaining a better acquaintance with the topography and discovering the resources of the larger villages, as well as of ascertaining the feelings of the inhabitants towards the British.

The weather was fine and the days warm and sunshiny, but at night the temperature was below freezing point. The troops of the Peshawar Valley Field Force were in good health and spirits.

Meantime the troops of the 2nd Division of the Peshawar Valley army were busily employed in the formation of camps for winter quarters and establishing hospitals and supply depots along the line of communication. Much labour had been expended on the road through the Khyber Pass and along the banks of the Kabul River between Dakka and Jalalabad, so that wheeled

¹ For a fuller account of this Expedition see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, Vol. II.

carriages could now traverse without interruption the whole roadway between Peshawar and Jalalabad. The transport service had been systematically organised, and was carried out by convoys of camels under the superintendence of transport officers at each stage. Besides heliographic communication, a telegraph line was erected by the Sappers, and, with the exception of occasional isolated outrages by marauders, chiefly Afridis, the communications between Peshawar and Jalalabad were held in comparative security.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS OF THE PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE FROM JANUARY TO JUNE, 1879.

ON the news of Sher Ali's flight and of Yakub Khan's succession to power being received by the Government of India, Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the Peshawar Valley Force, was instructed to make every endeavour to open communications and to arrive at a friendly understanding with the new ruler. These efforts met, however, with but little success, and the political situation in December, 1878, remained unchanged.

The month of January, 1879, passed without many incidents of importance. A parade of the Jalalabad garrison took place on New Year's Day, followed by a *darbar* held by the Lieutenant-General, at which, however, the attendance of chiefs was neither large nor representative.

Progress was made during the month in improving the defences, communications, etc., in and around the head-quarters of the division.¹

The telegraph was pushed on towards Jalalabad, and was completed as far as Dakka; but, as the line was always liable and constantly subject to interruption, heliographic stations were also completed between that place and Jamrud, and signallers kept hard at work.

Cavalry posts for escort duties were established between Dakka and Jalalabad at Basawal, and four miles from Batikot.

Considerable loss was suffered by the transport owing

¹ For distribution of Peshawar Valley Field Force on 1st January, 1879, see Appendix IV.

to the effects of the cold on the camels. It was therefore arranged to retain at Jalalabad and at Batikot (where there was tolerable grazing) only 1,500 camels, this number being sufficient to move one-half of the force there with six days' supplies, should occasion arise, at twenty-four hours' notice.

The remainder of the camels belonging to the 1st Division were directed to be employed in bringing up supplies to Dakka from the rear, as no difficulty was experienced in obtaining local camel transport between Dakka to Jalalabad.

A defensive post was constructed near the Kabul gate of Jalalabad, and a bridge over the Kabul River was built in three lengths of 170 feet, 170 feet, and 232 feet, the roadway being 8 feet wide. Improvements of the road near Peshawar were also hurried on by the Sappers and Miners, as well as between Landi Kotal and Jalalabad, in order to facilitate the collection of stores at the last-named place. For the storage of supplies there two sheds were constructed, each 140 feet long, and a three-months' supply of *atta*, etc., was collected at the head-quarters of the division.

The weather continued fine, though snow fell in the latter part of the month and the cold became severe.

From Kabul came news that the city was quiet. Yakub Khan had six regiments there, and as time passed on it was rumoured that great disaffection existed amongst these forces, and even that one cavalry regiment had deserted in a body.

Yakub Khan's intentions were undoubtedly warlike; he issued orders to the Ghilzai chiefs to the effect that the whole tribe, the most powerful in Afghanistan, was to assemble at Jagdalak, but that the chiefs alone were to proceed to Kabul for instructions as to their future programme. The assemblage of so many levies at Jagdalak evidently indicated hostile intentions; and, had the Ghilzais obeyed the summons, the formation of a strongly entrenched camp at Jalalabad would have been necessary.

The tribe did not, however, seem inclined to comply with Yakub Khan's orders, and, on the contrary, tendered its submission to the British early in January. Submissive letters were received from most of the chiefs in Kabul, and on the 14th January the Saiad of Kunar waited upon Sir Sam Browne at Jalalabad, and seemed anxious to place himself on good terms with the Government. Probably he was decided in this course by hearing of the occupation of Kandahar, news of which reached the British head-quarters two days later. The Saiad was a man of much influence amongst the Mohmands: indeed, the ex-Amir had trusted to his religious sway to preach a *jihad*¹ against the British.

The only active military operations during January were an expedition against the Mohmands and a second raid into the Bazar Valley. The former was undertaken at the instance of the Political Officer, to whom the headmen of Sangar Sarai in Kama had applied for assistance against the Baizai clan of the Mohmand tribe. It appeared that these tribesmen had been incited to acts of aggression by the chief of Goshta as well as by the Saiads of Shergarh in Kama, and it was accordingly decided to send a force, consisting of the Frontier Brigade of the 1st Division, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, to punish the Mohmands and capture the refractory Saiads.

A detachment of 100 men of the 20th Punjab Infantry and 25 sabres of the 10th Hussars, under Lieutenant F. D. Battye, proceeded to Ali Boghan to act as support and to watch the fords; the main column, consisting of two guns Hazara Mountain Battery, 50 sabres Guides Cavalry, and 250 Guides Infantry, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, with Major Cavagnari, Political Officer, marched from head-quarters at 5 a.m. on the 11th January, forded the Kabul and Kunar Rivers, and, under the guidance of Kalu Khan (Barakzai), the chief of Besud, reached Shergarh about 11 a.m. The headmen at once came out and surrendered themselves; but, whilst they were being secured, a body

¹ Religious war.

of ninety Mohmands, who had been plundering in the neighbourhood, made their escape from a small fort called Telian under fire from the two mountain guns, leaving behind them their loot and plundered cattle. The march of the detachment was then resumed to Sarai, where, by invitation of Mir Akbar Khan of Mayar, it halted at his fort, which he had prepared for the reception of the troops.

On the 12th the small force marched to Sarai, and thence to Ali Boghan, where the guns and baggage were ferried over on four rafts prepared for the purpose, whilst the horses and mules forded the river in about three feet of water a mile lower down. In places the water was so deep that some of the cavalry horses were obliged to swim, the men suffering severely from the icy coldness of the water. Some of the rear guard, who lost their footing near the right bank, were got out of the water by Lieutenant F. D. Battye in a state of great exhaustion, and were sent back to camp. Although the distance from Mayar to Jalalabad is only 12 miles, yet the march was distressing to men and animals, owing to the cold in crossing the river. The troops had to move for more than a mile, carrying ammunition on their heads, in water from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 feet deep, with a very stony bottom.

The object of this expedition was fully attained, and the Saiads from Shergarh sent as prisoners to Peshawar.

On the 24th January, at the request of the Political Officer, another small detachment marched 10 miles north from Basawal to punish the villagers of Nikati and Raja Miani, who had been concerned in the murder of a *bhisti* of the 17th Foot. This detachment consisted of:

	Officers.	Men.	
17th Regiment	4	100	} Under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Utterson, 1-17th Foot, with Mr. A. F. Cunningham as Political Officer.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	2	50	
4th Gurkhas	3	50	
Guides Cavalry	1	25	
Sappers and Miners	1	7	

The villagers tried to escape, but five were killed and seventy-five taken prisoners. A good many of the

46 SECOND BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION

prisoners were brought in, but the larger number were released. The villages were burnt; 500 head of sheep, 200 head of cattle, and some mules were captured.

On the same date the troops from head-quarters who were to operate in the Second Bazar Valley Expedition commenced their march.¹ This Expedition was the result of Major Cavagnari's representations that an excellent effect would be produced by a temporary occupation of the valley. Accordingly it was arranged to concentrate three columns—two from the 2nd Division Peshawar Field Force, starting respectively from Jamrud and Ali Masjid, and one, which was to start from Basawal, from the 1st Division.

The Jamrud Column, under Lieutenant-General Maude, who conducted the operations, marched on the 24th January; that from Ali Masjid marched on the 25th under Brigadier-General Appleyard; while the troops from the 1st Division started on the same day from Basawal under Brigadier-General Tytler.

The Jamrud and Ali Masjid Columns united at Burj on the 26th January, and then pursued their way into the Bazar Valley, meeting with but little open opposition, though there was a good deal of night firing on the picquets. The whole force concentrated in the Bazar Valley at 4 p.m. on the 27th January, and camped in a strong position in the plain.

	<i>Jamrud Column.</i>	All ranks.
Artillery . . .	{ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery (2 guns on elephants), 1 division . . .	28
	{ 11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division . . .	22
British Infantry	{ 1-5th Fusiliers	313
	{ 1-25th Foot	316
		— 679
Native Cavalry .	13th Bengal Lancers	145
Native Infantry	24th Punjab Infantry	356
Madras Sappers	55
		— 556
	Total	— 1,235

¹ For a fuller account of this Expedition see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, Vol. II.

DETAILS OF THE COLUMNS

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Ali Masjid Column.

		All ranks.
Artillery	11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division	18
British Infantry	51st Foot	213
		231
Native Infantry	{ 2nd Gurkhas	312
	{ Mhairwara Battalion	320
Sappers	31
		663
Native Infantry	{ 6th Bengal Infantry from Landi	
	{ Kotal	311
		974
Total		1,205

Basawal Column.

		All ranks.
Artillery	11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division	25
British Infantry	{ 1-17th Foot	361
	{ 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	210
		596
Native Cavalry	The Guides	32
Native Infantry	4th Gurkhas	201
Sappers and Miners	43
		276
Total		872

This column was joined at Chinar by the following :

		All ranks.
British Infantry	1-17th Foot	52
		52
Native Infantry	{ 27th Punjab Native Infantry	104
	{ 45th Sikhs	257
		361
Total		413
GRAND TOTAL		3,725

There was no doubt of the hostility of the Zakha Khel Afridis. Directly the force entered their country, it was fired upon night and day; the inhabitants had also deserted their villages and fired them, although promised by the Political Officer that they should not be

molested. None of the tribesmen showed themselves in the daytime to the troops, but they hung about the hills and ravines, and fired on small parties when they had a chance. Lieutenant-General Maude determined now, in accordance with his instructions, to reconnoitre in force the Bukar Pass towards the Bara Valley, and since the country was unknown, and there was a probability of resistance, a force of 1,000 men, with 2 guns, moved on the 28th of January to cover the reconnaissance.

From Halwai, two miles from camp, to within 1,100 yards of the Bukar Pass, considerable opposition was offered by the united Afridi clans, although with but small effect. At 4.15 p.m., General Maude, having obtained a good idea of the country about the pass, ordered the force to retire on the camp. The rear of the troops reached camp at dusk, the enemy not venturing beyond the high ground near Halwai.

The casualties on this occasion were Lieutenant R. H. L. Holmes, 45th Sikhs, one sergeant, Royal Artillery, one sepoy, and two followers wounded.

On the 29th January, 450 men under Colonel G. H. Thompson, 6th Bengal Infantry, were detached to destroy the towers of Halwai. The Afridis showed in even greater numbers than on the previous day; but, nevertheless, the detachment performed its task of blowing up the towers. The return march of the detachment was again harassed by the Afridis, but the party fell back in good order towards the camp, and inflicted a loss estimated at twenty men on the enemy, the British casualties being three sepoy and one follower wounded.

General Maude now telegraphed to Army Headquarters for instructions as to his future movements; while awaiting the arrival of the same an urgent message arrived recalling the Basawal Column, as an attack was expected on Jalalabad and Dakka. At the same time the Zakha Khel clan of the Bara Valley offered their submission and friendship, and the Lieutenant-General, having received instructions to act on his own judgment,

accordingly determined to retire. The three columns left the Bazar Valley on the 3rd February, and regained their several destinations unmolested on the following day.

Meanwhile at Jalalabad intelligence was received of the death of the Mir Akhor, and of the serious illness of the Amir at Mazar-i-Sharif. At the end of January news arrived of the death of the Amir, but it was not confirmed, although the rumour created considerable excitement at Kabul. At the same time some uneasiness was caused amongst the tribes by the Bazar Expedition, and a rising of all the Afridis was apprehended.

On the 28th January a cipher message from Peshawar informed Sir Sam Browne that a body of Mohmands and Utman Khels, numbering some thousands, were assembling with a view to attack Dakka or Jalalabad on the 7th February in combination with an attack from Kabul. According to trustworthy information, an army of 20,000 Mohmands and Utman Khels had actually been seen on the 2nd February assembled on the hills beyond Kunar under instructions from Kabul, and the tribes had been aroused by the relations of the Saiads who had been sent as prisoners to Peshawar from Shergarh. An attack by this force was hourly expected, and the artillery positions were occupied and extra picquets thrown out. Trenches were dug round the commissariat lines, and every precaution taken against any sudden and unexpected attack; while reconnoitring parties were sent towards Gandamak and in the direction of Kunar.

The apparent imminence of the danger caused Sir Sam Browne to give orders early in February for the repair of the old British fort of Jalalabad, now to be called Fort Sale and situated about three-quarters of a mile to the westward of the British camp. This was accordingly done, and the place rendered tenable by troops, the position being high and dry, and uncommanded by any hill or elevated ground.

Meanwhile the collection of Mohmands was variously

reported as having broken up, and as gathering in force and, in conjunction with the Bajauris and Utman Khels, making preparations for a night attack on the commissariat stores.

Although the British camp had nothing to fear from any such attack from the disaffected tribes, yet the friendly tribes across the river in the Kama district were not by any means safe; and as they had shown goodwill to the British (always excepting the recusant chief of Goshta), it was necessary to assist them.

On the 6th of February intelligence reached Sir Sam Browne that the Mohmands were descending on Goshta; and on the same day also a message from Captain W. North, R.E., commanding the Sappers at Girdi Kach, announced that the Mohmands were entering Kama across the river and about a mile distant in front of his camp, in number 5,000 foot and 50 horse.

It was then too late in the day to do more than order a force to move on the following morning from Jalalabad under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson into Kama, as well as a column under General Tytler *viâ* Chardeh to Goshta, and the cavalry brigade under General Gough to the fords at Ali Boghan.¹

At 4.15 a.m. the column under General Macpherson crossed the Kabul River by the recently constructed trestle bridge with the object of attacking the hostile tribes reported as raiding in Kama. Rapidity of movement giving the only chance of success, the cavalry were ordered to press on as quickly as possible across the

1 Cavalry	{ British—1 troop 10th Hussars.	} Under General Macpherson.
	{ Native—100 sabres 11th Bengal Lancers.	
Artillery	{ Hazara Mountain Battery.	
	{ British—250 men 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.	
Infantry	{ Native—300 men 4th Gurkhas.	
	{ 300 men 20th Punjab Infantry.	} Under General Tytler.
	{ 150 men 1st Sikh Infantry.	
	{ 82 Sabres Guides Cavalry.	
	{ 2 Guns 11-9, Royal Artillery.	} Under General C. Gough.
	{ 318 Rifles 1-17th Foot.	
	{ 1 Squadron 10th Hussars.	} Under General C. Gough.
	{ 1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.	
	{ 2 Guns I-C, Royal Horse Artillery.	

Kunar River and to seize the spur at Telian, while four companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry were detached to occupy the *kotal* to the north-east. The remainder of the infantry were to make for Landabuch at a quickened pace, and all transport was to follow, escorted by the 1st Sikh Infantry.

The country between the Kabul and Kunar Rivers is much intersected with watercuts and irrigated land. It was, therefore, impossible for the cavalry in the darkness to advance on a larger front than half sections, since on many of the bridges there was room only for a single horseman. However, the left bank of the Kunar was reached at 6.25 a.m. without accident. Here the cavalry halted for ten minutes until the light was good enough to enable it to advance, which it did with great caution, through the numerous rice-fields, in which some few of the horses got bogged, and arrived at Shergarh by 7.15 a.m.

The possession of the Telian spur would have enclosed the enemy in Shergarh and adjacent villages, which they were supposed to be still occupying; but the raiders had begun their retirement during the night, and small parties only could be seen on the rocky ridge above Telian. These opened fire on the 10th Hussars and 11th Bengal Lancers, but 30 of the Hussars and 12 of the Lancers, dismounting, occupied the knoll at the southern extremity of the spur, and from it returned the enemy's fire, while the Hazara Mountain Battery fired a couple of rounds, shell and shrapnel, at 1,000 and 1,800 yards' range. Soon after 8 a.m. the infantry came up, when the cavalry went on in pursuit of the retiring tribesmen through the Mayar villages towards Girdai, but without succeeding in overtaking any of them. As nothing was to be seen of the enemy, the mountain battery was sent back escorted by the cavalry, reaching Jalalabad by 7 p.m.

The infantry bivouacked near Jalalud-din, returning to Jalalabad the following morning. In crossing the Kunar several men and mules were washed away, but happily no lives were lost.

The columns under Generals Tytler and C. J. Gough marched as arranged from Basawal and Jalalabad respectively to Chardeh and Ali Boghan. The Guides cavalry in the former force managed to ford the river north of Chardeh, and reconnoitred three miles beyond the river as far as the foot of the hills, returning with the news that Akbar Khan's village had been attacked the evening before and his son slain. The 17th Foot and the guns, being unable to ford the river, remained on the south side to cover the retirement of the cavalry.

Brigadier-General Gough's mounted force marched from Jalalabad to beyond Ali Boghan, but seeing that the troops beyond the river would not be engaged, returned to camp.

It was afterwards ascertained that the Mohmands and Bajauris had not heard of the Mir Akhor's death, and had come down to carry out their share in the proposed combined operations, unaware that that event had caused the Khugianis and Shinwaris on the south and the Ghilzais on the west of Jalalabad to abandon their projected attack on the British camp.

On the 22nd February a column 900 strong with two mountain guns, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, left camp for Charbagh, in the Laghman Valley. The Alingar River was crossed on the 23rd, Tigri was reached the next day, and the return effected on the 25th without having met with any opposition.

The country now seemed to have settled down. On the 5th February the sons of the late Mir Akhor had come in and tendered their submission, and promised to bring in the Khugianis; and the Zakha Khel Afridis also appeared inclined to keep their engagements.

On the 16th February the Sardar Wali Muhammad from Kurram (where he had submitted to General Roberts) arrived at the British camp, and was received by the General Commanding with the usual ceremonial visits. He remained with Sir Sam Browne's division until peace was concluded.

At this time it was rumoured from Kabul that the

inhabitants were anxious for the advance of the British army to relieve them from the great oppression which was being exercised by Yakub and his officers. But there was every reason to believe that the regular Afghan soldiery was very bitter against the British, and anxious to redeem the defeats it had experienced. The majority of Yakub's army was said to be cantoned on the Siah Sang heights, close to the city. Here there were 3,000 cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry, with 25 guns, the remainder of the army being at Butkhak. There was also a force at or near Ghazni, estimated at 4,000 cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry, and 30 guns. Yakub Khan was reported to be in good health and most active in organising his troops and in encouraging the military ardour of his people, and to be greatly aided in this by the preaching of the *mullas*. The advance of the British to Jalalabad was made the subject of appeals to the passions and fanaticism of the Afghans, and it was considered certain that hostilities would be resumed as soon as practicable.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 24th February, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir F. P. Haines, with the head-quarters staff, arrived on a tour of inspection at Jamrud from Peshawar; and after having reviewed the 2nd Division and inspected the field hospitals and water-tanks, proceeded to Ali Masjid, where he halted for the night. The heights between Jamrud and Shahgai were crowned by the 5th Fusiliers from Ali Masjid, and the flanking parties were supplied by the 51st Light Infantry. No shots were fired, and men of the friendly tribes, posted at intervals all along the roads, represented a very orderly and thoroughly effective system of police. Sir F. P. Haines arrived at Jalalabad, and inspected Sir Sam Browne's division on the 28th February. He remained until the 3rd March, when he returned to Peshawar.

The Commander-in-Chief and his staff carefully examined the neighbourhood for a suitable site for cantonments, and inspected the camp, stores, bridges,

works, and picquet posts; and orders were given for huts to be built at once on the low flat hills which stand about 2,000 yards south of the city of Jalalabad. Fort Sale (named in memory of the defence of Jalalabad in 1841) had already been commenced, enclosing the sheds built for stores previously mentioned.

Whilst the Commander-in-Chief was at Jalalabad, letters arrived from Yakub Khan announcing the death of the Amir Sher Ali at Mazar-i-Sharif on the 21st February. This event quite altered the state of affairs, as it was evidently easier to grant terms to a new sovereign than to Yakub Khan as merely the *alter ego* of the late Amir, and the negotiations, which had been some time in progress, would now, it was hoped, be rapidly concluded.

The death of Sher Ali terminated a phase of Afghan history as momentous to British interests as that which had ended in 1863 with the life of Dost Muhammad Khan. Far inferior to his father in many of the latter's more striking and manly qualities, Sher Ali had amply justified the judgment of the Dost in selecting him as his heir in preference to any other of his sons. The commencement of his reign had been marked by a series of revolts against his authority, to which any but a ruler of very exceptional determination and force of character must have succumbed. Except for a brief period, when the death of his favourite son completely prostrated the energies of his emotional temperament, Sher Ali never allowed the successes of his adversaries to dishearten him or to go unchallenged, and after a stern struggle he won his way to power, unaided by aught but his own high qualities as soldier and ruler.

A day or two before the news of Sher Ali's death came a letter from Yakub Khan, dated the 20th February, to Major Cavagnari re-opening the question of negotiations which had remained in abeyance since the failure of the latter's overtures in December. A week later this was followed by another letter, dated the 26th February, announcing the death, on the 21st

February, of his father, Sher Ali Khan, and in conciliatory terms desiring the adjustment of "the accidental quarrel" between the Afghan and British Governments, and the renewal of friendly relations.

On the 5th March, Major Cavagnari replied to Yakub Khan's letters, expressing in suitable terms his sympathy and regret for the death of Sher Ali. This letter was addressed to "Sardar Yakub Khan," no intimation having as yet been received that Yakub had succeeded his father. On the 7th March a second letter was despatched, in reply to Yakub's of the 20th February, explaining the terms upon which the British Government was prepared to arrange a peace and revive its friendly alliance with Afghanistan. It was decided that this letter also should not be addressed to Yakub as Amir, although it was couched in suitable and courteous terms. The conditions demanded by the Viceroy in this letter were the renunciation by the Amir of authority over the Michni and Khyber Passes, and over the tribes which border on the same; the establishment of a British protectorate in the districts of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi; the invariable adjustment of the foreign relations of the Kabul Government in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and the residence of British agents and their escorts in Afghanistan.

On the 16th March two more letters arrived from Yakub. One of these, addressed to the Viceroy, announced the death of the late Amir and his own accession to the throne in accordance with the will of his father and the wishes of the people. The other, dated the 12th March, was a reply to Major Cavagnari's letter of the 7th. It was on the whole satisfactory; the only condition which Yakub declined to accept was that which provided for the renunciation of his authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes and the independent tribes in the vicinity and for the retention of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi under British protection and control. With regard to the reception of European British

officers, Yakub specially stipulated that they should reside at Kabul only, and should abstain from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

It now appeared that, matters having progressed thus far, misunderstandings might best be removed by a personal conference between Major Cavagnari and Yakub. Accordingly measures were taken, when sending an answer to Yakub's letter of the 12th March, to convey a hint that, if a favourable opportunity should arise, an invitation to Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul might be productive of good results. To this communication, which was dated the 23rd March, Yakub Khan replied promptly on the 29th of that month. He laid stress on his ready acceptance of two of the conditions proposed to him, and on his determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformity with his profession of loyalty to the British Government. He earnestly deprecated the remaining condition relating to a cession of territory, entreating that it might be waived. Finally, he expressed his readiness to receive Major Cavagnari at Kabul and discuss the matters at issue.

Meantime the Commander-in-Chief reached Peshawar on the 7th March, and held a council, at which the General Officers commanding the 1st and 2nd Divisions were present, and from that station gave orders for a redistribution of the 1st and 2nd Divisions in view of the probability of a further advance being ordered. It was decided that the 1st Division should be concentrated at Jalalabad, while the 2nd Division was to be so disposed as to occupy the line from Jamrud to Barikao, inclusive of both those posts. On the vacation of Jalalabad by the 1st Division, the 2nd Division was to furnish a garrison for that post, being augmented by the 39th Bengal Infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a wing and headquarters of the 9th Lancers from Taru. The 1st Division was to be augmented by the 51st Light Infantry and the heavy gun battery, and held in readiness to move forward on Kabul at short notice.¹

¹ Appendix IV.

On the 17th March a serious attack was made on a survey party by the inhabitants of some Shinwari villages.

Captain E. P. Leach, R.E., Assistant Superintendent of Surveys, having just completed a survey of the country southward towards Mazina and Mahrez, started again from Barikao to Zarbacha on the 15th March for a further survey by Chilgazai. He was escorted by 50 sabres Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton and 100 rifles under Lieutenant F. M. Barclay, of the 45th Sikh Infantry.

On the 17th the surveying party, with Lieutenants Hamilton and Barclay and 40 sabres and 40 rifles, left their encampment at Zarbacha, and, accompanied by Yar Muhammad, the Khan of Mahrez, proceeded to Chilgazai, from which village the *malik*, Umra Khan, met the party and consented to show them the way to a hill about four miles farther south, from which a survey of a considerable extent of the Safed Koh spurs could be made. Within half a mile of the summit the cavalry were halted and left in charge of Jemadar Muhammad Sharif of the Guides, with instructions, in case of attack, to hold the position, but to send the horses down a ravine under cover.

On the survey party showing themselves on the crest of the hill, several shots were fired and drums beaten in the group of villages, known as Maidanak, along the valley below, about a mile east of the position, and numbers of armed Shinwaris were observed rushing out of their houses and making for the low hills below this position. Umra Khan was sent down to reassure these people, but without much effect. A steady fire was opened on the survey party, which now began to retire towards the cavalry. Thereupon a body of about fifty men, armed with knives, made a rush at them. Lieutenant Barclay, wounded by a musket-shot through the shoulder, was carried by four of his men in front of the retiring party, a jemadar with about ten or fifteen men following, and Captain Leach, R.E., with the remainder brought up the rear. The enemy had

nearly succeeded, however, in surrounding the small party, when Captain Leach ordered the escort to fix bayonets and charge, and with his little band of Sikhs drove back the tribesmen and recovered the point last occupied by the survey party. The villagers now showered stones on them from 15 to 20 yards' distance, but only three attempted to rush in on the party, and these were all despatched. Meanwhile the troops behind opened fire, and in about five minutes they had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy beat a retreat, when the survey party joined the cavalry without further molestation. During this struggle, when the enemy came to close quarters, a havildar of the 45th Sikhs was shot through the head, and at the same time Captain Leach received a slight knife-cut on the left arm. There were no more casualties, and the enemy made no further attack against the rear guard of cavalry. It was 2.30 p.m. when the survey party began to fall back, and 4.30 p.m. when it reached the plain.

About 300 men attacked the survey party, but not more than half that number were able to bring their weapons into play. The enemy lost 9 men killed.

Sir Sam Browne expressed his high opinion of the gallant and spirited conduct of Captain Leach, which he brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, and recorded his belief that the personal gallantry and determination of Captain Leach, R.E., on whom devolved the duty of covering the retirement, saved the small party of infantry from annihilation. Captain Leach subsequently received the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct during this affair.

Brigadier-General Tytler was sent with a column¹

¹ Brigadier-General Tytler's column, 21st March, 1879 :—

Artillery	4 Mountain guns	50	} Total 788.	
Cavalry	{ 11th Bengal Lancers	61		
	{ Guides Cavalry	51		112 sabres
Infantry	{ 1-17th Foot	197		
	{ 4th Gurkhas	102		
	{ 27th Punjab Infantry	172		
	{ 45th Sikhs	49		520 bayonets
Sappers and Miners	106		

to punish this unprovoked attack; but since a general conflict with the Shinwari tribe at this juncture would have been most undesirable, Major E. R. Conolly, who accompanied the column as Political Officer, was instructed to obtain reparation if possible without open hostilities. The force left Barikao after midnight on March 21st, and reached Maidanak at daybreak. Here it was reinforced by a detachment from Basawal, consisting of:

34 Sabres 11th Bengal Lancers.	}	Under
100 Rifles 1-17th Foot.		Lieut.-Colonel Ball-Acton,
300 Rifles 51st Light Infantry.		

The valley was penetrated as far as Girdai by the column, and several village towers were blown up there and at Maidanak. Fines were levied on the same villages, and the survey of the district having been completed the force withdrew without having encountered any opposition.

Three days previously a foraging party under a jemadar had been fired upon near Deh-Sarakh. The camels were sent to the rear, and the party retired in good order on Pesh Bolak, followed by 300 or 400 Afridis to within two or three miles of Pesh Bolak. On the return, therefore, of Brigadier-General Tytler from Maidanak he was directed by Sir Sam Browne to punish this fresh outrage, and at 1 a.m. on the morning of the 24th March he led a force of 500 bayonets, 150 sabres, and 2 guns against Deh-Sarakh, the locality in which the offending villages were situated. Major Conolly, Political Officer, again accompanied the column from Basawal, and after the complete surrender of Maidanak no opposition was expected.

By 5 a.m. the force (composed as under¹) had

¹ Column under Brigadier-General Tytler, 24th March, 1879

Artillery	.	2 Guns 11-9, Royal Artillery.	
Cavalry	.	{	11th Bengal Lancers 90
			13th Bengal Lancers 60
Infantry	.	{	1-5th Fusiliers 150
			1-17th Foot 250
			27th Punjab Infantry 50
		{	2nd Gurkhas 50



reached the high ground at Pesh Bolak, when General Tytler and the cavalry pushed rapidly to the front, the guns and infantry following as quickly as possible. The advance party reached Mausam, which had been chiefly implicated in the raid, a large village situated on high ground sloping down to the Pesh Bolak plain, fortified in the usual manner, and protected on the east by a deep *nala*, and by a lesser one (about 200 yards) to the west, on the other side of which was a level plateau. About a mile north of Mausam, at the bottom of the slope, were three small villages close to each other, near which the cavalry halted while the Brigadier examined the position. Whilst making this reconnaissance, General Tytler detached Lieutenant H. R. Heath with a party of the 11th Bengal Lancers up the deep *nala* on the east of Mausam, to cut off the retreat of the people in the rear. At once the *tom-toms* began to beat, and the tribesmen crowded out on the walls and in front of the village, while others collected in the *nala* and on the level plateau beyond. At the same time fire was opened on the troops from the village in front, from the *nala*, and from the farthest of the three villages in rear.

A portion of the cavalry was at once dismounted, and replied to the enemy's fire until the arrival of the infantry and guns. Two companies were then extended against Mausam, and two told off as supports. The guns were unlimbered, and commenced to shell the place at 750 yards' range. At the same time the cavalry, under Captain D. Hamilton Thompson, 13th Bengal Lancers, was directed to cross the western *nala* lower down, where it could not be seen, and to charge the enemy if a favourable opportunity occurred.

A desultory matchlock fire was maintained by the enemy until the battery opened fire, when they at once began to evacuate the fort; and although they stubbornly disputed the possession of every tower and wall as long as possible, yet they gradually retired before the infantry advance. So occupied were the enemy on

EASTERN NINGRAHAR

To illustrate operations of March 1879 & May 1880.



the plateau across the western *nala* with the attack on the village, that they only observed the approach of the cavalry when it was too late to retreat. Opening fire as Captain Thompson gave the order to charge, about 300 Afghans in line four or five deep received the cavalry with an irregular volley, which killed two men and wounded six or seven more. The enemy then fled, pursued as far as the foot of a small range of hills by the Lancers, who cut down or speared at least fifty of them. The arms of the dead Afghans were collected, and the cavalry rejoined the main body.

The enemy retired to a distance of about 1,800 yards, where they seemed to consider themselves safe, until some shells from the battery caused them to beat a rapid retreat over the brow of a hill beyond the *nala*. The village of Mausam was occupied and the towers were blown up, after which the troops withdrew to their first position. Here another halt was made to blow up the towers of Darwazai, the village from which shots had been fired on the rear of the column.

As soon as the troops abandoned Mausam, the enemy crowded into it and occupied all the surrounding heights, forming a sort of semi-circle round the position of the British. When the Darwazai towers had been blown up and the village set on fire, the column commenced a very leisurely retreat by alternate lines of skirmishers, with skirmishers on both flanks, halting now and then for the guns to come into action against large masses of the enemy, who now began crowding on the rear and flanks, sometimes coming within 80 or 100 yards of the skirmishers, and making as though they would come to close quarters. This running fight was continued for four miles up to the walls of Pesh Bolak, where the column halted. The tribesmen here hung about in large masses a mile and a half off for upwards of an hour, but they made no further hostile demonstrations.

The casualties of the enemy were large, for they buried upwards of 160 men the following day; the loss

of the troops was very small, only 2 sowars killed and 12 wounded. Brigadier-General Tytler specially brought to notice the conduct of Captain D. Hamilton Thompson, 13th Bengal Lancers, and of the officers and men under his command. He attributed the success of the day's operations largely to the promptitude and gallantry displayed by Captain Thompson, and to the manner in which he handled the cavalry during the retirement. The names of Kot-Dafadar San Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, and of Lance-Dafadar Ayub Khan, 13th Bengal Lancers, were brought prominently to the notice of the General for special reward.

These operations were followed a few days later by another and more considerable expedition. On the 31st March Sir Sam Browne ascertained that Asmatulla, the principal chief of the Ghilzais, had descended into Kats Laghman (the alluvial plain along the right bank of the Kabul River to the north-west of the Siah Koh range). With him was a gathering of 1,500 followers to stir up the people against the troops, to attack the friendly Ghilzais, and to incite the Khugianis to rise. The latter tribe, it appeared, was assembling a few miles south-west of Fatehabad on the Kabul road.

It was decided to despatch two columns; one, under Brigadier-General Macpherson, into Kats Laghman; another, under Brigadier-General C. S. Gough, against the Khugianis near Fatehabad.¹

General Macpherson's column was to march at 9 p.m. on the 31st March across the Siah Koh by the Jawara-Miana Pass, and to cut off the enemy's retreat by the right bank of the Kabul River, in which operation he was to have the assistance of 600 *khasadars* (Afghan levies).

The success of the expedition depended on secret and rapid movements, and the cavalry of this column,

¹ Brigadier-General Macpherson's column :

Hazara Mountain Battery.
300 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
300 4th Gurkhas.

300 28th Punjab Infantry.
1 Squadron 10th Hussars.
1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.

ACTION AT MAUSAM

24th MARCH 1879

Nº 8



London, John Murray.

Scale 4 Inches = 1 Mile

Yards 500 0 500 1000 1500 Yards

V.A.S. Johnston, General Engraver & Letter-press

DISASTER TO THE 10TH HUSSARS 63

under the command of Major E. A. Wood, 10th Hussars, and accompanied by Mr. Jenkins (the Assistant Political Officer) and Wali Muhammad, was despatched at 9.30 p.m. across the river by the ford below the site of the trestle bridge at Jalalabad, which had been removed on the 29th March. The squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers led the way across; and as the moon was a week old it was fairly light, and they passed over in safety. Some mules followed, and it was noticed that they were bending down the stream; but it was known that there was such a bend in the ford, while the light was insufficient to show that the mules were off their legs and swimming. The whole squadron of the 10th Hussars, following the lead of the mules, was suddenly swept over into water 6 or 7 feet deep, and running like a mill race. The squadron was moving in half sections, and must have been nearly 150 yards long when it was swept away. Captain R. C. D. E. Spottiswoode, Lieutenant the Hon. J. P. Greenwood, and Lieutenant C. S. Napier were riding in front, and Sub-Lieutenant Grenfell in rear. They escaped with the greatest difficulty.

The first notice of this disaster was brought to the camp at Jalalabad by 28 riderless horses galloping into the cavalry lines, followed by a few men, who brought information of what had occurred. Another troop of Bengal Cavalry was ordered to leave the camp at 4 a.m. on the 1st April, and to follow Major Wood, who pushed on with the remainder of his force to the hills above Charbagh, which he reached at 6 a.m. Everything was done which could be thought of to render assistance to the missing men. Nine elephants of the heavy battery, as well as a strong detachment from the field hospital, under the direction of the Assistant Quartermaster-General, proceeded to the river and commenced a diligent search by the light of a large fire. In the morning the bodies of 19 men and 10 horses were found, and one officer and two or three men were taken alive off a sandbank in the river.

The loss of the 10th Hussars was 1 officer (Lieu-

tenant F. H. Harford), 3 sergeants, 1 farrier, 42 rank and file, and 13 horses. Most of the bodies found were wounded about the head, apparently by kicks received in the struggle in the water. This ford had been selected by the Political Officer, but it was not staked across, nor were any of the others in the Kabul River, on account of the objections of the Kama villagers.

Meantime the infantry column under General Macpherson, leaving camp at 9 p.m., followed the Kabul road for 9 miles, and then, turning sharp to the north, made its way through irrigated land, traversed by watercourses, till the river Surkhah was reached.

The mules of the Hazara Mountain Battery were much delayed in the darkness by the flooded fields and water-cuts near the stream, until at last a ford was found $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the village of Tatang-i-Nawab Jabbar Khan, which was crossed without difficulty, and the village at the foot of the Siah Koh Pass reached soon after daylight on the 1st April. Here a halt was made for the column to close up.


The march over the Siah Koh was beset with difficulties. In many places the road had to be made passable for the mules and guns over ascents and descents, across large boulders and layers of rock, so that it was 10 a.m. when the crest of the Jowara Miana Pass (elevation 5,300 ft.) was gained.

From this point Major Wood's cavalry could be observed north of the Kabul River, and the column pushed on, the advanced party of the Rifles reaching the level cultivated ground at 1.15 p.m., and finding there that Asmatulla had fled and his followers dispersed. Bahram Khan's fort near the river was now occupied by the column. Although the mules only carried half loads, the difficulties of the route were such that the rear guard did not arrive till 2 o'clock p.m. on the following day, 2nd April.

The distance marched by the column was not extraordinary, being only 25 miles; but the nature of the route tried the endurance of the troops to the utmost.

DISTRICTS OF BESUD, KAMA AND GOSHTA

TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF 11th JANUARY, 7th & 8th FEBRUARY 1879 & 20th & 21st MAY 1880.



The rear guard had to assist in passing the mules over difficult places, and in carrying and reloading the ammunition and provisions.

A reinforcement of one hundred of the 51st Light Infantry, two hundred of the Guides Infantry, and one hundred of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Major R. B. Campbell, Corps of Guides, had meanwhile left Jalalabad with a convoy of stores to join Major Wood's force. But the Political Officer having received information of the escape of Asmatulla, this reinforcement was recalled.

As previously arranged, Brigadier-General C. Gough's column¹ left Jalalabad at 1 a.m. on the 2nd April, and arrived near Fatehabad whilst it was yet dark. About 1 p.m. it was reported by the cavalry patrols of the Guides under Ressaldar Mahmud Khan, which had been thrown out towards Gandamak, that large bodies of men were advancing with flags from the direction of Khoja Khel south-west of the camp.

The whole force got under arms, and intelligence being received of the continued advance of the enemy, Major W. Battyé with the Guides Cavalry was directed to advance along the Gandamak road.

Three hundred infantry and two troops of cavalry having been left to protect the camp under Colonel C. McPherson, the Brigadier-General with three troops of Hussars and four guns of I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, followed Major Battyé's Guides, the remainder of the infantry, about 700 men, advancing as quickly as possible afterwards.

The enemy were found to be posted on the crest of a plateau, both flanks resting on steep sides which overlooked the cultivated valleys below. The crest of the ridge was strengthened by breastworks, and completely

¹ Brigadier-General Gough's column :

2 Squadrons 10th Hussars ; Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Ralph Kerr.

2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry ; Major Wigram Battyé.

I-C, Royal Horse Artillery (4 guns).

1-17th Foot, 400 men ; Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson.

300 27th Punjab Native Infantry.

300 45th (Sikhs) Native Infantry.

1 Company Sappers and Miners.

commanded the whole front, which sloped gently down towards the troops, except at the top, where the slope was steep.

The front of the enemy's force was about a mile in extent, and its numbers probably not less than 5,000. The right of their front nearest to the camp was the key of their position.

The cavalry and artillery advanced to within 1,200 yards, and the latter opened fire. The enemy met this fire by throwing out lines of skirmishers from their right. The mounted troops and guns were therefore ordered to retire across the plateau in the hope of drawing the enemy out of their very strong position, whilst the infantry came up on the left with the view of carrying the enemy's right.

As was expected, this retirement was immediately followed by the enemy, who came streaming out from behind their breastwork. As the infantry came up, they were brought into action on the left, and ordered to make a continuous advance, the 1-17th Foot and 27th Punjab Infantry in the front line, with the 45th Sikhs in reserve.

They were met by a determined resistance, the flags of the Afghans keeping well to the front in spite of the heavy fire of our infantry.

Here Lieutenant N. C. Wiseman, 17th Foot, followed by two or three of his men, charged one standard bearer and ran him through, but the gallant officer was instantly surrounded and cut to pieces. The enemy now showed signs of giving way, upon which an order was sent to the cavalry on the right to attack on the first favourable opportunity. But before this order was received both regiments charged successfully. The three troops of the Guides, under Major Wigram Battye, charged straight to the front, and the 10th Hussars to the right front, which the Afghans were trying to turn.

These decisive charges completely defeated the enemy, but with the loss of the gallant Major Wigram Battye, who fell dead at the head of the Guides from a

shot in the chest, having previously received a wound through the thigh, which, however, had not deterred him from still leading his men. Lieutenant Hamilton, Guides Cavalry, was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry in this action.

The entrenched position was carried, and from this height the enemy could be seen flying in every direction and dispersing into the numerous forts and villages dotting the richly cultivated valleys.

The cavalry were forthwith sent in pursuit, while the horse artillery guns fired upon any closed bodies of the enemy that were seen. The three troops of the 10th Hussars under Lord Ralph Kerr, and the Guides under Lieutenant Hamilton, pursued the enemy close up to the walls of Khoja Khel, cutting up numbers of them.

The troops were then ordered to retire to camp, as the enemy were completely dispersed. The action commenced about 2 p.m., and by 4.30 p.m. the enemy's position was captured. The estimated loss of the Afghans was between 300 and 400 men, while the casualties among the troops amounted to two British officers, one native officer (Ressaldar Mahmud Khan,¹ Guides), together with a loss of 20 horses and 3 men killed, and 4 native officers and 36 men wounded. On the 4th April Brigadier-General Gough marched against the Khugiani strongholds near Gandamak, several of which he destroyed. This further action resulted in the complete submission of their chief, Haidar Khan. The Commander-in-Chief brought prominently forward to the notice of Government the gallant conduct of the troops at Fatehabad, and their skilful handling by Brigadier-General Gough. In the death of Major Wigram Battye the army had sustained a severe loss, and the Government of India had been deprived of the services of a most distinguished and gallant soldier; while the loss of so brave a soldier as Lieutenant Wise-

¹ This intelligent native officer was killed in personal combat with one of the enemy, whom he slew.

man, 1-17th Foot, was also to be deplored. The tribesmen engaged in this action were all Khugianis, but the Ghilzais were hovering about in the neighbourhood, and had not General Gough taken the initiative they would certainly have joined the Khugianis, in which case the British would have had to encounter a much larger force.

The object of both these expeditions had been thus satisfactorily accomplished. Asmatulla fled to Kushi-nand, his followers dispersed, and the Khugianis had received a most severe lesson. Nearly all the headmen of that tribe came in subsequently and made their submission.

Macpherson's column returned to Jalalabad by the Darunta Pass and by a ford over the Surkhab $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles higher up than the one previously used. The Hazara Mountain Battery, with an escort of 200 native infantry, was detached to reinforce Gough's column at Fatehabad; and on the 4th April Brigadier-General Tytler also arrived at that place with the remainder of the 2nd Brigade. The combined troops then marched 9 miles southwards from camp to Khugian and destroyed three towers belonging to people who had joined in the attack of the 2nd April.

While these events were in progress, preparations for the proposed advance of the 1st Division from Jalalabad were being pushed on. The new road from Basawal *viâ* Ambar Khana and Lachipur, which had the advantage of running along the bank of the river, and thus being well supplied with water throughout, was now completed. Brigadier-General Appleyard with the heavy battery, the 51st Light Infantry, and some Madras Sappers and Miners arrived at Jalalabad on the 24th March. The head-quarters 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Tytler, consisting of the 17th Foot and part of the 11th Bengal Lancers, arrived on the 27th. The great difficulty now was to procure transport; carriage was urgently required, and it was proposed to utilise that of the 2nd Division.

BREAKDOWN OF THE TRANSPORT 69

Sir Sam Browne's estimate of his requirements is given in his telegram of the 21st March, 1879, to the Quartermaster-General at Camp Shink :

“Deaths, desertions, and sickness have reduced my original numbers, and originally I never had enough for supplies as well as for troops. The 1st Division requires, for baggage, ammunition, and three days' rations, camels 4,158, mules 2,432; for twenty-seven days' supplies, camels 4,742: total camels 8,900, mules 2,432. We possess between this and Peshawar, camels 4,015, mules 1,680.”

On the 2nd April the Quartermaster-General reported that 5,967 camels and 2,163 mules were deficient, and, notwithstanding a considerable reduction of carriage, the complete breakdown of the transport was reported by Colonel C. M. MacGregor, who now joined the division as Chief of the Staff, to be most serious.

Arrangements were, however, progressing for the move forward; and on the 7th April the post and telegraph offices were transferred to Fatehabad. Meantime a committee had been appointed to determine on the best sites for the various posts to protect the line of communications from Jamrud to Jalalabad.

On the 8th April the Government of India notified to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be expedient on political grounds that Gandamak should be occupied, and on the 9th Sir Sam Browne was requested by the Commander-in-Chief to detail such force as appeared to him expedient for the occupation of that place, bearing in mind the desirability of including in it two battalions of British infantry, so as to secure for them a more salubrious climate than that of Jalalabad.

Up to this time the troops had been in excellent health, all the sick and weakly having been sent back to India. The percentage of British and natives in hospital was respectively 3·6 and 4·27; all of these were suffering from slight ailments, nor had any cholera, fever, dysentery, or other serious illness appeared;

70 FINDING NEW CAMPING GROUND

therefore the climate of the valley of the Kabul River may be regarded as healthy up to the middle of April. But as the year advanced a move to higher and more open encampments was considered desirable.

From a military point of view, also, the advance to Gandamak was advantageous. The position afforded facilities for the collection of supplies; it was also sufficiently advanced to admit of easy communication should events necessitate a further move of the army towards Kabul. In communicating with Sir Sam Browne on the subject, the Commander-in-Chief insisted on the necessity of carefully selecting a position capable of defence by a comparatively small force, but which might be required to cover considerable quantities of stores and munitions, together with a field hospital. It appeared to Sir Frederick Haines that, if possible, one or more existing *garhis* (or walled enclosures), such as are found in every Afghan village, should, if possible, be secured and covered by field works, so as to form a strong defensible post, within which, of course, the existence of an ample water-supply would be an indispensable necessity. After occupation, every endeavour was to be made, and every available animal employed, to store provisions, and to bring up to this advanced base all provisions, grain, etc., required for a future advance, together with reserves of ammunition, artillery, and small-arms, such as would enable the 1st Division in the least possible time to respond to any urgent call for immediate movements.

At length on the 12th April the long-looked-for forward movement commenced, and Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne's divisional head-quarters with a small column of the 1st Brigade left Jalalabad at 5 a.m., and marched to Bawali, a distance of 12 miles. Next day the column proceeded about 12 miles to Nimla, joined *en route* by part of the force at Fatehabad, and on the 14th it arrived at Safed Sang, which was found to be more suitable for occupation than Gandamak.

On the 17th April the troops at Fatehabad were

ordered to join divisional head-quarters at Safed Sang; and the garrison of Fort Sale near Jalalabad was detailed as follows:

Cavalry	. . .	3 troops, 11th Bengal Lancers.
Artillery	. . .	E-3, Royal Artillery (1 division).
British Infantry	. . .	100 51st Light Infantry.
Native Infantry	. . .	{ 1st Sikhs.
		{ $\frac{1}{2}$ Guides Infantry.
Sappers and Miners		1 company.

The remaining portions of the 3rd Brigade, namely, two divisions of E-3, Royal Artillery, and head-quarters 51st Light Infantry, marched for Safed Sang on the 25th.

The Fatehabad detachment reached Safed Sang on the 20th and the camp there was on the same day shifted to higher and better ground on the southern slopes of the Nimla plateau.

Meanwhile the field telegraph, which had reached Fatehabad on the 10th April, was pushed on thence with the head-quarters' force, communication being kept up uninterruptedly during the march by the aid of the mule ground line.

The position of Safed Sang commands the whole of the country on three sides, the remaining side being the one towards Fatehabad, the holding of which was not likely to occasion difficulty. The heights of the camps at Fatehabad, Nimla, and Safed Sang were respectively 2,300, 3,700, and 4,500 feet, thus giving a rise of over 2,000 feet, which was desirable from a climatic point of view, as the weather grew warmer.

Safed Sang is distant from Jalalabad about 30 miles. The road for the first 12 miles is fatiguing, being either stony or knee-deep in sand as far as Fort Rozabad, which place is situated on the bank of an affluent of the Surkhab, and furnishes excellent accommodation for at least 250 infantry and 50 cavalry. A signalling station was established here on the highest tower of the fort.

From Rozabad (Bawali) to the next post the distance

is about 9 miles, the route running past the village of Fatehabad at about 4 miles. This post was named Fort Battye, being within sight of the battlefield of the 2nd of April, where Major Wigram Battye was killed. It was entrenched and put in a thorough state of defence, and garrisoned by 150 Punjab Infantry and a troop of 11th Bengal Lancers. The distance from Fort Battye to Safed Sang or Gandamak, where the head-quarters 1st Division were concentrated, is 9 miles; the road was not good, but was quickly improved by the Sappers.

Gandamak is about 3 miles beyond Safed Sang. The camp at the latter place was strongly situated on the summit of a barren, stony ridge, where the heat in summer is very great during the daytime, although the temperature at night, by reason of the excessive radiation, is comparatively low. The great drawback to the place was the dust, which necessitated two changes of site; otherwise the situation was secure and the water-supply excellent.

On the 15th April Colonel MacGregor (Chief of the Staff) again brought to notice the deficiency of transport, together with other questions regarding the general working of the Commissariat Department. In consequence of this General Maude was directed to transfer to the 1st Division all serviceable camels in excess of 1,500, and all available mule carriage, in view of a possible advance on Kabul from Gandamak.

On the 9th April a slight skirmish took place in the Haft Chah Valley resulting in a loss to the enemy of 15 men, but with this exception there were no hostilities during the middle of the month.

In consequence of incessant rumours¹ that the Mohmands were gathering with hostile intent, and were about to cross the Kabul River in order to attack Dakka or some other point in the line of communications, a column of the following strength under command of Lieutenant-Colonel O. Barnes, 10th Bengal

¹ These rumours were discounted by the Political Officer.

Lancers, commanding at Dakka, marched from that place on the 21st April to ascertain the number and character of the threatening force :

- 2 Guns C-3, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 3 Companies, Mhairwara Battalion.

This reconnaissance proceeded as far as Kam Dakka, a village on the same side of the Kabul River, 7 miles below Dakka ; the force found here that the south side of the river was clear of the hostile tribesmen, and accordingly returned to Dakka without experiencing any opposition except exchanging a few shots across the river, where, according to unanimous report, the Mohmands were in great strength. The guns, being unable to move along the goat path which clings to the spur overhanging the Kabul River, remained with an escort at Loi Dakka.

On this result being telegraphed to divisional headquarters, the Political Assistant, Major Conolly, who was in camp at the time, urgently recommended the despatch of two companies of the Mhairwara Battalion to Kam Dakka to protect its inhabitants.

Instructions were wired to this effect, and accordingly Captain O'Moore Creagh, with 138 officers and men of the battalion, marched at 5 p.m. on the 21st from Dakka and reached Kam Dakka 11 p.m., after experiencing considerable difficulty in getting the mules over the hills in the dark.

On arriving Captain Creagh was surprised to find that the villagers were very far from desiring his presence or protection, which would, they said, have no effect but to bring on them the anger of their fellow-tribesmen. Their demeanour was anything but friendly ; they refused to allow the detachment to enter the village, and on the following morning they persisted in limiting their alliance to remaining neutral in the fighting which was now imminent. From 5 a.m. on the 22nd hostile Mohmands were crossing the river

and gathering in crowds on the hill in front of the place where the detachment was camped. There appeared little chance of reinforcement during this day, and Captain Creagh made such dispositions as seemed possible for defence. As the attack of the Mohmands developed, Captain Creagh gradually drew back, until about 8 a.m., when, having been reinforced by 30 men with ammunition, he finally established his detachment in a graveyard, his left resting on the Kabul River. Here he set to work to construct rough breastworks, while the advance of the enemy was kept in check by skirmishers, and the baggage, followers, and animals were collected under cover of the river bank. Scarcely were these preparations completed when the skirmishers were driven in, the tribesmen swarmed down the hills and completely surrounded the position.

From 9 a.m. till 3 p.m. the defence continued, the enemy, who numbered about 1,200, several times making assaults on the entrenchments and being repulsed only by bayonet charges. About 2 p.m. the assailants had closed round the troops to a uniform distance of from 70 to 90 yards. At 3 o'clock the ammunition began to run low, and the position became most critical, when the enemy suddenly appeared to be moving away from right to left, and immediately afterwards a small reinforcement of 40 infantry arrived, under Captain D. M. Strong, 10th Bengal Lancers, having pushed on in front of a relieving column which had been sent out from Dakka under his command. This addition of strength, however, was not sufficient to dislodge the enemy nor to effect a withdrawal of the detachment without considerable loss, but a few minutes later a further reinforcement appeared in the shape of a troop of the 10th Bengal Lancers under Lieutenant C. E. Pollock. Captain Strong immediately took command of this from his subaltern, and delivered a vigorous charge against the enemy, driving them from their position, dispersing them in all directions, some seeking refuge by rushing into the river, while the

WITHDRAWAL FROM SATTA PASS 75

remainder fled to the hills on the right under the fire of the two mountain guns and infantry. Captain Creagh's detachment now charged out of the entrenchment, and then returned to carry off the dead and wounded, while the cavalry covered the withdrawal.

Almost at the same time a company of the 1-12th Foot and two guns of 11-9, Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, arrived opportunely from Colonel Norman's column, under Major J. B. Dyce, R.A., who assumed command; the guns opened on the masses of the enemy, who were again collecting, causing them to beat a precipitate retreat.

It had been the intention of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, commanding at Dakka, that after the relief of the Kam Dakka detachment the Satta Pass leading to that place should be held for the night, and the enemy attacked on the following morning with all the available troops. Major Dyce, however, did not consider it practicable to hold the pass owing to the fatigue which the men had undergone, and the want of water, rations, and ammunition. The withdrawal of the original force and reinforcements under Captain Strong and Major Dyce was consequently effected. The combined column arrived at 8 p.m., the enemy following it up closely and keeping up an incessant though almost harmless fire.

Meanwhile, on the 21st April, a reconnoitring column¹ under Colonel F. B. Norman, 24th Punjab Infantry, had been despatched from Landi Kotal by General Maude, who considered, notwithstanding the reports of the Political Officers, that the situation required clearing up. Colonel Norman's column marched *viâ* Kam Shilman to Sarobi in the Prang Darra, where they encamped. Next morning the two mountain guns with their escort were pushed on up the Loi Shilman, over the Shilman Ghakhe Pass, and the foresight of General Maude was rewarded by the assistance they gave in extricating Captain Creagh's detachment.

¹ 11-9 Royal Artillery, 2 mountain guns. | 24th Punjab Infantry, 4 companies,
1-12 Foot, 4 companies. | and a few *sowars*.

On the 22nd further reinforcements were sent from Basawal as well as from Landi Kotal on the situation of the Kam Dakka detachment becoming known.

On the morning of the 23rd, at 6.30 a.m., a force composed as under¹ consisting of all the available troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Sillery, 1-12th Foot, moved from Dakka to the Satta Pass, over which the cavalry and Gurkhas advanced, while the guns were posted so as to command the river and the road. A few tribesmen were observed on the opposite bank apparently preparing to cross on a raft, but a shell from a mountain gun dispersed them, and no other hostile parties were seen.

The remainder of Colonel Norman's column effected a junction with this force at Kam Dakka in the afternoon after a toilsome march, and remained there without molestation during the night, while the Dakka column returned to its own station the same evening.

The casualties among the troops in the affair of the 22nd were 6 killed and 18 wounded: the enemy lost about 200 killed.

The admirable gallantry displayed by the detachment of the Mhairwara Battalion was highly eulogised by the Commander-in-Chief; Captain Creagh was recommended for and awarded the Victoria Cross, and Captain Strong was brought to the special notice of the Commander-in-Chief for the judgment with which he had delivered a most effective charge against the enemy at a very critical moment.

On the 3rd May General Sir Sam Browne telegraphed to Simla that Yakub Khan had left Kabul that day for Safed Sang to negotiate terms of peace. It is necessary now to sketch the course of the negotiations which led to this result.

We have seen how on the 29th March the Amir

¹ C-3, Royal Artillery, 6 guns.

11-9, Royal Artillery, 4 mountain guns.

10th Bengal Lancers, 1 squadron.

2nd Gurkhas, 2 companies.

1-5th Fusiliers, 1 company.


1-12th Foot, 2 companies.

Mhairwara Battalion, 1 company.

ACTION OF FATEHABAD


April 2nd 1879.

Nº 6



W & A K. Johnston, Limited, Edinburgh & London

Scale of Yards



10th Royal Horse Artillery +++++

Guides Cavalry [Red Envelope Symbol]

Enemy (Khúgianis) [Green Dashed Line]

10th Royal Hussars [Red Envelope Symbol]

British Infantry [Red Square]

Figures denote successive positions.

wrote to Major Cavagnari expressing his readiness to receive a British Mission to consider the terms of a treaty. Notwithstanding the friendly tone of this letter, a few days later a communication from Yakub to the Khugianis was intercepted, dated the 4th April. In it the Sardar praised the tribesmen for their gallant resistance at the battle of Fatehabad, and exhorted them not to fear the infidels, against whom he (Yakub) was ready to launch an irresistible force of regular troops and *ghazis*. It continued: "Then, by the favour of God, and in accordance with the verse 'Verily, God has destroyed the powerful ones,' the whole of them will go to 'the fire of hell for evermore.' Therefore, according to the sacred text, 'Kill them to the extent of your ability.'"

It having been decided that, notwithstanding this letter, negotiations with Yakub should not be broken off, Major Cavagnari addressed a letter to His Highness, dated the 7th April, saying that the British Government acquiesced in the Amir's suggestion that a British Mission should be deputed to Kabul, and would appoint one as soon as intimation was received that the requisite arrangements for its reception had been made. Subsequently the Viceroy, in replying to Yakub's announcement of Sher Ali's death, and his own accession to the throne, intimated that he had decided to depute Major Cavagnari to Kabul and had invested him with authority to communicate unreservedly with the Amir upon the questions at issue; and that Major Cavagnari might be considered the representative of the Government of India.

Bakhtiar Khan, bearing Major Cavagnari's letter, reached Kabul on the 12th. Councils were at once held and the manner of receiving the British Mission was discussed in secret conclave. There was reason to believe that Yakub's advisers, two of whom, Sardar Sher Ali and Shah Muhammad, had just returned from Tashkent, were counselling him to abandon the English alliance and to trust to Russia. In these circumstances

Bakhtiar Khan, in the hope of securing the reception of the British Mission, advised Yakub to visit the British camp in person, a suggestion which was favourably received and ultimately adopted. On the 24th April Bakhtiar returned to Safed Sang, bringing two letters from the Amir, in one of which he proposed a visit to the British camp.

According to Bakhtiar Khan's account Yakub was afraid to receive a British Mission, lest it should undermine his authority at Kabul, and so compel him to accept such conditions as the British Government might choose to dictate. Moreover there was a strong military party at Kabul averse to peace, and it was doubtful whether Yakub would be able to protect the Mission from insult. Reports received from Kabul tended to show that the Amir's authority was unable to restrain the lawlessness of the mob and the soldiery, who plundered in the open street with impunity and even threatened to pillage the late Amir's treasury. They were only appeased by the payment of a large instalment of the arrears due to them.

In view of these reports the proposal that the Amir should come to the British camp was considered by the Viceroy to be preferable to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was therefore ordered to reply in friendly terms accepting the offer and promising to accord His Highness an honourable reception. On the 28th April Bakhtiar Khan reached Kabul and delivered his letter. On the next day he received the following reply from the Amir, stating that His Highness would start from Kabul on the 3rd May :

From Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Kabul, to Major Cavagnari, c.s.i., Political Officer.

“I beg to write this friendly letter to inform you that your very friendly communication, dated 25th April, 1879, sent by the hands of the worthy and intelligent Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, reached me at a very fortunate moment.

“Its gratifying contents, which notify the marks of noble friendship and give the glad tidings of the tokens of great affection between the two sublime States, have afforded me unbounded joy. The Munshi above mentioned has strung one by one on the thread of description the pearls of your friendly hints and the verbal messages with which you, actuated by the motives of most sincere friendship, entrusted him, and thereby he has opened the door of happiness and joy to the face of my heart, inasmuch as the grasp of the desire of having an interview with the (British) officers of high rank, and holding a happy conference with them, has taken hold of the skirt of my heart. I will, please God, set out from the capital (Kabul) for my destination on Monday, the 3rd May, 1879 (= 10th Jamadi-ul-Awal). Further, what can I write beyond expressions of friendship?”—Kabul, 30th April, 1879 (= 7th Jamadi-ul-Awal).

As has been related, Sir Sam Browne telegraphed the news of Yakub Khan's departure from Kabul on the 3rd May. This meant that the Amir accepted the principal demands of the British Government, including the cession of the Khyber and Kurram Valleys and the appointment of a British Resident. “The Kabul campaign,” said Sir Sam Browne, in a telegram of 3rd May, “may now be regarded as terminated.”

On the same date another sign of the favourable condition of affairs was furnished by the arrival in camp of Asmatulla Khan, the influential chief of the Ghilzais, who came to tender his services to the British General, and whose example would, it was expected, be followed by the whole of his tribe.

On the 6th May the approach of the Amir was announced. Ground was selected and tents pitched for his accommodation and that of his following, and on the 8th he arrived at the British camp at Gandamak, accompanied by his suite, and by an escort of the 10th Hussars and Guides Cavalry, who with Major Cavagnari had gone out to meet him. A royal salute of 21 guns was accorded to him, and the whole route


across the valley to the conical hill overlooking the Kabul road (where the remnants of the ill-fated 44th Regiment made their last stand in 1841) was lined with British troops. At the further end of the line the Amir was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, accompanied by his staff, and he rode into camp between the General and the Political Officer. There were on parade 156 officers and 4,595 non-commissioned officers and men. A guard of honour of 100 British infantry (1-17th Foot) received the Amir at his camp, where all arrangements for his comfort had been made.

The Amir appeared to the observers to be about 30 years of age, rather above the middle height; he seemed civil and cheerful, but said he was yet suffering from the effects of his imprisonment.

At 3 p.m. the Political Officer paid a visit of ceremony to the Amir, and at 4 p.m. Sir Sam Browne visited him. Congratulatory telegrams were then exchanged between His Highness and the Viceroy at Simla. Later on he paid a return visit to Sir Sam Browne, being received by a guard of honour of the 51st Light Infantry, and a salute of 21 guns being fired on his arrival and departure.

On the 10th May the serious negotiations commenced.

Considerable difficulty was encountered in bringing the Amir to terms on the territorial questions, and he combated any cession of country to the British with an obstinacy which Major Cavagnari characterised as "childish perverseness." After several interviews between the Political Officer and Yakub Khan or his advisers, the basis of an agreement was at length settled at a private interview between the former on the 17th May. On the 19th the commercial and telegraph clauses of the treaty were discussed, and notwithstanding incessant and often irrelevant additions and amendments on the part of the Amir, who evinced considerable suspicion, the tact and ability of Major Cavagnari brought matters to a close on the 26th May.



GUARD OF HONOUR TO AMIR YAKUB KHAN, GANDAMAK, MAY 1879

COUNTRY IN THE VICINITY OF KAM DAKKA

To illustrate Affairs of 21st and 22nd April 1879, and 15th to 18th January 1880.

Route of troop 10th B.L. -----


Cap^e Creagh's Force -----

Enemy -----

Camel track =====

Mule " -----

N^o 4



London, John Murray.

THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL 81

On the same day the Treaty of Gandamak¹ was formally executed. Mr. Jenkins, Assistant Political Officer, immediately started with it for Simla. It was ratified there by the Viceroy on the 30th, and it was received again at Safed Sang in time to be presented to the Amir on the morning of the 6th of June in full *darbar*.

Méantime, the Afridis and Shinwaris along the line of communications were reported to be more active than ever in cutting off unarmed camp followers and stray camels, whilst the telegraph line also was continually being cut at intervals; it was calculated that upwards of 50 miles of telegraph wire had been stolen during the occupation, probably, as it was suggested, by the so-called friendly picquets of *jazailchis*.

Nevertheless the news of the negotiations had already produced a good effect in dispersing the tribes who were assembled in Bajaur and Swat to join in a *jihad* against the unbelievers.

The question of the possibility of an immediate withdrawal² now became of first importance. On the 10th May a conference was held at Government House, Simla, over which Lord Lytton presided, and at which the Surgeon-General of the British Forces, Dr. Ker-Innes, and Dr. Cuninghame, the Sanitary Commissioner, were invited to express their opinions on the possibility of withdrawing the troops through the Khyber in the midst of the hot weather.

Previous to this date an outbreak of cholera at Peshawar had much increased the dangers and difficulty of withdrawal. Precautions were immediately taken, and sites suitable for cholera camps were selected, in case the disease should appear among the troops of the Field Force.

As early as 30th April Dr. J. Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer of the 2nd Division at Landi Kotal, had drawn up a detailed statement of the measures to be

¹ See Appendix V.

² For distribution of Field Force on the 26th May, see Appendix VI.

adopted to arrest the advance of cholera in the pass, which was published in Divisional Orders. Examining posts and cholera hospitals were established at Jamrud and Ali Masjid, where every human being was inspected on arrival and departure, examining tents being pitched and guards posted at the entrance and exit of each camp. A detached cholera hospital was also provided, and a medical subordinate was placed on duty with the guards for the purpose of inspecting incoming and outgoing convoys.

In spite of these measures, however, a fatal case of cholera occurred at Ali Masjid on the 6th May. The disease rapidly spread amongst the coolies employed by the Engineers: seventeen cases and twelve deaths occurred up to the 12th May, and on the 14th and 15th idem two cases, one of them fatal, were reported at Jalalabad. Yet, so far as was then known, Afghanistan was otherwise free from cholera, and previous history and experience led to a belief that, although a serious outbreak was to be feared in the Peshawar Valley, yet it was not likely that the epidemic would spread up the Khyber till later in the year.

On the 25th May a medical committee, under the presidency of Surgeon-General Ker-Innes, recommended the withdrawal of the troops from the Jalalabad Valley, on the ground that cholera had already broken out there, and there was reason to fear that it might increase. Moreover, there had been numerous cases of enteric fever among the British troops; and, with no better protection than small tents, there was grave cause to fear that the men would suffer much during the hot weather, not only from enteric fever, but also from other diseases consequent on exposure. There could be no question that, from every point of view, it would be of the greatest benefit to get the troops into quarters.

The memorandum concluded: "We have considered the matter with the anxious care which its importance demands, and have come to the conclusion that the alternative courses which present themselves are more

or less fraught with risk and danger, but that, under all the circumstances of the case, no such sanitary reasons now exist for retaining the troops in Afghanistan as would outweigh the political and financial reasons which, we understand, press for their return. Unfortunately; in this particular year and at this particular time, the choice is a choice of evils, and the troops, whether they remain or whether they return, will form a source of great anxiety for some time to come. These remarks do not apply immediately to that portion of them quartered at Gandamak; but as we apprehend that the question must be answered as regard the whole force, and not only as regards any one part of it, they need not be considered separately. If it should be resolved to withdraw the troops, there are certain special precautions which we would recommend for adoption, both with reference to the season of the year and the prevalence of cholera; and these we propose to submit at once in a separate memorandum."

Surgeon-General Ker-Innes indicated in his forwarding report the data and reasoning on which the foregoing conclusion was arrived at:

"The time was May. Cholera was present in the Khyber route and Peshawar Valley: it was extending to the north, and even threatening Kabul at a later date. If the troops marched into India, they marched into cholera; if they remained, it advanced on them. But, assuming that they remained, it would be necessary for them to continue at their posts until October; for past experience has sufficiently shown that cholera, when once it has invaded the Peshawar Valley, may be expected, speaking broadly as the result of past epidemics, to localise itself there from May to November. And, in addition to the augmentation of sickness from other and ordinary causes, such as fever, both malarial and enteric, and dysentery, there was the prospect, if not the absolute certainty, of the troops having to incur such additional risk from heat apoplexy as in the Punjab, the portion of the country nearest Afghanistan about

which we have any accurate data, which increases at the end of June, doubles in July, and remains in full activity in August and September."

A decision once arrived at, prompt action became essential, and instructions, embodying the views entertained by the Surgeon-General as to the expediency of the return march, and the conditions under which it might best be undertaken, were forwarded to the responsible medical officers.

Considering the nature of the march, and the time of year at which it was to be undertaken, an unusual amount of sickness was anticipated, and it was consequently imperative that every practicable precaution should be taken. It was recommended, as a first and essential step, that an experienced medical officer should be attached to the Quartermaster-General's Department as Sanitary Field Inspector, charged with the duty of advising the military authorities in the selection of encamping sites, preservation of water-supply, and sanitation of the several camps and rest depots *en route*; and especially with the initiation of the medical and hygienic arrangements for the troops and rest depots on the line of march. This duty was delegated to Surgeon-Major Porter.

At the same time other recommendations were made in regard to the formation of standing camps at easy marching distances from one another, old camping-grounds being avoided, and the double-fly European privates' tents being made available; marching in the evening was advocated in as open order as possible; the issue of refreshments, chiefly in a liquid form, half way and at the end of the march; the issue of meals at regular hours; the division of the rum ration into two issues.

By the end of May the cholera was severe, especially among the British troops at Landi Kotal and among the natives at Ali Masjid. There were nearly 200 sick, all serious cases, in the British field hospital at Safed Sang, and each corps there had from 20 to 60 men attending

daily for medicine. There were 200 sick in the native hospital at Safed Sang and 150 at Jalalabad, and these hospitals were filled very rapidly owing to the wretched condition of the followers of the force.

Notwithstanding this state of things, the military authorities decided on the withdrawal, and orders were issued that the British portion of the 1st Division should march in four bodies. The Field Hospital, 1st Division, Safed Sang, was thereupon divided into four sections, each section complete in itself as regards medicines, instruments, servants, and purveyors' stores. There were five medical officers and five medical subordinates with the field hospital :

British troops from Safed Sang.	troops	}	1st Section	{ 10th Hussars . . . }	Surgeon-Major H. Cornish.
			2nd Section	{ I-C, R.H.A.	} Surgeon-Major J. F. Supple.
				{ 13-9, R.A.	
			3rd Section	{ 4th Battalion Rifle Bri-	} Surgeon-Major G. J. H. Evatt.
{ gade.					
4th Section	{ E-3, R.A. (2 divisions) . }	} Surgeon-Major J. E. Fishbourne and Surgeon H. Charlesworth.			
	{ 51st Light Infantry . }				
British troops from Jalalabad	}	}	E-3, R.A. (1 division)	Surgeon-Major A. H. Ratigan.	
			51st Light Infantry		

The European strength at Safed Sang on 31st May was 2,679, which gave an average strength of 669 to each of the four sections.

With respect to the native regiments, the regimental system was maintained, each regiment having one medical officer.

Immediately on orders being issued for the retirement, every effort was made to despatch the commissariat stores and Engineer Park from Jalalabad. From that place to Dakka (40 miles) they were to be conveyed by rafts, and two wharves were accordingly constructed at Jalalabad for their embarkation. On the 3rd June the first despatch from the upper wharf took place, and on the 4th the regular service of rafts began. Some of these rafts were made of inflated skins, others of light pontoon casks; and others again of timber.

REMOVAL OF STORES

Meanwhile the troops of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were already on the move towards India, beginning with the 25th Foot, which left Dakka for Peshawar on the 31st May.

On the 7th June the Amir left Gandamak, having completed all arrangements with Major Cavagnari as to the reception of the Mission at Kabul; and on the same day Sir Sam Browne and divisional head-quarters left Safed Sang, and Major Cavagnari started immediately for Simla to confer with the Viceroy. The field telegraph line was also rolled up between Safed Sang and Fort Battye, communication being maintained by heliograph.

On the 8th June Brigadier-General Tytler's brigade, forming the rear guard of the Peshawar Field Force (as it had also found the advanced guard), vacated the camp, and the last British soldier left Gandamak. The field telegraph was rolled up one day's march in advance of the rear guard, and its place taken by the heliograph under Lieutenant Whistler Smith, R.E. The rear guard consisted of:

- 27th Punjab Infantry (for Dakka).
- 45th Sikhs (for Mardan).
- Hazara Mountain Battery (for Dakka).
- Guides Cavalry (for Peshawar).

In spite of the unwearied exertions of the Sappers under Major Blair the stores from Jalalabad were not all despatched by the 10th, and consequently the march of the rear guard was delayed to admit of the remainder, some 25,000 maunds of stores, being shipped down the river. On each raft one or more sappers were sent as guard, and in this manner two companies, as well as all the pioneer workmen, were despatched to Dakka. It was also found feasible to send down a large number of native invalids, including cholera patients.

On the morning of the 11th June the divisional head-quarters staff and numerous other officers embarked on rafts, and before night all the stores remaining were

down at the wharves ; and, by carrying on the preparation of the rafts all night, everything was cleared off by 6.30 a.m. on the 13th, so that the rear guard could march that day. A little wetting to the food supplies was incurred, but no loss whatever to the Engineer stores. None of the defensive works constructed at Jalalabad were demolished, but were handed over intact to the Amir's Government.

From Jalalabad to Dakka signalling was not maintained after the telegraph line was rolled up, owing to the difficulty of establishing detached stations on Samar Khel Koh above Ali Boghan, from which only could communication be kept up between the Chardeh and Jalalabad plains. Signallers, however, accompanied the rear guard so as to open communication, if necessary.

Sir Sam Browne left Landi Kotal for Peshawar on the 16th June, by which date the evacuation of the line held between Landi Kotal and Gandamak had been completed.

Meantime, the troops had suffered considerably from cholera during their march from Gandamak to India. The 10th Hussars lost 34 troopers and 3 camp followers. The Rifle Brigade suffered more severely still—viz. 2 officers and 46 men, besides 6 from sunstroke. The 17th Regiment lost the comparatively small number of 9 men, and the 51st Light Infantry 13 men. Three medical officers and an officer attached to the Transport also succumbed to this disease.

The effects of the return march are thus described in Surgeon-General Ker-Innes' narrative :

“ A march at this time of the year in Afghanistan involved exposure to a temperature ranging from 110° to 115° Fahr. in the shade ; and, in spite of every precaution, the suffering of the troops was, as might have been expected, great. The men were in indifferent health from long exposure and inactivity in a trying climate. Their recall to India was evidently welcome and popular, and they started with a considerable degree of alacrity and cheerfulness, and throughout

an excellent and self-denying spirit animated the whole. But the conditions to which they were inevitably exposed—excessive heat, dust-storms, not a particle of shade from Safed Sang to Peshawar, indifferent food, intolerable thirst, scarcity of water, and that which was available bad—proved unusually trying. Had it not been for the prevalence of cholera, the troops would, however, have performed the march with comparatively few casualties.

“On reaching Jamrud and Hari-Singh-ka-Burj, and especially as they made their final marches, their distress was very apparent. Their clothes were stiff and dirty from the profuse perspiration and dust; their countenances betokened great nervous exhaustion, combined with a wild expression, difficult to describe; the eyes injected, and even sunken; a burning skin, black with the effects of sun and dirt; dry tongue; a weak voice; and a thirst which no amount of fluids seemed to relieve. Many of these men staggered rather than marched into their tents, and threw themselves down utterly incapable of further exertion until refreshed by sleep and food. This was very marked in the 51st Light Infantry. Nor did the officers appear to be in any better plight.

“But if there was one class worse than another, it was certainly the medical officers and subordinates. Surgeon-Major Porter states that on their arrival at Hari-Singh-ka-Burj, most of these were in a painfully helpless and prostrate condition, both mentally and bodily. This was attributable to the strain to which they had been subjected—almost incessant work, night and day, coupled with that anxiety and depression which even the most indifferent or callous must share in the presence of so much disease, fatigue, and responsibility. Some had almost literally no relief from toil, as from so many of their number becoming ill, the duties became doubled and trebled for those who remained at their posts. The medical officer in charge of the section field hospital broke down early; next,

the surgeon of the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade; and a third arrived at Hari Singh simply capable of handing over his sick before being himself placed on the sick list. The medical officers had been thrown entirely on their own resources in regard to the pitching and striking of tents, receiving no European assistance for this purpose. They had also to muster the doolie bearers before marching, and drive them like so many cattle along the march. Others, not entitled to draw forage allowance, were obliged to march on foot, and at the end of it (the march) to perform their professional duties when worn out by fatigue and excessive heat. While the troops were passing through Peshawar there were twelve medical officers on the sick list at one time. And, according to the returns of the officers' hospital, the percentage of medical officers to total admissions was 38·3."

Up to the 25th of June 317 cases of cholera and 199 deaths were reported, of which latter 75 were Europeans, including Captain R. B. Reed, 12th Foot. The remainder were native troops and followers.

The whole of this retirement was effected almost without molestation, and the subjects of the Amir were quiet along the route by which the British troops had to march. Within the new British frontier in the Khyber Pass, an attack was made on the baggage of the 9th Lancers, on the 6th June, by Afridi robbers, when two cartmen were killed and some property of officers stolen, and on the 27th a small number of grass-cutters were attacked by robbers, near Landi Kotal, and two of their number killed.

On the 21st June Sir Sam Browne reported to the Commander-in-Chief that the 1st Division of the Peshawar Valley Field Force was broken up on the 19th, and that he himself was about to leave for Mian Mir on the same date.

On the 26th June Brigadier-General Tytler reported that Dakka had been evacuated and all the stores

EVACUATION COMPLETED

removed, which, with the rear guard, had arrived at Landi Kotal.

On the completion of the evacuation the following were detailed to garrison the posts in the newly acquired British territory on the Khyber line as follows :

Cavalry . . .	10th Bengal Lancers (2 squadrons)	} Landi Kotal.	
Artillery . . .	{ 11-9, Royal Artillery . . .		}
	{ No. 4, Mountain Battery . . .		
British Infantry	{ 1st Battalion 12th Foot . . .		}
	{ 1st Battalion 17th Foot . . .	}	
Native Infantry	{ 24th Bengal Infantry . . .		}
	{ 27th Bengal Infantry . . .	}	
Native Infantry	{ 39th Bengal Infantry . . .		} At Ali Masjid.
	{ 45th Bengal Infantry . . .	}	
Cavalry . . .	10th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron)		} At Jamrud.
Native Infantry	2 companies from Peshawar.	}	

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRE COLUMN, OR KURRAM VALLEY FIELD FORCE

THE original intention of the Government of India, when a campaign against the Amir of Afghanistan became necessary, was to make the only important advance in the autumn of 1878 by the Kurram line, since it was considered that owing to the lateness of the season immediate pressure could not be exerted elsewhere. As early as the 4th October the movement towards the frontier of the troops destined to form the Kurram Valley Field Force commenced, the ground for the concentration camp was selected at Thal, the site laid out, and conservancy, watering, and sanitary arrangements were pushed forward.

The following staff and troops had been detailed on that date :

Major-General F. S. Roberts, R.A., C.B., V.C., Commanding.

Lieutenant G. T. Pretyman, R.A., Aide-de-Camp.

Major W. Galbraith, 85th Foot, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major H. Collett, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain R. G. Kennedy, Q.M.G.'s Dept., } Deputy Assistant Quarter-

Captain F. S. Carr, 5th Punjab Cavalry, } masters-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer.

Lieutenant F. T. N. Spratt, R.E., } Assistant Field Engineers.

Lieutenant S. Grant, R.E., }

Captain A. S. Wynne, 51st Foot, Superintendent Field Telegraphs.

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General F. F. Allen, C.B., Indian Medical Service.

Commissariat Department.

Captain A. R. Badcock, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

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ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Lindsay, R.A., Commanding.
Lieutenant E. G. Osborne, R.A., Adjutant.
Captain J. A. S. Colquhoun, Commissary of Ordnance.
F-A, Royal Horse Artillery.
G-3, Royal Artillery.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
No. 2 (Derayat) Mountain Battery.

CAVALRY.

Colonel H. H. Gough, C.B., V.C., Commanding.
1 Squadron 10th Hussars.
5th Punjab Cavalry.
12th Bengal Cavalry.

INFANTRY.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Colonel A. H. Cobbe, 17th Foot, Commanding.
Captain A. Scott, V.C., 4th Sikh Infantry, Brigade-Major.
2nd Battalion 8th Foot.
5th Punjab Infantry.
23rd Pioneers.
29th (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Colonel J. B. Thelwall, C.B., Commanding.
Captain G. de C. Morton, 6th Foot, Brigade-Major.
72nd Highlanders.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
5th Gurkhas.
21st (Punjab) Regiment of Native Infantry.

7th Company, Sappers and Miners.
Engineer and Ordnance Field Parks.

(At Kohat.)

Major J. C. Auchinleck . . . C-4, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker . . . 92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson . . . 28th Punjab Native Infantry.

On the 22nd October Major-General F. S. Roberts was appointed to the command of this column, and the following general directions for his guidance in the

INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL ROBERTS 93

operations entrusted to his charge were given to him in Adjutant-General's letter No. 138-K., dated Simla, 22nd October, 1878 :

“ 1. I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inform you that, with the sanction of Government, you have been appointed to the command of a column of troops as per margin.

“ 2. Your first endeavour will be to get this force together in the Upper Miranzai Valley, and to establish an entrenched post at Thal.

“ 3. This post should be of such dimensions as to cover two guns, a regiment of native infantry, and a wing of cavalry, to be detailed from the troops of the column and at Kohat. The object of this detachment is to maintain your communications, and to afford a convenient half-way depot for sick and stores, provision of shelter for which should be provided.

“ 4. His Excellency cannot too forcibly impress upon you the necessity of securing in your interests the services of the chiefs and khans of influence of the tribes bordering on your route and the district of Kurram.

“ 5. In communication with the civil authorities, it would be very desirable to cause one of those chiefs to accompany you, and to secure the services of as many of the chiefs of Turis and their horsemen as may be available.

“ 6. It will be for you to consider, with the information at your disposal, the nature of operations most likely to secure the objects of Government. The positions respectively of Kurram, Khost, and Dawar, all south of the Safed Koh, held by or more or less subordinate to the Kabul Government, must be accepted as within the zone of your operations.

“ 7. Your first object will be to engage any of the troops belonging to the Amir of Kabul in occupation of Kurram, to drive them and the ruler from the valley, and to take possession of the same, as also of Khost ; and to communicate to the inhabitants of Dawar that

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the British has replaced Afghan supremacy from date of notification, but to leave any practical application of such supremacy for future adjustment at a convenient time.

“8. It is difficult to define the limit to which your action should immediately extend in the direction of Kabul. Without question the Kurram district must be held to extend to the watershed of the Kurram River, embracing the Hariab Valley and Mangal country up to the Shutargardan and Zurmat Passes.

“9. In the first instance, however, it may be desirable to command the Paiwar Pass and the road as far as the village of Ali Khel or hamlet of Rokian, near to the junction of the direct road from Kabul by the Gharigi (Lakara Pass) route with the Shutargardan route, and which marks the boundary between Jaji and Ghilzai lands.

“10. Every endeavour should be made to gain over the Ahmadzai faction of the Ghilzai tribe, who hold the lands on the watershed on this line to Kabul, and whose tents and herds seek shelter in the winter months in the Kurram district.

“11. Discipline demands that the officers, soldiers, and followers confine themselves to the roads; and that the latter especially be prohibited from wandering into villages or destroying crops.

“12. Every encouragement should be given to the people to supply your bazaars, and at every camp a place not only be allotted for such trade, but a British and a native non-commissioned officer of the Provost Marshal's establishment be told off to protect them and to prevent disputes.

“13. The considerate and friendly demeanour of all towards the people will do more than anything else to secure their goodwill and assistance. The Jajis and Turis of Kurram, having nothing in common with the ‘powers that be’ at Kabul or with the Afghan tribes, may be expected gladly to espouse our cause.

“14. Although the most direct route from Kohat

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to Kurram is through the Zaimukht country, policy immediately demands that its adoption be positively prohibited.

“15. On first arriving at Kurram, the position of Muhammad Azim’s fort in the centre of the valley, and which has hitherto been the seat of Government, would appear to present the most desirable location for the establishment of your head-quarters; and, should such appear to you desirable, it would be well to concentrate there your depot and supplies, and without delay secure all available shelter.

“16. The matter of supply is a most important one, and every endeavour must be made to rapidly collect some two or three months in advance of the daily demands of the force.

“17. Too great stress cannot be placed upon your limiting baggage, while at the same time ensuring that every soldier and follower is fully provided with all articles of warm clothing as sanctioned, and that your stores of ammunition and food are continually maintained.

“18. The protection and care of your carriage is a matter of great importance. The former must be secured by prohibiting grazing of camels without escort, and the latter by constant inspections.

“19. Grass-cutters when beyond our present border will, whilst engaged at their calling, require protection. Much, however, of your supply of provender for maintenance of horses and cattle will have to be secured from the villagers; but, in obtaining this, parties must not be permitted to act indiscriminately, but invariably act under the immediate orders of an officer, British or native.

“20. With these orders for your general guidance, the Commander-in-Chief, with the full authority of Government, must leave the matter to your discretion and judgment, in which his Excellency has the fullest confidence.

“21. Should affairs in Kurram appear to justify such

a measure, it will be for you to distribute your force, so as to expose it as little as possible to the inclemency of the winter. Such consideration would justify the retention of any portion of it at Thal or elsewhere as circumstances on the spot may appear desirable."

On receipt of above letter Major-General Roberts lost no time in discussing with Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Waterfield, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, the manner in which an advance up the Kurram Valley could most advantageously be carried out. A report had already been drawn up by that officer, and submitted to the Punjab Government, detailing the tribes with whom a column in that district would come in contact, and the probabilities of their attitude being hostile or otherwise. After consulting with Lieutenant-Colonel Waterfield, Major-General Roberts forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief a sketch of his proposed advance, in the preparation of which, however, he was impeded by the uncertainty as to when the operations would probably begin. The scheme which was ultimately carried out is contained in the following paragraph :

"14. Should the advance be delayed for two or three weeks, the column will, I hope, be in a different condition to what it is now as regards supplies and carriage, and it would then be practicable to leave Thal as a body, or by brigades at a day's interval, carrying one month's supplies. This would enable me to push on to the Paiwar or Ali Khel, with perhaps only one or two days' halt at Muhammad Azim's fort. Indeed, if the frontier is to be crossed on any date after the 15th November it would be necessary to move with the least possible delay so as to reach the Paiwar before snow falls. In this case Khost and Dawar, etc., would be left until later in the season, when a small column could march leisurely all over Kurram and the neighbouring valleys."

Here, as elsewhere, the Commissariat and Transport arrangements were a serious difficulty and were alluded to with anxiety by Major-General Roberts.

“21. The question of supply is, as stated in paragraph 16 of the Adjutant-General’s letter, a most important one, and has my most earnest attention; but I may be permitted respectfully to remark that it is a matter in which I am at present more or less helpless.

“Rawalpindi is our immediate base, from which come all provisions required for British troops, such as tea, sugar, and rum. Rawalpindi is also the place to which we have to look mainly for our transport, bread-stuff and *ghi*, and altogether for warm clothing for followers, doolie-bearers and *dandies*—that is to say, all these requirements come either from or through Rawalpindi. The necessity for meeting the sudden large demands in the direction of Peshawar has caused the diversion of considerable quantities of supplies originally intended for Kohat. The result is that this column is at present without some of the necessaries required both by British and native troops, and is still short of the estimated amount of transport.”

Immediately on appointment to the command, Major-General Roberts proceeded to Kohat, to superintend the organisation of the force assembling there and at Thal, the construction of an entrenched post at the latter place, and the establishment of a main depot of supply, the formation of a base hospital at Kohat, and arrangements for the construction of a trestle bridge across the Kurram River at Thal.

For the present the bulk of the troops on their arrival were echeloned in the vicinity of Kohat, to prevent any premature crowding to the front until the final concentration was required, thereby allowing supplies to be collected at the Thal depot more speedily.

Meanwhile reconnaissances were made in the neighbourhood of Thal by Captain F. S. Carr, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, by whom the various fords over the Kurram River were personally tested, and one for infantry and one for cavalry were finally selected.

The looked-for order to advance was received by General Roberts on the afternoon of the 20th November, and at 5 a.m. on the 21st the river and the frontier on the right bank were crossed by an advanced party¹ under Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, 29th Punjab Infantry. The Major-General and divisional staff accompanied this party for reconnaissance purposes.

The remainder of the 1st Infantry Brigade with F-A, Horse Artillery, crossed the river immediately behind the advanced troops, and marched along the right bank direct to Khapianga (4 miles), where there was good camping ground and a fortified *thana*. The advanced troops arrived at the same place by a circuitous march with the object of intercepting the retreat of the garrison, but the latter had retired on the previous evening, and the place was found to be deserted. On the same day, after a short halt at Khapianga, Colonel Gordon's advanced party, accompanied by Major-General Roberts and the head-quarters, pushed on another 8 miles to Ahmad-i-Shama, where was another *thana*, also deserted. Next day the advanced troops marched to Hazir Pir, the 1st Brigade to Ahmad-i-Shama, and the 2nd (Brigadier-General Thelwall's) Brigade to Khapianga, and in this order the division advanced without opposition till the 27th November. Kurram Fort was reached *viâ* the Darwazai Pass and occupied by the head-quarters and the advanced party on the 25th, and on the same date the Major-General and staff, escorted by the 12th Bengal Cavalry, reconnoitred towards Habib Kala, whence the Amir's troops under Muhammad Zaman Khan, including six mountain battery and five field guns, and (it was reported) about 18,000 infantry, had just retired, and were seen retreating over the Paiwar Kotal.

¹ Colonel J. J. H. Gordon.	{	Cavalry .	{ 1 squadron 10th Hussars . . .	} By ford opposite Bilaud Khel.
		Artillery .	{ 1 troop 12th Bengal Cavalry	
			No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Bat- tery (Captain J. A. Kelso)	} By ford below the bridge.
		Cavalry .	12th Bengal Cavalry (re- mainder).	
	Infantry .	29th Punjab Infantry . . .	By the bridge.	

On the 27th November both Brigadier-General A. H. Cobbe's brigade and that of Brigadier-General J. B. Thelwall, except the 21st Punjab Infantry, which remained at Khapianga, were concentrated at Kurram Fort, where also the camp of the head-quarters and escort remained.

During the advance signs were not wanting of the goodwill of the inhabitants of Kurram towards the British. On the 21st a letter from the Saiads of Kurram was received enquiring when the force would arrive there, as the people had been suffering much from the tyranny of the Amir and were looking forward most anxiously for the arrival of the British troops. As the Major-General proceeded along the road the headmen of the different villages came out to pay their respects; when Colonel Gordon of the advance guard arrived at Hazir Pir two of the leading Saiads of Kurram, *viz.* Muhammad Khan and Badshah Mir, came into his camp. Shinawaz Khan of Durani (Zaimukht) also sent in a messenger to say that he himself would have come, but that he feared his son had been detained as a hostage by the Afghans. Supplies of grass, fuel, and rice were freely brought in by the villagers at Hazir Pir. But high prices were asked, and the people seemed quite aware that no supplies would be taken forcibly, and that they had only to fix their own price.

"There can be no doubt," says Major H. Collett, in his diary, "that the people in the Kurram Valley were glad to see us, and that, smarting, as they then were, under Sher Ali's late exactions, they regarded General Roberts' troops as deliverers from an oppressive Government."

On the 27th November orders were issued at Kurram preparatory to the assault of the enemy's position on the Paiwar Kotal; a garrison was told off for the Kurram Fort; all weak and sickly men were weeded out, to be left there under a field officer of the 8th Foot; and tents and other baggage were reduced to the lowest possible scale.

The following day the main body moved to Habib Kala in two columns, the left, including the 1st Brigade under the personal direction of the Major-General, the right under Brigadier-General Thelwall. On arrival at Habib Kala intelligence was received by General Roberts that the Amir's troops had abandoned their guns at the foot of the Paiwar Kotal, and that they were in disorderly retreat.

A reconnoissance in force, consisting of the 5th and 29th Punjab Infantry, with two guns and a mountain battery, under Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, were therefore pushed up the south-eastern flanks of the Paiwar, by which it was ascertained that, far from the enemy having abandoned any guns, they had, on the contrary, taken up an extremely strong position on the pass and were well provided with artillery judiciously placed.

This force came up with the last of the Afghan rear-guard entering the ravine leading to the pass, and pushed into the hills to reconnoitre the position, with the object of making the enemy disclose his dispositions. In carrying out the instructions given, the 5th and 29th Punjab Infantry came under a hot fire from the Afghan artillery and infantry, who were found to be strongly posted ready for defence. These two regiments retired at nightfall, supported by the 5th Gurkhas, who were sent out from the main body for the purpose. The casualties were Lieut. A. J. F. Reid, of the Punjab Infantry, and eleven men wounded.

The Major-General, with the 8th Foot and 23rd Pioneers, arrived at the village of Teri Mangal at 2 p.m., and arrangements were made to encamp the troops on the dry ricefields below the village, which had been that morning vacated by the Amir's troops. The tents had not arrived, but the arms were piled on the ground told off to the different regiments. At 4 p.m. the enemy brought a gun to the top of the ridge above Teri Mangal, commanding the approach to the kotal, which was immediately above and about 2,000 yards from the camping ground, and pitched several shells

into the camp. They were 7-pr. mountain shells, and fortunately were blind, so that no one was injured.

Two guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, were quickly got into action, and several well-aimed shells were sent in reply, as well as among some Afghans who were annoying a picquet of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

After this the camp was withdrawn about a mile to the rear, strong picquets were posted on the adjacent heights, and there was no disturbance during the night.

On the 29th the camp was again shifted to a more secure site and the troops were arranged in a more systematic manner than had been possible on the previous evening. The day was occupied in various reconnaissances of the Paiwar Kotal and the surrounding hills. On the night of the 29th the Jaji *maliks*, who up till now had shown a friendly spirit and had remained in General Roberts' camp, suddenly absconded.

The enemy's position extended from the Spingawai Kotal on their left or north to some commanding heights about a mile south of the Paiwar Kotal, thus presenting a front of about four miles facing due east, the Paiwar Kotal being about the enemy's right centre. From right to left or north and south the position ran along a rugged range of mountains, mostly covered with dense pine forest. The range was precipitous towards the eastern side, but was known to descend on the western by a succession of upland meadows towards the valley of the Hariab. The position, as thus described, was crossed by two regular tracks over the Paiwar and the Spingawai Kotal respectively, besides two or three other paths, which, however, were too narrow and precipitous for the passage of troops. The important military feature in the position was that the successive ridges or peaks into which it was broken dominated each other from north to south. Thus a force stationed on the heights to the south of the Spingawai Kotal would have a command over each succeeding eminence as it advanced along the ridge towards the Paiwar Kotal.

The Paiwar Kotal is a narrow depression in the ridge, and is commanded on each side by high pine-clad mountains. The approach to it from the Kurram Valley is up a steep, narrow, zigzag path, entirely commanded throughout its length from the adjacent heights, and was difficult of ascent owing to the extreme roughness of the road, which was covered with large fragments of rock. Every point of the ascent was exposed to fire from both guns and rifles securely placed behind breastworks constructed of pine logs and stones. At the top of the pass was a narrow plateau, which was again commanded from the thickly wooded heights as they rose to an elevation of 500 feet on each side of the kotal. On the western side the road passes by a gentle descent through a narrow valley with pine-clad sides for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, when it reaches the open valley of the Hariab, near the hamlet of Zabardast Kala.

The Spingawai Kotal, which formed the extreme left of the enemy's line, is a position far less capable of defence, and of an altogether different character from that of the Paiwar. The approach to it is up a broad stony ravine. The ascent is not steep, except when close to the summit, and the valley is of sufficient width to admit of the movement of troops. The position does not in short possess the natural military advantages which are so remarkable at the Paiwar Kotal. The Spingawai route was followed by Colonel Lumsden's Mission to Kandahar in 1857, in order to avoid collision with the Jajis of Paiwar.

A reconnaissance by Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., escorted by two companies of the 23rd Pioneers, showed that no attack could be directed from the north of the camp on the kotal, for a deep valley separated it from the ridge on which the northern picquet of the British force was posted. At the same time Major Collett with Captain Carr, Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., and a company of Pioneers, was sent to reconnoitre the Spingawai route. They reached the summit of a ridge 5 miles from camp, overlooking the Spingawai

road and the Paiwar village and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Spingawai Kotal, of which a good view was obtained.

It was reported :

- (1) That the road up the kotal was practicable for all arms.¹
- (2) That this kotal was on the same ridge as the Paiwar Kotal, and that (apparently) a force working from the former (*i.e.* the Spingawai) towards the latter would pass over a succession of dominating positions ;
- (3) That the enemy did not probably hold the Spingawai in force, though a picquet and a gun held a commanding route to the south of the Spingawai Kotal, and perhaps there was a gun on the kotal itself ;
- (4) That the road to the kotal from the village of Paiwar was easy ;
- (5) That the shorter road followed by the reconnoitring party was impracticable for mountain guns, but good for infantry ;
- (6) That the time required for infantry to march from the British camp to the ridge reached by the reconnaissance was two hours, and that two more hours would probably be required for them to reach the Spingawai. From the Spingawai Kotal along the ridge to the Paiwar Kotal the natives said would require three hours. So at least eight hours would have to be allowed for the accomplishment of any turning movement by this route.

The route appeared to Major Collett perfectly practicable, but the time necessary seemed almost prohibitive.

A third reconnoitring party was led by Colonel Gordon towards the Paiwar Kotal by way of the ridge on which the south (5th Punjab Infantry) picquet was

¹ This was proved afterwards to be erroneous.

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posted. It was ascertained that this ridge was continuous with the Paiwar Kotal ridge, and that an attack could be conducted along it.

During the day it was evident that the enemy's position had been considerably extended on both flanks, which seemed to indicate the arrival of reinforcements.

On the 30th November reconnoitring parties were again employed, Major-General Roberts, with Colonel Currie, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kennedy, going in the direction beyond the north picquet, Colonel Gordon again reconnoitring the hills on the enemy's right, whilst Major Collett and Captain Carr went to Paiwar village and got within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the Spingawai Kotal. The observations tended to confirm impressions of the ascent of the Spingawai being easy in comparison to that of the Paiwar. On his return from this reconnaissance Major Collett submitted a memorandum to Major-General Roberts proposing a night march round to the Spingawai and forcing the kotal at daybreak, a movement which would completely turn the enemy's position.

After consideration of the reconnaissance reports the Major-General finally decided to adopt this plan, and on the 1st December detailed orders for the operations were drafted.

On the previous day three guns of G-3, Royal Artillery, two guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, from Kurram, and the 12th Bengal Cavalry, which had been left at Habib Kala, were ordered up to the front to strengthen the attacking force, which was now divided as follows:

Turning force to march at 10 p.m. on the 1st December.

Major-General F. S. Roberts, commanding.	No. 1 Mountain Battery.	} Under Colonel
	29th Punjab Infantry.	
	5th Gurkhas.	} 2nd Brigade.
	72nd Highlanders.	
	2nd Punjab Infantry.	
	23rd Pioneers.	
	4 guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery (on elephants).	
2 companies 23rd Pioneers (escort).		



THE PAIWAR KOTAL FROM TERI MANGAL

(NOTE.—In 1878 the hills were more thickly wooded than is shown in this photograph, the summit of the Pass being then a dense forest)

Force for direct attack to remain in camp with instructions to advance at 6 a.m. on the 2nd December, so as to be in position to storm the Paiwar when the enemy's left flank had been sufficiently shaken :

Brigadier-General Cobbe, commanding.	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">2 guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery.</td> <td rowspan="6" style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td rowspan="6" style="padding-left: 0.5em;">1st Brigade.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">3 guns G-3, Royal Artillery.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">12th Bengal Cavalry.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">2-8th Foot.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">5th Punjab Infantry.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="padding-left: 0.5em;">Teri and other levies.</td> </tr> </table>	{	2 guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery.	}	1st Brigade.		3 guns G-3, Royal Artillery.		12th Bengal Cavalry.		2-8th Foot.		5th Punjab Infantry.		Teri and other levies.
{	2 guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery.	}	1st Brigade.												
	3 guns G-3, Royal Artillery.														
	12th Bengal Cavalry.														
	2-8th Foot.														
	5th Punjab Infantry.														
	Teri and other levies.														

During the 1st December reconnaissance parties were sent out in an ostentatious manner towards both flanks of the Paiwar position, in order to divert the enemy's attention from the intended turning movement, all arrangements for which were made with the utmost secrecy. Batteries were marked out on the plain near the village of Teri, and when the guns of G-3 and the 12th Bengal Cavalry arrived in the evening, they were marched up in full view of the enemy and in as conspicuous a manner as possible, all of which produced the belief amongst the troops of the column, and certainly amongst the natives, that the Paiwar Kotal would be attacked the following morning.

At 4 p.m. the orders for the turning movement and the intended plan of operations were communicated to all commanding officers, but the troops for the columns were not told off till after tattoo.

At length, at 10 p.m. on Sunday, the 1st December, the turning force marched silently from camp, leaving their tents standing and their fires burning, and took the road to the village of Paiwar. There the bed of the nala was entered, which forms the only road to the Spingawai. The marching was extremely difficult ; the nala was nothing but a mass of stones heaped in ridges, and furrowed into deep hollows by the action of the water ; the night was bitterly cold, and there was no moon. On starting from camp the column was led by the 29th Punjab Infantry, but on the march the order was changed, and the 5th Gurkhas took the lead,

followed by the 72nd Highlanders. The reason for this was the treacherous conduct of two Pathans in the 29th, who fired off their rifles with the object of alarming the enemy. One of these men was afterwards hanged by sentence of court-martial, and the *jemadar* of one of the two Pathan companies, along with several others, was transported, they having been convicted of complicity in this dastardly attempt to bring disaster on the army in which they served, and discredit on a gallant and loyal regiment.

It had been intended to halt the column for an hour or two during the night to rest the men ; but owing to the unavoidable slowness of the advance, and to the distance being greater than was anticipated, the intention had to be abandoned.

At a little before 6 a.m. on the 2nd December, the head of the turning force reached the foot of the Spingawai Kotal. Day was just breaking ; but the approach of the troops had been so far unobserved, since the enemy had neglected to place a picquet in the bed of the nala.

As the light increased a barricade became visible about fifty yards in front. At the same moment two shots from the enemy's sentries gave the alarm to their picquet on the kotal. The advanced party of the 5th Gurkhas immediately formed from column of fours into line, and, led by Major J. Fitzhugh and Captain A. Cook, rushed straight at the barricade. The remainder of that regiment extended and swarmed round the flanks of this obstacle, which was carried in brilliant style. The enemy fired a volley into the 5th Gurkhas as they rushed forward, but nearly all of them were killed by the troops at their posts.

Meantime the enemy's guns from the stockades or *sangars*, just above the attacking column, commenced firing shell into the troops, but without doing much damage. The 5th Gurkhas and the 72nd Highlanders continued to advance rapidly up the steep side of the kotal. Three stockades were captured in quick succes-

sion, though the enemy defended them most obstinately, and were mostly bayoneted as the troops jumped over the barricades.

During the advance Captain J. A. Kelso's (No. 1) Mountain Battery was of the greatest assistance. In spite of the difficulties of the ground and the obstacles erected by the enemy, two of his guns were brought well to the front in the most determined manner ; and within ten minutes of the enemy's left picquet having been stormed they were brought into action in the battery vacated by the Afghans on the left of the position. Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Lindsay, R.A., now ordered Captain Kelso to take one of his guns more to the right, where a better view could be obtained. While carrying out this order Captain Kelso was killed, and the command of the guns then devolved upon Lieutenant J. C. Shirres, who, assisted by Lieutenant E. G. Osborne, Adjutant, Royal Artillery, worked them with good effect until a general advance was made from this position. The other two guns of this battery, under Lieutenant H. N. Jervis, were delayed in coming up the nala, and took no part in the first engagement.

As soon as the firing commenced, the remainder of the 72nd Highlanders was ordered up from the rear of the column, while the 29th Punjab Infantry acted as a support throughout this advance, and successfully repelled an attack by the enemy on the right flank. By 6.30 a.m. the whole of the barricades and sangars on the Spingawai were in possession of the troops, and the line of the enemy's defence was completely turned.

In the meantime on the south side of the Paiwar Kotal two guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, and three guns G-3, Royal Artillery, escorted by 100 men of the 2-8th Foot, moved out of camp at 5 a.m. and took up a position about a mile further up the Paiwar Valley, whence, as soon as day broke, they were to open fire upon a gun which the enemy had posted on a crag to the left front, and which commanded the lower part of the pass. As soon as this was silenced, the guns were

to turn their fire upon the enemy's batteries on the kotal proper and to endeavour to silence them.

At 6.15 a.m. the guns, under Major Sidney Parry, came into action at a range of 1,700 yards, directing their fire on the crag for upwards of an hour. Soon after 7 a.m. the fire of a portion of the artillery was turned upon the kotal batteries, which replied vigorously; and for the next three hours an incessant and well-directed fire was kept up by the artillery on both sides, with the result that two of the enemy's guns situated on the summit of the pass were silenced about 11 a.m.

Meanwhile the infantry of the frontal attack marched from camp soon after 6 a.m., and moved forward into a favourable position to the right front and slightly in advance of the guns, where they were concealed by jungle, and sheltered by a spur running down from the range of hills on the right of the battery.

In this position they remained until about 8 a.m., when orders for a further advance and vigorous co-operation were signalled from the Major-General on the Spingawai. Thereupon a ridge, 350 yards nearer the enemy's position, was rapidly secured by two companies of the 2-8th Foot under Lieutenant-Colonel E. Tanner and by the 5th Punjab Infantry under Major McQueen. The infantry of the 1st Brigade then continued steadily to advance from ridge to ridge, keeping themselves under cover as much as the nature of the ground would allow, until, about noon, they were not more than 1,400 yards from the top of the pass. From here rifle fire was opened on the kotal and on the masses of the enemy on the opposite side of the ravine, and the advance halted for the moment. Before it was resumed, Brigadier-General Cobbe was wounded in the thigh by a rifle bullet, and was obliged to resign the command of his brigade to Colonel F. Barry-Drew of the 2-8th Foot.

Since the first sangar on the Spingawai was carried by the 5th Gurkhas at 6 a.m., the 2nd Brigade had been pushing rapidly on towards the enemy's main position.

On the summit of the Spingawai the leading regiments were ordered to halt, form up, and refill their ammunition pouches, while the Major-General himself pressed forward with the 29th Punjab Infantry to clear the intervening woods between the position gained and the Paiwar.

Immediately afterwards the 2nd Punjab Infantry and six companies of the 23rd Pioneers reached the summit of the Spingawai; the remaining two companies of the latter corps were still in rear with the guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, whose elephants were unable to keep up with the infantry over the stony ravine below. Keeping one company of the 2nd Punjab Infantry to escort the wounded, and two companies of the 23rd Pioneers as a protection from stray parties of the enemy, who were working along the sides of the hills parallel to the British advance, protected by the thick forest, Brigadier-General Thelwall sent forward the remainder of these regiments to join the advance, which had already been reinforced by the 72nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas.

Meanwhile the 29th Punjab Infantry had advanced for about a mile without meeting any opposition, when suddenly it was checked by a terrific fire from large bodies of the enemy, strongly posted amongst dense pine woods on the further side of a deep ravine. In a few minutes the whole of the column was again hotly engaged. On the right of the attacking line was a precipitous-sided hill, covered with thick wood and held by ever-increasing masses of Afghans, who hastened to concentrate their strength on the threatened flank as soon as they realised that their position had been turned by the British. On the left were deep gullies, whose precipitous sides, held by parties of the enemy, rendered any advance in this quarter impossible. The 72nd Highlanders became engaged on the left, the 2nd Punjab Infantry and 23rd Pioneers made gallant efforts to dislodge the enemy on the right, and as far as the difficulties of the ground permitted they were

successful, though not without incurring heavy loss, amongst which was Major A. D. Anderson, of the last-named regiment, who fell while gallantly defending himself at close quarters ; a havildar and a sepoy of his regiment sharing his fate in their brave endeavours to recover his body.

About noon the four guns (on elephants) of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by two companies of the 23rd Pioneers, arrived under Colonel W. Stirling, and were brought into action against the skirmishers of the enemy posted among the trees which covered the steep slopes of the hills to the north of the kotal ; they continued shelling this position for about an hour, thus giving considerable relief to the right flank of the British. Three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery also worked their way to the front with great difficulty on the densely wooded hill, where the infantry were hotly engaged with the enemy, and shelled the latter with apparently good effect.

Meantime, as has been seen, the 1st Brigade had made considerable progress in the frontal attack. The 5th Punjab Infantry had ascended a spur on the right front, which it was believed would give access to the ridge on which the kotal was situated, and to some point close to the kotal itself. But this expectation proved erroneous. At one point the 5th Punjab Infantry were indeed less than 900 yards from the enemy's position, but they were separated from it by a ravine with sides so precipitous as to be quite impassable, and further examination showed that the spur on which the regiment had established itself continued to trend further away till it joined the main ridge at the point to which the attack of the 2nd Brigade had been advanced.

Advancing up this spur the 5th Punjab Infantry thus established direct communication between the two columns, and furnished useful information to the Major-General as to commanding positions where No. 1 Mountain Battery could be placed in action, overlooking the

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entire position at the kotal from a superior elevation, at ranges of about 1,200 yards. This advantage was not earlier noticed, owing to the densely wooded character of the ridge along which the Major-General was advancing. The mountain battery guns were accordingly advanced, and shelled the enemy with such excellent effect that they set fire to the camp and did considerable damage.

The advance of the 5th Punjab Infantry on the right and its junction with the 2nd Brigade reduced the infantry with the 1st Brigade to five companies of the 8th Foot. These now essayed a further advance, and after a laborious climb up a precipitous and difficult hillside, they were rewarded by gaining a crest whence they were able to open fire upon the guns of the kotal at a range of 800 yards. From this position the troops were able also to clear the opposite side of the ravine, from which the enemy had hitherto maintained a heavy fire protected by ample cover. The Afghan gunners served their guns steadily for a considerable time, but at length were compelled to abandon their batteries by the rifle fire of the 2-8th Foot.

Notwithstanding the success of the turning movement by the Spingawai Kotal, and the advanced positions which had now been reached, further reconnaissance convinced the Major-General that the Paiwar Kotal was practically inaccessible from the northern side. He therefore resolved to withdraw the troops from this line of attack, and about 1 p.m. he ordered a new disposition accordingly. The 2nd Punjab Infantry were directed to maintain their hold on the hill on the left flank of the Paiwar Kotal, which was the most advanced position gained by the troops. The 29th Punjab Infantry was ordered to occupy the hill overlooking the Spingawai, and to protect the field hospital, which had been established there; whilst a column, formed as under, was to march, under the Major-General's direction, towards Zabardast Kala, so as to threaten the enemy's line of retreat:

F-A, Royal Horse Artillery (4 guns on elephants). No. 1 Mountain Battery. 72nd Highlanders. 5th Punjab Infantry. 23rd Pioneers. 5th Gurkhas.	}	Brigadier-General Thelwall, commanding.
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As soon as this movement was discovered by the Afghans their retirement, which had already commenced, developed into a precipitate retreat. The fact became quickly apparent to the 1st Brigade. The fire of the defenders opposite the 2nd Punjab Infantry slackened; and the signs of weakness along the whole front were so unmistakable that an advance against the kotal was decided upon. The guns under Major Parry, R.H.A., supported by the 12th Bengal Cavalry under Colonel Hugh Gough, v.c., moved forward to a more advantageous position to cover the advance of the infantry. The two companies of the 2-8th Foot, under Captain J. Dawson, hitherto escorting the guns, were directed to move up the pass by the road which was now commanded by the troops, and to support the final advance.

Between the positions now occupied by the 1st Brigade and the summit of the pass two deep ravines, with precipitous sides, intervened. Whilst crossing them, a dropping fire was still maintained by the enemy; but once the troops reached the road, all opposition ceased. Sheltered under the shoulder of a projecting hill, the troops were formed up, before pushing forward for the final advance. A steep ascent over a bad road led up to the kotal, which was occupied without further resistance, and the position was gained.

At 2.30 p.m. the Paiwar Kotal was in possession of the troops and the enemy in full flight along the Ali Khel road, which for some distance was found to be strewn with abandoned guns, limber-boxes, etc. The 12th Bengal Cavalry under Colonel Hugh Gough was

immediately sent in pursuit, and captured several guns abandoned by the enemy in their flight.

The turning force under Major-General Roberts could not get up in time to fall on the retreating enemy, and bivouacked near the village of Zabardast Kala, while the Paiwar Kotal was garrisoned by the 2-8th Foot.

During the progress of the attack the native Teri levies under Major A. P. Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry, with a number of friendly tribesmen, advanced along the crest of the hills on the enemy's right, with the object of creating a diversion in that direction, but they did not show much eagerness to come to close quarters with the Afghans, and only arrived just as the latter evacuated the position.

The whole line was strongly barricaded, and any attack in force against the enemy's right would have been quite impracticable, owing to the narrow front on which the troops attempting a turning movement would have had to work, while a direct attack up the gorge against these barricades would have suffered terribly. The intelligence which had been gained by reconnoitring as to the difficulties which would have attended an attack from this direction was thus confirmed. An examination of the Paiwar Kotal defences proved it to be a place of enormous natural strength, and the enemy's dispositions for repelling an attack on it from the front were very complete and judicious. It was also evident, from the large stores of ammunition and supplies which were captured, that it was the intention of the Afghan Government that their troops should remain in this position for the winter, and that they fully expected to be able to maintain it against the British troops.

Their defeat and expulsion from a position of their own choosing and of unusual natural advantages could not but have a very beneficial effect upon the population of the Hariab, Kurram, and Khost Valleys. This is at all events certain, that had the Afghan troops

succeeded in holding their position on the Paiwar Kotal, the British Government would never have been regarded as having full possession of the Kurram Valley.

The enemy's strength on the Paiwar Kotal-Spingawai position on the 2nd December, included : three regular regiments which had lately arrived from Kushi, eighteen guns, and a large number of Jajis, Ghilzais, and other tribesmen, whose strength could not, of course, be exactly ascertained, but who must have numbered at least four thousand. There was also a mule battery of six guns, which was coming up to reinforce the garrison of the Paiwar Kotal, but did not get further than Ali Khel. A battery of horse artillery had been left at the Shinkai Kotal, and a battalion of infantry on the Shutargardan, having been unable to cross those passes. A regiment of cavalry was also at Kushi.

On the British side the turning force consisted of 43 officers and 2,220 men ; the co-operating column of 30 officers and 838 men ; total, 73 officers and 3,058 men.

The casualties in this force were 2 British officers and 18 men killed ; 2 British officers, 3 native officers and 67 men wounded. Captain Kelso, commanding No. 1 Mountain Battery, was shot through the head when bringing his guns into action early in the day ; Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, fell at the head of his men ; Brigadier-General Cobbe was wounded by a rifle bullet in the thigh, as before recorded ; and Lieutenant S. C. H. Monro, 72nd Highlanders, was also wounded.

The loss of the enemy could not be estimated, but was believed to have been large. About seventy dead were counted in the Spingawai breastworks ; but the thickly wooded hillsides must have concealed the bodies of many more.¹ Seventeen guns with their carriages were


¹ 4 bronze 6-pr. S.B. guns.

2 bronze 24-pr. S.B. howitzers.

11 7-pr. mountain R.M.L. guns.

ACTION OF PAIWAR KOTAL AND SPINGAWAI PASS


Dec. 2nd 1878.



Sketch of ground by Capt. R.G. Woodthorpe R.E.

REFERENCE

- I 4 Guns F.A. R.H.A.
 - II { No 1 Mth Batt^y
5th P.I.
2 Co^s 8th Foot
 - III 5 Co^s 8th Foot
 - IV { 2 Guns F.A. R.H.A. } Near present
3 Guns G.3. R.A. } (1907) site of
1 Co^y 8th Foot } Teri Mangal
12th B.C. } Post.
 - V { 2nd P.I.
23rd Pioneers
72nd Highlanders
- Afghan Force + —
Line of British Advance —



captured on or near the position, besides ammunition of all descriptions and large quantities of rice and grain.

The conduct of the troops was highly eulogised by Major-General Roberts in his despatch.

The Field Force now halted for four days, in order to rest after the fatigues which it had undergone and also to bring up supplies from Kurram, to which place the sick and wounded were moved. Working parties were employed in making the road practicable on each side of the kotal, and preparations were begun for hutting the troops during the winter. The Jajis and Teris seemed friendly, afforded assistance in labour, and brought in supplies.

On the 6th December the main body of the force marched for Ali Khel under the command of Colonel Drew, and accompanied by Major-General Roberts and the head-quarters staff. Brigadier-General Thelwall being placed in command of the garrison¹ left at the Paiwar Kotal, whence heliographic communication was opened with Kurram.

Ali Khel was found to be a small village, 11 miles from Zabardast Kala, with a camping ground on an elevated plateau near the junction of the Hariab and Hazar Darakht streams, a mile beyond the village. The Amir had formed a depot at this place, but the granaries had been looted by the Jajis after the retreat of the Afghan army.

On the 7th December the head-quarters and staff, accompanied by 250 of the 72nd Highlanders, 250 Gurkhas, and one division No. 1 Mountain Battery, marched from Ali Khel to Rokian, distant $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, along a track gradually ascending the bed of the stream. The tribesmen were quiet and respectful, but evidently in doubt as to the future, and unwilling to commit themselves.

¹ Garrison at .	.	{	Paiwar Kotal	{	Half G-3, Royal Artillery.	
						2-8th Foot.
			Teri			7th Company Sappers.
			Village of Paiwar			29th Punjab Infantry. 12th Bengal Cavalry.

The following day the reconnoitring column proceeded on its march to Jaji Thana and $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond.

On the 9th December a small camp was left standing near Jaji Thana with 50 men of the 72nd Highlanders and 50 Gurkhas as guard, and the staff, with the remainder of column, marched to the top of the Shutargardan Pass, about 6 miles, and back to camp. The cold was felt severely, the temperature in camp at 7 A.M. being 5° Fahr.

The results of the reconnaissance were eminently satisfactory. The fact was disclosed that, up to the summit of the Shutargardan Pass, there was no defensive position as strong as the Paiwar, which could be held by the enemy to check our advance on this line towards Kabul. It was also ascertained that the road leading up to the Shutargardan on the east side was not as difficult for the passage of troops as had been expected, and that the summit was not easily defensible against a force advancing from the east. It further became known that the completeness of the defeat inflicted upon the Afghan army on the 2nd December had given confidence to the Jajis, and even convinced the Ghilzais, a tribe supposed to be loyal to the Amir's cause, of the uselessness of resistance.

The column returned to Ali Khel on the 10th December, and thence it was decided to follow a more convenient route to Kurram.

Besides the regular route by the Paiwar Kotal, two roads connect Ali Khel with Fort Kurram. One of these follows the course of the Hazar Darakht stream till its junction with the Kurram, and then passes down the valley of that river. The other road cuts off the angle thus formed by crossing the range of hills which at this point runs south from the peak of Sikaram. As it was of the first importance to have an exact knowledge of the lines of communication between the Kurram Valley proper and the trans-Paiwar district of Hariab, in which Ali Khel is situated, it was determined to explore one of these alternative routes. The

one which passes through the hills was fixed upon, both because it was the shorter of the two, and also because it had been used by the Amir three years previously when sending a mountain battery to Fort Kurram. This route was described as easily practicable for camels, and was known to be entirely in the territories of the Jaji and Chakmanni tribes, whose headmen were in the camp at Ali Khel.

Accordingly on the 12th December the headquarters staff and Major-General Roberts marched by this road for Kurram with No. 1 Mountain Battery, a wing of the 72nd, the 5th Gurkhas, and the 23rd Pioneers.

The route lay for the first 4 miles along the river valley, and then ran in a south-easterly direction, leading up a narrow glen thickly wooded with pine trees, till an open elevated plateau was reached, on which stood the village of Sapri, distant 7 miles. When the column arrived at the village of Karmana, 3 miles from Ali Khel, the headmen came to pay their respects to the Major-General. They informed him that the force would probably be annoyed by attacks from the Mangals from the Lizah villages, and an attack might be looked for when passing the defile between Sapri and Karaia, the next halting-place on the Kurram River. It was therefore determined to occupy the head of the defile that evening, and to move the baggage off before daylight on the 13th, so as to get as much as possible of it over the kotal before the Mangals had time to collect.

On the next morning accordingly the baggage was sent in front under Captain F. T. Goad, Assistant Superintendent of Transport; but, owing to the steepness of the road and the frozen, slippery stream, the progress of the laden camels and mules was but slow. Four companies of the Pioneers formed the advance guard, the remainder acting as escort to the baggage which had already crossed the Sapri Kotal. The 5th Gurkhas were ordered to act as rear guard.

Although a few men were observed on the hill-tops, not a shot was fired by them; but two camp followers, who lingered behind, were cut down.

About 11 a.m. the last of the camels had passed over the kotal, and as the long column of baggage animals was descending the steep and narrow valley, the Mangals, of whom nearly 100 men had now collected, and who subsequently increased considerably in numbers, commenced firing into the baggage and rear guards, and pressed on the 5th Gurkhas.

From this time to 4 p.m., when the column cleared the hills, the Mangals never ceased annoying the rear guard, and during these five hours the 5th Gurkhas, under Major Fitzhugh, maintained a rear-guard fight over difficult ground with a bold and active enemy thoroughly acquainted with the locality. So successfully was this duty performed that, although the rear-guard did not reach Karaia until after nightfall, and had to protect itself from marauders numbering, it is supposed, about 300, yet not one baggage animal or one article of baggage fell into the hands of the enemy. The 72nd Highlanders and 23rd Pioneers were sent back to the assistance of the rear guard, but their services were not required. This success was not gained, however, without severe loss. Captain Goad received a wound of which he afterwards died; Captain C. F. Powell and three Gurkhas were killed, and eleven were wounded (one mortally). From these operations it was evident that the passage of the Sapri Pass, if it were efficiently held and defended, would be very difficult.

The column remained at Karaia till the 20th December, but the Major-General and staff went on to Kurram on the 14th idem. Preparations for hutting and for redistributing the troops were pushed on both at Kurram and at the various other cantonments and posts, but it was decided that a column should visit the Khost district before any final orders were given as to the distribution of the Field Force during the winter.

Meanwhile the country remained quiet for the most part. The post at Ibrahimzai was fired into on the 17th December, and reinforcements of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, 8th King's, and 21st Punjab Infantry were sent thither. Moreover the telegraph wire was constantly cut, and as the cavalry with the Field Force was quite inadequate for the additional duty of protecting it, it was proposed to hold the Khan of Hangu responsible for the safety of the line between Hangu and Thal. On the 18th December messengers were despatched into Khost to communicate with Akram Khan, the Durani governor, who had shown signs of friendship.

The Karaia Column marched to Kurram Fort on the 20th, and four days later the 5th Punjab Infantry marched for Kohat, taking under their escort some convicted prisoners, a convoy of sick and wounded, and the ordnance captured at the Paiwar Kotal.

The questions of transport and supply had even before this date been a matter of serious difficulty with the Kurram Field Force, and at this juncture Captain A. R. Badcock, the Principal Commissariat Officer, found himself further straitened by the diversion to the Peshawar Valley Field Force of 1,000 camels, which had with great difficulty been collected at Thal; moreover, he was ordered not to procure any more camels from the Dera Ismail Khan district, but only through the Commissary-General's head-quarter office.

This order rendered the completion of the transport for the forthcoming winter extremely difficult; and in such circumstances the collection of supplies for an advance in the spring was impossible. General Roberts pointed this out to the Quartermaster-General in India, and added that if Captain Badcock was to receive no assistance in carriage, and if the camels he had procured were taken from him, the Kurram Column would very soon run short of provisions, and would possibly not be able to

keep the field. The difficulties to be overcome in supplying the troops in Kurram and Khost were great. In the Kurram Valley itself there were no supplies at all, except small quantities of rice and whatever wheat had been captured from the enemy in the Hariab, so that practically the whole force had to be fed from British territory. The Kurram force had been drawing on the Kohat and adjacent districts since October, and the purchasing agents had every day to go farther away to get supplies, and consequently required an increasing number of camels for their collection. According to the latest reports, 3,000 camels were necessary to collect supplies from the district depots at Kohat and Thal.

It was also important to mass supplies at Kurram, so as to be able to feed the troops in the front, should the roads become temporarily impassable, or lest the rivers should rise and prevent the arrival of the regular convoys.

It was thus obvious that not only did the Kurram force require all the camels it had got, but that arrangements must be made for a constant supply of fresh camels to replace casualties, which might be expected to increase in number should snowy or rainy weather set in.

General Roberts suggested the advisability of railing up some thousands of *brinjari* bullocks from Mirzapur. This suggestion was ultimately carried out, and was found to answer between Kohat and Thal.

Meanwhile Akram Khan, Governor of Khost, had replied to General Roberts' message by himself coming into the British camp, where he remained until the force for the occupation of his district was on the point of starting. He promised to maintain order in Khost until the arrival of troops, stipulating that in return his personal safety should be guaranteed, and that he should be allowed to proceed either to Kabul or to British territory, as he might desire. To these conditions General Roberts agreed, hoping thus to accomplish the

occupation of the Khost Valley without bloodshed and with the least possible disturbance to the settled government of the country.

The attitude of Akram Khan was considered to be due mainly to instructions received by him from Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan (the half-brother of Sher Ali), who subsequently arrived in the camp of the Kurram Valley Field Force after its return from Khost. Akram Khan was the deputy of this Sardar, who had recently sent Akram Khan's own brother from Kabul to reassure him, and to give him intelligence of his own movements and of the situation at Kabul.

The head-quarters of the Khost Column left Kurram on the 27th December, and the whole¹ concentrated at Hazir Pir by the 1st January, 1879.

On the latter date news was received that the Massuzais, a section of the Orakzais, had burnt a village of their own, 2 miles north of Sadda, and had barricaded the entrance to the Karmana glen. This was regarded as a declaration of war; the head-quarters of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, 130 sabres, were therefore ordered to Sadda, to remain there while the Khost Column was away from the Kurram Valley.

On the 2nd January, 1879, the Khost Valley Column marched from Hazir Pir at 9 a.m. under the command of Colonel Barry-Drew, 8th King's, acting Brigadier-General.

The country is open and easily practicable for cavalry, and is quite bare but for the occasional growth of small palms. The road, which is a good one, lies over rolling, stony hills and plains. After a march of 10½ miles the column halted in Jaji Maidan, a cluster of seven villages, situated in a small basin

Cavalry	{ 1 squadron 10th Hussars. 3 troops 5th Punjab Cavalry.	} Colonel H. H. Gough, v.c.
Artillery	{ No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.	
	Infantry	{ British : 200 men, 72nd Highlanders. Native : 21st Punjab Infantry. 28th Punjab Infantry.

surrounded with easily accessible hills. Next morning at 9 a.m. the march of the column was resumed, but the passage of a deep nala beneath the camp delayed the camels so much that the last did not leave camp till 1.30 p.m. The road lies for $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles up a fairly open valley with hills on either side, and dotted with several small villages, till the Dhani Kotal is reached by a gentle ascent. This kotal is a low ridge commanding the Khost Valley; thence the descent is steep for the first mile, after which the track passes along the top of a spur from the kotal range for about three-quarters of a mile, and then descends into the bed of the Kaitu River, which runs through this part of the district. The main valley is a broad open plain studded with numerous villages, and covered with cultivation. Here the head-quarters of the column encamped at Nar, one of the Bak group of villages, where eighteen of the Akbar Khel *maliks* or chiefs presented themselves as a deputation, but failed to explain satisfactorily their not having met the column at their boundary. Indeed, their welcome was by no means a warm one, and some who should have been present did not put in an appearance.

The 5th Punjab Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and 21st Punjab Infantry halted on the Jaji Maidan side of the Dhani Kotal as a guard to the commissariat convoy, which did not cross the kotal on the 3rd January, the camels being out of condition for want of proper grazing. The main column halted during the 4th at Nar, and the commissariat convoy with its escort closed up. Intelligence was received at Nar on the previous evening that the Mangals intended to attack the baggage as it crossed the kotal, but no attempt of the sort was made, nor was there any sign of hostility during the 4th January except the murder of a Sikh havildar, who was cut down and killed early in the morning, when going to the latrine trenches, about 50 yards from the quarter guard.

On this day the Major-General with a small escort

visited some villages whose *maliks* had not come out 50 yards to meet the column.

Next morning the force marched in two columns over an open plain to the village of Yakubi, distant 6 miles. Here Akram Khan, the deputy governor of Khost, came into camp and arranged to surrender the Matun Fort on the following day. He was received by General Roberts with the usual courtesies, and complimented on his management of the somewhat turbulent population during the change of rule. He then returned to Matun, and on the morrow with his followers he met the British column at the mouth of the Khawanich Pass which leads through the low range of hills 3 miles south of Yakubi. He conducted the General and the Political Officer to the fort.

Matun is the name of a group of villages, some thirty in number, occupying the lands on either bank of the stream that issues from the Ghalang glen in the Mangal Hills and passes close to the Khost Fort.

The headmen of some of these villages having neglected to present themselves, Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Waterfield, the Political Officer, sent a summons to them all, which they obeyed during the same evening, and the twelve principal of them remained in camp during the night.

On the same afternoon, about 4 p.m., intelligence was received of a gathering of Mangals, Makbhils and Zadrans, besides Khostwals of Mandazai and Ismail Khel in the west, as well as the Gurbaz Waziris in the south of Khost. The *maliks* afterwards reported that these insurgents had vacated the Khost villages and retired, but on the morning of the 7th January large numbers were observed assembling in the neighbourhood. Accordingly a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major J. C. Stewart, accompanied by Captain F. S. Carr, was sent out to reconnoitre and to draw the enemy out of the villages.


This party soon ascertained that the villages of

Matun were thronged with hostile tribesmen and that the enemy, numbering certainly several thousands, had collected round three sides of the camp.

