


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INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

MAHSUD-WAZIRI OPERATIONS.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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EAST INDIA.

(NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.)

MAHSUD-WAZIRI OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 26th October, 1899. Received 13th November, 1899.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's

From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th October, 1898, with enclosure.

From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 5th May, 1899, with enclosures.

From the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 20th September, 1899, with enclosures.

To the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 6th October, 1899, with enclosures.

Government, copies of the letters marked in the margin, regarding raids committed by Mahsud and Waziri tribesmen.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

W. S. A. LOCKHART.

E. H. H. COLLEN.

A. C. TREVOR.

C. M. RIVAZ.

C. E. DAWKINS.

T. RALEIGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 17th October, 1898.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 28th September, 1898, regarding the raid committed by Mahsuds on Jani Khel flocks on the 3rd September, 1898, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted correspondence, from which it will be seen that the Commissioner, Derajat Division, recommends that the following terms be demanded from the Guri Khels, who, it has been established, planned the raid and furnished the largest number of offenders, the others accompanying as assistants:—

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 22nd September, 1898, and enclosures.

Commissioner, Derajat's, dated 23rd September, 1898.

Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 1st October, 1898.

Punjab Government, dated 5th October, 1898.

- (1) Payment of customary blood-money and compensation for men killed and wounded, the raiders being allowed to set off any sum on account of blood-money owing to them;

- (2) Restitution of all animals carried off and of any ransom paid for them, and of the value of animals killed, dead or permanently injured; and
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs. 800, half to be remitted if terms (1) and (2) are completed within one month of the date of their announcement.

2. Commissioner further recommends that the present garrison of the Jani Khel post be relieved by the 12 sabres recently withdrawn from the Tochi post, as they are infantry sepoy and practically useless for purposes of pursuit, since the post is 10 miles from the border and raiders have ample time to get away.

3. It will be seen from the enclosures of this letter that the kidnapped shepherds and children were released almost immediately by the raiders. The Lieutenant-Governor has, therefore, approved of the terms recommended by Mr. Merk, and trusts that his action will be confirmed by the Government of India.

4. As to the alteration of the Jani Khel garrison, the Commissioner has been authorised to ascertain the views of the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, and to report them with his own.

5. With reference to the remark contained in paragraph 3 of your letter, dated 7th October, 1898, I am to add that the whole question of the best way of bringing the Mahsuds to account for the repeated outrages committed by them in British India, Tochi and Zhob has been referred by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, and is now under the separate consideration of the Lieutenant-Governor.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 22nd September, 1898.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram, dated the 15th instant, on the subject of the Jani Khel raid on the 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of the letter and telegrams noted in the margin.

Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, dated the 20th instant.

Telegram from Political Officer, Wana, dated the 20th instant.

Telegram from Political Officer, Tochi, dated the 15th instant.

2. The persons kidnapped by the raiders were, it seems, released soon after capture at the intercession of the guardian of a shrine, to which the raiders had presented sheep as a thank-offering for the success of their attack.

3. There appears to be no special motive for the raid, the robbing propensities of the Mahsuds and their hereditary enmity with the Jani Khel (who are Darwesh Khel) are the probable causes.

4. The *personnel* of the raiders is established by the Political Officer to have been Guri Khel, Garerai, Jalal Khels and others; the Guri Khel, with Asal Khan and Dabbas Khan as their ringleaders, having apparently planned the raid and furnished the largest number of offenders, the others accompanying as assistants.

5. The Jani Khel post, as at present constituted, seems to me to be useless. It lies 10 miles from the actual line of the border, its garrison are infantry whom it would take two-and-a-half hours to reach the frontier, and

for purposes of repelling raids and following up raiders the sepoy might as well not be there. With the permission of His Honour, I propose to suggest to the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, that cavalry be substituted for infantry here.

6. The introduction of the breech-loader has, in the matter of the Frontier Grazing Regulation of 1874, as in many other matters on the border, brought about a complete revolution. So long as our troops had breech-loaders and the hillmen had none, our protective agency was so infinitely superior to the offensive power of raiders that the effective line of safety was pushed right up to the foot of the hills, far beyond the "frontier road" mentioned in the Regulation. Here the distance is nine miles. Now that the hillmen are obtaining breech-loaders, the conditions of the case will be reversed unless we either arm our villagers with similar weapons or place our troops practically on the actual border itself. The former alternative is for several reasons impossible, and my proposal to put cavalry in Jani Khel practically adopts the second alternative. It would be obviously unfair to enforce the Regulation when half-a-dozen raiders armed with breech-loaders are superior to three times that number of villagers who have only jezails or even Enfields; and, as the Deputy Commissioner says, the Regulation is becoming obsolete. I would not recommend its repeal, for it may be useful on occasion, but in view of the greatly altered circumstances of the present day, as compared with 1874, in the vital point of armament, we cannot, I think, look to that Regulation as affording much in the way of the protection of border graziers and their animals.

7. It is satisfactory that the Jani Khel acted fully up to their responsibility for the Shakta Pass.

8. There can be no further doubt that the raid occurred in British territory, that the men killed and wounded are British subjects, and that the owners of at least half of the animals that have been lifted are British subjects. The owners of the other half are not British subjects, but as their property was carried off from British territory, we are bound to take up their case as well as that of our subjects. Even if the raid had not actually crossed our border, we should, I think, for the considerations stated in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated the 1st February, 1892, to this office, have been under the obligation to exact redress from the Mahsuds. In connection with this letter the Deputy Commissioner has properly warned the Jani Khel not to retaliate.

9. Now as to this redress: the raid having been made in British territory, two British subjects having been killed and three wounded, and all the animals having been carried off from within our limits, the case seems to me far more serious than if the affair had happened in the grazing lands adjacent to our border, and if no British subjects had been killed, wounded and injured. In the latter event we should probably have been content to merely enforce reparation. But the present case appears to me to be one calling for more than mere reparation. There has been a good deal of raiding lately by the Mahsuds, witness the recent correspondence about Zhob and the various diaries and reports of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana; and the time has come, I think, for making a stand and for showing to the Mahsuds that British interests must be scrupulously respected. In this case there has been a gross offence committed, for which, if any raiders had been caught in our territory, they could have been hanged under the law. I understand from the Political Officer, Wana, that in a similar case the Garerais were fined Rs. 500, which fine was subsequently remitted. I do not know the circumstances of this remission, but I venture to hold that, if a punishment is inflicted at all, it ought always to be one that will be felt and remembered, and, secondly, that, although in individual instances it may have sometimes a good effect to forego a penalty which has been unconditionally announced, yet unconditional remissions are dangerously apt to create the impression that we are making idle threats.

10. I have discussed the following terms with the Political Officer, Wana:—

- (1) Payment of customary blood-money and compensation for the men killed and wounded.
- (2) Restitution of all the animals carried off and of any ransom paid for them, and payment of market value of any animals killed, dead or permanently injured.
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs. 1,500, one-half to be remitted if terms (1) and (2) are completed within one month after date of notice given of the terms.

Details as to (1) and (2) will be settled direct by the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.

Mr. Kettlewell states that the first and second terms are already fully understood by the Guri Khel, but that as regards (1) they plead a set-off on account of blood-money owing to them. To this, I think, there is no strong objection, although it is not usual to admit such set-offs for the death of British subjects; but here the circumstances are peculiar in that there is an old feud between the parties.

11. With regard to the fine, Mr. Kettlewell thinks it too high, and in deference to his opinion I have reduced my proposal to Rs. 800, to which he does not demur on the score of its being excessive, but he would postpone altogether the question of a fine until we see what the Guri Khels are doing and have done already in the matter of reparation. As to this, I differ. The condition under which half the fine will be remitted is intended to meet the case of fairly prompt restoration. Whatever the attitude of sections may be, we must, I think, mark what has happened, and considering the nature of the raid, a fine of Rs. 400 or Rs. 800, as the case may be, spread over three sections, can scarcely be called harsh. If the Maliks have to pay up, then all I can say is that they must be weak and powerless. The usual course where an independent clan is fined, is either for the whole clan to subscribe according to hereditary shares (this, if they sympathise with the individual offenders and take up their case as a clan question), or the jirga pays and recovers from the individual offenders by prompt and drastic methods of its own. If it comes to this that we are prevented from punishing an offending clan, because the punishment will fall not upon the offenders or upon the whole clan (in the latter case, because the clan voluntarily takes upon its shoulders the offence of the individuals), but upon the Maliks who help us, then we are in a grave dilemma: the clans can go on raiding as much as they like, secure in the knowledge that nothing more disagreeable is likely to happen than a more or less complete restoration, as chance will have it, and we are in the position of being unable to strike for fear of hitting our friends! There is a limit to the policy of consideration; to my mind it is incumbent upon all tribes to whom we extend the privilege of friendly relations with us, whose members we protect when in our own limits, and whose interests we respect, that they shall reciprocate, and that, if any members of tribes injure us, those tribes shall do us reparation without delay. That is of the essence of friendly relation; it is an obligation upon the clans whether they receive allowances from us or not, but this obligation is greatly enhanced in the case of those that draw our money. Under any circumstances, it is the duty of the clans to make immediate restitution; it is no particular merit to them if they do their plain duty; and for the reasons given above, I am of opinion that, if any consideration is required owing to the special conditions of the case, it is sufficiently expressed in the lenient amount of the fine and in the remission which depends upon the conduct of the sections at fault. I therefore adhere to my proposals and recommend for the orders of Government terms (1) and (2) and a fine of Rs. 800, of which one-half is conditional, as stated above. If the Maliks have, after all, to pay, it is an internal question between them and their clansmen, with which we have nothing to do: and these very Maliks are to blame for not having restrained and controlled

their clansmen. If they plead inability to do so, then there seems no particular good in their being Maliks, nor do they appear to deserve much consideration. I would ask for the favour of early orders, in view of the facts stated in the telegram of the Political Officer, Tochi.

Annexure 2.

Letter from A. H. Gunter, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 20th September, 1898.

In reply to your letter of the 11th instant, on the subject of the Mahsud raid on the Bannu border at Jani Khel, I have the honour to report that I have ascertained that the kidnapped shepherds and children were released almost immediately by the raiders. The robbers paused at a Ziarat in the Shaktu valley belonging to one Dina, a Bibizai Mahsud, and presented five sheep to the shrine as a thank-offering for the success of their expedition, and Dina then begged and obtained the release of their captives.

2. I have been unable to discover any special motive for this raid, though I have questioned the Jani Khel Maliks and other persons who would be likely to know about the matter. I do not myself believe there is any to be looked for save such as lay in the opportunity. The Mahsuds on the one hand, and the Jani Khel and Bakka Khel Waziris of this district on the other, have a long-standing enmity and have raided one another time and again, though the scene of their operations has been generally across the border and the scale a smaller one.

3. As to the *personnel* of the raiders, my latest information is that the band consisted of—

- (1) *Asal Khan, Guri Khel*, with a hundred men. There seems to be no doubt that this man was at the bottom of the whole business, the organizer and leader of the raid, and I am told that the herds were all driven straight to his village and there divided.
- (2) *Muhabbat Khan, Guri Khel*.
- (3) *Shergand of Kamir Khan, Shabi Khel Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (4) *Shahpir Khan, son of Majhak Khan, Shaman Khel Mahsud*, with 1 man.
- (5) *Fatteh Khan, Lamanzai*, with 12 men.
- (6) *A Gudi Khel*, with 2 men.
- (7) *Shadi Nir Khan, Garerai Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (8) *Fatteh Khan, Marsai Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (9) *Khan, Biland Khel Mahsud*, with 12 men.
- (10) *Jamaroz Khan, son of Muhammad Khan, Abid Ali*, with 6 men.
- (11) *Makin, son of Gulaband, Bizai*, with 6 men.
- (12) *A Jalal Khel*, with 7 men.

I will not vouch for the completeness or accuracy of this list, which has been brought by spies sent up after the raiders, and which I see differs materially from the list sent by the Political Officer, Wana, but that officer will doubtless be able to check it.

4. I was given a very natural explanation as to why the news of the raid was not at once sent to the Jani Khel post by the Jani Khels themselves. "There were only sepoy's there," they said, "and what we then wanted was sowars." The sepoy's from the Jani Khel Fort would probably have never even caught up the *chigha*. Our posts are so far from the border at this portion of it that we cannot hope to strike effectively in cases of this sort unless indeed we returned to the old system of having cavalry instead of infantry at Jani Khel and keeping our roads out to Khaisora and Shaktu from the post in condition for galloping. If we had had the Khaisora post built which was proposed a few years ago, the raiders might not have found matters quite so easy, but what is really required is one post at the Khaisora mouth and another at the Shaktu mouth. Then Jani Khel and Burji might be done away with.

5. I find that section 3 of the Punjab Frontier Grazing Regulation has been practically a dead-letter for years, and after seeing the ground I think you would agree that it is unsuitable. The frontier road is here about nine miles from the border. All the good grazing lies across the road, and for the greater part of this strip owing to the proximity to villages and posts there is no serious danger from exterior foes. The most that we should do is, I think, to mark off, say, a three-mile strip and insist on armed escorts within that. The people's own opinion about the matter is that it is better that they should lose an occasional flock rather than that their men should have the trouble of a close watch and ward of this sort. They also say—"If you insist on our turning out as an armed escort, we must have a weapon with which we can meet our attackers on equal terms. The raiders came with twelve breech-loaders. We have only two amongst the whole tribe. In any case what could we have done?" We at present supply them with no weapons for border defence either of their homes or of their flocks. The Jani Khels say the men who were shot were shot with breech-loaders.

6. The Jani Khels who were responsible for the pass turned out in great force after the raiders, and with great promptitude, but the distance was against them, and some of the hamlets were 10 miles off the scene of the raid, and a mistake was made in going to that scene instead of heading straight for the mouth of the Shaktu. The men of Khar and Khui avoided that mistake and came up with the raiders, but met with repulse as has been already described.

7. I have visited the scene of the occurrence of the raid and ridden along the border. The place whence the animals were carried off is undoubtedly British territory. Revenue-paying land and the survey boundary pillars are beyond in towards independent territory. The owners of about half the sheep and donkeys are Waruka Jani Khels who permanently reside beyond the border line and are not British subjects. The owners of the other half and of all the cows are permanently resident in British territory who pay revenue and are British subjects in every sense of the word. I append a detailed list of owners and property claimed to be lost, given me by Mr. Wilkin, District Superintendent of Police. He says he is inclined to think that the numbers have been exaggerated. The Jani Khels, on the other hand, tell me they are prepared to take oath on the "Koran" that their numbers are correct. The difference between these numbers and those given by the Political Officer, Wana, is not a very great one, and this detail might be settled according to the custom of the country.

8. I am now told that the man Kokar, who was mortally wounded by the raiders, was not a man from *Khui*, but is a British subject from Bitannai, a village situated within the border near Khui. Also that one of the wounded men, Ghazal (a British subject too), has died of his wounds.

9. I have told the Jani Khels that Government are taking up this case, and that retaliation on their own part is absolutely prohibited.

List of stolen Cattle with Owners and numbers raided by the Mahsuds.

Serial No.	Name of Owner.	Father's Name.	Tribe.	Sub-section.	Number of Head of Cattle.
1	Sheikh Majid ...	Sheikh Farid ...	Warika ...	Jani Khel ...	} Lost 200 sheep.
2	Bassim ...	Massalla ...	Lohar Warika	Do. ...	
3	Khowjak ...	Do. ...	Do.	Do. ...	
4	Saiyid Rahim ...	Mer Mon ...	Do.	Do. ...	
5	Jamal Din ...	Shamal Khan ...	Warika ...	Do. ...	} Lost 180 sheep.
6	Shamal Khan ...	Bangi Khan ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	
7	Zai Gai ...	Kaim Khan ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	
8	Ahmad Khan ...	Shal Khan ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	220 sheep and goats and 3 donkeys.
9	Tor Khan ...	Karai Khan ...	Khujala Khel	Do. ...	200 sheep.
10	Pir Saiyid ...	Karar Khan ...	Do.	Do. ...	200 goats and sneep.
11	Nijaz Khan ...	Karai Khan ...	Do.	Do. ...	110 sheep, 13 goats, 2 donkeys.
12	Tar Gul ...	Utman Shan ...	Malli Khel ...	Do. ...	2 donkeys, 2 cows.
13	Pir Azam ...	Almari ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 cows, 1 donkey, 14 sheep.
14	Zargon Shah ...	Ahmad Shah ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	25 sheep.
15	Tapuzai ...	Izat Khan ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 cows.
16	Dablai ...	Pushai ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 do.
17	Zamak ...	Muhammad ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	2 do.
18	Shatai ...	Mehr Gul ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	1 cow.
19	Nazar Khan ...	Daduki ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 cows.
20	Kulai ...	Hakim Khan ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 do.
21	Shana Gul ...	Azam Khan ...	Sardi Khel ...	Bakka Khel ...	5 do.
22	Anga Mal ...	Jungai ...	Malli Khel ...	Jani Khel ...	6 do.
23	Kadi ...	Teral ...	Ali Khel ...	Do. ...	2 do.
24	Malik Din ...	Salam Din ...	Bacha Kai ...	Do. ...	2 do.
25	Zarmaat Khan ...	Dangar <i>alias</i> Merat Khan.	Do. ...	Do. ...	6 do.
26	Jamak Khan ...	Trippal ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	2 do.
27	Kemal Khan ...	Dodai ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	3 cows and 1 sheep.
28	Mussamat Gulami ...	Widow of Badon ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	4 cows.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 15th September, 1898.

Difficult to get reliable information about Mahsuds in Tochi, but raid in Bannu appears to have been committed chiefly by Guri Khels. Ringleaders said to be Asal Khan and Karar Khan. One account implicates Jalal Khels and Shabi Khels. Also a gang of Guri Khels headed by Kamal, son of Karar, is said to be now in Sheratala, which means they have crossed lower Tochi. Another gang of Jalal Khel and another of Kikarai Mahsuds are reported to be hanging about near lower Tochi. Unless strong action taken in Bannu raid case soon, effects will be felt in Tochi where Mahsud raids were already more frequent and serious than usual.

Annexure 4.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 20th September, 1898.

Your No. 238. I would defer question of fine and terms for a short time, until we see what the Guri Khels have done already and are doing in matter of reparation. The men I have in the hills watching matters should return in about four days and we shall then know definitely what attitude of section is. If prompt restitution is made, we can deal with section accordingly. With regard to blood-money the Guri Khels stated that a Galeshahi whose father had been killed by Wali Khels had committed the murder, and that they themselves have blood claims against the Wali Khels. Truth or falsity of this can only be ascertained in jirga. A year ago, however, Dabbas, Guri Khel, stated before Grant that he had claims against Wali Khels and was referred to Tochi for restitution. It must be remembered that in cases of this kind fine imposed generally falls on Maliks, who, if they work well, are entitled to consideration. In this case I would announce no fine at present. If Maliks do nothing, Rs. 800 is not too high.

Annexure 5.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikh Budin, the 23rd September, 1898.

With reference to the remark in my letter, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 22nd instant, on the subject of the Jani Khel raid, that "there has been a good deal of raiding lately by the Mahsuds," I ought to say in explanation that out of a total of 97 offences charged against the hill tribes of Southern Waziristan, as having been committed since the 1st of January to the 1st September this year, in British territory or in the protected area including the Gomal route, 53 are put down to Mahsuds.

Annexure 6.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Bannu, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Simla, dated the 1st October, 1898.

If convenient, kindly send me telegraphic orders on my letter of 22nd ultimo, Guri Khel raid.

Annexure 7.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Simla, to the Commissioner, Derajat, Bannu, dated the 5th October, 1898.

Yours of 1st instant. Lieutenant-Governor approves of terms proposed by you in your letter, dated 22nd September, in connection with raid near Jani Khel. As to alteration of constitution of garrison of Jani Khel post, you may ascertain the views of the General Officer Commanding, Punjab Frontier Force, and report them with your own.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 5th May, 1899.

I am directed to invite attention to paragraph 5 of Mr. Dane's letter, dated the 17th of October, 1898, and to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters marginally noted relating to the settlement of cases against the Mahsuds which were decided at the joint jirgas held at Tank by the Political Officers of Tochi and Wana.

Letters, dated the 27th and 30th January, 1899, respectively, from the Commissioner, Derajat, and enclosures.

Punjab Government's letters, dated the 19th April, 1899, and enclosures.

2. As regards the cases relating to offences committed by Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District reported on in Commissioner's letter, it will be seen that 49 cases were instituted against the Mahsuds; that in 14 of these cases there was no evidence to show that the Mahsuds were the offenders; and that the disposal of 6 cases was postponed in consequence of the absence of complainants or parties. Out of the remaining 29 cases, 22 were of simple theft, house-breaking, &c., in which the property stolen was valued at Rs. 1,512 in all; the remaining two cases were one of dacoity and one of murder, and, as a matter of fact, formed one case only. These have been fully described by the Political Officer in paragraph 3 of his letter of the 28th November, 1898, which forms an enclosure to Mr. Anderson's letter of the 27th January, 1899. The Commissioner has approved of the orders passed, and has authorized the Political Officer to take action to enforce the orders, and his action has been confirmed by the Lieutenant-Governor in my letter of the 19th April, 1899.

3. As regards the settlement of cases against Mahsuds relating to the Tochi Valley in which Government or travellers were the complainants, the details of these are contained in the enclosures of Commissioner's letter of the 30th January, 1899. Mr. Anderson has approved of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, submitted in their letter dated the 10th January, 1899, and has authorized the latter to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. These orders have been approved by His Honour in my letter, and Sir Mackworth Young has also sanctioned the recommendations of the Political Officers in cases in which Government servants or property were injured, and has directed that steps be taken to realize the fines and compensation awarded in all these cases.

 Annexure 1.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 27th January, 1899.

In continuation of this office endorsement, dated the 19th October, 1898, I have the honour to forward a copy of letter, dated the 28th November last, and its enclosure, from the Political Officer, Wana, reporting the result of the cases relating to offences committed by the Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District, and decided at the joint jirga held at Tank.

2. There are altogether 49 such cases instituted against the Mahsuds. With the exception of 4, all of these occurred after the attack at Maizar in June, 1897. It is the fact that much pressure was not brought to bear on the Mahsuds to obtain redress in these cases until the Tochi Expedition was over, and the disturbance on the Peshawar border subsided. There were

strong political reasons for adopting temporarily this cautious line of policy as regards the settlement of these cases. In fact, my greatest anxiety during the crisis was to keep things going smoothly on the Derajat border and to avoid any action likely to raise disturbances. I make this remark as Mr. Merk's remark in his letter, dated the 6th October, 1898, seems to indicate that cases on the Derajat border are not dealt with promptly as they arise, which is not the case.

3. In 14 out of the 49 cases instituted there was no evidence that the Mahsuds were the offenders, and the disposal of 6 cases was postponed in consequence of the absence of complainants or parties.

Out of the remaining 29 cases, 22 are cases of simple theft, house-breaking and lurking house-trespass, in which the property stolen was valued at—

Rs. 50 and below	in 11 cases.	
„ 100	„ in 7	„
„ 200	„ in 3	„
„ 300	„ in 1	case.

In 5 cases the offence committed was robbery, and the loss sustained was less than—

Rs. 50	in 3 cases.
„ 300	in 1 case.
„ 512	in 1 „

The remaining 2 cases are one of dacoity and one of murder. They, as a matter of fact, form one case, and have been fully described by the Political Officer in paragraph 3 of his letter which forms an enclosure to this letter.

4. I approve of the orders passed on the awards of the jirga by the Political Officer and the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, unanimously, and have, therefore, authorized the Political Officer to take action to enforce the orders.

5. Mr. Merk, in his letter, dated the 6th October, 1898, a copy of which was forwarded to you, under the cover of his letter of the same date, writes that "the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan has represented to me that the depredations of Mahsud Wazir robbers and thieves on the border of his district have of late been passing endurance, and that it is time that the consequent insecurity to life and property were put an end to." Before going on leave in August I was aware that the Mahsuds had, partly no doubt in consequence of the excitement which prevailed along the north-west border, committed petty offences in which strong action was not taken at the time for political reasons, but I had not been informed that the state of things was as bad as is described in the above extract. I accordingly wrote a letter of enquiry to Mr. Homan, copies of which and of his reply are attached for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

Mr. Homan, it will be seen, denies that he made the strong representation which is attributed to him, and states that the words used by Mr. Merk were not justified by the situation.

Annexure 2.

Letter from A. B. Kettlewell, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 28th November, 1898.

I have the honour to forward herewith a statement showing the cases decided by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and myself, at the recent joint jirga just held at Tank.

2. The cases consisted entirely of outstanding claims against the Mahsud tribe for thefts and raids committed in British territory. The jirga awards in each case, together with our joint opinion and orders, will be found in columns 6 and 7.

3. Cases Nos. 32 and 33, both of which form part of one offence, call for special notice, and a brief capitulation of the facts will be useful. On April 14th last a Hindu marriage procession, while proceeding along the road between Kulachi and Draband, was attacked by a gang of Mahsuds, who robbed them of a quantity of jewels and other property and then decamped. On the way back (case No. 33) the gang came suddenly on a party of Zarkannis, who were laying water on to their fields. Mistaking them for a pursuit party sent to intercept them, the raiders opened fire, and the Zarkannis, who were also armed, rejoined, with the result that one raider and two Zarkannis were shot dead. The remainder of the gang succeeded in making good their escape to the hills. Enquiries elicited the fact that the Mahsud killed was Mehr Dad, a Shaman Khel, and eventually the names of seven other members of the gang were ascertained. The jirga appointed to try the case found the accused guilty of both offences, but recommended that the amount to be awarded for the property stolen should be reduced from Rs. 1,600, the amount at which it was valued in the first report, to Rs. 1,312. As a matter of fact, however, subsequent enquiries by the police proved that the Rs. 1,600 originally reported was an under-estimate of the value of the property actually carried away, and the Deputy Commissioner and I decided to award Rs. 2,000 to complainants as a fair estimate of their loss.

Rupees 360 each has been fixed at the usual rate awarded in cases of this kind as blood-money for the two Zarkannis killed, and, in addition, we recommend, owing to the serious nature of the case, that a Government fine of Rs. 280 be imposed, making a total of Rs. 3,000 in all. The accused are Haidrai Shaman Khels.

4. As soon as the joint jirgas, which I am about to hold with the Political Officer, Tochi, and the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, are over, I propose to submit a statement showing the total amount of compensation and fines due from the Mahsud tribe, together with the sections to which the various sums are chargeable, and I therefore defer, for the present, drawing up a separate account for Dera Ismail Khan cases alone. The matter of realization of fines for offences committed against Government and compensation for thefts committed in British territory (including Zhob) will, I understand, be dealt with first before those cases which have either occurred in protected area or involve an intertribal settlement. When the account is complete, therefore, I shall be in a position to show exactly the amounts outstanding against the tribe, the sections mainly responsible, and also the class of cases for which the compensation and fines are due.

Annexure 3.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898.

Serial No.	No. in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No. 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused.	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga.	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
1	49; 1st April, 1897 ...	Begi Khan, son of Saido, Suleman Khel, of Kirri Wazir Lundezi.	Aspin, Abdul Rahman Khel ...	Theft of two donkeys valued at Rs. 18.	Rs. 12 should be decreed ...	Decree for Rs. 12 passed against accused in accordance with jirga finding.
2	53; 5th May, 1897 ...	Kasim Khan, son of Karim Khan, Kharoti, of Kirri Ghulam Rasul, Kharoti.	1. Jumma Khan, Shingi 2. Sadamir, Garerai. 3. Muhammad Amin, son of Gulpir Shingi. 4. Yargai, Shingi. 5. Sher Khan, Shingi. 6. Ahmad Khan, Mal Khel.	Theft of a bundle of piece goods valued at Rs. 480. Recovered Rs. 380.	Decree as below should be given against— Rs. A. P. 1. Jumma Khan, Shingi 27 0 0 2. Sadamir, Garerai ... 27 0 0 3. Muhammad Amin, Shingi ... 9 3 0 4. Yargai, Shingi ... 9 3 3 5. Sher Khan, Shingi ... 9 3 3 6. Ahmad Khan, Mal Mhel ... 18 6 6 Total ... 100 0 0	Award of jirga approved, and decree passed accordingly.
3	54; 5th May, 1897 ...	1. Ahmad Khan, son of Karam Khan, Gandapur. 2. Ramzan Khan, son of Bahadur Khan, of Garra Pathar.	1. Mir Afzal, Wazirgai ... 2. Pir Muhammad, Goldsmith.	Robbery of a chadar valued at Rs. 3-12-0.	Decree for Rs. 3-12-0 should be given. Fine also recommended.	Decree approved and passed. We recommend a fine of Rs. 30 in this case in addition to the amount decreed by the jirga, because the thieves assaulted two chaukidars in the course of the offence.
4	60; 2nd April, 1897 ...	Mr. Cliff, Commissariat Officer, Tank.	1. Nazar Din, 2. Bakhtamir, 3. Nazar Gul. } Azpukal Shingis.	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 60.	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds.*	Case dismissed in accordance with jirga finding.
5	62; 5th July, 1897 ...	Saleh, son of Ahmad, caste Kasrani, of Zarkanni.	1. Asad Khan, Shingi ... 2. Mohabbat Khan, Shaman Khel.	Theft of 14 cows ...	There being no sufficient proof against the accused, the decree should be passed against persons responsible for Kuram Pass.	Case filed for want of evidence. Pass responsibility cannot be enforced in this case.
6	64; 27th October, 1897	Ghulam Rasul, son of Paind, caste Nasir Powindah, of Kirri Juma Khan.	Sumak, Abdul Rahman Khel ...	Murder of Shah Muhammad, Nasir.	Parties being absent, deferred till next Mahsud jirga meets.	This course approved.

7	65 : 3rd August, 1897 ...	Nandu Ram, son of Tikaya Ram, caste Matreja, of Uttar.	1. Lanuri, 2. Muhammad Alam.	{ Caste Wazirgai Alizai.	House - breaking with theft of jewels valued at Rs. 694-6-0.	Claim against Lanuri, and Muhammad Alam should be dismissed, being unproved against Mahsuds.	Case not proved, and claim dismissed.
8	72 : 13th January, 1898	Kadir, son of Bakhtawar, caste Bhittanni, of Dabra.	1. Nazar Din, 2. Gula Khan,	{ Shingis ...	Theft of a bullock valued at Rs. 20.	Decree for Rs. 15 should be given.	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding.
9	74 : 15th January, 1898	Mussammatt Kai Khela, wife of Fazil, caste Waruki Bhittanni, of Kirri Waruki.	1. Gangi, Shingi ... 2. Gulzaman, Hamsaya of Shingis.	{ ...	Theft of a she camel, with a young camel, valued at Rs. 70.	Decree for Rs. 65 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
10	75 : 16th January, 1898	Mr. Mercer, Assistant District Superintendent of Police.	{ ...	Theft of a revolver	Struck off ; no proof against hill tribes.
11	77 : 24th January, 1898	Jassu Ram, son of Parma Ram, caste Junji Khel, of Tank.	1. Sultan, Koth Khel ... 2. Lal Khan, Malikdinai. 3. Turiti, son of Lalin, caste Malikdinai.	{ ...	House - breaking with theft.	Case struck off ; no proof against hill tribes.
12	78 : 1st February, 1898	1. Ahmad Yar, son of Lashkar, caste Kaulzai. 2. Shaishta Khan, chaukidar of Sheikh Sultan.	1. Ali Khan, 2. Kamar Din, 3. Gul Sher,	{ Chund Khel Alizai.	House - breaking and causing a wound to complainant No. 2.	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds.	Case dismissed for want of evidence.
13	79 : 17th February, 1898	Sher Dii, son of Muhammad, caste Miani, of Kot Nawaz.	1. Mirza, 2. Gulzada,	{ Abdul Rahman Khels.	Theft of two bullocks...	Rs. 30 should be decreed ...	Decree in accordance with jirga finding approved.
14	81 : 18th February, 1898	Bhoja Ram, son of Balik Ram, caste Khatri, of Tank.	1. Charkha, 2. Mirza, 3. Nephew of Khoidad,	{ Caste Shaman Khels.	House - breaking with theft of articles of food valued at Rs. 34.	Rs. 34 should be decreed ...	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding.
15	82 : 27th February, 1898	Guldad, son of Azad, caste Dhedi Jat, of Turan Nan.	Azak, son of Bhattanni, of Kirri Khicha Jandola.	{ Sarwari Khan, Khels.	Theft of a bullock valued at Rs. 45.	Rs. 25 against accused should be decreed.	Decree passed in accordance with jirga finding.
16	83 : 27th February, 1898	Jassu Ram, son of Kanhiya Ram, caste Taneja, of Uttar.	1. Abdulla Khan, Powinda Nasir / ang. 2. Daulat Khan, Shaman Khel Zari Khel. 3. Ashik Khan, Shaman Khel.	{ ...	House - breaking and inflicting a wound on Lorinda Ram.	Claim should be dismissed, it not being proved against Mahsuds.	Claim dismissed. Case filed.
17	84 : 27th February, 1898	Lekhu Ram, son of Jhagji Ram, caste Sachdeo, of Katawaz.	1. Guldad, 2. Asperlai, 3. Nek Muhammad, 4. Mirza Khan,	{ Abdul Rahman Khels.	Theft of piece goods valued at Rs. 108-9-0.	Should be dismissed, there being no proof.	Case dismissed.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No.	No. in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No. 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused.	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga.	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
18	85; 3rd March, 1898 ...	Zafar, son of Laddi, caste Atman Khel Bhattani.	1. Gulzida, brother of Gandapur, Abdul Rahman Khel. 2. Shaistam, Shingi. 3. Shahwarang, Abdul Rahman Khel.	Robbery of two bullocks and clothes valued at Rs. 53-8-0.	Accused absent. A clear case. Decree for Rs. 30 passed against accused.
19	86; 20th March, 1898...	Ustrana, son of Mitha, caste Bhattani, of Kirri Ahmari.	1. Nazar Gul, Uzbukai 2. Umar Khan, son of Bahadar Khan caste Haji Khel Shingi. 3. Unknown.	Theft of 15 sheep valued at Rs. 60.	Decree for Rs. 45 should be given.	Decree approved and passed.
20	87; 20th May, 1898 ...	Gulzar, Chaukidar, for— Sultan, Mihr Khan, Shah Kalim, Rahmati of Dabra.	Asad and Gangi, Shingis ...	Theft of 11 cows ...	Decree for Rs. 100 should be passed against accused.	Decree for Rs. 100 approved.
21	88; 23rd March, 1898...	Mohana, son of Mirbaz, caste Sheikh, resident of Kulachi.	1. Asal Khan, } Abdul Rahman 2. Isparlai, } Khels.	Robbery of a she camel with saddle and kajawa valued at Rs. 55. Recovered Rs. 5.	Decree for Rs. 30 should be given	Decree for Rs. 30 against accused approved.
22	89; 21st December, 1897	Lieutenant Browne, 6th Punjab Infantry.	1. Khalu, } 2. Shah Gul, } Caste Abdul 3. Shahtara, } Rahman Khels. 4. Isparlae, } 5. Mujid, }	Theft of clothing, &c., from Murtaza dak bungalow.	Accused absent. Decree for Rs. 244-10-0 passed against Khalu, Abdul Ridman Khel, without being placed before a jirga.
23	90; 15th February, 1898	Akhtiar, son of Ali Khan, caste Tatta Bhattani, of Cheshan Kuch.	Asad Khan and Piao, Shingis ...	Lurking house-trespass with theft of five cows valued at Rs. 85.	Decree for Rs. 75 against accused should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
24	92; 18th March, 1898...	Resuldad, Tator	Theft of six cows	Case filed for want of evidence.
25	93; 21st March, 1898 ...	1. Wadha, son of Muhammad Yar, Jat. 2. Mihrdad, son of Azad, caste Jat, of Turan Nan.	1. Juma Gul, } Jalal Khels ... 2. Isparlai, } 3. Zafar, nephew of Diyak, Bibizai.	Theft of a she camel with a young camel valued at Rs. 220.	Case struck out; no proof against hill tribes.

26	94; 25th March, 1898 ...	Mussammat Tulsibai, wife of Jangi Ram, of Tator.	...	Theft of sugar, oil and a cock valued at 10 annas.	...	Case struck out; no proof of any kind.
27	95; 2nd April, 1898 ...	Mr. Kettlewell and servants ...	1. Bahadur, } Abdul Rah- 2. Ahmad Khan, } man Khel. 3. Daulat Khan and another, } Shaman Khel.	Theft of certain goods, Rs. 129.	Decree recommended for Rs. 127.	Decree for Rs. 127 passed against accused.
28	96; 16th April, 1898 ...	1. Nur Muhammad, } son of Khudai } Rahm, } Caste In- 2. Muhammad } dar, of Hayat, son of } Khorasan. Khudai Rahm, }	1. Hajim, } 2. Murghae, } Shabi Khel 3. Budrudin, }	Robbery of piece goods, &c., valued at Rs. 52-8 0.	Should be deferred till the next Mahsud jirga meets, complainant being absent.	This course agreed to.
29	97; 16th April, 1898 ...	Sarwar, son of Yaran, caste Gishkori Biloch, of Kirani Mail Cart Chauki.	1. Salim, } Abdur Rahman 2. Almar, } Khels.	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 60.	Decree should be passed against brother of Kapip, Abdur Rahman Khel, for Rs. 60, Kapip being dead.	Jirga's award approved.
30	98; 21st April, 1898 ...	Zamma, son of Bira, caste Tomsari, of Keth (Bhakhar).	1. Nadir Khan, } Shingis 2. Ekam Khan, }	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 70.	Decree for Rs. 50 should be given	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
31	No. 99; 7th April, 1898	1. Lawarg, son of Guldad ... 2. Khudai Rahm, } Sons of 3. Sher, } Khasor, caste Zar- kanni. 4. Hakim, son of Muhammad, } Gundapur. 5. Kamar Din, son of Nasir Din, } Baghbai. 6. Dur Muhammad. 7. Ibrahim.	1. Asal Khan, } 2. Kapit, } 3. Aya Khan, } Caste Malik- 4. Sadamir, } dinai. 5. Abdulla Khan, 6. Niamat, 7. Bakhta Mir, }	Robbery of 24 cows, a rifle, a chapli and Rs. 40 in cash.	Decree for Rs. 510 against Darre Khan, Nekzan Khel, should be given.	Do. do.
32	100; 14th April, 1898 ...	Jas Ram, son of Gila Ram, caste Khanduja, resident of Kulachi.	1. Muhammad Yar, } 2. Charkha, } 3. Asal Khan, } Shaman 4. Mihrdad, } Khels. 5. Nezam, 6. Saleh Mir, 7. Mirza Khan, 8. Zardam and } others, }	Dacoity of jewels and wearing apparel valued at Rs. 3,733-8-0.	Decree for Rs. 1,312 should be given.	Cases Nos. 32 and 33 below were part of the same raid. The jirga unanimously found that both offences were committed by the accused, but recommend that a decree for Rs. 1,312 should be given instead of the sum claimed. We consider this sum an extremely low estimate of the value of the property stolen, and think that property of the value of at least Rs. 2,000 was taken. Our orders are that a decree for Rs. 2,000 should be given in this case and blood-money to the amount of Rs. 720 awarded in case No. 33. In addition to this, owing to the serious nature of the offence, we recommend that a fine of Rs. 280, making the total Rs. 3,000 in all, should be imposed.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No.	No. in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No. 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused.	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga.	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
33	10; 10th April, 1890 ...	Alam Sher, caste Zarkani, of Zarkani.	1. Muhammad Yar, 2. Charkba, 3. Asal Khan, 4. Mirdad, 5. Nezam, 6. Saleh Mir, 7. Mirza Khan, 8. Zardam and others. } Shaman Khels.	Murder of Khan Muhammad, Zarkanni, and Ghulam Kadir, Isa Khel.	Decree for Rs. 720 should be given	See above.
34	101; 21st July, 1898 ...	Parma Ram of Khadak Kot ...	1. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel. 2. Mirza, Shirani. 3. Dangar Khan, } Abdul Rahman Khel. 4. Nika Khan, }	Theft of Rs. 30-8-0 property.	If complainant, who is absent, takes oath, decree for Rs. 30-8-0 will be passed against accused.
35	102; 24th May, 1898 ...	Kasor, Miani, of Kot Khadak, per Ahmad Din.	1. Guldad, } Abdul Rahman Khels. 2. Digar, } 3. Bakal, } 4. Mirza, Shirani, Hamsaya of Abdul Rahman Khels.	Lurking house-trespass with theft of a rifle and house property and jewels valued at Rs. 256-8-0.	Should be dismissed, there being no proof against Mahsuds.	Case dismissed for want of proof.
36	104; 17th May, 1898 ...	Hakim, son of Ali Khan, caste Suleman Khel.	1. Dargai, } Abdul Rahman Khels. 2. Iparlai, } 3. Tor, Shirani, Hamsaya of Abdul Rahman Khels.	Theft of 2 sheep valued at Rs. 10.	Rs. 8 should be decreed	Decree for Rs. 8 passed against accused in accordance with finding of jirga.
37	105; 21st June, 1898 ...	Gadde Khan	1. Tor Khan, Shirani 2. Dangar, Alizai. 3. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel.	Theft of 18 cows ...	No proof at present against the men charged. Recommended that the case be deferred to another jirga.	Agreed to.
38	106; 15th July, 1898 ...	Sher Dil, son of Nauder Sheikh of Garwiki.	1. Dagara, Wazirgai 2. Tor, Shirani. 3. Guldad, Abdul Rahman Khel.	Theft of 8 cows valued at Rs. 178. Recovered 5 cows valued at Rs. 123.	Should be deferred till next Mahsud jirga meets.	Agreed to. Case deferred accordingly.
39	—; 8th March, 1898 ...	Bashar, son of Umar, caste Ama Khel, resident and lambaradar of Nadar.	Said Ghulam, } Ama Khel Daur, }	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 36.	Should be dismissed, complainant being absent.	We agree. Case dismissed.

40	—; 23rd May, 1898 ...	Miru, son of Ahmad, caste Balooch, of Garra Mamrez.	Abdulla, Faridae Alizai	Theft of a bullock valued at Rs. 50. Animal recovered on payment of Rs. 20 as bhunga.	Decree for Rs. 20 should be given	Award confirmed and decree passed.
41	—; 18th July, 1898 ...	Shahra, son of Hosain, caste Lishari, resident of Tank.	1. Asai, 2. Muhabbat, 3. M u h a m m a d } Guri Khel Akbar, Alizai.	Robbery of 5 camels valued at Rs. 445 and wounding the complainant.	Decree for Rs. 300 should be given.	Jirga award confirmed, and decree passed accordingly.
42	—; 5th August, 1898 ...	Piara Ram, son of Pokhar Ram, caste Bareja, of Gomal. Kotu Ram, son of Murli, of Murtaza. Takht Ram. Gele Ram.	1. Gulab Din, } Abdul Rahman 2. Amar Din, } Khels.	Dacoity of jewels, a bullock, wearing apparel, valued at Rs. 267-0-6. Recovered Rs. 10-7-6.	Parties absent; should be deferred till next Mabsud jirga meets.	Case deferred.
43	—; 19th September, 1898	Dina, camelman, servant of Abdul Rahman, Camel Contractor.	Gungi, Shingi	Theft of a camel valued at Rs. 80.	Decree for Rs. 85 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
44	—; 11th October, 1898	Nazar Khan, Zangi Khel Nazir, of Kirri Nazar Khan.	1. Isparlac, Abdur Rahman Khel 2. Nazardad, 3. Shahtazar, 4. Alladad, } Abdul Rahman Khels. 5. Rasul Khan, 6. Pezwal, 7. Reshmin, 8. Guldad, } Shaman Khels. 9. Daulat, 10. Abdulla, } Faridae Ali- 11. Shahwal, } zais. 12. Khar Khan, 13. Nadir, Abdur Rahman Khel.	Theft of 60 goats valued at Rs. 202. Recovered 58 goats valued at Rs. 196-8-0.	Decree for Rs. 8 should be given	Decree for Rs. 8 passed accordingly.
45	—; 15th October, 1898	Yaran, son of Gulan, caste Kumbhar, of Gara Balooch.	1. Mohabat 2. Muhammad } Guri Khels 3. Samandar,	Theft of 2 camels valued at Rs. 160.	Decree for Rs. 160 should be given.	Jirga award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
46	—; 21st June, 1898 ...	Tunrae, Bhitanni Warspun, of Kirri Khairu.	Gangi, Shingi, and Gul Azam, Shingi.	Theft of 3 camels	Case incomplete as yet; the statement of a man named Yasin has to be taken on oath and settlement of claim rests on this being done.

List of Cases committed by the Mahsuds in British Territory decided at Tank in November, 1898—continued.

Serial No.	No. in the List sent to Commissioner with this Office No. 473, dated 17th October, 1898, and date of Occurrence.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused,	Nature of the Offence.	Finding of Jirga.	Orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Political Officer.
			<i>Shirania.</i>			
47	—; 16th May, 1898 ...	Falck, Shirani Tumandar ...	1. Shaktora and } Gareral Mah- 2. Misa Khel, } auds.	Theft of 18 cows ...	Decree for Rs. 270 should be passed against accused.	Award approved, and decree passed accordingly.
48	—; 23rd August, 1898	Paindi Khan and Gul Khan, Shibezaib of Sheikh Mela.	Ashik Khan, Wazirgai ...	Theft of 8 cows from Drazinda.	There being no sufficient proof against the accused, the case should be struck off the file.	Case dismissed for want of proof.
49	—; 26th Sept., 1898 ...	Aspin, Hassan Khel Shirani ...	1. Asai Khan, Guri Khel 2. Muhammad Akbar, 3. Alimat.	Theft of 11 cows ...	Decree for Rs. 165 should be passed against accused.	Accused absent, jirga award approved, and decree passed in accordance therewith.

Tank,
The 22nd November, 1898.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

T. H. HOMAN,
Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

Annexure 4.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Homan, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated Camp Kulachi, 11th December, 1898.

I find the following opening sentence in an official letter, dated 6th October, 1898, addressed by Mr. Merk to the Political Officer, Wana:—
 “The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan has represented to me that the depredations of Mahsud Waziri robbers and thieves on the border of his district have of late been passing endurance, and that it is time that the consequent insecurity to life and property were put an end to.” You were lately associated with Kettlewell at Tank in going through all cases committed since August, 1895, by Mahsuds on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District. So you are in a good position to judge of the misdeeds of the Mahsuds and the state of security on the border. I should very much like to know, for the information of Government, whether you think now that the words used by Merk, which I have quoted, are strictly applicable to the situation. I have analyzed the cases which came up for settlement before Kettlewell and yourself, and find that while there were five robberies, one dacoity and one murder, the majority of cases were cases of theft, house-breaking and lurking house-trespass. In all there were 49 cases, in 14 of which there was no evidence that Mahsuds were concerned. I hardly think that these figures justify the description given by Merk of the state of things on the Dera Ismail Khan border, and I certainly never had the least reason for believing that you considered things were as bad as he describes, quoting you as an authority.

Secondly, do you think that the Border Military Police of the Dera Ismail Khan border are as efficient as they should be, and that they patrol sufficiently? If they are sufficiently disciplined and patrol properly, how is it that Mahsud thieving parties are more numerous and successful than formerly? The Border Military Police are now armed with Sniders; why can they not cope with the Mahsud thieves and robbers?

Annexure 5.

Letter from T. H. Homan, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 15th December, 1898.

Your letter of 11th instant regarding offences committed by Mahsuds in this district since August, 1895. Mr. Merk was labouring under a mistake in considering that I made the very strong representation you have quoted from his letter. To the best of my recollection all that I said to him when he asked me about Mahsud raids was that they had considerably increased during the last few months. I certainly did not say the state of things was past endurance and attended with great insecurity to life and property.

Having been lately associated with Mr. Kettlewell at Tank in putting all Mahsud offences committed since August, 1895, except those already settled, before jirgas, and seeing that with a few exceptions most of these offences consisted of raids in which cattle were carried off or were petty burglaries, I am of opinion that the words which Mr. Merk through some misunderstanding represented me as saying were not justified by the situation, and that the state of affairs was not nearly so serious as they made out. As regards the Border Military Police, I do not think that it is as efficient as it might be made, if properly officered and supervised. Since Mr. Mercer left it, except for a short time, during which Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant District Superintendent, Police, was in charge of it, it has been under the

control of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tank, who has no time to look after it as it should be looked after, and I fear, in consequence, little has been done towards teaching the men to use the Sniders with which they have been for some time armed, or towards seeing that they really do the patrolling they are ordered to do, and I think the sooner a special officer, a European if possible, who would devote his whole time to them, is appointed, the better.

Annexure 6.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th January, 1899.

With reference to this office letter, dated the 4th October, and the correspondence ending with your letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to forward a copy of letter, dated $\frac{8\text{th}}{10\text{th}}$ instant, from the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, together with the enclosures, in original, regarding the settlement of cases in which Government or travellers in the Tochi Valley were the complainants against the Mahsuds.

2. The recommendations of the Political Officers as to the fines and compensation to be recovered from the Mahsuds are tabulated in two Appendices, A and B. I approve of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, and am authorising the Political Officer, Wana, to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. In regard to the cases in which Government servants or property were injured, I solicit early sanction to the recommendations of the Political Officers.

3. I beg to request that copies of the enclosures, which are submitted in original, may, when printed, be supplied for the use of this office.

Annexure 7.

Letter from J. G. Lorimer, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Tochi Valley, and A. B. Kettlewell, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tochi, 8th January, 1899, and Wana, 10th January, 1899.

We have the honour to submit herewith two lists of cases (I. and II.) showing the Government and travellers' claims dealt with by us in the recent jirga of Dauris, Waziris and Mahsuds, held at Bannu. Our recommendations as to the fines and compensation to be realized are tabulated in two Appendices (A and B) of this letter.

2. It will be observed from the lists that a few cases have been held over for further enquiry. When this has been made our joint recommendations in regard to these will be submitted.

3. Where a sum to be recovered is partly a Government fine and partly compensation, the portion payable as compensation has been made, where possible, realizable from Waziris and Dauris in order to reduce the delay in redress to private individuals to a minimum.

4. As some doubt was expressed as to the advisability of employing jirgas in Government cases, we beg to quote case No. 1 (3) as an extreme instance of this procedure. In this case there was no evidence or information such as a Government officer could have taken action upon, and the only

alternative to taking the opinion of Maliks was that we should dismiss the case *in limine*. We believe that a perusal of the list of Government cases will show that jirgas have nowhere been employed by us with prejudice to the interests of Government. We have not proposed to dismiss any Government case in which there is reliable evidence or information against the accused.

5. Our recommendations on the lists submitted are somewhat more detailed than those conveyed in the Appendices. We would request that the orders of Government may be passed upon the recommendations as expressed in the Appendices, so that we may be left a free hand as to the distribution of the fines or compensation within the tribe, as expediency and further enquiry may indicate, upon particular sections or individuals.

6. The final instructions given us for the disposal of cases between Mahsuds and Dauris were that nothing beyond a friendly tribal settlement should be attempted. The attempt was made, but was unsuccessful, and we believe that from the nature of the case a friendly settlement between these two tribes is impossible. We would suggest that whenever an opportunity occurs the cases of the Dauris against the Mahsuds, together with any cases which the Mahsuds may have against the Dauris, should be taken up in the same manner as the travellers' cases against Mahsuds and Waziris have been on the present occasion. The Political Officer, Tochi, considers that the attitude of the Dauris to the British Government is at the present time all that could be desired, but he doubts whether this desirable state of matters will continue if Government declines to intervene effectually to obtain reparation for the Dauris against Mahsud aggressions, especially as Government now realises land revenue from the Dauris.

7. The Political Officer, Tochi, recommends that the claims of revenue-paying Waziri villages in the bed of the Tochi, which are practically an integral part of Daur, should be taken up in the same manner as Dauri cases proper, but he does not desire to press this point so strongly as these villages are not entirely helpless, and are able, to some extent, with the help of their kinsmen in the hills, to obtain redress from the Mahsuds.

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Annexure S.

APPENDIX A.

Fines to be realised in Government cases.

K. = Kabuli.

B. = British.

	Tribe.	No. of Case.	Amount of Fine.	REMARKS.	
Mabauds ...	Jalal Khels ...	I 5	Rs. 1,000 B. or 500 B., and one Martini-Henry rifle of good quality in good condition.	Government fine as complainant does not desire an amicable settlement with his brother's murderer.	
	Do. ...	I 8	300 B.	Payable as compensation to owners.	
	Do. ...	I 13	450 B.	Government fine.	
	Do. ...	I 15	350 B.	Rupees 210 Government fine. Rs. 140 compensation to owners.	
	Do. ...	I 17	500 B.	Government fine.	
		Total ...		2,600 B. or 2,100 B. and a rifle.	
		Shabi Khels ...	I 12	400 B.	Government fine.
		Do. ...	I 16	1,000 B.	Rupees 800 Government fine. Rs. 200 compensation to levy Sowar.
			Total ...	1,400 B.	
		Marsanzais ...	I 7	120 B.	Payable to Dauris fined.
Waziris ...	Bakka Khels ...	I 1	31 B.	Payable to Government, which advanced ransom money.	
	Mohmit Khels ...	I 8	150 B.	Payable to owners as compensation.	
	Do. ...	I 17	500 B.	Rupees 300 payable to heirs of deceased and Rs. 200 to Commissariat.	
		Total ...	650 B.		
	Tori Khels ...	I 13	300 B.	Payable as compensation for levy disabled.	
Dauris ...	Dauris ...	I 13	150 B.	Government fine.	

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 9.

APPENDIX B.

Compensation to be realized in Travellers' cases.

B. = British.

K. = Kabuli.

	Tribe.	No. of Case.	Compensation payable to Complainants.	REMARKS.	
Mahsuds ...	Jalal Khels ...	II 1	Rs. 88 B.		
	Do. ...	II 2	50 B.		
	Do. ...	II 3	60 B.		
	Do. ...	II 6	130 K.		
	Do. ...	II 7	300 B.		
	Do. ...	II 9	100 B.		
	Do. ...	II 10	200 B.		
	Do. ...	II 13	53½ K.		
	Do. ...	II 14	162 K. 500 B.		
	Do. ...	II 17	450 B.		
	Do. ...	II 18	205½ K.		
	Do. ...	II 21	193 K.		
	Do. ...	II 22	400 B.		
		Total ...	—	2,148 B. and 744 K.	
		Marsanzai ...	II 5	75 B.	
Waziris ...	Mohmit Khels ...	II 2	50 B.		
	Do. ...	II 13	53½ K.		
	Do. ...	II 18	205½ K.		
	Do. ...	II 22	200 B.		
		Total ...	—	250 B. and 259 K.	
	Tori Khels...	II 5	50 B.		
Dauris ...	Dauris ...	II 5	25 B.		

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 10.

LIST No. I.

Injury to Government Servants or Government Property.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
1	100; 1897 ...	Safedgi Military Post; 6th February, 1897.	Bata Singh, Sub-Overseer, Public Works Department.	Gurl Khels	Theft of a pony, which was recovered for Rs. 31.	Case dismissed as against Mahsuds. Money should be recovered from Gulato, Bakka Khel. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Dated Banna, 3rd December, 1898.
2	223; 1897 ...	Soor Kaur; 4th April, 1897.	Empress... ..	Jalul Khels and Abdul-luis.	Attack on dak okka, murder of Muhammad coachman, wounding Bhole, Bhishiti, and killing okka pony and robbery of miscellaneous property worth Rs. 195.	In this case the Tochi Waziris concerned make no claim against Mahsuds. The Dauris interested claim against Jalul Khels. Gul Khan, Barakzai, and Din Muhammad, Dauri Maliks, consider that Shekh Mansur, Dauri Malik, should be allowed to put forward two witnesses who either recognized the accused at the time of outrage or heard the accused admit their guilt afterwards. Talib, Abdul Rahman Khel Mahsud Malik, thinks oath of innocence should be taken from the accused and Kargai and Karim Khan, Jalul Khel Mahsud Maliks, Shekh Mansur has allowed his witnesses to go home, and even if they were present we should not with regard to absence of confirmation by circumstantial evidence or otherwise be prepared to accept their testimony. We consider this case not proved against the Mahsuds. Fines have already been realized from Dauris and Tochi Waziris. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Dated Banna, 25th December, 1898.
3	173; 1897 ...	Soor Kaur; 16th July, 1897.	Empress... ..	Jalul Khels and Abdul-luis.	Theft of 12 camels and firing shots on Military pursuit party, in which a sepoy was wounded.	The jirga in this case have given the oath to Zakk Khan, Ghaibadin and Zare Khan, accused, and their Malik Karim Khan, and the oath of innocence has been duly taken in the presence of the jirga. We consider the case not proved against the accused Mahsuds. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Banna, 8th December, 1898.

4	549; 1897 ...	Soor Kamr; 19th Aug., 1897.	Empress..	Abdullahi, Khushali (Tori Khels) and Mohmit Khels.	Attack on <i>dák</i> ekka, murder of 2 sepoys of 25th Punjab Infantry, a coachman and Telegraph Signaller and carrying off 2 Martini-Henry rifles.	<p>In this case the Tochi Waziris concerned claimed against Abdullahi Mahsuds on the ground that Amr Din and Abdullahair and Limar, Abdullahi lohar, took part in outrage. Arbitrators appointed as between Abdullahis and Waziris found that the Abdullahis could clear themselves by oath of following compurgators: (1) Fazal, (2) Mamak, (3) Zaffar Khan, (4) Azim, Maliks, (5) Darre, (6) Zarghun Shah, (7) Gul Shah, (8) Usman, Abdullahis, to effect that the three Abdullahis named did not take part in the offence nor <i>steal</i> the rifles. Darre, Aman, Fazl, Mamak, Zaffar, Gul Shah and Zarghun Shah, Abdullahis, who are present, are willing to take oath that the rifles lost have never come in any way into the possession of Amr Din, Abdullahair or Limar. We do not consider it necessary that this oath should be taken. The Dauris claimed against Jalal Khels, especially Mohabbat, and opinions were taken from Abu Khan, Marwat, Talib, Abdurrahman Khel Malik, and Mirai, Darpa Khel. The Marwat Malik considers that Jalal Khel accused with two Maliks and seven Motabars should take oath of compurgation. The Mahsud Malik considers that oath of accused and one Jalal Khel Malik will be sufficient, while the Dauri Malik would allow the Dauris to produce two witnesses who either saw the accused committing the offence or heard them admit their guilt. We have heard the witnesses produced by the Dauris, Jasim Gul and Mad Amir. They are not men of any position, and we do not consider their testimony reliable. Their story is that Mohabbat, Jalal Khel, said in their presence that of the two rifles lost one was with the Jalal Khels and one with the Tanis, and that both could be recovered on payment of Rs. 2,000. This story is in itself improbable for several reasons. Kargai and Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Maliks, are willing to take oath that neither of the rifles ever came among the Jalal Khels. We consider the charges against Abdullahis and Jalal Khels in this case not proved. A large fine has already been recovered from the Dauris, Mohmit Khels and Tori Khels.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A. B. KETTLEWELL, J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Wana. Political Officer, Tochi.</p>
5	505; 1897 ...	Parmat graveyard between Ajam chauki and Saidgi Post.	Empress through— (1) Khanbad Shah, Bakka Khel. (2) Nandram, son of Beli Ram, Narola. (3) Ram Dyal, son of Dasu Ram, Golati. (4) Ram Lal, son of Pritam Das, Bhagat, of Idak.	Jalal Khel and Marsanzai.	Murder of Murad Shah, Jamadar, Le vies, Saidgi, and carrying off his Martini-Henry rifle, with Rs. 68 cash and other property worth Rs. 44-1-6 from Nos. 2 to 4.	<p>In this case the relatives of the deceased Levy Jamadar, Murad Shah, have from the first consistently stated that the murder was committed by Aki Khan, Jalal Khel, who was accompanied at the time by a gang consisting mostly of Jalal Khels but including also one Marsanzai Mahsud, and at least one Tori Khel Waziri. Aki Khan's defence is that the claim was suggested to the Bakka Khels by Dawar Khan, Shabi Khel, a personal enemy of his and one of the principal witnesses against him. The Jalal Khel Maliks present allege the existence of bitter enmity between Bakka Khels and Jalal Khels owing to a successful raid by the former on the latter some years ago, in which they say three Jalal Khels were killed. We do not consider the enmity of Dawar Khan against Aki Khan nor the tribal enmity, if such exists between Bakka Khels and Jalal Khels, sufficient to discredit entirely Khan Bad Shah's claim and evidence. He must know who the murderers of his brother really were, and we cannot suppose that in order to please Dawar Khan or gratify the ill-feeling of his tribe against the Jalal Khels he would suppress his claim against the real murderers and bring it against a mixed gang of Jalal Khels and others. We</p>

LIST No. I.—continued.

Injury to Government Servants or Government Property—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
6	51; 1898 ...	Post Saidgi 17th Jan- 18th nary, 1898.	Empress... ..	Abdullahi, Umar Khel, Shabi Khel, Marsanzai and Tori Khel.	Theft of two officers' ponies, recovered by Levy pursnit party.	<p>therefore consider that Aki Khan or his section should be held responsible for the murder, and in our opinion a suitable order would be that the Jahl Khels should either pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 to Government, or a fine of Rs. 500 and surrender a Martini-Heury rifle of good quality and in good condition.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p> <p>Further particulars of wounded thief have been furnished by Atlas Khan, formerly Civil Officer, Saidgi, who saw him, and file made over to Political Officer, Wana, who will endeavour to identify the man.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
7	165; 1898 ...	Kajuri Post; 19th Jan- 20th uary, 1898.	Do.	Marsanzai	Attempt to break through the wall of Kajuri Post.	<p>After reading the papers and seeing Ghazze's wound we are satisfied that Ghazze is the man who attempted to break into the Kajuri Post and was wounded in so doing. The wound is in the place assigned to it by the information before Ghazze had been seen by any Government Officer. In this case a fine of Rs. 180 was collected from the Waziris and Dauris adjoining Kajuri. Rupees 60 recovered from the Tori Khels should remain on them as they were accomplices, but the Rs. 120 paid by the Dauris should be recovered from Ghazze and repaid to the Dauris.</p> <p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 8th December, 1898</p>

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8	348; 1898 ...	Near Boya Post; 9th February, 1898.	Bhai Khan, son of Zaman, of Isa Khel; Ramzan, son of Muhammad Zaman; Barkurdar of Karra Kullo (Isa Khel Tahsil); and Ali Khan, Orderly, Political Officer.	Jalal Khels	Theft of seven camels with property worth Rs. 73. One camel died with the accused and the rest (six) recovered on payment of ransom, Rs. 370 British coin.	The seven camels were traced by Political Officer, Tochi, and party next morning to the Zuri Narai Pass leading out of Tochi into Khaisor (Mohmit Khel country). Alizai, Mohmit Khel, then hamsaya of Khan Muhammad Khan of Muhammad Khel, a well known agent of the Jalal Khels in the Tochi, was sent to look for the camels. He returned the fifth day and reported that he had found six of them with Mamak and Amidar, Bhattannis of Saratak in Band. The Political Officer, Wana, has been unable to obtain any confirmation of this story and considers it intrinsically highly improbable. On the other hand Nazr Shah, a Bhattanni Malik, states that his son saw six of the camels with the Jalal Khels. Momazzi, Machi Khel Mohmit Khel Malik, reported that not long after the loss that he had seen camels, probably those in question, among the Jalal Khels, and Nazir Khan and Ali Khel, his companions, have corroborated this. There seems no doubt that the camels were stolen by Jalal Khels with connivance of Mohmit Khels, and probably of Alizai himself. Rs. 370 ransom and Rs. 80 value of one camel (total Rs. 450) remain to be recovered. We recommend that Rs. 300 be recovered from the Jalal Khels and Rs. 150 from the Mohmit Khels of Khaisor.
						<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
9	327; 1898 ...	Near water spring on the Spin Chilla route; 1st March, 1898.	Empress... ..	Abdullai, Garrerai and Guliram, Taji Khel outlaw.	Murder of Habibulla, sepoy of 33rd Punjab Infantry, and robbery of 41 Commissariat goats worth Rs. 286.	Political Officer, Wana, will make enquiries into this case, and, if possible, the Khidder Khels and Manzar Khels will be sent to Wana to prosecute their claim. File made over to Political Officer, Wana.
						<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December 1898.</p>
10	135; 1898 ...	Spina Punga in Shindar; 26th March, 1898.	Do.	Nazar Khel, Abdullai, Haibat Khel.	Firing shots on Cavalry grass-cutting party, wounding a sowar, a horse, and killing a mule.	Political Officer, Wana, will make enquiries in this case. File made over to Political Officer, Wana.
						<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
11	—	Saidgi; 18th April, 1898	Do.	Marsanzai	Theft of a rifle from the 1st Punjab Infantry.	File made over to Political Officer, Wana, who will make further enquiries as to whether Zarif Khan, Marsanzai, was wounded in the commission of an offence in the Tochi.
						<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>

LIST No. I.—continued.

Injury to Government Servants or Government Property—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	(complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
12	370; 1898 ...	Post Idak; $\frac{22\text{nd}}{23\text{rd}}$ April, 1898.	Empressa... ..	Shabi Khel	Prowling of thieves near post and wounding of a thief by a Levy sentry.	We agree that there is very little doubt that Guljang was wounded in the Tochi while prowling near Idak Military Post with criminal intentions. We recommend a fine of Rs. 400 to be recovered, if possible, from Guljang, who is understood to be a personal adherent of the Mullah Powindah. The Mullah Powindah has sent a letter admitting that he was wounded in the Tochi, but pretending it was done by thieves. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
13	352; 1898 ...	Soor Kamr; 27th May, 1898.	Do.	Jalal Khels, Marsanzai, and Khushali Tori Khels.	Attack on Panjabi coolies and wounding Guljanab Foot Levy, and carrying off his musket.	We are agreed in this case on a consideration of the evidence and circumstances generally and of the opinions submitted by the Maliks nominated by us that the Jalal Khels were undoubtedly concerned in this raid and that they received assistance from the Tori Khels living south of the Tochi. We consider that a fine of Rs. 900 should be imposed, of which Rs. 450 should be payable by Jalal Khels, Rs. 300 by Tori Khels, and Rs. 150 by Dauris, the latter having failed to make a proper endeavour to trace the criminals. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
14	574; 1898 ...	On high road between Ahmad Khel and Amzoni; 26th June, 1898.	Do.	Jalal Khels	Attack on Public Works Department coolies and theft of shovels, pickaxes, &c., and robbery of coolies' clothes.	The Maliks appointed by us to give an opinion are unable to give one, and the file is made over to Political Officer, Wana, for further enquiry as to the alleged death of Pilod, Jalal Khel. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.

15	561; 1898 ...	Hinjarki Khwala within the limits of Land Daur; 11th July, 1898.	Empress through Landwals.	11	Jalal Khels	Theft of seven bullocks and firing shots on Cavalry pursuit party. One bullock was recovered for Rs. 13 ransom.	We are agreed that the Jalal Khels committed this raid. The chief Dauri Malik of Land is prepared to take oath that the cattle of his village were raided by Jalal Khels, who also fired at the cavalry pursuit party. Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Malik, is not prepared to swear, even along with the accused Balai, that a bullock lost by the Dauris on this occasion was not recovered or ransomed from Balai. We recommend, therefore, that a fine of Rs. 350 be imposed on Jalal Khels, out of which Rs. 140 will be payable to Dauri owners of cattle as compensation.
							<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
16	499; 1898 ...	On high road one mile east of Idak Post; 4th August, 1898.	Empress... ..		Shabi Khel, Abdullai and Jalal Khels.	Attack on Levy Commandant's baggage camels and carrying off the camels, which were recovered by levy pursuit party, and killing a mare of a levy sowar.	We agree that the leader in this daring attack on the Levy Commandant's camels was Aziz, Shabi Khel, who is present here to-day. The information regarding the other members of the gang is not sufficiently definite to warrant action being taken against them. The fight between the raiders and the levies, who ultimately prevented the camels being taken away, lasted a considerable time, and a large number of shots were fired, which could be distinctly heard in Idak Post. Political Officer, Tochi, considers that the raid is one which calls for severe notice. There was a levy guard with the baggage, and in spite of the guard being well armed with muzzle-loaders the raiders most obstinately endeavoured to carry the matter through, and succeeded in taking the camels a distance of two miles before they were recovered. A levy sowar's horse worth about Rs. 200 was killed. We recommend a fine of Rs. 1,000 be imposed on Aziz, Shabi Khel. If it cannot be recovered from him, it should be recovered from Shabi Khels. Of this Rs. 200 should be payable as compensation to the sowar who lost his horse.
							<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 25th December, 1898.</p>
17	...	Near Boya; 17th August, 1898.	Empress... ..		Jala Khels, Alizai (out-law) and Pila, Mohmit Khels.	Murder of Commissariat shepherd and robbery of 42 sheep and goats.	In this case the opinion of the Muhsud Munsif is that the Jalal Khels should be given oath of innocence. The other two Munsifs think that the two witnesses, who state that they saw the stolen goats in Yargul's possession, should be allowed to take oath on Koran to this. In view of these opinions and circumstances of case and result of enquiries, we consider that the Jalal Khels and Mohmit Khels of Khaisor are both implicated, and that the fine should be paid in equal shares. As the case is a serious one, the Commissariat shepherd having been murdered in afternoon at a distance of 700 yards from Boya Post, we recommend a fine of Rs. 1,000 to be divided as above.
							<p>A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.</p> <p>J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi.</p> <p>Bannu, 26th December, 1898.</p>

Annexure 11.

LIST No. II.

Injury to Travellers in the Daur Valley.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
1	287	Laka Ghundi; 30th October, 1895.	Badr-ud-din, son of Mohy-ud-din, and Bandar Shah and Sanam Khan, son of Khan Baddar of Fatma Khel.	Jalal Khels	Eleven donkeys with property.	In this case the jirga are agreed that decree in favour of complainant should be passed against Jalal Khels for as many donkeys as complainant takes oath to having lost at Rs. 8 per donkey. We approve of this finding, which is unanimous. Oath taken by complainant that 11 donkeys were stolen. We, therefore, recommend a decree for Rs. 88 Sikka be passed against Jalal Khels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu.
2	409; 1896	Near Laka Ghundi; 30th November, 1896.	Gulmat Khan, son of Allahdad, and Nazar Khan, son of Aikam Khan, Paipalis of Bir-mal.	Do.	Two camels worth Rs. 200 Kabuli.	In this case the jirga are divided. The travellers' munsifs consider that the Jalal Khels are responsible for the whole of the loss, as the camels admittedly came into the possession of Soi, Jalal Khel. The munsifs for the Mabsuds give it as their opinion that the thieves were Mir Gul, his brother and another man, all of Thal village in Tochi, and that Soi only assisted in disposing of the stolen camels and is only responsible for Rs. 10. The Sarpanches recommend that Soi and nine other Jalal Khels should prove his assertion on oath, and on condition of doing so should pay Rs. 10 only. The facts as disclosed show that the Mohmit Khels of Thal and at least one Jalal Khel were in this raid, and we consider that Rs. 50 should be realized from each tribe and paid to complainant. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
3	362; 1897	Beri Khwala, Hamzoni, in January or February, 1897.	Amir, son of Ilm, Saidgi, of Dande plain.	Do.	One camel, 1 gun, 1 pistol with property.	Jirga unanimously recommend a decree for Rs. 60 Kabuli being passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khels. We approve of finding, which is unanimous. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi Bannu, 25th December, 1898.

4	273 ; 1897	Tochi Bed south of Khiddi ; 12th April, 13th 1897.	Anab, son of Hamal, Arsala Khan, Ghulam, Shah, Ghatte, son of Saroghui, Umarzai Waziris of Pirmal's village (Bannu District).	Jalal Khels and Tori Khels.	Six camels worth Rs. 670 and property worth Rs. 22-8-0.	Complainant admits having received full satisfaction. Case may be filed. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
5	353 ; 1897	Camp Miram Shah ; 28th April, 29th 1897.	Allahyar, son of Umed Ali, of Mianwali, Ahmad, son of Manjhi, Sarwans of Mianwali.	Marsanzai sub-section of Abdullais and Tori Khels.	Three camels worth Rs. 320 British coin.	Jirga have unanimously found that if three persons who are said to have seen two of the stolen camels in the possession of Zarif, Marsanzai, will take oath to this effect, Zarif should be considered guilty. The required oath has been taken in our presence, and we recommend that Rs. 75 be recovered from Zarif or those responsible for him, and from the Tori Khels and Dauris territorially responsible Rs. 50 and Rs. 25 respectively, the value of the camels having been fixed at Rs. 50 each by the jirga. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 26th December, 1898.
6	375 ; 1897 ..	Wuzi Spring near Boya ; 6th May, 7th 1897.	Aman Shah, son of Boyak, of Kot Kastirai (Khushali).	Jalal Khels	Five camels (recovered on Rs. 150 Kabuli bhunga).	Jirga in this case recommend that decree for Rs. 130 Kabuli be passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khels. We approve of finding. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
7	604	Palosin grazing-ground near Boya ; 15th October, 1897.	Yaghi Khan, Mir Ali, son of Bokhan, Sirakki Afridi of Gandhi (Kohat).	Do.	Theft of four camels ...	In this case we agree with finding of majority of jirga, which is that with regard to four camels the complainant should take oath to that loss, and that he saw them in possession of Jalal Khels. As regards remaining two camels, seven Jalal Khels should be allowed to take oath of innocence. The required oaths have been taken in our presence, and we find the claim for four camels against the Jalal Khels proved and the claim for the other two not proved. We value the camels at Rs. 75 each, and recommend a decree for Rs. 300 against Jalal Khels in complainants' favour. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 26th December, 1898.

LIST No. II.—continued.

Injury to Travellers in the Daur Valley—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
8	582; 1898 ...	Raghzai Wuzi near Bosa; 21th October, 1897.	Mamande, Rahman, Pirzai, sons of Miran, Malikshahis of Kurram.	Jalal Khels	Two hundred sheep and goats, and murder of Pashak, and theft of one mare.	The jirga with one exception are of opinion that this should be treated as an inter-tribal case and not as a traveller's case. We agree in this opinion. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
9	551; 1898 ...	Tut Shiga; 25th October, 1897.	Tor Gul and Muhammad Roz, son of Said Gul, Pathan of Bhanamari (Peshawar).	Jalal Khels and Guli Ram, Taji Khel, outlaw.	Seven donkeys and Rs. 41 cash.	In this case we agree with the majority of the jirga, who are of opinion that complainant should be given oath as to amount of his loss, and that he and one companion should take oath that they saw the stolen property in the possession of Pir Muhammad, Jalal Khel. Complainant has taken oath that he was robbed of seven donkeys and Rs. 41 in cash, and he and a companion have taken oath that they saw the stolen property in possession of Pir Muhammad, Jalal Khel. We consider that decree for Rs. 100 should be passed in favour of complainant against Jalal Khel Mahsuds. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.
10	565; 1898 ...	Samie Kour near Khutti Killa; 5th December, 1897.	Bade, son of Muhabbat; Saku, son of Said; Ruzak, son of Rahmat. Khuratas of Saroba Wargun.	Jalal Khels	Four camels worth Rs. 485 Nandrami.	Majority of jirga in this case have found that complainants should be given oath as to the amount of their loss, and as to the fact of the stolen camels having been seen by them in the possession of Aki Khan and Shah Bahram, Jalal Khel Mahsuds. We consider this a proper finding. Two complainants have taken oath that they were robbed of four camels which they subsequently saw in the possession of Aki Khan and Shah Bahram, Jalal Khel. We recommend that decree for Rs. 200 be passed in favour of these complainants against the Jalal Khels. The other complainant lost only miscellaneous property of small value. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.

11	555; 1898 ...	Near Boya; 11th December, 1897.	Sikandar, son of Paindah, caste Bidwal, of Jabul Akhora, Tahsil Fatahjang, District Rawalpindi, Daifadar, Commissariat.	Do.	Theft of a camel with property worth Rs. 132-12-0.	In this case the jirga is of opinion that Karim Khan, Jalal Khel Malik, should be given oath that he never said that this camel was stolen by Shadar Gul and that he knows nothing about it, and that accused should be given oath that they did not steal the camel and know nothing about it. We agree with the jirga. The prescribed oaths have been taken, and we consider that the claim must be dismissed. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.	A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
12	112; 1898 ...	Spin Chilla; 8th January, 1898.	Sheran, son of Sarwar, Kharoti, of Haibat Killa (Bannu).	Jalal Khels, Abdullais and Guliram, Waziri outlaw.	One camel	The jirga in this case recommend that Guliram, Taji Khel, should be allowed to take oath of innocence. If he refuses to do so, the value of the camel should be recovered from him. If he takes oath the Sarpanches consider that the value of the camel should be recovered from those who are territorially responsible. File should be made over to Political Officer, Wana, in order that an opportunity to clear himself may be given to Guliram. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.	A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
13	567; 1897 ...	Khozhat hill near Arghzan Killa; 26th January, 1898.	Niaz Gul, Adamzai, sons of Pirzada Dosalli, Mohmit Khels of Khaisore.	Jalal Khels	Two camels (recovered on payment of Rs. 107 Nandrami bhunga).	In this case majority of jirga are of opinion that ten Jalal Khel Mahsuds should be given oath that Pila and Khungai, Mohmit Khel Waziris, committed the robbery and brought the camels to Shpzhmai and Trozhmai, Jalal Khel Mahsuds, and took half the ransom money. If this oath is taken half the bhunga (which the Mahsud munsifs admit to be Rs. 107 Kabuli) should be recovered from the Jalal Khels and half from the Mohmit Khels. We approve of this finding. The oath has been taken as prescribed, and we recommend that Rs. 53-8-0 Kabuli be recovered from the Jalal Khels and the same from the Mohmit Khels for the complainants. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.	A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
14	84; 1898 ...	Zer Hill, 1½ miles north of Lak Ghundi; 7th March, 1898.	Sherjan, son of Khodadad; Ghazi Khan, son of Nek Kadam; and Muzullah, son of Shinakai, Aka Khel Suleman Khels of Takwara, Tank Tahsil, District Dera Ismail Khan.	Do.	Robbery of 18 camels and property worth Rs. 51. Three camels recovered on bhunga of a Rs. 220 Kabuli; 1 camel recovered from Khidder Khels for Rs. 60. Rest (14) are still with the accused; also property.	In this case the jirga are of opinion that oaths should be given to complainant (1) as to amount of bhunga paid by him for recovery of three camels, (2) as to the number of camels originally stolen, and a decree passed in his favour for amount of bhunga and number of camels to which he takes oath. We agree with the finding. Complainant has taken oath that he spent Rs. 162 in bhunga and that ten of the camels lost by him in this case are still unrecovered. We recommend that decree for Rs. 162 Kabuli and Rs. 500 British be passed against Jalal Khel Mahsuds. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.	A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.

LIST No. II.—continued.
Injury to Travellers in the Daur Valley—continued.

Serial No.	Tochi Register No. of Case, with Year.	Place and Date of Occurrence.	Complainants in detail.	Accused (Tribe only).	Property taken or other Damage.	Opinion of Political Officers, Tochi and Wana.
15	318: 1898 ...	Tarki Ghundi near Idak; 9th May, 1898. 10th	Sadda Khan, son of Lallai, Sarki Khel Wazir of Karlasta, Bannu Tahsil.	Jalal Khels	Two camels (recovered for Rs. 141 Nandrami bhunga).	Majority of jirga consider the case is a very doubtful one and that oath of innocence should be given to seven Jalal Khels, including Kargai, Malik, and the accused Jumaraz. If they fail to take it, decree should be passed in complainant's favour. We agree with this finding. Oath has been taken as required, and we consider case should be dismissed. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.
16	—	Tochi bed near Kajuri; 15th May, 1898.	Shamir, Malik, son of Balai, Muhammad Khel Wazir, subsection Khiddrai, of Bannu.	Shabi Khels	Two camels (recovered for Rs. 204 Kabuli bhunga).	Complainant has withdrawn his claim. Case may be filed. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 25th December, 1898.
17	429: 1898 ...	High road near Ahmad-Khel: 23rd May, 1898.	Ali Khan, son of Muhammad Ali Khan, of Kohat (Tahsil Hangu); Fakir Khan, son of Muhammad Din; Gulzada, son of Mamot Khan, of Kohat (Samori village).	Jalal Khels	Seven camels	Majority of jirga were of opinion in this case that complainants should be given oath as to the amount of their loss and as to having seen their camels in the possession of Jalal Khels. Two complainants have taken oath that they lost seven camels and that they saw them in the possession of Jumaraz and Nizam Din, Jalal Khel Mahsuds. We consider that decree should be passed in favour of complainants against the Jalal Khels for Rs. 450, the value of seven Kohati camels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.
18	560: 1898 ...	High road near Ahmad Khel: 5th June, 1898.	Kotian Khan, Kabul Khel	Do.	Five camels (recovered for Rs. 400 Kabuli).	The Mahsud munsifs admit complicity of Jalal Khels in this raid, but say they were assisted by Mohmit Khels. Having regard to place and circumstances of robbery, it may be safely assumed that Mohmit Khels were either concerned in or connived at the offence. We therefore recommend that a decree for Rs. 411 Kabuli be decreed in complainant's favour and recovered, half from Jalal Khels and half from Mohmit Khels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.

19	421; 1898 ...	High road near Musakki Tower; 9th July, 1898.	Said Khan, son of Ali Khan of Shoki (Lachi Tahsil in Kohat).	Do.	Two camels and Rs. 45 in cash.	Majority of jirga in this case find that oath of innocence should be offered to Sariadin and Khiddar, Jalal Khels, accused, and that if they clear themselves by oath the complainants' loss should be made good to them by villages or tribes territorially responsible. The accused have taken the prescribed oath, and the case should now be dealt with by the Political Officer, Tochi, as recommended by the jirga. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana. Bannu, 7th January, 1899.
20	—	Kot Issori; 5th August, 1898.	Gul Kadam and Gulbat Khan, son of Kippat Khan, Bora Khel.	Do.	Three hundred and twenty sheep, one donkey, and one gun, with clothes; wounding Gul Kadam.	With the exception of one member, who is personally interested, the jirga are unanimously of opinion that this should be treated as an inter-tribal and not as a traveller's case. We agree. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
21	—	Chauki Wuzi; 28th September, 1898.	Payan Gul, son of Arzon Akhund, and Gulam Din, Jani Khels, of Bannu.	Do.	Two mares and one colt	In this case complainant states that it cost him Rs. 220 to recover the animals stolen, of which he has already been repaid Rs. 27 and Rs. 193 Kabuti are still due. Jumaraz, Jalal Khel, admits that he is responsible for this balance, and will recover their shares from the other thieves concerned and pay the full amount to complainant, who is satisfied with this settlement. We recommend that this friendly settlement be accepted. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.
22	—	Near Boya; 16th October, 1898.	Macha, son of Nuradin, and Shahzad, son of Amzullah; Muhammad Ali, son of Darya Khan, Kharotis of Mastoi (Khorasan), now living in Bharat (Bannu District).	Do.	Twelve camels	Mahsud munsifs admit complicity of Jalal Khels, and they and the Sarpanches think that Mohmit Khels mentioned in the enquiry were also in the raid. In any case stolen camels must have been taken through Mohmit Khel country in Khaisore. We agree with majority of jirga, and consider that a decree of Rs. 600 should be passed in complainant's favour, of which two-thirds will be recovered from Jalal Khels and one-third from the Mohmit Khels. J. G. LORIMER, Political Officer, Tochi. A. B. KETTLEWELL, Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 12.

ORDER.

We are agreed that these* travellers' cases against Jalal Khel Mahsud should be tried by a jirga of 15 persons, appointed 5 by the Jalal Khels, 5 by the travellers and 5 by Government. The jirga will arrive at a separate finding on each claim as to the amount of property lost and the extent to which Jalal Khels are responsible for it. In cases where the travellers are natives of Waziristan or immediately adjoining tracts with whom it is possible the Jalal Khels may be at enmity, the first question for the jirga will be whether the raid, if committed by Jalal Khels, was in pursuance of a personal, family or tribal feud; if a feud is proved, the case will be removed from the list of travellers' cases and placed among tribal cases.

The Mahsuds have selected the following five men as their Munsifs:—

Mir Ajal, Nana Khel.
Allahbagh, Shaman Khel.
Muhammad Afzal, Langar Khel.
Siman, Shabi Khel.
Gulpir, Shingi.

The travellers have selected the following:—

Gulbat Khan, Mohmit Khel,	}	For Waziris.
Aliyas Khan, Tori Khel,		
Nabbi Khan, Madda Khel,	}	For Kharotis.
Dost Muhammad, Kharoti,		
Mohibullah, Jowaki Afridi—	For Peshawaris, Kohatis, Afridis, &c.	

We approve of the above, and appoint the following five on the part of Government:—

Mir Abas Khan, Shahbuzurg Khel.
Akbar Ali Khan, Ditto.
Zabita Khan, Mama Khel (Bannu).
Allahdad Khan, Isa Khel, Marwat.
Wazir Khan, Shahbaz Khel, Marwat.

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 9th December, 1898.

As Wazir Khan, Sarpanch, has not arrived, we reduce the Sarpanches to three instead of five. They will be Mir Abas Khan, Zabita Khan and Allahdad Khan.

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 13th December, 1898.

As Muhammad Afzal, Langar Khel, is ill, Khoedar, Shabi Khel, has been substituted for him.

J. G. LORIMER,
Political Officer, Tochi.

A. B. KETTLEWELL,
Political Officer, Wana.

Bannu, 23rd December, 1898.

Annexure 13.

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 19th April, 1899.

I am directed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, reporting the result of the cases relating to offences committed by Mahsuds in or on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan District and decided at the joint jirgas held at Tank.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor approves of the orders passed by you in these cases and confirms your action in authorizing the Political Officer to enforce those orders. His Honour also agrees with you that the number and character of the complaints brought against the Mahsuds as regards the Dera Ismail Khan border do not evidence any serious insecurity of life and property on that border.

Annexure 14.

Letter from J. Wilson, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 19th April, 1899.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th of January, 1899, reporting the settlement of cases in which Government or travellers in the Tochi Valley were the complainants against the Mahsuds.

2. It is observed that you have approved of the joint recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and have authorized the latter to take steps to recover the arms recommended to be recovered in the cases in which travellers are the complainants. Your orders are approved by the Lieutenant-Governor, who desires that his acknowledgments may be conveyed to Messrs. Lorimer and Kettlewell for the satisfactory settlement effected by them.

3. His Honour is also pleased, as desired by you, to sanction the recommendations of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, in cases in which Government servants or property were injured, and to direct that steps may now be taken to realize the fines and compensation awarded in these cases.

4. In conclusion, I am to request that you will be good enough to submit the statement referred to in Mr. Kettlewell's letter of the 28th November, 1898, showing exactly the amounts outstanding against the tribe, the sections mainly responsible, and also the class of cases for which the compensation and fines are due, and to report what prospect there is of realization of the amounts due and what steps you propose to take to realize them. The Lieutenant-Governor will also be glad to receive your opinion on the recommendation of the Political Officers that whenever an opportunity occurs cross-cases between Mahsuds and Dauris should be taken up and enquired into as they occur, together with an opinion on the further suggestion that claims of revenue-paying Waziri villages in the bed of the Tochi should be taken up in the same manner as Dauri cases proper.

5. The original enclosures of your letter under reply are herewith returned, together with six printed copies of the same.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from the Hon. Mr. L. W. Dane, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 20th September, 1899.

In continuation of this office letter, dated 11th August, 1899, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the telegrams marginally noted, on the subject of the Shaman Khel prisoners captured in connection with the telegraph wire cutting and the attack on the ration convoy at the Shahur Tangi on the 1st July, 1899. From my telegram, dated 11th September, 1899, it will be seen that, failing the discovery and surrender of the individual offenders, the Lieutenant-Governor has sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs. 1,500 on the Shaman Khels, the release of the prisoners of that section as soon as the fine is paid and the immediate release of Suleman, Michi Khel Malik, who was acquitted by the tribal jirga.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th September, 1899.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Jirga consisting of Badshah Khan and Muhammad Afziel Khan, Alizais, Barahmat, Nur Agai and Azam Khan, Bohlolyai, and Marwat, brother of Allah Ragh, and Amin Khan, Shaman Khels, has found Suleman not guilty; main reason is that further enquiries proved that the two witnesses, who stated that they spoke to Suleman and his companions in Splitoi, were lying, and had been induced to tell this story in hope of getting their relatives, who were among Shaman Khel prisoners, released. Marwat and Amin Khan swear that the more important of these witnesses admitted this to them privately, and jirga is convinced that their evidence is false. This conviction appears genuine, and is considered well founded; case against Suleman thus breaks down, and jirga strongly affirms belief in his innocence; it is proposed that of fine imposed one-third should be paid by Shahur Shaman Khels and two-thirds by Shabar Khel, to be refunded if real murderers are found and punished. Proposal as regards Michi Khels is hardly logical if Suleman is really innocent, but jirga thinks that, if pressure is put on powerful section like Michi Khels in this way, they will be likely to find a clue to real offenders, and proposal might, I think, be justified on grounds that appearances against Suleman are still suspicious, and he is therefore bound either to pay share of fine or to prove case against offenders, so though failure to prove case up to date against actual murderers is to be regretted, I think jirga's award should be accepted, and fine of Rs. 1,500 imposed as proposed. I will submit detailed report as soon as possible, but should be glad of telegraphic orders about prisoners at once. I think Suleman might be released immediately on heavy security, and Maliks required to give security for payment of fine within month, and I would also release Shaman Khel prisoners on payment of Rs. 500. Latter are innocent, and their further detention will serve no useful purpose, while it keeps their section in a state of irritation and contest. Fine of Rs. 500 will, I consider, be sufficient punishment for failure to prove case and for false evidence of witnesses. *Ends.* Commissioner wires:—*Begins.* In event of Suleman being discharged, the Michi Khels can be fined only if jirga awards that. Case against Suleman is doubtful, and they cannot return

him guilty, and that they therefore recommend a fine on his section. Does the jirga make the above award? Do the Michi Khels object to or accept the jirga's proposal regarding imposition of two-thirds of total fine on them? If Michi Khels are to be fined, there ought to be a good reason for making them share responsibility with Shaman Khels. *Ends.* Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Object of jirga in imposing two-thirds of fine on Michi Khels, though they considered Suleman innocent, was that latter should, in hope of fine being refunded, give clue to actual murderers. If Michi Khels fail to do this, but are innocent themselves, they will recover sum they have paid as fine from Shaman Khels. Shah Salim tells me that he has strong hopes of real offenders being discovered, but that, if they are not, it has been privately settled between Michi Khels and Shaman Khel Maliks that former should call on latter to repay them their share of fine, which Shaman Khels will probably do without demur. Shah Salim says Michi Khels have no objection whatever in these circumstances to paying two-thirds of whatever fine imposed, and I strongly recommend that proposal be sanctioned, as, though illogical, it is one on which all parties are agreed; further enquiries confirm impression that Suleman is innocent after all. Suspicion against him was roused by his visit to Nasib's kirri, and Shaman Khels, possibly with genuine belief in his guilt, invented other statements strengthen case against him, and get their prisoners released. If Suleman and Shaman Khel prisoners are now discharged at once, as proposed, unrest among both Michi Khels and Shaman Khels will cease, and tracing of real offenders will be facilitated. Please let me have orders before evening, as I wish to leave Sarwekai to-morrow, and Maliks here are waiting to hear orders passed, otherwise please wire when orders may be expected. *Ends.*

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, (repeated to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab), dated the 8th September, 1899.

You state that Michi Khels have made private arrangements with Shaman Khels to realise from Shaman Khels the part of fine imposed on Michi Khels, in event of their failing to trace actual offenders. Michi Khels are certain that they will not pay fine actually in any case, and the mere imposition of fine will not serve as a pressure on them to trace offenders. Under these circumstances, if Michi Khels are not proved to be responsible in any way, why should we not relieve them of all responsibility, release Suleman and let tribesmen see that we do not punish innocent section or men? On the contrary, if we are convinced of innocence of suspected men or section, we are ready to acquit them at once. In this case whole fine of Rs. 1,500 proposed should be imposed on Shaman Khels, who are locally responsible, have brought a false charge against Suleman, and have failed to trace actual offenders. Is there any objection to this? In any case, in my opinion, not a single Shaman Khel should be released until whole of fine in this case has been realised, and then other Shahur Tangi cases have been satisfactorily disposed of.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 9th September, 1899.