Vigorous action was therefore necessary to ensure the safety of the force, which only numbered about 2,000 men all told, an insignificant strength in comparison with the enemy arrayed against it, while the column was separated by many miles of difficult country from its nearest support.

The enemy, taking advantage of the very broken ground and the low hills, were endeavouring to work round the reconnoitring cavalry, whose position became somewhat critical until they were reinforced by the remainder of the cavalry under Colonel Hugh Gough, consisting of 1 squadron 10th Hussars, 70 sabres strong, and a wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 130 sabres strong, the former under Major T. J. W. Blukeley, and the latter under Major B. Williams.

The body of tribesmen immediately engaged at this point was apparently about 1,000 strong, though much scattered. This number was subsequently increased by a reinforcement of 500 men, and the whole occupied a very strong position on some low hills at the foot of the mountains. The 10th Hussars were ordered up to the foot of an advanced rising ground, which afforded excellent cover. They there dismounted, and, quickly taking up a position on the crest of the low mounds, they opened a steady and well-directed fire upon the enemy. The 5th Punjab Cavalry were brought up to the foot of some low detached hills on their right, and also opened a brisk dismounted fire. The effect of this combined movement was that the enemy began to retire, followed up by a further advance of the troops. The 10th Hussars then again dismounted and opened fire on the enemy's right, while at the same time a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, personally led by Major B. Williams, charged in a most dashing and gallant manner up the hill on which the tribesmen had made a stand, threw themselves on their centre, and, as the



**AFFAIR NEAR
MATUN
(Khost)
7th January 1879.**

REFERENCE.
 Villages burnt..... [hatched square]
 Enemy..... [green dotted line]
 British..... [red dotted line]
 Time 1 P.M.

Scale 1 Inch=1000 Yards.



enemy gave ground, rapidly dismounted and harassed their retreat with carbine fire.

Meanwhile another body of the enemy began to pour out of the villages on the left and front of the troops and tried to reinforce those already engaged; but a troop of the 10th Hussars was detached to the left, where, from under cover of some low trees and shrubs, they opened fire and frustrated this attempt.

By this time six companies of 28th Punjab Infantry and No. 2 Mountain Battery arrived to support the cavalry, but the latter had already done their work effectually, and all that remained was for the guns to shell the enemy on the more distant hill-tops.

While this attack was being repulsed in front of the camp the right and rear were protected each by a wing of the 21st Punjab Infantry and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, while the front and left flank were protected by a wing of the 72nd Highlanders.

The enemy having been repulsed in front, Colonel Barry-Drew was ordered to carry the villages, on the right and rear, from which the enemy had fired on the troops, and to burn them as a punishment to the inhabitants for having given shelter to the enemy. During this operation Major Stewart, with his detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, had gradually worked round through the broken ground and nalas to the left rear. Here he hovered about the enemy, harassing them most effectually, till at last he found an opportunity of making a charge and driving them off in complete disorder, upwards of thirty bodies being subsequently found on the ground.

On the north-west of the camp the guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery under Captain Swinley opened an effective fire, while the 28th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson kept the enemy in check. When the retreat of the enemy had become general, the British force was gradually withdrawn from their positions on the surrounding high ground to the camp in the valley. This movement was effected slowly and

steadily under cover of the mountain guns, but the enemy had been so completely beaten that they did not venture to follow up the retiring troops. It was impossible to calculate the casualties of the enemy, which must, however, have been considerable. Those among the troops were insignificant, and amounted to only two native soldiers killed, one of whom was a dafadar, and six wounded.

Simultaneously with the attack on the camp, attempts had been made by the villagers against the small cavalry posts left at Yakubi and Bak, but in both cases the sowars were protected by the *maliks*.

On the 8th January the headmen of the Ismail Khel and Lakkan clans of Khostwals and the Gurbaz Wazirs appeared in camp, in obedience to the summons of the Political Officer, and were heavily fined. Everything seemed quiet that day in the neighbourhood until 7 p.m., when some ten or twenty men managed to approach the right picquet of the 21st Punjab Infantry, apparently in hopes that the prisoners still detained might escape in any confusion which might occur. The sentry of the picquet fired and the picquets all round the camp took up the firing, thinking that a night attack was being made for the purpose of releasing the prisoners. On this the prisoners rose in a mass, and calling to each other in Pushtu to get up and run away, some attempted to wrest the rifles of the sentries from them, and one tried to seize the sword of the native officer, a *jemadar*, in command of the guard, but was pistoled by him. Thereupon the native officer, after warning the prisoners to keep quiet, ordered the guard to fire upon them, when nine were shot dead and thirteen wounded, of whom five were mortally injured, mostly by bayonet wounds.

The column remained halted at Matun till the 13th January, before which date several headmen came in with horses and ponies which had been stolen from the force, as well as nine deserters from the Amir's army at Kabul, who stated that large numbers were leaving his regiments.

On the 13th the column marched 7 miles up the Khost Valley to Dehgan Valley, a wing of the 21st Punjab Infantry, under Major F. W. Collis, being left to garrison the fort at Matun.

On the 14th January the infantry halted whilst a cavalry reconnaissance was made from the camp at Dehgan to Dara Geh and the villages about, named Burhan Khel, the people of which seemed friendly and brought abundant supplies. Although there were rumours of the Mangals assembling in the adjacent hills, there were no open hostilities.

On the 15th the Major-General marched his force back to Matun, where it remained until its final departure from the Khost Valley. During this halt Captain R. G. Woodthorpe, R.E., in charge of the survey party attached to the Kurram Valley Field Force, escorted by Kippat Khan, the chief of a *jirga* from the Mohmit Khel Wazirs, and a detachment of native infantry, ascended the peak of Laram (6,631 feet) at the extremity of the south-eastern end of the valley overlooking the Waziristan, Khost and Dawar. From this place communication was effected by heliograph with Bannu, Hazir Pir, and Matun Fort. The survey of the eastern end of the Khost Valley was completed, and this work was joined in a satisfactory manner to Captain Woodthorpe's plane-table sketch of the Kurram basin. The geographical results of this expedition were consequently most valuable.

As the column had been now some time in Khost, it appeared, from the general tenor of the reports received from the Kurram Valley, inadvisable to keep much longer in this isolated district the only troops which were available for a movable column in Kurram. It therefore became necessary to decide whether a garrison should be left in Matun Fort, or whether arrangements should be made for the administration of the district by a native representative, aided by the municipal *maliks*. The question involved the following considerations :

- I.—Any garrison left in Khost must be of sufficient strength to hold its own, if attacked by a combination of the powerful Mangal and Jadran tribes.
- II.—It should not, therefore, be less than a regiment of native infantry, with two guns and a squadron of cavalry.
- III.—If a garrison of this strength were deducted from the Kurram Valley Field Force, there would be no means of forming a movable column after providing for the Kurram garrison, and for an advanced post at Ali Khel in the event of an advance to Kabul being ordered.
- IV.—Any garrison left in Khost might hamper future operations.
- V.—On the other hand it was desirable politically to keep a firm hold on Khost, which is a very important district, and might become a focus of dangerous intrigue against any settled government in the Kurram Valley.

The balance of the argument was against an occupation, and Major-General Roberts finally decided not to leave a garrison, but to place Shahzada Sultan Jan, Extra Commissioner in the Punjab, a Saddozai gentleman of birth and a Sunni Muhammadan, likely to be acceptable to the Khostwals, in charge of the Khost district, supported by an adequate body of native levies, and associated in his administrative duties with the chief *maliks* of Khost.

General Roberts did not disguise from himself the possibility of a rising of the neighbouring tribes, which might necessitate the abandonment of the post; but he considered that the reoccupation of the valley would be now easy, and that Shahzada Sultan Jan could always escape to the neighbouring post of Hazir Pir.

Having decided on this course, a darbar was held on the 26th January, when the chief *maliks* of Khost were received, together with the *jirgas* of the Mangals and

Makhbils. It was explained to the people that instead of leaving regular troops in the fort, it had been determined to entrust the peace of the valley to the inhabitants themselves and to levies raised for the purpose. Shahzada Sultan Jan was introduced to them as their governor, and they were advised to keep the hill tribes in check, since it could not be pretended that these latter could come down in any numbers through their lands without their support or, at least, connivance.

Certain headmen were selected for the management of the different sections in Khost, who would receive cash allowances from the revenue. Meanwhile some 350 Teri levies, mounted and on foot, arrived from Kurram, and to them some 50 Jajis of Maidan, 20 Wazirs, some Khostwal levies were added, and the fort duly handed over.

The Khost Column then began its march from Matun towards Hazir Pir on the 28th January, using the southern route. The column had only reached Sapri, twelve miles distant, when a report arrived from Shahzada Sultan Jan that an attack on Matun Fort was imminent; that he had summoned the headmen of Khost to his assistance in defending the post, but that they had only partially responded to his call; also that he did not consider it probable that he could retain a hold on the country after the column had left the neighbourhood.

The hostility of the tribesmen being thus so clearly demonstrated, the General determined to avoid further complications in the immediate future by abandoning the Khost Valley to the management of its own *maliks* for the present. He considered it necessary to return to Matun in order to withdraw Sultan Jan and his escort in safety, and he accordingly marched back on the 30th January, taking with him—

No. 2 Mountain Battery.		150 men 72nd Highlanders.
Squadron 10th Hussars.		28th Punjab Infantry.

This column reached Matun early the same morning,

where it was found that the Mangals and Jadrans had collected in considerable numbers. After removing the Shahzada and the Teri levies, and clearing the fort of all supplies, the column began its return march to Sapri about noon. Two squadrons of cavalry under Colonel Gough moved forward towards the hills north of Matun, where the enemy were assembled, and covered the withdrawal of the mountain battery and infantry.

The tribesmen descended into the plain as if to attack the column, but they were easily repelled by the dismounted fire of a troop of cavalry, and no serious collision took place. The troops reached Sapri at 4 p.m., and on the following day the whole column marched to Hazir Pir without further interruption.

The return of the Khost Column allowed the proposed redistribution of troops for the winter to be carried out. These included the following movements :

- (i)—1 squadron 10th Hussars to Rawalpindi (4th February).
- (ii)—Left wing 29th Punjab Infantry from Hazir Pir to Thal (2nd February).
- (iii)—1 company 29th Punjab Infantry from Thal to Ahmad-i-Shama (4th February).
- (iv)—1 company 21st Punjab Infantry to Jalamia to work on road (4th February).
- (v)—Detachments 2-8th Foot from Hazir Pir and Thal to Kohat (6th February).
- (vi)—2 companies 21st Punjab Infantry to Balesh Khel to relieve 12th Bengal Cavalry.
- (vii)—12th Bengal Cavalry from Balesh Khel to Hazir Pir.
- (viii)—No. 2 Mountain Battery and 28th Punjab Infantry to accompany head-quarters Field Force to Ali Khel.

No further forward movements were contemplated at present ; the troops in the various posts were occupied in improving their winter quarters, whilst the construction of a second road from Thal to Kurram along the left bank of the river was being pushed forward by the 23rd Pioneers.

During the absence of the column in Khost, on the 7th January, reports were received of intended attacks

by the Mangals on the Paiwar Kotal and Ali Khel posts, and arrangements were made for supporting those places; but the tribesmen disappeared without hostile action, and the movements which had been ordered were cancelled.

On the 1st February Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, accompanied by several chiefs of the Logar Valley, visited the head-quarters camp. He was met half a mile from the camp by the Major-General and staff. A company of the 28th Punjab Infantry was drawn up on the sides of the main street of the head-quarters camp, at the top of which stood the *darbar* tent, in which he was received. After a short conversation, Wali Muhammad was conducted to his quarters, and dined with the Major-General commanding in the evening. Colonel Waterfield, the Political Officer, did not enter into any political conversation with the sardar, but merely formal courtesies were exchanged, as it was considered advisable that Wali Muhammad should have direct communication with none but the political authorities at Jalalabad, for which place the sardar started on the 4th February, escorted by a squadron of the 10th Hussars, who were about to join their regiment with the Peshawar Valley Field Force.

On the 6th February the General left Hazir Pir on a tour of inspection to Kurram Fort, examining the new line of communication along the left bank, which was making rapid progress, and which rendered the troops independent of any rise in the river. It had the further advantage of lying throughout its course in Teri territory. The hospital, barracks, and commissariat depots at Kurram were inspected; these were being roofed in, and the work was nearly complete; the whole of the 72nd Highlanders were comfortably hutted, as well as about three-quarters of the Gurkhas, the tents of the remainder being pitched inside the enclosure of the smaller fort, where they were sheltered from the cold winds. The hospitals for both Europeans and natives were complete, the patients having very good

accommodation of fair size, warmed by open fireplaces. The commissariat sheds were capable of containing 35,000 maunds of flour, with space for other supplies. The ordnance depot was established in the keep of the larger fort, where the treasure chest (under Major Moriarty) was also kept.

On the 7th the head-quarters moved on to Habib Kala. The road from Kurram to the foot of the Paiwar was already completed, and camels could now travel from Thal to the Paiwar Kotal without traversing the Darwazagai defile. Snow had fallen on the Paiwar range, and the General proceeded on the 8th by the Spingawai route to the head-quarters of the 2nd Brigade. The defensive works on the Paiwar Kotal had now been perfected, the right of the position being held by the 2nd Punjab Infantry. The defences at this end consisted of a strong log barricade arranged so as to suit the contour of the hill, and affording fair defilade shelter from the heights which command it, as well as being a formidable obstacle against any assailant. The hill, sweeping round in a convex curve towards the most likely approach of an enemy, permitted by its shape the construction of a bastioned breastwork, which gave an admirable flank fire to the continuation of the line of defence on the west of the hill, along which a good pathway had been made.

The 2-8th Foot and G-3, Royal Artillery, had been comfortably hutted at the Paiwar Kotal. There was an excellent hospital, and a recreation-room had been constructed, while the sentry boxes were well protected from the weather.

The men of the native infantry were not all provided with huts, but their tents, being under sheds made of pine branches, were free from snow. A great extent of forest had been cleared away, which materially increased the defensive power of the place, by exposing to the rifle fire of the defenders the hillsides in the vicinity of the breastworks. Good roads had been made, and every auxiliary that military engineering science could

apply from the means at hand had been added to fortify the position by the Royal Engineer officers and the sappers and working parties under them.

In fact, as regards its defences, the Paiwar Kotal could now be considered secure from any attack of Mangals or other hill tribes, and with an increase to its garrison could easily be held against disciplined troops furnished with artillery.

On the 9th the General inspected the Zabardast Kala detachments; and finding the men there most uncomfortable and the horses in bad condition, the cold being severe, he ordered the troops to be withdrawn, *viz.* :

The 12th Bengal Cavalry to Hazir Pir.

The 2nd Punjab Infantry to Habib Kala.

The 28th Punjab Infantry to Paiwar Kotal.

It was decided that 115 rifles of the 28th Punjab Infantry should be ordered to Ali Khel, which is lower down the valley of the Hariab, then covered with snow, and in a better situation for an advanced post than Zabardast Kala. These troops, under a British officer, were to be stationed in a fortified post and furnished with 250 rounds per man. The Assistant Political Officer, Mr. Christie, was also stationed at Ali Khel, so that this detachment was not likely to be attacked without previous information being received.

On the 12th February the Major-General and staff returned to Kurram, and spent some days inspecting posts at Ibrahimzai, Hazir Pir, and Ahmad-i-Shama, whither Lieutenant C. M. Fitzgerald was ordered to take two companies 21st Punjab Infantry to work on the right bank road.

From Kurram Major-General Roberts proceeded to Thal, where he inspected the contingents supplied to the British Government by the Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Faridkot and Nahan, *viz.* 1,700 infantry, 550 cavalry, and 7 guns, under Brigadier-General Watson. This force proved to be a fine body of men, likely to be of great value for post work at the different stations when

the intended forward movement of the Kurram Column should take place.

During the remainder of February the Major-General and staff continued to move up and down the line of communications; the health of the troops continued good on the whole; great progress was made meanwhile in road-making, all the available troops being employed for the purpose, and two roads from Thal to Kurram, one on each side of the river, were completed.¹

The collection of supplies at Kurram was continued with energy, and by the 1st March nearly two months' stores were available, while all the troops about the Paiwar were provisioned up to the end of the month.

An advanced depot was constructed at Ali Khel, a considerable quantity of stores having been conveyed thither by camels and mules furnished by the Jiji and Teri tribesmen. Similarly, some additional 1,500 camels and bullocks of the Kurram district were employed in transporting stores from Thal to Kurram. No military escorts were sent with these loads, which nevertheless were delivered with great regularity. The Punjab Chiefs' Contingent furnished about two-thirds of such escorts as were required for convoys, and performed the duty in a most satisfactory manner.

On the 9th and 10th March the Field Force headquarters proceeded towards Thal to meet Sir F. P. Haines, the Commander-in-Chief in India, who was on his way thither from Jalalabad. Major-General Roberts arrived at Thal on the 13th, and the Commander-in-Chief, with the Army Head-quarters Staff, on the 18th. On the same day the Commander-in-Chief reviewed the Punjab Chiefs' Contingents, under Brigadier-General Watson, numbering about 2,000 men with 7 guns.

The Nabha Contingent had just received orders to march to Balesh Khel, 35 miles from Thal, a point on the line of communications very liable to attack by the Masozai, Zaimukht, and other hostile tribes.

¹ For disposition of the Kurram Valley Field Force on the 24th February, see Appendix VII.

There the men of the contingent entrenched their camp with great care and skill, building three towers in it, so that at any time they could move out, leaving the camp to be defended by 100 men. They patrolled the roads, and furnished guards to protect some 3,000 commissariat camels sent to Balesh Khel to graze. Though never attacked, they were often threatened, and at times harassed by small marauding parties. They remained at Balesh Khel till their return home in June.

From Thal Sir Frederick Haines moved up the Kurram Valley to the Paiwar Kotal, inspecting all the posts on the road, and returning to Thal on the 30th March.

As April opened preparations for a forward movement were renewed with energy. The post at Ali Khel was strongly entrenched, for the protection of the commissariat storehouses ; orders were issued for the collection there of supplies for two months for the British and one month for the native troops of the advance column ; 120 miles of telegraph wire was also sent forward, and two Gatlings and a battery of new pattern screw guns. A base hospital was established on the Paiwar Kotal. On the 5th April the Field Force headquarters moved from Paiwar over the kotal, to an admirably situated plateau 4 miles east of Ali Khel. On the 10th April the 92nd Highlanders marched into Kurram from Thal about 800 strong, accompanied by drafts from the 72nd, and by the 13th April the Field Force, brigaded as follows, was concentrated on the Ali Khel plateau :

	<i>1st Division.</i>	<i>Reserve.</i>
1st Brigade	{ 72nd Highlanders. 28th Punjab Infantry. 5th Gurkhas.	23rd Pioneers. 7th Company Sappers and Miners.
2nd Brigade	{ 92nd Highlanders. 5th Punjab Infantry. 21st Punjab Infantry.	<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i> 1 squadron 9th Lancers. 12th Bengal Cavalry.
Artillery ...	{ F-A, Royal Horse Artillery. Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Bat- teries.	14th Bengal Lancers.

The importance of placing the posts along the line of communications between Thal and Ali Khel in a defensible state was fully understood by General Roberts and his engineers. At Thal a post was established on a plateau about 500 yards from the bank of the Kurram River. The post was calculated to hold a battalion of native infantry, a wing of native cavalry, half a battery of artillery, and two companies of British infantry. The plateau on which it stood is scarped naturally on three sides about 40 feet above the river, and it was surrounded with a low, roughly built stone wall, irregular in trace and conforming to the nature of the ground. The position was capable of offering resistance to any force likely to be brought against it.

At the posts of Sapri, Manduri, Alizai, Shinak, and Balesh Khel there were fortified *serais*; and in addition, at the last post was the entrenched camp of the Nabha Contingent. At Wali-dad Kala, the last post before Kurram Fort was reached, was a similarly fortified *serai*.

Kurram "fort" consisted of two native forts connected by a good road and situated about 600 yards one from the other, near the present village of Ahmadzai and 1 mile north of the river.

The fortifications of the Paiwar cantonment (Habib Kala) consisted of *sangared* entrenchments.

The Paiwar Kotal position is 6 miles distant from Habib Kala. The extremely mountainous nature of the entrenched position rendered it necessary to form four separate posts, distant about a quarter of a mile from each other. They were protected by blockhouses and breastworks of timber and stone or earth on the western or exposed side. The troops were quartered in huts. The stores were placed in tents over which rough sheds of unhewn timber were erected.

At Bian Khel and Ali Khel there were entrenched camps, the latter of which had been laid out with great care, since the position was one of great strategic importance, commanding as it does the entrance to the

Hazar Darakht defile leading to the Shutargardan Pass, and the approaches up the Karaia stream from the Mangal country ; it also served to cover the garrison at the Paiwar Kotal from any sudden advance of Afghan troops across the Shutargardan.

The month of April passed without incident.

No intimation was received regarding the advance of the Field Force ; but the preparations for it were nevertheless continued, both in road-making and collecting supplies and fortifying the advanced post at Ali Khel. Practice was also carried on with the Gatling guns, whilst reconnaissances in all directions were made when practicable.

Important reinforcements were received during the month, including the 67th Foot and the 11th B.I.,¹ the former of which was employed under direction of Major Collet in laying out a new gun road between Zabardast Kala and over the high ground through the village of Bilut, opening communication with the entrance of the Lakarai Pass. With the 67th Foot came half C-4, Royal Artillery, bringing with it thirty-seven elephants to carry the 9-pr. guns over the passes.

On the 23rd April a committee was appointed to select a site for a cantonment between the Paiwar and Kurram, and a spot near Shalozan was finally decided upon.

The month of May was equally undisturbed by any hostile incident, and closed with the announcement of the Treaty of Peace with the new Amir, signed at Gandamak on the 26th. Major-General Roberts took advantage of this unbroken tranquillity to enlarge the geographical knowledge of the valley of the Upper Kurram, and of the passes which connect that district with Kabul and independent territories. Such explorations were conducted under exceptionally favourable circumstances, for the people were inclined, apparently, to view without suspicion the endeavours of the British

¹ The 2nd Punjab Infantry, who had suffered much from exposure, were withdrawn from the Kurram Force.

to make themselves acquainted with the territories which had been assigned to their rule by the treaty.

On the 5th May a reconnaissance was made to the top of the Shutargardan Pass, and on the 12th five reconnoitring parties were employed simultaneously on the range of hills between the Paiwar Kotal and the Mangiar Pass. On the 1st June General Roberts made a reconnaissance to the Lakarai Pass, where the road passes over the Safed Koh, which forms the watershed on the western side of the Hariab Valley. The primary object was to join hands with the Khyber Field Force, but the party from Gandamak did not succeed in getting through the Babar Ghilzai territory. The route from the Hariab was found to be difficult, and indeed impassable for an army, unless considerable labour was expended in improving it. The ascent to the kotal lies through dense forest, and is very steep. The summit of the pass is overhung by precipitous cliffs, and is so narrow that it could be easily blocked. It is broken into four small ridges, or kotals, which of course would facilitate its defence. The descent on the western side appeared to be even steeper than the ascent, and the road beyond, as far as could be seen, was closed in by hills, and seemed to be most unsuitable for the passage of troops in the face of an enemy.

On the 2nd the Major-General, with an escort of No. 2 Mountain Battery and a wing each of the 92nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas, marched to the village of Dabuzai, about three-quarters of a mile from the right bank of the Karaia. Thence he visited the principal settlements of the Ahmad Khels in the lower part of the Sirkai Valley, and on the following day he explored the range of hills above the left bank of that stream. "The view from this range was," says General Roberts, "extremely interesting, for through the country lying at our feet will be found, as I believe, the easiest commercial and military route between Afghanistan and India. All the information which I have succeeded in obtaining regarding the road describes

it as fairly level and capable of being made a good road for wheeled carriages without difficulty. It is said that the late Amir Sher Ali brought his bullock guns into Kurram by this route."

On the 6th June the reconnaissance moved from Ali Khel over the Istiar Pass to the villages of Istiar, and thence to Karaia. This pass is between the Paiwar and the Sapri defile, and although not so difficult as the latter, can never be made as practicable as the Paiwar. The General had now seen all the passes over the Paiwar range, and had no doubt that when the time came to carry a cart-road over it, the best line would be found to be that at the Spingawai, which presented no very serious difficulties.

On the 8th a reconnaissance was made with the 12th Bengal Cavalry up the valley of the Hushan stream in the Chakmanni country. The tribes in these villages had not at first been friendly, but had now come in and made submission, with offers of service, and it was hoped that the reconnaissance would cause the submission of the Mangal tribe, as a whole.

"On the 9th June," says General Roberts in his despatch, "escorted by the 12th Bengal Cavalry, I reconnoitred the valley which forms the principal entrance to the hilly district inhabited by the Makhbils.

"This independent tribe has not had much intercourse with us since we entered the Kurram territory; but just before I left Ali Khel, a deputation from the tribal council arrived at our camp expressing their desire to live on good terms. The men were hospitably entertained, and accompanied us to Karaia. At their invitation, I visited the valley; and we were received with every expression of goodwill. The *maliks* have agreed to take Captain Woodthorpe to the top of one of the highest peaks in their territory, from which, they say, the whole country can be seen, and promised to conduct him back to Kurram by a new route, which we have not yet explored. The Makhbil villages, which

we saw, were poor hamlets belonging to the Warukhi section of the tribe, but the valley was wide and open, and presented no military obstacles. The Makhbil tribe will remain independent of our rule; but I gladly took advantage of the opportunity to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to extend our acquaintance with the topography of the country.

“It will be observed that these reconnaissances have all been executed with the active co-operation of the people themselves. To use their own expression, they have lifted to us the *parda* (curtain) of their country, and they have taken a curious pleasure in pointing out to me the particular places they had intended to defend, if we had entered the country as an enemy. The results will, no doubt, possess a political, in addition to their geographical value, and will, I have a confident hope, conduce materially towards the permanent tranquillity of this district. In a military point of view, the local knowledge we have gained cannot fail to be useful.”

On the 15th June Major-General Roberts marched with three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, 200 sabres of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 200 rifles of the 5th Punjab Infantry to the boundary of the Chakmanni territory. There the troops were left in support and the General and staff, accompanied by a *badraga* or safe-conduct, proceeded some 8 miles from camp to visit the Mangal villages of Laji. It soon became evident, however, that the tribesmen were hostile and not under the control of the *badraga*. It was, therefore, determined to retire, and a message was sent to the officer in charge of the troops to move up the valley to support the reconnaissance. This was done; and although the Mangals fired a few shots, wounding a havildar and a *malik* of the Hasan Khel Jajis, and followed the party a short distance, the march back to Karaia was accomplished without further interruption. The reconnaissances were now completed, and the General on the following morning marched to Shalozan, to supervise

the arrangements in progress for hutting the troops at that place, and to give the troops and transport animals a much-needed rest.

One or two unfortunate outrages marked the end of June and the beginning of the month of July.

On the 25th June Dr. W. B. Smyth, of the Indian Medical Department, was murdered by robbers near the *scrai* at Sapri when on his way to Thal. The crime had no political significance, but the offender was traced to the Watazai division of the Zaimukhts.

On the 28th June some working parties of the 11th and 21st Bengal Infantry, when cutting brushwood near Balesh Khel, were fired into; and two of the number, who were beyond the picquets, were killed by Massuzai Orakzais. Some camels also were fired on when grazing, and other unprovoked attacks were made in the same neighbourhood, at the instigation, as it was supposed, of persons who lived in Sadda and Durani. Accordingly General Roberts ordered Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Heathcote, Road Commandant, to surprise and surround Sadda with troops, to seize all the Massuzai and Alisherzai Orakzais living within its limits, and to deport them to Kohat. This order was successfully executed on the 30th June, when seventeen men were arrested and sent to be lodged in the Kohat jail. The effect was good, and the headmen of Sadda afterwards came up to head-quarters on the Paiwar Kotal to express their contrition, and to pray for the release of the prisoners. They were told that this would not be done until the whole *jirgas* of the Massuzai and Alisherzai divisions or clans of the Orakzai tribe made their submission. In the meantime Balesh Khel was strengthened with three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The general health of the troops in the Kurram Valley was good. A few sporadic cases of cholera occurred at Thal, but it did not assume an epidemic form. Its presence, however, determined the Major-General to delay the departure to the lower country

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beyond Thal of the British troops, who had hitherto been quite free from the disease.

The climate of the valley was good, the heat never excessive, and at Shalozan it was quite cool by the end of July.

The mortality amongst the camels, however, was very great, in consequence of which General Roberts recommended that the regimental organisation of transport should be broken up and that the animals should be collected at Thal, where good grazing was procurable.

The Major-General also urged the importance of completing a cart track from Thal, and he advocated the laying down of a tramway or light railway from Rawalpindi or Kohat to Kurram, repeating his belief that the natural line for traffic between India and Kabul was through the Kurram Valley.

Excellent political relations had been formed with Padshah Khan, the chief of the Ghilzais near the Shuturgardan, and our most advanced outpost at Ali Khel, in the Hariab Valley, was entirely free from any annoyance by the tribesmen. This satisfactory arrangement was undoubtedly of material assistance in the advance of the following autumn.

On the 23rd July Major-General Roberts took leave of the Field Force and proceeded to Simla, and with this event the first campaign in the Kurram Valley may be said to have terminated.¹

¹ For distribution of troops on the conclusion of the campaign, see Appendix VIII.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS OF THE FIELD FORCE IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN FROM OCTOBER, 1878, TO AUGUST, 1879.

ON the 27th September, 1878, the appointment of Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph, c.B., to the command of the Quetta Reinforcement¹ was sanctioned by the Government of India ; and the following instructions were issued by the Adjutant-General in India to General Biddulph :

“ I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inform you that, with the sanction of Government, you have been appointed to command the troops now at or proceeding to Quetta. His Excellency desires to impress upon you that the force you are about to command not being in British territory, but in the country of a friendly prince, all requisitions for supply, or demands of any description on the Government or people, must be made through the British political officers attached to the Agency. To gain the goodwill of the ruler, chiefs and inhabitants of Baluchistan must be to you and to the officers and men under your command a matter of primary importance.

“ You will, at as early a date as possible, place yourself in immediate communication with Major Sandeman, the Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan. His Excellency cannot too forcibly impress upon you the necessity of cordially co-operating with that officer in every object tending to further the views of Government.

“ Political considerations bearing on our position in

¹ *Vid. sup.* p. 5.

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Baluchistan must guide your disposition of the force, subject only to critical necessity and the safety of the troops.

“The concentration of forces at Quetta is strictly a defensive measure, necessitated by present political complications with Afghanistan, and its command will impose on you the maintenance of Quetta with the integrity of the Baluch country, and the covering of your lines of communication. It is impossible to foresee contingencies which may present themselves; but his Excellency has full confidence in your judgment, and requires of you to remain strictly on the defence, or rather in such a defensive-offensive attitude as, in case of hostile demonstrations in your immediate vicinity, would restrict action, without orders from the Commander-in-Chief, to within a day’s march of Baluch territory.

“On no account, however, is the boundary of Baluch territory to be crossed, or offensive initiative resorted to in the first instance, without the authority of Government received through the Commander-in-Chief. The force at Quetta should be so disposed as to enable a small body to protect the depots and permit the remainder of the troops to remain in the field. Care must be taken to secure the best available accommodation for a general reserve hospital at Quetta, as also to provide for large depots of ordnance and commissariat stores. Whilst providing for these immediate requirements, you must bear in mind the likelihood of some 3,000 men being permanently cantoned at Quetta.

“There is no point which will demand more attention than the protection of soldiers, followers, and animals from the vicissitudes of climate. Every endeavour must be made to secure for all, at the earliest date, the warm clothing, blankets, and necessaries sanctioned by Government, and constant inspection be applied to insure that the same are maintained, and that all available shelter in the way of huts or tents is secured for their protection.

“Experience has shown the necessity of providing for intercourse, for purposes of trade and barter, between the people of the country and the soldiers and followers of our camps. To protect villagers and ensure order, a non-commissioned officer, British or Native, of the provost marshal’s establishment, must invariably be told off for duty at the market allotted for the purpose.

“The strictest discipline must be maintained amongst followers. They should be prohibited from entering villages and wandering about beyond prescribed limits or in unfrequented tracts. Grass-cutters and camels must invariably proceed in a body under escort, and in such directions as, after consultation with the political authorities, you may indicate.

“In conclusion, I am desired to remind you of the necessity of impressing on all economy in the expenditure of ammunition, and of constant supervision over the maintenance of supply and reserve, as, although individually only occupied by you, eventualities may hereafter cause Quetta to become a most important post for the re-equipment and supply of other troops.”

Major-General Biddulph reached Multan on the 8th October, whence, after opening the sealed orders which awaited him there, he proceeded immediately to Rajanpur. Here he was joined by a portion of the head-quarters staff, and with the assistance of Mr. Fryer, the Deputy Commissioner, all possible arrangements were made for the supply of the troops on their march to Quetta. On the 20th October the Major-General and staff, with Mr. Fryer, started for Quetta *viâ* Lehri and the Bolan Pass, marching as far as Lehri in company with E-4, Royal Artillery, and the 70th Foot. Some stages of this march presented exceptional difficulties for the passage of artillery. Moreover, the 70th Foot were hampered by a large and increasing sick list, in consequence of which, at Mr. Fryer’s suggestion, both the above corps handed over their provision columns, numbering about 650 camels, to be conducted by Mazari escorts. Arriving at Lehri, General Biddulph

left the troops to continue their march, and pushed rapidly on to Quetta, which place he reached on the 9th November.

The situation there at the time of his arrival was not encouraging ; the garrison was too small for its position, and had been further weakened by effects of the feverish influences always present at the close of the hot weather. Moreover, the faulty position of the cantonments was, at a critical time like the present, a constant cause of alarm and watchfulness. Not only did the close neighbourhood of the Kakar border, and of a considerable range of hills, afford opportunity for the secret maturing of hostile movements, but even the main roads between Kandahar and Kalat were not covered by the station.

The duties which first engaged the attention of the Major-General on his arrival, were arrangements for the supply and sanitation of the large camp, which was suddenly growing up near the station, and the equipment of the troops for field service. With these objects in view, and with the assistance of the political officers, purchases of all kinds of country produce were made ; buildings suitable for the reception of the numerous sick were prepared and a base hospital opened ; such measures as were possible, in the absence of *bildars* or a proper establishment of sweepers, were taken to provide for the cleanliness of the camps and the surrounding ground, while roads of some extent between the camps were constructed under the direction of Captain W. Bissett, R.E. ; finally the scale of baggage was remodelled and the weights increased to allow a sufficiency of warm clothing to be carried both by troops and followers.

Meanwhile the country was reconnoitred as far as Kuchlak, where a depot of supplies was opened, and the roads as far as the Afghan frontier were examined.

On the 9th November a telegram was received from the Quartermaster-General directing a movement to be made into Peshin. This order gave an entirely new aspect to the operations of the Major-General, who lost no time in communicating with Major Sandeman.

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“And it is due to him,” writes General Biddulph, “to say that by his forethought, and the energy of himself and Mr. Bruce, the Quetta Force was able to take the field, and the way paved for the advance of General Stewart’s division to follow after.”

In reply to an enquiry from head-quarters, the Major-General announced his readiness to make a forward movement with an advance force of 900 men and six guns into Peshin territory on the 21st November, and into the Peshin Valley on the following day. The composition of the Quetta and Multan Divisions on that date was as follows :

KANDAHAR LINE.

Quetta Division.

Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph,	
C.B., R.A.	Commanding.
Lieut. S. F. Biddulph, 34th Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Major G. B. Wolseley, 65th Foot	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain R. McG. Stewart, R.A. . .	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain H. B. Hanna, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel H. Moore, C.I.E., Bombay Staff Corps	Assistant Quartermaster-General <i>for special duty.</i>

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hendley, Army Medical Department	Principal Medical Officer.
Surgeon-Major W. G. N. Manley, v.c.	

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Lane, Bengal Staff Corps	Officiating Assistant Commissary-General.
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Engineer Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens,	
R.E.	Commanding Royal Engineer.
Captain W. S. S. Bisset, R.E. . .	Field Engineer.
Captain W. G. Nicholson, R.E. . .	Field Engineer.
5th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
Engineer Field Park.	

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Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Le Mesurier	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant F. H. G. Cruickshank	Adjutant.
Major F. V. Eyre	Commissary of Ordnance.
E-4, Brigade, Royal Artillery	Major T. C. Martelli.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force	Captain J. Charles.
No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery	Captain R. Wace.
Ordnance Field Park.	

Cavalry.

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, c.b., Bengal Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain H. R. Abadie, 9th Lancers	Brigade-Major.
1st Punjab Cavalry	Major C. S. Maclean.
2nd Punjab Cavalry	Colonel T. G. Kennedy.
3rd Sind Horse	Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Lacy, 59th Foot	Commanding.
Captain M. H. Nicholson, General List, Bombay Infantry	Brigade-Major.
70th Foot	Colonel H. de R. Pigott.
19th Punjab Infantry	Colonel E. B. Clay.
30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles)	Major F. T. Humfrey.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Bombay Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain W. W. Haywood, 1st Battalion, 14th Foot	Brigade-Major.
1st Punjab Infantry	Major F. J. Keen.
26th Punjab Infantry	Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. Smith.
32nd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fellowes.
29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluch Regiment)	Lieutenant-Colonel G. Nichollets.

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Multan Division.

Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps .	Commanding.
Lieutenant N. R. Stewart, 68th Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Captain E. Molloy, Bengal Staff Corps	Interpreter.
Colonel J. Hills, C.B., V.C., R.A. .	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major E. F. Chapman, R.A. .	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Major G. V. Prior, 100th Foot .	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain A. Gaselee, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain R. F. C. A. Tytler, General List, Infantry . . .	Deputy Judge Advocate.

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General A. Smith, M.D., Army Medical Department	Principal Medical Officer.
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Commissariat Department.

Colonel T. H. Sibley, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Commissary-General.
Colonel M. J. Brander, Bengal Staff Corps	Assistant Commissary-General.

Engineer Department.

Colonel R. H. Sankey, R.E. . . .	Commanding Royal Engineers.
Major A. Le Mesurier, R.E. . . .	Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant C. F. Call, R.E. . . .	Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant E. S. E. Childers, R.E.	Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant G. R. R. Savage, R.E.	Superintendent of Field Telegraphs.
3 companies, Sappers and Miners. Engineer Field Park.	

Artillery.

Brigadier-General C. G. Arbuthnot, C.B., R.A.	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Captain A. D. Anderson, R.A. . .	Brigade-Major.
Colonel E. J. Bruce, R.A.	Commanding Siege Train.
Major W. H. Noble, R.A.	Staff Officer, Siege Train.
Captain R. A. Lanning, R.A. . . .	Adjutant.

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Major C. Cowie, R.A.	Commissary of Ordnance.	
A-B, Royal Horse Artillery	Colonel D. Macfar-	Colonel A. C. Johnson, R. H. A., and Field Artillery.
	lan.	
I-1, Royal Artillery	Major H. C. Lewes.	
D-2, Royal Artillery	Major E. Staveley.	
G-4, Royal Artillery	Major Sir J. W. Campbell, Bt.	
13-8, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major E. S. Burnett.	Colonel A. H. Dawson, Heavy Batteries.
16-8, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major J. H. Blackley.	
5-11, Royal Artillery (Heavy)	Major C. Collingwood.	
6-11, Royal Artillery (Heavy)	Major J. A. Tillard	
8-11, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major H. H. Murray.	
11-11, Royal Artillery (Mountain)	Major N. H. Harris.	
	Ordnance Field Park.	

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. Fane, c.B.	Commanding.
Captain H. H. F. Gifford, 13th Hussars	Brigade-Major.
15th Hussars	Colonel J. E. Swindley.
8th Bengal Cavalry	Colonel B. W. Ryall.
19th Bengal Lancers	Colonel P. S. Yorke.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Barter, Bengal Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain C. M. Stockley, 2-9th Foot	Brigade-Major.
2nd Battalion 60th Rifles	Colonel J. J. Collins.
15th Sikhs	Colonel G. R. Hennessy.
25th Punjab Infantry	Colonel N. Barton.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, 63rd Foot	Commanding.
Captain A. G. Handcock, Bengal Staff Corps	Brigade-Major.
59th Foot	Major J. Lawson.
1st Gurkha Regiment	Colonel R. S. Hill.
3rd Gurkha Regiment	Colonel A. Paterson.
12th Bengal Infantry	Colonel R. H. Price.

As a reserve to General Stewart's force, a mixed division of Bombay and Madras troops was ordered to assemble in lower Sind, composed as follows, to concentrate at Sukkur and Jacobabad :

Major-General J. M. Primrose,	
C.S.I.	Commanding.
Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton,	
2nd Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Colonel E. A. Green	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major Lloyd	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain A. B. Stopford	Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General.

Medical Department.

Nil.

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell Divisional Commissariat Officer

Engineer Department.

Major Le Mesurier, R.E. Field Engineer.
 No. 2 Company Bombay Sappers, and 2 companies Madras Sappers.

Cavalry Brigade.

Colonel J. E. Swindley, 15th
 Hussars Commanding.
 14th Hussars.
 1st Sind Horse (Bombay).
 1st Madras Cavalry.

Artillery.

Major W. H. Caine B-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
 Major H. F. Pritchard H-1, Royal Artillery.

Bombay Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Phayre Commanding.
 Major C. J. Burnett Brigade-Major.
 83rd Foot.
 1st Bombay Infantry (*Grenadiers*).
 19th Bombay Infantry.

A FORWARD MOVE

Madras Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General A. C. Mac-	
Master	Commanding.
Captain S. W. Bell	Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Knowles	67th Foot.
	30th Madras Infantry.
	36th Madras Infantry.

The forward movement of the several corps from Quetta was complicated by the necessity for commanding and medical officers to remain behind to hand over the sick in person to the medical charge of the base hospital. With a view to carrying out this arrangement, the first line of troops put into the field was composed of detachments, from which every sick or ailing man was withdrawn; and the head-quarters were left to move with the second line as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. With the object also of facilitating the rapid movement of troops in all directions, small but complete bodies of all arms were formed, which were supplied on departure from Quetta with seven days' supplies of food and two days' firewood. The commanders of these small bodies were advised to keep up their supplies of food, which they were very well able to do.

There being no Commissariat agents, all the necessary arrangements for maintaining their supplies were to be made by the commanders of columns, who were also to begin purchasing for depots.

On the 19th November the first forward movement was made by a reconnaissance under the Major-General, consisting of two guns of the Bombay Mountain Battery, 100 of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and a wing of the 29th Bombay Infantry. On the same day the 32nd Punjab Pioneers moved to Kuchlak and set about making a road over the Margha Kotal. The detachment mentioned above was on the 20th reinforced by two guns of the Peshawar Mountain Battery and a wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and on the 22nd November, war having been proclaimed against the

Amir, the whole (except the wing of the 29th Bombay Infantry) marched to Huramzai on the Lora River. On the 25th November the main body of the force marched to Saiad Yaru Karez, and on the 27th to Haikalzai, whence Major-General Biddulph joined a reconnoitring force which had been pushed forward from Quetta under Colonel Clay, consisting of two and a half battalions, two mountain guns, and two squadrons. This reconnaissance extended as far as Khushdil Khan Kala in the Peshin Valley, which was reached on 1st December, and the General returned to head-quarters at Haikalzai with full information regarding all the outlets from the Peshin Valley.

On the 4th December a reconnaissance under Colonel T. G. Kennedy, comprising the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 26th Punjab Infantry, and two mountain guns was despatched from Haikalzai into the Peshin Valley, with orders to reconnoitre the Khojak, Khojani, Roghani, and Gwajha Passes, as well as the road through the Ghazarband Pass between Quetta and Gulistan Karez.

In the meantime the 1st or Multan Division under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart had been steadily advancing from Multan and up the Bolan Pass; thence the Lieutenant-General and staff proceeded rapidly to Quetta, where he arrived on the 8th December, and on that date assumed command of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force. Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser had joined his cavalry brigade, and Brigadier-Generals R. Lacy and T. Nuttall assumed command of the two infantry brigades of the 2nd (Quetta) Division.

On the 9th December and following days the force at Haikalzai made a further advance, and on the 11th Major-General Biddulph in company with Lieutenant-Colonel J. Browne, R.E., and Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, Commanding Royal Engineer, visited the Khojak Pass and explored the different tracks with a view to the selection of the best route for the passage of the army across the Khwaja Amran range.

The two roads in use were that which was made

by the British troops in 1839-42, and the route over the Gwajha Pass. The latter was much the easier, but owing to the difficulty of getting water in sufficient quantity for a large number of troops at any time of the year, and the great probability that there would be none at all at two of the halting-places during the hot weather, it was determined that the Khojak route should be opened. It was decided that the best thing to do would be to repair the old British road, which had, in the course of some forty years of entire neglect, fallen into such a state that the passage of a laden camel had become almost impossible.

Accordingly, on the 12th, Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens marched from Abdullah Khan Kala, where divisional head-quarters had been established, with a small column, *viz.*—

2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery	} Under Colonel Kennedy,	
50 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry		} 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
1st Punjab Infantry		

This column encamped on the south side of the Khojak, about 2 miles below the kotal. Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens had with him the 5th and 9th Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners, the former extremely weak (two years at Quetta having reduced their working strength to less than 50 men), whilst the 9th Company was also much below its strength.

Besides them there were the 32nd Pioneers under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fellowes; a working party of the 26th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. Smith; Captain Nicholson, R.E., with the Engineer Field Park; Lieutenants E. S. Hill and C. Maxwell with No. 5, and Lieutenant Sharpe, R.E., with No. 9 Company.

On the 13th December, whilst a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry crossed the Khojak and reconnoitred as far as Chaman, the majority of the advanced brigade under Brigadier-General Nuttall pushed forward and occupied the pass, and work on the road at once

began ; the Sappers and Miners with the working party of the 26th Punjab Infantry worked on the south side of the kotal, and the Pioneers on the slope towards Chaman. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the undertaking the work progressed so rapidly that on the evening of the 14th Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens was able to report the road fit for cavalry, infantry, and baggage animals. Accordingly the small column under Colonel Kennedy passed over on the following day with 450 camels and encamped at Chaman.

Nevertheless, the slope on the north side remained terribly steep even for camels, and it was clear to Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens that, apart from the necessity of keeping this road clear for camel traffic, it would be quite impossible to make the descent practicable and safe for wheeled artillery in less than ten days or a fortnight. He accordingly determined to construct a ramp, or slide, down the bed of a water-course which descended tolerably straight from that part of the kotal over which the old road ran, and down which the guns, limbers, and wagons could be passed by ropes. The slope of this ramp was as much as 29° to 31° for between 450 and 500 feet of its length, after which it fell into the bed of a nala with a moderate gradient and joined the old camel road some 400 yards lower down, from which point the road into Chaman presented no difficulties. A broad platform was provided on the kotal at the top of the slide, where guns could be placed, and whence the ropes by which they were let down were worked by parties of infantry. The top of the ramp was turned slightly to the right, in order that the guns might not have to pass over the beam and sand-bags which had to be placed there to lessen the friction of the ropes ; this turn was also in conformity with the natural lie of the ground, and saved much cutting, which would, moreover, have considerably cramped the platform above. It was at first thought that this curve on so steep a slope might present some difficulties to the lowering of the guns ; but when

properly handled, they passed down without the smallest difficulty. Stiff bollards well strutted and securely fixed were placed in pairs at the sides of the ramp, over which the ropes could be turned and the stress of the pull taken off the working party at the top. Even heavy guns could have been let down thus with ease and safety.

Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart arrived at Abdulla Khan Kala on the 14th December, and on the 16th visited Chaman with Major-General Biddulph and Colonel Hichens. A site for a fortified post was laid out there, and the work at once began, after which the Generals returned to Abdulla Khan Kala, where the head-quarters remained for the present.

On the 21st December the passage of the Khojak by the main body of the 2nd Division began, the troops passing by a march of $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Abdulla Khan Kala to Charjat (afterwards styled "Camp Khojak Pass").

The field batteries, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier, occupied two days in crossing, and the transit could not be effected more rapidly. E-4, Royal Artillery, was the first to make the passage. The plan adopted was to drive to the summit on the first day; then park all the carriages on ground prepared for them at the top of the incline. Next day the horses were watered and led to the foot of the steep portion of the incline and there picketed; the gunners, assisted by working parties of infantry, then proceeded to lower down the ordnance and carriages. This was best done by unlimbering the carriage and letting each portion down separately by means of two long ropes reaching to the bollards at the summit. Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens timed No. 2 gun E-4, and from the moment of starting from the top of the slide to the time when the ropes were cast loose at the bottom was $9\frac{1}{2}$ minutes; and there was no reason why any gun or wagon should have taken longer. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, also crossed in this manner; and

“besides these two batteries,” write Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens, “I-1, Royal Artillery, and its wagons were let down without any accident of which I have heard.”

Meanwhile a thorough examination had been made of the Gwajha Pass over the Khwaja Amran range by the cavalry of a small column commanded by Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, which crossed the Gwajha on the 16th December, bivouacked that night and joined the force at Chaman on the 17th.

Colonels Le Mesurier, R.A., and R. H. Sankey, R.E., accompanied this reconnaissance, and tested the possibility of making a line suitable for the heavy guns along the foot of the Khwaja Amran range direct from Gwajha to Chaman. The distance is about 27 miles, and the line was found to be quite unsuited for the objects in view, although a track was met with and water was abundant in two places, the first at Iskan Khan, 6½ miles from Gwajha, and the second from a *karez* about the same distance short of Chaman and a mile north of the debouchure of the Roghani Pass.

The pass itself, although rendered difficult by heavy gradients and the obstruction of rocks projecting from the sides or of large boulders, presented no insuperable obstacle to the passage of all arms. At the same time it was evident from the first that the road over the Khojak Pass would be very liable to block if no other were available for return carriage. It was for three reasons particularly necessary to relieve this pressure: first, the want of transport rendered necessary the return from the front of the camels of one corps to help others or to bring over commissariat supplies; secondly, convoys of stores arrived daily, the camels of which had to be sent back for further supplies after depositing their load at Chaman; thirdly, a large addition was made to the troops of the 2nd Division originally detailed to cross. The 15th Hussars, A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 11-11, Royal Artillery, and escort, and I-1, Royal Artillery, and all reserve ammunition were ordered to move by the Khojak. Moreover the 1st Punjab Infantry

was now ordered back from the front to Gulistan Karez, thus necessitating an extra return movement, and a loss of working power.

It was decided, therefore, that the Gwajha Pass should be improved without delay, and on the 23rd December Colonel Sankey, R.E., began work with a party, 120 strong, of the 32nd Pioneers. Next day the rest of the Pioneers, the 2nd Baluchis (29th Bombay Infantry), and the 9th Company of the Sappers arrived, making a total strength of 526, and up to the end of the month the work was pushed rapidly forward without intermission, so that on the 30th December it was practically complete. "No portion of the road was less than 13 feet in width, and the curves were so widened as to prevent any difficulty being experienced by the heavy guns with their long teams of bullocks," writes Colonel Sankey. With the exception of the quarter of a mile immediately west of the kotal, the gradients were good throughout. Here, however, they could not be made less in some places than one in nine.

During this period work had not slackened on the Khojak and at Chaman, though sickness interfered a good deal, and the redoubt at the latter place consequently progressed but slowly. On the Khojak Pass the track was widened, and the gradients so far decreased by zig-zags as to admit of the passage to and fro of laden camels. A considerable portion of the road through the narrow gorge on the south side was avoided by this road, and the traffic was much relieved.

At the same time the carriage road, since constructed, was laid out roughly under Colonel Hichens' supervision, and a new camel-road, from the point on the southern road where the gorge begins to contract, was carried over the hill to the right, joining the wheel-road near the kotal; this was a valuable addition to the means of transit on this side of the kotal, as the worst and narrowest part of the gorge road was avoided and the constant pressure there relieved. "This road

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was suggested and almost laid out," says Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens, "by Major-General Biddulph, R.A."

As soon as this second camel-road was completed, all difficulties ceased, and the movement of troops and convoys from both sides went on simultaneously without a hitch.

Meanwhile on the 26th December General Stewart moved his head-quarters to Gulistan Karez, and on the following day orders for the distribution of the Field Force were issued as follows :

1st DIVISION.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. Fane, Commanding.

15th Hussars.		8th Bengal Cavalry.
		19th Bengal Lancers.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Barter, Commanding.

2-60th Rifles.		15th Sikhs.
		I-1, Royal Artillery.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, Commanding.

59th Foot.		12th Bengal Infantry.
1st Gurkhas.		3rd Gurkhas.
		D-2, Royal Artillery.

2nd DIVISION.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, Commanding.

1st Punjab Cavalry.		3rd Sind Horse.
2nd Punjab Cavalry.		A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Lacy, Commanding.

19th Punjab Infantry.		32nd Pioneers.
		E-4, Royal Artillery.

IN TWO COLUMNS

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry.	26th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Sikhs.	G-4, Royal Artillery.
5th Company Sappers and Miners.	

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

5-11, Royal Artillery.	11-11, Royal Artillery.
6-11, Royal Artillery.	No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.
No. 2 Jacobabad Mountain Battery.	

During the last few days of 1878 the remaining troops of the 2nd Division were moved across the Khojak to Chaman, leaving a company of the 1st Punjab Infantry posted at the summit of the pass, where they were ordered to hut themselves and make a fortified post to guard the communications.

A field officer was appointed to the special charge of the traffic, and definite instructions issued to him for the guidance of all concerned. About 900 camels could, if necessary, be passed over from the south side of the Khojak daily, and about 700 returning camels could cross at the same time. Heliographic communication greatly assisted the movement of transport.

The Lieutenant-General now issued Field Force Orders for the army to move forward in two columns, on separate lines of route, and to converge in the Takhtapul district.

The right column was formed by the 2nd Division, under General Biddulph, which was to advance from Chaman and the Khojak. The left column was composed of the 1st Division, accompanied by Field Force head-quarters, and was to follow the Gwajha route (with the exception of A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, I-1, Royal Artillery, 11-11, Royal Artillery, and the 15th Hussars, which crossed the Khojak).

The joint advance guard of the two divisions was commanded by Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, and



WESTERN DESCENT FROM THE KHOJAK PASS

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was divided in turn into two columns, composed as follows :

Left or Gwajha column under Brigadier- General Palliser.	}	15th Hussars, 123 sabres. 1st Punjab Cavalry, 219 sabres. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns. 25th Punjab Infantry, 419 rifles. 32nd Pioneers, 539 rifles. 2nd Baluch Regiment, 266 rifles. 4th and 9th Companies, Sappers.
Right or Khojak column under Colonel Kennedy.	}	15th Hussars, 79 sabres. 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 200 sabres. 3rd Sind Horse, 30 sabres. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns.

The left column marched on the 1st January, 1879, from the vicinity of the Gwajha Pass to Lalgoli Daud or lake, on the next day to Kunchai, and on the 3rd January to Shah Pasand, covering about 17 miles each day. This advance column was followed at one day's interval by the remainder of the 1st Division and Field Force head-quarters, which consequently reached Shah Pasand on the 4th January, whilst the advanced column proceeded on that day to Shadezai on the Mel stream. The right column left (Old) Chaman on the 2nd January and camped near the bed of the Kadanai River beyond Spin Baldak, where supplies had been collected beforehand by political and cavalry officers. The main body of the 2nd Division followed its advance column on the following day. The advanced party of this division, moving one day in front of the main body, reached Mel Manda on the 4th January, whilst the division in rear moved by brigades to Humai Karez, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Gatai, and Fatehulla on the Kushobai stream about 5 miles west of Humai Karez, respectively.

On the 5th January the two columns of the respective advance guards moved in concert by the Ghlo and Kurkura Kotal from the Mel Valley into the Takhtapul Valley. Major G. Luck, 15th Hussars, with 100 sabres of the 15th Hussars and 28 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, was ordered to make a reconnaissance of the Kurkura Kotal by which the left column was moving.

On nearing this pass some Afghan scouts were seen retiring over it, and on debouching into the open country on the other side, the valley was found to be swarming with the enemy's cavalry. Major Luck immediately formed his detachment into two lines, the first composed of one troop of the 15th Hussars and of the small party of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, with the second line of one troop of 15th Hussars in support. In this formation the detachment moved forward at a gallop to meet the advancing cavalry of the enemy, who, however, turned about when the troops got to within 200 yards of them, and retired, firing as they went. The troops pursued for some distance, but the country being full of ravines and very stony, they halted, dismounted, and opened fire with their Martini-Henry carbines, the effect of which was seen to be that a few saddles of the retreating force were emptied. However, on following up the retreating foe, one prisoner only was taken, although a quantity of baggage was captured, which had been thrown away during the flight. Major Luck, having received orders from the Brigadier-General, now withdrew his party towards the pass with a view to drawing the enemy after him, so as to bring them under the fire of the guns, which were advancing through the pass.

Meanwhile the advanced party of the right column also came in sight of a body of hostile cavalry, and on receipt of orders from the Brigadier, Colonel Kennedy pushed on with his cavalry and guns, and was able to bring the latter into action at ranges varying from 2,200 to 1,300 yards. The enemy then withdrew, pursued across the Ghlo Pass by the cavalry and guns of the column.

Brigadier-General Palliser, having issued orders to the right column to push on against the enemy, hastened with all his available cavalry to join Major Luck, who was halted on the further side of the Kurkura Pass. He then advanced against the retiring parties of Afghans, until the sound of artillery from the Ghlo Pass on the right caused him to change his direction towards that

point. Accompanied by the cavalry under Major Luck, the Brigadier and staff reached the north side of the Ghlo Pass in time to charge a body of the enemy who were retiring before the right column, and inflicted on them as much loss as the tired condition of the horses would allow. Immediately after this encounter the guns and cavalry of the right column debouched from the pass.

The guns of the left column had meanwhile arrived at a trot in the Takhtapul Valley, and struck across the low hills in the same direction as the cavalry, and for about a quarter of a mile experienced some difficulty in advancing, owing to the very rough nature of the ground. An order was, however, received from Brigadier-General Palliser directing the guns to follow the *kafila* road on the left and below the ridge of hills, over which the cavalry had crossed. After proceeding 4 or 5 miles, and on reaching the village of Saif-uddin, a large body of the enemy's horsemen appeared on a hill to the right front about 1,700 yards distant. The scouts of the escort reported that the enemy were in great force. Therefore, as none of the cavalry or infantry supports were in sight, the officer commanding the battery considered it advisable to retire the guns slowly for a short distance, while intelligence of the position of the enemy was despatched to the infantry, who were coming up in rear. This force of the enemy did not alter its position until the infantry under Colonel H. Moore, C.I.E., arrived, and the Brigadier-General coming up shortly afterwards from the right, ordered the guns to open fire. Captain H. de la M. Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, was then ordered to advance and throw out dismounted skirmishers, while the guns were brought up behind a mound. After the skirmishers had fired some twenty rounds, they remounted and retired, and, as expected, the enemy followed in numbers, and were again fired on by the guns with effect. The main body of the enemy now withdrew out of range and sight, but their skirmishers still held their

ground, though beyond carbine range, and remained hovering about. The Brigadier-General, therefore, ordered three companies of the infantry to be brought up; and after a few rounds from two companies of the 2nd Baluchis, the effect of which could not well be ascertained owing to the coming darkness, the whole force, with the exception of a strong picquet, retired to camp near Saif-ud-din.

The enemy numbered from 1,000 to 1,200 horsemen in all, and their loss was estimated at 100 killed and wounded; while the casualties among the troops were one officer and six men, 15th Hussars, wounded, and one jemadar and three sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, wounded.

The enemy retired through Deh-i-Haji to Kandahar, and retreated from Kandahar two days later towards Herat. A few of the same cavalry came subsequently into the British camp and offered to take service with us.

The two divisions of the Field Force, continuing their march without further interruption, effected their junction, as had been previously arranged, at Abdur Rahman on the 6th January. Here a redistribution of the cavalry and advance guards took place, after which the march was resumed towards Kandahar, the divisions still moving on separate roads, *viâ* Deh-i-Haji and Kushab.

At Khushab, about 7 miles south of Kandahar, on the 7th January information reached General Stewart that Mir Afzal Khan, Governor of Kandahar, having disarmed the two infantry battalions of the garrison, had fled towards Herat with only 200 horsemen and accompanied by all the officials of the city except the Deputy Governor or *Naib*. At the same time a deputation arrived bearing a letter of submission from the latter.

At 3.30 p.m. on the following day General Stewart arrived at the Shikarpur gate of Kandahar, and, with the 1st Brigade of each division, marched through the city and encamped outside the Kabul gate. The 2nd Brigades had been previously halted some miles from Kandahar and were kept in rear for a few days.

A large crowd of the inhabitants assembled outside the gate to witness the arrival of the troops, and numbers more lined the streets along which they passed. Their attitude was perfectly impassive, showing neither fear, hostility, nor pleasure. The shops in the streets and the bazaar were open, with the exception of the larger establishments whose owners had lost confidence on the departure of the late Governor.

On the following day the troops entered the city freely. The shops were all opened, and although it was not considered necessary to quarter any large body of troops within the city, guards were stationed at each of the gates, and a wing of the 25th Punjab Infantry occupied the square in the centre of the town.¹

The first few days of the British occupation were marked by two acts of violence, the first of which, however, had no connection with the bearing of the Afghans towards the invading army. On the afternoon of the 10th January, Major O. B. St. John, Political Officer, was riding through the town with an orderly and accompanied by Nawab Ghulam Husain Khan, who had been appointed to conduct the civil government of the city, when a man suddenly sprang forward and fired a pistol full in Major St. John's face. The horse he was riding fortunately swerved, and the bullet missed. The assassin then drew sword, but was quickly felled by the orderly, captured, and imprisoned. Almost immediately afterwards, in another part of the town, Lieutenant H. V. Willis, of E-4, Royal Artillery, was attacked by a fanatic while standing in front of a shop, and severely stabbed with a long knife. The man rushed through the crowd and wounded several soldiers, but was stopped by Captain Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and then cut down and killed by a mounted trooper of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. Lieutenant Willis's wound

¹ The advance on Kandahar was not effected without considerable wastage in transport. Many of the hired camels were in poor condition when first engaged, and their owners did not accompany them to Kandahar; 11,912 dead camels were counted on the road between Chaman and Kandahar after the first advance.

was found to be very serious, and he died a few days afterwards. These occurrences produced some disturbance in the city, but the people shut their shops quietly; and though the streets could not be cleared, strong patrols moved about them. All stray soldiers were ordered back to camp, and after a time the excitement abated. On enquiry the man who had attempted to assassinate Major St. John proved to be a Pathan sepoy, formerly in the service of the Khan of Kalat, whence he had deserted. It appeared that he had mistaken Major St. John for Major Sandeman, for whom he had conceived an intense hatred.

On the 14th January¹ the following troops were detailed to form the garrison at Kandahar, and to take up their quarters in the citadel :

Garrison in the citadel of Kandahar under Brigadier- General Nuttall.	{	1st Punjab Cavalry.
		E-4, Royal Artillery.
		5-11, Royal Artillery.
		6-11, Royal Artillery.
		59th Foot (wing).
		12th Bengal Infantry.
		26th Punjab Infantry.

Major St. John remained at Kandahar as Political officer, and the Nawab Ghulam Husain Khan as Civil Governor. Captain W. Bisset, Assistant Field Engineer, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Lane, Assistant Commissary-General, formed the staff; and Lieutenant Worgan and signallers of the 59th kept up signalling communication between the citadel and both divisions.

On the same date the Lieutenant-General with the head-quarters 1st Division and the 2nd (Brigadier Hughes's) Brigade left Kandahar to execute a reconnaissance in force to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, while Major-General Biddulph was ordered to undertake a similar movement, with the 2nd Division, towards the Helmand.

The march of the 1st Division was ordered as follows :

¹ For the distribution of the S. Afghanistan Field Force on this date, see Appendix IX.

The Cavalry Brigade one day's march in advance under Bri- gadier-General Faue.	{	15th Hussars. 8th Bengal Cavalry. 19th Bengal Lancers. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.	
Main column and head- quarters.	{	D-2, Royal Artillery. G-4, Royal Artillery. 11-11, Royal Artillery (4 mountain guns). 59th Foot (wing). 12th Bengal Infantry. 3rd Gurkhas.	} 2nd Infantry Brigade under Brigadier- General Hughes.
One day's march in rear.	{	2-60th Rifles. 15th Sikhs. 25th Punjab Infantry.	} 1st Brigade under Briga- dier-General Barter.

Leaving Kandahar on the 14th, a party of the advance guard, under Colonel J. Browne, R.E., reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai without opposition on the 20th January, and entered the fort. The garrison, which had consisted of some 500 or 600 of the Amir's militia, had retreated towards Ghazni, after first removing the large stores of grain and forage which had been collected in the fort, into the neighbouring villages, to prevent their falling into the hands of the British.

The Lieutenant-General arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 22nd January, and the main body of the 1st Division remained encamped there until the 2nd February. This time was utilised to obtain a complete survey and reconnaissance of the surrounding country. The temper of the neighbouring sections of the great Ghilzai tribe was found on the whole to be friendly, although little dependence could be placed on them, and unprotected stragglers were always liable to be attacked. All requisitions were, however, complied with, and supplies came in freely.

Towards the end of January two reconnoitring columns were despatched respectively into the Arghandab and Arghastan Valleys, neither of which was well known. The first, composed of two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, one squadron 19th Bengal Lancers and the 25th Punjab Infantry, and commanded by Colonel Barton, left Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 24th January, marched to Sehnum, whence large quantities of grain were sent

back to divisional head-quarters, and after a thorough reconnaissance and survey of the district returned by Arghasu, Chinartu and Soznai to Kandahar, where the column arrived on the 28th February.

The second column was commanded by Colonel B. W. Ryall, 8th Bengal Cavalry, and was composed of two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, 100 sabres 15th Hussars, and the head-quarters and one squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry. This column was also joined on the 1st February by the 3rd Gurkhas under Colonel A. Paterson. Moving by Akram Khan and Wali Muhammad Kala the force crossed the Khushk-i-rud Valley to Sundarzai on the Arghastan River. The only noticeable incident of the march was an attack made on the camp at Wali Muhammad Kala by three *ghazis* supported by a small body of armed men on foot and a few horsemen. The leading men were shot down as they dashed into the camp, and the rest immediately fled up the hills pursued for some distance by the Gurkhas. With this exception no hostility or opposition was met with, either from the population of the villages or the chiefs.

On the 21st February the column marched 5 miles to camp at Mandi Hissar, where it was broken up, the 15th Hussars joining the head-quarters of the regiment, then at Mandi Hissar *en route* to India. The 8th Bengal Cavalry, also ordered to India, was here joined by a troop which had been on detached duty, and remained at the same camp. The two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, escorted by the wing of the 3rd Gurkhas under Colonel Paterson, rejoined the camp of Lieutenant-General Stewart's force outside Kandahar on the 22nd February.

Meanwhile the Lieutenant-General with the head-quarters of the 1st Division, after remaining at Kalat-i-Ghilzai till the 2nd February, had marched back to Kandahar, where he arrived on the 11th February.

It is necessary now to return to the 2nd Division, which left Kandahar on the 16th January to execute

a reconnaissance in force to Girishk and the Helmand. The column was composed as follows :

Head - quarters 2nd Division under Major- General M. A. S. Bid- dulph, R.A.	<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i>	One day's march in front under Brigadier-Gen- eral C. H. Palliser.	{ 2nd Punjab Cavalry (Colonel T. G. Kennedy). 3rd Sind Horse (Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson).
	Lieutenant B. L. P. Reilly, Commissariat Officer. Captain W. A. Lawrence, Transport Officer.		
	<i>Artillery.</i>		{ 1-1, Royal Artillery. 11-11, Royal Artillery (2 guns). No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (4 guns).
	Lieutenant - Colonel Le Mesurier, R.A.		
	Lieutenant H. C. E. Lucas, Commissariat Officer. Lieutenant M. K. Martin, Transport Officer.		
	<i>Engineers.</i>		{ 5th Company Sappers. 10th Company Sappers. Field Park. Two pontoon boats.
	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, R.E.		
	Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moore, Political Officer. Captain Luckhardt, Principal Commissariat Officer.		
	<i>Infantry Brigade.</i>		{ 70th Foot. 19th Punjab Infantry. 32nd Punjab Pioneers. 29th Bombay Infantry.
	Brigadier - General R. Lacy		
Major H. J. Barton, Executive Commissariat Officer. Captain W. G. Thomas, Transport Officer. Lieutenant J. E. Dickie, R.E., in charge of signalling.			

Supplies for three days for natives and for twenty days for British troops were provided on leaving Kandahar. No forage for cattle was taken. All the camels and baggage animals available were required for the carriage of the force thus equipped ; these were procured with some difficulty, and contained a large number of weak and sickly animals.

The movement towards Girishk was made chiefly with a view to tap new sources of supply, feed the force, examine the country, and await further orders. Rapid movements were, therefore, unnecessary and would, indeed, have been difficult with the transport at

hand, and with the obligation imposed on the force of procuring supplies from the country traversed.

The column reached Karez-i-Ata, 31 miles from Kandahar, on the 23rd January. Thence two roads strike off to Girishk, of which Major-General Biddulph chose the southern and longer one as it passed through a comparatively better supplied district. At the same time Colonel O. V. Tanner, 2nd Baluch Regiment, with a small detachment was despatched by the direct road *viâ* Khushk-i-Nakhud to cover the right flank of the column. On the 26th January such difficulty was found in obtaining supplies for the division from the barren country through which it had to pass that General Lacy's brigade was ordered to fall back on Karez-i-Ata, and to draw its supplies from Kandahar, the advance guard being first reinforced by No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, the 10th Company of Sappers with the pontoons, and the 32nd Pioneers; on the 31st January half a battalion of the 2nd Baluchis (29th Bombay) also joined the advance column from General Lacy's brigade. With this force the Major-General advanced to the Helmand, and arrived at Abazai opposite Girishk on the 29th January. The fort of Girishk on the further side was immediately occupied, and ground selected for camps on both sides of the river. On the right bank General Palliser commanded with the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 3rd Sind Horse, Sappers, and 32nd Pioneers, who were encamped south of the fort facing the direction of the Herat road. The divisional head-quarters and remainder of the force remained on the left bank of the river.

The halt on the Helmand lasted from the 2nd to the 13th February, during which time the whole force was fully occupied either with the duties of obtaining supplies, with reconnaissances and surveys, or with the task of arranging a ferry and commencing the construction of a trestle bridge over the river from rough timbers obtained on the spot. The bridge was not completed,

By the middle of February the supplies in the vicinity of Girishk were beginning to fail. To relieve the district, therefore, a reconnaissance in force was despatched southwards under Colonel Nicholetts to Kala Bist, and the opportunity was taken to complete the survey already commenced between the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers. This column was also joined by Major-General Biddulph and staff. On the 15th, however, orders were received for the return of the division to Kandahar, in view of the reduction of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force, and arrangements were accordingly commenced with that object.

All the country in the vicinity of Girishk had been drained of supplies; and before a move could be effected the arrival of a convoy from the Garmsel district, with supplies collected from 30 to 40 miles to the southwest, had to be awaited. Nevertheless by the 22nd the whole of the force on the right bank of the river was moved across, and on the 23rd the retirement began, the cavalry brigade under General Palliser acting as the rear guard. Meanwhile rumours were rife of a hostile movement amongst the Alizai Duranis of Zamindawar, and a small force was sent up the left bank of the Helmand under command of Colonel Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse, to watch the fords from Zamindawar in the neighbourhood of Sarwan Kala and Sangin; this body encamped the same evening at Haidarabad. Next day Colonel Malcolmson's detachment fell back on Yakhchal, and thenceforward became the rear guard of the division, moving one march in rear of Major-General Biddulph's force during its retirement on Kandahar.


At 7 p.m. on the 26th February a note from Colonel Malcolmson reached the Major-General commanding the 2nd Division, then encamped at Karez-i-Ata, stating that he had been attacked by considerable numbers of the enemy, and asking for reinforcements. Before, however, the reinforcements reached the rear guard, the enemy had been defeated and driven off under the following circumstances.

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Colonel Malcolmson with his detachment (3rd Sind Horse, 266 sabres; 29th Bombay Infantry, 118 rifles) had encamped on the 26th at Khushk-i-Nakhud, when at 4.20 p.m. the videttes reported that a body of the enemy was advancing to attack the camp. The enemy were visible in very large numbers advancing from the the NNW. with flags flying, over the crest of some rising ground, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the camp. The troops fell in and the infantry were ordered to advance, and to get the enemy as soon as possible under their fire, and then to draw them on by retiring into the open ground, which extended for about a mile to the front and left of the camp.

The infantry opened fire at about 500 yards, on which the enemy, apparently to avoid the fire, edged off to their right, thus overlapping the left of the troops, their intention evidently being to pass the flank of the troops and to occupy the huts and walled gardens of the village of Sultan Ali Khan on our left. In this, however, they were frustrated by the advance of the 3rd Sind Horse, under Major W. Reynolds, who charged their left centre, and after a fierce hand-to-hand fight lasting about ten minutes the enemy were forced to retreat though still disputing the ground fiercely.

Major Reynolds was now ordered to pursue, while Colonel Malcolmson, with a portion of his men, tried to intercept a small body of the enemy who were making for Sultan Ali Khan; but a broad and deep karez defeated his purpose, and the Afghans succeeded in reaching shelter. An infantry attack on the village was ordered, and only countermanded in consequence of a report (which proved to be a false alarm) that an attack was threatened against the opposite side of the camp. Meanwhile the cavalry and part of the infantry had pursued the enemy's left wing for some distance when, as night was falling, the troops were recalled, the camp was struck, and the camp equipage, treasure, etc., placed in an enclosure adjoining the Nurzai Fort. This



position was held during the night, which, however, passed quietly.

The strength of the enemy was computed to have been 1,500 men, of whom 500 were *ghazis*¹ and 50 cavalry. Abu Bakka, a notorious robber chief, was reported to have been killed, and 200 others.

Major Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse, early in the affair received a bullet wound, but still led his squadron to the attack, and so became engaged in personal encounters with several of the enemy, when his horse fell with him in a *karez*, and before he could recover himself he was cut down and hacked to pieces. The casualties included also four men of the cavalry killed and Colonel Malcolmson and twenty-three men wounded, besides a loss of twenty-eight horses.


On the 27th February the main column halted, and the Major-General and staff, with signallers, rode back to Khushk-i-Nakhud, returning with Colonel Malcolmson's rear guard, which rejoined the head-quarters of the 2nd Division the same evening. The next day the division marched to Hauz-i-Madat, and on the 1st of March reached Sinjiri, whence the head-quarters and most of the troops reached the camp outside Kandahar on the 2nd March.

While the operations detailed above were in progress but little had occurred to disturb the troops left at Kandahar and the garrisons of the various posts on the line to India. Some outrages were, however, committed towards the end of January in the neighbourhood of Spin Baldak by a band of marauders under a chief named Lashkar Khan. A small column was sent out from Chaman to punish the offending villages, and in a skirmish on the 21st January a party of 26 sabres 3rd Sind Horse and 10 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant H. Wells, R.E., scattered the marauders, killing Lashkar Khan, his two sons, and his nephew.

Early in February instructions were received by Lieutenant-General Stewart relative to the return to

¹ So-called religious fanatics.

both at Quetta and Kandahar suffered severely during July and August. At the end of August detailed orders were published relative to the return of the South Afghanistan Field Force to India, and the evacuation actually began on the 1st September, when the movement was suddenly stopped by the news of an outbreak at Kabul on the 3rd September and the massacre there of the British Resident and his escort.



CHAPTER VI

FROM THE PEACE OF GANDAMAK TO THE MASSACRE OF THE KABUL EMBASSY.

ON the 7th July, 1879, a despatch was sent by the Government of India to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, which, after setting forth the circumstances immediately preceding the rupture with the Amir Sher Ali Khan, and describing the strategic weakness of the Indian frontier before the war, alluded to the principal objects which the Government hoped to attain after the unprovoked affront received from the Amir had been appropriately avenged. Foremost among these objects was the more complete establishment of British influence in Afghanistan, and the rectification of the frontier, for which (says the despatch) "no great extension of territory was required. All we needed was the permanent command, not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which, piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our empire from beyond its northern and western confines. The main defiles of the Mohmand and Afridi hills, converging towards Peshawar, are peopled by independent tribes and have never belonged to the Amirs of Kabul. For the command of these passes it would probably suffice, after clearing them of the Amir's troops, to reserve to ourselves the payment and control of the pass tribes.

"The valley of the Kurram, rising eastward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal, terminates

at the Shutargardan, a high ridge of the Safed Koh range. And an army holding that position would command, on the one side Kabul and Ghazni, on the other, easy access into India. Our southern frontier, as before observed, had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Kalat, which gave us a strong position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Peshin, which, bounded by the Khwaja Amran range, constitutes the great natural granary of Quetta. Holding Peshin, and commanding the issues of the Khojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our own plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues. For these reasons we regarded the permanent military command of the Kurram and Peshin districts as essential to the complete rectification of our frontier. But all such objects could certainly be attained without wholesale annexation, and possibly even without any actual acquisition of territory."

The despatch then emphasises the unpopularity of Sher Ali's military rule in Afghanistan, the downfall of which would not, therefore, ensure the hostility of the Afghan people. Thence it proceeds to describe the operations of the campaign, pausing only to consider the question of the advance to Kandahar in the following paragraph:

"Our longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar. And it was, therefore, necessary that the force operating on this line should be proportionally stronger, as, whilst its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign than that of the Khyber and Kurram Columns. In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amir, it was deemed desirable

to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan; and for the purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a more far-reaching character. In the event of a complete disintegration of the Kabul power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any chief or state whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and in the event of re-established relations with a ruler of united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar, however, has never formed part of our political programme. And no endeavour has been spared during the war to render our temporary occupation of it as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants. The command of the Kandahar force was entrusted to General Stewart. And his instructions were to carry out a reconnaissance in force as far as the Helmand and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, ascertaining the features and resources of the country in that direction, and attacking any enemy he might find within striking distance, but not establishing himself at any point beyond Kandahar."

Having related the course of events which led to the Peace of Gandamak, the despatch treats of the particulars of the Treaty, and again refers to the territorial question as follows:

"The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber Pass has never formed part of those dominions, while the districts of Peshin, Sibi, and Kurram are retained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security of our frontier, and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which

will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly, the towns of Kandahar and Jalalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gandamak to the Amir of Kabul. The passes of the Khojak mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Peshin country, like the upper districts of the Kurram Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression, that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require, or have ever contemplated. It is reported to be a position of no material strength; it can be easily turned; and the surrounding country could not support a large military force. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Peshin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his Government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence

which the Treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

“ Similar objections applied to the retention of Jalalabad. As a military position, that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Landi Kotal ridge. It can at any moment be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber; and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation, as far as Gandamak, of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and petty chiefships to the north-east of the frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilising those tribes and chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Kabul; and for the control or punishment of such action material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the Treaty, which secures to us the permanent military command of Kabul from the crest of the Shutargardan. In short, we have framed the Treaty with an earnest desire to render the conditions of it not only consistent with, but also conducive to, the maintenance of that friendly and mutually advantageous footing on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan; and from those relations we have laboured to eliminate every appreciable cause of irritation and disunion.”

The despatch concludes with a tribute to the conduct of the troops engaged in the campaign, a sentiment which was repeated with greater detail in an Order of the Governor-General in Council dated the 11th July.

On the 4th August a vote of thanks was moved in both Houses of Parliament to the Viceroy of India, the Commander-in-Chief, and the military forces engaged; while a despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated the 7th August, conveyed the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government of

the several articles of the Treaty of Gandamak as well as of the general policy of the Indian Government.

Meantime, immediately on the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir Yakub Khan returned to Kabul, while Major Cavagnari proceeded to Simla to report personally to the Viceroy on the late events, and to discuss the future action of the Government.

For every reason it was deemed desirable that, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, and with the Amir's own proposal (as expressed in his letter to Major Cavagnari of the 29th March), the British Resident should take up his appointment at Kabul without delay. Major Cavagnari was himself nominated for this important post, and during his stay at Simla the constitution of his staff and escort was carefully considered. The circumstances under which he was about to repair to Kabul, namely, at the *special desire* of the Amir, to reside as a friend at the Amir's capital, within the Amir's own stronghold and in close proximity to the Amir's own residence, precluded the possibility of his being accompanied by a strong military force, such as had been detailed to accompany Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. Moreover, the dangers to which the Embassy was specially liable were such as might be provoked by quarrels or misunderstanding between the excitable townspeople and the soldiers of the escort. It was, therefore, at Major Cavagnari's personal request that his staff and escort were reduced to most moderate dimensions, and were finally restricted to a secretary, Mr. Jenkins, a medical officer, Dr. A. H. Kelly, and a military attaché, Lieutenant W. H. P. Hamilton, in charge of a carefully picked escort of twenty-five Guides Cavalry and fifty infantry of the same corps.

Major Cavagnari left Simla on the 6th July, 1879, and arrived at Thal, on the British frontier, on the 14th idem. The following day he joined Major-General Roberts's headquarters at Kurram, whence he was escorted by the Major-General and a small force of all arms to Karatiga in the Hazar Darakht defile, where

was the new frontier line between British Afghanistan and the dominions of the Amir. Here the Envoy was received by Sardar Khushdil Khan, late Governor of Turkistan, who had been deputed by the Amir to conduct him to Kabul, and on the 19th July Major Cavagnari took leave of General Roberts and, with his escort, joined the Afghan camp. On the following day the march towards Kabul was continued, the capital being reached on the 24th. The Embassy was met with every token of friendship and respect, and its members were lodged in a commodious building, considered one of the best dwelling houses in Kabul, situated in the Bala Hissar, about 250 yards from the Amir's palace.

Throughout the month of August the demeanour of the Amir towards the Embassy was most friendly, and although the unsettled state of the country indicated that Yakub Khan's authority was small beyond the walls of his capital, while the *mullas* and the anti-British party lost no opportunity of exciting the hostility of the people towards the British alliance, yet the Envoy (who had meantime been created a Knight Commander of the Bath) appeared satisfied with the good faith of the Amir, and with the position of the Embassy at Kabul. As late as the 30th August, Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote as follows :—" I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." How ill-founded was this belief, or at least how little reliance could be placed on the Amir's authority over his turbulent subjects, was soon to be but too clearly proved. The story of the tragedy which brought to an end this second attempt on the part of the British Government to establish an envoy at the Afghan Court is best told in the words of one of the few credible witnesses who survived to tell the tale, Resaldar-Major Nakhshband Khan, of the Guides Cavalry, who was on furlough at the village of Afshar, 2 miles from Kabul, when the events related occurred.

“Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the Mission, six regiments of infantry arrived at Kabul from Herat. They encamped for three days at Deh-i-Bori, about one *kos* distant from Kabul. On the morning of the fourth day they marched in order through the streets of Kabul, headed by their officers, and with bands playing. While marching along they shouted out, abusing the Envoy by name, asking why he had come there, etc. They also abused all the Kizilbashes, saying that they were not men, and that they (the Herati soldiers) would show them how to act. That they would soon put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to their camp at Sherpur. The residents of the city said nothing to them. They appeared neither pleased at what was going forward, nor the reverse. I was present when this took place, and at once took the news to the Envoy, who said, ‘Never fear; keep up your heart. Dogs that bark do not bite.’ I said, ‘These dogs do bite, and there is real danger.’

“The Envoy said, ‘They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our deaths will be well avenged.’ I then went to Mr. Jenkins and told him what I had heard and seen. He asked me if I had been to the Envoy; and if so, what he had said about it. I told him what had passed, and Mr. Jenkins said, ‘What the Envoy says is very true. The British Government will not suffer from losing the three or four of us here.’ A day or two after this, these Herati regiments were all paid up most of their arrears of pay, and were given forty days’ leave to visit their homes. At this time cholera was raging violently. About 150 men out of their number died in one day, and the men dispersed to their homes in a fright, placing their arms in the Bala Hissar. They did not even wait for their leave certificates. Up to date none of these troops have returned. In my opinion the greater part of them will not rejoin, though some of them may do so. The Commander-in-Chief (*Sipah Salar*), Daud Shah, was present when the



THE RESIDENCY, KABUL—FRONT VIEW

troops marched through the city as above mentioned, and was also abused by them. He did not reply at all. Some of my own countrymen were serving in these regiments. On my asking them what the meaning of all this was, they answered, 'Do you think soldiers would have acted thus without orders? We were ordered to act as we did by our officers, and to shout out as we marched about.' I called upon a well-to-do Hindu, whose son is a servant of Sardar Ibrahim Khan (the elder brother of Yakub Khan). He knows the 'ins and outs' of what goes on in the houses of the great men. He had been to see the Envoy twice before. I called him up and sent him to report to the Envoy. He went towards the Residency for that purpose. He came back to me and told me that the Amir's sentry would not let him pass, and stoned him. I reported this to the Envoy, who said, 'It is untrue. The man lies.' The next morning another man endeavoured to get speech of the Envoy. This man was also stopped by the sentry. I don't know who this man was. But I reported this also to the Envoy, and asked him, 'What is the use of you being kept like a prisoner, and no one allowed to come near you?'


"He answered, 'I will have that sentry removed.' A day or two after this the sentry was removed by the Envoy's order. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent to order the sentry's removal, which was accordingly done. I heard that the Amir was very angry at the removal of this sentry. A day or two after this the Envoy asked me whether I knew what the Amir's intention was—to travel with him to the frontier as he had engaged to do at Gandamak, or whether he intended not to go?

"I have omitted to mention one thing. Before the arrival of the six regiments from Herat mentioned above, the Envoy, agreeably to a suggestion of mine, wished to pay Wali Muhammad Khan a visit to condole with him on the death of his mother. The Envoy said that he wished, first of all, to ask permission from the Amir before going. He did so, and the Amir answered,

‘Go.’ The Envoy then told me what he had done, and said that he intended to visit Wali Muhammad Khan the next day, ordering me to go and prepare Wali Muhammad Khan for the visit. I went to Wali Muhammad Khan’s house and told him this, and the Sardar made every preparation to receive him. The next day, however, the Envoy told me that he had asked Ghiaz, the *Mehmandar*, whether the Amir would really like his paying this visit; and that Ghiaz had answered, ‘No; the Amir will not like your going.’ I then said, ‘I warned the Sardar that you were coming; and every one expected that you would have paid this visit, and all the Sardars, hearing that you have put it off, have begun to tremble in their hearts, saying, ‘We wonder what our fate will be; if the *sahib* is afraid of going, or is unable to go and visit our chief Sardar?’ When the Envoy asked me about the Amir’s intentions as to his proposed journey with him round his frontier, I replied, ‘He will not go. He has made no preparations for it at all. If you wish to make further enquiries, call the Mustaufi Habibullah Khan.’ The Envoy ordered me to call him. I went to the *Mustaufi*, who said, ‘I am not well to-day; I will go to-morrow; give the *sahib* my *salam*.’ I went to the *Mustaufi* the next day at 10 a.m. to call him, as he had promised to be with the Envoy at 8 a.m. The *Mustaufi* went to the Amir and stated that the Envoy had called him. The Amir gave him permission to go; but said, ‘Don’t go alone. Take Shah Muhammad, the *Wazir*, with you.’ They both accompanied me to the presence of the Envoy, who made the three of us sit down, and entered into conversation. He then said to them that he had heard that the Amir was not treating well the Sardars who had accompanied him (the Envoy); that he had stopped giving them the income they were entitled to, and which the Amir’s father had given them regularly; that they had nothing to live upon, and would suffer in consequence; that the British Government would not let them be the losers, and would pay

their allowances, if the Amir refused to do so, and that the Amir would not be pleased at this. The *Mustaufi* said he was unaware that this was the case; that he would mention it to the Amir; and say that, if this was the case, it was not proper. The Envoy then asked the *Mustaufi* whether it was the Amir's intention to travel with him, as promised, or not. Both the *Mustaufi* and the *Wazir* said, 'He cannot go this year because the country is unsettled; but he will go next year.' The Envoy said, 'Very well.' He then asked them whether the Amir intended to go to meet the Viceroy in India. The *Mustaufi* said, 'Yes; he will go about December.' The Envoy said to them, 'Ask the Amir again about this.' They said, 'We will ask him.' The Envoy then dismissed them, and asked me my opinion as to whether the Amir intended to go to India or not. I answered, 'No; he has thrown up the idea of going on this tour with you, and he does not intend going to the darbar.' I heard shortly afterwards from a friend of mine that he heard from a friend of his, who was present at the time, that on the *Mustaufi* and Shah Muhammad leaving the Envoy, they went straight to the Amir and mentioned what had taken place at the interview. The Amir was very angry. The *Mustaufi* said, 'Why are you angry? If you do not give these men anything, and the British Government gives nothing to them either, they will suffer from actual want.' The Amir then asked Daud Shah what he thought of it. Daud Shah answered, 'I am a soldier. I don't understand this sort of thing. I think that the promise with the British at Gandamak ought to be carried out.' The Amir answered, 'This country is Afghanistan. We cannot get on here without practising deceit.' On this the Naib Shah Muhammad (Farastani) said, 'If this is true what you say, that Afghanistan cannot be managed without practising deceit, then we may look upon Afghanistan as on the way to ruin; it will go out of our hands.' The Amir made no reply. On hearing all I reported it to Sir Louis Cavagnari, who said, 'The

Amir can do as he likes.' (*This took place some eight or ten days before the 3rd of September.*) About three days after this, the Envoy said, 'I will go and call on the Amir to-morrow.' When I went to the Amir's darbar the next day, I saw the Envoy sitting alone with the Amir. When he returned to the Residency, I came and spoke with him. He told me that he had had a private interview with the Amir which had lasted two hours; that the expression of the Amir's face was a pleased one; that it was the same expression that he had seen him wearing at Gandamak. On the 2nd September, the Envoy told me that he had asked Shah Muhammad to secure a house for Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan somewhere in the Bala Hissar, but away from the Residency. This Shah Muhammad had refused to do. The Envoy asked me to look out for one for him, either in the city or the Kizilbash quarter, or some other place than the Residency ground. I had selected one, and was coming towards the Residency the next morning at seven o'clock to report having done so. On arriving at the gate of the Bala Hissar, I heard a report that Daud Shah had been killed by some men of a regiment. I went on and saw three regiments and a few bazaar people going towards the Envoy's quarters. I followed them with two of my own retainers. Some of the men of one of the regiments recognised me, and said, 'Kill him; he is Cavagnari's father.' The majority of them were unarmed. Some of them had side-arms. Two men attacked me with sticks. One struck me on the shoulder, and another struck my horse, which reared and turned round. I found that I could not get to the Envoy's, so I went up a by-street to Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan's house; and leaving my horse in his stable, I went inside the house, where I found Wali Muhammad, who was taking his bath. I called out to him to come out. He did so, and said, 'What is the matter?' I said, 'Men have gone up to kill Cavagnari.' He said, 'Don't stay below, go upstairs'; and from there, 200 yards off, through a window I saw all these



THE RESIDENCY, KABUL—BACK VIEW

people go up to the Envoy's stables and begin stoning the *syces*, undoing the horses, and plundering. Some went on to where the sowars' horses were, and began to stone the sowars and to plunder and unfasten the horses. The sowars armed immediately, and I then heard two or three shots evidently fired by the sowars. I cannot tell whether any damage was done by these shots. But the crowd all retired at once, and some 200 of them went to the upper part of the Bala Hissar to fetch their comrades, the rest of the soldiers going out by the Shah Shahir gate of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms from their camp.

“I heard that when the men had gone to fetch their arms, the Envoy wrote a letter to the Amir and sent it by a *chaprasi*. I heard that this letter reached the Amir; but did not hear whether he sent any reply or not.

“In about half an hour's time, at about 7.30 or 8 a.m., the soldiers returned with their arms and a regular fight began.

“Firing went on without intermission on both sides. The Afghan soldiers had capital cover, and surrounded the Residency on all sides. The officers of the Afghans directed their men. They had looted the magazine of the upper Bala Hissar, and had plenty of ammunition with them. All the clothing, stores, treasury, and other store-houses are near the Residency. The store-houses were looted. They attacked the treasury, but were stopped by the regiment on guard there. This regiment was, I suppose, about 500 strong, and remained at the treasury all the day. The Amir's house is about 250 yards from that of the Envoy. Besides the regiment on duty at the treasury, I suppose there were some 2,000 followers of the Amir, who had come into the Bala Hissar early that morning, who were all round the Amir's house. They were all armed. None of these joined the attacking party, though some of them did so at about 2 p.m. I hear that the Amir several times said, ‘Some of you go to the Envoy's assistance.’ But

whenever any did go towards where the fighting was going on, they only shouted out 'Kill! kill!' This is only hearsay.

"At about 9 a.m., when the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers of the Embassy charge out at the head of some twenty-five of the garrison. They drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. When charged, the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head (Cavagnari was not with them this time), with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkins and Hamilton) leading. A fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jemadar leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go up to the upper part of the house, and fired from above. At about half-past eleven o'clock I noticed part of the building in which the Embassy was to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders, finding themselves so few, fired part so as to have a less space to defend. The musketry fire went on continually all day. Perhaps it was hottest from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., after which time it slackened. And the last shots were fired about 8.30 or 9 p.m., after which all was quiet, and every one dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman, to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, what was going on. She sent her son to find out. He said, 'They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency.' The whole of the day the dead bodies, stripped, remained in the Residency. On the next day I heard that the bodies of all Muhammadans, Hindus, and the two British officers (Hamilton and Dr. Kelly) were all thrown together into a place dug for the purpose. I heard that the body of Mr. Jenkins was taken to the Amir. I know nothing more about it. Cavagnari's body was not found. I am of the opinion that it must have been burnt in the house. I heard

that on the 4th the soldiers found some money in the Residency. On hearing this, the Amir posted sentries over the house; and on the 5th, caused the bodies to be buried. And from other money he found there, he paid each sepoy of the regiment that had guarded the treasury a present of Rs. 7 each man. I asked Wali Muhammad Khan to send me to some safe place. He gave me three ponies. I dressed as a grass-cutter, and with one grass-cutter riding one pony in front, and the second behind me with the other pony, we got safely to Afshar, where I remained in hiding about nine days, when, hearing that the British force was at the Shutargardan, I travelled by night and reached that place in safety, and reported myself to the Brigadier-General commanding there. On about the 13th or 14th of September, the man in whose house I was concealed came to his house and stated the following facts: He said the Amir called up the Sardars of every class—the Ghilzais, Kohistanis, Kabulis, Kizilbashes, Jajis, etc.—and asked them whether they intended to join in a *ghaza* (religious war) to fight the British; and if so, he requested that they would send their families to Kohistan and the Ghilzai country, or some other out-of-the-way place. They answered, ‘We are not going to send away our families. Let the Ghilzais bring their families to Kabul, and we will then fight.’ The Amir at this reply was very angry and abused Jamullabadin, the man who had collected all the Sardars together, and had said that they would agree to fight. Abdul Karim Khan Safi, the most powerful man in Kohistan and a friend of the late Envoy’s, was cut into small pieces by order of the Amir about ten days ago, the Amir fearing that he would probably seize him (the Amir) and make him over to the British, in case he wished to fly to Balkh or Kohistan.”

“Major Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I.,¹ was born at Stenay, Meuse, France, on 4th July,

¹ *Life of Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I.*, by Kally Prosono Dey. Calcutta, 1881.

1841. He was the son of Major Count Adolphe Cavagnari, member of an old Parmese family; and Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte; and his mother was an Irish lady, daughter of Mr. Montgomery."

Louis Cavagnari was a scholar of Christ's Hospital for six years from 1851 until he passed the examinations at Addiscombe.

In April, 1858, he entered the service of the East India Company as a cadet, and joined the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, with which regiment he served throughout the Oudh campaign of 1858, receiving the Indian Mutiny medal.

In 1861 Cavagnari was appointed to the Staff Corps, and gazetted Assistant Commissiener in the Punjab. He held political charge of the Kohat district from April, 1866, to May, 1877, when he was appointed Deputy Commissioner at Peshawar.

His untimely death was an irreparable loss to the Service which he had adorned, and to the Empire, for whose interests he lived and died, and to which he bequeathed the grateful guardianship of an honoured memory and a spotless name.

The conduct of Lieutenant Hamilton and the rest of the Envoy's escort was worthy of their noble leader.

The Commission of Enquiry appointed by Major-General Roberts at Kabul, after the occupation of that city in November 1879, to investigate the circumstances attending the attack on the Residency and the massacre of the Envoy and his escort, recorded the following remarks in their proceedings:

"The conduct of the escort of the Queen's Own Guides does not form part of the enquiry entrusted to the Commission. But they have, in the course of their enquiries, had the extreme gallantry and the bearing of these men so forcibly brought to their notice, that they cannot refrain from placing on record their humble tribute of admiration. They do not give their opinion hastily, but they believe that the annals of no army and

no regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of Guides. By their deeds they have conferred undying honour, not only on the regiment to which they belong, but on the whole British Army."

Colonel C. M. MacGregor, the President of the Commission, brought this record to the notice of Sir Frederick Roberts with a view to some substantial recognition of the conduct of the escort. This took the form of the posthumous admission to the Indian Order of Merit of the whole escort; and the distinction to be borne on the appointments of the Guides: "Residency, Kabul."

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN; ADVANCE OF THE FIRST DIVISION,
KABUL FIELD FORCE, AND OCCUPATION OF SHERPUR, TO
DECEMBER 1st, 1879.

LATE at night on the 4th September, 1879, the intelligence of an attack on the Residency at Kabul was brought first by a *kossid* to Captain A. Conolly, Political Officer at Ali Khel. The news was immediately telegraphed to Simla, where the Viceroy summoned a Council on the following day. But the full extent of the disaster was not yet disclosed, nor could authentic information be expected for some time to come. The Government, however, acted with promptitude, and after a brief conference between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, the following telegram in cipher was despatched to Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, then commanding the Kurram Column, during the temporary absence of Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla :

“ Move 23rd Pioneers, 5th Gurkhas, and Mountain Train to Shutargardan crest of pass. To entrench themselves there and await orders. Ten days' supplies.”

On the same day, the 5th September, at the desire of Lord Lytton, Sir Frederick Haines submitted a project of the operations necessary for the immediate advance on and occupation of the city of Kabul, in which the Commander-in-Chief suggested that, if the news of the destruction of our Mission at Kabul should prove true, a division under Major-General Sir F. Roberts of one brigade of cavalry and two brigades of infantry should immediately advance on Kabul over the Shutargardan Pass; that Jalalabad should be occupied by another division under Major-General Bright, and

that Kandahar should be reoccupied by all available troops under Major-General Sir D. Stewart and Ghazni threatened if necessary. Meanwhile a sufficient force must remain on the Shutargardan, to hold the pass and the line of communication through the Kurram Valley. "The great difficulty," concluded this memorandum, "is carriage, and Sir Frederick Haines cannot too emphatically urge upon Government the necessity of using every endeavour to collect, by purchase or otherwise, some 20,000 camels, which will assuredly be required to maintain our position at Kabul.

"The Shutargardan Pass, as a line of supply, cannot be depended on after the middle of November at the latest. And the question of communication with the capital of Afghanistan, should we be compelled to remain there, is one which will require early and serious consideration."

The Governor-General in Council having approved of immediate action being taken in accordance with these proposals, Sir Frederick Roberts started from Simla on the 6th September to resume command of the Kurram Column. Before leaving Simla, Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts telegraphed instructions to the Political Officer at Ali Khel to issue a summons to all the headmen of the surrounding districts to meet him in camp on his arrival. On reaching Jhelum, Sir Frederick Roberts wrote semi-officially to Sir Peter Lumsden, Adjutant-General in India, to the following effect :

"The main difficulty will be keeping the long line of communications safe. I require the following positions to be held ; and placing the garrisons at the lowest, the strength of each should be what I now propose :

<i>Thal.</i>	<i>Balesh Khel.</i>	<i>Kurram Fort.</i>
1 squadron, Native Cavalry.	1 squadron, Native Cavalry.	1 squadron, Native Cavalry.
1 regiment, Native Infantry.	1 regiment, Native Infantry.	½ battery, Field Artillery.
		3 companies, British Infantry.
		1 wing, Native Infantry.

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN

<i>Paiwar Kotal.</i>	<i>Ali Khel.</i>	<i>Shuturgardan.</i>
6 companies, British Infantry.	$\frac{1}{2}$ battery, Field Artillery. 1 British Mountain Battery. 1 regiment, British Infantry. Details of British Infantry. 2 regiments, Native Infantry.	1 Native Mountain Battery. 2 regiments, Native Infantry.

Kushi.

1 regiment, Native Cavalry.
 Wing, Native Infantry.

Total	1 Field Battery.
	1 Mountain Battery, British.
	1 Mountain Battery, Native.
	2 regiments, British Infantry.
	Details, British Infantry.
	2 regiments, Native Cavalry.
	7 regiments, Native Infantry.

“There will be in the Kurram Valley after the advance column has moved :

1 Field Battery.
 1 Native Mountain Battery.
 1 regiment, British Infantry.
 Details, British Infantry.
 1 regiment, Native Cavalry.
 4 regiments, Native Infantry, including the 3rd Sikhs,
 ordered from Bannu.

“So that the following troops should be ordered up as soon as possible :

1 Mountain Battery, British.	1 regiment, Native Cavalry.
1 regiment, British Infantry.	3 regiments, Native Infantry.”

Sir Frederick Roberts then indicated the regiments whose employment he would suggest, and proceeded :

“When snow falls, and my communication with India has to be carried on by the Khyber route, the force between Kohat and Kushi could, no doubt, be weakened. But for the next three months I would maintain it at the strength I have named, and throughout the winter I would keep two regiments of British infantry in the valley.

“I have recommended a fairly strong force for Ali Khel, as I consider that, for the present, it represents my reserve. And before winter comes on, and my base is moved to the Khyber, it will probably be necessary

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to bring on some native infantry, in addition to the 44th, to Kabul. Even without casualties in action we must expect losses from sickness; and there may be more work to be done in Kabul than is at present anticipated.

* * * * *

“My weak points at present are commissariat and transport. I have just telegraphed to you for the services of six young regimental officers, whom I can employ in either one or the other department. With this aid, and if assisted by the Ghilzais and Jajis, I dare say I shall be able to manage about my transport. The commissariat causes me considerable anxiety.”—

(Jhelum, 8th September, 1879.)

Owing to the continuous hard work to which the animals on this line had been subjected since the commencement of the first campaign, their numbers had steadily diminished till there remained but 1,500 mules, 800 bullocks, and 500 sickly camels. The deficiencies were only partially supplied locally by the Turis and Jajis and by the Ghilzais through the good offices of their chief, Padshah Khan. Eventually about half the total required to move the whole Kurram Force was collected, but only at the cost of the immobility of the Khyber Force, which was denuded of its transport.

Brigadier-General Massy, having provided as far as possible for early transport requirements, had, on receiving the news of the disaster at Kabul, telegraphed his orders for the occupation of the Shutargardan to the officers in command of his nearest detachments.

Four companies of the 23rd Pioneers, which for some weeks had been employed at Sancona (also called Shank Gorge) in felling timber and in other work connected with the new cantonment of Shalozan, started under Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Currie on the 8th September, halting within 2 miles of the Paiwar that night, and on the 9th arrived at Ali Khel. Here Lieutenant-Colonel Currie was joined by Captain G.

Swinley's mountain battery ; and on the 10th this party arrived at Karatiga, where the 5th Gurkhas under Captain J. Cook, who had marched from Ali Khel two days previously, were already encamped.

On the 9th, in accordance with a telegraphic order from Major-General Roberts, the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners, then at Shalozan, marched with all speed towards the Shutargardan.

At 2.30 a.m. on the 11th the combined force under Lieutenant-Colonel Currie left Karatiga, the 5th Gurkhas leading. The Sirkai Kotal was passed in about two hours, and at 5.30 a.m. the head of the advance guard reached the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, followed by the whole column at about 6.30 a.m. No opposition was met with ; but there can have been but little time to spare, for two horsemen were observed galloping away towards Dobandi on the appearance of the leading file of the 5th Gurkhas on the crest. The entrenchment of the position was at once begun by the 23rd Pioneers under the direction of Lieutenant Nugent, R.E., and completed by the night of the 12th September. Heliographic communication was opened with Ali Khel, and the laying down of the field telegraph to that place was put in hand.

Meanwhile, as much of the force in the Kurram Valley as could be moved with the available carriage, and as could be withdrawn with a due regard to the maintenance of the line of communications, was set in motion to the front ; and by the 12th September some 6,000 men were at and near Ali Khel, at which place Sir Frederick Roberts arrived on that day, accompanied by Brigadier-General T. D. Baker and Colonel C. M. MacGregor. Here General Roberts received a letter from the Amir, in answer to one forwarded to Kabul :

“I have received your letter of the 7th, and was much pleased. I fully understood what was written. Complete confidence was restored, and a sense of relief felt in the friendship shown by the Viceroy, as my prosperity found favour in his sight. I am dreadfully

distressed and grieved at the recent event ; but there is no fighting against God's will. I hope to inflict such punishment on the evil-doers as will be known world-wide ; and to prove my sincerity, I have twice written on this subject, and the third time by my confidential servant, Sher Muhammad Khan. I now write to say that for these eight days I have preserved myself and my family by the good offices of those who were friendly to me, partly by bribing, partly by coaxing the rebels. Some of the cavalry I have dismissed, and night and day am considering how to put matters straight.

“ Please God, the mutineers will soon meet with the punishment they deserve, and my affairs will be arranged to the satisfaction of the British Government. Certain persons of high position in these provinces have become rebellious ; but I am watching carefully and closely every quarter. I have done all I could to ensure Nawab Ghulam Hasan's safety. I trust to God for the opportunity of showing my sincere friendship for the British Government, and for recovering my good name before the world.”

At Ali Khel General Roberts was met by a large number of the headmen, who had been summoned by the Political Officer. A better feeling appeared to exist among them than might have been expected, notwithstanding that emissaries from Kabul had been endeavouring to incite them against the British Government. General Roberts was of opinion that the surrounding tribes would not attempt any insurrection so long as the British force in front was strong and successful.

On the 13th September, Brigadier-General Baker proceeded to the Shutargardan to take command there, and the sappers, who had by this date arrived on the pass, began work on the Sirkai Kotal, to improve the steep gradients on the Kurram side of the summit.

The following day Nawab Sir Ghulam Hasan Khan, K.C.S.I., who had received warning of the outbreak at Kabul while on the road from Kandahar to the capital,

and had thereupon turned off towards the Kurram Valley, arrived at the British post on the Shutargardan; the fact that he had not been molested on the road proved that the Logar Valley was as yet undisturbed.

On the 16th Brigadier-General Baker reconnoitred from the summit of the Shutargardan towards Kushi and reached the Shinkai Kotal, a short distance beyond the village and fort of Dobandi. No resistance was offered, and inspection proved that the difficulties both of this kotal and the far-famed Akhun Khel gorge had been rather overestimated, though if held by a skilled and resolute force their passage would, doubtless, be attended with considerable difficulty.

During this interval the concentration of troops was proceeding as rapidly as possible, but was impeded by the deficiency of adequate transport. Owing to the continuous hard work to which the transport animals of the Kurram Field Force had been subjected, their numbers had steadily diminished, until at the beginning of the month of September there remained only about 1,500 mules, 500 sickly camels, and 800 bullocks, or barely sufficient to enable the commissariat to feed the force, which it was presumed would remain in the Kurram Valley for the winter. It is true that a large number of pack-bullocks had, prior to the occurrences which led to the advance on Kabul, been despatched for the commissariat service in the valley. But many of these had been either knocked up by the journey from the Punjab, or were suffering from semi-starvation to such an extent as to be practically useless.

Local carriage, drawn from the Turis and Jajis, had to some extent made up for the deficiencies in this respect; and, aided by transport obtained from the Ghilzais, had enabled the commissariat to collect a considerable amount of supplies at the Shutargardan, quite sufficient to relieve any anxiety as to the immediate wants of the troops left there, and it had also been possible to move still larger stores forward for the force advancing on Kabul,

These troops, composing the 1st Division of the Kurram Field Force, amounted to some 7,500 of all ranks, and were brigaded by Major-General Roberts as follows :

KABUL FIELD FORCE.

Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding.
 Captain G. T. Pretzman, B.A., Aide-de-Camp.
 Captain R. Pole-Carew, Aide-de-Camp.
 Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Political Officer.
 Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I. C.I.E., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.
 Major W. Galbraith, 85th Foot, Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Captain R. G. Kennedy, B.S.C., Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Captain B. A. Combe, 10th Hussars, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith, 3rd Sikhs, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Major C. A. Gorham, B.A., Deputy Judge Advocate.
 Captain R. B. McEwen, 92nd Highlanders, Provost Marshal.

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General S. C. Townsend, Principal Medical Officer.
 Surgeon-Major A. J. Dale, M.B.

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. V. Hunt, B.S.C., Principal Commissariat Officer.

Engineer Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., Royal Engineers, Commanding.
 Captain R. G. Woodthorpe, R.E., in charge of Surveying.
 Captain E. Straton, 2-22nd Foot, in charge of Signalling.
 Lieutenant C. Nugent, R.E., No. 7 Company Sappers.
 Lieutenant F. Burn-Murdoch, R.E., Royal Engineer Field Park.

Communications and Transport.

Brigadier-General H. H. Gough, C.B., V.C., Road Commandant.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Heathcote, B.S.C., Director of Transport.

Veterinary Department.

Veterinary-Surgeon G. A. Oliphant, Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.A., Commanding.

Captain J. W. Inge, Adjutant, Royal Horse Artillery.

F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major J. C. Smyth-Windham.

G-3, Royal Artillery, Major Sidney Parry.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (4 guns), Captain H. R. L. Morgan.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, Captain G. Swinley, and 2 Gatlings, Captain A. Broadfoot.

Captain E. D. Shafto, in charge Ordnance Field Park.

Captain G. E. Pemberton, in charge Ordnance Field Park.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. G. D. Massy, Commanding.

Lieutenant J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major.

9th Lancers (3 squadrons), Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Cleland.

5th Punjab Cavalry, Major F. Hammond.

12th Bengal Cavalry, Major J. H. Green.

14th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Ross.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., Commanding.

Captain W. C. Farwell, Brigade-Major.

67th Foot, Colonel C. B. Knowles.

92nd Highlanders, Colonel G. H. Parker.

28th Punjab Infantry, Colonel J. Hudson.

2nd Infantry Brigade:

Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, 18th Foot, Commanding.

Captain G. de C. Morton, 1-6th Foot, Brigade-Major.

72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.

3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money.

5th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. MacQueen.

23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Currie.

5th Gurkhas, Major A. FitzHugh.

The transport for this portion of the above force consisted of about 2,000 mules, 750 camels, and 750 bullocks. There were some 6,000 followers with this force under Sir F. Roberts.

The remainder of the Kurram Force, to be left on the line of communication, was composed as follows, *viz.* :

3rd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, c.B., v.c., Commanding.

Major H. T. Jones, 81st Foot, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant E. Burrell, 85th Foot, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Major A. P. Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry, Assistant Road Commandant between Thal and Ali Khel.

85th Foot, Major D. A. Grant.

11th Bengal Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel P. H. F. Harris.

13th Bengal Infantry, Colonel J. T. Watson.

20th Punjab Infantry, Colonel R. G. Rogers.

4th Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, c.s.i., Commanding.

Captain H. G. Grant, 78th Foot, Brigade-Major.

2-8th Foot, Colonel F. B. Drew.

4th Punjab Infantry, Colonel H. P. Close.

21st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Collis.

29th Punjab Infantry, Colonel J. J. H. Gordon.

It was subsequently, however, found impossible to adhere to the above organisation by brigades.

Sir Frederick Roberts's plan of operations, as submitted to Army Head-quarters on the 17th September, included the occupation of Kushi on or before the 27th September by an advance brigade under Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, the rendezvous there of the troops intended for the advance, and the collection at the same place of all supplies and transport necessary for a rapid march on Kabul. Pending the completion of these preliminaries he intended himself to remain at Ali Khel, perceiving that by so doing the people of Afghanistan would be kept in doubt as to the actual intentions of the British Government. Their idea was that the season was too far advanced for troops to attempt a march on Kabul, and that, beyond occupying the Shutargardan and making a demonstration as far as Kushi, nothing would be done until the spring of next year. The fact of Sir Frederick Roberts crossing the Shutargardan would, he was aware, make his plans clear to the Afghans and neighbouring tribes, and

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would be the signal for the assemblage of all those who had determined to oppose the advance. His object, therefore, was to let as short a time as possible intervene between his move to Kushi and his arrival at Kabul, especially in view of the fact that lack of transport would prevent him from moving the whole of his force at once, and that *a halt would have to be made every second day to allow of the transport animals being sent back to bring up the rear brigade.*

By the 18th of September the following force was collected at and firmly established and entrenched upon the crest of the Shutargardan under command of Brigadier-General Baker :

No. 2 Mountain Battery.
72nd Highlanders.
7th Company Sappers and Miners.
23rd Pioneers.
5th Gurkhas.

The road over the Shutargardan Pass was being made practicable for horsed guns, and the force was being strengthened as rapidly as possible for an advance on Kushi. The attitude of the neighbouring tribes was considered satisfactory, for some of those who hitherto had been holding aloof had now come in or were on their way to the camp. The headmen on the Kushi side were also inclined to be friendly, and said that supplies and transport would be forthcoming when the troops advanced.

Notwithstanding this apparent tranquillity, however, directly *Ramzan* was ended, on the 22nd September, a combined attack was made by Mangals and Ghilzais, numbering from 200 to 300 men, upon a telegraph party whilst on the march between the Sirkai Kotal and Karatiga. Soon after 6 a.m. on that day a party consisting of 1 telegraph linesman, 22 telegraph coolies, 40 muleteers, and 84 mules, escorted by 1 naik and 10 sepoy of the 5th Punjab Infantry, left Shutargardan, without the knowledge of Brigadier-

General Baker, for the purpose of bringing up telegraph poles from Karatiga. About 9 a.m. intelligence reached Shutargardan that not only had this party been attacked, but also that a heavy fire had been kept up upon a detachment, consisting of 1 British officer and 50 non-commissioned officers and men stationed in a blockhouse on the Sirkai Kotal. As many of the 72nd Highlanders as could be spared from Kasim Khel at once proceeded to the spot; but the marauding band had disappeared, and attempts to follow them up proved fruitless. One man of the detachment at the Sirkai Kotal had been surprised and cut up, while the loss of the telegraph party amounted to 1 naik and 6 sepoy of the 5th Punjab Infantry, 1 linesman, 12 muleteers, and 5 coolies, killed; 1 sepoy, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 2 muleteers wounded; and 1 muleteer, 2 coolies missing, while the whole of the convoy of mules was carried off. Orders had been issued that no escort of a less strength than 25 men per cent. of animals in a convoy should be sent out; but this order does not seem to have been understood by the Superintendent of Telegraphs.

On the 23rd September F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, joined the remainder of the advanced force on the Shutargardan. The guns, limbers, and wagons had to be man-handled up the last ascent to the Sirkai Pass, the last 1,000 yards of the ascent taking over three hours to accomplish, although assisted by the detachment of the 72nd Highlanders with drag-ropes. The descent from the Shutargardan to Dobandi on the following day necessitated the same arrangements.

On the 24th September the forward movement to Kushi began, General Baker and part of his brigade moving down from the Shutargardan through Dobandi and over the Shinkai Kotal and reaching Kushi the same evening, thus securing the entrance into the Logar Valley and obtaining a standpoint in it. The remainder of the brigade reached Kushi on the two following days as follows:

THE BRIGADE AT KUSHI

September 24th . . .	{	1 company 72nd Highlanders. 5th Gurkhas. 12th Bengal Cavalry. 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery.
September 25th . . .	{	F-A, Royal Horse Artillery. 7 companies 72nd Highlanders. 2 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery.
September 26th . . .	{	23rd Pioneers. 7th Company Sappers and Miners. 5th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).

On the 26th September Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts made over to Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon the military command of all troops in Kurram, and also the political charge of the district, preparatory to his proceeding to join the advance column of the Kabul Field Force.

Besides the brigade which had already reached Kushi, the strength and positions of the remainder of the troops on this date are given below :

At Shinkoi Kotal	5th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).
Shutargardan . . .	{	14th Bengal Lancers. No. 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns). 72nd Highlanders (1 company). 92nd Highlanders (6 companies). 3rd Sikhs.
Sirkai Kotal . . .	{	92nd Highlanders (1 company). 5th Punjab Infantry (1 company).
Karatiga . . .	{	92nd Highlanders (1 company). 5th Punjab Infantry (1 company).
Ali Khel . . .	{	Squadron 9th Lancers. 5th Punjab Cavalry. $\frac{1}{2}$ C-4, Royal Artillery. 2-8th Foot (2 companies). 67th Foot. 28th Punjab Infantry.
Zarbardast Kala . . .	{	G-3, Royal Artillery. 11th Bengal Infantry. 21st Punjab Infantry.
Paiwar Kotal	2-8th Foot (4 companies).

Kurram	{	13th Bengal Lancers (wing). ½ C-4, Royal Artillery. 2-8th Foot (2 companies). Details, British regiments.
Balesh Khel	{	1st Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 20th Punjab Infantry.
Thal	{	1st Bengal Cavalry (2 squadrons). 29th Punjab Infantry.

Before detailing further the advance of the force on Kabul it will be well to glance at the positions of the troops destined to hold the long line of communications, and to consider the circumstances under which their employment was necessary.

In order to make certain the continuance of the apparent inclination of Padshah Khan (Ahmadzai) and his Ghilzais to assist the forward movements of the troops, it was necessary to hold the Shutargardan and Ali Khel in strength for the present. A month or six weeks later the extreme cold would necessitate the withdrawal of the troops stationed at the Shutargardan, and in two or three months' time those at Ali Khel would also have to be withdrawn. This retirement would then be understood by the tribes, and would not be misconstrued by them into an expression of weakness on the part of the Government. Should it, however, be carried out before there was any apparent cause for it, it would probably be the signal for a general rising.

By the time indicated, the Shutargardan route would no longer be necessary, since it was assumed that the line of communication by the Khyber would then be opened. The position on the Shutargardan had been carefully entrenched, and was to be held by two native infantry regiments with four guns of a mountain battery, well supplied with food and ammunition.

These troops, it was considered, should have no difficulty in maintaining themselves against any attack

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of such tribes as might combine against them. For this duty the 21st Punjab Infantry were detailed, with the exception of about 250 weakly men, who were to be left at Kurram, the 3rd Sikhs, and four guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, the whole being under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Money, 3rd Sikhs. At Ali Khel, where the head-quarters of Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, c.s.i., were to remain, there were to be stationed three guns of C-4, Royal Artillery, a wing of the 2-8th (The King's) Regiment, and the 11th Bengal Infantry. These troops at Ali Khel were to be encamped on a defensible plateau, which had been rendered very strong, and where they would be able to hold their own against any possible combination. On the Paiwar Kotal the other wing of the 2-8th (The King's) Regiment was to be stationed.

It would have been desirable to have had a wing of a native infantry regiment and some cavalry stationed at Shalozan, near the site of the new Kurram cantonment; but there was not a sufficient number of troops to allow of this. It was, therefore, arranged with Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon that a Turi levy, numbering about 350 or 400 men, should be raised from the villages of Paiwar, Shalozan, Mailana, and Ziran, in the Kurram Valley. These men were to be under the orders of their own *maliks*, and it was considered that they would afford sufficient protection to the workpeople until a small garrison could be provided.

At Kurram Fort the garrison was to consist of the—

13th Bengal Lancers (head-quarters wing).	
C-4, Royal Artillery (three guns).	
67th Foot	} details, numbering some 230 men.
72nd Highlanders	
92nd Highlanders	
21st Punjab Infantry (250 weakly men).	

Looking, however, to the importance of Kurram as the depot for stores and ammunition for the troops in

the valley, it was arranged, for the sake of security, that the 29th Punjab Infantry was to move to that station from Thal on the arrival at the latter place of the 13th Bengal Infantry, and that Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, the commandant of the first-named regiment, should be placed in command of the troops at Kurram.

Although the garrison at Kurram itself was weak, it was considered beneficial to the upper portion of the valley for the wing of the cavalry regiment detailed for that garrison to be constantly on the move; and, therefore, one troop was directed to march frequently between Kurram and Ali Khel, as this was likely to have the best possible effect, and would act as a strong patrol.

Balesh Khel was a post of some importance, as the several sections of the Orakzai tribe meet near that point. Two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery and the 20th Punjab Infantry were, therefore, stationed there under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Rogers of that regiment. This small garrison was placed on a commanding position, which had been artificially strengthened, and was believed to be quite impregnable against the tribes.

The posts of Wali Muhammad Khan, Shinak, Alizai, Mandori, and Sapri were all held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry as strong as the sickly state of the 1st Bengal Cavalry and of the 29th Punjab Infantry would admit of; while at Thal the garrison consisted of the remainder of these two regiments.

This disposition accounted for all the troops in the valley; and although it was perhaps desirable to have stronger posts at certain places, yet it was not anticipated that any attack would have to be met beyond ordinary hill raids, so long as success attended the force moving on Kabul.

Meanwhile, however, the garrison of Kohat had been considerably weakened in order to supply regiments for the front and for the more advanced posts. This fact was brought to the notice of the

Punjab Government by the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, who deprecated the further reduction of the Kohat garrison by the advance of a wing of the 13th Bengal Lancers from that place to Kurram. In consequence, therefore, of the representations of the Punjab Government, the 18th Bengal Cavalry was ordered to proceed from Peshawar to Kohat, a wing of it being detached to Serozai. The remainder of the Kohat garrison then consisted of a wing of the 13th Bengal Lancers, a garrison battery, and the 1st Sikh Infantry.

On the 27th September Sir Frederick Roberts moved his divisional head-quarters from Ali Khel to the Shutargardan, accompanied by the head-quarters of the Cavalry Brigade, 1 squadron of the 9th Lancers, the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 28th Punjab Infantry and a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

The infantry marched in rear of the column, the cavalry and staff being ordered to push on in order to reach Kasim, Khel or the Shutargardan before dark. At about 10.30 a.m. the head of the column was joined by 25 men of the 92nd Highlanders, who had been sent from Karatiga to act as an advance guard, in consequence of a rumoured gathering in the Hazar Darakht defile of Mangals and Ghilzais of Machalgu. On their march downward this detachment saw no indications of the presence of an enemy; but at 11 a.m. a report reached the Major-General that 20,000 Mangals had occupied the pass between Jaji Thana and Karatiga. A reconnaissance was immediately sent forward under Captain W. J. Vousden, 5th Punjab Cavalry, who ascertained that the enemy held both sides of the ravine half a mile beyond Jaji Thana. They were speedily cleared off the northern side of the gorge by the detachment of the 92nd, supported by a dismounted troop of the 9th Lancers, but some little time elapsed before they were driven from the precipitous hills on the south. In this skirmish Captain Vousden's horse was shot, and Deputy Surgeon-

General S. C. Townsend was severely wounded in the cheek.

Meantime fighting had for some hours been carried on in the direction of Karatiga; and presently large numbers of the enemy were seen retreating before a small detachment of the 92nd Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs, which had been sent out from Karatiga. This party was handled with energy and skill, which reflected the highest credit on Color-Sergeant Hector MacDonald, 92nd Highlanders, and Jemadar Sher Muhammad of the 3rd Sikhs, but for whose excellent services it might, writes Sir Frederick Roberts, have been impossible to carry out the programme of the march.

Havildar Fazl Jan and three sepoy of the 3rd Sikhs were killed, while the enemy suffered so severely that they withdrew to their homes and abandoned their intention of attacking Karatiga.

Sir Frederick Roberts arrived at Kushi on the 28th September, and found there, in addition to the troops already detailed, 1 squadron 9th Lancers, the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 92nd Highlanders. The Amir Yakub Khan had also arrived from Kabul on the previous day. His Foreign Secretary and Finance Minister, Wazir Shah Muhammad and Mustaufi Habibullah, had visited Sir Frederick Roberts's camp on the 23rd, and remained there three days, and in consequence of the negotiations conducted by them, Yakub Khan with his eldest son, several Sardars, a suite of 45 persons and an escort 200 strong, arrived in General Baker's camp on the 27th. He remained permanently with Sir Frederick Roberts's head-quarters during the advance against Kabul, and was treated as a guest under the lightest surveillance. He took advantage of the liberty accorded him, to keep in close touch with the leaders of the Afghan army at Kabul, and was continually visited by various messengers and probably by Nek Muhammad himself, the chief commander at Kabul, who was the Amir's own uncle.

On the two last days of September the rear guard

of the 1st Division, Kabul Field Force, marched from Ali Khel to the Shutargardan, and arrived at Kushi on the 1st October, while on the 30th September the Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, accompanied by two guns F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, two companies 72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjab Infantry, advanced from Kushi 10 miles to Zargan Shahar. The two batteries of artillery with the force had now surmounted the difficult Shutargardan Pass without any accident, a feat which evidently much astonished the Afghans, and reflected great credit on Captain H. Pipon, who commanded F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, and Major Sidney Parry, commanding G-3, Royal Artillery.

So far, General Roberts' force had concentrated at the rendezvous in Kushi according to the programme which he had planned, "notwithstanding difficulties of transport greater than I ever remember to have experienced in any former campaign."

Now, on the 1st October, it became evident, however, that, owing to want of carriage, the Major-General would be reluctantly compelled to alter his plans and defer his contemplated arrival at Kabul for some days. Thus, instead of being able to push on the cavalry under Brigadier-General Massy to Saiadabad on the 2nd October, as intended, it was necessary for the brigade to remain halted at Zargan Shahar. On this date the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Baker, marched to Zargan Shahar, where the General with divisional head-quarters and the remaining infantry joined them before evening. Sardar Wali Muhammad, a representative of Dost Muhammad's family and of the faction opposed to Amir Yakub Khan, joined Sir F. Roberts's camp at Zargan Shahar. On the 3rd October the advance was continued to Saiadabad by the head-quarters and the greater part of the column, and on the 4th a halt was made to permit of the arrival of supplies and transport.

On the former date the following proclamation to

the people of Kabul was issued by Sir Frederick Roberts :

“Be it known to all that the British army is advancing on Kabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good ; if not, the city will be seized by force.

“Therefore all well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy, or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore, after the receipt of this proclamation, all persons found armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British Government ; and further, it must be clearly understood that if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people, who may have neglected this warning.”—(Zargan Shahar, 3rd October = 15th Shawal 1879.)

On the 5th October the vicinity of the group of villages known as Chaharasia, 11 miles from Kabul, was reached by the whole column except a rear guard, under Brigadier-General Macpherson, left at Saiadabad to protect ammunition and stores, for which transport had to be sent back on the afternoon of the same

day.¹ Up to this point no serious interference had been offered to the advance, except a feeble attack on the rear of the column while crossing the Logar at Saiadabad. But the evident hostility of the people, as well as news of a determined attack on the Shutargardan immediately after the departure of the bulk of the force, showed sufficiently clearly that more vigorous opposition might be looked for before Kabul was reached. It was, however, quite impossible to obtain any information as to the intentions of the enemy.

Immediately on arriving at Chaharasia reconnoitring parties of cavalry were pushed forward along three roads leading to Kabul. A few shots were fired at these parties, but no traces of any large body of the enemy were visible, and the force under Sir F. Roberts concentrated at Chaharasia, where they bivouacked for the night.

The troops actually present under his immediate command were as follows :

<i>Artillery.</i>		
	F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major Smyth-Windham.	} Total 16 guns.
	G-3, Royal Artillery, Major Parry.	
	No. 2 Mountain Battery (4 guns), Captain Swinley.	
<i>Cavalry.</i>		
Under Brigadier-General Dunham Massy.	9th Lancers (1 squadron), Captain Apperley.	} Total 9 squadrons.
	5th Punjab Cavalry (2 squadrons), Major Hammond.	
	12th Bengal Cavalry (3 squadrons), Major Green.	
	14th Bengal Lancers (3 squadrons), Lieutenant-Colonel Ross.	
<i>Infantry.</i>		
Under Brigadier-General Baker.	British { 67th Foot (half battalion), Colonel C. B. Knowles.	} Total 5½ battalions.
	72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.	
	92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker.	
	Native { 5th Punjab Infantry, Major H. M. Pratt.	
	23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Currie.	
	5th Gurkhas, Major A. Fitz Hugh.	
	2 Gatling guns, Major A. Broadfoot.	

¹ This force consisted of 1 squadron 5th Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, a wing 67th Foot, and the 23rd Punjab Infantry.

The total strength of this force was about 3,800 men, including gunners.

Cavalry patrols were ordered to proceed at daylight on the 6th October to feel for the enemy, while the Major-General determined to seize as soon as possible after dawn the crest of the pass known as the Sang-i-Nawishta, about 5 miles in advance of the camp, by which he had decided to continue his march on Kabul. In addition the following force left the camp soon after daybreak, to work on the road through the pass and to render it fit for the passage of guns :

Under Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Currie, 23rd Pioneers.	}	9th Lancers (20 sabres), Captain H. W. Apperley.
		5th Punjab Cavalry (1 squadron), Major F. Hammond.
		No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns) (left division), under Lieutenant C. A. Montanaro, R.A.
		92nd Highlanders (284 rifles), Major G. S. White.
		23rd Pioneers (450 rifles), Lieutenant-Colonel Currie.

Before, however, any reports had been received from the cavalry patrols, and before the Major-General could carry out his intention of occupying the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, all doubts as to the intentions of the enemy were set at rest by the appearance of large masses of Afghan troops on the crest-line of the hills stretching from the heights on both sides of the pass on the right to the Chardeh Valley on the left.

No hurry or confusion marked their movements, and the positions were taken up and guns placed with so much deliberation and coolness that it was evident that a large number of regular troops were massed along the position. Soon afterwards reports were received that the cavalry patrols had been fired upon and were retiring slowly.

It was essential that the enemy should be dislodged from their strong position before dark. Their occupation of heights intervening between Chaharasia and Kabul was a menace that could not be brooked.


Behind these heights lay the densely crowded city of Kabul, with the scarcely less crowded suburbs of Chardeh, Deh-i-Afghan, etc., and the numerous villages which lie thickly clustered all over the Kabul Valley.

Each of these had contributed its quota of men to dispute the advance of the British ; and it did not require much experience of Afghans to know that the numbers already assembled would be very considerably increased if the enemy were allowed to remain in possession of their stronghold for a single night.

About this time it was also reported that the road in rear of the column was blocked, and that the march of General Macpherson's brigade, with its long string of baggage, would be opposed ; whilst on the hills on both sides of General Roberts's camp bodies of men were seen assembling and, as was afterwards learnt, only waiting for nightfall to make a general attack upon the encampment.