Yours 8th September. I venture to deprecate further punishment of Shahur Shaman Khels beyond fine of Rs. 500 proposed. They are an in-offensive and well-disposed section, and more under our control than any

other Mahsuds; in present case I believe now they have to choose between proving case by false evidence against Suleman, whose actions had given rise to well-founded suspicion of his guilt and confessing themselves unable to trace offenders. Offence was committed on border of Shaman Khels' territory; none of offenders were wounded and they carried nothing off with them, so that, unless some one had actually seen them on way to or from Tangi, evidence against them would be difficult to procure; they would keep what they had done very dark, and facts would probably only leak out months afterwards, if ever. On other hand, in case of outrage in Tangi of July 23rd last, one raider was killed; I have, owing to this fact, succeeded in tracing offence to gang of ten or eleven Aimal Khels, of seven of whom I now know the names. In view of severe pressure brought to bear through baramta on Shaman Khels, where crops are suffering for want of men to look after them, I think there is some excuse for their action. I venture to think fine proposed sufficient punishment, but, if you consider it advisable, fine might be raised Rs. 1,000, and Michi Khels absolved altogether. Imposition of fine on latter will exercise some pressure on them, though they expect to realise it ultimately from Shaman Khels, for it will be some time before they do so; there is always chance of friction arising, though Shaman Khels are at present complaisant. I mainly supported proposal, however, because it was that of jirga, and consented to by all parties, and I agree that it would perhaps be more fair to Michi Khels to absolve them altogether. In any case I venture again to urge most strongly immediate release of Suleman and Shaman Khel prisoners on payment of whatever fine imposed. I would again point out that Shahur Shaman Khel allowances are same as before Shahur route was opened, and I don't think we should come down on them too severely as regards local responsibility, especially in case like present and only other recent Tangi case, where responsibility can be enforced is that of wire cutting; in which they have given satisfactory clue to offenders. Latter case will be taken up at Tank jirga. Addressed Commissioner; repeated Punjab.

Annexure 4.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th September, 1899.

Watson's telegram, 9th September. I adhere to imposition fine of Rs. 1,500 on the Shaman Khels. There is no doubt that Shahur Shaman Khels are inoffensive and well-disposed, but punishment awarded in serious cases should be deterrent. I recommend accordingly fine of Rs. 1,500 on the Shaman Khels and immediate release of Suleman. Shaman Khel prisoners may be released as soon as fine is paid. Watson refers to allowances of Shahur Shaman Khels. I would point out that all Mahsud allowances were forfeited after the attack at Wana, and subsequent military expedition, and new allowances were sanctioned afterwards in consideration of new obligation; the opening of Shahur route was a result of expedition.

Annexure 5.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 11th September, 1899.

Your telegram of 9th. Lieutenant-Governor agrees in your recommendation to impose a fine of Rs. 1,500 on Shaman Khels, to release Suleman immediately, and also to release Shaman Khel prisoners as soon as fine is

paid. As Zhob authorities are clearly not convinced of innocence of Mahsud prisoners arrested by them and now being sent to Wana, Political Officer should, before releasing them, in view of the failure to prove these cases on his side, again review the evidence against them in the view of what he has since learned.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 6th October, 1899.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my endorsement, dated the 6th September, 1899, I am directed to forward, for such action as the Lieutenant-Governor may think necessary, copies of two letters from the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, regarding raids committed by Waziris on Zhob.

Dated the 25th August, 1899, with enclosures.
Dated the 26th August, 1899, with enclosure.

2. I am to take this opportunity of enclosing a brief statement which has been prepared in this office of cases outstanding against the Mahsuds and Waziris. Additions may be necessary to make the statement complete up to date; but, even as it stands, the number of cases is considerable, some of them are serious, and the fines due from the tribes seem likely to reach a high figure. I am accordingly to enquire, with reference to your letter, dated the 17th October, 1898, what action it is proposed to take to effect a settlement of all these cases. I am to suggest that it would be convenient if your reply were accompanied by a statement, as far as this can be prepared without undesirable delay, showing all outstanding cases against these tribes, in which orders have not been passed or have not been completely executed, and indicating, to such extent as may be readily possible, the tribes, sections and sub-sections against which the liability in each case has been proved or is expected to be proved.

3. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will, no doubt, agree that an early settlement of outstanding cases is very desirable, since the record of the last twelve months, culminating in attacks upon regular troops as well as levies, and finally on Government officials, both in Zhob and in South Waziristan, appears to indicate an increasing spirit of lawlessness among the tribes. The Government of India would be very reluctant to sanction anything in the nature of an expedition to compel a settlement of these cases, and I am to enquire whether, if other means fail, vigorous action cannot be taken, before the tribes move to the hills for the next hot season, to recover fines by a system of reprisals against the various sections concerned.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Colonel H. Wyllie, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ziarat, the 25th August, 1899.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my telegram, No. 179, dated the 26th May, 1899, reporting an attack made by a band of Waziris on a party of five Zhob Levy Corps sepoy between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel.

2. I now forward, herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter,* with my reply† thereto, from the Political Agent in Zhob on the subject.

* Dated the 2nd August, 1899.

† Dated the 25th August, 1899.

3. It appears that, on the afternoon of the 25th May last, a Naik and four men of the Zhob Levy Corps, while returning from Girdao to Mir Ali Khel, and proceeding in single file up the bed of a nalla, were suddenly fired on, when about two miles from Girdao, by two parties of men, one on either side of the nalla. Three shots were fired. One struck and killed sepoy Bharat, another hit sepoy Kalla Khan in the left thigh, breaking the bone, while the third missed.

4. Seeing their comrade fall, and as their assailants—about ten in number—outnumbered them, the other sepoys took to their heels, making for Mir Ali Khel, where they arrived about 7 in the evening, and at once reported what had taken place.

5. Meanwhile the Waziris, for by the clothes they wore and their general appearance, there can be no doubt as to the tribe to which the men belonged, came down to where the dead and wounded men lay, and, after having relieved them of their arms, accoutrements, &c., decamped.

6. On receiving intimation of the attack, the Officer Commanding the Mir Ali Khel post at once wired to Fort Sandeman and Gul Kach, and sent messages to the other neighbouring posts informing them of what had occurred, at the same time sending out 2 parties in pursuit of the offenders, and making arrangements to bring in the dead and wounded men.

7. Three parties of the Zhob Levy Corps were also despatched in different directions from Gul Kach, and a party under Jemadars Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din from Fort Sandeman. The Commandant himself, with the Extra Assistant Commissioner, following a little later.

8. On the morning of the 27th, one of the parties despatched from Gul Kach came across three Zalli Khel Waziris near Toi Khulla on the Zhob side of the Gomal, and arrested them on suspicion. These men were found to have in their possession a rifle, recently discharged, 3 empty cartridge cases, 15 loaded cartridges, 1 pistol and 2 knives. It will thus be seen that appearances were very much against them.

9. On the 28th May the party under Jemadar Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din came across another gang of 4 Zalli Khel Waziris at the same place where the first three men were arrested, and accused them of having been concerned in the attack of the 25th May. One of these men escaped. The remainder stated that they knew the offenders and took the Jemadar and his party to the village of Karab Kot, some ten miles on the Waziri side of the border, where the offenders were supposed to be. On arrival the villagers, Mahsuds, were found scattered about attending to their fields. The Zalli Khel pointed out six men, all of whom were quietly secured and the party then returned to Gul Kach. While the arrests were being made, a woman was heard to say, "Did I not warn you against doing such deeds."

10. On being placed with others before the wounded sepoy, Kalla Khan, for identification, Kalla Khan picked out three of the Mahsuds as the men whom he had seen at the time of the outrage. One man in particular he recognised as a man who came down to where he (Kalla Khan) lay after his comrades had run away and levelled his rifle at him with the intention of despatching him, but desisted on the sowar's pleading for his life. Kalla Khan has since died.

11. Copies of the various statements for and against the accused have been sent to the Political Officer, Wana, who has been asked to find, if possible, corroborative evidence against (1) the 6 Mahsuds, or (2) the 3 Zalli Khels who were arrested on the 26th May. Should he be unable to do so,

the Political Agent, Zhob, has suggested that a combined Punjab and Baluch jirga should assemble and enquire into the case on such evidence as is already available. The Political Officer, Wana, is understood to have referred the matter to the Commissioner, Derajat.

12. At the request of the Political Officer, Wana, the Political Agent, Zhob, has sent the three Zalli Khels who gave Jemadar Baz Muhammad his information in custody to Wana, and has suggested to that officer the possibility of his learning from the prisoners something that might prove of use in the case.

13. It will be seen from my letter to the Political Agent, Zhob, that I have approved of the action taken by him.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Political Agent in Zhob to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 2nd August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 26th May, 1899, regarding the attack by Waziris on a party of the Zhob Levy Corps between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel, I have the honour to submit the following detailed report on the subject.

2. On the afternoon of the 25th May, 1899, a Naik and four men of the Zhob Levy Corps, while returning from Girdao to Mir Ali Khel, and proceeding in single file about 20 yards one behind the other, were fired upon in the defile about two miles from Girdao. The assailants, who were in two parties, one on either side of the naika, were about 10 in number, and, from their appearance, garments and the arms they carried, were, without doubt, Waziris. Three shots were fired by them, one of which missed, while of the other two, one hit sepoy Bharat and killed him, and the other broke the bone of sepoy Kalla Khan's left thigh. The Naik of the party and the other two sepoys, seeing their comrades fall, and as their assailants outnumbered them and were posted in unassailable positions, took to their heels, and arriving at Mir Ali Khel—about 7 in the evening—reported what had happened. From the statement of sepoy Kalla Khan it appears that two of the Waziris came down to where the two men of the corps were lying. The others ran after the Naik and his party, but their pursuit, as already stated, was unsuccessful. One of the first two Waziris told the wounded sepoy that they had been after them for a week and that it was only to-day that they had got an opportunity of attacking them. The same Waziri levelled his rifle at Kalla Khan intending to despatch him, but at the latter's entreaties his life was spared. The Waziris then having stripped the wounded man and the dead one of the arms, accoutrements, &c., they had on them, decamped.

3. On the Naik's making his report at Mir Ali Khel, the Officer Commanding the post at once despatched telegrams to Fort Sandeman and Gul Kach and messages to the other neighbouring outposts, at the same time sending out two parties in pursuit of the offenders. These, however, returned unsuccessful. Arrangements were made to bring in the wounded man and the body of the dead man to Mir Ali Khel. On receipt of the news of the raid at Gul Kach, three parties of the Zhob Levy Corps detachment there at once set out in different directions. Besides this, early on the 26th May, a party of the Zhob Levy Corps under Jemadars Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din started from Fort Sandeman, the Commandant, Zhob Levy Corps, and the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lower Zhob, following them.

4. On the morning of the 27th one of the Gul Kach parties came across three Zalli Khel Waziris near Toi Khulla on the Zhob side of the Gomal. They were proceeding towards the river from the Zhob direction, and the party suspected them of having been concerned in the late raid. They were,

therefore, secured, and they were found to have in their possession a rifle which had recently been discharged, three empty cartridge cases, 15 cartridges, one pistol, and two knives. Thus appearances were very much against these men.

5. On the 23rd May in the afternoon the party under Jemadars Baz Muhammad Khan and Fakhr-ud-din, who were accompanied by Abdul Kablik, a Jemadar, and some sowars of the 5th Bombay Cavalry from Mir Ali Khel, came across 4 other Zalli Khel Waziris on the same spot and accused them of having committed the crime. One of the Zalli Khels disappeared on some pretence, and the other three said that they were quite innocent. At the same time they stated that they knew who the actual offenders were and where they lived, and one of them agreed to go with the party and point the offenders out. Accordingly the following morning Jemadar Baz Muhammad Khan, accompanied by some of his men and the Zalli Khel, started for the village of Karab Kot, some 10 miles on the Waziri side of the border. On arrival the villagers, who are Mahsuds, were found scattered about attending to their fields. The Zalli Khel informer was hidden among the horses of the party, so that the Mahsuds might not become aware of his having informed against them, and from this retreat he pointed out one by one 6 Mahsuds, whom he declared he had seen cross the river after the outrage. These men were quietly secured and the party returned with them to Gul Kach. While the arrests were being made, a woman was heard saying to one of the men arrested, "Did I not warn you against doing such deeds." The six Mahsuds, together with the three Zalli Khels who had informed against them and the three Zalli Khels first arrested, were then brought to Fort Sandeman. Thus we had in custody six Mahsuds and six Zalli Khels in connection with this affair. These men, together with two Waziris arrested on the 23rd May near Khuni Burj, four Waziris arrested last year in connection with the outrage committed in May 1898 (since released) and certain other prisoners, were, on the 26th May, placed before the wounded sepoy Kalla Khan (since dead) with a view to his identifying any of them if possible. Kalla Khan picked out three of the Mahsuds as men whom he had seen at the time of the outrage. One man in particular he recognised as he who had intended to give him his *coup de grace*. I do not, however, attach the highest importance to this identification owing to the sepoy's wounded and weakened condition. It serves, nevertheless, when taken in conjunction with the information of the Zalli Khels, to constitute a sufficiently strong *prima facie* case to justify the retention in custody of the whole party of six Mahsuds, pending the result of further enquiries.

The three informing Zalli Khels, I should mention, completely denied before the Magistrate that they had ever said anything about the Mahsuds or pointed them out to the Zhob Levy Corps party. But Jemadar Baz Muhammad, Ghilzai, is a man of unimpeachable truthfulness, and I have not the least doubt that the Zalli Khels acted as he described.

6. The case now stands as follows:—

Copies of the various statements for and against the accused have been sent to the Political Officer, Wana, and he has been asked to find, if possible, corroborative evidence against—

- (1) the six Mahsuds, or
- (2) the three Zalli Khels arrested on the 26th May.

Should he fail to do so, I have suggested that a combined Punjab and Baluchistan jirga should assemble and enquire into the case on such evidence as we already have. The Political Officer, Wana, has referred the matter for the orders of the Commissioner, Derajat.

7. At the Political Officer, Wana's, request, I have discharged the three Zalli Khels who gave Jemadar Baz Muhammad his information. They were forwarded in custody to Wana, and I suggested to the Political Officer the possibility of his learning from them something that might prove of use.

Either they really did see the Mahsuds crossing the Gomal and can give valuable evidence against them, or, for some purpose which they should explain, they wilfully deceived Jemadar Baz Muhammad and his party.

8. I may mention that one of the parties sent out after the occurrence of the outrage on the 26th May was one consisting of the Thanadar and a few tribal levies at Moghal Kot. In the hills towards Bagh they were fired on by some Waziris. The party returned the fire, whereupon the Waziris decamped, and were not again seen by the Thanadar. No damage was done on either side.

9. I am making a separate report about the late wire cutting outrage near Moghal Kot.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to the Political Agent in Zhob, dated Camp Ziarat, the 25th August, 1899.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter, dated the 2nd August, 1899, reporting details of the attack made by Waziris on a party of the Zhob Levy Corps between Girdao and Mir Ali Khel.

2. I am now to convey the approval of the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General to the action taken by you in the matter, as reported in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your letter under reply. Your report on the result of the reference made to the Political Officer, Wana, is awaited.

Annexure 4.

Letter from Colonel H. Wyllie, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ziarat, the 26th August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 25th June, 1899, and the entries in my diaries for the weeks ending 30th June and 24th July, 1899, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 14th August, 1899, from the Political Agent in Zhob, furnishing further details of the attack by Waziris on a telegraph-line repairing party under the Thanadar of Moghal Kot and a Zhob Levy Corps patrol near Kuchbina on the 21st June, 1899.

2. As this is the second occasion within the last few months on which parties of Waziris have raided into Zhob, I venture to suggest that the Punjab Government should be addressed with a view to steps being taken to prevent the recurrence of such attacks.

Annexure 5.

Letter from the Political Agent in Zhob to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 14th August, 1899.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 24th June, 1899, on the subject of wire cutting near Kuchbina on the 21st June, 1899, I have the honour to forward a more detailed report as under.

2. On the afternoon of the 21st June, 1899, information was received at the Moghal Kot Thana that the telegraph line had been cut at a point some 6 miles distant on the road to Kuchbina and Khajuri Kach. The Thanadar, Moghal Kot, accompanied by 3 civil levy sowars and a tracker at once proceeded to the site of the damage and found that about 200 feet of wire had been cut and carried off. The party was soon joined by 2 telegraph-line-riders, one from Khajuri Kach and the other from Moghal Kot, who at once set about repairing the line. While they were thus engaged, the party was fired upon from an adjoining hill. The spot whence the fire came was subsequently found to have been roughly "sangared," and the idea is that the Waziris knowing a party would come out to repair the line had purposely lain in waiting in order to attack it, the object being, doubtless, to plunder fire-arms. At the time of the attack a Zhob Levy Corps patrol of five men, which was on its way back from Moghal Kot to Kuchbina, was present in the neighbourhood. Hearing the firing the patrol endeavoured to make its way

* *Note.*—The appearance of the raiders which is well known to the levies and others on the Waziri border, and the marks at the scene of the wire cutting of "Mirzai Chaplis" which are generally worn by Waziris establish the fact that they were Waziris.

to Kuchbina, 5 miles distant, in order to summon assistance, but found their road blocked by a second party of Waziris.* They then returned and joined the Thanadar's party, which, in the meantime, had made an attempt to retire towards Moghal Kot, but here also retreat was cut off by a third Waziri gang. The only man that got away was the line rider from Khajuri. The Khajuri road was apparently not blocked, and the line rider reached that place without accident. It should be mentioned that his first act was to wire news of the occurrence to his superiors, adding that when attacked the Thanadar and party had at once fled to Moghal Kot, leaving him, the line-rider, to shift for himself.

3. However, the Thanadar and the Zhob Levy Corps parties, finding themselves unable to reach either Moghal Kot or Kuchbina, established themselves in the most sheltered spot they could find, and there remained on the defensive for several hours. The Waziris kept firing on them at intervals and from different directions, till about 1 a.m., when they took their departure without having done any damage. In the morning a party of the Zhob Levy Corps came out from Moghal Kot, but nothing further was seen of the Waziris.

4. It seems to me that the Zhob Levy Corps patrol allowed themselves to be somewhat easily repulsed from their endeavour to reach Kuchbina. They were apparently fired at from a hill overlooking the Kuchbina stream. But the bed of the stream is wide and open, and is not bad going for horses, so that a smart dash would soon have got them past the point of danger. However, it is always difficult to judge of such cases without having been present, and the fact stated by Major Alban, to whom I mentioned the matter, that the men were mostly recruits, should be taken into consideration.

5. It is not known what the exact number of the raiders was on this occasion, but there were probably a dozen or fifteen of them. Nor is it known to what section of the Waziris they belonged. The Political Officer, Wana, has been informed of the affair and asked to take cognisance of it.

6. I may mention that, on the day after the above attack, damage was done, I believe, to the telegraph line near Khajuri. This was in the Wana jurisdiction, and the Political Officer, Wana, was informed of the report.

No. 2.

Letter from the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 18th October, 1900. Received 5th November, 1900.

Our despatch, dated the 20th October, 1899, forwarded certain papers relating to raids committed by Mahsud and Waziri tribesmen. Early in the

* Enclosure No. 1. current year, we received* from the Punjab Government copies of letters from and to Mr. Anderson, then Commissioner of the Derajat Division, in which the actual position was reviewed; and, after further voluminous correspondence, the Punjab Government† transmitted a report in which Mr. Anderson claimed that all cases outstanding against the Mahsuds up to the 24th March, 1900, had been disposed of.

2. The report did not‡ appear to us to be entirely satisfactory, and it was not long before we learnt that the settlement had not only omitted to take note of a claim nearly as large as that concerning which an agreement had been arrived at, but was in other respects defective. Further correspondence§ which was transmitted by the Punjab Government in July appeared to indicate that the situation was drifting from bad to worse, and was such as to give ground for much anxiety. The Lieutenant-Governor was accordingly invited to summon to Simla for a personal conference Mr. W. H. Merk, C.S.I., who had succeeded Mr. Anderson as Commissioner of the Derajat Division. The result of the conferences held after Mr. Merk's arrival at Simla is set forth in our Foreign Secretary's letter|| of the 1st October, 1900, of which we invite perusal. It will be observed that the course to be followed will depend on the attitude of the Mahsuds when Mr. Merk meets them in jirga next month. Mr. Merk will submit in advance a sketch of the communication which he proposes to make to the jirga. Should the jirga prove obdurate, a strict blockade will be enforced.

3. As the enclosed papers contain reference to the Mulla Powindah, we may explain that in June last the Mulla definitely asked Mr. Merk for an allowance, and we sanctioned the payment to the Mulla of an allowance of Rs. 100 a month.

We have, &c.,

(Signed)	CURZON
"	E. H. H. COLLEN.
"	A. C. TREVOR.
"	C. M. RIVAZ.
"	T. RALEIGH.
"	E. F.-G. LAW.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 6th February, 1900.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 14th January, 1900, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, on the subject of our present position in regard to the Mahsud tribe.

Letter, dated 24th January, 1900, from Commissioner, Derajat.
My letter, dated 6th February, 1900, in reply.

Annexure 1.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 24th January, 1900.

With reference to the serious offences recently committed by the Mahsuds, namely, the murder of Border Military Police at Zeranobo, on the 16th December, 1899, which was reported by the Political Officer, Wana, in his telegram, dated the 16th idem, and the attack made on the garrison of the Zam Post on the 9th instant, I have the honour to submit a report showing what is the present position as regards the Mahsud tribe and our relations with it in order to enable Government to determine what action should be taken to obtain redress both as regards the cases which have been disposed of, but in which satisfaction has not been obtained yet, and also with reference to the cases which are pending disposal.

2. In order to lay the case clearly before Government it will be necessary to give a brief account of the proceedings which have been taken in connection with the settlement of cases, and the realisation of fines since the autumn of 1898. In my letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, I have explained that much pressure was not brought to bear on the Mahsuds earlier to obtain redress in the cases which were pending when I left on three months' leave in August, 1898, and that this was done advisedly. Before these cases, which were disposed of in November and December, 1898, were taken into account, the fines due on the 1st November, 1898, from the Mahsuds and other tribes under the political control of the Political Officer, Wana, amounted to Rs. 3,703-3-9, on account of the offences committed by them in British territory, and against British subjects and Government in protected areas. Out of this sum the Mahsuds were responsible for Rs. 3,247-3-9.

3. The disposal of the pending cases referred to above in the last paragraph, in November and December, 1898, imposed on the Mahsuds a fine of Rs. 18,867-15-0 as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
On account of the offences committed in the Dera Ismail Khan District	5,567	14	0
On account of the offences committed in Zhob	1,715	0	0
On account of the offences committed in Gomal	90	0	0
On account of the offences committed in Tochi	7,258	12	0
Guri Khel raid on the Jani Khel flocks and a few other petty offences committed in the Bannu District	3,801	5	0
On account of offences committed in the Sherani country	435	0	0
Total	18,867	15	0

and the total sum due from the tribe amounted to Rs. 22,115-2-9.

4. Since then fines aggregating Rs. 18,466-8-7 have been imposed on the Mahsuds from time to time during the year 1899, partly on account of certain offences committed during the year, and partly on account of the old cases disposed of during the period, as noted below:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
1. Attack on the Bhattanni Levies committed on the 29th September, 1898...	2,000	0	0
2. Murder of two Bhattanni Levies in July, 1897	1,000	0	0

	Rs.	A.	P.
3. Raid by the Shingis on Suleman Khel flocks near Nasran in February, 1899 (share of the Mahsuds)	4,278	0	0
4. Murder of Sepoy, Isar Singh, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, near Shahur Tangi, on 1st July, 1899	1,500	0	0
5. Murder of two Cavalry sowars near Tiarza, on 5th March, 1899 (share of Mahsuds)	1,856	0	0
6. Murder of Zhob Levy sowar near Darra Gardao, on 25th May, 1899 ...	2,000	0	0
7. Killing and wounding of Sherani with robbery (<i>vide</i> paragraph 3 of Commissioner's letter, dated the 27th January, 1899, share of the Mahsuds) ...	1,600	0	0
8. On account of petty theft and robbery cases in the Dera Ismail Khan District, Gomal and Wana, &c.	4,252	8	7
Total ...	18,466	8	7

This sum being added to the total arrived at in paragraph 3 raises the total charge against the Mahsuds to Rs. 40,581-11-4.

5. Out of this total charge of Rs. 40,581-11-4 sums aggregating Rs. 21,739-2-11 have been realised from the tribe from time to time during the year, and the outstanding balance at the close of the year amounts to Rs. 18,842-8-5. Moreover, in certain inter-tribal cases, action was taken during the year, and the amount of compensation awarded in respect of such cases including the opening balance brought forward from 1898 amounted to Rs. 12,460-7-11. Out of this sum Rs. 7,526-1-0 have been recovered, and paid to claimants. The outstanding balance in these cases at the close of the year amounts to Rs. 5,934-6-11. This balance is on account of cases which occurred outside the limits of protected area in the hills and among tribesmen themselves. For the realisation of this balance we are not as much concerned as we are for the recovery of the balances of the fines imposed on account of offences committed in British territory, Zhob, Tochi, and protected area against Government and our own people.

6. The figures given in the preceding paragraph of fines imposed and collected during the year, however, do not fully manifest what has actually been done. The value of the property, cattle, sheep and goats recovered in original by putting pressure on the tribe, section, or individual offenders soon after the occurrence of the offence or restored by the actual offenders after enquiry by a tribal jirga has not been included in the figures of fines imposed and recovered. There are several large cases in which property and cattle worth several thousands of rupees were recovered in this way, notably in the case of the Shingi raid on the Suleman Khel flocks near Nasran, and the Guri Khel raid on the Jani Khel flocks in the Bannu District; while there are numerous petty cases in which the camels or other property stolen were restored to complainants, and the cases were filed after imposing a small fine or without taking any further action.

7. As regards the steps which have been taken to realise the fines imposed during the year, I shall give a brief account of what has been done—

- (a) The first step taken was to stop the allowances of all the Mahsud Maliks temporarily. These allowances were, however, restored when the Maliks showed that they made a real endeavour to realise the fines and to assist the Political Officer.

- (b) In December, 1898, when a large Mahsud Jirga was sitting at Bannu, in connection with the settlement of the cases of offences reported to have been committed by the Mahsuds in the Tochi, I authorised Mr. Kettlewell, the Political Officer, Wana, to make arrangements for the seizure of convoys of certain Mahsud sections. I authorised this step subject to one condition, namely, that the Mahsuds, whose jirgas had been invited by us to come to Bannu, and were then assembled at Bannu, would not look upon the seizure as a breach of faith. Mr. Kettlewell thought that the action might create a misunderstanding, and recommended that all seizures should be postponed until after the jirgas were dismissed. After the termination of the jirgas, Mr. Kettlewell, however, never returned to Wana or Tank, and was compelled to take one year's furlough on medical certificate from the 16th January, 1899. Mr. Watson, who succeeded him, was new to the work and unacquainted with the situation, and the proposed seizures had of necessity to be postponed temporarily.
- (c) Early in February, 1899, I happened to be near Nasran on my way to the Mahsud country, when I received the report of a serious raid by the Shingis on the Suleman Khel flocks, in which 1,200 sheep and goats were carried off, and 5 Suleman Khels of the pursuit party were killed. Being in the neighbourhood of the locality when the raid was committed, I was in a position to take immediate action. The Shingis were surprised in their homes at Kotka, and near Jandola, and orders were issued for the arrest of every Shingi at Tank and in the Dera Ismail Khan District. The result was that the Suleman Khels were fully redressed, all compensation due in the case was realised, and 12 of the ringleaders of the raid, who were surrendered unconditionally, or were arrested, were sentenced to imprisonment for terms varying from three to five years.
- (d) The Political Officer, Mr. Watson, acting in accordance with the instructions given to him, summoned a large Mahsud Jirga, and impressed on them the necessity of an early settlement of the fines imposed in the cases of the past year. After long discussion it was proposed by the Maliks that the fines outstanding against each section and sub-section should first be explained to the Maliks of those sections, and if they could not be realised by those Maliks in a month's time from the date of communication the leading Maliks would then meet again to discuss matters. The suggestion was adopted, and the month asked for was allowed.
- (e) At this stage another serious offence was committed on the 5th of March, 1899, namely, the attack on the Cavalry sowars at the mouth of the Tiarza. The Garerai, a sub-section of the Alizais, were believed to have been concerned in this offence. Proposals were submitted for the surprise of certain Abdul Rahman Khel and Garerai villages with the assistance of troops, and these proposals were sanctioned in your office telegram of 12th March, 1899. All arrangements were completed involving the movement of a considerable body of troops, but when Mr. Watson went out to make the surprise sanctioned, he had to modify the scheme for the reasons explained in his telegram of the 14th March, 1899, and his letter, dated the 17th March, which gives an account of the operations. The surprise was carried out in regard to the Abdul Rahman Khels only. The results of this surprise are reported by Mr. Watson in his letter, dated the 31st March, 1899, copy forwarded to you under the cover of this office letter, dated the 18th April, 1899.

The claims against the Abdul Rahman Khel amounted at the time to Rs. 3,821; a very large part of this was paid up at the time, and good security was furnished for the payment of the balance.

- (f) The Malikis, who had gone to their sections to recover fines, as reported in clause (d), made many recoveries, but the outstanding balance was still very large. The leading Malikis met in April, 1899, and decided that they should give their allowances which had not been paid to them for some months past in settlement of the fines outstanding against their sections, and should make the recoveries from their tribesmen or actual offenders afterwards. The result of these measures was that sums aggregating Rs. 4,864-10-1 were readily recovered.
- (g) Two sections which were heavily involved, and which were under blockade from the beginning of the year, namely, the Guri Khels and Jalal Khels, did not attend the jirgas. By this time the hot weather was setting in, and the sections removed to the higher hills, where it was difficult to reach them. The Guri Khels owed a sum of about Rs. 4,000, and the amount due by the Jalal Khels was Rs. 7,000. These sections are small. Their Malikis are few in number, and do not appear to have a hold on their tribesmen. It was decided that further endeavours should be made to persuade them to come and settle their account. The Guri Khels disputed the fairness of the award made against them in the Jani Khel raid case, while the Jalal Khels expressed their inability to pay such a large sum.
- (h) In July other serious offences were committed, namely—
- (1) The attack on a convoy, and murder of a sepoy on the 1st July, 1899.
 - (2) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and murder of his chaprasi, Mahar Shah, on the 20th July, 1899.
 - (3) The attack on a convoy on the 23rd July, 1899.

In connection with offence No. (1) the Shahur Shaman Khels were surprised in their villages, and a number of them were arrested on the ground of their local responsibility for the offence, and were detained until the whole amount of fine imposed in the case was realised.

- (i) The Guri Khels and the Jalal Khels were then induced to come in. A settlement was arrived at with the former; they have paid a part of the fine due from them, but they have not carried out the agreement they made to pay off their fines as has been reported to you. Some of the other sections, however, who were jointly implicated with them, such as Abdullais, have been induced to pay in their share of the fine.
- (j) Before the Zam attack was made, in the beginning of this month, arrangements were being made to arrest large convoys of the Shabi Khels and Jalal Khels in the Bannu District. These arrangements are being carefully worked out on the Tochi side, and will, I hope, be successful hereafter.

The result of the steps taken during the past year is that sums aggregating Rs. 21,739-2-11 have been realised during the year on account of the offences committed in British territory, and against Government or our own people in protected areas, and Rs. 7,526-1-0 in other cases.

8. The subjoined table will show the amount each sub-section has yet to pay on account of the former class of cases.

Section.	Sub-section.	Dera Ismail Khan.	Gomal, Wann and Shahur.	Zhob.	Sherani.	Bannu.	Tochi.	Total.
	<i>Alizais.</i>	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Giddi Khels.	Langar Khels...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Kai Khels ...	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
	Chund Khels ...	69 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	69 0 0
	Batkais ...	69 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	69 0 0
	Wazirgais ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Furidais ...	150 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	150 0 0
Dachhi Khels.	Salami Khels ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Guri Khels ...	640 0 0	—	165 0 0	165 0 0	3,283 3 0	—	4,253 3 0
	Mal Khels ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shumi Khels.	Mochi Khels ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Gareris ...	223 6 8	573 8 0	168 0 0	270 0 0	—	—	1,234 14 8
	Marisais ...	—	182 0 0	—	—	—	—	182 0 0
	Bahadur Khels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Para Khels ...	—	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
Shabi Khels	Malik Dinais ...	150 0 0	—	—	—	—	—	150 0 0
	Sultanais ...	—	—	—	—	—	1,400 0 0	1,400 0 0
	Total Alizais...	1,351 6 8	805 8 0	333 0 0	435 0 0	3,283 3 0	1,400 0 0	7,603 1 8
Shaman Khels	<i>Shaman Khels.</i>							
	Qasim Khels ...	360 0 0	56 8 0	—	—	—	—	416 8 0
Bahlolzais	<i>Bahlolzais.</i>							
	Jalal Khels ...	77 8 0	—	—	—	86 4 0	5,033 15 0	5,197 1 0
	Dhur and Nekzan Khels.	510 0 0	1,179 1 9	—	—	—	—	1,689 1 9
	Abdur Rahman Khels.	171 0 0	160 0 0	—	—	—	—	331 0 0
	Kikarais ...	—	50 0 0	—	—	—	—	50 0 0
	Shingis ...	285 6 0	376 0 0	—	—	—	—	661 6 0
	Aimal Khels ...	217 8 0	—	—	—	—	—	217 8 0
	Abdullais ...	—	364 0 0	—	—	—	—	364 0 0
Marsanzais ...	—	—	—	—	12 14 0	195 0 0	207 14 0	
	Total Bahlolzais	1,261 6 0	2,129 1 9	—	—	99 2 0	5,228 15 0	8,718 8 9
Mahsuds ...	Mahsud Tribes	—	—	2,099 6 0	—	—	—	2,099 6 0
	GRAND TOTAL	2,972 12 8	2,991 1 9	2,432 6 0	435 0 0	3,382 5 0	6,628 15 0	18,842 8 5

It will be observed that the sum due from the Shaman Khels is very small, and this sum will be realised without the adoption of any special measures. Among the Alizais the sections which owe large sums are—Guri Khels, Rs. 3,283-3-0, Shabi Khels, Rs. 1,400, Garerais, Rs. 1,234-14-8. Among the Bahlolzais the sections from whom large sums are due are—Nekzan Khels, Rs. 1,689-1-9, Jalal Khels, Rs. 5,033-15-0. In addition to the cases in which the penalties have been fixed there are some serious offences pending disposal, namely—

- (1) Attack on a convoy guard on July 23rd, 1899.
- (2) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and the murder of his chaprasi on 20th July, 1899.
- (3) The attack on Border Military Police men near Zeraniobo, in December, 1899.
- (4) The attack on the Zam Post on the 9th January, 1900.
- (5) The attack on the Zhob Levy sowars in May, 1898.

The fines which are likely to be imposed in the above cases may be estimated at Rs. 12,000, which, being added to the sum of Rs. 18,842-8-5 outstanding on account of the cases already disposed of as reported in paragraph 5 will raise the total charge against the tribe to Rs. 31,000 in round numbers. To this sum may be added Rs. 9,000 more on account of the petty cases pending disposal against the Mahsuds, and the total charge will amount to nearly Rs. 40,000.

9. If the Mahsuds had not committed fresh serious offences during the year, the sums recovered during the year would have been sufficient to pay off all fines and compensation awarded in old cases. The sum of Rs. 40,000, which has been arrived at in the last paragraph is large, and cannot all be realised at once, unless measures of a very drastic nature are adopted to enforce the payment. It will be observed that to realise the sum of approximately Rs. 30,000 in the past year several surprises of villages were made, convoys were arrested both at Tank and in Bannu, sections were placed under blockade, Maliks exerted strenuous endeavours to realise fines, and in fact paid large sums out of their allowances, and every effort was made to induce the sections which are heavily involved to clear their accounts, with the result that even the Jalal Khels and Guri Khels, who are the most troublesome sections and owe the largest sums, paid up Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 700 respectively. If it be desired that the fine due up to date on account of old and new undisposed of cases should be realised at once, the only measure which I can suggest to effect this is to place the whole Mahsud tribe under blockade until the whole sum is recovered.

10. There is at present great scarcity in the Mahsud country, in consequence of the failure of rains, and though the offences lately committed by them cannot, I think, be attributed directly to this cause, yet there can be no doubt that the privation caused by scarcity of food and fodder has occasioned a certain amount of restlessness among the disaffected. If a blockade of the tribe is decided on it will be necessary to strengthen the military posts in the Shahur, and to place military garrisons in certain levy posts, such as Ngandioaba and Haidri Kach, and also to strengthen the Border Military Police posts on the Dera Ismail Khan and part of the Bannu border. As a result of blockade it must be anticipated that our negotiations with Mulla Powindah, which are at present being arranged to enlist his assistance on the side of Government, will be interrupted, the raising of the Militia Corps in Southern Waziristan will, no doubt, be interfered with, and our friendly relations with the tribe and the Maliks will be broken off temporarily; but at the same time there can be no doubt that the blockade of the whole tribe, which is already hard pressed for food and fodder, will probably bring about the submission of the tribe in a reasonably short time, and will lead to the early recovery of all the outstanding fines. It is now for the Government to decide whether it is necessary to realize the whole sum promptly and at once. If so, there appears to be no other alternative than the adoption of the extreme measure suggested above. On the other hand, if Government is not disposed to sanction this measure, the realisation of the fine by means such as were adopted last year will proceed in due course. The progress in realisation will,

no doubt, be gradual, but there will be no serious risk of straining relation with the tribe or the Maliks, who will in the future render the same assistance that they have rendered in the past.

11. As to the motives of the serious offences committed last year, there is yet some uncertainty in regard to them. Mr. Watson is positive in his opinion that these offences were committed at the instigation, or at the instance of Mulla Powindah. He has, in fact, from the very first suspected that the Mulla is at the bottom of these offences. But on the other hand, if the Mulla is actually desirous of coming to a settlement with Government, as he appears to be, why should he instigate offences of this kind. The Mulla does not attempt to gain his ends by openly showing that he can trouble the Government by the commission of serious offences. On the contrary he tries to exonerate himself and his men. On more than one occasion when an offence of a serious nature had been committed he has at once sent an express message to the Political Officer or to the Naib Tahsildar to the effect that his men were not concerned in the offence. Whether Mulla Powindah is or is not the instigator of these offences there can be no doubt that the Maliks, as a body, are well disposed, and wish to maintain friendly relations with Government. Mr. Watson assures me that there is no sign whatever of hostility on the part of the tribe in general, or of any large section in particular, and I have no reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by him. I have, however, observed of late, and particularly since the Border Military Police have been armed with Sniders, that there is an ever-increasing desire among the Mahsuds to possess themselves of firearms of a superior kind, and there appears to be no doubt that in every case that has been committed during the past year the aim of the offenders was to get hold of rifles. It is not to be supposed that the Mahsuds are gathering together arms of precision as a preparation for the display of hostility towards Government. Like the Afridis they find that the better a man is armed the stronger he is in the tribe, and each man and boy does his best to acquire good arms, and will stick at nothing to obtain them. The Mulla's followers have devoted their energies particularly to securing firearms, and presumably the Mulla encourages them, in order to strengthen his own position in the tribe. He appears to be playing a double game, coquetting with Government, while he attempts to strengthen his position in the tribe by increasing the armed strength of his body guard. I have asked Mr. Watson to make further careful and searching enquiries to ascertain what are the objects of the Mulla, and what is the correct explanation of his conduct and submit a separate report on the point.

12. As regards the Zam case, the Shabi Khels, Jalal Khels, and Bhattannis are suspected. I have seen Mr. Watson and discussed the situation with him. He wishes that some further time may be given to prosecute enquiries as to the sections to which the offenders belonged. I have accordingly postponed action for ten days to enable him to complete his enquiries. I propose, in the event of a blockade of the tribe being not approved of, to make a large baramta of the sections implicated, if this can be done without serious risks. It is desirable to bring about a prompt settlement in this case as well as of any other cases that may be pending against those sections. This has already been reported to you—*vide* correspondence ending with this office endorsement, dated 22nd instant.

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Lahore, 6th February, 1900.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th January, 1900, on the subject of our present position as regards the Mahsud tribe, in connection with the question of redress for offences in which satisfaction is still due to Government.

2. The case stands thus: No action was advisedly taken during the winter of 1897-98 to obtain a settlement, in consequence of the general excitement then prevailing on the border, which it was apprehended might spread to Waziristan. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with you that this was a good reason at the time for suspending pressure. The spring of 1898 would probably have been a favourable opportunity for resuming operations, when the news of the defeats of the tribes was fresh along the frontier. The pending cases were, as a matter of fact, taken up during the winter of 1898-99, and at the close of the year 1898, the balance for which the Mahsuds were found to be liable was Rs. 22,115. In the course of the year 1899, a sum of Rs. 21,739, in cash, with various recoveries in kind, was realised. While the proceedings for collecting the balance of Rs. 22,115 were in progress, a succession of offences, some of them having a grave character, has raised the outstandings payable by the Mahsuds to about Rs. 40,000. In this sum is not included the penalty for the attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard, which occurred on the day before your letter was despatched. Against this, the proceeds of the seizures in the Zeranobo affair, amounting to Rs. 3,460, may be set off, so that the pending balance at the present moment remains roughly Rs. 40,000. After realisations which very nearly reach the opening balance of 1899 we find ourselves now with a closing balance of double the amount. The debit account apparently accumulates much faster than it can be liquidated.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor cannot regard the situation as satisfactory. The measures which you propose at this juncture are either a blockade or the recovery of the balance by means such as have been adopted during 1899. In view of the experience of the past year it is clear that the employment of these latter means gives us no reasonable guarantee of a speedy settlement or of the cessation of offences in the future.

4. In consideration of the large balance, and of the numerous offences lately committed by the Mahsuds, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor that the time has come for bringing home to the whole Mahsud tribe the gravity of the situation, in which it has been placed by the misconduct of many of its members. A blockade, to be of any use, should obviously be one, not of individual sections, but of the whole tribe. But before it is imposed the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the Mahsuds should have an opportunity of complying with our demands and that a formal demand should be made on the whole tribe. For this purpose it would be necessary to summon not alone the 270 Maliks (*vide* Appendix D to Mr. Bruce's letter, dated the 26th May, 1895), whom we subsidise out of a fighting strength of some 10,000 men, but all the grey-beards, elders and persons of influence who sway the tribal councils. If the fully representative body of the whole tribe fails to satisfy Government, we shall then probably be compelled to resort to a blockade. The Lieutenant-Governor will be glad of your opinion on the proposed step, *viz.*, to convene a full jirga of the Mahsuds and to formally call upon the tribe to make redress. A full jirga is requisite because it is abundantly clear from what has happened since December, 1898, that the Maliks (who are reported to be willing to aid Government) have neither the power to restrain the clansmen nor the ability to furnish early information of the personality of offenders; in the Zeranobo case, for instance, although it occurred six weeks ago, the identity of the attacking party seems to be still doubtful. Much less do they appear to have the power to bring offenders promptly to justice.

5. In your letter under acknowledgment you have adverted to the effect of the blockade upon the negotiations with Mulla Powindah. The Political Officer is positive in his opinion that the more serious offences during the past twelve months have been committed at his instigation. If the Mulla is sincere in his overtures, it is very doubtful of course if this view or information can be correct. But the point is whether he is sincere or not; you yourself think that he is playing a double game. However that may be, it is unquestionable that the Mulla is responsible for the present state of affairs in exact proportion to his power in the tribe, like any other Mahsud of note and

weight. If he really wishes to further the interests of Government, he will have an excellent opportunity of using his influence in that direction at the jirga which is suggested.

6. A rupture in our friendly relations will naturally interfere for the time with the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Southern Waziristan Militia, but would probably not affect the non-Mahsud element, the Darwesh Khel, Dotanis, Ghilzais and British subjects whom, the Lieutenant-Governor understands, it is also proposed to entertain in the Militia. I am to ask for your opinion in this matter.

7. It is quite possible that the present scarcity in the Mahsud hills may bring a blockade to a speedy conclusion, but it would have to be stringent and efficient, and we should be prepared for outbreaks. Under these conditions the Lieutenant-Governor desires your opinion, so far as you are able to frame it at the present stage, without delaying this reference, as to the employment of further troops and of Border Military Police and Levies on the lines of communication with Wana, along the border of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts, and, perhaps, in the Tochi also.

8. In conclusion, I am to remark that, as previously intimated, the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that, judging by results, the present procedure in force on the Derajat border for the settlement of cases requires some change; the process of ascertaining and, if possible, of effecting the surrender and punishment of individual offenders, and failing this, of dealing first with small sub-sections, then with sections, and so on till the whole clan or tribe is reached, seems to be productive of delay and complications. The following seems to be some of the necessary accompaniments of the system. First there is the difficulty in obtaining information, which has already been mentioned. Then the jirgas or judges in the trials of the offenders appear to run no inconsiderable personal risk when they do bring cases to light; this was brought to notice in Mr. Watson's report on the Tiarza case, received with your letter, dated the 6th December, 1899, and has been observed in other instances. At times, too, the Maliks, who are paid to help our officers, do not shrink from deliberate perjury, witness the case reported in your endorsement, No. 34, of the 15th January, 1900. The procedure of gradation from the person of the offender through successive tribal sub-divisions to the whole body of the clan is no doubt excellent in theory, but the inherent difficulties make it so slow and uncertain that it seems to fail to give us redress or to act with sufficient deterrent force on the tribesmen, and the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that when offenders are not promptly given up by the Maliks, immediate recourse to tribal responsibility is likely to be more efficacious in preserving peace and in enforcing good conduct. This, however, is a subject that can be more conveniently discussed when matters have been put straight between us and the Mahsuds.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, 16th April, 1900.

In continuation of this office telegram, dated 26th March, 1900, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 30th March, 1900, and enclosure, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, containing a complete report on the settlement recently effected with the Mahsud Waziris.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor desires me to say that he considers that this settlement, which is a most satisfactory one, is mainly due to the personal influence of Mr. Anderson, whom the tribes on the Derajat border have learnt to trust.

3. With reference to the remarks made in paragraph 10 of the Commissioner's letter regarding the future management of the tribe, His Honour can only say that he has no objection whatever to the system of dealing with individual offenders or sub-sections of tribes provided that—

- (1) this method is accepted by the tribal jirga; and
- (2) it is not productive of delay.

The present case, however, appears to His Honour to afford an exemplary instance of the value of resorting to general tribal responsibility. Although the Maliks in the last sentence of their petition mildly protest against this method of treatment being regarded as a precedent, Sir Mackworth Young is inclined to regard it as a most valuable precedent. The Commissioner was enabled, by means of negotiations with the full tribal jirga, numbering as many as 2,500 persons, to effect a complete settlement up to date of cases involving demands to the amount of Rs. 35,000. If these cases had been settled by the individual method, they would probably have dragged on for many months, perhaps years. Provided the amounts are realised, the incident seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to establish conclusively the importance of keeping in view the tribal responsibility, which is the only secure basis for diplomatic relations with such a heterogeneous body as the Mahsud tribe.

Annexure 1.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th March, 1900.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 24th instant, reporting the settlement made with the Mashuds by which all the cases pending against the tribe to that date had been disposed of, I have the honour to submit a translation of the petition presented to me by the Mahsud Maliks, on the 24th instant, and referred to in the telegram cited above.

2. It will be convenient to narrate here briefly the circumstances which led to the conclusion of the present settlement.