The situation was a difficult one, for the main body of the division was almost surrounded, and separated from its baggage. It was probable that any hesitation would encourage the enemy to descend from all sides upon the camp, while an attack in overwhelming numbers might have been made upon General Macpherson's small force encumbered with the convoys of stores and ammunition. Notice was at once sent to General Macpherson to keep a good look-out, and to reach Chaharasia, if possible, before dark ; and at the same time a squadron of cavalry was sent back to reinforce him.

The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, and extended from the Sang-i-Nawishta gorge to the heights above Chardeh, north-west of Chaharasia. Both sides of the gorge were occupied ; and so was the semi-detached hill to the south of it, and at least sixteen guns were observed in position—*viz.* twelve mountain guns on the hill immediately to the west of the gorge and four Armstrongs in front of the Sang-i-Nawishta gorge, the total length of the enemy's line occupying nearly 3 miles of country. The main position of the Afghans was on the elevated ridge directly to the west of the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass. At the end next the defile where the guns were posted the elevation (6,529 ft.) measured some 700 ft. above the plain, whilst at the



VIEW OF CHAHARASIA PLAIN, SHOWING THE POSITION HELD BY THE ENEMY ON 6TH OCTOBER, 1879

other extremity the ridge culminated in a peak 7,334 ft., or 800 ft. higher. Thence the line extended along the crest of the lower heights to a rugged rocky hill, whose summit (6,953 ft.) was nearly 1,300 ft. above Chaharasia. In front of the whole were sandy, barren, undulating hills, forming a series of easily defensible positions. At the foot of these inferior heights was a bare, stony slope (*dasht*) descending to the arable land around Chaharasia and the hamlet of Khairabad. The main position commanded the whole ground in front, and was inaccessible, except at a few points.

Up to this period all the General's operations had led the enemy to expect that the attack would be delivered against their left at the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, and they were seen to be concentrating their forces in that quarter. This position was so strong, and could only have been carried with such loss, that Sir Frederick Roberts determined that the real attack should be made by an outflanking movement upon the right of the enemy, while their left continued to be contained by the force originally detached under Colonel Currie. The difficult task of executing this attack and of dislodging the enemy from their position was entrusted to Brigadier-General Baker, and for the purpose the following troops were placed at his disposal, in addition to the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Currie already mentioned, and which was now halted between the camp and the left of the Afghan position :

Cavalry	12th Bengal Cavalry (détachment).	
Artillery	{ No. 2 Mountain Battery, 2 guns (centre division), Lieutenant F. E. Allsopp. 2 guns (Gatling), Captain Broadfoot.	} Under Captain Swinley.
Infantry	72nd Highlanders (700 rifles), Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke.	
	5th Punjab Infantry (200 rifles), Captain C. McK. Hall.	
	5th Gurkhas (6 companies, 300 rifles), Major Fitzhugh.	
	No. 7 Company Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant Nugent, R.E.	

In accordance with the proposed plan the main attack was reinforced with 350 rifles of the 23rd Pioneers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Currie, which were withdrawn from the containing force on the right front. The command

of the latter now devolved on Major George White, 92nd Highlanders; with this detachment three guns G-3, Royal Artillery, were substituted for the two mountain guns, besides which it now consisted of:—Two squadrons of cavalry made up of detachments of the 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, in all about 140 sabres, under Major Hammond; a wing of the 92nd Highlanders under Major J. C. Hay, and 100 rifles of the 23rd Pioneers under Captain H. Paterson, making a total of 384 bayonets. Major White's orders were to threaten the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, to prevent the enemy occupying any portion of the Chaharasia village, to advance within artillery range of the enemy's main position, and when, but not before, the outflanking movement was thoroughly developed, and when the enemy were in retreat, to push the cavalry through the pass and pursue.

Meanwhile the column for the main attack was assembled by General Baker in the wooded enclosures of Chaharasia, a collection of detached villages, in the most convenient of which he selected a place for his reserve ammunition and field hospital, heliographing to the General commanding the division to increase the strength of the small guard he was able to leave there in charge. One hundred bayonets were sent at once from the 5th Punjab Infantry, and the remainder of that regiment followed as soon as transport could be procured for its ammunition. This only left, for the protection of the camp, the horse artillery battery, between 600 and 700 infantry, and about 450 cavalry, and from this small force patrols and picquets were thrown out to watch the enemy on the hills on either side.

The troops under General Baker advanced close to the left of Chaharasia, cover being there afforded for some little distance by the enclosures adjacent to the villages, and about 11.30 a.m. emerged into the open and were immediately engaged with a large number of the inhabitants of the Chardeh villages, supported

by a considerable force of the Afghan regulars. The Brigadier-General now extended one company of the 72nd Highlanders, under Captain R. H. Brooke-Hunt, to crown the heights on the left. This company established itself on a small peak next to the rocky and elevated ridge held by the enemy as the extreme right of their position. Running along this ridge, and stretching across the Indaki road on to inferior hills, the Afghan right wing was holding a line considerably in advance of their left wing on the Sang-i-Nawishta heights, and one which could not easily be turned. The heights on the enemy's extreme right were inaccessible in front, while the fire from them swept the slopes up which the troops must advance. It was necessary to dislodge the enemy first of all from this point, which was, in fact, the key of the position.

The company of the 72nd Highlanders on the left having gained a footing on the crest of the spur, could make no further progress, and were shortly afterwards reinforced by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, v.c., the main body of the 72nd attacking the enemy in front, their advance being well covered by the two guns of the mountain battery. Owing, however, to the obstinate resistance of the enemy, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground on the left flank, the advance was somewhat checked, so that two more companies of the Gurkhas, commanded by Major FitzHugh, and 200 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, were pushed forward to strengthen the direct attack, the former extending the fighting line on the right of the 72nd, whilst the detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry was echeloned in rear of the left. The 23rd Pioneers supported the right of the front line.

The engagement now became hot, but little progress could be made so long as the enemy retained possession of the commanding height on their right flank. As it was by this time evident to them that the real attack was being directed against this point, and their troops were seen to be moving in hot haste to its support, it

became imperative to carry their position before it could be further reinforced. Already, judging by the colours displayed, it appeared that Brigadier-General Baker was now opposed by seven regular battalions, besides the host of irregular auxiliaries.

At 2 p.m., after two hours' fighting, the ridge on the British left was seized, and the retreating enemy was exposed to a cross-fire which inflicted a very heavy loss. The general advance was then sounded, and the first position was gallantly carried by the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Gurkhas, and 5th Punjab Infantry. The enemy fought well to the last, and charged close up to the 5th Gurkhas, who, however, commanded by Major FitzHugh, repulsed them with heavy loss. The 72nd Highlanders bore the brunt of the early part of the engagement on this flank, as evidenced by their numerous casualties. They were admirably led by their company officers, under the skilful direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, assisted by his Adjutant, Lieutenant R. H. Murray, while the conspicuous gallantry of Private MacMahon was especially marked. This young soldier, closely followed by a few Gurkhas, was to a great extent instrumental in taking the extremely strong position above mentioned, and for his intrepidity on this occasion he was subsequently decorated with the Victoria Cross. The opposing force of the Afghans had now retreated to a position some 600 yards in rear of that from which they had been driven; and against this the British troops advanced in rushes, covered by the fire of the mountain battery. In the first line the 72nd Highlanders were on the left, two companies of the Gurkhas in the centre, with two companies of the 23rd Pioneers on the right; the detachment 5th Punjab Infantry and remainder of the 23rd supporting the attack. After defending this place for half an hour, the enemy again fell back, the attack made by a company of the Pioneers, under Lieutenant D. Chesney, supported by the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Gurkhas, and two companies

of the 92nd Highlanders, under Captain R. H. Oxley, detached from Major White's force, proving irresistible.

In the meantime the small column under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, had engaged the Afghan left with great success. The enemy's advanced posts on the hill south of the Sang-i-Nawishta and in front of the gorge prevented the guns from getting within range of the main position. It was, therefore, necessary to capture them, as a preliminary to effective co-operation with General Baker's attack. Major White accordingly advanced to the right of and parallel to the road. About 12.30 p.m. the southern hill was gallantly taken by two companies of the 92nd Highlanders under Captain H. F. Cotton. The half battery of G-3, Royal Artillery, was then advanced to a position between the hill and the road, from whence Major Parry's guns engaged the four guns of the Afghans, which were advanced in front of the Sang-i-Nawishta defile. The latter were apparently supported by about three battalions of infantry.

Brigadier-General Baker's troops on the left having by this time carried the enemy's first position, Major White directed Captain Oxley, 92nd Highlanders, to advance with two companies and assist in the attack on the second position, as before mentioned.

The Afghan right wing and centre were unable to make any further stand against this renewed attack. They broke and fled down the reverse slopes of the hill in a north-westerly direction, taking refuge in the Chardeh villages. At 3.45 Brigadier-General Baker's infantry were in possession of the main ridge. The first objective point was thus gained; and pivoting on the right, the troops brought round their left, and advanced against the now exposed flank of the enemy's left wing. At the same time Major White,¹ taking advantage of this movement, advanced from the southern hill, and shortly after 4 o'clock was in possession of the defile and the guns in front of it. Com-

¹ For his gallantry on this occasion Major White received the V.C.

pletely outflanked and enfiladed by the fire of General Baker's troops, the remaining portion of the Afghan force made but little resistance. They rapidly abandoned the position, and retired across the Kabul River towards the north-east. Brigadier-General Baker occupied the crest of the rocky precipitous heights, which had formed the right of the enemy's main position, with the 23rd Pioneers, and paused to allow of the infantry being replenished with ammunition. He then advanced along the ridge towards the Sang-i-Nawishta defile. At the same time a company of the 92nd Highlanders ascended the height to the left of the gorge, and took possession of the twelve mountain guns in position there, which had been abandoned by the enemy.

The rapid and dashing advance through the pass, of the squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Major Hammond and Captain Carr, and the party of 9th Lancers, under Captain Apperley, materially contributed to the rout of the enemy and the abandonment of their guns; but the cavalry were checked at the river by the enemy's rear guard, on whom they were unable to make any impression, as the ground was unfavourable for the action of the arm. On perceiving this, Brigadier-General Baker ordered his mountain guns to shell the enemy from the heights while the 23rd Pioneers and 5th Punjab Infantry descended the hill at the double to engage the remains of the Afghan force, who were soon compelled to make a hurried retreat; but as darkness was now fast approaching, no further pursuit could be attempted. Brigadier-General Baker was, therefore, compelled to content himself with holding the ground in advance by picquets, and occupying both ends of the Sang-i-Nawishta defile. The main body of the troops bivouacked on the heights to west and north of the pass, forming part of the position held by the enemy in the morning.¹

While General Baker was thus successfully engaging the Afghans on the heights in front of Chaharasia, the

¹ No use was made of the cavalry on the enemy's right flank.

enemy on each flank remained on the hills in an attitude of expectancy. They did not venture into the plain within reach of the cavalry patrols; but one party, bolder than the rest, caused so much annoyance to a picquet of the 92nd Highlanders, that they were attacked and dislodged by a detachment led by Lieutenant R. A. Grant. Color-Sergeant Hector MacDonald (whose skilful management of a detachment against superior numbers in the Hazar-Darakht defile has been already mentioned) here again highly distinguished himself.¹

On this day, on the British side, there was engaged a force equal to about three and a half battalions, two weak squadrons, and seven guns, having a total strength of 1,090 British and 1,513 native soldiers. The casualties were comparatively slight. The 72nd Highlanders had 3 killed and 1 officer (Lieutenant C. H. Fergusson) and 33 men wounded. The 23rd Pioneers had 1 sepoy killed and their Surgeon (Dr. A. Duncan) and 2 men wounded. The 5th Punjab Infantry had 4 killed and 1 officer (Captain C. Young) and 4 sepoys wounded; the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 1 killed and 2 wounded; the 9th Lancers, 1 man wounded; No. 7 Company Sappers and Miners, 2 wounded. Total British loss, 3 officers wounded; 18 rank and filed killed, and 67 wounded.

The infantry expended 41,090 rounds, of which over 20,000 were fired by the 72nd Highlanders.

The half battery G-3, Royal

Artillery, fired . . .	6 common shell (percussion fuzes).
	71 shrapnel (time fuzes).

Total 77 rounds. Casualties *nil*.

No. 2 Mountain Battery
fired—

10 common shell.	} Casualty 1 mule slightly wounded.
94 shrapnel shell.	

Total 104 rounds.


One Gatling fired 9 drums; the other got jammed after firing half a drum. Casualties *nil*.

¹ Color-Sergeant H. MacDonald subsequently received a commission in the 92nd Gordon Highlanders.

Judging from the number of troops seen, and from information subsequently received, General Sir Frederick Roberts calculated that 13 regular regiments were opposed to General Baker's small force; and that these, aided by contingents from the city and neighbouring villages, brought up the total force of the enemy to several thousand men. They appear to have been commanded by Sardar Nek Muhammad Khan, uncle of the Amir and Governor of Kabul, who had been in intimate, if not personal, communication with Yakub Khan since he joined the British camp; besides him were General Ghulam Haidar Khan (Charkhi), General Muhammad Afzal Khan, and Sardar Muhammad Zaman Khan, Governor of Khost. Their loss in killed alone was estimated at upwards of 300 men, to which were added a large proportion of wounded.

All the guns, twenty in number, brought out from Kabul to assist in the defence of the position, were captured; amongst them was an 8-in. brass howitzer presented to the Afghan State by the British Government; whilst a large number of small-arms and ammunition used against us were also gifts from the same source. The Ghilzais from Tezin and Hisarak assembled in large numbers to join the enemy in the Chaharasia engagement, but arriving too late, some of them returned to their homes, though a good many still waited about Kabul to see the result of any fresh stand made by the regular Afghan troops.

Three battalions were also on their way from Ghazni, three from Kohistan (Charikar), and six more with three cavalry regiments from Afghan Turkistan. The arrival of these considerable reinforcements was anticipated by Sir Frederick Roberts's action, and they beat a retreat on hearing of the defeat of the Kabul troops. The rear guard under Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson encamped at Chaharasia, a demonstration being made against the camp there by considerable bodies of Afghans on the morning of the 7th, but these



ACTION AT CHAHARASIA

OCTOBER 6th 1879

Scale of Yards.



- REFERENCE.
- British Infantry ▭
 - ,, Artillery ▭ A
 - ,, Cavalry ▭ C
 - Afghan Infantry ▭
 - ,, Artillery ▭ A

Survey of ground by Sub Surveyor Saiaad Ullah under the superintendence of Capt. T. Holdich R.E.

were speedily driven from their position by detachments of the 67th Foot and 28th Punjab Infantry.

On the same morning Sir Frederick Roberts, with the Cavalry Brigade, F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, and G-3, Royal Artillery, the 7th Company Sappers and Miners, a wing of the 92nd Highlanders, the 23rd Pioneers and Gatling guns, proceeded through the Sang-i-Nawishta defile to Beni Hissar, a large irregular village, 2 miles south of the Bala Hissar, situated on the Logar road at the foot of a long spur of the Takht-i-Shah. While passing through the defile some bands of hill men opened fire on the column, but were speedily silenced by the British infantry.

At Beni Hissar, Sir Frederick Roberts determined to encamp his whole force prior to his final advance to Kabul. Meanwhile, however, having ascertained by means of cavalry patrols that the Bala Hissar had been evacuated, but having received information that three of the Afghan battalions, which had been in Kabul at the time of the attack on the Residency, were entrenching themselves on the heights north-west of Kabul, and had been joined by some of the force defeated at Chaharasia, the Major-General directed Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, on the morning of the 8th October, to move out towards Deh Mazang, where a force of the enemy was said to be encamped, and thereafter to place his brigade in such a position as would enable him to intercept the retreat of the Afghans, in case they should disperse towards Turkistan. The troops available for this purpose consisted of:

Total, 720 all ranks.	{	9th Lancers (1 squadron), Captain Apperley.
		5th Punjab Cavalry (3 squadrons), Major Hammond.
		12th Bengal Cavalry, Major Green.
		14th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross.

This cavalry brigade started at 1 a.m., and, owing to the shortness of the notice, no rations, and but little grain, could be taken. Proceeding in a northerly

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direction over the Siah Sang range of hills, and thence westward, the brigade reached the fortified cantonment of Sherpur, which was examined and found to have been recently evacuated, and its large artillery park deserted. From this point it could be seen that the Asmai heights on the further side of the Kabul River were crowded with the enemy, who occupied a very strong position, with guns, unassailable by cavalry, and commanding the direct road running *viâ* Buland Kala over the Aliabad Kotal to Deh Mazang, and thus necessitating a considerable detour *viâ* the village of Baraki and over the Nanachi Kotal at the extreme edge of the ridge. On ascertaining the position and great numbers of the enemy, General Massy heliographed the facts to the Major-General, and then proceeded as quickly as possible by the route described into the Chardeh plain, within about a mile of Deh Mazang, to the east of which village was seen the enemy's camp pitched on the slope of the hill, under the protection of their guns and infantry, which fact was also heliographed to the British camp at Beni Hissar.

The Brigadier-General now threw out three picquets of two squadrons each, covering the roads from the west and north, two squadrons being retained in reserve in front of the Asmai position. In this formation the brigade remained throughout the remainder of the day; but as darkness began to close in, and it became evident that the British infantry would not be able to carry the heights before nightfall, the Brigadier collected his scattered squadrons and bivouacked for the night under cover of two walled enclosures, between the roads running past Aliabad and Deh Buri. Having every reason to suppose that the enemy had no intention of abandoning their position without further fighting, and anticipating for the cavalry a hard day's work on the morrow, General Massy was anxious to rest and feed the men and horses, many of whom had had nothing to eat since early morning; but the endeavours to

collect supplies were only very partially successful, as in consequence of the firing the villagers refused to venture out after dark.

Meantime Sir Frederick Roberts was informed by the first reports from the cavalry reconnaissance that the enemy appeared determined to make a final stand on the Asmai heights, where they were in a strong position, aided by twelve guns overlooking the city. He therefore decided to attack, and Brigadier-General Baker was ordered to advance with the following force :

72 men	{	Right division No. 2 Mountain Battery (50), under Lieutenant E. A. Smith, R.A. No. 2 Sub-division of Gatlings (22), under Captain A. Broadfoot, R.A.
982 rifles	{	2 companies 72nd Highlanders (142), under Captain C. W. N. Guinness. Head-quarters wing 92nd Highlanders (370), under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Parker. 23rd Pioneers (470), under Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Currie.

Total—British 534, Native 520 ; Grand Total 1,054.

Starting from the camp at Beni Hissar at about 11 a.m. on the 8th October, General Baker directed three companies of the 92nd Highlanders to cross the Takht-i-Shah at Khiddar Ziarat, some 600 yards south-west of the Bala Hissar. Thence they were to proceed along the foot of the range, at the same time keeping up communication with the Brigadier, who, accompanied by the rest of the force, advanced along the ridge reconnoitring the enemy's position.

General Baker had not proceeded far along the summit of the heights when his advanced parties came in contact with the enemy's scouts and picquets, which retired before them. It was now seen that this ridge gave the troops complete command of the direct rear of the enemy's position and of their camp. Accordingly Captain Guinness's company of the 72nd was ordered to proceed along the top of the ridge, followed by the two

guns under Lieutenant Smith, and the Gatling with the 23rd Pioneers, whilst the 92nd Highlanders occupied the ridge on the left above Baber's tomb. The ground over which the column had to advance was of so difficult a nature that much delay ensued, and the day was drawing to a close before General Baker found himself near enough to engage the enemy. On reaching the extreme point at the top of the ridge, the guns came into action, and at the same time the infantry (two companies 72nd, one company 92nd) took up a position some 500 or 600 yards in front, on lower ground, which commanded the road leading up the gorge from the city, and also allowed of the troops there coming into action against a detachment of the enemy located in a tower at the foot of the heights on the opposite side. The fire of the two mountain guns, although directed with great accuracy on the enemy's artillery, made but little effect against the heavier artillery opposed to them, which consisted of six field guns and six 7-pounders.

Reinforcements were sent out in the course of the afternoon consisting of:

Wing, 67th Regiment,
2 companies 5th Gurkhas,
2 divisions No. 2 Mountain Battery, Captain Swinley;

but, owing to the roughness of the ground traversed, they did not reach General Baker till late.

As these reinforcements had not made their appearance by 5 p.m., the Brigadier-General determined on attacking the enemy's position should daylight allow of it, and a wing of the 92nd, with the Pioneers, were told off for this purpose; but, by the time dispositions had been made for an assault, it was evident that sufficient daylight did not remain to enable the attack to be carried well home, and the General was reluctantly compelled to defer it until the following morning. The reinforcement above mentioned arrived at dark, and thus General Baker found himself quite in a position, as regarded the number of troops, to assail the enemy

on the Asmai heights at daybreak. He had, however, great misgivings as to the enemy maintaining his position till the morning, and in reporting to the Major-General, he recommended that the enemy's retreat should be further cut off by a force on the Kohistan road. Brigadier-General H. Gough was, therefore, sent in that direction with some cavalry and two guns, Royal Horse Artillery. At 1.30 a.m. on the 9th October General Baker, still fearing that the enemy might retreat during the night, despatched a strong patrol, consisting of 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers under Captain Paterson, and 50 men of the 92nd Highlanders under Captain Oxley, accompanied by Lieutenant C. H. Manners-Smith, 3rd Sikhs, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to move in the direction of the enemy's encampment. This detachment soon came into contact with some few of the Afghans, whom they killed or took prisoners; and from these latter it was ascertained that the main portion of the enemy had dispersed to their homes, and that about 800 of the regular troops had alone retained their cohesion; this body, under the general who had commanded the whole force, Muhammad Jan Khan (of Wardak), had gone in a westerly direction, but whether towards Bamian, Ghazni, or Hazarajat, the prisoners were unable to state. This information was reported at about 4.30 a.m., an hour before daylight; and the first action taken by Brigadier-General Baker was to despatch a mounted native with the intelligence to Brigadier-General Massy, who with his cavalry was at Deh Mazang.

Immediately on receipt of this message the Cavalry Brigade proceeded at a gallop along the Ghazni road as far as the village of Kala Kazi, 7 miles west of Kabul, but without finding any traces of the fugitives. Here a heliogram was received from Sir Frederick Roberts, in accordance with which two squadrons were detached across country to the Kohistan road, with equal ill success. The rest of the brigade continued

their rapid march along the Ghazni road as far as Kotal-i-Takht, 22 miles from Kabul, where, at about 11 a.m., the 5th Punjab Cavalry came on a small party of the enemy, of whom twenty were killed after a desperate resistance. No others of the fugitive Afghans were seen, and the horses and men being now much exhausted, the Brigadier returned to camp, sending forward only two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry a further 8 miles, in order to verify the assertions of the villagers that no troops had passed along the Ghazni road. These squadrons rejoined the Cavalry Brigade on the 10th, Brigadier-General Massy with the remainder passing without mishap through the city of Kabul, and reaching the camp at the Siah Sang heights by nightfall.

Although no casualties occurred amongst the men of the Cavalry Brigade, yet some score of horses died during or from the results of this hard day's work. "The men were without food both days they were out, but they behaved splendidly, not a grumble being heard. For instance, the [squadron of the] 9th Lancers started on the morning of the 8th, after having received one loaf to every three men. They carried no food, as only a reconnoissance was intended; and at night some sheep were killed for them, and they tried to eat the flesh after roasting the animals whole. They had nothing but their swords to use in cutting up the carcases, and they found it quite impossible to eat the flesh; so on the 8th they went supperless to bed. On the 9th they were in the saddle from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. (when they reached this camp, Beni Hissar), and the pursuit and return were made in such quick time, that again there was no chance of getting food. Horses and men of all the regiments out with General Massy were quite exhausted when they at last reached their quarters here" (*The Afghan War of 1879-80*, by Howard Hensman, pp. 48-9). Meanwhile the whole of the enemy's camp on the Asmai heights and their baggage animals and twenty-one guns had fallen into our hands. During the day the British camp had been

shifted from Beni Hissar to the Siah Sang, a low, isolated hill lying between the city of Kabul and the confluence of the Kabul and Logar Rivers.

On the 10th October Sir Frederick Roberts visited the Sherpur cantonment, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry were ordered to remove thither to protect the guns and stores found there, including seventy-six pieces of ordnance (*vide* Appendix XI.).


On the following day the Major-General, with a small escort, closely examined the Bala Hissar and the buildings occupied by the late Envoy and his suite. Of the condition of this latter, the following graphic description was penned by Mr. Hensman, who accompanied General Roberts on this occasion :

“Our first view of the Residency was of the rear wall, still intact, but blackened on the top, where the smoke from the burning ruins had swept across. At each angle where the side walls joined were seen the loopholes from which the fire of the little force on the roof had been directed against the overwhelming numbers attacking them. Every square foot round these loopholes was pitted with bullet-marks, the balls having cut deeply into the hard mud plaster. The western wall, which faced toward the Upper Bala Hissar, commanding it, was scarred with these marks, proving only too well how severe had been the fire from the higher level occupied by the mutineers in the arsenal. At this end the Residency was of three stories; but the present wall does not indicate the height of more than two, the upper part having collapsed when the fire obtained a mastery over the buildings. A lane, 6 or 8 ft. wide, runs between this wall and the buildings on the right in which the Guides were quartered. Plans hitherto published have made the Residency and these quarters one block, but this is a mistake; they were quite distinct.”

Riding along the lane and passing through a narrow gateway, half blocked with rubbish, “we entered the main court of the Residency, and were soon thoroughly

able to appreciate the fate of its defenders. The southern end on our right hand was standing untouched, and consisted of rooms built on wooden pillars so as to form a kind of oblong pavilion. The mud basement is 3 or 4 ft. from the ground; and the whole structure, except a few partition walls and the roof, is of wood, and, from the dryness of the climate, very inflammable. It is neatly whitewashed, and the upper rooms being open on both sides must be cool and pleasant. These were Sir Louis Cavagnari's quarters, and from them the rich Kabul plain beneath can be seen stretching away to the Tezin hills.

“The courtyard of the Residency is about 90 ft. square, and at its northern end, where formerly stood a three-storied building like that I have just described, are nothing but the bare walls, blackened and scarred by fire, and a huge heap of rubbish, the ruins of the roof and walls which fell in as the woodwork was destroyed. Portions of the partition walls still remain, jutting sullenly out from the mass of *débris*; and these only serve to make the place more desolate. The whitewashed walls on the left are here and there bespattered with blood, and on the raised basement on which the building stood are the remains of a large fire, the half-charred beams still resting among the ashes. The ruins are still smouldering. Whether, as suggested, any bodies were burnt there is still an unsettled point; but in one room into which I went there can be no doubt fire had been used for such a purpose. The ashes were in the middle of the chamber, and near them were two skulls and a heap of human bones still fetid. It would seem as if a desperate struggle had taken place in this room, the blood stains on the floor and walls being clearly discernible. The skulls are to be examined by surgeons, as it is possible they may be those of Europeans. The Residency was looted so thoroughly that not even a peg has been left in the walls. In Sir Louis Cavagnari's quarters, the windows overlooking the Bala Hissar wall have been torn out even to the sashes, and a few bits of



KABUL FROM ASMAI

glass on the floor alone remain of them. The chintz hangings and *purdas* have been stripped away, a fluttering bit of coloured rag on a stray nail being the only sign of such cheerfulness as this once gave.

“Bare cross-poles and rafters, floors rough with dirt and defiled with filth, staring white walls, with here and there a bullet mark—such are the once comfortable quarters of our Envoy. The view over the Kabul plain is still as peaceful as when poor Jenkins described it so enthusiastically, but all else is changed. The one consolation is that a British army is encamped within gunshot of the walls. It is still difficult to make out the point at which the mutineers obtained entry into the Residency buildings, unless it was by a hole in the eastern wall, a little to the right of a small doorway leading to a lower range of houses adjoining. Round this hole are scores of bullet-holes, and their direction seems to show that the defenders on the roof fired down as the men streamed in in the vain hope of checking them before they could rush forward and set fire to the woodwork. Once the lower part of the three-storied building was in flames, nothing could save the brave men on the roof, as all retreat was cut off. We viewed the scene of desolation for some time from the roof of Sir Louis Cavagnari’s quarters, and General Roberts gave orders that nothing should be disturbed until careful sketches had been made of the interior of the Residency and its surroundings. Careful excavations for bodies will also be made among the ruins. It is absurd to talk of the Residency being a safe place for a garrison. It is commanded completely from the walls of the arsenal in the upper Bala Hissar, and also from the roofs of some high houses to the south-west. In addition, houses closely adjoin it on the eastern side; and an attacking party sapping the walls would have perfect cover in this direction the whole time. This may account for the breach in the walls, through which I have suggested the mutineers made their rush. Riding into the quarters occupied by the Guides escort, on the

western side of the lane, I found but few bullet-marks on the walls. Facing was a high door, firmly closed and seemingly uninjured; but on going into the Sikh quarters on my right, and following a broad passage which turned at right angles towards the wall, a huge breach was visible. This was where the Afghans had blown in the gate after Lieutenant Hamilton's noble, but ineffectual, efforts to check them. Three times he charged out, killing many men with his sword and pistol; but what could one hero do against a mob of fanatics? No doubt, when it was seen that a breach was made, the Guides withdrew to the Residency proper, and there made the last stand; first in the courtyard guarding the doors, and afterwards on the roof."

Early on the morning of the 12th October, the day appointed for the formal occupation of the Bala Hissar, the Amir sought a private audience of Sir Frederick Roberts and forthwith announced his intention of resigning the Afghan throne. He was cautioned by the General not to act in haste, but persisted in his determination, and his tents and those of his personal attendants were accordingly removed to the headquarters camp the same afternoon, where Yakub Khan remained pending the receipt of orders from the Viceroy. Meanwhile he excused himself on the plea of illness from attending Sir Frederick Roberts's entry into the Bala Hissar. He was represented, however, on this occasion by his eldest son, while the ceremony, rendered as impressive as possible by a full-dress parade of all the troops in camp, was attended by all the principal Sardars of Kabul. A proclamation was read by the Major-General in the Diwan-i-Am of the Bala Hissar announcing to the people that they were now under martial law, and offering rewards for the capture of any persons concerned in the attack on the Residency or the massacre of its inmates (*vide* Appendix XII.).

On the following day General Roberts made a formal entry into the city of Kabul, and traversed its



THE RESIDENCY, KABUL, SHOWING THE GATE AND SCAFFOLD

main thoroughfares at the head of the whole Field Force ; after which the 67th Foot and 5th Gurkhas were quartered in the lower and upper Bala Hissar respectively, while Major-General J. Hills, C.B., V.C., was nominated to take over the office of Military Governor of Kabul, assisted by Nawab Sir Ghulam Hasan Khan.

The Gurkhas and the 67th had only occupied their quarters in the Bala Hissar for three days, when, on the 16th October, by an explosion of part of the great magazine within the fortress, Captain E. D. Shafto, R.A., one soldier of the 67th, one native officer and eleven non-commissioned officers and men of the 5th Gurkhas, three sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and five ordnance lascars were killed, while four other men were seriously injured. Whether this deplorable catastrophe was the result of accident or malicious design was never discovered, nor could any light be thrown on the origin of the explosion. Captain Shafto was engaged in taking stock of the large quantity of war *matériel* found in the fort, and all with him perished ; the Gurkhas were killed by the fall of an enormous mass of the wall of the fort.

The whole of the Gurkhas were at once ordered to leave their camp, and the 67th Regiment was also directed to vacate the garden of the Diwan-i-Am, which was dangerously close to the burning ruins ; and as delay was fraught with danger, the tents and kits, etc., were not removed, and only the regimental ammunition was brought away. Exactly two and a half hours after the first explosion, another and more violent one took place ; but, owing to the precautions taken, no further loss of life happened amongst the troops, though several natives were killed by falling stones at upwards of 400 yards' distance from the side of the magazine.

The 67th Regiment was provided with quarters for the night in the tents of the 72nd and 92nd Highlanders, whilst the Gurkhas were distributed over the camp as accommodation could be provided for them. As an instance of the good feeling which existed amongst the

troops, it should be mentioned that a large number of the 72nd Highlanders came forward and insisted upon making over their great-coats for the night to their comrades, the Gurkhas. "Only those who know the coldness of the nights here," wrote Sir Frederick Roberts, "can realise what a practical proof of regard for the regiment that had served so long with them, this most creditable action on the part of the 72nd furnished."

Although these two explosions had been powerful enough to level a large portion of the massive wall of the fort, a greater and still more terrible danger threatened the city; and this was the possible ignition of the main magazine, a structure the reverse of substantial, in which upwards of 450 tons of gunpowder were known to be stored. A large portion of the fort was in flames, a high wind was blowing, and constant minor explosions hurled burning beams and brands in all directions. Barely 90 yards separated this magazine from the flames; its walls were considerably scorched, and during the night of the 16th its explosion was momentarily expected. However, towards morning the wind went down, the explosions became less frequent, and the flames to a certain extent subsided; but it was not till the afternoon of the 17th that it was deemed prudent to allow working parties to endeavour to extinguish the fire. Even then the service was one of considerable danger, as efforts had to be made to guard against the fire making its way to the main magazine, whose badly fitting wooden doors had to be built up, and its weak roof and projecting woodwork strengthened and protected. This dangerous work was well and bravely performed, and the General recorded in his despatch his "very high sense of the services which the officers and men rendered who were engaged upon it." Although the fire continued to smoulder for some time afterwards, all anxiety regarding the safety of the main magazine was now at an end.

Meanwhile the Ghilzais, and the people of Kohistan Logar and others, who had assembled around Kabul to

resist the British advance, appeared to have dispersed to their homes, and it was reported that three regiments, which had left Ghazni to join the troops at Kabul, meeting the disheartened tribesmen and mutineers, had fled, abandoning twelve guns which they had brought with them. Some cavalry were sent by General Roberts to bring these guns into Kabul, where they arrived on the 15th October.

Disquieting intelligence was, however, received about the same time from the Shutargardan. This important post on the line of communication, which was garrisoned by: 4 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery, 3rd Sikhs, 21st Punjab Infantry, was said to be threatened by a considerable gathering of the tribes. Padshah Khan, the Ghilzai chief, whose aid was no longer indispensable to the British force, and who had therefore been ousted in the negotiations in favour of his younger brother, had become recalcitrant. Ala-ud-din's terms for remaining neutral were, or could be regarded as, less exacting, but he could not succeed in alienating the allegiance of any large proportion of the tribe from his elder brother Padshah Khan. Accordingly, on the 17th October, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough was sent from Kabul to relieve Colonel Money at Shutargardan with a column composed of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the 5th Punjab Infantry. Brigadier-General Gough, with these troops, and a large convoy of transport animals, reached the Sirkai Kotal on the 19th; and although by the time of his arrival Colonel Money had already succeeded in dispersing the enemy, yet he had the satisfaction of knowing that the appearance of his column tended much to this success (see Chapter IX.).

Having forwarded a large convoy of ammunition and ordnance stores to Kabul, with some 500 details of various regiments, General Gough on the 28th October sent back the 21st Punjab Infantry to Ali Khel, and on the 30th finally evacuated Kushi and started on his return march to Kabul, taking with him the 3rd Sikhs


and 4 guns of the first (Morgan's) Mountain Battery, and also the head-quarters and three squadrons of the 9th Lancers, who had just come up from Ali Khel. Communication with India *viâ* the Shutargardan was thus closed, and, until the telegraph line *viâ* the Khyber and the Lataband Pass was opened on the 19th November, the force at Kabul was without communications with its new base at Peshawar, and even then convoys did not pass up till the end of the month. The above troops arrived at Kabul on the 4th November, where the garrison of the Shutargardan were congratulated by General Roberts on their gallant defence of their post, a description of which will be found in a later chapter.

While these events were in progress, the selection of a site for the winter quarters of the division had been under the consideration of the General and staff at Kabul.


The advantage of using all existing roof accommodation seemed, at first glance, to indicate the Bala Hissar as the quarter which promised best to meet the requirements of the garrison; but its dangerous proximity to the large magazine which had escaped destruction, and the fact that it would not accommodate all the force, and that the troops would have to be more or less scattered, eventually led the General to decide upon occupying the large and, for the most part, fortified cantonment of Sherpur, which was built by the late Amir Sher Ali as winter quarters for his regular troops.

This cantonment, which lies rather less than a mile north-east of the city, contained large ranges of brick buildings which enabled Sir Frederick Roberts at once to house the entire European portion of his force, besides providing accommodation for the commissariat stores. The native troops proceeded to hut themselves, aided by the materials at hand and woodwork brought from the dismantled portions of the Bala Hissar.

A lofty and massive loopholed wall, with numerous



KABUL FROM SIAH SANG



THE BALA HISSAR AND PALACE, 1879

flanking towers, surrounded three sides of the cantonment, whilst the rear was protected by the Bimaru heights, on which the engineers proceeded to lay out defensive works. It was close to the site of the old British cantonments, but embraced in its defences the very heights which were such a danger in 1841, and in the struggle for possession of which so many lives were lost. A large portion of the division was at once moved into Sherpur, and the commissariat depot was promptly established within the walls. The engineers set to work to make and superintend necessary preparations of the site; five months' provisions, stores, forage, etc., were accumulated in the commissariat godowns, and the supply of fuel for the winter was fortunately ensured by the appropriation of the large stacks of wood found in the Sherpur cantonments. On the 1st November the camp at Siah Sang was broken up, and the main body of the 1st Division moved into the new quarters.

On the 26th October Sir Frederick Roberts visited Butkhak, and selected a position there for an outpost in the direction of the line of advance of the Khyber column. The position was a strong one, and easily defensible. The telegraph line was now commenced in this direction from Sherpur, and pushed on with all convenient speed, but it was not until the 19th November that telegraphic communication was opened up with India.

On the same day a despatch reached General Roberts at Siah Sang from the British Government accepting the abdication of the Amir, Yakub Khan; and the following proclamation was issued by the General:

"I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a government.

"In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the

capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.

“The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities, chiefs, and Sardars do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me wherever necessary.

“The British Government desires that the people shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected.

“The services of such Sardars and chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognised; but all disturbers of the peace, and persons concerned in attacks upon British authority, will meet with condign punishment.

“The British Government, after consultation with the principal Sardars, tribal chiefs, and others, representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people.

“Kabul, *28th October, 1879.*”

On the same day Yakub Khan appears to have contemplated flight to Turkistan, and in consequence his tent was isolated by the removal of all those of his servants which had been pitched about it, and he was now placed under close arrest. The guard was increased to forty rifles (British), and four sentries surrounded the tent. A fifth sentry was posted inside the tent itself, and the Amir's personal attendants were only allowed access to him under guard and surveillance; whilst his food was carefully examined, and all means of conveying information to or from him was removed. Meantime the work of investigation by the Special Commission continued.

At the end of the month Sir Frederick Roberts published to the troops under his command the thanks of the Queen-Empress for their gallantry at the action of Chaharasia and the other operations leading to the occupation of Kabul.

The task of opening up communication with India by way of Jalalabad and the Khyber was then commenced.

On the 1st November Brigadier-General Macpherson marched for Butkhak with the following troops from Siah Sang:

- 12th Bengal Cavalry, Major Green.
- F-A, R.H.A., (4 guns), elephant equipment.
- 67th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Knowles.
- 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie.
- 28th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson.


Arriving at Butkhak the next day, the force was joined by Captain Swinley's guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, which had just arrived from the Shutargardan. Here the post selected by Sir Frederick Roberts on the 26th October was occupied by forty rifles, and placed in a state of defence; and the field telegraph line from Kabul was laid down and opened. On the same day General Roberts himself arrived from Kabul accompanied by several Ghilzai chiefs, and made a thorough examination of the Lataband and Khurd-Kabul routes eastwards towards the Khyber, as well as of the Chinari defile, which connects the two roads. Having completed his reconnaissance, the General returned to Sherpur on the evening of the 3rd November.

On the 4th November and following days Brigadier-General Macpherson advanced *via* Khurd-Kabul and Tezin to Seh Baba, and riding forward with his advance guard to Katasang, he met the advanced parties of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's detachment of the 2nd (General Bright's) Division of the Kabul Field Force, which had advanced on the line of the Khyber to join hands with the brigade from Kabul (see Chapter X.). Further inspection having now proved the superiority of the Lataband route over that of the Khurd-Kabul Pass, it was decided that the main line of communication with the Khyber should be by the former road; a post was established on the Lataband Kotal, and the 23rd Pioneers and Sappers

were immediately set to work to improve the road and extend the telegraph line.

From Seh Baba Brigadier-General Macpherson moved his camp about 10 miles down the Tezin stream to its junction with the Kabul River at Nagalu. Near here, on the 10th November, a foraging party, commanded by Captain A. J. Poole, of the 67th Foot, was attacked by a considerable force of Afghans, numbering some 700 or 1,000 men. On receipt of information of this attack, the Brigadier at once moved to Captain Poole's assistance with 140 men of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, the four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, 150 men of the 67th Foot, and 96 men of the 28th Punjab Infantry. The road was almost impassable, being blocked by laden camels of fugitive friendly Afghans, and the General therefore directed the infantry and mountain guns to ascend a spur to the north of the road. Their arrival there was most opportune, as two bodies of the enemy were at once seen, one about 1,000 yards distant to the right front, and the other about 1,700 yards off on the bank of the river at the entrance of the upper of two defiles, through which the river runs, advancing to envelop Captain Poole's company. On both of these Captain Swinley opened fire with his guns with such precision as to cause them immediately to retire.


Major G. Baker, 67th Regiment, was now sent with the 28th Punjabis, the guns, and one company of the 67th along the mountain ridge in pursuit of the first party of the enemy, and the other company of the 67th, under Lieutenant R. F. Atkinson, was ordered to pursue the Afghans in the defile. The enemy retired behind a sangar, which extended along the ridge for quite a mile at right angles to the line of advance, and at first showed some disposition to contest this point; but eventually they continued to retire beyond the village of Doaba, which was entered by the troops. Having forced the enemy to retire from all the positions they had held to about a distance of 6 miles from Nagalu bivouac,



AFFAIR AT DOABA, NOVEMBER 10th 1879.

REFERENCE

- C. First position of enemy ————
- D. First position of foraging party ■
- E. Line of retirement of ditto - - - - -
- F. Line of Afghan advance - - - - -



THE BALA HISSAR DISMANTLED 243

General Macpherson recalled the troops across the river to the camp at Sarobi. The enemy appear to have been Safis of Tagao, and were reported to be acting under Usman Khan, who had previously written to say that he was coming in to make his submission. Three of Captain Poole's men were killed and four men wounded in this affair.

On the same date Brigadier-General Macpherson had sent back part of his force under Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson to work on the road over the Lataband Kotal, and the following day he again marched with the remainder to Seh Baba, where a small post and commissariat depot was established. On the 12th November Macpherson marched across the Lataband Kotal to Chaman Mela-Shuman, by a very rough and difficult route, and on the 13th by an equally trying march to Butkhak. Two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, a wing of the 23rd Pioneers, and the 28th Punjab Infantry were left at Lataband to continue the construction of the road, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson. It was decided that the brigade under General Macpherson should remain at Butkhak for the present; but the head-quarters wing of the 23rd Pioneers marched into Sherpur on the 15th, on which date General Roberts proceeded to Butkhak for inspection, returning to Kabul the same evening.

During this time the troops at Kabul had been employed in dismantling the Bala Hissar and in destroying the loose powder stored there, which had been such a source of danger to the vicinity, and of which only sufficient was now reserved for blasting work. All time-expired men, the wounded, and those who had been pronounced unfit for further service marched from Kabul towards India on the 14th November; while, in order to economise the consumption of the forage stored for winter use, the elephants, spare bullocks, and sick transport animals were sent away from the capital.

In anticipation of the detailed arrangements which it was proposed to carry out shortly for the organisation

of the several forces employed in Afghanistan, the Governor-General in Council was pleased to confer on Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts the local rank of Lieutenant-General from the 11th November, 1879, and to place under his orders the two divisions in Eastern Afghanistan from Kabul to Jamrud inclusive.

Since the middle of October a Military Commission had been sitting to enquire into the circumstances attending the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the after events up to the battle of Chaharasia. All the Afghan prisoners captured during the operations since Chaharasia were brought before it, and every man who was proved to have taken an active part in the massacre was executed. Eighty-nine in all were tried, of whom forty-nine were executed. Each separate case was enquired into in the most thorough manner, great numbers of witnesses being examined, nor were any sentences of death carried out before being approved and signed by Sir Frederick Roberts. On the 18th November the Commission completed its onerous task, and the final report was forwarded to Simla, while on the 11th of the same month the Lieutenant-General published a proclamation of amnesty to all persons who had fought against the British since the 3rd September, withholding, however, the benefits of the same from any persons concerned in the attack on the Residency.

Rumours now became general of threatened risings amongst the tribes of the country round Kabul, and at length these reports gained so much strength that on the 21st November the Lieutenant-General despatched Brigadier-General Baker into Maidan with the following force :

Cavalry	.	.	{	1 squadron 9th Lancers.
			{	2 squadrons 5th Punjab Cavalry.
			{	2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers.
Artillery	.	.	{	2 guns G-3 Royal Artillery.
			{	4 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery.
Infantry	{	British	{	500 rifles 92nd Highlanders.
		Native	{	400 rifles 3rd Sikhs.
			{	400 rifles 5th Punjab Infantry.

General Baker's instructions were to assist in the collection of supplies, which had been much impeded by the presence of hostile leaders in the district. On the 22nd General Roberts himself left Kabul and joined General Baker on the following day at his camp beyond the Kotal-i-Takht. He was then informed that some hundreds of armed men were said to have gathered in the north of the upper valley of the Logar or Khawat River, inhabited by the Wardak Saiads, with the intention of crossing into the Nirikh Valley, immediately south of Maidan, and that Bahadur Khan, one of the leading maliks of Nirikh, and head of the Umar Khel Ghilzais, had refused to come to the British camp when called upon to do so. An attempt was made to arrest the malik in question, but he evaded capture. The Lieutenant-General returned on the 25th to Kabul, leaving Brigadier-General Baker to continue the collection of supplies and to check further disturbances as much as possible.

The latter remained in the Maidan district until the end of the month without encountering serious opposition. On the 1st December, having despatched large quantities of forage to Kabul, he returned to head-quarters and reported that the surrounding country was now apparently quiet.

Since the 28th October the Amir had been kept in close confinement at head-quarters; and on the 29th November orders arrived from Simla for his immediate deportation to India.

Yakub Khan left the British camp at 6.30 a.m. on the 30th November under charge of Captain Turner, the Political Officer, and escorted by Major Hammond with a squadron of the 9th Lancers and a squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Four body-servants and a faithful attendant alone accompanied the ex-monarch, his request that Yahiya Khan and two other Sardars might accompany him being refused. The party moved by double marches, and reached Lataband the first night. At Jagdalak on the 3rd an escort was furnished by

Brigadier-General Charles Gough, and the journey to Peshawar was completed without incident in eight days, the rapidity of the Amir's removal preventing the possibility of any tribal combination being effected to obstruct his deportation.

Yakub's son and the members of the harem for the present remained at Kabul; whilst the Mustaufi Yahiya Khan and other Sardars still awaited orders from the Government as to their disposition.

The following were the composition and distribution of the 1st Division, Kabul Field Force, on the 1st December, 1879:

KABUL FIELD FORCE.

Head-quarters, Sherpur Cantonment.

Cavalry	.	{	9th Lancers.
			5th Punjab Cavalry.
			14th Bengal Lancers.
Artillery	.	{	F-A, Royal Horse Artillery.
			G-3, Royal Artillery.
			No. 1 Mountain Battery.
			No. 2 Mountain Battery (4 guns).
Sappers	.	{	No. 7 Company (Sappers and Miners).
Infantry	{	{	67th Foot (7 companies).
	British		72nd Highlanders (4 companies).
			92nd Highlanders.
	Native	{	3rd Sikhs.
			5th Punjab Infantry.
			23rd Pioneers (wing).
			5th Gurkhas.

On Line of Communications between Jagdalak and Butkhak.

Cavalry	.	.	12th Bengal Cavalry.
Artillery	.	.	No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
Infantry	{	{	67th Foot (1 company).
	British		72nd Highlanders (300 rifles).
	Native	{	23rd Pioneers (wing).
			28th Punjab Infantry.

CHAPTER VIII

EVENTS AT KABUL DURING DECEMBER, 1879.

EARLY in the month of December the reports of disaffection amongst the tribes west of Kabul became daily more circumstantial. The general political situation at this time was described as follows by Sir Frederick Roberts in a despatch dated the 23rd January 1880 :

“After the outbreak of last September and the massacre of our Envoy, the advance of the British force from Ali Khel was too rapid to give the Afghans, as a nation, time to oppose it. At Chaharasia the troops who had participated in the massacre, aided by large numbers of the disaffected townspeople, were conspicuously beaten in the open field, their organisation as an armed body was at an end, and their leaders all sought personal safety in flight. It appears probable that at this period the general expectation amongst the Afghans was that the British Government would exact a heavy retribution from the nation and city, which then lay at its mercy, and that after English vengeance had been satisfied, the army would be withdrawn. Forty years ago an English massacre had been followed by a temporary occupation of the city of Kabul ; and as Pollock and Nott on that occasion had sacked and destroyed the great bazaar and then retired, so now the people believed that the same signal punishment would be succeeded by the withdrawal of our troops.

“It thus happened that after the action of Chaharasia there followed a period of expectation and doubt ; the Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had not

yet arrived when any national movement was possible. But this pause was marked by certain occurrences, which doubtless touched the national pride to the quick, and which were also susceptible of being used by the enemies of the British Government to excite into vivid fanaticism the religious sentiment which has ever formed a prominent trait in Afghan character.

“The spectacle of the prolonged occupation by foreign troops of the fortified cantonment which had been prepared by the late Amir Sher Ali for his own army; the capture of the large park of artillery and of the vast munitions of war, which had raised the military strength of the Afghans to a standard unequalled among Asiatic nations; the measures which had been taken to dismantle the Bala Hissar, the historical fortress of the nation, and the residence of its kings and principal nobles; and, lastly, the imprisonment and deportation to India of the ex-Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan and his leading ministers—were all circumstances which conspired to inflame to a high degree the natural antipathy felt towards a foreign invader. The temper of the people being in this condition, it was clear that only mutual jealousy and distrust among the chiefs could prevent their making common cause against us; and that, if any sentiment could be found strong enough to dominate such internal dissensions, a powerful movement might be evoked, having for its object our own expulsion from the country. Such an impulse was supplied by the fervent addresses to Muhammadan religious feeling made by the aged Mulla, Mir Muhammad, commonly known as the Mushk-i-Alam; by the universal denunciation of the English in the mosques of every city and village; by the appeals of the ladies of Yakub Khan’s family to the popular sympathies, and by the distribution of the concealed treasure which was at their command; and, lastly, by the expectation of sharing in the plunder of the British camp. The Mullas, in short, became the masters of the situation,

and having once succeeded in subordinating private quarrels to hatred of the common foe, the movement passed rapidly through the phase of religious enthusiasm, and culminated in nothing less than a national rising against the English invaders. The memories of the disaster of 1841-2 were again appealed to; it was urged that what had happened once might happen again; and the people were assured that, if they would only rise suddenly and simultaneously, the small English army in Sherpur might easily be driven from its position, and, as before, be overwhelmed in its retreat through the difficult passes which divide Afghanistan from India. Such were the hopes of the chiefs and religious leaders who had now combined against the British infidels; and, according to the information which I received, their intention was to gain possession of the city and Bala Hissar, and after occupying numerous forts and villages in the neighbourhood of Sherpur, to surround the cantonments.

“To attain this object, they arranged that the forces from the south, *viz.* from Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran districts and intervening Ghilzai country, should seize the range of hills which extends from the city towards Chaharasia, and include the Bala Hissar and the high conical peak called the ‘Takht i-Shah’; that forces from Kohistan should occupy the Asmai heights and hills to the north of the city; while those from Maidan, Wardak and the Ghazni direction moved upon the city from the westward.”

Under the circumstances thus described Sir Frederick Roberts endeavoured to deal with the advancing forces in detail, and before they could concentrate or be joined by the disaffected people from Kabul and the adjoining villages. With this object a parade of all the troops at Sherpur was held on the morning of the 8th December, in order to impress the spectators with the sight of their efficiency, and on the afternoon of the same day the following column started from Sherpur under Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, c.b., v.c. :

Cavalry . . .	{	9th Lancers (1 squadron)	}	3 squadrons.
		14th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron)	}	
Artillery . . .	{	F-A, Royal Horse Artillery	}	4 guns.
		No. 1 Mountain Battery	}	
		British . 67th Foot	401	}	
Infantry . . .	{	Native { 3rd Sikhs	509	}	902	}	1,303 rifles.
		Native { 5th Gurkhas	393	}		}	

Macpherson's original instructions were to reach the junction of the Bamian, Ghazni, and Kohistan roads near Arghandi, to prevent a junction between the Kohistanis and the Wardak general, Muhammad Jan, and to force the latter back on another brigade under Baker, which, marching *viâ* Chahasia and Chihil-dukhtaran, was to throw itself across the Ghazni road near Beni Badam.

On the 9th December Macpherson halted, by order of the Lieutenant-General, at Kala Aushar, to give time for the completion of Baker's detour and to draw the enemy forward by an appearance of hesitation. Mean-time intelligence was received of large numbers of the enemy moving northwards from Arghandi towards Kohistan, as well as of a considerable Kohistani force collected at Karez Mir, some 10 miles north-west of Kabul. General Macpherson was therefore directed to change the line of his advance and to attack the Kohistanis, and, as the country to be traversed was unsuitable for cavalry, to leave the whole of his mounted troops, except one squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers, at Kala Aushar.

With the remainder he marched at 7 a.m., on the 10th December, *viâ* the Kirskhana Pass towards the Surkh Pass, which divides the Koh Daman from the Chardeh Valley. The battery and infantry moved along the foot of the spurs which extend from the ridge to the west, and were halted behind a rise in the ground which hid them from the north, precaution being taken that their presence should not be betrayed, and that no sign of the column should appear above the sky line; whilst the squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers was sent round to reconnoitre the

eastern approach to the Surkh Kotal, the baggage being meanwhile collected at the foot of the ravine up which the column ascended. The enemy were at once observed coming from a northerly direction; and the cavalry reported a collection of some 2,000 men near Karez Mir, with groups advancing to join them from the west. The General's stratagem was successful in fostering the confidence of the enemy, for about noon they had advanced within striking distance; upon which an advanced party consisting of two companies of the 67th Foot under Major Baker, and two companies of the 5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, approaching in perfect silence, suddenly burst upon the foe from a distance of 50 yards. Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Money with five companies of the 3rd Sikhs, one company of the 67th Foot, and two guns to hold the ridge, and sending round three companies of the 3rd Sikhs (which were very happily placed for the purpose) to annoy the enemy's left and support the cavalry, the General advanced with the rest of his force. Meantime the advance party were driving the men opposed to them down the hill to the plain, which lay between the Surkh Pass and the main position of the enemy on three conical hills, which covered Karez Mir with a front extending three-quarters of a mile. The passage down the slopes was so rapid, the order of attack in three columns (5th Gurkhas on the left, 67th in centre, and 3rd Sikhs and cavalry on the right) so promptly formed under Lieutenant-Colonel Knowles, of the 67th Foot, and the general advance so simultaneous, that the flying enemy, under the fire of the two guns of Captain Morgan, could not rally until they reached the main body. Even there, although some of the Afghans made a stubborn resistance, nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the assault: two miles of country were traversed and the enemy's position captured within an hour, while Captain Morgan, bringing up his guns with great rapidity, was able to inflict

severe loss on what had now become a flying rabble. The British casualties were one officer, Major FitzHugh, 5th Gurkhas, and six men wounded, two severely.

The enemy advancing from the south-west seemed inclined at first to ascend the Surkh Pass from the Paghman side and assist the Kohistanis; but on seeing that Macpherson's troops held all the commanding positions, and probably hearing of the defeat of their allies, they retreated towards Arghandi.

Brigadier-General Macpherson at once (about noon) informed the Lieutenant-General by heliograph of his success, whereupon the latter ordered Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.H.A., to take the cavalry and horse artillery at Aushar, reinforced by two squadrons from Sherpur, and to endeavour to cut off the retreat of the Kohistanis. This attempt, however, was unsuccessful, as the enemy took to the hills. Colonel Gordon therefore returned to Kala Aushar, and the two extra squadrons marched back to Sherpur, while Brigadier-General Macpherson bivouacked at Karez Mir for the night.

Early on the morning of the 11th Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, in compliance with orders from General Roberts, left Sherpur with a squadron of the 9th Lancers and repaired to Kala Aushar, where he took over command of the troops there and marched with the whole towards Arghandi, with the intention of meeting Macpherson, who was to advance that morning from the Surkh Pass in a southerly direction against the Afghans under Muhammad Jan.

"General Massy's orders were to advance from Kala Aushar by the road leading directly from the city of Kabul towards Arghandi and Ghazni; to proceed cautiously and quietly, feeling for the enemy; to communicate with General Macpherson; and to act in conformity with that officer's movements, but on no account to commit himself to an action until General Macpherson had engaged the enemy" (*Major-General Roberts's despatch*). Later on General Massy received

written instructions to "operate towards Arghandi in conjunction with General Macpherson."

At 9 a.m. he started from Kala Aushar, his force being composed as follows :

Artillery : F-A., R.H.A. (4 guns)—Major H. J. C. Smyth-Windham.
 Cavalry { 9th Lancers, 2 squadrons (213)—Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Cleland.
 { 14th Bengal Lancers, 1 squadron (44)—Captain J. P. C. Neville.

The whereabouts of General Macpherson not being accurately known, a troop (consisting of 43 men) of the 9th Lancers, under Captain J. J. Scott-Chisholme, was despatched to the right to endeavour to establish communication with him ; but, although he eventually reached General Macpherson, he was unable to rejoin General Massy, and consequently the cavalry force was reduced to 214 lances, with the four guns.

In hopes of ultimately joining hands with Macpherson, Massy moved in a south-west direction, and, instead of gaining the Ghazni road by the ordinary route, started across country, intending to strike that road beyond the village of Kala Kazi, Captain B. Gough being sent ahead with his troop of the 9th Lancers as an advance guard.

After advancing about 3 miles, being then about a mile to the north-west of the village of Kala Kazi, Captain Gough reported that the enemy were occupying in considerable force the slopes of the hills on either side of the Ghazni road some 3 miles distant. Nevertheless General Massy still moved on, and shortly afterwards further reports were received by him that the enemy were coming down into the plain in the direction of Kala Kazi ; in order therefore to check their advance, and to detain them until he could see something of Brigadier-General Macpherson's force, Massy ordered Major Smyth-Windham to open fire on them, which he did at a range of 2,900 yards.

Major Windham's range proved accurate, and for a time his firing checked the advance of the enemy. It was, however, soon evident that they were in immense

numbers (probably about 10,000), that they were well led, and meant to come on. General Massy now moved a little nearer to Kala Kazi, and again ordered Major Windham to open fire, which he did with good effect at 2,500 yards. The attack still developing towards the left of the British cavalry, Massy again moved further in that direction, and the guns came into action at 2,000 yards, after which he directed Major Windham to change front right back to a position on the bank of the river at 1,700 yards' range. This also being ineffectual in stopping the enemy, who still maintained a steady advance, General Massy dismounted 30 men of the 9th Lancers, who commenced firing as soon as the Afghans came within range of their carbines, but without any appreciable result in keeping their masses back. The cavalry and horse artillery now kept on slowly retiring, the guns firing at intervals: and about this time General Roberts arrived on the ground, having left Sherpur with the intention of taking command of the united forces of Generals Macpherson and Massy. Seeing the inutility of continuing a cavalry and horse artillery action against an enemy in such overwhelming strength, and on ground so unfavourable, the Lieutenant-General ordered General Massy to retire slowly, to find a road by which the guns could be brought away in safety, and to watch for an opportunity for the cavalry to charge, so as to give time to extricate the guns. The order regarding the necessity of finding a line of retreat for the guns was also given to Colonel Gordon, commanding the artillery, who had accompanied General Massy from Aushar, where he had previously been in command. On receiving these orders, General Massy sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland to charge with one squadron (126 lances), directing Captain Neville to support him with the squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers, whilst Captain Gough with the remaining troops of the 9th Lancers attacked the left flank of the enemy. These orders were executed in the most gallant manner, the charges,

skilfully led by Cleland (who was dangerously wounded by a sword-cut and a shot through his side), were well delivered and did considerable execution, but did not succeed in checking the enemy for more than a few minutes. The Afghans were driven back for the moment, and had more troops been at hand to follow up the movement, the desired result must have been achieved; but the enormous odds told heavily, and the cavalry had to fall back under a heavy fire, from which they suffered severely, Lieutenants C. J. R. Hearsey and W. P. Ricardo, with sixteen of their men, being left dead, whilst Captain J. A. H. Stewart-Mackenzie and seven lancers were wounded. Meanwhile the artillery continued to retire until they found their further movement stopped by a deep and narrow channel, while the ground was so intersected with watercourses, all of which were almost impassable for artillery, that the enemy's infantry, who advanced in admirable order, were able to move faster than the guns.

Here, whilst searching for a passage, General Roberts ordered a second cavalry charge as a last hope of saving the guns; and a second time the 9th Lancers and the 14th Bengal Lancers charged to give more time to Windham to get his guns away. But this charge had still less effect than the first on the enemy, who were now coming rapidly forward, outflanking General Massy's troops on both sides, and maintaining a destructive fire. Meanwhile, in crossing one of the deep ditches, thickly planted with lines of poplars, one of the guns of F-A stuck, and Major Windham, having no means of carrying it away, was obliged to order it to be spiked and abandoned. The other three guns of F-A, under Lieutenants E. Vaughan-Hughes and E. Hardy, had taken up a position in a village enclosure and were in action, a low wall in front of the guns and a deep ditch in rear. The ammunition being nearly expended, and the enemy close at hand, Major Windham gave the word to limber up and retire. As this order was being executed the wheel horse of the

leading gun fell into the ditch, the shafts broke, the gun was rendered helpless, and the passage was completely blocked for the guns in rear. This being the only crossing for a considerable distance, the enemy closing in all round, and the villagers commencing to fire at the gunners at close range, Major Windham gave orders to unhook and spike the guns, saw this order carried out, and then abandoned them.

Here in the village Lieutenant Hardy was killed by a shot through the head. Major Smyth-Windham, and those men of the battery whom he could collect, retired *viâ* Deh Mazang to Sherpur, where they arrived at 1.30 p.m.


Immediately on reaching the ground, Sir Frederick Roberts, seeing that a retirement was inevitable, had sent back to Sherpur for 200 rifles of the 72nd Highlanders to be despatched with the least possible delay, to hold the gap at Deh Mazang, so as to prevent the enemy gaining possession of the city; and on this point the General now retired with the greater portion of the cavalry, who, by manœuvring in front of the enemy, and keeping them in check, gave opportunity for the 72nd Highlanders to arrive at the gorge, which they did just in time to hold it and to bar the enemy's passage, thus allowing the remnants of Massy's force to make good their retirement to Sherpur.

Thereupon the enemy, finding they were unable to enter the city, moved to the right and occupied the Takht-i-Shah, with all the slopes leading up to it, besides taking possession of the large walled villages in Chardeh.

The loss in this disastrous engagement was 4 officers (Lieutenants Hearsey and Ricardo, 9th Lancers, Hardy, R.H.A., and O. E. S. Forbes, 14th Bengal Lancers) and 23 men killed, while 2 officers (Colonel Cleland and Captain Stewart-Mackenzie, 9th Lancers) and 23 men were wounded. The casualties amongst the horses were 51 killed and 23 wounded out of a total of about 350 engaged. The gallantry displayed



CAPTURED GUNS AT KABUL, OCTOBER 1879



C. H. M. 1879
D. W. Smith

VIEW OF THE POSITION ATTACKED BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL BAKER ON 14TH DECEMBER, 1879
FROM THE VILLAGE OF BILAND KHEL

by both officers and men was most praiseworthy, and during the final retirement the squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers was especially distinguished for its steadiness and coolness.

The 9-pr. guns, which had of necessity been abandoned by Major Smyth-Windham, were all recovered later in the day under the direction of Colonel MacGregor, Chief of the Staff, the ground where they lay having been meantime partially cleared of the enemy by the advance of General Macpherson's brigade.

Meanwhile, at about 7.50 a.m., Brigadier-General Macpherson had marched from Karez Mir, passed through the Surkh Pass within the hour and reached the cross roads to Kabul and Arghandi, when the sound of guns in action was heard from the direction of the Chardeh Valley. Concluding at once that the cavalry and horse artillery from Aushar were engaged with the enemy, Macpherson turned to his left, and leaving his squadron of Bengal Lancers and six companies of the Sikhs and Gurkhas to protect his baggage, he pressed on with the remainder of his force and soon sighted the enemy about 3 miles east of Kala Kazi. Captain H. R. L. Morgan was immediately ordered to bring his mountain guns into action, in order to give the cavalry force intimation of Macpherson's whereabouts. The retreat of the latter, as described above, had, however, commenced about an hour before this time, 12.30. Meanwhile, the infantry advance was continued, and a body of the enemy appeared inclined to make a stand to resist it. But they broke before the attack could close with them, and were pursued in all directions by the 67th, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Gurkhas. "To describe every change of front that was made," writes General Macpherson, "would be tedious. We almost boxed the compass and drove—I may say hunted—the enemy in all directions, so that by two o'clock the mountains, crowded with black specks, looked like ant-hills, and later on, from the commanding position of Kala Kazi,

not an Afghan could be seen on Chardeh plain." While the two mountain guns, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Gurkhas drove the parties which lingered on the Kala Kazi mounds up the goat-paths, the 67th Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Knowles, did excellent service in searching the range of forts and enclosures west of that place, which had been crowded with Afghans. The force made a rendezvous at Kala Kazi at 3.30 p.m., and from thence was recalled to Deh Mazang by order of the Lieutenant-General, reaching that place at 7 p.m. The main body of the force bivouacked at Deh Mazang, and the baggage with the rear guard went *viâ* Kala Aushar to the cantonments of Sherpur.

Early in the day the troops in charge of the baggage were closely pressed by a large body of the enemy while traversing the Kaffir Jan defile. Happily the dispositions of Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Ross and Major C. J. Griffiths in protecting the convoy under very trying circumstances were conceived and carried out with great judgment and gallantry, and the baggage was brought through the difficult pass in safety, not, however, without the necessity of a bayonet charge, which was brilliantly executed under Captain J. Cook, 5th Gurkhas, and his equally gallant brother, Lieutenant W. Cook, 3rd Sikhs, both of whom were wounded, the latter severely. The other casualties in Macpherson's brigade during the day were two sepoy killed, one native officer and four sepoy wounded.

It is necessary now to turn to Brigadier-General Baker, and to describe the movements of his brigade from the time that he marched out of Sherpur on the morning of the 9th December with the following force:

Cavalry . . .	5th Punjab Cavalry, 2½ squadrons (Major B. Williams).	
Artillery . . .	No. 2 Mountain Battery, 2 divisions (Captain G. Swinley).	
Infantry {	British . . .	92nd Highlanders (Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker) . . . 450
	Native {	5th Punjab Infantry (Major H. M. Pratt) . . . 450
		No. 1 Company, Sappers and Miners (Lieutenant C. Nugent) 25

On that evening Baker encamped at Chihildukhtaran,

south-west of Chaharasia, and 12 miles from Sherpur, and on the 10th he marched, first south and then west, by a difficult road which led him by evening over the watershed between the Kabul and Logar Rivers at the Taitamur Pass, reaching with his main body the southern slopes of the kotal, 17 miles from Chihildukhtaran, at 4 p.m. A small portion of the transport with the rear guard was belated, and bivouacked on the top of the pass.

On leaving camp, shortly after daybreak, on the morning of the 11th December, it was found that parties of the enemy were occupying the heights in the distance on both flanks. They were composed of men from the Logar district and some Wardak Saiads on their way to join the main gathering under Muhammad Jan; those on the right numbered about 3,000; whilst those on the left were but some few hundreds in number. A few harmless shots were fired at first on the main body; but the rear guard, with its long train of baggage animals, became somewhat hotly engaged with the enemy immediately after commencing its march, the latter clinging to the heights, and not venturing into the valley through which runs the road which had previously been followed by General Baker's brigade in November. The rear guard was composed of—

80 rifles 92nd Highlanders—Lieutenant A. D. Fraser	} Captain G. K. M'Callum, 92nd Highlanders.
200 rifles 5th Punjab Infantry—Lieutenant J. P. Sparling	
And details, regimental baggage guards	

This rear guard was supplemented, when the firing commenced, by 100 rifles 5th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant R. F. Jameson and two mountain guns under Lieutenant C. A. Montanaro, with a troop of 5th Punjab Cavalry. The troops took up a position on a low kotal and engaged the enemy until the whole of the baggage had passed, which operation was effected satisfactorily under the direction of Captain W. A. Wynter, 33rd Foot, the officer in charge of the transport.

Meanwhile, in order to carry out the combined movement with General Macpherson, the cavalry under Major Williams had been pushed forward early in the morning and gained possession of the Ghazni and Nirikh Valley roads, as also of the other roads leading from the Maidan Valley. Since, however, no communication had up to this time been received from Macpherson, it was evident that his plan of operations must have been changed. Baker, therefore, determined to push on to Pain Arghandi (12 miles). When the advance guard of cavalry, supported by 120 of the 92nd Highlanders under Major G. S. White and by two of Captain Swinley's guns, arrived near that place late in the afternoon, a large body of the enemy, which afterwards proved to be the rear guard of Muhammad Jan's force, was found in occupation of the heights on either side of the gorge leading into the Chardeh Valley, and thus closing the road to Kabul. It was necessary to gain these heights before dark, and with this object Major White and Lieutenant the Hon. J. S. Napier led their Highlanders up the precipitous sides of the hills in the face of great odds, and without the slightest hesitation attacked the Afghans in such a dashing manner that the enemy were driven away and their position stormed with success. Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, with the head-quarters of the 92nd, and Captain Swinley's guns supported the assault, whilst the Punjab Cavalry succeeded in cutting off the retreat of a small number of the enemy and capturing some of their horses.

On the morning of the 12th the road to Kabul was still closed, but heliographic communication was established with the Lieutenant-General, who ordered the column to join Macpherson at Deh Mazang. The rear guard, under Major H. M. Pratt, was again considerably harassed by the same bodies of Afghans, who had been so troublesome on the previous morning, and the baggage animals were so distressed by the work of the last few days that General Baker at length determined to pack his baggage in a small fort, four miles

on the road to Kabul, in order that he might take forward his main body unimpeded, and bring it into action, if required, outside the city. But by the time that the fort was reached the day was far advanced, and it was evident that a considerable proportion of the main body must be left to defend the baggage against the increasing numbers of the enemy, so that Baker found that he could not reach Deh Mazang in time or with sufficient men to come into action with any appreciable effect. He therefore continued the march of the whole column, the line being well protected and covered by the cavalry. On reaching Deh Mazang instructions were received for the column to proceed forthwith to Sherpur, where the main body arrived before 6 p.m., while the rear guard with the baggage reached the cantonments by 8.30 the same night (12th December).

The casualties in the brigade since the 9th had been only two men killed and thirteen wounded.

At Sherpur during the night of the 11th December every possible precaution was taken to resist the gathering masses of the enemy. The picquet on the Bala Hissar heights was reinforced by 200 of the 72nd Highlanders, and was thus able to hold its own against an attack of the Afghans at 7 p.m. of the 11th, as well as against a very harassing fire kept up all night. Meanwhile the British were reinforced by the arrival from Lataband of the Guides Corps, cavalry and infantry, under Colonel F. H. Jenkins, the Lieutenant-General having ordered their advance from Jagdalak on the 7th, when he foresaw the probability of reinforcements being required. The baggage of the corps, with a guard of 200 men, reached Sherpur on the following day.

On the morning of the 12th the enemy were seen to be in great force on the Takht-i-Shah peak, distant about 1,000 yards from the picquet on the Bala Hissar heights, with which it is connected by a long saddle of difficult ground. It was decided that they must be dislodged from this important position, and for this

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duty a force, as under, was detached from Macpherson's brigade at Deh Mazang, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money, 3rd Sikhs :

	2 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery.
215	{ 67 Foot, detachment.
	{ 72nd Highlanders, detachment.
150,	3rd Sikhs.
195,	5th Gurkhas.

Total . 560 rifles and 2 mountain guns.

On the saddle, between the peak and the Bala Hissar ridge, is a low mound which was held by the advanced Afghan troops, and it was against this mound that, at about noon, Money's attack was at first directed from the neighbourhood of Deh Mazang.

The ground was extremely difficult, and the resistance obstinate, and it was not till 3.30 that the Afghans were driven from the mound. By this time ammunition had run short, and the enemy's strength being found to be greater than had been expected, General Roberts determined to postpone any further advance on the peak until the return of Baker's brigade should enable him to assist the direct attack by means of a flanking movement. Colonel Money bivouacked on the ground he had gained, Macpherson still holding the Deh Mazang gorge with 217 men of the 67th and 106 of the 72nd. The British casualties on this day were : Captain J. Cook, v.c., 5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant C. H. Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders, and Lieutenant E. J. N. Fasken, 3rd Sikhs, and 15 men wounded, the first-named mortally. Sergeants Cox, Macdonald, and McIlveen, of the 72nd, greatly distinguished themselves in Colonel Money's attack ; the former again brought himself to notice on the following day by his coolness and judgment while escorting the wounded from the Bala Hissar to Sherpur.

On the morning of the 13th, in compliance with instructions received the previous evening, Brigadier-General Baker, who, as has been seen, had returned to

Sherpur, marched in the direction of Beni Hissar with the object of attacking the Takht-i-Shah position from the south-east. With him was a column composed as follows :

- 1 squadron 9th Lancers (Captain B. Gough).
- 2½ squadrons 5th Punjab Cavalry (Major B. Williams).
- 4 guns G-3, R.A. (Major W. R. Craster).
- 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery (Captain G. Swinley).
- 6 companies 92nd Highlanders (Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker).
- 7 companies Guides Infantry (Colonel F. H. Jenkins).
- 300 rifles 3rd Sikhs (Major C. J. Griffiths).

The column was subsequently reinforced by 150 rifles of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Major Pratt.

Debouching on the plain below the Bala Hissar height, the advance guard, under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, saw large numbers of the enemy leaving Beni Hissar and rapidly ascending the eastern slope of the ridge, which, rising at Beni Hissar, runs up almost uninterruptedly to the conical hill, to gain which was the main object of the day's operations.

It was evident that if this movement were not promptly checked, not only would the force originally in Beni Hissar escape, but it would also be enabled to unite with the main body occupying the heights above. Major White was fully alive to the situation, and somewhat changed the line of advance ; and orders were immediately given that the troops detailed for the attack should move direct on the centre of the ridge, along which the enemy intended making their flank movement, and so place themselves between the two portions of the enemy's force.

This advance was carried out in the most gallant and brilliant manner by the 92nd Highlanders, under Major White, ably supported by the Guides under Colonel Jenkins, and covered by the fire of the guns, which was concentrated at first on the enemy immediately above Beni Hissar, with great accuracy and success,

The advance soon became a race between the enemy and the 92nd Highlanders to gain the point on which the head of the attack was directed, and on the opposing parties reaching it, a hand-to-hand fight took place.

Lieutenant St. John Forbes and Colour-Sergeant Drummond, with a few soldiers who were able to keep pace with them, led the advance, and were the first to reach the goal; but both were cut down and killed by a party of Afghans, who were, however, in turn entirely annihilated by another party of the 92nd under Lieutenant W. H. Dick Cunyngham¹; the enemy's line was thus cut, the possession of the heights at this point secured, and the Afghans, staggered for a moment by the suddenness and rapidity of the assault, fell back on Beni Hissar and the village in the vicinity, whither they were followed by a detachment of the 3rd Sikhs, under Major Griffiths.

It now remained to drive the enemy from the lofty Takht-i-Shah, the key of the position. Covered by the fire of No. 2 Mountain Battery, which was moved forward on to the ridge already gained, and by that of G-3, from the plain, the 92nd Highlanders and Guides pressed on, and by 11.30 had fought their way to the summit of the peak. Here they were met by a portion of Colonel Money's force, including detachments of the 3rd Sikhs, 5th Gurkhas, and 72nd Highlanders under Major A. FitzHugh, which had arrived a few minutes earlier from the position occupied the previous day above the Bala Hissar. The enemy, who had offered a most determined resistance, fled in a southerly direction towards Indaki.

Meanwhile large bodies of Afghans were moving from the Bala Hissar and the city towards the Siah Sang heights, while others occupied two villages on either side of the road along which Baker had advanced in the morning. His communications with Sherpur were thus seriously threatened, and it became necessary

¹ This officer was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on this occasion.

to drive the enemy from the villages ; one of them was easily captured, but the other held out for a considerable time, until eventually stormed in a most gallant manner by a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Major Pratt, which had been sent out from Sherpur to clear Baker's communications.

As soon as the main position of the enemy had been carried, orders were sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Money to hold the conical height, Takht-i-Shah, with the force under his command ; while the 92nd Highlanders, the Guides, and No. 2 Mountain Battery were to descend into the plains, so as to allow of further operations against the enemy in the direction of Siah Sang. It was, moreover, important that General Baker should return to Sherpur as soon as possible, for the garrison there had been reduced to the lowest possible limits, and the sound of guns in that direction indicated that the cantonment was being threatened. A heliograph message received by him from head-quarters at 11.30 a.m. also stated that the enemy were advancing towards Bimaru on the east side of the Sherpur cantonment.

Meantime a squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Major J. C. Stewart, had already done some good work towards Siah Sang, having made a most successful charge against a largely superior body of the enemy, in which charge the horse on which Major Stewart was riding was shot dead. This success was now to be followed up, and the attention of the four guns of G-3, Royal Artillery, which had remained in the plain, and that of the entire cavalry was devoted to the force collecting on the Siah Sang heights. A few shells, dropped with telling effect, at once set the enemy in motion, who, seeing that the main body had been signally defeated, appeared to be doubtful how to act ; numbers retreated to the city, whilst large parties moved towards the eastern extremity of the ridge. Observing this, General Baker despatched all his available cavalry under Major Williams, 5th Punjab Cavalry, in that direction to cut off the retreat of the


Afghans—a movement which considerably hastened the enemy's retirement. During this operation the Guides cavalry under Major Stewart arrived from Sherpur, followed shortly afterwards by Brigadier-General Massy with one squadron of the 9th Lancers and two of the 14th Bengal Lancers. On arriving at Siah Sang, General Massy assumed command of all the cavalry except the Guides, who continued to work independently, and several effective charges were delivered, not, however, without loss; the 9th Lancers especially suffered severely, Captain S. G. Butson and four men being killed, Captain J. J. Scott-Chisholme, Lieutenant C. J. W. Trower, and eight men wounded.

As the day drew to a close all the troops, except those under Brigadier-General Macpherson, returned to Sherpur. The latter officer, after waiting vainly at Deh Mazang in hopes of being able to harass the enemy as they retired from the Takht-i-Shah, at length sent the detachment of the 72nd back to Sherpur, and with the 67th joined Money on the heights above the Bala Hissar, being compelled by the smallness of his force to abandon Deh Mazang and the western approach to Kabul.

The casualties in the brigades under Generals Baker and Massy during the 13th December amounted to 2 officers and 12 men killed, 2 officers and 43 men wounded; 52 horses killed and wounded.

The results of the day's operations were considered satisfactory; the enemy had been driven from the southern range, and their advance in that direction had been stopped. They had apparently suffered greatly from the artillery and infantry fire when on the hillsides, and on the plain below they had been severely dealt with by the cavalry.

Indeed the success of the British troops had been so decided, and the loss inflicted upon the enemy so heavy, that Sir Frederick Roberts was prepared to find that the Afghans would be unable or unwilling to renew their attempts, that the combination had broken up,



VIEW OF THE POSITION ATTACKED BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL BAKER ON 14TH DECEMBER, 1879. FROM THE ALIABAD KOTAL (FACING SOUTH-EAST), SHOWING LINE OF ATTACK ON EASTERN END OF ASMAI BY THE HIGHLANDERS AND GUIDES

fire the advance party, consisting of 64 men of the 72nd Highlanders and 60 of the Guides, was led forward by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke, and in the most gallant and dashing manner these few rifles carried and kept possession of a conical hill on the right flank; and this position having been gained, it was subsequently further secured by 4 guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery and 100 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry. The main body now advanced, and, bringing their right forward, assaulted the centre of the enemy's position on the summit of the heights, the sides of which were most precipitous and rocky. "Nothing could have exceeded the dash and resolution with which the Highlanders, under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, advanced up the steepest part of the ridge, while the Guides on their right were affording every assistance by continually turning the positions held by the enemy." The western portion of the heights was gained; but not without hard fighting and several casualties, among whom was Captain F. D. Battye of the Guides, who was severely wounded before the summit was reached. The enemy now retreated from the left of their position under a very heavy fire from our troops, while the artillery played on them with the most telling effect. The several points of importance along the ridge were stubbornly defended, and the highest peak on the extreme right was held with greatest determination, a number of its defenders being killed by the bayonet in a hand-to-hand fight before it was stormed by the Highlanders and Guides. The advance was covered by the four guns G-3, Royal Artillery, under Major Craster, and by four guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, commanded by Captain Papon, which the Lieutenant-General brought into action near the southwest corner of the Sherpur cantonment.

Meantime General Macpherson had been directed to give all the assistance in his power to General Baker's attack; and accordingly the whole of the 67th

moved under Lieutenant-Colonel Knowles across the gorge at Deh Mazang and worked towards the enemy's left rear, while the marksmen of the 67th and two guns under Captain Morgan, R.A., went to the nearest point on the northern slope of the Sher Darwaza, and opened on the rear of the enemy's breastworks with great effect. Two companies of the 67th, under Major Baker, ascended the Asmai hill and rendered valuable service, arriving just as the summit of the peak was finally stormed by the Highlanders and Guides.

Hardly, however, had this success been achieved when the small detachment of 72nd, 5th Punjab Infantry, and Guides, which had been left to hold the conical hill on General Baker's extreme right, was threatened by large masses of Afghans from the direction of Kohistan. Every effort was made to reinforce the position, but before this object could be effected the enemy, advancing in overwhelming numbers, compelled the British detachment to retire, after a most stubborn resistance, in which Captain A. Spens, 72nd Highlanders, sacrificed his life in an heroic attempt to stem the advance of the enemy. The troops retreated quietly and steadily down the eastern slope of the hill under a heavy fire, but it was unfortunately found impossible to bring away two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, which up to the last moment had played upon the Afghans, and which fell temporarily into the hands of the enemy.

"No blame for the loss of these guns is in any way to be attached to the officers and men of No. 2 Mountain Battery, but, on the other hand," says Brigadier-General Baker, "every credit is due to Captain Swinley, the late Lieutenant Montanaro, and Lieutenant Liddell, and the several native officers, non-commissioned officers and men composing the gun detachment, for the gallant manner in which they stood to their guns to the last, and it was only on the sudden rush of this overwhelming force of the enemy that they had to retire with the loss of two guns." Of the men composing the gun detach-

270 "A MOST DASHING LITTLE AFFAIR"

ments, one was killed and six wounded; and Surgeon J. Duke was specially mentioned for his attention to the wounded under the heavy fire.

Lieutenant Montanaro, with Subadar Nazar Khan, brought the two remaining guns down the hill without mishap.

While the events above narrated were in progress, numbers of the enemy were observed (as had been the case on the previous day) collecting on Siah Sang and proceeding round the eastern flank of the cantonments in the direction of Kohistan. The Lieutenant-General therefore despatched a small force of cavalry and two guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, under command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, to disperse them. The ground, however, in that direction was so intersected by deep water-courses that the advance of the guns was necessarily slow, and by the time the obstacles had been overcome the enemy had got so far on the road towards Kohistan, and so close to the hills, that pursuit was hopeless.

A party of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Captain W. J. Vousden, met with better success. This regiment was quartered in the King's garden, about a third of the way between Sherpur and the city, and in the morning orders had been sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams to be on the look-out for any of the enemy that might pass in that direction. About 1 p.m. some 300 or 400 were observed moving along the left bank of the river, and Captain Vousden, who with one troop was out on reconnaissance, most gallantly charged into the middle of them; and notwithstanding that only twelve of his men were able to follow him (the remainder being stopped by a heavy fire which was opened on them from behind some low walls) he succeeded in dispersing the enemy, and in inflicting severe loss upon them, killing five men with his own hand. Six of his small band were wounded in the skirmish, which, as Sir Frederick Roberts wrote, "was a most dashing little affair, and reflects great credit on

OVERWHELMING FORCE OF AFGHANS 271

Captain Vousden." He was awarded the Victoria Cross for this exploit.

The object of the Lieutenant-General throughout these operations had been to break up the hostile combination against him, by dealing with the enemy in detail, or at least to prevent their getting command of the hills to the north and west of Kabul, and thus gaining possession of the city and the Bala Hissar. Up to this time Sir Frederick Roberts had had no reason to apprehend that the Afghans were in sufficient force to cope with disciplined troops; but the resolute and determined manner in which the conical hill had been recaptured, and the information sent to him by Brigadier-General Macpherson from the signal station on the Bala Hissar, that large masses of the enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and west, made it evident that the numbers combined against him were too overwhelming to admit of his comparatively small force meeting them, especially on ground which still further increased the advantages they possessed from their vast numerical superiority. The General therefore determined to withdraw from all isolated positions and to concentrate the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing the safety of the large cantonments, and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life.

The measure was one which Sir Frederick Roberts was most reluctant to order; for it, of course, involved the temporary abandonment of the city and the Bala Hissar, with the ammunition stored there—a loss serious in itself, and likely to produce a bad effect on the country at large. In the circumstances, however, the General considered that no other course was left to him but to remain on the defensive and wait until the arrival of reinforcements, or the growing confidence of the enemy, should afford him a favourable opportunity for dealing a decisive blow.

Orders were accordingly issued to Brigadier-Generals Macpherson and Baker to retire their forces upon Sherpur.

This difficult operation was conducted in a manner which reflected the greatest credit upon the Brigadiers and their troops. Under Macpherson the withdrawal was commenced by Major J. M. Sym with the 5th Gurkhas, who not only evacuated his position with the greatest coolness, but on the retirement of the rest of the column being threatened, he returned with his men through the fire which they had just passed and helped to hold the enemy at bay. The rear of the column was brought off by Lieutenant-Colonel Knowles, aided by Lieutenant R. L. Milne, who commanded a party of the 72nd, and the steadiness of the whole enabled the brigadier to withdraw both troops and baggage with comparatively little loss.

The retirement of Baker's brigade was accomplished with like success, and by 4.45 p.m. the whole force under that officer returned to the Sherpur cantonments. "The retirement," wrote General Roberts, "of Brigadier-General Baker's troops down the eastern face of Asmai, under a very heavy fire, was most ably conducted by that distinguished officer Colonel Jenkins, who speaks with great admiration of the example set to their men by Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow and Major Stockwell, 72nd Highlanders, and also of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell (Queen's Own), Corps of Guides. Another officer who greatly distinguished himself on this occasion was Captain Hammond, Corps of Guides. He had been very forward during the storming of the Asmai heights, and now, when the enemy were crowding up the western slopes, he remained with a few men on the ridge until the Afghans were within thirty yards of them. During the retirement one of the men of the Guides was shot, and Captain Hammond stopped and assisted in carrying him away, though the enemy were at the time close by and firing heavily." He received the Victoria Cross for his gallantry.

The total casualties on the 14th December amounted to 3 British and 2 native officers and 30 men killed; 3 British and 7 native officers and 101 men wounded.

REASONS FOR OCCUPYING SHERPUR 273

Sir Frederick Roberts's reasons for occupying Sherpur cantonments in preference to the Bala Hissar and the Siah Sang heights have already been alluded to (p. 265). He now recapitulated these as follows, together with the further causes which led him to concentrate the whole of his force in the cantonments after the events of the 13th and 14th December :

“The Bala Hissar was not sufficiently large to contain and afford shelter to the entire force, its camp followers, and many transport animals. It would have been obligatory, therefore, to have divided the troops—a measure to which I was very averse—and to have located a portion of them elsewhere, possibly upon Siah Sang, a bare and bleak plateau, nearly a mile distant from the remainder of the force, where water would have been procurable with difficulty, and where no single facility for carrying on the necessary hutting operations existed.

“Again, the disastrous explosion of the 16th October led me to regard as a grave risk the permanent settlement of the greater portion of the force close to and around a vast magazine, which there was a strong presumption was mined.

“These facts, added to the existence of accommodation sufficient to at once house the commissariat stores, the entire European quota of my force, and a large part of the native troops, and the rapid approach of an Afghan winter, induced me, after carefully weighing the matter, to decide upon the occupation of Sherpur, and I see no reason in the light of recent occurrences to alter that opinion.

“Sherpur, moreover, has the advantage of being on the side of the city nearest to our communications with India; and although it is situated on the left bank of the Kabul River, this river, except during the occasional spring floods, presents no difficulties to the passage of all arms. Another important consideration was that at Sherpur running water was abundant and good, and, in the event of this supply being diminished,

wells could be readily sunk, the soil being easy, and water found within 7 feet of the surface.


“The principal drawback to holding the cantonment was its great extent, and the impossibility of at all reducing our line of defences. Sherpur is almost a parallelogram, whose northern side is formed by the Bimaru ridge, a range of low but steep isolated hills rising some 300 feet above the surrounding plain, and running almost due east and west for a distance (including the slopes at either end) of 2,500 yards. A large lake or *jhal*, whose breadth varies from a quarter to half a mile, lies between the northern slope of the ridge and the steep hills which form the southern boundary of the Kohistan country. As this lake is not more than a mile and a half distant from, and is parallel to, the Bimaru heights for quite three miles, it forms a barrier, round whose flanks and between which and the heights no enemy dare advance.

“The southern face is a continuous and massive mud wall 16 feet high, pierced at intervals of about 700 yards by three gateways, which again are protected by lofty circular bastions. Between these gates, and also at the corners, are a series of lower bastions, which give an admirable flanking fire. The length of the southern side slightly exceeds 2,650 yards.

“The western flank is constructed on a precisely similar plan, save that the northern portion has been much damaged by the explosion which occurred there on the 7th October last. This face is about 1,000 yards in length.

“On the east the defences are much weaker, as the original design was never completed; and the wall, which was intended to resemble the other faces, does not exceed 7 feet in height. From this point the line of defence trends to the north-west, and, skirting the village of Bimaru, runs into the eastern slope of the Bimaru ridge, previously described as the northern face.

“From this it will be seen that though the perimeter of Sherpur was large for the force at my disposal, still



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF COUNTRY ROUND KABUL, FROM WEST END OF BIMARU HILL
By LIEUT. C. H. MANNERS-SMITH, D.A.Q.M.G.

its defensive powers, both natural and artificial, were so great that I could confidently look to holding it successfully against any attack. I have alluded to the impossibility of contracting the line of defence, and would here more fully explain that this is owing to the length of the Bimaru heights, and to the absolute necessity for holding them for their entire extent. To have given up any portion of them would have placed in the hands of the enemy a vantage ground from whence no part of our camp would have been secure, and to repeat a course which proved most disastrous in the year 1841. In fact, paradoxical though it may appear, the Bimaru heights form at once the strength and weakness of the position.

“On occupying Sherpur I saw that to prevent annoyance in the event of a strong combination being directed against that place, a considerable destruction of villages and walled enclosures was advisable so as to create an esplanade round the cantonment; but the pressure of even more important work, the collection of supplies, and the provision of shelter for such of the troops as had not already been secured, combined with the scarcity of labour, compelled me in a great measure to defer this precautionary step.

“I was also unwilling, by what might have appeared unnecessary harshness in the destruction of villages and orchards, to give rise to any ill-feeling on the part of the people of Kabul. Indeed, it has been my constant endeavour from the first to make our occupation of the country as little irksome to its inhabitants as the safety and welfare of my troops permitted.

“Several of these villages gave considerable trouble during the events which occurred between the 15th and 23rd December, and have since been razed to the ground. Each village is a small fortress in itself, protected by massive mud walls, impervious to all but heavy artillery, and guarded by strong loopholed flanking towers. Their reduction, if resolutely held, entails certain loss.

“As soon as it became apparent that the events of

the 11th were the forerunners of a serious movement, unless the measures which I was adopting speedily broke up the combination, I took all the necessary steps for strengthening the defences of Sherpur, and made every preparation to meet the large force known to be assembling.

“As regards food, ammunition, etc., I had no anxiety at this period. Sufficient supplies were actually stored in Sherpur to last the entire force for nearly four months, with the exception of *bhusa* (chopped straw), of which there was enough for six weeks. There was ample firewood¹ for all purposes; medicines and hospital comforts were sufficient for all possible requirements for a similar time, and there was enough ammunition both for guns and rifles to have carried on an obstinate defence for three or even four months.”

The critical events of the 14th were followed by a period of comparative calm at Sherpur; the garrison of Butkhak was successfully withdrawn, and Sir F. Roberts with his recruited force was able to direct his full attention to strengthening his entrenchments, so as to be able to hold out against any immediate hostile combination until his reinforcements under Brigadier-General C. Gough should arrive from Gandamak.

The enormous extent of the cantonment, together with the unfinished state of its defences, caused some anxiety lest a general attack should be made before the preparations could be completed. For the defence of a perimeter of some 8,000 yards the maximum number of troops available was about 7,000, including cavalry, no allowance being made for reconnaissances or for counter-attack. Colonel Perkins, R.E., was directed to carry out as far as possible a scheme for the defence which had been prepared in November, but postponed, as being at that time less urgent than providing shelter for the troops and collecting supplies.

¹ Large stacks of firewood were fortunately found in the cantonment when first seized; this supply of fuel had apparently been stored for the use of the Amir's troops.

Strong working parties were at once employed as follows :

The northern face, and in fact the key of the cantonment, *viz.* the Bimaru heights, had been strengthened by the erection of some towers ; these were now supplemented by a line of breastworks below the outer crests, with emplacements for guns at selected points. The gap in the hills was flanked by trenches and commanded by a blockhouse. The south and west faces (about 2,700 and 1,000 yards long respectively) were already finished and considered fairly secure, consisting of a wall 16 feet high with banquette and parapet, and 30 feet in rear the flat-roofed barracks, also provided with a parapet and forming a second line of defence. Four gateways, however (three in the southern and one in the western face), had to be barricaded and provided with the means of firing from them, while other irregular entrances, which had been made for convenience' sake, were built up. Ramps and ladders were also added to the existing means of access to the outer wall.

At the north-west angle of the defences there was a broad gap between the fall of the Bimaru Hills and the western line of barracks (a portion of which had been destroyed some time previously) ; this was now closed by a ditch and a breastwork of ammunition-wagons, and swept by two 18-prs. and a Gatling gun placed in position on the interior slopes of the Bimaru Hills. It was further strengthened by abattis and wire entanglements.

The eastern face was extremely weak, the outer wall being as yet little higher than its foundations, while a low barrack erected by the 28th Punjab Native Infantry along part of its length was not yet provided with a permanent parapet. It received some assistance, however, from a small fort within the enceinte, which had been used as a hospital, and was now furnished with a sand-bag parapet on the roof, while another small fort some fifty yards in front of the right centre was occupied as a redoubt, and flanked the wall of the barrack.

The north-east corner was further strengthened by a two-gun battery thrown up on the eastern slopes of the heights, while Bimaru village was loopholed, and the open space in front obstructed by abattis and wire entanglements.

Of the outlying buildings in advance of the village some were made defensible and others were destroyed, as well as some of the adjacent woods, the trees of which were largely used as abattis.

The artillery available consisted of twelve field and eight mountain guns, besides such of the captured guns as could be pressed into the service. These latter were placed in position, and consisted of four smooth-bore 18-prs., with about 200 shot and 160 shell, and two 8-inch howitzers with 140 common shell; but owing to the wretched quality of the Afghan fuses the 18-pr. shell had to be filled and used as shot, while our own fuses were wrapped round with wax-cloth, and so made to fit the howitzer shells. There were also four 7-pr. mountain guns of Afghan make, which Colonel Gordon mounted, but their ammunition was so unreliable that their effect proved almost *nil*. The infantry were fairly off for ammunition, having on an average about 350 rounds per man.

The defences of the cantonments were divided into the following sections—shown in the accompanying plan—and their superintendence entrusted to the officers named below :

Section I.—Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, c.B., v.c., from the 2nd Brigade gate on the southern face to the Bimaru village on the east.

Section II.—Colonel F. H. Jenkins, c.B., Corps of Guides, from the Bimaru village up to the eastern slope of the Bimaru ridge.

Section III.—Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, c.B., v.c., from the eastern extremity of the Bimaru village to the gorge which divides the ridge.

Section IV.—Major-General J. Hills, c.B., v.c., from the gorge to the head-quarters gate



Section V.—Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow, c.B., 72nd Highlanders, from the head-quarters gate to the 2nd Brigade gate.

Brigadier-General Massy was placed in the centre, whilst Brigadier-General Baker, c.B., commanded the

PLAN
of
SHERPUR

Showing distribution of Garrison

Dec 1879



By Major R. G. Kennedy
and Lt. Mansur Smith D. A. Q. M. G.

reserve, which was formed up at the southern entrance to the gorge leading to the Bimaru ridge.

Telegraphic communication was established between divisional head-quarters on the west face and the temporary head-quarters of Generals Macpherson, Gough, Hills, and Baker, and the native field hospital. All the sections were also brought into communication with each other and with head-quarters by means of visual signalling.

Every effort was made to place the British position in a thorough state of defence, while the situation of the force was communicated by telegram to the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the advisability of reinforcements being despatched was urged by General Roberts. At the same time orders were sent to Major-General Bright at Jalalabad to move Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade to Kabul without loss of time, and to advance Brigadier-General Arbuthnot's brigade as soon as fresh troops should reach Jalalabad from India.

Early on the following morning (15th December) the telegraph wire was cut, communications with the base (at Peshawar) severed for the second time since Kabul was occupied, and the force again isolated. The Lieutenant-General had intended to recall to Sherpur the garrisons of both Butkhak and Lataband, but he finally decided to maintain the latter post, whose situation was a strong one, its ammunition plentiful, and its supplies sufficient to last over the probable date of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's arrival. Sir Frederick Roberts rightly judged that so long as this post was held, no serious opposition would be offered to General Gough's advance. The event amply justified the Lieutenant-General's decision; heliographic communication was kept up with Lataband whenever the weather allowed it during the ensuing week, while a serious attempt on the part of the Afghans against the post on the 16th December was easily frustrated by the troops under Colonel Hudson. The enemy, to the

number of 800 or 1,000, were dispersed with considerable loss, and not a single casualty occurred on the British side.

Meanwhile at Kabul, on the 15th and 16th, the enemy were comparatively inactive, the latter date being occupied with the looting of the city and Bala Hissar, where Muhammad Jan secured large quantities of ammunition, which was reported to consist of 130 tons of powder and 100,000 rounds of Snider ammunition. Eighty tons of powder had already been destroyed by the British.

On the 17th December a hostile demonstration was made by the Afghans on the Asmai heights and the Siah Sang ridge, which was answered by artillery fire from the cantonments and their immediate neighbourhood.

On the 18th the Lieutenant-General learned by heliogram from Lataband, and by a letter from Brigadier-General Charles Gough, that that officer had not yet advanced beyond Jagdalak, owing to the weakness of the force available for the strengthening and reopening of the line of communication. It was, however, of the utmost importance that the force at Sherpur should be enabled to assume the offensive as soon as possible, both for the sake of the prestige of the British, which would seriously suffer if the city of Kabul remained much longer in the hands of the enemy, and because the post of Lataband was only provisioned up to the 23rd. General Roberts, therefore, urged the Commander-in-Chief to instruct Brigadier-General Gough to advance at all hazards. His appeal did not reach head-quarters in India till the 21st. [For an account of the difficulties and delays on the line of communication, see p. 318.]

On the same date, shortly before noon, the enemy issued from the city in great strength and again occupied the Siah Sang ridge and the heights west of Sherpur. By using the cover afforded by the orchards and walls of the suburbs, some of them managed to advance to

within 400 yards of the works ; here, however, they were checked by the telling rifle fire of selected marksmen, and they made no attempt to advance further. The British loss was only one sepoy killed, Lieutenant L. Sunderland, 72nd Highlanders, and one man wounded.

During the night the enemy occupied two fortified villages a few hundred yards from the cantonment eastern face, from one of which, Kala Mir Akbar, they caused considerable annoyance to the garrison of the small fortified village which had been transformed into a redoubt at that point and garrisoned by fifty rifles of the 67th. General Baker was accordingly sent out at 9 a.m. on the 19th with 400 each of the 67th and 3rd Sikhs, two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, and some sappers, with orders to destroy the fort. In this undertaking twelve men were wounded, as well as Lieutenant C. A. Montanaro, R.A., who received a mortal wound while laying a gun. This young officer had already distinguished himself on the 14th December, and was mentioned by Sir Frederick Roberts for his gallantry on that date. The 19th December was also marked by the death of Major J. Cook, v.c., 5th Gurkhas, of wounds received on the 12th, an officer whose loss was universally deplored, and who was spoken of by the Lieutenant-General in Divisional Orders as having earned "the admiration of the whole force."

On the 20th desultory firing similar to that of previous days was kept up on the cantonments, but beyond throwing out cavalry videttes no sorties were undertaken in reply, nor any attempt made to gain possession of portions of the enemy's position. The British force was not large enough to admit of the General holding such positions when taken ; and he considered that had he replied to the enemy's efforts in this manner, he would have been playing their game, and he therefore determined to wait until he could act decisively. Every night information reached the Lieutenant-General that an attack was contemplated, but it was not until the 21st December that the enemy

showed signs of special activity. On that day large numbers of them moved from the city, and, passing round to the eastward of Sherpur, occupied the numerous villages in that direction in very great force. It became apparent that this movement was preparatory to an attack from that quarter; and at the same time the General was informed that the enemy were preparing a number of ladders, with the intention of attacking the southern and western walls by escalade.

On the same date Sir Frederick Roberts received news by heliograph that Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade was approaching Seh Baba, and would be at Lataband on the 22nd and would reach Kabul on the 24th. As the Lieutenant-General was very desirous of keeping open his communications with India, and as he felt it most important that General Gough should be fully acquainted with the exact position of affairs at Kabul, and further, as it was very possible that cavalry might be of service in the advance from Lataband, the 12th Bengal Cavalry were despatched at 3 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd December to join hands with Gough's advance guard. Major J. H. Green, who commanded the regiment, was instructed that if Butkhak, through which place he had to pass, was unoccupied by the enemy and proved friendly, he was to halt there, leaving a detachment to watch the Logar bridge, whilst from the other side Colonel Hudson was to push on to Butkhak with the Lataband garrison as soon as the head of General Gough's column arrived at Lataband. Should it be found, however, that Butkhak was hostile, Major Green was to press on to Lataband and unite with the troops there. The latter event proved to be the case, and the cavalry went on as arranged, losing three men killed and three wounded in the operation.

The story of this perilous ride, through a hostile country and in the darkness of a winter night, cannot be better told than in the graphic words of Mr. Hensman (*Afghan War*, p. 250).

“The 12th Bengal Cavalry had a fearful journey outwards. On passing Kala Muhammad Sharif, on their way to the Kabul bridge, they were fired upon by a picquet; and, the alarm being given, the enemy turned out and blocked the way. The cavalry turned off from the road, and struck the river lower down. The water was not very deep, but the banks were steep and slippery, and men and horses fell backwards as they tried to climb up the further bank. It cost two hours to ford the river, the last squadron having to dismount in the stream, crawl up the bank, and drag their horses after them. The sowars were wet through, and two or three horses were drowned. Once over the road to Butkhak was taken, and from every village on the road turned out a few men, who fired upon the horsemen. They, perhaps, mistook them for another convoy of *yabus*. The dismounted men had to be left to return to Sherpur under cover of the darkness. Upon nearing Butkhak, a patrol was sent out; and as it was then near daybreak, they could see men moving about the village. The place was occupied by several hundred Afghans, who opened fire upon the cavalry. The latter could not stay to fight; and Major Green, in command, knowing how impossible it was to return to cantonments, resolved to push on to Lataband. One sowar was shot dead and three others wounded; and the enemy followed so closely, that a squadron was dismounted and ordered to skirmish out with their carbines. This gave time for all stragglers to be got together again, and in a short time the skirmishers were recalled, and the whole regiment trotted off to Lataband. Twelve men were missing, but ten have since reported themselves at Sherpur. They disguised themselves by altering their uniform, and then hid away in *nalas* until evening, when they crept out and made a wide detour to the north, until they reached the open plain between the Wazirabad Lake and the Bimaru Hills. Their horses and accoutrements were lost. The enemy have occupied the village of Khoja Darwesh, about 3 miles

to the east of Sherpur, and are reported to be collecting in force in the forts between Bimaru and this village. They are probably Kohistanis, who have taken the precaution of securing their line of retreat in case of defeat."

The 22nd passed at Sherpur without noteworthy incident. The enemy were, however, aware of the near approach of reinforcements for the British, and they perceived that the moment for decisive action had arrived. Towards evening Sir Frederick Roberts received credible information that a general attack was to be delivered on the following morning; that the real operations would be against the eastern face, supported by a false attack on the southern wall; and that the aged mulla, Mushk-i-Alam, would with his own hand light the beacon fire at dawn on the Asmai heights which was to be the signal for the commencement of the attack. All the British troops were accordingly ordered to be under arms at a very early hour on the 23rd, and at 5.30 the information was proved to be correct, the signal fire appearing on the Asmai Peak and announcing the beginning of the assault.

Heavy firing was opened almost immediately against our southern and eastern faces, and by 7 a.m. an attack in force against the eastern side was fully developed, whilst large numbers of the enemy, provided with scaling ladders, were drawn up under cover of the walls to the south. The guns were at this time in position as follows:

- 2 guns F-A, Royal Artillery, in the 67th bastion; remainder in reserve.
- 2 guns G-3, Royal Artillery, in gorge; 2 guns on north-west spur of Bimaru heights.
- No. 1 Mountain Battery on Bimaru; 2 guns G-3, Royal Artillery, in reserve.
- No. 2 Mountain Battery in bastion to right of 72nd gate.

From 7 a.m. until 10 a.m. the fight was carried on vigorously; repeated attempts were made to carry the low eastern wall by escalade; but though the enemy on several occasions reached the abattis, they were each

time repulsed, and many dead marked the spots where the assault had been pressed home. The most determined attack was directed against the sections commanded by General Hugh Gough and Colonel Jenkins, and its defeat was in a great measure due to the excellent dispositions which these officers made.

The troops defending these sections were the Guides Infantry, in the trenches about Bimaru, 100 men of the 28th Punjab Infantry, in the native hospital, and the 67th Foot, reinforced by two companies of the 92nd Highlanders from the reserve. When the attack was first made, it was still so dark and misty that little could be seen in front of the trenches, and orders were given to reserve fire until the advancing masses of Afghans could be clearly distinguished. The men of the 28th Punjab Infantry were the first to open fire, while at the same time General Hugh Gough's guns of No. 1 Battery, under Lieutenant J. C. Shirres, fired star-shells, which, bursting in the air, illumined the attacking force in the fields and enclosures 1,000 yards away. The Guides next joined in the fusillade. To the right of the 28th Punjabi sepoy were the 67th and the 92nd, whose fire was reserved until they were ordered to fire volleys within 200 yards' range on the advancing enemy, some of the ghazis amongst whom advanced to within 80 yards against the concentrated fire. The attack collapsed, and the Afghans hastened behind cover. The cartridges of the defenders were too precious to be wasted, and only when bodies of men got within range were volleys fired at them; but the Afghans were lavish in their expenditure of ammunition, to which they had been able to help themselves without stint from the immense stores at the Bala Hissar.

Meanwhile the heavy Afghan guns under Major C. A. Gorham, on the bastions of the cantonments, had opened fire with round shot and shell whenever opportunity offered. At 10.30 two 9-prs. of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, were placed on the battery

facing east, and fire was opened from one of them on such bodies of rebels as could be seen among the orchards and villages. Two mountain guns were also in action in the 72nd bastion, and the right division of G-3, Royal Artillery, shelled the enemy at 1,200 yards' range from the west end of Bimaru ridge. Finally Captain Morgan, with two 7-prs., was in action at Bimaru village.

Soon after 10 a.m. a lull took place, but at 11 a.m. the attack was resumed, although it was not marked with the determination of the former period.

Finding that it was impossible to dislodge the enemy by any fire that could be brought to bear upon them from the defences, the General determined to attack them in flank; and for this purpose he directed four guns of G-3, Royal Artillery, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under the command of Major Craster and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams respectively, to move out through the gorge in the Bimaru heights. Accordingly between 11 and 12 (noon) Major Craster took four guns of his battery about half a mile beyond the gorge and began to shell a village, Khwaja Kala, under the east end of the ridge, at about 1,500 to 1,600 yards' range. The view was much obscured by willow brushwood, but the fire of the guns had the desired effect. The counter-stroke at once told, and the Afghans, who had doubtless been apprised by their scouts of the arrival of reinforcements on the Logar, wavered and soon began to seek safety in flight.

The time for the action of cavalry had now arrived; General Massy was directed to proceed with every available man and horse, and do his utmost against the enemy. The 5th Punjab Cavalry had already proceeded (as above mentioned) through the gorge to the north-east. As soon as Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, who commanded them, observed that the enemy, now foiled in their attack and disheartened, began to disperse, he advanced to cut off the Kohistanis, who were attempting to retreat to the north, and he

succeeded in twice charging home among them, killing a considerable number. General Massy followed as soon as possible with the remaining cavalry of his brigade, but by the time he arrived the Kohistanis had made good their retreat over the hills. Accordingly, in pursuance of instructions, Massy skirted the village of Khojah Rawash, whence the 14th Bengal Lancers were sent back towards the gorge leading over the hills to Kohistan to block that road; the 5th Punjab Cavalry and 9th Lancers were sent to Siah Sang hills to intercept the retirement towards the city of Kabul, whilst the Guides Cavalry were kept on the plain to the east to prevent the enemy's retreat towards Butkhak. The only three available roads of retreat were thus cut off. The 5th Punjab Cavalry and 9th Lancers engaged the Afghans who were retreating towards Kabul, and both regiments, dismounting, opened a heavy and telling fire upon them. The Guides Cavalry also succeeded in rendering a good account of the enemy more to the eastward.

Meanwhile a party of infantry and sappers moved out to destroy the villages to the south which had already caused considerable annoyance, and which might have impeded the arrival of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade on the following day. In this duty Lieutenant J. Burn-Murdoch, R.E., was wounded, and Captain J. Dundas, V.C., R.E., and Lieutenant C. Nugent, R.E., were accidentally killed by an explosion.

The other casualties on the 23rd December amounted only to three men killed and two officers (Brigadier-General H. Gough¹ and Lieutenant C. F. Gambier) and twenty-eight men wounded—a very trifling loss when the results of the day's fighting are considered. The great combination of the tribesmen was completely dissolved, their forces were scattered, and the wisdom of Sir Frederick Roberts in concentrating his army at Sherpur, and in awaiting the course of events until he

¹ Brigadier-General H. Gough's clothing was penetrated by a bullet, but the *poshtin* he was wearing saved him from anything worse than a contusion.

could deliver a crushing blow from his own position was conclusively proved.

On the 24th not a single Afghan was to be found in the adjacent villages, or visible on the surrounding hills. The city was perfectly clear of them, and so precipitate was their flight, that they left their dead unburied where they fell. By mid-day many parties of them were upwards of 25 miles from Kabul, the rapidity of their retreat being doubtless accelerated by the knowledge that reinforcements were near at hand.

The cavalry, divided into two parties, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Massy and Hugh Gough, proceeded by Beni Hissar and the Chardeh Valley in pursuit; but so rapid had been the enemy's flight and so retarded were the troopers by the heavy snow, that no success attended their efforts, though neither party returned to Sherpur until after nightfall.

The old mulla, Mushk-i-Alam, had carried off the newly proclaimed Amir, the young son of Yakub Khan, Musa Jan, to Ghazni; Muhammad Jan was reported to have fled from the city at 8 a.m. on the 24th; Muhammad Tahir Khan, son of Muhammad Sharif Khan (a state prisoner at Dehra Dun), who had been very active against our troops, was said to have escaped to Wardak.

Meanwhile Brigadier-General Charles Gough had left Lataband with his column at daybreak on the 23rd December, and was able to communicate by heliograph with Sir Frederick Roberts at 1 p.m. from Butkhak. He halted that evening 6 miles from Sherpur, and marched into cantonments without opposition on the following morning, his brigade amounting to 2,000 infantry, 2 squadrons and 6 mountain guns, including Colonel Hudson's Lataband garrison and the 12th Bengal Cavalry under Major Green.

The city of Kabul and the Bala Hissar were again occupied by the troops, the ground at the latter place being first carefully examined and the magazine emptied.

MAP OF KABUL AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1879.

No 1



Scale of Miles
London, John Murray.

Camel Track
Mule "

W.A.K. Johnston, Limited, Edinburgh & London.

During the time that the enemy occupied the city and the Bala Hissar, the people, especially the Hindus and Kizilbashes, no doubt suffered considerable inconvenience, and a few, whose relations with the British had been friendly, were ill-treated, but the General had no reason to believe that any large amount of either treasure or valuables was discovered or carried away by the followers of Muhammad Jan.

It was impossible to form any accurate estimate of the numbers of the enemy who had been assembled against the division under Sir Frederick Roberts in the cantonments at Sherpur. The contingents from Kohistan, the Logar and Langar Valleys (Khawat) and other districts had received great accessions to their estimated strength from every hamlet through which they passed, and when within a day's journey of Kabul they had been joined, almost *en masse*, by the population of the numerous surrounding villages, and by many disaffected people of the city. General Roberts calculated the strength of the enemy besieging Sherpur at 60,000 men. Their losses must have been considerable, not less than 3,000 having been killed and wounded.

The average strength of the British force round Kabul during the events from the 15th to the 23rd December was 225 officers, 6,882 men and 24 guns. The losses from the 10th to the 23rd inclusive amounted to 12 officers and 84 men killed, 15 officers and 248 men wounded, exclusive of about 30 followers.

Every exertion was at once made to re-establish communications and to facilitate the advance of troops from the Khyber towards Kabul, whose arrival would have the best possible effect, and convince the Ghilzais and other neighbouring tribes of the power of the British Government.

On the 26th December Butkhak was re-occupied. Major-General R. O. Bright was urged by the General Commanding the Field Force to send up troops to occupy Seh Baba and Lataband, and to push on the

telegraph line and re-open communications. General Hills resumed his functions as Military Governor, and Sir Frederick Roberts issued a proclamation announcing a general amnesty to be extended to all insurgents, with the exception of a few of the ringleaders.

On the 27th December Brigadier-General Baker marched from Kabul through deep snow into the Koh-i-daman with four mountain guns, the Guides Cavalry, and 1,700 infantry. The column marched 12 miles and encamped, and on the following day moved another 6 miles to the fortified village of Baba Kushkar belonging to Mir Bacha, the principal leader of the Kohistanis in the late rising, which was found deserted and razed to the ground; all other forts and villages belonging to the same chief were destroyed, his vineyards were cut down, and his fruit-trees ringed. The force then returned to Sherpur, having accomplished its mission without experiencing any opposition.

By the 29th communications with the Khyber were restored, Seh Baba was occupied on the 30th by 200 men from Jagdalak, and Lieutenant-Colonel Money marched from Sherpur with the 3rd Sikhs to re-occupy Lataband.

At the capital all walls and enclosures within 1,000 yards of the Sherpur cantonment were levelled, including the fortified villages of Muhammad Sharif (Rikabashi) and Muhammad Khan, from which the British troops had been much harassed in 1841.

CHAPTER IX

OPERATIONS IN THE KURRAM DISTRICT FROM SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS'S ADVANCE TO KABUL, SEPTEMBER 26TH, 1879, TO THE END OF THE YEAR.

THE restlessness and lawlessness of the hill tribes in the neighbourhood of the Kurram Valley were not long in showing themselves after the departure of Sir Frederick Roberts from Ali Khel on the 26th September, 1879. The first outrage committed was the murder on the 30th September, near Sapri, of Lieutenant F. G. Kinloch, 5th Bengal Cavalry, who was on his way to join the 12th Bengal Cavalry at Kurram Fort. This act led to the issue by Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, c.s.i., who had taken over command of the Kurram Valley from Major-General Roberts, of more stringent orders regarding the strength of posts and convoys and their hours of marching. A punitive expedition against the Zaimukhts was also sanctioned by the Government of India, but owing to subsequent events this had to be postponed for a time.

On the 2nd October the hostility of the Mangals and Ghilzais, which had manifested itself in attempts to impede the advance to Kushi of the 1st Division, found vent in an attack on the entrenched camp on the Shutargardan, where the following garrison had been left under command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money, 3rd Sikhs :

No. 1 Mountain Battery, 4 guns (Captain H. R. L. Morgan).
3rd Sikhs (Major C. J. Griffiths).
21st Punjab Infantry (Major F. W. Collis).

This force had no reserve ammunition.

As early as 7 a.m. on the date mentioned large numbers of the enemy were observed on the heights overlooking the crest of the Shutargardan Pass. Colonel Money at first refrained from firing on them in consequence of the representations of Captain Turner, the Political Officer, who hoped that Ala-ud-din Khan, younger brother to Padshah Khan, head of the Ghilzais, who was momentarily expected in camp, would have sufficient influence to induce the tribesmen to come to terms and to withdraw without bloodshed. Padshah Khan had been ousted in favour of his younger brother in negotiations with the British, and the attitude of the tribe was no longer friendly. At the same time it was important that heliographic communication with the Field Force should be kept up. An attempt to occupy a position favourable for this purpose was opposed by the Ghilzais, who, moreover, emboldened by the apparent hesitation of the British, continued to advance, and fired several shots into the outlying picquets. Colonel Money now felt that the time for negotiation was passed, and that vigorous reprisals should be made on the aggressive tribesmen. An advance was ordered, the four guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, which were posted in divisions on the right and left, beginning at the same time to shell the enemy. Major Griffiths, with 200 rifles of the 3rd Sikhs and 50 rifles of the 21st Punjab Infantry, under Captain G. H. C. Dyce, advanced to storm the position occupied by the tribesmen, 150 rifles of the 21st Punjab Infantry being kept in reserve. Major Griffiths was wounded almost immediately, and the command then devolved on Captain W. B. Aislabie, who led the assault with complete success. The artillery fire was most effectual in keeping down the enemy's cross-fire, which would otherwise have caused annoyance and more loss. Thanks to this and to the suddenness of the attack the position was carried with but slight loss, amounting to only one British officer and six men wounded. The enemy fled in the utmost confusion

before the British advance, and dispersed to their homes without making any attempt to rally. The bravery displayed on this occasion by Jemadar Ganesha Singh (Dogra), 3rd Sikhs, was brought prominently to notice by Colonel Money.

This repulse seemed, however, to have only a temporary effect in the neighbourhood. Annoyances on the line of communications continued, the telegraph was cut more than once, and on the 13th October Brigadier-General Gordon at Ali Khel received a telegram late at night from Mr. Christie, Political Officer at Kurram, to the effect that a number of Mangals and Jajis had assembled to make an attack on either or both posts of Paiwar and Ali Khel. At day-break on the 14th the enemy advanced against a tower on the left front of the camp at Ali Khel, and engaged the picquet which was posted there. Immediately afterwards they showed in great force on the right, and advanced boldly over broken ground to within 80 yards of two towers and a palisade held on that flank by the 29th Punjab Infantry. They also appeared lower down in the ravines, and engaged the picquets posted there by the 2-8th Foot. They had evidently taken up their position during the darkness, and waited for the first daylight to make their attack. A portion of the 29th Punjab Infantry was ordered to sally out through the palisade and drive them off, which operation was performed most effectually by the detachment under Lieutenant H. P. Picot, followed up by supports under Major C. E. D. Branson and Lieutenant R. W. Macleod, and, with the assistance of parties of the 2-8th Foot and 11th Bengal Infantry, the enemy were completely repulsed. Captain H. G. Grant, Brigade-Major, then took out 50 troopers of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 5th Punjab Cavalry by the front of the camp, and passing up the broad bed of the Rokian stream, intercepted the enemy and cut up some twenty of them. In front of the British infantry position the tribesmen were forced to abandon twenty-four bodies

of their dead and three wounded men, who were brought into camp.

While this was happening on the right, the enemy also showed in strength at the end of the plateau on the left flank, coming up the ravines leading from the Paiwar Kotal stream. They were at once driven out from their advanced position by a detachment of the 5th Gurkhas and party of the 11th Bengal Infantry under Colonel P. H. F. Harris. The Afghans then crossed the stream and took up a fresh position on the rocky and wooded ridges above, whence, however, they were quickly dispersed by the fire of the three guns of C-4 Battery, and were pursued for some distance by the infantry.

The casualties of the British were six men of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 11th Bengal and 29th Punjab Infantry slightly wounded. Five prisoners were taken, including three wounded men. It was estimated that 1,500 to 2,000 men were engaged in the attack.

A simultaneous and still more determined attempt was made to overpower Colonel Money's post on the Shutargardan. On the 13th October intelligence was received there that the Ghilzais were again assembling and bent on disturbing the road near Karatiga and Surkh Kotal; and at 9 p.m. information arrived that the telegraph wire was cut and the enemy were in possession of the road, intending to attack the post at Surkh Kotal, which was held by 90 rifles under a British officer. Accordingly Lieutenant-Colonel Money directed Major Collis, commanding 21st Punjab Infantry, to take two companies of his regiment and two guns of the Kohat Mountain Battery and to accompany the relief (90 rifles) which was about to proceed to the Surkh Kotal post. At 8 a.m. on the 14th heavy firing was heard, and intelligence was brought that 2,000 Ghilzais had attacked the Surkh Kotal at daybreak, and were then engaged with Major Collis's detachment. Major Griffiths was at once ordered out in support, with two companies of the 3rd Sikhs; while two

companies of the 21st Punjab Infantry and one mountain gun, were directed to take possession of the ridge above the camp. The latter party was only just in time, as the enemy, who were advancing in force from the south of the camp (where the action took place on the 2nd), were within 50 yards of the ridge when the Punjab Infantry arrived, and were with difficulty dislodged. Later on a very large body of the enemy again endeavoured, with great pertinacity, to force this ridge, and the detachment there was reinforced by two additional companies of the 3rd Sikhs under Lieutenant-Colonel Money in person.

In the meantime, in obedience to instructions, Major Collis had moved out of the camp at the Shutargardan, at 7 a.m., with Captain Morgan, R.A., and one mountain gun, Lieutenant Fasken and 50 rifles of the Sikhs, and Captains W. E. Gowan and Dyce, Lieutenant W. H. Young and 140 rifles of the 21st Punjab Infantry, with a view to relieving the post at Surkh Kotal, and covering a detachment which was bringing up a convoy of ammunition from Karatiga. On arrival at Surkh Kotal, Major Collis found that the post was then being attacked by a considerable number of hillmen. He at once engaged the enemy, and his little force were already dislodging them from their positions when the arrival of Major Griffiths's reinforcement completed their discomfiture for the time and drove them from the hills above Surkh Kotal with considerable loss. Nevertheless, the Afghans having been in turn reinforced by large numbers, renewed the attack, and endeavoured once more to establish themselves on the neighbouring heights, in which, however, they were frustrated by the gallantry of the 3rd Sikhs and 21st Punjab Infantry, and by the accurate fire of Captain Morgan's guns. The enemy now broke, and were pursued for more than a mile, the guns continuing to shell them until they were out of range. Their strength was estimated at 3,000, of whom they left 40 dead on the field. The British loss was two men killed,

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Captain D. M. D. Waterfield, R.A., and seven men wounded.

On the following day (October 15th) Colonel Money was informed that the enemy had been largely reinforced, and that their numbers were now from 10,000 to 17,000. He therefore resolved to concentrate his small force, and accordingly abandoned the post on the Surkh Kotal. On the 16th the numbers of the tribesmen were said to have still further risen, and as Colonel Money was very uncertain as to when news of his position would be received at Kabul or assistance reach him, he determined to act as much as possible on the defensive, to be sparing of ammunition, and to endeavour to draw the tribesmen on to expose themselves. On the 18th October the British position was completely surrounded and the water supply cut off; but meantime a force had started from Kabul on the previous day under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, and on the morning of the 19th this force arrived at Kushi and heliographic communication was established with the Shutargardan post. Having support near at hand, and feeling sure that the fact would have a strong moral effect on the enemy, Colonel Money decided to resume the offensive. Skirmishers were sent out to drive off the enemy's sharpshooters from below the plateau to the west of the camp, and access was re-opened to a water-spring near the Kushi road. At the same time the four guns of the Kohat Battery, under Captain Morgan and Lieutenants W. H. Frith and J. C. Shirres, opened a heavy fire of shell and shrapnel on the whole of the enemy's line. On this an immediate movement was observable amongst them; their fire slackened, and before long ceased altogether, a rapid retreat commenced, and before evening there was not a man to be seen. The British casualties on this day were eight men wounded.

On the arrival of General Hugh Gough at the Shutargardan the Karatiga road was at once re-opened, in order that the mails might be forwarded from Ali

Khel, as well as the details of regiments who were waiting to join their head-quarters at Kabul. After this object had been accomplished, the 21st Punjab Infantry was sent back to Ali Khel (as related in Chapter VII.), the remainder of the Shutargardan force and the 9th Lancers returned with General Hugh Gough to Kabul, and the post on the Shutargardan was evacuated for the winter.

Meanwhile the hostility of the tribesmen which had been shown by the attack on the Shutargardan was also felt at Balesh Khel, and at points in the Hariab Valley. At the former place a demonstration by some 5,000 of the enemy was speedily dispersed by a small force under Colonel R. G. Rogers, commanding the post; while an advance from Ali Khel into the Chakmanni Valley had an excellent effect in scattering the combinations of the Afghans. Brigadier-General Gordon, however, considered that the available British force would be more advantageously disposed on a less extended line now that communication with Kabul was broken, and advocated a retirement from the Hariab Valley, and the establishment of our most advanced post at the Paiwar Kotal.

This suggestion was adopted, but before the troops were moved from Ali Khel, General T. E. Gordon was recalled to Simla and was succeeded in the command of the Kurram district by Brigadier-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C. General Gordon remained, however, at General Watson's request, until the arrangements for the evacuation were complete. By the 8th November the post at Ali Khel was abandoned, and the troops there fell back to Kurram, turning aside for a few days into the Chakmanni country to enforce the payment of a fine inflicted as a punishment for the share taken by the Chakmanni in the late disturbances.

No obstacle now stood in the way of the punitive expedition into the Zaimukht Valley which, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, was sanctioned by Government as far back as the 4th October, but which

had been postponed for various reasons. As originally ordered, this expedition was to be under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, c.B., v.C., and a column composed as follows concentrated at Balesh Khel on the last day of November, 1879¹: Brigadier-General Watson being in chief military and political charge of the Kurram District, accompanied the force to Zawo.

Adequate transport for the force had not yet been collected at Balesh Khel, in consequence of which a further delay of a week occurred, which was, however, utilised by the Brigadier in obtaining information about the country to be traversed. Several reconnoitring parties were pushed forward on the 30th November and following days, without meeting with any opposition or hostility, except a few shots fired by Massuzai villagers

¹ For a fuller account of this expedition see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. II.*

Native Cavalry.

1st Bengal Cavalry	57	} Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers.
13th Bengal Lancers	155	
18th Bengal Cavalry	55	

Artillery.

1-8, Royal Artillery (4 guns 7-pr. M.L.R. jointed, 2 divisions)	195	Major J. Haughton, R.A.
No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns 7-pr.)	78	Lieutenant H. N. Jervois, R.A.

European Infantry.

2-8th Regiment	41	} Captain D. A. Grant, 85th Foot.
85th Light Infantry	733	

Native Infantry.

13th Bengal Infantry	323	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Playfair.
4th Punjab Infantry	557	Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Close.
20th Punjab Infantry	399	Colonel R. G. Rogers, c.B.
29th Punjab Infantry	568	Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, c.B.
No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners (half company)	57	Lieutenant H. P. Leach, R.E.
Medical officers	8	Surgeon-Major W. C. Boyd.

Total 3,226

on the 3rd December, which did no damage and were not replied to. At length, the route of the column having been determined upon, and the transport having arrived, Brigadier-General Tytler began his march on the 8th December, his force carrying eleven days' supplies, while sufficient for a further ten days had been collected at Doaba, and was to be forwarded thence to meet the column at Torawari. Starting from Balesh Khel, the force reached Gwaki on the 8th December, and next day pushed on to Manatu. Next day three separate columns were sent out to destroy the villages in the Wattizai Valley. On the 12th the force advanced to Chinarak and next day a portion of the force moved out to attack Zawo, a noted stronghold of the tribe. Hitherto the enemy had offered no serious opposition, and at Zaithunak and Chinarak the villagers had given in their submission.

Zawo is a regular mountain fastness, approachable by three paths, one up a difficult ravine about 8 miles long and in places only 10 feet wide, and the other two by tracks over difficult hills. General Tytler decided to advance up the ravine with the main body, but detached Colonel Gordon with a column to protect his right by an advance along the hills, while a smaller flanking detachment moved along the spurs on the left.

The main body reached Bagh, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chinarak, without opposition, but after a very difficult march. Meanwhile Colonel Gordon, advancing along the hills, came upon the enemy in a strong position. A direct attack having failed, the position was turned, but even then the enemy did not retire until turned out after a sharp hand-to-hand encounter, when they retreated to a second position, from which they had again to be driven. Colonel Gordon, having at last gained possession of the ridge, bivouacked for the night on its crest.

On the 14th the advance was continued as before, and Colonel Gordon, after driving the enemy before him, occupied the high ground flanking the approach

to Zawo by the ravine. The main body, leaving a detachment at Bagh, pushed on to Zawo, but, on nearing the village, had to move in single file under a heavy fire and shower of rocks from the heights on the left. The summit of the pass being gained, detachments were sent down to destroy the villages. Having effected their object, the troops returned to Chinarak unmolested, for which the reason appears to be that the enemy had, in their hand-to-hand encounters with the right column, lost heavily.

On the 17th the force moved to Sperkhwait, and from thence a detachment proceeded next day to destroy Yasta, which was effected without much opposition. On the 21st the force returned to Chinarak, where the submission of certain sections was received. On the 22nd the force marched to Sangroba and a detachment was sent on down the valley to the villages of Hadmela and Dilragha. A fine of Rs. 7,000 was levied on the three last-named villages, of which Rs. 3,100 were paid on the spot, and hostages given for the payment of the balance within five days. Two men, who were implicated in the murder of a syce of the 1st Bengal Cavalry in August, were caught at Dilragha and were shot in front of the villagers.

On the 23rd the force reached Thal, where it was broken up.

The expedition was completely successful, severe punishment had been inflicted in the destruction of villages, their strongholds Zawo and Yasta had been penetrated, and the tribe forced to offer their submission at Chinarak. The total amount of fines imposed amounted to Rs. 26,100, and was realised.

Our casualties were slight, consisting of one British officer (Lieutenant Renny, 4th Punjab Infantry) and one sepoy killed and two men wounded.

About this time the rising of the tribes round Kabul, and the confinement of the division there to the Sherpur cantonments, was the cause of hostile demonstrations against Thal, Kurram and Paiwar; the

tribesmen, however, dispersed to their homes without hostilities on receipt of news of the re-occupation of Kabul by General Roberts.

On the 22nd December Brigadier-General Watson brought to the notice of the Adjutant-General in India the desirability of relieving several of the regiments of the native army then serving in the Kurram command. Thus the 1st Bengal Cavalry had 105 men and 124 horses short of strength, 107 men on sick leave, besides a large proportion in hospital. The horses of the regiment were in very poor condition, and quite unfit for hard service. The 11th Bengal Infantry wanted 113 men to complete strength and had about 250 men in hospital and absent on sick leave, and General Watson feared that by the end of the cold season the regiment would have but a very few men in its ranks fit for duty. The 20th Punjab Infantry had not a large number sick or absent on sick leave, but it was 206 short of its numbers and had suffered a good deal in the Khyber the previous year. The 21st Punjab Infantry was 114 short of numbers, had 142 sick in hospital, and upwards of 50 away on sick leave. The 29th Punjab Infantry was only 51 short, and had not a large number sick; but, including the Jowaki campaign, it had been by this time three years in the field, and deserved relief.

At the end of the year various movements of troops were ordered in the Kurram Valley, the 1st Bengal Cavalry being directed to proceed to Thal. Brigadier-General Tytler was ordered to take command of all troops at and below Balesh Khel, while Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon commanded at and above Kurram Fort.¹

¹ The distribution of the troops in the Kurram Valley on the 31st December is shown in Appendix XVI.

CHAPTER X

OPERATIONS ON THE KHYBER LINE, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1879.

WHEN the news of the attack on Sir Louis Cavagnari's Embassy reached Simla on the 5th September, 1879, the British troops under Brigadier-General Doran in the Khyber were distributed as follows :

At Landi Kotal.

Cavalry	10th Bengal Lancers (2 squadrons).
Artillery	{ 11-9, Royal Artillery.
					{ No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
Infantry	{	British	{ 1st Battalion, 12th Foot.
		Native	{ 1st Battalion, 17th Foot.
					{ 24th Punjab Infantry.
					{ 27th Punjab Infantry.
Sappers	"A" Company, Bengal Sappers.

At Ali Masjid.

Infantry	{ 39th Bengal Infantry.
					{ 45th Sikhs.

At Jamrud.

Cavalry	10th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron).
Infantry	2 companies (from Peshawar).

The pass was, for some portion of its length, in charge of a *jazailchi* corps under Lieutenant G. Gaisford, which was intended for escort and orderly work and to hold certain posts. His command consisted of 259 men at the end of the first campaign, and was gradually increased to a total of 400.

Steps were at once taken to strengthen this line of advance on Kabul, and on the 9th September a project was forwarded from the Adjutant-General's office to the Government of India for the support of General

GENERAL BRIGHT'S BRIGADES 303

Roberts's advance by a movement from this direction. The proposals put forward were to create depots along the Khyber route with the least possible delay and with a minimum force, and gradually to increase the posts as fresh troops arrived. For this purpose the following troops would be required :

1 British Cavalry Regiment.	1 Horse Artillery Battery.
11 squadrons of Native Cavalry.	8 Mountain Train guns.
1 Heavy Battery.	2 British Infantry Regiments.
1 Field Battery.	5 Native Infantry Regiments.
2 companies of Sappers and Miners.	

Major-General R. O. Bright was named to command the operations and all the troops from the Indus to the front of the line of communications, with the following brigades under him holding sections of the line :

- Base at Peshawar*, Brigadier-General J. C. G. Ross, c.b., commanding the Peshawar District.
- 3rd Brigade*, Jamrud to Basawal, Brigadier-General J. Doran, c.b.
- 2nd Brigade*, advance depot and brigade at Jalalabad, Brigadier-General C. G. Arbuthnot, c.b.
- 1st Brigade*, Safed Sang to Jagdalak, with movable column at Gandamak, Brigadier-General C. S. Gough, c.b., v.c.

The first move was to be to Dakka, which was to be occupied as soon as possible by the Guides Corps with two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, and a supply depot formed with rations for 10,000 men for two months; from Dakka further advances were to be made, as troops and supplies arrived, to Jalalabad and Gandamak. On the 10th September the Commander-in-Chief asked for sanction for the immediate move to Dakka of the 10th Bengal Lancers, the Hazara Mountain Battery, and the 24th Punjab Infantry, contemplating a further advance to Basawal as soon as the Guides should arrive at Dakka. This he proposed to do in order to give confidence to the Governor and people of Jalalabad, for up to this date it was taken for granted that the Amir's garrison would hand over the fort of Dakka at once to the British. But on the 11th a reconnaissance to within half a mile of Dakka, as well as reports from the Khyber, showed that, though the

regular infantry of the Amir's garrison still held Dakka, yet resistance might be expected beyond that point; that six Herati regiments were advancing towards the Khyber from Kabul, and that efforts were being made by the mullas to excite a general rising of the tribes.

The instructions regarding the advance were therefore modified, and the movement beyond Landi Kotal delayed until that post could be further strengthened.

Major-General R. O. Bright, c.B., arrived at Peshawar on the 15th September, and was followed on the 20th and 21st by Brigadier-Generals C. Gough, c.B., v.c., and C. G. Arbuthnot, c.B., who were appointed respectively to the command of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the Khyber Field Force, as the line of communication was called. Meantime the movement of troops to the frontier continued, and the work of organising the Field Force was pushed forward with such haste as was possible. But in addition to the sickly state of the regiments at Peshawar, the Major-General had to cope with other and even more serious obstacles to his advance. The difficulties in the way of obtaining transport were enormous. All available carriage, both in the station and district of Peshawar, as well as a considerable portion of the movable column carriage, was being diverted to the Kurram Division for the advance of that force on Kabul. Arrangements were, however, at once entered into for sending supplies to Landi Kotal by contract. At first there were some difficulties in carrying out the contracts owing to the *Id* festival; but the service afterwards proceeded with regularity, and supplies were sent forward daily.

On the 25th September Brigadier-General C. Gough reported from Landi Kotal that the Amir had written to his officials positively forbidding opposition to the advance of the British troops. On the 29th the Guides, with two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, occupied Dakka without opposition, whither he was followed the next day by the 10th Bengal Lancers and

the 24th Punjab Infantry, together with Brigadier-General Charles Gough and his staff.

The strength of the Khyber Field Force on the 28th September was 1,385 British and 4,060 natives. (For the composition of the whole force see Appendix XIII.)

Brigadier-General C. Gough, with the advance column, continued his march on the 2nd October as far as Basawal, thence, as soon as supplies and transport allowed, to Barikao, and on the 12th idem the Guides occupied the fort at Jalalabad. The slowness of this advance was occasioned in part by the difficulty in procuring supplies, while the lack of transport was terribly felt, the column having to depend principally on carts, almost the whole of which broke down in the march from Basawal to Barikao, and incalculable extra fatigue and exposure were thus entailed on the baggage guards. Only half the necessary transport being available, three days were consumed for each daily stage of the forward move.

Meanwhile Brigadier-General Arbuthnot with the 2nd Brigade, except the Carabiniers who had not yet joined, advanced as far as Jamrud, and General Bright with divisional head-quarters was at Ali Masjid on the 8th October and Landi Kotal on the 9th. At the former place the amount of sickness amongst the troops was most deplorable, the 2nd and 39th Bengal Infantry regiments being almost entirely *hors de combat*.

On the 12th October orders were received for General C. Gough to send forward a flying column under Colonel Jenkins, c.B., to consist of the Guides, a wing of the 9th Foot, and the Hazara Mountain Battery, which was to reach Gandamak as quickly as possible. The object of this move was to overawe the Ghilzais and to intercept fugitives of the Afghan regiments broken up at the battle of Chaharasia, news of which had been received a few days before.

Considering, however, the weakness of the force at his disposal, the scarcity of supplies, and the want of

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transport, General Gough was of opinion that such a deduction from his troops would only invite disaster, as he could not afford supports; and, should the column be despatched, there would remain with him only one troop of cavalry, a wing of British infantry, and a wing of native infantry, with no guns, and only three days' supplies. Gandamak, moreover, was fully 28 miles from Jalalabad, and the feeling of the country was very doubtful, and even reported hostile; whilst the smallness of the force at Jalalabad, even without reductions from it, almost invited attack. In view of these facts the flying column was not despatched, as proposed, to Gandamak, but a day or two later it was advanced as far as Fatehabad.

About the same time the heavy battery (13-9) was ordered back to India, as its services were no longer required, now that Sir Frederick Roberts's division had occupied the city of Kabul. Thus on the evening of the 17th October the following was the distribution of troops between Landi Khana (divisional head-quarters) and Jalalabad:

Fatehabad

(Under Colonel Jenkins).

Guides Cavalry (220 sabres).		2-9th Foot (wing) (300 rifles).
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.		Guides Infantry (480 rifles).

Jalalabad

(Head-quarters of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's, 1st Brigade).

10th Bengal Lancers (2½ squadrons).		2-9th Foot (wing).
C-3, Royal Artillery (4 guns).		24th Punjab Infantry (5 companies).
No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners.		

Añ Boghan.

24th Punjab Infantry (1 company).

Barikao.

10th Bengal Lancers (1 troop).		24th Punjab Infantry (2 companies).
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Basawal

(Head-quarters of Brigadier-General Arbuthnot's, 2nd Brigade).

3rd Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron).		1-12th Foot (2 companies).
C-3, Royal Artillery (2 guns).		51st Light Infantry (2 companies).
27th Punjab Infantry (2 companies).		

Dakka.

3rd Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron).		27th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).
11-9, Royal Artillery (2 guns).		45th Sikhs (1 company).

On the 19th October Brigadier-General Charles Gough was authorised to continue his march with the main body of his brigade as soon as he should think fit, as Sir Frederick Roberts from Kabul was pressing for his advance to Safed Sang. Transport was now available in the form of 1,000 camels belonging to nomad Afghan traders (*Kuchis*), which reached Jalalabad on the same date, and arrangements were made to march on the following day.

A garrison of two guns C-3, Royal Artillery, and detachments of the 10th Bengal Lancers and 27th Punjab Infantry was left at Jalalabad, and the remainder of the force united with Colonel Jenkins' column near Fatehabad. Its further advance, however, was here again delayed by the news of the Amir's abdication. It was believed that this intelligence would materially affect the attitude of the Mohmands and the people of Jalalabad, and General C. Gough was accordingly ordered not to leave the vicinity of that place until the line of communications should have been strengthened. Meanwhile a reconnaissance was pushed on to Safed Sang; the divisional head-quarters and those of Brigadier-General Arbuthnot moved to Basawal, and the 27th Punjab Infantry (1st Brigade) and the 45th Sikhs (2nd Brigade) exchanged places.

About the same time an attempt was made to negotiate with the Ghilzai chief Asmatulla Khan, in consequence of a letter from Sir F. Roberts urging that he should be induced to visit him at Kabul.

On the 23rd October a further advance was made, the 1st Brigade moving to Fort Battye and occupying Gandamak with an advance guard composed of the Guides and the Hazara Mountain Battery, while on the same date General Bright's head-quarters marched to Barikao and thence on the following day to Jalalabad. Brigadier-General C. Gough's main body also advanced to Gandamak and encamped there on the 24th October.

Here the brigade was ordered to halt, while arrangements were made for opening communications with the

1st Division. In a despatch received by Brigadier-General C. Gough on the 26th, Sir Frederick Roberts announced that about the first week in November he would be able to despatch a strong brigade towards Gandamak to co-operate with an advance from that place. Major-General Bright therefore determined to employ the 1st Brigade of his division as a movable column, to advance to Jagdalak, or further if necessary, and to meet the brigade from Kabul.

Meanwhile a darbar was held at Jalalabad by the Major-General on the 30th October, at which the intentions of the British Government were explained to the ex-Amir's Governor. On this occasion apparently trustworthy information was received that the Ghilzai chiefs had decided not to oppose the British advance.

On the 1st November General Bright proceeded to visit the camp of the 1st Brigade at Gandamak, which place was now in telegraphic communication with the head-quarters of the division.

Preparations had been made for the early advance of the brigade, to join hands with the Kabul force. The scale of baggage had been reduced to a minimum, calculated for a ten days' absence. Officers were allowed one mule between two; British soldiers, one mule between nine; native soldiers, one mule between ten; followers, one mule between sixteen. Reinforcements had also arrived at the front, including I-A, Royal Horse Artillery, No. 2 Company of Sappers and Miners, and detachments of the 24th Punjab Infantry and 45th Sikhs and of the 51st Light Infantry.

On the 1st November a messenger arrived at Gandamak from Kabul, from which place he had set out at 2 p.m. on the 30th October, bringing with him a copy of the instructions issued to General Macpherson, in command of the column about to start from Kabul. On receipt of this intelligence, preparations for the march of Gough's brigade were at once made, and on the morning of the 3rd November the following force, taking seven days' supplies, marched out of camp

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to the old cantonments, thus getting clear of Gandamak and crossing two stony river-beds, which considerably delayed the baggage animals :

		Strength.	Total.	
Cavalry .	{	Guides Cavalry	200	
		10th Bengal Lancers	100	
			300	
Artillery .	{	2 guns I-A, Royal Horse Artillery	38	
		Hazara Mountain Battery	200	
			(8 guns)	
Infantry .	{	British . 9th Foot	425	
				425
	{	Native	Guides Infantry	500
		24th Punjab Infantry	500	
		Nos. 2 and 6 Companies		
Sappers and Miners		100		
			1,100	
			1,825	

At 8.30 on the 4th November the force marched for Jagdalak, the Guides Infantry, which were in the advance guard, being ordered to crown the heights on either side whenever necessary. The crowning parties were in turn relieved by the 9th Foot and 24th Punjabis as those regiments came up. After an uneventful march of 8 miles the brigade encamped at Surkhab.

On the 5th November the column marched at 7.30 a.m. in the same order as on the previous day, with the exception that 150 of the 24th Punjabis were sent on with the advance guard for the purpose of crowning the heights and holding them till the arrival of the rear guard, thus saving the labour entailed by relieving the crowning parties from different portions of the column. The two guns of I-A, Royal Horse Artillery, were left at Surkhab, and two companies of the 45th Sikhs were sent out from Gandamak as an escort to them. A halt of about 1½ hours was made at the Pezwan Kotal, to enable the baggage (which was much delayed by a very difficult ascent from the Surkhab Valley) to close up. A second halt was made on the Jagdalak Kotal, on the hills to the south of which some men were seen; but they kept perfectly

quiet until the main body had moved on. As the rear of the baggage came up, about fifty men made a demonstration against it; but on being promptly met by a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, they retreated without coming within range. Eventually, when the rear guard descended from the kotal, a few men followed up and fired three shots, without, however, doing any harm.

A round hill completely commanding the Jagdalak end of the pass below the kotal was occupied by a company of Guides, who held it until the arrival of the rear guard. Preparations had evidently been made to defend the kotal, for low stone walls, apparently newly built, were observed on the hillside to the north of the road. These defences, however, could have been easily turned.

The head of the column reached Jagdalak, which is 13 miles from Surkhab, at 4.15 p.m., but the rear guard did not arrive till dark, the rough nature of the road and the frequent ascents and descents having delayed the camels very much. The whole of the infantry, artillery, and sappers were encamped in a spacious old ruined fort about half a mile beyond the village, and overlooking the entrance of the famous Pari Dara. The position thus held was a very strong one against any enemy not armed with the best long-range weapons. The cavalry were encamped in the valley between the fort and the village.

Information having been received that the Pari Dara, or narrow defile through which the Jagdalak stream flows, was the road usually taken by camels, it was determined that a portion of the force should advance by this route on the 6th November. The higher road to the west is best suited for the march of troops, and accordingly the force was divided into two columns, one advancing by each route to Kata Sang.

Two hundred men of the 24th Punjab Infantry, with fifty Guides Cavalry, under the command of Captain E. Stedman, were left to hold the fort of

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Jagdalak, with orders to patrol with infantry and cavalry beyond the Jagdalak Kotal, occupying the kotal for the greater part of the day, so as to keep the road open for the mails. The 10th Bengal Lancers formed the advance guard of the column which took the Pari Dara route, and the whole of the camels were sent through the defile, guarded by the 24th Punjabis. The Guides, 9th Foot, the Mountain Battery, and Sappers and Miners, with the whole of the mule and pony transport, proceeded by the upper road. The heads of the two columns, which started at 7.30 a.m., arrived almost simultaneously at the place where the two roads again converged, about 6 miles north of Jagdalak. Three miles further on the encamping ground of Kata Sang was reached, and here the advance guard met General Macpherson, who had also intended to encamp here, but, on account of the limited space, he sent back orders for his brigade to halt at Seh Baba, 4 miles distant, at the foot of the Lataband Pass, whither he returned in the evening.

Brigadier-General C. Gough having thus accomplished the purpose of his advance and joined hands with General Macpherson, his brigade started on its return march at 7.30 a.m. on the 7th November.

The troops who had come by the Pari Dara returned by the upper route, and *vice versa*, Colonel Jenkins, with some of the Guides, being sent to reconnoitre the track which leads over the Dabeli Pass towards the Adrag Badrag Pass, striking the Kabul River near Kats Muhammad Ali. The troops resumed their old positions in the fort and valley at Jagdalak on their return. It was reported by Captain Stedman that on the previous day, when returning from the kotal, which he had occupied according to orders, his men had been fired upon and followed up, but on their fire being returned the enemy retired with the loss of one of their party.

On the 8th November the Guides, one company of Sappers, and two guns were left to hold Jagdalak under

Colonel Jenkins, who was directed to reconnoitre the Iro Manzil route, and to return the next day to the Pezwan Kotal, leaving 200 Guides Infantry, 50 Cavalry, two guns, and the company of Sappers to hold the Jagdalak Kotal and repair the road. He was to hold the Pezwan Kotal with the remainder of the Guides, four guns of the Hazara Battery, and another company of Sappers, who were also to repair the road and Surkhab Bridge.

The remainder of the force, with the advance guard under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. Norman, 24th Punjab Infantry, and the rear guard under Major N. H. Macnaghten, 10th Bengal Lancers, marched to Lukhai, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the Surkhab Bridge. A signalling party was left on the Jagdalak Kotal and another on the Pezwan Kotal until late in the afternoon, and a heliographic message was received from Colonel Jenkins on the Iro Manzil Pass.

On the 9th November, leaving the four guns, the company of Sappers and Miners, and the 2nd Gurkhas (who had relieved the two companies of the 45th Sikhs as escort to the guns of I-A, Royal Horse Artillery, at the Surkhab), the remainder of the force, including the horse artillery, marched for Gandamak at 7.30 a.m., and on arriving there resumed their original positions in camp.

The health of the troops during the expedition had been excellent, and the weather bright and fine, though the nights were extremely cold.

A month now passed almost without incident. The winter set in with severity soon after the return of Gough's brigade to Gandamak, and every effort was made to lay out the winter encampment there with as little delay as possible; warm clothing was urgently required, and food supplies were only obtained with difficulty and in small quantities from the surrounding country. In the course of the month sites were chosen and arrangements made for constructing posts at Pezwan Dara, Jagdalak Kotal, Jagdalak Fort, and Sang Toda,

which were to be occupied by small garrisons. The telegraph line was completed on the 19th November to Kabul.

On the 15th November Sir Frederick Roberts assumed command of the whole Kabul Field Force from Kabul to Jamrud. Various movements of troops took place amongst the brigades of the 2nd Division; the 45th Sikhs were re-transferred to the 2nd Brigade and their head-quarters marched back to Jalalabad, together with the two companies of the 51st King's Own Light Infantry which had advanced temporarily to Gandamak; and the 4th Gurkhas with the divisional staff moved up to Gandamak, where Major-General Bright remained until the 1st December.

On the 14th Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, with an escort of 100 infantry and 50 cavalry, arrived in the camp of the 1st Brigade from Kabul for the purpose of making arrangements between the 1st (or Kurram) Division and the 2nd (or Khyber) Division for the safety of the communications between Gandamak and Kabul; he had found the road apparently quite safe with nomad Ghilzais proceeding up and down it.

On the 1st December divisional head-quarters with General Bright returned to Jalalabad. Two days later two squadrons of the Carabiniers proceeded to Fatehabad to meet the ex-Amir Yakub Khan, who was being escorted by rapid stages to India. The party reached Jalalabad on the 4th December, and went on towards Barikao on the following day, accompanied by four companies of the 51st Light Infantry, as well as the cavalry escort. No excitement was caused in the country by the passage of the Amir, although it was generally known that his removal to India was contemplated.

When December opened, General Bright was preparing for a long-projected expedition into the Laghman Valley, but on the evening of the 7th December an order was received from General Roberts that the Guides Corps was to march at once with all

speed to Kabul. The Laghman expedition was accordingly abandoned, and every effort was made to carry out General Roberts's orders with all possible expedition; but there was the usual difficulty of transport, and there was a distance of 23 miles to send reliefs before the Guides could advance. The 2nd Gurkhas and 200 of the 10th Bengal Lancers marched from Gandamak on the 8th with this object, the former reaching Jagdalak that evening. Colonel Jenkins was thus able to leave Jagdalak on the morning of the 9th, and arrived at Kabul on the evening of the 11th.

Up to within the last few days the attitude of the Ghilzais had been friendly, but on the 11th December intelligence reached divisional head-quarters at Safed Sang from Brigadier-General Charles Gough, that there was much uneasiness amongst the tribes, and that he had been informed that Asmatulla Khan was endeavouring to collect men for an attack on Jagdalak. Orders were therefore sent to reinforce the Jagdalak garrison, and a report was made to Field Force head-quarters respecting the weakness of the line from Dakka to Gandamak.

Late on the same night a telegram was received by General Bright stating that there was considerable excitement at Kabul, where large numbers of the enemy had collected and been engaged that day. Sir Frederick Roberts therefore directed Gandamak to be reinforced, so that, if necessary, he could call on General C. Gough to advance his brigade on Kabul. Orders were at once issued for the following moves:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 3 companies 51st Foot and a wing 24th Punjab Infantry to march from Jalalabad to Gandamak, detaching one company to strengthen Fort Battye. | |
| 1-12th Foot to march from Landi Kotal to Jalalabad. | |
| 30th Punjab Infantry to march from Landi Kotal to Dakka. | } Furnishing detachments to Basawal, Barikao, Ali Boghan. |
| 27th Punjab Infantry to march from Dakka to Jalalabad. | |
| 4th Gurkhas (company) to march from Ali Boghan to regimental head-quarters. | |

An application was sent to Peshawar for the 22nd

Punjab Infantry to reinforce Landi Kotal; but no telegraphic communication on these subjects could be despatched to Army Head-quarters, as the telegraph line was cut between Barikao and Basawal for the first time for some nights.

On the 12th December a more satisfactory telegram was received by General Bright from Sir Frederick Roberts, announcing that he thought it was improbable that he would be obliged to call on the Khyber Division for assistance, and directing that no application was at present to be made for reinforcements from India. In the evening of this day another telegram was received from Sir Frederick Roberts stating that he proposed withdrawing the Seh Baba post to Lataband, fearing an attack on it by Asmatulla Khan, and that, if the wire was cut between Gandamak and Kabul, General C. Gough was at once to advance and attack Asmatulla. On the 13th General Gough received orders from General Bright to advance from Safed Sang to Jagdalak on arrival of the relieving troops detailed. Accordingly General Gough on the 14th moved forward with the 9th Foot, 2 squadrons 10th Bengal Lancers, 4th Gurkhas, and, leaving half this force at Pezwan, he marched on with the remainder and two guns Hazara Mountain Battery to Jagdalak, where he received telegraphic orders from General Roberts to advance on Kabul, leaving sufficient garrisons at all the posts which were calculated to resist attack and to abandon the remainder, including Lataband. On the 14th Bright was directed to push on Arbuthnot's brigade towards Kabul, the posts of Pezwan and Jagdalak being still held. Meanwhile news had been received of the severe fighting at Kabul; the excitement amongst the Khyber tribes was daily increasing and the line of communications was constantly threatened by Asmatulla Khan, who, on the 14th December, was reported to have moved with some 2,000 men to the village of Sapri, about 4 miles from Jagdalak (not on map). It was likewise reported that the intention had been that there should be an attack

on the 1st Division at Kabul, and, simultaneously with this movement, one upon the troops holding the line of communications; but that Sir Frederick Roberts, having taken the initiative, had apparently hurried matters on sooner than the tribes intended.

On the same day Bright telegraphed to Army Headquarters at Cawnpore that the 1st Brigade of his division had been called to Kabul by Sir Frederick Roberts and that orders had also been received by him for the 2nd Brigade to follow as soon as possible, and that these were the only troops between Landi Kotal and Kabul. Almost the whole of the 1st Brigade was now, General Bright reported, *en route* to Kabul, and it was not known by him whether any garrison had been left at Pezwan and the Jagdalak outposts; but if there had, they were, he considered, most dangerously situated, as no support was available. General Bright was therefore of opinion that a strong division of all arms was required before the 2nd Brigade could advance from Jalalabad, as the state of the line of communications was at the time weak and precarious.

Intelligence had already reached Army Headquarters at Cawnpore, on the 12th December, that Sir Frederick Roberts anticipated being obliged to call up the 1st Brigade of the Khyber Division; on this the Commander-in-Chief had at once directed the following troops to be warned for service, and to be held in readiness to move on receipt of orders:

4th Bengal Cavalry from Mian Mir to Peshawar.

11th Bengal Cavalry from Nowshera to Peshawar.

17th Bengal Cavalry (300 sabres).

D-A, Royal Horse Artillery, from Peshawar.

I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, from Rawalpindi to Peshawar.

D-4, Royal Artillery, from Rawalpindi to Peshawar.

1-5th Fusiliers (6 companies) from Hasan Abdal to Peshawar.

1-25th Foot (wing).

On learning on the 14th December that Lieutenant-General Roberts had decided to collect his force within Sherpur, orders were immediately issued by the Com-

mander-in-Chief in India for the above troops to move to the front. The General Officer commanding the Rawalpindi Division reported that the troops from that division would be ready to march on the 16th December; and D-4, Royal Artillery, which was ready to move, marched at once for Peshawar. In accordance with personal orders given by the Viceroy, on the same evening the 8th Hussars were ordered from Muttra to Hasan Abdal, the 1st Gurkhas from Dharmasala, and the effective men of the 2nd and 4th Gurkhas from Dehra and Bakloh, respectively, to Peshawar.

Meanwhile, on the arrival at Gandamak of the 24th Punjab Infantry and three companies of the 51st Light Infantry, Gough had advanced to Jagdalak, leaving reinforcements at Pezwan and Jagdalak Kotal. He was followed on the 15th December by Colonel W. Daunt of the 2-9th Foot, with 280 men of that regiment and 187 of the 4th Gurkhas, which column was fired on by Ghilzais while on the march. All the troops which General C. Gough had brought from Gandamak were supplied previous to starting with seven days' provisions; but, on arrival at Jagdalak, it was found that the garrison there had only one more day's supply in hand, and had sent their transport into Gandamak for more.

Early on the morning of the 15th the telegraph wire was cut on both sides of Jagdalak. That evening crowds of men with standards were observed assembling on all the surrounding hills, and numerous beacon fires were lit on all the peaks of the Siah Koh. At the same time news arrived that Asmatulla Khan had come from Kats Laghman with a large gathering and purposed an attack on Jagdalak in conjunction with the Ghilzais of Hisarak and Auzangiani west of Gandamak under Maizullah Khan and Saiad Khan of Hisarak, with whom was Abdul Karim, who led the enemy against Roberts at Chaharasia. Later on, as it was getting dark, the enemy came pouring down from the hill-tops and opened a desultory and long-range fire from every direction upon the camp, fortunately without inflicting

any loss. This was continued for some hours, the men remaining steady at their posts, and only returning the fire when it could be done effectively, and in order to drive the enemy from positions which caused annoyance.

Brigadier-General Charles Gough's force at Jagdalak on the 15th and 16th December amounted to 961 infantry, 73 sappers, 4 7-pr. guns, and 224 sabres. His orders were to move without delay to Kabul, but considering the very threatening attitude of the tribes, and the weakness of the garrisons which he must leave behind him, he did not consider it advisable to comply with directions which involved such risk without reference to General Bright in the following message on the 15th:

“The more I think of this advance that I have been ordered to make, the more risky and injudicious I think it. Even if I take all available force, my column would be a weak one to face the odds and difficulties I should have to encounter. Roberts with 6,000 men is not able to keep the field, and has withdrawn into position at Sherpur, and it seems a great risk to expect me to force my way in. If any disaster happened, it would have a very serious effect; whilst even success would leave this line so weak that communication would be instantly cut, and there would be no news from Kabul. I cannot help thinking it would be much wiser for me to wait till reinforcements come up from the rear, and when you are able to hold these posts during an advance. Of course, I know how weak the line is all the way down; but by pushing up regiments along the line, troops may be accumulated at the front pretty quick. I shall not be able to advance for two or three days yet; and the responsibility thrust upon me is so great I should be much obliged by your opinion as to what course I ought to pursue. The wire is cut both sides of us, so that I cannot communicate either way.”

General Gough was instructed in reply by General Bright to await further orders from General Roberts,

to whom the Major-General at once wrote detailing the views of General Gough, and to whom Sir Frederick Roberts was requested to send his orders on the subject direct.

The importance of the Khyber line at this moment, and the difficulty of deciding between withholding support from the Kabul Division, and exposing the communications to imminent danger of being broken, if Gough's brigade advanced, is sufficient reason for pausing here to detail the distribution of troops along the line on the 16th December.

From Kabul eastward to Lataband that post and the intermediate one at Butkhak were held by detachments from the 1st Division (Chapter VIII.).

From Jagdalak eastward to Jamrud the whole line of communications was garrisoned by the 2nd Division (less the Guides Corps) under Major-General Bright, distributed as follows:

Jagdalak Fort and Kotal.

Head-quarters of 1st Brigade.		No. 3 Company, Sappers.
10th Bengal Lancers, 220 men.		2-9th Foot, 487 men.
No. 4 Mountain Battery, 4 guns.		2nd Gurkhas } 507 men.
No. 2 Company, Sappers.		4th Gurkhas }

Pezwan Kotal.

10th Bengal Lancers, 50 men.		No. 5 Company, Sappers.
No. 4 Mountain Battery, 2 guns.		No. 6 Company, Sappers.
24th Punjab Infantry (wing).		

Safed Sang and Gandamak.

10th Bengal Lancers (detachments).		51st Light Infantry (5 companies).
I-A, Royal Horse Artillery.		2nd Gurkhas } (detachments).
2-9th Foot (detachment).		4th Gurkhas }
24th Punjab Infantry (3 companies).		

Fort Battye.

10th Bengal Lancers (detachment).		24th Punjab Infantry (1 company).
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Fatehabad.

51st Light Infantry (3 companies, en route to Gandamak).		45th Sikhs (wing, en route to Gandamak).
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Jalalabad.

Head-quarters of 2nd Brigade and of Khyber Division.		1 Company, Madras Sappers.
6th Dragoon Guards (3 squadrons).		1-12th Foot (3 companies).
C-3, Royal Artillery, 4 guns.		27th Punjab Infantry (7 companies)
		45th Sikhs (wing).

Barikao.

3rd Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). | 27th Punjab Infantry (1 company).

Basawal.

6th Dragoon Guards (1 squadron). | C-3, Royal Artillery, 4 guns.
3rd Bengal Cavalry (3 squadrons | 1-12th Foot (wing).
furnishing detachments).

Dakka.

3rd Bengal Cavalry (detachment). | 22nd Punjab Infantry (wing, *en route*
11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns. | to Gandamak).
30th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).

Landi Khana.

3rd Bengal Cavalry (detachment). | 31st Punjab Infantry (detachment).

Landi Kotal.

Head-quarters of 3rd Brigade. | 11-9, Royal Artillery, 4 guns.
17th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron | 1-12th Foot (detachments).
furnishing detachments). | 22nd Punjab Infantry (wing).
31st Punjab Infantry.

Ali Masjid.

17th Bengal Cavalry. | 30th Punjab Infantry (2 companies).
8th Bengal Infantry. | 4th Madras Infantry.

Jamrud.

3rd Bengal Cavalry (detachment). | 15th Madras Infantry (2 companies).

In all 224 officers, 2,557 British and 9,288 Native troops: total combatants, 12,069.

On the 16th December the Commander-in-Chief in India, who had twice before urged unsuccessfully the desirability of mobilising a reserve force, again repeated his recommendation to Government that a reserve division, composed as follows, should be assembled at Peshawar:

Cavalry Brigade.

8th Hussars, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Chaplin, v.c.
5th Bengal Cavalry, Major H. A. Shakespear.
1 regiment Central India Horse, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, c.b.
E-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major W. W. Murdoch.

Three Brigades of Infantry.

1-5th Fusiliers, Colonel Rowland. | 2-14th Foot, Colonel D. S. Warren.
1st Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel | 1-18th Foot, Colonel M. J. Mac-
Story. | Gregor.
32nd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel | 1 regiment Hyderabad Contingent.
Crookshank. | 3 regiments Madras Infantry.

The Deoli Regiment.

The formation of this reserve division was sanctioned by Government on the 21st December, 1879, and Major-General J. Ross, c.b., commanding the Peshawar District and the base of operations, was appointed to the command of it.

To return to the movements of the Khyber Division, the days between the 16th and 21st December were employed at all the stations on the line of communications in anxious endeavours to hasten forward the reinforcements which should relieve Gough at Jagdalak, and enable him to comply with Sir Frederick Roberts's orders for the advance of the 1st Brigade on Kabul. The remaining 3 companies of the 51st Light Infantry and a wing of the 45th Sikhs at Jalalabad marched to Gandamak on the 16th December and thence towards Jagdalak, closely followed by the remainder of the 45th Sikhs, a company of the 4th Gurkhas, and the head-quarters of the 2nd Brigade under General Arbuthnot. At the same time detachments of the 12th Foot and 27th Punjab Infantry moved from Barikao to Jalalabad, and the remainder of the 12th with 11-9, Royal Artillery, were ordered to advance as soon as reinforcements should reach Landi Kotal from Peshawar.

Meanwhile on the 17th December a reconnaissance from Jagdalak Fort under Major Macnaghten, commanding the 10th Bengal Lancers, co-operating with Major E. T. Thackeray, v.c., r.e., from Jagdalak Kotal, cleared the road between Jagdalak and Pezwan and inflicted some loss on the enemy, who had taken up a position some 2 miles from the kotal. On the 18th the road was still further cleared by detachments from both places under Major F. F. Rowcroft (4th Gurkhas) and Colonel F. Norman; and on the 19th the latter officer started from Pezwan for Jagdalak with a convoy of 1,200 animals, escorted by 670 men of the 24th Punjab Infantry and 2nd Gurkhas, and 2 guns, No. 4 Mountain Battery. General Gough sent a force under Major C. J. C. Roberts, 9th Foot, to meet Colonel Norman

and to assist him in attacking and dispersing the Ghilzais who assembled every day and threatened the road below Jagdalak Kotal. Major Roberts found the enemy posted as on the previous day and an engagement took place, the Ghilzais attempting to get round his flank. This was met by Major Roberts, and immediately afterwards Colonel Norman came up and, bringing his guns into action, enfiladed the enemy's whole line, forcing them to retire with considerable loss, including their leader Saiad Khan and his son among the wounded. Major Roberts then covered the passage of Colonel Norman's convoy, which came into camp without the loss of a single animal, although the Ghilzais from the north side made a daring attempt to get at it whilst coming through the pass west of the kotal, which was defeated by the steadiness of the rear guard.

This reinforcement brought General C. Gough's effective strength up to:

Cavalry	:	:	:	:	242		Sappers	:	:	:	73
Infantry	:	:	:	:	1,679		Mountain guns	:	:	:	6

Colonel Norman also informed General C. Gough that he had arranged for another large convoy for the next day (the 20th December) with warm clothing and supplies, which duly arrived without mishap.

Previous to the above engagements, Brigadier-General Charles Gough had been informed by divisional head-quarters through Pezwan that a large number of Ghilzais were collecting in his front, and that he was on no account to risk his communications with Gandamak or a repulse, which would have the worst possible effect on the whole line. He was further instructed that, under the circumstances, his advance on Kabul had become impossible. A little later it was notified to him by General Bright that the Ghilzais were collecting in large numbers, not only in his front but also on his flanks, and threatening Pezwan; and, therefore, that it would be more judicious for him not

to jeopardise his communications with Gandamak, and that he should consequently retire and concentrate at that place. Having, however, been reinforced in the manner described, and finding that little serious opposition was offered to the movement of troops, General Gough reported to the Major-General on the 20th that he hoped that the Ghilzais had now been effectually dispersed, and that he proposed advancing to Lataband, whence he could communicate by heliograph with Sherpur. He also enquired when he might expect reinforcements to reach him. In reply General Bright told him that the 22nd Punjab Infantry was the only additional regiment which could be sent on until reinforcements arrived from India. The proposed advance to Lataband was, however, sanctioned; but in consequence of various items of intelligence received at Jalalabad, General Bright came to the conclusion that Brigadier-General Gough was not fully alive to the state of the country round him, since all information tended to show that the Ghilzais were collecting in large numbers and were only waiting for Gough to advance to cut off his retreat. The Major-General accordingly sent telegraphic instructions through Pezwan countermanding the advance on Lataband until reinforcements should arrive. But on the evening of the same day (the 20th December) a telegram was received at divisional head-quarters from General Gough stating that he had received fresh orders from Sir Frederick Roberts to advance on Kabul without delay, and that he proposed doing so on the following day, reaching Seh Baba that day, Lataband post (Samuch Mulla Umar) on the 22nd December, Butkhak on the 23rd, and Kabul on the 24th of the month. The message from the Lieutenant-General had been heliographed from Kabul to Lataband, and thence sent on by a special messenger to Jagdalak. At the same time Colonel Hudson, commanding at Lataband post, informed General Gough that he had supplies only up to the 22nd December and that his men were on half rations.

GOUGH'S COLUMN

Accordingly, on the 21st December, Brigadier-General Charles Gough commenced his march from Jagdalak fort with a column composed as follows:

		Guns. Officers. Men.				
Artillery	.	{	Hazara Mountain Battery,			
			Captain A. Broadfoot, R.A.	4
Infantry	{	British (528)	2-9th Foot, Lieutenant Colonel			
			W. Daunt	17	483
		Native (874)	72nd Highlanders	1	45
			2nd Gurkhas, Major A.			
			Battye	6	399
			4th Gurkhas	6	377
Sappers	3	73			
Details	25			
Total				<u>4</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>1,402</u>

The following garrisons were left in the posts beyond Gandamak:

Jagdalak Fort.

		Officers. Men.	
Colonel Norman	{	10th Bengal Lancers	6 210
		2nd Gurkhas 14 sick.
		24th Punjab Infantry	4 431
Total		<u>10</u>	<u>655</u>

Jagdalak Kotal.

		Guns. Officers. Men.			
Major Thackeray, V.C., R.E.	{	Hazara Mountain Battery	2
		10th Bengal Lancers	12
		24th Punjab Infantry	50
		Sappers and Miners	193
		Royal Engineers	5	...
Total		<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>252</u>	

Pezwan Kotal.

		Guns. Officers. Men.			
Lieutenant-Colonel Ball-Acton, 51st Light Infantry.	{	10th Bengal Lancers	50
		I-A, R.H.A.	2
		51st Light Infantry (3 companies).	150
		24th Punjab Infantry (1 company)	50
		Sappers and Miners	12	80
Total		<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>330</u>	

Having halted on the night of the 21st at Seh Baba, Gough reached Lataband post on the following day, after a very harassing march owing to the breakdown of a large number of Indian camels, of which the transport chiefly consisted. Here he was joined by the garrison under Colonel J. Hudson, 28th Punjab Infantry. On the 23rd the united force marched to the Logar River, where it was found that the bridge near Butkhak had been barricaded and shelter trenches made to defend the passage; but the position was not occupied, the enemy having abandoned their posts, and General Gough was enabled to cross without opposition, and encamped near Butkhak with his main body the same evening. On arrival, General Gough heard from native rumour that the Afghans had made a determined attack on Sherpur that morning and had been defeated with heavy loss. This intelligence was confirmed by the receipt in the evening of a letter by messenger from Sir Frederick Roberts's camp, which added the information that the enemy still remained in force in the villages and forts round Sherpur and in the Bala Hissar. The day was dull, and heliographic communication consequently impossible.

At dawn, on the 24th December, the advance was continued. A dense fog made it almost impossible to see, and a heavy fall of snow in the night rendered the road over the causeway across the marsh nearly impassable for transport animals. On reaching the Siah Sang hills General Charles Gough occupied them with infantry, and turning to the right made for the Sherpur cantonments, leaving the hills on his left. On the march it became known that the Afghans had almost entirely dispersed during the night, and General Gough's column entered Sherpur without opposition. Thus the junction between the Khyber and Kurram Divisions was accomplished; but the communication with Jagdalak was temporarily suspended owing to the abandonment of the Lataband post.

The advance of Gough's brigade was the signal for

the threatened attacks on the posts on the line of communications. On the 23rd December, at 2 p.m., a vigorous effort was made against Jagdalak Kotal by 3,000 Ghilzais, and the fighting lasted until ten at night, the enemy at one time approaching as near as 150 yards from the fort on three sides. The garrison, however, behaved with the greatest steadiness, and the enemy was successfully driven off with some loss. The casualties amongst the defenders were two sepoy killed, and Major Thackeray, v.c. (commanding), and one sepoy wounded.

Meanwhile the news of the attack had reached both Gandamak and Jagdalak Fort. From the former place Brigadier-General Arbuthnot sent orders to Colonel Ball-Acton to proceed from Pezwan with 400 men to Thackeray's relief; while Colonel Norman marched at daybreak from Jagdalak and reached the post on the kotal without opposition, the enemy having dispersed. Here a heliogram was received announcing Colonel Ball-Acton's approach, and Colonel Norman accordingly started to meet him, taking Major Thackeray, who was sent to Safed Sang for treatment. On his return to the kotal, after carrying out this service, Colonel Norman was intercepted by Asmatulla Khan with about 300 men, who gave some annoyance to the column, but was soon compelled to retire with some loss. This had the effect of clearing the line for the time, and a convoy passing from Pezwan to Jagdalak on the 25th was not molested; but the skirmish having shown that Asmatulla was still out, Colonel Norman considered that the garrison of his outposts should be strengthened, that at least 800 infantry were required to hold Jagdalak and the kotal, and that the two guns should be at the latter place. Should the kotal be lost, he would have to retire, leaving his tents behind.

On the evening of the 24th one of the posts at Dalangai, near Choragali, was attacked and several *jazailchis*, cart-drivers, and doolie-bearers killed, and others very badly wounded. It was not known who

had committed this outrage, but they were believed to be either Shinwaris or Khugianis. An attempt was made to follow up the enemy, but without success. Another post at a *ziarat* near the Choragali Pass was also attacked, but the marauders were driven off by the garrison.

During these events the forward movement of troops all up the line from Peshawar had been proceeding steadily. A wing of the 45th Sikhs marched from Gandamak to Pezwan, the head-quarters of the 22nd Punjab Infantry had reached Rozabad, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry was at Jalalabad, part of the 8th Bengal Infantry and two guns of D-A, Royal Horse Artillery, at Dakka, while the remainder of the last-named battery and part of the 1-25th King's Own Borderers had arrived at Landi Kotal.

On the 29th December an attack was made on Jagdalak camp by a large force of Ghilzais under Asmatulla Khan, accompanied by Muhammad Hasan Khan, late Governor of Jalalabad, and Faiz Muhammad Khan, formerly commandant of Ali Masjid. The attack was resisted with energy by the small garrison of Jagdalak, and the arrival at 4 p.m. of Colonel Ball-Acton with reinforcements consisting of 4 guns 11-9, Royal Artillery, 3 companies of the 51st, and 6 companies of the 45th Rattray's Sikhs soon completed the dispersion of the enemy. In this affair Lieutenant I. D. Wright, Royal Artillery, was killed by a musket-shot as the guns were being laid. The enemy were said to have suffered heavily.

On the same day (29th December) Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, set out from Jalalabad to Barikao, whence on the 30th he marched through Shershai against a cluster of villages, named Banda, Khadi and Roghani, which were supposed to be sheltering some of the Shinwari perpetrators of the outrage near Ali Boghan on the 24th. His column was composed of 1 troop of the Carabiniers, 3 troops 3rd Bengal Cavalry, 2 guns C-3, Royal Artillery,

2 companies 1-12th Foot, 70 rifles 27th Punjab Infantry, and 20 Madras Sappers. After a difficult march of 12 miles, the valley in which the villages lie was reached and the place completely surrounded. The chiefs were then summoned, and ten of them having been taken as hostages, the column returned to Barikao without opposition or further incident.

During the week every exertion was made to strengthen the posts on the line of communications. Telegraphic communication with Jagdalak was re-established; and, in spite of rumours of proposed attacks at various points, it appeared that the gatherings of tribesmen had dispersed, and the year closed quietly.¹

¹ For composition, distribution, and strength on the 31st December, see Appendices XIV. and XV.

CHAPTER XI

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE KANDAHAR FIELD FORCE FROM SEPTEMBER, 1879, TO MARCH, 1880; AND THE MARCH OF THE GHAZNI FORCE UNDER SIR DONALD STEWART FROM KANDAHAR TO NORTH AFGHANISTAN.

THE news of the outbreak at Kabul and of the massacre there of the British Resident and his escort reached the Field Force in Southern Afghanistan when the troops were in process of withdrawal from Kandahar to Peshin in accordance with the Treaty of Gandamak (Chapter V.). The head-quarters were still at Kandahar, but the remainder of the troops were distributed at various places along the line, as follows:

At Kandahar.

19th Bengal Lancers.		2-60th Rifles.
11-11, Royal Artillery.		15th Sikhs.

At Abdul Rahman.

6-11, Royal Artillery.		59th Foot (wing).
		3rd Gurkhas (wing).

At Mandi Hissar.

25th Punjab Infantry.

At Chaman.

2nd Punjab Cavalry.		G-4, Royal Artillery.
		29th Bombay Infantry.

At Arambi Karez.

A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.		D-2, Royal Artillery.
		59th Foot.

On the Kakar Lora.

1st Punjab Cavalry.

At Khushdil Khan Kala.

3rd Sind Horse.		2nd Sikhs.
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On the 5th September telegraphic orders were despatched by the Quartermaster-General in India to

Sir Donald Stewart, commanding the Field Force, for all troops north of Peshin to move back to Kandahar. Every effort was at once made to prepare the force for renewed service ; the transport was carefully overhauled ; the troops themselves were medically inspected, and those unfit for field service were sent back to Quetta, where a base hospital was established ; commissariat yards were re-opened, and orders issued for the purchase of wood, grain, and *bhusa* ; telegraph stores which had started for Peshin were sent back to Kandahar ; and arrangements were made to keep all bell-tent equipage in readiness for a sudden move on Kabul.

The 15th Sikhs, who had on the previous day vacated the citadel of Kandahar, re-occupied it on the 5th with the consent and at the personal request of the Governor ; the 60th Rifles moved from camp on the 7th September and re-occupied the barracks, which they had vacated preparatory to commencing their march to Peshin ; on the 8th the head-quarters of the 2nd Infantry Brigade returned to the capital, and within ten days the whole of the Field Force was re-assembled.

Sir Donald Stewart now (13th September) proposed that D-2, Royal Artillery, should return to India, while a wing of the 59th Foot, the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and a company of the 2nd Sikhs were to be located at Gulistan Karez, and orders were given for hutting to be pushed forward at that place.

On the 16th September the Commander-in-Chief informed the Government of India that he considered it desirable that a demonstration should be made in some strength from Kandahar towards Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and that he had therefore instructed Sir Donald Stewart, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, to direct a movement of the sort to be carried out in such strength as he might consider desirable ; that he had impressed on Sir Donald at the same time, that the presence of some heavy guns, which were ready to move, would add to the effect of the operations, and

would induce the belief that these troops were to advance on Kabul.

This reconnaissance was not to proceed further than Naorak, the second march beyond Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The 2nd Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, with five field guns and two heavy guns, was detailed for the movement, and the Governor of Kalat-i-Ghilzai was requested to arrange for supplies and postal communications as far as Pul-i-Sang.

On the 23rd September the brigade marched from Kandahar, 1,418 strong, with 1,286 followers, composed of the following corps :

Cavalry.

2nd Punjab Cavalry, Colonel T. G. Kennedy.

Artillery.

G-4, Royal Artillery, Major Sir J. W. Campbell, Bart.
6-11, Royal Artillery, Major J. A. Tillard.
11-11, Royal Artillery, Major N. H. Harris.

British Infantry.

59th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lawson.

Native Infantry.

3rd Gurkhas, Colonel A. Paterson.
29th Bombay Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel O. V. Tanner.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes reached Khel-i-Akhund on the 26th and Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 30th September without experiencing any opposition. At the latter place it soon became evident that the power of the governor to make arrangements for supplies was small, as the headmen of the Hotak and Tokhi clans of the Ghilzais declined to bring in anything unless they dealt directly with the British Commissariat officer.


A further advance of the brigade to Ghazni was discussed, but the idea was abandoned in consequence of the lack of transport and supplies. The limit of the reconnaissance was, however, extended to Ab-i-Tazi, one march beyond Naorak. Accordingly an advance force, consisting of two guns each from G-4 and 11-11

332 CO-OPERATION WITH GHILZAIS

Batteries, and detachments of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 59th Foot, 3rd Gurkhas, and 29th Bombay Infantry, marched from Kalat-i-Ghilzai under Brigadier-General Hughes, and arrived at Naorak on the 9th October and at Tazi on the following day. Here a halt of several days was made, which was occupied with reconnaissance work. The supplies of the neighbourhood were already beginning to run short, when rumours became rife of the assembling at Aghao Jan and Martaza Kala, under the leadership of Sahib Jan, the son of a Taraki Ghilzai malik of influence, of a body of men to attack the troops at Tazi. On this the Brigadier determined to move forward to Shahjui, where he was informed that the Ghilzais were gathering, being induced to adopt this course by the increasing scarcity of supplies round Tazi and by the consideration that an advance would be more advisable than a retirement.

Accordingly, at 1.30 a.m. on the 24th October, Colonel Kennedy, commanding the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, accompanied by Ahmad Jan, an influential Tokhi Ghilzai chief, marched from camp with 150 sabres of his own regiment, 2 guns of 11-11 Mountain Battery, 80 rifles of the 59th Foot, and 100 rifles of the 29th Bombay Infantry. The Brigadier intended to follow in support with the remainder of his force, namely, 1½ squadrons 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns G-4, Royal Artillery, 1 gun 11-11, Royal Artillery, one company 59th Foot, and 4 companies 3rd Gurkhas.

Shortly before daylight, and at about the tenth mile from camp, Ahmad Jan pointed out a fire some distance in advance, saying that it was the watch fire of the enemy's picquet on the road. The country on either side was too rough for troops to move over in the dark; and knowing from a previous reconnaissance that the village was still 2 miles distant, Colonel Kennedy directed Captain J. H. Broome, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, to advance with his squadron, 65 sabres strong, and a few rifles of the 2nd Baluchis (29th Bombay Infantry) and, under cover of a volley from the latter, to drive in



the picquet. He was then to push on with his own men to Shahjui, and observe the movements of such of the enemy as might be present at that place.

Captain Broome surprised the picquet, killing five men and capturing three ponies. A few men, however, escaped to Shahjui and gave the alarm.

Captain Broome then advanced rapidly along the road, and seized an isolated mound in the plain before the village. By this time it was beginning to get light, and the enemy, in number about 200 horse and 700 foot, came streaming out towards the mound. But Colonel Kennedy and the remainder of the troops were near at hand; on seeing them the Ghilzais halted irresolutely about half a mile off, and the guns and 59th having opened fire, the enemy declined battle and moved off towards the left. The troops followed and a running fight began, which was continued for about 6 miles over a difficult country. The guns opened fire occasionally on groups driven together by the cavalry, and the latter now and then dismounted and used their carbines; but the infantry could not get within range, and the enemy's horse declined altogether to be tempted into a combat.


At last the enemy reached a high hillock surrounded by broken ground. The summit had been the site of an old fort, and the ruins of an outwork still existed at the foot of the rising. Here the Ghilzais halted, those on foot planting two standards on the top of the hillock, while the horsemen retired behind it. Thereupon Colonel Kennedy ordered the 59th, under Captain E. H. Sartorius, to seize the outwork and to work round the foot of the hill until the horsemen were under his fire. At the same time the guns prepared to open fire, supported by the 2nd Baluchis.

Captain Sartorius was soon in possession of the ruins at the foot of the hillock, and, moving round it, got within sight of the enemy's horse at the very moment that two shells, intended for the top of the hillock, dropped among them. Shifting their ground,

the Ghilzai horsemen came in view of the squadron under Captain Broome, who, having a troop dismounted, gave them a volley, and again mounting, retired slowly. Somewhat unexpectedly the Ghilzais at once dashed after him, led by Sahib Jan in person. Major F. Lance with another squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry was, however, in readiness, and charged the enemy in flank. At the same time Captain Broome wheeled about and met the enemy in front. A spirited hand-to-hand combat ensued, in which the Ghilzais were overthrown and driven off the field, losing their standard, and leaving their leader and fifteen men dead on the ground. Sher Jan, brother to Sahib Jan, was among the wounded.

The main body of the enemy now dispersed in all directions over a country so much enclosed that pursuit was impracticable. A few men, however, still clung to the hillock, and Captain Sartorius was ordered to take it. The summit could only be gained by one narrow zig-zag path, up which Captain Sartorius slowly climbed, followed by fifteen of his men. The remainder kept down the fire of the defenders. Only seven of the enemy remained on the hillock, and these sprang up and threw themselves on the first of the assailants that gained the top. They were all killed after a desperate struggle, in which a private of the 59th was cut down, and Captain Sartorius wounded on both hands. This officer afterwards received the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on the occasion.

Fifty-six dead bodies of the enemy were counted in all, so that their total loss was certainly considerable. Among the troops one man of the 59th Foot was killed and one officer wounded. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry also had one man killed and no less than twenty-seven wounded, all in the combat with the enemy's horse. In this mêlée Captain Broome, after cutting down two of the enemy, had his horse killed under him, and received a sword cut on the head. Two native officers were also wounded. The two squadrons had four horses



J. F. Irwin, Lieut.
59th Regt.

Affair near Shahjui 24th October 1879.

London, John Murray.

W & A K Johnston Limited Edinburgh & London

killed and twelve horses wounded, all by the sword or lance.

Colonel Kennedy's detachment rejoined the remainder of the brigade at Shahjui the same day, and the force encamped there; the neighbouring villagers brought in supplies freely; water was plentiful and the grazing for camels found to be abundant.

The political and military advantages of this affair were decidedly good; the threatened attack of the enemy, whose numbers had been daily increasing, was forestalled, and the additional prestige of taking the initiative was also secured.

On the 26th October the return march was begun, and the brigade arrived at Kandahar on the 8th November after leaving at Kalat-i-Ghilzai a garrison composed of 1 squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns each of G-4 and 11-11, Royal Artillery, 2 companies 59th Foot, and the 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluchis). By the beginning of December all these troops were hutted, and supplies were being freely brought into Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

During the past weeks the work of laying down a line of rail towards Sibi had been pushed forward. Jacobabad was reached at the beginning of November, and the line was to be completed to Mittri by the end of January, 1880. It was not yet decided whether it should be continued through the Bolan Pass and Quetta, or by the Harnai Pass to Peshin.


Towards the latter part of November Sir Richard Temple, Governor of Bombay, paid a visit to Kandahar, travelling by the Gwajha Pass and Dara ravine, which route he recommended for the extension of the railway to Kandahar.

The month of December was occupied in correspondence between Lieutenant-General Stewart and the Commander-in-Chief on the one hand, and the Government of India on the other, regarding the further movements from Kandahar and the relief of the Bengal troops in the South Afghanistan Field

Force. The Commander-in-Chief was especially insistent on the importance of Brigadier-General Phayre's brigade being moved forward immediately to Quetta and Peshin in order to set free the 19th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Sikhs, and 3rd Sind Horse, who would then advance to Kandahar. This he considered necessary in view of the rising of the tribesmen around Kabul, an example which might at any moment be followed by Western Afghanistan. Accordingly, on the 23rd December the Viceroy sanctioned the advance of the reserve brigade (General Phayre's) to Quetta and Peshin, the brigade held in readiness under Brigadier-General Burrows being moved up to take their places in the lower Bolan.

Correspondence at the same time continued on the subject of an advance of all the Bengal troops, under Lieutenant-General Stewart, from Kandahar in the spring through Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and Ghazni to Kabul; and on the 10th January the Lieutenant-General was asked to state fully for the Commander-in-Chief's information his views and proposals with regard to his projected advance; in reply he sent a detailed despatch on the 13th as follows:

“Estimating that the troops to relieve the Bengal Division might commence movement from Dadar by the 10th February, and that they must be dependent for movement as far as Chaman upon the cart-train established, and working upon the stage system as far as Quetta, it is necessary to calculate upon twelve stages from the base to Quetta itself, from which point to Chaman is seven marches. No more than one hundred carts, each carrying six maunds, could be made available every second day for an organised movement of troops,—that is, a half battalion of native infantry or two companies of European infantry could be despatched every second day; and granting the most favourable conditions of weather, it is clear that the troops to relieve the Bengal Division could not be assembled at Kandahar before the end of March.



ACTION
AT
AHMAD KHEL
19th April 1880

Position of British Force
after retirement of 19th B L
Enemy



THE TROOPS SELECTED

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Meanwhile, the Transport Department would have purchased a sufficiency of camels to equip the division to move forward, as well as the number necessary to equip a portion of the troops arriving in relief, as a movable column.

“The troops belonging to the Bengal Army, which I would propose to take forward at the end of March, may be taken at the following strength :

Brigade.	Regiment or Battery.	EUROPEANS, EFFECTIVE.			EUROPEANS, SICK.			NATIVE TROOPS.		FOLLOWERS.*			
		Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Total.	Effective.	Sick.	Public.	Private.	Total.	
ROYAL ARTILLERY.	A-B, Royal Horse Artillery	4	118	122	1	6	7	218	24	237	
	G-4, Royal Artillery	4	194	198	1	9	10	228	25	248	
	11-11, Royal Artillery	5	78	83	1	14	15	176	19	195	
	Total	18	890	848	8	29	32	612	68	680	
CAVALRY BRIGADE.	1st Punjab Cavalry	5	...	5	810	6	883	26	409	
	2nd Punjab Cavalry	9	...	9	845	18	448	52	500	
	19th Bengal Lancers	8	...	8	408	9	866	50	416	
	Total	22	...	22	1,058	33	1,197	128	1,825	
1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.	2-60th Rifles	22	718	785	...	21	21	128	61	278
	15th Sikhs	3	...	3	2	...	2	690	17	212	22	284	
	25th Punjab Infantry	7	...	7	702	81	260	24	284	
	Total	32	718	745	2	21	23	1,892	48	684	107	791	
2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.	59th Regiment	28	758	781	...	10	10	511	50	561	
	8rd Gurkhas	6	...	6	621	9	176	40	216	
	2nd Sikhs	5	...	5	665	21	880	25	855	
	Total	34	758	792	...	10	10	1,186	80	1,017	115	1,182	
SAPPERS AND MINERS.	No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners	3	7	10	105	7	134	15	149	
	No. 10 Company, Sappers and Miners	1	5	6	1	...	1	99	5	127	14	141	
	Total	4	12	16	1	...	1	204	12	261	29	290	
REGIMENTAL DIVISION.	Royal Artillery	18	830	848	8	29	32	612	68	680	
	Cavalry	22	...	22	1,058	33	1,197	128	1,825	
	1st Infantry Brigade	32	718	745	2	21	23	1,892	48	684	107	791	
	2nd Infantry Brigade	34	758	792	...	10	10	1,186	80	1,017	115	1,182	
	Sappers and Miners	4	12	16	1	...	1	204	12	261	29	290	
	GRAND TOTAL	105	1,818	1,918	6	60	66	8,840	128	3,771	447	4,218	

* Followers, including camel-drivers, may be estimated approximately.

“The transport allowed for their equipment would be given in strict accordance with the scale authorised in Quartermaster-General’s circular of September, 1879, surplus baggage of officers and the extra kit of troops and followers being returned to India by the Bolan route. Sick soldiers and followers will be despatched to India by the same route, preparatory to movement.

“The above force, comprising two brigades infantry, one brigade cavalry, one battery Royal Horse Artillery, one light field battery, and one mountain battery, with ordnance reserves for two months, would carry a sufficiency of European supplies for two months and native supplies for seven days, exclusive of wood, and grain for horses and cattle; two days’ supply of grain for horses would, however, be taken. At the season when it will have been found possible to effect the relief in contemplation, a sufficiency of forage will be procurable throughout the entire route, and due notice being given, it is considered possible to arrange for the laying in of supplies of grain, *atta*, and *ghi* at the various stages as far as the neighbourhood of Mukur, from which point to Ghazni the arrangements to be made for obtaining supplies must depend upon the attitude of the inhabitants; but a cultivated district is passed through and the requirements of the force could be met.

“The present condition of the fortifications at Ghazni is such that it is not necessary to take the 40-pounder guns with the force moving forward; indeed, the presence of the heavy battery during a movement in the direction of Ghazni and Kabul could only be an encumbrance, and I would, therefore, strongly recommend that this battery return to India: it should leave Kandahar early in February. The services of the 19th Punjab Infantry may also be dispensed with, and I would propose that this regiment escort the heavy battery from Quetta.

“In considering, as above, the arrangements to be

made for the movement of the Bengal troops under my command, in accordance with your telegram of the 10th instant from Calcutta, I have estimated that the troops to reach Kandahar in relief could not do so before the end of March. Should it, however, be possible to expedite the despatch of the troops under orders of movement from Bombay, I would urge the advisability of so doing, it being in my opinion in every respect desirable that the movement of the division to march from hence should commence, if possible, as early as the 21st March next."

In the course of the next few days instructions relative to the execution of this relief of the Bengal Division were issued to the Government of Bombay, and by General Stewart to Brigadier-General Phayre at Dadar. Arrangements had already been made by the Bombay Government for the relief of Phayre's brigade, and on the 15th January the Lieutenant-General was informed that the 5th, 16th, and 28th Bombay Infantry would reach Jacobabad for that purpose on the 25th of the same month.

Towards the end of January definite instructions were sent to General Stewart to hold all the troops under his command, which were originally drawn from the Bengal Presidency, in readiness to move in relief as a division, with the object of their returning to India either through the Bolan or *viâ* Ghazni; and he was informed that the following relieving corps would be at, or beyond, Jacobabad by the 17th February:

- 2nd Sind Horse (Major M. M. Carpendale).
- Poona Horse (Colonel C. d'U. La Touche).
- E-B, R.H.A. (Major G. F. Blackwood).
- C2, R.A. (Major P. H. Greig).
- 2-7th Royal Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny).
- 66th Foot (Lieutenant-Colonel J. Galbraith).
- 4th Bombay Infantry (Colonel W. Bannerman).
- 10th Bombay Infantry (Colonel H. H. James).

A reserve division was also warned and equipped by

the Bombay Government in accordance with instructions on same date, consisting of:

<i>Jacobabad</i>	.	{	1st Sind Horse.
			1st Light Cavalry.
			3rd Light Cavalry.
<i>Sukkur</i>	.	.	3rd Bombay Infantry.
<i>Hyderabad</i>	.	{	F-2, R.A.
			24th Bombay Infantry.
<i>Karachi</i>	.	{	D-B., R.H.A.
			2-11th Foot (wing).
			2-15th Foot.
			9th Bombay Infantry.
			23rd Bombay Infantry.
<i>Bombay</i>	.	.	2-11th Foot (head-quarters and wing).

About the same time General Stewart's detailed estimate of transport necessary for the march of his division (including the heavy battery and the 19th Punjab Infantry, which the Government of India considered should accompany his column), was furnished as follows to the Quartermaster-General:

Military Equipment.

Ordnance Department	.	.	.	3,300	camels.
Engineers' Field Park	.	.	.	700	"
General Hospital	.	.	.	50	"
Supplies and Commissariat	.	.	.	150	"
Reserve	.	.	.	2,600	"
Total	.	.	.	<u>6,800</u>	"

In addition to the above, 500 mules were required for equipment, and from 500 to 1,000 mules as reserve.

The month of February opened with a few days of very severe weather; the Bolan pass was blocked with snow, and all movements were brought to a standstill. By the 7th, however, the road was reopened for traffic, and the forward movement of troops continued steadily all along the line throughout the month.

On the 10th February Lieutenant-General Stewart, in reply to enquiries as to the date on which he could

begin his march, intimated that he hoped to move by the 15th March, by which date a brigade of the Bombay Division would have reached Kandahar. He proposed to send a brigade by Maruf to Kalat-i-Ghilzai about the 1st March to transfer supplies from the Arghastan Valley to that of the Tarnak; the remainder of the division was to move by brigades from Kandahar to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and the force would be assembled at Ghazni between the 10th and the 15th April.

The Lieutenant-General also communicated to the Bombay Government about this date his views as to the most suitable transport for the force moving towards Kandahar to relieve him. He considered that all transport in advance of the Khojak should be such as could be utilised in a forward movement beyond Kandahar, and for this purpose camels and mules only should be employed. If a sufficiency of such transport were kept up, it could work back to where the regular cart-train ended. Kala Abdulla was the most convenient changing station, and must remain so until the road over the Khojak was made fit for wheeled transport. The number of carts constituting a daily train which could be kept up was limited by the restricted amount of forage which could be collected in the Bolan during the winter months. Ponies, as procured from India, were, he considered, worthless for transport purposes. Pack-bullocks and donkeys, as well as hired camels, could advantageously be employed by the Commissariat Department as reserve transport, and every endeavour should be made to supplement Government transport by hired carriage. For the former attendants could with difficulty be procured at the scale of wages fixed, and any increase of pay was to be deprecated as affecting the position of the native soldier.

During this month some correspondence passed between Sir Donald Stewart and head-quarters regarding the lines of communication and the projected Harnai-Kandahar railway. The line had been completed to Sibi, the Harnai route had been selected for

its further extension, and a cart road had also been completed as far as Harnai. Writing on the 5th March, the Lieutenant-General strongly advocated the extension of this line from Gwal along the Surkhhab drainage, by Nya Bazar to Kala Abdulla, but on further investigation it was found that the advantages of this route were doubtful, and a decision of the question was accordingly deferred.

Meanwhile the progress made with the Harnai road and railway pointed to an abandonment of the Bolan route at no distant date, and this prospect materially altered the conditions under which it had been proposed to erect shelter for the officers and establishments of the Transport Department at Sibi, and at the stages on the Bolan line. Sir Donald Stewart now considered that it would be sufficient to erect temporary roof-shelter under which transport officials could pitch their tents in the hot weather.

The question of transport for Sir Donald Stewart's division was one which continued to occupy the attention of the Lieutenant-General. The estimated requirements were increased by the necessity of carrying warm clothing for the troops; while 140 camels were needed for the transport of treasure, of which it was estimated that 1,371,000 rupees would be required. It was, however, found extremely difficult to purchase camels in the Kandahar district during March, a fact which appeared to arise from the severe weather of the preceding month, the high rate of hire given by the Commissariat Department, the long drought, which had necessitated the removal of camels by their owners to inaccessible districts where water was procurable, and the rise in the market value of these animals. The Director of Transport was accordingly requested, in view of the forward movement in contemplation, to use every endeavour to spare the camels belonging to the regimental equipment of corps which were under orders to move, and Sir D. Stewart wished that no more Government carriage should be despatched from

Kandahar, all necessary commissariat stores being brought forward on hired cattle.

On the 15th March the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Field Force, communicated to the Director of Transport, in the following memorandum, the Lieutenant-General's views as to the systematising of this use of hired transport :

“There are three points along the line to which hired carriage may be drawn : (i) At the base, Sibi, the owners of Brahui camels will contract at fixed rates for the conveyance of loads to Quetta throughout the greater portion of the year, and although, as their experience extends, they may become willing to make journeys to Kandahar itself, it seems advisable to limit their operations to the portion of the line between the base and Quetta to which they are accustomed, and where they are more or less known ; as the regular cart-train will work between Quetta and Kala Abdulla throughout the year, the entertainment of hired carriage at Quetta will only be necessary under exceptional circumstances, as at the present time, when a large number of troops and stores are being brought forward at once. (ii) Kala Abdulla, the stage at which the cart-train stops, becomes, therefore, the second point to which hired carriage should be drawn. At Kala Abdulla, Peshin carriage proper may be entertained for trips to Kandahar, and some carriage belonging to residents on this side of the Khojak can be procured, while, in a short time, the owners of camels in Shorawak may be expected to bring them forward for hire. A large portion of the carriage available at Kala Abdulla consists of donkeys. (iii) Kandahar is the third point at which hired carriage can be engaged, either for working forward towards Kalat-i-Ghilzai, or backwards towards Kala Abdulla, or for stocking the posts along the line of communication.

“The employment of hired carriage relieves troops from the arduous duty of furnishing escorts with convoys, and admits of the necessary rest being given

to camels belonging to the military equipment of troops, and to brigade and departmental reserve. The price which is already paid for hired carriage in consequence of the exceptional demands made on Government transport during the past year is, however, excessively high; and it must be remembered that in advocating the equipment of a large number of troops at Kandahar with field carriage, the intention has been to employ this transport in bringing forward supplies from the terminus of the cart-train, whenever the General Officer Commanding the troops may consider it possible to do so, while in arranging transport for treasure and warlike stores, which are placed under military escorts, it is always necessary to use Government camels.

“The pilfering which is liable to occur during the transfer of stores by hired transport can only be properly checked by the weighing of loads previous to despatch and upon receipt, a regular invoice being sent with each consignment. I am, however, to suggest that it is necessary to discontinue the despatch of stores at irregular intervals, whenever owners of carriage declare their willingness to start, and to arrange the entertainment of hired transport in accordance with a fixed time-table worked forward from the base. The control of carriage in this manner can be best arrived at by the employment of *caravan-bashis* and a regular weekly or bi-weekly despatch.

“The owners of carriage are well known, and it can be arranged to let them understand through the *caravan-bashi* how many camels or donkeys will be required on each occasion, if regular notice of all despatches from the base is passed along the line. A *caravan-bashi* should accompany each batch of hired animals, and should be responsible for the stores entrusted to him, taking them over formally at the stage of departure and obtaining a receipt on delivery.

“The management of hired carriage and the control of its cost are matters which very materially affect arrangements connected with the supply, and movement

of troops, and influence the market of the country ; the Lieutenant-General is therefore anxious that these points receive close attention."

On the 9th March General Phayre, c.B., and staff, with head-quarters 1st Bombay Infantry, escorting 5-11, Royal Artillery, and ordnance stores, arrived at Kandahar ; General Phayre was forthwith directed to assume command of the Kandahar garrison.

In the afternoon of Monday, 15th March, Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart received the principal mullas and headmen of the city and surrounding villages in darbar. He addressed them at length, recapitulating the causes which had led to the occupation of Kandahar by the British, and pointing out the desire of the British Government to leave Afghanistan to be governed by Afghans, as proved by the establishment of Sardar Sher Ali Khan as Wali or Viceroy of Kandahar. He then proceeded to condemn the senseless and disgraceful outrages by fanatics on British officers and soldiers, attributing much of the blame for such deeds to the evil counsels of some of the mullas, and he concluded by warning his hearers that a continuance of such outrages would certainly be punished by measures which should be felt by the whole community, and which would ensure the severe punishment of all in any way connected with the wretched individuals who were thus made the tools of designing men not less guilty than themselves.

The General then dismissed the assemblage, informing them of his own approaching departure, and stating that the policy inaugurated by him under the orders of Government would certainly be continued by his successor as long as the people behaved with loyalty to the Sardar and the Government.

On the 13th March an attempt had been made by the inhabitants of some Tokhi Ghilzai villages to cut off a convoy of mules with *bhusa* between Takir in Mizan and Kalat-i-Ghilzai. On the 17th a force of the following strength, under Lieutenant-Colonel J.

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Galloway, 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluchis), was despatched from Kalat-i-Ghilzai to seize the maliks concerned in this outrage:

2nd Punjab Cavalry, 1 officer and 60 sowars.

11-11, Royal Artillery (2 guns).

29th Bombay Infantry, 2 officers, 213 sepoy.

The cavalry detachment of Colonel Galloway's force, under Captain J. R. Campbell, accompanied by Major Briscoe, Political Officer, went on in advance, but did not succeed in capturing the head malik, Muhammad Ata, who, with a few followers, escaped to the hilly ground, where pursuit was impossible. A few shots were exchanged, and one of the cavalry horses was killed and another wounded. One or two of the malik's followers were reported to have been hit.

The force bivouacked on the 17th and 18th in Muhammad Ata's village, and reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai in two marches on the 20th, having secured Muhammad Ata's brother and property.

Meanwhile, with the arrival of detachments of the Bombay Division at Kandahar, the departure of General Stewart's force drew near. In view of this event the following letter was, on the 17th March, despatched from the Adjutant-General in India to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army:

"The move of the Bombay Division to Kandahar, and the projected advance from that place of the Bengal Division under Sir D. Stewart, render it necessary that some definite instructions should be issued in regard to the command and supply of the Bombay troops after Sir D. Stewart leaves. I have, therefore, the honour, by desire of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to inform you that all questions of discipline, and all matters of supply, clothing and equipment, ammunition, medical services, etc., should, when the Bengal Division advances, be dealt with under Your Excellency's orders. All orders, however, regarding movements, tactical or strategical, of the Kandahar Force will continue to be issued by the

Commander-in-Chief in India, to whom the usual returns will continue to be submitted. The Government of India have been informed that His Excellency considers that the supply of the troops should continue to be dealt with by the Bombay Government. A Brigadier-General to command the line of communications from Jacobabad to Kandahar has been recommended, and if the appointment is sanctioned, this officer will be responsible to the General Officer Commanding at Kandahar for forwarding all supplies, stores, etc., from the base of that place."

On the following day the staff and constitution of the 1st Bombay Division were published by the Bombay Government, Major-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I., being in command, Brigadier-General R. Phayre, C.B., A.D.C., in command of the line of communications, and Brigadier-Generals G. R. S. Burrows and H. F. Brooke commanding brigades.

General Stewart intended to take with him food supplies for British soldiers for two months (except potatoes, of which the supply was for one month only); supplies for seven days for natives. The total weight of these supplies was estimated at 6,260 maunds (about 4,750 cwt.)

The date of Sir Donald Stewart's departure from Kandahar, originally fixed for the 15th March, was put off, owing to delays in the arrival of the Bombay troops and in the movements of drafts for Bengal regiments, until the end of the month.

One of the brigades of the force was to march by the alternative Khushk-i-Rud route to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, whilst the remainder followed the main road.

On the 29th March Brigadier-General R. Barter's brigade, composed as follows, began the march :

1st Punjab Cavalry.
11-11, R.A. (4 guns, mountain).
2-60th Rifles.
25th Punjab Infantry.
Section B, Field Hospital.

On the 30th and 31st respectively the Field Force head-quarters, with the Cavalry (General Palliser's) Brigade and the 2nd (Brigadier-General Hughes's) Brigade, left Mohmand, of the following strength:

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser.	{	19th Bengal Lancers. A-B, R.H.A. 6-11, R.A. (40-pr. elephant). 19th Punjab Infantry. Engineer Field Park.
Escort of Lieutenant-General Stewart.	{	19th Bengal Lancers (1 troop). 2-60th Rifles (1 company). 25th Punjab Infantry (1 company). 11-11, R.A. (2 guns, mountain).
Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes.	{	2nd Punjab Cavalry. G-4, R.A. (field). Ordnance Field Park. 59th Foot. 2nd Sikh Infantry. 3rd Gurkhas. Section A, Field Hospital.

The strength of the force was¹:

British troops (including officers)	2,154
Native troops	5,095
Followers	7,273
Horses	1,942
Artillery mules	162
„ bullocks	547
„ elephants	13
Riding mules	162
Grasscutters' ponies	714
Transport camels	6,881
„ mules	789

General Barter's brigade moved by way of Tagak into the Khushk-i-Rud Valley, the remainder of the force by Jaldak to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, which was reached without incident on the 6th-7th of April.

Meanwhile, previous to his departure from Kanda-

¹ For a complete return of the division see Appendix XVII.

har, Sir Donald Stewart, on the 29th March, sent the following telegram to the Viceroy at Calcutta :

“I am not in possession of the orders of Government, nor have I received the programme for field operations now being commenced ; but I would point out that I am carrying forward from hence supplies for two months, and that I shall not require to draw more European supplies from India by Kabul or Kurram until the end of May. If it is intended that the division under my command move forward beyond Ghazni towards Kurram, supplies should be collected at some place in Kurram where the troops under my command may pass the remainder of the hot weather. By the information which I have received, no opposition is likely to be encountered at Ghazni which may not be easily overcome by the troops with which I am advancing. The movement of a column from Kabul to meet the division under my command will, in my opinion, increase the strain upon the country which the demands of this division for native supplies must entail. The collections of tribesmen under Muhammad Jan and Mushk-i-Alam have already drawn largely upon the supplies which are procurable in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and the uncertainty which prevails throughout the country has doubtless prevented large areas from being cultivated this spring. It is only with difficulty that sufficient transport has been obtained to allow of the division under my command being moved with full equipment, and I am calculating on replacing casualties amongst baggage animals by purchases made at Ghazni. I submit for consideration that it is very desirable that no movement of troops belonging to Kabul or Kurram command should be made in advance of Kushi. I have this morning received a telegram from Sir F. Roberts that he only proposes to supply, for my division at Ghazni, tea, sugar, and possibly rum, and that for all other supplies I must depend upon the country.

“I hope it will be understood that I do not require any supplies to be advanced from Kabul to meet me ;

and that if orders are given for my division to remain at Ghazni, I would at once establish communication with Kabul or Kurram as may be desired, sending my own transport to bring forward necessary supplies. I make this statement not with a view of disturbing any proposed plan of operations, but in order that there may be no misconception regarding the difficulty of feeding a large force at Ghazni during the present season."

On the 2nd April General Stewart wired further :

"I would recommend that a column be held in readiness at Kabul for movement. On arrival at Kalat-i-Ghilzai I shall be in a position to state with some precision the date on which I hope to reach Ghazni, by which date I think the column [from Kabul] should be at Shekhabad, as proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief."

The Commander-in-Chief telegraphed on the 31st to Sir Donald Stewart in the following terms, but the communication never reached him, and he acted in the spirit of the instructions which had emanated from the Government of India :

"Government of India desire that you may be informed of the entire plan of operations, and of the political objects desired by Government, which are thus summed up in a telegram from the Military Department: 'The Government is anxious to withdraw, as soon as possible, the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps are being taken for this purpose; meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation and will overawe disaffection; but it is not desirable to spread our troops over a large tract of country or to send small columns to any place where they would encounter opposition and increase the hostile feeling against us. All that is necessary, from the

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political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir F. Roberts at Kabul. This he can do either by the direct route or by Kushi, as he may think to be most expedient, under such conditions as may exist when he is at Ghazni. It is undesirable that Sir D. Stewart's troops should remain for long at Ghazni, and it is therefore necessary that all military dispositions should be made with a view to enabling him to leave Ghazni as soon as he has put down any open opposition that he may find there. It is very desirable that the operations in Afghanistan should, as soon as possible, be brought under one head. Sir D. Stewart should, therefore, assume the supreme command as soon as he is in direct communication with Kabul. In the meantime he should be daily kept informed, both by the Foreign Department and the Military Department, of all news received from Kabul, and from any part of the Khyber or Kurram lines of communication, so that he may be constantly and fully made aware of the exact state of the situation at all points.

“With reference to foregoing, which will be your guide, you will, on reaching Ghazni, open communication with Kabul either by the direct route or by Kushi, as may be found expedient, and assume supreme command. General Roberts has reported to Government that he is unable to carry out the proposed move to Kushi, the object of which was to open up communication with Kurram, and to be ready at Kushi to support you should you call for aid; he has been told therefore that he must send a column along the Ghazni direct road, so as to open communication with you and support you by the time you reach Ghazni. There has never been any intention of sending any of the Kabul force to Ghazni unless you called on them to move up. It has been arranged that six months' supplies for 5,000 British and 10,000 native troops shall

be collected in Kurram for any of your force withdrawn into the valley for the hot weather."

On the 7th April the Lieutenant-General telegraphed to the Government of India that he hoped to arrive at Ghazni on 21st April, and recommended that the column from Kabul should reach Shekhabad on the 20th April. Owing to unexpected difficulties about transport, he had not been able to take with him all the two months' supplies for British troops as intended, but arrangements had been made for the balance to be sent after him; he therefore proposed to ask General Roberts to despatch groceries and rum for British troops with the Shekhabad column from Kabul. General Stewart telegraphed to the same effect to General Roberts, asking him to send ten days' supplies of groceries, etc. for 2,200 Europeans.

On the 8th April the march of the Field Force was continued, 6-11, Royal Artillery, being transferred from Palliser's to Hughes's brigade, in order that the road might be prepared in advance for the heavy guns; two guns of 11-11 Mountain Battery joined General Palliser from Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and Nos. 4 and 10 Companies of Sappers.

General Barter's brigade and the Field Force headquarters with General Palliser's brigade advanced by the left and right bank of the Tarnak respectively, the 2nd Brigade following one march in rear of General Palliser. At Shahjui, which was reached on the 11th April, General Barter was only two miles from headquarters, and the two guns of 11-11, Royal Artillery, which had accompanied the latter from Kalat-i-Ghilzai, joined the head-quarters of the battery in the 1st Brigade.

On the 14th April the two leading brigades concentrated at Mukur, distant 155 miles from Kandahar and 74 miles from Kalat-i-Ghilzai; General Hughes's brigade still remained one march in rear. Since leaving Kalat-i-Ghilzai all the villages passed had been found deserted, and great difficulty was consequently experienced in collecting supplies for the natives and

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transport, although large foraging parties consisting generally of half the infantry of the force, taken from each unit, scoured the country on each side. On several occasions considerable bodies of hostile Afghans were seen by these parties hovering on the flanks of the column; on the 12th Sir Donald Stewart reported to Simla that opposition would probably be encountered within the next few days; and on the 15th a few shots were exchanged between the scouts on the right flank of the column and those of a large hostile force, said to be mostly Taraki and Suliman Khel Ghilzais. Similar incidents occurred on the 16th; on the 17th the main body halted at Jan Murad (Jamrad), where the whole force was concentrated and marched on together the next day. On this date (April 18th), a force estimated at from 8,000 to 10,000 Afghans was observed by scouts moving on a line parallel to General Stewart's advance, and distant some 8 or 10 miles from the right flank. Meanwhile, the difficulty in procuring supplies continued until Jan Murad was reached, where, thanks to the co-operation of the Hazaras, who were ready to help the British against their constant enemies, the Afghans, a large quantity of flour and grain was obtained.

On the morning of the 19th April the order of march of the 1st and 2nd Brigades was reversed, and the division left camp at Mashaki as follows:

19th Bengal Lancers	300 lances.		
A-B, Royal Horse Artillery	6 (9-pr.) guns.		
19th Punjab Infantry	470 rifles.		
Divisional Head- quarters, es- corted by	2-60th Rifles 25th Punjab Infantry		
	19th Bengal Lancers	85 " " " "	
Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Ben- gal Sappers and Miners	50 lances.		
	80 rifles.		
59th Foot	436 "		
3rd Gurkha Regiment	289 "		
2nd Sikh Infantry	367 "		
G-4, Royal Artillery	6 (9-pr.) guns.		
6-11, " "	2 (40-pr.) guns. 2 (6·3") howit- zers.		Main body, consisting of the 2nd Infantry Bri- gade, under Brigadier- General Hughes. Total: 1,092 rifles, 349 sabres, and 10 guns.
2nd Punjab Cavalry	349 sabres.		

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Field Hospitals	}	Baggage and supply trains with detachments on the flanks.
Ordnance and Engineer Field Parks		
Treasure		
Commissariat		
Baggage		
2-60th Rifles 443 rifles.	}	Rear guard, composed of the 1st Infantry Brigade, etc., under Brigadier- General Barter. Total: 1,393 rifles, 316 sabres, and 6 mountain guns.
15th Sikh Infantry 570 „		
25th Punjab Infantry 380 „		
11-11, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery) 6 (7-pr.) guns.		
1st Punjab Cavalry 316 sabres.		

The length of the entire column when on the march was about 6 miles.

Divisional head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade had marched about 7 miles and were halting for a short rest, when the cavalry of the advance guard reported that bodies of the enemy were in position 3 miles ahead. The Lieutenant-General directed the battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade to form on the left of the road, in line with the horse artillery battery. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry passed to the right, the country on that side being flat and open as far as the Ghazni River, some 3 miles distant. The 19th Punjab Infantry, head-quarters escort, and companies of sappers followed in reserve. The three batteries were in column of route on the road. An order was sent to Brigadier-General Barter to bring up half his infantry, and to despatch two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry to join the cavalry, of which Brigadier-General Palliser assumed command.

The advance being resumed, half a squadron of 19th Bengal Lancers were sent to cover the left flank of the infantry brigade, which was in close proximity to a range of low hills. These hills ran parallel to the road for some distance, and then bent round to the eastward, the track passing through them. The enemy were found to be in position at this point, and their standards planted along the ridge on both sides of the road. Their right wing extended for some distance, flanking the line by which the division would advance.

When within a mile and a half of the enemy, the horse artillery and field batteries moved out and took up positions to shell the ridge in front, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry supplying the escort to the horse artillery, and one company of the 19th Punjab Infantry protecting G-4. The 2nd Infantry Brigade deployed in line of quarter columns to the left of the guns, facing the enemy's right wing. One and a half squadrons of the 19th Bengal Lancers were now on the left of the infantry, protecting that flank. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry (three squadrons) were on the right of the artillery, which had also special escorts of one squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers, and one company of the 19th Punjab Infantry. The heavy guns unlimbered on a knoll close to the road, about 1,500 yards from the left of the field artillery. They were thus on the extreme left of the line. Between them and the 19th Bengal Lancers was a considerable gap. Behind the knoll were placed the equipment of the sapper companies, the infantry entrenching tools, etc. The troops detailed for the reserve were in rear of the left, while the Lieutenant-General placed himself on a slight elevation immediately behind the 19th Bengal Lancers.

At 9 o'clock, and before the intended attack of the position was developed, the crest of the range occupied by the enemy was observed to be swarming with men along a front of nearly 2 miles. Scarcely had the guns opened fire when from the enemy's centre rushed successive waves of swordsmen on foot, stretching out beyond either flank and seeming to envelop the troops. At the same time a large body of horse rode along the hills, threatening the left flank and rear. As the swordsmen on foot swept down on the infantry and guns, the Afghan horse poured along two ravines, which united at the foot of the hills, and in one mass charged the 19th Bengal Lancers before the latter could acquire sufficient speed to meet them fairly. The 19th were forced back in some confusion to their right rear, disordering the 3rd Gurkhas, who were the

left of the three battalions of infantry, which had now been formed into company squares. The enemy's mounted men having swept right through, disappeared on to the plain to the east. The 2nd Brigade then resumed the line formation and fired steady volleys.

Meantime the swordsmen on foot pressed their attack home with fanatical fury, and it became necessary to place the whole reserve in the fighting line. Half a battalion of the 19th Punjab Infantry and the Sapper companies were brought up on the left, and the other half battalion of the 19th, with the two companies of the Lieutenant-General's escort belonging to the 60th Rifles and 25th Punjab Infantry, were pushed in between the two batteries.

These were now firing case and reversed shrapnel at close ranges into the swarming Afghans, but neither this nor the heavy fire from the breechloaders of the infantry could stop the rush of the *ghazis*.

At this moment the situation was critical, and the 59th Foot received from a staff officer the order to retire from the depression in which they had formed. The Afghan horsemen, who were pushing round the left flank, were, however, checked by the firmness of the 3rd Gurkhas, while on the right the 2nd Punjab Cavalry charged and drove back the swordsmen on foot. The batteries of artillery, whose gallantry and discipline were highly commended by Sir D. Stewart, took up fresh positions, and the guns of G-4, Royal Artillery, being distributed in the infantry line, again opened fire. The 59th Foot, recovering from the confusion into which the two companies on the right had been thrown in obeying the order to refuse the right flank, poured a withering fire into the Afghans. In the centre the 2nd Sikhs gallantly maintained their position with unwavering steadiness.

A squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry relieved the squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers, acting as escort to the guns, and the other two squadrons of the former regiment relieved the Lancers on the left flank. Two

squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry having come up, they were joined by the 19th Bengal Lancers, and the whole, under Brigadier-General Palliser, were pushed to the right towards the river.

Meantime the steady fire of the Sikhs and Gurkhas began to tell. Checked by the deadly effect of the rifles, which mowed them down by hundreds, the enemy slackened their attack and began to retire, creeping off along the high hills to the west, where they came under the well-directed fire of Major Tillard's heavy battery, which prevented any attack being made on the left rear and the baggage column. Once the fanatical onslaught of the enemy was quenched, their defeat rapidly became a rout, and by 9.45 a.m. the whole body was broken up and dispersed over the country. The "cease fire" was sounded at 10 o'clock, the engagement having then lasted one hour. Towards the close of the fighting a portion of Brigadier-General Barter's infantry came up and reinforced the right centre.

Owing to the necessity for protecting the large parks and baggage, no pursuit was possible. The cavalry were therefore re-called, but not before the regiments on the right had been closely engaged.

The enemy lost very heavily; more than a thousand dead bodies lay thickly scattered on the ground in front of where the British line had stood. The numbers engaged on the Afghan side were probably about 15,000, the majority of whom were Ghilzais, but a large contingent of Alizai and other Duranis of Zamindawar had undoubtedly followed the British army from the neighbourhood of Kandahar and were forward in the fight. The total losses of the Afghans were probably about three thousand killed and wounded.

The casualties among the troops were slight, considering the fanatical onslaught of the enemy and consequently the close nature of the fighting. The artillery had one officer and two men wounded, also a *syce* killed. The 1st Punjab Cavalry (two squadrons)

had 19 men wounded, 32 horses wounded, and 5 missing. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry had 3 men and 5 horses killed, 2 officers, 20 men, and 21 horses wounded, and 2 horses missing. The 19th Bengal Lancers had 5 men and 3 horses killed, 4 officers, 3 native officers, 41 men, and 15 horses wounded, and 6 horses missing. The 59th Foot had 1 man killed and 2 officers and 10 men wounded. The 2nd Sikhs had 1 man killed and 10 wounded, including a muleteer. The 3rd Gurkhas had only 3 followers wounded. The 19th Punjab Infantry had 3 wounded; the Sappers and Miners, 1 wounded.

In the head-quarters escort, the 2-60th Rifles had 3 killed and 1 wounded, and the 25th Punjab Infantry 3 wounded; of the infantry of Brigadier-General Barter's brigade, 1 man of the 60th Rifles was wounded.

The total losses were 17 killed and 124 wounded, including officers and followers. Eight cavalry horses were killed, 68 wounded, and 13 missing.

After a halt of two hours, during which the killed were buried and the wounded attended to, the advance was resumed in compact formation, and passing over the ground occupied by the enemy, the division completed its march of 17 miles to Nani, where it halted for the night.

Two days later, on the 21st April, the division encamped outside the city of Ghazni (223 miles from Kandahar), and halted there for the next four days. From the top of the Sher Dahan Pass, on the 22nd, heliographic communication was established with Major-General J. Ross, who had advanced from Kabul to Saidabad, in the Wardak Valley. A reconnaissance was also made of the country north-east of Ghazni, which revealed the presence of a large body of hostile Afghans occupying the villages of Arzu and Shalez. Accordingly at 3.30 a.m., on the 23rd April, while a wing of the 19th Punjab Infantry was despatched to guard the gates of Ghazni, the following force marched out of camp to disperse the enemy:

THE FORCES ENGAGED

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Cavalry, 6 squadrons.	{	1st Punjab Cavalry . . .	322	sabres.	}	Under Briga- dier- General Palliser.
		2nd Punjab Cavalry . . .	325	,,		
Artillery, 2 batteries.	{	A-B, R.H.A.				
		11-11, R.A. (Mountain Battery).				
			647			
Infantry Bri- gade, 4 bat- talions.	{	British . . .	2-60th Rifles . . .	525	rifles.	}
		Native {	2nd Sikhs . . .	424	,,	
			15th Sikhs . . .	578	,,	
			25th Punjab In- fantry . . .	458	,,	
			Total . . .	1,985	,,	
				1,985		Under Briga- dier- General Barter.

After marching some 3 miles from camp a ridge was ascended, from the top of which was seen, about 3,000 yards off, a great number of the enemy (about 6,000 strong) in a position between two villages, Arzu and Shalez, which were both strongly enclosed with mud walls and some half a mile apart.

About 5 a.m. the Royal Horse Artillery guns opened fire with common shell and those of the mountain battery with similar charges, the right half-battery of A-B shelling the village of Shalez, and the left half-battery and mountain guns laying on Arzu.

After a few rounds had been fired by both batteries, A-B advanced and took up a position from which the 9-prs. could fire at 1,800, 1,700, and 1,600 yards, shelling the villages with common shell, and from time to time firing shrapnel with time fuzes, as the enemy showed themselves; but the Afghans had capital cover in both villages. Simultaneously the mule battery 11-11, Royal Artillery, was advanced, firing at different ranges, but none at less than 1,400 yards.

By 8.30 a.m. it was evident that the cover in the villages was too good for the enemy to be much shaken by the fire, and Brigadier-General Palliser considered that the force with him was not sufficiently strong to attack the position. He communicated (by heliograph) accordingly with Sir Donald Stewart, and at the same time withdrew the batteries to their first positions.

Meanwhile, in the absence of the troops under Brigadier-General Palliser, the 2nd Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Hughes, had got under arms and taken up a position to cover the camp, whilst the 19th Bengal Lancers were pushed forward about a mile as a connecting link with the troops engaged at Arzu and Shalez.

On receiving Brigadier-General Palliser's first report, Sir Donald Stewart promptly despatched the following troops :

59th Foot (half battalion),
3rd Gurkhas (6 companies),

to reinforce him. But even with this additional strength Brigadier-General Palliser did not consider himself justified in making the attack with the troops then at his disposal, and withdrew, as before mentioned, to a position on the ridge some 2,500 yards short of the villages held by the enemy.

Consequently Sir Donald Stewart himself advanced with the remainder of the troops under Brigadier-General Hughes, *viz.* :

19th Bengal Lancers,
G-4, R.A.,
59th Foot (half battalion),
19th Punjab Infantry (half battalion),

the protection of the camp being entrusted to Major Tillard, R.A., who had at his disposal—

6-11, R.A.,
Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
2 companies 3rd Gurkhas,

with the usual standing guards. At 11 a.m. the Lieutenant-General personally assumed command, and the troops were formed for attack; the disposition of the force being as follows :

Major H. de G. Warter was ordered to take his horse battery (A-B) to the right of General Barter's infantry brigade, and to open fire as soon as he could do so with good effect, taking ground to the right all

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the time, so as to take the enemy in the front of the villages on their flank; the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 19th Bengal Lancers supported the horse artillery on the right flank against Shalez.

Sir John Campbell, on his arrival with G-4, was ordered to come into action on the left of Brigadier-General Hughes, supported by a company of the 59th Foot and a cavalry regiment (2nd Punjab) some little way to the left. At the same time 11-11, Royal Artillery, Major Harris's mule battery, was placed under Brigadier-General Hughes's orders in the centre of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Major Warter came into action several times, moving forward at intervals at a steady gallop, until he was within 800 yards of the flank, when his fire was very effective in scattering the enemy. Sir John Campbell's guns likewise opened fire on the left village (Arzu) at a range of about 1,720 yards, directing their shell on the enclosures in front and to the right and left of the village, with an occasional shell into the village itself.

Major Harris's mountain guns formed part of the direct attack and advanced with the fighting line, which was formed for attack and moved forward at 11.40 a.m. These guns came into action at different ranges from 1,400 to 900 yards, when the position was rushed and the enemy fled from the villages closely followed by the infantry, who were again accompanied by Harris's and Campbell's batteries. Major Warter was ordered to detach half a battery to join the cavalry on the right in pursuit, and was supported by detachments of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 19th Bengal Lancers, as well as by a company of the 2nd Sikhs, who kept up with the battery in a wonderful manner. Sir John Campbell had meantime detached two guns to join the cavalry on the left, which did good service by their fire on the retreating bodies of the enemy.

The enemy's loss was estimated at 400 men, the British casualties being two killed and eight wounded.

The Kandahar force proceeded on its march two days later, but, just after leaving Ghazni, the following orders were on the 24th April communicated to Sir Donald Stewart from Simla :

“As soon as Sir D. Stewart has opened up communication with General Ross, he is to proceed to Kabul and assume supreme command. He should take no steps for the withdrawal of the Ghazni force by the Kurram until he has had an opportunity of personally acquainting himself with the state of things at Kabul, and until the results of the present gathering of the sardars and tribes have declared themselves. The wall of Ghazni should be breached, and a plan made of the place as it stands.”

In reply to the above, the Lieutenant-General despatched two messages to Head-quarters on the 24th and 25th, respectively, as follows :

To the Quartermaster-General, Simla.

“In reply to His Excellency’s telegram from Simla, dated 20th, I propose to place the Kandahar Division for the present at the head of the Logar Valley between Charkh and Purak, proceeding myself with General Ross’s force to Kabul. 6-11, Royal Artillery, the heavy battery, will go to Kabul. All information tends to prove that Muhammad Jan is now doing his utmost to rouse the tribes in this neighbourhood to attack the Paiwar Kotal. Such an attack is not at all probable, but it is probable that we shall be attacked when we go to Ali Khel, and that General Watson will meet with considerable opposition on the Shutargardan.”

To the Adjutant-General, India.

“His Excellency’s telegram of the 20th from Simla reached me too late to admit of my breaching the walls of Ghazni. As, however, the defences of Ghazni are contemptible, I do not think the matter is important. I brought away with me two field guns said to have been left at Ghazni after the last occupation,

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“In accordance with the orders of His Excellency, I proceed to Kabul from Saidabad with General Ross’s force.”

The Field Force encamped on the 25th April at Shashgao, where General Stewart was visited by Major-General J. Hills, C.B., V.C., who, with four other officers and an escort of 3rd Punjab Cavalry, rode over from General Ross’s camp at Saidabad. Continuing the march on the following days, the Sajawan Pass was reconnoitred by Captain Broome, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, on the 27th, who reported it unsuitable for the passage of laden animals. On the 28th the Field Force headquarters with General Hughes’s and Palliser’s brigades marched to Saidabad, and General Barter’s brigade to Shekhabad (265½ miles from Kandahar), and reconnaissances were made from each of these camps to the Zamburak Pass and the Tangi Wardak defile respectively. The latter proved impassable to wheeled artillery. On the same date Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart handed over the command of the Ghazni Field Force to Brigadier-General Hughes, whose brigade was henceforward commanded by Colonel R. Lacy of the 59th Foot; the Lieutenant-General himself joined General Ross’s camp at Shekhabad, with a view to proceeding to Kabul to assume supreme command of the British forces in Afghanistan.

The following message was despatched by General Stewart to Army Head-quarters on the 28th:

“The following is distribution of Ghazni Field Force: To-day General Barter’s brigade is at Shekhabad, General Hughes’s and Palliser’s at Saidabad. The constitution of these brigades is unchanged, except that 6-11, Royal Artillery (heavy), has joined General Ross’s column, and will proceed with them to Kabul. I start for Kabul to-morrow (29th) with General Ross, reaching there on 2nd May. General Hughes commands the Field Force temporarily, and has been instructed to have the roads from Shekhabad and Saidabad to the Logar Valley reconnoitred and made

practicable; when this is done, both columns will march simultaneously, effecting a junction in the Logar Valley at Amir Kala. The Field Force will then proceed to about Purak and Charkh, and be located there till further orders. Advantage will be taken of the halt to reconnoitre thoroughly in all directions, and furnish opportunity for survey work. General Hughes has been requested, when possible, to move a portion of the troops under his command to a post in a more northerly direction, so as to open and maintain communication with Kabul." On the 29th the Zamburak Kotal was again reconnoitred and the road over it improved the following day.

On the 30th April General Barter's brigade moved from Shekhabad by the Tangi Wardak defile to Amir Kala, whither it was followed on the 1st and 2nd May by General Palliser's and Colonel Lacy's (late Hughes's) brigades, from Saidabad *viâ* the Zamburak Pass. The former included the horse artillery battery, which was man-handled down the incline; with the latter proceeded the other battery on the following day, the track having been further improved meanwhile, consequently less difficulty was experienced. General Barter marched on the latter date to Barak-i-Barak, and there the division again concentrated on the 3rd May. One reconnaissance was sent out under Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Maclean, 1st Punjab Cavalry, to the Altimur Pass, and a rough survey of the country made up to the watershed; and a second under Captain G. M. Abbott, 19th Bengal Lancers, towards Hisarak. The road to the latter place was also diligently pushed forward during the next few days, and on the 8th May the head-quarters of the division, with General Palliser's and Colonel Lacy's brigades, were established there. General Barter's brigade on the same day marched to Yusuf Kala, where he pitched his camp 2 or 3 miles from the mouth of the Charkh Valley, and separated by a low ridge from the Logar Valley. Communication was established with Hisarak by a

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road across the Logar River and Valley. Supplies were brought in freely during this period, and no hostility was shown by the inhabitants beyond one or two shots being fired at reconnoitring parties.

Meanwhile, on the 5th May, Lieutenant-General Stewart assumed command of the forces in Afghanistan, and on the 13th the fact was notified in the following General Order :

General Orders by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated
Head-quarters, Simla, 13th May, 1880.

“ In continuation of G.O.C.C., dated 13th March, 1880 (p. 144), it is notified that Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, K.C.B., having arrived at Kabul, has, as senior officer, assumed command of the troops there and on the line of communication.

“ 2. With the sanction of Government, the whole force under the command of Sir D. Stewart, K.C.B., will be called ‘ *The Northern Afghanistan Field Force*,’ and will consist of :

“ I.—The 1st and 2nd Divisions of what has been heretofore known as ‘ *The Kabul Field Force*,’ which will become the 1st and 2nd Divisions, respectively, of ‘ *The Northern Afghanistan Field Force*,’ and remain under the immediate command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, K.C.B., C.I.E., V.C. ;

“ II.—‘ *The Ghazni Field Force*,’ which will become the 3rd Division of ‘ *The Northern Afghanistan Field Force*’ ;

“ III.—‘ *The Khyber Line Force*,’ which will keep its present name ; and

“ IV.—Should the forces touch, ‘ *The Kurram Force*,’ which will retain its present designation.”

On the 16th May Major-General James Hills, C.B., V.C., was appointed to command the 3rd Division, Northern Afghanistan Field Force (late Ghazni Field Force), and joined the camp at Hisarak on the same date.

CHAPTER XII

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST DIVISION, KABUL FIELD FORCE,
FROM JANUARY TO APRIL, 1880.

WE must now return to the events at Kabul, which had hitherto been the chief centre of operations during the campaign. The opening of the new year found the Field Force there under Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts enjoying the results of their recent success. The defeat of the Afghans had dispersed the combination of hostile tribes in a manner more effectual than weeks of desultory operations such as those which had preceded it. The news of the British victory had spread over the country, the clansmen round Kabul were subdued, at least for the time, and the military position of the British forces in Afghanistan was apparently assured.

On the 7th January a detailed despatch from the Indian Government to the Secretary of State reviewed the situation and outlined the proposed course of military and political action in the immediate future. After commenting on the failure of the attempt to establish at Kabul a powerful and friendly ruler of a united Afghanistan in the person of Yakub Khan, the despatch draws the conclusion that the only course to be pursued was the dismemberment of the country into the separate provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, and the arrangements of such a plan are discussed. It is not, however, necessary to consider these proposals at length, since they were afterwards subjected to important modification.

About the same date as this despatch a scheme of military operations for the ensuing spring was

submitted by the Commander-in-Chief to the Government of India, through the Military Department. It suggested the march of Sir Donald Stewart's division by Ghazni to Kabul, as described in the last chapter; it also proposed operations from Kabul towards Kohistan and Bamian, and from the Khyber against the Ghilzais in the Laghman Valley, and the advance of a force from Kurram over the Shutargardan to Kabul. In the event of the tribesmen again renewing hostilities against Kabul in the spring, it would thus be possible within a very short time to assemble a large force from all the above-named quarters at the capital.

Meanwhile, however, reinforcements were required to replace casualties and invalids. Recommendations were put forward by the Commander-in-Chief to improve the recruiting for the Native Army, and proposals were also urged for the accumulation of stores of all sorts at Kabul before the beginning of the hot weather.

The latter question was one of much importance. As already stated, the lack of forage at the capital had necessitated the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 14th Bengal Lancers being sent to Jalalabad and Gandamak respectively; and at the same time all spare transport animals at Kabul were sent down the line, some to Peshawar, to be fitted with saddles, and others to work on the Khyber line until again required at Kabul. On the 6th January 1,000 of these transport animals left Sherpur with a convoy of sick and wounded, accompanied by Colonel C. M. MacGregor, who was to meet General Bright and confer with him on the disposition of the troops from Jamrud to Lataband.

On the 1st of the month Kabul was visited by several leading men of the Hazara tribe, who were well disposed to the British, and had held Ghazni in our interest until the 20th December, when it was seized by the Afghan tribesmen. During the same week a number of the Kohistani chiefs also came to the capital, as well as some headmen from Logar and several chiefs of the Ghilzais, amongst their number being the

influential Padshah Khan. The opportunity was therefore taken of holding a darbar, which took place under the presidency of Sir Frederick Roberts on the 9th January, and at which Sardar Shahbaz Khan was installed as Governor of Kohistan, and the intentions of the British were explained by the General.

On the 10th January General Roberts was asked to state his views as to operations to be undertaken in the coming spring, and he replied on the 13th in detail as follows :

“ With reference to your telegram of the 10th instant to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my proposals as to operations to be undertaken in Kohistan and Bamian in the spring, I have the honour to state that, as soon as the severe weather is over, it is my intention to move the force from Sherpur, which from its great extent requires a large garrison, to the Siah Sang hill.

“ The force will then be distributed between the Siah Sang (in an entrenched camp) and the Bala Hissar, where commissariat and ordnance stores, etc., will be duly protected.

“ These two forces should consist of not less than a division of infantry, and should comprise :

Two British infantry regiments,
Five native infantry regiments,

as well as—

Two Bengal cavalry regiments,
One battery horse or field artillery,
Four mountain guns,
One company Sappers and Miners ;

also sufficient gunners to work the heavy Afghan guns which will be in position.

“ This force will be sufficient to protect Kabul and to ensure the tranquillity of the surrounding country, as well as to act as an immediate reserve to the troops employed in the direction of Bamian, Ghazni, or elsewhere.

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“For such field operations a force of the following strength should be at my disposal :

Two British infantry regiments,
Five native infantry regiments,
A brigade of cavalry,
One battery horse or field artillery,
One heavy battery,
Eight mountain guns,
Three companies Sappers and Miners.

“To bring the force now at Kabul up to the above strength I shall require :

One heavy battery,
A detachment of garrison gunners,
Two regiments native infantry.

* * * * *

“I annex a statement showing the posts which I consider should be maintained between Jamrud and Lataband, to enable me to take the field without anxiety for my communications with India by the Khyber route.

“This has been drawn up in consultation with General Bright, who, in lieu of a wing of native infantry at Dakka and 600 men at Ali Masjid, would prefer to have a regiment at the former, and 800 men at the latter, post.

“My object is to render each post strong enough to resist attack, and to form three small compact movable columns at Gandamak, Jalalabad, and Landi Kotal, respectively, as I consider that the safety of the line will be better secured in this manner than by posts of greater strength without movable columns.

“To admit of these posts being held, and movable columns being formed, General Bright's force will have to be increased by :

Two regiments British infantry,
Four regiments native infantry,
Two mountain guns ;

and the total increase to the Kabul Field Force, as it stood on the 1st instant, will be :

One heavy battery,
 Some garrison gunners (for Afghan guns of position),
 Two mountain guns,
 Two regiments British infantry,
 Six regiments native infantry.

“If mountain guns can be sent, one field battery now in the Khyber can well be spared.

“I am addressing the Adjutant-General regarding the strength of the different regiments at Kabul, also about ammunition supplies.

“I desire in this letter to suggest, for His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's consideration, the advisability of letting the 10th, 12th, and 14th regiments of Bengal Cavalry proceed now to the nearest trans-Indus point where grass is plentiful, as the horses are done up and require rest. These regiments would then be fit for service by the end of March, the duty between Lataband and Basawal being taken meanwhile by other corps.

“If these proposals meet with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, I trust His Excellency will urge upon Government the desirability of increasing General Bright's force as I have recommended, without delay, in order that the districts of Laghman and Hisarak may be visited as soon as possible. The Khans of those districts have never yet felt the British power, and will assuredly break out and again disturb our communications on the first signs of disaffection in Kabul.

“On the other hand, if now dealt with, they will give us no anxiety in future; and when the season advances, we shall probably be able to place the majority of our troops in cooler and healthier localities than Jalalabad and other stations of low elevation.

“In conclusion, I think that the increase to the present Kabul garrison of the battery of heavy artillery and two native infantry regiments should be deferred

until the season for active operations arrives, as it is undesirable to have a larger force than is absolutely necessary in Sherpur during the winter months.

“I would name the 20th March as the date by which these additional troops should reach Kabul.

“Statement of posts proposed to be held between
Lataband and Jamrud.”

<i>Lataband</i>	{	Two mountain guns. 24th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Jagdalak and Seh Baba</i>		45th Sikhs.
<i>Jagdalak Kotal and Pezwan</i>		51st Light Infantry.
<i>Gandamak</i> (to hold fort and form movable column)	{	Two squadrons 3rd Bengal Cavalry. Two guns 11-9, Royal Artillery. Two guns Hazara Mountain Battery. 12th Foot. 22nd Punjab Infantry. 27th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Fort Battys</i> to be abandoned and a new post formed near <i>Rozabad</i>	{	One squadron 3rd Bengal Cavalry. Two companies 4th Madras Infantry.
<i>Jalalabad Fort</i>	{	One squadron Carabiniers. One squadron 17th Bengal Cavalry. Six companies 4th Madras Infantry.
<i>Jalalabad Movable Column</i>	{	One squadron Carabiniers. One squadron 17th Bengal Cavalry. Four guns 11-9, Royal Artillery. 25th Foot. 30th Punjab Infantry. 31st Punjab Infantry.
<i>Ali Boghan</i>		50 men 8th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Barikao</i>	{	One troop 17th Bengal Cavalry. 150 men 8th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Basawal</i>	{	One squadron Carabiniers. One troop 17th Bengal Cavalry. 390 men 8th Bengal Infantry.

“The Field Artillery, 2nd Division, to remain undisturbed as at present.

“The reserve division to take up all posts to and inclusive of Dakka, *viz.* :

<i>Dakka</i>	{	1½ troops native cavalry. Four guns Field Artillery. One company British infantry. One wing native infantry.
<i>Haft Chah</i>		50 men, native infantry.
<i>Landi Khana</i>	{	Half troop native cavalry. 60 native infantry.

<i>Landi Kotal garrison</i>	{	One squadron native cavalry. 500 infantry. Two field guns.
<i>Landi Kotal Movable Column</i>	{	1,000 infantry. Two mountain guns.
<i>Kata Kushtia</i>		18 native infantry.
<i>Ali Masjid</i>	{	One troop native cavalry. 600 native infantry.
<i>Fort Maude</i>		25 native infantry.
<i>Jamrud</i>	{	One troop native cavalry. 250 native infantry."

The above statement was followed on the 28th of January and 5th of February, respectively, by the two communications from Sir Frederick Roberts which are given below.

1. *Despatch from Kabul, No. 24 of 1880.*

“Ghazni for the present may be looked upon as the centre of disaffection, many of those who were at Kabul having made for that place after having been defeated here; and Musa Jan, the infant son of the ex-Amir, has been set up there as Sovereign of Afghanistan, and his rule proclaimed. The country is undoubtedly greatly excited, but though constant rumours of projected attacks are industriously circulated, no offensive movements have been undertaken, and I see no reason to anticipate at present any attack in force, though doubtless later on, unless we take the initiative, a combination against us is more than probable.

“The past month has been devoted to strengthening Sherpur cantonment, improving the defences of the Bala Hissar, which the arrival of General C. Gough’s brigade enabled me to hold; the opening out of communications which may prove of great service hereafter; and the collection of commissariat stores, principally forage, which the events of December interrupted. Into these matters I propose to go at some length for His Excellency’s information.

“Although much was accomplished in placing Sherpur in a state of defence previous to the Afghan attack, much still remained, and this has now been

THE STRENGTHENING OF KABUL 373

almost entirely completed. The most noticeable improvements are the completion of the blockhouses on the Bimaru heights, the construction of a long loop-holed wall connecting the native field hospital with the Bimaru village, and the strengthening of all the works along the eastern and northern faces, and at the north-east corner.

“An esplanade of a depth of 1,000 yards has been cleared all round the position ; the villages, walls, and woods which came within this radius have been cleared away, and all cover for an attacking force as far as possible destroyed.

“A good military road, suitable for field artillery, now encircles the cantonment, and is connected by branch roads with all the gates ; whilst the village of Deh Afghan, the Aliabad Kotal, and the Kabul River, have all been united with cantonments. An excellent bridge has been constructed by the 23rd Pioneers at a point on the Kabul River to the eastward of, and well removed from, the city. It is not intended to carry guns, the sappers and miners being employed upon a more massive and permanent pile-bridge a short distance down-stream.

“The fortified village of Kala Ibrahim, which stands about 150 yards beyond the river, is being prepared for the reception of a detachment, and will form an admirable bridge-head. These works will render communication with the Bala Hissar and the Siah Sang heights permanently safe. For the convenience of local traffic, and in anticipation of the spring floods, another bridge is being erected close to the site of the old stone bridge under the remains of the walls of Kala Muhammad ; but as this road runs for a considerable distance within pistol-shot of the city walls, it clearly would not do to depend on it alone.

“A blockhouse and small entrenched camp will be provided at the western end of Siah Sang. These will command our direct line of communications with India ; and with them in existence and the Bala Hissar held, no enemy could venture on the plain to the east of Kabul.

“The interior defences of the Bala Hissar have been much improved; broad roads have been opened out, lateral communications established, and the banquette, which in many places was destroyed, repaired and made practicable. The hill above is now being rendered very defensible by a strong blockhouse on its summit, supporting two smaller posts to the south.

“Connection between these posts and the Bala Hissar itself is maintained by the old and partially ruined walls, which form an excellent covered way.


“A magazine is also being constructed in the upper Bala Hissar, sufficiently large to contain all the ammunition which His Excellency wishes held in reserve at Kabul,—namely, 600 rounds per rifle.

“With the increase of the force by General C. Gough’s brigade and the completion of the improvements above related, I anticipate no difficulty in holding both Sherpur and the Bala Hissar, and also in preventing the enemy occupying the city, unless the townspeople should rise *en masse* against us.

“The Commissariat Department, under Major Badcock, has worked admirably. Since the 25th of December 17,712 maunds of bhusa and 2,840 sheep have been purchased and brought in; and, with the exception of one or two articles of minor importance, the entire force is provided for for the next three months. The actual supply of bhusa in store is sufficient for 54 days only, but current expenditure is met from current collection, so this reserve is intact. Several convoys have arrived, bringing almost entirely warm clothing, with some rum and a few hundred maunds of *dhal*.


“There are now at present in Sherpur the following rounds of ammunition :

Per field gun	356
„ mountain gun	277
„ Martini-Henry	386
„ Snider	337
„ M.-H. carbine	202



TEMPORARY BRIDGE OVER KABUL RIVER AT JALALABAD, 1880 (CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PORTIONS)

Aliabad
Kotal



NORTH-WEST CORNER OF SHERPUR CANTONMENT, SHOWING THE ALIABAD KOTAL p. 374

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“ A dispensary has been established in the city, under the supervision of Surgeon Charles Owen, in medical charge of the divisional staff. It is popular amongst the natives, and several of those who were wounded during the recent operations have attended for surgical aid.

“ At present, having regard to the extent of the position which we hold, I do not feel it to be advisable to move out and take the field, and, apart from this, the country is covered with snow, and is most difficult for man and beast ; and, save under exceptional circumstances, I should not feel myself justified in incurring the inevitable losses, both amongst the troops, their followers, and the transport animals, that must ensue from exposure at this season.

“ As it is most desirable that I should be in a position to take the initiative and anticipate the combination which will probably be organised, I trust that the troops named in the margin and asked for by me in my confidential letter No. 1217, dated 13th instant, may be despatched so as to arrive at Kabul not later than the 15th of March.

“ Should I, meanwhile, be seriously threatened, I would, of course, call upon General Bright, c.B., to send towards Kabul the movable column at Gandamak, and, if necessary, that at Jalalabad also ; and as the posts *en route* are now held in strength, it is unlikely that the troops coming up would meet with sufficient opposition to prevent their moving rapidly on Kabul within five or six days.

“ Should occasion necessitate the sending for reinforcements, it is tolerably certain the excitement would spread more or less along the line of communications ; it is, therefore, most desirable that transport should always be kept up at Peshawar to enable sufficient troops of the reserve division to be pushed up rapidly

Some garrison gunners.
One heavy (siege) battery.
Two regiments native infantry, and details sufficient to make each infantry regiment up to 800 strong.
Artillery and cavalry in proportion.

to fill the places of General Bright's movable columns."

Sir Frederick Roberts then entered into the detail of the fortifications proposed for the Bala Hissar and the Sher Darwaza and Asmai hills, showing the number of men actually required for the defence of each; the number of guns, and where placed; the quality and supply of water; the shelter proposed for commissariat stores, troops, followers, and transport animals; the supply of fuel, and the position and capacity of proposed magazine accommodation, etc., and continued:

"XI.—During the late operations the enemy did not fail to make use of the fine natural position afforded by the Siah Sang heights, and in order to prevent this in future, and also to preserve unmolested communication between Sherpur and the Bala Hissar, I find it advisable to erect on the south-east corner of these heights a small fort, to hold a wing of infantry and four heavy guns. A good road running from Sherpur to the north-east foot of Siah Sang, and thence under cover of the fort to the Bala Hissar, is already near completion. This includes a permanent bridge over the Kabul River due south of the south-east corner of Sherpur.

"XII.—To protect this bridge and to flank the open country to the south of Sherpur, I have placed a fort,¹ known as Kala Ibrahim Khan, in a state of defence, and I propose to garrison it with three companies of infantry. These two forts will effectually block the approaches to Kabul from the east, and prevent any attack being attempted on the south face of the Sherpur cantonment.

"XIII.—The position of Sherpur has already been described. The total line of parapet to be defended is 8,000 yards; and the garrison at present consists of the whole of my force, except General C. Gough's brigade in the Bala Hissar.

"XIV.—The defences of Sherpur have been daily

¹ Afghan fortified village.



NORTH-EAST CORNER OF SHERPUR CANTONMENT

strengthened, and I have no hesitation in saying that they are now in a state which precludes the possibility of a successful attack on them.

“XV.—In order to complete the defence of this place and to prevent the enemy from again entering the city, it will, however, be necessary to erect a small but strong fort on the Asmai hill. This will not only prevent the above, but would paralyse any attempt directed on the west face of the cantonments.

“XVI.—In addition to these measures, I have ordered a committee, under the presidency of Colonel Jenkins, C.B., to consider what part in the defence of the city can properly be taken by those of the inhabitants whose self-interest can be relied on to induce them to aid us. I have not yet received the report, but it will doubtless tend to provide further measures to prevent the enemy entering the city.

“XVII.—Again, a broad gun-road has been made outside all round Sherpur to the Deh Mazang gorge and to the Siah Sang ridge, and this, with the roads already existing, will enable me to move out a force of all arms in any direction. Moreover, all the forts and enclosures within 1,000 yards of the walls of Sherpur have been levelled, so that now there is no more of that cover from which the enemy were enabled to annoy us during the late operations.

“XVIII.—Having thus effectually arranged to prevent the possibility of an attack on the south and west faces of Sherpur, it only remains to consider the north and east fronts. The north face of the Bimaru ridge is strongly entrenched, but even were it not so, I should have no anxiety for this side, the country in this direction being so open that the enemy are to the last degree unlikely to attempt to attack it.

“XIX.—The east face also causes me no anxiety, as although it was at first the weakest part of our position, it is now about the strongest; and in order to attack it, the enemy must traverse under our eyes a large extent of open country, and fatally expose his

line of retreat, whether he came from Kohistan in the north or from Logar or Maidan in the south and west.

“XX.—The position thus described, though an extensive one, comprises the smallest area that would secure all requirements of the present time. The force under my command is ample for purely defensive purposes, but as in the event of another rising of the country in anything like the same strength as the last, I should be very loth to adhere to a strictly defensive attitude, I consider that my force should be increased by at least two more regiments of infantry. If this is done, and taking into consideration the greater security from attack of the Sherpur position, I should be in a position to keep a movable column always ready to sally out and attack the enemy.

“XXI.—In regard to the other points in your telegram under reply, the number of guns in position should be four heavy in the Bala Hissar, and four on Siah Sang.

“XXII.—The water-supply of Sherpur is good and ample, and cannot be cut off; that in the Bala Hissar is also ample and safe, and is now being improved. In the Siah Sang position, the ordinary supply would come from the canal from the Logar River which runs below; but as this could be cut off, wells must be dug in the low ground below, under cover of the rifles of the fort. The supply of Sher Darwaza and Asmai posts is no doubt difficult, but arrangements, as I have said, will be made to store seven days' supply, and more can be taken up on mules.

“XXIII.—The commissariat stores are at present situated within the Sherpur cantonments, and are well protected, being surrounded by an entrenchment and 'laager.' Hereafter they will all be placed in the Bala Hissar. The same remarks apply to the ordnance stores, and to the stores of fuel, which latter are ample for all requirements, while any amount now is easily procurable.



CORNER OF SHERPUR CANTONMENT, NEAR BIMARU VILLAGE, SHOWING IMPROVED FORTIFICATIONS OF COLONEL JENKINS' SECTION ; PAGHMAN RANGE IN BACKGROUND

“XXIV.—The troops under my command are now fully and comfortably housed in Sherpur and the Bala Hissar, as also are the followers. The bulk of the transport animals are provided with shelter in the Bimaru village.

“XXV.—The amount of ammunition in store and in regimental possession at present is as follows :

Martini-Henry carbine	202	rounds per carbine.
Snider carbine	200	” ” ”
Martini-Henry rifle	386	” ” rifle.
Snider rifle	337	” ” ”
9-pr. guns	356	” ” gun.
7-pr. ”	338	” ” ”

“XXVI.—I must now proceed to consider the position which should be held when the state of the weather will permit of our taking the field. This question altogether depends upon whether it would be necessary to continue to hold Sherpur, or whether we should abandon it. I am quite of opinion that even if it were necessary to maintain our hold on it, it would not be necessary to keep up a full garrison for it, as, if another fort like that already existing on the east end of Bimaru is constructed on the west hill, it would be impossible for any enemy to hold the place for a minute. However, as it may not be possible to provide sufficient shelter elsewhere in time, I request early orders whether Government will require a force to remain at Kabul for another winter.

“XXVII.—Should this step not be contemplated, I would propose to abandon Sherpur and draw in the lines of defences closer round the city. The Bala Hissar and the Asmai positions would remain the same, and that on Siah Sang would be extended, so as to provide space for two battalions of infantry.”

The result of these communications was that on the 20th February the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief for the operations in the spring which have been mentioned (p. 368) were sanctioned by the Government of India; but the advance of Sir Frederick

Roberts, however, to Bamian was excluded from this approval, since it was considered that its necessity on political and military grounds had not yet been established. No movements were, however, contemplated before April, and the first three months of the year at Kabul were, from a military point of view, uneventful. The measures which had been undertaken for the defence of the positions occupied by the British at the capital were pushed on; arrangements were completed for sending all invalids to India in a series of convoys, and efforts were made for increasing the transport with the force, which was still seriously deficient.

On the 12th February some 200 Hazaras from near Ghazni, under the leadership of Saiad Muhammad, arrived in Kabul for the purpose of paying their respects to General Roberts. This tribe had been in constant conflict with Muhammad Jan near Ghazni, and they admitted that they were beaten in their first fight with him, but reported that they had since got the best of it, and a truce between the two parties had been agreed upon till the 21st March.

During February a corps of Mounted Infantry was formed by Sir Frederick Roberts at Kabul. For this purpose detachments of the following strength were selected from each infantry regiment in the 1st Division, and from the 45th Sikhs :


British regiment.

1 Officer.
3 Sergeants.
3 Corporals.
1 Bugler.
53 Men.

Native regiment.

1 British officer.
1 Native officer.
3 Havildars.
3 Naiks.
1 Bugler.
53 Men.

The training and superintendence of the corps were placed in the hands of a committee, of which Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, c.B., was the President, but the efficacy of the measure was largely discounted by the fact that it was only sanctioned on the under-



TEMPORARY BRIDGE OVER KABUL RIVER AT JALALABAD, 1880 (SOUTHERN PORTION)



SAPPERS' AND MINERS' BASTION, WEST FACE, SHERPUR CANTONMENT

standing that no separate establishment of animals would be asked for, since it was an important element in the scheme that it aimed at the utilisation of transport ponies (*yabus*) when available for the purpose. Sir M. Kennedy, the head of the Commissariat and Transport Department, therefore pointed out that, looking to the great difficulty that existed in equipping the forces in the field with transport necessary for their requirements, it could not be anticipated that there would be many surplus transport animals available for mounted infantry purposes.

On the 1st March, Brigadier-General Massy, having been recalled to India, was succeeded in the command of the Cavalry Brigade by Brigadier-General H. H. Gough, v.c., c.B.

On the 13th March the Commander-in-Chief directed that the force in Kabul, under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, should be formed into two divisions—the 1st Division to be under General Roberts's immediate command, and the 2nd Division under Major-General J. Ross, C.B. The whole force, under General Roberts, was to be termed "*The Kabul Field Force.*"

Meanwhile there had been important changes in the political situation in Afghanistan. On the 9th March Muhammad Jan was reported to have gone to Wardak to confer with the Mustaufi. The latter personage, Habibulla Khan, had been Finance Minister to Yakub Khan, and after the massacre of the British Envoy he was one of the officers who were sent by the Amir to Ali Khel to try and delay General Roberts's advance. Along with all the other Afghan ministers, he was put under arrest by General Roberts on his arrival in Kabul; but the Commission which enquired into the circumstances of the massacre found so little against him that he was released on security, only, however, to be again confined during the attack on Sherpur. His behaviour at that time was greatly in his favour, as he resisted all the offers of Muhammad Jan, and advised the latter to desist from his attempt. After the defeat of the

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Afghans he was released unconditionally, and showed himself anxious to aid Sir F. Roberts in bringing about a settlement of the country. With this object he left Sherpur, in the hope of bringing in all the opposing chiefs to Sherpur, to state what their views and intentions were to General Roberts, so that, if possible, some peaceful arrangement might be arrived at.

At this time the Indian Government was equally anxious to retire from Kabul in the ensuing autumn, or, if possible, earlier, and to withdraw also from Kandahar as soon as the rule of the Wali Sher Ali Khan should be established there. The immediate difficulty was to find a strong ruler for Northern Afghanistan, and in this dilemma the eyes of Kabul politicians were turned towards Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan.

This sardar was the son of Mir Afzal Khan, the eldest son of Dost Muhammad, and consequently the nephew of the late Amir Sher Ali. Since 1868, when he was defeated near Bamian by his cousin Yakub Khan, he had resided in Russian territory, and received a pension from the Russian Government of 25,000 roubles a year. According to all reports he had saved large sums out of his pension, and during February information reached Kabul that he had, with the approval of the Russians, crossed the frontier and arrived in Badakhshan. He was, by all accounts, an able soldier, and he undoubtedly possessed at this period more influence than any other chief in Afghanistan.

On the 15th March the proposal to open negotiations with Abdur Rahman was approved by the Secretary of State. On the 19th Mr. Lepel Griffin, who had been appointed Chief Political Officer at Kabul, arrived at that place, and on the 1st April the following letter was sent to Abdur Rahman at Kunduz:

*Mr. Griffin to Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan,
1st April, 1880.*

“It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent to you

by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan."

The Mustaufi was, meanwhile, still absent from Kabul, and from time to time sent satisfactory news of his negotiations with the chiefs of Ghazni and the Wardak Saiads to Sir Frederick Roberts. Nevertheless, the month of March closed with disturbing rumours of the hostile activity of Muhammad Jan and of other Afghan leaders, and much excitement was said to prevail in Koh Daman, Maidan, and Logar. On the 4th April it was reported that the Mustaufi was in Maidan with Muhammad Jan's brother, the latter chief himself being at Ambu Khak, a village in the Langar Valley, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Shekhabad. The following day the Mustaufi arrived at Kabul and stated that he had left Muhammad Jan, Muhammad Hasan Khan, Executive Governor of Jalalabad, Sardars Tahir Khan, Alim Khan, and Sarwar Khan, Generals Aslam Khan, Ghulam Khan and other leading men in Maidan, and that they were willing to attend a darbar. After some negotiations with Mr. Lepel Griffin, the Mustaufi again returned to Maidan to arrange for the attendance of representative chiefs at Kabul on the 13th April. In the meantime the Chief Political Officer had made known the proposed subdivision of Afghanistan, and the separation of Kandahar from Kabul. This announcement, it appeared, gave general dissatisfaction; and on the 11th April, the following document was laid before Mr. Lepel Griffin, in anticipation of the approaching darbar:

"We, the undersigned, as representatives of the tribes of Afghanistan, send the following representations to the British Government:

"I.—Friendship between the people of Afghanistan and the great British Government

should be re-established as of former years, inasmuch as in this way the interests and welfare of both parties would, God willing, be secured.

- “II.—Our King and Ruler should be released and restored to his former power; and we the tribesmen guarantee that, by the blessing of God, he will maintain a lasting and sincere friendship towards the British Government, and that both parties will have identical interests.
- “III.—The British Agent, whoever he may be, should be of the Muhammadan religion, while all British troops should be withdrawn from our country.
- “IV.—The Kingdom of Afghanistan should be restored in its entirety to its King and Ruler. In this way it will be able to cope with its foreign enemies.
- “V.—The British Government should furnish such assistance to the King and Ruler of Afghanistan as it may think best for the interest of both parties.
- “VI.—Immediate assistance should be given to the Amir, seeing that the country has been desolated and nothing of value is left, as the British authorities are themselves thoroughly aware.