In the end of January last, after the commission of certain serious offences, notably—

- (1) the attack on Border Military Police sowars at Zarrani Oba, on the 15th December, 1899;
- (2) the attack made on the garrison of the Zam Post, on the 9th January, 1900;

I submitted a detailed report in my letter, dated the 24th January, in which I attempted to describe as clearly as possible our position as regards the Mahsud tribe, and our relations with it, in order to determine what action should be taken to obtain redress as regards both the cases which had then been disposed of, and also the cases which were then pending against the tribe. In my report I gave a brief account of the measures which had been adopted in connection with the settlement of cases, and the realisation of fines due by the tribes since the autumn of 1898, in order to show that all possible steps had been taken to obtain reparation as early as was practicable, with the concurrence of the Maliks, and without breaking off relations with the tribe in general, with the result that fines aggregating nearly Rs. 30,000 had been realised from the tribe in the past year by means of those measures. At the same time I recommended that if it was desired that the fines due to date on account of the old disposed of and new undisposed of cases should be realised at once, the whole Mahsud tribe should be placed under a blockade until the whole sum was recovered, which measure I considered could be carried out after strengthening the military posts in the Shahur, and placing

military garrisons in certain levy posts, and strengthening certain Border Military posts on the Dera Ismail Khan and part of the Bannu border. I pointed out, however, that the measure was attended with certain difficulties, and would lead to the temporary interruption of our relations with the tribe, and suggested, as an alternative, the realisation of the fines by means such as had been adopted during 1899. The Government, however, decided that the employment of measures, such as were used in 1899, gave no reasonable guarantee of a speedy settlement or of the cessation of offences in the future, and considered that before the blockade was imposed the Mahsuds should have an opportunity of complying with our demands. The Government further proposed that a formal demand should be made on the whole tribe, and asked for my opinion on this proposal. In the meantime the Political Officer, Wana, was arranging for an interview which he had proposed with Mullah Powindah, and the submission of the opinion called for was delayed for a short while. The enquiries, however, made in the interval in regard to the serious offences, which had induced me to consider the position in regard to the tribe seriously, and to postpone drastic measures for reparation, showed that these offences were the work of intriguers, that the tribe in general was not to blame, and that it had, on the whole, behaved better than usual, as was reported in my telegram, dated the 9th instant. Mr. Watson strongly deprecated taking action against the tribe as proposed by Government. I recommended that a formal demand for the payment of the fines should be made, first on the jirga of Maliks, and then on the whole tribe, as proposed, if Government was prepared to pass orders that in default of compliance with our demands within a month a blockade of the whole tribe would be declared and carried out. At the same time I expressed my concurrence with Mr. Watson, that the tribe as a whole was not to blame for the serious outrages recently committed.

3. As the time for my making over charge of the Division before proceeding on furlough was drawing rapidly near, on the 9th March I summoned the whole Mahsud jirga to Tank for the 17th of the month, in order to go there, and first discuss matters with the Maliks myself, and see if any settlement could be made for the recovery of the fines and settlement of all pending cases.

I summoned the whole Mahsud jirga in order that if Government decided by that date that a formal demand should be made on the whole Mahsud tribe as proposed, there should be no difficulty in making it at once. The Government decided, however, that it was inadvisable to make a formal demand at this time, and left me to discuss matters with the Maliks, and see if any settlement could be made.

4. I proceeded to Tank on the 18th instant, and first interviewed the leading Maliks. I explained to them the gravity of the position, and impressed on them the desirability of making some arrangement to clear the tribe. I explained that I was shortly going on leave, and that I desired to bring about a settlement in the interest of the tribe as well as of Government, and this was the last opportunity that I would have of effecting such a settlement.

The maliks promptly expressed their readiness to fall in with my wishes, and asked me to have an estimate made out of the fines which would have to be paid on account of all pending cases.

5. The whole of the files which were found pending against the tribe on account of offences committed to that date in British territory, the Shirani country and Zhob and against Government or British subjects in the Gumal, the Shahur, Wana, and the Tochi were examined. It was estimated that the Mahsuds would be liable to pay a fine of Rs. 18,000 in respect of these cases in addition to nearly Rs. 17,000 already due by them, or in all Rs. 35,000. This estimate was communicated to the Maliks, who then held consultations, and discussions, with a view to make arrangements for the liquidation of this sum, and the outcome was the presentation of the petition of the 24th instant,

which was drawn up by all the Maliks unanimously, and was verified on the afternoon of that date in an open Darbar attended by over 2,500 Mahsuds of all classes.

6. In this petition the Mahsuds Maliks arranged for the payment of nearly Rs. 20,000 at once, as follows:—

	Rs.
(1) Their allowances for three months... ..	8,466
(2) Half the pay of the levies for three months	3,300
(3) Estimated value of two-third share of the rabi crops of the Mahsud lands	3,234
(4) Sale proceeds of previous crops of the Mahsud lands in deposit	5,000
Total	<u>20,000</u>

Most of the money under the first and second items will be available on the 1st of April, and will be awarded as compensation in cases. The amount of the fourth item has been made over to the Political Officer. As regards the third item, tenders were invited for the purchase of the green crops. The highest bid which was made was Rs. 4,000 for the whole share of the Maliks. The Naib Tahsildar, Tank, who inspected the crops, assured me that Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 5,000 might be accepted as a safe estimate of the full Mahsud share of the produce when ripe. In any case the sale proceeds of the crops will not be less than the estimated amount. With regard to the balance of Rs. 15,000, the Maliks offered to pay a toll on all camels, bullocks, cows, donkeys, &c., coming in trading convoys to the Dera Ismail Khan and Banna Districts and the Tochi Valley. The offer was a reasonable one, and I had no hesitation in accepting it on the spot, and I issued orders for the imposition of the toll at once. It is hoped that the Rs. 15,000 will be recovered within six months.

7. The Maliks were certainly supported by the whole tribe in general in making the offer to pay tolls, as none of the 2,500 men, who were present in the Darbar, and to whom the Maliks' petition was translated into Pashtu, made any objection. The settlement which has been concluded has the great advantage, I think, of bearing on all classes equally, namely, the Maliks, the levies, and the masses who have any relations with British territory.

8. As soon as I discovered the satisfactory attitude of the Maliks, and before the petition of the Maliks was presented on the 24th, I arranged that the cases pending against the Mahsuds relating to the Dera Ismail Khan District and the Shirani country should be taken up by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan and the Political Officer, Wana. In the same way the cases in which offences had been committed against Government, British subjects, and Powindahs in the Gomal, the Shahur and Wana were referred to jirgas. The Political Officer reports to-day that Rs. 16,003 in all have been awarded as compensation by the jirgas, namely, Rs. 8,997 in the Dera Ismail Khan cases, Rs. 515 in the Shirani country cases, and Rs. 6,491 in respect of Gomal, Shahur, and Wana cases.

Statement A, which forms the enclosure of Mr. Donald's letter, dated the 21st November, 1899, a copy of which was forwarded to you with this office letter, dated the 16th December last, will show that there were only seven Tochi cases against the Mahsuds in which Government or British subjects are complainants. In most of these reparation has already been obtained. The Political Officer, Wana, however, is arranging to meet Mr. Donald in a few days to dispose of all the cases pending against the Mahsuds to date, and to ascertain the actual amount of compensation in respect of them.

The Political Officer, Wana, and the Political Agent, Zhob, held a joint jirgah at Tank in November last to dispose of the cases against Mahsuds, relating to the Zhob District, and only eight cases were then left undisposed of. These, together with any other cases that may have been brought against the tribe since then, will be taken up probably next month. Though the

Tochi and Zhob cases have not been actually disposed of, the amount which will be left in hand after paying for the disposed of cases relating to other tracts will, it is hoped, be more than enough to meet the demands of the Tochi and the Zhob District. Assuming that no modification is made in the awards of the jirga in the cases which are being disposed of, the demand against the tribe will amount to Rs. 32,854-8-0, as follows:—

(1) Fines unrealised in cases disposed of before the present settlement (Kabuli rupee equals eight annas)	Rs.	A. P.
(2) Dera Ismail Khan cases recently disposed of	10,851	8 0
(3) Shirani country cases recently disposed of	8,997	0 0
(4) Gomal, Shahur, and Wana Valley	515	0 0
	6,491	0 0
Total	<u>32,854</u>	<u>8 0</u>

This leaves Rs. 2,145-8-0 to meet the Tochi and Zhob demands. It is probable, however, that some modifications of the jirga awards, as reported by Mr. Watson will be made, and that the total receipts from the Mahsud land crops will exceed the estimated amount by about Rs. 700, in which case we shall have over Rs. 3,000 in hand for the Tochi and Zhob cases. Under these circumstances, the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the inter-tribal cases, which will be disposed of as opportunities offer.

9. It is gratifying to me to be able to report to Government that the large Mahsud jirga, which assembled on the present occasion, showed a very friendly and cordial attitude. The Maliks displayed good feeling and gratitude for the friendly relations which have been maintained in the past between the local officers and themselves. This feeling of cordiality between the officers who are conducting our political dealings, with the tribe and the tribal Maliks, is increasing as time goes on; and as the intimacy and personal intercourse grow closer and closer, and the true knowledge of each other increases, the feeling will, I think, unquestionably grow stronger, provided the policy of the past, namely, the policy of acting through headmen, is maintained in the future. Mr. Gee and the other English officers, who were present at the jirga will bear me out in saying that the leading note struck by the tribal speakers at the jirga was that they were grateful to the local officers for the treatment they had received in the past, and they made this tribal settlement to show their good-will to the local officers, and to mark their gratitude for the friendly relations maintained by these officers with the tribal Maliks and the tribe through the Maliks.

10. It has been placed on record recently that the Lieutenant-Governor considers that the present procedure in force on the Derajat border for the settlement of cases requires some change, and the want of tribal unity is our principal difficulty in dealing with the Mahsuds. In view of these remarks it appears to me right that I should, before proceeding on leave, report the result of my experience of working the Mahsuds during the last four years I have had charge of the tribe as Commissioner. I consider that the system for the settlement of cases which has been in force has, on the whole, worked well and satisfactorily. I fully admit that the Derajat system of working is slow, and is attended with difficulties. The effort to bring home offences to the actual offenders, and to obtain their surrender and punishment causes delay, and we do not generally, though we do occasionally, obtain prompt satisfaction. Similarly, the enforcement of the graded responsibility of sub-section, section, and finally the tribe is not favourable to the immediate settlement of cases. On the other hand, the system of obtaining reparation from actual offenders, and of restricting punishment to a guilty section instead of at once punishing the whole tribe is a much less primitive system than the system of habitually from the first enforcing tribal responsibility. It is far more popular with the Mahsud tribe; the alternative system is distasteful to them. It is repugnant to them, because the weak and innocent are forced

to share the punishment with the strong and the guilty. The Mahsuds are sufficiently civilized to appreciate the ethical superiority of the one system to the other.

We have for some years past attempted to work the present system in the face of difficulties, but it must take its time before it can be fully developed, and time may well be allowed before it is condemned. During the past year we have enforced personal responsibility and inflicted punishment on actual offenders in more than one serious case of offence.

There can be no doubt, I think, that any essential change in the present system of working will weaken the power and influence of the Maliks, and the system of working through them will break down. In former years the system of dealing with the Mahsuds was that we dealt with the tribe as a whole. The evil of this system is that the tribe easily becomes committed as a body, and then there is no alternative but to enforce our demands by a military expedition. The experience of the past shows that, under this system, our chances of cultivating friendly relations are small, and it is difficult to enlist the sympathy of the tribe. Coercive pressures are the essential basis of this system, and they are not conducive to the cultivating of really friendly and sympathetic relations. Punitive expeditions mark our attempts in the past to manage the Mahsud tribe, dealing with it as a whole.

The Mahsud Maliks receiving allowances have, undoubtedly, not acted up to the full extent of their obligations, and their position and influence are weakened by their jealousies of each other, their feuds and intrigues. Moreover, their tribesmen are turbulent and difficult to manage. Making all allowances for their defects, it must be admitted, in my opinion, that the Maliks have been of the greatest assistance in managing the tribe. They are, I think, gaining power and influence, and are gradually justifying the position assigned to them in the tribe under our arrangements. Had it not been for their influence in the tribe, and their disposition to maintain friendly relations with Government, the settlement now arrived at would never have been effected. They saw clearly the seriousness of the position; they realised the danger of friendly relations being broken off, owing to the outrages committed by a small minority of tribesmen. They grasped the situation, and in return for the sympathetic treatment accorded to them in the past they readily acquiesced in my wishes that they should use all their power and influence in the tribe to induce it to pay up the fines due, and make a friendly settlement. Had we not had these sensible responsible men to deal with, I do not think that it would have been possible to have made a settlement. A blockade would have been necessary to coerce the tribe, our friendly relations, which we have done our best to create and consolidate at much expense and trouble would have been broken, and had the blockade failed, there would have been no alternative left but to send out another expedition. The settlement now made at Tank affords strong evidence of the power, strength, and friendly spirit of the Mahsud Maliks, and should not be overlooked when considering whether radical changes should be introduced into our present system of managing the Mahsud tribe.

11. In conclusion, I desire to tender my best thanks to Mr. Gee, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and Mr. Watson, Political Officer, Wana, for their hearty co-operation and assistance rendered in bringing about the settlement. Mr. Gee has acted as Political Officer in Southern Waziristan, and his knowledge of the Dera Ismail Khan Frontier, and the relations of the Mahsuds with British territory, enabled him to make full use of the intelligence and influence of the leading men of that frontier for the promotion of the settlement. Mr. Watson has earned the liking and respect of the Mahsud Maliks by the marked fairness and justness of his dealings with them, and by his accessibility and patience. He has acquired influence in Southern Waziristan, and I regret that we are soon to lose the benefit of his experience and knowledge of the Mahsud tribe.

I desire also to bring to the notice of Government the good work done in connection with the settlement by Mr. E. Tej Bhan, Head Clerk of my

office, and by Muhammad Azim Khan, Naib Tahsildar of the Mahsuds. The former proved himself invaluable in working out the terms of a practicable settlement and in obtaining the unanimous consent of the Maliks to them. His intimate knowledge of the Maliks and of their personal characters and relations once more came in usefully, and he showed his usual tact and judgment in his dealings with them. Muhammad Azim Khan showed good political capacity, and worked hard and well.

Annexure 2.

TRANSLATION of a petition, dated 24th March, 1900, presented by the Mahsud Maliks representing all sections in a Darbar attended by nearly 2,500 Mahsuds at Tank.

With reference to your enquiries as to what measures should be adopted for the realisation of the fines amounting to about Rs. 17,000 due on account of the cases already disposed of, and for the disposal of the cases pending against the Mahsuds, we beg to state as follows:—

After full consideration and discussion it is only right that the offending sections should be made to pay the fines due by them, in order that pressure might be brought to bear on the actual offenders. Each Malik should control and restrain his section, otherwise he should bear the consequences of his failure. This practice has been in vogue in the past. No doubt on special occasions the tribe joined in settling matters affecting the tribe as a whole.

You have now explained that the amount of the fine realizable in cases already disposed of, or still pending against the tribe, is a substantial one, and it would take time to recover it if each section is made to pay the amount due from it, that you are about to proceed on leave, and that you desire that the tribe should clear itself before your departure. You have examined all the files pending against the tribe in which the offence was committed in British territory or Zhob, or against Government or British subjects in the Gomal Pass, Shahur, Wana or Tochi.

You estimate that fines aggregating eighteen thousand will be imposed in those cases. The total fine will thus amount to Rs. 35,000 for all offences recorded against the Mahsuds to date.

This is a large sum, however, and, owing to failure of crops, there is great distress in the hills. The Mahsuds you are aware have scanty means of livelihood, and the recent drought has made their condition worse, and we, the Maliks, are pressed hard. But as it is very necessary to settle all the cases at once, we unanimously propose that the allowances of all the Maliks for three months, and half the pay of the levies for three months should be credited to the fines, as well as two-thirds of the Maliks' share of the produce of the rabi crops of the lands granted to Mahsuds by Government, and the amount in deposit being the income of the Mahsud lands should also be devoted to the liquidation of the fine. We hope that in this way the sum of Rs. 20,000 will be recovered at once.

As regards the payment of the remaining sum of Rs. 15,000, we propose that a light toll should be imposed on camels, bullocks, &c., accompanying Bahirs to Dera, Bannu, and Daur, and Rs. 5,000 should be realised from each of the three sections of the Mahsud tribe, *i.e.*, Alizai, Shaman Khel, and Bahlolzai. When one section has paid up its share of the fine of Rs. 5,000 its responsibility should cease, and it should not be required to help in the liquidation of the arrears of the other section.

The following scale of tax is proposed to be imposed:—

For a camel	8 annas.
„ bullock	3 annas.
„ donkey	1 anna 6 pies.
„ balla brought down to Tank by water	1	„

We trust that by this arrangement the tribe will clear itself in the course of a few months, but we request that this arrangement may not be taken as a precedent for the future, and pressure may be made to bear on the actual offenders, and the offending sections should be made to clear themselves, so that the bad characters may not be emboldened. Even in the present cases, the money, if realised from the actual offenders, should be refunded to the Maliks.

This petition is submitted for favour of sanction.

We, the petitioners, are—

Sealed by Malik Bad Shah Khan, Alizai.
 Malik Muhammad Afzal, Alizai.
 Malik Badr Din.
 Mir Ajal, Malik of Haibat Khel.
 Malik Bramat Khan, Aimal Khel.
 Fateh Khan Shingi, Bahlolzai.
 Ghazi Khan Malik, Shaman Khel.
 Ala Bagh, Malik, Shaman Khel.

Signed by Muhammad Amir Khan, Malik.
 Malik Fateh Roz Khan, Shaman Khel.
 Marwat.
 Muhammad Ayaz Khan, Shabi Khel.

Sealed by Shah Salim, Michi Khel.
 Khawaja Muhammad Khan.

Signed by Muhammad Amin Khan, Shaman Khel.

Sealed by Shahzad, Shami Khel.
 Muhammad Afzal, Gaga Khel.
 Muhammad Afzal.
 Sur Kamand, Aimal Khel, Malik Shabi.
 Khata kai.
 Zabar Khan.
 Pasham Din, Aimal Khel.

Signed by Ali Khan.

Sealed by Zama Khan.
 Faqir, Shaman Khel.
 Tor Khan.

Sealed by Gul Khan.
 Arsala Khan.
 Muhammad Ali Khan.
 Gul Pir.
 Tor.
 Gul Dad, Abdul Rahman Khel.

Signed by Talib.
 Maizar.

Sealed by Shahzam.

Signed by Jamal.

Sealed by Janggi.

Signed by Muhammad Amin, Shahman Khel.

Sealed by Muhammad Amir, Shahman Khel.
 Shahzar Shingi.

Signed by Haji Muhammad.

Sealed by Panani Khan.
 Rasul Khan.
 Atta Muhammad.

Signed by Ziyate.

Sealed by Maida.
 Malang.
 Bara Khan.
 Senrang.
 Muazam Khan.
 Gandapur.
 Shahamar Din.

- Sealed by Saiyid Akbar Shah.
 Sanobar Shah.
 Muhammad Amin Khan, Shahman Khel.
 Fazal Khan.
 Azim Khan.
- Signed by Gauhar Malik.
 Muzaffargarh Khan.
 Gul Band, Band Khel.
 Gul Walli.
- Sealed by Ghaizal.
 Maindar Khan.
 Khawaja Gai.
 Fateh Roz, Shahman Khel.
 Khaila, Shahman Khel.
 Bailak.
 Nazar.
- Signed by Salehin.
- Sealed by Naizam Din.
 Samandi Khan.
 Piyao Shah.
 Mamidar.
 Karim Khan.
- Sealed by Khawaja Muhammad.
 Saiz.
 Bazgul Khan.
 Salim Khan.
 Zar Piyao, Badanzai.
- Signed by Gul Bagh.
- Sealed by Shahnazar.
 Nilgar.
 Haji Muhammad.
- Signed by Khana Shah.
 Nek Amal.
- Sealed by Badarkai.
- Signed by Pira Khel, Shamerai.
- Sealed by Tairsam.
 Maula Dad, Shaman Khel.
- Signed by Rasha Din, Gule Shabi.
- Sealed by Bat, Shabi Khel.
 Shanir.
 Suleman, Badanzai.
 Adal Khan, Badanzai.
 Shaujar Khan, son of Sayid Shaman Khel.
 Dinak, Shabi Khel.
 Mustafa, Bibizai.
- Signed by Suleman, Shabi Khel.
 Haidar, Shabi Khel.
 Darai, Shabi Khel.
- Sealed by Azmat, Batkai.
 Brahim Khan.
 Salehin.
- Sealed by Sabil Khan.
 Bala Hissar.
 Khudrai.
 Akbar Shah.
- Signed by Azam, Gori Khel.
 Tor, Gori Khel.
 Saidal.
 Tair Sam.
 Sayyid Muhammad.
- Sealed by Laki, Shamerai.
- Signed by Sher Ali Khan, Shamerai.

Sealed by Shahzad, Kasim Khel.
 Kakar, Shaman Khel.
 Barat Khan.
 Iaman Khan.
 Bara Khel, Shahman Khel.
 Mamidar, Shahman Khel.
 Lal Gul.
 Azam, Turi Khel.
 Saidal, Guri Khel.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 16th May, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 16th April, 1900, forwarding a report on the general settlement recently effected with the Mahsuds.

2. As far as can be judged at present, the settlement may be regarded as satisfactory; but the confiscation of half the pay of the levies in Southern Waziristan, in order to make up the fine, indicates a weak spot, unless, indeed, this was expressly ordered on the ground that many of the offences were to be ascribed to the negligence of the levies. Experience alone can show whether the hope that Rs. 15,000 will be realised within six months by tolls on caravans is not over sanguine.

3. With reference to the future management of the tribe, the Government of India will only observe that the best method of dealing with the Pathans of Waziristan appears to be still a matter for experiment. The recent negotiations were not conducted exclusively with the Maliks, and the degree of success with which the negotiations were attended may indicate that it is desirable for the tribe to be more fully represented during discussions with the local authorities than had previously been the custom.

The matter, however, is one in which the Government of India do not desire to fetter in any way the discretion of the Local Government or of the local officers. Similarly, in regard to the question of individual offenders and tribal responsibility, the Government of India prefer to lay down no fixed principle, and will leave it to the local officers to deal with particular cases in such a manner as may, on a consideration of all the circumstances, seem suitable. They ought not to regard it as an inflexible rule that attempts must be made to find and punish the individual offenders before tribal responsibility is enforced.

4. The Governor-General in Council awaits with interest the result of Mr. Merk's negotiations with the Mahsuds concerning their difficulties with the Darwesh Khel, as decided upon at the recent conference at Dera Ismail Khan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Extract from letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 15th May, 1900.

The Lieutenant-Governor understands that, by suggesting in Mr. Barnes's letter, dated the 2nd October, 1899, that we should come to terms with the Mullah, the Government of India meant that, if he could be induced to formulate some reasonable basis for a good understanding, they

would have no objection to subsidizing him. But while he may intend to do this in time, he has assuredly not done so yet, and Sir Mackworth Young is of opinion that, though a present may whet his appetite, it will, under present circumstances, be misunderstood. Whatever favours are bestowed upon him should have their equivalent in some engagement on his part.

I am to ask for very early orders on this reference.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 19th May, 1900.

With reference to correspondence, regarding the Mullah Powindah, ending with my letter, dated 15th May, 1900, I am directed to submit copies of the telegrams noted in the margin and to communicate the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

Punjab Government telegram, dated 14th May, 1900.

Commissioner, Derajat, telegrams, dated 15th May, and 18th May, 1900.

2. Sir Mackworth Young is much concerned to know that the balance of fine due from the Mahsuds was understated, and he has no doubt that Mr. Merk is quite right in regarding the position as a difficult one. Full explanation will be called for, and meanwhile the Lieutenant-Governor would be extremely sorry unduly to hamper Mr. Merk in his conduct of negotiations.

3. But as regards the present of Rs. 1,000 which Mr. Merk proposes to give to the Mullah Powindah, Sir Mackworth Young is quite unable to see that it is likely to do anything but harm. The Mullah is pretty sure to realize that we want something from him, will not be slow to avail himself of this advantage, and the last thing he is likely to do is to throw his influence into our scale for this small consideration.

4. Mr. Merk speaks of the refusal to make the present as if it were a drawing back, but the Lieutenant-Governor does not suppose the Mullah has been led to believe that we are going to give him money before he has formulated his demands, and given us some assurance of his good will. Sir Mackworth Young therefore still thinks that, before showing him any favour, we should obtain this much from him.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 14th May, 1900.

Yours, dated 10th May, has been referred to Foreign. Lieutenant-Governor has not recommended the present.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 15th May, 1900.

Your telegram of yesterday evening. In my telegram of yesterday from Tank I reported that I had succeeded in getting Mahsuds to agree to mode of settlement of Badar disputes desired by Government; this was not done

without considerable difficulty. Please refer to my letter of 6th instant. I ascertained yesterday from Watson and am reporting officially that, in addition to the Rs. 35,000, of which payment was arranged by Mahsuds in March last, a sum of Rs. 32,000 is, at the present month, due from the Mahsuds, about the payment of which no arrangement has been made with them, and payment of this additional sum it will be by no means easy to obtain. Backed up as he is by the *ulus*, the man has certainly the power, and if not won over or neutralised, may very likely have the will to upset the arrangement about settlement of Badar disputes and any arrangements we may come to presently for payment of this additional Rs. 32,000. If either arrangement is upset, we shall be within near distance of a rupture with the tribe and its grave sequels. I do not myself, after enquiry, share Watson's view that he is instigator or accomplice in most of the offences attributed to him; but, however this may be, I venture, in view of the general situation, to suggest a reconsideration of the case in respect of the present. It seems to me that it is eminently desirable at the present juncture to neutralise this element of evil, and if, after Watson's interview, and what was said by Watson at it, we draw back, I think he will certainly construe this withdrawal as a rupture, and will take up a position accordingly. I was personally not in favour of opening negotiations; but since they have been opened, and after what was said at the interview, I consider we have to go on at the risk of grave complications if we draw back.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 18th May, 1900.

Yours of 15th instant to Government, India; please refer to my telegram of 15th instant. If Mullah Powindah only stands neutral in cases of border disputes and of realization of fines due by the Mahsuds, he will, I submit, have done us at this juncture considerable service, worth more as an equivalent than what I propose to give.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Telegram from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 21st May, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated the 16th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted regarding the cases outstanding against the Mahsud Waziris.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 8th May, 1900, and enclosures.
Punjab Government letter, dated 21st May, 1900.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th May, 1900.

In compliance with the instructions conveyed in your letters noted in the margin, the Political Officer, Wana, has now prepared and submitted a statement of cases against the Mahsuds and other Waziris, a copy of which is herewith submitted in his letter, dated the 1st instant, with enclosure.

Dated 31st October, 1899,
15th February, 1900, and 16th
April, 1900.

In cases of class C and in class D and miscellaneous cases the amount actually awarded will probably be still less in proportion and may be estimated at Rs. 6,000 in all, so that the total amount likely to be due in pending cases may be put at Rs. 15,000.

3. In the cases already decided the realization of Rs. 35,000 has been provided for, and the sum of some Rs. 8,500 is still due in the less important classes of cases. The realization of the latter sum is proceeding slowly.

4. As regards the serious cases mentioned in the memorandum of actual and prospective liabilities of the tribes compiled by Government of India, the results arrived at may be briefly indicated below:—

I.—(a) Fine of Rs. 2,000 included in settlement of Rs. 35,000.

(b) Fine of Rs. 2,000 inflicted will be realized under recent settlement if possible.

(c) Will be disposed of at next meeting of Political Officers, Zhob and Wana.

IV.—Some Tochi and Dauri cases were disposed of at a recent meeting of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and fines aggregating about Rs. 15,000 inflicted, which will be included, if possible, in the recent settlement.

V.—(a) Rs. 2,000 fine inflicted and realized.

(b) All the fine due from the Mahsuds in this case has now been realized.

(c) Fine aggregating about Rs. 4,450 imposed on certain Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. Mahsud's share of fine included in recent settlement.

(d) Ringleader punished by two years' rigorous imprisonment as well as confiscation of rifle.

(e) Fine realized.

(f) Fine of Rs. 910 inflicted on Mahsuds in recent settlement. It is proposed also to impose a fine of Rs. 1,000 on some Tori Khels who were concerned as well. Case will be reported separately.

(g) Three of offenders surrendered and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment each.

5. Two other serious offences, viz., the attack on the Zam post and the murder of Border Military Policeman near Zaraminoba, were included in the recent settlement. A separate report on the latter case will be submitted. If any further report on the Zam case is required, it will, I presume, be submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to whom I have forwarded a précis of the information which I obtained.

6. In apologising for the delay in submitting this statement, I would at the same time venture to explain that I thought at first that the ground was covered in my two letters, dated January 16th and January 26th, 1900. Later I imagined that, in view of the settlement with the Mahsuds effected by Mr. Anderson, no such statement would now be required.

Annexure 3.

List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.

Serial No.	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Sub-section.	Section.	Offence.	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
					CLASS A.			Compensation. Rs. A. P.	
1	160-A.	26th-27th February, 1900.	Shera, son of Nawaz of Shahbaz.	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Theft of two bullocks and two donkeys valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Case under enquiry.
2	167-A.	9th March, 1900 ...	Madar, son of Jamal of Girmi.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 20 goats valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
3	168-A.	23rd-24th March, 1900	Maghar, son of Shakho of Tank.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of three bullocks valued at Rs. 100.	60 0 0	Do.
4	169-A.	3rd-4th March, 1900...	Khota, son of Ghulam Muhammad, Baloch.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of ghi valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
5	...	23rd March, 1900 ...	Guldad, son of Tor, Badzai Bhattanni.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of two camels valued at Rs. 127-4-0.	127 4 0	Do.
6	...	20th March, 1900 ...	Nazr Khan, Zangi Khel Nasir.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 300 sheep and goats.	900 0 0	Do.
7	...	28th March, 1900 ...	Sharfaraj Shah, son of Lal Shah, Powindah.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 100.	50 0 0	Do.
8	...	30th March, 1900 ...	Kajiri Khan, son of Amir Hasan, Jani Khel.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of three bullocks valued at Rs. 95.	95 0 0	Do.
9	...	13th March, 1900 ...	Sahib, son of Nadir Khan.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of 40 goats valued at Rs. 120.	120 0 0	Do.
10	...	2nd January, 1900 ...	Pirzada, son of Ustrana	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
11-16	...	{ 3rd-4th March, 1900... 26th February, 1900... 27th-28th March, 1900 23rd-24th March, 1900 29th-30th March, 1900 7th-8th December, 1900 }	{ Ahmed Khan and Loku Ram, Nihal Singh, Fateh Haji, Wariam Haji, Gard- wir. }	Do.	Do.	Do.	Theft of property, &c....	160 10 0	Do.

17	164-A.	12th March, 1900 ...	Mian Khan, son of Brahim Khan.	Jalal Khel Bhattannis...	Jalal Khel Bhattannis	Bahlolzais, Bhattannis	Theft of 16 camels valued at Rs. 840 and wounding complainant.	1,032 0 0 Mahsud Ghure Rs. 688. Decree for Rs. 688 given against Jalal Khel; rest against Bhattannis.	Efforts will be made to realise share of Mahsuds by Baramata of kindred sections.
								Total ... Rs.	2,430 0 0
CLASS B.									
1	50-B.	5th January, 1900 ...	Garai, son of Aju Dotani	Gulzada. Sinak, Muhammad Ali Maktar.	Abdurrahman Khel ...	Bahlolzai ...	Theft of 40 sheep valued at Rs. 120.	120 0 0	Case under enquiry.
2	48-B.	3rd November, 1899...	Dost Muhammad, son of Sarfaraz, Mian Khel, Powindah.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Murder of one man, theft of two revolvers, one sword, and one belt, &c., valued at Rs. 210.	470 0 0	Do.
3	56-B.	7th-8th March, 1900...	Shin Kai, Akka Khel, Powindah.	Unknown ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Theft of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
4	...	26th March, 1900 ...	Brahim, son of Zafar Khan.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Theft of 180 sheep and goats.	540 0 0	Do.
5 & 6	59-B.	13th-14th March, 1900	Hakim, &c., Nasirs and Adam Khan Levy, footman.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Theft of eight sheep, &c., valued at Rs. 55.	55 0 0	Do.
7	57-B.	7th March, 1900 ...	Nasiran, Myanjar Khel	Abdurrahman Khel ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Theft of 62 cows, 160 goats, and murder of two men.	2,130 0 0	Pressure is being put on Abdurrahman Khels to restore stolen property, but without effect as yet.
8	58-B.	7th March, 1900 ...	Nasirs through Hassan Suleman Khel.	Aimal Khel ...	Aimal Khel ...	Do. ...	Theft of 40 camels worth Rs. 2,000 and wounding one man.	2,000 0 0	Five camels have been restored, and efforts are being made to recover the remainder. Six Aimal Khels are in custody and case will probably be settled satisfactorily.
								Total ...	5,365 0 0

List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.—continued.

Serial No.	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Sub-section.	Section.	Offence.	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
					CLASS C.			Compensation. Rs. A. P.	
1	117 C.	21st December, 1899	Guldod, Taji Khel of Wana	Najam Ikhtiar	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolzai	Theft of one horse valued at Rs. 100.	100 0 0	Under enquiry.
2	2-C.	2nd December, 1896...	Torsam and But, Zalli Khels of Wana.	Asl Khan, Shahzaman...	Guri Khel, Shahman Khel.	Alizai Shahman Khel	Ransom money Rs. 160 for 200 sheep.	160 0 0	Do.
3	125-C.	20th June, 1898 ...	Ismail, son of Khan Muhammad, Taji Khel of Wana.	Samand Khan, Zargul...	Mal Khel, Wazirgai ...	Alizai	Claim of one camel valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
4	61-C.	7th September, 1898	Shuja Khan, son of Sarfraj Khan, Ghunc Khel of Wana.	Bakai Khan	Wazirgai	Do.	Theft of four cows valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
5	58-C.	28th June, 1899 ...	Baz Gul, Kaka Khel of Wana.	Rajak Gulzada Ashik ...	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolzais	Theft of one gun, together with cartridges and belt, valued at Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
6	86-C.	18th July, 1898 ...	Ali Muhammad, Masti Khel of Wana.	Satal Mashkui, Mukhtar Garras, Bobzai.	Faridai	Alizai	Theft of two camels and Rs. 60 Kabuli.	150 0 0	Do.
7	53-C.	3rd March, 1899 ...	Pirogai and Ekam, Khandi Khel.	Kuzam and Abdulla ...	Marizais	Do.	Theft of five cows and clothing valued at Rs. 100.	100 0 0	Do.
8	120-C.	1st January, 1900 ...	Khamu Khan, Umar Khel.	Unknown	Theft of 50 goats valued at Rs. 150.	150 0 0	Do.
9	44-C.	9th November, 1897	Amir Khan, son of Pauid Khan, Dotani..	Rakhu Shah and Abdul Ghafur.	Dhur	Bahlolzais	Theft of nine cows valued at Rs. 135.	135 0 0	Do.
10	89-C	14th August, 1898 ...	Shahazim Sarkai, Khejal Khel.	Hamzoon, Fazl Shah, Maste, Abdul Aziz, Mir Jamal Michi Khels.	Michi Khels	Alizais	Theft of property valued at Rs. 200.	200 0 0	Do.

11	34-C.	10th January, 1899 ..	Said Hassan	Khojal Khel	Akhtijan Marisai Shadamir, Garerai.	Alizai	Theft of five cows valued at Rs. 75.	75 0 0	Do.
12	26-C.	8th July, 1899 ...	Jallundhar, Taji Khel...	Sabib Din, Nekzan Khel, Hassan, Lal Khan, Bhunga Khel.	Nekzan Khel, Bhunga Khel.	Bahlolzais	Theft of 56 sheep and goats and Bhunga money Rs. 200 Kabuli, etc., worth Rs. 270.	270 0 0	Do.
13	51-C.	20th November, 1898	Pastakai, Khojal Khel...	Mir Alam, Para Khel, Kazi, Michi Khel, Mastkai, Faridai, Gul- dad Malik, Shahi Gul- wam, Garerai, Satal Abdulla, Faridais.	Para Khel, Michi Khel, Malik Shahi, Fari- dai.	Alizai, Bahlolzai	Murder of one man ...	360 0 0	Do.
14	174-C.	8th February, 1900 ...	Shakai Khan, son of Almar, Zalli Khel.	Unknown	Robbery of 18 cows and cash Rs. 80, total Rs. 200.	200 0 0	Do.
15	123-C.	8th January, 1900 ...	Vallamir, son of Mir Khan.	Theft of 32 sheep valued at Rs. 96.	96 0 0	Do.
16	36-C.	1st August, 1899 ...	Nawar Khan, son of Pirwan, Utman Khel.	Gulzada, Sinak, Balocha Abdulla Khan.	Abdurrahman Khels	Bahlolzai	Theft of 13 goats valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
17	126-C.	13th January, 1900 ...	Nizam Din, Utman Khel	Piao Shah, Aimal Khel, Satal, Faridai, Abdulla.	Aimal Khel, Faridai, Abdurrahman Khel.	Bahlolzai, Alizai, Bah- lolzai.	Theft of 14 goats valued at Rs. 52.	52 0 0	Do.
18	50-C.	12th November, 1898	Nandar Khan, Utman Khel.	Mira Khel Kamin ...	Garerai	Alizai	Theft of one camel, Bhunga money Rs. 80.	50 0 0	Do.
19	55-C.	24th July, 1898 ...	Bojar Zalli Khel ...	Kozam Ahmad, Marizai, Mushkai, Faridai.	Marisai, Faridai ...	Alizai	Theft of three cows valued at Rs. 50.	50 0 0	Do.
20	183-C.	19th February, 1900	Akbar Shah, Qaderdad Khan, Khan Mir Zalli Khels.	Unknown	Theft of 12 bullocks and five donkeys.	210 0 0	Do.
							Total	3,000 0 0	
1-60	Other cases of class C	5,578 0 0	
							Miscellaneous ...	6,000 0 0	(roughly).

3
List of Pending Cases of Classes A, B, C, &c.—continued.

Serial No.	Number in Register.	Date of Occurrence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Sub-section.	Section.	Offence.	Fine or Compensation.	Remarks.
1	5	25th March, 1899 ...	Mahi Shirani, Shirani...	Jalal Khels Abdurrahman Khels.	<i>Zhob.</i> Jalal Khels, Abdurrahman Khels.	Bahlolzais	Theft of eight cows and 1 gun, Rs. 150.	Compensation. Rs. A. P. 150 0 0	Under enquiry.
2	...	26th March, 1900 ...	Mazar Khan, Suleman Khel.	Unknown	Theft of 2,020 Kabuli and murdering one man and wounding three others.	1,223 0 0	Do.
3	...	2nd September, 1899	Bakhtar Nasir	Gulzada Abdullah, Id Muhammad.	Abdurrahman Khel, Nekzan Khel.	Bahlolzais	Theft of 40 goats.	120 0 0	Do.
4	5	12th April, 1898 ...	Hassan Umar Khan, Shiranis.	Id Muhammad, Abdulla Khan.	Nekzan Khel	Do.	Theft of two horses worth Rs. 400.	400 0 0	Do.
5	8	26th August, 1899 ...	Surat Hikmat Khan, Shiranis.	Unknown	Theft of three bullocks worth Rs. 100.	50 0 0	Do.
6	9	7th October, 1899 ...	Baz Gul, son of Rahim Khan, Madda Khel	Do.	Theft of 135 sheep worth Rs. 530.	530 0 0	Do.
7	...	24th August, 1899 ...	Khair Muhammad Juma Khan, Mihtar Musa, Madda Khel.	Theft of 240 goats worth Rs. 720.	720 0 0	Do.
8	3	10th April, 1899 ...	Murad, son of Jehandad	Spin, etc.	Nekzan Khel	Bahlolzais	Theft of seven donkeys	70 0 0	Do.
9	...	6th March, 1898 ...	Lala Khan, etc. Shiranis.	Theft of three bullocks worth Rs. 60.	60 0 0	Do.
10	...	April, 1897	Said Khan, Lambardar, Getol.	Theft of copper utensils	200 0 0	Do.
Total								3,523 0 0	

		<i>Shiranis.</i>															
1	..	28th October, 1899 ...	Gulistan, son of Gumbad, Shirani.	Unknown	Theft of 166 sheep worth Rs. 400.	400 0 0	Do.
2	...	16th March, 1900 ...	Empress, through Powindabs.	Do.	Theft of 15 cows, and murder of one man and wounding another.	635 0 0	Do.
3	...	28th February, 1898 ...	Ala Khan, Muhammad Yar, Musazai.	Do.	Theft of 120 sheep worth Rs. 360.	360 0 0	Do.
4	4	29th December, 1897	Shahbaz, Shirani	Do.	Theft of 15 goats	50 0 0	Do.
5	...	28th December, 1899	Kakar Khan, and Muhammad Nasirs.	Asl Khan, Guri Khels...	Guri Khel	Alizai	Theft of 130 goats	390 0 0	Do.
															Total	1,885 0 0	

Rs.		ABSTRACT OF TOTAL FINES AND COMPENSATION DUE.										Rs. A. P.				
A=	...	2,430	Fine due from Mahsuds in accordance with recent settlement with tribes (including classes A, B, Shirani, Zhob, and Tochi cases)=										35,000	0 0		
B=	...	5,365	Fines outstanding in classes C, D, and Miscellaneous=										8,351	8 2		
C=	...	5,578											Total		43,351	8 2
Miscellaneous=	...	6,000											200 Kabuli.			
Zhob=	...	3,523	Total fines outstanding (including sum of Rs. 35,000) which is being realized in accordance with recent settlement										43,351	8 2		
Shirani's	...	1,885											200 Kabuli.			
		24,781	Total amount of compensation estimated as due for loss of property, &c., in cases of all kinds (excepting Tochi cases) pending up to last week in March, 1900.										24,781	0 0		

Camp Sarwekai,
The 1st May, 1900.

(Signed) H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 4.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 21st May, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated 8th May, submitting a statement of cases against the Mahsuds and other Waziris, I am directed to say that the Lieutenant-Governor is much concerned to learn that the case has hitherto been so imperfectly reported, and that the outstandings against the Mahsuds appear to be so much larger than hitherto stated.

Sir Mackworth Young awaits with anxiety the further explanation promised. He agrees with you in thinking that the reasons given by Mr. Watson for not complying earlier with the orders for the preparation of a list of cases is insufficient, and a full explanation on this point should be submitted in due course. The first request for a statement of outstanding cases was made so long ago as 31st October, 1899, in Mr. Dane's letter of that date.

2. With reference to Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, I am to send you a copy of a letter, dated 16th May, from the Government of India, Foreign Department, and to say that Sir Mackworth Young fears that the expression of satisfaction contained therein may, with reference to the facts you have now reported, prove to have been premature. I am to invite your attention to the remarks contained in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the above-mentioned letter.

 Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 29th May, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marked in the margin, regarding Mullah Powindah and fines due from the Mahsuds.

2. With reference to the proposal made by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, to give a present of Rs. 1,000 to Mullah Powindah, I am to say that if any negotiations with him could be secretly undertaken so as to commit him in the eyes of his tribe, it would be worth spending Rs. 1,000 or more in order to gain that object; but the opportunity has probably passed, and the dealings with the Mullah have been so fully and openly discussed that anything given to him now would probably be regarded on every hand as an acknowledgment of him as a leader and a power in the tribe. This is precisely the position which the Government of India desire to avoid.

3. As regards the fines due from, and the claims against, the Mahsuds, the Government of India have heard with much surprise and concern that the settlement arrived at with the tribe in March last omitted to take note of a claim nearly as large as that concerning which an agreement was come to. The Governor-General in Council will wait with interest to hear how so remarkable an omission can have taken place.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, dated the 29th of May, 1900, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted relating to the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr. Anderson.

Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 11th May, 1900, and enclosures.
 Commissioner Derajat's endorsement, dated 18th May, 1900, and enclosures.
 Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 19th May, 1900, and enclosures.
 Commissioner Derajat's letter, dated 24th May, 1900.
 Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900.
 Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 11th May, 1900.

With reference to this office telegram, dated the 17th January, 1900, regarding the Zam outrage, I have the honour to submit, for the information and orders of Government, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin.

This office endorsement, dated 20th January, 1900, and enclosure,
 Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated the 30th April, 1900, and enclosures,
 2nd May,

2. This offence is included in the settlement that was arrived at last March on account of which the Mahsuds are to pay 35,000 rupees. It seems to me that a very inadequate retribution has been made for this grave occurrence in that the Mahsuds have to pay only the blood-money for the murdered men and the value of the rifles and accoutrements carried off.

3. But inadequate as the punishment is, we are, I think, precluded from further action against either the individual offenders or with a view to the recovery of the stolen property. It is always understood that a settlement with a tribe clears everybody and everything, except where it is expressly stipulated to the contrary. The tribe pays for all individual offenders and for all property stolen, unless there is a distinct agreement excluding special persons or special property. From my predecessor's letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, to your address, it will be seen that no such stipulation or agreement was concluded when the settlement was effected. Under the circumstances I am unable to support the proposals of Messrs. Gee and Watson, and am obliged to suggest that, although the punishment for the Zam attack is exceedingly lenient, the recent settlement be accepted as final. I would ask for the instructions of Government in this matter.

Annexure 2.

EXTRACT from the Police Diary of the District Superintendent of Police, Dera Ismail Khan, for the week ending Saturday, the 13th January, 1900.

Police Station, Tank.

C. R. 6. Sections 302—396, Indian Penal Code—Zam Post.

On the night of the 9th instant a band of 30 or 40 men, said to be Waziris, entered the Zam Post, the door of which was open, and killed two Border Police Sepoys, three Bhattanni Levies, and a zamindar, and carried

off four Snider rifles, two Enfield muskets and one Enfield carbine, besides uniform, belts and clothes, and 130 Snider cartridges. Tracks showed that the raiders came from the direction of Mianbagh, and after committing the offence the gang appears to have separated, twelve or thirteen men going through the Khoa Pass to the Shuza. One man of the gang appears to have been wounded, as there were marks of blood in three places near the tracks going to the Zam Pass. The report is that one Buchi, Bhattanni, Lance-Bardar, and his nephew, Ali Khan, vowed vengeance against one Talwar, Bhattanni Levy, as the latter had fired and killed Hakim, brother of Ali Khan, beyond Khirgi, Hakim being with a gang of badmashes. The gang is supposed to have been a mixed one composed of Shabi Khels, the Mulla Powindah's Sheikhs, some Niamat Khel, Bhattannis, and a few Shingis. I have submitted a full special report regarding this separately.

ENDORSEMENT by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th January, 1900.

Copy of the above forwarded to H. W. Gee, Esquire, C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, for favour of report, particularly as to the sections to which Buchi and the other Bhattannis named or who were killed in the attack belong.

Annexure 3.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 30th April, 1900.