“We hope that the great British Government will grant these, the expressed wishes of the tribes of Afghanistan, as they consult the interests of both parties.

“All of us have come to the British authorities to ask that we and our Sovereign may be forgiven; our wishes are set forth in the paragraphs above.”

Dated Friday, 29th Rabi-ul-Sani, 1297 (9th April, 1880).

THE DARBAR

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NAMES SEALED AND SIGNED.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Muhammad Alam. 2. Muhammad Jan. 3. Muhammad Sarwar. 4. Ghulam Haidar. 5. Muhammad Hasan. 6. Abdul Karim. 7. Muhammad Tahir. 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Abdul Ghafur. 9. Shah Muhammad. 10. Muhammad Afzal. 11. Sultan Muhammad. 12. Lal Muhammad. 13. Ghulam Haidar.
Suliman Khel Ghilzais 15 in number.		
Andar Ghilzais 8 ”		
Ahmadzai (Suliman Khel) Ghilzais of		
Zurmat 17 ”		
Saiads of Wardak 17 ”		
Mixed representatives from Logar and		
Kharwar 15 ”		
Ahmadzai (Suliman Khel) Ghilzais 46 ”		
Tajiks 5 ”		
Tajiks of Ghazni 9 ”		
Mixed representatives from Maidan 14 ”		
Mangals and Totakhels (<i>sic</i>) 43 ”		

On the 13th April the darbar took place. From various causes Muhammad Jan, his brother, and Muhammad Hasan Khan and the leading Durani chiefs were not present, and included few except Ghilzais and representatives of the Saiads of Wardak and the other non-Durani tribesmen from Logar, Zurmat, and Koh Daman. The darbar was opened by a speech from Sir Frederick Roberts, and the chiefs were then addressed by Mr. Lepel Griffin, who, after alluding to the absence of some of the more important leaders, proceeded as follows:

“ You have first asked that the former friendship between the Government of the Queen-Empress of Hindustan and the Afghan nation should be restored, that Amir Yakub Khan should be released and reinstated, and that the British armies should retire from Afghanistan.

“ In reply, I would first remind you that the breach in mutual friendship was made by Amir Sher Ali Khan. The British Government not only always desired, and

still desires, friendship with Afghanistan, but will not appoint any one as Amir who does not profess friendship, nor will allow him to continue Amir, unless he plainly shows himself the friend of the friends of the British Government, and the enemy of its enemies.

“For this reason the Viceroy has decided that Muhammad Yakub Khan shall not return to Afghanistan. You know whether he observed the promises that he made to the British Government. You know that he rewarded those who had opposed us in the first campaign, while those who had assisted us he turned out of their lands and appointments. You have told me privately that if Yakub be not allowed to return, you are willing to accept as Amir any one whom the Government may choose to select.

“These expressions of the wish of a large number of respectable maliks will be, at the proper time, laid before His Excellency the Viceroy, together with that of others who may wish to support the candidature of Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sardar Hashim Khan, Sardar Musa Jan, Sardar Ayub Khan, or any other member of the ruling family who may be approved by a large number of the people. The Government has no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and will occupy no more of it than may be necessary for the safety of its own frontiers. But the Province of Kandahar will not remain united with Kabul, but will be placed under the independent rule of a Barakzai prince. For the administration of those provinces that remain attached to Kabul, the Government is anxious to appoint an Amir who shall be strong to govern his people, and steadfast in his friendship to the British. And if only these qualifications be secured, the Government is willing and anxious to recognise the wish of the Afghan people and the tribal chiefs, and to nominate the Amir of their choice. But no decision can be given at present. You, who have assembled here, represent but a small part of the people, and it is necessary to ascertain the views and wishes of many others, chiefs

and sardars who are absent from Kabul. But your votes in favour of Yakub Khan's immediate family will be remembered and considered if, until the decision of the Government be given, you absolutely abstain from all hostile action. Otherwise you must not expect that the Government will consider him likely to be a friendly Amir whose friends are its persistent enemies.

“The armies of the Queen-Empress will withdraw from Afghanistan when the Government considers that the proper time has come. As they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so they will not withdraw at your request. When the country is again peaceful, and when a friendly Amir has been selected, the Government has no wish to remain in Afghanistan. The army came to Kabul to inflict punishment for the murder of its Envoy in time of peace, which some of you have called a regretted accident, but which the British Government considers an atrocious crime, and it will remain until some satisfactory settlement can be made.”

The Chief Political Officer then alluded to the intended movements of troops throughout the country, and counselled the sardars to do what they could to assist the leaders of these, as well as to discountenance the perpetration of outrages which could only result in the punishment of those implicated. He declared that in its European as well as its Asiatic relations the British Government had shown itself the friend and protector instead of the destroyer of Islam; and he concluded by stating that such questions as the future appointment of a Muhammadan Agent at Kabul must be reserved for discussion between the Viceroy and whatever chief should eventually be appointed Amir.

All this time the supporters of Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan were rapidly gaining adherents in Northern Afghanistan. The influence of the sardar in Afghan Turkistan, of which he was practically master, was equally instrumental with his position in the Barakzai family in furthering his claims. The

news of his arrival at Kunduz had created the utmost excitement all over the country. It was said that the Kohistanis were unanimous in their support of him, and an announcement on the part of Abdur Rahman of his approaching visit to Kohistan had drawn forth a reply from Khoja Jan, Mir Bacha, and all the chiefs of Kohistan and Koh Daman, saying that they looked on him only as their sovereign, and would give no support to Muhammad Jan, Musa Jan, or Yakub Khan. Such was the position of parties when, on the 21st April, the following letter was received at Kabul :

*Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan to Mr. Lepel Griffin,
15th April, 1880.*

“Whereas at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to enquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great [British] Government know well that throughout these twelve years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of revisiting my native land. When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated [that I should do so]; then I went to Tashkend, consequently Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested [dishonest] person, and raised fools to power, until the ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had eighteen able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: That as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should

live quietly in ease and peace; and these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them [England and Russia], for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with Empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathising with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people.

“This is my wish; for the rest it is yours to decide.”

To which the following reply was given :

From Mr. Lepel Griffin to Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, 30th April, 1880.

“On the 21st April I received your friendly letter from Kunduz, and understood its contents, together with the messages which you sent by Muhammad Sarwar. Both were submitted by telegram for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla, and I am now commanded by him to reply to your letter to the following effect :

“The friendly sentiments which you have expressed are cordially reciprocated, and the British Government has only one object in its communications with you, namely, to restore peace to Afghanistan, and friendly relations between that country and itself. For this it is believed that the time is opportune. An army marching from Kandahar has just occupied Ghazni, and is now pursuing its march to Kabul; while the Wardaks, who have opposed the march of a brigade sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar army, have been defeated with heavy loss. The British Government does not desire to annex Afghanistan, and will withdraw its armies from Kabul so soon as it has established an Amir who is willing to live in peace and friendship with the Government. This you

are ready to do, and consequently the Viceroy and Governor-General, believing you to be the most capable of the Barakzai family, and most approved by the people of Afghanistan, offers you the Amirship, and will assist you to establish yourself and supply your immediate wants.

“What you said regarding Russia has been fully understood, and the Government appreciates your sentiments towards those from whom you have so long experienced hospitality, but on this point no difficulty need arise, for, with regard to your future relation with Russia, the Government desires nothing different from what has already been agreed upon between that country and Her Majesty’s Government.

“It is of great importance for you to take action at once; should you accept this friendly offer of the Government, you will do well to come to Kabul without delay, where you are assured of honourable reception and personal safety. But at no place but Kabul can final arrangements be satisfactorily and quickly made.

“This letter, in duplicate, is taken by Wazirzada Sardar Muhammad Khan, a trusted official of the British Government, who will explain other matters by word of mouth, and by Sardar Sher Muhammad Khan, who is well known to you, and who is a well-wisher of the British Government and of Afghanistan.”

It is now necessary to leave the account of the political negotiations and return to that of the military movements at the beginning of April.

On the 17th March the Quartermaster-General telegraphed to Sir F. Roberts:

“At the time of Stewart’s reaching Ghazni your movable force will be disposed as follows: It will occupy Surkai Kotal, Shutargardan, and Kushi; with sufficient force at Kushi to hold it, and, if necessary, reinforce Stewart at Ghazni. Please report for Chief’s information what disposition of the force you would make with this view. Stewart is ready to start, but

cannot do so until the Bombay troops arrive in sufficient strength. I will give you more detailed information shortly, but I suppose end of month will see him *en route*, and at Ghazni about twenty-five days later."

Again, on same date: "When your movable force takes the field, and if you only hold the Bala Hissar and Siah Sang with your reduced force, will Sherpur be sufficiently under command of these places to prevent its being occupied and held by the enemy, or would it be necessary to break the walls and otherwise render the place untenable?"

To the above, General Roberts replied on the 20th March:

"To hold Shutargardan and Surkai Kotal with safety, and to be able to meet all gatherings of the Ghilzais, not less than one mountain battery and three regiments of infantry would be required. The balance of the movable column would be available to operate in the direction of Ghazni, if necessary. But as affairs are now progressing, I think it likely that the whole, or at least the greater part, of my force will be required for political reasons at or near Kabul, and that General Stewart will not need any assistance at Ghazni. The proposed submission of the sardars and leading men now at Ghazni will ensure no opposition being offered at that place, and will require increased watchfulness and strength at Kabul. There is, of course, no certainty what aspect political affairs may assume about the time of General Stewart's arrival at Ghazni. The Commander-in-Chief shall be kept carefully informed of all political changes from day to day, to enable His Excellency to consider what the military requirements may be."

With regard to Sherpur cantonment, General Roberts replied on the 20th that the only way to render Sherpur untenable, without knocking down the walls, which would cause great delay, was to hold the posts on the Bimaru heights. Blockhouses had been erected there, and with the aid of a small movable

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column the position could safely be held; otherwise Sherpur would have to be abandoned to the enemy, which would not only increase their prestige, but would give them easy and uninterrupted access to the city. General Roberts pointed out that the retention of Sherpur depended on various circumstances which could not be foreseen, and he therefore submitted that the question should be left to him to decide at the time.

General Roberts was informed, in reply, that the Commander-in-Chief considered that Sherpur should be held as long as possible; but that the point must be settled by General Roberts when necessity arose.

On the 19th March the 24th Punjab Infantry (Colonel F. M. Norman) and the 45th Sikhs (Colonel B. Armstrong) reached Kabul, in augmentation of the force there, followed by the 17th Bengal Cavalry on the 24th and the 27th Punjab Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes) on the 26th March. On the 22nd large reinforcements of transport animals were received, while those with the force had improved considerably in condition as the weather became milder. The Kabul Field Force now numbered over twelve thousand men, and at the close of the month the infantry was formed in two divisions, commanded severally by Sir Frederick Roberts and General Ross, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's orders of the 13th March (see Appendix XVIII.).

On the 27th March the Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, supported by the newly organised Mounted Infantry, reconnoitred beyond Chaharasia and found the country all quiet. Three days later a reconnaissance towards Arghandi showed similar tranquillity in that direction.

Major-General J. Ross arrived on the 2nd April and took over command of the 2nd Division, while Brigadier-General W. Roberts assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, on the 8th idem. No. 6-8 Battery (screw guns) and the 3rd Punjab Cavalry also arrived from India early in the month,

News from Sir Donald Stewart stated that his force would reach Ghazni on the 21st, and preparations were therefore pushed forward for the march from Kabul of a force which was to proceed to Shekhabad to support General Stewart's advance. Of this force General Ross was directed to take command, and its departure was fixed for the 14th April, but was afterwards postponed to the 16th to allow the sardars and maliks who had attended the darbar at Sherpur to return to their homes. At length on the morning of the 16th the column marched from Kabul, composed as follows:

	Cavalry	.	{	9th Lancers (1 squadron)—Captain the Hon. H. Legge.	
				3rd Bengal Cavalry—Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.	
				3rd Punjab Cavalry (2 squadrons).	
	Artillery	.	{	6-8, R.A. (4 screw guns)—Major T. Graham.	
				No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery—Captain A. Broadfoot.	
	Infantry,	{	British	.	2-9th Foot—Colonel W. Daunt.
	2,680 rifles.				
				24th Punjab Infantry—Lieutenant-Colonel F. B. Norman.	
					4th Gurkhas—Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft.
					No. 3 Company, Sappers and Miners—Lieutenant H. Dove.

Total strength, 3,960, with four days' ordinary supplies, and fifteen days' tea, sugar, and rum; also ten days' tea, sugar, and rum for General Stewart's troops.

The general military situation at this time at Kabul and on the line of communications was described at length by Sir Frederick Roberts in a report to Army Head-quarters, dated April the 17th. After noticing in detail the strength of the Field Force, etc., the General proceeds:

“On my first arrival at Kabul, and for some time afterwards, the passage of troops to and fro between Kabul and the Shutargardan kept the fertile valley of the Logar open, and I then drew, and am still continuing to draw, thence (but latterly in smaller quantities) a considerable portion of the supplies necessary

for my force. The disturbances of last December, the expectation that the festival of Naoroz would be the prelude to further hostilities, the rumoured approach of Abdur Rahman, and intrigues in other interests by Muhammad Jan—all combined to unsettle the country and to paralyse trade; but the steps taken politically to break up the Ghazni faction, which no doubt was brought about by the mission of the Mustaufi Habibulla, prevented the anticipated combination at Naoroz. The Mustaufi has succeeded as well as could be expected, but his success was attended with much delay and difficulty, owing to the scattered habitations and the conflicting interests of the sardars with whom he had to deal; and although the men who accompanied him to Sherpur cannot be considered as powerful personages, they still form a fairly representative section. Of course, there would have been no military obstacle to moving out and coercing the refractory sardars, but this would have undoubtedly frustrated the very objects which the Mustaufi was endeavouring to attain."

He then adverts to the march of General Ross's division; after which, turning to the question of commissariat, he writes:

"Up to the present no insurmountable difficulties have been met with in provisioning the troops, and I do not think that any such are likely to arise. Certain articles must be procured from India, but to these, of course, I do not refer. But though I see no reason to anticipate the occurrence of any greater obstacles than have already been successfully overcome, still this very important matter is, and must continue to be, a source of grave anxiety to any one commanding a large force in an enemy's country; especially a country like Afghanistan, where, even in a few days, and with little or no previous warning, great pressure may be successfully brought to bear against those upon whom we are dependent." (For further details as regards equipment and supply, see Appendix XIX.)



THE "PUL-I-FERINGHI" OVER THE KABUL RIVER, NEAR VILLAGE OF IBRAHIM KHAN (LOOKING UP-STREAM TOWARDS ASMAI)

“No precautions,” continues General Roberts, “have been neglected to strengthen our position at Kabul.

“All the forts and walled enclosures within a radius of 1,000 yards from Sherpur have been levelled, with the exception of Kala Mustaufi and Kala Zulfikar, at the north-west and south-east corners of cantonments respectively; these have been retained, as they give admirable flanking fire along the faces.

“The fort of Ibrahim Khan has been strengthened, and forms an excellent bridge-head at the spot where a very substantial wooden bridge (capable of bearing heavy artillery) spans the Kabul River and carries the direct road from Sherpur to Siah Sang and Butkhak.

“On the north-west corner of Siah Sang, and in sight of Fort Ibrahim Khan, a tower capable of holding twenty men has been constructed; and this tower again is visible from Fort Roberts, a strong work on the most western spurs of Siah Sang, which completely dominate the city, and from which the 40-pounders and new 6·3-inch howitzers can sweep the country in any direction.

“From here the Bala Hissar is distant not more than 1,400 yards, and flag signals can easily be read with the naked eye. In the Bala Hissar an inner line of defence has been prepared, within which all our stores are collected, and the space between this inner line and the outer wall on the city side, which was formerly a tangled network of houses, has been levelled and cleared. Three hundred feet above the Bala Hissar stands the Bala Burj, which has been repaired, and which is now capable of accommodating twenty rifles; it is practically inaccessible, has a most extensive command of fire, and is an excellent link between the upper Bala Hissar and the Sher Darwaza and the Deh Mazang gorge, and to communicate with the work on Asmai. From this point to Asmai a new line of road has been constructed, completely avoiding the city and Deh Afghan. It crosses the Kabul River near the site of the old bridge and enables the garrison of the Asmai

post to retire upon the Sher Darwaza, if it should become necessary. On Asmai is a fort to accommodate 150 rifles. This effectually covers the northern entrance of the Deh Mazang gorge, and as long as this fort and the works on Sher Darwaza are in our possession, the occupation of the city by an enemy is impossible.

“On Bimaru ten blockhouses have been constructed, in addition to a small fort on the eastern end, and another small one in Bimaru village. Various other military precautions have been taken, such as abattis, scarping where needful, entanglements, clearing the front of all cover, etc.; whilst care has been taken that each post is visible to its neighbour, and that they give mutual flanking defence. The position may now be said to be as strong as the means and time at my disposal admit of its being made.”

The despatch further deals with the arrangements made by the General in case of attack and with the working of the various departments, including transport, with regard to which he reports:


“The present state of the transport is as follows:

	Effective.	Sick.	Total.
Camels	1,708	196	1,904
Yabus	1,625	439	2,064
Mules and ponies	5,540	902	6,442
Bullocks	749	87	836

Sickness is almost entirely due to sore-backs and mange, the former being in a large majority. Convoys from below arrive, as a rule, in good order; but the animals which come with regiments or drafts almost invariably contribute largely to the number of sore-backs in hospital.”

Finally, Sir Frederick Roberts goes on to describe the events which had occurred on the Khyber line, and which will be dealt with in a future chapter.

General Ross's force, which left Kabul on the 16th April, camped that night at Kala Kazi, being accompanied so far by Sir Frederick Roberts. Thence it



THE "PUL-I-FERINGHI" OVER THE KABUL RIVER, NEAR VILLAGE OF IBRAHIM KHAN (LOOKING DOWN-STREAM TOWARDS LATABAND)
p. 396

Deh-i-Afghan

Sher Darwaza

Head-Qr. Gate



WESTERN FACE OF SHERPUR CANTONMENT, SHOWING THE SHER DARWAZA

marched by Arghandi to Maidan, where a two days' halt was made. Reports were received of a hostile force coming from Logar, but no definite information could be obtained by reconnoitring parties; the people of the country, however, refused to bring in supplies, and a foraging party sent out on the 19th, under Lieutenant W. G. Straghan, 2-9th Foot, was opposed by some 500 men, supposed to be under Bahadur Khan. Brigadier-General Charles Gough proceeded to Lieutenant Straghan's support, but when he arrived it was too late in the day to take any active measures. On the same afternoon a reconnaissance party of eight sowars, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, under Captain the Hon. C. Dutton, A.Q.M.G., was fired on near the Safed Khak Kotal: one sowar was badly wounded and two horses shot.

To inflict punishment for these outrages two columns were sent out from the force on the 20th, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Charles Gough and Colonel F. B. Norman. The towers of the offending villages were blown up and supplies collected from each, and the columns returned to camp without being molested.

On the 21st General Ross marched to Kala Durani, and on the 22nd to Top (or Sar-i-Top); shots were fired at the column from the neighbouring hills on both days, but without causing any casualties. While on the march to Top a heliographic light was seen on the Sher Dahan, in the direction of Ghazni, a kotal 8,300 feet in height, and the highest spot on the road between Kabul and Kandahar. This turned out to be from the signallers of Sir Donald Stewart's Field Force. Communication was at once established, and news received of the decisive victory at Ahmad Khel. This intelligence was sent back to Kabul by special messengers, where the announcement had a most beneficial effect in quieting existing uncertainty and excitement. A salute of thirty-one guns was fired from the upper Bala Hissar on the following morning in honour of the victory.


From Top General Ross's force marched to Saidabad, where it halted and established regular communication with Sir Donald Stewart. Bodies of armed Afghans were several times observed on the surrounding hills, but they always withdrew without attempting hostilities when threatened by the British force. Reconnoitring parties were sent out from camp on the 24th, one over the Zamburak Pass towards the Logar Valley round by the Tangi Wardak and back by Shekhabad; a second up the Ghazni road, and a third across the hills west of the camp.

Meanwhile, on the 20th April, the following force had marched from Kabul towards Chaharasia, under the command of Colonel F. H. Jenkins, C.B., with a view to keeping in check the people of Logar, who were said to be assembling under Muhammad Hasan Khan, *ex*-Governor of Jalalabad, and were threatening the rear of General Ross's force:

Colonel Jenkins, C.B.	{	Cavalry .	Corps of Guides, 2 squadrons—Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stewart.			
		Artillery.	F.A., R.H.A. (2 guns)—Lieutenant J. H. Wodehouse.			
		Infantry .	{	92nd Highlanders (wing), 266 rifles—Major G. S. White.		
	{		Corps of Guides, 600 rifles—Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. P. P. Campbell.			
		Total .	{	866 rifles.		
				{	250 sabres.	
					{	2 guns.

The column encamped on the 20th at Beni Hissar and marched for Chaharasia on the following morning; here it encamped between the Chaharasia hamlets and Chihil Dukhtaran, where news was brought to Colonel Jenkins that Muhammad Hasan Khan had started with 2,000 men to attack General Ross, but on hearing of his (Colonel Jenkins's) march, he had returned and was then at Muhammad Agha or Kuti Khel, two villages on the Logar road, 12 miles ahead of the column.

On the 22nd the force remained halted at Chihil Dukhtaran. Further intelligence was received of



Panorama of Action near Chihil Dukhtaran
25th April 1880

London, John Murray.

W.A. & J. Murray, Limited, London & Dublin.

Muhammad Hasan's gathering, and a picquet of the Afghans was discerned on a high hill about a mile south-east. At 2 a.m. on the 25th Colonel Jenkins received warning that the enemy intended to attack him at dawn. This intelligence was at once despatched to Sherpur and preparations were made for meeting the attack. To the left and left front of the camp, and distant from 1,300 to 1,500 yards, were ranges of rocky hills, spurs of which ran down to the Logar road, 1,200 yards from the camp front. On the right and right rear, 1,200 to 1,300 yards away, were the hamlets of Chaharasia with their gardens and enclosures.

A party of Guides Cavalry was sent to reconnoitre down the Logar road, which ran due south from the camp past the spurs described above, and as day broke this party was seen retiring slowly before an advancing body of Afghans, while similar hostile forces were descried threatening both right and left flanks.

Colonel Jenkins at once ordered the tents to be struck and the baggage to be parked under shelter of a small detached hill in rear (north) of the camp, half a company of the 92nd and a company of the Guides being told off as baggage guard.

Two small fortified villages protecting the right and right rear of the camp were also occupied by detachments of the Guides Infantry, while a troop of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant G. K. Daly was sheltered behind the western of these.

The right centre, centre, and left of the position were held respectively by two companies of the Guides under Captain Battye, two companies of the 92nd under Major White, and two other companies of the Guides under Captain A. G. Hammond. The two guns of F-A were brought into action from their position in camp, and opened fire at about 5.15 a.m. on the enemy on the ridges. The latter seemed at first to number about 3,000 men, but they were further reinforced during the day. They speedily commenced a brisk fire on the British force, using Martini, Snider,

400 SUPPORT FROM MACPHERSON

and Enfield rifles; but though in the course of the morning their standards were brought up to within 200 yards of our position, they could not be induced by their leaders to attempt an effective charge.

As soon as the sun got high enough, Colonel Jenkins sent a heliograph message to Kabul announcing that he was attacked; in answer to which he was informed that reinforcements had already started to his support under General H. T. Macpherson. In anticipation, therefore, of their arrival, the British force retained its original position unaltered, with the exception of the withdrawal of the guns to a less exposed spot about 400 yards in rear.


Brigadier-General Macpherson had left Sherpur at 9 a.m., with the following force:

3rd Punjab Cavalry ($\frac{1}{2}$ squadron)—Lieutenant L. S. H. Baker	85 sabres.	
3-8, R.A. (screw gun, British mountain battery)—Lieutenant A. F. Liddell	2 guns.	
No. 2 Mountain Battery (Derajat), Native—Major G. Swinley	2	„
92nd Highlanders (other wing)—Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker	278 rifles	} 962
45th Sikhs—Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Armstrong	555	
2nd Gurkhas—Captain W. Hill	129	

His orders were to relieve Colonel Jenkins's force and to bring it back to Sherpur, after driving off the enemy.

Having left two companies of the 45th Sikhs to hold the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, which commands the road to Kabul, General Macpherson pressed on, and arriving at the scene of action, his first order was to send the baggage back to Sherpur, so as to free the remainder of the force for action. He then prepared to attack the left wing of the enemy's semicircle, which occupied the walled gardens, vineyards and orchards near the villages of Chaharasia; while, at Colonel Jenkins's suggestion, three companies of the 45th were ordered to reinforce the British left, so as to allow of a forward movement at that point also.

Action near
CHIHIL DUKHTARAN
 25th April 1880.



REFERENCE

British.....  

Enemy..... 

General direction } 

of the march }

Scale 3 Inches-1 Mile

100 0 200 400 800 1600 2400 3200 Yards

On the right the four mountain guns under Major Swinley came into action some 600 yards in rear of a line of skirmishers composed of the wing 92nd Highlanders and detachment 2nd Gurkhas, who advanced steadily towards a mound and a walled orchard occupied by the enemy. From these points the Afghans were quickly driven, and they were soon streaming over the hills in rear pursued by General Macpherson's infantry and by the fire of the four British and native mountain guns, which were advanced as the enemy retreated. The line of advance was over heavy ground, terraced fields, and walled villages and orchards, among which the enemy's standards were dotted in considerable numbers; one of these was captured with great determination and dash by the 2nd Gurkhas, and its loss was the signal for a general retreat on the part of the Afghans.

Meantime, about 3 p.m., as soon as the three companies of the 45th Sikhs had come up on the left of Colonel Jenkins's fighting line, a general advance took place of the British left and centre, Captain Hammond's companies of the Guides, supported by the 45th Sikhs, advancing over the south-eastern heights without a check. The resistance met with was not protracted, and only a few fanatics stood their ground until bayoneted or shot as the British advanced.

The head-quarters wing of the 92nd, the 2nd Gurkhas, and detachment of the 45th Sikhs cleared all the hills to the south and east, until not a man was visible, and the Guides Cavalry and the Horse Artillery continued the pursuit for 4 miles. The pursuers then made a *détour* and returned by Chihil Dukhtaran to the original site of Colonel Jenkins's camp. Here the whole force was assembled at 4 p.m. and marched for Sherpur under General Macpherson's orders. The cantonment was reached at about 8 p.m.

Brigadier-General Macpherson estimated the Afghan loss on this occasion at 200 in killed alone, while native

reports made it 250. The British loss was 4 killed and 34 wounded.

To return to General Ross's movement to meet General Stewart's force.

On the 25th April part of General Ross's force was engaged with the Afghans near Shekhabad. News having been received of a large hostile gathering under Abdul Ghafur of the Langar Valley and Akhta Buland of Rustam Khel in the eastern Maidan Valley, General Ross determined to send out two parties, one to proceed direct against the enemy occupying the ridges north-west of camp, and the other to go *viâ* the Shekhabad road and attack the left of the enemy's position, so soon as the direct attack had developed itself.

Both columns left camp at about 11 a.m. The first was composed of :

Under Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft, 4th Gurkhas.	{	3rd Bengal Cavalry	(1 troop, 40 sabres)—Major G. W. Willock.
		Hazara Mountain Battery	(Centre division, 2 guns)—Lieutenant H. M. Sandbach.
		2-9th Foot	(2 companies, 3 officers, 123 men)—Captain C. M. Stockley.
		4th Gurkhas	(Wing, 3 British officers, 5 native officers, 272 men)—Major J. Hay.

The second party was as follows :

Under Major B. A. Combe, D.A.Q.M.G.	{	3rd Punjab Cavalry	($\frac{1}{2}$ troop, 1 native officer, 25 sabres).
		24th Punjab Infantry	(3 companies, 2 British officers, 3 native officers, 13 havildars, 168 rifles)—Captain P. H. Wallerstein.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rowcroft's force proceeded towards the hills to the north-west of the camp to dislodge and drive off the enemy, who had occupied in force several very commanding positions on different crests and ridges of the hills.

This duty he effected with a loss of only one killed

and four wounded, and at 3 p.m. he returned to camp. Meanwhile Major Combe's detachment, having advanced up the Shekhabad road, found the enemy occupying a ridge parallel to, and about 2 miles to the left (west) of the British advance. From this position they were driven without difficulty and without any loss by the British.

Whilst the above operations were proceeding, Major-General Hills and several other officers, with an escort of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, rode over to Sir Donald Stewart's camp at Shashgao, and thus established personal communication with the Ghazni Field Force.

On the following morning (26th April) the signallers above General Ross's camp reported that the enemy were again assembling on the neighbouring heights; Brigadier-General C. Gough was accordingly sent out with a column composed of two guns each of 6-8, Royal Artillery, and the Hazara Mountain Battery, a wing each of 2-9th Foot and the 23rd Pioneers; another division of the Hazara Mountain Battery under Lieutenant E. C. Wace also took part in the affair from the "signal hill," west of the camp. The combined fire of the guns soon caused the Afghans to retire from the position which they had taken up, and they were hotly pursued by the infantry, who advanced without opposition for a considerable distance. The detachment returned to camp at 5.30 p.m.

On the 28th April General Ross's division moved from Saidabad to Shekhabad, and was joined here by 6-11, Royal Artillery, the heavy battery drawn by bullocks which had accompanied the Ghazni Field Force from Kandahar. The next day Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, with some of his staff, himself joined General Ross and the division marched to Top, a column having been sent under Brigadier-General C. Gough to visit Langar, to inflict punishment for the attacks lately made, in which expedition no opposition was encountered. From Top the force continued its return march towards Kabul by way of Kala Durani

and Arghandi, at which place Sir Donald Stewart was met by Sir Frederick Roberts.

The division marched into Kabul on the 2nd May. On the same day Sir Donald Stewart took over the supreme command of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force (see p. 365).

While these events had been occurring in Afghanistan, Lord Beaconsfield's Administration in England had come to an end, and the 29th April saw the announcement of the appointment of the Marquis of Ripon to be Viceroy of India in succession to Lord Lytton, while the Marquis of Hartington assumed the office of Secretary of State for India.

CHAPTER XIII

OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN FIELD FORCE, UNDER SIR DONALD STEWART, FROM MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1880.

THE month of May found the country in the immediate neighbourhood of Kabul fairly quiet and settled, but it was evident that where the actual presence of our armies had not been felt no influence or authority had been established by the British. The monarchy of Sher Ali had given place to a state of anarchy, in which the rival chiefs recognised no authority but their own. The one point of agreement amongst them, however, was their desire to rid themselves, as speedily as possible, of the presence of the invading troops, and the events of the past few months having shown conclusively that this object could not be effected by force, they were willing to unite in furthering the negotiations which should again establish a Barakzai prince on the throne, and thus supply an alternative government to that of the British generals.

These negotiations meanwhile proceeded slowly. Further letters were received from Sardar Abdur Rahman on the 16th May and 9th June, couched in friendly terms; but he appeared to hesitate to visit Kabul in person, and accordingly, in letters dated the 14th and 15th June, Mr. Griffin strongly urged him to lose no time in concluding final terms of friendship with the British and in using his influence to bring about a settlement with the Afghan leaders. The prolongation of the negotiations increased the existing feeling of unrest and excitement, which was further augmented

406 CONCENTRATION NEAR KABUL

as Abdur Rahman approached Kabul. This restlessness showed itself in the neighbourhood of the capital by frequent attacks on picquets, and by difficulty in collecting supplies from the country people. It was determined, therefore, in the latter part of June, to concentrate the British forces in the neighbourhood of Kabul. A month earlier various movements of troops had taken place, partly to relieve the strain on the Commissariat Department at Kabul and partly to protect adherents who were in danger of being coerced by the recalcitrant factions. Thus on the 8th May the following force, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General T. D. Baker and accompanied by Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, proceeded to Chaharasia in the Logar Valley :

Cavalry	. {	9th Lancers (wing). 3rd Punjab Cavalry (2 squadrons). 17th Bengal Cavalry.
Artillery	. {	6-8, Royal Artillery (4 guns). No. 2 Mountain Battery (6 guns).
Infantry	. {	Nos. 5 and 7 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 72nd Highlanders. 2nd Gurkhas. 5th Gurkhas. 5th Punjab Infantry.

From Chaharasia the column moved along the Logar Valley to Zahidabad and Deh-i-Nao, whence a party was despatched some seven miles east on the 15th to destroy a fort belonging to the Ghilzai chief Padshah Khan, who had become recalcitrant now that he was no longer in a position to profit by the political situation in Afghanistan; thence it marched to the neighbourhood of Hisarak, but keeping to the right bank of the Logar River, and here, on the 17th May, it was but a mile and a half from the camp of the 3rd Division (late Ghazni Field Force), on the opposite bank. On the 20th May the brigade turned westwards to Baraki Rajan, Amir Kala, and Shekhabad: thence northwards to the vicinity of the Kotal-i-Takht. From the latter place, Sir F. Roberts, taking with him the

four guns of 6-8, Royal Artillery, 1 troop of the 9th Lancers, No. 5 Company of Sappers, and 2 companies of the 2nd Gurkhas, returned to Kabul by way of Kala Haidar Khan, and reached the capital on the 29th May. Another detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. McQueen, c.B., composed of 6 companies 2nd Gurkhas, and the 5th Punjab Infantry, returned to Kabul by the Chardeh Valley. The rest of General Baker's brigade remained in camp in Maidan until the 6th June, being rejoined meanwhile by 2 guns of 6-8, Royal Artillery. On that date it marched for Kabul, where it arrived on the following day, and encamped between the Bimaru hills and the lake.

Meanwhile Major-General James Hills, c.B., v.c., was appointed to command the 3rd Division, North Afghanistan Field Force, in Logar, and joined the division on the 14th May. It was encamped at the time at Hisarak, with one brigade (General Barter's) at Kala-i-Jabir.¹ On the 19th May General Hills with his head-quarters joined the latter brigade, Brigadier-General Hughes still remaining at Hisarak. On the 31st the divisional head-quarters, Cavalry Brigade, and 1st (Barter's) Infantry Brigade moved to Deh-i-Moghalan on the left bank of the river where it turns sharply northwards. Here, in consequence of the unsettled state of the surrounding country and the possibility of a hostile demonstration against the British, General Hills constructed a series of defences against night attacks, cutting the standing crops round the perimeter of the camp, erecting sangars on the neighbouring heights, demolishing two fortified villages which had harboured the enemy, and rendering the position of the division as impregnable as possible. It was evident that there was a great deal of ill-feeling against the British in the district; the sentries and picquets were fired on night after night; difficulty was experienced in collecting supplies, and all information tended to show that but little provocation was required

¹ Not on map.

to arouse a considerable outburst of hostility in the valley.

On the 18th June the 3rd Division left Logar, marched towards the capital, and encamped on the 20th at Chaharasia, sending in a convoy of sick and the ordnance field park which was not required to Kabul.

Meanwhile, a few days earlier, on the 14th June, a brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Gough, moved out of Sherpur and encamped at Wazirabad, preparatory to marching into the Paghman Valley. It was composed of the following troops :

3rd Bengal Cavalry	451 sabres.
Hazara Mountain Battery
2-9th Foot	690 rifles.
4th Gurkhas	639 "
24th Punjab Infantry	628 "
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers	102 "

On the 18th this brigade encamped in the Begtut Valley, a fertile locality at the foot of the Paghman range, about 4 miles from Kala Ghulam Haidar, and so situated that a force placed there could prevent the movement of bodies of men between Maidan and Kohistan.

Here, on the 20th June, news was received that there was a gathering of *ghazis* in Maidan, and the brigadier accordingly sent out a detachment consisting of 1 squadron of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, 2 companies of the 9th Foot, and 4 of the 24th Punjab Infantry under Colonel F. B. Norman, to ascertain the state of affairs. This party reconnoitred as far as the Kotal-i-Safed Khak and encountered a considerable body of tribesmen, but the latter fell back without offering any serious resistance, and only a few shots were exchanged. Colonel Norman's detachment rejoined the brigade the same evening.

The next day (21st June), Gough's brigade moved to a high and commanding ridge in Paghman, where it was reinforced by the 3rd Punjab Cavalry ; thence on

the 24th it marched in two columns by the Siah Bini Kotal and the Surkh Kotal to Karez Mir. On the latter date the camp was visited by Sir Frederick Roberts, who made a reconnaissance towards Kala Murad Beg, returning to Sherpur by the Kara Dushman Pass, and the Pai Minar Kotal.

Meanwhile the 3rd Division under General Hills remained at Chaharasia till the 26th June, when the increasing scarcity of supplies in the neighbourhood of Kabul necessitated the return of the division to the Logar Valley. This movement was the signal for the hasty break-up of the turbulent bands which had assembled in Logar on the departure of the British; but considerable parties of Afghans were reported to be still hanging about in the neighbourhood, at Patkao Shahana, Hisarak, and other villages. Of these the force at the first-named place was said to number 1,000 or 1,500 tribesmen from Zurmat who were awaiting reinforcements from Muhammad Jan. In consequence of intelligence to this effect the Major-General directed Brigadier-General Palliser to proceed with his cavalry brigade towards Patkao Shahana and Hisarak, and to ascertain whether any hostile gathering was present at either place or in the neighbourhood.

Accordingly, at 3.30 a.m. on the 1st July, Brigadier-General Palliser marched with the following force :

1st Punjab Cavalry, 231 sabres (Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Maclean).
2nd " " 158 " (Colonel T. G. Kennedy).
19th Bengal Lancers, 188 lances (Colonel P. S. Yorke).

General Palliser's first object was to turn the river-flank of Patkao Shahana so as to cut off retreat thence towards the neighbouring enclosed country, where the action of cavalry would be hampered. On the way the news of a hostile gathering near Patkao Shahana was confirmed, and when within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the low range of hills which concealed the village, a few horsemen were observed towards the left front, watching the advance of the brigade. The direction of the march

was thereupon changed, and the column headed towards this point, General Palliser hoping that, from the top of a ridge in front, he would be able to look down on Patkao Shahana and the lower levels adjacent; but instead of this he found a succession of undulating heights over which the scouts advanced for about a mile, while the main body of the brigade halted at the foot of the first ascent.

At length from the farthest crest the village of Patkao Shahana was visible to the right front, and to the left front the enemy could be seen in compact order but in full retreat towards the Altimur Pass; about 2 miles away a separate body of infantry was observed, estimated at 1,000, with a few scattered horsemen. The Brigadier now checked the advance of the scouts and ordered up the main body of the brigade, leaving a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 52 sabres, to watch Patkao Shahana and to summon the maliks of that village. Then, concealed under cover of the ravines, he took ground to the left so as to get as near to the enemy as possible, and finally followed in direct pursuit with 1½ squadrons 19th Bengal Lancers and 2 squadrons 1st Punjab Cavalry in the first line, supported by 1 squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry and 1 squadron 2nd Punjab Cavalry under Colonel Kennedy.

Owing to the difficulty of the ground it was some time before the brigade came in contact with the retreating enemy, who by this time were much scattered. The Afghans fought desperately when brought to bay; Captain Seymour Barrow, 10th Bengal Lancers, galloper to General Palliser, was severely wounded on the bridle hand and right forearm, and altogether the casualties were considerably more, in proportion to the numbers engaged, than is usual in combats with Afghans, the totals being three men and eight horses killed, twenty-nine men and twenty-five horses wounded.

The pursuit was continued for a space of two hours,

and extended over 7 or 8 miles from Patkao Shahana to within a few miles of the Altimur Pass near the village of Oucha Khan. The enemy were so much disorganised and scattered that the supporting squadrons were engaged as much as those in front.

At length at 9 a.m., seeing that the country became more rugged as the mountains were approached, and as the horses were getting tired and footsore, General Palliser collected his squadrons and retired, carrying off the killed on horses, and those severely wounded on improvised litters made with *lungis* and lances; the whole force then returned to Patkao Shahana, which place was reached by noon. Here the horses were watered and fed, and after a halt of two hours the march back to Zargan Shahar was commenced. Camp was reached at 6.30 p.m., the brigade having covered about 40 miles in the course of the day.

The enemy in this affair numbered about 1,500 infantry, chiefly Ghilzais of the Zurmat district. They left fully 200 on the field, and, but for the unfavourable nature of the ground, their losses would have been much heavier. Their dispersal had a most excellent effect in the district: the hostile combination against the British was entirely broken up, and Logar was once more freed from the presence of the ghazis; more than this, it deterred Muhammad Jan from joining the gathering, which he was on the point of doing when the action took place.

The month of July passed uneventfully. Gough's brigade in Koh-i-Daman remained at Karez Mir till the 12th, when it marched about 4 miles north-east to Pai Nao and thence on the 14th to the neighbourhood of Zimma. On the 26th it returned to Kara Dushman, south of Mama Khatun Kotal, 11 miles from Kabul, and on the 29th to Kala Haji. No changes took place in the brigade except the exchange of the 2-9th Foot for the 67th Foot from Sherpur on the 21st. The latter regiment had been rather sickly and the change was carried out for their benefit.

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The 3rd Division, meanwhile, remained in camp in Logar, nor did any movements occur in the division except the march, on the 12th July, of the 19th Bengal Lancers, one squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and the 15th Sikhs to Kabul, the first regiment for duty at Field Force head-quarters, in relief of the 17th Bengal Cavalry, which was returning to India, the remaining troops on escort duty. The march of this detachment, with the convoy under its charge, was covered by the movement of General R. Barter's (1st) Brigade from the main camp of the division at Zargan Shahar to Saiadabad. There the brigade remained till the end of the month, the remainder of the 3rd Division moving, on the 28th July, from Zargan Shahar to Mirza Khel.

From Kabul, on the 9th July, the following force under Brigadier-General Macpherson moved out to Abdul Ghafur in the Chardeh Valley, about 6 miles from Sherpur :

9th Lancers (1 squadron).
No. 2 Mountain Battery (4 guns).
92nd Highlanders.
28th Punjab Infantry.
45th Sikhs.
1 Company, Bengal Sappers.

These troops were to remain there some little time, as their presence was intended to act as a check upon the movements of the gathering which, with fluctuating strength, still existed in Maidan ; whilst they were also within easy distance of General Gough's brigade, which had moved to Sofian, 3 miles south of Baba Kuhkar.

At Head-quarters preparations were in train for the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan by way of the Khyber ;¹ arrangements (which were subsequently stopped) were made for the destruction of the defences about Kabul and Sherpur ; all sick and weakly men

¹ The original intention of withdrawing part of the force *via* the Kurram Valley was eventually discarded, owing partly to the necessity of despatching a large force from Kabul to Kandahar, and partly to the desirability of using the most direct route in order speedily to leave Northern Afghanistan to the new Amir.

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from the three divisions, as well as excess of camp followers, were collected at Sherpur and marched for India on the 28th and 29th July; schemes were prepared for the withdrawal of General Bright's troops from the Khyber, and for the retrograde movement from Kabul.

During this time the negotiations with Sardar Abdur Rahman had been proceeding without interruption. On the 3rd July the Sardar was at Khinjan, on the 16th he reached Tutam Dara in Kohistan, having previously sent a letter to the Kohistan maliks announcing that he came with friendly intentions towards the British, and calling on them to refrain from hostile gatherings or disturbances. His approach to Kabul and the negotiations between him and the British naturally excited the keenest interest in Afghanistan. On the 22nd July a darbar was held at Sherpur, at which many sardars and maliks attended to hear Mr. Lepel Griffin's announcement that the British Government had arrived at satisfactory arrangements with Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, and that the troops would very shortly evacuate Afghanistan. Sir Donald Stewart concluded the proceedings by expressing a hope that the Afghans would sink all private quarrels, and unite in preserving peace and order in Kabul and the country after the departure of the British.

About the same date a despatch was received by Sir Donald Stewart from the Government of India saying that the arrangements for withdrawal from Afghanistan might now proceed, and indicating the attitude to be adopted by General Stewart preparatory to that movement. With this despatch was enclosed the following letter to Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, to be delivered to him after his recognition as Amir :

*To His Highness Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan,
Amir of Kabul.*

(*After compliments.*) "His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has proceeded toward Kabul in

accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which Your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the sardars and people from the establishment of a settled government under Your Highness's authority, the British Government recognises Your Highness as Amir of Kabul.

“I am further empowered on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to inform Your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal government of the territories in the possession of Your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse such as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be advisable that a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Kabul. Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government with regard to the position of the ruler at Kabul in relation to foreign powers should be placed on record for Your Highness's information. The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council authorises me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by foreign powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that Your Highness can have no political relations with any foreign power, except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of Your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it: provided that Your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.”

Such was the position of affairs when, on the 29th July, on the day on which the distant sound of musketry, saluting the arrival of the new Amir at Istalif, reached General Gough's camp, now at Kala Haji, the bazaars of Kabul, crowded as they were by armed supporters of Abdur Rahman, were thrown into the greatest excitement by wild rumours of a fight at Khushk-i-Nakhud between the troops of Wali Sher Ali of Kandahar and those of Sardar Ayub Khan from Herat, resulting in the defeat and flight of the former. Within a few hours the particulars of the disaster at Maiwand reached Sir Donald Stewart from Simla. This intelligence completely deranged all previous plans for the withdrawal of the troops and materially altered the complexion of affairs as well in Eastern Afghanistan as in the province of Kandahar.

General Stewart's first action was to order the 3rd Division to march slowly towards Kabul, where a camping ground was chosen for it, and General Macpherson's brigade was at the same time recalled from Chardeh.

But neither these movements nor the disturbing news from Kandahar were allowed to interfere with the arrangements for the reception of Abdur Rahman. The Sardar had now arrived from Charikar at Ak Sarai, and 2 miles from that place and 16 north of Kabul the first interview took place between him and the Chief Political Officer on Saturday, the 31st July. The event was one of considerable interest and importance; that the result was satisfactory was evident on all sides. The impression made by Abdur Rahman's appearance and bearing was most favourable. The Amir-elect was thus described in a letter from Mr. Lepel Griffin to Sir Donald Stewart relating the circumstances of the meeting:

"The darbar tent was pitched on a hill affording a good outlook on all sides; and His Highness was accompanied by only 200 or 300 horse and a few infantry, while a large number of followers, estimated at

from 3,000 to 4,000, accompanied him to within half a mile of the place of meeting, and remained there till proceedings had terminated.

“Amir Abdur Rahman Khan is a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank, courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who were present at the interview was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of all the Barakzai sardars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were characterised by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government, and although his expectations were, as might have been anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous insistence, and the result of the interviews may be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.”

This practically completed the preliminary arrangements with the new Amir. The subsequent negotiations proceeded without serious difficulty, and from this time forward the discussions as to the political settlement of Afghanistan have no bearing on the military operations, and will not be further referred to.

The month of August found the preparations for the evacuation of Eastern Afghanistan almost completed. This movement had been arranged and had been publicly announced both in darbar and to the new Amir before the news of Maiwand arrived, and it was considered advisable not to make any change in the plans for withdrawal. Not only was there a fear lest delay might result in the British being involved in new complications owing to the possible spread of increased hostility from the west, but it was also held that adherence to the intended evacuation would produce confidence in our good faith and in our ability to deal

Cavalry Affair near PATKAO SHAHANA


July 1st 1880.

Scale of Yards



1 st Position	
2 nd " "	
3 rd " "	
Pursuit	

N^o 7



without difficulty with the complications that had arisen towards Kandahar.

Nevertheless the despatch of a strong force to Kandahar was of course essential. Sir Frederick Roberts was given the command of it, and the details of its composition were arranged on the 3rd August. On the same date the revised programme for the withdrawal of the troops of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force from Kabul was submitted by Sir Donald Stewart to the Commander-in-Chief, and on the 6th the sanction of the Secretary of State to the proposed movement was received by the Viceroy.

Meanwhile the 3rd Division arrived in the Chardeh Valley on the 1st August, and concentrated at Kabul on the 5th; General Gough's brigade marched into Kabul on the 4th; while in compliance with orders from General Stewart, the Central India Horse and 11-9, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery), were sent up from the Khyber Line Force to join General Roberts's division, which was styled the "Kabul-Kandahar Force."

No. 4 Mountain Battery started for Pezwan on the 4th August; 6-11 and 12-9, Royal Artillery, escorted by Nos. 2 and 3 Companies Sappers and Miners, left Kabul for India on the 5th; G-3, Royal Artillery, with a squadron 19th Bengal Lancers and Nos. 5 and 7 Companies Sappers and Miners, left on the 6th, and A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, with 3 troops 19th Bengal Lancers and No. 4 Company Sappers, marched on the 7th. The general departure, however, was not to take place until the 9th August, and this date was afterwards changed for the 11th; the Kabul-Kandahar Force was to march on Monday, the 9th.

On the 6th August the following Order was issued by Sir Donald Stewart:

"As the force now employed in Northern Afghanistan is about to be broken up, the Lieutenant-General Commanding takes this opportunity of thanking Generals Roberts, Ross, Hills, and the officers of all

departments, civil and military, for the cordial support they have given him during the period of his command. The discipline and conduct of the soldiers, European and Native, who have served in the various Field Forces throughout Afghanistan, have, from first to last, been beyond praise; and it is with pride that the Lieutenant-General here records the fact that during the two years he has been in the field, only two cases have come to his notice in which complaints have been made by the people of the country against the men of the force. The Lieutenant-General desires to give his special thanks to General Bright and the troops employed on the line of communication, as on their exertions the comfort and the efficiency of the troops at the front have been largely dependent. General Bright and his officers and men may be satisfied that their valuable services are fully appreciated by Government and their comrades at Kabul. Though the return to India of that part of the force detailed for service in the direction of Kandahar may be somewhat delayed, the Lieutenant-General feels sure that he speaks with the voice of the army, when he assures Sir Frederick Roberts and the column under his command that they carry with them the warmest sympathy and good wishes."

On the 9th and 10th August the arrangements for the march of the force to India were completed; the remaining sick, and all ordnance and telegraph stores started for India on the latter day, and every preparation was made for the retirement to begin in earnest on the 11th. (For detail of the Field Force on this date, see Appendix XX.)

At length, on the morning of the 11th August, Sir Donald Stewart, accompanied by Major-General Hills and the officers of the Political Staff, held a *darbar* outside the western gates of Sherpur cantonments, and there received the Amir Abdur Rahman, handing over to him the charge of the capital, which had been in the hands of the British for the last ten months. The fortifications built by the British army of occupation

OCCUPATION OF KABUL ENDED 419

round Kabul were left undemolished at the special request of Abdur Rahman, which was acceded to by the Government of India.

Thirty of the guns captured by Sir F. Roberts at Kabul were restored to him as the successor of Sher Ali, and more than five lakhs of rupees which remained in the Kabul treasury were handed over to him.

At 5 a.m. on the same day the baggage of the force had moved off towards Butkhak, and was followed in the course of the morning by the troops, now formed into one division, under Major-General Hills. The division, numbering in all 6,678 men, marched out of Kabul and the Bala Hissar in three parallel columns, and were accompanied by Sardar Wali Muhammad, Tahir Khan, Alam Khan, late Governor of Ghazni, Amin Abdulla Khan, and many Hindus. The departing columns were also followed by large droves of cattle, the property of private owners going down to India.

The division encamped that night at Butkhak, 9 miles from Kabul, thus bringing to a close the eventful occupation of the Afghan capital.

The march of the Field Force head-quarters and of General Hills's division to India was uneventful, and may be described in a few words. The table on p. 420 gives the principal details of the order of march and the dates of departure from the various points.

It had been Sir Donald Stewart's intention to move Major-General Hills's division as a body to Gandamak, to march it from that point by brigades to Dakka, and thence in smaller detachments through the Khyber, but this plan was necessarily modified by circumstances.

The division ceased to march as one body from Seh Baba, as it was found necessary to rest some of the transport animals, since nearly the whole of the reserve transport had been used to carry stores and baggage. From Jagdalak the retirement was by single brigades owing to the camping grounds on the route being confined, as well as for the reason given above as to the saving of the transport. From Dakka, according

420 MARCH OF THE KABUL FIELD FORCE

Detail of the March of the Kabul Field Force to India

DATE	1st Brigade, General Gough.	2nd Brigade, General Hughes.	3rd Brigade, Colonel W. Daunt.
Aug. 11th	Butkhak . . .	Butkhak . . .	Butkhak.
" 12th	Lataband . . .	Lataband . . .	Lataband.
" 13th	Seh Baba . . .	Seh Baba . . .	Seh Baba.
" 14th	" . . .	Jagdalak . . .	Jagdalak.
" 15th	Jagdalak . . . (with Divisional Head-quarters).	(with Field Force quarters). Pezwan . . . (with Field Force Head-quarters).	and Divisional Head-quarters). Jagdalak.
" 16th	" . . .	Safed Sang . . .	Pezwan.
" 17th	Pezwan . . .	" . . .	Safed Sang.
" 18th	Safed Sang . . .	" . . .	"
" 19th	" . . .	Fort Battye . . .	"
" 20th	" . . .	Rozabad . . .	"
" 21st	" . . .	Jalalabad . . .	Fort Battye (with Divisional Head-quarters).
" 22nd	" . . .	" . . .	Rozabad.
" 23rd	Fort Battye . . .	" . . .	Jalalabad.
" 24th	" . . .	Detachment to Ali Boghan, remainder at Jalalabad.	"
" 25th	Rozabad . . .	Ali Boghan . . .	"
" 26th	Jalalabad . . .	Sir Donald Stewart posted to Landi Khana <i>en route</i> for Simla.	Detachment Ali Boghan, remainder Jalalabad. Ali Boghan.
" 27th	" . . .	These brigades here	after moved by detachments.
" 28th	Ali Boghan . . . (with Divisional Head-quarters).		
" 29th	Lachipur . . .		
" 30th	Chardeh . . .		
" 31st	Basawal . . .		
Sept. 1st	Dakka (General Brig)	ht assumed command	of the troops in Northern Afghanistan).
" 4th	Landi Khana . . .		
" 5th	Kata Kushtia . . .		
" 6th	Shergai . . .		
" 7th	Hari Singh-ka-Burj		

to the original programme, the brigades were to be broken up into smaller fractions; but it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief inexpedient to delay this

until so late in the march, and the reduction was accordingly made from Jalalabad, whence only the 1st Brigade, which acted as rear guard, marched as nearly as possible intact. This brigade experienced to the full the harassing and trying duties of the rear guard of a large force moving through a difficult country, inhabited by an unfriendly population, at a season of the year when the heat is most intense and trying. Its march and that of its baggage was frequently much delayed by the block of troops in advance, and the nature of the route, especially between Butkhak and Safed Sang, necessitated the heights commanding the road being crowned.

At Safed Sang large bodies of men, chiefly Khugianis, assembled on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd August; they were, however, respectful in their demeanour to the British force, and made no attempt to break the peace. General Gough called up the chief maliks of the villages around on this day and warned them against plundering the Amir's property, pointing out to them the short-sightedness of a policy which must bring eventual punishment, even though they might obtain some small present gain. Notwithstanding this warning, no sooner was the rear guard out of sight of Safed Sang than the place, which had been handed over to an officer of the Amir, was invaded and plundered by the tribesmen. In consequence of these proceedings no one could be found, two days afterwards, to take over Fort Battye in the interests of the Amir; it was accordingly left, with the surplus stores therein, at the mercy of the neighbouring villagers, who carried off all they could lay their hands on. From Jalalabad downwards, however, all commissariat and other stores were moved back to British territory, their transport being facilitated here by the use of rafts, which had been collected in as large numbers as possible on the Kabul River.

Meanwhile a site had been selected for camps for the various parts of the divisions as they issued from the Khyber at about 600 yards beyond Hari Singh-ka-

Burj, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Peshawar, in a north-westerly direction. Here there was a stream with a good flow of water, and a deep well of excellent water about 600 yards off. Arrangements were made to improve the water-supply and to facilitate the watering of horses, etc. Sites were allotted for latrines and precautions were taken to ensure proper sanitation.

A standing camp was also formed at Khairabad for the use of troops crossing the Indus at Attock, and all available boats and boatmen were collected at that place.

It was found desirable to delay the final retirement of the rear guard from Dakka, in order to clear out stores, etc., as well as for political reasons ; but by the 4th September the last troops marched from Dakka to Landi Khana, this final march from Afghanistan being made by General Hills in comparative force.

On the 8th November the North Afghanistan Field Force was broken up, and the campaign in this part of Afghanistan thus came to an end. The frontier defined by the Treaty of Gandamak was temporarily adopted as the north-west boundary of the Indian Empire.

CHAPTER XIV

OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS ON THE KHYBER LINE FROM THE 1st JANUARY, 1880, TO MARCH, 1881.

THE story of events on a line of communications must of necessity be more disjointed, and less full of connected interest than the operations at the head-quarters of a field force. There are few if any independent movements, and the narrative resolves itself more or less into a diary of the gradual advance of troops towards the front, or withdrawal thence as operations approach a close.

On the line of communications by the Khyber Pass the events happening at Kabul, which caused the transference of the 1st (General C. Gough's) Brigade from the 2nd to the 1st Division at Kabul, necessitated a reinforcement of the whole line and rearrangement of the garrisons of the various posts.

It has been seen in Chapter X. that the line of communications was reorganised on the 21st December, 1879, and another (reserve) division under Major-General Ross added to it to guard the communications between Jamrud and Basawal.

This division, however, was independent of Major-General Bright's command, which now extended only from Baswal to Butkhak, and included the 1st (Brigadier-General Arbuthnot's) Brigade and the 2nd (Brigadier-General Doran's) Brigade. The Reserve Division was organised in three brigades commanded by Brigadier-Generals Gib, Sale-Hill and W. Roberts respectively. Major-General Ross retained command of his (Peshawar) District in addition to that of this Reserve Division.

Sir Frederick Roberts kept command over his own (1st) Division at Kabul, as well as the 2nd Division on the lines of communication as far as Basawal.

It was found necessary to reinforce the 2nd Division under Major-General Bright, and Major-General Ross was accordingly directed to send forward the 25th Foot and the 4th and 17th Bengal Cavalry. At the same time the 10th, 12th, and 14th Bengal Cavalry, all of whom required rest, were sent down into the Peshawar District to recruit. On the 9th January Colonel MacGregor, Chief of the Staff to Sir Frederick Roberts, reached Jalalabad from Kabul to confer with Major-General Bright regarding the rearrangement of the line of communications.¹

Meanwhile on the 5th January an accident, somewhat similar to that which happened to the 10th Hussars on the 31st March, 1879, occurred to the Carabiniers. A reconnoitring party under Major Cracroft, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, consisting of 75 men of that regiment with 75 of the Carabiniers, left Jalalabad in the morning, by a ford close to the town, to examine the country towards the Laghman Valley. On its return the party proceeded to cross the Darunta ford about 7 miles west of Jalalabad, which seemed perfectly easy, as natives were at the time passing over on foot. Two branches of the river had to be crossed, the northern one leading slightly down-stream to an island in the middle of the river, and lying about 70 yards above a rapid, the line of which is quite apparent, and below which is deep water. The 3rd Bengal Cavalry led, headed by Captain G. H. Elliott of that regiment, followed at a short interval by Major B. Cracroft with his own squadron, Major W. I. Boyes, Captain the Hon. C. Dutton, and Captain R. Warburton, all of whom had accompanied the expedition on staff and political duties. The Carabiniers followed under Captain Porter, the first troop reaching the island in

¹ For distribution of 2nd Division and Reserve Division on the 27th January, 1880, see Appendix XXI.

safety ; in the second troop, however, five men lost the line of the ford, and, inclining down-stream towards the rapid, fell over into deep water, where they sank ; four of the horses reached the bank, but all the five troopers were drowned.

During the early days of January signs were not wanting of impending trouble with the Mohmands, who began to collect at various points on the left bank of the Kabul River.

The reason for the rising of the Mohmand tribe is attributable to the arrest of the ex-Amir Yakub Khan's wife, who was a daughter of the Khan of Lalpura, the principal Mohmand chieftain. This lady had been implicated in the recent rising. On the night of the 12th January a party of forty Mohmands having crossed the river near Ali Boghan, attacked that post, but they were easily driven off. At 3 a.m. on the 13th a force 600 strong, under Colonel G. F. Walker, left Jalalabad for the purpose of attempting to cut off the retreat of this party ; none were, however, found on the right bank of the Kabul, but several large bodies of Mohmands, numbering many thousands in all, were seen on the opposite bank, and were shelled with considerable effect until obliged to disperse.

On the 14th January 5,000 Mohmands with 25 standards were observed from Dakka encamped on the small riverain plateau west of Kam Dakka, while another body, estimated at 3,000, occupied the Gara heights about 3 miles to the south-east of Dakka Fort. This news having been reported to General Ross, commanding the Reserve Division, it was arranged that Colonel T. W. R. Boisragon, 30th Punjab Infantry, commanding at Dakka, should march thence and attack the enemy on the Gara heights, and that a force under Brigadier-General J. Doran should simultaneously move northwards from Landi Kotal *viâ* the Anjiri Kandao and Shilman Ghakhe, upon Kam Dakka. The retreat of the enemy would thus be intercepted, and he would be cut off between the two forces, having a lofty range

of hills on the one side, and the Kabul River on the other.¹

Colonel Boisragon's force was composed as under :

6th Dragoon Guards	. . .	94	} 144 sabres.
17th Bengal Cavalry	. . .	50	
I-C, Royal Horse Artillery	4 guns.
25th Foot	. . .	110	} 710 rifles.
8th Bengal Infantry	. . .	100	
30th Punjab Infantry	. . .	500	

At 11 a.m. on the 15th January the above troops were drawn up on the plain between Dakka and Haft Chah, in front of the enemy holding the Gara heights. The Afghans had as usual strengthened their position by constructing stone breastworks on all the commanding points, and had even thrown up during the night an entrenchment along the foot of the hills. Brigadier-General Doran had marched from Landi Kotal six hours earlier, and, it was hoped, was now in a position to cut off the enemy's retreat.

The enemy's north flank nearest the river was first threatened by Colonel Boisragon's force, whilst his guns opened fire on the enemy on the hills. Eventually, by 2.30 p.m., the heights of Gara were gained with the loss of one killed and three wounded² in the firing line and supports, and the reserve and ammunition joined the main body *viâ* the Gara Pass at Kam Dakka at 5 p.m.

Meanwhile the advance of the force from Landi Kotal had been delayed beyond all expectation by the unforeseen difficulties of the road. The troops assembled a little before 4.30 in the morning at the old fort on the Loargai Plateau. An advance guard of 100 *Jazailchis*, under Lieutenant G. Gaisford, 5th Punjab Infantry,

¹ For a fuller account of this expedition, see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*.

² One native officer 8th Bengal Infantry killed, and three sepoy of the 30th Punjab Infantry wounded,

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had gone on ahead an hour earlier to seize the Anjiri Kandao, about 8 miles from camp. Brigadier-General Doran's column consisted of;

17th Bengal Cavalry	20	sabres.
11-9, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery)	2	guns.
5th Foot	200	}
25th Foot	200	
31st Punjab Infantry	300	
1st Madras Infantry	300	
4th Madras Infantry	200	
C Company, Madras Sappers and Miners	30	men.

Owing to the darkness of the night the progress of the troops was slow, and it was not till 7.40 that the head of the column was on the Anjiri Kandao. Here a halt was made to enable the rear to close up, and the Brigadier-General received a report from Lieutenant Gaisford, who had ascended a peak near at hand, that no enemy was in sight.

At 8.45 the descent from the Anjiri Kandao was commenced. The track was so narrow and difficult that the troops could only move in single file. The battery mules could hardly be got along, and although only the reserve ammunition, water-mules, and a few dandies were with the troops, even those caused most serious delay. In fact, the path was a mere goat-track; some baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and the rear guard was sixty-seven hours in covering 17 miles.

At the foot of the Torsappar, General Doran received information that the enemy were occupying the Shilman Ghakhe in force. Another halt was therefore ordered to allow the mountain guns to come up, and a company of the 5th Foot was detached to crown some commanding heights ahead.

At 10.30 a.m. the troops again advanced. The road was still most difficult, some of it being over slippery rock, on which the horses of the cavalry detachment,

428 THE SHILMAN GHAKHE PASS

and even the unshod battery mules, could not keep their footing.

At about 11.30, during a third short halt, the guns of Colonel Boisragon's force were heard. After this the path was somewhat better, and the troops advanced more rapidly. It was nearly one o'clock before the gorge of the Shilman Ghakhe came in sight. The pass was held by the enemy, but they were few in number and all opposition was speedily swept away.

The enemy now retired to the heights north of the Shilman Ghakhe, and were in turn expelled from there, and by 2.30 p.m. the pass was cleared with no casualties on our side.

In the meantime Brigadier-General Doran had established heliographic communication with Dakka, which could be seen from the crest of the Shilman Ghakhe. By this means he learnt that Colonel Boisragon had crossed the Gara heights, and was between them and the Kabul River.

At 2.45 p.m. dense masses of the flying enemy could be seen moving down the right bank of the river and across the mouth of the nala running from the Shilman Ghakhe to the Kabul River.

Having stayed some time trying to ascertain the whereabouts of his baggage, regarding which no information could be obtained, Brigadier-General Doran commenced the descent of the Shilman Ghakhe at about 3.20. The path down to the Kabul River is nearly as bad as that between the Anjiri Kandao and Torsappar, and it was not till nearly 5 o'clock that the mouth of the nala was reached. Here about 600 or 700 of the enemy were discovered on the opposite bank of the river, making their way across the sands from the ferry to the village of Reina. Another party was crossing on two rafts, and some on the right bank were making for the ferry. The mountain guns opened at 1,000 yards, and a steady fire was kept up by the few British infantry at hand. Many of the enemy were

seen to fall and be carried off, while a few bodies were found on the spot next day.

General Doran's troops reached Kam Dakka at 6.20 p.m., and met there Colonel Boisragon's detachment as already related. Both columns bivouacked without baggage, many without food, and some without even great-coats.

The baggage of Brigadier-General Doran's column was ordered to remain for the night at the village of Arbul, near the Shilman Ghakhe Pass, but none of it got so far that night or even the next.

Very great difficulty was experienced by Colonel G. C. Hodding, commanding 4th Madras Infantry, who was in charge of the baggage with 200 of his regiment, in getting the animals over the extremely difficult road. The almost impassable nature of the path beyond the Anjiri Kandao caused an immense block of animals at that place, and the confusion was increased by a false alarm causing a panic among the mule-drivers and followers, in which some animals and loads were lost and many drivers deserted.

The baggage and guard bivouacked for the night on the Anjiri Kandao without water. Next day (16th January) the march was resumed, and a detachment of sappers came out from Landi Kotal to improve the road; nevertheless, in spite of the exertions of Colonel Hodding and his officers, the baggage was only got that day as far as the first water, four miles from the bivouac.

On the 17th the baggage struggled over the Shilman Ghakhe, and being met by 100 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry, under Major Gordon Cumming, who came out to render assistance, the bulk of it reached Kam Dakka about 10.30 that night; some, however, did not get in till the next morning.

On the 16th January the troops halted at Kam Dakka, and the day was spent in collecting materials for rafts.

Two rafts having been prepared, Colonel Boisragon's

column was passed over on the 17th, with orders to destroy the village of Reina. Crossing commenced at 10.30 a.m., and was completed at 4.30 p.m. Reina was reached at six o'clock, and found to be completely deserted, as was the neighbouring village of Parchao and the whole country for three miles down the river.

On the 18th Reina was burnt and its one tower blown up. Pursuant to Brigadier-General Doran's orders, the troops then recrossed to the right bank, and two additional rafts having been constructed, the operation was effected in less than three hours. The column then marched back to Dakka, which was reached at 4.30 p.m., without a shot having been fired. A small detachment marched from Reina by the Lalpura Road, and saw no traces of the enemy. In fact, the defeat of the Mohmands on the Gara heights had caused a panic in the tribe, and the country was reported to be deserted for miles around.

Brigadier-General Doran's column returned to Landi Kotal on the 18th January by the Gara Pass and Haft Chah. The baggage was sent round by Dakka.

There were no more casualties on the British side, and none at all in General Doran's column. The enemy's loss was estimated at about 500 killed and wounded during the four days' operations. During the last week of January movements were constant on the Khyber line of troops returning to India, or being pushed forward towards the front. Several alterations were made in the brigades, and in the distribution of regiments, as shown in the distribution list, dated the 28th January, in Appendix XX.

The principal movement at this time was an expedition into Laghman from Jalalabad, which marched on the 27th January, under the command of Colonel G. F. Walker, 12th Foot, and accompanied in person by Major-General Bright.

The column in question was composed as follows :

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of which Major-General R. O. Bright was made Inspector-General, reporting direct to Sir F. Roberts at Kabul.

The communications were reorganised in three sections :

1st Section.—From Peshawar to Barikab, under Brigadier-General Gib, with head-quarters at Landi Kotal.

2nd Section.—From Ali Boghan to Fort Battye, under Brigadier-General Doran (who thus retained the same sphere), with head-quarters at Jalalabad.

3rd Section.—From Safed Sang to Butkhak, under Brigadier-General Sale-Hill, with head-quarters at Safed Sang.

Two movable columns were organised at Safed Sang and Jalalabad respectively, both of which were under the command of Brigadier-General Arbutnot, who had his head-quarters at the former place. Both these movable columns were at the call of Sir Frederick Roberts in an emergency.

The staff of the line of communications was :

Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	Colonel Wemyss.
Assistant Adjutant-General . . .	Major Thompson.
Assistant Quartermaster-General . . .	Major Creagh.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General . . .	Lieutenant Maisey.

As the month of March drew on there were renewed signs of hostility amongst the tribesmen. On the 10th the officer commanding at Seh Baba telegraphed that large numbers of Safis had collected, with the intention of attacking Seh Baba, in the Tagao Valley, which runs from the north into the Kabul River Valley near the confluence of the Panjsher River. Seh Baba post was reinforced with two mountain guns and 200 men of the 25th King's Own Borderers, and 30th Punjab Infantry from Jagdalak. Reports of robberies and other symptoms of uneasiness being also heard of from



CONDITION OF ANCIENT BRIDGE OVER HASHIM KHEL STREAM, NEAR SAFED SANG, IN MAY 1879

the neighbourhood of Pezwan and Jagdalak, two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery were ordered to the last-named place from Jalalabad on the 22nd March, while 400 of the 8th Bengal Infantry were sent from Safed Sang, and 100 of the 12th Foot to Pezwan. General Doran was also directed to push up the 1st Gurkhas without delay.

On the above date (22nd March) two officers, Lieutenants B. S. Thurlow and H. A. S. Reid, of the 51st Light Infantry were fired at while riding alone from Jagdalak to Jagdalak Kotal. Lieutenant Thurlow was hit, and fell heavily to the ground; Lieutenant Reid, checking his horse as soon as possible, galloped back to the assistance of his comrade. At the same moment an Afghan appeared running towards Lieutenant Thurlow's body, and as Reid approached he raised his rifle and fired point-blank at the latter officer. At this critical juncture Reid's horse shied suddenly, and by so doing saved the life of his rider, whose coat-sleeve was burnt away above the elbow. Closing with the Afghan, Reid blew out his brains with his revolver; but, some thirty Ghilzais rushing up, he was forced to abandon Thurlow's body, which was recovered the following day by a party of the 25th Foot under Major Ramsay.

On the 23rd March 150 hired transport bullocks were carried off between Pezwan and Safed Sang. On the 24th a report was received from General Doran at Jalalabad that the chief Moghal Khan was said to be collecting men in the Mohmand villages of Goshta, on the left bank of the Kabul, with the object of attacking and turning out Azim Khan, who had been nominated by the British as governor of that district, but this gathering dispersed before a column could be sent against them.

On the night of the 26th March the camp at Pezwan was fired into, and on the same date a determined attack was made by Khugianis and Shinwaris on Fort Battye, a very weak post, held by only 100 of the 4th Madras Infantry and 50 sowars of the 4th Bengal

Cavalry, commanded by Major E. B. Blenkinsop, 4th Madras Infantry, but fortunately reinforced for the moment by 150 of the 31st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant F. C. C. Angelo, who were passing through. The attack began at 11.30 p.m. with a sudden rush of the enemy from the road up to the south wall of the fort. The garrison turned out immediately, but not before the enemy, having established themselves under cover of the wall, poured a heavy fire, coupled with showers of stones, into the camp; Lieutenant Angelo and three men were killed, Subadar Major Sher Singh and several others severely hurt, though fortunately most of the Afghan bullets flew high. At the same time another party of the enemy rushed the transport lines, and there killed several men. It was not long, however, before the native infantry, gaining the walls, drove the enemy back, while the cavalry detachment opened fire from the north and west faces of the fort whenever opportunity offered. Finding that their assault had failed, the Afghans soon began to retreat, and in a short time they were scattered in all directions over the hills. Several prisoners were captured the next morning by mounted patrols from the fort, and from them and other reports it appeared that the tribesmen numbered some 1,200, of whom, according to their own account, 25 were killed and 40 wounded.

Major Blenkinsop detained the detachment of the 31st Punjab Infantry, and heliographed for reinforcements to Safed Sang, in answer to which request 100 men 1-12th Foot, 100 31st Punjab Infantry, and 30 sabres 4th Bengal Cavalry were at once despatched to Fort Battye.

Major Blenkinsop pointed out the weakness of the fort with such a small permanent garrison, and stated that had it not been for the detachment of the 31st Punjab Infantry having arrived on the morning of the 26th, under Lieutenant Angelo, the garrison in all probability would have been cut to pieces.

The wall of the fort on the south side, against which

the principal attack was made, was so low that nearly the whole of the east face could be enfiladed by an enemy posted behind rocks 100 or 150 yards distant on the plain. The transport lines on the east face of the fort were also a constant source of weakness, as the space was filled with carts and animals, under cover of which the enemy were able to come up close and fire.¹

The month of April opened with punitive measures against the clansmen who had taken part in these outrages and hostilities against the British.

On the 4th April two columns marched from Gandamak and Jalalabad, under Brigadier-Generals Arbuthnot and Doran respectively, and effected a junction at Kailaghu, 6½ miles due south of Fort Battye. Their object was to exact a fine of 5,000 rupees as a punishment for the attack on Fort Battye. The money was paid, however, without any resistance being offered, and the columns returned on the 7th April.

On the 11th April a movable column composed as under, commanded by Brigadier-General Arbuthnot and accompanied by Major-General R. O. Bright, marched from Gandamak to Pezwan :

6th Dragoon Guards (50 sabres).
 4th Bengal Cavalry (50 sabres).
 I-A, R.H.A. (2 guns).
 11-9, R.A. (2 guns).
 No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
 51st Light Infantry.
 1st Gurkhas.
 31st Punjab Infantry.
 8th Bengal Infantry (300 rifles).
 No. 6 Company (Sappers and Miners).
 "A" Company, Madras Sappers.

The next day the column started for the Hisarak Valley, with the object of inflicting punishment for the murder of Lieutenant Thurlow. Proceeding 3 miles along the main road to Jagdalak, the column struck

¹ For distribution of the troops on the line of communication on the 31st March, see Appendix XXII.

436 COLONEL ACTON'S RECONNAISSANCE

across two low ridges, past the village of Mardadand,¹ to the Karkacha stream. Here the advance guard began to be fired on by groups of Afghans on the neighbouring hills, and one sepoy was wounded. The force bivouacked round Mazulla Khan's fort,¹ and during the night a constant fire was kept up on the camp; a sergeant of the 51st was shot, while four men of 11-9, Royal Artillery, were wounded by sword cuts, presumably by ghazis who had crept into camp unnoticed.

On the 13th the chief of Hisarak, Muhammad Shah, as well as other headmen, came into camp to treat with General Bright, and no movement of troops took place, though several shots were fired in the course of the day and one sepoy was wounded.

At noon on the 14th April a reconnaissance in force was made along the left bank of the Auzangiani stream, following the low range above the valley. The force consisted of 600 infantry, 2 guns No. 1 Battery, and a troop of Carabiniers, the whole under the command of Colonel C. Acton, who was accompanied by General Arbuthnot. The object of this reconnaissance was to search the ridges on the left bank of the river, and to reconnoitre towards Auzangiani, and on its return to search the villages on the north side of the Hisarak Valley.

No opposition was met with till the troops approached the gorge of the Auzangiani stream; but here large bodies of the enemy were perceived: one established in a sangar on the right bank of the gorge, and another holding a spur on the opposite side. The infantry soon dislodged this latter body, but the group in the sangar held to it, notwithstanding the artillery was brought to bear on them.

As the afternoon was drawing in, and the object of the reconnaissance had been obtained, Colonel Acton was ordered to withdraw, and on the retirement being commenced, the enemy rapidly advanced to harass the

¹ Not on map.

movement. The heights on each side, however, were crowned by infantry, who retired in succession. At this time Lieutenant E. Palmer, of the Commissariat, was mortally wounded while carrying an order, and Captains C. H. Hamilton, R.A., and J. V. Nugent, 51st Light Infantry, were struck by half-spent bullets, the former receiving a slight wound and the latter being severely bruised. A doolie-bearer, too, was slightly wounded, but no other casualties occurred. The party reached the bivouac at Mazulla Khan's fort about six in the afternoon.

On the same day a convoy of 400 ponies, escorted by 200 rifles, was sent to Sarandu *via* Chartut, to bring in three days' provisions from Pezwan.

On the 15th the force remained in camp, and orders were issued for its return next day to Pezwan; meanwhile Colonel D. Limond, R.E., made the necessary arrangements for the destruction of Mazulla Khan's fort, as that chief had not tendered his submission or given satisfaction for the outrage committed by his people. Next morning the baggage of the force started for Pezwan, under escort of the 31st and 8th Bengal Infantry, two guns I-A, on elephants, two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery, and a troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards. The remainder of the force waited till the destruction of the fort was effected. The mines were fired at 9 a.m., and the fort successfully destroyed. The movement of the main body on Pezwan was followed up by the enemy, who fired continually at long ranges, wounding four men of the 51st and one Gurkha. The column reached Pezwan about 3.30 p.m., taking up its former camping ground.

General Bright and his staff returned to Safed Sang on the 17th, and on the same day orders were issued for the formation of a camp at Mardadand, the troops to garrison it being two guns of 11-9, Royal Artillery, 80 sabres of the 4th Bengal Cavalry, 500 of the 51st King's Own Light Infantry, and 400 of the 31st Punjab Infantry. This force remained at Mardadand till the

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26th April, when it marched to Pezwan and thence to the neighbourhood of Jagdalak, in consequence of threatening rumours from that quarter.

Meanwhile the 2nd Movable Column had marched on the 14th from Fort Battye to Safed Sang, under Colonel G. F. Walker of the 12th Foot; it was not, however, engaged in any further operations before the end of April, nor did any other hostilities take place on the part of the tribesmen, although disquieting rumours were constantly rife.

Early in May a reconnaissance in force towards Tezin was projected by Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, but the movement was postponed in consequence of an application from the Ghilzai leaders (Mazulla Khan, Faiz Muhammad Shah, etc.) to be allowed to visit Kabul for the purpose of expressing their concurrence in the proposals of the British Government regarding the choice of an Amir. Preparatory to this action a meeting of Ghilzai chiefs was held at Tezin, where a lengthened conference took place, but no united course could be agreed on. Asmatulla Khan systematically held aloof, and Faiz Muhammad Khan, with some others, separated himself from the rest of the chiefs. Finally, on the 15th May, Faiz Muhammad, with Khan Muhammad, Mazulla Khan, and other chiefs of less note, had an interview with the Political Officer at Seh Baba, and promised to send representatives to Kabul, with such petitions as they might desire to make to Government. They did not wish to be pressed to go into Kabul in person, but promised to refrain from disturbing the line of communications until some final settlement should be arrived at. They informed the Political Officer later that there was every prospect of Asmatulla Khan joining them in coming to terms. At the same time it was known that each chief had sent an agent to Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan.

Meanwhile disturbances continued in the neighbourhood of Jalalabad. On the 5th May an attack was made on a convoy of commissariat stores near Rozabad ;

one driver was killed and two wounded, and some stores carried off before a party of cavalry came to the assistance of the escort. The robbers, who were Ut Khil Ghilzais from Laghman, were said to have lost two killed.

Two days afterwards a serious raid was committed on the commissariat cattle-yard, about a mile west of Jalalabad, by a large band of marauding Ut Khel Ghilzais, who succeeded in carrying off 1,000 head of cattle towards Laghman. The 5th Fusiliers being opportunely on the spot, Colonel T. Rowland with 400 rifles and some cavalry started in pursuit about 4 a.m., and followed the raiders to the Darunta gorge. Here he overtook the rear guard of the enemy, about sixty men, holding the defile. Colonel Rowland forced the pass, but the cattle were now two hours ahead in Laghman, and further pursuit was abandoned. On the 12th May it was ascertained that the perpetrators of this outrage were Ghilzais of Laghman, who had slipped through the Darunta gorge in small parties, and thus eluded observation. Of the 1,000 head of cattle and 180 sheep carried off, some had been left at villages along the line of retreat, and these were recovered; but the bulk of the spoil, some 800 bullocks, were now at Surkhakan in Laghman. A fine of 4,000 rupees was exacted from the villages between Jalalabad and Darunta for not giving warning of the raid, and for permitting the robbers to pass through their lands.

About the same period rumours of coming disturbances were prevalent in Besud. This district is a small richly irrigated and triangular cultivated piece of country in the angle between the Kabul and Kunar Rivers, immediately opposite Jalalabad. There are two paths leading northwards, one along the right bank of the Kunar River past Tokchi, and the other running over the Paikob Pass, about 2 miles west of the former, and separated from it by a high hill running north and south, and about 4 miles in length. The Tokchi defile is passable by infantry in single file, and cavalry can

lead through it, though with some risk, as the path at one place lay along a wooden aqueduct 4 feet wide, overhanging the Kunar River. The Paikob Pass presents no difficulties. The only portions of Besud in which troops can act are strips on the banks of the two rivers, and the slopes at the foot of the range of hills. The whole centre of the district is, at this season, under rice cultivation, and forms an expanse of standing water and marsh, intersected by numerous deep water-courses with ditches branching from them in all directions.

On the 9th May Brigadier-General Doran reported that Mulla Khalil, a fanatic priest, who had been for some days past preaching a religious war in Kunar, and gathering the wild freebooters of the frontier to his standard, had occupied Besud and Goshta with a large number of Safis. Accordingly, General Doran moved the head-quarters of his (the 2nd) Section of the Khyber Line Force from Rozabad to Jalalabad, and detained at the latter place the 5th Fusiliers, who were *en route* to Safed Sang.

The 4th Madras Infantry was also ordered from Rozabad to Jalalabad, and its place was supplied temporarily by two companies 9th Bengal Infantry, from Safed Sang.

Meanwhile, in order to prepare for the contingency of having to cross the Kabul River into Besud, the Brigadier had ordered rafts to be got ready by the Governor of Jalalabad for the transport of troops. This precaution was necessary in consequence of the rising of the river at this season of the year, caused by the melting snows, which compelled the dismantling of the bridges. On the 14th May, to give confidence to the Governor and people of the Jalalabad district, Brigadier-General Doran resolved to occupy the Fort of Pir Muhammad Khan on the further side of the river, about half a mile above the bridge. Two hundred rifles 1st and 4th Madras Infantry, under command of Major G. Tyndall, 1st Madras Infantry, were accord-



RESTORED BRIDGE OVER HASHIM KHEL STREAM, NEAR SAFED SANG (LOOKING WEST)

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ingly sent across the river on rafts. On the 15th May the head-quarters of the Central India Horse reached Jalalabad, and in the afternoon fifty sabres were sent across the river to join Major Tyndall's detachment. On the 16th two companies of the 9th Bengal Infantry arrived from Rozabad, to reinforce the Jalalabad garrison during the impending operations in Besud. On the same day a cavalry reconnaissance was pushed forward by the Tokchi defile to Shigai, within 3 miles of Shewa, on the right bank of the Kunar River. The force at Jalalabad was yet further strengthened on the 17th May, when the 12th Foot and four guns of I-A, Royal Horse Artillery, marched in on their way to India, and Brigadier-General Doran determined, in view of the necessity for action in Besud, to detain both corps temporarily.

The next day definite news was received of the threatening attitude of Mulla Khalil, in consequence of which 200 rifles 5th Fusiliers, 200 rifles 12th Foot, a troop of Central India Horse, and a division of No. 1 Mountain Battery crossed the river forthwith; on the same date Brigadier-General Doran received orders from Major-General Bright, commanding the Khyber Line Force, to attack the enemy on the 19th May.

The only known path by which the troops could reach the practicable ground at the foot of the hills was by first following the bank of the Kabul River up-stream for about a mile, and striking off to the right in single file along a winding track through a rice-swamp. This would bring them out on the slopes at the north-west corner of Besud, whereas the enemy were known to be in the north-east angle between the hills and the Kunar River. Brigadier-General Doran was thus compelled to act on a line parallel to his base on the Kabul River, so that the enemy's left was as near Dabela, and the bridge-head opposite Jalalabad, as was the British right. Moreover, the intervening swamp was by no means as impenetrable to an irregular enemy, acquainted with every path and by-way in the country, as it was to the

British troops. It was therefore quite possible for the former to march on Dabela and the bridge-head, while the British column was seeking them along the base of the hills to the north of Besud. And this, in fact, was their intention.

General Doran's object, therefore, was to strike a blow at the enemy as quickly as possible before they should be aware of his having left Dabela Kala. On the morning of the 19th May, at 4.30 o'clock, he marched with the following troops:

Central India Horse, 1 squadron, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin	79 sabres.	
No. 1 Mountain Battery	2 guns.	
5th Fusiliers, Colonel Rowland	175 rifles	} 542 rifles.
12th Foot	183 "	
1st Madras Infantry, Colonel F. Dawson	92 "	
4th Madras Infantry	92 "	

A small garrison was left in Dabela Kala; and the officer in temporary command at Jalalabad was ordered to hold the bridge-head with troops from the garrison, and to place two guns of C-3, Royal Artillery, in position on the right bank of the river to sweep the ground in front of the works, should the enemy make a descent on the bridge-head.

About 6 a.m. Brigadier-General Doran reached a small isolated hill about a mile west of Beninga. From the summit of this he viewed the enemy, about 2,000 strong, with eighteen standards. Their right was protected by a dry ditch in front of the fort, and was strongly held. Along the line, banks, ditches, and broken ground afforded excellent cover, and their left rested on Bulandgarh, a village on the edge of the marsh. As the Brigadier and his staff observed the enemy, they began to move in considerable numbers towards their left. It afterwards transpired that they had no idea of the proximity of a force strong enough to take the initiative, and were even then on their way to the bridge-head and to Dabela Kala, which latter they believed to be held by only eighty men. The groups on the hill were mistaken for a reconnoitring patrol.

General Doran had no wish now to check a movement which took the enemy into open ground away from the pass through which lay their line of retreat. He therefore directed Colonel F. Dawson, commanding 1st Madras Infantry, the next senior officer to himself, to bring up the troops and place them in close formation behind the hill. The enemy meanwhile continued to take ground to their left until they suddenly discovered the force, and came to a halt.

Concealment being no longer possible, General Doran ordered Colonel Dawson to attack.

The detachments of British infantry were each formed in three companies, and the native infantry detachments in two companies. The 5th Fusiliers on the left extended one company, with one in support, and the third in echelon to the left rear as a reserve. In the centre the 1st Madras Infantry extended one company, supported by the other. On the right the 12th Foot extended a company, with the second in support, and the third in reserve. The detachment 4th Madras Infantry formed the general reserve, and the mountain guns were kept in rear of all till wanted. The cavalry detachment was to the left rear; it watched the exposed flank, and was in readiness to cut off the enemy from the hills.

In this order the troops advanced until within 600 or 700 yards of the Afghans. The guns then opened fire as well as the infantry. The latter fired very steadily and well, so much so that the enemy's right could not face the shower of bullets, and began to make off towards the hills.

Brigadier-General Doran at once sent the cavalry against them. Led by Colonel Martin, the detachment of Central India Horse swept along between the hills and the fort, overtaking the enemy and killing about twenty-five.

Some, however, of the defenders of the fort, seeing their retreat cut off, resolved to stand their ground. A few of these were killed either just outside or in the quadrangle. The survivors then retreated into the

south-eastern tower and stood at bay, nor were they overpowered until the wall had been breached with shell and a hand-to-hand conflict had followed in which Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland, Captain H. Kilgour, Color-Sergeant Wood and three privates of the 5th Fusiliers distinguished themselves.

Altogether, the enemy's loss in killed was not less than 70, besides many wounded. Among the troops (who numbered 24 British officers and 684 of all other grades actually engaged) the casualties were very few. Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland and six men were wounded, for the most part with sword-cuts, besides one horse killed and five wounded.

By 10 a.m. the last shot had been fired, and the return march to Dabela Kala began.

On the morning of the 21st May the troops marched to Azimulla Khan Kala, a strong fort on the northern side of the Paikob Pass, which was destroyed. Next day a combined movement, under Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland (whose wound was slight) and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, surrounded the fort of Banaras Khan, which was also destroyed; and on the evening of the same date the difficult task of recrossing the river to Jalalabad was undertaken. The river had been rising rapidly, and was now a formidable torrent; but the detachment of the 12th Foot and a division of C-3, Royal Artillery, which had joined the force at Dabela on the 19th, got over on that day, and the guns were placed in position on the right bank to cover the passage.

The river continued to rise during the night, and on the morning of the 23rd the sole remaining bridge over the southern branch of the river was carried away. The troops on the left bank had now to cross either on rafts or by swimming the whole breadth of the Kabul River in flood, some 400 yards of rushing water. Twenty elephants and seven small rafts, supported by inflated skins, were the only means at hand. The current was so strong that rafts could not be towed

against it, and the elephants could only breast the stream with difficulty. The latter had to wade through 6 feet of water with their loads, and the rafts were taken out after each trip and carried up-stream for half a mile to enable them to hit the landing-place. Under these difficult conditions the division of the mountain battery with all its mules, three troops of cavalry with all their horses and some of their ponies, the detachment Madras Sappers and Miners, and some of the native infantry, were brought over. The guns crossed on elephants. The infantry, with all the baggage and the saddlery of the cavalry, were conveyed on rafts or elephants. The horses, mules, and baggage animals swam the 400 yards of river, in many cases with their owners or drivers riding them or swimming alongside. Some men of the Central India Horse crossed as often as ten times to swim horses and ponies over; many crossed six or seven times. Picked swimmers with ropes and unrolled turbans were placed down-stream to assist exhausted men and animals, and saved many that must otherwise have been carried down the stream to almost certain destruction. Brigadier-General Doran recorded that all ranks worked splendidly. It was not to be expected, however, that so dangerous a passage could be made without loss. A battery driver and a sowar's horse were unfortunately swept away and drowned.

Next day, the 24th May, the few remaining troops were brought across; sixty-five men of the 5th Fusiliers, on the twenty elephants, being the last to leave Besud.

Events of a somewhat similar nature had meanwhile been in progress in the neighbourhood of Pesh-Bolak, where Brigadier-General W. A. Gib, commanding the 1st Section, Khyber Line Force, had received certain intelligence of a tribal gathering at Shershahi, under one Mulla Fakir. Accordingly, at 11 a.m. on the 18th May, the Brigadier marched from Pesh-Bolak with the following troops:

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MAZINA AND HISARAK

8th Hussars	135 sabres.
5th Bengal Cavalry	110 „
L-5, R.A.	4 guns.
2-14th Foot	450 rifles.
32nd Pioneers	266 „

Three days' supplies and ammunition, but no tents, accompanied the troops. While the operations were proceeding Brigadier-General Gib stopped the march of the 8th Hussars to India.

The column reached Shershai at 8 a.m. on the 19th, after a difficult and trying march, but without having encountered any opposition. Information was there received that the enemy were at Mazina, and a reconnaissance was made in that direction to ascertain the nature of the intervening country. The Brigadier also seized the chief men of Shershai and the neighbouring villages as hostages, in order to secure his rear from attack while engaged with Mulla Fakir.

Early on the morning of the 20th May the troops marched towards Mazina. There was no road, and the route lay over a stony plain, intersected with ravines, and extremely difficult for artillery; however, with the aid of working parties from the 32nd Pioneers, all difficulties were successfully surmounted.

About half-past seven the enemy were discovered in a strong position in the cultivated portion of the valley. The country was studded with forts, and broken by orchards, terraced fields, and water-courses. The enemy's line was about a mile in length and faced south-east, the front being strengthened by stone breastworks. In rear was a broad stony river-bed, almost dry at this season, and beyond this again the collection of walled villages known as Hisarak. As the troops approached, the enemy beat their drums and defiantly waved their standards. The Political Officer, however, anxious to detach the villagers, sent a flag of truce by a native cavalry officer in political employ, which was promptly fired on.

Brigadier-General Gib determined to attack at once.

His line of advance being due west, brought him nearly on the left flank of the Afghans, and against this he directed his attack, supporting his infantry by the heaviest possible fire from the guns, as the enemy were in great force.

Two companies of the 14th Foot were extended to begin the attack, with two companies in support. The 32nd Pioneers were in column to the right rear of the 14th Foot. The four guns unlimbered about 1,200 yards in front of the enemy's centre, and shelled the left wing. The cavalry were in readiness to oppose a counter-movement from the enemy's right.

As the infantry advanced upon the Afghans, the latter opened a very heavy but fortunately an ill-directed fire; they offered a most stubborn resistance, and the progress of the infantry was slow though steady. Seeing that the 14th Foot were gaining ground, and the guns were producing a considerable effect, the General ordered the 32nd Pioneers to assume attack formation, sending two companies into the fighting line on the right of the British troops.

Behind the left of the enemy's line was a stone breastwork, screened by a bank from the fire of the guns, and this was obstinately held by the Afghans. It was finally carried by a bayonet charge, headed by Captain A. W. Noyes, 14th Foot, who was wounded in the hand as he led his men into the breastwork.

The main body of the enemy now withdrew a short distance to a second position, to which they clung with considerable tenacity, and some cases occurred of individual Afghans being bayoneted in their breastworks. Gradually, however, the steady advance of the infantry rolled up the Afghan line, and as they were driven back, the guns advanced to successive positions towards the right bank of the stream-bed, and by their fire hastened the rout of the tribesmen.

By one o'clock the enemy were dispersed and out of the range of infantry fire, and the action seemed to be at an end; but at this juncture fresh bodies appeared

from the direction of Mazina and began firing on the troops. The infantry therefore again advanced and rapidly drove the enemy quite out of the valley into very difficult ground to the hills some 5 or 6 miles off.

It was now late and the troops were recalled and bivouacked at Mazina, occupying several of the numerous Afghan forts. Not a single shot was fired during the night.

The enemy were estimated to have lost at least 120 killed, and by their own account upwards of 200 wounded. Three standards were captured by the troops. A number of prisoners were also taken, but being unarmed, they were handed over to the Political Officer.

The casualties among the troops were very few, a fact which was principally attributed by Brigadier-General Gib to the effective fire and good handling of the four guns of L-5, commanded on this occasion by Captain B. F. Donville. The 14th Foot had two men killed, and one officer and three men wounded; the 32nd Pioneers, one man wounded; the battery, one officer and one man wounded. In this affair the camp followers behaved extremely well, the hospital *kahars* freely venturing under fire to carry away the wounded. One was killed when close to Surgeon-Major D. A. S. Thorburn; who was attending to a man of the 14th Foot immediately in rear of the troops engaged.


On the morning after the action the troops marched back to Shershai, the 32nd Pioneers and squadron 5th Bengal Cavalry diverging *en route* to the village of Khadi, whose inhabitants had allowed Mulla Fakir to murder an official of the Government of Jalalabad. Three different forts had each a tower blown up and the gateways destroyed.

Next day the force halted at Shershai, and the 32nd Pioneers were again employed in blowing up three towers and dismantling a fort, as the people had here also permitted a local official to be butchered.

On the 22nd the troops returned to Pesh-Bolak, no



RESTORED BRIDGE OVER HASHIM KHEL STREAM, NEAR SAFED SANG (LOOKING EAST)



COUNTRY IN THE VICINITY OF
GANDAMAK AND HISSARAK
 (SURKHAB RIVER)

To illustrate operations of 11th to 16th April and 4th July 1880.

London, John Murray.

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resistance of any sort having been encountered since the affair at Mazina.

The last days of the month passed without noticeable incident. Mulla Khalil, after his defeat by Brigadier-General Doran, was said to have gone to Kama and there to be at the head of a gathering of Mohmands. To disperse this gathering a movement into Kama was sanctioned, but the operations had to be postponed in consequence of the swollen state of the Kabul River. On the 29th, however, Brigadier-General Doran reported that the river was practicable, and orders were therefore issued for the projected movement to begin, assisted by two guns and 400 infantry from the 1st Section at Pesh-Bolak.

Meanwhile disquieting rumours were also heard regarding Asmatulla Khan's hostile activity, and the Mulla Fakir was said to have established himself in the Chapriar Valley; and finally it was reported that the Laghmanis were in open revolt against their Governor. Brigadier-General Arbuthnot was therefore directed to march to Umar Khel *viâ* Rozabad, with No. 1 Movable Column, composed as follows:

Cavalry	{	6th Dragoon Guards (squadron).
		4th Bengal Cavalry.
Artillery		11-9, R.A.
Infantry {	British	51st Light Infantry.
	Native	{ 1st Gurkhas.
		31st Punjab Infantry.
Engineer Field Park (portion).		
Field Hospital.		


On the 3rd the column marched to Rozabad, where it was joined by "I" Company, Madras Sappers and Miners; Darunta was reached on the 4th and Asmatulla Khan's fort on the 5th, where arrangements were made for constructing rafts, and a spot selected for crossing the Kabul River. This was eventually found opposite the fortified villages of Sali Kala, about 4 miles from Asmatulla Khan's fort, and there the column crossed in two detachments on the 8th and 9th of June, having marched thither on the 7th. The squadron of Cara-

biniers and 31st Punjab Infantry remained on the right Bank of the river to hold Asmatulla Khan's fort, under Major F. Tweddell of the latter corps.

On the 10th June Brigadier-General Arbuthnot marched against the villages of the Ut Khel Ghilzai raiders in Laghman with his main force, leaving 53 sabres and 308 rifles to hold Dareh Ghat, which he had occupied in crossing. The villages were deserted and there were no stores nor crops to destroy, the nomad inhabitants having anticipated their yearly departure by a few days so as to avoid punishment for their outrages. Nothing remained, therefore, but to blow up and destroy the forts and villages, which were of but little value; and this work having been completed, the whole of the column recrossed the river on the 11th June. Whilst the outlying picquets were being withdrawn from the left bank of the river, a small party of Afghans kept up a continuous fire on the troops from behind hillocks on the Laghman side, at a range of 700 yards. Two of the 1st Gurkhas were slightly wounded, and two officers received contusions. The enemy's fire was returned, but as they did not show above the hillocks, it was doubtful if any of them were hit, and it would have caused considerable delay to dislodge them. The whole of the animals were got across without accident, and the last of the column reached Asmatulla's fort at 9 p.m.

No. 1 Column marched to Amir Kala on the 12th, thence to Rozabad and Fort Battye, and finally, on the 15th June, to Safed Sang, where, on the following day, Brigadier-General Arbuthnot made over its command to Brigadier-General R. Sale-Hill, prior to leaving for England. On the same date the 67th Foot and 45th Sikhs, which had been sent to strengthen Jagdalak during the absence of the column, were ordered to return to Kabul.

Meanwhile the projected expedition into Kama had also been carried out. On the 2nd June No. 2 Movable Column, composed as under, and commanded



PANORAMA OF CAMP AT SAFED SANG, APRIL—JUNE, 1879

by Brigadier-General Doran, was assembled on the right bank of the Kabul at Girdi Kats:

Cavalry	}	Central India Horse (150 sabres), Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, from Jalalabad.
		5th Bengal Cavalry (7 sabres), from Pesh-Bolak.
Artillery	}	L-5, R.A. (2 guns), Lieutenant G. G. Simpson, from Pesh-Bolak.
		C-3, R.A. (2 guns), Lieutenant C. T. Robinson, from Jalalabad.
		No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns), Lieutenant F. R. Thackeray, from Jalalabad.
Infantry	British	1-5th Fusiliers (200 rifles), Lieutenant-Colonel T. Rowland, from Jalalabad.
		2-14th Foot (239 rifles), Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Warren, from Pesh-Bolak.
	Native	9th Bengal Infantry (350 rifles), Colonel T. E. Webster, from Jalalabad.
		32nd Pioneers (192 rifles), Captain A. P. Samuells, from Pesh-Bolak.
		4th Madras Infantry (100 rifles), Major J. Godson, from Jalalabad.
	15th Madras Infantry (50 rifles), Lieutenant E. S. Hastings, from Pesh-Bolak.	
		Pontoon train from Dakka.

On this date news was received that Mulla Khalil's band and the Mohmand Khans had dispersed on hearing that a British force was marching against them, so opposition to the expedition was not expected.

On the 3rd the column, which had now been joined by 80 sappers of "C" Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, began crossing the river into Kama by two ferries, about 2½ and 1½ miles, respectively, above the camp at Girdi Kats. The cavalry, mountain guns, and majority of the transport animals crossed at the upper ferry, bivouacking for the night on an island opposite Sangar Sarai. The main body of the infantry crossed by the lower ferry, and occupied a position by the fort of Muhammad Amin Khan. The remainder of the column and a detachment of sappers from Ali Boghan crossed on the 4th June, the guns of G-3 and L-5, Royal Artillery, with 100 men of the 5th Fusiliers and 14th Foot being left to hold Girdi Kats.

Next day a demonstration was made in a N.-E.

direction, while the Pioneers and Sappers were engaged in destroying the towers of the Maliks Baz Gul, Sadur Khan, and Nur Muhammad, all of whom had assisted Mullah Khalil. All the inhabitants of the district came into camp and tendered their submission, and the object of the expedition having thus been gained without resistance, the troops recrossed the river on the 6th and 7th June and marched back to their respective stations.

While these events were in progress, the part of the Khyber occupied by General Gib with the 1st Section had not been free from disturbance. Raids on traders were made near Ali Masjid on the 5th June and again on the 9th; while on the 12th General Gib reported that serious hostile gatherings were taking place in Tirah. It appeared that several Afridi tribes had combined together, under the leadership of a Saiad named Mir Bashir, and it was said that seven thousand men were assembled in the Bara Valley, with the intention of attacking some part of the line of communication between Landi Kotal and Jamrud.

In view of these reports the garrison of Ali Masjid was reinforced by a company of the 18th Royal Irish from Landi Kotal, some of the 32nd Pioneers were sent to Basawal from Pesh-Bolak, while 200 of the 15th Madras Infantry from Basawal reinforced Landi Kotal.

On the 19th June a successful attack was made by the tribesmen on a convoy proceeding from Jagdalak to Pezwan, and a considerable amount of property was carried off; a naik of the 22nd Punjab Infantry was killed, as well as a sick sowar of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry. A similar raid took place on the same road on the 29th, at about 7.30 a.m.; between one and two hundred Afghans rushed down on the rear guard of a convoy which consisted of some men of the 31st Punjab Infantry and 4th Bengal Cavalry, and fired a volley, killing three men of the 31st, dangerously wounding three more, as well as wounding two horses

of the Bengal Cavalry ; they also succeeded in carrying off eleven pack-bullocks, five sheep, and four rifles and accoutrements of the 31st Punjab Infantry. Captain R. A. Swetenham, of the 27th Punjab Infantry, who was travelling with the convoy on his way to Kabul to rejoin his regiment, assumed command of the few men (about fifteen) who formed the convoy party, and, assisted by Lieutenant R. H. B. Taylor and Color-Sergeant Hamilton of the 25th Foot, kept the enemy off, and prevented them from carrying off more property, till assistance arrived.

On receiving news of the attack, Major F. S. Terry, commanding the 25th Foot, sent out reinforcements from Pezwan with all possible despatch ; and Captain J. L. Ross with eighty-one men of the same corps, who were marching from Jagdalak Kotal to Pezwan, hearing the firing, cut across country in rear of the point attacked. At the same time, Captain H. G. Dixon, from Jagdalak Kotal, took a party across the hills, and got within range of one party of the enemy as they were retiring. Major Terry estimated the enemy at 200 ; three dead Afghans were left behind, and it was reported that others had been seen to fall. The spot where the attack was made had been patrolled by cavalry, and the mail had passed only five minutes before the attack was made.

About the same date as this attack news was brought in of Asmatulla Khan's continued activity about Tezin, where he was said to have been joined by Hashim Khan, who had just fled from Kabul, and Faiz Muhammad Khan ; it was reported that an attack by these chiefs might be expected about the 2nd July.

In view of these disquieting rumours the garrisons of Jagdalak and Seh Baba were reinforced by moving the troops that composed No. 1 Movable Column from Jagdalak to Jagdalak Kotal, the rest of the 1st Gurkhas (150 men) and one company 51st Light Infantry from Safed Sang joining them there, and 100 men of the 1st Gurkhas were sent to Seh Baba,

On the 30th June another attack was made by raiders from Hisarak on a party of ten men of the 51st Light Infantry sent on in advance of a convoy from Pezwan to crown the heights at the half-way place to Jagdalak Kotal. This party on approaching their destination perceived the enemy advancing in some numbers towards the road, from the neighbouring hills, and immediately opened fire on them.

Lieutenant C. G. R. Thackwell, 51st Foot, hearing the sound of firing, went forward and, taking command of the ten men, led them up the hill and gallantly drove the Afghans off the neighbouring ridges; in performing this duty Lieutenant Thackwell was severely wounded and disabled, a bullet passing through his shoulder. The convoy in the meantime approached, accompanied by forty-two rifles of the 51st Light Infantry, who were proceeding to join the detachment of their corps with the movable column; these men soon cleared the road, and, occupying the heights above, enabled the convoy to pass in safety.

The month of July¹ did not open auspiciously for the tranquillity of the line of communication, which had been thus frequently disturbed. Outrages still continued; the telegraph wire was cut near Pezwan and the *jazailchi* posts between there and Safed Sang were attacked. It became evident that some vigorous measures were necessary, and accordingly, on the 4th July, Brigadier-General Sale-Hill instructed Colonel Ball Acton, commanding the 51st King's Own Light Infantry (which was at Pezwan about to relieve the 25th King's Own Borderers), to march from Pezwan on the same night so as to reach the village of Nargozai by daylight, and punish it for its share in the late disturbances; at the same time Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fryer was directed to co-operate with two squadrons of the Carabiniers from Safed Sang *via* Tutu.

¹ Many changes had lately taken place in the location of troops on the line: for a distribution list, dated the 30th June, see Appendix XXIII.

Colonel Acton marched out, as ordered, with the following force:

Total rifles, 492	}	4th Bengal Cavalry (40 sowars), Ressaldar Gulab Singh.
		11-9, R.A. (2 guns), under Captain Duthy, R.A.
		25th Foot (202 rifles), Major Terry.
		51st Light Infantry (196 rifles), Major E. B. Burnaby.
„ sabres, 40	{	31st Punjab Infantry (94 rifles), Subadar Jowahir Singh.

Acting on previous experience of night-marching, Colonel Acton decided to have no horses, ponies, or mules with the column, except such as were ridden, and the guns, baggage, and reserve ammunition, etc., followed at their best pace, but kept all closed up together and did not attempt to keep up with the column; they received orders to halt at some convenient place one or two miles short of Nargozai till sent for. In consequence of having no baggage animals, the column advanced quicker than on any previous night march, and the men were thus saved much fatigue.

Meantime Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fryer left Safed Sang at 1.30 a.m. with two squadrons of the Carabiniers and seventeen sabres 4th Bengal Cavalry, and just before daylight debouched into the Tutu Valley.

Major Terry led the advance guard of Colonel Acton's force, which, after experiencing some difficulty in getting through the village of Samuda in the darkness, proceeded on towards Gatgai. About three miles from Nargozai a native started up close before the advanced files and disappeared in the darkness, and after another mile this occurred again. Just as it was getting light, the Carabiniers under Colonel Fryer were sighted two miles to the left of the Pezwan column, and when within about half a mile of Nargozai some loud shouting was heard in the village, and several alarm shots were fired, but they were not returned.

The village of Nargozai is surrounded by walled orchards, which fortunately were not occupied. East and west are *nalas*, which afford good cover, and eastward again is a hill, the end of a spur coming down from the Safed Koh: a ridge of this, parallel to our

front, strengthened with sangars afforded a strong line for the enemy.

Immediately on the alarm being given in Nargozai, Lieutenant-Colonel Fryer sent two troops, under Captain H. B. Hamilton, to seize and hold the ground between it and the important village of Petla, situated one mile north-east of Nargozai, with a view to preventing any assistance being sent to the latter place. Fire was opened on these two troops by a party of men in a ravine, and about the same time an attempt was made by a large body of Afghans to advance from Petla; this was, however, immediately checked by Colonel Ball Acton's attacking force, supported by the other two troops of the Carabiniers. Major Terry, with the King's Own Borderers, meanwhile carried the height east of Nargozai, being met by a sharp fire, which, however, ceased as soon as the attacking party began to ascend. The village itself was evacuated and was quite empty when the troops reached it; no punishment could therefore be inflicted but to fire the place, which was accordingly done, while part of the force (a company of the 25th under Captain F. E. Carleton, the 31st Punjab Infantry detachment under Subadar Jowahir Singh, and some of the 51st Light Infantry) advanced into the Jokan Valley, where the Punjabis had some smart skirmishing, and had three men wounded, two of them mortally. Two small villages in the Jokan Valley were burned, and the force then retired, it being deemed unwise to attempt to follow the scattered bands of Afghans into the difficult country, cut up by deep *nalas* and gorges, east of the village of Nargozai.

The movable column was now (5th July) massed at Madarband, half way between Pezwan and Jagdalak Kotal, and although shots were still fired into the camp at night and at columns on the road, yet the expedition against Nargozai had evidently, on the whole, had a quieting effect in the district; the gatherings reported in the neighbourhood of the Tezin were said to have broken up, and the excitement had considerably abated.

Preparations now began in earnest for the withdrawal of the British forces from North Afghanistan. All the heavy baggage and surplus stores both from Kabul and from the Khyber line were gradually moved down towards India ; the raft service from Jalalabad to Dakka much facilitated the movement, and the rafts continued to ply daily during the early part of the month. By this means of transport 18,726 maunds of baggage and 2,073 men, chiefly invalids, were conveyed from Jalalabad to Dakka.

On the 10th July, however, some rafts were fired at near Chardeh, and on the 12th so determined an attack was made upon them near Lachipur that this method of transport had to be temporarily discontinued, until arrangements could be made for the adequate protection of the rafts.

With the beginning of August the withdrawal of sick and of surplus stores was continued busily, and on the 4th of the month the gradual retirement of troops along the Khyber line commenced, in conjunction with that of Sir Donald Stewart's force from Kabul.

Several rumours had reached Landi Kotal early in the month of gatherings of Afridis in Tirah, and on the 30th July large bodies of raiders were supposed to be collected under Saiad Mir Bashir in the Bazar Valley. Every precaution was taken by Brigadier-General Gib, commanding the Section of the Khyber, but the reports proved to be without much foundation. These rumours, however, were very harassing to the troops, and increased materially the already arduous convoy duties, which often extended to twelve hours in one day.

Major-General Bright and the head-quarters of the Khyber Line Force left Gandamak for Rozabad on the 15th August ; on the 16th they marched to Jalalabad, where General Bright halted on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, and inspected the working of the raft service.

On the 20th General Bright marched to Lachipur, moving on the next day, 21st August, to Basawal ;

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whence, on the 22nd, the head-quarters marched to Dakka, and on the 23rd to Landi Kotal.

Here Sir Donald Stewart arrived on the following day, and, leaving again for Peshawar on the 28th, handed over the command of all the troops in North Afghanistan to Major-General Bright on the 1st September.

No trouble or annoyance was experienced by the troops moving down the Khyber line, and the movements were carried out without hitch or difficulty in accordance with the pre-arranged programme.

Considering the great heat at this season of the year, the health of the troops was generally very good, and no epidemic disease broke out.

The first portion of troops from the Khyber Line Force began to arrive at the camp at Hari-Singh-ka-Burj on the 15th and 16th August, and the last detachment (No. 10 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners) reached that place on the 2nd September.

At the conclusion of the war a brigade, under Brigadier-General C. J. S. Gough, c.B., v.c., was left in the Khyber to hold Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid, and Jamrud. It was composed as follows:

STATION.	CORPS.
Landi Kotal	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). No. 1 Mountain Battery. 1-18th Foot (head-quarters). 27th Punjab Infantry. 41st Bengal Infantry.
Ali Masjid	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-18th Foot (detachment). 16th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 41st Bengal Infantry (detachment).
Jamrud	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (head-quarters). 16th Bengal Infantry (detachment).

In all 46 officers, 839 British, 2,848 Native troops—total 3,733 all ranks.

The Peshawar District Force, under the command of Brigadier-General G. C. Hankin, was thus constituted:

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At Peshawar, Naoshera, Michni, Cherat, Fort Mackeson, etc.	11th Bengal Lancers	}	Cavalry.
	17th " Cavalry		
	19th " Lancers		
	E.A., R.H.A. . . .	}	Artillery.
	G-4, R.A. . . .		
	10-11, R.A. . . .		
	12-9, R.A. . . .		
	2-9th Foot . . .	}	British Infantry.
	1-12th " . . .		
	2-14th " . . .		
	1-17th " . . .		
	1-25th " . . .		
	1st Bengal . . .	}	Native Infantry.
	27th " . . .		
	28th " . . .		
31st " . . .			
45th " . . .			
Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners. Details and Convalescents.			

In all 117 Officers, 5,005 British, 4,644 Native troops—total 8,766 all ranks.
 Grand total for Khyber and Base—12,499 all ranks.

The Khyber Brigade remained as above detailed throughout the autumn and winter, but the Peshawar District Force was reduced to peace footing, and by the end of November, 1880, was of normal strength.

With regard to the Khyber Pass the Government of India decided, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to recognise the independence of the neighbouring tribes, and to make such arrangements with their representatives as should ensure that the road would be kept open and free from interference. When these arrangements were concluded, the British garrisons were to be withdrawn, but the occupation of the pass by regular Afghan troops, without the consent of the British Government, was not to be permitted.

In February, 1881, the arrangements with the Khyber tribes were completed, and were described as follows in a despatch from the Government of India to Lord Hartington, dated the 28th February:

“The total cost to the British revenues will be under two lakhs of rupees per annum, the sum of Rs. 87,540 being given in allowances to the different sections of the Afridis, and Rs. 87,392 being allotted to

the payment of a corps of *Jazailchis* which the tribes desired to maintain. In consideration of these payments the Afridis have covenanted to undertake entire and exclusive responsibility for the freedom and security of the road, and to occupy with the *Jazailchis*, Ali Masjid and other important posts as far as Landi Khana. Beyond this point their responsibility does not extend, Landi Khana being the defined western limit of the independent tribal territory in which, for the purpose of keeping open and free of interruption the passes into India, the authority of the Kabul Government is not recognised."

The final evacuation of the Khyber was thereupon arranged. The movement commenced on the 18th March, and concluded without incident on the 28th March, 1881, when the Khyber Brigade was broken up.

CHAPTER XV

OPERATIONS IN THE KURRAM DISTRICT FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1880.

THE opening months of 1880 were uneventful in the Kurram Valley. The force left in occupation by Sir Frederick Roberts was under the joint command of Brigadier-Generals J. Watson, v.c., and J. J. H. Gordon, c.B., the former having chief command over the district.

The chief difficulty which was encountered was the ill-health of the troops. Some regiments, especially the 29th Punjab Infantry, were terribly reduced by the results of their exposure in the previous year, and urgently required relief. The 29th lost 51 native officers and men between the beginning of November and the end of January, and on the 16th January General Watson reported that not more than 200 or 250 men in the regiment could stand any severe fatigue.

Major-General Tytler died of pneumonia at Thal on the 14th February, and the command of the forces in the Kurram devolved on Brigadier-General Watson. Colonel H. L. R. Newdigate, 4th Rifle Brigade, succeeded Brigadier-General Gib, who moved to the Kabul line in command of an infantry brigade at the beginning of March.

On the 13th March the Commander-in-Chief represented to the Government of India the anomalous position of Brigadier-General Watson in the Kurram district, who, though having the rank only of a brigadier, was nevertheless in command of a division consisting of one cavalry brigade, four batteries of artillery, and three infantry brigades, while for staff he had but a joint commander in Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon,

one Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, one officer officiating in that appointment, and two brigademajors. The Commander-in-Chief recommended that General Watson should have temporary rank of Major-General and a proper divisional staff of A.A.G. and A.Q.M.G. and D.A.Q.M.G. These proposals were at length sanctioned by Government on the 29th April.

A fortnight later (13th May) the Kurram District Force was divided into two brigades, designated respectively the Upper and Lower Kurram Brigade. (For effective strength at the end of April, see Appendix XXV.)

Meanwhile the peace of the district remained almost completely undisturbed. On the 13th April, however, a report was received from Thal that the Waziris had collected in Maidan, about 8 or 9 miles south of the former place. It was reported that about 3,000 had assembled there, under the leadership of Mulla Adkar and Gulab Miah. The officer commanding at Thal consequently ordered a detachment of 40 men of the 11th Bengal Infantry to strengthen the garrison in the *dāk* bungalow enclosure; and a cavalry reconnaissance was ordered from Thal towards Maidan to obtain reliable information. This party, consisting of 82 sabres of the 18th Bengal Cavalry, under the command of Captain G. L. R. Richardson, crossed the Kurram River south of Thal, and, on approaching Biland Khel, struck off to the right towards Maidan. When they had gone about 8 miles they came on a body of the enemy, estimated at about 600 strong. Shots were exchanged, but as the object of the reconnaissance had been sufficiently effected in discovering the enemy's position and strength, Captain Richardson withdrew towards Fort Khapianga. The enemy followed as far as the hills to the south of the fort, firing at long ranges, but only succeeded in hitting two horses. The Waziris were reported to have lost four killed and eight wounded; among the former was their leader, Gulab Miah. A detachment, under Lieutenant McMullen,

was left in the fort, and the remainder of the party returned to Thal.

The month of May opened with an unfortunate affair in Lower Kurram, where, on the night of the 1st May, a body of marauders effected an entrance into Chapri post and murdered Lieutenant O. B. Wood of the Transport Department, one sowar of the 13th Bengal Lancers, one sepoy of the 5th Bengal Infantry, and eight doolie-bearers, while one dafadar and one sowar and several followers were wounded. The news reached Brigadier-General Newdigate at Manduri, where he was on inspection duty, and on its receipt he immediately rode over to Chapri to enquire into the affair. It appeared that the Khatak guard of six men, who formerly occupied a small shed outside, and within 10 yards of the enclosure on the north-west angle, had absented themselves without leave. The enemy, taking advantage of this, effected an entrance by pulling down the wall close to this shed. A sentry of the 5th Bengal Infantry was posted inside the enclosure within 20 yards of the spot, and was killed on his post; but as he did not fire or give any alarm, it was supposed that he was asleep. The enemy were thus enabled to enter the cattle enclosure and to attack those within it without any alarm being raised, and to inflict the heavy loss of twenty-seven killed and wounded on the garrison before the latter could drive them out. No pursuit was attempted by the garrison, and the assailants retreated unmolested.

General Newdigate, on learning the nature of this attack, ordered parties out at once from Thal and Manduri; no enemy was met with by either, but the party from Manduri came across numerous tracks of blood.

From information received, it appeared that the assailants were an advanced portion of a considerable gathering of armed men on the banks of the Kaitu. They were not well armed or equipped, as their original intention was only to rob and murder at any favourable opportunity. Their loss was reported to be four killed and four wounded.

It was afterwards ascertained that they were inhabitants of the villages Landa and Sada in Eastern Khost.

On the same date (2nd May) General Newdigate received intelligence that a large body of Wazirs, some 1,500 or 2,000 strong, under Mulla Gulab Pir and Wazir Adam Khan, had collected on the Shabakghar range, about 9 miles from Manduri. It was further reported, on the 3rd, that the Wazirs intended attacking Chapri, Manduri, and Badshah Kot that night. The garrison of Ahmad-i-Shama, which was not strong enough to resist a determined attack, was accordingly withdrawn and sent to Chapri, which was further reinforced by 100 rifles and 6 sabres from Thal, while 50 rifles and 6 sabres were sent from Chapri to Manduri. Forty sabres proceeded from there to Khapianga, with orders to move, with 20 rifles at daybreak, up the right bank of the Kurram River, to cut off the retreat of any attacking party. None of the posts were, however, attacked, and a fortnight later (17th May) it was reported that the Wazir raiders had dispersed on hearing of the preparations for defence.

On the evening of the 22nd information was given to Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon at Paiwar Kotal, by Major E. R. Conolly, Political Officer, that the Jaji Malik Nanak was at his village, Karmana, 3 miles south of Ali Khel. This man was a notorious intriguer and an enemy of the British, and had been most active in endeavouring to stir up the neighbouring tribes, though he had been pardoned for similar conduct last year. General Gordon decided to try and capture him, or, failing that, to destroy his stronghold. Accordingly, he started at 11 p.m. on the same night with the following force :

18 lances 13th Bengal Lancers.
2 guns 1-8, R.A. (Mountain Battery).
300 rifles 85th Regiment.
100 rifles 2-8th Regiment.
40 rifles 28th Punjab Infantry.

The troops marched rapidly and quietly, avoiding the village of Ali Khel, and surrounded Karmana at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd. Here it was found that Malik Nanak had left the night before; his tower was blown up and completely levelled, and the people of the place disarmed. After halting at Karmana for four hours, the force returned towards the Paiwar Kotal, halting three hours for breakfast at Ali Khel. The force reached the Paiwar Kotal at 6 p.m., the troops having covered 32 miles in 21 hours, including halts.

The month of June was similarly uneventful, and, beyond reconnaissances of the passes over the Safed Koh between Sikaram and Matungeh, there were no military operations to be recorded. A few movements of troops took place, but, notwithstanding occasional rumours of threatening gatherings, no outrages of the prevailing tranquillity ensued. A more serious enemy than the tribesmen, however, was encountered in an outbreak of rinderpest amongst the commissariat and transport cattle, and of foot-and-mouth disease amongst the camels, the former of which assumed considerable proportions before it could be checked.

The months of July and August were equally uneventful, and passed without any more important hostilities than occasional attacks by marauders upon convoys and transport animals.

Meanwhile, although the health of the troops was good along the upper part of the Kurram line, in Lower Kurram it was most unsatisfactory, and malarial fever of a serious type was prevalent.

The transport animals in the Kurram were also still in bad condition; the mortality amongst the camels was very heavy, and those which survived were quite unfit for work and terribly emaciated, notwithstanding every effort to improve their condition.

Preparations for the final evacuation of the Kurram at an early date were now in progress; stores, which had been collected at the Paiwar Kotal, with a view to part of the Kabul force returning to India by that

route, were withdrawn, as well as all other surplus commissariat supplies; sufficient for six weeks only was retained at the Paiwar Kotal, and for one month at Shalozan.¹

As September advanced the British force was gradually withdrawn from the Upper Kurram. All commissariat stores were withdrawn from the Paiwar Kotal to Habib Kala, and the former place was evacuated on the 12th September, the troops falling back on Shalozan, and the head-quarters of the brigade being established at Bara Imam. On the withdrawal of the troops from the Paiwar Kotal, the blockhouse and other buildings erected by the British at that place were destroyed, while the Hariab Valley was handed over by Brigadier-General Gordon to Afghan deputies on behalf of the Amir.

The march of the troops and removal of stores was much hindered and inconvenienced at this time, especially in the Upper Kurram, by heavy rain, which fell in torrents between the 8th and the 20th of September; the retirement, however, continued steadily, and without any hostile demonstration on the part of the tribesmen. All stores were removed from Habib Kala and Bara Imam by the 21st September, and on that date the troops fell back on Shalozan, whence the further removal of the stores to Kurram was immediately commenced, and continued up to the end of the month.

Kurram Fort was finally evacuated on the 16th October, and was handed over to a Turi garrison on the following morning. General Gordon with the rear guard of the Kurram Field Force, consisting of 1-8, Royal Artillery, 85th Light Infantry, 13th Bengal Lancers (head-quarters), and 20th Punjab Infantry, reached Thal on the 21st October, and there the brigade head-quarters were established until further orders.

¹ For strength and distribution of the Kurram Field Force on 1st September, see Appendix XXVI.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BOMBAY DIVISION IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN FROM
THE BEGINNING OF APRIL TO THE END OF AUGUST, 1880.

WE have now to turn to the events at and about Kandahar, where on the departure of the Bengal Division, Brigadier-General R. Phayre was left in temporary command pending the arrival of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, c.s.i.

A week or two previously two British officers, Captain H. F. Showers, Commandant of the Baluch Guides, and Lieutenant C. F. Fuller, r.e., had been treacherously attacked and the former murdered by Kakar marauders near the Khojak. The first work of the Bombay Division in April was to avenge this outrage. With this object two small columns started respectively from Harnai and Gwal; they met on the 3rd April and found that the Kakars had occupied a strong position near the Khojak defile; on the appearance of the troops, however, the enemy withdrew after only very slight opposition, and the columns having recovered Captain Showers' body and some of the débris from Lieutenant Fuller's camp, returned to Gwal and Dargai by the 6th April.

On the 11th April Lieutenant-General Primrose with some of his staff arrived at Kandahar, and took over command from Brigadier-General Phayre, who had been appointed commandant of the line of communications.

Political charge was not vested in General Primrose, as it had been in General Stewart. Major O. St. John was thus independent of the military commander;

this arrangement was possibly a contributory cause to the subsequent disaster at Maiwand.

It was not long before disturbances commenced within Brigadier-General Phayre's new command. On the 15th April a message reached Major-General Primrose to the effect that the people of Zhob were in communication with the Kakars, and that hostilities might be expected against the posts and working parties on the line. On the following day further rumours were heard of hostile gatherings near Baghao, as well as in the Arghastan Valley.

On this date (April 16th) the Road Commandant, Major S. J. Waudby, 19th Bombay Infantry, with a dafadar and two sowars, 3rd Sind Horse, and two sepoys of his own regiment, arrived at Dabrai, on his way to Kandahar after a tour of inspection.

It afterwards transpired that for some days previously a mulla, by name Sahibzada, had been inciting the villagers to rise and attack the posts of Gatai, Dabrai, and Mel Karez, and, having collected some ghazis, the mulla, with a Kakar named Shah Muhammad, prepared to attack those posts on the night of the 16th.

In the course of the afternoon of 16th April, warning of the impending danger was brought to Major Waudby by a Pathan sowar sent by the Achakzai chief Ghulam Jan. Major Waudby accordingly barricaded the entrance to the post, using for that purpose bags of grain, etc. The post consisted of a simple enclosure surrounded by a wall, $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, with a small ditch outside; its garrison, besides the five men with the Road Commandant, was composed only of some Pathan levies. At 10 p.m. Major Waudby, who had been lying down to rest for an hour or two, after posting some sentries, arose and sent out two men to reconnoitre towards the low hills on the east of the post. They had advanced but a short distance when the enemy, apparently about 300 strong, were seen coming over the hill. Major Waudby ordered his five men to reserve their fire, and the assailants were kept at bay

for a short time, until the ammunition of the little party began to fail; the enemy then made a rush and succeeded in gaining an entrance. Major Waudby fought to the last, and was said to have killed several of the enemy with a hog-spear. The Pathan levies seem to have bolted when the attack began.

One sowar of the Sind Horse made his escape at the last moment, shot down the foremost of his pursuers, and got away to the neighbouring hills, from which he saw the post set on fire and the enemy making away with their plunder into the hills, where they quickly dispersed.

Early in the morning the sowar observed a *kafila* coming from Chaman, and returned with it to the ruined post. The only person uninjured was a servant of Major Waudby who could speak Pushtu, and had saved himself by reciting the *Kalma*. The *dafadar* was severely wounded, and had been left for dead, but he afterwards recovered. The sowar got an Afghan dress from the *kafila*, and went on through the hills to Kandahar to report the affair.

The best proof of the resistance offered by Major Waudby was that thirty dead bodies of tribesmen were counted; and it was known that the assailants had carried away two dead bodies and many wounded.

Telegraphic communication between Kandahar and Chaman was interrupted from 3 a.m. on the 17th, but on receiving trustworthy information of the attack on Dabrai, Major-General Primrose promptly directed Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, commanding the 3rd Sind Horse, to detail a troop of his regiment, under a British officer, with orders to push on to Mel Karez, and, if possible, to Dabrai, and to open communication with a wing (200 men) of Jacob's Rifles, which was supposed to have arrived that morning at Gatai *en route* from Chaman. Similar precautions were taken by Brigadier-General Phayre from the direction of Chaman to ensure the safety of the posts; but no further attempt was made by the hostile Kakars, who

were said to be astonished and disheartened at the desperate defence made by the six men at Dabrai.

The foregoing was not the only disturbance in Southern Afghanistan at this time. On the 18th April news was received at Kandahar of an attack on a convoy near Jaldak by the inhabitants of the Kajbaz villages, which are situated on the left bank of the Tarnak, about 8 miles south of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Two days afterwards a hostile gathering of Hotak Ghilzais, under Muhammad Afzal, the Hotak chief, was reported to be at Sheori, 12 miles east of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and to be planning an attack on the camel yard outside the fort at that place; this gathering, however, broke up without any serious hostilities.

On the 27th April a force from Gatai and Chaman, composed as follows, marched with 400 men of native levies against Abu Saiad's force to inflict punishment for the attack on the Dabrai post:

Sind Horse	40 sabres.	} Under Major F. C. Singleton, 28th Bombay Infantry.
Poona Horse	20 „	
No. 2 Mountain Battery	2 guns.	
9th Bombay Infantry	85 rifles.	
28th „ „	85 „	

The force marched to the fort and halted within a mile of it, when a message was received that the fort would be given up without fighting. Abu Saiad himself was taken prisoner and carried back to Kandahar; his fort was destroyed.

The outrages and disturbances in the neighbourhood of Kalat-i-Ghilzai also necessitated punitive measures against the Kajbaz villages, and an expedition, under Colonel O. V. Tanner, consisting of 250 of the 29th Bombay Infantry (Baluchis), and a small signalling party from the 66th Foot, marched on the night of the 1st May for that purpose.

By daybreak on the following morning Colonel Tanner reached and surrounded with his troops the three principal Kajbaz villages, and succeeded not only in making two maliks prisoners, and in securing hostages,

but also in recovering a quantity of looted stores and in seizing a number of goats and sheep.

At about 8 a.m. on the same day news was received that a party of Popalzai and Ishakzai Duranis had taken up a position between Kajbaz and Kalat-i-Ghilzai; and these, to the number of about 240, were encountered by Colonel Tanner on his return march. They were posted on the Shahbalan hill, 300 feet above the road, in a strong position. Colonel Turner attacked them immediately and put them to flight, after they had lost fourteen killed, with their leader, Mulla Ahmad, and eight prisoners. The loss on the side of the British was only one Baluchi wounded.

On the 9th May Captains A. J. Garrett and F. W. Leckie with Lieutenant E. E. M. Lawford, of the Transport Department, were fired at as they were returning late from Kohkaran to Kandahar. Captain Garrett was severely wounded in the arm and a sowar of the 3rd Sind Horse was slightly wounded in the wrist. Owing, however, to the lateness of the hour when the report was received, the perpetrators of the outrage could not be followed up.

At Kandahar the months of April and May were not eventful, but the frequent rumours which reached the British authorities of the movements of Sardar Ayub Khan in the direction of Herat foreshadowed the danger which was growing in that quarter. As early as the 6th April the following telegram was despatched by Colonel O. St. John, who was the independent political authority at Kandahar, to the Indian Foreign Office :

“Sardar Abdul Salam, who came from Herat in December last as an envoy from Ayub, and returned in January, has sent his confidential servant to me with a letter, reporting arrival of Persian Commissioner. He offers to be medium of communication with Ayub in our interests, and asks for confidential agent to be sent to him at Herat, or letter declaring that the English Government wish to have friendship and

services of Ayub. He hints that Ayub is hesitating between Persia and England, but inclines to latter. Messenger reports that Persian Commissioner left two days before he did, while letter speaks of him as still there. He says Ayub is practically in hands of the Kabuli troops, who for two months would not let him leave his house. Object of letter appears to be acknowledgment of Ayub's title to Herat, overtures to Persia having finally failed. I presume letter may be answered in accordance with previous communications, namely that Ayub can do as he likes; that we want nothing from him; and that if he wants anything from us he should express his wishes."

A week later the news reached Kandahar that a *jeihad* had been proclaimed in the province of Herat, but it was not supposed that it would meet with any response. Again on the 17th April information was received that the Kabuli regiments were pressing Ayub to march on Kandahar and that Shahgassi¹ Yusuf Khan had written from Farah that he had succeeded in rousing the Zamindawaris against Sardar Sher Ali, Wali of Kandahar, and that now was the time to advance.

On the 24th May Sardar Nur Ali Khan, the son of the Wali, writing from Zamindawar, confirmed the news already received that Ayub Khan had succeeded in reconciling the Heratis and Kabulis and intended marching on Kandahar about the 10th of June. He enclosed a number of letters received by Sardar Khan, the general in command of the regular troops, from Ayub Khan, the *Luinab*,² and others, exhorting them to return to their allegiance.

The Wali called on the Political Agent on the evening of the day he received the above news, and expressed his fear that the menaced advance on Kandahar might have serious consequences if carried into

¹ "Master of the Ceremonies or Chamberlain," corrupted from "Ishak Akasi."

² The Chief Deputy, corrupted from "Loi Naib."

effect; he said that he himself intended leaving at once for Zamindawar, and he hoped that a brigade of British troops would be sent to Girishk to support him.

The Alizai Duranis, he said, were in correspondence with Ayub at Herat, and, unless they saw very clearly that the British Government were on his side, they would join Ayub, after which the contagion of rebellion would spread over the country.

On the 25th the Wali paid a visit to Mirza Hasan Ali Khan, and expressed no doubt of Ayub's intention to march on Kandahar, saying that he heard that the Zamindawar chiefs were in constant correspondence with him, and that directly Ayub should advance from Herat, his own (*i.e.* the Wali's) troops in Zamindawar would be sure to desert to the Sardar. He said that promises of help had been given to Ayub both in transport animals and men, and that he feared that many of the ignorant people would raise disturbances throughout the country. It was said, however, that the Herati and Kabuli troops were really not on good terms, but were divided into two factions, the Heratis headed by the *Luinab*, Shahgassi Khushdil Khan, and the Kabulis by Abdulla Khan, Nasiri Ghilzai.

The next day the Wali came with fresh news to Colonel St. John. He had sent two spies to Herat disguised, but they were both captured and imprisoned; one of them, however, who was able to give personal security, had returned with the news that on the 10th May the Kabuli troops went to Ayub and told him that that was the day he had appointed to march on Kandahar, but that no orders had been received nor preparations made. He informed them that want of carriage alone prevented him from marching, but that he would do so fifteen days later. On this the Kabulis began to seize camels and horses, the property of private individuals, and Ayub stopped several caravans proceeding towards Kandahar. On the 20th May a brother of the Wali's principal minister arrived from

Farah, and stated that the people there were being forced by Muhammad Umar Khan (Nurzai Durani) to cut their crops so as to have supplies ready for Ayub's army, which was to leave on the 30th May. A thousand horsemen were to march direct on Zamin-dawar by the Siahband road.

In consequence of the above intelligence the following communication was on the 26th May made by the Quartermaster-General in India to the Secretary to Government in the Military Department :

“Looking to the political intelligence from Kandahar that Ayub contemplates an advance from Herat, the Commander-in-Chief considers that if such a move is made, it will have a disturbing effect, not only in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, but also on the Panizai Achakzais and Kakars on the line of communication, and that, therefore, the Bombay Reserve Division should be mobilised as soon as possible after it is known for a certainty that Ayub contemplates a move on Kandahar, or any other direction eastward.

“2. Under the above circumstances, Kandahar is not, His Excellency thinks, sufficiently strong enough to detach a brigade to Girishk, as suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, Political Officer. It is evident that very little reliance could be placed on the Wali's troops.”

Such was the position of affairs at the end of May, when the troops of the Kandahar Field Force were as shown in Appendix XXVII.

At Kandahar itself almost the only noticeable event was the formal installation of Sher Ali Khan as Wali by Colonel Oliver St. John, in the presence of Major-General Primrose and his staff, on the 11th May.

At the end of the month it was determined to send a reconnoitring party under Major E. P. Leach, R.E., v.c., to Maiwand, and about half way to Girishk, to complete the survey of the Khakrez and Kushk-i-Nakhud Valley, and to ascertain its fitness as a camping ground for a brigade, in case it should be necessary to move

thither in support of the Wali's troops. For this duty a troop of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry and a company of the 30th Bombay Infantry were detailed on the 1st June.

At this time Sardar Ayub Khan was rapidly completing his arrangements for the march against Kandahar. On the 1st June the standards of his troops were planted outside Herat, and twelve tents were pitched at Pul-i-Malan in readiness for the Chahar Aimak sowars expected to come with Abdulla Khan (Nasiri Ghilzai), who had been sent to collect them; but these Chahar Aimaks did not respond readily to Ayub's call; and there were no other signs of an early move from Herat. Forty Herat horsemen had been sent to obtain supplies in Bakwa, without, however, any success. The Kabuli and Herati troops were still quarrelling amongst themselves, but, notwithstanding all difficulties, the Sardar had determined, if possible, to begin his march on the 4th June. He was forced by circumstances, however, to remain at Pul-i-Malan beyond that date, and meanwhile employed himself in the manner described in the following extract from letters from Herat, received by native agents *viâ* Teheran, and dated the 4th June:

“Several days ago Ayub Khan despatched Sardar Abdulla Khan, his Wazir, along with several other sardars, to Kushk, to see Jahan Turk Khan, the son of Khan Agha (Jamshidi), with three objects: *first*, to ask for Ayub Khan the hand of Khan Agha's daughter, who was formerly intended for Abdulla Jan, Amir Sher Ali's heir-apparent; *secondly*, to arrange the disputes between the Hazara and Firozkohi tribes; and *thirdly*, to bring in horsemen from every tribe for the expedition against Kandahar.

“Two days ago they returned, accompanied by a son of Khan Agha, Fatehulla Beg (Firozkohi) and Muhammad Khan (Hazara), each of the chiefs bringing 100 horsemen. Khan Agha's daughter has been betrothed to Ayub Khan. Peace has been made between the Hazaras and Firozkohis.

“Three or four days ago a person resembling an Arab made his appearance *viâ* Teheran and Meshed. He brought a green banner with him, and gave out that it had been given him by a holy man at Baghdad, who told him to take it to Ayub Khan at Herat, and he would be victorious against the infidels. Ayub Khan received the flag with due reverence, and said he would follow it and fight and be victorious. The Kabul troops also collected about sixty or seventy *tomans* amongst themselves, and brought several sheep and two *kharwars* of bread.

“They sacrificed the sheep and divided the meat and bread as an offering to the flag. This Arab will not take any present whatever, and asserts that he has brought the flag to help the troops of Islam against the infidels. Ayub Khan, his officers and all the troops believe in him, and firmly believe they will gain a victory. I am at a loss to know how this affair of the flag has arisen and who sent it. The troops are all preparing to march upon Kandahar. Ayub Khan has ordered 1,500 Herati horsemen to accompany him. I have all along said, and am still of opinion, that if the army starts, it will be upset by the time it gets to the borders of Farah, as there is no friendship between the Herati and Kabuli troops, and they are sure to have a quarrel. Ayub Khan’s secret object is to get rid of the Kabuli troops, for he has no money for them and they do not obey him.”

At length, on the 9th June, Ayub Khan having collected all the Herat horsemen, chose 1,400 out of the whole, which he put under the command of the *Luinab*, Khushdil Khan (son of Shahgassi Sherdil Khan), who had arrived some time before from Kabul. He ordered the *Luinab* to proceed with his cavalry in advance to Farah; and on the date named the latter accordingly marched across the Hari-rud at Pul-i-Malan to Pul-i-Sabzawar, 5 miles beyond the bridge. Here the ground is cut up by irrigation canals and the country well cultivated. The first three marches were

purposely short, whilst the baggage and supplies were crossing the river.

Most of the inhabitants deserted their villages along the route; but this was a customary proceeding, in the track of an Afghan army, which can be well understood. Nor does it appear that the people were ill-disposed towards Ayub; indeed, on this occasion, from all accounts, the supplies were procured with ease.

On the 10th June the *Luinab* advanced his camp to Mir Daud Sarai, $14\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Herat, while the bulk of Ayub's force was marshalled without the walls of Herat; but, as usual at all gatherings of disunited tribes and leaders jealous of one another, dissensions seem to have been frequent in the various camps. More curious to English ideas seems the fact that the question most difficult of settlement was not whose should be the post of honour in advance, but who should be the last in order of advance, and Kabulis and Heratis were alike jealous of forming the rear in preference to the van guard. Each chief and sardar was anxious that his rival should precede him. From the accounts given it appears, however, that the Kabuli regiments were by far the best disciplined, whilst the majority of the Heratis were more or less disaffected.

The following is the estimate made of the composition of Ayub's force at this time. Their leader, however, only calculated upon them for the nucleus of his army, which he anticipated would be speedily reinforced *en route* by the local tribesmen, levies, and religious fanatics (ghazis) when passing through Zamin-dawar and on approaching Kandahar.

1st Infantry Brigade, Taj Muhammad Khan (Tajik), Mir Akhor, Commanding.
 3 regiments of regular infantry (Kabulis), each 500 . . . 1,500

2nd Infantry Brigade, Saidal Khan Commanding.
 2 regiments of regular infantry (Kabulis), each 500 } . . . 1,500
 1 regiment " " (Kandahari), 500 }

3rd Infantry Brigade, Ghafur Khan (Tajik) Commanding.
 3 regiments of regular infantry (Herati), each 366 . . . 1,100

Total regular infantry, 9 regiments . . . 4,100

AYUB'S ARMY

<i>Cavalry Brigade, Abdul Rahman Khan (Rika) Commanding.</i>	
3 regiments of regular cavalry (Kabuli), each 300	900
<i>Artillery, Ahmad Gul (Kabuli) Commanding.</i>	
1 mountain battery (mules), gunners	100
4 field batteries (horses), gunners and drivers, each 100	400
Total artillery, 30 guns, and gunners and drivers	500
<i>Irregular horse.</i>	
Herati sowars, all ranks	1,500
Durani " "	500
Total irregular horse	2,000
<i>Abstract.</i>	
Infantry	4,100
Cavalry	900
Artillery	500
Irregulars	2,000
GRAND TOTAL	7,500 all ranks. ¹

Of these, 500 of the Durani irregulars were at Farah, having been there since the middle of March under Muhammad Yusuf Khan, where he was joined by Sartip Nadir Shah (Kabuli) with four guns and one Herati regiment.

At Farah, likewise, were collected the families and belongings of the Kandahari and Kabuli regiments, and there they remained until the campaign was decided.

On the 15th June the main body of Ayub's army crossed the Hari-rud and camped at Pul-i-Sabzawar, and Ayub himself, with his head-quarters staff, accompanied by four regiments, thirty guns, and four regiments of cavalry, left Herat and established himself at Roza-bagh. Thence he moved by the usual caravan road through Shah-Bed and Khwaja Uria to Sabzawar, arriving there on the 20th June, and halting there for some days. Meanwhile the *Lwinab* with the advanced cavalry had also been advancing steadily, and on the 23rd was at Farah. The main army continued its march on the 24th, and by the 27th June it had reached Khushkawa, 23 miles north of Farah, and therefore 135 miles from Herat and 193 miles from Girishk.

¹ See Appendix XXVIII.

Definite intelligence of Ayub's arrival at this point at length opened the eyes of the authorities at Kandahar to the reality of the intentions of the Sardar.

Rumours of his advance had, as we have shown, reached the Wali of Kandahar several weeks back, but authentic news was not obtainable. There was no military Intelligence Department, and the independent political agency at Kandahar, which had control of all available sources of information, was insufficiently organised for this purpose and ill-served; moreover, the disaffected troops of the Wali were able to prevent true tidings from Herat reaching Kandahar, whilst false information of Ayub's ill-success was disseminated there. On the receipt of some such deceptive news, on the 30th May General Primrose telegraphed to India his opinion that the rumour of Ayub Khan's move on Kandahar had been exaggerated, and that, according to later reports, the Kabuli regiments, having heard of the British victories near Ghazni, were desirous of giving up their arms and leaving Herat, with a view to returning to Kabul or taking service with the Wali of Kandahar.

Even the Wali remained in apparent security at Girishk up to the latter part of June, and wrote to Colonel St. John on the 13th of that month that everything was going on well, that his troops were in good order and well affected; in short, his only anxiety was want of funds, which difficulty he hoped to get over by the help of the British Government. He added that should a brigade move to Kushk-i-Nakhud or Maiwand, the effect on the Herat faction would be very great.

On the 14th he wrote again to say that he had sent agents to stir up the people of Farah and Taiwara against Ayub, and added that he only wanted money and encouragement to go himself to Herat. If it were not wished that he should do so, he would return to Kandahar in three months' time, after collecting the Zamindawar revenue.

At last on the 21st June Colonel St. John received

from Wali Sher Ali authentic reports of Ayub's preparations to leave Herat, and the Wali earnestly requested that a British brigade should advance towards Girishk to support him. This news was telegraphed by Colonel St. John to Simla, together with the statement that General Primrose did not wish to move his troops in the very hot weather then prevalent, unless it was positively necessary, and that the Wali ought, with the assistance afforded him in arms and money, to be able to put down any rising in Zamindawar, if it was not supported from Herat in a manner more formidable than that which he described.

"At the same time," added Colonel St. John, "I am inclined to think that should it be desired to keep affairs in Southern and Western Afghanistan *in statu quo* for the present, an advance of a brigade to Maiwand, together with a prohibition of the Wali crossing his present frontier, would be advisable. An outbreak on the Herat border, however slight, might lead to complications."

On the 27th the following telegram was sent to the Quartermaster-General in India by Lieutenant-General Primrose:

"With reference to cipher telegram from Foreign to Political Resident, regarding Ayub Khan's move towards Kandahar, I have arranged, pending reference and orders, that a brigade, with battery, horse artillery, and a regiment of native cavalry, shall move on Girishk. I am of opinion that active support to the Wali, who is now at Girishk, will be more efficacious than if the whole force remained at Kandahar. To strengthen garrison here on departure of the brigade, I propose moving up 4th Native Infantry from Quetta, to be replaced on line of communication by a regiment from Reserve Division, and have ordered a wing of 2nd Baluchis from Kalat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar; the latter move is with concurrence of Political Resident."

On the 29th June the Quartermaster-General replied to Lieutenant-General Primrose that no active measures should be taken previous to the receipt of direct orders

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from the Commander-in-Chief, but that he should be prepared to move in case of need. On the 30th June he wrote as follows to the Government of India with reference to General Primrose's telegram of the 27th :

“ I am desired by the Commander-in-Chief to submit the annexed copy of a telegram (dated 27th June, 1880) from Lieutenant-General Primrose, c.s.i., commanding in Southern Afghanistan, in which he gives his views as to the movements he would consider necessary in the event of the advance of Ayub Khan from Herat with a considerable force being confirmed.

“ 2. It will be remembered that when rumours were rife of possible movements of Afghan troops from Herat in December last, Sir D. Stewart proposed to call up Brigadier-General Phayre's reserve troops to Quetta and Peshin, to enable the 19th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Sikhs, and 3rd Sind Horse to march on Kandahar. His Excellency was then of opinion that not only was this increase necessary, but that a further reinforcement to the extent of a battery of artillery and a British infantry regiment was necessary.

“ 3. General Stewart then stated that, unless additional troops were pushed forward to Kandahar, it would not be politically desirable to detach any portion of the garrison, and Sir F. Haines considered that the advance of the Reserve Brigade from the Bolan at once to Peshin and Quetta, so as to admit of the troops there being moved forward, was a measure of necessity, and His Excellency further urged the formation of a division at Jacobabad to be ready to move forward as a reinforcement.

“ 4. It now appears that a similar contingency has again arisen, only possibly a more serious one. Ayub is reported to have left Herat on the 9th June with a considerable force, with the intention of moving on Kandahar and raising the tribes as he advances. Should this be true, he should now be very close to Girishk.¹

¹ Ayub's army was, as shown above, then at Farah, i.e. within 170 miles of Girishk.

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“ 5. The troops on the line of communication cannot now, as they could in December last, be reduced and act as immediate reinforcements. The line of railway and new line of communication cannot with safety be left with less protection than at present, and therefore the reinforcements must be at once pushed up from the rear.

“ 6. The Commander-in-Chief does not consider that Lieutenant-General Primrose's proposals would sufficiently meet the occasion; the move of a brigade to Girishk in support of the Wali would leave Kandahar dangerously weak; and to withdraw a wing of the Baluchi regiment from the small garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai would be courting disaster, as no support would be available within eight marches.

“ 7. The force at Kandahar consists of—

		Officers.	Rank and File.	
	3rd Sind Horse	5	391	
	Poona Horse	6	271	
	3rd Bombay Light Cavalry	7	411	
	E-B, R.H.A.	7	153	
	C-2, R.A. (4 guns)	5	112	
	5-11, R.A. (heavy)	5	98	
	2-7th Fusiliers	24	682	
	66th Foot	18	610	
	1st Bombay Infantry	8	697	
	19th Bombay Infantry	8	645	
	30th Bombay Infantry	9	491	
	No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners	2	104	
TOTAL .	{	Artillery	17	363
		Native Cavalry	18	1,073
		British Infantry	42	1,292
		Native „	27	1,937
		104	4,665	

including non-effectives, sick, etc.

“ General Primrose proposes to move a brigade with a battery of horse artillery and a regiment of native cavalry: this would leave Kandahar with the following garrison, until troops arrived from the rear:

Kandahar .	{	Native Cavalry	682 all ranks.
		Artillery	4 guns and heavy battery.
		British Infantry	610
		Native Infantry and Sappers	810

“The Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison, after the proposed withdrawal of the wing of native infantry, would muster, including sick, etc. :

Kalat-i-Ghilzai.	{	Native Cavalry	103
		Guns	2
		British Infantry	147
		Native Infantry (about) . .	380

“The above garrison would, Sir F. P. Haines considers, be altogether insufficient.

“The Commander-in-Chief desires to urge upon the consideration of Government the necessity for at once moving up troops from the rear, and recommends that a brigade, consisting of a British infantry and two native infantry regiments, with a battery of artillery and a regiment of native cavalry, be moved up.

“The withdrawal of these troops from Sind will necessitate a further call of the wing of the 11th Foot from Bombay to Karachi, and at least one native infantry regiment from that Presidency.”¹

To this the Government of India replied, concurring with the Commander-in-Chief’s opinions in the following terms :

“In reply, I am to inform you that the Governor-General in Council approves of the proposal to send a brigade of the strength denoted to Girishk, but desires that strict injunctions be given to Lieutenant-General Primrose that none of his troops are to cross the Helmand on any account. His Excellency in Council agrees with Sir F. Haines in objecting to the withdrawal of the wing

¹ *Distribution of Reserve Division.*

Jacobabad, under Brigadier-General Wood.	{	1st Sind Horse (part).
		2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (part).
		1st Madras Cavalry.
		9th Bombay Infantry (ordered to Kandahar).
Haidarabad	{	F-2, R.A.
		2-11 Foot (wing).
	{	24th Bombay Infantry.
		D-B, R.H.A.
Karachi		2-15th Foot.
		3rd Bombay Infantry.
	{	9th Bombay Infantry (part), (ordered to Kandahar).

of native infantry from Kalat-i-Ghilzai, or any weakening of the line of communications ; and I am to convey the approval of the Governor-General in Council to the recommendations made in your letter under reply for the strengthening of the force under Lieutenant-General Primrose's immediate command."

Meanwhile Ayub Khan's main force had reached Farah on the 30th June and united there with the cavalry under the *Luinab*. Here orders much more strict than heretofore were issued for the march of the army, and during a halt of five days the organisation of the force was completed, and the families of the Kabulis and Kandaharis were left behind. At the same time Ayub's patrols scoured the country even up to the advanced outposts of the Wali's troops near Washir.

Except the threatened advance of Ayub Khan and the consequent uneasiness in the north the country occupied by the Kandahar Field Force had been fairly tranquil during the past weeks. The weaker posts had been brought into a proper defensible state, and all appeared to be going well on the line of communications. An outrage was committed, however, near Harnai, on the 9th June, when a convoy of carts was plundered by a small gang of hill-robbers, who made off to the hills, taking with them some property and bullocks. They were, however, followed and overtaken: ten of them were killed or captured, and most of the bullocks were recovered.

The surveying party and escort under Major Leach, which had been sent to Maiwand at the end of May, returned to Kandahar on the 14th June without having encountered any hostility.

Near Kalat-i-Ghilzai, Colonel Tanner, with a small detachment, attacked and dispersed a body of Afghans under the leader Muhammad Aslam on the 1st July.

To return to the point where at this moment were centred all the vital interests of the British in Southern Afghanistan, as well as the hopes of their enemies. The news of the march of the Afghan army from Herat

had by this time spread like wildfire all over the country, producing the most exciting and disturbing effect on the population, both in the city of Kandahar and in the surrounding country. Constant rumours were in circulation of gatherings of large bodies of *ghazis* and of Ghilzais assembling and moving to meet Ayub. The Wali's authority seemed to diminish daily; large numbers of men were leaving the city with their families, giving as their reason for so doing the high price of food and the fear of coming disturbance. This state of affairs continued from the beginning of the month of July till the final catastrophe which, preceded by the disaffection and desertion of the Wali's troops, raised the country to a man against the British.

On the 2nd July the following troops were detailed to march to Girishk, under the command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows, to support the Wali :

Staff	}	Captain W. H. McMath, 66th Foot, Brigade-Major.
		Captain T. Harris, 66th Foot, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
		Captain J. R. Slade, R.H.A., Orderly Officer.
		Lieutenant G. C. Dobbs, Officiating Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
		Major E. P. Leach, R.E., V.C.
Cavalry Brigade.	}	Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Commanding.
		Major G. C. Hogg, Poona Horse, Brigade-Major.

	Officers.	Sabres.	Rank and File.
3rd Sind Horse, Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson .	4	207	...
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, Major A. P. Currie.	6	300	...
E-B., R.H.A., Major G. F. Blackwood	6	...	127
66th Foot (6 companies), Colonel J. Galbraith .	20	...	518
1st Grenadiers, Bombay N.I., Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson	8	...	603
30th Regiment Bombay N.I. (Jacob's Rifles), Colonel W. G. Mainwaring	8	...	592
No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant T. R. Henn	1	...	45
	53	507	1,885

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One month's supplies were to be taken, and reserve ammunition at the rate of 100 rounds per gun and 100 rounds per rifle; treasury, field hospital, and extra water-carriage, etc., also accompanied the column.

The march to the left bank of the Helmand was to be accomplished in seven stages, viz. :

	Number of miles.
1. Kohkaran	7
2. Ashikan	9
3. Karez-i-Ata	20
4. Kushk-i-Nakhud	10
5. Mis Karez	8
6. Yakhchal	20
7. Helmand (left bank)	6
TOTAL	<u>80</u>

On the 4th July the cavalry brigade under General Nuttall, accompanied by Colonel St. John, moved out of Kandahar to Kohkaran. Brigadier-General Burrows's head-quarters, with the infantry brigade, commissariat, hospital and ordnance stores, etc., left the Kandahar cantonments early in the morning of the 5th, and encamped at Kohkaran, while the cavalry brigade left Kohkaran at the same time, and advanced to the camp at Ashikan, and throughout the march westward the cavalry always kept one day's march ahead of the main column.

On the 6th July Brigadier-General Nuttall with the cavalry marched some 20 miles to Ata Karez, and the main body of the Girishk force moved to Ashikan.

Simultaneously with the move of General Burrows's brigade the news of Ayub's advance necessitated a forward movement of some of the reserve troops on the line of communications. The 9th and 24th Bombay Infantry were pushed on with all possible speed to Sibi, and thence transported in 250 carts up the Bolan to Quetta, the Harnai route being impassable owing to floods. Meanwhile the 4th Bombay Infantry had been sent from Quetta to Kandahar, where it arrived on the 13th July.

During this time Ayub Khan's army had been

advancing towards Zamindawar, but it was difficult or even impossible, in the absence of any military organisation for obtaining and sifting intelligence, for the British to obtain any reliable information as to the enemy's movements. The Afghan advance was screened by cavalry and tribesmen, through whom it was impossible for spies to pass. It appears, however, that the *Luinab* with the advance cavalry, was at Washir on the 10th July, and that Ayub himself, with the main body, was close behind. By the 14th the army was reported to be at Eklang, 55 miles from the Helmand, and hordes of tribesmen from Tirin, Derawat, and Zamindawar were coming in from all sides to swell the numbers in the Afghan camp. There were also additions from the Arghastan Valley, besides a number of Duranis, both Achakzais and Nurzais, from either bank of the Kadanai River.

Brigadier-General Burrows was at Ata Karez on the 7th July, the cavalry under Nuttall being on that day at Kushk-i-Nakhud. Thence advancing by Mis Karez and Yakchal, Brigadier-General Nuttall reached the banks of the Helmand on the 10th, where he was joined by the main body on the following day. The whole column was encamped on an open plain on the near bank of the river, nearly opposite to Girishk. The encamping ground was a good one for peace time, but untenable in the face of an advancing enemy, as it was within range of artillery and rifle fire from a dense wood on the opposite bank of the river.

Here the force halted, as the Commander-in-Chief's orders definitely forbade an advance across the Helmand, while the brigade was so entirely *en l'air*, and the advance of reinforcements was delayed. The Commissary-General found some difficulty in obtaining supplies, but grazing for the camels, horses, and ponies was abundant.

Meanwhile the advance of Ayub Khan had a disastrous effect upon the Wali's troops with the British column. Immediately after the arrival of Brigadier-

General Burrows's force on the Helmand the Wali's troops exhibited unmistakable signs of insubordination. One regiment was reported to be openly mutinous, and the rest were certainly tainted with a disloyal spirit. What ammunition there was with them should have been put out of their reach, and Colonel St. John advised the Wali to take measures to do so, but without success. One of the *sardars* with his immediate followers, Alizais, had deserted to the enemy; but he failed, for the present, to persuade the others to do so.

So matters continued until the 14th July, when, while the British force were striking their camp with the intention of taking up a stronger position further up the river, the cavalry brigade with the battery of horse artillery were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate action, in consequence of signs of open mutiny in the ranks of the Wali's force at Girishk.

It appeared that in order to disarm his disaffected infantry, numbering 2,000, the Wali had ordered his force to retire from the neighbourhood of Sadat Kala, 18 miles north-west of Girishk, on to the Helmand. On this order being issued, his infantry, with the exception of the officers, deserted in a body with the guns to the enemy, taking with them in accordance with a preconcerted arrangement the whole of the gun and small-arm ammunition. The Wali's cavalry remained for the time faithful to their chief, and escorted the Wali and his treasure over to the Kandahar side of the river, where he presented himself in Colonel St. John's camp. But the cavalry then became equally mutinous and went off in the direction of Kandahar.

On learning that the infantry had mutinied and were marching off with the guns along the Herat road, Brigadier-General Burrows ordered the following troops to cross the Helmand and pursue :

3rd Sind Horse	47	} 310 sabres.
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry	263	
E-B, R.H.A.		
66th Foot, 4 companies.		

30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), 3 companies.
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

The force then left to guard the camp was—

66th Foot, 2 companies.
1st Bombay Grenadiers.
30th Bombay Infantry, 5 companies.

At 10 a.m. the Helmand was crossed by a difficult and dangerous ford, about 2 miles north-east of the first camping ground and close to the new camp. The cavalry and horse artillery were pushed on at once under Brigadier-General Nuttall to gain touch with the mutineers, and hold them in check until the infantry could be brought up. The advance was, however, much delayed by the difficult nature of the ground which had to be traversed ; it was cut up by numerous wide and deep canals and *nalas*, all of which could only be crossed by the guns by means of ramps cut in the banks. At length General Nuttall with the 3rd Sind Horse came on the mutineers about 6 miles from the new camp, and 12 from the point whence the brigade had started. Here he was shortly afterwards joined by the 3rd Light Cavalry, escorting the guns, and awaited, about 1500 yards from the enemy's position, the arrival of the infantry, who were required to clear some villages, enclosures, and water-courses which would have threatened his right flank had he advanced with his cavalry. After three-quarters of an hour the enemy retired parallel with and close to the river ; and as General Nuttall's orders were to keep the enemy in check, if possible, until he could be attacked by the united force, the cavalry were pushed on to within 500 or 600 yards of the enemy, when the latter again faced round and opened fire with their guns.

Finding that the enemy had got the range, and that the cover was scarcely sufficient from their heavy and well-directed fire, General Nuttall moved his cavalry a little further back under cover of some undulating ground, and the Afghans, apparently construing this

movement into a retreat, fired more rapidly than ever. After about twenty minutes of this cannonading, and at about 1 p.m., the horse artillery battery under Major Blackwood came into action against the enemy's artillery at a range of 1,800 yards, but with only four guns, as the remaining two guns, forming the left division of the battery under Lieutenant H. Maclaine, were still behind labouring through the heavy ground.

The well-directed fire of Major Blackwood's guns soon caused the enemy to fall back; and Maclaine arriving shortly afterwards, took up a position on Major Blackwood's left front, and about 200 yards in advance; for about half an hour the artillery duel continued, at the end of which time the mutineers abandoned their guns.

Brigadier-General Nuttall now received orders from General Burrows to move round to the left with his cavalry and take the enemy's guns; he accordingly left a troop of Sind Horse with Major Blackwood's battery, and, advancing with the remainder of his cavalry, took possession of the guns, which had been abandoned by the gunners. The cavalry were, however, received by a sharp fire from a body of the enemy's infantry posted on the slopes of the river-bank, in reply to which Brigadier-General Nuttall dismounted some of his men, and kept up a musketry fire on the mutineers until the guns came up. A few mounted men and many of the infantry of the enemy were now seen retreating over the enclosed country towards the villages and jungle which bordered the Helmand, whilst numbers of others still stood their ground under the lee of the banks.

Accordingly the battery of horse artillery, which had now advanced, came into action on the gardens and orchards into which the mutineers had fled, and covered the advance of the infantry, making good practice at batches of men streaming away through the ditches and lanes. This fire was continued until the mutineers were completely scattered, when the battery took the captured guns and wagons back to camp.

The cavalry pursued as far as possible and was successful in making the enemy abandon the whole of their baggage, but the difficulties of the ground prevented any more execution being effected on the Afghans. The troops at length retired with the enemy's camels, fifty-three in number, guns, and the baggage, including a quantity of small-arm ammunition, accoutrements, and supplies.

The battery captured consisted of four 6-pr. smooth-bore guns, two 12-pr. howitzers, and three ammunition wagons; the latter were, however, destroyed, as it was found impossible to move them, but the guns and howitzers were brought safely into camp.

The mutiny of the Wali's soldiery completely altered the position of General Burrows on the Helmand. Even previous to that event supplies for the troops had only been obtained with difficulty, and it was certain that with the advance of Ayub's army the supply would be entirely cut off. The position on the Helmand was, therefore, untenable were it only for want of supplies; but a still more cogent reason for retiring was the fact that the Helmand formed no barrier to the advance of the Afghans; it was now fordable everywhere, and General Burrows, from his position opposite Girishk, could not prevent them from crossing either above or below that place. Kushk-i-Nakhud appeared to be the most favourable place to occupy with a view to intercepting Ayub's advance, and it was accordingly decided on the morning of the 15th July, after the matter had been discussed by the senior officers, to move back there. This decision on the part of General Burrows was, under the circumstances, approved of by the Commander-in-Chief, and is described as follows in General Primrose's despatch:

“General Burrows's position had now entirely changed. Instead of a loyal force under the Wali, with which he was to co-operate and prevent Ayub crossing the Helmand, the Wali's infantry and artillery had mutinied and gone over to the enemy, and his cavalry,

except a very small number, had dispersed, while the Wali himself was a fugitive in General Burrows's camp. The Helmand was fordable everywhere, and behind was a desert of 25 miles. Add to this, the supplies he had expected to find at Girishk were not forthcoming. He therefore, acting on his own responsibility, determined to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, an important position, where supplies were plentiful, covering directly the road from Girishk to Kandahar, and indirectly the one from Haidarabad to the same, *viâ* the Malmand and Maiwand Passes. This retirement under the circumstances was approved of by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. There was also an impression, and rumours current, that Ayub would not attempt a collision with our force, but would make his way north. Should he have attempted any such movement, General Burrows was in a good position to pursue him and cut him off from the Helmand."

Starting at 7 o'clock on the night of the 15th, the brigade made a forced march from opposite Girishk to Mis Karez, a distance of 26 miles, and reached the latter place on the following morning at 9, accompanied by all its baggage. Here a fair amount of *bhusa* was obtained, and grain was brought on from Girishk; but owing to want of carriage the commissariat was obliged to abandon the greater part of the grain obtained the previous day. After halting at Mis Karez on the 16th the brigade marched on the 17th July to Kushk-i-Nakhud, and encamped on the Kandahar side of the old fort.

Meanwhile, on the receipt of news of the mutiny at Girishk, General Primrose immediately requested Brigadier-General Phayre to hasten up the 28th and the remainder of the 4th Bombay Infantry, purposing, on the arrival of the former, to send it up to Kushk-i-Nakhud. Two 40-prs. of the heavy battery were sent from the cantonments at Kandahar into the citadel, a measure which had a quieting effect on the city, excited and disturbed as it was by the news from the

north. The uneasy feeling, however, extended all along the line towards Chaman; but the continual march of reinforcements towards Kandahar tended to reassure the excited population. The 9th and 24th Bombay Infantry were now up the Bolan, and Brigadier-General Phayre endeavoured to push on the Madras Cavalry towards Kandahar as quickly as possible without interfering with the transport of European troops.

At this juncture General Primrose was asked if he considered Kushk-i-Nakhud the most favourable position for covering Kandahar and striking a blow at Ayub should he cross the Helmand. The Commander-in-Chief desired General Primrose to favour him with a full expression of his views both as regarded the city and Ayub's probable movements. The officer commanding at Kandahar was also asked his views regarding the "*total withdrawal of troops from Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Can satisfactory arrangements be made for its being held by Wali or otherwise?*" General Primrose answered, on the 19th July, as follows:

"Taking into consideration that the Helmand is now fordable everywhere, it presents no obstacle to the advance of Ayub at any point he chooses to cross it. Kushk-i-Nakhud is an important position covering roads leading from the Helmand to Kandahar; whilst remaining on the Helmand, forage and grain could hardly be obtained, whereas they are plentiful at Kushk-i-Nakhud; between the latter place and Girishk there is a desert 25 miles broad.

"General Burrows at Kushk-i-Nakhud is within fair supportable distance from Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet. At present I am unable to obtain any definite intelligence of Ayub's movements; an impression is abroad that he will not meet our troops in the open, but that if he crosses the river at all, he will do so to the north of Girishk, and perhaps make for Ghazni for political reasons. As regards Kandahar, great uneasiness prevails

in the city; large numbers of the families are leaving daily, fearing the approach of Ayub.

“There are, of course, a number of disaffected men in and about Kandahar ready for a disturbance if they get a chance. I keep the city constantly patrolled, and have placed the 40-prs. of 5-11, Royal Artillery, in the citadel, which has had the effect of quieting the minds of those peaceably disposed.

“The units of reinforcements will probably arrive here:

“Detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 24th.

“Detachments, 28th Native Infantry, on 25th, 26th, and 27th.

“Last detachment, 4th Native Infantry, on 28th.

“The 9th and 24th Native Infantry are now in the Bolan and will be in position probably on 24th and 30th July.

“The 11th Foot are to come up the Bolan in cart-carriage, beginning by companies on 20th, and doing double stages to Dozan.

“One wing will be concentrated at Quetta on 1st August, leave Quetta 3rd, and reach Kandahar about the 15th.

“Two more companies will leave three days later, and last two will form escorts to F-2, Royal Artillery.

“Previous to the present aspect of affairs I should have recommended the withdrawal of the Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison; but now I advise its retention. As regards the Wali holding the place, his power is *nil* throughout the country, and I know no other arrangement.”

On the 16th July the ever-increasing Afghan army was at Khoja Ahmad, about 30 miles from the Helmand, where the head-quarters were established for a few days in order to give more time for the distant tribesmen to come in. On the 17th the enemy's cavalry reached Girishk, and three days later the main body was also on the banks of the Helmand; the guns and infantry were distributed through the villages south of Haidarabad.

On the 19th July General Burrows shifted his camp to a site selected on the right bank of the Kushk-i-Nakhud stream, about 3 miles from the former position. The new selection, however, was not wholly favourable, as it was commanded by low ridges all round, and no view could be obtained from it of the surrounding country. Some attempt was made to entrench the camp, but with only partial success; the force was much impeded by the large numbers of transport animals and baggage; these were crowded into a small enclosed garden, the cavalry and artillery horses being ranged "outside against one wall, and the infantry in line and guns at angles formed a boundary round them, very close-packed; and the entrenchment consisted of a shelter trench thrown up by the 66th Regiment on their front, and a line of kit-bags in front of the rest, with camel pack-saddles filling any break in the circumvallation."—(Major Currie's report.)

On arrival at the new camp a detachment of 42 men of the 66th Foot, under Lieutenant G. de la M. Faunce, were, at the suggestion of Captain Slade (attached to General Burrows's staff as galloper), handed over to that officer to work the battery of smooth-bore guns which had been taken from the Wali's troops. These men had been previously instructed in gun drill and knew their work fairly well. Captain Slade was placed in command of this newly organised battery, and Lieutenants T. F. T. Fowle, R.A., and G. S. Jones, R.A., of the Ordnance Park and Transport respectively, were appointed to assist Slade, together with eight men from E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. The battery was further completed by the receipt of twelve of the Wali's artillery horses and harness, etc., from Kandahar, which were despatched by General Primrose by forced marches on the 21st July, escorted by 50 sabres of the 3rd Sind Horse, who were also to join Brigadier-General Burrows's force.

The troops of the brigade were at this time in excellent spirits, and supplies were being brought in

freely from the surrounding country notwithstanding its apparently unproductive character, which is thus described by Mr. Griesbach, of the Geological Survey:

“For miles around all was more or less desert (*dasht*); north of us, 15 or 16 miles away, suddenly rising from the stony plain, rise the spurs of the Shah Maksud and the Garmab hills. From these precipitous ranges the *dasht* slopes towards the Arghandab River, under an angle not exceeding 2° to 3° on an average. But this apparent level is intersected by several *karezes* and open streams, most of them dry at that season; besides that several low swells in the ground, some of them of loose sand, interrupt what would otherwise be an even *glacis*.

“About 4 miles north of our camp, a long low ridge, or gentle wave, stretched east and west, shutting out all view in that direction. Along that ridge, therefore, we had to keep two patrols (cavalry), who could see over some miles of ground from the highest point along that line (a ruined fort). South of our camp, about 2 miles distant, was a gentle rise of sandhills. There we had another cavalry patrol, who, if it had not always been too hazy, might almost have seen as far as the Arghandab River. West, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, was a low plateau, consisting of gravel, which divided the Garmab-Arghandab *glacis*, leaving on each side a comparatively narrow passage.”

At Simla the probability of an attack on General Burrows by Ayub does not appear to have been apprehended; rather it was feared that the latter would attempt to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni, and General Primrose was repeatedly urged to strike a blow at Ayub before he could have an opportunity of adopting such a course.

Meanwhile it was not until July 22nd that Ayub Khan made any sign of crossing the Helmand. On that date, however, some of his cavalry crossed at Haidarabad, feeling the way for a general advance of the main body, and one party came as far as Sangbar,

but returned again. From previous reports and subsequent information Ayub's army, including the troops of the Wali which had defected and joined him at Farah, seems to have been composed of about 1,400 regular cavalry, 5,000 regular infantry, 1,500 irregular cavalry from Herat (*Khawanin sowars*), 30 guns, besides local contingents of tribesmen totalling about 15,000.¹ Intelligence, however, was by no means full, and Colonel St. John, in whose hands the collection of information principally lay, was unable to give more than the approximate numbers and probable position of the enemy. The daily cavalry reconnaissances only visited the villages of Garmab, Sangbar, and Band-i-Taimur, and failed to keep the General informed of the enemy's probable intentions.

On the 23rd July the advanced cavalry of the enemy, under the *Lwinab* Khushdil Khan, for the first time came in contact with the British outposts.

Upon information received by Colonel St. John the previous evening, Major Leach had been directed to proceed, at 4.30 a.m., to Maiwand with a squadron of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, under Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, and to burn the stores of grain which were still lying in the fields. Lieutenant J. Monteith of the Sind Horse, with the usual daily Sangbar patrol, 40 sabres strong, had started half an hour before, and Leach was informed that he would probably meet the party of cavalry at Maiwand.

Lieutenant Monteith, however, came on reconnoitring parties of the enemy's cavalry at about 3 miles from camp, and having been compelled to retire for a short distance before superior numbers, he then dismounted his men and held his ground with carbine fire until he could be supported. Major Leach heard the sound of firing shortly after leaving camp. He accordingly halted the squadron which formed his escort and rode forward; he then found Lieutenant Monteith in the

¹ See Appendix XVIII. Tribesmen are therein calculated at 20,000, but this is probably exaggerated.

presence of about 500 of the enemy's regular horse. Major Leach immediately rode back to General Burrows to report, and Brigadier-General Nuttall was sent out with part of the cavalry brigade and Maclaine's Division of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. According to Mr. Griesbach's narrative the intention of General Burrows was that Monteith should fall back gradually, drawing the enemy on, until they could have been attacked effectually by the whole cavalry force. Nuttall's advance, however, had the effect of causing the Afghan reconnaissance to retire at once, on which the enemy were pursued for some distance, but without any appreciable result.

Two days later, on the 25th July, as the daily patrol was approaching Sangbar, a number of the enemy's cavalry sallied out and pursued the advanced party of the patrol. The horses of the Sind cavalry were worn out by overwork, in consequence of which two of the sowars, notwithstanding that they had a good start of their pursuers, were overtaken and cut down.

The same day a reconnaissance under Lieutenant E. D. N. Smith, 3rd Sind Horse, which proceeded to the neighbourhood of Maiwand, elicited the information that the enemy's patrols had reached Garmab, 7 miles from Maiwand, and that Ayub was expected at Sangbar the next day and at Maiwand on the 27th.

On the 26th July Colonel St. John was informed that the Malmand Pass was clear of the enemy, but, later on the same day, news was brought that Maiwand was occupied by a body of *ghazis* from 200 to 300 strong; it was also reported that Garmab was held in force by the enemy's cavalry. In order, therefore, to intercept Ayub Khan's further advance Brigadier-General Burrows determined to seize Maiwand before it could be reached by the main body of the enemy. He was influenced in coming to this decision by the belief that the cavalry at Garmab were the *Luinab's* men only, who were known to be acting independently

of Ayub Khan's main force. This belief was shared by Colonel St. John, who urged General Burrows to move at once to Maiwand and to eject the *ghazis* before they could receive support from either Sangbar or Garmab; in fact, the whole of the information received by the General led him to conclude that, if he moved upon Maiwand within the next 24 hours, he would, in all probability, anticipate the main body of Ayub's army by at least a day.¹

Orders were issued accordingly, and at 4.30 on the following morning, the 27th July, the force paraded for the advance to Maiwand.

The column was encumbered by a very large quantity of ordnance and commissariat stores and baggage, a disadvantage which was unavoidable, for the hostile state of the country rendered it impossible to leave anything behind in safety, and the force under Brigadier-General Burrows was too weak to admit of his detaching from it an efficient guard for these stores.

Before daybreak Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, was sent out with fifty sabres of his regiment, to act as an outlying picquet while the baggage was being loaded, and, when the brigade began to move, to form the advance party.

About the same time, or rather earlier, Lieutenant A. M. Monteith with fifty sabres of the Sind Horse was also sent out for picquet duty on a hill, 3 miles north of the camp, at Kushk-i-Nakhud. From this commanding position all the approaches from the direction of Sangbar and Maiwand could be clearly observed for several miles. Lieutenant Monteith was ordered to maintain this position until the British force in its advance should arrive in line with him, when he was to advance as the left flanking party to the column.

¹ All reports appear to have been inaccurate in topography if not in other details; e.g. the military reconnaissances reported Garmab as being ten miles from Maiwand, whilst Colonel St. John's civil agents said five miles.

THE FORCE ENGAGED

*Composition and Strength of the British Force at the
Battle of Maiwand.*

CORPS.	BRITISH.			NATIVE.			MUSKETS.	GUNS.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and men.	Total.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and men.	Total.		
CAVALRY.								
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, Major Currie	6	...	6	13	297	310	306	...
3rd Sind Horse, Colonel Malcolmson	5	...	5	8	247	255	252	...
	11	...	11	21	544	565	558	...
ARTILLERY.								
E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, Major Blackwood	5	141	146	191	6
Captured Battery, 6- pounder, S.B., Captain Slade, R.H.A.	1	42	43	6
	6	183	189	191	12
INFANTRY.								
<i>British.</i>								
66th Foot, Colonel Gal- braith	19	497	516
<i>Native.</i>								
1st Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers), Lieuten- ant-Colonel Anderson	7	...	7	15	626	641
30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), Colonel Mainwaring	8	...	8	14	603	617
	15	...	15	29	1,229	1,258
<i>Sappers and Miners.</i>								
No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers, Lieutenant Henn, R.E.	1	2	3	1	41	42
GRAND TOTAL	52	682	734	51	1,814	1,865	749	12

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS

501

<i>Abstract.</i>			
	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Cavalry	576	558	...
Artillery	189	191	12
British Infantry	516
Native Infantry	1,273
Sappers	45
Total, all ranks, including 84 sick .	2,599	749	12

The main body of the advance guard, consisting of the 1st Squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Captain Mayne, marched half a mile behind Lieutenant Geoghegan, accompanied by the left division (two guns) of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant Maclaine. These were followed, after an interval of 500 yards, by the cavalry brigade staff, the remaining two squadrons of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and Major Blackwood with Lieutenant Fowell's (the right) division of E-B.

About 100 yards in rear of the guns was the infantry, in line of columns at deploying distances, the 66th and the 30th Bombay on the right, the 1st Bombay Grenadiers on the left, with No. 2 Company of Sappers and the smooth-bore battery in the centre.

The whole of the baggage was on the extreme right of the line, numbering over 2,000 animals, and rendering the progress of the column very slow, besides absorbing in guards 209 of the small infantry force.

The rear guard was composed of Lieutenant Osborne's centre division of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery (two guns), escorted by a squadron of ninety-six sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, under Lieutenant E. V. P. Monteith, and it was commanded by Colonel Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse. On the right was a flanking party consisting of Lieutenant Smith's troop (fifty sabres), 3rd Sind Horse; and on the left, as has been seen, was a similar troop of the same corps under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith.

It was not until 7 a.m. that the column moved off the camping ground. When the advanced party had proceeded about 6 miles, Lieutenant Geoghegan heard

seven or eight shots in the direction of Maiwand; he reported this at once by letter to Brigadier-General Nuttall and received the following answer: "Proceed cautiously, as Maiwand is supposed to be occupied by a small force of cavalry and *ghazis*." Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Geoghegan saw horsemen, in twos or threes, proceeding across the left front in an oblique direction about two miles away, towards Maiwand; this circumstance also he reported to his commanding officer.

Meantime the infantry brigade was advancing slowly, with occasional halts to enable the animals with the baggage to close up.

During the second of these halts, from 8.30 to 9.15 a.m., near the village of Mushak, about 5 miles from camp, Major Blackwood watered the horses of his battery.

The country here is for miles and miles almost flat, but for the occasional gentle undulations caused by the watersheds of the dry ravines and water-courses. From about a mile beyond Mushak, the ancient mound or ruined fort of Maiwand could easily be seen, as well as the gradual rise or *glacis* which divides the Maiwand from the Garmab villages.

About 10 a.m., when nearly midway between Mushak and Karez-ak, the column was halted for the third time; here a spy, who had arrived the same morning from Sangbar at the late camp at Kushk-i-Nakhud, overtook the column, and communicated with Colonel St. John, who then for the first time gave General Burrows certain information that Ayub's troops were occupying Maiwand in force.

The Brigadier, on learning this, decided that it was too late to go back and that the advance must continue.

Meanwhile, when the brigade halted, Lieutenant Geoghegan reported that he saw large masses of troops moving on the left front. Simultaneously a report was received by Major Hogg, the Cavalry Brigade-Major, from Lieutenant A. M. Monteith to the same effect. Brigadier-General Burrows thereupon sent Major Hogg

forward to reconnoitre. Major Hogg rode forward about 800 yards beyond the most advanced scouts, and ascertained that about three-quarters of a mile beyond where he was standing there was a body of horsemen, whom he judged to be about 600 or 800 strong. At first they had apparently not caught sight of Burrows's column, the scouting on their right flank having most likely been neglected; but all of a sudden, as Major Hogg was watching them, he observed a change in their direction, and they inclined to their left, away from the British column in a northerly direction towards Garmab, leaving scouts to watch the movements of their adversaries.

Major Hogg could discover no infantry or guns, the configuration of the ground preventing him from seeing any great distance.

He returned to Brigadier-General Burrows after an absence of about ten minutes to report the result of his reconnaissance, and found on rejoining that the headquarters staff had accompanied Generals Burrows and Nuttall, with Colonel St. John and the Wali, to reconnoitre from a small hill, where Lieutenant Geoghegan was halted, which commanded a view over the surrounding country. The morning was very hazy, and it was difficult to judge of distant objects with accuracy, but large bodies of Afghans could be descried about four or five miles off, while squadrons of the enemy's cavalry were visible coming forward over some rising ground about two and a half miles ahead.

The information of the spy, and the forces now distinctly visible in dark masses on the open plain that extended between Mandabad (Mahmudabad) and Garmab, left no doubt but that Ayub's main body was passing across the front, had already occupied Maiwand, and intended to seize the pass, and with it the shortest line to Kandahar.

Brigadier-General Burrows without hesitation determined to attack the enemy at once. The "advance" was again sounded, and the brigade moved forward,

while the scouting parties and flankers were ordered to close in on the column, whose march was now inclined slightly towards the left. As the British advanced the Afghan cavalry fell back, and nothing was as yet seen of the force which occupied Maiwand.

The column was moving up the right bank of the broad Kushk-i-Nakhud ravine, and about a mile to its left front at this juncture lay the village of Mandabad, and immediately beyond it was a deep *nala*. When within a quarter of a mile of the former Major Blackwood was ordered to clear it if held by the enemy, and escorted by Captain Mayne's squadron he inspected the ground in front, and then sent word for the right division of his battery under Lieutenant N. P. Fowell to trot after him, leaving Lieutenant Maclaine with his two guns waiting for orders. At the same time Lieutenant Geoghegan was also ordered to lead his squadron to Mandabad to cover the baggage, and on arriving there he was asked by Major Blackwood to reconnoitre the village and some enclosures just beyond it, as the latter did not think it safe to advance his guns further if it was occupied. Lieutenant Geoghegan complied with this request, and, finding the village empty, he halted his squadron at the further side of its enclosures for a few minutes.

The exact sequence of the incidents which followed and the precise time of their occurrence cannot be ascertained with accuracy, and protracted enquiries into and discussion of these points have not resulted in any satisfactory elucidation of the disputed questions. The main facts are, however, tolerably clear. On finding from Lieutenant Geoghegan's reconnaissance that the village of Mandabad was unoccupied, Major Blackwood advanced across the *nala* beyond, followed by Lieutenant Fowell with his two guns, while at the same moment Lieutenant Maclaine with two more guns crossed the *nala* and advanced towards the left front; in fact the usual parade movement of "cavalry and artillery to the front" was executed.

Lieutenant Maclaine advanced at a gallop, and moving further to the front and left flank than was considered advisable, a message was sent to recall him. Before its receipt, however, his guns, as well as those of Lieutenant Fowell, had come into action against a crowd of hostile horsemen, who bore down on the left front as the guns advanced. A round or two from the artillery quickly caused these advanced bodies to withdraw, and Maclaine then fell back upon the cavalry on the left of the line, in accordance with his instructions.

The infantry changed front three-quarters left when the artillery became engaged, and advanced to the edge of the *nala*, and then crossed immediately in rear of the right division of E-B.

At the same time the guns of the centre division E-B under Lieutenant E. G. Osborne were ordered to the front, and went forward across the *nala* to join Blackwood, followed by Slade's smooth-bore battery; the former, by order of Major Blackwood, were brought into action to the right of Fowell's division, while the smooth-bore battery was directed to take up a position somewhat to the left rear of the horse artillery, where Captain Slade at once opened fire on the enemy at about 1,800 yards.

Meantime the infantry columns moved across the ravine, and after ascending the slope on the opposite side were halted, deployed to the left, and as they came up advanced a short distance in line under the immediate supervision of General Burrows.

As they advanced, Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, of the 30th Bombay Infantry, detached his left wing of four companies under Major J. S. Iredell to follow as a reserve from 200 to 300 yards in rear of the centre.

By this time Maclaine's guns had rejoined Blackwood's battery from their former advanced and isolated position, and the whole of E-B battery was now formed in echelon of divisions from the left, with the 6-pr. battery on the left of all; Captain M. Mayne with his

squadron of Bombay Light Cavalry was on the right flank, Lieutenant A. M. Monteith on the left flank of Maclaine's guns, and a troop each of the 3rd Sind Horse and of the 3rd Light Cavalry were in rear of the centre of the battery. The smooth-bores were escorted by Lieutenant J. H. E. Reid's troop 3rd Bombay Cavalry.

At some distance in rear the infantry were in line lying down, the 1st Bombay Grenadiers on the left, the 30th Bombay Infantry in the centre, and the 66th Foot on the right; the left wing of the 30th Bombay Infantry, with the Sappers in support, some 200 yards to the rear.

In rear was the baggage, partly in the *nala* (where also the field hospital was established), some yet remaining in the village of Mandabad, and a portion following up the infantry across the *nala* with the reserve of ammunition escorted by the baggage guard under Major J. T. Ready, 66th Foot. The enemy's artillery was now in action, and crowds of Afghan tribesmen were on the right of Burrows's brigade, whilst swarms of irregular and Herati horsemen circled round on the left flank, threatening the rear guard.

Such seems to have been the first phase in the action, at about 10.50 a.m.

Meantime Ayub's commanders were apparently emboldened at finding the British line brought to a standstill, and had wheeled their regular infantry into line to their right, whilst they hurried up more of their guns from the rear, and brought them successively into action. Commencing their fire on their right, from nearly opposite where Maclaine's guns had first been posted, they pushed their other guns forward on their left, taking advantage of a shallow *nala* which afforded some cover, and a heavy artillery duel was sustained on both sides with vigour.

The British infantry line now advanced some 500 yards, and was aligned in some degree with the guns. The right wing of the 30th Bombay Infantry and the

66th were to the right of Osborne's guns; two companies of the former regiment were between Osborne and Fowell; the company of sappers on Fowell's left; then Maclaine's division, the Bombay Grenadiers and smooth-bore guns; and finally two detached companies of the 30th Bombay Infantry under Lieutenant D. Cole.

The cavalry occupied about the same relative position as before. It was impossible to withdraw them under cover or out of range of the Afghan guns, owing to the necessity of demonstrating continuously against the swarming Afghan horsemen who threatened the left rear and baggage. Meanwhile the fire was kept up with increasing vigour on the part of Ayub's artillery, which far outnumbered the two English batteries.

At about 12.15 two of the smooth-bore guns under Lieutenant G. S. Jones were shifted to the right of the 66th, where the enemy's attack had developed, and opened fire at 2,000 yards on parties of the enemy who were advancing from the direction of Maiwand. About the same time Captain Slade directed Lieutenant T. F. T. Fowle with the two 12-pr. howitzers to open fire from the left of the 30th Bombay Infantry, whose flank in this direction was quite unsupported. From this position the howitzers were able to throw shell amongst the enemy's horsemen, who were in large numbers, which had the effect of temporarily checking the enemy's advance in this direction. Brigadier-General Nuttall himself was in this part of the field, and by his orders some of the sowars of Reid's troop dismounted and fired on the enemy's cavalry, assisted by Lieutenant A. M. Monteith's Sind Horse, which had formed the escort of Maclaine's guns. The other guns of the smooth-bore battery remained in their original position under Lieutenant Faunce of the 66th.

The cavalry on the left had meanwhile been reinforced by 50 sabres of the 3rd Sind Horse under

Lieutenant E. D. N. Smith, which were brought from their former position on the right ; and they were thus able to prevent the enemy from establishing themselves in rear of Burrows's infantry ; but although reinforced Nuttall was not strong enough to prevent the more extended hostile flanking movements, and after some time the British were fighting against an enemy whose front overlapped their flanks so completely that the line, with its flanks thrown back, almost resembled a horse-shoe. Moreover, the rear guard and baggage guard were now engaged with the enemy, who had threatened them ever since the first hour of the battle.

"The enemy" (says Fowle) "for some time made no direct advance on our position that I could see, but kept pouring men round both our flanks in some loose sort of skirmishing order. They also got guns on our flanks and enfiladed us. Also, taking advantage of the *nala* which ran from behind our position to the front of theirs, they afterwards brought up guns to within 700 yards, and a number of riflemen with them, who kept up a hot fire on us.

"Their artillery was extremely well served ; their guns took ours in flank as well as directly, and their fire was concentrated. We were completely out-matched, and although we continued to fire steadily, our guns seemed quite unable to silence theirs. Their six Armstrong guns threw heavier shell than ours, and their smooth-bore guns had great range and accuracy, and caused great damage, especially among our horses and limbers, which were totally without cover. They continued to advance, overlapping us on both flanks."

At or about 1.30 p.m. the guns of the smooth-bore battery were again massed on the left centre, and remained in action there until all their ammunition was expended, when, as it was impossible to get any more up from the rear, Captain Slade ordered them to retire, and to get what was left, and then to come again into action on the left flank as quickly as possible.

On the retirement of the smooth-bore battery, Captain Slade reported himself to Major Blackwood. The latter had been badly wounded in the thigh, and directed Slade to take charge of E-B whilst he got his wound dressed; very shortly afterwards Lieutenant Fowell, who although severely wounded had until now remained with his guns, was peremptorily ordered to the rear by Captain Slade. The latter then worked the guns of the right division which were in the centre of the battery. Blackwood, after having his wound bound up, returned to the fighting line, but, being unable to mount his horse and take command of his battery, he remained with the 66th, assisting Colonel Galbraith to sight the men's rifles, and he was last seen, when the retreat began, retiring with Colonel Galbraith and the 66th.

Hitherto the principal fire of the enemy had been that of three Armstrongs and four 9-prs. in the centre, with two 3-prs. and six field guns on the left, the 3-prs. and Armstrongs doing most execution among the horses of the British artillery and cavalry. As yet the infantry, who had been lying down, had not suffered much; but now the enemy, under cover of the small *nala*, pushed up four 9-pr. guns to within 700 yards, another similar battery a little later got within 500 yards, and at last two 3-pr. mountain guns were planted directly opposite the centre of the British line within 500 yards. At the same time the regular Kabuli and Herati infantry advanced in successive lines, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground, and crowds of *ghazis* planted their standards within 700 yards of the 66th, and poured down the branches of the ravine into the main *nala* near Khig. The whole of the British infantry was soon engaged in keeping up a steady fire on the masses of the enemy. The 66th opened fire first, directing their volleys at the gun detachments and bodies of the infantry moving along their front, Major Blackwood giving the ranges. Their fire was excellently directed, and must have told

heavily on the dense masses of the enemy. As the *ghazis* advanced within nearer range, the whole line of the 66th met them with volleys fired by companies, each company lying down again after firing, and taking advantage of such cover as the ground afforded.

When the smooth-bores were sent to the rear to obtain ammunition, the aspect of affairs became very critical, although all the regiments and corps were yet standing firm. The turning movements of the enemy on both flanks had now been thoroughly developed, and although the cavalry prevented the enemy from pressing on to the immediate rear of the fighting line, Burrows's force was practically surrounded. At this moment a body of *ghazis*, who had hitherto kept at a respectful distance, were seen to be pressing boldly towards the right rear of the line. Under instructions from Brigadier-General Nuttall, Major G. C. Hogg ordered a charge by the cavalry detachments on that flank; but the men did not readily respond, and before the charge could be delivered a further order to halt was received from Brigadier-General Nuttall. The enemy appeared to gain confidence when they saw the cavalry halt, and continued to press on, whereupon our men, confused by counter-orders and being without cohesion owing to their division into small parties of different regiments, retired hastily, and in some confusion till they got in rear of the centre of the line, when they pulled up and re-formed.

Whilst the 66th were meantime doing great execution on the right, the 30th Bombay Infantry, next to them, were also hotly engaged. As the enemy was now coming on in strength, and was well within rifle range, fire was opened along the whole line with admirable effect, and, says Colonel Mainwaring, "I was twice enabled to give the order to cease firing, consequent on the enemy having been driven back."

Before the musketry fire began, Captain H. F.

Smith, the Adjutant of the regiment, who was in rear of the centre, had been killed by a shell.

On the left the Bombay Grenadiers, with their left wing in alignment with the two detached companies of the 30th Bombay Infantry and the right company somewhat thrown back, were busy firing.

The sappers were also hotly engaged, firing into the regulars of Ayub's army whenever they were visible directly opposite to them.

"At first," says Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith "volleys were fired by companies, but after a few rounds, such was the din that words of command could not be heard, and independent firing was carried on along the whole line." This fire at once checked the advance of the enemy and did much execution in their ranks, but their numbers were so great that they were able to press on, and in time quite outflanked the Grenadiers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith continues: "About 1.30 p.m., being on the right of the Grenadiers, near two Royal Horse Artillery guns commanded by Lieutenant Maclaine, I saw the enemy bring up a battery of artillery and place them in a ravine about 500 yards to my right front. With these guns were a regiment of regular infantry and numberless *ghazis*. I threw back the right company of my wing so as to bring a direct fire on the guns and infantry; but the cover they were under was so good that they did not sustain much loss, until some time after they made an advance and appeared in the open. Our fire was very heavy and accurate, and more than once the enemy retired into the *nala* again, and would not face us."

"The critical moment was not far distant," says Major Leach. "Under cover of the sheltering banks, two 6-prs. (3-prs.?) had been brought to bear upon our line at a distance of less than 500 yards, and almost enfiladed it. Hidden breast-high, the men serving them were distinctly visible; but notwithstanding a fire opened upon them by the left company of the 66th, and

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the efforts of our guns, the Afghans held their ground, and our losses became serious."

The 66th, 30th Bombay Infantry, and the sappers were all more or less covered by shallow depressions, or rather folds, in the ground; whilst the Bombay Grenadiers and the two detached companies of the 30th Bombay were much exposed, and their loss was proportionately heavier. Lieutenant Cole, the only British officer with these last-named companies, was killed very early in the day, and the only three native officers were severely wounded; the smooth-bore guns also, which had been hitherto on the flank and rear of these two companies, had retired, as before noticed, for ammunition, the effect of which on the native troops, though it was not evident at once, was fatal. This must have been, according to Leach, at about 1.30 or 2 p.m.

Finding our artillery fire slackening, the Afghan centre pushed forward up the near bank of the ravine. The Grenadiers fired steadily enough, but their confidence was shaken, and the numbers of the wounded were rapidly increasing.

Meantime the baggage guard had been actively engaged from the first. It consisted of one company 66th Foot, under Captain J. Quarry, one company of the Bombay Grenadiers, under Lieutenant C. G. Whitby, and one of Jacob's Rifles (30th Bombay Infantry), under Lieutenant M. B. Salmon, with a treasure guard of Grenadiers and a commissariat guard of Jacob's Rifles, Lieutenant Whitby acting as baggage-master. The baggage was, as before mentioned, partly in the *nala* and a portion of it on the sheltered slope. As soon as Major Ready, of the 66th, who commanded the whole, found that the enemy's cavalry were threatening his left flank, he extended Captain Quarry's company in this direction, continuing this line of skirmishers with half the company of Grenadiers; he also made a similar disposition on the right front with the rest of the Grenadiers and the company of Jacob's

Rifles. The effect of the well-directed fire of these troops was to keep the enemy at a distance for a considerable time. A number of the Afghans, horse and foot, made repeated attempts to push down the *nala* which ran from the enemy's left; but they were met here by Lieutenant R. E. T. Bray with a party of the 66th, who were posted on the left bank of the *nala*, and were prevented from getting round to the rear. In the course of the morning the camels were withdrawn a little from the *nala*, to avoid the enemy's artillery fire; but the main body of the baggage guard held their ground until after 3 p.m., when the retreat of the fighting line became general.

An attempt was then made to withdraw the baggage. Captain Quarry's company retired in skirmishing order, covering the retreat, and joined Lieutenant Bray's party on the bank of the *nala*; some Grenadiers and men of the 30th Bombay Infantry also joined this line, and the Subadar-Major of Jacob's Rifles, who was with them, did good service. Lieutenant G. L. Melliss, 66th, the Transport Officer, joined the baggage guard, and rendered great assistance. But the men were all greatly exhausted from want of food and the excessive heat of the day, and Major Ready was soon compelled to abandon the camp equipage and stores and to retreat, carrying the wounded on the baggage animals.

Meanwhile the battle had been fiercely contested by the firing line. Between 2 and 3 p.m. the fire from the enemy's guns began to slacken, and General Burrows hoped that their ammunition was beginning to run short; but it soon appeared that the cessation was merely to admit of the *ghazis* making a direct advance on the British centre.

They came rapidly on. Up to this time the casualties amongst the British infantry had not been numerous; the men were firing steadily, the 9-prs. were sweeping the ground with case-shot, and the General felt confident as to the result. This time, however, the fire of guns and infantry, murderous though it

was, failed to check the determined onslaught of the *ghazis*.

Of the sequence of events at this critical juncture there must ever be a doubt, but of the main facts there is little difference of opinion. Had the infantry line stood firm, the charge must have failed; but without waiting for the enemy to close, the two detached companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had suffered so severely throughout the day, suddenly gave way, and were followed almost immediately afterwards by the Grenadiers.

The men of the latter regiment, rising to their feet, attempted to form square on the left; but in the confusion of the moment the attempt failed, and the small number of officers were powerless to steady their men.

"At this moment," reports Brigadier-General Burrows, "the infantry gave way, and, commencing on the left, rolled up on the 66th, forming a helpless crowd of panic-stricken men." The *ghazis* closed on them, and for a little space bayoneted and shot them without resistance. It was an appalling sight. The effect of the fighting line giving way on the followers and others with the camp baggage, hospitals, etc., in rear, was to cause an immediate panic. Surgeon-Major Preston, of the 66th, who had just been severely wounded, thus describes it:

"After my wound had been attended to, I was lying quietly in my doolie, imagining that all was going on well as regarded the day, the idea of our losing it never entering my thoughts, when all of a sudden my doolie-bearers took up the doolie and commenced running off with me as fast as they could go, shouting as they ran along that the *ghazis* were on us. I raised the curtain of the doolie and looked out, and, to my great surprise, saw a regular stampede, men and animals making off as hard as they could, all in utter confusion—no order of any kind, but everybody evidently bent on doing the utmost to save his own life and get out of the way of danger as fast and as best he could. With this object all the loads had been thrown off from the baggage

animals, which were at once appropriated for riding purposes. The ground all about was, in consequence, covered with camp equipage, boxes of ammunition and treasure, mess stores, wine, etc.

“My doolie-bearers had not carried me far before they deserted me to a man, and after two other modes of conveyance in which I had been placed that afternoon had failed, I was finally taken up by a horse artillery wagon. All this time the stampede had been going on, and men (white and black), horses, camels, bullocks, etc., passed me in endless confusion.”

“Sudden as had been the panic among the Grenadiers,” wrote Major Leach, “they were still standing, apparently irresolute, but so closely packed that defence was hopeless. I question whether bayonets were fixed; and if they were, they were little used. The mass of men must have been ten deep, and flushed with success a rush was made upon its rear by the advancing bodies of the enemy. . . . Up to the last the Grenadiers had certainly behaved well, and the Afghans themselves admit that the Heratis on their right centre twice fell back. The sepoys seemed to Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, who commanded the Grenadiers, to be completely exhausted from want of food and water; and although every endeavour was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and his officers to rally the men and to form square, they were by this time in a great measure out of hand, and the officers could only get the sepoys to form a sort of V, whilst several of the enemy’s foot and horsemen, who had got in their rear, were bayoneted. At this juncture Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson¹ was hit by the pieces of a shell in six places,

¹ Havildar Ganda Sing and four privates put Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson in a doolie and carried him across the *nala*, where Ressaldar Dhokal Sing, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (the same native officer who had saved Sir Evelyn Wood’s life in 1857-58), placed the wounded Lieutenant-Colonel on a pony and escorted him to a gun-limber of E-B, on which he was carried from the field.

The 1st Grenadiers had lost from 100 to 150 men killed and wounded in the fighting line before they gave way. Four native officers and 55 men were brought on to Kandahar wounded, but no man who was dangerously

and the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith. The infantry then continued retiring without formation."

Colonel Mainwaring, 30th Bombay Infantry, states—

"I found the situation to be as follows: 'The 1st Grenadier Regiment was from 80 to 100 yards in rear of the 30th Native Infantry, and it was then taking ground to its proper right either in fours or files, but I am not certain which. The whole of the ground to the left of the 30th Native Infantry, and between it and the Grenadiers, was covered with swarms of *ghazis* and banner-men. The *ghazis* were actually in the ranks of the Grenadiers, pulling the men out and hacking them down with their swords. I have not any idea how this state of affairs came about, as the battery firing on my left prevented my seeing in that direction until it had moved away.

"Immediately on seeing that their left and rear were completely turned, the regiment [30th Bombay] got into confusion and crowded down towards the right, thus falling on the left and rear of the 66th."

The two portions of the line were now separated by an interval of about 200 yards. The Grenadiers had fallen back, but were still close to their original position when the vain attempt to re-form them was made.

On the right the main body of Jacob's Rifles under Colonel Mainwaring had retired in confusion upon the 66th, which regiment alone retained its formation. When the line was broken, Captain Beresford Peirse, of the 66th, seeing the *Kabulis* and *ghazis* around Maclaine's guns, turned the rear rank of his left half company about and fired some volleys into them, but their fire was immediately masked by the flying sepoys, who came straight to the rear of the 66th, and pressing among them caused much disorder.

wounded ever reached the hospital, which was three-quarters of a mile in rear, and quite 250 men of the 1st Grenadiers must have been killed before they reached the *nala*, out of the original 470 men who had been in the fighting line.

The 66th, thus pressed by the *ghazis* in front and the broken sepoy in rear, retired to their right, but still preserved cohesion, the men turning round to deliver their fire and keeping off the crowds of Afghans at some 25 yards. The regiment was followed by a mingled mass of the other troops in hopeless disorder, the direction of the retreat being towards that part of the *nala* nearest the village of Khig. Under such circumstances the last hope rested in a cavalry charge.

“General Burrows now rode up at a gallop to General Nuttall, and said, ‘Nuttall, the infantry has given way; our only chance is a cavalry charge; do you think you could get the cavalry to charge the line of *ghazis* in rear of the infantry, and they might perhaps then be induced to re-form?’

“Whatever men were still available were in a somewhat irregular formation. There was no time, however, to wait for a well-dressed line, and General Nuttall ordered the cavalry to advance and charge, placing himself with his staff in front of the line. The men, instead of advancing straight to their front, inclined to the right and fell on the *ghazis* who were attacking the Grenadiers, which regiment was undoubtedly saved by the cavalry charge from heavy loss. After doing this much, the cavalry, instead of advancing straight on into the mass of the enemy, seeing the infantry all retreating and the guns all gone, wheeled about and retired, to the very best of my belief, without orders. I certainly heard no orders, but I cannot give further evidence on this point beyond stating that, whilst personally engaged in combat with the enemy, I turned round to see if the men were following, and found they had gone. After wheeling about the cavalry retired steadily; but they could not be induced to front again in the right direction.”—(Hogg.)

It should be remembered that this small cavalry force, numbering in all only about 130 sabres, had been exposed for upwards of four hours to that severest of all trials, inaction under heavy fire and while

RETIRING THE GUNS

suffering serious losses. In addition to this they had been thrown into disorder by the retiring infantry and guns, the sight of which alone might well shake the morale of the best of troops after the disturbing influences of the morning. They had no time to re-form, nor space to gather themselves together into a collected charge, while their course towards the enemy was impeded and broken by flying soldiery.

There was now nothing left but to fall back on the rear guard, and the retreat of the cavalry across the *nala* was made in an orderly and steady manner under the direction of Brigadier-General Nuttall, who halted and re-formed his men on the opposite side.¹

Meanwhile when Captain Slade saw that the guns of E-B were in danger, he gave the order to limber up and retire. Lieutenant Maclaine on the left, who probably never heard the order, waited to fire another round of case, at about twenty yards range, when the *ghazis* were so close that it was only possible to save the limbers. At about this time Lieutenant Osborne was killed. Captain Slade halted, re-formed the battery about 150 yards to the rear of the position, and refilled the limbers from the wagon-bodies, but he was forced to leave three wagons on the field, as they were completely disabled, and there were then over fifteen horses killed, whilst the enemy were pressing on the guns very closely. He then took the battery across the *nala* in which the baggage had been placed in the morning, and with the smooth-bore battery came into action to cover the retreat, which was rapidly becoming a rout.

From this position Slade fired two rounds, but he was immediately ordered to retire, as the enemy's cavalry were threatening both his left flank and rear. The smooth-bore battery was also ordered to retire, as

¹ Colonel Malcolmson, c.b., 3rd Sind Horse, and Major Currie, Commanding 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, were afterwards placed under arrest for their conduct on this occasion. Both officers were tried by court-martial and honourably acquitted early in 1881.

they had not a single round left. Captain Slade thereupon ordered Lieutenant Maclaine to retire first with two of the guns of E-B, whilst he remained himself in rear with the remaining two.

During the whole of this retreat, which began at 3.30 p.m., all the guns and carriages brought out of action were crowded with wounded and exhausted men.

To return to the infantry. A portion of the Bombay Grenadiers under Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith succeeded in reaching the village of Mandabad, and there joined the guns and what remained of the baggage. A large proportion, however, seemed to have followed the 66th.

The latter regiment, as before noticed, being forced out of line by the pressure of the native regiments in rear, moved forward to its proper front, and then wheeling round into column retired upon Khig. The men were at first in formation, and (according to their own officers) the *ghazis* gave way before them as long as they advanced; but when they began to retire, a general rush seems to have been made by the Afghan infantry and *ghazis*, and the formation of the regiment was broken. The struggle now centred round the village of Khig, and Mandabad was almost deserted. The whole weight of the attack was thrown upon the 66th and the Grenadiers who were with them.

The leading companies of the 66th seem to have passed straight through Khig towards an enclosed garden in rear, where a last stand was made by Colonel Galbraith and the gallant band of officers and men who accompanied him—Captains W. H. McMath and W. Roberts, Lieutenants M. E. Rayner and R. T. Chute, 2nd Lieutenants H. J. O. Barr, W. R. Olivey and A. Honeywood.

From the account of one of Ayub's officers who was present at the action at Maiwand, it appears that a stand was made by the remnant of the 66th regiment round their colours in this enclosure; he estimated their number at about a hundred. He stated that these brave men were surrounded by the whole army, and

that when all but eleven were killed, these made a desperate charge, and perished fighting bravely to the last man. "This stubborn defence," says Sir Frederick Haines, "may have delayed the pursuit as well as checked the desire to pursue."

Amongst this small and desperate band, besides Colonel Galbraith, were Blackwood of the Artillery, Henn of the Engineers, and Hinde of the Grenadiers.

When the 66th got broken up a number of men of the regiment retreated in the direction of Mandabad, and halted there together with some of the native infantry, in an enclosure where there was some water with which they slaked their thirst. Here General Burrows, after endeavouring to stem the tide of pursuit with a cavalry charge, joined the party, which was about 150 strong, and for a few minutes the men kept up a sharp fire over the wall, which had the effect of temporarily checking the enemy. The Afghans, however, soon began to creep round the outer flank, and it was evident that the retreat would soon be cut off; General Burrows thereupon ordered the men to retire. As they left the village the long line of straggling infantry headed at first towards the hills on the east instead of converging towards the proper line of retreat in a south-easterly direction. To turn them Major Leach rode alone across the open intervening ground, but only partially succeeded in altering their course. At this time Brigadier-General Burrows was under the impression that this party was the last of the infantry left in the village, and was ignorant of the whereabouts of Colonel Galbraith and the main body of the 66th in Khig, as the trees and gardens of Mandabad rendered it impossible to tell what was taking place beyond. The interval which now separated the cavalry and guns from the infantry was about three-quarters of a mile.

The troopers of the cavalry had meanwhile recovered their formation, and the squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry and the Sind Horse had re-united.

“It was generally believed that General Burrows had been killed during the action, and it was not until we had proceeded about 2 miles” (says Lieutenant J. Monteith, 2nd Sind Horse, orderly officer to Brigadier-General Nuttall) “that he suddenly came up from the rear, riding behind the Wordi-Major of the 3rd Sind Horse (both being on the same horse); and about the same time Major Oliver, 66th, Lieutenant Lynch, 66th, and Captain Harrison of Jacob’s Rifles, were brought out of action in a similar way by some sowars of the 3rd Sind Horse.”

Numbers of baggage animals, commissariat stores, and doolies were hastily abandoned. Many of the wounded found refuge on the gun limbers; others who were still able to ride were put on spare ponies, but no halt was made, although there was no pursuit to speak of, except by some small bodies of irregular cavalry, who were kept at a distance by Captain Slade’s guns. The artillery alone appear to have maintained their military formation and morale during the retreat; “for although,” says Sir Frederick Haines in his despatch, “the cavalry appear to have kept together, the General had lost all confidence in them, apparently with reason.”

At length the Kushk-i-Nakhud River was reached, and here, if it had been more generally known, water was not far distant, but the men could not be persuaded to stop. All looked forward to halting later, and none realised the terrible night march which lay before them.

At this point the remains of the infantry joined in, and the column, if such it could be called, struck one of the direct roads to Kandahar. A number of the wounded were still on foot and could go no further; and Major Leach, whose narrative is followed in this account, had no hesitation in recording his opinion, that had the cavalry remained in rear, they might have rendered most material assistance. There were still a number of surplus animals on the road, spare ponies

and pack bullocks, many ridden by unwounded followers and others by sepoys who might well have walked; all pursuit on the part of the enemy had ceased.

Whilst the main body crossed the river-bed Lieutenant E. V. Monteith with his troopers held the left bank and covered the retirement until carriage had been found for most of the wounded. The cavalry then followed in rear of the guns; throughout the remainder of the retreat, the last gun was the last point protected, and men who failed to reach it were left behind. Colonel St. John had ridden down to the old camping ground at Kushk-i-Nakhud, 2 miles distant, where there was abundance of water, but it was decided by General Burrows not to halt there, as the baggage, sick, wounded, and stragglers already extended over several miles, and it was quite impossible to turn the head of the line. Officers, men, and horses were all much exhausted, and the want of water was severely felt. Hauz-i-Madat, the nearest point on the direct line to Kandahar where there was a chance of finding water, was 15 miles distant; Ata Karez, visible on the right, was 7 miles. The General and the cavalry therefore trotted off to Ata Karez, where they watered their horses and then proceeded on to Hauz-i-Madat, leaving the infantry, baggage, stragglers, and last of all the guns, to struggle on to the last-named place. Fortunately Major Leach, who remained with Slade and the guns, knew the ground well, otherwise the column might easily have passed Hauz-i-Madat in the dark. Many of the sepoys had already fallen out and thrown themselves down exhausted, and the remaining portion of the 66th were in great distress with thirst and fatigue. The guns served, however, as a rallying point, which kept the men together, and soon after 11 p.m. the rear guard sighted trees. The trees meant water; and although the search was for some time unsuccessful, the tank was at last hit off, though not before Captain Slade had been obliged to

abandon one of the smooth-bore guns, owing to the exhaustion of the horses. The large dilapidated masonry tank was some little distance from the road, and on reaching it Slade found the General, who, as has been seen, had arrived there some time before with the cavalry under Nuttall.

As the column came up men and horses rushed to the water, and for an hour and a half the struggle there continued, the crowd being constantly increased by the arrival of fresh stragglers. Even at the end of that time many of the men had not yet succeeded in reaching the tank, and numbers of others had not been able to obtain a drink of water. Major Leach therefore urged General Burrows to prolong the halt, but a report had reached the General that the enemy were already opening fire on the rear of the retreating force, and on these grounds he refused to remain longer at Hauz-i-Madat. The order was given for the cavalry to resume the march, when Leach again represented that the men at the tank would be left behind, and, with General Burrows's permission, he rode back with five sowars to recall them. The column left Hauz-i-Madat about 1 a.m. on the 28th July.

Brigadier-General Burrows wrote as follows of the retreat: "Towards dusk a report came from the rear that the enemy were pressing on the rear guard, and I sent General Nuttall back with the cavalry to remain until they were finally beaten off.

"Subsequently I took the cavalry across to Ata-Karez to water, and rejoined the guns at Hauz-i-Madat. At this place Slade had succeeded in finding some water for the wounded officers and men with him.

"Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., went away to look for water here, and was not seen again.

"I waited a couple of hours to collect any stragglers there might be in the neighbourhood, and sent out a party of cavalry under Major Leach, v.c., R.E., who volunteered to go to search for them. I could not delay longer, as I feared a panic amongst the cavalry,

and that they might leave me without protection for the guns. Some shots from *jazails* and matchlocks from surrounding villages were magnified into the enemy's guns pursuing us; every clump of trees on the sides of the road were troops of cavalry threatening our flanks; and all sorts of scares were constantly occurring."

Lieutenant Geoghegan, of the 3rd Light Cavalry, now relieved Lieutenant Monteith in command of the troops left in rear to escort the guns. This officer remained for some considerable time at Hauz-i-Madat after General Burrows left, and waited for all the men to come back from the water, the report about the guns of the enemy being in the rear proving to be entirely without foundation.

The gun teams were by this time completely exhausted, and Slade was forced to abandon the store limber wagon and spare gun-carriage, and to yoke the bullocks to the guns. Even with this assistance the guns had some difficulty in keeping pace with the cavalry, and General Burrows, who now remained behind with Captain Slade, accordingly sent Major Leach forward with an order to Nuttall "that the cavalry were to go easy, and allow the guns to come up." The cavalry nevertheless did not check their pace, and continued to press forward until an interval of fully three miles separated them from the rear guns. Major Leach was therefore sent with a second order directing the cavalry to halt, and by the time that he delivered it the cavalry were nearing Ashikan, while General Nuttall, with his orderly officer, Lieutenant J. Monteith, was a mile in rear.

At this point, and again at Ashikan, long halts were made, the latter place being reached about 5 a.m., at daybreak; here the two howitzers were abandoned. The gun teams still struggled gallantly on, and to assist them General Burrows ordered the cavalry to lend some horses, so that the limbers carrying wounded men might be brought on.

After leaving Ashikan shots were heard in front, and again an alarm, groundless as before, was raised that the enemy were pursuing in rear. The fact was that the inhabitants of Ashikan were firing on the retreating force, and Lieutenant Whitby, 1st Bombay Infantry, was killed while passing the village. At Sinjiri, which was reached at about 7 a.m., the firing was renewed, but no serious opposition was offered to the progress of the column or to its passage over the River Arghandab, which had to be crossed here. Nevertheless it was only with great difficulty that the guns were dragged over the heavy ground of the river-bed by the exhausted teams, and it was found necessary to abandon one of the smooth-bores. Meanwhile the rest of the column was halted, and when the crossing was half completed, the advance guard of a supporting force from Kandahar under Brigadier-General Brooke, consisting of 40 sabres of the Poona Horse under Captain J. W. Anderson, appeared in sight. From this time the retreating troops were relieved of the work of securing their own protection; Captain Anderson's sowars took up a position at the river-bank and saw the stragglers safely across, and then brought up the rear.

At Kohkaran General Brooke's head-quarters were met, and here a halt was made of over an hour, the wounded men were put into doolies, and stragglers were allowed to close up.

The surviving portions of General Burrows's brigade left Kohkaran at about 8.45 a.m., and marched on without further opposition until the villages close to Kandahar were reached. At about 9 a.m. Captain Slade was obliged to abandon another 6-pr., as the horses could not move it and the battery was exposed to heavy fire from the villages, but the limber with its freight of wounded was brought on. Numbers of the Duranis had taken up their position here, in the neighbourhood of Abbasabad, to harass the British troops, but their attack was repulsed by the fire of the infantry

CASUALTIES

and of the guns of C-2, and after some delay the passage through the now deserted villages was effected. The cantonments were reached by the head-quarters of the cavalry brigade at about 2 p.m., and the citadel of Kandahar half an hour later, the men having been incessantly on the move for 33 hours, in which they covered the 45 miles between the scene of the disaster and Kandahar.

The four horse artillery guns of E-B reached Kandahar safely, but the loss sustained by the battery in action and during the retreat was cruelly heavy.

The total number of men belonging to the brigade under General Burrows engaged at Maiwand was 2,476.

Of these the following casualties were reported, viz. :

	Killed and missing.	Wounded.
British Officers	21	8
„ Troops	296	42
Native Officers	11	9
„ Troops	643	109
Total	<u>971</u>	<u>168</u>
Followers	331	7
Horses	201	68

Names of Officers killed.

- Captain P. C. Heath, Brigade-Major.
 Major G. F. Blackwood, Commanding E-B, R.H.A.
 Lieutenant E. G. Osborne, R.H.A.
 „ T. R. Henn, R.E.
 „ W. C. Owen, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel James Galbraith, Commanding 66th Foot.
 Captain E. S. Garratt, 66th Foot.
 „ W. H. McMath, 66th Foot.
 „ F. J. Cullen, 66th Foot.
 „ W. Roberts, 66th Foot.
 Lieutenant M. E. Rayner, 66th Foot.
 „ R. T. Chute, 66th Foot.
 2nd Lieutenant A. Honeywood, 66th Foot.
 „ W. R. Olivey, 66th Foot.
 „ H. J. O. Barr, 66th Foot.

LOSSES AT MAIWAND

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Lieutenant C. W. Hinde, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
 „ C. G. Whitby, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
 Captain H. F. Smith, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
 Lieutenant W. N. Justice, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
 „ D. Cole, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
 Besides 11 Native Officers.

Names of Officers wounded.

Captain T. Harris, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Lieutenant H. Maclaine, R.H.A. (taken prisoner and afterwards murdered).
 „ N. P. Fowell, R.H.A.
 „ A. M. Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse.
 „ H. Lynch, 66th Foot.
 Surgeon-Major A. F. Preston, 66th Foot.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson, 1st Grenadiers.
 Captain J. Grant, 1st Grenadiers.
 Major J. S. Iredell, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
 Beside 9 Native Officers.

There were lost at Maiwand a large quantity of arms and accoutrements, including over 1,000 rifles and carbines, and about 600 or 700 swords and bayonets. The ammunition expended was as under :

	9-pr. shell and case.	S.B. shot and shell.	Small arm.
In action	1,473	487	382,881
Lost in Ordnance Field Park	448	...	278,200
Total	1,921	487	661,081

The following were the losses among the transport, including some afterwards shot as unfit :

Camels.	Ponies.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Donkeys.
1,676	355	24	79	291

A total number of 455 transport followers and drivers, including one native 1st class inspector, were killed or missing.¹

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 28th July news was brought by a jemadar of the 3rd Sind Horse to Kandahar that General Burrows had been defeated with heavy loss and that the survivors of his force were retreating to the capital. This news was confirmed an hour or two later, and before day broke shots were heard in all the surrounding villages, showing that the whole country was up in arms.

No time was lost in sending out a column to cover the retreat of General Burrows, and within an hour Brigadier-General Brooke started along the Kohkaran road with the following small force :

Poona Horse, 40 sabres (Captain J. W. Anderson).

C-2, R.A., 2 guns (Captain W. Law).

7th Royal Fusiliers, 70 rifles (Lieutenant R. P. B. Rodick).

28th Bombay Infantry, 100 rifles (Major F. C. Singleton).

This column left Kandahar at 5.30 a.m. and moving as quickly as its small numbers and the precautions necessary for its safety would allow through the gardens and enclosures of the suburbs, in all of which were armed and hostile men, it reached Kohkaran at 9 a.m. Here, as has been seen, a junction was effected with Brigadier-General Burrows.

On the appearance of the force the village was hastily evacuated by a large body of armed men, who had previously been harassing and killing all small parties of fugitives from the British force. The enemy were kept at a distance until Brigadier-General Burrows and the remnants of his column had passed; the ford over the Arghandab was held meanwhile, as has already been related, by Captain Anderson and his sowars.

Brigadier-General Brooke then began his return march, picking up on the way all stragglers from the retreating force.

¹ For strength and composition of Ayub Khan's force see Appendix XXVIII.

For about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles the march was unmolested, but information was then received from the front that the hills and walled enclosures around Abbasabad were strongly occupied by the enemy. The two guns of C-2, under Captain Law, together with a cavalry escort, were at once pushed forward; Brigadier-General Brooke followed with the remainder of the cavalry and, passing through General Burrows's force, pushed on, throwing out skirmishers to clear the gardens and villages. This was effected with trifling loss and the enemy were driven from the hills by the fire of the guns. The column then passed through Abbasabad without difficulty. Brigadier-General Brooke's force again halted and formed up after clearing the village, until General Burrows's force had passed. A company of the 7th Fusiliers was sent back to keep the outskirts of the village clear of the enemy, and to bring in all stragglers. The force then returned to cantonments, which were entered about 1.30 p.m.

At Kandahar the whole day was spent in removing the troops, baggage, sick and wounded into the citadel.

The cantonments of Kandahar, from their position below the Pir Paimal and the Picquet and Karez hills, as well as from their lack of an independent water-supply and their isolation from the commissariat and ordnance stores in the citadel, were quite untenable. It was evident that the whole population of the surrounding country was hostile; Ayub's victorious army might be expected at Kandahar within a few days, and the course adopted of defending the city seemed therefore to be the only one possible under the circumstances.

The abandonment of the cantonments was, however, completed with more than necessary haste, so much so that in several instances stores and baggage were left behind and lost. This was especially the case as regarded the removal of the engineering stores from Rahim Dil Khan's garden. By some mistake the guard was withdrawn before this duty could be completed; only a few sick sappers were left in charge of the post

530 LOSS OF ENGINEERING STORES

under Lieutenant G. T. Jones, R.E., and as men from the adjacent villages had already begun to show themselves on the garden walls, Colonel J. Hills ordered this small party to retire as quickly as possible; consequently the whole of the sappers' tents, tools, and materials belonging to the field park had to be abandoned, because sufficient transport was not on the spot to carry them away. Subsequently a party under Lieutenant Jones was sent back to the garden, but could only bring away some of the men's kits and a part of the company equipment, and a good deal of valuable property, both public and private, was left behind.

The only articles saved from the field park were some boxes of guncotton and a few barrels of blasting powder; the Royal Engineer operations therefore depended entirely on tools obtainable from the ordnance department and on regimental equipment. Fortunately these were obtainable in sufficient quantities; but no detonators were available for the guncotton, the want of which was severely felt. The whole of the demolitions, however, outside the city were completed without the use of explosives.

Shortly after dusk, Brigadier-General Brooke having reported that he could see no signs of any more of the fugitives from Maiwand coming in, and all the sick and as much as possible of the baggage having been removed from cantonments, the whole of the British force was withdrawn within the city walls, and the gates were closed.

The city of Kandahar has a quadrilateral *enceinte*, the length of its sides being approximately as follows:

Shikarpur Gate front	. . .	about 1,300 yards.
Herat Gate front	. . .	" 1,987 "
Eedgah Gate front	. . .	" 1,178 "
Kabul Gate front	. . .	" 1,700 "
Total	. . .	<u>6,165</u> "

The walls were of solid sun-dried mud, of an average

height of 30 feet, and breadth 15 feet on the north and east fronts; the ditch was 18 feet deep on those fronts; while at the south-west bastion, and between that point and the Herat Gate, there was hardly any ditch at all. Flanking fire was obtained from small circular bastions, forty-nine in number, but much dilapidated; each gate was covered by two such bastions. The curtain or parapet wall had an average height of 8 feet, its thickness varying considerably. Great numbers of outlets existed, such as canals and underground passages. These were filled up and *fougasses* placed in them.

It is doubtful if the citadel could have been held if once the outer wall had been forced. The supply of water would then have had to be obtained from a single well, and the artillery square, commissariat yard, and enclosures were all commanded by adjacent houses, while the citadel wall at this point was only a few inches thick. The danger which was therefore most feared by the garrison was an assault by the Afghans on the city walls. But the wire entanglement and the sandbags which were constructed without loss of time on and around the parapets are said to have occasioned fears of hidden mines, etc., in the minds of the *ghazis*, and within ten days from the beginning of the siege the defences of the city had been so strengthened that there was little fear of a successful attack. All the gates were protected by *abattis*, and it was known by experience that heavy mud walls have a resisting power equal, if not superior, to that of solid masonry, as was proved by experiments made in 1879 with a 6·4-in. howitzer upon the walls of old Kandahar; and the actual results obtained with the 40-prs. and 9-prs. during the siege upon the villages of Deh Khoti and Deh Khoja confirmed this fact.

The night of the 28th July passed quietly, though a few shots were heard in the direction of the cantonments, and at about 10 p.m. the Sadar bazaar, which was chiefly constructed of light wood and matting, was set on fire.

The next morning the preparations to withstand a siege were continued. It was evident that, next to the extent and weakness of the walls, the danger from the large Durani population resident within the city was most to be feared. Their secret, if not open hostility to the British could hardly be doubted; while the very existence of so large and crowded a population within a beleaguered town necessarily added very greatly to the difficulty of supplying all with food and water.

The advisability of expelling all the Afghans from the city was therefore suggested, and this course was strongly advocated by Brigadier-General Brooke. The proposal met with considerable opposition from the political officers, but Brigadier-General Brooke's advice prevailed, and under General Primrose's orders the whole Pathan population was expelled on the 29th and 30th July.

At the same time search was made for a further supply of water, it being evident that the tanks within the citadel would not furnish sufficient for more than a few days. A good supply was found in the town from small wells in the houses; the cavalry and artillery horses were watered from a well in front of the Eedgah Gate, and the transport animals from two large wells near the south-west corner of the city. All the camels and ponies of the transport were driven there, and lines were made for them in some open gardens between the Shikarpur Gate and south-west bastion.

The troops were told off as follows for the defence of the town:

The 7th Fusiliers to the south and east faces of the citadel; the 28th Bombay Infantry to the north and west faces; the 1st and 30th Bombay Infantry to the Topkhana square; the 66th Foot to the Eedgah Gate, and as guards over the artillery and ammunition parks; and the 4th and 19th Bombay Infantry for the protection of Supply, Transport, and Medical departments, and internal defence. The guns and cavalry were distributed as shown on the plan. Inter-communic-

tion was established by telegraph between the Chaharsu, all the gates, and head-quarters in the citadel. A telephone line was also fixed up between the latter place and the north-west bastion. There were visual signalling stations in all four bastions. On the 1st August the commands in case of an attack were assigned as follow :

Brigadier-General Burrows to the Herat front.
 ” ” Nuttall to the Kabul front.
 ” ” Brooke to the Shikarpur front.

Colonel Mainwaring was to command the Eedgah front under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant-General.

Brigadier-General Burrows, as senior brigadier, was appointed to the command of the garrison.

A body of marksmen was told off to the bastions and other good positions for long-range shooting, under the command of Major F. G. F. Moore, 7th Fusiliers, and did excellent service during the siege. All ranks not assigned other duties were held in reserve in the citadel, where head-quarters were established.

On the 30th July the city was apportioned into blocks, so as to introduce some order into the drawing of water, the best water being reserved for the hospitals.

The latter were located within the citadel, partly in a building previously set apart for the purpose, and partly in large E.P. tents,¹ of which there was a large supply.

The general health of the garrison decidedly improved in the early days of the siege, under the influence of the excitement which the presence of an enemy caused.

The head-quarters of the 28th Bombay Infantry marched into Kandahar on the 28th July, and the total strength of the garrison on that date was as follows :

¹ Large two-poled tents, with double flies, as supplied to British troops in India.

534 STRENGTH OF THE GARRISON

CORPS.	BRITISH.			NATIVE.			HORSES.	ORDNANCE. ¹		TRANS- PORT.		
	OFFICERS.	EFFEC- TIVE.	SICK.	TOTAL.	EFFEC- TIVE.	SICK.		TOTAL.	GUNS.	8-in. mortars.	BULLOCKS.	
		Non-commissioned officers and men.	Non-commissioned officers and men.		Non-commissioned officers and men.	Non-commissioned officers and men.						
Cavalry.	Poona Horse	5	5	213	11	224	226
	3rd Sind Horse	5	5	358	9	367	396
	3rd Bombay Lt. Cavalry	6	6	354	29	383	355
		6	6	354	29	383	355
Artillery.	E-B, R.H.A.	4	115	19	138	123	4
	C-2, R.A.	5	101	14	120	81	4
	5-11, R.A.	4	90	1	95	12	4	2	372
British Infantry.	7th Fusiliers	24	620	45	689	10
	66th Foot	12	241	70	323	7
Native Infantry.	1st Bombay Grenadiers	6	6	273	72	345
	4th Bombay Infantry	7	7	533	21	554
	19th Bombay Infantry	6	6	586	27	613
	28th Bombay Infantry	7	7	671	36	707
	30th Bombay Infantry	5	5	319	77	396
Sappers.	No. 2 Company Sappers	1	1	59	7	66	7
Total	97	1,167	149	1,413	3,366	239	3,655	1,217	13	2	373	

Officers	97
Effective non-commissioned officers and men	4,533
Sick	438
	4,971
Total	5,068
Camels	1,021
Bullocks	135
Ponies	602
Mules	68

¹ Also one 6-pr. S.B. gun.

From the beginning of the siege parties were daily employed in improving the defences and strengthening the walls and gates, the latter by plates of sheet-iron. Gun platforms, traverses, ramps, and banquettes were constructed on the walls. All houses abutting on the city walls were, as far as possible, demolished, trees were felled, buildings and walls which could give cover to an enemy were levelled, so as to leave an enceinte of open ground round the city, and a wire entanglement constructed all round the foot of the walls.

Nothing was seen of Ayub Khan's soldiers until the afternoon of the 30th July, when a party of cavalry appeared near Kalachi-i-Haidar Khan, about a mile north-east of the city. An effort was made to lure them into the plain, but without success. On the 31st, however, a body of *ghazis* and mounted men having occupied Khairabad, they were attacked by a troop of the Poona Horse and 2 companies each of the 7th Fusiliers and 28th Bombay Infantry, who drove them out of the place into Deh Khwaja with a loss of about thirty. One of our sepoy was killed and three men wounded.

On the 1st August large numbers of men appeared on the hills near Kalachi-i-Haidar, and on the following day a reconnoitring party of the Poona Horse, who proceeded to that place through the Sadar bazaar and cantonments, were followed as they retired by shots from the enemy, who came streaming out from Abbasabad. A working party near the south-west bastion, around Mehr Dil Khan's garden, was also fired on, together with its covering party of the 7th Fusiliers and 4th and 28th Bombay Infantry, who, advancing in turn, killed several of the enemy with a loss of one sepoy killed and one private wounded.

On this date rations for artillery horses and officers chargers were reduced to 8 lb. of grain and 18 lb. of bhusa; those for native cavalry horses to 6 lb. of grain and 14 lb. of bhusa.

General Primrose assumed supreme political control

on the 2nd August, Colonel St. John acquiescing in this arrangement.

The enemy now appeared daily on the Picquet Hill and the heights near Baba Wali, as well as in the Sadar bazaar and cantonments, from which they kept up an occasional rifle fire on the city walls.

On the 4th August a redistribution was made of the troops on the walls, 300 being allotted to each face, a first reinforcement of 200 at the Chaharsu and a second reinforcement of 100 in the Topkhana square.

The remaining men, on the alarm sounding, were to fall in on their private parade grounds, followers to be in places appointed by officers commanding regiments. Signallers to be posted in each angle bastion.

On the 6th of August firing on the working parties was continued, and Lieutenant G. A. C. de Trafford and a private of the 7th Fusiliers were wounded. The numbers of the enemy were evidently increasing and Ayub's troops pitched their camp on the Picquet Hill, the encampment being further extended on the next morning to the north of the hill.

The firing of the enemy began earlier than usual on the 8th August, and was supplemented by an Armstrong gun, which opened fire at 5 a.m., from the Picquet Hill. In consequence of this, orders were issued on the 9th for the men of the garrison to be kept as much as possible under the west walls of enclosures, so as to screen them from the enemy's fire.

In the course of that day a spy came in and reported that the whole of Ayub's army was now encamped at Chihil Zina, near the north end of the ridge to the west of old Kandahar, and was contemplating a night assault on the city.

From day to day the firing went on in a desultory fashion without any noticeable incident, and was answered by the guns of the garrison whenever opportunity offered. A skirmish took place on the 12th, when a party of the 7th Fusiliers and 19th Bombay Infantry rushed a walled garden outside the Herat face

of the town, with the object of demolishing the walls, and killed several of the enemy, including the Governor of Farah ; our losses were one private killed, one private and eight sepoys wounded. Lieutenants G. T. Jones and E. A. Waller, R.E., very gallantly brought a wounded man of the 19th Bombay Infantry out of action under a heavy fire.

Several attempts had been made during this time to communicate with General Phayre, but it was seldom that a messenger either going or coming could elude the vigilance of the enemy (Achakzais) on the road, and several had been captured and put to death. On the 11th August, however, a letter was received from General Phayre, and a reply was sent back at once by the man who brought it.

On this date a fresh distribution of the garrison was made as follows :

Eedgah front	400
Herat front	{	Topkhana Gate	.	.	.	176
		Herat Gate	.	.	.	324
Shikarpur front	400
Kabul front	{	Kabul Gate	.	.	.	334
		Bar Durani Gate	.	.	.	166
Chaharsu reserve	200
Topkhana square reserve	100

On the 13th August the idea of a sortie was for the first time definitely put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hills, Commanding Royal Engineers, and on the 15th the details of the plan were discussed by that officer with General Primrose. The limited numbers available necessitated a modification of Colonel Hills's original plan ; but General Primrose agreed with that officer in his opinion that the attitude of the enemy in attempting a complete and careful investment of Kandahar by occupying and fortifying the adjacent villages, rendered a sortie absolutely necessary to make the Afghans show their hand.

Before resorting to this measure General Primrose

carefully searched the villages to the south and east of the city with artillery and mortar fire, but without any apparent result. He therefore determined to bombard one village heavily, and then to put some infantry through it.

The village selected was that of Deh Khwaja, situated to the east of the city, exactly opposite the Bar Durani and Kabul Gates, and running almost parallel to the city wall, distant from the former gate 600 yards, and from the latter 950 yards.

In making the selection the following points influenced the General and the officers of the council of war :

- I.—The village, Deh Khwaja, was isolated from the main body of the enemy's regular troops, who were encamped beyond Abbasabad, some 4 miles west of the city, with Kandahar between them and Deh Khwaja, and therefore out of supporting distance.
- II.—The only supports available for the village would have to come from the south and pass over ground on which the British cavalry could act with effect.
- III.—The village lies on the regular road from Mandi Hissar to Kandahar, and it was most important that this road should be cleared and kept open for the advance of General Phayre, as the Khushab road was studded with villages, which, if held in succession by the enemy, could only have been forced at immense cost.
- IV.—Artillery had been fired from this village, and the General was anxious to ascertain what number of guns the enemy had in position there, and what was the calibre of the guns. This information was necessary, as all reports from Maiwand agreed that Ayub Khan had with him thirty guns,

including two batteries of 12-pr. Armstrongs. Up to date he had only unmasked two Armstrong guns, and it was therefore a matter of importance to prevent his establishing an overpowering artillery fire within 1,000 yards of the walls.

V.—It was desirable to confine the enemy's artillery to positions perpendicular to the shorter faces of the city walls, as batteries placed opposite the east and west fronts would take these faces respectively in reverse.

VI.—The disarrangement of the enemy's dispositions to the east would practically limit his attack to the west and south fronts, as the ground to the north is open and devoid of cover.

Accordingly on the 15th August Brigadier-General Brooke was ordered to attack the village of Deh Khwaja on the following morning, the village being previously shelled from the walls, and the advance of the troops covered by the fire of one 40-pr., two 9-prs., and two 8-inch mortars.

The artillery was ordered to open fire at 4.45 a.m., and the infantry to leave the Kabul Gate at 5 a.m.

Brigadier-General Brooke made his own dispositions for carrying out the projected attack, which were as follows :

“ I.—The force will be divided into three columns as follows :

1st	{ 7th Fusiliers (2 companies) 19th Native Infantry (2 companies) }	} Under Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny.
2nd	{ 7th Fusiliers (2 companies) 28th Native Infantry (3 companies) }	} Under Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo.
3rd	{ 7th Fusiliers (1 company) 19th Native Infantry (2 companies) 28th Native Infantry (1 company) }	} Under Colonel C. T. Heathcote.

“ II.—To each column will be attached an Engineer officer with a proportion of sappers with tools and powder-bags

“III.—A medical officer and sick carriage will accompany each column. The reserve ammunition will remain within the Kabul Gate. Arrangements for carrying an ample supply of water are to be made by all commanding officers.

“IV.—The following will be the duties assigned to each column :

“*The first column* will, on leaving the Kabul Gate, take the road to the right, and after proceeding 150 yards along it, advance towards the south of the village, the advance being covered by skirmishers, and the details carried out as may seem best to Colonel Daubeny, with reference to the features of the ground and the resistance offered. The object of this column is to seize a good position at the south of the village from which to advance to the north of the village, driving out all the enemy who may be met there.

“*The second column* will conform to, and follow the movements of the first; but on reaching the village will seize a position on the right of that taken up by the first column. Both columns will make their advance in as open order as possible.

“*The third column* will remain within the Kabul Gate awaiting orders. The duty assigned to them will probably be to enter the village at the main entrance, and seize the enclosure on the left of the entrance where the gun embrasure is, and clear that part of the village.

“The other instructions will be issued to the commanders of the first and second columns by the Brigadier-General on their reaching the south of the village.

“The cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Nuttall is under orders to co-operate, and will be on the east and south of the village.”

As previously arranged, the cavalry quitted the Eedgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and trotted round into the position assigned, a few shots being fired at them, but at very long ranges, and doing no damage. The guns opened fire at 4.45 a.m., and at 5 a.m. the first two columns of infantry debouched from the Kabul Gate, making for the south of the village, which they entered under a heavy fire of musketry at 5.30 a.m.

At this moment numbers of *ghazis* were seen making their way to Deh Khwaja, across the open ground to the south of the village. They were at once charged by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry under Lieutenant Geoghegan, and driven back with heavy loss into broken ground, where further pursuit by the cavalry was hopeless, but where they were exposed to the fire of a 40-pr. in the south-east bastion under Lieutenant W. S. Plant.

The cavalry now formed up to the south of Deh Khwaja waiting for another opportunity to charge. Meanwhile the infantry were steadily making their way through the village, beating down all opposition. Once more the *ghazis* in large numbers tried to cross from Bala Karez to the support of Deh Khwaja; but Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Bombay Infantry, met them with three well-directed volleys, which turned them; Brigadier-General Nuttall thereupon seized the opportunity, and charged again with the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse, dispersing and cutting up many of them, and they again took shelter in the *nalas* and broken ground.

Meantime the enemy's fire in the village had entirely ceased, and the programme arranged by General Brooke had been carried out as regarded all three columns. Nevertheless, General Brooke having already sent back word to the Lieutenant-General that his position was untenable, he had in consequence unfortunately been

ordered to retire. On re-forming, therefore, after the second charge Brigadier-General Nuttall received a note from Brigadier-General Brooke asking him to cover the retirement of such of the infantry as were still south of the village, into the Kabul Gate.

In consequence of this request the cavalry was withdrawn towards the Kabul Gate, covering the retirement of the supporting infantry, which with Trench's companies fell back to the city.

This retirement, however, left the infantry columns in the village entirely unsupported, and allowed the enemy's reinforcements to move up from the south, with the object of entirely cutting off the British force. In the face of determined resistance, the first two columns under Lieutenant-Colonels Daubeny and Nimmo forced their way through Deh Khwaja, debouching at about 7 a.m. from the northern end, whilst the third column under Colonel Heathcote held its ground near the centre of the village until ordered to withdraw. These three columns then began to fall back, the two former from the north of Deh Khwaja to the Eedgah Gate, and Colonel Heathcote's column from the western entrance of the village to the Kabul Gate. They rallied to a certain extent behind walls in the fields; but they suffered terribly in extricating themselves. As soon as their retirement began, the enemy again occupied the village and reopened fire, and to the whole brunt of this the columns were exposed, while the cramped nature of the ground prevented them from moving in anything but close formation.

During the retreat Brigadier-General Brooke, whilst supporting Captain Cruickshank, R.E., whom he had brought out of the village severely wounded, was shot down whilst crossing a piece of open ground to gain the shelter of a wall.

At length by 7.30 a.m. the disastrous retirement was completed. The firing had entirely ceased, and the enemy were seen streaming away from Deh Khwaja,

carrying some of their dead with them. Their loss was said to have been very heavy, several chiefs of note having been killed, and one of the two guns in the village destroyed.

Whilst the fighting was going on in Deh Khwaja the enemy opened artillery fire on the city from Picquet Hill, and from a gun in position about 1,200 yards from the west face of the city wall. They also attempted to form up their infantry in the old cantonments under cover of this fire; but such was the steadiness and accuracy with which our guns were served that they were unable to do so, and within an hour their artillery fire was silenced, and one gun on Picquet Hill dismounted.

The total number of British troops engaged was 1,556, and the casualties, as follows, were 223 in number:

	Officers.	British troops.	Native troops and followers.
Killed . . .	8	24	74, including 1 native officer.
Wounded . . .	6	30	81, including 5 native officers.

Of these 31 were cavalry casualties, which arm had also 72 horses killed and wounded.

Names of Officers killed.

- Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke.
- Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Bombay Infantry.
- Major R. J. Le P. Trench, } 19th Bombay Infantry.
- Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, }
- 2nd Lieutenant F. P. Wood, } 7th Fusiliers.
- E. S. Marsh, }
- ” ” ” ”
- Captain G. M. Cruickshank, Royal Engineers.
- The Rev. G. M. Gordon, Chaplain, Church Missionary Society.

Officers wounded.

- Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Bombay Infantry.
- Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary-General (afterwards died).
- Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse.
- Major T. B. Vandeleur, 2-7th Fusiliers (afterwards died).
- Captain W. Conolly, 2-7th Fusiliers.
- Surgeon A. K. Stewart, Poona Horse.

“No words of mine,” wrote General Primrose, “can express my appreciation of the cool and gallant behaviour

of all ranks. Brigadier Brooke was killed whilst attempting to save the life of Captain Cruickshank, R.E., and by his death the service and the country have suffered a heavy loss. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Native Infantry; Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry; Captain G. M. Cruickshank, R.E.; Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; and 2nd Lieutenant F. P. Wood, 7th Fusiliers,—all died whilst leading their men in the most forward manner; and 2nd Lieutenant E. S. Marsh, 7th Fusiliers, was killed in helping to bring in Lieutenant Wood, who was then severely wounded. The Rev. G. M. Gordon, Church Missionary Society, was also mortally wounded whilst attending the men under a heavy fire; and I take this opportunity of paying my small tribute of admiration to a man who, by his kindness and gentleness, had endeared himself to the whole force, and in the end died administering to their wants.”

General Primrose also brought to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant W. St. L. Chase, 28th Bombay Infantry, who, under a “heavy fire carried a wounded man from the front into a place of safety,” also of Private Ashford, 7th Fusiliers, who accompanied and remained with Lieutenant Chase. These afterwards received the Victoria Cross.

In the course of the next few days some correspondence took place between Ayub Khan and Colonel St. John with regard to Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, who was a prisoner in the camp of the former, and who was, Ayub stated, treated with every consideration. An effort was made to effect an exchange of Lieutenant Maclaine for the son of the Sartip, but to this proposal Ayub Khan refused to consent.

Meanwhile the investment of Kandahar continued and the enemy kept up a daily artillery fire from Picquet Hill, the deserted British head-quarters, and Deh Khati to the south of the city. But the garrison, already encouraged by their success in the sortie of the 15th, were further cheered by the news that a relieving

force was being collected at Quetta and that a strong division under Sir Frederick Roberts was marching towards Kandahar from Kabul. At first this news seemed only to cause the enemy to redouble their efforts to entrench their position, but at length on the 24th August a great commotion was observed in the Afghan camp. Guns were seen moving towards Baba Wali, and hundreds of horsemen crossed the knolls near Gundigan. At 10 o'clock in the day it became evident that the enemy had broken up their camp, and were making for the Khakrez route. A Ghilzai who had been sent out by Colonel St. John to Kushk-i-Nakhud and had been made prisoner, came in this day, and stated that the *ghazis* had dispersed, that the guns from the General's garden had been withdrawn, and that the army was going to Baba Wali; also that there had been an altercation on the previous day between Ayub and the *ghazis* about assaulting the city. The cause of this disturbance was the news that a British force had arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and that Abdur Rahman had been declared Amir at Kabul.

In consequence of this information, on the following day the Assistant Quartermaster-General, with a party of the Poona Horse, rode out to reconnoitre, and found Baba Wali strongly held, but the country round quite deserted. Passing through Deh Khwaja the bodies of Colonel Newport, Captain Cruickshank and others were found, and on the return of the party to Kandahar arrangements were made for their burial. On the same day Major Vandeleur of the 7th Fusiliers died of his wounds, received during the sortie of the 15th August.

At length, about 12 noon on the 27th August, a heliograph was seen flashing in the east: communication was difficult at first owing to the dense haze, but when established it was ascertained that General Gough was at Robat, with two regiments of Bengal Cavalry. The Assistant Quartermaster-General rode out with Colonel St. John and arrived there at 5.30 p.m., and thus established communication with the advance guard of

END OF THE SIEGE

Sir Frederick Roberts's force. The Assistant Quartermaster-General remained at Robat until the next day, and saw the Bengal Division march in.

With the arrival of the Bengal force in the neighbourhood of Kandahar the trying four weeks of siege were brought to an end. The garrison had meanwhile suffered both from wounds in action and from disease, and from the 28th July to the 1st September there were admitted into hospital—

	Sick.	Wounded.
European Troops	187	86
Native „	340	83
	<u>527</u>	<u>169</u>
Total	696	

It has already been mentioned that at the beginning of the siege the general health of the men improved under the influence of the excitement which the presence of the enemy caused. Later on, however, it began to decline, owing to the usual causes which affect the health of besieged garrisons—the want of fresh vegetables, accumulation of large numbers of men and animals in a limited space, etc.

The fighting men had half an ounce of lime-juice daily until the 25th August, when the supply became exhausted. Great attention was paid to sanitation by the medical officer, Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, appointed to that special duty, and by Colonel G. F. Beville, the Provost-Marshal; but owing to the villages in the immediate vicinity being occupied by the enemy, whose fire reached up to the walls, it was difficult to convey dead animals and general débris to any distance from the city, and there was consequently much difficulty in keeping the city and environs clean.

Before relating the incidents of Sir Frederick Roberts's relieving march, we must pause to notice in a few words the course of events on the southern line of communications after the receipt of news of the Maiwand disaster.

This intelligence reached Major R. Westmacott,

Road Commandant, on the 28th July, and at 11 a.m. on that day communication with Kandahar ceased. Working parties were immediately put on to strengthen the defences of Chaman, all the smaller posts were withdrawn to that place, and every preparation made to resist attack. The whole country was in a turmoil of hostility, and reports were rife of a projected night attack on Chaman, but although the post was fired on and an effort was made by the tribesmen to waylay a convoy in the Khojak Pass on the 3rd August, yet it was safely conducted to Chaman by Major Westmacott, and no further attack was made.

The telegraph wire had meanwhile been cut, and it was not until the 13th August that Major Westmacott was able again to relay it to Kala Abdulla. It was again cut on the 15th but repaired the same day, and Major Westmacott having warned the villagers on both sides of the Khojak that they would be held responsible for its preservation, it was not again interfered with.

No further noticeable incident occurred until the end of the month, and on the evening of the 31st the advance cavalry brigade of General Phayre's relieving force, under Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson, reached Gatai, and moved forward next day towards Kandahar.

CHAPTER XVII

THE MARCH OF THE KABUL-KANDAHAR FORCE, UNDER SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, AND THE BATTLE OF KANDAHAR

As already related in a previous chapter, the news of the disastrous defeat of General Burrows's brigade at Maiwand, and of the consequent withdrawal of the Kandahar force within the walls of that city, reached Kabul by telegraph on the 28th July.

It was at once perceived by Generals Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts that the relief of General Primrose by way of Sind could only be carried out with delay and difficulty at that season of the year; and they therefore considered the possibility of rendering assistance by the movement of troops from Kabul. Accordingly, when called upon by the Viceroy for his opinion, Sir Donald Stewart did not hesitate to counsel the immediate despatch of a force from Kabul, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, to accomplish the object in view, and insisted on the necessity of selecting the pick of the troops under his command with the most efficient transport, thus making every effort to ensure the success of the undertaking.

The news of the decision of the Government of India to follow this advice was received on the 3rd August. It was decided that the force should leave Kabul on the 8th August, that being the earliest possible date, and it was estimated that Kandahar would be reached on the 2nd September.

Meanwhile, during the last week of July, the negotiations which had been for some time proceeding with Sardar Abdur Rahman, with a view to placing him on the throne of Kabul, had advanced satisfactorily towards a conclusion. It was now decided that his assistance should be openly asked in obtaining supplies for the force which was about to march against Ayub. Since, however, at such a crisis it would have been unsafe to place too much reliance on Afghan assurances of aid, every effort was made to ensure, by careful preparation, complete independence in the execution of the movements contemplated.

The following paragraphs, dealing with the nature of the proposed undertaking and with the measures taken to ensure its success, are taken from a paper read by Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, the Chief of Sir F. Roberts's Staff, at the Royal United Service Institution on the 9th March, 1881 :

“A march conducted without a base of operations or communications of any kind through a hostile country, and towards a point presumably in the possession of an enemy who had been recently successful, could only be warranted by such necessity as had arisen; in this instance, however, the wisdom which prompted the measure, and the courage which executed it, sprang of experience and of the confidence which claims success as certainty.

“The result justified the conception, and the march from Kabul to Kandahar has been recognised as a great achievement. It will be remembered that at the time it was undertaken, and until a crushing defeat had been inflicted upon Ayub Khan at Kandahar itself, the movement was condemned in no measured terms by military critics, its originators being judged to have acted in complete disregard of the principles of military science. With troops, however, trained and equipped as were those selected for the undertaking, a commander may, humanly speaking, anticipate success in any enterprise.

CAREFUL PREPARATION

“It is important to draw attention to the quality of the troops constituting the *corps d'armée* from which Sir Frederick Roberts's force was drawn, to lay stress on their superior physique, and to recall the fact that officers and men had gone through together the training of a lengthened period of active service. It is not too much to say that, in fighting power and intelligence, the troops in question could not be surpassed, whilst their equipment was in the very highest order.

“The measures of thoughtful preparation carried on during the few days that remained to Sir Frederick Roberts before the movement commenced may be classed under two heads:

- (1) The selection of the troops, followers, and baggage animals.
- (2) The survey and completion of equipment.

“No record of the work thus undertaken would be complete which did not set forward very prominently the self-abnegation and high military capacity evinced by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, who was in supreme command at Kabul, and who, without reference to the difficult task of withdrawal by the Khyber, which was to be his share of the programme, placed unreservedly at Sir F. Roberts's disposal the entire resources of the North Afghanistan Field Force, in transport and equipment: nor would it be possible to pass by without respectful recognition the singleness of purpose and true genius with which the two commanders devoted themselves to perfect the machinery which it was intended to employ in the execution of a difficult enterprise. The spirit they evinced became the leading principle that guided all ranks in the task of preparation.

“It is hard to appreciate fully the difficulties which beset a commander in the selection of troops for special

service: it is at the same time important, in reviewing the duty which devolved on Sir Frederick Roberts when called on to name particular regiments for the service in hand, to recognise that the exceptional hardships and difficulties involved in the undertaking were exactly understood by the rank and file of the army.

“The sentiment with which the announcement that a force would march to Kandahar was received was that of a strong sense of duty, rather than the enthusiasm of troops who had their reputation to make. Very many of the corps serving at Kabul, more especially native corps, had been for two years absent from their homes; they had seen a good deal of fighting, and had suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness. The native troops in Northern Afghanistan had welcomed the possibility of an early withdrawal to India, and very justly felt themselves entitled to rest. It was not with eager desire that the honour of marching to Kandahar was sought for, and some commanding officers of experience judged rightly the temper of their men when they represented, for the General’s consideration, the claim of the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field service. I lay stress on this fact, and claim for those officers who subordinated their own wishes in the interest of the soldiers they commanded, as also for the General who acted on their representations, an insight into the character of our native troops the result of long experience.

“It is not easy to estimate the confidence created by such knowledge as was thus brought to bear on the question of selection, nor rightly to describe the sense of duty and of absolute trust in their commanders which marked the behaviour of the troops at this time.

“The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts’s force with exceptional rapidity to Kandahar was an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself,

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and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself."

On the 3rd August the detail of the force placed under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts for the relief of Kandahar, and styled the Kabul-Kandahar Force, was published as follows :

		BRITISH.		NATIVE.	
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men	Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men.	
Staff		79	
<i>Cavalry.</i>					
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C.	{	9th Queen's Royal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Bushman	19	318	...
		3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie	7	...	394
		3rd Punjab Cavalry, Major A. Vivian	9	...	408
		Central India Horse, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, C.B.	11	...	495
		46	318	1,297	
<i>Artillery.</i>					
Colonel A. Johnson, Commanding Royal Artillery.	{	6-8, R.A., Mountain Battery, Major J. C. Robinson	6	95	139
		11-9, R.A., Mountain Battery, Major J. M. Douglas	6	95	139
		No. 2 Mountain Battery (Derajat), Major G. Swinley	5	...	140
		17	190	418	

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		BRITISH.		NATIVE.
		Officers.	Non-com-missioned officers and men.	Officers, Non-com-missioned officers and men.
Major-General J. Ross, C.B. Major R. G. Kennedy, A.Q.M.G. Major G. de C. Morton, A.A.G.	<i>1st Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General H. Macpherson, C.B., V.C.			
	92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker	19	651	...
	23rd (Punjab) Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett	8	...	701
	24th Punjab Infantry, Colonel F. B. Norman	7	...	575
	2nd (Prince of Wales's Own) Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye	7	...	501
		41	651	1,777
	<i>2nd Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.			
	72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow	23	787	...
	2nd Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell	7	...	612
	3rd Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Noel-Money	7	...	570
	5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fitzhugh	8	...	561
		45	787	1,743
	<i>3rd Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.			
	2-60th Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Collins	21	616	...
	15th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessey	10	...	650
4th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft	7	...	637	
25th Punjab Infantry, Colonel J. W. Hoggan	8	...	629	
	46	616	1,916	
TOTAL	274	2,562	7,511	

N.B.—These numbers were ultimately slightly increased by the discharge of sick men from hospital, giving a total of all fighting ranks, European and Native, 9,987 men.

Sir D. Stewart's force, marching in the opposite direction in the spring, numbered 5,414 of all fighting ranks.

THE STAFF

The following appointments were made to the Staff:

- Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, R.A., Chief of the Staff.
- Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. A. Lockhart, D.A.G.
- Colonel A. C. Johnson, R.A., C.R.A.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., C.R.E.
- Major R. Kennedy, A.Q.M.G.
- Major G. de C. Morton, A.A.G.
- Captain the Hon. C. Dutton, A.Q.M.G.
- Major Boyes, D.A.A.G.
- Major Hastings, Principal Political Officer.
- Deputy Surgeon General Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer.
- Major R. Combe, 10th Hussars.
- Captain A. D. Macgregor, 92nd Highlanders.
- Captain Gaselee, B.S.C.
- Lieutenant Spratt, R.E.
- Major Pretyman, R.A., A.D.C. and Commandant at head-quarters.
- Major Cowie, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance.

} D.A.Q.M.G.'s.

The Commissariat and Transport Staffs (respectively under Major A. R. Badcock and Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low) included the following officers:

<i>Commissariat.</i>	<i>Transport.</i>
Captain A. T. Rind, B.S.C.	Captain W. A. Wynter, 22nd Foot.
Lieutenant C. M. Fitzgerald, B.S.C.	„ G. H. Elliot, B.S.C.
„ H. M. Hawkes, B.S.C.	„ G. R. Macgregor, B.S.C.
„ Lyons Montgomery, B.S.C.	Lieutenant L. E. Booth, 33rd Foot.
	„ H. J. Elverson, 2nd Foot.
	„ R. B. Fisher, 10th Hussars.
	„ R. H. Wilson, 10th Hussars.
	„ G. C. Robertson, 8th Foot.

The transport included 1,589 yabus (Afghan ponies), 4,511 mules, 1,149 ponies, 912 donkeys, and 6 camels with hospital equipment.

The hospital was accompanied by 2,192 bearers, 115 doolies and 321 dandies, besides 286 ponies, 43 donkeys, 3 bullocks, and the 6 camels from the transport enumerated above. Commanding officers were warned to communicate with the Chief Director of Transport and to exchange such of their regimental baggage animals as were unfit for continued work.

The scale of baggage and camp equipage allowed, after some modifications, was finally fixed as follows:

To every European officer (this allowance to include camp equipment)	1 mule
To 8 officers for mess	1 „
To each staff officer on account of authorised office	80 lb.

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BRITISH TROOPS.

Adjutant's Office	80 lb.
Quartermaster's Office	80 „
Paymaster's Office	80 „
To each company for books	20 „
For carriage of line gear of mounted officers	2 mules.
Carriage of armourer's tools	1 mule.
For Quartermaster's stores	400 lb.
Entrenching tools, infantry	12 mules.
Kit allowance per man	24 lb.
For each public and private follower	10 „
(Camp equipage was not taken for followers, public or private.)	
Cooking pots according to Kabul scale, per troop or company	240 lb.
Per troop or company for carriage of arms of sick	1 mule.

Cavalry.

Camp equipage for veterinary stores	2 mules.
Entrenching tools (cavalry)	1 mule.
Armourer's, farrier's and saddler's shops (cavalry)	3 mules.
Mule <i>pakals</i> per troop, company or battery	2 „

Camp Equipage.

To each sepoy <i>pāl</i> of two tents	45 men.
„ „ lascar „ „ „	25 „
„ „ Mountain Battery tent	10 „

NATIVE TROOPS.

Cavalry.

The native cavalry marched with their regimental ponies only, for the conveyance of camp equipage, equipment, and cooking-pots. Each regiment received animals from the Transport Department for hospital and supplies as follows :

For armourers, farriers, and saddlers	3 mules.
For officers	80 lb.

For each bazaar, two *bantias* or attendants were allowed; these were permitted to take one mule or pony for requisite supplies.

For the carriage of arms of sick one mule was allowed per squadron.

Infantry.

For each native officer, inclusive of camp equipage	30 lb.
(Medical subordinates to rank as native officers.)	
For each native soldier, inclusive of camp equipage	20 „
For each public and private follower	10 „
Armourer's tools	1 mule.

Cooking pots.

For each native officer	10 lb.
For each company	160 lb.
Officers	80 „
For carriage of arms of sick per company	1 mule
Bazaar as for cavalry.	

SUPPLIES

The special pioneer equipment of 23rd Pioneers.

Quartermaster's stores 250 lb.

For Mountain Batteries.

Quartermaster's stores 130 „
Mule *pakhals* per troop or company, 2 per battery 1.

None but authorised officers' chargers were taken, but to admit of officers being mounted when on baggage guard, officers commanding British infantry regiments were allowed to arrange for three ponies, the property of officers accompanying the regiment.

Officers' attendants were restricted to one personal servant, one groom for each horse, and one servant for every three officers in mess.

The supplies taken were as follows :

For British Troops (in regimental charge).

Tea, sugar, rum, salt 30 days.
Preserved meat 2 „
Bread-stuff. 5 „
Atta for followers 5 „

For Native Troops and Followers (in regimental charge).

Rum (for men who drink spirits) 8 days.
Atta 5 „
Dhal and salt 30 „
Sheep—Estimated requirements for 10 days.

Commissariat reserve.

Army food 500 lb.
Lime-juice 200 gallons.
Preserved vegetables (all that were available.)

Bakeries and butcheries, with other necessary commissariat establishment, as detailed by the Deputy Commissary-General, accompanied the column.

The question of the amount and the nature of the artillery force which it would be advisable to attach to the division, was one which had been the subject of much anxious consideration. In his telegram of the 3rd August conveying his approval of the arrangements for the march from Kabul, the Commander-in-Chief expressed the opinion that, Ayub having thirty-six guns including a battery of breech-loaders, "mountain artillery is not sufficient to cope with Ayub's artillery,

THE QUESTION OF ARTILLERY 557

which is admirably served." Other considerations, however, induced him afterwards to modify this opinion, as described in the following paragraphs of Sir Frederick Roberts's despatch :

"In the detail of the forces it will be noted that the strength in artillery was not in proportion to the strength of the other branches. But there were strong reasons which made it desirable that the artillery with the column should consist only of mountain batteries. The whole question was one of grave importance, and it was not without due consideration decided that the force should proceed to Kandahar unaccompanied by wheeled artillery.