In reply to your endorsement, dated 20th January, 1900, on the subject of the attack on Zam Post, I have the honour to forward in original letter dated 27th ultimo, from the Political Officer, Wana, who has now completed all the investigation that is at present possible.

With regard to Mr. Watson's remarks in paragraph 2 of his letter, the recent settlement of this case in the Tank Jirga held last month should not be considered as final, as the amount debited to the Mahsud account only consisted of the actual blood-money payable to the relatives of the murdered men and the cost of the rifles and accoutrements stolen.

Annexure 4.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated 27th April, 1900.

I have the honour to forward, herewith, a summary of the information which I have obtained up to date regarding the attack by Mahsuds on the Zam Post on 9th January, 1900. As most of these statements were made to me under pledge of secrecy, I would ask you to regard this communication as confidential.

2. This case has been included in the recent settlement made with Mahsuds, and therefore as regards the tribe may be considered as disposed of. This does not, of course, preclude proceedings being taken against the actual offenders, if further evidence is forthcoming against them, and any of them fall by any chance into our hands, nor does it mean the abandonment of all efforts to recover the stolen property. Some time, however, must probably elapse before any further progress is made in this direction.

3. The enquiries which I have made convince me that the ring leaders of the gang were some so-called Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah, including

probably Raza Khel, Satar and Kamil, Shabi Khels, Fakir, a nephew of the Mullah Powindah, and Amr Din, Abdullai. I cannot obtain satisfactory evidence implicating any Bhattannis, for the statement of Shahzad (No. 17 in the Summary) is not reliable. Of course, the fact that the gang passed right through the Bhattanni country raises a presumption that some of the latter tribe were in collusion with them, but, on the other hand, the route is one which can be and is often taken by Mahsud raiders on their own account, while no Mahsud has given me any trustworthy information implicating the Bhattannis, although it was to be expected that the Mahsuds would do their best to throw the blame on them, and my most reliable informant, Haji Muhammad, the Shaman Khel Malik, expressly says, in his second statement, that he does not believe any Bhattanni was concerned.

4. If there was a Bhattanni in it, he would probably be Ali Khan, Niamat Khel, whose brother was killed by the Khirgi Levies in a chiga a month or so previously. Boche, the Niamat Khel Malik, was reported to have threatened reprisals, and accordingly I had put him and the other Niamat Khel Maliks on security, but Ali Khan was at the time a hamsaya of the Shingis, and may possibly have induced the Mahsuds to help him to take his revenge for his brother's death. I doubt if any other Niamat Khels were directly concerned, for they must have too vivid a remembrance of the punishment received for their share in the Nasran raid to dispose them to take part in any similar offence for some time to come.

5. The route taken by the raiders appears to have been as follows:— Numbering 12 or 14 men they passed down the Tank Zam from the Kani-guram direction, and were seen in the Barari Tangi by Nezam Din, Galeshahi. Further on they were seen by Amin Khan, the Shaman Khel Malik. They made their way into the head of the Shuza by a route some miles north of Jandola, and were seen by the women of an Abdullai Kirri, which lies just off that nullah, cooking their food in the nullah bed. The women took them water and they left a "guda" (skin for holding water) behind them there. Further on, at the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza Nullah, they were seen at noon by three Bhattannis, who were irrigating their land there, and lower down, just above the Pir Tangi, Abdullah Khan, a Bhattanni Levy Sowar, saw them cooking their food in the shade of some trees. Some Niamat Khels who were watering their cattle below the Pir Tangi probably saw them also. At Kirwam they left the Shuza and proceeded across the tract of country named Khua to the Tank Zam, which they probably reached via the Khua Nullah. From there they proceeded to the Zam Post.

6. On their return journey they followed the same route as far, at any rate, as the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza Nullahs. They are said to have been met in Khua by some Jalal Khels (see statement of Guldin, Kiharai, &c.), but I am not sure whether this information is to be relied on.

7. As said above, I believe the ringleaders of the gang were the Mullah's Sheikhs; the rest were probably composed of hangers-on of the Mullah belonging to various sections, but mainly Shabi Khels and Abdullais. I doubt if any Shingis were concerned, but possibly there may have been one or two Jalal Khels and Abdurrahman Khels. The chief motive of the attack was probably the arrest of Hakim, the Mullah's Sheikh in the Bannu District, but it is possible that the Mullah did not intend that so serious an offence should be committed, and that what he meant was to kidnap one or two Levies or Border Police, and hold them as hostages. In murdering the men the gang may have exceeded their instructions, though the Mullah must have known what was likely to happen with such a set of ruffians, for they included men who have been involved in several of the more serious offences of recent years. Other motives may possibly have been the shooting of the brother of Ali Khan by the Khirgi Levies and the death of two Jalal Khels at the hands of Bhattannis, referred to by Shahzad, and several members of the gang may have had their individual grievances against Government. It is to be hoped that eventually by recovery of some of the stolen property or by other methods further light may be thrown on the matter.

Annexure 5.

Information received with regard to the attack on Zam Post, January 9th, 1900.

1. *Haji Muhammad, Shaman Khel Malik—13th January, 1900.*

On the day of the attack Amin Khan, Shaman Khel Malik, met in Bangewal a Shaman Khel bahir which was going down to Tank, and told them not to go on, as a gang of the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs had passed by. Masta Khan, Shaman Khel, told me he went to the kirri of Gat, Abdullai, in the Shuza, and the woman there told him that 12 of the Mullah's Sheikhs had passed down the nullah, and had been given food and water. A shepherd of mine at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah also saw them. The woman above mentioned recognised Vatta, Bhattanni, among them, and she also spoke of Kamil, Shabi Khel, as being one of them. They all wore pattis like Levies, and no one but the Mullah's Sheikhs wore these; both the woman and the shepherd noticed this. Maste Khan says Vatta was wounded.

2. *Second Statement of Haji Muhammad—6th February, 1900.*

The facts which I stated before are true. The Mulláh Powindah sent his Sheikhs to make some prisoners. He did not mean that murder should be committed. Raza Khan, Shabi Khel, one of the gang, borrowed his rifle (Martini-Henry) from Hela, Shaman Khel Malik. Amin Khan, Shaman Khel Malik, lent his Martini-Henry rifle to Mad Akbar, Shabi Khel (cousin of Kamil). Both Maliks knew the gang were going to commit some offence.

The gang came to a Shabi Khel Kirri, close to mine; there are only three families in it, Patonais, chief man Jat. They also passed the kirri of Esamdin and Azim Khan, Abdullais. The woman who went to fetch water saw them cooking their food in the nullah. I made a mistake when I said they came to Gat's kirri.

The gang included Raza Khan, Kamil, Mad Akbar, Satar, Shabi Khels; Amr Din, Abdullai; Fakir, Shabi Khel, nephew of Mullah Powindah; 12 in all.

Some Bhattannis at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah recognised him. I don't believe now there was any Bhattanni in the gang. The route taken is one constantly used by Mahsuds. The Shabi Khel relative of the Mullah Powindah (Bazgul) gave information about the post. I don't believe any Jalal Khels were concerned. Balik and Amin Khan have sworn on the Quran to the Mullah Powindah that they said nothing about the matter to the Political Officer.

3. *Masti Khan, Shaman Khel—13th January, 1900.*

The day before yesterday at "Namazidigar," I came to the kirri of Gat, Abdullai, in the Shuza. All the cattle, &c., had been driven out of the kirri. I asked Lajmir, Abdullai, what was the reason. I had heard of the attack on Zam, the news having been brought by Faujdar, Sheikh of the Mullah Powindah. I asked Lajmir whether the murderers were Abdullais. He told me that he had heard at Jandola that Khan Mir, Badzai Bhattanni, was wounded, and suspicion would therefore fall on the Bhattannis. The women in the kirri told me they had fetched water for the gang, which was a large one.

4. *Bilak, Shaman Khel—14th January, 1900.*

The offence was committed by the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs. They came to Tank, thence by Narai Shua down the Shuza and through Pir Tangi. There were eight men with rifles. The Mullah Powindah sent them an account of Hakim's arrest. Shabi Khels were in it. Ask Nezam Din, Galeshami, Amin Khan, Shaurang, Haibat Khel, Gulkhadin Umar Khel.

5. *Mamak, Umar Khel—14th January, 1900.*

Eight Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah were concerned, including the Afridi from Tirah, Raza Khan and Kamil, Shabi Khels. A boy from my kirri met them on the road, I think on the morning of the day of the attack.

6. *Amin Khan, Shaman Khel, Malik—15th January, 1900.*

Two or three days before this affair I visited the Mullah Powindah, and he told me that his Sheikh had been treacherously seized in Bannu, and that, in revenge, he would send some men to seize a sahib who went out fishing, or if he could not do that, he would try some other plan. I went home and spent two nights there. On the third day there was a jirga of Shaman Khels at Adam Kachkai. As I was returning home in the afternoon I saw some men proceeding in the direction of the Shuza. Each had a rifle and their faces were muffled. They were going along in bodies of three or four. There were probably about 15 men. I recognised Raza Khan only. The brother of Khidrai, Shamarai, told Nezam Din, Galeshahi, that there were some Garerai among them. I did not notice whether they wore pattis. I told my Kirriwals not to take bahirs or go down to the plains as the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs were after some mischief. The Mullah Powindah told me to go to the Political Officer and find out about his Sheikh. He deceived me, and I did not imagine his Sheikhs would meanwhile commit this offence. The Mullah Powindah promised me that he would not do anything until he heard from the Political Officer. The Sheikhs passed one or two nights in the Khua Nullah watching for an opportunity to commit some offence.

7. *Gulpir, Shingi Malik—15th January, 1900.*

There were eight men, including Raza Khan, the Afridi Sheikh, Satar, Shabi Khel, and the son of Mit, Shabi Khel (Tomin). They were seen in Mattaghar. They had baked bread with them. They were sent by the Mullah Powindah. He was much annoyed about the new Militia scheme. Gulkhaddin, Umar Khel, told me this.

8. *Second Statement of Bilak, Shaman Khel—15th January, 1900.*

Amar Din, Raza Khan, Kamil, were heads of the gang. They were 12 in all. The Mullah Powindah told them to go and commit some offence. I don't know about Bhattannis.

9. *Third Statement of Bilak—26th January, 1900.*

A Galeshahi boy with a bahir saw a gang of 13 men returning up the Khua. He recognized three men by their clothes as Bhattannis. One was Khanmir or possibly Vatta or Amaldar.

10. *Nezam Din, Galeshahi—16th January, 1900.*

I was going up the Barari Tangi, about six or seven days ago, when I met 12 or 13 men coming down. I recognized among them Amr Din, Raza Khan and Kamil. About four days later the son of Piyadad, Galeshahi, who was with a bahir, saw them in the Shuza, but did not recognize them, as it was dark. After passing by me the gang passed the night in the kirri of Salemkai, Abdullai, in the Shuza. They left a "guda" behind them. Gat, Abdullai, lives in the same kirri. Every one knows that this was the gang. Khanmir, Kamrzai, Bhattanni, and two or three others were with them. (The Galeshahi bahirwals told me this; they said the Bhattannis told them Khanmir and others were with them.)

11. *Gul Din, Kikarai, Muhammad Afzal, Haibat Khel, and Sandal, Kikarai—about 20th January, 1900.*

Two Jalal Khels, Saleh-ud-din and Mir Zaman, told us that they went to Khua to raid Bhattannis, and met there at night a gang of 14 or 15 men, who advised them to clear out, as they had raided a post, and there would be a chiga. Among these men they recognized Kamil, Nashtar, Shabi Khel, Tomin, son of Mit, Raza Khan,

the son of Mamat, Shingi (who owing to a blood-feud lives with the Mullah Powindah), Makhad, Garerai (lives with the Mullah Powindah), and the Tirah Mullah (the Afridi deserter). They met this gang at an old tank in Khua. They thought at first a Bhattanni chiga was after them. The Jalal Khels hurried off with them *via* the Pir Tangi, and turned off up the Khaisora Nullah, while the gang went on up the Shuza. They did not notice that any one of them was wounded. It is said in the hills that the gang had some food brought them from Gut Abdullai's kirri, which was in the Shuza. The gang was sitting on "Matta Ghar," between Shuza and Shilmanzai.

At first it was the Mullah Powindah's intention to openly boast of this attack on the post, but some wiser head advised him not to do so, but to protest his innocence.

The motive was probably the arrest of the Mullah's Sheikh. Somebody told the Mullah that Government refused to release him, and that he might do what he liked.

12. *Second Statement of Gulpir, Shingi—28th January, 1900.*

Daudin, Boblai, Shingi, told his relatives that he was with a bahir at the mouth of the Zam. When at Digarwala 12 men passed by with caps over the lower part of their faces like what sepoys wear; all had rifles. He recognized Raza Khan, Satar, Kamil, Muhammad Azam, Shabi Khels; the "Tirah Sheikh," the son of Mit, Shabi Khel; two Giga Khel Sheikhs and Amr Din. It is said the Mullah Powindah sent out three gangs, one towards Wana, one to Zam, and one to Bannu. Every one says this in the hills. I am certain no Shingis were concerned.

13. *Abdulla Khan, Levy sowar, Waruk Bhattanni—28th January, 1900.*

I was going on leave to my home in Khaisora, and was passing through the Pir Tangi, when I saw 16 or 17 men cooking their food among some trees in the nullah. I recognized Makin and Mauladad, Bibizai, Shabi Khels (relatives of Dinak, Ali Khan, the brother of Zanjir, Spozhmai and Tarazh-mai, Jalal Khels. A Niamat Khel kirri (that of the two Ahmad Khans) was in Torwazar near Kirwam, and is still in the same place. I turned back on seeing the gang, and the Niamat Khels, who were watering their cattle in the nullah, drove the animals away at the same time. Karre, Niamat Khel, Ahmad Khan, Oba Khel, Niamat Khel, were with the cattle. I did not say anything to them about the gang. Then I went round to my home by another way. Jangbaz, Mirazali, Umar Shah and Katte, who were irrigating their land at Dur Kachkai, at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah, saw the gang also, but they say they did not recognize them, except one, the nephew of the Mullah Powindah, but the gang was one of the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs. I suspect some of the others may have been Shingis. I heard of the attack on Zam the third day after this. All the gang had rifles. As they were cooking their food they had their faces uncovered, so I was able to recognize them.

14. *Jangbaz, Mirajalli, and Umah Shah, Waruka Bhattannis—7th February, 1900.*

We were irrigating our lands at noon at the mouth of the Khaisora Nullah when we saw some men pass down the Shuza Nullah under the cliff at the further side. First came eight men, each carrying a rifle, then at a distance of about half mile behind them three, four or five more men without rifles. Among the first lot we recognized by their appearance, gait, &c. (we did not see their faces, which were covered up) Kamil, Satar and Fakir, Shabi Khels. These men last year lived in a kirri close to us; so we knew them by sight. There were no Bhattannis among them.

15. *Mine Khan, Bhattanni Malik of Saraqhar—6th February, 1900.*

A small boy told a man who was stopping in the Niamat Khel kirri that some men who were irrigating land in Bedzahwam above Pir Tangi recognized

the gang. Then Ahmad Khan, son of Madad, stopped the boy from saying any more; so he did not mention their names. The men referred to were Niamat Khels of the same kirri. I suspect that one Bhattanni (probably a Niamat Khel) was with the gang.

16. *Ahmad Khan, son of Madad, Niamat Khel Malik—10th February, 1900.*

Abdullah came upon us in Torwazar. Karre was with me. My cattle were not in the Shuza Nullah. I have since questioned Karre, and he says he saw 12 or 15 men at "Peshinwela," going along by Kirwam, but they were a long way off, and he did not recognize them. He thought there were men going to the jirga.

17. *Shahzad, son of Mamad, Abba Khel Bhattanni.*

This affair was got up by the Niamat Khels, chiefly by Ali Khan, whose brother was killed by the Khirgi Levies, and who is a hamsaya of the Shingis. Ali Khan asked the Shingis to attack Zam, but they refused. He then went to Makomi Khan, Bibizai, Shabi Khel, an old friend of the Niamat Khel badmashes. The following then formed a gang:—Makomi Khan, Mauladad, Guldad, Shabi Khels; Chundai Khan, Juma Gul, Mumadar Khan, Jalal Khels; Matin Khan, Kamil Khan and a nephew of the Mullah Powindah (Fakir), Shabi Khels; in all 14 persons.

Munadar's brother had been killed by Bhattanni Lashkar along with another Mahsud. In revenge for one of these the Jalal Khels killed Namdar, Sheikh; the death of the other was laid by the Mahsuds to the account of Babrai Khan and Maluk Surars, who, from fear of the Mahsuds, came and lived in the daman.

The following rifles were in possession of the thieves:—

- Makomi, 2 Martini-Henry.
- Mauladad, 1 Snider.
- Guldad, 1 Snider.
- Chundai, 1 repeating rifle.
- Munadar, 1 Snider.
- Matin, 1 Snider.
- Amir Khan (? Ali Khan), 1 musket.
- Juma Gul, 1 Snider.
- Kamil, 1 Snider.
- Nephew of Mullah Powindah, 1 Martini-Henry.

Mukarrab, Dâk Jemadar, a relative of Ali Khan's, knew of the intended attack, and on this account detained Imam Bakhsh, Jandola Muharrir, in his kirri on his way back to Jandola and sent for Sheikh Halim from Zam, but the latter did not come.

Salim Khan, Sara, sold seven packets of Snider cartridges to Amaldar, Bhattanni badmash. Salim Khan also took one of the muskets, which, perhaps, had been left behind by the raiders, or perhaps it was his share of the loot. He has now probably sold it. Salim Khan's wife has told people about this. Four Bhattannis are said to have been in the gang, viz., Zakkan, brother of Amad Khan, Nianat Khel Malik, Taji, Makhmad, son of Bochie, Ali Khan and another whose name I don't know, but Malik Shah, son of Akil Shah, does. Ahmad Khan and Karre saw the raiders in the Shuza and spoke to them. If Amldar is pressed he will admit bringing the cartridges from Salim Khan.

18. *Gul Husain? Nubbul (as reported by Political Officer, Tochi)—
7th February, 1900.*

About 15th January a man went to the Shuza to look for a camel at Peshinwala. He met Abdullah, son of Akhmad, Abba Khel, Amrdin, Ghozrai, Sirat Khan, Abdullais, and a Shabi Khel Talib of the Mullah Powindah, and altogether 19 men with a number of rifles, going apparently with the intention of committing some serious offence. That night or next the attack on Zam occurred.

19. *Sherin Khan, Shaman Khel (reported by Political Officer, Tochi)—
6th February, 1900.*

The six rifles taken from Zam post are with the Sheikhs of the Mullah Powindah, Haji Muhammad, Shaman Khel, Gul Khatin, Umar Khel, Nezam Din, Guleshahi and Amin Khan, Shaman Khel, saw them.

H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana.

Annexure 6.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., C.S., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 14th May, 1900.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter, dated December 23rd, 1899, I have the honour to state that I met the Political Officer, Tochi, at Bannu, on April 9th, 1900, and the following days, and discussed with him a number of pending Tochi and Dauri cases.

We disposed of several that had remained outstanding in the lists submitted by Messrs. Lorimer and Kettlewell with their joint letter, dated Tochi, 8th January, and dated Wana, 10th January, 1899, and decreed against the Mahsuds sums amounting in all to Rs. 800. All the cases in these lists so far as concerns the Mahsuds may now be considered as disposed of.

2. Of the Dauri cases in the list submitted by Mr. Donald, we filed five, remanded four for future enquiry, and in seven gave decrees against Mahsuds, amounting in all to Rs. 740.

So the total amount awarded by us against the Mahsuds was Rs. 1,540. The remaining cases it is proposed to take up at a joint jirga to be held, probably at Tank, some time next cold weather.

3. The question of the realization from the Mahsuds of the sum awarded is a part of the question of the liabilities of the Mahsuds under the recent settlement and otherwise, which is forming the subject of separate correspondence.

Endorsement by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 18th May, 1900.

Copy of the foregoing submitted to J. M. Douie, Esquire, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Simla, for information, in continuation of the correspondence ending with this office letter, dated the 27th December, 1899.

Annexure 7.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 19th May, 1900.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, on the subject of the fines and compensation still due by the Mahsud tribe over and above the Rs. 35,000 settled for.

Letter, dated the 13th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, with enclosure.

Letter, dated the same day, from the same, and enclosure.

2. I would explain that the statements of offences, classed A, B, C and D, were prescribed by Mr. Bruce when Commissioner of the Derajat, and are furnished monthly

to this office by the Political Officer, Wana. In addition the Political Officer maintains statements of what are known as "Miscellaneous," "Tochi," "Shirani" and "Zhub" cases. These eight statements show what offences have been committed during the month and how disposed of, but they do not show cases pending from previous months; and I have arranged for one statement in place of eight to be prepared monthly, which will include undisposed of cases from previous months and will group the offences according as the offenders belong to the main sections of the Mahsuds.

3. I will endeavour now to clear up the complicated accounts, taking first those connected with the settlement of March last. In paragraph 8 of this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, the liabilities of the Mahsuds are given as Rs. 32,854-8-0. The Mahsuds arranged for a payment of Rs. 35,000, which left a balance of Rs. 2,145-8-0 in hand to meet Tochi and Zhub cases. In this Rs. 35,000 is included an item of Rs. 3,234, being the estimated value of the two-thirds share of the spring crop on Mahsud lands in the Dera Ismail Khan District. The Assistant Commissioner at Tank, however, anticipates that the value of the crop will be only Rs. 2,500, which *pro tanto* will reduce the 35,000 rupees. But this loss we can make up in tolls, and we may assume the figures of Rs. 35,000 to be so far unchanged. It appears, however, now that the liabilities of the Mahsuds for the cases on account of which they were held to owe Rs. 32,854-8-0 are in fact Rs. 36,055-1-11; and further that for the Tochi and Zhub cases, on account of which a balance of Rs. 2,145-8-0 was reserved, a sum of Rs. 3,540 is due. This raises the total liabilities of the Mahsuds on account of the March settlement to Rs. 36,055-1-11 + Rs. 3,540, total Rs. 39,595-1-11. To pay this we have:—

		Rs.	A.	P.
(a)	Agreed upon by the Mahsuds	35,000	0	0
(b)	Sundry fines paid in at the March jirga ...	292	0	0
(c)	Alimony of Mahsud hostages placed in jail owing to escape of a hostage; alimony is not paid to hostages in jail	1,100	0	0
	Total	36,392	0	0
		39,595	1	11
		36,392	0	0
	Deficit	3,203	1	11

or Rs. 3,200 in round numbers.

Mr. Watson proposes to meet this deficit in part by crediting and paying to private individuals as compensation, &c., a sum of Rs. 2,117, which is due to Government from the Mahsuds out of the March settlement of Rs. 35,000 on account of the value of rifles and other Government property stolen. I am unable to support this proposal. The settlement from what the Political Officer says was a lenient one; the fines inflicted in several of the cases were hardly commensurate with the gravity of the offences, he states; and that being so, it seems if, on making up accounts, we find that Rs. 3,200 more is due from the Mahsuds, plus the deficit on account of sales of the rabi crop, say, Rs. 4,000 in all, that it is for the Mahsuds to make the deficiency, and not for Government out of its just due. This deficit can be covered by continuing the tolls till they have produced Rs. 19,000 instead of the 15,000 rupees contemplated in paragraph 6 of this office letter No. 287 of the 30th March, 1900. I understand that it will take about eighteen months to realise Rs. 15,000 by means of the tolls.

If Government approve I will arrange to meet the deficit in the manner suggested above.

4. This deficit of Rs. 4,000 is a relatively trivial matter, however. The serious features in the present situation are, first, that at the time that the March settlement was made Rs. 23,500 were (in addition to the Rs. 32,854,

or as it appears Rs. 36,392, then due and settled for) payable by the tribe, for the liquidation of which no arrangements have as yet been made; and, second, that the settlement of March last has had no effect in checking the predatory habits of the Mahsuds, for they have, since this settlement, run up an account of at least Rs. 7,500 in six weeks, as explained in paragraph 4 of the Political Officer's letter, dated the 13th instant, to which must be added Rs. 1,000 for two murders of British subjects in the Dera Ismail Khan District, committed last week by Mahsuds. The total due comes to Rs. 32,000. The Political Officer has informed me that when they engaged to pay Rs. 35,000 last March, the Mahsuds knew that more money was due, but not how much.

5. We are responsible for the realization and payment of this money to the injured parties. Leaving British subjects and their property out of consideration for the moment, it was accepted years ago that on the roads through the protected area we are bound to maintain the *Pax Britannica*, and if, off the roads, we do not redress the wrongs suffered at the hands of the Mahsuds by the residents of the protected area, we must either permit them to exact redress themselves (a course which would make the protected area a scene of constant raids and counter-raids) or face grave discontent.

6. In the hot weather and with cholera hanging about the Gomal and Tank, it would be hopeless to attempt to convene the Mahsud Jirga for the settlement of the outstanding sum of Rs. 32,000. Even if we could assemble the jirga, I apprehend that the burden may be soon becoming too heavy for the tribe to bear. The only thing I can suggest is to leave matters alone till August or September, when it may be practicable to send for the whole Mahsud Jirga to Sarwekai or Jandola and then to see what can be done. By that time I hope to be in a position to submit a review of the whole situation in respect of the Mahsuds; it is clear that things cannot go on as they have been doing.

7. One point remains on which I would ask for the instructions of Government. The Political Officer thinks of going behind the settlement of March last, of procuring the punishment of the actual offenders in the more serious cases or the recovery of the stolen rifles and other property. It seems to me that this is neither just nor expedient. A settlement is supposed to wipe clean the slate. Although the punishments may have been inadequate, yet, such as they are, they have been accepted, and there is an end of the matters. There must be finality in proceedings, and to go on trying to get hold of offenders and effect the recovery of property in cases of which many are one to three years old, after a settlement has been made, opens up an interminable vista of trouble and friction which had better be closed. We have enough on our hands without this. And I am not so sure that to go behind the settlement may not be considered by the "ulus" as a breach of faith, whatever individual Maliks may have been told or may think. We could not entertain the thought of going behind the settlements effected with the various tribes in 1897 and 1898, and I submit that the same applies here.

In the petition enclosed with this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1890, the Maliks say nothing of pursuing individual cases. They talk of putting pressure on bad characters and misbehaving sections, so that they may not be emboldened and the settlement may not be a precedent; and they ask that if in the present cases the money (clearly meaning whatever was fixed at the settlement, and nothing more) is realized from the actual offenders, it may be refunded to the Maliks. This I should certainly decline to do. It is for the Maliks to police their sections; that is what they are paid for; and we cannot undertake to do the work of the Maliks, though they would naturally much prefer us to do so, and to relieve them of all trouble and responsibility and yet to pay them handsome allowances.

Annexure 8.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 13th May, 1900.

With reference to your endorsement, dated May 8th, 1900, forwarding a copy of your letter to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, on the subject of the statement of fines due from the Mahsuds prepared by me and submitted with my letter, dated May 1st, 1900, I have the honour to state as follows.

2. In dividing cases into classes A, B, &c., I have followed the classification prescribed for the monthly statements of border offences which are submitted to you through the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan. These classes are explained in the foot-note to the printed form of Statement No. 1. Class A comprises offences committed by Mahsuds in British territory; Class B those committed against British subject (including Powindahs) in protected area; Class C those committed against the tribes in protected areas or near posts; Class D those committed in the area under political control exclusive of Class C. Tochi, Shirani and Zhob cases are separate.

"Miscellaneous" includes all cases not brought under the other classes. They are mainly claims brought against the Mahsuds some time after the offences to which they refer were committed, *e.g.*, a Powindah finds a stolen camel which he lost a year or so previously in the possession of a Mahsud, or he puts in a petition about some property which he lost several months or years before, and which he did not report at the time, having now perhaps received some information as to who the offenders were. These cases are of very little importance and very few of them can be brought home to the Mahsuds.

3. The sum of 8,500 rupees to which I referred in paragraph 3 of my previous letter is that due from Mahsuds in decided cases of Classes C and D and miscellaneous (the amount is really Rs. 8,351-8-2 + 200 Kabuli rupees—*vide* abstract statement appended to letter). These are the inter-tribal cases referred to in paragraph 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter to the Punjab Government dated 30th March, 1900, and are not included in the 35,000 rupees of Mr. Anderson's settlement. Nor is this sum of about Rs. 8,500 included in the 15,000 rupees estimated by me as the additional fines to which the Mahsuds have rendered themselves liable for recent offences of the different classes which were not taken up at the jirga because in cases other than Classes C, D and miscellaneous, enquiries into them had not been completed.

They are the cases mentioned in the abstract statement referred to in my letter as pending up to the last week in March. The value of the property lost, &c., is there estimated at Rs. 24,781, but for reasons given in my letter I considered that not more than 15,000 rupees would probably be realized from the Mahsuds.

4. I have now brought the estimate of the liabilities of the Mahsuds up to date by a supplementary statement attached to this letter, which shows all cases reported against Mahsuds up to last week. The value of the property lost in these most recent cases of all is shown as for Class A Rs. 3,659-5-0, for Class B Rs. 7,993-8-3 (of which Rs. 2,000 is due from the Zalli Khels), for Zhob Rs. 682-8-0, and for C and D Rs. 630 and Rs. 90 respectively. As some of these claims are probably exaggerated or not proveable against Mahsuds, the amount of their liabilities may be estimated as follows:—

Class A Rs. 2,500, B Rs. 4,000, Zhob Rs. 500, Classes C and D Rs. 500

5. In saying that certain sums due in Zhob and Tochi cases would be included, if possible, in the settlement of Rs. 35,000, I meant that they might be paid out of the balance reserved by Mr. Anderson to meet Tochi and Zhob demands (*vide* paragraph 8 of his letter above referred to), which he hopes will amount to over Rs. 3,000. Till it is known what the receipts from the Mahsud land crops will be, the account cannot be finally made up.

6. Leaving these Zhob and Tochi cases out of consideration, the total liabilities of the Mahsuds up to date may be estimated in round numbers as follows:—

	Rs.
Fines due from Mahsuds under recent settlement for outstanding cases of Classes A, B and Shirani, Zhob and Tochi	35,000
Estimated as due from them in the above classes of cases (exclusive of Tochi cases) up to end of March, 1900 (not included	
* With Rs. 6,000 below makes in settlement of	
15,000. J. M. D. Rs. 35,000) ...	9,000*
Estimated as due from them in the above classes of cases, reported between end of March and 2nd week in May, 1900	7,000
Total	<u>51,000</u>
Outstanding fines in Classes C, D and miscellaneous at date of Mr. Anderson's settlement	8,500
Estimated amount due in pending cases up to end of March, 1900	6,000
Estimated amount due in cases reported between end of March and second week in May, 1900	500
Total	<u>15,000</u>

Thus, briefly, in cases affecting British subjects or territory, the amount due up to date is Rs. 51,000; in inter-tribal cases it is Rs. 15,000. It must be remembered that this is a very rough estimate, and also that one or two of the more important cases are in a fair way to settlement through recovery of the stolen property or realisation of compensation from the offenders by baramta.

7. In conclusion I should be glad if one point in connection with the recent settlement could be cleared up. I have on several occasions told the Mahsud Malik since that settlement that I shall not relax my efforts to procure the punishment of the actual offenders in the more serious cases or the recovery of the stolen rifles and other property. I understood that Mr. Anderson agreed to my saying this, and on the principle that the innocent should not be punished for the guilty, and also in view of the fact that the fines inflicted in several of the cases were hardly commensurate with the gravity of the offence (if they had been, a settlement of this kind would have probably been impossible, for the burden imposed on the tribe would have been too heavy) I thought it would be bad policy to regard these cases as altogether wiped off the slate. In pursuance of this policy I have detained in custody Sabar Khan, nephew of Baramat, the Aimal Khel Malik, who is believed to have been concerned in the theft of the Nawab of Tank's rifles, and a Balkai Mahsud, whose brother Atta Khan is believed to have been concerned in the theft of Snider rifles from the Border Military Police guard at the Murtaza rest-house, both of which cases were included in the recent settlement. I do not think the Mahsuds regard these proceedings on my part as unfair or breach of the understanding arrived at in that settlement; and if by the pressure thus exercised I can recover any of the rifles stolen or prove the case against any of the thieves, I do not see that I am precluded from keeping those rifles or punishing the thieves by fine or otherwise. If you think, however, that all these cases were finally disposed of at the recent settlement, I should be glad if you would send my successor early orders on the point.

Annexure 9.

List of Pending Cases.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Thana.	Nature of Offence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Tribe.	Brief Account of the Case taken to Date.	Remarks.
					<i>Cases of Class A.</i>				
1	<u>23rd</u> <u>24th</u> January, 1900 ...	Jamal Dial ...	Tank ...	Theft of four maunds wheat, valued at Rs. 16.	Lal Chand	Case under enquiry.	
2	4th April, 1900 ...	Near Kulachi ..	Kulachi ...	Dacoity of four camels, valued at Rs. 360 and cash Rs. 260.	(1) Khan, (2) Faizulla, (3) Shah Jahan, } Miani Powindah.	Do.	
3	13th April, 1900 ...	Kotnawaz ...	Gomal ...	Theft of three sheep, valued at Rs. 17-10-0.	Ain-ud-din, Sheikh	Do.	
4	17th April, 1900 ...	Near Manjhi ...	Do. ...	One bullock with wheat, &c., valued at Rs. 40.	Hakim Machi	Do.	
5	18th April, 1900 ...	Talrod Chur ...	Tank ...	Robbery of three camels with other property valued at Rs. 110-8-0.	Amrdin, Ali Khel	Do.	
6	24th April, 1900 ...	Kaziwala Water-mill.	Do. ...	Theft of two camels, valued at Rs. 170.	Alam Khan, Kundi, Powindah.	Do.	
7	<u>22nd</u> <u>23rd</u> April, 1900 ...	Near Tank ...	Do. ...	Theft of one bullock, valued at Rs. 27.	Inayat Khan	Do.	
8	<u>24th</u> <u>25th</u> April, 1900 ...	Gul Imam ...	Mullazai ...	Theft of property by house-breaking.	Asa Ram	Do.	Value not told by complainant.
9	25th April, 1900 ...	Gomal... ..	Gomal ...	Theft of four cows. Theft of seven goats, valued at Rs. 61.	Alidad, Kharoti Powindah.	Do.	
10	<u>25th</u> <u>26th</u> April, 1900 ...	Near Jatta ...	Do. ...	Theft of clothing, valued at Rs. 1-3-0.	Mamit Khan, Khidarzai	Do.	
M 2 11	<u>25th</u> <u>26th</u> April, 1900 ...	Mullazai ...	Mullazai ...	Theft of one camel, valued at Rs. 50.	Zarif Khan, Carpenter...	Do.	

List of Pending Cases—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Thana.	Nature of Offence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Tribe.	Brief Account of the Case taken to Date.	Remarks.
					<i>Cases of Class A—cont.</i>				
12	26th April, 1900 ... 27th	Nasran ...	Mullazai ...	Theft of bullock, value Rs. 15.	Naurang Nasr	Case under enquiry.	
13	28th April, 1900 ...	Kot Azam ...	Gomal ...	Theft of 45 camels, valued at Rs. 2,250.	Dauran, Miavi Powindah.	Do.	
14	29th April, 1900 ... 30th	Kot Nawaz ...	Do. ...	Wounding complainant.	Baz Khan, Sheikh	Do.	
15	13th April, 1900 ...	Near Tank ...	Tank ...	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 15-6-0.	Khadim	Do.	
16	15th April, 1900 ... 16th	Kot Nawaz ...	Gomal ...	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 13-12-0.	Khalidin through Khangu.	Do.	
17	26th April, 1900 ...	Near Draband	Chaudwan ...	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 25i-14-0.	Abdulghafar.		
					<i>Cases of Class B.</i>				
1	1st April, 1900 ...	Khajuri Kach	Khajuri Kach	Theft of four camels, valued at Rs. 360.	Khar Khan Nasir ...	Unknown ...	Unknown ...	Do.	
2	2nd April, 1900 ...	Sado Chilla ...	Do.	Theft of property and jewels, valued at Rs. 133-8-3.	Ram Singh and Mussummat Bhag Bhari.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do.	
3	20th April, 1900 ...	Spin ...	Ngandioba ...	Theft of 11 camels, valued at Rs. 550.	Sahib Khan, Powindah, &c.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do.	
4	22nd April, 1900 ...	Chaparu Khulla	Do. ...	Theft of 100 camels, valued at Rs. 5,000.	1. Juma Khan ... 2. Jumal. 3. Hassan.	Numin Zangalte, &c.	Michi Khels, Malikdinais, Faridais, &c., also Zalli Khels of Spin.	Case under enquiry. Ten Zalli Khels of Spin have been arrested, and one has confessed, implicating himself, several of his companions, and a number of Mahsuds. Pressure is being put on the Mahsud Malikis to recover the camels, and six have been brought in by the Malikdinais. Share due from the Mahsuds may be estimated at Rs. 3,000.	
5	3rd May, 1900 ... 4th	Pasta Kach ...	Khajuri Kach	Theft of five camels, valued at Rs. 250.	1. Haider Shah ... 2. Umar Shah; Sayads	Case under enquiry.	

6	5th May, 1900	...	Near Ghwelera	Do.	Theft of two camels, valued at Rs. 100, and cloth valued at Rs. 900, and cash Rs. 600 Kabuli, and shooting four camels.	1. Mullah Muhammad, } 2. Sikandar, } Powinda. 3. Lal Khan, }	Do.
7	5th May, 1900	...	Grazing ground, Pasta Kach.	Do.	Theft of four camels, valued at Rs. 200.	Ghulam Rasul, Nasir	Do.
						<i>Zhob cases, 1899-1900.</i>			
1	10th December, 1899	...	Chachobi	Moghal Kot	Theft of 68 sheep, 50 bullocks, 60 cows, &c.; property valued at Rs. 682-8-0.	Khanak, Shirani	Do.
						<i>Class C.</i>			
1	January, 1900	...	Wana	Wana	Theft of 60 sheep and goats, valued at Rs. 180.	1. Naim Khan } Taji 2. Gandapur } Khels.	Do.
2	7th 8th May, 1900	...	Sarel	Jandola	Theft of 30 cows, valued at Rs. 450.	Rozi Bhattanni	Do.
						<i>Class D.</i>			
1	Gomal	Theft of five cows, five goats, valued at Rs. 90.	Dad Nasir	Do.

ABSTRACT.

					Rs.	A.	P.
A cases, value of property lost, &c.	3,659	5	0
B do. do.	7,993	8	3 (of which Rs. 2,000 is due from Zalli Khels).
Zhob do. do.	682	9	0
C do. do.	630	0	0
D do. do.	90	0	0

H. D. WATSON,
Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan.

Annexure 10.

Letter from H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Tank, 13th May, 1900.

In accordance with your verbal instructions and in continuation of my letter of to-day's date, I have the honour to submit herewith a statement giving a more correct account of the sums due from the Mahsuds under the recent settlement, and of the sums which are or will be in hand for discharging those liabilities. It will be seen that the liabilities are more than were originally estimated, owing partly, I fear, to mistakes made in my office, and partly to the fact that Mr. Gee and myself found ourselves unable to keep within the limits allotted in awarding compensation.

2. On the other hand there are several items which can be added to the Rs. 35,000 which the Mahsuds agreed to pay; and I have shown these in the total sum realized or realizable from the tribe. I trust that under the circumstances they will be allowed to be credited.

3. It will be seen that the balance in hand for settling Tochi and Zhob demands is Rs. 2,484-1-11. This will be diminished or increased according as the sale of Mahsud crops realises less or more than was anticipated.

4. The Tochi and Zhob demands in cases settled up to date (excluding those comprised in the item of outstanding fines) come to Rs. 3,540, viz., Rs. 2,000 for the murder of the Zhob Levies in May 1899 and Rs. 1,540 for Dauri cases recently decided at the meeting held by the Political Officer, Tochi, and myself. There is thus a deficit of Rs. 1,086 still to be realized under the settlement; and I would add to this Rs. 914 for settling some undecided Zhob cases which have been long pending. If it is considered advisable to settle up this particular account without making further demands on the Mahsuds, as I strongly recommend, part of the odd 19,000 rupees due for outstanding fines might be used for this object, for out of this sum over Rs. 2,000 are due as fines to Government and not as compensation to individuals, so Government would be the only loser if that amount of fines were commuted into compensation.

Liabilities of Mahsuds up to Settlement of March, 1900 (including cases decided at the jirga held).

	Rs.	A.	P.
Outstanding fines (as amended after re-examination of files)	19,113	0	5
Awarded in March jirga in Classes A, B and Shirani cases	16,942	1	6
Total	36,055	1	11
Realized or realisable under recent settlement	35,000	0	0
Fines paid in at jirga, &c.	292	0	0
Pay of Mahsud hostages in Jail at Dera Ismail Khan	1,100	0	0
Compensation due to Government for rifles, &c., awarded in certain cases decided at recent jirga and included in the total of Rs. 16,942-1-6 above	2,117	0	0
Total	38,509	0	0
Balance in hand available for Tochi and Zhob cases	2,454	0	0
Due for Tochi and Zhob cases settled up to date	3,540	1	1
Deficit	1,086	1	1

Annexure 11.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., I.C.S., Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 24th May, 1900.

Your letter of the 21st instant has crossed my letter, dated the 19th instant, which furnishes the further report promised regarding the outstandings against the Mahsuds. Mr. Watson has left India on furlough, and I am therefore unable to obtain the full explanation called for by Government. I would, however, in justice to Mr. Watson, point out that insistence on the part of this office would doubtless have resulted in an earlier compliance with the orders of Government.

2. With regard to the remarks of the Government of India in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Foreign Department letter, dated 16th instant, I propose, with the permission of Government, to submit, in August next, the review of the situation in respect of the Mahsuds which is mentioned in paragraph 6 of my letter cited above. The accuracy of the conclusion in paragraph 2 of your office letter, dated the 6th February, 1900, viz., that the liabilities of the Mahsuds under present conditions accumulate faster than they can be liquidated, has been vindicated by the facts as now ascertained; and it seems to me that the whole position requires very full consideration, for it is clear, if the tribe cannot or will not reform its ways, that there can be but one end to the existing state of affairs.

3. I think it is very unlikely that the Rs. 15,000 will be realized by tolls within the next six months; from what I was informed at Tank, I should say eighteen months would be nearer the mark.

4. I am unable to say why half the pay of the Levies was attached for three months, nor can any officer inform me, since the Political Officer was apparently not associated with the Commissioner in the actual settlement of the terms with the jirga. This was, I understand, effected alone by my predecessor, with the assistance of his Head Clerk, Mr. E. T. Bhan, who has left my office. It was arranged, I believe, that the Levies are to go in turn on leave, and that while they are away their pay is to be credited towards payment of the Rs. 35,000.

5. For the result, so far, of negotiations with the Mahsuds about the Badar disputes, I would refer to my telegram of the 14th instant, and to my letter of to-day's date to your address.

Annexure 12.

Letter from J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of yours, dated 18th May, regarding the disposal of certain Tochi and Dauri cases. In accordance with the orders contained in this office, No. 83, dated 19th January, the reason why four of the cases remained unsettled should have been reported. I am to request that the necessary information may now be obtained from the Political Officer, Tochi.

Annexure 13.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Simla, 2nd June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters noted in the margin, giving further information as to the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr. Anderson.

Dated 11th, 19th and 24th May.

2. Of the eight classes of cases described in paragraph 2 of Mr. Watson's, dated 13th May, to your address, your predecessor only professed to have dealt with five in the jirga held at Tank. These comprised offences in British territory, and offences against British subjects and Powindahs in the protected area, correspond to Classes A and B in the registers maintained in your office, also offences in the Shirani country, the Tochi and Zhob. Mr. Anderson expressly stated that he had not settled the "inter-tribal cases," which the Lieutenant-Governor presumes are identical with Classes C and D in your registers, and that these would "be disposed of as opportunities offer." For some unexplained reason the "miscellaneous" cases were also omitted, though to judge from the figures in the abstract at the end of the list appended to Mr. Watson's No. 663, dated 1st May, this last class is not unimportant. It was stated that the settlement "leaves no case" with the exceptions noted above "pending anywhere against the Mahsuds."

3. It now appears that the settlement was faulty in the following respects. A composition of Rs. 35,000 was accepted for offences for which the amount really due is Rs. 39,595. The detail is—

	Rs.
(a) Unrealized fines in cases previously settled ...	19,113
(b) Fines due in cases settled at Tank jirga ...	16,942
(c) Tochi and Zhob cases ...	3,540

The figures given under the first two heads in paragraph 8 of your predecessor's, dated 30th March, are incorrect, and it is difficult to understand how such serious miscalculations can have passed muster. Moreover it now appears that Mr. Anderson was in error in thinking that all pending cases of the five classes which he mentioned had been settled. A comparison of Mr. Watson's, dated 1st May, 13th May, and 14th May, shows that a number of cases were left unsettled in which the claim against the Mahsuds is stated at Rs. 13,203 (see list appended to Mr. Watson's letter, dated 1st May), which the Political Officer considers will probably be reduced to Rs. 9,000 when the cases are finally decided. To this must be added the amount ultimately found due on account of four cases in the Tochi Valley. Had a complete settlement been made with the Mahsuds in March the demand made upon

* Rupees 7,000 estimated as due on account of A and B cases and Shirani, Zhob and Tochi cases which have occurred since March plus Rs. 1,000 due for the murder of two British subjects in Dera Ismail Khan.

them should have been in round figures Rs. 49,000 instead of Rs. 35,000. Since March they have added Rs. 8,000* to their liabilities under the same five classes of cases. The claims against them in respect of the other three classes, namely, C, D and miscellaneous, may be roughly stated as—

	Rs.
(a) In respect of cases settled before March, 1900 ...	8,500
(b) In respect of cases pending in March, 1900 ...	6,000
(c) In respect of cases which have occurred since March, 1900 ...	500
Total ...	15,000

Assuming that we are bound to enforce the responsibility of the Mahsuds in all these cases, the total claim against them amounts to Rs. 72,000, of

which cases involving in round figures Rs. 40,000 are included in the settlement made at Tank and cases involving Rs. 32,000 are not so included.

4. The first question that arises is whether the difference between the real demand of Rs. 39,595 in the cases actually dealt with at Tank and the lump sum of Rs. 35,000, at which the demand was assessed, can be recovered. No doubt the petty fine of Rs. 292 realized at Tank can be utilized, but Sir Mackworth Young fails to see how Rs. 1,100, which would have been paid as alimony to Mahsud hostages had they not been transferred from the serai at Dera Ismail Khan to the Jail, can be used to make up part of the deficit. The question whether we can continue to collect tolls from Mahsud trading convoys till the whole amount now found to be due is realized depends on the question whether the Maliks understood that they were agreeing to pay Rs. 35,000 as a final settlement of certain cases previously settled and certain other cases actually decided by jirgas at the time the payment was arranged. It would appear from paragraph 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, that this is the case, and unless you have anything further to urge on the subject, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks we must forego the demand of Rs. 4,303 (*i.e.*, Rs. 4,595 — Rs. 292) overlooked at the Tank settlement.