"The object was to reach Kandahar in the shortest possible time ; and it was not improbable that the main road would have to be left, should the Afghan army at Kandahar endeavour to make its way towards Ghazni and Kabul by the valleys of the Arghandab or the Arghastan.

"The nature of the ground throughout Afghanistan is such that artillery can never be safely employed with cavalry alone, unsupported by infantry. Nor is rapidity of movement so much required of artillery in countries like Afghanistan, as the power of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without causing delay to the rest of the troops."

These reasons, united with the fact that a heavy battery as well as horse artillery would join the force at Kandahar, finally led to the decision that no wheeled carriage should accompany the Kabul-Kandahar Column.

At length, on Saturday, the 7th August, the arrangements for the march of the force were complete and its approximate strength then stood as follows :

British troops (including officers)	2,836	}	9,987
Native "	7,151		
Staff officers' horses	190		
Cavalry horses	1,779		
Artillery mules	450		
Followers	7,000		
Transport animals	6,000		

558 COMMENCEMENT OF THE MARCH

Meanwhile such of the troops as had been selected to form part of the Kandahar Column from the 3rd Division, Northern Afghanistan Field Force, or the columns at a distance from Kabul, had moved to within easy reach of that city on the 5th August. The next day the Cavalry Brigade under General Hugh Gough went into camp on the Bimaru plain, while the 1st Infantry Brigade, under General Macpherson, camped on the grassy plain between Siah Sang and Sherpur; the 2nd Infantry Brigade moved into Sherpur cantonments and the 3rd Infantry Brigade encamped close to the Bala Hissar.

On Sunday, the 8th August, the march began, the Cavalry Brigade moving to Chaharasia, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades to Beni Hissar, and the 2nd Brigade to Indaki. The force was, however, not yet complete; 11-9, Royal Artillery (3rd Brigade), and the Central India Horse (a wing from each of the two regiments) were moving by forced marches up the Khyber line. The battery joined its brigade on the evening of the 8th, and a wing of the Central India Horse on the same day, but the other wing was delayed at Butkhak by a flood, which rendered the river impassable, and only caught up the Cavalry Brigade at Saiadabad on the evening of the 9th August.

Momentous as were the issues involved in the undertaking, yet the march itself from Kabul to Kandahar was not marked by sufficient incident to necessitate a detail of its daily progress. The following extract from the Divisional Order Book (which was quoted by Colonel Chapman in the lecture above mentioned) may be inserted as indicating the plan adopted during the earlier stages of the march:

“No. 10. *Camp, Zargunshahar, August 10th, 1880.*—When two or more brigades march together, the following will be the order of march:

1. Troops constituting the fighting line, with the first reserve of ammunition, rations, and cooking-pots for European regiments, doolies, and dandies.

2. Field Hospitals.
Ordnance Park.
Treasure.
Engineer Park.
Led horses.

The baggage of brigades massed, and moving in the order of movement of corps.

3. The rear guard as may be detailed.
The baggage will be controlled in brigades by brigade transport officers.

All followers, with the exception of officers' *syces* and cooks accompanying British regiments, will remain with the baggage, and will be under the control of the Provost-Marshal and his establishment.' ”

With reference to the rate of marching, Colonel Chapman says :

“ Although halts were ordered at regular intervals, it was found impossible to assimilate the pace and preserve a regular rate of marching. When the Highlanders led the column the Gurkhas were worn out by their efforts to keep up, and when the Gurkhas were in front the pace became generally so slow as to fatigue the Europeans and the Sikhs ; yet it was very important for brigade commanders to strive at a uniform rate of marching, and to adhere to the halts of 10 minutes ordered at the end of each hour of march, as well as the breakfast halt of 20 minutes fixed for 8 o'clock.

“ It will be readily understood that the collection and distribution of food, fuel, and forage, together with the establishment of markets within the limits of each brigade where the inhabitants might find a sale for articles of supply, necessitated an elaborate system ; the work of marching, camping, and supply rested, however, with no inexperienced soldiers ; it was not very often during the entire length of the march to Kandahar that the British troops had to substitute *chupatties* for the regular bread ration, and no instance

was brought to notice in which either a soldier or a follower failed to receive his ration. The principle applied in marching, in the formation of camps, as well as in the distribution of supplies and forage, was that each individual in the moving body should, as far as possible, depend upon his own exertions. In the formation of camps, the positions of brigade and regimental head-quarters were, as far as was practicable, the same on each day, and were readily recognised; everything was left to regimental agency, and action in brigade was rarely necessary. A sufficiency of wood for the bakeries attached to British regiments was obtained with the greatest difficulty; the country is almost devoid of trees, and except near villages and when it was possible to take the roofs off the houses, strong fatigue parties had to be told off to dig up the roots of the *southern wood* and shrubs which fortunately abounded. A fair price was invariably paid for the wood, and it was found that the inhabitants were for the most part willing to sell their houses; the native troops were, however, most frequently reduced to collecting the roots of the southern wood, and on it the followers depended for fuel.

“After leaving the Logar Valley, water was, as a rule, only found at more or less extended intervals. This caused much difficulty in selecting the site of each day's encampment, with due regard to the length of the march and the presence of a sufficient supply of water.

“Long stretches of desert had often to be traversed without a drop of water, causing great inconvenience and suffering to man and beast marching under a burning sun. Fortunately, when a stream was found, the water, as far as Kalat-i-Ghilzai, was generally good and fairly plentiful. The climate showed great variations of temperature between day and night, at times as much as 80°. The sun was throughout the day very powerful, and the nights comparatively cold until Kandahar itself was nearly reached. This caused great

inconvenience to the troops, who had to march in the same clothes when the thermometer was nearly at freezing point as when it reached 110°. They also suffered greatly from constant sand-storms, and from the suffocating dust raised by the column on the march. It must also be noticed that the moon was in its first quarter when we left Kabul: the comfort derived from its light after a weary day's march, and in the preparation for an early start, cannot be over-estimated."

To turn to the diary of the march and to such details as need special notice.

August 9th.—Cavalry Brigade from Chaharasia to Saiadabad. 1st Infantry Brigade from Beni Hissar to Saiadabad (14 miles). 2nd Infantry Brigade from Indaki to Saidabad. 3rd Infantry Brigade from Beni Hissar to Saidabad.

August 10th.—Cavalry Brigade continued its march on the left bank of the Logar River, and, passing through the Tangi Wagajan, reached a point in the open country opposite Hisarak. The 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades and divisional head-quarters marched along the right bank to near Zargunshahar (12 miles), whilst the 2nd Brigade, following a road nearer the river, continued past Zargunshahar another 4 miles to Dadu Khel.

August 11th.—Cavalry Brigade to Barak-i-Barak, along the left bank of the Logar, *viâ* Unai Saiadan and Deh Moghalan. 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades to Patkao-Roghani (17 miles). 2nd Infantry Brigade crossed the Logar near Dadu Khel and marched over a pass across the low range abutting on the river from the west to Barak-i-Barak.

August 12th.—Cavalry and 2nd Infantry Brigades across the Logar at Ursak or Warsak, *i.e.* the spur $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Amir Kala, and over the Zamburak Kotal to near Saidabad (16 miles). 1st Infantry Brigade to Warsak, near Amir Kala (11 miles). 3rd Infantry Brigade to Amir Kala.

Opposition was expected at the Zamburak Kotal,

but none was met. The kotal, however, itself presented a serious obstacle to the progress of the baggage animals,¹ and, though the cavalry got most of their animals over the pass that day, the whole of the baggage of the 2nd Brigade had to halt at Warsak, and the brigade had to bivouac without tents or baggage at Saidabad. One hundred men of the 5th Gurkhas held the pass during the night, and next morning recovered the baggage of the Cavalry Brigade which had been left behind. The thermometer showed 92° in the tents, although the height of the camp at Warsak was 6,800 feet above the sea; the night, however, was cold, especially on the summit and at Saidabad.

August 13th.—Cavalry and 2nd Brigades to Jakin, near Haidar Khel. 1st Brigade over the Zamburak Kotal to Haidar Khel (16 miles). 3rd Brigade up the Logar River, through the Tangi Wardak to the junction of the new Shonaz stream, and up it to Haidar Khel.

August 14th.—The whole division concentrated at Shashgao (11 miles).

On this day the whole force started at the same hour, 4 a.m. A block was caused about 3 miles from Jakin by all the troops and baggage having to converge upon one narrow road, and the rear brigades were consequently delayed two hours; after this, however, the road widened, and, the country being open, the troops moved along rapidly on a broad front. The rear guard got in at 6 p.m.

August 15th.—To Ghazni (15 miles—a total of 89 miles in seven days). The Sher Dahan Pass was crossed after being seized by a mixed advance guard. This was the only day until Kandahar was reached that the cavalry did not perform the entire duties of advance guard. At Ghazni Sir Frederick Roberts was met by the Governor, and received from him the keys of the

¹ The Zamburak Pass was crossed in the opposite direction by two brigades of Sir D. Stewart's force, each accompanied by a battery of wheeled artillery, on the 1st and 2nd May.

city gates. The force encamped on the plain to the east of Ghazni, between the city and the suburb of Roza.

A battalion occupied the citadel during the day while supplies were being collected in the town, and guards and sentries were placed in and around Ghazni.

August 16th.—To Ergatta (20 miles).

The 3rd Brigade followed the main road, and was joined by the 2nd Brigade, which had followed a line of its own across country to the west.

The Cavalry Brigade were in advance of all, the whole starting at 4.30 a.m. The baggage followed its respective brigades, and the rear was brought up by the 1st Brigade, immediately preceded by its baggage. The road was a fairly good one, but as the entire force had to move by but one road for two-thirds of the distance, progress was slow. The baggage animals were now beginning to show signs of distress from continuous marching, and the above causes, added to the length of the march and a severe dust-storm, which blew during the afternoon, much delayed progress, so that the rear guard did not reach camp at Ergatta till 9 p.m.

At Nani the force diverged from the road, and the baggage animals were unloaded and allowed to graze for a couple of hours in the surrounding fields. But for this timely and judicious halt and feed, many animals would doubtless have succumbed to the fatigues of this trying march, which was a severe test to the men as well as the animals, both by reason of its length and of the absence of water for the last 7 miles. The camping ground at Ergatta was bad, and the only water-supply was from a narrow but deep watercourse, full of treacherous quicksands, which brought many of the baggage animals to grief, while the water was soon fouled by the passage of the column at several points.

No local supplies were forthcoming; indeed none existed, and many of the animals remained unfed. This evil, however, was mitigated by the halt and feed which had taken place at Nani.

August 17th.—To Chardeh (13 miles).

During this march a cavalry patrol was fired on, and at Chardeh the villagers showed considerable reluctance in complying with requisitions, asserting that they had previously been looted by ghazis. A good supply of forage, however, was forthcoming for the baggage animals. In the evening 300 men were sent out to seize and impress for transport purposes 300 *Powindah* camels from an encampment within sight; some slight resistance was offered at first, but eventually an amicable arrangement was arrived at and the camels were brought into camp, 170 of them being taken on by the force.

On this day a letter was brought in by a messenger from the officer commanding at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, Colonel O. V. Tanner, dated the 12th August, giving news from Kandahar up to the 8th, to the effect that the place was closely invested, but that the garrison had two months' supplies and fifteen days' forage for the animals. Round Kalat-i-Ghilzai the country was quiet, and its garrison was awaiting with confidence the early arrival of the Kabul force.

August 18th.—To Karez-i-Oba (16 miles).

August 19th.—To Mukur (14 miles).

The cavalry covered the front of the advance, the infantry moving by brigades in three parallel lines, with rear guards formed of two companies from each of the four regiments of each brigade.

August 20th.—To Kala-i-Juma (21 miles), in the same formation.

August 21st.—To Kajai (13 miles).

Heliographic communication was here opened direct with Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and news was received of the sortie by the troops of the Kandahar garrison against the village of Deh Khojah on the 16th August, in which Brigadier-General Brooke and eight other British officers fell.

August 22nd.—To Tazi ($17\frac{1}{2}$ miles).

The heat had now noticeably increased, and the

march was consequently begun at 2.30 a.m. At Tazi the thermometer reached 96° in the tents.

August 23rd.—To Kalat-i-Ghilzai (16½ miles, total 225 miles in 15 days).

The march again began at 2.30 a.m., and on arrival at Kalat-i-Ghilzai the force encamped on the open plain between the fort and the River Tarnak. The garrison here was found all well, and the commanding officer had anticipated the arrival of the column by collecting a considerable quantity of stores and forage.

The progress of the Kabul force had been so satisfactory up to this point, that Sir Frederick Roberts, having received reassuring reports from Kandahar, determined to rest his division by halting at Kalat-i-Ghilzai over the 24th August. The news of his arrival there and of his plans were announced to the Government of India in the following message, received at Simla on the 30th August:

“Kalat-i-Ghilzai, August 23rd.—The force under my command arrived here this morning. Authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until the 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp followers.

“The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last eight days. The troops are in good health and spirits. From this I purpose moving by regular stages, so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar.

“I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distance 20 miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the fort over to Muhammad Sadik Khan, a Tokhi chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879. The present Governor, Sardar Sherindil Khan, refuses to

remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent order. Our casualties to date are one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy 23rd Pioneers, one sepoy 2nd Sikhs, and two sepoy 3rd Sikhs, dead; one sepoy 4th Gurkhas, two sepoy 24th Punjab Native Infantry, and a dafadar 3rd Punjab Cavalry, missing; six camp followers dead and five missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from Ghazni on 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 13th August."

This halt at Kalat-i-Ghilzai was much required by both the troops and the animals, and was thoroughly appreciated. All the soldiers and followers were inspected with regard to their fitness for marching further, and the Lieutenant-General visited the hospitals.

As mentioned in the above message, Sir Frederick Roberts, being of opinion that it would be inconvenient to keep open communication with Kalat-i-Ghilzai for some time to come, determined to withdraw its garrison and to take it on with the Kabul-Kandahar force. All the necessary arrangements for this purpose were made during the halt of the 24th August, and the next morning the column was augmented by the garrison, of the following strength :

3rd Sind Horse (100 sowars).
 C-2, R.A. (2 guns).
 66th Foot (2 companies).
 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluchis).
 British and native details.

August 24th.—Halt.

August 25th.—To Jaldak (15 $\frac{3}{4}$ miles). The troops had to march on a single line, the country being confined.

At Jaldak a wing of the 2nd Baluchis, which had preceded the force by a day, had collected 700 maunds of flour and a large stock of bhusa.

August 26th.—To Tirandaz (16 miles), in the same formation.

Here a message was received from Kandahar that the siege had been raised on the 23rd, and that on the morning of the 24th Sardar Ayub Khan had struck his camp and retired to Mazra over the Baba Wali Kotal in the Arghandab Valley, where he was said to be entrenching his camp.

August 27th.—To Pomazai (15 miles).

On this date the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the whole under Brigadier-General H. H. Gough, starting at 1 a.m., made a double march of 34 miles to Robat, and succeeded in establishing heliographic communication with Kandahar. As related in the last chapter, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, the Resident, and Major F. J. S. Adams, Assistant Quartermaster-General, immediately rode out from Kandahar to General Gough's camp, and complete connection was thus successfully restored with the garrison.

The next morning (August 28th) the main body of the Kabul-Kandahar force marched 19 miles to Robat, the sick and weakly men being halted half way at Khel-i-Akhund, under the escort of the Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison.

From information received at Robat from Kandahar, and from what General Roberts heard from other sources, he was led to believe that Ayub Khan intended to make a stand, and was strengthening his position, which was said to extend from Gundigan to Kotal-i-Murcha.

Upon receipt of this news it was decided to make a halt at Robat on the 29th August to rest both men and animals, and to divide the remaining distance to Kandahar (19 miles) into two short marches in order that the force might arrive fresh and fit for action at Kandahar.

Soldiers, followers, and transport animals were much fagged by the long and continuous marching, and somewhat exhausted by the daily increasing heat, and many of the men were suffering considerably from sore feet.

On the whole, however, the health of the force was wonderfully good, and there was no sickness of a serious nature. Unfortunately, however, Sir Frederick Roberts was laid up with fever for several days about this period, and was seriously ill at a time when his mind was necessarily occupied by heavy and anxious work. But with the arrival at Robat the suspense and strain of the forced marches from Kabul were at an end; the much discussed and hazardous venture had arrived within measurable distance of a successful termination, and at the head of a well-trying and hardy army the General could look forward with confidence to the impending struggle with the Afghan forces. Since leaving Kabul the force had covered 280 miles in 20 days, or 19 marches.¹

During the halt of the 29th a letter was received by Sir Frederick Roberts from General Phayre, dated Kala Abdulla, the 24th August. He expected to leave that place on the 30th, and, provided that he encountered no greater difficulties than he had hitherto met with, he hoped to reach Kandahar about the 8th September.

The receipt of this letter from Major-General Phayre precluded the possibility of General Phayre's division arriving at Kandahar in time to co-operate with the Kabul force. This Sir F. Roberts much regretted, as he was well aware of the strenuous exertions that officer had made to relieve the beleaguered garrison, and the privations and hardships which he and his troops had undergone to effect this object. He wrote to General Phayre to continue his advance, but not to knock up his men or transport animals by forced marches.

On the 30th August General Roberts's force marched $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles to Mohmand, and the next morning at 3.30 it started on the remaining 12 miles to Kandahar. The advance guard was composed of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, two guns of C-2, Royal Artillery, and the

¹ For the condition of the transport animals on arrival at Kandahar, see Appendix XXXV.

92nd Highlanders, and preparations were made to meet possible opposition in the neighbourhood of the city before a position could be occupied for the camp. Generals Primrose and Burrows rode out to meet Sir Frederick Roberts, who led his force to the southern face of Kandahar, in front of the Shikarpur Gate. Arriving there at 8.30 a.m. the men breakfasted and the baggage animals were unloaded, watered, and fed, after which, at 10 a.m., the 1st and 3rd Brigades again moved off towards the camping ground. The position which Sir Frederick Roberts determined to take up was to the west of the city, with his right on the cantonments and his left touching Old Kandahar, thus covering the city, besides giving him the advantage of a good and ample supply of water, and placing him within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp. The facilities for water, in fact, rendered the choice of this spot almost a necessity, as no other such existed elsewhere, all other sources of supply having been cut off. On the other hand, it was reported that, on the previous day, the enemy had occupied the Karez Hill, a rocky and steep though not lofty eminence which commands the cantonments and the one water-supply available. But on reaching this place, the advanced brigades found it unoccupied, and, with the exception of a few shots fired at the advance guard from distant orchards, no opposition was offered, and the movement was accomplished without any resistance. Nevertheless the camp was within the range of the enemy's guns on the Baba Wali Kotal, and the best had to be made of the position by keeping the troops as much as possible under the lee of the Karez Hill.

The baggage was now ordered up, with the cavalry and 2nd Brigade of infantry, which were at the time on baggage and rear guards; and by 3 p.m. the troops were tented. The sick (940 in number) with Sir Frederick Roberts's force had been accommodated in the hospitals in the city.

Immediately after the camp had been established,

picquets were sent out to the northern spur of the Kohkaran Hill, the villages of Abbasabad and Chihil Dukhtaran Hill, the Karez and Picquet Hills, all of which were occupied without opposition. But large numbers of Afghans were observed on the Baba Wali Kotal, and entrenching parties were at work on the low range of hills which runs south-east from the main ridge above the village of Ahmad Khan.

From such a cursory examination of the ground as General Roberts was able to make on his arrival in the morning, he was quite satisfied that any attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by a direct attack would be attended with very severe loss. He determined, therefore, to turn it.

To enable the Lieutenant-General to decide how best this operation could be carried out, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise extent of the position occupied by the enemy. He was anxious to obtain this information without delay, and he therefore ordered a small column under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, and accompanied by Colonel Chapman, R.A., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, to start at once and make as complete a reconnaissance as possible. This column was composed of—

3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.
15th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessey.
11-9, R.A. (2 guns).

The reconnaissance started at 1 p.m. from the left of the British position near Old Kandahar, and proceeded towards the high ground immediately above the village of Gundigan and Murghan. Here the infantry and guns halted, while the cavalry advanced some 2 or $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal village, where the enemy was found to be strongly entrenched.

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the cavalry fell back, while, at the same time, the two mountain guns of 11-9 were brought into

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action, partly to test the range and also to check the enemy, who were now observed to be passing rapidly into the gardens near Gundigan. General Gough's reconnaissance was at this time 1,800 yards from the guns the enemy had placed near Pir Paimal.

After a few rounds from the guns, the retirement of the infantry and artillery of the reconnaissance to within the line of picquets was ordered. The instant General Gough's troops began to fall back, the enemy advanced in great strength and pressed the infantry, and they eventually assembled in such large numbers, and endeavoured so persistently to follow, that the whole of the troops of the 3rd Brigade and part of those of the 1st were ordered to fall in.

Just before dark some reinforcements were sent out from the 3rd Brigade towards Kohkaran, to support the retirement, and by nightfall the troops were safely in camp, the object of the reconnaissance having been successfully accomplished.

Meanwhile, from about 4 p.m. till a little before dark, three guns on the Baba Wali Kotal had kept up a desultory fire on the camp. Their practice was good, and they had got the range accurately, so that shot and shell were pitched all round the camp, but without doing any damage. This fire stopped entirely after dark. Occasional sharp outbursts of musketry throughout the night, along the line of picquets to the west, showed that the enemy were present and in considerable numbers, and the picquets were consequently strengthened during the night.

The total casualties on the 31st August were five killed and fifteen wounded. The reconnaissance afforded Sir Frederick Roberts all the information that he required, and he decided to attack the enemy the following morning.

As soon as the General's plans were formed, his orders were issued for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and for one day's cooked rations to be carried by all ranks. Brigades were to be in position by 8 a.m. ; tents

were to be previously struck, and were to be stored with the kits in a walled enclosure. Officers commanding divisions and brigades, with the second senior officers of brigades, were ordered to assemble at 6 a.m.

At the same time, in compliance with instructions from the Lieutenant-General, Major-General Primrose directed E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by two companies of the 7th Fusiliers and four companies of the 28th Bombay Infantry, to join the Cavalry Brigade under General Gough at the village of Gundigan at 9 a.m. on the morning of the 1st September. 5-11, Royal Artillery (four 40-prs.), four companies of the 7th Fusiliers, the 4th and 19th Bombay Infantry, with a party of sappers, under Brigadier-General Burrows, were to take up a position at Kalachi-i-Haidar at 8 a.m., and remain there during the day for the purpose of threatening the Baba Wali Kotal and watching the Kotal-i-Murcha. Brigadier-General Daubeny with four companies of the 66th Foot and two companies each of the 1st and 28th Bombay Infantry were to relieve the Kabul Force in the line of picquets from Picquet Hill by Karez Hill to Chihilzina.

On the morning of the 1st September Sir Frederick Roberts, who on that date assumed supreme command of the troops in Southern Afghanistan, explained personally to the officers commanding divisions and brigades his plan for the day's battle.

This plan was, briefly, to threaten the enemy's left on the Baba Wali Kotal, while the main attack turned his right by the Pir Paimal village. With this object in view the 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was to make the demonstration against the kotal, was formed up in rear of the low hills which covered the front of the British camp, while the 1st and 2nd Brigades, those intended for the main attack, were massed behind Karez Hill.

The Cavalry Brigade of the Kabul Force was drawn up under Brigadier-General Gough in rear of the left,

in readiness to operate by Gundigan towards the bed of the Arghandab River, so as to threaten the rear of Ayub Khan's camp and endanger his line of retreat towards Girishk and Khakrez. E-B, Royal Horse Artillery (four guns), under Major J. A. Tillard, two companies of the 2-7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay Infantry were, as mentioned above, placed at the disposal of General Gough, whose orders were that if, when firing began, the ground in his front should be clear, he should, with his infantry and guns, occupy the position above Gundigan, which had been so useful during the reconnaissance of the previous day, and should then push his cavalry brigade from that point to the bed of the Arghandab, where he would close the line of retreat to the Helmand and touch that which led towards Khakrez.

The disposition of the Bombay Division has been already described; C-2, Royal Artillery, was ordered to join the 1st Brigade of the Kabul Force, to which 6-8, Royal Artillery (screw guns), was already attached.

Brigadier-General Nuttall's cavalry moved out at 7.30 a.m., and was followed at 8 a.m. by General Daubeny's brigade, which occupied the ground allotted to it as follows :

- 2 companies 1st Bombay Infantry were posted on Picquet Hill.
- 2 companies 66th Foot on Karez Hill.
- 1 company 66th Foot between Karez Hill and Picquet Hill.
- 1 company 28th Bombay Infantry between Chihilzina and Karez Hill.
- 1 company 28th Bombay Infantry watching the gardens in left rear of Chihilzina.

Shortly afterwards Brigadier-General Burrows marched out and took up a strong position in the old cavalry and Jacob's Rifles lines, an excellent position being found for 5-11, Royal Artillery, about 100 yards to the right of Picquet Hill.

The dispositions above described were completed soon after 9 o'clock, and fire was opened from Captain Hornsby's 40-prs. upon the Baba Wali Pass at about 9.20 or 9.30 a.m., engaging the guns on the kotal. The

latter replied with much spirit until about noon, when they were apparently turned against the troops who were attacking the Afghan right by Pir Paimal.

Meanwhile it had been clear from a very early hour in the morning that an offensive movement was contemplated by the enemy, who evidently regarded the withdrawal of General Gough's reconnoissance on the previous evening as a further success to themselves. The villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdad were held in strength, and a desultory fire was brought to bear on the British front from the orchards connecting these two villages, while an ill-directed fire was also opened from the Baba Wali Kotal, which was held in force during the greater part of the day's operations. This point in the enemy's line was crowded with ghazis, while some of Ayub's regular cavalry held the comparatively lower hills and slopes in front of the position occupied by the 40-prs. of 5-11. Instead of waiting for the British advance the Afghans were making every preparation for a counter-attack, and the movement of large numbers of their troops was covered by the fire of their skirmishers from the line of the Gundi Mulla and Gundigan villages.

Under these circumstances the advance of the British cavalry was necessarily delayed until the main infantry attack could be developed, the signal for which was the opening fire of Major Hornsby's 40-prs. at about 9.30 a.m.

The instructions given by Major-General Ross, commanding the Infantry Division, were that Brigadier-General Macpherson with the 1st Brigade should make his first attack on the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, after which he was to clear the enemy from the enclosures which lay between that village and the low spur of the hill short of Pir Paimal. General Ross further ordered Brigadier-General Baker to advance in a westerly direction, keeping touch with the 1st Brigade on his right, and clearing the gardens and orchards in

his immediate front; and Brigadier-General MacGregor was ordered to support in advance of the village of Abbasabad.

The batteries C-2 and 6-8 were held in readiness behind the Karez Hill to cover the infantry advance, and at about 9.30 a.m. two guns of C-2 moved to the right of that hill and opened fire against the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad; there they were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the battery, which kept up a fire on the village until masked by the advance of the 1st Brigade. The battery then limbered up and followed the 1st Brigade during the remainder of the day; they came into action again on the left of the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, but the enemy dispersed before they could open fire.

The shell fire of the batteries was very effective, but the enemy found cover in underground chambers in the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad. The infantry attack upon this village was made by Colonel Battye's 2nd Gurkhas and Colonel Parker's 92nd Highlanders respectively. The remaining two regiments of Macpherson's brigade—*viz.* the 23rd Pioneers under Colonel Collett and the 24th Punjabis under Colonel Norman were in support. The village was carried in a most dashing style, Gurkhas and Highlanders vieing with each other in the rapidity of their advance. The enemy withdrew sullenly and slowly, a good number of the ghazis remaining to the last in the village to receive a bayonet charge of the 92nd.

Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade under General Baker had been threading its way through the lanes and walled enclosures which lay in their line of attack, and became engaged whilst clearing the orchards. The resistance encountered was most stubborn, the enemy being well protected by the high mud walls, which they had carefully loopholed. The loss suffered in clearing these enclosures was necessarily severe, and here Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow was killed while gallantly leading his regiment, the 72nd Highlanders.


Captain St. J. T. Frome and Lance-Sergeant Cameron, of the same regiment, also fell here.

Of the regiments of this (the 2nd) Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs had the chief share of the fighting. They were the two leading battalions, and frequently had to fix bayonets to carry positions or to check the determined rushes of the enemy. General Baker spoke in high terms of the gallant behaviour of these two regiments, and noticed especially the manner in which a charge of the enemy was repulsed by the 2nd Sikhs under the able and immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell.

Finding that their position in the villages of Gundi Mulla and Gundigan was no longer tenable, the enemy now fell back, withdrawing their right towards Pir Paimal. The forward movement of Macpherson's and Baker's troops was continued, after the capture of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad and its surrounding gardens, almost without a pause, and after severe fighting these brigades forced the enemy back from Pir Paimal and rounded the spur of the hill near that position.

As soon as Sir Frederick Roberts heard from Major-General Ross of the success of the troops under his command, he determined to support their further advance by the 3rd Brigade, which had hitherto been drawn up in front of the village of Abbasabad. The capture of Pir Paimal had brought the British in rear of the Baba Wali Kotal, and feeling that nothing had now to be feared from the enemy's left, the Lieutenant-General pushed on to complete the discomfiture of their main position.

"At this stage," writes Colonel Chapman, "Ayub Khan must have realised that the day was lost to him, and as soon as the advancing British troops were in rear of his position on the Baba Wali Pass, his regular troops at once made off through the thick gardens and orchards of the Arghandab Valley, the Herat regiments towards Zamindawar, and the Kabuli regiments by the Arg-



Panorama of Battle of Kandahar
1st September 1880
Showing position of troops at 12 noon.

W & A. Tait & Co. Limited, Edinburgh & London.

London, John Murray.

handab Valley; but it was almost impossible to ascertain exactly the manner in which they dispersed. The Sardar Ayub Khan must, about this time, likewise have secured his own safety by flight."

Meanwhile Major-General Ross, seeing the advantage already gained, and knowing that he could rely upon the courage and eagerness of his troops, had very wisely determined to press forward without waiting for reinforcements.

The position to which the enemy retired after the capture of Pir Paimal lay to the south-west of the Baba Wali Kotal, commanding an open piece of ground and covering the camp at Mazra. This position was strongly entrenched, and the enemy seemed likely to make a determined stand; reinforcements were being rapidly pushed up from their reserves, while the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal were turned round, so as to increase the fire of artillery which was brought to bear upon Roberts's force.

It was evident that this position must be stormed without delay by the victorious brigades. Recognising this, the 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Gurkhas, and part of the 23rd Pioneers rushed forward, and with resistless gallantry, in which Major G. S. White, of the 92nd, and Sepoy Inderbir Lama, of the Gurkhas, were conspicuously foremost, drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet.

At the same time the last stand of the Afghans round three guns on the extreme left was broken down by a gallant charge of a half battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money.

The enemy were now completely routed, but, owing to the nature of the ground, it was impossible for Major-General Ross, who was commanding in the front line, to realise the extent of the victory he had won. Expecting, therefore, that the enemy would take up a fresh position further on and continue their resistance, he ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigades to halt and replenish their ammunition.

When this had been done and the troops had advanced about a mile, Major-General Ross found himself in sight of the whole of Ayub Khan's camp, standing deserted and apparently as it had been left in the morning when the Afghans moved out to the attack, and by 1 o'clock was in possession of both camp and ordnance.

With this camp Ayub Khan lost all his artillery, numbering thirty pieces, excluding the two recaptured guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, which had been taken at Maiwand.¹

The enemy had meanwhile made good their retreat, and further pursuit with infantry being hopeless, the two brigades were halted on the far side of the village of Mazra, where they were shortly afterwards joined by the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General MacGregor.

While the infantry attack had been developing successfully as above described, Brigadier-General Gough's cavalry had not been equally fortunate in reaching the enemy.

Major Tillard with the four guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, reported himself to General Gough at 9 a.m., and was immediately ordered to come into action on the Kohkaran road and to clear the low hills near the village of Gundigan. The fire of the guns was met by heavy musketry fire (which was, however, soon silenced) and also by artillery fire from two guns at the foot of the south-west spur of the Pir Paimal, which made good practice, and which the guns of E-B were unable to silence.

When, however, the enemy fell back from Gundigan, E-B with its escort of 7th Fusiliers and 28th Bombay Infantry advanced to the hills above that village and remained in that position for the remainder of the day.

At the same time Gough's cavalry advanced rapidly, scouting as far as Kohkaran, and then proceeded to execute the extended turning movement entrusted to

¹ 6 iron B.L.R. 9-pr. guns; 16 bronze M.L. S.B. 6-pr. guns; 2 12-pr. howitzers; 2 4.5 mountain guns; 4 3-pr. mountain guns.

MURDER OF HECTOR MACLAINE 579

the brigade. The nature of the ground, however, necessarily precluded very direct or rapid progress, while the enemy's retreat, as soon as the Pir Paimal position was turned, was precipitate. Thus, although the brigade crossed the Arghandab and pushed beyond the line of the enemy's retreat towards Khakrez, none of the regular troops were encountered, but some 350 of the fugitive tribesmen were killed.

In the meantime, at about 2 o'clock, on reaching Pir Paimal village, General Roberts had sent an order for the cavalry of the Bombay force to move over the Baba Wali Kotal and follow the retiring enemy by the direct road leading through the Arghandab Valley; in compliance with which General Nuttall, with the 3rd Sind Horse and the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, pushed forward and came up with several parties of the enemy making for the hills and along the valley. These he charged and dispersed, following them as far as Mansurabad, a distance of some 15 miles, until the approach of night compelled him to abandon the pursuit, and he returned to camp at about 10 p.m., having killed about 100 of the enemy.

The total casualties in the Kabul-Kandahar force on the 1st September were 35 killed and 213 wounded. Among the former was Captain Stratton, 22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, who was shot by a ghazi, shortly before the final advance, when proceeding to the Baba Wali Kotal to signal the success of the infantry attack to Sir Frederick Roberts.

One other subject of regret clouded the rejoicing at the brilliant victory gained. Amongst the first objects encountered in the abandoned Afghan camp was the body of Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, R.H.A., which was discovered lying outside the tent that he had occupied, and close to Ayub Khan's quarters. It was evident that he had been quite recently murdered, and it was believed that this wanton outrage was the work either of a ghazi, or of the guards who had been posted over the unfortunate officer by Ayub Khan.

580 NUMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES

It was difficult to estimate the loss sustained by the enemy, but it must have been considerable. Six hundred bodies were afterwards buried between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone, so it is probable that the total of killed amounted to quite double that number.

The numbers of the enemy opposed to the force on the 1st September were calculated at—

Regular Infantry	4,000
„ Cavalry	800
Tribesmen	5,000 ¹
Irregular Cavalry	3,000
TOTAL	<u>12,800</u>

Only about one-third of the tribesmen were supplied with firearms.

The total numbers of the Kabul-Kandahar force engaged were 8,392 of all ranks and eighteen guns (see Appendix XXIX); while the number of the Kandahar garrison under arms was 4,110.

After the battle of Kandahar, the 1st Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson, remained at Mazra during the night of the 1st September to protect the guns and stores which had been captured.

The 2nd and 3rd Brigades, as well as the cavalry, returned to camp near the old cantonment of Kandahar. General Gough's Cavalry Brigade reached camp, *viâ* the Batawali Kotal, between 8 and 9 p.m., after inflicting a loss of some 300 men upon the fugitive enemy.

On the following morning all traces of Ayub's army had disappeared.

News subsequently received proved that the Sardar retreated to Herat, accompanied by a small number of Herati infantry and a few Khawanin sowars.

The remainder of his force scattered over the country and mingled with the agricultural population.

¹ Mirza Muhammad Akhbar, Pay-Clerk to the Kandahari regiments with Ayub Khan, told Captain Gaselee, D.A.Q.M.G., that there were perhaps 30,000 guerrillas present on the 1st September. See Appendix XXVIII.

ILL-HEALTH OF GENERAL ROBERTS 581

On the 3rd September all the wounded were moved into quarters in Kandahar, except a few, who to avoid overcrowding were accommodated in tents. The 92nd Highlanders also moved into quarters in the old cantonments, Macpherson's brigade having been relieved at Mazra by Bombay troops. On the morning of the same date the 23rd Pioneers and 15th Sikhs, with two guns, were sent off up to the Arghandab River to restore the water communication, which had been cut off by Ayub's troops, and by the evening the water was again flowing into the canal which fed the city.

The Cavalry Brigade, with a large number of sick and transport animals, moved 6 miles west to Kohkaran, where forage was more plentiful than at Kandahar, and were joined there on the 4th by E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. Major Euan Smith, Assistant Political Officer, was despatched eastwards with the 3rd Bombay Cavalry and the 19th Bombay Infantry, to reopen communications with General Phayre and Chaman, and to restore the line of telegraph. The latter work was completed as far as Abdur Rahman, 25 miles from Kandahar, by the 5th September, on the evening of which day General Phayre arrived at Abdur Rahman. That officer pushed on to Kandahar on the 6th, leaving the advanced portion of his force at Karez-i-Zarak, near Khushab.

Meanwhile the health of Sir Frederick Roberts caused much anxiety. The constant strain of responsibility, added to continued attacks of fever, had weakened his system, and it was very desirable that he should as soon as possible leave Kandahar. It was also necessary that he should be in direct telegraphic communication with Army Head-quarters in order to obtain the orders of Government regarding the future movements of the troops in Southern Afghanistan.

It had already been decided to move the 3rd (MacGregor's) Brigade, to which the 23rd Pioneers were now attached, towards Peshin, in order to ease the pressure regarding supplies at and about Kandahar.

582 SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION

Sir Frederick Roberts now determined to accompany this brigade, and accordingly marched from Kandahar on the 8th September.

On the same date Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts assumed supreme command in Southern Afghanistan, and divided the force there as follows :

- 1st Division, under the command of Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I.
- 2nd Division, under the command of Major-General R. Phayre, C.S.I.
- 3rd (Kabul-Kandahar) Division, under the command of Major-General J. Ross, C.B.

The Kabul-Kandahar Force had now successfully accomplished the important service for which its return to India had been delayed. The southern theatre of war had been pacified by its labours ; and as a force under Major-General Phayre had by this time reached the neighbourhood of Kandahar, amply adequate to guard against a recurrence of the disasters of July, steps were at once taken to relieve the Kabul troops, who by long-continued hard service had well deserved rest and a speedy return to their homes.

CHAPTER XVIII

MEASURES FOR THE RELIEF OF KANDAHAR FROM QUETTA, AND THE MARCH OF GENERAL PHAYRE'S FORCE.

ON the morning of the 28th July, 1880, the news of the disaster to Brigadier-General Burrows and his brigade at Maiwand reached Brigadier-General Phayre at Quetta, and before telegraphic communication with Kandahar was interrupted General Phayre was also informed that the outposts on the line of communication from Abdur Rahman southwards had been ordered to fall back on Kandahar.

The attention of the Brigadier-General and of Major Sandeman, the Governor-General's Agent, was at once directed to the question how to reinforce the garrison of Kandahar. Their views were conveyed to the Government of India in the following telegram, dated the 28th July:

“Our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolan Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is, What is to be done, under present circumstances, with the railway line under construction? We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiali to Quetta should be concentrated in Peshin with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali should, if possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once.”

To this communication the Foreign Office replied:

“Your ‘clear the line’ telegram this day. Viceroy

entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and desires that the forces employed for protection of railway must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will reoccupy railway line when possible; but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces towards Kandahar. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements."

At the same time Brigadier-General Phayre wired to the Quartermaster-General in India his report on the military situation as follows:

"Telegraph beyond Chaman stopped.

"Please urge extension of railway to mouth of Bolan as quickly as possible; we shall require it for supplies, as well as troops; our transport is not sufficient under present circumstances.

"I have seven native regiments on lines of communication—one for Sibi and Bolan, one for Quetta, one for line of posts to Chaman. This leaves four regiments for field column. In addition, I have 2-11th Foot and F-2, Royal Artillery, coming up from Sind. If, in addition to these, you send me one European infantry regiment, and a field battery in succession to F-2, I think I shall have enough infantry and artillery to advance with. As regards cavalry, I ought to have at least nine squadrons, which, I think, I can make up from that on the line of communication, including Madras cavalry. It would take at least fifteen days to form and equip this force here and in Peshin, and within that time I hope to have sufficient transport. But certain movements of the enemy reported to be now taking place against Chaman may oblige me to push troops to the Khojak. I have Major Westmacott there giving me information; and Agent, Governor-General, has also sent out men. I commence withdrawal of troops from railway line by retiring the Thal-Chotiali force on Harnai, whence it will march

to Peshin, making over stations to maliks and collecting the troops now posted along that line. Simultaneously with the advance from Harnai the Political Officer and Officer Commanding at Sibi will return (to?) each post and settle with the maliks about stores, material, etc., left behind between Spin Tangi and Nari mouth."

In consequence of the news from Kandahar the following troops were ordered to join the force in South-west Afghanistan: H-1, Royal Artillery; 8th Bengal Cavalry, 2-22nd Foot and 63rd Foot; 3rd, 4th, 14th and 38th Bengal Infantry.

As mentioned above, all detached posts between Kandahar and Chaman were withdrawn by order of Major-General Primrose. Major W. Jacob, of the 19th Bombay Infantry, commanding the detachments, who was at Mel Karez when the order for concentration at Chaman arrived, waited there for the party from Abdur Rahman, and marched on the morning of the 29th to Dabrai. During the previous night a large body of Achakzais and Nurzais had collected round Mel Karez, and they followed the march of the detachment, constantly firing at it from a distance, without doing any damage. After halting a few hours at Dabrai the march was continued to Gatai, and on the 30th July Chaman was reached in safety and without casualties, though the camp was fired into on the night of the 29th and the rear of the column was threatened by the tribesmen at starting. The march was a trying one, for, besides the constant danger of an attack, the want of water, especially during the last stage of 17 miles from Gatai to Chaman, was keenly felt.

Both General Phayre and the Commander-in-Chief expressed their appreciation of the soldier-like manner in which Major Jacob had executed the difficult duty entrusted to him.

The preparation of a force to relieve Kandahar was now pushed forward with all possible despatch, but many circumstances combined to hinder and retard the work. "It happened," wrote Brigadier-General Phayre,

“that the difficulties in the way of prompt movement of troops on the line of communication in question were at that time exceptionally great owing to the whole tract of country from Sibi to Kandahar (about 241 miles) being destitute of grain and forage, from a drought of nearly two years’ duration; in addition to which the hot season was at its height, and at several places between Quetta and Kandahar the water supply was scanty and brackish.

“These and other causes had obliged us, some time previously, to remove the bulk of our transport cattle from the line to a distant grazing-ground, to withdraw all superfluous commissariat and transport establishments, and place the carts and material generally under repair at central workshops until the opening of the season: consequently, when the necessity for resuming active operations suddenly occurred, our transport had to be reorganised and augmented, our line of communication stocked, weak points placed in a defensible state, and a sufficient force concentrated before any forward movement could be made.

“The troops nearest at hand to meet this sudden emergency were the 9th and 24th Regiments of Bombay Native Infantry, then *en route* up the Bolan Pass, and the force noted in the margin employed in protecting the Nari Valley railway line. The latter together with the services of Lieutenant-Colonel J. G.

Colonel F. Roome, Commanding.

2 mountain guns	} Thal- Chotiali. Force.
3 troops of cavalry	
1 regiment native infantry	
3 companies Bombay Sappers.	
1 squadron cavalry.	
16th Bombay Native Infantry.	
27th Bombay Native Infantry.	

Lindsay, R.E., and his staff of Royal Engineer officers were at once placed at my disposal, and I was thus enabled to act promptly to the front between Quetta and Chaman by occupying the Ghazarband and Khojak Passes, strengthening and fortifying intermediate posts, and by holding in check the Kakar and other Pathan tribes, who, on hearing of the Maiwand defeat, lost no time in collecting their fighting men to attack convoys

and prevent supplies of grain and forage from being brought to the line of communication.

“Their designs, however, were happily frustrated by the rapid concentration of the troops named on Peshin; for, although the Khojak Pass had been occupied by a strong body of Achakzais, and the telegraph line between Chaman and Kala Abdulla entirely destroyed by them, they were driven out by the combined operations of the detachments as per margin, with a loss of fifty killed, after two days’ skirmishing, since which time they have never attempted to reoccupy the pass. Nor did they succeed in injuring any outpost in the northern portion of the assigned districts, though Kach was attacked by about 2,000 tribesmen; and the reported gathering of other large bodies in Shorawak and on Toba for combined attack on Khushdil Khan, Dinar Karez, Segi, Gulistan, and Kala Abdulla rendered it necessary to hold them in check by constant movements of troops. The fact is that, having been beaten by detachments of native infantry in the open field at Khojak, Dinar Karez, and Kach, the tribesmen were little inclined to face strong, well-garrisoned entrenchments.”

The Khojak was occupied on the 30th July, but the Achakzais rapidly reassembled in the neighbourhood in increased numbers, and threatened the Kandahar road from sangars on either side of the pass. The safety of the post on the Khojak, however, was secured by the arrival of reinforcements under Colonel H. H. James,

From Chaman Garrison.

Lieutenant-Colonel Iredell,
16th Bombay Native Infantry,
Commanding.

Major R. Westmacott, Road
Commandant.

Major R. Wace, R.A., com-
manding 2 guns No. 2 Mountain
Battery.

16th Bombay Native Infantry
(detachment).

19th Bombay Native Infantry
(detachment).

Poona Horse (detachment).

From the Khojak Position.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. H.
Sibthorpe, 9th Bombay Native
Infantry, commanding.

Lieutenant A. Keene, R.A.,
commanding 2 guns No. 2
Mountain Battery.

Detachments of Sappers and
Miners.

9th Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. G.
Lindsay, R.E.

Lieutenant W. B. Whiteford,
Adjutant.

10th Bombay Infantry, who assumed command of the troops between Chaman and Segi.

A convoy retiring towards Sibi through the Harnai Pass was attacked on the 8th August and one British officer wounded, besides ten sepoy killed and wounded. All the baggage and treasure which were being escorted was lost.

In consequence of this incident General Phayre found himself compelled to utilise for the defence of the Sibi road troops which were urgently required at the front, and the 8th Bengal Cavalry and 23rd Bombay Infantry (to be afterwards relieved by the 4th) had to supply several detachments for the protection of the road.

As soon as they were relieved by the 4th Bombay Infantry, the 23rd was ordered to Quetta, where it was to remain in garrison with one squadron of the 1st Madras Cavalry. At the same time, in consequence also of the state of the country, General Phayre was obliged to occupy several fortified posts between Quetta and Chaman.

For this line of communications, two strong native infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment were required (instead of one native infantry regiment as had before been estimated).

The following troops were detailed to garrison these posts :

24th Bombay Infantry.
3rd Bengal Infantry.
1st Madras Cavalry.

The troops detailed for the reserve were—

H-1, R.A.
A-4, R.A.
8th Bengal Cavalry (3 troops).
2 Bombay Infantry Regiments.

This unexpected demand on his resources compelled General Phayre to ask for extra troops, and the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry and 38th Bengal Infantry were

accordingly ordered, on the 15th August, to proceed at once to Sibi. The 17th Bengal Infantry was afterwards nominated in place of the 38th, which was declared unfit for service.

Meanwhile the concentration of the Kandahar relieving force at Quetta and in Peshin was progressing, and Brigadier-General Phayre, who had now been given the temporary rank of Major-General, stated on the 1st August that he expected by the 24th to have collected 6,406 men and 18 guns for that service exclusively.

As far as Chaman there was no difficulty to be apprehended regarding transport, but on the road from Chaman to Kandahar embarrassment was to be expected. In order, therefore, to reduce this difficulty, General Phayre intended to march as light as possible with the above force, leaving behind all superfluous grass-cutters and camp followers of other classes to follow with the reserve.

The Executive Commissariat Officer calculated that ten days' rations for the above force, including German horse-biscuits, could be carried on 800 camels. All heavy kits and most of the tents were to be left at the Khojak in charge of a small party, and would be brought on to Kandahar as soon as desirable. General Phayre calculated that the whole of his force would be concentrated at Chaman by the 29th August, when he would endeavour to reach Kandahar in four marches, arriving there about the 2nd September.

The reserve force, with fifteen days' supplies for the whole of the troops at Kandahar, including those who were marching from Kabul with Sir Frederick Roberts, would be ready to march from Chaman on the 2nd September.

Such was the position when, on the 16th August, an attack was made on the fortified post at Kach, garrisoned by the head-quarters and 300 men of the 16th Bombay Infantry and 350 sick of the Sappers and other corps, who had just reached Kach from Thal-Chotiali, Sharigh, Chapar, etc., the whole being commanded by Colonel

T. W. W. Pierce, 16th Bombay Infantry. In consequence of the disturbed state of the country special precautions had been taken for the safety of the place by Colonel Pierce. A sangar, built on the summit of a hill south of camp, was held by a party consisting of one havildar and twelve rank-and-file; all the picquets had been strengthened, and a company of fifty rifles, under a native officer, was ordered to patrol along the banks of the river in the direction of Amadun, east of the camp. A company of similar strength was also placed in reserve at the quarter guard, ready for any emergency.

At 4 a.m. on the 16th shots were heard in the direction of Brahiman, outside the cattle lines, and immediately afterwards the picquet, which had been posted over the cattle lines, was driven in by a rush of 500 or 600 ghazis. The company in reserve at the quarter guard at once proceeded in that direction and checked the advance of the ghazis with a steady fire, but the attack was so determined that several of the enemy were shot close to the walls of the fort.

Meanwhile the company which had patrolled towards Amadun had taken up their position on the left, and repulsed the attack of a large body of the enemy on that side, and at the same time the rear of the position was held by the remainder of the men in camp. It was reported that a number of the enemy were advancing from Chapar along the crest of the hill south of the post, and the party in the sangar on that side was therefore reinforced to thirty rifles under a native officer. But no further attack was made, although the tribesmen hung about the hillsides beyond the cattle lines and continued to fire into the camp until daybreak, when they were finally driven off by a company under Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Davis, and by 7.15 a.m. the firing had ceased.

The British casualties were two sepoy and twenty-five followers killed, the latter having, in their blind panic at the beginning of the attack, run out towards

the enemy. One officer, eight men, and six followers were wounded.

The enemy left forty-eight bodies on the ground and were supposed to have lost altogether 200 in killed and wounded. Their total force must have exceeded 2,000 men.

The successful repulse of this determined attack had a most beneficial effect, both on the neighbouring tribes and on the Maris, and, as stated by General Phayre, saved Quetta and the upper part of the Bolan from molestation.

Nevertheless the difficulties arising from the hostility of the tribesmen were not yet removed. Large numbers of Achakzais and Kakars, instead of returning home after their defeat, collected in force on the heights above Kach and fired on parties attempting to leave the post. Nevertheless it was necessary that traffic along the road should continue, for the sick and wounded had to be carried into Quetta, and the supplies of forage and grain for the cattle at Kach had run very low and had to be replenished.

Under these circumstances General Phayre was obliged to order two mountain guns, three troops of cavalry, and a regiment of native infantry from his advanced force in Peshin to Kach, *via* the Gharkhai defile.

General Phayre ordered this flying column to do its work as quickly as possible, in order that, if possible, his advance on Kandahar should not be delayed beyond the date arranged. These instructions were complied with, and on the 21st August the convoy of sick, etc., arrived safely at Quetta with the report that the tribal gathering had dispersed.

The arrangements for the advance on Kandahar were now approaching completion, notwithstanding the enormous difficulties which had to be contended with. Foremost amongst these was the want of transport, which was only met by the strenuous efforts of Sir Michael Kennedy (Director-General of Transport) and

592 PREPARATIONS FOR THE MARCH

Sir Robert Sandeman, supplemented by a gift of between 200 and 300 horses and ponies from the Khan of Kalat.

Owing to the intense and often deadly heat which prevails throughout the valley of the Indus and the lower slopes of the Bolan and Nari valley hills from June to September, it was decided, in order to preserve the health and efficiency of the European troops, to move them in detachments of only 100 men in carts from the railway terminus at Sibi to the Upper Bolan. The detachments followed one another every twenty-four hours. Staging camps of large tents were pitched, and each detachment, with its light camp equipage, baggage, rations, etc., was carried in bullock-carts to Mach, a distance of 55 miles, in three days. From Mach they proceeded in the ordinary manner. By this plan the danger of exposing European troops to a temperature of 120° to 130° (Fahrenheit) in small tents for several successive days was avoided.

It was also a matter of great importance that the road between Chaman and Kandahar should be made practicable for carts without delay as soon as the march should begin. Provision for this work also was made by Sir Robert Sandeman, who placed at Major-General Phayre's disposal for the purpose the services of Major T. F. Dowden, R.E., Superintending Engineer in Baluchistan, and of Major E. D'O. Twemlow, R.E., Public Works Department. General Phayre was thus enabled to utilise the large number of carts which brought supplies to Kala Abdulla, and to make arrangements for successive convoys of wheeled transport.

On the 21st August Major-General Phayre left Quetta for the front, and after remaining four days at Kala Abdulla, he arrived at Chaman on the 26th.¹

News was there received of a partial rising at Kalat of the Khan's troops on the night of the 25th, and although the mutineers did little damage before march-

¹ For the details of Major-General Phayre's division and its distribution on the 24th August, see Appendices XXXI. and XXXII.

ing off to join Ayub Khan's army at Kandahar, yet it was thought best by General Phayre and Sir Robert Sandeman to divert 400 of the 78th Highlanders (then on the march from Sibi) to Kalat, in order to restore confidence in the country. The Major-General also considered it highly probable that the mutineers (about 1,000 strong) would excite the Barechis of Shorawak to attack Gulistan and that part of his line of communication. He therefore ordered a company of the 2-15th Foot to garrison Gulistan Fort, and another company to be stationed at Kala Abdulla Fort, both of which places had been threatened by tribal attack for some time past.

On the 25th August two columns were sent out from Chaman to a distance of 30 miles, the first to prepare the water-supply at Gatai and to forage to Margha-Chaman; the second to forage west of the road towards Shah Pasand. These columns were composed as follows:

Margha-Chaman Column.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Bell, 27th Bombay Infantry, Commanding.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Lindsay, 3 Companies of Sappers and Miners and Engineer Staff.
 Major R. Westmacott, Road Commandant.
 No. 2 Mountain Battery, 2 guns—Major R. Wace.
 2nd Sind Horse—Major Carpendale.
 27th Bombay Infantry.

Shad Pasand Column.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Iredell, 16th Bombay Infantry, Commanding.
 Major E. D'O. Twemlow, R.E.
 Captain W. Loch, Assistant Political Agent.
 No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment).
 16th Bombay Infantry (detachment).

With the help of these columns Major-General Phayre hoped to be able to draw supplies from the Nurzai Durani villages in the Kadanai Valley and so to stock the fortified posts, which would be restored and again garrisoned as soon as native infantry were available for the purpose. The want of grain and forage throughout Peshin was most serious, owing to

THE ADVANCE BEGINS

the continued drought and the consequent failure of the springs.

At length the date (30th August) arrived which had been fixed for the forward move of Major-General Phayre's advanced force across the Khojak. The column was composed of the following troops (including the forage party previously sent out):

<i>Cavalry Brigade.</i>	}	15th Hussars, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Luck, c.b.
Brigadier-General		2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (2 squadrons), Major W. H. J. Stopford.
H. C. Wilkinson.		Poona Horse (1 squadron), Major C. M. Erskine.
	}	2nd Sind Horse, Major M. M. Carpendale.
		2nd Madras Light Cavalry (1 squadron), Captain W. B. Warner.
<i>Artillery.</i>	}	D-B, R.H.A., Major F. W. Ward.
		F-2, R.A., Major J. R. J. Dewar.
		14-9, R.A., Major G. A. Crawford.
		2 25-pr. guns, 2 9-pr. guns, Captain E. Buckle. No. 2 Mountain Battery, Major R. Wace.
<i>1st Infantry Brigade.</i>	}	2-11th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Corrie.
Brigadier-General		8th Bombay Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Fellows.
H. H. James.		10th " " Major C. E. Blowers. 16th " " (detachment), Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Iredell.
<i>2nd Infantry Brigade.</i>	}	2-15th Foot (head-quarters and wing), Major R. L. Dashwood.
Brigadier-General		63rd Foot (detachment), Captain H. R. Cook.
T. S. Brown.		5th Bombay Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. C. Hunt. 27th " " " " T. Bell.
<i>Engineer Force.</i>	}	No. 3 Company Sappers, Lieutenant G. H. W. O'Sullivan.
		No. 4 " " " J. Neville.
		No. 5 " " " E. C. Spilsbury.

The advance thus began in accordance with the pre-arranged plan, but how great had been the obstacles to General Phayre's preparations and what difficulties he had still to contend against are suggested in the following paragraph, written on the 28th:

"By this time he (Sir F. Roberts) has, I hope, learnt my position and the famine-stricken state of the country through which I have to march. His (Sir F. Roberts's) march has been most successful in every way; he has supplies to the 8th September. My advanced troops at Aktar Khan and Gatai are doing their

best to collect forage and grain. They had to blow down the towers of Abu Saiad, for he was preventing that group of villages from helping us ; this punishment should cause grain and forage to flow into Dabrai and Gatai. I have ordered a field column to Shah Pasand and Dori River route, so as to secure as plentiful a supply of wood, water, and forage as possible. My advanced force forms at Gatai on 30th ; we shall then push on as fast as weakly state of transport animals will admit."

Nor was the Major-General free from serious anxiety regarding the safety of his communications. On the 28th Sir Robert Sandeman wired to him :

"To-day I have received fresh news, confirming information already received, that there is a considerable collection of Achakzais and bad characters on Toba, acting together under the orders of Sultan Khan. Their plan is to take the field directly your troops have advanced from Chaman towards Kandahar. They intend to attack our lines of communication between Khojak and Quetta, and the villages in Peshin which have aided us with supplies. It is also reported that the Shorawak people have similar intentions, and that 150 of the Khan's mutinous sepoys have gone there. I earnestly bring the matter to your notice, and trust you will secure the safety of Peshin by placing a movable column at my disposal to protect the country before you march for Kandahar. It will be a very serious matter if any of the Brahui convoys are attacked when conveying food to Kala Abdulla."

With reference to this news Major-General Phayre wired on the 30th August to Head-quarters :

"Before receipt of Sir Robert Sandeman's telegram, I had issued orders for column for Peshin under General Walker, who is also appointed to command posts between Segi and Chaman (Gulistan and Kala Abdulla being strongly held by detachments of mountain guns, European detachment, and native infantry with cavalry). But I submit, for his Excellency's consideration, that the intelligence received from General Roberts yester-

day, and that given by Primrose to-day, that Ayub Khan had withdrawn his force to the Arghandab, 4 or 5 miles north-west of Kandahar, and that the whole country from this to Kandahar and around that city for a radius of 15 or 20 miles has been denuded of all supplies, renders it matter for immediate and serious consideration whether, under the circumstances, I should advance more of my troops from Chaman towards Kandahar than will be sufficient to re-establish and stock with provisions the posts *en route*, re-establish the telegraph, and clear Takht-i-Pul Kotal¹ of the tribal gatherings which still appear to be hovering about it. One brigade of infantry, with some native cavalry, mountain guns, and the field batteries, will, I think, be sufficient for this, setting free the 15th Hussars and wing of 2-15th Foot for Shorawak, agreeably to Sir Robert Sandeman's earnest request that a force should be sent there to allay existing excitement, not only in Shorawak itself, but also in the Khan of Kalat's adjacent territory. I am informed by Captain H. Wylie, Chief Political Officer, with my force, that plentiful supplies of grain and forage can be had for these troops in Shorawak, and should his Excellency approve the measure, our scanty resources on the line of communication will be at once relieved and a political object of the highest importance gained. Moreover, the Hussars will be in a good climate, ready to advance or return to India at the proper time, as the course of events may appear to dictate. I have most of ten days' supplies for force already at Gatai; the rest will follow to-night. To-morrow I shall occupy Dabrai, after that clear Takht-i-Pul Kotal and re-establish Abdul Rahman post, and thence open communication by the shortest line with Kandahar. In this way I can stock the road with supplies, economise men and food, and do the utmost possible to assist the large force at Kandahar. The German horse-biscuit, on which I mainly depended for use from this to Kandahar, I have just

¹ Ghlo Kotal.

learned, was left at Sibi for some days, in spite of special instructions personally given to have it forwarded by *dák* on arrival.

“From Kandahar it is reported that Colonel Shewell can supply both forces, General Phayre’s and General Roberts’s, for a month or six weeks, but forage would have to be sent up the line, and also the reserve depots which are at Quetta. With reference to this my reports from Gatai outposts are that very little forage or grain is procurable there ; the whole route has already been foraged by Ayub’s troops. Regarding supplying General Roberts’s force for a month, the opinion of the Deputy Commissary-General may alter when he sees the list of daily consumption of forage. Perhaps he includes Quetta reserve, which I am trying to take up.”

On the 1st September the advanced force reached Gatai, but unfortunately the water, which ought before the arrival of the troops to have been brought to that place from a *karez* 17 miles to the east, had not yet flowed to within $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of it. The cavalry and artillery, therefore, under the command of Brigadier-General Wilkinson, had to push on to Muhammad Amin without halting, thus performing a very trying waterless march of 26 miles. Two squadrons of the 15th Hussars, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Luck, actually marched from Kala Abdulla to Muhammad Amin, a distance of 42 miles, without a single case of sore-back.

Next day (September 2nd) the Cavalry Brigade, No. 2 Mountain Battery, Sappers and Miners, and detachments of the 16th and 27th Bombay Infantry occupied Mel Karez, and the rest of the force reached Muhammad Amin.

On the 3rd September the advance was continued, and the cavalry reached Abdur Rahman, within 26 miles of Kandahar. But on this day Major-General Phayre received from Sir Frederick Roberts despatches announcing the complete victory gained by the latter two days previously over the forces of Ayub Khan,

and the object of the advance to Kandahar, which had cost so much anxiety and labour, was thus entirely removed.

Major-General Phayre was requested temporarily to locate the troops of his column at the nearest points to Kandahar, where water, forage, and supplies were locally procurable; accordingly, on the 9th September, they were distributed as follows:

Concentrated in neighbourhood of Karez-i-Zarak and Khushab. Brigadier-General Wilkinson. " " James. " " Brown.	15th Hussars. 2nd Sind Horse. 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry. 2nd Madras Light Cavalry (1 squadron). D-B, R.H.A. F-2, R.A. No. 2, Bombay Mountain Battery. 11th Foot. 15th Foot (wing). 63rd Foot (detachment). 5th Bombay Infantry. 10th " " 27th " "
On line of communication to Chaman, under Brigadier- General Walker.	Poona Horse (detachment). E-B, R.H.A. (2 guns). 14-G, R.A. 63rd Foot. 8th Bombay Infantry. 9th " " 16th " " (detachment). 23rd " " 3 companies Bombay Sappers and Miners.

Although the Southern Afghanistan Field Force had thus been unsuccessful in its attempt to gain the honour of relieving Kandahar, yet this ill-success could not deprive it of a very large measure of praise and credit for hard work conscientiously performed in the face of disheartening difficulties. "The troops," wrote Major-General Phayre on arrival at Kala Abdulla, "had already undergone a good deal of hardship during their march of 148 miles from Sibi. The heat during the day was sometimes very great, occasioning excessive thirst, which the brackish water of some places failed to quench, and, in addition, injured the health of a great part of the force.

"Our transport cattle were good, but weak from

want of grain and forage; most of the cattle attendants had deserted. We had few commissariat subordinates, and only one transport and one commissariat officer; consequently a vast amount of departmental work devolved on the troops themselves, who, to their lasting credit, performed it cheerfully and well. I merely mention these facts for the purpose of bringing prominently to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India that the indefatigable energy and zeal with which the officers and men of the whole force met and overcame the natural difficulties of our position are deserving of this record of them: all showed by their conduct that they meant to succeed in thoroughly accomplishing the honourable duty which they were called on to perform.

“The following instance will show that the same zealous spirit actuated the troops with the rear brigade of the division. After the advanced force had left Quetta, the drivers of a convoy of 300 carts laden with food supplies, proceeding to the front, deserted and could not be replaced at the time. In this dilemma Captain Watling, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, arranged with Captain Harpur of his own regiment (23rd Bombay Light Infantry) to have these carts taken on by the sepoy drivers. Three hundred men, or about half the regiment, readily undertook the work and brought the convoy safely to its destination.”

CHAPTER XIX

AFFAIRS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN, FROM THE 9TH
SEPTEMBER TO 31ST DECEMBER, 1880.

ONE of the first tasks undertaken by Sir Frederick Roberts, after the restoration of British authority in Southern Afghanistan, was to seek such further details of the disastrous day at Maiwand as could be gained by a careful survey of the ground; and at the same time to provide for the decent interment of the bodies of our soldiers who had fallen in the battle and during the retreat.

With this object a column, under the command of Brigadier-General Daubeny, and composed as follows, marched from Kandahar on the 9th September:

Poona Horse (142 sabres).	
3rd Sind Horse (310 sabres).	
C-2, R.A.	
7th Royal Fusiliers.	
4th Bombay Infantry.	
66th Foot.	
1st Bombay Grenadiers.	} Small detach- ments.
30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	
Bombay Sappers and Miners.	

On the march through Sinjiri, Hauz-i-Madat, Karez-i-Ata and Kushk-i-Nakhud to the Maiwand Valley (which was reached on the 15th September), 128 bodies were found and buried; five men (of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers) and a milk woman, who had been made prisoners, were also sent into camp at Sinjiri, and the journal of Lieutenant Henn, R.E., was recovered.

At Maiwand searching parties were formed and the

whole of the battlefield carefully examined; a large number of bodies were found and buried, some of them being identified. Those bodies which had been superficially interred were re-buried, and over all a funeral service was read by the Rev. Mr. Cane and Father Jackson.

The graves were constructed neatly with earth raised over them to the height of about 2½ feet, and with stones placed over all.

On the line of retreat were found and buried 52 Europeans and 92 natives.

In the enclosure near the battlefield were buried 85 Europeans and 37 natives.

The approximate number of those buried on the field was 409, both Europeans and natives.

The bodies of most of the officers of the 66th who had been killed were found in the garden south of the village of Khig, where they had rallied round their colours.¹

The enemy appeared to have carried most of their dead to the village of Maiwand, and to have buried them there. Those of Ayub's regulars who fell were buried in a piece of ground about 300 yards north-west of the *ziarat* of Ahmad Shah of Maiwand, where about 300

¹ The following British officers, non-commissioned officers and men's bodies were identified and buried in the enclosure :

Major G. F. Blackwood, E-B, R.H.A.
 Lieutenant T. R. Henn, R.E.
 Colonel J. Galbraith, 66th Foot.
 Captain W. H. McMath, 66th Foot.
 Lieutenant M. E. Rayner, 66th Foot.
 " R. T. Chute, 66th Foot.
 " W. R. Olivey, 66th Foot.
 Captain H. F. Smith, 30th Bombay Infantry.

Color-Sergeant F. Gover.	<i>Drummers.</i>	C. Barrett.	M. Diamond.
Corporal E. Mahoney.	J. Groves.	8500 J. Beard.	A. Castle.
Lance-Corporal L. Weston.	M. Darby.	B. Watts.	G. Anderson.
" " G. Hinton.	<i>Privates.</i>	488 R. Donnon.	J. Feeney.
" " E. Beggs.	J. Mannon.	1449 W. Brown.	W. Wilson.
" " G. Tuttle.	J. Evans.	J. Jackson.	831 J. Jones.
	G. Carter.	S. Wetch.	H. Murrell.
		G. West.	O. McCaffreys.

All of the 66th Foot.

graves were seen, in each of which, the villagers stated, two or three corpses had been interred. Comparatively speaking, few graves of ghazis were found, most of them, according to common report, having been taken away to their own villages for burial. This statement seems to be borne out by the fact that two or three bodies belonging to ghazis were found still unburied, as the villagers thought it probable that the friends of the deceased might come and claim them.

The force under Brigadier-General Daubeny, having performed the duty with which it was entrusted, marched back to Kushk-i-Nakhud on the 18th September by a slightly different route. Parties of cavalry were sent out to scout the adjacent country, and four or five more bodies were found and buried.

From Kushk-i-Nakhud the column returned to Kandahar.

In the meantime Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, with the 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor), had left Kandahar (as related in Chapter VII.) on the 8th September, and reached Abdur Rahman on the 9th. Thence on the next day he telegraphed to the Adjutant-General in India and requested to be relieved of his command in October, his medical advisers having urged him to proceed to England as soon as possible.

Pending his relief Sir Frederick Roberts continued his march towards Peshin, hoping that the change thither would benefit his health, and wishing also to have an opportunity of meeting Sir Robert Sandeman, and of personally discussing with him various matters connected with the British occupation of Southern Afghanistan.

For the moment the question of supplies for the large force which had suddenly been massed at Kandahar and in its neighbourhood, was of more urgent importance than any other. So great was the difficulty of meeting the demand for grain and fodder, both at Kandahar and on the line of communication, that it became necessary for the Government of India to

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authorise Sir Frederick Roberts to take such measures as he might think fit, by detachments or by other arrangements, to obtain supplies from outlying districts. Acting upon this authority the Lieutenant-General's first intention was to divide the 3rd Brigade (MacGregor's) into two columns, which were to march respectively through Shorawak and by the Kakar Lora to Kawas, and eventually to unite at Quetta. He further proposed that from Quetta at least the native portion of the brigade should be allowed to return at once to India.

At the same time he proposed to move the 2nd (Baker's) Brigade from Kandahar into Peshin.

These proposals were eventually modified, and it was decided that the 3rd Brigade should return to India from Quetta, but that it should be used *en route* to inflict punishment on the Maris and other tribes who had given trouble during the past month. At the same time the posts on the projected line of railway were to be reoccupied, and thereafter a considerable portion of the Kabul-Kandahar Force was to return to India *viâ* Thal-Chotiali.

On the 14th September General Roberts and the 3rd Brigade reached Chaman. A day later the 2nd Brigade (Baker's) of the 3rd Division left Kandahar *en route* for Quetta, taking with it the sick and wounded to the number of 227 fighting men and 76 followers.

The march of a column into Shorawak, proposed by Sir Frederick Roberts, was postponed until after the General's meeting with Sir Robert Sandeman, and accordingly on the 16th September the main portion of the 3rd (MacGregor's) Brigade left Kala Abdulla for Quetta direct; a column as under, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rowcroft, 4th Gurkhas, was at the same time detached from it and proceeded to Kach and Kawas:

Central India Horse (100 sabres).
11-9, R.A. (2 guns).
60th Rifles (1 company).
4th Gurkhas.

On the same date Brigadier-General Walker's brigade of the 2nd (Major-General Phayre's) Division (except the wing of the 63rd Foot) marched from Peshin for Kandahar.

The above movements proceeded without incident. MacGregor's brigade reached Quetta on the 18th September: its detachment under Colonel Rowcroft, having visited Kawas, remained at Kach. Baker's brigade marched to Chaman and halted there. Sir Frederick Roberts meantime proceeded to Gulistan, where he remained from the 16th to the 20th, and there he met the Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Robert Sandeman. With Sir Robert Sandeman the Lieutenant-General discussed the question of the garrisons of posts on the line from Kandahar to Quetta, and it was decided that for the present there should be at each post two companies of native infantry and forty sabres, Mandi Hissar being furnished from Kandahar and the other four posts north of Chaman by the 19th Bombay Infantry and 3rd Bombay Cavalry. From Chaman to Quetta the garrisons were to be as follows:

At Chaman . . .	{	40 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 2 25-pr. guns, 2 9-pr. guns, detachment 14-9, R.A. 4 companies 24th Bombay Infantry.
At South Khojak . . .	{	12 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 2 companies 63rd Foot. 2 companies 24th Bombay Infantry.
Kala Abdulla . . .	{	40 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 2 guns 5-8, R.A. Head-quarters and 2 companies 63rd Foot. 2 companies 24th Bombay Infantry.
Khushdil Khan-ka-Kala.	{	Head-quarters and 1st troop 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 2 companies 15th Bombay Infantry.
Segi	{	12 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 30 rifles 15th Bombay Infantry.
Dinar Karez . . .	{	12 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 30 rifles 15th Bombay Infantry.
Mehtarzai	{	12 sabres 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 30 rifles 15th Bombay Infantry.
Gulistan Karez, as a movable column for Peshin.	{	1 squadron 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 2 guns 5-8, R.A. 4th Bengal Infantry.

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With these detachments the posts and line of communication would be quite secure, and in time, as the country quieted down, some of the larger garrisons might even be reduced.

Before leaving Gulistan Sir Frederick Roberts issued orders for the head-quarters of the Cavalry Brigade of the 3rd Division, with the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, to march from Kandahar to Quetta, and there to be in readiness to accompany the Punjab frontier infantry regiments to India by Harnai, Sibi, and Thal-Chotiali, should it be decided to send them by that route. The scarcity of the supply of forage at Kandahar was becoming serious, and some reduction of the troops there was necessary, although in Peshin and Quetta supplies were not more plentiful.

During his meeting with Sir Robert Sandeman the Lieutenant-General also discussed the plans for a movement from Chaman on the part of the 2nd Brigade (3rd Division) against the Achakzais. The plan proposed by Brigadier-General Baker, and approved by General Roberts, was that the Brigadier should march over the Bogra Pass on to the Toba Plateau, and thence descend by the Arambi Valley, the mouth of which should in the meantime be closed by cavalry, to prevent the Achakzais from escaping into Peshin.

In accordance with this scheme Brigadier-General Baker marched without tents from Chaman on the morning of the 21st September, with the main portion of his brigade, as below, taking three days' supplies :

3rd Bengal Cavalry (80 sabres), under Captain G. T. Morris.
No. 2 Mountain Battery under Major G. Swinley.
72nd Highlanders under Major C. M. Stockwell.
2nd Sikhs under Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell.
5th Gurkhas under Lieutenant-Colonel A. FitzHugh.

Three days were spent in marching across the western part of the Toba Plateau, and on the 24th September the force marched to Kala Abdulla, where it was met by the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and thence it

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proceeded by the usual stages to Quetta. There the brigade arrived on the 28th, and from Quetta its regiments marched separately to Sibi.

It has already been mentioned that the 3rd (MacGregor's) Brigade of the 3rd Division was to march from Quetta by the Harnai Pass to Kuchali, and thence *viâ* Thal-Chotiali in the Mari country to India, the posts on the line of railway there being meanwhile reoccupied by Bombay troops.

The composition of General MacGregor's column for the proposed expedition had on the 24th September been detailed as follows :

3rd Punjab Cavalry.
11-9, R.A.
2-60th Rifles.
2nd Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
4th Gurkha Regiment.
5th Gurkha Regiment.

In addition to these the following column under Colonel Morris, 15th Bombay Infantry, was ordered to march from Kach to Harnai, and thence to move to Thal-Chotiali simultaneously with Brigadier-General MacGregor's advance to Quat-Mandai in the Mari country¹:

2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, 129 sabres.
No. 2 Bombay (Jacobabad) Mountain Battery (2 guns).
15th Bombay Infantry, 309 rifles.

The object of the expedition was obtained without bloodshed, a satisfactory result which General MacGregor attributed to the strength of the force which accompanied him, and to the plan of march by which he was able to cut off every avenue of retreat from the Mari tribesmen.

¹ For a full account of this Expedition, see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. III.*

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The brigade was broken up at Drigri, in the Derajat, south of Dera Ghazi Khan, where it arrived on the 14th November.

During the time that General MacGregor's brigade was preparing for the Mari expedition, a small column had executed the march into the Shorawak country which had been projected in September.

Shorawak is a narrow strip of country about 40 miles long by 12 broad, bounded on the north and west by the Registan Desert, on the south by the khanate of Kalat and on the east by the Sarlat range. The inhabitants, who are Brahuis, were friendly, and the object of the march was solely to obtain and to send to Quetta supplies of grain and forage. Precautions had naturally to be taken, however, in case of hostility being met with.

The troops detailed for the duty were a squadron of the 1st Madras Light Cavalry, 2 guns of No. 2 (Jacobabad) Mountain Battery, and the 4th Bengal Infantry, the whole under Colonel Robertson, of the latter corps. Captain Henry Wyllie, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, accompanied the column.

Previous to the march of the troops the road over the Gwajha Pass was obstructed by demolitions to prevent the passage of any hostile parties, and was not reopened until the column was ready to start. It marched from Gulistan Karez on the 9th October, taking four days' supply of *atta* and twenty-one days' supply of *ghi* and *dhal*. A company of the 4th Bengal Infantry was left in garrison at Gulistan Karez.

The march of the detachment through the valley was accomplished without incident. The people were found to be quiet and well-disposed, and the resources of the country as regarded forage and grain were considerable. The column encamped at Mandozai, 35 miles north of Nushki, in the Kalat khanate, and arrangements were made for the weekly despatch thence of supplies to Gulistan for a period of four weeks.

Meanwhile Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick

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Cavalry, 3 regiments . . .	{	9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers (to be relieved by 13th Hussars, which regiment may be expected to leave India towards the end of November). 7th Bengal Cavalry: this regiment will reach Sibi at end of October. Poona Horse, or 2nd Sind Horse, as General Phayre may determine.
British Infantry, 4 battalions .	{	2-7th Fusiliers. 2-11th Foot. 2-15th Foot. 63rd Foot.
Native Infantry, 5 battalions .	{	3rd Bengal Native Infantry. To march from Quetta when equipped with warm clothing. 4th Bengal Native Infantry, at present employed in Shorawak, to march for Kandahar on return of Shorawak Movable Column. 17th Bengal Native Infantry to march for Kandahar when relieved by 16th Bombay Native Infantry. 5th Bombay Native Infantry. 9th Bombay Native Infantry. No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners.

To garrison Posts upon Line of Communication.

Mandi Hissar	{	2 companies native infantry. 1 troop cavalry (to be found by the Kandahar garrison).
Abdur Rahman	{	Head-quarters and 2 companies 8th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry.
Mel Karez	{	2 companies 8th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry.
Dabrai	{	2 companies 8th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry.
Gatai	{	2 companies 8th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry.
Chaman	{	Head-quarters and 4 companies 4th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry. 2 guns Jacobabad Mountain Battery (No. 2), temporarily employed in Shorawak and to be located during the winter at Gulistan Karez.
Kala Abdulla	{	3 companies 4th Bombay Native Infantry. 1 troop cavalry (furnishing detachment at Khushdil Khan).

Tirin; nor do I think it desirable to detach a small body of troops in a mountainous district where a large column could not easily be maintained. The system of creating several centres for the purpose of obtaining supplies, within a comparatively short radius from Kandahar, will no doubt be attended with good results, and until transport is available is the only course immediately possible; but so soon as the necessary number of troops can be equipped for movement, it will, I think, be necessary to send a force towards the Helmand, in order that supplies from districts upon that river or beyond may flow into Kandahar. This force should consist of D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, four guns 6-8, Royal Artillery, two squadrons 9th Lancers, one regiment native cavalry, two British and two native infantry regiments, and should be under the command of Brigadier-General Wilkinson. It might be sufficient, in the first instance, for these troops to be advanced as far as Kushk-i-Nakhud, and thence, as circumstances might dictate, to the Helmand at Girishk, or towards Kala-i-Bist. At Kushk-i-Nakhud it would draw supplies from Khakrez and the districts on the Helmand above Girishk. I would keep the force together, placing no detachment between it and the Kohkaran, arrangements for maintaining communication by local sowars being organised in the Political Department. I do not think that any troops should remain absent from Kandahar throughout the winter, but that during December, January, and February it will be necessary to concentrate and provide shelter and hospital accommodation close to Kandahar itself. Yet throughout November the movements of troops will probably be found practicable, and efforts should be made to provide the requisite amount of carriage for the despatch of such a force, apart from the movements towards India already ordered. A march to the Helmand and back, leisurely conducted, might occupy six weeks. It is therefore necessary for you to consider whether it can be carried out; to state

when it may be commenced; and what staff officers would be detailed to accompany Brigadier-General Wilkinson in order that his command may be properly constituted. The British infantry regiments to go should be the 11th and 63rd Foot. Please name native regiments chosen."

With reference to this proposal General Phayre consulted with Colonel O. St. John when the latter stated that he could form, by native agency, a central supply depot at the Band-i-Taimur, on the lower Arghandab River, whence grain and forage could be sent to Kandahar. It was proposed to send in addition the force under Brigadier-General Wilkinson, but its despatch was delayed for want of transport. Most of the Kandahar transport had gone with convoys or troops towards India, and the serious deficiency caused thereby was discussed on the 29th October by General Phayre, Mr. A. C. Lyall (Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department), and Sir Robert Sandeman. Mr. Lyall wrote on this subject the following memorandum:

"The position is this, that at present the force is not movable for want of transport, of which there is little at the moment available at Kandahar.

"That if you bring up surplus transport from India merely in order to strengthen your resources here you will put such a severe strain on your stores of supplies along the line of communication that you run very great risk of interruption of the line, and consequent severance from your base by failure of supplies for any considerable movement of troops along the road.

"That by continuing, as now, to purchase as many camels as can be procured at Kandahar, you may calculate on increasing your transport at the average rate of forty camels daily, so that in two or three months you may work up to a fair proportion of mobility for the Kandahar force.

"That you can feed all the transport you can

possibly purchase at the above rate for the next four months, if the stipulated condition of one month's supply in store is not required. For this reserve there is not carriage to bring it in, but we may rely on eight or ten days' reserve, probably more, as until the transport purchases reach a considerable number we shall have a large margin; that is, the supplies will pour in faster than the animals. But the regular influx of supplies depends on the maintenance of tranquillity in the country, as it is brought in by local carriage; and it is not proposed to send out parties as guards and escorts or forage parties during the winter if avoidable.

"2. The exertions of the political officers, in co-operation with the military, should therefore be directed—

"(1) Towards keeping the supplies flowing in, by enlisting the services of the headmen of clans and places, in facilitating collection and safe import into Kandahar, on the understanding that this is their best way of saving us the necessity of sending out troops and forage parties into their villages;

"(2) Towards helping the collection and purchase of transport as speedily as possible.

"3. If we can rely on a fair and substantial prospect of promising supplies and transport at Kandahar, this will preclude the necessity of wintering a force on the Helmand—a measure which is, in my opinion, open to several military and political objections."

"This memorandum," wrote General Phayre on the 30th October, "describes the assistance which the Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, R.E., will be able to afford in the matter of grain and forage for transport for the force at Kandahar itself, and the line of communication, as far as Chaman, during the present winter.

"It will be observed that this operation is conditional upon the maintenance of tranquillity in the country, and

the consequent willingness of the people to bring in supplies of grain and forage on local transport. The number and description of animals which it is intended to retain at Kandahar during the winter are as follows :

Camels . . .	1,055	About 250 only have to be purchased.
Yabus . . .	160	} A number at present unfit, but those received from Kabul Force are included.
Ponies . . .	1,585	
Mules . . .	632	
Pack bullocks . . .	428	
Draught bullocks	1,200	They will be ready for work in a month.
Donkeys . . .	116	

“All this transport represents about 3,700 camels.

“I do not think it would be safe to keep up a less establishment than the above for Kandahar, and its immediate communication with Chaman.

“*Sibi to Quetta and Chaman.*—From Sibi to Quetta there is a bi-weekly train of fifty carts, Government transport.

“Sir R. Sandeman has made a contract with the Brahui sardars to convey 1,000 maunds of food supplies per diem, warm clothing, etc., from Sibi to Chaman by the 30th November.

“There is a Government transport train of fifty carts bi-weekly from Quetta to Kala Abdulla.

“Across the Khojak a train of pack animals has been organised.

“The forage difficulty between Quetta and Chaman will be met by the establishment of a strong grazing and grass-pressing depot in Shorawak. A large number of sickly animals, horses, etc., might be sent there.”

Little remains to be told of the year 1880. At Kandahar the principal interest centred in the arrangements between the Indian Government and the Wali Sher Ali Khan, which concluded with the voluntary retirement of the latter to India. The announcement of this intention was made public on the 30th November, and the Wali left Kandahar on the 16th December. It was foreseen that the departure of the Wali foreshadowed the withdrawal of the British force at no

distant date, and the surrender of the province either to the Amir Abdur Rahman or to Sardar Ayub Khan.

Meanwhile the troops of the force were suffering seriously from their location in South Afghanistan. Every possible effort was made to procure wholesome food for the men and to improve the sanitation of the quarters and camps at and around Kandahar. It was inevitable, however, that the events of August and September should be followed by sickness amongst the troops who had been subjected to so severe a strain. Moreover, to the insanitary conditions consequent on the concentration of the Afghan army in the neighbourhood, immediately followed by the arrival of two large British divisions, were added the dangers, no less serious, arising from the want of proper clothing, heavy night duties, great variation of temperature, and intense cold at night.

On the 28th November there were 281 European patients (of which 111 were cases of dysentery) in the hospitals at Kandahar: 107 belonged to the Kandahar garrison, including the sick left behind of the Bengal Army and the 1st Bombay Division; the other 174 came in from the Cavalry Brigade at Kohak and the 1st Brigade in the Arghandab Valley; of these the 2-11th Foot alone furnished 128 sick, and on the 16th December this regiment had 138 men in hospital out of a total strength of 556.

The relief of the regiments in the force was, however, now in progress. The 9th Lancers and 2-15th Foot had suffered much from sickness. The former left Kandahar for India (on relief by the 13th Hussars) on the 23rd November. The 2-15th had already marched on the 8th November. On the 2nd December the 4th Bengal Infantry in Shorawak were relieved by the 5th Bombay Infantry, and about the same date the Bengal troops under Major Anderson at Quat-Mandai in the Mari country (11-9, Royal Artillery, two guns, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, one squadron, 2nd Sikhs) were relieved by a squadron of the 1st Madras Light Cavalry,

two guns of No. 2 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, and the 16th Bombay Infantry; Major Anderson's troops marched to Sibi and were railed thence to their respective destinations in India.

On the 10th November Major-General R. Hume was appointed to succeed Sir Frederick Roberts in the command of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force, with the following staff:

Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Little, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

Major C. J. Burnett, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major M. J. King-Harman, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Major P. C. Story, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Phayre reverted to his original appointment of Commandant of the Line of Communication, his staff comprising the following officers, who were already filling the appointments named:

Major C. A. Cunningham, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major J. Jopp, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Major A. R. Heyland, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General

The force at Kandahar now consisted of:

A cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson.

Three infantry brigades under Brigadier-Generals G. C. Walker, T. S. Brown, and H. H. James.

Five batteries of artillery (1 horse, 2 field, 1 mountain, 1 heavy) under Brigadier-General Denis de Vitre, R.H.A.

Major-General Hume arrived at Kandahar on the 29th November and took over command from Major-General Phayre, who left for Quetta on the following day.

At the same time it was determined to locate a movable column, under the command of Brigadier-General J. H. Henderson, near Gwal, of which the primary duty was to constitute a first reserve for the troops at Kandahar in case of need; it was also to serve as support to the line of posts generally. Kach was considered to be the best centre for this column, in

DIFFICULTY OF PROCURING FORAGE 617

consequence of the ready communication thence with Quetta, as well as towards Kandahar and Sibi. But the difficulties of procuring forage during the winter months either at Kach, Gwal, or Kasim Kala were such that it was eventually (16th November) decided by General Phayre that the best course to pursue was simply to hold the troops for the column in readiness, and not to move them until further arrangements could be made for their supply.

CHAPTER XX

THE BRITISH FORCE IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN FROM JANUARY, 1881, TO THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KANDAHAR.

THE opening of the new year found the population of Kandahar outwardly tranquil, but secretly disturbed and excited by the growing rumours of the withdrawal of the British, as well as by exaggerated accounts from Herat of the activity of Ayub Khan. Reports were received from Tirin and from beyond the Helmand of disturbances and outrages by the partisans of Ayub; it was apparent that systematic efforts were being made to stop the usual passage of supplies to Kandahar; and it was said that a raid was contemplated on Kushk-i-Nakhud, where the British Government was believed to have large stores of grain and money. Colonel St. John, British Resident at Kandahar, feared that this incipient uneasiness would be considerably augmented when it became more generally known that the withdrawal of the British was contemplated in the near future. Nothing like a formidable rising was to be expected, nor was this local movement likely to receive serious support from Herat; but General Hume reported that it might, nevertheless, affect the garrison through the obstruction of the supply of food, besides weakening the prestige of the British army of occupation in the country generally. Colonel St. John argued that although the agitation was of so trifling a nature as to be easy to quell by the levies of the local governors, yet the numbers of these were small, and the governors, believing from the inaction of the British troops that they were about to

quit the country, would probably not exert themselves zealously on behalf of the British Government.

The western roads to the Helmand were the only ones that remained open during the winter, those to the east and north being liable to be blocked by snow; and it was from the Helmand districts that the General looked for the supplies of grain and wheat to prevent his reserve stock from diminishing, as well as for any considerable number of camels to supply the many deficiencies in the transport of the force.

Colonel St. John therefore recommended the despatch of a small force, of which cavalry should form the greater part, in order to secure the tranquillity of the neighbouring districts; a large column, it was thought, would be difficult to feed, and would also tend to convey the impression that extended operations were in contemplation. In compliance with this suggestion General Hume proposed to detach a force under General Wilkinson, to march on Maiwand, *viâ* Karez-i-Salim, at an early date, composed as follows:

13th Hussars (300 sabres).
Poona Horse (400 sabres).
6-8, R.A. (Mountain Battery).
27th Bombay Infantry (500 rifles).
No. 3 Company Sappers ($\frac{1}{2}$ company).

As a reserve to the above, the following were to be held in readiness for immediate movement:

D-B, R.H.A., at Kohkaran.
63rd Foot (700 rifles) at Kandahar.

In the place of the 13th Hussars the garrison at Kohkaran was to be reinforced by a portion of the 2nd Sind Horse and one wing of the 2-11th Foot. These, with D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, and the 10th Bombay Infantry, completed the strength of that station.

A site was selected for Brigadier-General Wilkinson's camp at a point 38 miles west of Kandahar, within direct heliographic communication with Kandahar; and

detachments of the 2nd Sind Horse at Sinjiri and Karez-i-Salim would form a line of detached posts between the advanced force and General Hume's head-quarters in the city.

The proposed movement was sanctioned from Army Head-Quarters on the 14th January, and on the 20th idem Brigadier-General Wilkinson's column concentrated at Sinjiri. Mr. Merk accompanied the column as Political Officer.

Meanwhile various movements and reliefs had been taking place in the Southern Afghanistan Field Force. In consequence of the intense cold the southern Khojak post was withdrawn on the 6th January, and the garrison marched to Kala Abdulla. On the 8th idem the head-quarters of the 8th Bengal Cavalry marched from Sibi for Kandahar, while on the following day one squadron of the same regiment with the 29th Bombay Infantry (forming Sir Robert Sandeman's escort, now broken up) arrived at Sibi from Mandai, and various other movements took place and on the line of communication.

On the 21st January, as Major-General Hume was preparing to leave Kandahar to join Brigadier-General Wilkinson's column, orders were received by him to furnish a detailed scheme, for submission to the Government of India, for the withdrawal of the British troops from Kandahar. Such a scheme was to be arranged with a view to the fact that only existing transport was to be used. The scheme consequently propounded by Major-General Hume was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief on the 8th February.

In his arrangements he assumed that the withdrawal of the force would begin about the 16th of March, so as to enable the troops returning to India to reach their stations as early as possible. Operations before that date were precluded by the expectation of snow and rainy weather, which would render the movement of troops difficult and unhealthy.

It was estimated that carriage up to 30,000 maunds

THE CART TRAIN DISCONTINUED 621

would be required for the withdrawal, but the transport available at Kandahar on the 27th January was only equal to about 15,000 maunds, or about one-half of what was required. As hired transport was difficult to procure at Kandahar, and it was doubtful whether owners at that place would accompany the withdrawal, General Hume directed that hired carriage to supplement the Government transport should be brought from east of the Khojak. It would probably take at least five weeks to complete this operation, so that the 15th March and the 1st April were respectively fixed as the earliest possible dates for the beginning and completion of the retirement.

During the winter, in consequence of the difficulty of obtaining forage, General Hume had ordered the discontinuance of the cart train from Sibi to Kandahar. It was now necessary to move all this carriage, as well as available pack carriage, up to Kandahar without delay (if the withdrawal was to begin on the 16th March) as the carriage would, even thus, only reach Kandahar by the 15th March. Accordingly, three divisions of the cart train, or 3,000 bullocks with 1,350 carts, with grain for the consumption of the bullocks *en route* and for delivery at Chaman and other posts west of the Khojak, left Sibi between the 7th and 16th February.

Three hundred and fifty spare bullocks accompanied the first cart division, to replace casualties at Kandahar; and with the second cart division were sent 116 artillery bullocks, for spare wagons in the arsenal at Kandahar. These spare bullocks were provided with leading-yokes, thus enabling a load of ten maunds being carried in carts with double teams, instead of only eight, which was the load for single teams.

All the above arrived at Kandahar by the 20th March.

At the same time the purchase of camels at Kandahar was continued, and orders were issued for the completion of many minor details on the line of com-

munications. Posts were stocked with provisions, grain, and forage; camp equipage for standing rest camps was prepared at the various stages in the Bolan; and all surplus stores and equipment were removed from stations and depots in Peshin or at Chaman to Quetta. The road between Quetta and Kandahar was divided into two sections, commanded respectively by Major A. F. Reid, 29th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant W. J. R. Wickham, 63rd Foot; and these officers thoroughly inspected the road and arranged for the repair and cleaning of it and of the camp grounds.

The supply of forage upon the road between Kandahar and Chaman had always been kept up by the Road Commandant, Major Westmacott. That officer now went down the line, summoning the maliks of the adjacent country, and explained to them that they should make a special effort to meet the demand for forage. He said that although this was a heavy call upon them, yet it was a final one, and that, if they now made up the quantity required, he would guarantee that no man of the force should enter their villages.

On the other hand, if the supply was not forthcoming, Major Westmacott would hold them responsible, and take out foraging parties in their villages, and cut what was required; at the same time, with the permission of the Commissariat Department, the rates of purchase were raised. These arrangements worked admirably, and when the troops moved down an ample supply of forage and firewood was ready at each post.

On the 11th February General Wilkinson's column returned from Maiwand to Kohkaran, and such of the troops as were under orders for Kandahar marched there the next day. The expedition had been very successful. Connecting posts were established at Sinjiri and at Karez-i-Salim, and the main body encamped in the neighbourhood of Maiwand; the supplies there were plentiful, and the strain on the country round Kandahar was thus relieved; the tranquillity of the Helmand district was at the same time secured, many of the

Alizai chiefs tendered their submission, and the westward roads from Kandahar were opened for traffic, thus allowing of the free flow of supplies to the camp and city.

On the 24th February General Hume was informed that the Government of India approved of the scheme of withdrawal from Kandahar submitted by him on the 8th February, and the Major-General consequently continued his arrangements preparatory to beginning the withdrawal on the 16th March. Already two convoys of ordnance stores had left Kandahar on the 9th and 17th February respectively. The latter of these experienced very severe weather on the march to Quetta, and a number of casualties occurred amongst the transport animals, which were in weak and poor condition after the short rations of the winter months. In consequence of these casualties 850 spare bullocks were ordered forward: 400 for Khojak and Kandahar, 250 for Gulistan, and 100 for Quetta and Mach. A few days later (26th February) 1,000 mules, yabus and ponies, with 500 other pack animals, left Sibi for Kandahar. With a view to further supplementing the Government transport at that place, the Director of Transport on the line of communication had been instructed to hire and send to Kandahar a further thousand camels. These left Sibi in batches between the 20th and 26th February, the last batch being included in the convoy mentioned above.

On the 19th March a third convoy of ordnance stores left Kandahar, and on the 16th idem a convoy of carts with medical stores had started.

Meantime Major-General Hume had ordered the preparation of rest camps for 800 men each in the Bolan, with which object the first convoy from Kandahar had carried down all available E.P. tents. This arrangement enabled regiments returning to India to store their camp equipage in the arsenal at Quetta, where the second reserve of ammunition, entrenching tools, and followers' arms were also handed over,

together with the ammunition in the wagons of the artillery and their camel boxes, with the equipment belonging to them. By this means the requisitions for railway carriage were considerably reduced, and in several cases it was possible to despatch from Sibi rail-head complete corps in a single train.

Officers were appointed, as far as practicable, to each post in the Bolan; but where this was not possible, one officer had two posts under his command, each of which he visited three times during the week. He was assisted by a medical officer or medical subordinate to superintend the sanitary and conservancy arrangements.

By the 21st March all transport arrangements for the evacuation were completed at Kandahar. But no orders had yet been received intimating when the move was to take place. In the bazaars the belief that the city was about to be handed over to the Amir had created great excitement, which was much fostered by doubts as to the stability of the new rule at Kabul, and by the rumours of Ayub's activity at Herat. One of the first results of these disquieting reports was that a large number of Hindu traders and others began to make preparations to precede the British army in its withdrawal, which was known to be imminent, but the exact date of which was still unsettled.

At length, on the 27th March, Major-General Hume was instructed to be prepared to withdraw from Kandahar about the 10th April. The Amir was sending from Kabul a force which was to take over charge of the city and province on the departure of the British, and it was expected that this force would arrive on or about the above date. The first intentions of Government were to march part of the retiring troops to India by way of Thal-Chotiali, but the Commander-in-Chief showed how strong were the arguments against this course, now that the hot weather had begun, and the idea was abandoned. Detailed instructions for the march were issued from Army Head-Quarters on the 6th April, when the Shorawak Column was

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KANDAHAR 625

authorised to move to Sibi as soon as the withdrawal should commence.

All this time the surplus stores and invalids had been leaving Kandahar at intervals, and on the 1st April the last sub-division of carts, containing the final detachment of these details, started for Quetta, where it arrived on the 15th April.

Meanwhile further efforts were made to improve the road between Kandahar and the south of the Khojak, a work which was considerably impeded by the heavy rain which fell early in April, and did much damage on the line.

At Kandahar during the first fortnight of April all was quiet. News was received from time to time of the approach of the Amir's force of occupation, the cavalry of which was at Robat on the 5th, and the infantry and guns at Shahjui on the same date; and on the 7th it was reported that the whole force would be at Kandahar by the 15th April at the latest. But in some of the country districts the news of the approaching withdrawal of the British appeared to have a disquieting effect, an example of which was given by the Achakzais of Toba. Their chiefs refused to obey the summons of the Political Agent for the settlement of compensation on account of recent robberies, and it seemed likely that they might give some trouble, in which case it was feared that the Kakars might also be induced to join. This intelligence the Agent to the Governor-General telegraphed to General Hume, suggesting that the post at Kushdil Khan should be strengthened. General Hume accordingly reinforced the post with the squadron of Madras Cavalry from Shorawak, and a company of the 5th Bombay Infantry; while two guns of 5-8, Royal Artillery, were ordered to be held in readiness to move from Quetta to Kushdil Khan if required.

On the 9th April formal instructions for the withdrawal of the British force from Kandahar were issued to Major-General Hume, in a telegram from the

THE QUETTA GARRISON

Quartermaster-General in India. The Major-General was asked to select, in consultation with the Political Agent, the earliest date after the 10th April convenient for beginning the withdrawal.

Chaman was to be occupied as our advanced post. All garrisons and posts in the Peshin Valley were to continue in the occupation of our troops, and to be held by portions of the Quetta garrison, thus relieving the present want of accommodation at that place.

The Quetta garrison was to consist of—

7th Bengal Cavalry.
 2nd Sind Horse.
 A-4, R.A. (Field).
 No. 15-9, R.A. (Garrison).
 No. 5-8, R.A. (Mountain).
 Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Bombay
 Sappers.

61st Foot.
 63rd Foot.
 3rd Bengal Native Infantry.
 9th Bombay Native Infantry.
 13th Bombay Native Infantry.

And the 13th Hussars, if sufficient forage were available.

Along the Harnai line and at Thal-Chotiali the following force was to be retained :

1st Sind Horse.
 No. 1 Mountain Battery, in relief of No. 2.
 4th Bombay Rifles.
 8th Bombay Native Infantry.
 15th Bombay Native Infantry.
 24th Bombay Native Infantry.

After consulting with the Political Resident at Kandahar, Major-General Hume telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General that the 13th April would be the earliest date when it would be convenient to begin moving his force from Kandahar. He intended to move in four columns, of which the last would leave Kandahar on the 22nd April.

General Hume also notified that forage could be provided for the 13th Hussars at Quetta, in addition to that required for the native cavalry regiments.

The following distribution for the Peshin outposts was sanctioned :

Chaman . . .	{	7th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). 5-8, R.A. (2 guns). No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers. 3rd Bengal Infantry (wing).
Kala Abdulla . . .	{	7th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). 5-8, R.A. (2 guns). 63rd Foot (2 companies). 3rd Bengal Infantry (2 companies).
Gulistan . . .	{	2nd Sind Horse (1 squadron). 5-8, R.A. (2 guns). 63rd Foot (2 companies). 3rd Bengal Infantry (2 companies).
Kushdil Khan . . .	{	7th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). 9th Bombay Infantry (wing).
Segi . . .	}	as at present, viz. { 5th and 13th Bombay Infantry (detachments).
Dinar-Karez . . .		
Mehterzai . . .		

General Hume was ordered to begin the retirement on the 13th April. Every portion of the movement was to be carried out in closest consultation with the political authorities.

The following garrisons were approved on the Harnai route :

Kach . . .	{	2nd Sind Horse (25 sabres). 4th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters and 6 companies).
Chapar . . .	{	4th Bombay Infantry (2 companies).
Sharigh . . .	{	24th Bombay Infantry (2 companies).
Harnai . . .	{	1st Sind Horse (1 squadron). No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 24th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters and 4 companies).
Thal-Chotiali . . .	{	No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 15th Bombay Infantry. 1st Sind Horse (head-quarters and 1 squadron).
Spin Tangi . . .	{	24th Bombay Infantry (2 companies).
Gandakin Daf . . .	{	1st Sind Horse (1 troop). No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 8th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters and 2 companies).
Nari Gorge . . .	{	1st Sind Horse (25 sabres). 8th Bombay Infantry (50 rifles).
Sibi . . .	{	1st Sind Horse (25 sabres). 8th Bombay Infantry (200 rifles).

The posts in the Bolan were held by detachments of the 8th Bombay Infantry.

Arrangements were made for nine rest camps on the Bolan route as far down as railhead at Rindli.

At the last moment the departure of the troops from Kandahar was unavoidably postponed for two days. It has already been noticed that the beginning of April was marked by heavy rain, and these storms continued with such violence that the Major-General was compelled to put off the march of the force till the weather should be more favourable. The final withdrawal, however, was still to take place on the date originally fixed, the 22nd April.

At length the movement of troops actually began on the 15th April.¹

On the morning of the 16th April Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, the Governor appointed by the Amir, entered Kandahar, and in the course of the day paid a formal visit to Colonel St. John, with whom he discussed the detail of the evacuation and of the handing over of the city.

On the 17th the 3rd Brigade began its march. This brigade alone was supplied with cart carriage, and with it were despatched the stores belonging to the Ordnance Field Park, the Engineer Field Park, the records, and all the heavy baggage of departments. For this purpose all the cart carriage remaining at Kandahar was required, and only field transport or pack carriage was available for the remainder of the troops. In order to allow the cart carriage to cross the Khojak without a block, the brigade marched in two bodies, the first portion, as stated above, leaving Kandahar on the 17th April. This first portion consisted of the 8th Bengal Cavalry and the 4th and 10th Bombay Infantry, under the personal command of Brigadier-General Henderson. The remainder of the brigade started on the morning of the 18th, escorting the Field Park, which consisted of 200 carts and 400 donkeys.

The 2nd Brigade marched from Kandahar on the 20th April.

The moment had now arrived for the final evacua-

¹ For Programme of dates of departure and arrival of troops, see Appendix XXXIV.

tion and for handing over the city to the officials of the Amir. General Ghulam Haidar Khan, with the Afghan forces, was within two marches of Kandahar: a party of infantry were at Deh Khwaja ready to take over charge of the gates and citadel; Colonel St. John had committed to the charge of the sardars the burial-places of British soldiers in the neighbourhood and had written officially to Muhammad Hashim Khan, commending to his protection the families and property of certain persons in the employ of or friendly to the British. The octroi and customs were handed over to the same official, as well as 400 smooth-bore muskets, formerly belonging to the Wali's troops, which had been collected in the neighbouring villages. Eighteen smooth-bore field guns had been sent up from India for the Amir, and were ready for delivery, together with 50,000 rupees; while 3,000 rifles were ready at Chaman to be handed over to the Amir's officers. It only remained to hand over the city itself. On the morning of the 21st April General Hume vacated the quarters he had occupied with the head-quarters staff; and at 10 a.m. the field officer of the day commenced withdrawing the guards on the city gates, each being in turn occupied by a detachment of the Amir's *khasadars*. Charge of the entrance from the city to the citadel square was then similarly transferred, and the eighteen field guns, which were pushed within the citadel square, were made over to Sardar Shams-ud-din.

At noon precisely the Union Jack on the central tower was hauled down under a salute of 31 guns, after which the guard on the north or citadel gate was withdrawn, and the last of the British troops marched out of Kandahar. All the remaining troops had previously quitted the cantonment and citadel, and were encamped on the plain to the north.

Colonel St. John, R.E., remained in the city till half-past three, when a considerable number of sardars, chiefs, merchants and others assembled to wish him good-bye, after which he rode through the streets and the citadel

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to the camp. Except that the gates were closed, and that the Indian camp followers, usually so numerous in the bazaars, were wanting, the town wore its accustomed appearance. The evacuation of Kandahar was thus quietly completed without disturbance or trouble of any sort.

At 7 a.m. on the 22nd Sardar Shams-ud-din Khan and others of the Amir's officers, accompanied by the Kandahari sardars, came out to bid farewell to General Hume and Colonel St. John, and at 8 a.m. the column, composed of the 1st Brigade under General Walker and the Cavalry Brigade under General Wilkinson, moved off the camping ground as follows :

Main Column.

Field Force head-quarters, Major-General Hume, and 1st Brigade head-quarters, Brigadier-General G. C. Walker.	}	Poona Horse (2 squadrons).
		6-8, R.A.
		No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners.
		63rd Foot.
		3rd Bengal Infantry.
		9th Bombay Infantry.

Rear Guard.

Under Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson.	}	13th Hussars.
		Poona Horse (2 squadrons).
		D-B, R.H.A.
		63rd Foot (2 companies).
		3rd Bengal Infantry (2 companies).

The whole column marched to Mandi Hissar, which the rear guard reached at noon.

For the next five days the march was continued without interruption or incident to Chaman, each post in turn being handed over, on the departure of the column, to the Amir's agents. Chaman was reached on the 27th April, and as this post was to be retained by the British, the withdrawal from Afghan territory was now completed.

But little remains to be related. The march of the troops was continued in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. Major-General Hume reached Quetta on the 4th May, and the troops from Kandahar

detailed for the Quetta garrison arrived on the following day.

Meanwhile General J. H. Henderson had pushed on by double marches from Quetta to Sibi, where he assumed the direction of the entrainment and despatch of corps as they arrived. Brigadier-General O. V. Tanner at the same time proceeded to Sukkur to personally superintend the passage of the troops across the Indus.

The health of the force was excellent, both between Kandahar and Quetta, and in the Bolan Pass, a satisfactory result of the excellent arrangements made beforehand by Major-General Hume and his assistant staff officers. The heat was indeed excessive below Mach, but the rest camps had been arranged so carefully with regard to shelter and water-supply that but little inconvenience was felt by the troops, and in the British portion of the force only one death occurred during the whole operations of the withdrawal. Among the natives thirteen soldiers died and six followers.

On the 8th May the leading portion of the force from Kandahar (the 2-11th Foot and a wing of 2-7th Fusiliers) marched to Pir Chaoki railway station, near Rindli, and on the 23rd the troops detailed for withdrawal to India had all passed Sibi. The whole movement had been accomplished without a hitch, and the commissariat arrangements for feeding such a continuous stream of troops, as well as the care for the sanitary condition of the camp grounds, were as worthy of praise as was the preparation for the arrival of the force at the rest camps and the railway terminus.

On the 23rd May Major-General Hume reported from Quetta that the last regiment for India had left Sibi. The Southern Afghanistan Field Force became the Quetta Division, and the second phase of the Second Afghan War was at an end.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I (see p. 14)

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM *POLICE REPORT* (No. 27) DATED
14TH APRIL, 1878.¹

(1) *Distribution of troops of Amir Sher Ali in March, 1878.*

	Men.	Men.	Men.	Station.
14 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	8,400	}	10,010. Kabul.
1 squadron of cavalry . . .	150 =	150		
2 elephant batteries . . .	70 =	140		
6 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	900		
6 mule mountain batteries . . .	70 =	420		
3 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	1,800		
2 regiments of cavalry . . .	600 =	1,200	}	3,200. Jalalabad.
1 troop of horse artillery . . .	150 =	150		
1 mule mountain battery . . .	70 =	70		
5 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	3,000	}	3,220. Sherabad.
1 troop horse artillery . . .	150 =	150		
1 mule mountain battery . . .	70 =	70		
3 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	1,800	}	3,190. Kurram.
2 regiments of cavalry (less one squadron at Kabul) . . .	600 =	950		
2 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	300		
2 mule mountain batteries . . .	70 =	140		
4 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	2,400	}	6,370. Kandahar.
6 regiments of cavalry . . .	600 =	3,600		
2 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	300		
1 mule mountain battery . . .	70 =	70	}	11,220. Herat.
17 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	10,200		
4 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	600		
2 mule mountain batteries . . .	70 =	140		
4 bullock batteries . . .	70 =	280		
4 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	2,400	}	2,840. Maimana.
2 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	300		
1 mule mountain battery . . .	70 =	70		
1 bullock battery . . .	70 =	70	}	11,820. Balkh.
12 regiments of infantry . . .	600 =	7,200		
6 regiments of cavalry . . .	600 =	3,600		
4 troops horse artillery . . .	150 =	600		
4 mule mountain batteries . . .	70 =	280		
2 bullock batteries . . .	70 =	140		

¹ No Intelligence Department existed in India at that date.

There are only eight centres or military depots, from which detachments are posted at different places in the vicinity of the several depots.

The regular troops are well supported by the irregulars at Kandahar, Herat, Maimana, and Balkh. The artillery is looked upon as the most important branch of the service; it is the best paid, and most depended upon in case of trouble.

<i>Abstract—</i>	Men.
Kabul	10,010
Jalalabad	3,220
Sherabad	3,220
Kurram	3,190
Kandahar	6,370
Herat	11,220
Maimana	2,840
Balkh	11,820
Total	<u>51,890</u>

(2) *Military resources of Afghanistan at the close of March, 1877.*

1. Received by the Amir from the English Government :

12,000		1 elephant battery . { 4 guns. 2 mortars.
2,000		
15,000		
29,000 rifles, muzzle-loading.		1 mule mountain battery 6 guns.
5,000 rifles, breech-loading (Snider).		
Total . <u>34,000</u> rifles, M.L. & B.L.		

2. All the above arms were presented with ammunition and gear complete. In store in the arsenal there were 30,000 stands of firearms, principally muzzle-loading muskets, smooth-bore and rifles.

The arsenal, in proportion to the requirements of the country, was fairly stored with munitions of war.

3. Guns, rifles, muzzle- and breech-loaders, powder, and percussion caps are manufactured in Kabul with facility.

Lead, iron, and necessaries for powder are procurable within Kabul territory. Copper and brass are imported through Peshawar merchants from Bombay and Calcutta.

4. The following is an abstract of the Amir's army, which is divided into regular and irregular troops :—

APPENDIX I

635

Regulars.

62 regiments of infantry, 600 men each, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers	37,200
16 regiments of cavalry, 600 men each, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers	9,600
2 elephant artillery batteries, 4 guns and 2 mortars, each 70 men	140
22 horse artillery batteries, 6 guns, 150 men, officers and non-commissioned officers	3,300
18 mule mountain batteries, 6 guns, 70 men	1,260
7 bullock batteries, 6 guns, 70 men	490
	5,190
Total	51,990

<i>Abstract</i>	Men.
Artillery	5,190
Cavalry	9,600
Infantry	37,200
	51,990
Total	51,990

with 309¹ guns, of which 24 only are breech-loaders.

Irregulars.

Foot levies	8,000
Mounted levies	16,000
	24,000
Total	24,000

5. The regular troops have much improved of late years in regard to their drill, discipline, arms, and clothing. But the service is unpopular owing to bad officers, forced enlistment, poor and uncertain pay. *In case of war with the English, most of the troops at each action will either come over to us or else disperse.*

6. The irregular troops are entered on the Amir's books at 24,000, and he has to pay for this number to the different sardars through whom they are entertained; but in times of peace only 6,000, or about a fourth, are actually kept up. This branch of the service is, however, excessively elastic. In the hour of trouble every headman and chief of every clan or tribe is called upon and made to furnish levies. Lists have already been prepared of all the able-bodied men capable of bearing arms; and 100,000 armed men could be assembled at Kabul without much difficulty.

¹ This total does not agree with the numbers given immediately above, which aggregate 324 guns.

APPENDIX II

DECLARATION OF WAR (see p. 22)

CAMP LAHORE,
21st November, 1878.

The Viceroy of India to the Amir Sher Ali Khan of Kabul, to his Sardars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan.

It is now ten years since the Amir Sher Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the throne of Kabul. At that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances the Amir, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India. His wish was cordially complied with. He was courteously received and honourably entertained by the Viceroy at Umballa. The countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him. He at the same time obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Amir, after his return to his own country, in there securing his position and extending his authority.

Since then the Amir Sher Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms. The powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition by the Emperor of Russia of a fixed boundary between the kingdom of Kabul and the Khanates of Bokhara and Kokand. The Amir's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakhshan was thereby admitted and made sure—a sovereignty which had, till then, been disputed by the Russian Government. His subjects have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects. In no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction.

For all these gracious acts the Amir Sher Ali Khan has ren-

dered no return. On the contrary, he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakhshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank returning from a mission to a neighbouring State. He has closed against free passage to British subjects and their commerce the roads between India and Afghanistan. He has maltreated British subjects, and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress. He has used cruelly and put to death subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government. He has openly and assiduously endeavoured, by words and deeds, to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incite war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British Mission, having left unanswered friendly communications addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British Government and himself, he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an Embassy from Russia. This he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it, well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged, by engagements with England, to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian Embassy is still at his capital, the Amir has forcibly repulsed, at his outposts, an English Envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy attesting the importance and urgency of the Envoy's mission.

Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Amir a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Amir has refused to avail himself. It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State, whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a Prince, whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Amir Sher Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interests of the two neighbouring countries. But its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance.

The Amir Sher Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the sardars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility for the recent acts of the Amir; and as they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them. Nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Upon the Amir Sher Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India.

APPENDIX III (see p. 42)

Distribution of the Peshawar Valley Field Force on 1st January, 1879.

Garrison of Jalalabad.

Cavalry	{	10th Hussars	}	Under Brigadier-General						
		Guides Cavalry			C. J. S. Gough.					
		11th Bengal Lancers								
Artillery	{	I-C, Royal Horse Artillery.								
	{	No. 4 Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force.								
Infantry	{	Sappers and Miners	}	1st Brigade	{	Under Brigadier-				
		4th Battalion Rifle Brigade				General H. T. Mac-				
		4th Gurkhas					pherson.			
		20th Punjab Native Infantry						3rd Brigade	{	Under Brigadier-
		Guides Infantry								General F. H. Jenkins.
1st Sikhs										

Line of Communications.

2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Maude.	(1) Basawal	{	Head-quarters 2nd Brigade,	}	Under Brigadier-General
			1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force		
	(2) Dakka	{	11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns	}	
			1-17th Foot		
	(3) Landi Khana, 6th Bengal Native Infantry.	{	F-3, Royal Artillery	}	
			27th Punjab Native Infantry.		
	(4) Ali Masjid	{	45th Sikhs	}	Under Brigadier-General
	(5) Jamrud	{	½ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery	}	Under Brigadier-General
			11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns		
(6) Peshawar	{	51st Foot	}		
		2nd Gurkhas			
(7) Taru	{	Mhairwara Battalion	}		
		Madras Sappers			
(8) Nowshera	{	13th Bengal Lancers	}	Under Brigadier-General	
		½ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery			J. Doran.
	{	11-9, Royal Artillery, 2 guns	}		
	{	5th Fusiliers			}
	{	25th Foot	}		
	{	24th Punjab Native Infantry.			}
	{	Sappers and Miners	}		
	{	81st Foot			}
	{	14th Sikhs	}	sickness.	
	{	9th Lancers.			}
	{	H-C, Royal Horse Artillery.	}		
	{	1-12th Foot.			}

APPENDIX IV (see page 56)

Distribution of 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, ordered on the advance of the 1st Division in April, 1879.

Barikao . . .	{	1 squadron 13th Bengal Lancers. 2 companies 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
Basawal . . .	{	Head-quarters Cavalry Brigade. Head-quarters 1st Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General Doran). Head-quarters 13th Bengal Lancers. D-A, Royal Horse Artillery. Head-quarters 25th King's own Borderers. Head-quarters 24th Bengal Infantry.
Dakka . . .	{	C-3, Royal Artillery. 1 company 25th Foot. Bhopal Battalion.
Landi Kotal . . .	{	Divisional head-quarters. Head-quarters 2nd Infantry Brigade. 1 troop 10th Bengal Lancers. 11-9, Royal Artillery. 1-5th Fusiliers. 2nd Gurkhas.
Ali Masjid . . .	{	Detachment 10th Bengal Lancers. 6th Bengal Infantry. Mhairwara Battalion.
Jamrud . . .	{	9th Lancers. Detachment 10th Bengal Lancers. H-C, Royal Horse Artillery. 39th Bengal Infantry.

APPENDIX V (see p. 81)

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May, 1879, by His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, c.s.i., Political Officer, on special duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Hon. Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The following articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies :

Article 1.—From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

Article 2.—His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

Article 3.—His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign State, except with the con-

currence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

Article 4.—With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominions, it is agreed that a British representative shall reside at Kabul with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may, on his part, depute an agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

Article 5.—His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British agents within his jurisdiction, and the British Government on its part undertakes that its agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's dominions.

Article 6.—His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions, so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

Article 7.—In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his

best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness will be stated in a separate commercial treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

Article 8.—With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments, and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by, and at the cost of, the British Government; and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

Article 9.—In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States, which has been attested and secured by the foregoing articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jalalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram, Peshin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amir. The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jalalabad districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes.

APPENDIX V

Article 10.—For the further support of His Highness the Amir, in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagement stipulated by the foregoing articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of 6 lakhs of rupees.

Done at Gandamak this 26th day of May, 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-ul-Sani 1196 A.H.

Seal.

(Sd.) AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN.

(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major,*

Political Officer, on Special Duty.

Seal.

(Sd.) LYTTON.

APPENDIX VI (see p. 81)

Distribution of the Peshawar Valley Field Force on 26th May, 1879.

1st Division.

Artillery . . .	{ I-C, Royal Horse Artillery E-3, Royal Artillery (2 divisions) 13-9, Royal Artillery No. 4 Mountain Battery	} At and near Gandamak and Safed Sang.	
Cavalry . . .	{ 10th Hussars (5 troops) Guides Cavalry 11th Bengal Lancers (1 troop)		
British Infantry	{ 17th Foot 51st Foot (7 companies) 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade		
Native Infantry	{ Guides Infantry 4th Gurkhas 27th Punjab Infantry (6 companies) 30th Bengal Infantry 45th Sikhs (6 companies) Bengal Sappers and Miners (2 companies)		
Artillery . . .	{ E-3, Royal Artillery (1st division)		
Cavalry . . .	{ 11th Bengal Lancers (5 troops)		
British Infantry	{ 51st Foot (1 company)		
Native Infantry	{ 1st Sikhs 27th Punjab Infantry (2 companies) 45th Sikhs (2 companies) Bengal Sappers and Miners (2 companies) Madras Sappers and Miners (1 company)		} At Jalalabad.

2nd Division.

Cavalry . . .	{ 13th Bengal Lancers (2 troops)	} At Barikao.
British Infantry	{ 5th Foot (1 company)	
Native Infantry	{ 2nd Gurkhas (2 companies)	} At Basawal.
Artillery . . .	{ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery	
Cavalry . . .	{ 9th Lancers (2 squadrons) 13th Bengal Lancers (3 troops)	
British Infantry	{ 1-5th Fusiliers (7 companies)	
Native Infantry	{ 2nd Gurkhas (6 companies) Madras Sappers and Miners (1 company)	
Artillery . . .	{ C-3, Royal Artillery	} At Dakka.
Cavalry . . .	{ 10th Bengal Lancers (3 troops)	
British Infantry	{ 12th Foot (1 company)	
Native Infantry	{ Mhairwara Battalion	

Artillery . . .	11-9, Royal Artillery	} At Landi Khana and Landi Kotal.
Cavalry . . .	10th Hussars (1 troop)	
British Infantry {	12th Foot (7 companies)	
	25th Foot	
Native Infantry {	24th Punjab Infantry (1 wing)	
	Bhopal Battalion (1 wing)	
	Madras Sappers and Miners (1 company)	
Cavalry . . .	10th Bengal Lancers (1 troop)	} At Ali Masjid and Jamrud.
	13th Bengal Lancers (1 troop)	
Native Infantry {	6th Bengal Infantry	
	24th Punjab Infantry (1 wing)	
	Bhopal Battalion (1 wing)	
	36th Madras Infantry	
Artillery . . .	H-C, Royal Horse Artillery	At Peshawar.

APPENDIX VII (see p. 134)

Distribution of the Kurram Valley Field Force and Garrisons of the Punjab Frontier on the 24th February, 1879.

Advanced troops under Brigadier-General Thelwall at and about the Paiwar Kotal.	{	Detachment 5th Punjab Cavalry. ½ G-3, Royal Artillery. No. 2 Mountain Battery. Detachment 2-8th Foot. Detachment 72nd Highlanders. 2nd Punjab Infantry. 28th Punjab Native Infantry. 7th Company Bengal Sappers.
Thal	{	Head-quarters. Detachment 5th Punjab Cavalry. Detachment 14th Bengal Lancers. ½ F-A, Royal Horse Artillery. Wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry.
Fort Kurram	{	Detachment 5th Punjab Cavalry. Detachment 72nd Highlanders. 5th Gurkhas.
Hazir Pir	{	12th Bengal Cavalry. ½ F-A, Royal Horse Artillery. No. 1 Mountain Battery. Detachment 72nd Highlanders. Detachment 21st Punjab Native Infantry.
Kohat	{	1 squadron 9th Lancers. Detachment 5th Punjab Cavalry. Part of 14th Bengal Lancers. ½ G-3, Royal Artillery. Wing 2-8th Foot. 5th Punjab Infantry.
At Mandori on left bank of Kurram River	{	23rd Bengal Pioneers. Part of 29th Punjab Native Infantry.

Approximate Strength.

		Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
<i>Punjab Chiefs' Contingent.</i>	{	Patiala 800	300	4
At Thal	{	Nabha 500	200	3
	{	Sirmur 200
	{	Faridkot 200	50	...
At Bannu	{	Jhind 500	200	3
	{	Kapurthala 500	100	3
At Dera Ghazi Khan	{	Bahawalpur 300	100	...
	{	At Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan under Brigadier-General McMaster.	} Madras Brigade.	
Reserve	{	At Rawalpindi 67th Foot.		
	{	36th Madras Light Infantry.		
	{	92nd Gordon Highlanders.		
At Kohat	{	1 wing 2nd Bengal Native Infantry.		
	{	11th Bengal Native Infantry.		
At Bannu	{	1 wing 2nd Bengal Native Infantry.		

APPENDIX VIII (see p. 142)

Distribution of Troops in the Kurram Valley on the conclusion of the First Campaign.

Ali Khel	{ No. 2 Mountain Battery. 72nd Highlanders. 92nd Highlanders. 5th Gurkhas.	Paiwar Cantonment.	{ F-A, Royal Horse Artillery. C-4, Royal Artillery. G-3, Royal Artillery. 9th Lancers (1 squadron). 5th Punjab Infantry.
Kurram Fort			
Bian Khel	67th Foot.	Balesh Khel	23rd Bengal Pioneers.
Paiwar Kotal	2-8th Foot.	Samguma	

APPENDIX IX (see p. 166)

*Distribution of the South Afghanistan Field Force on the
14th January, 1879.*

Head-quarters of the army at Kandahar.	{	Artillery .	{	A-B, Royal Horse Artillery. I-1, Royal Artillery. D-2, Royal Artillery. E-4, Royal Artillery. G-4, Royal Artillery. 5-11, Elephant Battery. 11-11, Mountain Battery. Peshawar Mountain Battery, head-quarters and 4 guns. 2 Engineer Field Parks.	}	Under Brigadier-General Arbuthnot.
		Cavalry .	{	15th Hussars. 8th Bengal Cavalry. 19th Bengal Lancers.	}	Cavalry Brigade, 1st Division, under Brigadier-General Fane.
				1st Punjab Cavalry. 2nd Punjab Cavalry. 3rd Sind Horse.		Cavalry Brigade, 2nd Division, under Brigadier-General Palliser.
		Engineers .	{	4th Company, Sappers and Miners. 5th Company, Sappers and Miners. 9th Company, Sappers and Miners. 10th Company, Sappers and Miners.	}	
		Infantry .	{	59th Foot, head-quarters and 7 companies.	}	1st Division.
2-60th Foot	2nd Division.					
70th Foot						
12th Bengal Native Infantry.						
		15th Sikhs. 19th Punjab Native Infantry (half battalion). 26th Punjab Native Infantry. 29th Bombay Native Infantry (2nd Baluch Infantry). 32nd Bombay Native Infantry (Pioneers).				

TOTAL—Europeans, 2,891 ; Natives, 3,814. GRAND TOTAL, 6,705.

At Mandi Hissar . 3rd Gurkhas.

At Haji Deh { 6-11, Royal Artillery.
59th Foot (1 company).

At Chaman . { Peshawar Mountain Battery (2 guns).
Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns).
8th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).
1st Punjab Infantry.
26th Punjab Native Infantry.

At Haikalzai	. 29th Bombay Native Infantry (detachment).
At Quetta	. { Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 1st Gurkhas arrived at Quetta on 23rd January. 2nd Sikh Infantry (furnishing escorts from Dadar). 19th Punjab Native Infantry (wing). 30th Bombay Native Infantry (wing).
At Kalat	. 30th Bombay Native Infantry (wing).
South of Dadar	. { 8-11, Royal Artillery (Jacobabad). 13-8, Royal Artillery (Dadar). 16-8, Royal Artillery (Sukkur). } Siege train.

APPENDIX X (see p. 175)

Strength, Distribution, and Detail of the S. Afghanistan Field Force on the 16th May, 1879.

European troops	2,642	} Total combatants	Men.
Native troops	6,850		9,492
Followers			9,500
Grand Total			18,992

and 12,000 animals of sorts, including 15 elephants, 2,488 horses, 1,486 mules, 846 ponies, 6,500 camels, and 953 bullocks.

Distribution of Force.

Kokeran	{	2nd Punjab Cavalry. 11-11, Royal Artillery. 29th Bombay Native Infantry.
Kandahar	{	1st Punjab Cavalry. 19th Bengal Lancers. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery. D-2, Royal Artillery. G-4, Royal Artillery. 5-11, Royal Artillery. 6-11, Royal Artillery. 10th Company, Bengal Sappers. 59th Foot. 2-60th Rifles. 15th Sikhs. 3rd Gurkhas. 25th Punjab Native Infantry.

N.B.—Force present on Parade at Kandahar on the 24th May.

	Officers.	Men.
Staff	33	—
Royal Artillery	20	392
European Infantry	34	1,129
Native Infantry	20	1,239
Native Cavalry	15	511
Total	122	3,271

Chaman (Khushdil, Gulistan Karez, and Toba), Peshin.	{	3 troops 3rd Sind Horse. ½ No. 2 Mountain Battery. 2nd Sikhs. 19th Punjab Native Infantry (1 company).	Colonel Malcolmson, Commanding Peshin Movable Column.
--	---	--	---

		(13-8, Royal Artillery)	} Siege Trains.
		16-8, Royal Artillery)	
		1-1, Royal Artillery.	
Quetta	{	E-4, Royal Artillery.	
		19th Punjab Native Infantry (7 companies).	
		30th Bombay Native Infantry (head-quarters and wing), Jacob's Rifles.	
Kalat		30th Bombay Native Infantry (wing).	
Line of communication	{	1st Sind Horse.	
Quetta to Jacobabad	{	19th Bombay Native Infantry (wing and head-quarters).	
At Mach and Dozan		1st (Grenadiers) Bombay Native Infantry.	
Darwaza	{	19th Bombay Native Infantry (wing).	
		2 companies Bombay Sappers (Nos. 2 and 5).	
Vitakri, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pendergast in the Multan Command.	{	15th Bengal Cavalry, Native 348 sabres.	
		Bombay Mountain Battery, Native 2 guns.	
		9th Company, Sappers and Miners 12 men (?)	
		21st Madras Native Infantry, detachment 387 rifles.	
		30th Madras Native Infantry, detachment 212 rifles.	
		Bhawalpur Contingent, detachment 104 rifles.	

APPENDIX XI (see p. 231)

(a) *Table prepared by Lieutenant N. F. FitzG. Chamberlain, showing the numbers and nature of Cannon and Small Arms in the possession of the Afghans at the outbreak of the war.*

<i>Number of Cannon.</i>	
English Siege Train (elephant)	6
Kabuli Siege Train (elephant)	10
" " " (bullock)	18
Breech-loaders . 89 } (horse batteries)145
Brass guns . 56 }	
Breech-loaders . 6 }	
Muzzle-loaders . 48 } (mountain guns)	150
Brass guns . 96 }	
Various small guns of position	<u>50</u>
	379
Deduct captured, 1879-80	<u>256</u>
Remaining in January 1880 (chiefly in Herat and Afghan Turkistan)	<u><u>123</u>¹</u>

<i>Small Arms.</i>	
English Sniders	5,000
" Enfields	15,000
" Rifled carbines	1,200
" Brunswick carbines	1,400
" Tower muskets	1,000
" Cavalry pistols	1,045
Kabuli Sniders	2,189
" Enfields	8,212
Rifled carbines	589
Kandahari Enfields.	453
Herati Enfields	516
Various kinds for cavalry	1,553
Smooth-bores	1,418
Flint muskets	<u>1,300</u>
Total	<u><u>40,875</u></u>

¹ Thirty-two of these cannon were captured from Ayub Khan at Kandahar on 1st September, 1880.

Number of Arms delivered up or Taken.

English Enfields	742	
” Sniders	500	
Muskets and country rifles of sorts	<u>5,427</u>	6,669
Remaining in hands of the Afghans in January, 1880		<u>34,206</u>
Total		<u>40,875</u>

N.B.—It must be borne in mind that, besides these, almost every able-bodied man in Afghanistan is in possession of a *juzail* or native firearm of some sort, which is generally rifled and shoots very fairly.

It is worth noticing that no information could be obtained as to whence the English rifled carbines, Brunswick rifles, Tower muskets, and cavalry pistols were obtained. The “Brown Besses” were, perhaps, part of those taken in 1841-2.

(b) *Return of Ordnance captured by the Kabul Field Force on the 6th and 12th October, 1879.*

Nature of Ordnance.		Calibre.	Number.	Manufacture.	Taken at Chaharasia on 6th October, 1879.	Taken at Deh heights above Kabul on 9th October, 1879.	Taken at Sheerpur on 8th October, 1879.	Found in Bala Hisar on 12th October, 1879.	Abandoned by Ghazni regiments on 8th and 9th October, 1879.	
Smooth-bore.	Bronze.	Guns	12-pr.	4 Afghan	4	
			9-pr.	2 Afghan	2		
		Howitzers	6-pr.	17 1 English	17
			3-pr.	51 Afghan	42	3	6	...
			8-in.	2 Afghan	2
	Iron.	Mortars	12-pr.	5 Afghan	5
			8-in.	6 Afghan	6
		Guns	5½-in.	7 1 English	7
			24-pr.	2 Afghan	2
			18-pr.	4 English	4
Rifled.	Steel.	Howitzers	8-in.	2 English	1	...	1	
			20-pr.	6 Afghan	6	
		Breech-loading	12-pr.	6 Afghan	6
			9-pr.	14 Afghan	1	7	6	...
			8-pr.	6 Afghan	6
	Muzzle-loading	6-pr.	22 Afghan	10	...	6	
		4-pr.	11 Afghan	5	...	6	
		7-pr.	26 Afghan	26	
	Iron.	Muzzle-loading	8-pr.	21 Afghan	6	10	5	
			Total	214	...	20	21	76	85

APPENDIX XI

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The amount of war *matériel* found in the Bala Hissar was very great. Among the stores were 1,000,000 rounds of English-made Snider ammunition, with a quantity of the same of local make. Of loose powder there was a large quantity (much of which was destroyed by General Roberts), together with a store of lead, copper, tin, shot, shell, caps, as well as of clothing and accoutrements. The rifles had been taken away, but some were being brought back almost daily, as well as the horses, ponies, and other property belonging to the Embassy. A quantity of warm clothing was also found, but not nearly sufficient for the troops during the coming winter.

APPENDIX XII (see p. 234)

Proclamation by Sir Frederick Roberts to the people of Kabul, 12th October, 1879.

In my proclamation of the 3rd October (=15th Shawal), dated Zargunshahar, I informed the people of Kabul that a British army was advancing to take possession of the city; and I warned them against offering any resistance to the entry of the troops, and the authority of His Highness the Amir. That warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has now reached Kabul, and occupied the Bala Hissar; but its advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have therefore become rebels against His Highness the Amir, and have added to the guilt already incurred by them in abetting the murder of the British Envoy and of his companions, a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people. It would be but a just and fitting reward for such misdeeds if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed, and its very name blotted out. But the great British Government is ever desirous to temper justice with mercy, and I now announce to the inhabitants of Kabul that the full retribution for their offence will not be exacted, and that the city will be spared. Nevertheless, it is necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and that the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore such of the city buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops to be quartered in it, will be at once levelled with the ground; and further, a heavy fine, the amount of which will be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants, to be paid according to their capabilities. This punishment, inflicted upon the whole city, will not of course absolve from further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching enquiry will be held into the circumstances of the late outbreak, and all persons convicted of bearing a part in it will be dealt with according to their deserts. I further give notice to all that, in

order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Kabul and the surrounding country to a distance of ten miles are placed under martial law. With the consent of the Amir, a military governor of Kabul will be appointed to administer justice and to punish with a strong hand all evil-doers. The inhabitants of Kabul and of the neighbouring villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. For the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, within the streets of Kabul, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this proclamation any person found armed within these limits will be liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession any articles whatsoever which formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy are required to bring them forthwith to the British camp. Any one neglecting this warning will, if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subject to the severest penalties. Further, all persons who may have in their possession any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to, or seized by, the Afghan troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle, whether breech or muzzle loading, a sum of Rs. 3 will be given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture, Rs. 5. Any one found hereafter in possession of such weapons will be severely punished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of Rs. 50 for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy or for such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar sum will be given in case of any person who may have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September last (15th Ramzan), and has therefore become a rebel against the Amir. If any such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or subaltern officer of the Afghan army, the reward will be increased to Rs. 75, and if a field officer to Rs. 120.

APPENDIX XIII (see p. 305)

*Composition of the 2nd (Khyber) Division, North Afghanistan
Field Force, September, 1879.*

Major-General R. O. Bright, c.B., Commanding.
 Captain E. W. H. Crofton, 60th Rifles, Aide-de-Camp.
 Captain J. H. Barnard, c.M.G., Aide-de-Camp.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Wemyss, Bengal Staff Corps, Deputy Adjutant and
 Quartermaster-General.
 Major W. J. Boyes, 1-12th Foot, Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Captain the Hon. C. Dutton, 85th Foot, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Captain R. O'S. Brooke, 1-12th Foot, Provost-Marshal.

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General H. B. Hassard, Principal Medical Officer.

Commissariat Department.

Major N. R. Burlton, Bengal Staff Corps, Principal Commissariat Officer.

		BRITISH.		NATIVE.		
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.	
2ND DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. BRIGHT, C.B.						
<i>Cavalry.</i>						
British, 354. Native, 1,648.	{	6th Dragoon Guards	18	336
		3rd Bengal Cavalry	7	406
		Guides Cavalry ¹	4	254
		10th Bengal Lancers	8	443
		17th Bengal Cavalry	7	419
Total . . .		18	336	26	1,522	

¹ See Footnote, p. 660.

APPENDIX XIII—continued

		BRITISH.		NATIVE.		
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.	
2ND DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. BRIGHT, C.B.						
		Brought over . . .	18	336	26	1,522
		<i>Artillery.</i>				
36 guns. 997 men.	18 guns . . .	D-A, Royal Horse Artillery . . .	6	160	...	14
		I-C, Royal Horse Artillery . . .	6	166	...	12
		I-A, Royal Horse Artillery . . .	6	134
		C-3, Royal Artillery . . .	6	147
		11-9, Royal Artillery . . .	5	97	...	14
		No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery ¹	4	220
		Total . . .	29	704	4	260
		<i>Sappers and Miners.</i>				
871	Bengal . . .	No. 2 Company	4	2	110
		No. 3 Company	5	2	103
		No. 5 Company and headquarters ¹	11	7	139
		No. 6 Company	4	2	89
		"E" Company	4	4	115
		"A" Company . . .	2	6	3	136
Madras . . .	"I" Company	4	4	117	
	Total	38	24	809	
		<i>Infantry.</i>				
British (2,658).	1-5th Fusiliers . . .	1-5th Fusiliers . . .	2	149
		2-9th Foot ¹ . . .	19	580
		1-12th Foot . . .	21	786
		1-25th Foot . . .	20	560
		51st Light Infantry . . .	18	503
		Total . . .	80	2,578
		Carried over . . .	127	3,656	54	2,591

¹ See Footnote, p. 660.

APPENDIX XIII—*continued.*

		BRITISH.		NATIVE.	
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.
2ND DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. BRIGHT, C.B.					
Brought over		127	3,656	54	2,591
Infantry 9,550. (Native regiments 6,892.)	8th Bengal Native Infantry	7	553
	2nd Gurkhas ¹	7	451
	Guides Infantry ¹	6	564
	4th Gurkhas ¹	6	431
	22nd Punjab Native Infantry	22	740
	24th Punjab Native Infantry	7	713
	27th Punjab Native Infantry	5	602
	30th Punjab Native Infantry	8	747
	31st Punjab Native Infantry	7	662
	45th Sikhs	6	636
4th Madras Native Infantry	9	609	
15th Madras Native Infantry	1	124	
Total	91	6,892
GRAND TOTAL		127	3,656	145	9,483

GRAND TOTAL 13,411 of all ranks.
 Less 2,627 „ „ at Kabul with 1st Division.

10,784 on line of communication.

¹ The following was the constitution of the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General C. J. Gough, C.B., V.C., detached to 1st Division at Kabul :

Guides Cavalry.
 20 sabres 10th Bengal Lancers.
 4 guns No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
 2-9th Foot.
 2nd Gurkhas.
 4th Gurkhas.
 Guides Infantry.
 No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

APPENDIX XIV (see p. 328)

Strength of the Kabul Field Force, 31st December, 1879.

Eastern Afghanistan Field Force, under the command of
Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.

FIRST DIVISION.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.	
<i>Cavalry.</i>					
Brigadier-General D. Massy, v.c., Commanding—					
9th Lancers	14	319	
5th Punjab Cavalry	8	403	
12th Bengal Cavalry	6	395	
14th Bengal Lancers	6	372	
<i>Royal Artillery.</i>					
Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.A., Commanding—					
F-A, Royal Horse Artillery	6	125	
G-3, Royal Artillery	6	136	
No. 1 Mountain Battery	3	153	
No. 2 Mountain Battery	6	204	
Gatlings, 2	
<i>1st Infantry Brigade.</i>					
Brigadier-General H. T. Mac- pherson, v.c., Commanding—					
67th Foot	19	643	
92nd Highlanders	20	724	
28th Punjab Native Infantry	7	635	
<i>2nd Infantry Brigade.</i>					
Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, Commanding—					
72nd Highlanders	23	708	
3rd Sikhs	8	710	
5th Punjab Infantry	5	640	
23rd Bengal Pioneers	7	685	
5th Gurkhas	7	560	
No. 7 Company, Sappers and Miners	2	3	86	
Total	88	2,657	66	4,843	7,654 All ranks.

APPENDIX XIV—continued

SECOND DIVISION.	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.	
<i>1st Brigade.</i>					
Brigadier - General C. Gough, v.c., c.B., Commanding.					
<i>Cavalry.</i>					
Colonel Jenkins, Commanding—					
The Guides	4	254	
10th Bengal Lancers (detachment)	20	
<i>Royal Artillery.</i>					
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (4 guns)	3	125	
<i>1st Infantry Brigade.</i>					
2-9th Foot	19	580	
2nd Gurkhas	7	451	
Guides Infantry	6	564	
4th Gurkhas	6	431	
No. 5 Company, Sappers and Miners	11	7	139	
Total	19	591	33	1,984	2,627 All ranks.

<i>At Kabul—</i>	<i>All ranks.</i>	
1st Division	7,654	
2nd Division (part of)	2,627	
GRAND TOTAL	10,281	including regimental officers.

Veterinary Department.

Veterinary-Surgeon F. F. Collins, Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

Engineer Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. Limond, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer.

Major E. T. Thackeray, v.c., R.E.

Nos. 2, 3, 5, and 6 Companies of Sappers and Miners.	{ No. 2, Lieutenant J. C. L. Campbell. No. 3, Captain H. Dove. No. 5, Lieutenant E. S. Hill. No. 6, Lieutenant W. F. H. Stafford.
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APPENDIX XIV—*continued**Communications and Transport.*

Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. A. Lockhart, Road Commandant.
 Captain C. H. Stoddart, B.S.C., Assistant Road Commandant.
 Lieutenant E. B. Coke, R.E.A., Assistant Road Commandant.
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. St. G. Tucker, B.L., Director of Transports.
 Major J. C. T. Humfrey, 2-9th Foot, Field Treasure Chest (Jalalabad).
 Captain R. O'S. Brooke, 1-12th Foot, Field Treasure Chest (Landi Kotal).
 Lieutenant J. B. MacDonnell, 1-12th Foot, in charge of Signalling.

Artillery.

Colonel C. R. O. Evans, R.A., Commanding.
 Captain R. A. Lanning, R.A., Adjutant.
 Captain R. H. S. Baker, Orderly Officer.
 I-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major M. W. Ommaney, R.E.A. (1st Brigade).
 C-3, Royal Artillery, Major H. C. Magenis, R.A.
 11-9, Royal Artillery, Major J. M. Douglas, R.A.
 D-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Sidney Parry, R.A.
 13-9, Royal Artillery, Major C. W. Wilson, R.A.
 No. 4 (Hazara) Battery Mountain Train, Captain A. Broadfoot, R.A. (1st Brigade).
 Major S. Cargill, R.A., Ordnance Field Park.

1ST BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General C. J. S. Gough, V.C., C.B., Commanding.
 Captain M. G. Gerard, Bengal Staff Corps, Brigade-Major.
 Major A. A. Kinloch, 60th Rifles, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
 Major H. J. Hallows, Brigade Transport Officer.
 Lieutenant F. H. R. Drummond, 10th Bengal Lancers, Orderly Officer.
 Captain L. Tucker, Political Assistant.

Cavalry.

Guides Cavalry, Colonel F. H. Jenkins, C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart.
 10th Bengal Lancers, Major W. H. Macnaghten.

Infantry.

2-9th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Daunt.
 2nd Gurkhas, Major A. Batty.
 Guides Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Campbell.
 4th Gurkhas, Major F. F. Rowcroft.
 24th Punjab Native Infantry, Colonel F. B. Norman.
 45th Sikhs, Colonel F. M. Armstrong.
 No. 6 Company, Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant W. F. H. Stafford, R.E.

2ND BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General C. G. Arbuthnot, R.A., C.B., Commanding.
 Captain J. Cook, Bengal Staff Corps, Brigade-Major.
 Captain C. A. Carthew, Bengal Staff Corps, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

APPENDIX XIV—*continued**Cavalry.*

6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fryer.
 3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.
 17th Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Watson.

Infantry.

51st King's Own Light Infantry, Colonel C. Ball-Acton.
 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, Colonel J. J. O'Brien.
 27th Punjab Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Hughes.
 No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant J. C. L. Campbell, R.E.

3RD BRIGADE

Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B., Commanding.
 Major H. P. Pearson, 1-12th Foot, Brigade-Major.
 Lieutenant F. C. Maisey, Bengal Staff Corps, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Infantry.

1-12th Foot, Colonel G. F. Walker.
 2nd Bengal Light Infantry, Colonel T. N. Baker.
 8th Bengal Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Smith.
 30th Punjab Native Infantry, Colonel T. W. R. Boisragon.
 31st Punjab Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Tweddell.

APPENDIX XV (see p. 328)

Distribution of the 2nd (Khyber) Division, East Afghanistan Field Force, 31st December, 1879.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. BRIGHT, C.B., COMMANDING.

1st Brigade, Brigadier-General Charles Gough, v.c., attached to 1st Division at Kabul.

Cavalry	}	Guides.
Artillery		
		: No. 4 Mountain Battery (4 guns).
Infantry {	}	: British
		: 2-9th Foot.
		: 2nd Gurkhas.
		: Native
		{ Guides.
		{ 4th Gurkhas.
		{ No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers.

ON LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS, KHYBER ROUTE.

Lataband, Seh Baba, and Jagdalak.

- 10th Bengal Lancers (detachment).
- No. 4 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
- 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
- No. 2 Company, Sappers.
- No. 3 Company, Sappers.

Pezwan Kotal, Safed Sang, and Gandamak.

(HEAD-QUARTERS OF 2ND (GENERAL ARBUTHNOT'S) BRIGADE).

- 10th Bengal Lancers (furnishing small detachment).
- I-A, Royal Horse Artillery.
- 11-9, Royal Artillery (4 guns).
- 2-9th Foot (detachment).
- 51st Light Infantry.
- 2nd Gurkhas } (detachment).
- 4th Gurkhas }
- 22nd Punjab Native Infantry (furnishing detachment).
- 24th Punjab Native Infantry (1 company).
- 45th Sikhs, *en route* to Seh Baba.
- No. 6 Company, Sappers.

APPENDIX XV—*continued**Rozabad and Fort Battye.*

10th Bengal Lancers (detachments).
 22nd Punjab Native Infantry (detachment).
 27th Punjab Native Infantry (detachment).

Jalalabad.

(DIVISIONAL HEAD-QUARTERS OF GENERAL BRIGHT.)

6th Dragoon Guards (furnishing detachment).
 C-3, Royal Artillery (4 guns).
 1-12th Foot (5 companies).
 27th Punjab Native Infantry (furnishing detachment).
 1 company Madras Sappers.

Barikao, Basawal and Dakka.

6th Dragoon Guards (1 squadron).
 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
 17th Bengal Cavalry (furnishing detachment).
 D-A, Royal Horse Artillery (2 guns).
 C-3, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
 11-9, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
 1-12th Foot (2 companies).
 22nd Punjab Native Infantry (detachment).
 27th Punjab Native Infantry (detachment).
 30th Punjab Native Infantry (2 companies).
 "A" Company, Madras Sappers.

Landi Khana and Landi Kotal.

(3RD BRIGADE, HEAD-QUARTERS OF GENERAL DORAN.)

17th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).	1-25th Foot.
D-A, Royal Horse Artillery (4 guns).	31st Punjab Native Infantry.
1-12th Foot (detachment).	"C" Company, Madras Sappers.

In Khyber, Ali Masjid, and Jamrud.

17th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).	8th Bengal Native Infantry.
I-C, Royal Horse Artillery.	4th Madras Native Infantry.
1-5th Fusiliers (1 company).	15th Madras Native Infantry.

On the 31st December, 1879, the Peshawar District Force was thus constituted, a portion being at Nowshera. It was afterwards reinforced and became the Reserve Division :

APPENDIX XV—*continued.*

PESHAWAR DISTRICT FORCE.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS, C.B., COMMANDING.

Cavalry		1st Bengal Cavalry.	
Artillery	:	{ D-4, Royal Artillery.	
		{ 6-8, Royal Artillery.	
		{ 13-9, Royal Artillery.	
Infantry	{	British	{ 1-5th Fusiliers (5 companies).
			{ Depots and detachments, British regiments
			{ 1st Bengal Native Infantry.
			{ 5th Bengal Light Infantry.
		Native	{ 39th Bengal Native Infantry.
		{ 15th Madras Native Infantry (6 companies).	
		{ Native depots.	

TOTAL—in all, 5,439 of all ranks.

APPENDIX XVI (see p. 301)

*Distribution of troops in the Kurram Valley on 31st December, 1879,
under the command of Brigadier-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C.*

1ST BRIGADE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. H. GORDON.

At Paucar, Shalozan and Habib Kala.

13th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron).
C-4, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
1-8, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
2-8th Foot (furnishing detachment).
85th Foot (wing).
21st Punjab Infantry.
29th Punjab Infantry (furnishing detachments).

At Kurram Fort.

13th Bengal Lancers (furnishing detachments).
C-4, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
2-8th Foot (2 companies).
85th Foot (detachment).
11th Bengal Infantry (3 companies).
13th Bengal Infantry (furnishing detachments).

2ND BRIGADE, UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYTLER.

At Balesh Khel.

13th Bengal Lancers (detachment).	85th Foot (detachment).
C-4, Royal Artillery (2 guns).	11th Bengal Infantry (5 companies).
No. 1 (Kohat) Battery (2 guns).	20th Punjab Infantry (2 companies).

At Thal and Alizai.

1st Bengal Cavalry (furnishing detachment).
11-8, Royal Artillery (2 guns).
No. 8 Company Sappers.
85th Foot (wing).
5th Bengal Infantry.
20th Punjab Infantry (6 companies).

At Kohat, Bannu, etc.

18th Bengal Cavalry (furnishing detachment).
E-3, Royal Artillery.
No. 5 Garrison Battery (detachment).
1-5th Fusiliers (2 companies).
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.
1st Sikhs.
4th Punjab Infantry.
5th Punjab Infantry (depot).
1st Madras Infantry.
Details.

APPENDIX XVII (see p. 348)

Return of the Bengal Division under Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart on its departure from Kandahar, March, 1880.

FIELD FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS AND CAVALRY BRIGADE.

CORPS.	TROOPS.				Grand Total.	RIDING OR DRAUGHT ANIMALS.						TRANSPORT ANIMALS.		Followers.
	BRITISH.			NATIVE.		Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Ponies.	Elephants.	Grass-cutters' ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Total.	Officers, non-commissioned officers and men.										
Field Force Head-quarters	20	88	108	149	257	107	3	152	12	269
Cavalry Brigade Head-quarters	3	...	3	...	3	9	13	...	27
Royal Artillery Staff	2	...	2	...	2	6	9	...	12
A-B, R.H.A.	2	154	156	...	156	202	...	21	13	291	11	352
11-11, R.A. (2 guns, mountain)	1	24	25	38	63	3	36	66	4	115
19th Bengal Lancers	8	...	8	415	423	427	216	218	34	466
No 4 Company, Sappers and Miners	3	7	10	106	116	9	...	37	107	80	208
No. 10 Company, Sappers and Miners	2	5	7	99	106	4	...	48	104	49	185
Engineer Field Park	1	5	6	...	6	2	50	199	169
Commissariat Department	2	4	6	...	6	4	12	571	...	223
Transport Department	5	29	34	...	34	10	153	...	39
Field Post Office	1	...	1	...	1	3	...	7
19th Punjab Infantry	8	...	8	654	662	251	45	288
Field Hospital	85	...	122
Total	58	316	374	1,461	1,835	783	36	106	12	...	232	2,073	434	2,282

APPENDIX XVII—continued

1ST BRIGADE.

CORPS.	TROOPS.				Grand Total.	RIDING OR DRAUGHT ANIMALS.						TRANSPORT ANIMALS.		Followers.
	BRITISH.			NATIVE.		Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Ponies.	Elephants.	Grass-cutters' ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Total.	Officers, non-commissioned officers and men.										
1st Brigade Staff	4	...	4	...	4	9	11	...	23	
11-11, R.A. (4 guns, mountain)	5	53	58	84	142	12	118	144	10	162	
2-60th Rifles	19	637	656	...	656	10	...	14	715	39	560	
1st Punjab Cavalry	5	...	5	511	516	439	221	35	536	
15th Sikhs	6	...	6	685	691	6	253	45	236	
25th Punjab Infantry	7	...	7	643	650	7	227	39	293	
Commissariat	1	2	3	...	3	2	6	...	200	...	89	
General Hospital	3	...	3	...	3	2	25	...	59	
Total	50	692	742	1,923	2,665	487	118	14	6	...	236	1,796	168	1,958

APPENDIX XVII—continued

2ND BRIGADE.

CORPS.	TROOPS.				Grand Total.	RIDING OR DRAUGHT ANIMALS.						TRANSPORT ANIMALS.		Followers.
	BRITISH.			NATIVE.		Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Ponies.	Elephants.	Grass-cutters' ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Total.	Officers, non-commissioned officers and men.										
Head-quarters, 2nd Brigade	4	...	4	...	4	7	3	152	12	269
G-4, Royal Artillery (field)	7	146	153	...	153	142	8	27	288	11	291
6-11, Royal Artillery (heavy)	5	92	97	...	97	6	...	400	...	13	...	297	15	530
2nd Punjab Cavalry	8	...	8	470	478	487	243	286	2	520
59th Foot	18	738	756	...	756	12	823	45	580
2nd Sikhs	8	...	8	723	731	8	259	45	353
3rd Gurkhas	6	...	6	518	524	6	227	57	270
Ordnance Park	1	5	6	...	6	4	3	540	...	185
Treasure	140	...	35
Total	57	981	1,038	1,711	2,749	672	8	427	3	13	246	3,012	187	3,033
Total, 1st and 2nd Brigades	107	1,673	1,780	3,634	5,414	1,159	126	441	9	13	482	4,808	355	4,991

APPENDIX XVIII (see p. 392)

Approximate Strength of the Kabul Field Force on 31st March, 1880.

CORPS AND COMMANDANTS.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		TOTAL.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British Officers.	Natives, all ranks.	
<i>Sappers and Miners.</i>					
No. 2 Company, Lieutenant J. C. Campbell, R.E.	4	2	101	107
No. 3 Company, Captain H. Dove, R.E.	4	2	101	107
No. 5 Company, Lieutenant E. S. Hill, R.E.	5	3	77	85
No. 7 Company, Lieutenant P. T. Buston, R.E.	5	2	86	93
<i>Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.A.</i>					
F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major A. J. C. Smyth-Windham	6	162	168
G-3, Royal Artillery, Major W. R. Craster	6	178	184
No. 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns), Captain H. R. L. Morgan	4	143	147
No. 2 Mountain Battery, Major G. Swinley	5	199	204
No. 4 Mountain Battery, Captain A. Broadfoot	4	150	154
<i>Cavalry under Brigadier-General H. H. Gough.</i>					
9th Lancers, Major H. A. Bushman, C.B.	17	287	304
3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie	8	372	380
17th Bengal Cavalry, Major E. G. Newnham	4	412	416
Guides Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stewart	4	275	279
<i>1st Division, General Sir F. S. Roberts.</i>					
<i>1st Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson.</i>					
92nd Highlanders, Colonel G. H. Parker, C.B.	22	695	717
28th Punjab Infantry, Colonel J. Hudson	8	638	646
45th Punjab Infantry (Rattray's Sikhs), Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Armstrong	8	670	678
	22	695	16	1,308	

392

857

1,379

2,041

APPENDIX XVIII—continued

CORPS AND COMMANDANTS.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		TOTAL.	
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British Officers.	Natives, all ranks.		
1st Division, General Sir F. S. Roberts.	2nd Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General T. D. Baker.					
	72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow, c.B. . .	19	691	710
	5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. FitzHugh, c.B.	8	636	644
	3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Noel Money, c.B.	10	634	644
	5th Punjab Infantry, Major H. M. Pratt	8	609	617
2nd Division, General J. Ross.	3rd Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General W. Roberts.					
	67th Foot, Colonel C. B. Knowles, c.B.	23	622	645
	4th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft	7	532	539
	27th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Hughes	6	632	638
	4th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General C. J. S. Gough.					
9th Foot, Colonel W. Daunt, c.B.	16	449	465	
2nd Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Batty	7	532	539	
24th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel F. B. Norman	8	717	725	
<i>Unattached.</i>						
23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett	16	449	15	1,249		
Guides Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Campbell	8	769	767	
	6	607	613	
	14	1,366		
GRAND TOTAL	109	3,102	122	8,882	12,215	

En route { 6-8, Royal Artillery, Major T. Graham.
 10-11, Royal Artillery, Major C. D. A. Straker, R.A.
 12-9, Royal Artillery, Major H. L. Gwyn, R.A.
 3rd Punjab Cavalry and drafts (European, 530; Native 30), Major A. Vivian.

APPENDIX XIX (see p. 394)

Extract from General Roberts's despatch, No. 1339, dated the 17th April, 1880.

“25. I think I have now dealt with all the points of military importance connected with the military position in Northern Afghanistan, but there are a few questions of more general interest which I desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

“26. First with regard to rations : the daily scale of issue to native troops is given in the margin. It has been found throughout the campaign, even when the men were employed upon hard work, that 12 *chittacks* of *atta* daily are amply sufficient for the native troops, supplemented as of late, through the liberality of Government, by a bi-weekly issue of 1 lb. of meat. In a climate like Afghanistan, where the inhabitants are all meat-eaters, this liberality has been most wise. Every endeavour was made, before this sanction was granted, to supply the native portion of the force with meat on payment, and I attribute to this, in great measure, the sound health and excellent stamina which they now exhibit.

“With regard to the issue of rum, if I may be permitted to offer an opinion, I would suggest that it should not be issued free to native troops, except under exceptional circumstances of fatigue and weather; but that the Commissariat Department should be authorised to have in store a sufficiency of rum to admit of a bi-weekly issue to such troops as drink the spirit, *on payment*, and then only on the recommendation of the medical officer and under the sanction of the General Officer Commanding. On all occasions when rum is sanctioned, either free or on payment, those who do not partake of spirits should be allowed a ration of tea and sugar under similar conditions.

“27. The scale of rations for native followers requires no alteration.

<i>Daily ration of native soldiers.</i>	
Atta .	12 chittacks.
Dhal .	2 ”
Ghi .	1 chittack.
Salt .	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb. bi-weekly.
Meat .	1 lb. bi-weekly.
Rum .	1 dram.

“28. The European rations now under issue in Kabul are as

European ration.

Meat . . .	1½ lb.
Bread . . .	1½ ”
Vegetables . . .	1½ ”
Rice . . .	4 oz.
Salt . . .	3 ”
Tea . . .	3 ”
Sugar . . .	3 ”

per margin, and with reference to them I would make the following remarks: the increase of ¼ lb. in bread and meat is, in my opinion, very desirable; for not only is the meat, as a rule, on service, inferior to that supplied in cantonments, but the extras which can be procured from the coffee-shop are not here forthcoming. When the

vegetable ration consists of potatoes, 1 lb. is sufficient; but when it is made of mixed vegetables 1½ lb. is necessary. The substitution of *dhal* for any portion of the vegetable ration I consider undesirable.

“Tinned soups and meats and biscuits are most valuable, and should be liberally supplied to every force in the field. They are portable and liked by the men, to whom they furnish a very welcome change of diet. I would very strongly recommend that a much larger issue of these articles than has hitherto been sanctioned should be provided.

“29. A question which has arisen during this campaign, and which may crop up again, has been the provision of firewood for cooking to native troops and followers. Throughout the winter firewood could not be purchased at Kabul, and it was absolutely necessary to issue it to these men. This was done at the rate of one *seer* per man, but this amount is not arbitrary, and might, under certain circumstances, be diminished. Since roads were reopened and markets re-established, the issue of wood has been discontinued. In framing any future rules for the guidance of a force in the field, the question of providing firewood through the Commissariat Department for native troops and followers, free or on payment, should be vested in the General Officers Commanding.

Firewood.

Warm clothing.

“30. The scale of clothing authorised by Government for native troops and followers was found, even in the rigorous climate of Afghanistan, to be most liberal, except that during the very coldest weather a second blanket was required. This want I was able to meet from stock in hand, and as the weather became milder these extra blankets were withdrawn and returned into store. Warm stockings, too, are very necessary in a climate where frost-bite is not uncommon; fortunately some thousands were procured locally and issued to followers. The ordinary native shoe of India, as provided

Shoes.

by the Commissariat Department, is utterly unfitted for a country such as Afghanistan. Major Badcock will send to Peshawar (where they can easily be

made up) a pattern Kabuli shoe, which I am convinced would be found admirably suited for native troops and followers crossing the frontier. We are now almost entirely dependent on the local market for our shoes.

“ A large supply of English-made ammunition boots should always accompany a force in the field, in order to allow those natives who use them, and who are often crippled by wearing other descriptions of shoe, to obtain them on payment at the moderate rate now fixed, *viz.* Rs. 4 per pair.

“ The country-made waterproof sheets, though slightly heavier, have proved themselves quite as serviceable, if not more so than the English-made ones.

“ At the close of the campaign, I would very strongly recommend that an intelligent committee should be required to go thoroughly into these questions of clothing for troops, British and native, and for followers. I would also suggest that when a decision is arrived at, sealed patterns of every article approved should be deposited at all manufacturing centres, and in all the large jails, so that when certain articles are required they need only be called for, and precious time (often wasted in reference) and correspondence saved.

“ 31. The number of doolie-bearers with the two divisions of the Kabul Field Force, now at Kabul, is 3,536, with the very moderate sick report of 35, or 1 per cent. of strength.

“ Doolies and dandies are distributed as follows :

British troops . . .	{ doolies, 3 per cent. dandies, 2 per cent.
Native troops . . .	{ doolies, 2 per cent. dandies, 3 per cent.

a percentage which I consider sufficient for field service, as, in the event of any unusual number of casualties, transport animals could and would be made use of, and it is most undesirable to increase the number of followers.

“ The Lushai dandy for this sort of warfare is much preferable to the carpet or *dhurrie* dandy, as it can be made into a bed, and men are not so liable to fall out of it.

“ Bourke's doolie is very good, but liable to get out of order and difficult to repair when broken. The ordinary kind is fair and serviceable.

“ 32. I would urge that in future all field-service tents should be made after the pattern of the mountain-battery tent, single fly for natives, double for Europeans, and that the poles should be constructed on the

telescopic principle—that is, that no thinning of the wood where it enters the socket should be allowed either on uprights or ridge pole, and that the old system of paring away should be abandoned. Instead, the upper section should sit flat on the lower. Doubtless the sockets will have to be longer and stronger than those now in use, but this is the only means by which tents can be adapted to mule and pony carriage, which will no doubt in future wars be our chief means of transport.

“33. The Waler horses of the cavalry and artillery have stood the strain remarkably well, considering the hard work and great exposure they have had to bear, and also that for a very considerable time they were entirely deprived of green food. I feel sure this information will be most satisfactory, seeing that, for the future, the artillery and cavalry in India must mainly depend upon the Australian market for their remounts.

“34. As there are some minor points of detail which might advantageously be considered by those who have had the experience of recent service, I have convened a committee, with Colonel MacGregor, C.B., as President, which will take suggestions and record opinions regarding packing transport animals, equipment, kit, dress, etc., of both officers and men of the several branches of the Service. From the constitution of the committee, I feel certain that their recommendations cannot but be valuable, and I hope to have the honour of submitting them shortly, for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.”

Committee to record suggestions on equipment.

Waler horses.

APPENDIX XX (see p. 430)

Table showing approximately the distribution and strength of the British Forces in Afghanistan prior to the final evacuation of Kabul (10th August, 1880), being the maximum strength attained during the war.

I.

NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR D. STEWART, K.C.B.

	DESCRIPTION.	Guns.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		Total all ranks.				
			Officers.	Men.	British officers.	Men.					
At Zargunshahar, preparing to march on Kandahar, under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, K.C.B., with Major-General Ross, Second in Command.	Staff	...	79	9,987				
	Artillery	Colonel A. C. Johnson.	6-8, Royal Artillery 11-9, Royal Artillery No. 2 Mountain Battery	18 (Mountain)	12	190		5	418		
		Cavalry	Brig.-Gen. H. H. Gough, V.C., C.B.		8th Lancers 3rd Bengal Cavalry 3rd Punjab Cavalry Central India Horse	...		19	818	27	1,297
			Infantry		(1) Brig.-Gen. H. T. Macpherson, C.B.	92nd Highlanders 2nd Gurkhas 23rd Pioneers		...	19	651	22
				(2) Brig.-Gen. T. D. Baker, C.B.	24th Punjab Infantry 72nd Highlanders 5th Gurkhas 2nd Sikhs	...		23	787	22	1,743
				(3) Brig.-Gen. C. M. MacGregor, C.B.	3rd Sikhs 2-60th Rifles 4th Gurkhas 15th Sikhs 25th Punjab Infantry	...		21	616	25	1,916
			Total		18	178		2,562	101	7,151	

678

At Kabul, and about to withdraw to India, under Major-General J. Hills, V.C., C.B., on 11th and 12th August.	Sappers	Brigadier C. T. S. Gough.	No. 10 Company	5	2	104	6,678	
	Artillery		G-4, Royal Artillery	12	11	238	...	133		
	Cavalry		1st Punjab Cavalry	14	889		
			2nd Punjab Cavalry (3 troops)		
	Infantry		Brigadiers R. J. Hughes and W. Daunt.	Guides
				2-9th Foot (6 companies)
				59th Foot	58	1,831	38		3,355
				67th Foot
				5th Punjab Infantry
				27th Punjab Infantry
28th Punjab Infantry			
Total			12	69	2,074	54	4,481			
En route to India from Kabul by detachments.	Sappers	Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 Companies	A-B, Royal Horse Artillery	33	13	485	2,930	
	Artillery		G-3, Royal Artillery	30	23	499	5	378		
			6-11, Royal Artillery	11	588		
	Cavalry.		No. 4 Mountain Battery		
			2nd Punjab Cavalry (3 troops)		
	Infantry		19th Bengal Lancers (3 troops)		
			2-9th Foot (2 companies)	9	272	7	607		
			67th Foot (detachment)		
	Total			30	32	804	36	2,058		

APPENDIX XX—continued

NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN.—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR D. STEWART, K.C.B.

	DESCRIPTION.		Guns.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		Total all ranks.	
				Officers.	Men.	British Officers.	Men.		
<i>Khyber Line Force, from Butkhak to Jamrud, under Major-General R. O. Bright, C.B.</i>	Sappers	12	5	369	} 14,025	
	Artillery	16	11	296	4	230		
	Cavalry	15	310	24	1,235		
	Infantry	Brigadiers W. A. Gib, J. Doran, and R. S. Hill.	No. 6 Company, Bengal "A," "C," "I" Companies, Madras	12	5		369
			C-3, L-5, R.A., and No. 1 M.B.	16	11	296	4		230
			6th Dragoon Guards	15	310	24		1,235
			4th, 5th, 17th Bengal Cavalry	15	310	24		1,235
			1-5th, 1-18th, 2-14th, 1-25th, 51st Foot	101	3,889	82		79
			8th, 9th, 16th, 22nd, 27th, 80th, 31st, 32nd, 41st Bengal Infantry	101	3,889	82		79
			1st Gurkhas
		1st, 4th, 15th Madras Infantry		
		Total	16	127	4,007	115	9,776		
<i>Peshawar District Force, under Brigadier-General G. C. Hankin.</i>	Artillery	18	8	348	...	139	} 6,967	
									Cavalry
	I-A, Royal Horse Artillery	18	8	348	...	139			
	10-11, Royal Artillery	10	292	8	971			
	8th Hussars	10	292	8	971			
	10th Bengal Lancers	10	292	8	971			
	Infantry	11th Bengal Lancers	10	292	8		971
			14th Bengal Lancers	10	292	8		971
			1-12th Foot
			1-17th Foot
1st Bengal Infantry	82	2,166	16	2,977		
		6th Bengal Infantry	82	2,166	16	2,977		
		39th Bengal Infantry	82	2,166	16	2,977		
		Depots		
		Convalescents and other details		
		Total	18	50	2,806	24	4,087		
GRAND TOTAL of the Force at Kohat, and on the Khyber Line of Communication			94	451	12,263	830	27,553	40,587	

¹ Depot and detachment.

APPENDIX XX—continued

II.

KURRAM FIELD FORCE.—MAJOR-GENERAL J. WATSON, C.B.

	DESCRIPTION.			Guns.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		Total all ranks.
					Officers.	Men.	British Officers.	Men.	
Paiwar Kotal, eastward to Kohat.	Sappers	No. 8 Company	2	1	104	} 8,679
	Artillery	C-4, E-3, and I-8, Royal Artillery No. 5 Garrison	18	15	410	...	213	
	Cavalry.	{ 1st Bengal Cavalry 8th Bengal Cavalry (detachment) 13th Bengal Lancers 18th Bengal Cavalry }	21	1,382	
	Infantry	{ Brigadiers J. J. H. Gordon and H. R. L. New- digate.	{ 2-8th and 85th Foot 4th R.B. (2 companies) 5th Bengal Infantry 11th Bengal Infantry (detachment) 13th, 20th, 21st, and 29th Bengal In- fantry 1st Sikhs Deoli Battalion Depots and Staff }	...	61	1,831	49	4,590	
	Total			18	76	2,243	71	6,289	

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APPENDIX XX—continued

III.

SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. M. PRIMROSE, C.B., MAJOR-GENERAL R. PHAYRE, C.B., Second in COMMAND.

	DESCRIPTION.			Guns.	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		Total all ranks.
					Officers.	Men.	British Officers.	Men.	
Kandahar, less casualties on the 26th July (not yet reported on the above date).	Kalat-i-Ghilzal.	Staff.		...	87	97	...	848	527
		Artillery	C-2, Royal Artillery	2	2	55	...	5	
		Cavalry	{ Colonel O.V. Tanner, 20th N.I. } 8rd Sind Horse	2	180	
		Infantry	{ 66th Foot 29th Bombay Infantry }	...	8	265	8	721	
			Total	2	10	320	10	866	
		Sappers	No. 2 Company, Bombay	5	2	104	6,112
		Artillery	{ E-B, Royal Horse Artillery C-2 and 5-11, Royal Artillery }	10	15	340	...	25	
		Cavalry.	{ 8rd Sind Horse Poona Horse (detachment) 8rd Bombay Cavalry }	15	1,103	
		Infantry	{ Brigadiers H. F. Brooke and G. R. S. Burrows. } 2-7th and 66th Foot 1st, 4th, 19th, 28th, and 80th Bombay Infantry }	...	40	1,180	84	3,249	
			Total	10	55	1,525	51	4,481	

Eastward to Chaman	Cavalry.	Poona Horse (detachment)	1	68	} 490
	Infantry	16th and 19th Bombay Infantry	1	420	
			Total	2	488	
From the Khojak, eastward to Quetta, including Peshin.	Artillery	F-2 and 14-9, Royal Artillery	16	9	293	4	164	} 5,127
	Cavalry.	No. 2 Mountain Battery	16	906	
			2nd Sind Horse	
	Infantry	Poona Horse (detachment)	23	805	25	2,882	
			1st Madras Cavalry	
2-11th Foot 4th, 9th, 10th, and 16th Bombay In- fantry (detachment)	
			Total		16	32	1,098	45	3,952	
En route to Peshin and Quetta from Thal-Chotiali, Sibi, the Bolan Pass, Jacobabad, etc.	Sappers.	3rd, 4th, and 5th Companies (Bombay Sappers)	12	5	222	} 2,234
	Cavalry.	1st Sind Horse (detachment)	6	491	
			2nd Bombay Cavalry	
	Infantry	5th and 23rd (detachments)	22	1,467	
			9th, 10th, and 16th Bombay Infantry	
			Total	12	33	2,189	
GRAND TOTAL in Southern Afghanistan					28	184	3,052	141	12,309	15,686

RECAPITULATION

	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		Total.	Guns.
	Officers.	Men.	British officers.	Natives.		
I. Northern Afghanistan	451	12,253	330	27,553	40,587	94
II. Kurram District	76	2,243	71	6,280	8,670	18
III. Southern Afghanistan	184	8,052	141	12,300	15,686	28
GRAND TOTAL	711	17,548	542	46,151	64,952	140

APPENDIX XXI (see p. 424)

*Distribution of the 2nd Division and Reserve Division Kabul Field Force,
27th January, 1880.*

MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. BRIGHT.	1ST BRIGADE, BRIGADIER- GENERAL C. G. ARBUTHNOT.	Seh-Baba, Jag- dalak, Peswan.	Gandamak . . .	11-9, Royal Artillery (4 guns), Major J. M. Douglas. Nos. 2, 3, and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers. 12th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 14th Bengal Lancers (detachment). 51st Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Ball-Acton. 45th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Armstrong. 1-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major M. W. Ommaney. 8rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie. 17th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron). 1-12th Foot (3 companies). 8th Bengal Infantry (6 companies), Lieutenant-Colonel R. Smith. 22nd Punjab Infantry, Colonel B. T. Stafford. 27th Punjab Infantry (1 company). C-3, Royal Artillery (4 guns), Major H. Cole Magenis. 6th Dragoon Guards (2½ squadrons). 17th Bengal Cavalry (2 squadrons). 1-12th Foot (4 companies), Colonel G. F. Walker. 1-25th Foot (4 companies). 8th Bengal Infantry (2 companies). 27th Punjab Infantry (3 companies). 80th Punjab Infantry (1 company). 31st Punjab Infantry (6 companies), Lieutenant-Colonel F. Tweddell. 4th Madras Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodding. "A," "C," and "I" Companies, Madras Sappers, Major Ross Thompson. 6th Dragoon Guards (1 troop). 30th Punjab Infantry (1 company). 31st Punjab Infantry (2 companies). [Parry. D-A, Royal Horse Artillery (Lieutenant-Colonel Sidney I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, Major and Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. A. Stewart.					
	2ND BRIGADE, BRIGADIER- GENERAL J. DOBAN.	Rozbad, Fort Battye, Darunia, and Jalalabad.	Ali-Boghan, Bar-kab, and Basawal.	L-5, Royal Artillery (4 guns), Major R. C. W. Brough. 8th Hussars (1 squadron). 4th Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Prendergast. Central India Horse (2 squadrons), Lieutenant-Colonel O. Martin. 3rd Infantry Brigade. { 1-5th Fusiliers, Colonel T. Rowland. 1st Madras Infantry, Colonel F. Dawson. 15th Madras Infantry, Colonel G. Hearn. 1st Gurkhas (1 company from 2nd Brigade). L-5, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 9th Bengal Infantry, Colonel E. T. Webster (from 1st Brigade). 2nd Infantry Brigade. { 2-14th Foot, Colonel D. S. Warren. 1st Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Story. 41st Bengal Infantry, Colonel H. S. Obbard. 8th Hussars (3 squadrons). 1st Infantry Brigade. { 1-18th Foot, Colonel M. J. R. MacGregor. 9th Bengal Infantry. 10th Bengal Infantry, Colonel R. S. Moseley. E-A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major W. W. Murdoch. D-4, Royal Artillery (4 guns), Major J. F. Free. 6-8, Royal Artillery, Major T. Graham. 13-9, R.A., Major C. W. Wilson. 5th Bengal Cavalry, Major H. A. Shakespear. 11th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Hoyia. 12th Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Greene. 1-17th Foot, Colonel W. D. Thompson. Depots, British Regiments. 1st Bengal Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel L. H. P. de H. Larpent. 6th Bengal Infantry, Major W. Atkins. 30th Bengal Infantry, Colonel Fraser. Depots, Native Regiments G. W.					
MAJOR-GENERAL J. ROSS.	KHYBER RESERVE DIVISION.	Basawal, Dakka, Landi Kotal, Landi Khana, under Brigadier- General Gib.	Ali Masjid, Jamrud, under Brigadier- General Hill.	Peshawar, under Brigadier- General Roberts.	Artillery . . .	PESHAWAR DISTRICT FORCE, 5,000.	Native Cavalry, under Brigadier- General Hankin.	British Infantry	Native

In all, 15,000 of all ranks.

APPENDIX XXII (see p. 435)

*Distribution of the Troops on Line of Communication under
Major-General Bright, 31st March, 1880.*

3RD SECTION. BRIGADIER- GENERAL R. SALE HILL.	}	Butkhak	4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 67th Foot (2 companies from Kabul). (No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns), Lieutenant J. C. Shirres.
		Lataband	4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 28th Punjab Infantry (wing from Kabul). 30th Punjab Infantry (head-quarters), Lieut- enant-Colonel R. D. Campbell.
		Seh Baba	4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 51st Light Infantry (detachment). 22nd Punjab Infantry, Colonel B. T. Stafford. (No. 6 Company Sappers, Lieutenant W. F. H. Stafford.
		Jagdalak	11-9, R.A. (2 guns) (Mountain Battery). 1-25th Foot (detachment). 51st Light Infantry (detachment). 22nd Punjab Infantry (detachment).
		Jagdalak Kotal	51st Light Infantry (detachment). 1-12th Foot (detachment).
		Pezwan	51st Light Infantry (head-quarters), Lieut- enant-Colonel Ball-Acton. 8th Bengal Infantry (detachment). 1-A, R.H.A., Major M. W. Ommaney. 6th Dragoon Guards (1 squadron). 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). "A" Company, Madras Sappers, Lieutenant C. H. Darling.
		Safed Sang (Brigade Head-quarters, 3rd Section).	1-12th Foot (head-quarters), Colonel G. Walker. 8th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters), Lieut- enant-Colonel R. Smith. 31st Punjab Infantry (head-quarters), Lieut- enant-Colonel F. Tweddell. 1st Gurkhas (head-quarters), Lieutenant- Colonel P. Story.
		Fort Battye	4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 9th Bengal Infantry (detachment). 1st Gurkhas (detachment). 4th Madras Infantry (detachment).
		Rozabad	4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 4th Madras Infantry (detachment).
		2ND SECTION. BRIGADIER- GENERAL J. DORAN.	}
Lachipur, Girdi Kas, and Ali Boghan	4th Madras Infantry (head-quarters), Lieut- enant-Colonel G. C. Hodding. "C" Company, Madras Sappers, Captain A. R. F. Dorward, R.E. "I" Company, Madras Sappers, Lieutenant A. E. Dobson, R.E. 9th Bengal Infantry (detachment). 1st Madras Infantry (detachment).		

APPENDIX XXII—*continued*

1st SECTION, BRIGADIER- GENERAL W. A. GIB.	{	Barikab and Basawal	{ L-5, R.A. (4 guns), Major W. R. C. Brough. 6th Dragoon Guards (1 squadron). 8th Hussars (head-quarters), Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Chaplin, v.c. 5th Bengal Cavalry (2 squadrons), Major H. A. Shakespear. 1-5th Fusiliers (detachment). 1st Madras Infantry (detachment). 15th Madras Infantry (detachment).
		Dakka	{ L-5, R.A. (2 guns). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-5th Fusiliers (detachment). 15th Madras Infantry (head-quarters), Colonel G. Hearn.
		Haft Chah	{ 15th Madras Infantry (detachment).
		Landi Khana and Torsappar, Divisional Head-quarters.	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 32nd Punjab Pioneers (head-quarters), Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fellowes.
		Landi Kotal (Brigade Head-quarters).	{ No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-5th Fusiliers (head-quarters), Colonel T. Rowland. 32nd Punjab Pioneers (detachment). 41st Bengal Infantry (head-quarters), Colonel H. S. Obbard.
		Ali Masjid	{ 11-9, R.A. (2 guns). No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). Central India Horse (head-quarters). 16th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 41st Bengal Infantry (detachment). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).
		Jamrud	{ 2-14th Foot (head-quarters), Colonel D. S. Warren. 16th Bengal Infantry (detachment), Major A. F. Taylor.
		Peshawar	{ 1-18th Foot, Colonel M. J. R. McGregor.

In all, about 15,965 of all ranks with 23 guns.

The Peshawar District Force was thus constituted—

BRIGADIER- GENERAL G. C. HANKIN, at Peshawar, Nowshera, etc.	{	Artillery	{ E-A, R.H.A., Major W. W. Murdoch. D-4, R.A., Major J. F. Free. 10th Bengal Lancers, Major England. 11th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Boyle.	
		Cavalry	{ 12th Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Greene.	
		Infantry	{ British	{ 1-17th Foot, Colonel W. D. Thompson. Depots, British Regiments.
			{ Native	{ 1st Bengal Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel L. H. P. de Hochpied Larpent. 6th Bengal Infantry, Major W. Atkins. 39th Bengal Infantry, Colonel G. W. Fraser. Depots, Native Regiments.

Total, 5,768 of all ranks.

APPENDIX XXIII (see p. 454)

Distribution of the Troops on the Line of Communication under Major-General R. O. Bright, c.B., on the 30th June, 1880.

3RD SECTION, BRIGADIER- GENERAL R. S. HILL.	}	Butkhak . . .	{ 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 72nd Foot (detachment) from Kabul. 27th Native Infantry (detachment) from Kabul.
		Lataband . . .	{ No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 27th Bengal Infantry (detachment) from Kabul. 30th Punjab Infantry (head-quarters).
		Seh-Baba . . .	{ 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 51st Foot (detachment). 22nd Punjab Infantry (head-quarters). 1st Gurkhas (detachment).
		Jagdalak Kotal	{ 11-9, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-25th Foot (detachment). 51st Foot (detachment).
		Jagdalak . . .	{ 1st Gurkhas (head-quarters). 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). No. 6 Company Bengal Sappers. 1-25th Foot (detachment).
		Pezwan . . .	{ 22nd Punjab Infantry (detachment). 1-19, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 4th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-25th Foot (head-quarters).
		Safed Sang	{ 31st Punjab Infantry (detachment). "A" and "I" Companies, Madras Sappers. C-3, Royal Artillery (4 guns). 11-9, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 6th Dragoon Guards (head-quarters). Central India Horse (detachment). 4th Bengal Cavalry (head-quarters). 1-5th Foot (detachment).
		Fort Battye	{ 51st Light Infantry (head-quarters). 31st Punjab Infantry (head-quarters). 1st Gurkhas (detachment). 4th Madras Infantry (head-quarters).
		Rozabad . . .	{ Central India Horse (detachment). 8th Bengal Infantry (detachment). Central India Horse (detachment). 8th Bengal Infantry (detachment).
		Ali Boghan	{ "C" Company Madras Sappers (half). Central India Horse (detachment). 9th Bengal Infantry (detachment). C-3, Royal Artillery (2 guns). No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns). Central India Horse (head-quarters). 1-5th Fusiliers (head-quarters).
2ND SECTION, BRIGADIER- GENERAL J. DORAN.	}	Jalalabad . . .	{ 8th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 9th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 1st Madras Infantry (head-quarters). 4th Madras Infantry (detachment).
		Lachipur . . .	{ "C" Company Madras Sappers (half). Central India Horse (detachment). 1st Madras Infantry (detachment).
		Char Deh . . .	{ Central India Horse (detachment). 1st Madras Infantry (detachment). L-5, Royal Artillery.
		Pesh-Bolak	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (head-quarters). 2-14th Foot (head-quarters). 32nd Pioneers (head-quarters).

APPENDIX XXIII—*continued*

1st SECTION, BRIGADIER- GENERAL W. A. GIB.	}	Basawal . . .	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 32nd Pioneers (detachment).
		Dakka . . .	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 15th Madras Infantry (head-quarters).
		Haft-chah . . .	{ 15th Madras Infantry (detachment). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).
		Landi Khana . . .	{ 41st Bengal Infantry (detachment). No. 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns).
		Landi Kotal . . .	{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-18th Foot (head-quarters). 32nd Pioneers (detachment).
			{ 41st Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 15th Madras Infantry (detachment). 10-11, Royal Artillery (heavy), (detachment).
			{ 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 1-18th Foot (detachment).
		Ali Masjid . . .	{ 16th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters). 41st Bengal Infantry (detachment). 5th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).
Jamrud . . .	{ 16th Bengal Infantry (detachment).		
In all 293 British officers. 4,588 British troops. 9,973 Native troops.		
		<u>14,864 total of all ranks, with 24 guns.</u>	

Peshawar District Force, June 30th, 1880.

Peshawar. BRIGADIER-GENERAL HANKIN.	}	E-A, Royal Horse Artillery.
		1-A, Royal Horse Artillery.
		10-11, Royal Artillery.
		10th Bengal Lancers (head-quarters).
		11th Bengal Lancers (head-quarters).
		1-17th Foot.
		1st Bengal Infantry.
		6th Bengal Infantry.
		1-25th Foot (depot).
		22nd Punjab Infantry (depot).
27th Punjab Infantry (depot).		
1st Madras Infantry (depot).		
15th Madras Infantry (depot).		
Nowshera	{ 8th Hussars. 39th Bengal Infantry.	
	{ 2-9th Foot (depot). 1-12th Foot.	
Cherat	{ 6th Bengal Infantry (detachment). 10th Bengal Lancers (detachment).	
	{ 11th Bengal Lancers (detachment). 14th Bengal Lancers (detachment).	
Doaba outposts	{ 1st Bengal Infantry (detachment). 39th Bengal Infantry (detachment).	
	In all 21 British officers. 2,533 British troops. 3,811 Native troops.
		<u>6,435 total of all ranks.</u>

Abstract.

14,854 all ranks—On line of communication.
6,435 „ „ At base of operations.

GRAND TOTAL of Communica- }
tions and Reserve. } 21,289 of all ranks.

APPENDIX XXIV (see p. 357)

Brief purport of intelligence concerning the force of the enemy opposed to us at the battle of Ahmad Khel, as taken from the prisoners on the night of the action, 19th April, 1880 (Euan Smith).

The number of the enemy may be fairly estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000 men. The prisoners gave the number as being between 40,000 and 100,000, but this is obviously exaggerated. The tribes engaged (in almost equal proportions) were the Tarakis, Suliman Khels, Andaris, and Tokhis. There were also a few Hotaks and Kakars, several Zamindawaris, and a contingent of some hundreds of *Talibs-ul-Ilm* from Kandahar. The principal leader of the whole gathering was Sher Jan, son of Mir Ahmad and brother of Sahib Jan, who was killed at Shahjui by the British; the other leaders were Muhammad Aslam, Tokhi, Sher Muhammad, Andari, Pir Muhammad, Taraki (this man lost a hand in the battle of Shahjui), Mahmo Khan, Suliman Khel, Ziran, Taraki, and others of less note, together with many mullas. There was no attempt at anything like drill, but the various bodies of men were instructed as to the position which they should take up when the fight with the English came off. Each man brought his own arms and ammunition, and all, save the *talibs* and very poor men who were fed by Sher Jan, found their own provisions. There was a very large number of real Ghazis among the gathering, including twelve women who were admitted as Ghazis and were allowed to remove their *pardahs* on the condition that they followed the Ghazis into action, and took water, etc., etc., to the wounded. The entire gathering was marching on the right flank of the English force for many days, and the intention was to have gone on to Ghazni and fight there. Muhammad Jan, however, discouraged their fighting, and wrote to say that they should do nothing until the result of certain negotiations, which he had commenced with the English authorities at Kabul, became known. Mushk-i-Alam, however, had written encouraging the leaders to fight. On the day of the action the prisoners state that they were quite taken by surprise. They had been watching our troops the day before, while encamped at Mashaki, and had

been told that it was intended that we should halt there for one day. They therefore left their camps at Mashaki at midnight and came on to the pool of water near the Asia-i-Nani, where they also intended to halt, but, while they were eating their morning meal, our cavalry scouts appeared. Even then most of the leaders wished to defer fighting, but Sher Jan, who was very eager and fanatical, declared that he would not delay any longer. He raised suddenly the religious cry "Ya Allah," which was responded to on all sides, and from that moment all chances of postponing the fight were at an end. The prisoners state that none of the men present had the least idea of what would be the effect of our fire. At the first shot from the artillery guns many of the half-hearted slunk away, but the majority determined to fight. As all the prisoners were taken off the field of action, they could none of them give any idea of the amount of the casualties either in killed or wounded. One of the Kandahar *talibs*, a Kakar of Zhob, gave information to the effect that one of the leaders of the *talibs* was a mulla named Akram, Sahibzada Khel. All the Kandahar *talibs* used to meet at the house of a Pir in Zakir (living close to the ziarat of Miah Nur Muhammad), whose name he did not know. They met there for prayers the day that they started for the *Ghaza*.

There were two deserters from the regiment at Kalat-i-Ghilzai with the gathering, armed with breech-loading rifles.

APPENDIX XXV (see p. 462)

Strength and distribution of the Troops serving in the Kurram District under the command of Major-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C., April, 1880.

CORPS AND COMMANDANTS.	EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.		Total.	STATION OR POST.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers and men.		
No. 5 Garrison Battery (Kohat)	---	---	1	40	41	Kohat.
E-3, Royal Artillery (2 guns)	4	108	---	---	112	
1st Bengal Cavalry	---	---	1	109	110	
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	3	124	---	---	127	
1st Sikh Infantry	---	---	8	702	710	
	7	232	10	851	1,100	
1st Bengal Cavalry (detachment)	---	---	---	35	35	On outposts.
1st Sikh Infantry (detachment)	---	---	---	28	28	
	---	---	---	63	63	
1st Bengal Cavalry	---	---	5	112	117	Togh.
1st Bengal Cavalry (detachment)	---	---	1	63	64	On outposts.
E-3, Royal Artillery (2 guns)	1	50	---	---	51	Thal.
85th Foot (detachment)	1	52	---	---	53	
13th Bengal Cavalry	---	---	5	114	119	
11th Bengal Infantry (left wing)	---	---	4	404	408	
13th Bengal Infantry	---	---	7	229	236	
	2	102	16	507	627	
19th Bengal Cavalry	---	---	1	230	231	On outposts.
11th Bengal Infantry	---	---	---	51	51	
13th Bengal Infantry	---	---	---	183	183	
	---	---	1	464	465	
No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners	2	3	---	96	101	Chapri.
5th Bengal Infantry (detachment)	---	---	2	159	161	
	2	3	2	255	262	
5th Bengal Infantry	---	---	4	336	340	Balash-Khel.
18th Bengal Cavalry	---	---	1	50	51	
	---	---	5	386	391	
5th Bengal Infantry (detachment)	---	---	1	91	92	On outposts.
C-4, Royal Artillery (2 guns)	2	54	---	---	56	Kurram Fort.
2-8th Foot (detachment)	3	176	---	---	179	
13th Bengal Lancers	---	---	6	212	218	
29th Punjab Infantry	---	---	7	540	547	
	5	230	13	752	1,000	
13th Bengal Lancers	---	---	---	40	40	On outposts.
1-8, Royal Artillery (4 guns)	3	68	---	70	141	Shalozan.
C-4, Royal Artillery (4 guns)	4	108	---	---	112	
85th Foot	21	774	---	---	795	
13th Bengal Lancers	---	---	---	100	100	
20th Punjab Infantry	---	---	6	473	479	
21st Punjab Infantry	---	---	5	420	425	
	28	950	11	1,063	2,052	
1-8, Royal Artillery (2 guns)	1	19	---	7	27	Faiwar Kotal.
2-8th Foot	15	633	---	---	648	
1st Punjab Infantry (detachment)	---	---	1	144	145	
	16	652	1	151	820	
GRAND TOTAL	60	2,169	66	5,028	7,323	

APPENDIX XXVI (see p. 466)

Strength and distribution of the Kurram Field Force under the command of Major-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C., 1st September, 1880.

CORPS.	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH.				DISPOSITION.
	BRITISH.		NATIVE.		
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.	
<i>Sappers.</i> No. 8 Company	8	2	108	108 Shalozan.
<i>Artillery.</i> C-4, Royal Artillery . . .	6	162	Shalozan, 4 guns; Kurram Fort, 2 guns.
E-3, Royal Artillery . . .	4	150	Kohat, 4 guns; Thal, 2 guns.
1-8, Royal Artillery . . .	5	100	...	142	Paiwar Kotal.
No. 5 Kohat Garrison Battery	1	70	Kohat.
<i>Cavalry.</i> 1st Bengal Cavalry . . .	15	412	1	212	640 Total.
8th Bengal Cavalry	51	Kohat and outposts: 15 men, Togh; 26 men, Sarozai; 14 men, Gandiawar; 2 officers and 89 men, Hangu; 5 men, Thal; 34 men, Manduri.
18th Bengal Cavalry	7	474	Transport duty: line of communication.
18th Bengal Lancers	7	464	Head-quarters Thal: 25 men, Fort Khapianga; 1 officer, 40 men, Chapri; 25 men, Ahmad-i-Shama; 6 men, Manduri; 42 men, Alizai; 40 men, Shinak; 52 men, Balesh Khel.
<i>Infantry, British.</i> 2-8th Foot . . .	19	833	Head-quarters Shalozan: 2 officers, 114 men, Kurram; 32 men, Wali Muhammad; 1 officer, 48 men, Paiwar Kotal; 6 men, Stirkala.
85th Foot . . .	20	731	1,488 Total.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade (2 companies) . . .	2	128	Paiwar Kotal: 8 officers, 180 men, Shalozan; 10 men, Kurram; 2 officers, 101 men, Thal; 1 man, Kohat; 4 men, Balesh Khel.
<i>Infantry, Native.</i> 5th Bengal Infantry . . .	41	1,692	Head-quarters Paiwar Kotal: 33 men, Shalozan; 2 officers, 110 men, Kurram; 2 officers, 94 men, Thal.
11th Bengal Infantry (detachment)	1	238	Kohat.
13th Bengal Infantry	7	448	Head-quarters Balesh Khel: 1 officer, 53 men, Shink; 61 men, Alizai; 1 officer, 100 men, Manduri.
20th Punjab Infantry	6	617	Kohat.
21st Punjab Infantry	7	690	Thal: 47 men, Fort Khapianga.
29th Punjab Infantry	7	570	Head-quarters Paiwar Kotal: 51 men, Stirkala.
5th Punjab Infantry, depot	1	234	Head-quarters Shalozan: 3 men, Thal; 1 officer, 105 men, Fort Frederick: 2 officers, 250 men, Torghar; 16 men, escort duty.
1st Sikhs	7	845	Kurram: 22 men, Wali Muhammad; 4 men, Thal; 8 men, Paiwar Kotal.
Deoli Infantry	7	573	Kohat.
Total	50	4,818	4,863
Details and Signallers . . .	11	84	...	8	48 along the line.
GRAND TOTAL . . .	67	2,141	72	6,545	8,825

N.B.—Within the first week of September the 10th Bengal Lancers also arrived at Kohat and were distributed in garrison at Fort Garnett, Muhammadzai, Lachi and Banda.

APPENDIX XXVII (see p. 474)

Composition of the Kandahar Field Force, 26th May, 1880.

STATION.	CORPS.
Kalat-i-Ghilzai	{ C-2, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 3rd Sind Horse (detachment). 66th Foot (detachment). 29th Bombay Infantry.
Kandahar	{ No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers. E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. C-2, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 5-11, Royal Artillery (garrison battery). 3rd Sind Horse. Poona Horse (head-quarters). 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (head-quarters). 2-7th Fusiliers. 66th Foot (head-quarters). 1st Bombay Infantry. 19th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). 30th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters).
<i>En route to Kandahar.</i>	{ 2-7th Foot (detachment).
Mandi Hissar	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 19th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Abdur Rahman	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 19th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Mel Karez	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 30th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Dabrai	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 30th Bombay Infantry (detachment). No. — Company, Sappers (detachment).
Gatai	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 30th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Chaman	{ Poona Horse (detachment). No. 2 (Jacobabad) Mountain Battery (2 guns). 28th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Kala Abdulla	{ 28th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Gulistan Karez	{ 28th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Quetta	{ 14-9, Royal Artillery. ¹ 2nd Sind Horse (head-quarters). 4th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). 10th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters).
Mach	{ 4th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Kushdil Khan-Kala	{ Poona Horse (detachment). 28th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Gwal	{ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. ¹
Kasim Khan-Kala	{ 16th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). 16th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Chapar	{ No. — Company, Bombay Sappers. No. 2 (Jacobabad) Mountain Battery (2 guns). 2nd Sind Horse (detachment). 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ 10th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 16th Bombay Infantry (detachment).

¹ Reserve Division.

APPENDIX XXVII—*continued*

Dargai	{ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ 5th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 27th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Spin Tangi	{ 23rd Bombay Infantry (detachment). ¹ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ No. — Bombay Sappers and Miners. 2nd Sind Horse (detachment).
Harnai	{ 5th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 27th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). 2nd Sind Horse (detachment). No. 2 (Jacobabad) Mountain Battery (2 guns). 5th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters).
Thal-Chotiali	{ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ 23rd Bombay Infantry (detachment). ¹
Dalutal	{ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ 23rd Bombay Infantry (detachment). ¹
Zindigiah	{ 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹ 23rd Bombay Infantry (detachment). ¹
Nari Gorge	{ 9th Bombay Infantry (detachment). ¹
Bolan	{ 4th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). ¹
Sibi	{ 27th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 23rd Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). ¹

Total strength (exclusive of Reserve Division troops) :

British, all ranks	2,159
Native „	9,058
Total	<u>11,217</u>

NOTE.—Owing to the successive calls for troops from the Reserve, which ended in the 1st Baluch Regiment (27th Bombay Infantry), 23rd Bombay Infantry, some of the 1st Sind Horse, and 3 troops of the 2nd Bombay Cavalry being brought in to serve on the line of communications, the regiments along the line had become much scattered. Accordingly, on the 29th May, General Phayre redistributed them from Sibi in the following order :

1st Sind Horse (detachments)	} Posts between Sibi and Spin Tangi.
23rd Bombay Infantry	
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (3 troops)	} Posts between Spin Tangi and Harnai, including Harnai.
2nd Sind Horse	
5th Bombay Infantry	
27th Bombay Infantry (1st Baluch Regiment).	} Posts at Nasak, Sharigh, Shor Dargai, and North Chapar Rift.

¹ Reserve Division.

APPENDIX XXVIII (see pp. 478, 580)

Details of Ayub's force which was engaged at Maiwand.

[From notes of conversation held by Captain Gaselee, D.A.Q.M.G., with Mirza Muhammad Akbar, pay clerk to the Kandahari regiments with Ayub Khan.]

Ayub left Herat in the beginning of June, 1880, with the following force :

- 24 field guns, drawn by horses.
- 6 mountain guns, on mules.
- 5 Kabuli regiments of 500 men each, armed with Enfields (presented to Sher Ali by the British).
- 1 Kandahari regiment of 500, armed with rifles made at Kandahar.
- 3 Herati regiments of 336 men each, armed with rifles made at Herat.
- 3 regiments of Kabuli regular cavalry (300 each).
- 1,500 Herati irregular horsemen (*Khawanin Sowars*).
- 500 horsemen (*Wali's troops*), and
- 1,000 infantry joined at Farah, after mutiny of the Wali's troops on 14th July.

On reaching Farah, Ayub halted to allow the Zamindawaris to collect. Ghazis and others came in in numbers. At Maiwand there were probably 20,000.¹ At Baba Wali on the 1st September perhaps 30,000.¹

* * * * *

The march was led throughout at one day's interval by the irregular cavalry under the *Luinab* Kushdil Khan.

In addition to the Sartip Mir Muhammad, who joined Ayub after the mutiny of the Wali's troops on the 14th July, there were ten principal officers attached to his army, including the Naib Sipah-Salar Hafizulla Khan (Logari), and Taj Muhammad Khan (Ghilzai), who, with the *Luinab*, appear to have been Ayub's chief advisers; also Abdul Rahman Khan (Rika), commanding the regular cavalry; Taj Muhammad Khan (Tajik), and Saidal Khan (brother of General Gholam Haidar, late Governor of Turkestan), commanding infantry brigades: and Ahmad Gul (Kabuli), commanding artillery.

¹ Probably exaggerated (L. B., 1905).

Ayub, on reaching the neighbourhood of Maiwand, expected to find the British troops in camp at Kuskh-i-Nakhud, and was in hopes that by going through the Maiwand Pass he would cut Burrows off from Kandahar, and annihilate him after surprising and capturing the city.

Ayub was surprised at finding the British drawn up near Maiwand on the 27th July; but within an hour all the Afghan troops were concentrated. The fighting was very severe, the Afghans suffered much from want of water, their loss was heavy, and they were often on the point of giving way.

The Herati horsemen would not fight; those who behaved best were the Kabulis and the Wali's mutineers, the former of whom took the two guns of E-B., Royal Horse Artillery, when they saw the British (native) infantry beginning to give way.

Losses among the regular troops were 1,250 men and 700 horses; of the Ghazis the number is uncertain, but they had 800 killed. The Herati horsemen were ordered to pursue the British, but remained to plunder the camp.

APPENDIX XXIX (see p. 580)

Detail of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, engaged in the action of Kandahar, on the 1st September, 1880.

(Exclusive of Bombay troops of Kandahar Garrison.)

Brigade.	Corps.	Total.	Guns.
Divisional Staff . . .		8	...
Cavalry Brigade . . .	9th Lancers	300	...
	3rd Bengal Cavalry	300	...
	3rd Punjab Cavalry	356	...
	Central India Horse	422	...
	Brigade Staff	8	...
1st Infantry Brigade . . .	92nd Highlanders	528	...
	2nd Gurkhas	399	...
	23rd Pioneers	544	...
	24th Punjab Infantry	421	...
	6-8, Royal Artillery (attached)	193	6
	Brigade Staff	7	...
2nd Infantry Brigade . . .	72nd Highlanders	694	...
	2nd Sikhs	514	...
	3rd Sikhs	462	...
	5th Gurkhas	470	...
	Attached	463	...
	{ 29th Bombay Infantry	206	6
	{ No. 2 Mountain Battery	6	...
3rd Infantry Brigade . . .	2-60th Rifles	516	...
	4th Gurkhas	530	...
	15th Sikhs	437	...
	25th Punjab Infantry	486	...
	11-9, Royal Artillery (attached)	122	6
	Total	8,393	18

APPENDIX XXX (see p. 592)

Detail of the force in Southern Afghanistan intended for the relief of Kandahar, published in Division Orders of 17th August, 1880.

Major-General R. Phayre, c.b., Commanding.
Major C. A. Cunningham, Assistant Adjutant-General (sick).
Captain W. Cooke-Collis, Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major J. Jopp, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Major A. R. Heyland, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain R. Phayre, Aide-de-Camp.
Lieutenant the Hon. G. Fitzroy Somerset, Orderly Officer, Extra Aide-de-Camp.
Major C. Swinhoe, Assistant Commissary-General.
Major De L. R. F. Wooldridge, Director of Transport.
Deputy Surgeon-General L. S. Bruce, Principal Medical Officer.

Artillery Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. P. Smith, R.H.A., Commanding.
Captain E. Blaksley, Adjutant.
D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, Major F. W. Ward.
F-2, Royal Artillery, Major J. R. J. Dewar.
No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery, Major R. Wace.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson, Commanding.
Major Morris, Brigade-Major.
Captain C. W. Muir, Orderly Officer.
15th Hussars, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Luck.
1st Madras Light Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel E. M. Cherry.
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Macnaughten.
2nd Sind Horse, Major M. M. Carpendale.
Poona Horse (198 sabres), Major C. M. Erskine.

Engineer Force.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Lindsay, Commanding.
Lieutenant W. W. B. Whiteford, Adjutant.
Lieutenant H. O. Selby, in charge of Signalling.
Lieutenant C. F. Fuller.
Lieutenant G. Davidson.
Lieutenant S. A. E. Hickson.
Lieutenant W. W. Robinson.
Lieutenant W. Coles.
Lieutenant M. J. Slater.

} Assistant Field Engineers.

APPENDIX XXX—continued

- Captain F. W. Joseph, B.S.C., Assistant Field Engineer (attached).
 No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant G. H. W. O'Sullivan.
 No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant J. Neville.
 No. 5 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant E. C. Spilsbury.

1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Infantry Brigade.	3rd Infantry Brigade.
Brigadier-General H. H. James, Commanding. Captain W. Cooke-Collis, Brigade-Major. Major T. W. Saunders, Commissariat Officer. Lieut.-Col. J. Barras, Transport Officer. 2-11th Foot, Lieut.-Col. W. T. Corrie. 8th Bombay Infantry, Lieut.-Col. S. Fellows. 10th Bombay Infantry, Major C. E. Blowers.	Brigadier-General T. S. Brown, Commanding. Major H. J. Stock, Brigade-Major. Major J. L. Fagan, Commissariat Officer. Lieut. K. R. Mackenzie, Transport Officer. 2-15th Foot, Lieut.-Col. R. L. Dashwood. 5th Bombay Infantry, Lieut.-Col. R. A. C. Hunt. 24th Bombay Infantry, Lieut.-Col. R. M. Chambers. 27th Bombay Infantry, Col. T. Bell.	Brigadier-Gen. H. H. A. Wood (sick). Brigadier-Gen. Walker (Officiating), Commanding. Captain J. W. Andrews, Brigade-Major. Lieut. P. A. N. St. L. Wood, Orderly Officer. 63rd Foot, Lieut.-Col. W. L. Auchinleck. 9th Bombay Infantry, Lieut.-Col. L. H. Sibthorpe. 23rd Bombay Infantry, Lieut.-Col. J. Harpur.

- Line of Communication from Sibi to Chaman (for which some of the above were detained). } General J. H. Henderson.
 } Captain J. T. Watling, Deputy Assistant
 } Quartermaster-General.
 } Brigade-Major (vacant).
 Sibi and Outposts . . . { 8th Bengal Cavalry (3 troops).
 . . . { 13th Bombay Infantry.
 Bolan Post 15th Bombay Infantry (wing).
 Quetta to Chaman, including Kach and Kushdil Khan, 2 squadrons cavalry. } 8th Bengal Cavalry (1 squadron).
 } 1st Madras Light Cavalry (1 squadron).
 3rd Bengal Infantry 24th Bombay Infantry.
 Quetta Garrison and Reserve Troops (staff vacant.) { A-4, Royal Artillery, Captain J. D. Dalton.
 } H-1, Royal Artillery, Major C. Crosthwaite.
 } 5-8, Royal Artillery, Major W. R. Lluellyn.
 } 14-9, Royal Artillery, Major G. A. Crawford.
 } 1st Madras Light Cavalry (1 squadron),
 } 4th Bengal Infantry, 15th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters and wing).

APPENDIX XXXI (see p. 592)

Distribution of the force in Southern Afghanistan under Major-General R. Phayre on the 24th August, 1880.

Chaman	{	Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Companies, Bombay Sappers (detachments). 14-9 Royal Artillery (detachment), equipped with two 9-pra. No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). Poona Horse (detachment). 16th, 19th, and 29th Bombay Infantry (detachments).
Khojak	{	Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Companies, Bombay Sappers (detachments). 14-9, Royal Artillery (detachment), equipped with two 25-pra. No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns). 9th Bombay Infantry. 10th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Kala Abdulla	{	Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Companies, Bombay Sappers (detachments). Poona Horse, 2nd Sind, 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). 4th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 9th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 10th Bombay Infantry. 27th Bombay Infantry.
Gulistan Karez	{	2nd Sind Horse (detachment). 2-11th Foot (wing). 2-15th Foot (detachment).
Segi, Dinar Karez, Gharband, Mehterzai, Kushdil Khan.	{	2nd Sind Horse (detachment). 1st Madras Light Cavalry (detachment). Poona Horse (detachment). 24th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 27th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
Quetta	{	D-B, Royal Horse Artillery. F-2, Royal Artillery. 14-9, Royal Artillery (detachment). 15th Hussars. 1st Madras Light Cavalry (detachment). 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (head-quarters). 8th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 2-11th Foot (wing). 2-15th Foot (head-quarters). 8th Bombay Infantry. 24th Bombay Infantry. British and Native details.
En route to Quetta	{	E-B, Royal Horse Artillery (2 guns), to replace those lost at Maiwand. H-1, Royal Artillery. 5-8, Royal Artillery. 8th Bengal Cavalry (head-quarters). 63rd Foot. 66th Foot (detachment). 23rd Bombay Infantry.

APPENDIX XXXI—*continued*

On the northern frontier at Kach was the following force :

No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment).
 5th Bombay Infantry.
 16th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters).

At Sibi and posts about Nari :

8th Bengal Cavalry (detachment).
 1st Sind Horse.
 4th Bengal Infantry.
 9th Bombay Infantry.

The following troops were moving up from Sukkur and Karachi :

From Bombay	.	.	{	78th Foot. 13th Bombay Infantry. 15th Bombay Infantry.
From Bengal	.	.	{	A-4, Royal Artillery. 15-9, Royal Artillery. 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry. 3rd Bengal Infantry.

APPENDIX XXXII (see p. 607)

Distribution list of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force under Major-General R. Phayre, on the 30th October, 1880.

Kohkaran and Kohak	{	D-B, Royal Horse Artillery. 9th Lancers. Poona Horse. 2nd Sind Horse (detachment). 8th, 10th, 27th Bombay Infantry.
Kandahar, in Arghandab Valley, and neighbourhood.	{	H-1, R. A. No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers. F-2, R. A. 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (ordered to India). 6-8, R. A. Poona Horse (detachment). 14-9, R. A. 2nd Sind Horse. 2-7th Foot } British 4th Bombay Infantry. 2-11th Foot } Infantry 5th Bombay Infantry. 2-15th Foot } 9th Bombay Infantry. 63rd Foot } 27th ,, (detachment).
Line of communication to Khojak.	{	3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). 19th Bombay Native Infantry (detachment), ordered to India. 23rd Bombay Native Infantry (detachment). 28th Bombay Native Infantry (detachment).
Quetta and in Peshin	{	A-4, Royal Artillery. 5-8, Royal Artillery. 15-9, Royal Artillery. 1st Madras Light Cavalry. 78th Foot (ordered to Kandahar). 3rd Bengal Infantry (ordered to Kandahar). 13th Bombay Infantry. 15th Bombay Infantry (detachment).
On Railway Line (under construction).	{	No. 4 and 5 Companies, Bombay Sappers. 16th Bombay Infantry. 24th Bombay Infantry. Kach, 16th Bombay Infantry (200 rifles). Mangi, 16th Bombay Infantry (200 rifles). Dargai and Chapar, Nos. 4 and 5 Companies, Sappers. Sharigh, 24th Bombay Infantry (2 companies). Harnai, 24th Bombay Infantry (head-quarters). Harnai to Sibi, 17th Bengal Infantry (detachment). 8th Bengal Cavalry (detachments).
At Sibi	{	No. 1 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns); No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 8th Bengal Cavalry; 1st Sind Horse (detachment); 1st Madras Cavalry (detachment). 17th Bengal Infantry (part of), ordered to Kandahar.
In Shorawak	{	No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 1st Madras Cavalry (1 squadron). 4th Bengal Infantry (ordered to Kandahar).

APPENDIX XXXII—*continued*

Returning to India	{ E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. C-2, Royal Artillery. 5-11, Royal Artillery (escorting captured guns and General No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers. [Brooke's body). 3rd Sind Horse. 66th Foot. 1st, 29th, and 30th Bombay Infantry.	
Co-operating with General MacGregor's column in the Mari country.	{ No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry. 15th Bombay Infantry (detachment).	} To re-establish the posts at Thal- Chotiali.

Additional troops warned for service from India.

13th Hussars; 7th Bengal Cavalry; 61st Foot.

N.B.—The 3rd, 7th, 13th, 20th, and 26th Bombay Infantry had each 1 company on service attached respectively to the 5th, 10th, 16th, 23rd, and 4th Bombay Infantry.

APPENDIX XXXIII

Distribution of the troops in Southern Afghanistan on the 31st December, 1880.

Kohkaran	{	D-B, Royal Horse Artillery. 13th Hussars. 2nd Sind Horse. 10th Bombay Infantry.
Kandahar	{	H-1, Royal Artillery. F-2, Royal Artillery. 6-8, Royal Artillery. 14-9, Royal Artillery. No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers. Poona Horse. 2-7th Fusiliers. 2-11th Foot. 63rd Foot. 78th Highlanders. 3rd Bengal Infantry. 4th Bengal Infantry. 17th Bengal Infantry. 9th Bombay Infantry. 27th Bombay Infantry.
Line of communications, including Quetta.	{	5-8, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 15-9, Royal Artillery. 1st Madras Light Cavalry (detachment). 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachments), under orders to return to India. 61st Foot (wing). 3rd Bengal Infantry (detachment). 5th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 8th Bombay Infantry (wing). 13th Bombay Infantry. 23rd Bombay Infantry. 28th Bombay Infantry.
In Shorawak	{	No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 1st Madras Light Cavalry (detachment). 5th Bombay Infantry.
On Gwal-Sibi Railway line	{	Nos. 4 and 5 Companies, Bombay Sappers. 4th Bombay Infantry. 16th Bombay Infantry (detachment). 24th Bombay Infantry.
At Sibi and adjacent posts, including Brigadier- General Henderson's reserve column.	{	A-4, Royal Artillery. 5-8, Royal Artillery (4 guns). No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 8th Bengal Cavalry. 1st Madras Light Cavalry (detachment). 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment). 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (detachment), under orders for India. 1st Sind Horse (detachment). 61st Foot (wing). 8th Bombay Infantry (wing). 16th Bombay Infantry. 19th Bombay Infantry, under orders for India. 29th Bombay Infantry, under orders for India.
With Sir Robert Sandeman at Mandai.	{	11-9, Royal Artillery (2 guns). 8th Bengal Cavalry (detachment). 29th Bombay Infantry (detachment) for India.
Thal-Chotiali and Kuriak.	{	No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery (2 guns). 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry (head-quarters). 15th Bombay Infantry.
Jacobabad	{	1st Sind Horse (part of).
Ordered to Kandahar from India.	}	7th Bengal Cavalry.

APPENDIX

Programme of the dates of departures and arrivals of troops of the South

	Corps.	Kandahar, Dep.	Chaman, Arr.	Halt.	Cross Khojak.	Kala Abdulla, Arr.	Halt.
Portion of Shorawak Column.	No. 2 Mountain Battery, 2 guns, 5th Bombay Infantry
	14-9, Royal Artillery 2-11th Foot Sick Convoy, European and Native	April 15	April 20	April 21	{ April 22 " 23 " 24 }	April 24	April 25
1st portion 3rd Brigade.	4th Bengal Infantry 8th Bengal Cavalry 10th Bombay Infantry	" 17	" 22	" 23	" 24	" 25	" 26
	2nd portion, 3rd Brigade.	F-2, Royal Artillery 2-7th Fusiliers (head-quarters and right wing)	" 18	" 23	" 24	" 25	...
2nd Brigade	H-1, Royal Artillery 78th Foot 17th Bengal Infantry 27th Bombay Infantry	" 20	" 25	" 26	" 27	" 27	{ " 28 " 28 " 28 " 29 }
	D-B, Royal Horse Artillery Poona Horse	" 22	" 27	" 28	" 29	" 29	{ May 1 " 1
	28th Bombay Infantry	...	" 27	{ " 28 " 29 " 28 }	" 20	" 30	{ " 2 " 3 " 3 " 4 " 1
	23rd Bombay Infantry	...	" 27	{ " 28 " 29 " 30 " 28 }	May 1	May 1	{ " 3 " 4 " 1 " 2 " 3
1st Brigade	6-8, Royal Artillery 13th Hussars	" 22	" 27	" 28	" 29	" 29	{ " 3 " 4 " 1 " 2 " 3
	2nd Sind Horse	...	" 27	" 28	" 29	" 29	" 30
	No. 3 Company Sappers and Miners	" 22	" 27
	63rd Foot	" 22	" 27	" 28	" 29	" 29	April 30
	3rd Bengal Infantry	" 22	" 27	" 28	{ Wing April 29 }	" 29	" 30
	9th Bombay Infantry	" 22	" 27	" 28	" 29	" 29	" 30

NOTE.—Previous to leaving Kandahar General Hume redistributed the brigades, so as to leave

CAVALRY BRIGADE. <i>Brigadier-General Wilkinson.</i>	1ST BRIGADE. <i>Brigadier-General Walker.</i>
D-B, Royal Horse Artillery. 13th Hussars. Poona Horse.	6-8, Royal Artillery. 63rd Foot. 3rd Bengal Infantry. 9th Bombay Infantry. No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers.

XXXIV (see p. 628)

Afghanistan Field Force in the retirement from Kandahar, in April, 1881.

Kala Abdulla, Dep.	Gulistan, Arr.	Halt.	Segi, Arr.	Quetta, Arr.	Halt.	Quetta, Dep.	Pir-Chaoki, Arr.	Destination.
...	April 20	April 23	April 24	April 25	May 3	Karachi.
April 26	" 26	" 29	" 30	May 1	" 8	Jullundur.
...	April 27	{ April 28	{ " 28	May 1	May 2	" 3	" 10	Calcutta.
...		" 29	" 29	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 11	Jubbulpur.
...		" 30	" 30	" 3	" 4	" 5	" 12	Karachi.
...	{ Left wing 7th Fusiliers.	April 30	" 1	" 2	{ " 9	Karachi.
...					" 8	
" 20	" 29	" 30	May 1	May 4	" 5	" 6	" 13	{ Jullundur. Benares and Sitapur.
" 30	" 30	{ May 1	" 8	" 6	" 7	" 8	" 15	Calcutta.
" 30	" 30	" 1	" 4	" 7	" 8	" 9	" 16	Karachi.
" 30	" 30	" 2	" 5	" 5	" 9	" 10	" 17	
May 2	May 2	" 3	" 5	" 5	" 9	" 10	" 17	
" 2	" 2	" 4	" 5	" 5	" 9	" 10	" 17	
" 4	" 4	" 5	" 8	" 11	" 12	" 18	" 20	
" 4	" 4	" 6	" 9	" 12	" 13	" 14	" 21	
" 4	" 4	" 7	" 8	" 11	" 12	" 13	" 20	Lahore.
" 4	" 4	" 8	" 9	" 12	" 13	" 14	" 21	Quetta.
" 4	" 4	" 9	" 8	" 11	" 12	" 13	" 20	
" 1	{ 1 Squadron, May 1	...	" 1	" 4	Chaman. Quetta. Kala Abdulla. Gulistan. Chaman. Kala Abdulla. Gulistan.
" 1	" 1	" 4	
{ 6 Companies May 1	{ 2 Companies May 1	...	{ Wing May 1	Wing May 4	Quetta and Kushdil Khan.
{ 2 Companies May 1	{ 2 Companies May 1	
{ Wing May 1 Kushdil Khan.	{ Wing May 1	Wing May 1	

the troops for the Peshin and Quetta garrisons with the last brigade leaving Kandahar, as follows: "

2ND BRIGADE. <i>Brigadier-General Penton.</i>	3RD BRIGADE. <i>Brigadier-General Henderson.</i>
H-1, Royal Artillery. 78th Highlanders. 17th Bengal Infantry. 27th Bombay Infantry.	F-2, Royal Artillery. 8th Bengal Cavalry. 2-7th Fusiliers. 4th Bombay Infantry. 10th Bombay Infantry.

APPENDIX XXXV (see p. 568)

Transport employed on General Roberts's march from Kabul to Kandahar (August, 1879).

The total numbers of transport animals, other than camels, actually employed during the march, and those which became ineffective from sickness, death, or loss, on or before arrival at Kandahar, are shown below :

	Yabus.	Ponies.	Mules.	Donkeys.
Total employed	1,651	1,303	4,510	1,163
Dead or missing	419	308	216	107
Sick	681	479	942	57
Total ineffective	1,090	787	1,158	164
Balance effective.	561	516	3,352	999
Percentage of effective on completion of march	34%	39%	73%	85%

Compiled from official sources.

NOTE.—The transport allotted to corps was of variable quality, and was not equally cared for by all units. The 2nd Sikh Infantry are reported to have marched into Kandahar with three only of their total transport animals in an ineffective condition.

APPENDIX XXXVI

System of Intelligence with the troops in the field in Afghanistan, 1878-80.

No Intelligence Department existed in India at this time. The only campaigns on the North-West Frontier since 1842 in which a demand for field intelligence arose were those against Pathan tribesmen. This important branch of the duties of the Staff was undertaken in war as well as in peace time by the Civil Service, whose local representatives on the Punjab frontier were informed, in the course of their duties, of all political events amongst the tribes immediately beyond the borders of their respective administrative districts by agents, spies, and informers, who were either permanent or temporary members of their subordinate political establishment.

This system had proved capable of meeting nearly all the intelligence requirements of the small frontier expeditions, in which the Punjab Frontier Force (controlled by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab) was generally employed against these tribesmen to the exclusion of the regular army.

The objects of these small campaigns were almost entirely political, and it was therefore considered that they would be served best by a civil and political intelligence department separated to a large extent from the control of the military commander. No prepared plans of campaign were considered beforehand by the Army Head-Quarters Staff of the day, and the schemes of operations were usually framed and often modified to suit the political exigencies of the moment.

The opening of the Second Afghan Campaign consequently found the Government and the Commander-in-Chief in India practically uninformed regarding the strength, disposition, strategy, and tactics of the Afghans who lived beyond tribal territory, and therefore out of reach of political emissaries. Police reports (see Appendix I.) had mainly to be relied on for an estimate of the opposition likely to be met. Nor had a particular study of the terrain been made beyond the scrutiny of a few road reports which had been compiled from information gathered chiefly during the former Afghan campaigns of 1838-42.

The plan of campaign in 1878 and again in 1879 could be neither seriously nor methodically considered by the Commander-in-Chief and Government owing to the lack of the necessary machinery.

The military means for obtaining the indispensable groundwork for plans of operations were unorganised, and the commanders both at Army Head-Quarters and in the field had to rely chiefly on the Civil Service to supply intelligence for both strategical and tactical purposes.

The inefficiency of this system was aggravated when the military commander was not also, as was sometimes the case, the chief political authority in the theatre of operations.

That this agency did not satisfactorily fulfil the demands which were made on it during the campaign may be gleaned from the public as well as the confidential records of the campaign.

* * * * *

Generals Stewart and Roberts both used the Political Service as their main agency for intelligence, whilst the former organised an Intelligence Branch comprising one Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Captain Gaselee), one native officer, and one native non-commissioned officer as the permanent staff, who supplemented the efforts of the Political Officers attached to the division in Southern Afghanistan.

APPENDIX XXXVII

Extracts from statements showing amount of food supplies, exclusive of fodder, despatched to Northern Afghanistan during the twelve months September, 1879, to August, 1880.

	Received at and forwarded from—		
	Jhelum (rail-head).	Rawal Pindi.	Peshawar.
Atta	153,034 maunds	43,739 maunds	129,064 maunds
Barley	312,083 "	114,784 "	146,292 "
Biscuits	58,327 lb.	4,788 lb.	77,445 lb.
Beef, boiled, corned, etc. (about)	63,000 "	9,942 "	46,000 "
Breadstuff	19,187 maunds	2,193 maunds	28,937 maunds
Cocoa	23,248 lb.
Dal	56,559 maunds	12,251 maunds	34,561 maunds
Ghi	4,278 cases	...
"	18,127 maunds	1,162 maunds	11,870 maunds
Grain	66,979 "	...	64,361 "
Lime juice	25,284 gallons	2,840 gallons	15,648 gallons
Potatoes	14,340 maunds	...	21,763 maunds
Preserved potatoes	16,228 "	3,672 maunds	9,267 "
Rice	99,370 "	17,423 "	55,140 "
Rum	151,994 gallons	27,983 gallons	84,408 gallons
Soups, various (about)	45,000 lb.	3,500 lb.	20,000 lb.
Salt	2,900 maunds	750 maunds	5,863 maunds
Sugar	941,700 lb.	21,450 lb.	475,751 lb.
Tea	231,680 "	39,290 "	112,556 "
Tobacco	71,829 "
Vegetables, preserved (about)	8,300 "	2,028 lb.	4,400 lb.
Wheat	135,053 maunds	32,895 maunds	6,000 maunds

In addition to the above were smaller supplies of the following articles:—Brandy, champagne, extract of beef, beer, cocoa paste, cocoa milk, coffee, gin, hay (compressed), lime juice (bottled), pork, pale ale, sherry, sago, vinegar, etc., etc.

APPENDIX XXXVIII

Expenditure incurred in the Afghan War.¹

The estimate of the cost of this war was rendered on the 26th October, 1880, by the Government of India to the Secretary of State, framed on the following assumptions:

1. That all future extra expenditure for troops remaining on a war footing *beyond the whole frontier* (prior to the Treaty of Gandamak) is part of the cost of the war, and may be expected to continue up to the end of the financial year 1880-81.

2. That no expenditure *within that frontier* (excepting that upon the frontier railways) incurred after the end of October, 1880, should be attributed to the war.

3. That the normal military expenditure may be calculated on that of the year 1877-78, before the war.

On these hypotheses the following amounts and estimate were submitted, subject to the later adjustment of various balances which would act one against the other:

	Rs.		£
Net military expenditure proper	15,77,71,000	= at 20d.	13,148,000
Frontier railways	5,90,63,000	,,	4,917,000
Total	21,67,74,000	,,	18,065,000
Deduct excess revenues from telegraphs and railways	68,00,000	,,	567,000
Net cost of war	20,99,74,000	,,	17,498,000

That is, 21 crores of rupees, or 17½ millions sterling.

On the 21st March, 1881, the Secretary of State for India announced in the House that the total estimated expenditure up to May 31st, 1881, was £19,500,000 sterling, exclusive of a total sum of 39½ lakhs of rupees paid at different times to the Amir up to the end of July, 1881, and an additional sum of 50,000 rupees per month for six months.

The Exchequer bore a share of £5,000,000 towards the total cost of the campaigns, the Indian revenues defraying the remainder.

¹ From Parliamentary Papers, 1881, Nos. 65-81.

APPENDIX XXXIX

Index to Corps, Regiments, Battalions, Batteries, Companies, Departments, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81.

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.	
British Cavalry.	6th Dragoon Guards (Carabini- niers)	Lieut.-Col. J. Fryer, c.b.	1879-80	
	8th Hussars (King's Royal Irish)	Lieut.-Col. J. W. Chaplin, v.c.	1879-80	
	9th Lancers (Queen's Royal)	Colonel H. Marshall	1879-80	
		Lieut.-Col. R. S. Cleland		
	10th Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Lieut.-Col. H. A. Bushman, c.b.	1878-79	
Lieut.-Col. E. A. Wood				
15th Hussars (The King's)	Colonel Lord Ralph Kerr	1878-80		
	Colonel J. E. Swindley			
Royal Horse Artillery.	A Brigade.	Lieut.-Col. G. Luck, c.b.	1878-80	
		D Battery		Major P. E. Hill
		E Battery		Lieut.-Col. Sidney Parry
	B Brigade.	Major W. W. Murdoch	1880	
		F Battery		Major and Lieut.-Col. W. Stirling, c.b.
		I Battery		Captain H. Pipon
	C Brigade.	Major J. C. Smyth-Windham	1879-80	
		A Battery		Major W. O. Ommanney
		D Battery		Bt. Colonel D. MacFarlan
	D Brigade.	Captain R. G. S. Marshall	1878-80	
		E Battery		Major H. de G. Warter
		F Battery		Major F. W. Ward
	E Brigade.	Major G. F. Blackwood	1880	
		Captain J. R. Slade		1880
		Major J. A. Tillard		
F Brigade.	Major C. E. Nairne	1879		
	H Battery		Major G. R. Manderson	
	I Battery		Major Hon. Alex. Stewart	
G Brigade.	Major H. F. Pritchard	1880-81		
	Major C. Crosthwaite		1878-79	
	I Battery			Major N. C. Lewes
H Brigade.	Major P. H. Greig	1880		
	C Battery		Major E. Stavelly	
	D Battery		Major J. R. J. Dewar	
I Brigade.	F Battery	1880-81		
	C Battery		Major H. C. Magenis	
	E Battery		Major T. M. Hazlerigg	
J Brigade.	Major Sidney Parry	1878-80		
	G Battery		Captain R. Purdy	
	Major W. R. Craster		1879-80	
Major J. C. Auchinleck	1879-80			
C Battery		Major J. F. Free		
K Brigade.		D Battery	1878-79	
	E Battery	Major T. C. Martelli		
	G Battery	Major Sir J. W. Campbell, Bart.		
L Brigade.	L Battery	Major W. R. C. Brough	1878-80	
		Major W. R. C. Brough	1879-80	

APPENDIX XXXIX—continued

Index to Corps, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81.—contd.

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.				
Royal Artillery— (heavy garrison, and siege batteries).	8th Bri- gade. { No. 1 Battery . . . No. 6 Mountain Battery (7-pr. jointed screw guns)	Major J. Haughton . . . Major T. Graham . . .	1879-80 1879-81				
	Siege Train. { 8th {No. 13 Battery Brigade. {No. 16 Battery 11th Brigade. } No. 8 Battery	Major F. S. Burnett . . . Major J. H. Blackley . . . Major H. H. Murray . . .	1878-79 1878-79 1878-79				
	9th Bri- gade. { No. 11 Battery . . . No. 12 Battery . . . No. 13 Battery . . . No. 14 Battery . . .	Major J. R. Dyce . . . Major H. L. Gwyn . . . Major C. W. Wilson . . . Major G. A. Crawford . . .	1878-80 1880 1878 1880 81				
	11th Bri- gade. { No. 5 Battery . . . No. 6 Battery . . . No. 10 Battery . . . No. 11 Battery . . .	Major C. Collingwood . . . Captain G. M. B. Hornsby . . . Major J. A. Tillard . . . Major C. D. A. Straker . . . Major N. H. Harris . . .	1878-80 1879-80 1880 1878 80				
				Gatling Battery . . .	Major A. Broadfoot . . .	1879-80	
				Punjab Frontier Force Artillery.	No. 1 (Kohat) Moun- tain Battery . . .	Captain J. A. Kelso . . . Captain H. N. Jervois . . . Bt. Major H. R. L. Morgan	1878-80
					No. 2 (Derajat) Moun- tain Battery . . .	Major G. Swinley . . . Major A. Broadfoot . . . Captain H. F. Smyth . . .	
	No. 3 (Peshawar) Moun- tain Battery . . .	Major J. Charles . . .	1878-79				
	No. 4 (Hazara) Moun- tain Battery . . .	Major E. J. de Latour . . .	1878-79				
	No. 5 (Kohat) Garrison Battery . . .	Captain H. F. Smyth . . . Lieut. R. A. C. King . . .	1879 1879-81				
Bom- bay.	No. 1 Mountain Battery	Captain J. D. Snodgrass . . .					
	No. 2 Mountain Battery	Major R. Wace . . .	1878-81				
Royal Engi- neers.	Bengal Sappers and Miners. { No. 1 Company No. 2 Company No. 3 Company No. 4 Company No. 5 Company No. 6 Company No. 7 Company No. 8 Company No. 9 Company No. 10 Company	Lieut.-Col. E. T. Thackeray, R.E., V.C.	1878-80				
				Lieut.-Col. Ross Thomson, R.E. Lieut.-Col. C. A. Sim, R.E.	Lieut. J. C. L. Campbell, R.E. Captain H. Dove, R.E. . . . Captain P. Haslett, R.E. . . . Lieut. E. S. Hill, R.E. . . . Lieut. W. F. H. Stafford, R.E. Lieut. P. T. Buston, R.E. . . . Lieut. H. P. Leach, R.E. . . . Lieut. M. C. Barton, R.E. . . . Major L. F. Brown, R.E. . . .		
						A Company B Company C Company E Company I Company K Company	Lieut. C. H. Darling, R.E. . . . Lieut. W. B. Connor, R.E. . . . Lieut. A. R. F. Dordward, R.E. Captain T. H. Winterbotham, M.I. Lieut. A. E. Dobson, R.E. . . . Lieut. C. C. Rawson, R.E. . . .

APPENDIX XXXIX—*continued**Index to Corps, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81—contd.*

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.
Royal Engineers (<i>contd.</i>)	Bombay Sappers and Miners— <i>contd.</i>	No. 1 Company	Lieut.-Col. John Hills, C.B.
		No. 2 Company	Lieut. G. H. W. O. Sullivan, R.E.
		No. 3 Company	Lieut. G. T. Jones, R.E.
		No. 4 Company	Lieut. W. Coles, R.E.
		No. 5 Company	Lieut. W. A. E. St. Clair, R.E. Captain W. W. B. Whiteford, R.E.
British Infantry.	1st Battalion 5th Fusiliers	Lieut.-Col. T. Rowland	1878-80
	2nd Battalion 7th Fusiliers	Lieut.-Col. A. G. Daubeny Lieut.-Col. F. Beauchamp	1880-81
	2nd Battalion 8th Foot	Colonel E. B. Drew, C.B. Colonel C. E. Grogan Colonel E. Tanner	1878-80
	2nd Battalion 9th Foot	Colonel W. Daunt, C.B. Major A. B. Morgan	1878-80
	2nd Battalion 11th Foot	Colonel W. T. Corrie	1880-81
	1st Battalion 12th Foot	Colonel G. F. Walker	1879-80
	2nd Battalion 14th Foot	Colonel D. S. Warren, C.B.	1880
	2nd Battalion 15th Foot	Lieut.-Col. R. L. Dashwood	1880
	1st Battalion 17th Foot	Colonel A. H. Cobbe	1878-79
	1st Battalion 18th Foot	Lieut.-Col. W. D. Tompson Colonel M. J. R. MacGregor	1880-81
	1st Battalion 25th Foot	Colonel J. A. Ruddell Lieut.-Col. N. C. Ramsay Major F. S. Terry	1878-80
	51st Light Infantry	Colonel S. A. Madden, C.B. Colonel C. B. Acton, C.B.	1878-80
	59th Foot	Colonel R. Lacy	1878-80
	2nd Battalion 60th Rifles	Lieut.-Col. J. Lawson Lieut.-Col. J. J. Collins Lieut.-Col. C. Ashburnham, C.B.	1878-80
	63rd Foot	Lieut.-Col. W. G. Byron Lieut.-Col. W. L. Auchinleck	1880-81
	66th Foot	Lieut.-Col. J. Galbraith Major C. V. Oliver	1880
	67th Foot	Colonel S. G. C. Hogge	1879
	70th Foot	Colonel C. B. Knowles	1878-79
	72nd Highlanders	Colonel H. de R. Pigott Lieut.-Col. F. Brownlow Lieut.-Col. C. M. Stockwell, C.B.	1878-80
	78th Highlanders	Colonel A. E. Warren	1880-81
81st Foot	Colonel R. B. Chichester, C.B.	1878-79	
85th Foot	Lieut.-Col. E. M. Beadon	1879-81	
92nd Highlanders	Colonel G. H. Parker, C.B.	1879-80	
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	Colonel H. R. L. Newdigate, C.B.	1878-79	
Bengal Cavalry.	1st Bengal Cavalry	Major A. R. Chapman Colonel R. Jenkins	1878-80
	3rd Bengal Cavalry.	Lieut.-Col. A. R. D. Mackenzie	1879-80
	4th Bengal Cavalry	Lieut.-Col. M. M. Prendergast	1880
	5th Bengal Cavalry	Major H. A. Shakespear	1880-81

APPENDIX XXXIX—*continued**Index to Corps, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81—contd.*

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.	
Bengal Cavalry (<i>contd.</i>)	8th Bengal Cavalry . . .	Colonel B. W. Ryall . . . Lieut.-Col. H. Chapman . . .	1878-80	
	10th Bengal Lancers . . .	Lieut.-Col. O. Barnes . . . Major A. England . . .	1878-80	
	11th Bengal Lancers . . .	Lieut.-Col. R. E. Boyle . . . Lieut.-Col. A. H. Prinsep . . .	1878-79	
	12th Bengal Cavalry . . .	Lieut.-Col. H. A. McNair . . . Lieut.-Col. J. H. Green . . .	1878-80	
	13th Bengal Lancers . . .	Lieut.-Col. R. C. Low, c.B. . . Major W. H. Macnaghten . . .	1878-80	
	14th Bengal Lancers . . .	Lieut.-Col. C. R. Pennington . . . Lieut.-Col. R. C. W. Mitford . . .	1879-80	
	15th Bengal Cavalry . . .	Colonel T. G. Ross, c.B. . .	1879	
	17th Bengal Cavalry . . .	Colonel G. A. Prendergast . . . Lieut.-Col. T. J. Watson . . .	1879-80	
	18th Bengal Cavalry . . .	Major E. G. Newnham . . . Major T. R. Davidson . . .	1879-81	
	19th Bengal Lancers . . .	Major H. C. Marsh . . . Colonel W. Fane, c.B. . .	1878-80	
		Colonel P. S. Yorke . . . Lieut.-Col. A. G. Owen . . .		
		1st Bengal Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. L. H. P. de Ho- chepied Larpent . . .	1880
		2nd Bengal Light Infantry . . .	Colonel T. N. Baker . . .	1879
		5th Bengal Light Infantry . . .	Colonel E. Venour . . .	1880
		6th Bengal Light Infantry . . .	Colonel G. H. Thompson . . . Major W. Atkins . . .	1878-79
		8th Bengal Infantry . . .	Colonel G. A. Williams . . . Lieut.-Col. R. Smith . . .	1879-80
		9th Bengal Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. H. De Brett . . .	
		11th Bengal Infantry . . .	Colonel T. E. Webster . . .	1880
		12th (Kalat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment . . .	Colonel P. H. F. Harris . . .	1879-80
	13th Bengal Infantry . . .	Colonel W. Macdonald . . .	1878-79	
	14th (Ferozepore) Sikhs . . .	Colonel J. T. Watson . . . Colonel W. Playfair . . .	1879-81	
	15th (Loodianah) Sikhs . . .	Colonel L. H. Williams . . .	1878	
	16th (Lucknow) Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Col. G. R. Hennessy . . .	1878-80	
	19th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel R. S. Moseley . . . Colonel E. B. Clay . . .	1879-81 1878-80	
Bengal Infantry.	20th Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. A. Copland . . . Colonel R. G. Rogers, c.B. . .	1878-79	
	21st Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. H. W. Gordon . . . Lieut.-Col. F. W. Collis . . .	1878-80	
	22nd Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel J. J. O'Bryen . . . Colonel B. T. Stafford . . .	1879-80	
	23rd Punjab Pioneers . . .	Colonel A. A. Currie, c.B. . . Lieut.-Col. H. Collett, c.B. . .	1878-80	
	24th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel F. E. Norman, c.B. . .	1878-80	
	25th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel J. W. Hoggan, c.B. . .	1878-80	
	26th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel M. G. Smith . . .	1878-79	
	27th Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. C. J. Hughes . . .	1878-81	
	28th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel J. Hudson, c.B. . .	1878-80	
	29th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, c.B. . .	1878-80	
	30th Punjab Infantry . . .	Colonel T. W. R. Boisragon, c.B. . .	1879-80	
	31st Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. F. Tweddell . . . Lieut.-Col. H. Fellowes . . .	1879-80	
	32nd Punjab Pioneers . . .	Lieut.-Col. A. C. W. Crook- shank . . .	1878-80	

APPENDIX XXXIX—*continued**Index to Corps, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81—contd.*

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.
Bengal Infantry (<i>contd.</i>)	39th Bengal Infantry . . .	Colonel G. W. Fraser . . .	1878-79
	41st Bengal Infantry . . .	Major F. Gellie . . .	
	45th Rattray's Sikhs . . .	Colonel H. S. Obbard . . .	1880-81
		Lieut.-Col. F. M. Armstrong, c.B.	1878-80
Gurkha Regiments.	1st Gurkha Light Infantry . . .	Colonel J. S. Rawlins . . .	1878-80
	2nd Gurkha Regiment . . .	Colonel R. Sale-Hills, c.B. . .	
		3rd Gurkhas (Kamaon Batta- lion)	Colonel D. Macintyre, v.c. Lieut.-Col. A. Batty, c.B. . .
	4th Gurkhas		Colonel A. Paterson . . .
		5th (Hazara)Gurkhas (P.F.F.)	Colonel H. H. Lyster, v.c. Lieut.-Col. J. P. Turton . . .
	Lieut.-Col. F. F. Rowcroft, 44th Bengal Native Infy. Lieut.-Col. A. FitzHugh, c.B.		1878-80
Punjab Cavalry (P.F.F.)	1st Punjab Cavalry . . .	Lieut.-Col. C. S. Maclean, c.B.	
	2nd Punjab Cavalry . . .	Colonel T. G. Kennedy, c.B., Commandant, Punjab Frontier Force	1878-80
		3rd Punjab Cavalry . . .	
	5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	Lieut.-Col. A. Vivian . . .	1880
Corps of Guides (P.F.F.)	Guides Cavalry } Col. F. H. Jenkins, c.B. {	Lieut.-Col. G. Stewart . . .	1878-80
		Lieut.-Col. R. B. P. P. Campbell	
Sikh Regiments (P.F.F.)	1st Sikh Infantry	Lieut.-Col. A. G. Ross . . .	1878-79
	2nd Sikh Infantry	Lieut.-Col. H. C. P. Rice . . .	
	3rd Sikh Infantry	Lieut.-Col. J. J. Boswell, c.B.	1878-80
Punjab Infantry (P.F.F.)	1st Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. G. Noel-Money, c.B.	1879-80
	2nd Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. F. J. Keen, c.B. . .	1878-79
	4th Punjab Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. H. Tyndall, c.B. . .	1878-79
	5th Punjab Infantry . . .	Col. H. P. Close	1879
		Lieut.-Col. J. W. McQueen, c.B.	1878-80
	Lieut.-Col. H. M. Pratt . . .		
Central India Horse.	1st Regiment (wing) . . .	Lieut.-Col. C. Martin, c.B. . .	1880
	2nd Regiment (wing) . . .		
Native Contingents.	Bhopal Battalion	Colonel H. Forbes	1878-79
	Mhairwarra Battalion . . .	Lieut.-Col. F. W. Boileau . . .	1878-79
	Deoli Battalion		
Madras Cavalry.	1st Regiment Madras Cavalry	Lieut.-Col. E. M. Cherry . . .	1880-81

APPENDIX XXXIX—*continued**Index to Corps, etc., serving in Afghanistan, 1878-79-80-81—contd.*

Corps.	Regiment, Battalion, or Battery.	Commanding Officer.	Date.
Madras Infantry.	1st Madras Infantry . . .	Colonel F. Dawson . . .	} 1879-80
	4th Madras Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. G. Tyndall . . .	
	15th Madras Infantry . . .	Lieut.-Col. G. C. Hodding . . .	
	21st Madras Infantry . . .	Colonel G. Hearn . . .	
	30th Madras Infantry . . .	Major T. B. Middleton . . .	
Bombay Cavalry.	2nd Bombay Cavalry . . .	Colonel T. C. Georges . . .	1878-80
	3rd Bombay Light Cavalry . . .	Lieut.-Col. A. W. Macnaughten . . .	1880
	Poona Horse . . .	Major A. P. Currie . . .	1880
	2nd Regiment Sind Horse . . .	Colonel C. D'U. La Touche . . .	1880-81
	3rd Regiment Sind Horse . . .	Major M. M. Carpendale . . .	} 1878-81
	Captain G. A. de N. Lucas . . .		
Bombay Infantry.	1st Grenadiers . . .	Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, c.B. . . .	1878-80
	4th Infantry Rifles. . . .	Colonel H. S. Anderson . . .	1878-80
	5th Light Infantry . . .	Colonel W. Bannerman . . .	1880
	8th Infantry	Colonel F. Roome . . .	} 1880
	9th Infantry	Colonel R. A. C. Hunt . . .	
	10th Light Infantry . . .	Colonel S. Fellows . . .	1880
	16th Infantry	Major V. Birch . . .	} 1880
		Lieut.-Col. L. H. Sibthorpe . . .	
	19th Infantry	Colonel H. H. James . . .	} 1880
		Lieut.-Col. A. Durand . . .	
	23rd Light Infantry . . .	Colonel T. W. W. Pierce . . .	} 1880-81
	24th Infantry	Lieut.-Col. F. S. Iredell . . .	
	27th (1st Baluch) Infantry . . .	Colonel W. Creagh . . .	} 1878-81
	28th Infantry	Colonel C. T. Heathcote, c.B. . . .	
	29th (2nd Baluch) Infantry . . .	Colonel J. Harpur . . .	1880-81
30th (Jacob's Rifles) Infantry . . .	Colonel J. H. Henderson . . .	} 1880-81	
	Lieut.-Col. R. M. Chambers . . .		
Contingents of Sikh Feudatory States.	Patiala { Infantry (battalion). Cavalry.	Major Hogg	} 1878-81
	Bahawalpur { Infantry (wing). Cavalry (squadron).	Colonel T. Bell	
	Jhind { Infantry (battalion). Cavalry (2 squadrons).	Colonel J. R. Nimmo	} 1880-81
	Nabha { Infantry (battalion). Cavalry (2 squadrons).	Lieut.-Col. W. H. Newport . . .	
	Kapurthala { Infantry (wing). Cavalry (squadron).	Lieut.-Col. G. Nicholletts . . .	} 1878-81
	Maler Kotla { Infantry (2 companies). Cavalry (troop).	Colonel O. V. Tanner, c.B. . . .	
	Faridkot { Infantry (2 companies). Cavalry (troop).	Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, c.I.E. . . .	} 1878-80
	Nahan Infantry (2 companies).		

APPENDIX XL

Alphabetical Index to names of Officers who lost their lives in the Second Afghan War.

Rank.	Name and Corps.	Cause of death and place.	Date.
Major	A. D. Anderson, Staff Corps, 23rd Bengal Pioneers.	Killed in action at Paiwar Kotal.	2-12-78
Lieutenant	P. E. Anderson, Staff Corps, 25th Punjab Infantry.	Phthisis from exposure on the march to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, at Kandahar.	6-8-79
Lieutenant	F. C. C. Angelo, 31st Punjab Infantry.	Killed in action at the defence of Fort Battye.	25-3-80
Surg.-Major	G. Atkinson, M.B., Army Medical Department.	Pleuro-pneumonia during march of Ghazni Field Force, at Hafazai.	25-4-80
Lieutenant	F. M. Barclay, Staff Corps, 45th Bengal Native Infantry.	Effects of gun-shot wound during attack of Shinwaris on 17th March, 1879, at Landi Kotal.	31-3-79
Captain	W. B. Barker, 10th Hussars	Effects of sunstroke, at Dakka (Jhelum).	11-11-79
2nd Lieut.	H. J. O. Barr, 66th Foot	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Major	Wigram Battye, Corps of Guides.	Killed in action at Fatehabad.	2-4-79
Major	H. G. Becher, 11th Bengal Infantry.	Invalided from Ali Khel (in England).	26-10-80
Captain	John Becke, 21st Bombay Infantry (Marine Battalion).	Cholera, at Jhelum	27-10-79
Major	H. H. Birch, 27th Punjab Infantry.	Killed in action at the assault of Ali Masjid.	21-11-78
Lieutenant	W. H. Bishop, 2-11th Foot	Dysentery, at Kandahar	23-11-80
Major	G. F. Blackwood, Royal Horse Artillery.	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Surg.-Maj.	R. H. Bolton, Army Medical Department.	Rupture of abscess in liver, at Kandahar.	27-2-80
Brig.-Gen.	H. F. Brooke, Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade.	Killed in action at the retreat from sortie at Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	16-8-80
Lieut.-Col.	F. Brownlow, C.B., 72nd Highlanders.	Killed in action at Gandigan, near Kandahar.	1-9-80
Lieutenant	A. Burlton-Bennet, 10th Bengal Lancers.	Invalided from Afghanistan (in England).	23-10-79
Captain	S. G. Butson, 9th Lancers	Killed in action at Siah Sang, near Kabul.	13-12-79
Lieutenant	J. F. M. Campbell, 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluch).	Cholera, at Chaman	19-8-79
Captain	C. A. Carthew, 16th Bengal Cavalry, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.	Fever, at Landi Kotal	12-10-80
Major	Sir P. Louis N. Cavagnari, K.C.B.	Killed in action at the massacre at the Residency at Kabul.	3-9-79
Captain	D. T. Chisholm, 59th Foot	Typhoid fever, at Kandahar	30-7-79
Lieutenant	R. T. Chute, 66th Foot	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Bt. Lieut.-Col.	W. H. J. Clarke, 72nd Highlanders.	Pneumonia, and invalided from Kabul (at Allahabad).	7-4-80
Lieut.-Col.	R. S. Cleland, 9th Lancers	Mortally wounded in action at Kala Kazi (at Murree).	15-6-80

APPENDIX XL—*continued**Index to names of Officers who lost their lives in the Second Afghan War—contd.*

Rank.	Name and Corps.	Cause of death and place.	Date.
Lieutenant	Duncan Cole, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Killed in action by a round shot at Maiwand.	27-7-80
Lieut.-Col.	J. J. Collins, 2-60th Rifles.	Dysentery, at Nari Bank, Sibi.	8-10-80
Major	John Cook, v.c., 5th Gurkhas (Hazara Battalion).	Wounds received in action on 12th December, at Kabul	19-12-79
Lieut.-Col.	G. B. Crispin, 4th Bombay Rifles	Invalided home (in the Red Sea).	24-10-80
Captain	E. W. H. Crofton, 4-60th Rifles	Cholera, at Landi Kotal	18-10-79
Captain	G. M. Cruickshank, Royal Engineers.	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	16-8-80
Captain	F. J. Cullen, 66th Foot	Killed in action at Maiwand.	27-7-80
Lieutenant	R. E. L. Dacres, Royal Artillery.	Typhoid fever, at Landi Kotal.	13-5-79
Lieut.-Col.	A. G. Daubeny, 2-7th Fusiliers	Small-pox, at Kandahar	21-11-80
Lieutenant	G. G. Dawes, 1st Bengal Cavalry	Cholera, at Kohat	7-6-79
Lieutenant	A. E. Dobson, Royal Engineers	Malarious fever, at Safed Sang.	20-7-80
Captain	J. Dundas, v.c., Royal Engineers.	Killed by premature explosion of mine near Sherpur.	23-12-79
Lieut.-Col.	H. Fellowes, 32nd Punjab Pioneers.	Dysentery during march of the Thal-Chotiali Field Force at Kala Chapri.	9-4-79
Lieutenant	T. O. FitzGerald, 27th Punjab Infantry.	Killed in action at the assault of Ali Masjid.	21-11-78
Lieutenant	St. J. W. Forbes, 92nd Highlanders.	Killed in action whilst storming the Takht-i-Shah, near Sherpur.	13-12-79
Lieutenant	O. E. S. Forbes, 14th B.L.	Killed in action at Kala Kazi, near Kabul.	11-12-79
Captain	St. J. T. Frome, 72nd Highlanders.	Killed in action near Kandahar.	1-9-80
Lieutenant	C. H. Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders.	Killed in action at the Asmai heights, near Sherpur.	14-12-79
Lieut.-Col.	James Galbraith, 66th Foot	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Captain	J. H. Gamble, 1-17th Foot	Dysentery, at Landi Kotal	14-7-79
Captain	E. S. Garratt, 66th Foot	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Captain	F. T. Goad, 5th Hyderabad Contingent.	Mortally wounded on 13th December at the Mangior Pass, Kurram Valley, at Kurram Fort.	14-12-78
Major	J. Godson, 4th Madras Infantry	Subsequent to evacuation of the Khyber Line, at Bangalore.	25-12-80
Chaplain	Rev. G. M. Gordon, Church Missionary Society.	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	16-8-80
Surgeon	H. A. C. Gray, M.B., C.M., Bengal Medical Department.	Cholera, at Peshawar	4-7-79
Lieutenant	W. R. P. Hamilton, v.c., Corps of Guides.	Killed in action at the defence of the Residency at Kabul.	3-9-79
Captain	Edward Hardy, Royal Horse Artillery.	Killed in action at Kala Kazi, near Kabul.	11-12-79
Captain	G. J. Hare, 22nd Punjab Infantry.	Pneumonia, at Safed Sang	3-1-80
Sub-Lieut.	F. H. Harford, 10th Hussars	Drowned in Kabul River, at Jalalabad.	31-3-79

APPENDIX XI—*continued*

Index to names of Officers who lost their lives in the Second Afghan War—contd.

Rank.	Name and Corps.	Cause of death and place.	Date.
Lieutenant	C. J. R. Hearsey, 9th Lancers .	Killed in action at Kala Kazi, near Kabul.	11-12-79
Captain .	P. C. Heath, Brigade-Major, 1st Brigade, Kandahar Field Force.	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Lieutenant	T. Rice-Henn, Royal Engineers	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Lieutenant	W. F. Hennell, 1st Punjab Cavalry.	Cholera, at Kandahar .	21-7-79
Lieutenant	C. W. Hinde, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Lieutenant	A. Honeywood, 66th Foot .	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Political Officer	W. Jenkyns, M.A., C.I.E., Civil Service.	Killed in action at the defence of the Residency at Kabul.	3-9-79
Lieutenant	W. N. Justice, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Surgeon .	A. C. Keith, M.B., Army Medical Department.	Pneumonia, at Sherpur .	13-1-80
Surgeon .	A. H. Kelly, Bengal Medical Department.	Killed in action at the defence of the Residency at Kabul.	3-9-79
Surg.-Major	H. Kelsall, Army Medical Department.	Pleurisy, at Dakka . .	6-6-79
Captain .	J. A. Kelso, Royal Artillery .	Killed in action at Paiwar Kotal.	2-12-78
Lieutenant	F. G. Kinloch, 5th Bengal Cavalry.	Killed by an ambush of Orakzais in Kurram Valley, near Thal.	29-5-79
Lieutenant	S. E. L. Lendrum, Royal Artillery.	Typhoid fever, at Kohkaran	30-4-79
Lieutenant	E. D. Los, 1-25th Foot . .	Enteric fever, at Pezwan .	31-5-80
Lieutenant	G. H. Lumsden, 8th Bengal Cavalry.	Assassinated by Mangals in camp, at Kurram.	19-2-80
Lieutenant	Hector Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery.	Murdered when prisoner in Ayub's camp at Mazra, near Kandahar.	1-9-80
Captain .	W. H. McMath, 66th Foot .	Killed in action at Maiwand.	27-7-80
Lieutenant	E. S. Marsh, 2-7th Fusiliers .	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, near Kandahar.	16-8-80
Lieutenant	C. A. Montanaro, Royal Artillery.	Killed in action at Sherpur.	19-12-79
Captain .	C. S. Morison, 14th Bengal Lancers.	Invalided home (in England)	1880
Lieutenant	A. R. Murray, 13th Bengal Lancers.	Cholera, at Tret, Punjab .	18-7-79
Lieut.-Col.	W. H. Newport, 28th Bombay Infantry.	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar	16-8-80
Lieut.-Col.	G. Nicholetts, 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluch).	Cholera, at Kohkaran . .	18-7-79
Lieutenant	C. Nugent, Royal Engineers .	Premature explosion of a mine near Sherpur.	23-12-79
Colonel .	J. J. O'Bryen, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry . . .	Effects of exposure at Safed Sang.	21-1-80
Major .	C. V. Oliver, 66th Foot . .	Small-pox, at Kandahar .	10-10-80
Lieutenant	W. R. Olivey, 66th Foot . .	Killed in action at Maiwand.	27-7-80
Lieutenant	E. G. Osborne, Royal Horse Artillery.	Killed in action at Maiwand.	27-7-80

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Index to names of Officers who lost their lives in the Second Afghan War—contd.

Rank.	Name and Corps.	Cause of death and place.	Date.
Lieutenant	Lord Ossulston, 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.	—	—
Lieutenant	W. C. Owen, 3rd Bombay Cavalry.	Killed in action at Maiwand.	27-7-80
Lieutenant	E. Palmer, Bengal Commissariat Department.	Mortally wounded in Hisarak Expedition, at Pezwan.	14-4-80
Captain	E. W. Perry, 40th Foot . . .	Cholera, at Quetta . . .	19-6-79
Depy. Surg.-Gen.	J. H. Porter, Army Medical Department.	Pneumonia, at Sherpur . .	9-1-80
Lieutenant	Brownlow Poulter, Royal Engineers.	Enteric fever, at Peshawar	22-6-79
Captain	C. F. Powell, 5th Gurkhas . .	Mortally wounded in action in Sapri defile on 13th December, at Kurram Fort.	18-12-78
Major	L. A. Powys, 59th Foot . . .	Cholera, at Kandahar . . .	6-8-79
Captain	J. J. Preston, 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.	Fever, at Safed Sang . . .	1-5-79
Lieutenant	M. E. Rayner, 66th Foot . . .	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Captain	R. B. Reed, 1-12th Foot . . .	Cholera, at Landi Kotal . .	19-6-79
Lieutenant	T. J. O'D. Renny, 4th Punjab Infantry.	Mortally wounded in attack on Zawa, at Chinarak.	15-12-79
Major	W. Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse . .	Killed in action at Kushk-i-Nakhud.	26-2-79
Lieutenant	W. P. Ricardo, 9th Lancers . .	Killed in action at Kala Kazi near Kabul.	11-12-79
Lieutenant	J. T. Rice, Royal Engineers . .	Typhoid fever, at Kohat . .	23-12-79
Lieutenant	S. W. T. Roberts, 27th Punjab Infantry.	Cholera, at Landi Kotal . .	16-6-79
Captain	W. Roberts, 66th Foot . . .	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Lieutenant	H. R. Ross, Royal Artillery . .	Dysentery, in Peshin . . .	12-1-79
Captain	A. P. Samuells, 32nd Punjab Pioneers.	Invalided, at Rawalpindi	0-7-80
Captain	E. W. Samuells, Bengal Staff Corps.	Typhoid fever, at Peshawar	20-12-78
Captain	T. à B. Sargent, 78th Highlanders.	Typhoid fever, at Kandahar	21-1-81
Captain	E. D. Shafto, Royal Artillery . .	Killed by explosion of magazine at Bala Hissar.	16-10-79
Lieut.-Col.	A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary-General.	Mortally wounded in Deh Khoja sortie, at Kandahar.	2-9-80
Captain	H. F. Showers, 1st Punjab Infantry.	Murdered by Kakar Pathans at Chapri, near Quetta.	14-5-80
Captain	H. F. Smith, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Major	L. Smith, 3rd Gurkhas . . .	Dysentery, at Kalat-i-Ghilzai	25-1-79
Surgeon	W. B. Smyth, A.B., M.B., C.S.I.	Killed by Watazai robbers at Chapri.	25-6-79
Captain	N. J. Spens, 72nd Highlanders	Killed in action whilst storming the Asmai heights, near Kabul.	14-12-79
Lieutenant	H. H. S. Spoor, 1-25th Foot . .	Enteric fever, at Pezwan . .	1-6-80
Lieutenant	F. C. Stayner, 19th Bombay Infantry.	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	16-8-80
Lieut.-Col.	R. G. T. Stevenson, Poona Horse	Pleuro-pneumonia at Quetta	24-4-80
Captain	E. Straton, 2-22nd Foot . . .	Killed in action at Mazra, near Kandahar.	1-9-80

APPENDIX XL—continued

Index to names of Officers who lost their lives in the Second Afghan War—contd.

Rank.	Name and Corps.	Cause of death and place.	Date.
Captain .	S. A. Swinley, 11th Bengal Lancers.	Typhoid fever, at Safed Sang.	24-5-79
Lieutenant	B. S. Thurlow, 51st Foot . . .	Shot by ambush of Afghans near Jagdalak.	22-3-80
Major .	R. J. Le Poer Trench, 19th Bombay Infantry.	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, near Kandahar.	16-8-80
Brig.-Gen.	J. A. Tytler, c.B., v.c., Commanding Zaimusht Expedition.	Pneumonia, at Thal . . .	14-2-80
Major .	T. B. Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers .	Mortally wounded on 16th at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	26-8-80
Lieutenant	E. P. Ventris, 3rd Buffs	Fever, at Bagh	14-4-79
Surg.-Major	J. Wallace, M.A., M.D., M.R.C.S.	Cholera, at Landi Kotal . . .	16-7-79
Surgeon .	J. E. Walsh, M.D., Bengal Medical Department.	Cholera, at Kandahar	24-7-79
Lieutenant	E. H. Watson, 1-17th Foot . . .	Malarious fever, at Murree . .	4-7-79
Surgeon .	G. Watson, M.B., Bengal Medical Department.	Enteric fever, at Paiwar Kotal.	25-7-80
Major .	S. J. Waudby, 19th Bombay Infantry.	Killed in action at the defence of post at Dabrai.	16-4-80
Captain .	A. A. Weighall, Army Pay Department, 2-11th Foot.	Effects of exposure and fatigue, at Kandahar.	22-12-80
Lieutenant	C. G. Whitby, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Killed in action at Maiwand	27-7-80
Lieutenant	F. Whittuck, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.	Dysentery, at Kandahar . . .	5-9-80
Lieutenant	H. V. Willis, Royal Artillery . .	Assassinated at Kandahar . .	15-1-79
Captain .	F. H. Winterbotham, Madras Sappers.	Pneumonia, at Peshawar . . .	14-2-79
Lieutenant	N. C. Wiseman, 1-17th Foot . . .	Killed in action at Fatehabad.	2-4-79
Lieutenant	F. P. Wood, 7th Fusiliers	Killed in action at the sortie of Deh Khoja, at Kandahar.	16-8-80
Lieutenant	I. D. Wright, Royal Artillery . .	Killed in action near Jagdalak.	29-12-79
Surg.-Major	J. H. Wright, M.R.C.S., Army Medical Department.	Heat apoplexy, at Attock . . .	21-6-79
Lieutenant	G. M. Yaldwyn, 2-6th Foot	Cholera, at Peshawar	12-6-79

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