5. The question remains how we are to deal with the demand of Rs. 17,000 on account of the five classes of cases mentioned in paragraph 2 for which the Mahsuds are liable on account of cases left unsettled last March and cases which have occurred since, and with the further demand of Rs. 15,000 which is stated to be due on account of miscellaneous cases and cases of Classes C and D. With reference to the last two classes I am to refer you to the correspondence printed in the Foreign Department (Frontier) Proceedings, of May, 1899, where the policy to be followed with reference to them is discussed. In that correspondence you took the view which you have again expressed in paragraph 5 of your letter, dated 19th May, while Mr. Anderson contended that we should only deal with such cases by giving friendly advice to the contending parties. As Mr. Anderson and Mr. Watson have both left the country, Sir Mackworth Young will be glad if you can explain with special reference to the 3rd paragraph of Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 29th May, a copy of which has been sent to you with my letter of to-day's date, the precise nature of the C and D cases not included in the settlement, and endeavour to show why Mr. Anderson excluded them. As he stated that they would be disposed of as opportunities offered, it is clear that he did not regard them as pressing for settlement in the same way as offences in British territory or against British subjects in the protected area. You should also explain more particularly as regards cases of this description not settled before March last whether it is expedient to face the settlement of these inter-tribal cases as well as of the large number of cases in which the interests of British subjects are involved. Further particulars as to the cases classed as miscellaneous will also be useful. Subject to the above remarks the Lieutenant-Governor accepts your proposal to defer dealing with all cases against the Mahsuds not included in the March settlement till August or September next.

6. I am to add that the arrangement as to the Levies described in paragraph 4 of your letter, dated 24th May, is another unsatisfactory feature of the recent settlement.

7. Sir Mackworth Young endorses the views expressed in paragraph 7 of your letter, dated 19th May, and paragraph 2 of your letter dated 11th May, regarding the attack on the Zam Post. He entirely agrees with you in thinking that where a settlement with a tribe has been made in respect of any offence that settlement must, in default of express stipulation, be held to be complete, and to preclude further action against either the tribe or individuals of the tribe concerned in that offence.

8. But the demand made upon the tribe on account of the attack on the Zam post, consisting as it appears merely of the valuation of blood-money and of the property stolen, is so manifestly inadequate as a complete settlement of this very grave offence that the Lieutenant-Governor can hardly

believe that Mr. Anderson accepted it as such without recording his reasons. In the 5th paragraph of his letter, dated 30th March, he reported that the files in all pending cases were examined. His Honour would wish to be informed whether the particular file relating to the attack on the Zam post was laid before Mr. Anderson and whether there is any record on it of the settlement made with the tribe.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 25th June, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 19th June, 1900, forwarding a copy of correspondence regarding offences recently committed by Mahsuds, including a reported robbery of the mails in the Tiarza Nulla on the 20th May, 1900.

2. The Political Officer in Southern Waziristan considers that the mail robbery was instigated by the Mullah Powindah, and the mail bags were said, on the 5th June, to be in the Mulla's house, where they had been taken after the robbery. In these circumstances His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that the Mulla should not be granted any allowance at present, unless he clears himself of complicity in the robbery.

3. The Government of India are of opinion that the sooner the disbursement of the allowance, which has already been sanctioned, can be commenced the better, and the more so if steps are subsequently taken to ensure that publicity is given to the arrangement with the Mulla. With this view, the degree of Mulla Powindah's complicity, if any, in the robbery of the mail should be established by immediate investigation, so as to admit of further action being taken in the matter of the allowance, which is an object of much greater importance.

4. I am to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of the papers forwarded with your letter, dated the 2nd June, 1900, regarding the unfortunate defects which have been brought to light in the settlement made with the Mahsuds by Mr. Anderson in March last. The Government of India observe that the Commissioner of the Derajat Division has been called on for further explanations on some of the points at issue in regard to the settlement. I am to request that, when this supplementary information has reached the Lieutenant-Governor, the views and recommendations of His Honour may be furnished at the earliest possible date.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 26th July, 1900.

With reference to the 4th paragraph of your letter, dated 25th June, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the further correspondence noted in the margin on the subject of the settlement made with the Mahsud Tribe last March.

Letter, dated 28th June, from Commissioner, Derajat, with its enclosures.
Endorsement, dated 2nd July, from Commissioner, Derajat, with enclosure.

2. In the 3rd paragraph of my letter, dated 2nd June, to the address of the Commissioner, a copy of which was submitted with my letter of the same date, the fact that cases as regards which the claim against the Mahsuds would probably amount to Rs. 9,000 had been overlooked by Mr. Anderson was noted. It now appears that to these must be added seven cases belonging to the Bannu District, which were pending in March last, but had, apparently, not been reported by the Deputy Commissioner to the Political

Officer at Wana. The last and most serious of these cases only occurred in the end of February, and the facts of its not having been reported is not wonderful. But all the other cases ought to have been reported, and some of them are very old. The amount due by the Mahsuds on account of the seven Bannu cases is put at Rs. 4,800.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor accepts the conclusion stated in paragraph 2 of Mr. Merk's letter, dated 28th June, that the total amount due by the tribe at the end of March, on the assumption that the settlement made at Tank was intended to include all pending cases, except inter-tribal and miscellaneous cases was under estimated by about Rs. 19,000. In fact, it will be better to put the figure at Rs. 20,000, for Rs. 19,000 does not include Rs. 914, on account of pending Zhob cases mentioned in Mr. Watson's letter, dated 13th May, 1900. This is a serious matter, and the question whether we are really bound, under the terms of the agreement, to accept Rs. 35,000 as a full acquittance for a demand, which ought to have been put at Rs. 55,000, is a difficult one. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it very desirable to have the opinion of the officer who made the settlement, and he further considers that Mr. Anderson ought to have an opportunity of furnishing such explanation as may be possible of the numerous defects which, on the information at present available, appear to have marked his proceedings. A copy of the whole correspondence is, therefore, being sent to Mr. Anderson by this week's mail, with a request that he will favour the Punjab Government with his remarks on the various points in issue at a very early date. Until his reply has been received Sir Mackworth Young wishes to reserve his final conclusions on the case.

4. As already stated in my letter, dated 2nd June, to the address of the Commissioner of the Derajat, the Tank settlement did not profess to take account of claims relating to C, D, and Miscellaneous Cases, amounting to a sum of about Rs. 14,500. Mr. Merk has now explained exactly what these cases are. There is, of course, no manner of doubt that we can enforce our claims regarding them against the Mahsuds, and this will have to be done sooner or later. The Lieutenant-Governor reserves his remarks on the proper way of dealing with cases in the area "under political control" but outside "the protected area" till he is in a position to deal fully with the whole case on receipt of Mr. Anderson's reply.

5. With reference to the proposed recovery of Rs. 3,300 out of the total composition of Rs. 35,000 by withholding part of the pay of the Levies, I am to refer to the correspondence submitted with my letter, dated 25th June.

6. It is, as the Government of India are aware, unfortunately the case that our claims against the Mahsuds have mounted up rapidly owing to the commission of fresh offences since the conclusion of the settlement in last March, and that our relations with the tribe are in an unsatisfactory state. Mr. Merk proposes to report fully on this subject at a very early date.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government Punjab, dated 28th June, 1900.

I am now in a position to reply to your letter, dated the 2nd instant, on the subject of the settlement with the Mahsuds made by Mr. Anderson in March last. The case is complicated, and to avoid interrupting the text, all references to previous correspondence, and to copies of correspondence now enclosed, are given in the margin. I will, as far as possible, follow the heads of your letter under acknowledgment, in the order therein given. As none of the desired information could be found in my office, I addressed the

Dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer.	Political Officer, Wana, and attach a copy of my letter and of Mr. Waterfield's reply, which gives
Dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer.	information.

2. According to the information which was available when your letter under reply was written, the total sum really due from the Mahsuds, on account of the five classes of cases with which the settlement professed to deal, was Rs. 49,000. But since then it has been discovered that there were cases committed by them in the Bannu District, which had not been brought up at the settlement. What these cases are will appear from the enclosed correspondence. The damages that can be held to be fairly claimable on their account amounts to Rs. 3,370; add to this Rs. 1,500 for fines, which it will not be excessive severity to impose for offences, No. 1 (Rs. 200), No. 5 (Rs. 500), No. 7 (Rs. 800), and we have Rs. 4,870, or in round numbers Rs. 4,800 additional to the Rs. 49,000. This makes a total of Rs. 53,008 instead of Rs. 35,000, or an excess of Rs. 18,800.

3. In regard to this excess which is due, a very important point is raised by Mr. Waterfield. He says that the Mahsud Maliks argue that the Rs. 35,000 were a composition for *all* offences of the five classes whatsoever and wheresoever against the Mahsuds, whether decided before the date of the settlement or decided during the settlement or not decided at all as yet when the Tank meeting broke up, and, therefore, still pending like the cases aggregating Rs. 9,000, mentioned by Mr. Watson,* or these Bannu cases. Mr. Waterfield is inclined to accept the contention of the Maliks, upon the strength of Mr. Anderson's statement that "the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the "inter-tribal" cases, which will be "disposed of as opportunities offer." This statement certainly lends colour to what the Maliks urge. But in the first place, since the Bannu cases apparently escaped the notice both of Mr. Anderson and of the Mahsuds, it is impossible to make the settlement embrace what neither side was aware of, or rather, did not think of. In the second place, Mr. Watson before going on leave distinctly informed me that the Mahsuds, when they engaged to pay Rs. 35,000, knew that more was due, but not how much. The files of the cases for which the settlement was made were gone into, as will be described below. If these Rs. 9,000 cases had been included in the settlement the files relating to them would have been gone into and disposed of; but they were not so gone into, and, therefore, they cannot have been included in the settlement, since a clear account of what was actually included in the settlement is given by Mr. Anderson.† Against this is the puzzling statement that there were no cases pending. I do not understand it, and cannot explain it. That the Maliks should be anxious to show that the settlement covered the Rs. 9,000 cases, and the Bannu cases, one can quite understand; they refer to their petition of the 24th March, 1900, but this petition must be taken *quantum valeat*; but in spite of the statement of Mr. Anderson, which appears to have been written under some misapprehension, I consider that the March settlement did not, and was not, intended to cover the pending, or what I call the Rs. 9,000 cases, and also the Bannu cases; that we shall be perfectly justified in demanding redress for these cases, in addition to the Rs. 35,000, and that this will involve no breach of faith or appearance of such.

* His letter, dated 1st May, 1900.

Paragraph 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government.

Paragraph 4 of my letter, dated 19th May, 1900, to Government.

Paragraph 8 of his letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government.

† Paragraph 8 of his letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government.

4. The Rs. 4,303, mentioned by you were not overlooked, but miscalculated at Tank. What happened was this: The detail of the Rs. 35,000 consists of—

- I.—Unrealised fines in cases previously settled.
- II.—Fines due in cases settled at the Tank jirga.
- III.—Tochi and Zhob cases.

There was no need at Tank to go into the files of Class I. The files of Classes II and III were, I understand, run through by Mr. Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk in this office. He prepared an estimate of the liabilities considered due on

* Paragraph 8 of his letter these Classes II and III, which seems to have cited above. been what is given by Mr. Anderson,* and then

the officers concerned in the cases and the Mahsuds were told that an aggregate sum of Rs. 35,000 would be demanded, and would cover everything in Classes I, II, and III. Apparently the files of only four cases were put before the Mahsud jirga—see Mr. Waterfield's letter, dated 20th June, 1900. When, however, it came to working out the sums due in each individual case, the estimate could not be adhered to, and for the Dera Ismail Khan cases

† Letter, dated 9th June, 1900, from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

† My telegram, dated 14th June, 1900.

† Deputy Commissioner's telegram, dated 15th June, 1900.

alone the excess came to about Rs. 2,000.† Mr. Gee is mistaken in thinking that it was proposed to meet the aggregate excess (Rs. 4,000) by utilizing the fines due to Government on account of the Zam and Murtaza cases, *i.e.*, by making Government pay, for, firstly, it cannot have been foreseen when the estimate was framed that the actuals would be in excess, or otherwise, more than Rs. 35,000 would have been fixed as payable by the Mahsuds, and secondly, Mr. Gee himself, with Mr. Watson, assessed the payment for the

(5) Letter, dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer. Zam case, and they did not fix any fine at all. I will deal with the punishment awarded for the Zam and other serious offences later on.

5. The proceeds of the sale of the $\frac{2}{3}$ rd share of the Mahsud crops have fallen short of the estimate by Rs. 234, Rs. 3,000 having been realised. The anticipations on this point† have not been fulfilled; this gives a further deficit of Rs. 234, but the item is a trifle.

Telegram, dated 21st June, 1900, from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

† Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government.

6. The alimony of the hostages is looked upon as a tribal allowance. We call them hostages, but some years ago, in 1889, I think, it was proposed to send back the hostages to their homes, by way of punishment to the Mahsuds. This throws a new light upon the common interpretation of the term "hostage." It was because the alimony is in effect a tribal allowance that I proposed to utilize it towards

Paragraph 3 of my letter, dated 19th May, 1900, to Government.

meeting the deficit. I am presently going to address Government separately on the whole question of Mahsud hostages.

7. I thought we could explain to the Mahsuds that on working out the detail of the damages due from them we found that they come to Rs. 4,300, or rather Rs. 4,600 now (with the deficit on the Mahsud $\frac{2}{3}$ rd crop proceeds),

Paragraph 4.

and that they must make this good. But in view of the remarks in your letter I venture to agree that this measure is not feasible. The only course now open to us for giving some compensation, at any rate, to those injured British subjects, who will otherwise not have even

Paragraph 2 (9) of my letter, dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer, and his letter, dated 20th June, 1900, clause (9).

partial justice done to them, is to reduce rateably the compensation payable throughout the cases, so as to make all the cases fit into the limit of the Rs. 35,000. I do not advocate that Government pay the Rs. 4,600.

8. But here another and very grave difficulty meets us, if the plea of the Malik is accepted, *viz.*, that the Rs. 9,000 cases and the Bannu cases are included in the Rs. 35,000 settlement. These cases aggregate Rs. 13,800. Obviously some compensation must be given in these cases. We cannot do justice in some cases affecting British subjects and their property, and not do justice in others that are in precisely the same class. If the Malik's plea is accepted, we shall have to fit in Rs. 13,800 + Rs. 4,600 worth of cases, or Rs. 18,400 worth of cases altogether, into the Rs. 35,000 in addition to the cases already supposed to be covered by the Rs. 35,000. This will reduce the compensation payable all round by 50 per cent. To judge from what was done

in the grave offences mentioned below, it is not to be supposed that the compensation fixed in the II and III Classes errs on the side of liberality to the injured people. And it can easily be realised what effect a further reduction by 50 per cent. of this compensation will have upon British subjects and Mahsuds alike. If, however, Government decide to demand the Rs. 13,800 from the Mahsuds, the distribution of the deficit of Rs. 4,600 over the already settled cases will not matter much, *quâ*, moral effect, although the process will cause infinite trouble to the Political Officer, since compensation has, I believe, been already paid in many cases from moneys in hand out of the Rs.

* Paragraph 6 of Mr. Anderson's letter, dated 30th March, 1900, to Government. 5,000 Mahsud deposit, and the Rs. 8,466 Maliki allowances.* However, it will have to be gone through.

9. Turning now to what have been called "C and D" cases, I would explain that this classification was introduced by Mr. Bruce, late Commissioner of this Division, in 1895. "C" cases were defined by him to be inter-tribal cases in protected areas or near posts, &c., which, for political reasons, require to be taken up, and "D" were to be other inter-tribal case. What are "Miscellaneous" cases, and why so classified by Mr. Watson we cannot tell, beyond this that they

† Paragraph 2, clause (4) of my letter, dated 5th June, 1900, to Political Officer; clause (4) of his reply, dated 20th June, 1900.

appear to be old or doubtful cases, which were not of sufficient urgency or importance to be entered in Lists C and D. I have endeavoured to obtain some insight into the nature of the cases in the C, D, and Miscellaneous lists by going through the statements for the past four years of all cases sent monthly to this office by the Political Officer, but Miscellaneous cases are not mentioned in them, and for Lists C and D only numbers, viz., abstract totals and results, and no details of the offences are given. No further information than the above can, therefore, be supplied to Government without a laborious and lengthy examination of all the files in the Wana Office. In Proceedings, Foreign-Frontier A., May, 1900, an abstract (from which, however, D cases are omitted is given by Mr. Watson. Excluding the cases committed since

Paragraph 3 of your letter. March, 1900, the money equivalent of which by this date is very considerably more, I know, than Rs. 500, Rs. 14,500 are due for cases in Lists C, D, and Miscellaneous. At a rough guess, out of this I suppose about Rs. 8,000 are due for C cases, Rs. 4,000 for D cases, and Rs. 2,500 for Miscellaneous cases. It will be observed that both Messrs Watson

* Clauses (2) and (3) of his letter, dated 20th June, 1900. and Waterfield* are of opinion that all moneys due on C, D, and Miscellaneous cases should be exacted from the Mahsuds.

My own view is that the amount due is a detail, and that in this matter we are under an obligation. The principle that should govern our line of action must be accepted and defined, the rest follows as a matter of course. I would premise by pointing out that the designation "inter-tribal" in no way removes a case from the category of those in which Government is bound to "do right," if the case happens to come into this category; the Guri Khel raid upon a Bannu village has been termed an "inter-tribal" case, but no one is prepared to say that this was not an offence which Government was bound to take up, in which we were not obliged as a matter of duty to see that justice was done and punishment was inflicted. Now, as to the principle. In Punjab Government letter, dated the 1st April, 1892, it is emphatically laid down that the British Government has taken possession of the Gomal route, and has established the Queen's peace, and has determined to maintain law and order there. Hence, the Lieutenant-Governor proceeds to say, any attack there or any attempt to carry off looted property along the route by any one must be severely punished. And in paragraph 6 of your office letter of the 1st February, 1892, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick agreed with the local officers that under no circumstances ought raids in the Gomal Pass to be passed over without severe punishment and redress. That is to say, the obligation and responsibility incurred by possession were as clearly as possible recognized

and pronounced. It will be seen that no distinction of persons was made; whether the injured persons are British subjects or others, whether the cases are "inter-tribal" or not, there must be peace and order kept, and justice done. At that time, in 1892, we had not extended our possession to Wana, to the Shahur line, and to the intervening and neighbouring tracts. Since 1894 we have done so. But so far as I am aware the principle then enunciated, viz., that effective possession implies and imposes the duty to maintain the peace, has not been traversed, and the orders of Government are still binding upon the local officers. There is here no mention of "friendly advice" to the parties; it is the authoritative maintenance of order, the official and peremptory redress of wrongs, which is meant. Looking at the question from another aspect, to put it bluntly, we cannot eat our cake and have it. We cannot occupy a country, cover it with posts, cross it with roads, exercise in it criminal and civil jurisdiction, levy taxes in it (*e.g.*, the Suleiman Khel tirni), call it a protectorate, and then say to its residents: "Well, we will give friendly advice to the Mahsuds to leave you alone and to restore your property and pay you damages for your people whom they have killed." Considering the huge bill against the Mahsuds for offences against Government and against British subjects, much will the Mahsuds heed friendly advice, especially when it relates to their dealings with their hereditary and bitter foes, the Darwesh Khel, Powindahs and Ghilzais, who reside in or travel through our protected area. "Friendly advice" means practically an adjournment to the Greek calends, and both parties understand this. It would be out of the question to permit the residents or those who are temporarily in our protectorate to take the task of redress into their own hands. With raids and counter-raids the protectorate would soon be a pandemonium, and no one's life or property would be safe; they are not very safe now, but that is nothing to what would be the case if the door were thrown open to reprisals. But if we do not permit reprisals, and if we do not ourselves intervene with authority, what are those who are injured in our protectorate to do? A virtual denial of justice produces the worst effect upon all; upon the Mahsuds, upon the people in the protected area and upon British subjects. I am bound to say that I have recently had significant hints as to the state of feeling arising out of what the people within and without the border think is the almost unchecked licence of the Mahsuds to prey on their neighbours. If we do not protect those who live in the protected area, the discontent will be of such as to render it impossible to hold it with Militia drawn from the affected localities themselves. Lastly, in the Tochi we redress the wrongs suffered by the residents of the valley at the hands of the Mahsuds, and what we concede to one protectorate we cannot deny to the other. It comes to this: having taken the country we cannot abnegate our responsibility for the Queen's peace in it; "friendly advice," considering the character and habits of those concerned and the gravity of the bloodshed and rapine that have occurred is practically such an abnegation. The only course which in my humble judgment is wise, politic and just is to take up all cases that have taken place in the protected area in much the same way and to the same extent as if they had taken place in British territory and as if British subjects had been concerned. There is no other way out of it; legally and technically speaking the protected area is not British territory, but virtually to all intents and purposes it is like Zhob, and must be treated as such.

I am quite unable to say why Mr. Anderson, in view of the orders I have cited and in view of the general position which I have endeavoured to

* Clause (2) of his letter, sketch, excluded the C and D cases from the dated 20th June, 1900. settlement; nor can Mr. Waterfield* explain.

If the adoption of the principle which I have advocated is approved, we shall have to face the settlement of these cases, in so far as they have occurred in the protected area. It is expedient to do so, else there will be serious discontent in the protected area, and with the crisis in our relations with the Mahsuds, which is imminent, we cannot afford to have dissatisfaction behind us, even if for other reasons it were not highly expedient to

show those whom we take under our protection that we are prepared to incur trouble and risk in order to make that protection a reality and not a name, and our occupation a benefit and not an evil.

What will be the total of the cases that out of the aggregate of the Rs. 14,500 will on enquiry be found to have occurred in the protected area it is impossible to say without going through all the files; but I should not be surprised if we find all or almost all of the cases to have occurred in the protected area, since, however prepared Political Officers may have been on paper in the past to extend our responsibilities, I think that their practice did not correspond to their theory and that they were not particularly anxious to take up cases occurring outside of the rough limits of the occupied area. To this Rs. 14,500 or greater part of it must be added when the settlement comes off several serious offences committed since last March,

My endorsement, dated 25th April, 1900, to your address.

e.g., the robbery of 140 Powindah camels from Spin, out of which the Mahsuds have to account for 117. (Correspondence about this case will shortly be submitted.)

Paragraph 6 of your letter.
† My letter, dated 4th June, 1900.

10. For my opinion in the matter of the fine on the Levies I would refer to the correspondence already submitted to Government.†

11. I am at a loss to explain why Mr. Anderson accepted a settlement of the Zam case consisting only of blood-money and the value of the stolen property. There is no record of this settlement in my office file of the Zam case, nor apparently in that of the Political Officer beyond the vernacular finding of the jirga, signed by Messrs. Gee and Watson, which fixes the amount of the blood-money and value of property carried off to be paid. The examination of the files to which you refer was conducted I believe by Tej Bhan. In order to see if this Zam settlement was a slip or in accordance with a definitely adopted plan for settling all the grave offences, I requested Mr. Waterfield to report how the following cases had been settled:—

Letter, dated 20th June, 1900, from Political Officer.

My letter No. 82 C., dated the 5th June, 1900.

- (a) The murder of two Zhob Sowars in May, 1898.
- (b) The murder of two Zhob Levies in May, 1899.
- (c) The attack on Mr. Watson and the murder of his chaprasi in July, 1899.
- (d) The murder of two Border Military Policemen and the wounding of two others at Zerannioba in January, 1900.
- (e) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard in February, 1900.

He reports that in the Zhob cases what appear to be fairly adequate fines were imposed, but that in the Punjab cases (as in the Zam case), only blood-money and the value of the stolen property has been demanded.

In the Zam case 2 Border Military Policemen, 2 Levies and 1 non-official British subject, 5 men in all, were killed; the blood-money awarded is only Rs. 1,800, or Rs. 360 per man. The same rate is awarded in the Zerannioba case, which contrasts unfavourably with the Rs. 1,000 per head in the instances of the Zhob men. In the Zerannioba case a somewhat adequate punishment would have been inflicted if the Rs. 3,500 realized by a seizure of Mahsuds and their property had been retained as well as the Rs. 1,570 awarded in March, but Government are aware that the Rs. 3,500 were returned to the Mahsuds at the Tank settlement.

My letter, dated 26th June, 1900, to your address.

It cannot be that these amazingly lenient settlements were made with the power held in reserve to go behind the settlements and to punish the individual offenders; else why was not the same course

Paragraph 7 of your letter.

adopted in the Zhob cases? And if it was so intended, some record would exist of such a stipulation having been made and having been communicated to and accepted by the Mahsuds when they agreed to pay Rs. 35,000, regarding which it is expressly stated that it covered all cases, "leaving none pending anywhere against the Mahsuds," a comprehensive statement which doubtless covers individual Mahsuds as well as the tribe collectively. What verbal orders were given in respect of the principle of settlement of these grave offences I do not know; but it is clear that four of them were settled on the same lines, and therefore presumably some common mode of settlement must have been prescribed.

In the case of the firing upon Mr. Watson, the Tori Khel Darwesh Khel concerned in the matter will be fined Rs. 1,000 by the Political Officer, Tochi, as I have reported already.* But beyond the exaction of Rs. 910 (blood-money for the chaprasi that was killed and value of property carried off), nothing was done to the Mahsuds in or close to whose limits the offence occurred and who were active aiders and abettors, if not more. Probably Mr. Watson holds that the Tori Khel were the men who actually killed the chaprasi and fired on himself. It may be so, although in such a case it would naturally be the object of the Mahsuds to lay all the blame on their Darwesh comrades. But if, as he says,† Sheikhs of Mullah Powindah were also concerned in the attack on him, the punishment of the Mahsuds is manifestly inadequate.

12. The item of Rs. 5,000 to be paid out of a Mahsud deposit is explained by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. Clearly the money is, in a way, Mahsud property, but having lain four years‡ in deposit, its confiscation cannot have much effect upon the tribe as a whole. Up to date the proceeds of the tolls have been—

			Rs.	A.	P.
In Dera Ismail Khan	775	0	0
In Bannu	24	1	6
In Tochi	4	0	0
			<hr/>		
			803	1	6
			<hr/>		

I do not know if the Mahsuds will be shrewd enough to slightly raise the prices of what they have to sell, but if they do this then the consumers, British subjects, will have to pay so much of the Mahsud fines as proceeds from the tolls. An awkward feature about this tolls arrangement is that the usual, almost the only way of settling cases with Mahsuds, especially where property must be recovered, is to seize their caravans; the Political Officer cannot do this now; if he does, the realization of the fine is at once stopped or impeded.

13. I am afraid the settlement cannot be considered satisfactory whichever way it is looked at; and if in future the Mahsuds give trouble, as indeed they have been steadily doing ever since the day of the settlement, I and the Political Officer, Wana, must ask the indulgence of Government, because what was done in March cannot have acted as a deterrent: it cannot have given cause to the Mahsuds to amend their ways; it may encourage them to think that the next time they are brought to book they will be treated with the same extraordinary leniency; and if so, a further and weighty element of complication will have been added to a situation which is already full of difficulties. What the Mahsud Maliks themselves think of it will appear from the extract given below from a letter on the general situation which I have received from Mr. Waterfield, and which I shall submit separately to Government with the review promised next

Paragraph 5 of your letter.

month, preparatory to taking up the cases against the Mahsuds in August or September:—

EXTRACT from letter, dated the 12th June, 1900, from Political Officer,
Wana.

“That in making the settlement in March last they were induced by the “Master” (viz., Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk to Commissioner, Derajat) to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson. They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crime.”

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my endorsement, dated the 27th May, 1900, on the general subject of Mahsud misconduct and the March settlement, I have the honour to forward, for information and for *very early* report on the points noted below, a copy of Punjab Government letter, dated the 2nd instant.

2. The subjects on which you are requested to report are—

- (1) Did the Mahsud Malikis understand that they were agreeing to pay Rs. 35,000 as a final settlement of certain cases previously settled and certain other cases actually decided by jirgas at the time the payment was arranged? Please refer to your office letters of the 13th ultimo.
- (2) What is the precise nature of the C and D cases not included in the settlement, and is there anything on record in your office to show why they were excluded?
- (3) What is your opinion on the question whether it is expedient to face the settlement of their inter-tribal cases as well as of the large number of cases in which the interests of British subjects are involved?
- (4) What is the nature of the cases classed as “Miscellaneous”?
- (5) Does your office, in the English or Vernacular files, contain any note or record of the reason of the demand for the Zam case being limited to blood-money and restitution of the property stolen? Is there any record on the file, English or Vernacular, of the settlement made with the tribe for this case?
- (6) What were the demands made on the tribe and included I understand in this settlement, for the following cases:—
 - (a) The murder of two Zhob Levy Sowars in May, 1898.
 - (b) The murder of two Zhob Levy Footmen in May, 1899.
 - (c) The attack on the Political Officer, Wana, and murder of his chaprasi on 20th July, 1899.
 - (d) The murder of two Border Military Policemen and wounding of two others on the 9th January, 1900, at Zerannioba.
 - (e) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard, in February last.
- (7) What are the four Tochi cases left unsettled? *Vide* paragraph 3 of the Government letter enclosed.
- (8) Have the eight Zhob cases, and any others there may be pending, been disposed of during April by your predecessor and the Political Agent, Zhob, as was anticipated in paragraph 8 of this office letter, dated the 30th March, 1900, to Government.

- (9) If we forego the demand of 4,303 rupees (paragraph 4 of the Government letter enclosed), how are the injured persons to be compensated? Are they British subjects?

In your reply please follow the sequence of the above heads in your report.

3. Your letter, dated the 28th instant, with its enclosure, on the subject of fines on the Levies, has been submitted to Government.

4. Your special attention is invited to paragraph 7 of the enclosed Government letter. I attach a copy of paragraph 7 of my letter, dated the 19th ultimo, to Government; it relates to paragraph 7 of your office letter, dated the 13th ultimo.

Annexure 3.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

I have the honour to reply to your No. 82 C., dated 5th June, 1900, to forward the following answers to your questions contained in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned letter:—

(1) I have personally enquired from the Chief Mahsud Maliks as to what cases they understood were settled at the jirga held at Tank by Mr. Anderson, late Commissioner of the Derajat, in March, 1900. The Maliks all declare that all cases which were pending against Mahsuds and which had been committed against British subjects in British territory, in the Wana jurisdiction, and in the jurisdictions of Tochi, Zhob and Shirani prior to the date of this settlement were settled; and they one and all refer me to the petition* put in by the Mahsud Maliks dated 22nd March, 1900, in which they show how the sum of Rs. 35,000 can be realized.

* I doubt if any Mahsud drew up or dictated this petition.

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

(2) "C" and "D" cases not included in the settlement are purely inter-tribal cases, those committed within protected area being classed as "C" and those committed outside "protected area," yet which the Political Officer considered should be taken up against Mahsuds, being classed as D. Complainants in these cases are Suleiman Khels, Dotanis, Darwesh Khels and Bhattannis.

There is absolutely no record whatever in this office to show why these offences were excluded from the settlement made in March, 1900.

(3) I am of opinion that Government is bound to enforce the settlement of these inter-tribal cases, otherwise good cause will be given to the injured tribe for grave discontent, as the Bhattannis and Darwesh Khels both look to Government to protect them from injury at the hands of the Mahsuds, and, moreover, are forbidden to take the law into their own hands within the protected area, where only it is possible for them to retaliate on the Mahsuds.

(4) As to the definition of "Miscellaneous Cases," I can give no satisfactory answer. From Mr. Watson's letter, dated 13th May, 1900, I gather that they have to do with claims against Mahsuds brought forward some time after the commission of an offence which was never originally reported. There is nothing to show why these cases should not have been classed under the heading A, B, C, D, to one of which they properly belonged. Apparently such cases were taken up or not at the will of the Political Officer.

(5) There is no record on any English or Vernacular file to show the reason why only blood-money and restitution of stolen property was demanded from the Mahsuds for the Zam case.

On the Vernacular file of the Zam case there is an order to the following effect signed by Messrs. Gee and Watson: "Finding of jirga agreed to. A decree of Rs. 2,650 issued against Mahsuds."

The jirga's finding was as follows:—

"We have gone through the files of this case; we can find no evidence against any special individual, but there is no doubt that this offence was committed by Mahsuds. We therefore propose that the following amounts be recovered from the three sections of Mahsuds—

	Rs
" For blood-money	1,800
" For stolen rifles	600
" For two stolen muskets	100
" For stolen property	150
• Total	2,650

Signed by—Mir Ajal, Barahmat, Amin Khan and
Muhammad Azim of Kundi, &c."

(6) The demands made on the Mahsud tribe for the cases specified are—

- (a) Fine of Rs. 2,000.
- (b) Fine of Rs. 2,000 plus Rs. 560 Kabuli paid for recovery of one of the stolen rifles; total Rs. 2,280 British.
- (c) No fine was imposed for the attack on Mr. Watson, Political Officer. The case was filed by an order signed by Mr. Watson. For the murder of the Political Officer's chaprasi Rs. 720 blood-money, Rs. 150 for rifle stolen, and Rs. 40 for other stolen property was imposed; total Rs. 910.
- (d) For the Zerrannioba case the following fine was imposed on the three sections of the Mahsuds:—For blood-money of 2 Border Military Police sepoy Rs. 720, for wounding 2 Border Military Police sepoy Rs. 200, for theft of 4 rifles Rs. 600, for theft of property Rs. 50; total Rs. 1,570.
- (e) For the attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard the following fine was imposed:—For theft of 3 Snider rifles Rs. 450, for theft of 36 cartridges, 2 belts and 2 bayonets Rs. 50; total Rs. 500.

(7) The four Tochi cases referred to in paragraph 3 of Government letter No. 648, dated 2nd June, 1900, are:—

- (1) Murder of Pir Ahmad and wounding of other herdsmen by a gang of Jalal Khels, headed by Sahib Khan, on 20th February, 1899, at Inzarka Hill.
- (2) Theft of a mare valued at Rs. 300 Kabuli on 1st June, 1899, at Lewana Hill. Complainants being Ghaina Din and Muhammad Afzal, Levy sepoy, and accused being Yargul, Kangrai and Lawang, Jalal Khels. This case has been settled by recovery of the mare.
- (3) Theft of 23 camels belonging to Commissariat contractors from Dande plain on 16th October, 1899, by Jalal Khels.
- (4) Theft of three smooth-bore muzzle-loading muskets from Levies at Pamani Ghundi tower on 18th October, 1899, by Jalal Khels.

These cases were apparently not included in those compounded by payment of Rs. 35,000, as my predecessor has ordered enquiries to be instituted by the Naib Tahsildar of Jandola.

(8) No meeting took place between my predecessor and the Political Agent, Zhob, in April last, and none of the eight Zhob cases have yet been settled, unless they are to be considered as included in the composition of Rs. 35,000; nothing in the files, however, show whether they are included or not.

(9) If the sum of 4,303 rupees in excess of the Rs. 35,000, for which cases in Classes A and B against Mahsuds were compounded, is not to be realized from the Mahsuds, the complainants who are British subjects cannot be compensated, unless Government will advance the money required.

I have carefully noted paragraph 7 of the Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900, and will in future act accordingly.

In reply to your telegram, dated 18th June, in continuation of your letter, dated 5th June, 1900, now under reply, I have the honour to inform you that the Guri Khel Maliks were not present at the Tank jirga held in March, 1900, but Malik Badshah Khan, Salimi Khel, is said to have always represented the Guri Khel section, and it was to him that the sum of Rs. 781-8-0, which was due to the Guri Khels for baramta of their bahirs, was repaid. I find, however, that this sum of Rs. 781-8-0 was actually paid to Badshah Khan out of Political funds, owing to the fact that the original amount of Rs. 781-8-0 realized by baramta of Guri Khel's bahirs had already been forwarded to Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, in part settlement for the raid committed by Guri Khels on Walli Khels in Bannu. Thus this sum of Rs. 781-8-0 has been paid out twice over from this office, as this amount was not included in the Rs. 35,000 to be paid by Mahsuds.

In reply to your telegram, dated 18th June, I have the honour to state that no Bannu cases were put before the jirga for settlement at the Tank Jirga held in March, 1900.

Annexure 4.

Letter from A. J. Grant, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 14th instant, which reached me at Shekh Budin on 19th, I have the honour to send you a list of offences outstanding against Mahsuds committed in my district which were probably not included in the settlement of March last (either because of not having been reported to the Political Officer, Wana, before that date or because of having been committed since that date). The list, I am afraid, may not be quite complete as there was no definite system of registering such cases till a few months ago, when I opened a regular register, but my pending files have been thoroughly searched, and I hope all cases have been included.

Annexure 5.

Statement showing the Cases Outstanding against the Mahsuds.

No.	Name of Complainant.	Name of Accused Person.	Charge.	Brief Account of the Case.
1 Damages assessed Rs. 640. W. R. H. MERK.	Bande, son of Manak, Wazir Malikshahi of Malikshahi.	Rahman, son of Makin, Shabi Khel	Theft of 160 sheep on 26th August, 1896.	The complainant's labourer, named Gud, was grazing his flock in grazing ground of village Amaldar. Four offenders came there and carried away the flock. Chigha turned out but without success. Gud alleges to recognize one Rahman, accused.
2 Rupees 100. W. R. H. MERK.	Nasra Din, son of Said Amin, Sardi Khel Sardi Khel.	(1) Khoji, son of unknown; (2) Purdil, son of unknown; (3) Wardin, son of Baidal; (4) Chari, son of Haji Muhammad, Shabi Khels.	Theft of two camels on 9th April, 1897.	The camels were found with the accused, and the complainant got them back on payment of ransom Rs. 85, and Rs. 15 were paid to spies.
3 Rupees 80. W. R. H. MERK.	Shah Nawaz, son of Hassan, Narmi Khel of Narmi Khel.	(1) Samand Khan; (2) Tup, Mahsud, Shabi Khel of Bobar.	Theft of two bullocks; 9th August, 1897.	The complainant's bullocks were stolen from the Narmi Khel grazing ground. The complainant made search, and came to know that the bullocks were with the accused, who were asked to take ransom and restore the cattle, but they refused to do so.
4	(1) Abbas, son of Mirdad; (2) Mir Alam; (3) Baist Khan, Poin-dahs of Kulachi.	(1) Ghanni Khan; (2) Pir Gul, Haibat Khel Mahsuds.	Dacoity; 21st March, 1898.	Complainants' four camels were missed when they were watering them from the Gambila River. When they searched for their camels they saw 10 armed men carrying away the camels. Police Sergeant of Chauki Hawed went in pursuit, but without success. A spy brought the news that the camels were with the accused. They asked Rs. 240 as ransom. They were asked to give the names of actual culprits, but they declined to do so. One camel was found with Dost Muhammad, Shabi Khel, at Gandi Khan Khel. One of the complainants recognised his camel. Dost Muhammad said that he had purchased from Mozaffar, Shabi Khel. The former brought the latter, and they stood their trial by a Criminal Court. Dost Muhammad was discharged, and Muzaffar sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 10 fine, and the camel was restored to the complainant.
5 Rupees 600. W. R. H. MERK.	Atal, Umarzai, of Umarzai	Gid, Mahsud Kikarai	Murder of Khan on 21st September, 1899.	The deceased was murdered by the accused for private feud. A spy was sent to the Mahsud country to trace actual culprit. He, on his return, said that there was a prevailing rumour that the murder was committed by the accused.

Rupees 250. W. R. H. MERK.	6	Captain Luck	Daulati	Theft, Section 380, Indian Penal Code; 25th December, 1899. 26th	The accused is being suspected of stealing seven saddles and harness of a trap from Captain Luck's bungalow.
Rupees 1,700. W. R. H. MERK.	7	Villagers of Taoda	Shabi Khel and Jalal Khels	Dacoity, Section 397, Indian Penal Code; 26th February, 1900. 27th	The dacoity was committed by the Jalal Khels and Shabi Khels. In the course of dacoity the gang killed one man, wounded two men, and looted property worth Rs. 476.
Total Rs. 3,370. W. R. H. MERK.					

C. A. SMITH, Lieut.,
for Deputy Commissioner.

The 20th June, 1900.

Annexure 6.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 20th June, 1900.

In returning the original correspondence forwarded with your letter, dated 14th June, 1900, I have the honour to state it is perfectly true that the case in question* was not put before the jirga held at Tank by Mr. Anderson in March, 1900. In fact, no Bannu cases were produced at the jirga. This, however, in my opinion, does not alter the fact that the Mahsud Malik and jirga were distinctly told that the settlement then arrived at covered all cases committed against British subjects in British territory prior to the date of settlement. In my letter of 20th instant, in reply to your letter, dated 5th June, 1900, I have informed you that the Malik has declared that they were informed by Mr. Anderson that cases which had been committed by Mahsuds against British subjects and in British territory were settled. In support of this declaration made by the Malik to me, I would refer you to paragraph 8 of letter from H. A. Anderson, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 30th March, in which it is distinctly asserted that "under these circumstances the settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds except the inter-tribal cases, &c."

Even though this case was not brought up before the jirga, yet we cannot say that the Mahsud Jirga was to blame for not mentioning the case, as at the time they were merely informed that for old cases outstanding against the tribe, fines amounting roughly to 17,000 rupees were unrealized, and that for recent cases undisposed of compensation and fines amounting to Rs. 18,000 had been imposed, making a total of Rs. 35,000 due from the tribe. Except in the cases of—

- (a) The murder of the Political Officer's chaprasi,
- (b) The murder of 2 Border Police and wounding of two other Border Police Sepoys at Zerannioba,
- (c) The attack on the Murtaza rest-house guard,
- (d) The raid on the Zam Post,

I can find no trace of cases having been put before the jirga at the time of the settlement. Now with regard to this case if it is taken up against the Mahsuds, I venture to point out that the Malik will accuse us of breach of faith.

Then the Malik undoubtedly consider all cases committed in British territory prior to the date of settlement to have been settled.

From the point of view of the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, I grant that he has every right to demand reparation from the Mahsuds for this offence, but then again are we to go behind the settlement already arrived at? In connection with this question I would refer you to paragraph 7 of Punjab Government letter, dated 2nd June, 1900, to your address, and also to paragraph 7 of your letter, dated 19th May, to address of Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Possibly this is not the only case which may come up for orders, and I would therefore ask for definite instructions as to how I am to act with regard to the settlement of such cases.

Annexure 7.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 9th June, 1900.

I have the honour to reply to your letter, dated 5th June, 1900. I speak from memory as the records are in the office of the Political Officer, Wana.

The estimate made for compensation payable in Dera Ismail Khan and Shirani cases, which were the only ones in which I had any concern, was, I believe, about Rs. 9,500. The amount of compensation which Mr. Watson and myself did award in these two classes of cases was, I think, the minimum which we could have decreed. It was proposed to meet the excess amount over the estimate by utilizing that portion of the Rs. 35,000 which was due to Government itself as compensation in the Zam case and the case of rifle-stealing at Murtaza.

Annexure 8.

Telegram from Commissioner, Derajat, to Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, dated 14th June, 1900.

Your letter of 9th instant. Telegraph what was the amount of compensation which you and Watson did award.

Annexure 9.

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 15th June, 1900.

Your telegram. Amount of compensation awarded was eleven thousand and one hundred and sixty-two rupees four annas plus a fine of fifty rupees to be credited to Government.

Annexure 10.

Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 21st June, 1900.

Your letter. The Mahsud's grain has been sold to Dera Ismail at 3 rupees 12 annas per maund, hence exact price will be Rs. 3,000.

Annexure 11.

Letter from H. W. Gee, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 15th June, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 4th instant, I have the honour to state that the Rs. 5,000 referred to as in deposit on account of Mahsud lands is not composed of sums due to individual Maliks, but represents the balance in hand out of the general Naskot Colony income at the time of the partition effected by Mr. Bruce, late Commissioner. Previous to partition amongst

individuals the income from this Colony was paid over to the main divisions of the tribe, to divide up amongst themselves, while a certain sum was kept for expenditure on the cultivating arrangements in the Colony.

I would refer you to paragraph 3 of Mr. Ogilvie's letter, dated 21st January, 1887, to the address of Commissioner, Derajat, and also to paragraph 5 of Mr. King's letter, dated 9th March, 1892, to the address of the Commissioner.

The money, strictly speaking, belongs to the Colony, and not to Government; and, if it had not been paid to the credit of these fines, it would have been spent in developing the colonization scheme and on improvements, all of which the individual Maliks will now eventually have to pay for.

Annexure 12.

Letter from J. S. Donald, Esq., C.I.E., Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 23rd June, 1900.

In compliance with your endorsement, dated 12th June, 1900, I have the honour to submit a statement showing the reasons why the four cases mentioned in paragraph 2 of Mr. Watson's letter, dated 14th May, 1900, to your address, remained unsettled at the recent meeting held at Bannu in April last.

Case No. 4 of the statement has since been settled and filed. Thus there are now three cases pending, and two of these have also been settled so far as the claim of the Government is concerned.

ENDORSEMENT by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division; dated Dera Ismail Khan, 2nd July, 1900.

Copy, with copy of the enclosure, forwarded to J. M. Douie, Esquire, Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, for information, in reply to his letter, dated 2nd June, 1900.

Annexure 13.

List of Cases attributed to the Mahsuds which remained pending at the close of the Meeting of the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, held at Bannu in April, 1900.

Serial No.	Reference to previous correspondence.	Complainant.	Accused.	Nature of offence.	Brief account of the case.	Remarks made at the meeting, with explanations.
1	Statement A—Enclosure to Political Officer Tochi's letter No. 1425, dated 21st November, 1899. <i>Case No. 5</i>	Ghulam Muhammad Fatteh, &c., Sarwans, Commissariat Department.	Jalal Khel Mahsuds	Theft of 23 camels on 16th October, 1899.	From reports received in the Tochi it was found that the raid was committed by the Mahsuds and the camels were still with the raiders.	File to be made over to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification. On tribal responsibility the Tochi tribes paid a fine of Rs. 1,500 so the case is settled as far as the Tochi is concerned. It is for the Political Officer, Wana, to verify now whether the Mahsuds had any share in this case.
2	Do. <i>Case No. 7</i> ...	Empress	Do. ...	Robbery of three Levies' muskets on 18th October, 1899.	The Amzoni Maliks, in whose limits the robbery was committed, arranged and got back the muskets on payment of blackmail.	File made over to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification of "bhunga," which apparently amounted to Rs. 203 Kabuli. The Tochi tribes have returned the muskets, but they claim the amount of "bhunga" paid by them to the Mahsuds.
3	Statement B. <i>Case No. 2</i> ...	Gul Mir, &c., of Idal Khel, Daur.	Do. ...	Raid on flock and murder of shepherd on 20th February, 1899.	A gang composed of Papare, Khilji, Ballo, &c., committed the raid.	File to be sent to the Political Officer, Wana, for verification.
4	Do. <i>Case No. 10</i> ...	Ghania Din, &c.	Do. ...	Theft of one mare on 1st June, 1899.	Political Officer, Wana, also wired that the mare was found with the Jalal Khels.	Mare has been returned. Owner to be asked by the Political Officer, Tochi, if he has received it; if he has, case will be filed. NOTE.—Mare has been returned.* Case can be filed. 21-5-00. J. S DONALD.

Miramshah,
the 22nd June, 1900.

J. S. DONALD,
Political Officer, Tochi.

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 26th July, 1900.

I am directed to refer to the telegram from this office, dated 26th April last, and to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 2nd instant, from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, and enclosures, containing further details of the raid committed on Miani Powindas in Spin on the 23rd April.

2. The gang that committed this raid was composed of Darwesh Khel of the Zalli Khel section and Mahsuds. The names of 11 of the former and 17 of the latter have been ascertained by the local officers. Eight of the Zalli Khel offenders have been arrested, tried by jirga, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine, but the Mahsud Maliks have neither restored the stolen property nor surrendered the offenders. The Commissioner has, therefore, sanctioned the announcement to them of the following terms:—

- (1) Return of 117 camels, or compensation at Rs. 50 per camel for those not returned.
- (2) Payment of Rs. 360 as blood-money.
- (3) Payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000 if the offenders are not surrendered. If no camels are returned, and none of the raiders is surrendered by the Mahsuds, the sum payable by that tribe for this offence will be Rs. 7,210.

The Lieutenant-Governor has approved of the terms sanctioned by the Commissioner.

 Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 2nd July, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated the 30th May, 1900, I have the honour to submit a copy of the following correspondence regarding the raid on Miani Powinda camels:—

Report from Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter to the Political Officer, Wana, dated 21st June, 1900.

Political Officer, Wana's letter, dated 23rd June, 1900.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 2nd July, 1900, to the Political Officer, Wana.

 Annexure 2.

Report on the Raid committed by Mahsuds and Zalli Khel Darwesh Khels upon Miani Powindas in the "protected area" of the Wana political jurisdiction on night of 23rd April, 1900.

This case occurred at Chaparra Khulla in Spin, which is recognised as being "protected area," and, therefore, the case is cognisable by the Political Officer, Wana.

The complainants are Miani Powindas, who were travelling up the Gomal route on their way to summer quarters in Khorasan. They reported

that, when their camels were out grazing, a gang of some 80 men raided them and carried off 170, and that one Powinda who followed the raiders was shot.

Enquiries were at once instituted, and have been going on up to date, and the case has been most thoroughly worked out.

It has been ascertained that this raid was the work of a gang composed of Mahsuds and Zalli Khel Darwesh Khels. This gang made the original attack on the Powindas and started a stampede among the camels, and that whilst the Powindas followed in pursuit, four small gangs of Abdurrahman Khel Mahsuds drove off a certain number of camels which were left behind. It has been ascertained that 23 camels fell to the share of the Zalli Khels and 97 camels have been traced to Mahsuds, this gives a total of 120; it is more than probable that the complainants did exaggerate their loss, but it is also probable that a certain number of camels were killed when being driven off, so that if we take 140 as the total number of camels looted, we shall not be far wrong. This will leave 117 camels to be accounted for by the Mahsuds.

From enquiries made the names of 11 Zalli Khels and 17 Mahsuds who were with the gang who made the original attack and shot the Powinda have come to light, and the names of the leaders of the Abdurrahman Khel parties who also plundered the complainants are known. They are as follows:—

1. Suleman Gul.	} Zalli Khels.	7. Allahdad.	} Zalli Khels.
2. Miansai.		8. Mir Jang.	
3. Imarsan.		9. Kakorai.	
4. Zir Gul.		10. Mirzadad.	
5. Zar Khan.		11. Babar.	
6. Karimdad.			

Of the above, Nos. 1 to 8 have been arrested, tried by jirga under section 13, Frontier Crimes Regulation, and sentenced to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 100, with exception of Nos. 7 and 8, who assisted the jirga in coming to a decision. No. 7, Allahdad, was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 100 fine, and No. 8, Mir Jang, was sentenced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 100 fine.

The fines, if realised, to be paid as compensation to the complainants.

Nos. 9, 10, 11, when arrested, will also be placed before the same jirga for trial.

The following are the names of the Mahsuds known to have been with the original gang:—

1. Ashik.	} Garerais Alizais.
2. Zardad.	
3. Larrai.	
With others not known.	
4. Mina Khan.	} Kohat Khel Alizai.
5. Ammal Shah.	
6. Adamai.	} Malikdinai Alizai.
7. Miralam.	
8. Mashadi.	
9. Sheikhar.	
10. Amrai, Giga Khel.	} Hamsayas of Malik Badshah Khan, Alizai.
11. Gulbaz-Faridai.	
12. Shekhai.	
13. Brother of "Khak."	} Bahlolzai.
14. Shamdai, Guri Khel.	
15. Son of Juma Khan, Nekzam Khel.	
16. Saiyid Gholam.	
17. Abdul Ghafur.	

The following are the names of the chief men with Abdurrahman Khel gangs:—

- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| 1. Sinak. | 4. Banotai, brother of Malik |
| 2. Khalo. | Jangin. |
| 3. Drazs, brother of Malik
Shahzor. | 5. Shahbaz. |
| | 6. Saleh Khan. |

In spite of constant letters being written to the Mahsud Maliks, no efforts have been made to recover the stolen camels or to punish the offenders. It is impossible to allow such a case as this to slide, and I would, therefore, ask that I may be authorised to announce the following terms to the Mahsud Maliks for a settlement of this case:—

- (1) Restoration of stolen camels, or compensation at Rs. 50 per camel for those not restored, with offenders to be given up; or
- (2) Compensation for 117 camels at Rs. 50 per camel, Rs. 360 as blood-money for murdered Powinda with fine of Rs. 1,000.

S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana.

Sarwekai,
The 5th June, 1900.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 21st June, 1900.

With reference to the report on the raid committed by the Mahsuds and Zalli Khel Darwesh Khels on Miani Powindas in Spin on the night of the 23rd April, 1900, I have the honour to say that I do not understand the terms proposed. Does (1) of the terms mean that the camels are proposed to be restored without any fine at all? As the letter stands, term (1) or term (2) is given as alternative.

Annexure 4.

Memorandum from the Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 23rd June, 1900.

In reply to his letter, dated 21st June, 1900, has the honour to state that terms (1) and (2) should read as follows:—

- (1) Restoration of stolen camels, or compensation at Rs. 50 per camel for those not restored and offenders to be given up for punishment or fine of Rs. 1,000, also Rs. 360 blood-money for murdered Powinda to be paid.
- (2) Compensation for 117 camels at Rs. 50 per camel, Rs. 360 as blood-money for murdered Powinda with fine of Rs. 1,000.

Annexure 5.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 2nd July, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated 23rd June, 1900, I have the honour to say that I agree to the terms proposed.

Enclosure 12 in No. 2.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 17th August, 1900.

With reference to correspondence regarding the affairs of the Mahsud tribe ending with your letter, dated 10th August, I am directed to submit a copy of a letter, dated 24th July, with its enclosures, from the Commissioner of the Derajat, and to communicate the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

2. In the note appended to his letter Mr. Merk has dealt vigorously and comprehensively with the Mahsud question, and has made definite proposals for meeting a situation which has become extremely involved. It is fortunate that his predecessor, Mr. H. A. Anderson, before proceeding on furlough, prepared a full report on Waziristan, of which the first 72 pages, including the greater part of Section II., which treats of the Mahsuds, are now available in proof. This portion of the Memorandum is submitted for reference, and I am to invite special attention to Chapters II., V. and VI. of Section II. and to paragraphs 70 to 76 in Chapter IV.

3. Mr. Merk bases his recommendations to a great extent on views of the history of our dealings with the Mahsud tribe, which are open to discussion. But Sir Mackworth Young proposes to say but little on controversial topics. When he appointed Mr. Merk to the Commissionership of the Derajat, he anticipated that his experience of the Pathan tribes would be most valuable in enabling him to deal with the Mahsuds, and he has no doubt that this anticipation will be justified. As regards their democratic character, the Mahsuds and the Northern Pathans are much alike, and, as recognized by Her Majesty's Secretary of State in the 15th paragraph of his despatch, dated 28th January, 1898, the latter differ widely from the Biloch tribes controlled from Quetta, to which may be added those controlled by the Commissioner of the Derajat.

4. As to the broad question of policy raised by Mr. Merk in his second paragraph, it is, in His Honour's opinion, needless to go behind the decision of the Secretary of State communicated in the above-mentioned despatch and explained in the 7th paragraph of Mr. Barnes' letter, dated 7th August, 1899. Although it is inevitable that our control should be gradually extended over the whole of Waziristan, the Lieutenant-Governor understands that it is by no means desired that the collapse of all tribal authority should be in any way hastened by our attitude towards the Mahsuds. On the contrary it is intended that internal tribal government should be strengthened with a view to averting the necessity of our occupying the country or exercising an amount of interference in its affairs which would be hardly possible without occupation. If this is a correct statement of the position, the conclusion reached by Mr. Merk in the 12th paragraph of his note, with which Sir Mackworth Young is completely in accord, is the only one possible.

5. The question then arises whether Mr. Merk is right in his criticism of the existing system of management, which he regards as faulty in two respects, namely,—

- (a) that the Maliks through whom we work, and who receive allowances from Government, have been selected by us, and not by the tribe, and do not fully represent the latter, hence their influence over the tribe as a whole is not large,
- (b) that the attempt to secure the surrender of individual offenders instead of enforcing tribal responsibility is carried too far, and results in much unnecessary delay.

6. With reference to the allowances paid to the Maliks, we need not go further back than the agreement concluded between them and Sir Robert Sandeman in January, 1890, which is described in the 123rd and

124th paragraphs of Mr. Anderson's Memorandum. Mr. Anderson says that the detailed distribution of allowances was made "according to the recognized standard of tribal shares" and the agreement itself records that it was effected "by common consent and according to tribal usage." But the jirga at which the agreement was concluded consisted of only 400 persons out of a tribe containing 10,000 fighting men, and Mr. Anderson himself notes (paragraph 71) that the distribution "had many flaws in it," and that "several important sections and individuals had received no share in the allowances." The redistribution of 1895 (paragraph 72) aimed at a concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of Maliks, not upon the basis of tribal representation or a democratic vote so much as by the support and favour of Government. It is clear from the 25th and 29th paragraphs of Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 26th May, 1895, a copy of which was submitted with Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated 10th June, 1895, that the distribution lists were drawn up by our own officers. A subsequent letter from the Commissioner, dated 12th August, 1895, which was not forwarded to the Government of India, shows that, before the allowances were announced to a large jirga of 700 Mahsuds assembled at Shekh Budin, an attempt was made to obtain suggestions as to the distribution from the tribesmen. But they failed to agree among themselves, and the distribution made by the Commissioner was then announced to them.

7. All experience supports Mr. Merk's conclusions as to the inability of the Maliks, who are the recipients of allowances, to control the tribe. Mr. Bruce, the author of the present system of management, clearly admitted the fact in the 6th paragraph of his No. 98, dated 28th February, 1894, submitted with Mr. Fanshawe's letter, dated 24th March, 1894, and it is put forward as a reason for placing a military garrison in Spin in the Secretary of State's despatch, dated 24th August, 1894. The murder in 1894 of three Maliks who had been instrumental in procuring the surrender of Kelly's assassins, and the attack on Wana by the Mullah Powindah and the discontented tribesmen in defiance of the Maliks were patent proofs of weakness, which the Maliks themselves have never been slow to acknowledge, witness their twice-repeated request for annexation at the close of the expedition of 1894-95 and the petition of 3rd August, 1899, submitted with Mr. Dane's letter of 28th September, 1899. Notwithstanding what Mr. Anderson has stated in the 10th paragraph of the letter forwarded with my letter, dated 4th April, Sir Mackworth Young is forced to believe that the usefulness of the Maliks as a restraining force is getting less rather than greater.

8. Turning to Mr. Merk's second criticism of past methods of management, the Lieutenant-Governor has always held that, unless the individual offenders are surrendered at once, tribal responsibility should be enforced. This is the policy favoured in his telegram of 31st July, 1899, to the Commissioner of the Derajat, a copy of which was submitted with Mr. Dane's letter, dated 1st August of that year. The enforcement of tribal responsibility was asserted by Sir Robert Egerton twenty years ago to be the proper method of dealing with the Mahsuds, as the extract appended to Mr. Merk's letter shows. But the policy then laid down was not persevered in, and the strongest argument for believing in its soundness is to be derived, not from our experience with the Mahsuds, but from that gained in dealing with other Pathan tribes of similar character. Mr. Anderson's final defence of the Derajat system is contained in the letter mentioned at the close of paragraph 7, and the petition of the Maliks annexed to that letter contains a protest against its abandonment. But the arguments which Mr. Anderson advanced do not seem to Sir Mackworth Young to be convincing. The sequel to the surrender of Kelly's murderers, to which reference has already been made, is one notable example of the fact that the method hitherto pursued in dealing with offences is totally foreign to the ideas of the tribe, and that insistence on it is in practice extremely difficult. Sir Mackworth Young does not wish to be understood as maintaining that in the case quoted, where an Englishman was assassinated in cold blood, we should have been content with anything less than the surrender of his murderers. He merely

quotes the case as illustrating the extreme difficulty of insisting on the surrender of offenders in ordinary cases. The tribesmen must have felt that the circumstances of the case were such that the British Government was bound to insist on very heavy retribution, but this did not save the Maliks who helped us in the matter.

9. These being the faults of the present system, the remedies which Mr. Merk proposes briefly are—

- (1) to make the allowances, as in the case of the Khaibar, to the tribe instead of to selected Maliks, and
- (2) to deal with the tribe as a whole, and to enforce tribal instead of individual responsibility in the case of offences.

This will not preclude a demand for the surrender of an offender by the tribe in particular cases. And the Mahsuds can always, if they please, free themselves from responsibility for an outrage by giving up the guilty persons for trial by jirga or otherwise.

10. The Lieutenant-Governor believes that our future policy with reference to the Mahsuds should be reconstructed on these lines. He does not lose sight of the fact that we cannot deal with a mob of 10,000 fighting men, that there must be headmen to act as representatives and spokesmen of the tribe, that in recognizing such headmen there is room for the repetition of such mistakes as have occurred in the past, and, however good the selection may be, occasions may arise in which the headmen will be powerless to restrain their recalcitrant tribesmen. But it is essential that we should get into touch with the real tribal leaders, and, if we have not wholly succeeded in doing this in the past, we must be prepared to alter our system. In doing this we have to aid us the precedent of the Northern Pathan tribes. The introduction of a new system of tribal responsibility will require full consideration of details, among which may be mentioned the question whether there should be separate dealings with the three main subdivisions of the tribe in regard to smaller matters, or even with more of the tribal sections or sub-sections. But if we succeed in enlisting the tribe as a whole in our interests by a subsidy which is really tribal, we should not hesitate to exact correlative responsibility from the tribe as a whole when to do so suits our purpose.

11. What we require, in fact, is to find out whatever elements of self-government exist in the tribe, though the Mahsud "republic" is in actual working at present not far removed from anarchy, and to recognize these elements in our dealings with it. The 277 Maliks whom we see are not the government of the tribe, though with our help they have been able to pose as such. We need to find a broader basis for diplomatic relations, and one which coincides with the tribal government such as it is. In this way we may hope to strengthen internal self-government, for the present weakness of which our past policy is in part responsible.

12. Meanwhile we have on the one hand our existing engagements with the Maliks, and on the other a breakdown in our relations with the tribe. The present situation, though unfortunate in other respects, is favourable for a revision of our engagements. Mr. Merk's plan for dealing with the long reckoning we have against the Mahsuds in such a way as to force them to recognize the unsuitability of the present compact is set forth in the 13th and succeeding paragraphs of his note. A month hence our demand against the tribe is pretty sure to exceed a lakh of rupees, and in view of the scarcity which has recently prevailed in the hills to the west of the Derajat, Sir Mackworth Young fears Mr. Merk is somewhat sanguine in thinking it possible to have the account settled in a fortnight. But whether the settlement is long or short, it is essential that it should be effected, and that, failing voluntary compliance, the tribe should be coerced into submission. Mr. Merk's plan, therefore, has Sir Mackworth Young's entire support.

13. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with the Commissioner in thinking that, if coercion is necessary, it should take the form of a blockade. Former blockades of the Mahsuds have not always been very effectual. The one referred to in the 97th paragraph of Mr. Anderson's Memorandum was evidently severely felt, and, after being continued for nearly seven months, effected its object. But less than a year afterwards the most daring outrage which the Mahsuds have ever perpetrated was carried out when Tank was burnt on the 1st of January, 1879. We have now, however, far greater facilities than formerly for blockading the tribe. The Mahsuds can now be excluded from the Tochi, and though the back door to Afghanistan is still open, the approach to it through the Darwesh Khel country is likely to be closed so long as the Badar land dispute is unsettled. Sir Mackworth Young has no doubt that the pressure of a blockade would be very severely felt by the Mahsuds. It might be necessary to reinforce our posts, but if the tribe do not satisfy our demands, this and other inconveniences must be faced, otherwise greater troubles will ensue.

14. The submission of the tribe, however brought about, must be followed sooner or later by a revision of the arrangements as to allowances. Sir Mackworth Young understands that in the Khaibar a sum of about Rs. 80,000 is allotted to six tribes containing some 20,000 fighting men. A grant of over Rs. 60,000 yearly to the Mahsuds with 10,000 fighting men falls at a considerably higher rate per head. But the money will be well spent if we obtain a proper equivalent in the good behaviour of the Mahsuds, and it must be remembered that their military service is, and their militia service will be, much smaller than in the case of the Afridis.

15. The militia scheme may be somewhat interrupted, but the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it probable that the fear of being left out of it will be a strong lever to induce the tribe to compose their quarrel with us as soon as possible.

16. As regards the Mullah Powindah it is pretty certain that, if our new arrangement with the tribe is founded upon the actual facts of tribal government, he will, as Mr. Merk anticipates, have to be reckoned with. But the place he will occupy in the system will depend not upon our ideas of his power and influence, but upon the place assigned to him by the tribe. We shall, generally, in dealing with these uncivilized tribes, have to accept their own representatives, however much we may disapprove of them. In connection with the Afridi rising of 1897-98, a strong attempt was made by the Military Authorities to induce Government to proclaim the two Zakha Khel Maliks, Wali Muhammad Khan and Khawas Khan, as disqualified from ever representing their tribe. But it was held that such action would be a mistake, as whatever their conduct had been, it would be impossible to exclude them from the position accorded to them by the tribe itself when negotiations should be re-opened. The wisdom of this decision has been proved by subsequent events.

17. As Mr. Merk's views have been fully given in the letter now submitted, the Lieutenant-Governor has thought it best to defer summoning him to Simla till the Government of India has had an opportunity of considering the present communication. Further orders will be awaited, but meanwhile Mr. Merk has been warned that his presence may at any time be required.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 24th July, 1900.

In paragraph 5 of your letter, dated the 2nd June, 1900, His Honour accepted my proposal to defer dealing with all cases against the Mahsuds not included in the March settlement till August or September next.

2. The situation in connection with the Mahsuds is grave, and I have the honour now, in the note attached, dated to-day, to submit my views on it with recommendations for future action.

3. I also enclose copies of the following correspondence bearing upon the subject:—

- (1) Extract of paragraph 6 of Punjab Government letter, dated the 3rd January, 1881, to the Government of India, of which I specially invite perusal.
- (2) A Memorandum by Mr. Watson, late Political Officer, Wana, dated 14th May, 1900.
- (3) Telegram, dated 4th June, from Political Officer, Wana.
My reply, dated 5th June.
Letter, dated 12th June, 1900, from Political Officer, Wana.
- (4) A Memorandum by Mr. Waterfield, Political Officer, Wana, dated 17th instant.
- (5) Letter, dated the 18th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, with statements of offences committed by Mahsuds since the date of the March settlement up to the 15th instant.

Annexure 2.

Note by W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on our present position in respect of the Mahsud Wazirs, dated 24th July, 1900.

Before discussing briefly the present state of affairs in connection with the Mahsud tribe, and submitting proposals for future action, I will prefix a short historical retrospect, which will, I trust, serve to explain how the existing condition of things has come about; it may also be of use in elucidating mistakes that have been made in the past, and thereby in aiding to avoid them hereafter.

All references are given in the margin.

2. The key-note of the whole case regarding the Waziris is very well put in a recent military publication: "The organization of their clans, such as it is, is strongly democratic, and their headmen have little real power. . . . Contact with a settled Government like our own appears to have had a disintegrating effect on them, and their unity and power of combination are becoming things of the past." The question now is, shall we arrest this disintegration and endeavour to re-establish the power of combination; in other words, shall we strengthen and refresh internal tribal government, or shall we let the collapse of all tribal authority, of the internal controlling and restraining power proceed till, in self-defence, we shall be compelled to occupy the Mahsud country?

3. The Mahsuds from time immemorial, like many other frontier tribes who now are our peaceful neighbours, have been, and still are, robbers and raiders. The early and the later history of our dealings with them is—one brief interval of absolute peace excepted—that of constant friction and struggle, varied by the expeditions of 1860, 1881 and 1894-95. Till 1862 no systematic basis of political relations with the Mahsuds appears to have been adopted. In that year, however, the three main sections composing the Mahsud tribe, viz., the Bahlolzai, Alizai, and Shaman Khel clans, formally accepted tribal responsibility for their respective sub-divisions. The treatment, however, of the tribe does not seem to have been marked

with much vigour and success till 1875, when a local Chief in British territory, the Nawab of Tank, whose management of the Mahsud border and tribe had broken down, was set aside and "the enforcement among the Mahsuds themselves of complete tribal responsibility for offences committed

Page 532, Paget and Mason; also extract of paragraph 6 of Punjab Government letter, dated 3rd January, 1881, attached.

Page 533, Paget and Mason.

one contrasts this action with such retribution as has been meted out for the recent grave offences committed time after time by the Mahsuds, with the punishment (if it may be so called) inflicted on account of the repeated slaughter of Government servants and the harrying of British subjects, one

Page 533, Paget and Mason.

against the Mahsuds for the redress of all ordinary border crime. In 1878 it was reported that the Tank (Mahsud) border (of the Dera Ismail Khan

Paragraph 348, Part I, Tucker's Settlement Report of Dera Ismail Khan.

District) had never been before in such a satisfactory condition." It is of this halcyon time that the Settlement Officer writes of the Mahsuds: "In spite of one or two blockades enforced with a view to establishing the principle of joint tribal responsibility, raids and offences of all sorts have, during the last two or three years, become extremely rare. On the whole, our relations with the Mahsuds are now as friendly as with any of the other Pathan tribes on our border. . . . The Mahsuds have no recognized chiefs or headmen. They are exceedingly democratic in their ways. . . . They like to assert their equality."

4. Towards the end of 1878 the Mahsuds were drawn into the national and religious excitement which arose upon the outbreak of the Afghan War. On New Year's Day, 1879, they burnt Tank. For the next two years they were blockaded, and gave much trouble, till the expedition of 1881 put matters straight. It is doubtful whether this blockade was stringent enough. It was followed by a further period of quiet, during which tribal responsibility appears to have been steadily enforced. In fact, so friendly were the Mahsuds that in 1883 they helped the survey of the Gomal Pass.

5. We come now to the phase of the case relating to the Mahsuds with which we are still concerned. It commenced with an attempted exploration of the Gomal and adjoining country which failed in 1888. In 1889-90 the Gomal road was opened, and arrangements connected therewith were made with the Mahsuds, involving the payment of allowances and the constitution of Levies. Thereupon followed friction with the Amir, Afghan intrigues in Waziristan, and grave misconduct on part of the Mahsuds, the

Pages 2-11, "Operations against the Mahsud Wazirs," issued by Quartermaster-General's Department.

latter lasting throughout 1892 and 1893 and ten months of 1894, till in November, 1894, the Mahsud opposition culminated in the attack on the Wana camp. This led to the third Mahsud Expedition, 1894-95, and to a re-arrangement of the Mahsud allowances in July, 1895. Since then Mahsud misbehaviour has steadily increased in intensity and persistence till, after the faulty settlement of last March, we are confronted by an *impasse* and by the complete and openly acknowledged breakdown of what is known as the "Maliki" system.

6. The author of the existing political system which since 1890 has been adopted for the conduct of mutual relations by ourselves and by a portion (by no means numerically, and it seems politically, the strongest

portion) of the Mahsuds is Mr. Bruce. This officer, before coming to the Waziristan border, had spent the chief part of his service in Dera Ghazi Khan and the Quetta Agency, among Biluchis and Brahuis. He had seen the striking success of the system among a congeries of tribes over whom the late Sir R. Sandeman had established British supremacy. It was done by the force of personal character, influence, and abilities; by the skilful conciliation of the chiefs and headmen, to whom, according to their habits and ingrained loyalty, which is the tradition and custom of immemorial generations, the clansmen render an implicit obedience. It was effected also by the introduction of peace and order, partly through the settlement of inter-tribal disputes, either in a friendly manner or authoritatively, backed up, as Sir R. Sandeman was, by ample funds and by troops and numerous garrisons throughout the country which he occupied. Mr. Bruce came away impressed with the advantages of this political system, which, in a totally different people and in entirely different conditions had achieved a lasting victory. He approached his task with a strong pre-disposition to find among the Mahsuds, who are a purely Pathan tribe, with purely Pathan political institutions, that system of Chiefs and headmen

Paragraph 237, *et infra*, of Mr. Bruce's Memorandum on our past and present relations with the Waziri tribe, 1888.

and the existence of that official hierarchy and orderly discipline which are such conspicuous characteristics of the Biluch tribes, and also very probably (in a much less degree however) of the semi-Biluchized Pathan tribes fringing the Biluchis, such as the Dumars, Lunis, Musa Khels and others with whom in the course of his service in Biluchistan he had come in contact. In every community, however democratic it be, there are men who come to and remain at the front, owing to natural ability, hereditary wealth, or both, or from other causes. Among Pathan tribes these men are called Maliks, and it was natural for a man long accustomed to the Biluch hereditary and immutable gradation of undisputed authority and office bearers to assume that the same edifice existed in the Maliks among the Mahsuds; or if it did not actually exist, then that its rudiments were there and that with a little encouragement it might be built up. This assumption appears to me to have been the initial error—the leopard does not change his spots; nor can we graft on to political institutions what does not exist in them and what cannot develop except by the slow growth of centuries. We can destroy swiftly enough, but we cannot cause to grow much faster than is natural; least of all can the outsider implant political elements into a community with much hope of success. It seems to have been overlooked that Biluchis have not that fierce love of political and municipal independence, and that underlying current of fanatical dislike of the foreigner which are such marked features in the character of strong Pathan hill tribes. It seems to have been thought that, as with the Biluchis, with whom, however, these feelings are almost totally absent, the grant of allowances and of service would obliterate them. But the cardinal error lay in introducing the system without first providing the vital condition requisite for its successful working. That became soon enough apparent to Mr. Bruce and to the Maliks themselves. Briefly the system was and is—

- (1) What are believed to be, and in many cases are actually, the leading men are selected by us, *not by the tribe*; are classified by us into five grades according to their supposed power and influence (a process almost impossible to achieve with any degree of accuracy), and are paid allowances according to their gradation. These are the Maliks. This is intended to gain the leaders.
- (2) In order to win the body of the tribe, the Maliks are told to produce a certain number of clansmen for service, whose pay they share. These are the Levies.
- (3) In return for the allowances, both Maliks and Levies are expected to serve Government, to control the body of the clansmen, the "ulus," and to arrange that individual offenders are surrendered for trial and punishment by us, and not by the

tribe. This last stipulation obviously implies the loss of the internal or municipal independence of the tribe, which explains why all tribes are so loth to agree to the surrender of offenders for punishment by aliens instead of their being punished by the clan itself, if and when the clan does not prefer to share their punishment.

7. In a rough way this system corresponds to our system of administration in British India: the Maliks are the Lambardars, the Levies are the Police, and the trial of individual offenders is what our law Courts do. For a country which is in our effective occupation this rough analogy to our more settled administration within the border suits admirably. Sir R. Sandeman

* *Note.*—This is practically stated in paragraph 9 of Mr. Bruce's Memorandum cited above.

W. R. H. MERK.

was fully aware of this, but he also realised that, for the system to work, it was above all things necessary that the country should be occupied,* or else dominated to such a degree as differs only in name from occupation. He was careful to get hold of his country before he introduced his system. Mr. Bruce reversed the process with naturally a reversed result. He started the system and hoped to get hold of the country, but failed in this. That was the cardinal error to which I have referred above. He should have made sure of getting the country before he began the system.

8. The crucial test of the system occurred shortly after it was set going; in July, 1893, Mr. Kelly was murdered by Mahsuds in Zhob. The Biluchistan authorities pressed for a heavy punishment, and correspondence

Paragraph 11 of his letter, dated the 16th February, 1894.

recommend the imposition of heavy fines on both sections of the Waziri tribe (*i.e.*, to enforce tribal responsibility) or to act against the individual murderers of Mr. Kelly. He chose the latter

Mr. Bruce's letter No. 287, dated 30th May, 1894.

imprisonment. He states emphatically that it was impossible to enforce severer measures for the brutal and unprovoked murder of a European, because, as he had many times represented, "so long as our control over the

Paragraph 27 of above letter.

was "support of the Maliks from within," or, in other words, the occupation

Paragraph 9.

occupation he evidently foresaw the collapse of the system. Even so, without occupation, the Maliki system might have dragged on a precarious existence of doubtful value

Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 2nd August, 1894.

general service done for us.

It appears to have been intended that the surrender of the murderers

Punjab Government telegram of 5th August.

retribution for these murders seems to have been dropped, for in the terms

Page 52, Operations against Mahsud Waziris, 1894-95.

ensued in the course of which Mr. Bruce defined the Waziris to be "a very powerful semi-independent tribe." Eventually the position came to this that it was open to Mr. Bruce either to

course: two of the murderers were surrendered and were sentenced each to seven years' rigorous

and were sentenced each to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. He states emphatically that it was impossible to enforce severer measures for the brutal and unprovoked murder of a European, because, as he had many times represented, "so long as our control over the

Waziri country has to be entirely exercised from without and we are forbidden access to it, no matter how well disposed the Maliks may be, it

is impracticable for them to go beyond certain limits." What he wanted was "support of the Maliks from within," or, in other words, the occupation of the country; that control which he pointed out in his Memorandum of 1888 meant in Biluchistan practical annexation. Without this

Without this surrender and conviction of two of Kelly's murderers—the murder of three leading Mahsud

Maliks for the prominent part they had taken in effecting the surrender and of a fourth for

of the Maliks should be demanded, on pain of an expedition, but the Boundary Delimitation and attack on the Wana camp intervened, and to the Mahsuds enforced by the 1894-95 expedition there is no mention of the murderers of the Maliks. This pronounced the doom of the

Maliki system, and it became hereafter a mere question of time when it would break down altogether. If the Maliks were weak before, if the system had already grave defects and was without the only foundation which could ensure its stability, it is clear that the tribal vengeance that overtook such Maliks as endeavoured to carry out their engagements, a vengeance which we did not punish, proved a fatal shock and settled matters, at any rate as far as the Maliks themselves are personally concerned. It was anticipated that, so far from the allowances and such support as could be given them short of occupation adding to the strength of the Maliks, "we are destined both in the Darwesh Khel and the Mahsud country to experience greater difficulties as time goes on from the weakness of the Waziri Maliks." No doubt, however, so rapid a decline and death was not foreseen as has actually occurred. Although the effect of the 1894-95 expedition and of the grant of the enhanced allowances in July, 1895, brought about a temporary lull in Mahsud offences, they have from 1896-97 onwards steadily increased, and the will to control, and influence to restrain, of the Maliks have as steadily diminished, till we are face to face with the present crisis, within five years of an expedition on a large scale.

Punjab Government letter, dated 6th August, 1896, paragraph 2, to Government of India.

9. Before considering this crisis, I will go back for a moment to the July, 1895, settlement. From the nature of things where we, who are outsiders, undertake to gauge the influence and position of persons in a community of which we can know but little and which itself has no means (such as we have in Parliamentary elections) of estimating political power, numerous errors must necessarily occur. In the 1890 settlement of allowances these did occur, and the 1895 settlement sought to remedy them. But the papers of Messrs. Watson and Waterfield, which I enclose, who, as Political Officers, have had to work the settlement, show that this second settlement has not escaped the defects of its predecessor. It was made at Shekh Budin by the Maliks themselves. The estimates that Maliks form of each other are not by any means always those that the "ulus" forms of them, any more than those of Members of Parliament regarding each other correspond

Punjab Government letter, dated 21st January, 1895, to Government of India.

* e.g., the Zaranioba case, paragraph 7 of Political Officer Wana's letter, dated 14th May, 1900.

populo, in presence of the and serious point is that the

Paragraph 4 of Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 12th August, 1895, to Government.

protected territories, and that they will surrender offenders in cases against Government or Government servants and interests.

The third condition, viz., that they will supply escorts to officers entering their country for the management of the tribe or its administration, has remained a dead-letter in view of the Government of India orders which were

Foreign Department letter, dated the 28th June, 1894.

are all contrary to the existing orders of Her Majesty's Government . . . and these questions must for the present be held in abeyance." That the third condition should have been formulated after the issue of the above instructions is a curious instance of the tenacity with which Mr. Bruce held to the postulate (without which no doubt he felt that the system he had established would break down) that concurrently with his system there must

be some sort of occupation or administration of the Mahsud country. In view of what follows below, I note here that the allowances fixed in 1895 were—

	Rs.
	33,060 a year "service allowances," viz., shared by Levies and Maliks.
	28,488 a year "Maliki allowances," to the Maliks alone.
Total	... 61,548 per annum.

10. The present position is this: after what are undoubtedly most inadequate punishments had been fixed on our part for a series of grave offences against Government (in which the Maliks as a body are bound

Mr. Bruce's letter, dated 12th August, 1895.

by the conditions attached to their allowances, which conditions they deliberately and formally accepted, to surrender the offenders for punishment) and for a long series of other raids, murders and robberies, and after scraping together money, adding thereto items from the pay of Levies and from money that had lain for years in deposit, the Mahsuds have arranged, last March, to pay in the course of time 35,000 rupees, the liabilities in all probability not being liquidated for at least a year, if not more. But *at*

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Punjab Government letter of 2nd June, 1900, and paragraph 2 of my letter, dated 28th June, 1900.

* Letter, dated 18th instant, from Political Officer, Wana, and enclosure.

the time there was in addition due from the Mahsuds the sum of 18,800 rupees for one set of cases and 14,500 rupees for another set, or a total of 33,300 rupees. *Since* the date of the March settlement the account against the Mahsuds has been further swelled by the addition shown in the enclosed correspondence* of *fresh* liabilities up to the 15th July, 1900, aggregating 26,809 rupees, making with the 33,300 rupees above a total of 60,100 rupees. Now this is a perfectly hopeless position; over and above the 35,000 rupees settled for we have a claim of 60,100 rupees against them. And this, five years after an expedition, and to a month five years after liberal allowances had been allotted all round, and after what are understood to be the most powerful and really leading political elements in the tribe had explicitly engaged to keep the peace.

11. If by a determined measure we should now succeed in obtaining redress from the Mahsuds, what guarantee have we as matters stand that five years hence we shall not be as badly off as we are now? None whatever, I should say. I venture to submit as strongly as I can that something must be done, that things cannot go on as they are. There is something radically wrong, and if my premises in this note are sound, then the radical wrong lies in the present system. We move in a vicious circle. We look to the Maliks, and they look to us. Between the two the management of the Mahsuds falls to the ground. The system now in force pre-supposes—it demands—our occupation of the country: We do not occupy it, and the house that has been building from 1890 to date lacks its foundation. It seems to me that only two courses are open to us,—either to carry the present system to its logical and natural conclusion, viz., to occupy the Mahsud country, or to abandon a half-system and to revert to the other plan, which, as I have shown, certainly ensured a remarkable tranquillity from 1875 to 1878 and again from 1881 to 1889. This plan, viz., tribal responsibility and dealing with the tribe as a whole corporate body, and not alone with few representatives selected by us (270 men out of 10,000), has the merits of proved success in the past, and of being in entire consonance with the political constitution of the Mahsuds. There may be some other course available, but I can think of none. This at any rate is perfectly clear to me that an organic change in the present system is imperatively necessary, and that whatever measure we adopt ought not to be a half measure. As a matter of fact, in disbanding the Levies we have knocked away part of the structure that lacks its foundation.

12. Of the two courses indicated above, the occupation of the Mahsud country is a question of State policy, on which I am not called upon to give an opinion, beyond submitting my personal view for what it is worth, viz., that the game of occupation will be out and away not worth the large candle we shall have to burn for it. But that, if no change is made in the present system, we shall be driven, *volens volens*, to occupation, is, I submit, perfectly plain from the inferences to be drawn from the course of events since 1895 and from the accounts of the existing state of affairs contained in the enclosed Memoranda of Messrs. Watson and Waterfield. The Malikhs themselves entertain no illusions on the score of what the present system must inevitably lead to. They see clearly that to maintain their present

* See for instance paragraph 4 of Political Officer Wana's letter, dated 18th July, 1896, and paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter, dated 10th August, 1896, to the Government of India.

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position and emoluments we must be in their country; this conviction is at the bottom of their frequent petitions to us to take over their country,* and prompts the frank confessions of their political and social impotence which they might otherwise be tempted to conceal, which attitude again explains the power that Mullah Powindah has as the opponent of Malikhs who would sell their country, and the want of influence of the Malikhs among the clansmen themselves, who by no means long for our advent. As I have said, we are involved in vicious circles. If for other reasons it is not advisable to take the Mahsud country, then I submit it will be deplorable if we are driven to take it by adherence to a system which, worked by enthusiastic supporters who claim for it "ethical" superiority, has after a short time landed us in an *impasse* of unavenged bloodshed and rapine.

13. If Government approve of an organic change in the present system, I cannot with certainty predict that it will be carried through without a rupture in the existing relations with the Mahsuds, possibly a collision. But as we are anyhow, with our demand for satisfaction, on the brink of a crisis, and as the Malikhs by their patent failures to keep their promises of 1895 have offered us full justification for an alteration in the existing arrangements, the present moment seems the most favourable opportunity for introducing it. Moreover, the step brooks no delay, else, if the past is any indication of the future, we shall two or three years hence be again face to face with another unsettled bill of huge dimensions. That the Malikhs will object to the change is intelligible. At present they give plenty of advice, some information (if an enemy can be hit thereby so much the better), sit at home and pocket good allowances. This is pleasing, and there is further the agreeable prospect that this line of action may compel Government to occupy the country, after which they will peacefully draw their pay for ever. The "ulus," the clansmen, on the other hand, will no doubt welcome the change if it transfers to them what the Malikhs receive, and try as much as possible to stick to. Moreover, if the change removes the danger of an occupation of the Mahsud tract, it will commend itself to the bulk of the community and to fanatics, provided that both classes perceive this; and it ought not to be difficult to bring them to realize it.

14. But the main difficulty will be money: 28,488 rupees a year go a good distance when divided between 270 Malikhs; it comes to over 100 rupees per head; but they do not go far when shared by 10,000 fighting men. This sum of 28,000 rupees is one fraction of the total tribal allowance of 61,000 rupees; the other fraction is the 33,000 rupees, service allowance. Of this latter item a portion, viz., 12,504 rupees^(a), has been set apart as payable to the Malikhs† in lieu of *sillahdari*, which with their Maliki allowance makes a total of 41,000 rupees a year. If the Malikhs by their failure to execute the conditions of 1895 are held to have forfeited their allowances, we shall have 41,000

† Paragraph 26 of Punjab Government letter, dated 5th March, 1900, to Government of India.

^(a) This is a mistake. Of the sum mentioned only Rs. 6,600 will be payable to the Mahsud Malikhs—page 21 of Report of Waziristan Militia Committee.

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• Punjab Government letters, dated 21st January, 1895, and (Paragraph 9) 10th May, 1895.

† Page 63 of Waziristan Militia Committee's Report.

rupees available for distribution to the Mahsuds. There remain out of the 61,500 rupees* 20,500 rupees, being the pay of the Levies disbanded. Against this is the set off of the pay of the 300 Mahsuds, who will be entertained in the Southern Waziristan Militia, on 10 rupees per head, or 36,000 rupees a year.† But this pay and this service is something totally different from the old pay and the old service; men in the Militia will to all intents be on much the same footing as sepoys in the army. In fixing tribal allowances it has not been the custom to reckon in the pay of sepoys, &c., belonging to the tribe; *e.g.*, the Khaibar allowances, the Orakzai subsidies, the Kohat Pass allowances, the Mohmand allowances, have been allotted quite irrespective of the incomes of tribes from members drawing pay in Government service. At a moderate computation, some 1,800 Afridis serve in the army, some 1,200 more in the Khaibar Rifles. These 3,000 men between them draw at least three lakhs a year in pay, but I do not think that this fact has had any bearing upon the fixation of the amount of the allowances drawn by the Khaibar clans. I have no recent information of allowances paid in Biluchistan, but from Mr. Bruce's Memorandum of 1883 it would appear that the Marris draw 14 rupees a year per head of fighting men, the Bugtis 13 rupees, and the Kutchi Biluchis 16 rupees. On this scale the Mahsuds, who number 10,000 fighting men, should have been receiving at least 1,20,000 rupees, or, on the scale of the Thal-Chotiala Pathans, 80,000 rupees a year.

Paragraph 255.

15. There can be no question but that the Mahsuds are poor, that their country is small, and that the ever-increasing population is pressing upon its means of subsistence. We are not in the least called on to feed hungry hillmen. But it has been repeatedly brought to notice that the Mahsud allowances are small as compared with the strength and power of the tribe and with such payments elsewhere. What I would venture to point out is that the Mahsud problem is on all fours with the Khaibar Afridi problem: the cases are exactly parallel; in both we have powerful tribes of marked energy of character and restless predatory habits, living in distant highlands and commanding great routes or passes by which Afghanistan is reached through the mountain barrier on our frontier. No doubt the Khaibar is strategically much more important than the Gomal, but what is more to the point in the present question is that to both the Afridis and the Mahsuds allowances were granted, in 1879 and 1890 respectively, for the specific purpose of our use of the passes. By the 1895 settlement these allowances in the case of the Mahsuds have been extended to cover good conduct generally over a much wider sphere than is comprised in the Gomal Pass. On the whole, I would recommend that the Mahsuds be treated as the Khaibar Afridis. I have no exact details of the Khaibar allowances, but if I am not mistaken, a scale obtained by dividing the total amount of the Khaibar allowances among the number of fighting men in the Khaibar Afridi tribe will show that on a proportionate ratio the allowances for the Mahsuds would work out to something like 60,000 rupees a year. This is quite irrespective of the much greater income indirectly afforded to the Khaibar Afridis by their service in the army and in the Khaibar Rifles, as compared with the three companies in the Southern Waziristan Militia reserved for the Mahsuds.

16. I would therefore suggest that the whole 61,000 rupees be made available for re-distribution among the Mahsuds upon the basis of full tribal responsibility. This re-distribution I would leave to the tribe itself to effect, as I did with the Mohmands in 1896. The reasons for this course are as follows:—We cannot possibly know so well as the tribe knows itself who are the really powerful men; in a distribution by the tribe for the tribe the really powerful men and sections obtain what they want, for if they were not powerful they would not get it; and since our object is to win what power there is in the tribe, the process exactly ensures our aim;

lastly, the *odium* of irregularities is shifted off our shoulders on to the tribe itself. Moreover, as the distribution is arrived at ultimately, after a good deal of compromise and struggle within the tribe, by general consent, it has in it the element of stability and universal acceptance.

17. As to tribal responsibility *versus* individual responsibility, it is not a question of ethics at all, but one of international law, as applicable to our dealings with the politically subordinate, but municipally independent, little republics of the frontier. It is no use beating about the bush and hiding the true issue behind a coat of ethics. Tribal responsibility means internal self-government, which, I would add, is quite compatible with political subjection. The subsidising of selected agents coupled with the punishment of individual offenders means the assumption of the internal administration of the clans; and I hope I have made it clear that our difficulties with the Mahsuds are due to such an assumption having been declared in theory and attempted in practice without that essential condition to its success, the effective domination or occupation of the country. It is because the supporters of the present system have not clearly distinguished between political and municipal independence, and have argued that want of the first must necessarily bring with it loss of the second, that we are in the present dilemma. The Native States of India are examples of political but not of municipal subordination, and the establishment of tribal responsibility means that, *mutatis mutandis*, the little Mahsud Republic shall be in future a kind of Native State. From a practical point of view, the great advantage of tribal responsibility is that under it everybody in the tribe becomes, and is made to be, interested in controlling bad or restless characters, whereas by the Maliki system only a few individuals, perhaps small sections, are concerned in restrictive action. It is evident from the history of the past five years and from what the Maliks have cynically confessed to Mr. Waterfield that these few individuals have not the power to control; and that when they entertain the inclination to act up to their duty they have excellent reasons, *e.g.*, the murders of the Maliks in Kelly's case, to leave their duty alone. Lastly, as I have pointed out above, tribal responsibility has, as a matter of fact, proved successful with the Mahsuds in the past.

18. In this re-distribution it will be convenient to reserve a certain sum, partly for payment by the Political Officer at his discretion in reward of special services or other sufficient reasons, and partly to compensate any Maliks who may lose by such a re-distribution and at the same time have special claims on us; though I doubt if there are many such Maliks. They have failed completely to do their duties, *e.g.*, Barahmat, the Aimal Khel Malik, who was instrumental* in procuring the eventual surrender and punishment of the three minor offenders in the Shahur Tangi case, is the very man who broke up the recent settlement by *Shariat* of the Badar disputes.

19. It may be argued: why have a redistribution at all, why not enforce tribal responsibility with the present allowances and system of distribution? To which the tribe not unreasonably makes answer: "We see nothing of what the Maliks get; why should *we* be held responsible and *they* get the money? The 'service allowance' is paid for specific services rendered by the Levies, and is out of the account so to speak. We, the 'ulus,' receive nothing; it is fair that responsibility should fall on those who take money for it." And in fact this has been the attitude of the "ulus" all along. Were we to say that no one should get anything, but that it was incumbent on all with whom we have friendly relations to keep the peace with us, on pain of the displeasure of Government, that position would be perfectly intelligible to them. But what they do not understand and what seems to them unjust is that one set of members of the tribe should draw respectable allowances and that the second set (by far the most numerous), who get nothing, should suffer for the shortcomings of the first set. There is a good deal in this. It seems to me that to enforce tribal responsibility

* Punjab Government letter, dated 27th March, 1900.

with the existing distribution of allowances and system of management is to shift a burden from the shoulders of the paid to those of the unpaid; and although all are swept into the net when tribal responsibility is enforced, yet, under present arrangements, it is one thing to draw allowances and to pay a fine out of them, and another thing to draw no allowances and yet have to pay a fine.

20. But before anything is done in the way of reform and of re-adjustment, it is absolutely necessary that our claim for redress should be satisfied completely, and that it should be thoroughly brought home to the Mahsuds that Government are firmly resolved not to permit future misconduct. At present nothing can be done with them. They are quite out of hand. And this is not astonishing. For five years they have done pretty much what they pleased; the attempts of the Political Officers to keep them straight and to enforce redress with good behaviour have been as profitless as beating the water in face of the inherent weakness of the situation. To wind up matters, the settlement last March must have been liable to raise the impression that the larger the bill the smaller the retribution. Till the Mahsuds are wheeled into line, it is useless to try to manage them. And if we do not now bring them up with a round turn, if we do not now peremptorily compel them to do us complete and full satisfaction, there will be an end of keeping the Mahsuds in order—for reasons that are obvious. It is nonsense to say that the Mahsuds cannot pay; the claim against them is for 60,100 or 95,100 rupees, as the case may be. If each fighting man subscribes 6 or 9 rupees, the account will be settled in a fortnight. There is no question of their ability to pay, but their willingness to pay is another matter altogether. It is just possible that the prospect of a re-distribution of the tribal allowance, of the adoption of tribal responsibility and the implied guarantee of municipal independence so long as they keep the peace with us and fulfil their obligations may lead the tribe to give us satisfaction. But I doubt it. The 270 Maliks who benefit by the present system will, of course, through their weight against a change, and though they cannot do much good they can do harm. How much harm they can do depends upon how far they have been discredited with the "ulus" in the course of the past ten years, and how far they see their way to getting a share of the allowances as distributed by the "ulus." The experiment of announcing simultaneously with the demand for redress that the organic change in the system is contemplated is at any rate worth trying, for the body of the tribe, who have all to gain by that change, will to that degree be influenced in favour of settling the account. We shall to that extent divide the opposition. On the other hand, it is a heavy account; for years the Mahsuds have been shuffling off payment; they have got the idea into their heads that they are to be handled very gingerly, and more likely they will elect to try and brave it out.

21. If so, we shall have without delay to resort to coercion. Of this there are but two kinds, a blockade and an expedition. As regards the first, a blockade had no doubt an extraordinary effect in 1877-1878, and now that we encircle the Mahsuds with two arms, one to the right in the Tochi, the other on the left at Wana, a blockade can be made infinitely more stringent than was possible 20 years ago. The Mahsuds are well aware of this. A blockade, of course, is a wearisome business; in all probability it will involve

* Cf. the communications received from the Lieutenant-General Commanding in March last.

the employment of some additional troops (two regiments I should say); they may have to serve in the hot weather, to which the Military Authorities appear to take exception*; but this cannot be helped, and it will not be the first time that troops have had to serve in the heat. No doubt the blockade will be marked by raids and attacks, and it is possible that public opinion will press for the termination of the blockade by an expedition. But there can be no question that a strict blockade, unswervingly pursued to the bitter end, has a most punitive and lasting effect upon a tribe. And it has the great merit of being incomparably more economical than an expedition. An expedition, speaking under correction, means the employment of three

brigades for some considerable time, especially as the Mahsuds are now not unfamiliar with expeditions. With a view to occurrences and eventualities elsewhere which are making calls on the Indian Army, it may be that three brigades cannot be spared conveniently this winter. If so, that settles the question.

22. A demand on the Mahsuds for satisfaction has to be made early this autumn or not later than November. On no account would I suggest that the demand be made without, in the event of a refusal, its being promptly followed up by coercion. And all things considered I recommend that coercion take the form of a blockade, which may possibly last for 10 or 12 months.

To sum up, my proposals are that I may be authorized to summon the whole Mahsud jirga as soon as convenient; it may be feasible to convene it in September; if not, it will certainly be practicable to get them together by the end of October; that then the demand be made, and that the jirga be informed that such a change as Government determine in the present system is in contemplation, but that refusal to comply with the just claim of Government will lead to coercion—a blockade or other measures, as Government may deem expedient.

23. A rupture with the tribe will, of course, affect the Mahsud portion of the Southern Waziristan Militia. But, after all, this is only three companies out of eight, and it is impossible that its members in the Militia should not be infected by the present temper of the tribe. If so, it may be better not to have them till their tribe is in order.

24. The dark horse here is Mullah Powindah. It may be that he is working to establish for himself a position similar to that of Chikkai. If so, and if he has the sense and ability of Chikkai, who has loyally kept the pact he made with us in 1892, we shall have gained much. But of the future attitude of Mullah Powindah, in case complications threaten with the Mahsuds, it is impossible to speak now with confidence. All one can say is that he will play a prominent part in whatever is going to happen.

25. There can, however, be no doubt that the announcement on the one hand that coercion will be unhesitatingly and thoroughly applied if the tribe refuses to make redress, and on the other hand that reparation will be followed by a re-distribution of allowances, must powerfully influence the counsels of the Mahsuds when they are brought face to face with us.

Annexure 3.

EXTRACT from paragraph 6 of letter, dated 3rd January, 1881, from W. M. Young, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

It is sufficient to remark that, whereas in 1873 the Mahsuds were guilty of 68 serious offences, the average of the four following years was 23, and in 1878 they were implicated in one murder and six cases only of theft and robbery, for which full redress was at once procured. The policy thus inaugurated was further tested, and its success demonstrated, by the result of negotiations for the recovery of a Hindu child, kidnapped from Kot Nasran by a band of robbers belonging to the party of Umar Khan. For ordinary crimes it may be easy to obtain satisfaction by seizures and reprisals on the offending clan in British territory; but in this case our hold over the tribe had to be tested by the demand of specific redress. A blockade was enforced against the whole tribe, without distinction of clans, and with the energetic co-operation of the Bhattannis, whose passes were strictly closed to all Mahsuds, the pressure of want was soon felt among the tribe at large. The offenders, fearing that the clansmen would take the law into their own hands, surrendered the child to Ahmadi, till now ringleader of the opposition to the British Government; and, finally, he, with Umar Khan, Alizai, and the leading Shaman Khel Chiefs, formally surrendered their

prisoner to the British Authorities, laid down their arms, and made full submission. Thus was established the important principle of dealing with the tribe as a whole, and making all generally responsible for the misdeeds of the members of any sub-division. Before this the system attempted in 1861 of dealing separately with the three clans, Alizai, Shaman Khel and Bahlolzai, had been worked with but indifferent success, and with the result that all traded in British territory and had access to our markets under the name of Alizai, while all raided on British villages in the names of the proscribed sections. During the six months that the Mahsuds were under blockade for the offence last mentioned, from August, 1877, to February, 1878, not a single crime was recorded against the tribe; and this satisfactory state of things continued till the end of 1878, during which year the plains of Tank, formerly never at rest from Mahsud outrages, enjoyed an unexampled security of life and property.

Annexure 4.

Note by H. D. Watson, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, on the present state of the Mahsud tribe and our relation therewith, dated 14th May, 1900.

What I conceive to be more or less the facts as regards the Mahsuds and their Malikis is briefly as follows:—

After the last expedition Government revised the distribution of allowances to a number of leading men of the tribe called Malikis, and a new list was drawn up after the claims of the various Malikis had been investigated by the local officers with the assistance of certain native agents.* Now, however intimately these officers knew the tribe, and however trustworthy those agents might be, it was inevitable that mistakes should be made. A

* Azim Khan, Kundi.

Mr. Tej Bhan.

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Malik, for instance, who had for long been in close relations with our Political Officers might be treated with more liberality than another who had come in very seldom, but who really had more influence over his own section and was more respected in the hills. Or a section which had misbehaved itself or which lived some distance from the border and had few relations with Government officials might be deprived of a portion of the allowances which its importance in the tribal organization entitled it to. The Shabi Khels, Garerais and Jalal Khels are perhaps cases in point. And it also followed as a necessary consequence that the closer our relations with the tribe became and the more extended our control, the more prominent would become the cases of inequitable distribution of allowances. Our posts now line the border of the Mahsud country proper; sections which were left pretty much alone in the old days have to be controlled and punished, and their leading men come in to see the Political Officer to air their grievances or to protest against their fines, as they had never done before.

2. The Political Officer is being continually pestered by sections or individuals asking that the allowances which are their due may be allotted them. How far these claims are reasonable I do not, in most instances, know, and have not cared to enquire, so as to avoid raising false hopes. Such applications are generally torn up and the applicants informed that the settlement with the Mahsuds was a final one, for the time at any rate, and that unless and until a fresh distribution takes place nothing can be done for them. If ever a re-distribution is ordered, then their claims will be investigated and considered.

3. No doubt a large number of these claims are unfounded, or at least much exaggerated. But some of them are undoubtedly reasonable, if the view is held that such allowances should be assigned† to the best and strongest men in the tribe. To take one or two instances: Guldad,

† Of course.

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the Abdurrahman Khel badmash, is a man of far more influence in his section than most of the Maliks, and has shown by work that he has done for me that he can exercise a very real control over them. Muhammad Yar, formerly a noted raider, has similar influence over the Shahur Shaman Khels, and if we would induce other well-known raiders like Asl Khan, Guri Khel, and Khalo, Abdurrahman Khel, to reform in a similar manner, we should find also that they would do far more useful work for us than most of their Maliks. As it is, they care nothing for the Maliks, who have to pay in part for the raids which they commit, while they themselves get off practically scot-free.

4. Some of these men who are dissatisfied with their allowances, though not all, form part of the following of the Mullah Powindah. The rest prefer to raid on their own account, and do not have much to do with the Mullah, but if the latter declared a holy war against us, they also no doubt would side with him. I think it probable that the larger portion of the Mullah's immediate following consists not so much of men who consider themselves defrauded of their due share of the Government allowances as of fanatical patriots who resent our interference in their country in any shape or form. No doubt, however, if we could arrange that the allowances could be more equitably distributed (and also more liberally, for we should have to increase the present allotment, otherwise, while satisfying some, we should be making enemies of others) and could reach the tribe as a whole* instead of, as at present, being confined to the Maliks and their relatives, there would be a considerable diminution in the Mullah's following, while, if we could square the Mullah himself, the faction hostile to us would be altogether broken up.

* A most important admission.

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5. At the same time we must give the Maliks their due; they are, on the whole, very well disposed to us; many of them, notably the Shaman Khel Maliks,† have their own particular sections well under control, and many of the rest are anxious that the badmashes should be repressed and punished; but they have not the power or the courage to do it themselves. United (which they are not) they could keep the Mullah and the whole tribe in order, and even disunited as they are they are strong enough to force their tribe, or rather the trading sections, to acquiesce with hardly a murmur in a heavy‡ toll on their bahirs. There are, however, certain sections, the Abdurrahman Khels, Jalal Khels, Garerais, &c., who do very little trading, whose misdeeds their own Maliks§ sometimes connive at and even participate in, and the Maliks of kindred sections make very little effort to check. It is these unruly sections who, together with the Mullah Powindah's Sheikhs, give most of the trouble, and have brought about the present serious situation.

† The two most powerful of these have just been murdered.

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‡ Light I should say.

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§ N.B.

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6. A redistribution of allowances, with regard to which the whole tribe would be consulted and asked to apportion the amount allotted among its leading men (subject, of course, to the approval of Government), would certainly be a very good thing, if it could be arranged without a rupture of our present relations. But this is doubtful. We could not consent to a redistribution (which must involve an increase of the total amount allotted if it is to give satisfaction) until the Mahsuds have settled up the account still outstanding against them, which has again mounted up considerably during the last few weeks; and if the present Maliks felt that their interests would suffer in a redistribution, as would probably be the case, they would not be disposed to give us much assistance in bringing about that settlement. On the other hand, if we told the Maliks plainly that unless the account was squared by the end, say, of the hot weather, Government would take its own measures to realise it and punish those who were responsible for this state of affairs, it is quite possible that the Maliks, perceiving that their

own interests were at stake, would pull themselves together and effect a satisfactory settlement. We might then carry out a redistribution, taking care that the Maliks who had had most to do with bringing about the settlement, and thereby shown their influence with the tribe, did not suffer any loss.

7. Personally, however, I think it probable that the Maliks will be unable to make anything like a final settlement or prevent the worse behaved sections running up their account still higher. We must then resort to a blockade or an expedition, and after the operations a redistribution of allowances will be practicable and expedient. But then again the tribe is so *democratic*, and members of it attain to prominence and notoriety so

* This can be provided against in all probability.

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offences until their claims

† This will infallibly lead to an occupation of the whole country.

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8. As regards the question of individual as against tribal responsibility, it does not seem to

‡ They have always done that.

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permanent residents there;

§ We do not find this to be the case elsewhere in similar circumstances.

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on every member of the tribe found inside our territory, we should discourage their trade, prevent their settling down there, and generally create among them a feeling of uneasiness and insecurity which will seriously impair our

¶ In almost all cases failure is certain.

W. R. H. MERK.

great difficulty in realizing the fine imposed from the latter. I would therefore adopt the middle course of putting pressure on the larger sections in the more serious offences (if the actual offenders or their sub-sections cannot at once be punished) and in less serious offences of endeavouring to bring the case home to individual offenders or their sub-sections with the least possible delay, at the same time not losing sight of the ultimate responsibility of the larger section and enforcing that if the case cannot be settled otherwise. At any rate to suddenly adopt now the principle of tribal responsibility *in toto* when the other system has been followed for several years past would involve the risk of a serious rupture of our friendly relations with the tribe.

Annexure 5.

Telegram from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., to Commissioner, Derajat, dated 4th June, 1900.

Wire was cut on night of 2nd near to Zaranioba within sight of Karab Kot. Was mended in my presence yesterday. Have just heard wire cut in same place again last night. Officer Commanding, Wana, wires to-day. *Begins.* One shot from Kotkan fired on convoy this morning at 7.30 a.m. No damage done. *Ends.* It is evident gangs of Mahsuds are out with

intention to injure Government property. With regard to robbery of dāk, attack on Khajuri Kach picket, theft of carbine from Jandola, chief Maliks were written to, but none have replied, nor have any efforts been made by Maliks to clear up these or former cases. Am expecting chief Maliks in here to-morrow and next day. The account against Mahsuds is increasing daily. Have you any special orders for me to convey to Maliks?

Annexure 6.

Telegram from Commissioner, Derajat, to Political Officer, Wana, dated 5th June, 1900.

Your telegram. Please tell the Maliks from me that the position and their conduct is very unsatisfactory, and that they must do their duty on pain of incurring the severe displeasure of Government, to whom the present state of affairs is being reported. You should point out to them that this kind of thing cannot continue, and that it was expected that after the March settlement there would be an improvement, whereas matters remain the same as before. Please report by letter result of your interview.

Annexure 7.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated 12th June, 1900.

I have the honour to inform you that on the 9th-11th May, 1900, I interviewed the Mahsud Maliks. I had summoned 22 of the chief Maliks to come in and talk over matters referring to tribal responsibility and to arrange for a more speedy settlement of cases. Instead of only 22 Maliks being present about 150 came in. I first explained to the chief Maliks my proposals, which, briefly put, are:—Maliks of sections are responsible to Government for offences committed by members of their sections, and are bound by agreement to give redress for such offences; that in cases when sectional Maliks have not the power to coerce offenders, then the tribal Maliks, *i.e.*, Maliks of other sections, should step in and bring pressure to bear on the offenders.

I also gave to the Maliks the message conveyed in your telegram, dated 5th June.

I then dismissed the chief Maliks, asking them to talk over my proposals with the others, and promised to meet the whole of the Maliks after two hours. On again meeting the jirga of Maliks I explained to them that the present state of affairs was most unsatisfactory; that since the recent settlement come to in March last a number of serious offences had been committed by Mahsuds, the majority of which were offences directly against Government; that in spite of intimation of these offences having been committed having been sent to the Mahsud Maliks, not a single Malik had made any attempt to assist in the detection of the offenders or to arrange any settlement of these cases; and that consequently it seemed to me necessary that some arrangement should be made between the Maliks and myself by which speedy settlement of offences would be effected, and by which in future punishment should fall on the real offenders, and not, as under the existing system, upon the Maliks and other innocent persons.

I clearly pointed out that I had no intention of giving any orders on the subject, but that I left the matter absolutely in the hands of the Maliks.

I pointed out that what seemed to me most necessary was that, when the time comes for rendering service, the Maliks should unite and bring pressure upon the offenders or the offending section, and force them to give

redress for the offence committed; that were the Maliks to combine in this way they would undoubtedly be strong enough to control their turbulent sections. I further explained to them that my object in asking them to come to some such an arrangement with me was that the power for good of the Maliks would be strengthened, and that, in future, by combination, they would have the power of forcing the real offenders to redress the wrongs they had committed, instead of, as has been the custom up to date, the Maliks and other innocent members of the tribe having to suffer for the offences committed by others. The matter was discussed with the Maliks on 9th, 10th and 11th, but eventually they declared that they could not come to agree to any new system being introduced, and preferred to stand by the old system, and they gave me in a written agreement putting forward their wishes as to how cases should be settled. This is as follows:—

- (1) We, Mahsud Maliks, wish that the real offenders should be adequately punished.
- (2) If the Maliks responsible have not the power to impose adequate punishment on the real offenders, then the Political Officer should assist the Maliks with troops or with the Militia.
- (3) If this cannot be done, then the old system of gaining redress should be followed, which is as follows:—

The Maliks responsible shall bring in the suspected persons on safe conduct; if found guilty they should be allowed to return with the Maliks, and the latter will then be responsible for giving redress. If the Malik of the offenders "Kirri" is powerless to give redress, then only the sectional Maliks should be called in to assist.

The chief argument put forward by the Maliks against the introduction of a new system such as I proposed are:—

- (a) It is impossible, owing to the numerous feuds existing between them, for the Maliks to combine.
- (b) Even if they could and did combine to bring pressure on real offenders, each one of them would be in danger of being murdered,* and they are not prepared to take this risk.

* This is a sound reason and a real danger.
W. R. H. MERK.
- (c) They consider that the allowances paid to them by Government are on account of past services and [by receiving]† such allowances does not enforce responsibility upon them to settle cases.

† The receipt of ?
W. R. H. MERK.
- (d) That tribal responsibility has never† up to date been enforced, and the Maliks who receive allowances are unable to coerce and control turbulent gangs or sections of the tribe.

‡ This is incorrect.
W. R. H. MERK.
- (e) That in making the settlement in March last they were induced by the "Master" (*i.e.*, Tej Bahn, late Head Clerk to Commissioner, Derajat) to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson.

They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crimes. They also declare that they were promised assistance of troops to coerce turbulent sections; also

§ I have specially guarded against this idea in my note of instructions regarding the raising of the Militias.
W. R. H. MERK.

that when the Militia should be raised the Maliks§ might always make use of it to coerce those over whom they have no influence.

As soon as I saw that the Maliks were averse to the introduction of any new system, I stopped the discussion, and informed them that I would continue to work on the old lines, but that I expected the Maliks to exert themselves more to maintain control of their several sections and to render me proper assistance in bringing cases home to the real offenders. I then put before the jirga the following cases, which have been committed by Mahsuds since the settlement made in March. These are:—

- (1) The Kurram raid case, in which 23 camels belonging to Powindahs were looted by Aimal Khel and Malikdinai Mahsuds. Ten camels have been recovered, but there is still a balance of 13. No fine was imposed for this offence.
- (2) The Spin raid case, which occurred on 23rd April, 1900, and in which 170 camels belonging to Miani Powindahs were looted by a gang composed of Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. The Darwesh Khels concerned have been arrested and punished, but with the exception of restoring 9 camels out of the 140 which fell to the share of the Mahsuds, the Maliks have done nothing to get this case settled. In this case also one of the Powindahs was shot by a Mahsud.
- (3) The robbery of the mail bags in the Tiarza Nullah on night of 20th May, 1900. In spite of repeated letters to the Maliks to exert themselves to get this case settled, no assistance has been given by any Malik. The mail bags are with the Mullah Powindah.
 Doubtful.
 W. R. H. MERK.
- (4) The attack on the water picket at Khajuri Kach, the wounding of a sepoy of the 27th Punjab Infantry, and theft of three Martini-Henry rifles, 42 cartridges and two belts. This case occurred on 23rd May. The Maliks were written to to make enquiries and let me know who were the raiders, but have taken no steps whatever to enquire into the case.
- (5) The theft of a Cavalry Martini-Henry carbine from the Jandola Post. Suspicion points to members of the Shingis as being the offenders. Maliks have taken no steps to recover the carbine or to punish the offenders.
- (6) Four cases of cutting the telegraph wire during April and May. No trace of offenders yet obtained.
- (7) Firing on the convoy from the Kotkan Hill by a party of Mahsuds, about two miles from Wana Post. The offenders were seen by a Public Works Department contractor making off towards Mahsud country.
- (8) Wounding of a levy sowar escorting the mails between Zam Post and the hills. Offenders said to be Gunge Shingi. Maliks though written to have taken no steps in the matter.
- (9) Raid on a Bhattanni in Tank Ilaqa and murder of a Bhattanni who followed up raiders. This case was committed by Mauladad, Shingi Mahsud. Case was put before Maliks, who state they have no power over Mauladad.
- (10) Raid in Spin by Khalo, Abdurrahman Khel, and theft of 20 camels. Maliks say they have no power over Khalo.

Besides the above-mentioned cases some 40 cases of petty raids along the Tank border are pending against the Mahsuds. These have been committed during April and May, 1900. The Maliks, when asked how they intended settling these cases, asked for a week's grace, so that they might consider the subject. I have ordered them to meet me here on the 18th June, when I will hear what they have to say, and will report further.

Annexure 8.

State of the Mahsud Tribe and relations therewith.

Having only arrived in Wana in April last, and never before having served in the Derajat, I cannot claim to have an intimate knowledge of the Mahsuds. I can, however, claim to have had six years' experience of political working with Afridis, Mohmands, Swatis and Bajauris, and to be thoroughly acquainted with the system of political working carried out on the Peshawar Border.

I have had opportunities of observing the results of the system of political working carried out here, and I cannot say the results compare favourably with those attained on the Peshawar Border. In my opinion the principal defects in political working with the Mahsuds are:—

- (a) That instead of tribal responsibility, individual responsibility is enforced; this tends to delay the settlement of cases, and to bring upon the tribe such an enormous load of debt that it is impossible for the tribe to clear itself.
- (b) The majority of Maliks have little or no influence over their fellow-tribesmen.
- (c) The allowances paid by Government are, instead of being paid to the tribe as a tribal allowance, eaten up by a number of so-called Maliks who do nothing for them in return.

Since my arrival in Wana I have had opportunities of meeting all the principal Maliks of the Mahsuds tribe as well as many of the minor Maliks and of discussing with them the above defects which I have noticed. From these discussions and from my own observation of the action of various Maliks in their relations towards Government, I venture to put forward the following opinion:—

Owing to the fact that so-called Mahsud allowances are not shared by the tribe as a whole, but are merely paid to a certain number of Maliks, the tribe as a whole does not consider itself in any way bound by any obligation to Government. Roughly speaking, about one-third of the tribe follow the lead of the Maliks, and the remaining two-thirds follow their own sweet will, and consider themselves to be the equal of anybody. The Mahsud, on his own confession, being a born thief and highway robber, the result of this state of affairs is that there can be no peace in the country.

Again, the Mullah Powindah is doing all he knows to discredit most of the Maliks with the tribe in order to increase his own power, with the hope of eventually forcing Government to consider him as the leader of the tribe.

The Maliks declare their inability to exercise any control over the Mullah, and the consequence is that any Mahsud whom the Maliks may wish to coerce at once goes over to him for protection. A recent example which clearly shows the weakness of the Maliks is the case of the escaped hostage Mianji, Abdurrahman Khel. The Maliks promised to bring him back or to bring in his two brothers as hostages in his place. The whole family promptly fled to the Mullah, and the Maliks declare that they are now powerless to bring in any of them.

I venture to state that the system of political action carried out is greatly to blame for the want of control over the tribe and for the difficulties experienced in bringing pressure to bear upon the tribe. It has been the custom in obtaining redress for offences committed for responsibility to be enforced upon, firstly, the original offenders, secondly, if that fails, as it always does, upon the section or sub-section to which the offenders belong; the remaining sections of the Mahsuds consider that they have no concern in the matter and are in no way responsible for seeing that redress for the wrong is made. It is owing to this custom, which the Mahsuds* refuse to have changed, that cases remain so long unsettled, and eventually the total indebtedness of the Mahsuds

* i.e. the Maliks.
W. R. H. MERK.

amounts to such an enormous sum that it is impossible for them to liquidate the debt. Then, as the Maliks themselves say, they have to bear the punishment by forfeiture of their allowances, and the real offenders get off scot-free, and are merely incited to commit further crime. As I have already pointed out to the Maliks, the only cure for this evil is that they should unite, and by their combination bring such pressure to bear on the turbulent members or sections of the tribe that they cannot resist the Maliks.

This suggestion, however, the Maliks, though allowing it is a sensible one, say that they cannot carry out. As far as I can gather, the allowances to Maliks were originally fixed on the information given by a small number of well-known and prominent members of the Mahsud tribe, who, only naturally, in order to strengthen their own position, principally put forward only the names of men of their own party to receive the smaller allowances. The consequence of this is that these so-called 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Class Maliks, with a few exceptions, consider that they are in no way responsible for the control of their sections, and from what I have seen they live up to this idea, take their allowance, and do nothing.

I have no doubt that had the sections and sub-sections of the tribe been permitted to elect to whom and in what shares the allowances should be paid, as was done in the settlement of the Mohmand allowances,* several of these men would have received no allowances at all, and in their place men with the greatest influence in their sections would have been recognized as Maliks.

* In 1896.

W. R. H. MERK.

From what I have observed some sections of the Mahsuds, such as the Shabi Khels, Garerai, Jalal Khels, Band Khels, have reason to be discontented with the amounts they receive as allowances,† as compared with those received by other sections. The Shabi Khels are said, owing to their numbers and influence, to have a right to a half share of the Alizai section, whereas by the present arrangement they receive a little more than a one-fourth share. The Garerai are a sub-section of the Datchi Khel, and out of a monthly allowance of Rs. 251 enjoyed by the Datchi Khels, they only receive an allowance of Rs. 34.

† *Viz.*, to the Maliks; there are no tribal allowances among the Mahsuds.

W. R. H. MERK.

The Jalal Khels are a sub-section of the Nana Khel Bahlolzais, who receive a monthly allowance of Rs. 460, of which the Jalal Khels receive Rs. 40. The Jalal Khels in numbers and influence are in every way equal to the Abdurrahman Khel sub-section, which receives Rs. 151 per mensem.

The Band Khels are a sub-section of the Bahlolzais, the other sections being the Aimal Khels, Nana Khels and Shingis; yet, out of a total allowance of Rs. 1,154 per mensem enjoyed by the Bahlolzai section, the Band Khel receive only Rs. 39. The above examples are, in my opinion, sufficient to show that the Mahsud allowances were not apportioned out in fair shares, and also to show that the discontented sections have some reason for their discontent.

I agree with Mr. Watson that the majority of the Maliks and their special following are well disposed towards Government in so far that they do not desire a rupture in the existing relations. From my experience of the Maliks so far, I have found almost all of them very ready to give advice as to the treatment of offending sections, but when called upon to do their own work and to exercise control over the sections for which they are responsible, they one and all declare that they have not the power.

In one or two cases which have come to my notice lately they have not the will, notably the Badshah Khan, Shah Salem, Alizais, Fateh Khan, Gulpir and Khani Zaman, Shingis. The Maliks have themselves declared to me that they consider that the allowances they receive are due to them for past services, and do not consider that in return for these allowances they are bound to serve Government. They persist in saying that each

Malik of a section is responsible for obtaining redress for any offence committed by his section or any member of it, but that tribal responsibility has never been imposed upon them,* and that they are unable to combine and bring tribal pressure to bear on offenders in order to redress wrongs for Government.

* This is incorrect: tribal responsibility was enforced till 1890-91.

W. R. H. MERK.

The present system of dealing with the Mahsuds is impossible, as will be understood when it is known that since March last the bill against the Mahsuds for offences committed since by them amounts on a rough calculation to Rs. 15,000 for compensation alone, not counting fines. Not a single case has been settled, and I am powerless to take any forcible measures against them, as, if I were to do so, the March settlement would never be completed.

S. S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana,
Southern Waziristan.

The 17th July, 1900.

Annexure 9.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Wana, 18th July, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated the 2nd July, 1900, I have the honour to forward the statement called for.

Annexure 10.

STATEMENT A.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
1	25th April, 1900	Gul Imam	Asa Ram, son of Ganda Ram, Ganbhir, of Gul Imam.	On the night of 24th-25th April, 1900, the thieves broke into the complainant's shop and took off clothing and property. The value of stolen property not yet explained by the complainant.	Unknown. Suspicion on Mahsuds.	Nil	Nil. A compensation will be proposed on proof according to the statement of the complainant.
*2	13th April, 1900	Pir Kachh	Khadim, son of Sher Khan, caste unknown, of Tank.	On April 13th the complainant was carrying his atta from Pir Khan water mill to Tank when he was set upon by 12 raiders, who robbed him of his atta and clothing worth Rs. 15-6-0.	Twelve thieves; names unknown (Mahsuds suspected).	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 15-6-0 shall be imposed on proof.
*3	23rd April, 1900	Near Tank	Inayat, son of Sahrab, Gariban (coachman).	On 22nd-23rd April, 1900, thieves carried off one bullock valued at Rs. 27.	Unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 15 shall be imposed on proof.
*4	27th April, 1900	Nasran	1. Naurang, son of Muhammad Yar, Nasirs of Nasran. 2. Muhammad Yar, son of Nawaz, 3. Surkamand	On 26th-27th April, 1900, the complainants' four bullocks, worth Rs. 60, were carried off; two of them have been recovered, and tracks of other two bullocks led up to Shuza Pass.	Four thieves; names unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 30 shall be imposed on proof.
*5	26th April, 1900	Near Jatta	Mamid Khan, son of Bazu Jatt (camel driver), of Khizrza.	The complainant with his four companions was attacked on his way from Utar to Gomal by thieves, who carried off his clothes, worth Rs. 1-3-0.	Five thieves; names unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 1-3-0 shall be imposed on proof.
*6	8th April, 1900...	Chupar road bridge	1. Amar Din, son of Mian Khan, Ali Khel. 2. Aqil Shah, blacksmith, of Ali Khel.	The complainants on their way back to Ali Khel were attacked by some thieves, who carried off two camels, some clothes and other property, worth Rs. 110-8-0. Tracks led to Zam Pass.	Four thieves; names unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 110-8-0 shall be imposed on proof.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
*7	26th April, 1900	Mullazai	Zarif Khan, son of Surat Khan, carpenter, of Mur-taza.	On the night of 25th-26th April, 1900, a few thieves carried off one camel, worth Rs. 50.	Unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 50 shall be imposed on proof.
*8	24th April, 1900	Kazi Watermill ...	Alam Khan, son of Malik Khan, Kundi, of Tank.	On the night of 23rd-24th April, 1900, a few thieves carried off two camels, valued at Rs. 170.	Unknown. Shingi Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 100 shall be imposed on proof. Not explained why compensation less than the value of the camels is proposed. W. H. MERR, Commissioner.
*9	25th April, 1900	Gomal Nullah	1. Allahdad Khan, son of Buland Khan. 2. Zarif Khan, Kharoti Powindah.	Some thieves carried off 17 cows and 22 goats out grazing near Gomal Nullah.	Unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 110 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*10	30th April, 1900	Nawaz Kot	Baz Khan, son of Shadi Khan, Sheikh, of Kot Nawaz.	Complainant was fired at and wounded by some raiders while he was watching his own crops.	Do.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 360 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*11	23rd April, 1900	Near Jatta... ..	Sultan, son of Suleman, Dhobi (washer), of Maddi.	The complainant with his companion was driving camels loaded with Commissariat stores towards Khajuri Kach; on reaching Jatta he was attacked by raiders, who robbed him of one camel.	Do.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 50 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*12	13th April, 1900	Kot Nawaz	Ayan-ud-din, son of Abdul Halim, Sheikh, through Azmat Khan, Daffadar.	The complainant was robbed of his clothing, worth Rs. 17 10 0, and a sheep was carried off by thieves while he was in his own land.	Four thieves. Unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 20 will be proposed when the case is proved.

13	28th April, 1900	Azim Kot ...	1. Dauran, son of Maham-mad Khan. 2. Some other Miani Powin-dahs.	Complainants' 45 camels out grazing near Kot Azam were raided and carried off by 20 Mahsuds. The value of camels reported is Rs. 2,250.	1. Khalu, 2. Shah Guli, 3. Shahrang, 4. Banocha Khan, 5. Muhammad Ali, 6. Nujjam, 7. Asal Khan, Guri Khel, with 13 others. Five thieves. Unknown	Abdur-rahman Khels.	Nil	Nil. Rs. 500 fine and compensation of Rs. 2,250 will be proposed when the case is proved.
14	4th April, 1900...	Near Kulaehi ...	1. Khan, } Miani 2. Faizulla, } Powin- 3. Shah Jahan, } dahs.	The complainants on their way to Kulaehi from Shiranni country were attacked by five thieves and robbed of four camels, worth Rs. 360, and Rs. 260 in cash.	Ten thieves. Unknown		Nil	Nil. Rs. 200 fine and compensation of Rs. 200 for camels, and Rs. 260 cash will be proposed when the case is proved.
*15	17th April 1900	Tarkha Shakh ...	Hakim, son of Khalil, " Mo- chi " of Luni. 2. Khanik, son of Bhai Khan, Hassan Khel.	The complainants were proceeding to Luni from Munjhi when they were set upon by 10 thieves, who carried off three cows and other property.	Do.		Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 50 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*16	16th April 1900	Nawaz Kot ...	Khal-ud-din, Post Office, Kashmir Kar, through Khan Gul, Levy foot.	The complainant's house was broken into and his property, worth Rs. 13-12-0, carried off.	Do.		Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 14 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*17	30th April 1900	Do. ...	1. Shuja-ul-Mulk, } Mianis son of Pir Wali, } of 2. Guldak, son of } Nawaz Salih Khan, } Kot.	The complainants' wheat crop was cut down by thieves; valued at Rs. 12.	Do.		Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 12 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*18	Do. •	Kirri of Bhattannis	Zarif Khan, son of Sher Khan, Kharoti Powindah living in Pathan Kot.	On the night of 29th-30th April, 1900, the complainant's four donkeys, worth Rs. 130, were carried off by thieves.	Do.		Nil	Nil. A compensation of about Rs. 40 will be proposed when the case is proved. Not explained why only Rs. 40 compensation is proposed. W. R. H. MERE, Commissioner.
19	3rd May, 1900 ...	Kirri Jani Kai ...	1. Daulat Khan, son of Jhangli Khan, Waraspur, of Kirri Jani Kai.	On the night of 2nd-3rd April, 1900, complainant's two bullocks, worth Rs. 30, were carried off by thieves. A obigha turned out from Janiki Kirri and got over the thieves at Spinkai Raghza, and exchange of shots resulted in the death of Laghar and wounding of Amaldar, Bhit-tannis, Chighawals.	Mauladad, Shingi, and three others.		Nil	Nil. Fine of Rs. 1,000— Rs. 300 blood-money; Rs. 100 for wounding of Amaldar; Rs. 30 as compensation for bullocks; has been imposed.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
*20	24th May, 1900 ...	Kirri Jangi ...	Piaru, son of Zaman, sweeper, of Kirri Jangi.	On the night of 23rd-24th May, 1900, one horse, worth Rs. 15, belonging to the complainant, was carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 15 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*21	26th May, 1900 ...	Khanwand ...	1. Jangi Khan, } Mianis of 2. Khaisar Khan, } Murtaza.	Complainants' seven sheep, worth Rs. 48-8-0, were stolen.	Do	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 30 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*22	15th May, 1900 ...	Mian Buta water-mill.	Kamar Din, son of Ghulam Mahiy-ud-din.	On the night of 14th-15th May, 1900, the complainant's one sword and seven bags of atta, worth Rs. 72-4-0, were carried off.	Twelve thieves. Unknown.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 70 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*23	4th May, 1900 ...	Mauza Budh ...	Faqir, son of Nawaz, Sheikh, of Garra Budh.	On the night of 3rd-4th May, 1900, some thieves broke into the complainant's house and carried off one gun and other property worth Rs. 24-8-0.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 125 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*24	4th May, 1900 ..	Umar Khel ...	Mussammat Lamki, daughter of Almar Khan, Dauran, Khel, of Umar Khel in Mullazai Thana.	On the night of 3rd-4th May, 1900, thieves broke into the complainant's house and carried off four goats and three bags of wool and some clothing worth Rs. 22-12-0. Tracks led up to hills.	Unknown. Mahsuds suspected.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 50 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*25	28th April, 1900	Murtaza	1. Gandapura, } Mianis. 2. Khaisar Khan, } 3. Saidal, } Lambardars 4. Isa Khan, } of Kot Nawaz and Murtaza.	On the night of 27th-28th April, 1900, the complainants' wheat crop was cut down by the thieves, which is estimated at Rs. 450.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of not more than Rs. 100 will be proposed when the case is proved. Not explained why only Rs. 100 compensation is assessed.

W. R. H. MERR,
Commissioner.

26	27th April, 1900	Gang toba near Chaudhwan	Abdul Fikar Shah, &c., Powindahs of Khurasan, encamped near Gang toba.	On the night of 26th-27th April, 1900, the complainants were attacked by thieves, who robbed them of clothes and other property valued at Rs. 251-14-0.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of about Rs. 200 will be proposed when the case is proved.
27	22nd April, 1900	Chappra Khulla ...	1. Junia Khan, 2. Jamal Khan, 3. Hassan Khan. } Mianis.	On 22nd April, 1900, the complainants were attacked by a large gang of thieves consisting of 80 men and robbed of 170 camels.	This raid was committed by 11 Zalli Khel and 13 Michi Khel Mahsuds, Malik Denais, Abdurrahman Khels, &c.	Eleven Zalli Khels were found guilty by the jirga and punished judicially as follows:— 1. Mihr Jan, six months' imprisonment. 2. Allahdad, one year's imprisonment. 3—8. Two years' imprisonment. 9—11. Not punished as yet as they absconded. Each was fined Rs. 100, which will be made over to complainants if realized. As the complainants have gone to Khurasan, the case will be tried against the Mahsuds when they return. Rs. 5,760 will be imposed on the Mahsuds as follows:— Rs. Blood-money... 360 Compensation for camels ... 5,400 5,760	Compensation due from Mahsuds shall be Rs. 5,400 and blood-money 360 5,760, and from Zalli Khels Rs. 1,100.
28	31st March, 1900 1st April, 1900 ...	Khajuri Kach ...	Kber Khan, son of Samundar Khan of Kirri Jahan Khan Nasir.	On the night of 31st March, 1900, some thieves attacked Kirri of Jahan Khan and carried off four camels.	Unknown	Nil	A compensation of Rs. 200 will be proposed when the case is proved.
29	2nd April, 1900...	Sado Chilla ...	1. Ram Singh, Ngandioba, Bania. 2. Mussammat Bhag Bhari.	The complainants were attacked by 15 raiders, who took away their ornaments and some other property valued at Rs. 133-8-3. These were coming along with convoy while robbed owing to their being left far behind the convoy.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 133 will be proposed when the case is proved.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
30	21st May, 1900 ...	Wucha Tiarza ...	Empress	Government dak was looted in Wucha Tiarza at about 8 a.m. on 21st May, 1900, by some eight raiders.	Duransai, Senai, son of Khidrai, Nekzan Khel, Amrdin, Abdullai, Juma, Afzal, Giga Khels, &c.	Rs. 2,000 fined	Rs. 2,000 fined. Compensation Rs. 500.
31	25th May, 1900...	Khajuri Kach ...	Do,	Fifteen raiders attacked the water picket, Khajuri Kach, consisting of three Sepoys and one Havildar and took away three Martini-Henry rifles and 44 cartridges and two belts. One Sepoy wounded in the attack.	(1). Zalumme, Shingi, (2). Fannai, brocher of Zalumme, (3). Mianji, Abdurrahman Khel, with three others.	Compensation Rs. 1,800, price of three rifles, pouch, &c.	Due from Mahsuds Rs. 3,800 as follows :— Rs. Fine 2,000 Price of three rifles 1,500 Wound price ... 200 Price of goods ... 100 Total 3,800
32	25th May, 1900...	Military Post, Jandola.	Do.	On the evening of May 25th a Martini-Henry carbine, No. 211, with a pouch, belt and 20 rounds were stolen from Shahwali, Sowar, 5th Punjab Cavalry.	Shah Jahan and Mirajan, Shingie, Boji Khels.	Rs. 600 has been imposed as compensation as well as fines.	Due from Shingis Rs. 600 as follows :— Rs. Compensation of rifles 300 Price of belt, &c. ... 100 Fine 200 Total 600
33	4th May 1900 ...	Grazing ground, Karkan.	1. Haidar Shah, } 2. Umar Shah, } Syads, of 3. Gul Muhaun- } Kirri mad Shah, } Khoedad Khan.	On the night of 3rd-4th May, 1900, complainants' 14 camels, worth Rs. 840, were carried off by thieves from the grazing-ground of Karkan.	Unknown	Nil	Fine of Rs. 500; compensation Rs. 840 will be proposed when the case is proved.
34	5th May, 1900 ...	Ghwalwa Khurra...	1. Said Ahmad, } Luni, } 2. Sikandar, son } Mian of Mawal. } Khels, of 3. Lal Khan, } Khurasan. 4. Bahar Khan, }	On 5th May, 1900, the complainants Kirris of Dotanis on their way from Nili to Khajuri were attacked by a gang of 200 badmashes, carried off two camels worth Rs. 100, wounding and killing four camels, clothes worth Rs. 900 and Rs. 600 Kabuli in cash.	Do.	Nil	Nil. Compensation of Rs. 1,600 will be proposed as follows :— Rs. Two camels ... 100 Clothing 900 Cash 600 1,600 when the case is proved, i.e.—Rs. 1,000 British Rs. 600 Kabuli.

35	5th May, 1900 ...	Basta Kach ...	Ghulam Rasul, son of Paind Khan, Nasir, of Kirri Shah Muhammad Nasir, encamped at Panyala.	On 5th May, 1900, complainant's four camels worth Rs. 200 strayed near grazing Basta Kach.	Do.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 200 will be proposed when the case is proved.
36	15th May, 1900...	Three miles from Jandola towards Haidari Kach.	Empress through Post Master, Haidari Kach.	On 15th May, 1900, Post Master, Haidari Kach, wired that the telegraph wire was cut by some badmashes.	Do.	Rs. 50 fine has been imposed on Mahsud tribe.
37	10th April, 1900	Shirani Pass ...	1. Muhammad Afzal, 2. Shirin, 3. Baddo, 4. Muhammad Ashraf. } Suleman Khels.	On 10th April, 1900, complainants were robbed of Rs. 2,000 Kabuli by robbers near Gandhi Muza Khan.	1. Shahwarmin, son of Lale Gul, with four others, 2. Asai Khan, 3. Kipat Khan, with six other Guri Khels.	Nil	Nil. Compensation of Rs. 2,000 will be proposed when the case is proved.
38	1st April, 1900 ...	Unknown	Dadu Khan, Dawat Khel Powindah of Kirri Gul Khan at Kulachi.	Twelve camels and five goats out grazing in the Shirani Pass were carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 188 will be proposed when the case is proved.
39	2nd April, 1900...	Hissar Pass ...	Ghaza Khan, son of Haibat Khan, Mandi Khel, Nambardar of Kirri Ahmad Shah.	On 2nd April, 1900, complainants 38 goats, valued at Rs. 114, and three cows, valued at Rs. 45, were carried off by thieves.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 140 will be proposed when this case is proved.
40	24th May, 1900...	Zam Khulla ...	Empress through Maghar Khan, Bhattanni Sowar.	On 21st May Dak runners were carrying Government dak from Gandola to Tank. At Zam Khulla Maghar Khan, Dak badraga, was fired at by thieves and wounded in the wrist.	Nil	Fine of Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 for wounding the Levy Sowar will be imposed.	—
41	1st April, 1900 ...	Nurragai	Dad, son of Rakkai, Dawat Khel.	On 1st April, 1900, complainant's nine cows, valued at Rs. 135, and five goats, valued at Rs. 15, were carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. Compensation of Rs. 142 will be proposed when the case is proved.
42	24th-25th May, 1900.	Tank Serai... ..	Tahlu Ram, son of Chothu Rani, of Tank.	On the night of 24th-25th May, 1900, some raiders broke into the house of complainant and carried off ghi, &c., valued at Rs. 126-8-0.	Do.	Nil	Nil. Compensation of Rs. 126 will be proposed when the case is proved.
43	26th-27th May, 1900.	Murtaza	Saifal Khan, son of Murtaza Khan, Miani, of Kot Murtaza.	On the night of 26th-27th May, 1900, some raiders carried off wheat collected at complainant's door, valued at Rs. 10.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 10 will be proposed when the case is proved.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds against Government or Government Servants, or British Subjects or their Property—continued.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offence, briefly.	Details of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment Inflicted.	Amount of Compensation due, also Fine due or proposed.
44	3rd June, 1900 ...	Kurah Kot... ..	Empress	On 3rd June, 1900, telegraph wire was out with no other damage.	Unknown	Rupees 50 imposed as fine on three chief sections of Mahsuds.	Fine of Rs. 50 is due from three chief sections of Mahsuds.
45	4th June, 1900 ...	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
46	Do. ...	Mani of Guldad, Wana.	Do.	On 4th June, 1900, some badmashes fired at the convoy proceeding to Ngandioba from Kot Kun hill, but no casualty occurred.	Mahsuds suspected ...	Fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed on three chief sections of Mahsuds.	Rs. 1,000 is due from three sections of Mahsuds.
*47	27th-28th April, 1900.	Tank	Dost Muhammad, son of Mauladad, Powindah Mullah.	On the night of 27th-28th April, 1900, some thieves penetrated into the Kirri of complainant, encamped near Tank, and took away one tent and some vessels, valued at Rs. 77.	Unknown	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 77 will be imposed when case is proved before jirga.
*48	29th-30th May 1900.	Mullazai Kirri, Lakki Michan.	Chela Ram, son of Bihari Ram, through Sher Ahmad.	On the night of 29th-30th May, 1900, some thieves broke into complainant's house and carried off a silver necklace.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 10 will be imposed when case is proved before jirga.
49	30th-31st May, 1900.	Tattar Tank ...	Sahib Khan, son of Dinak, Akhund Khel of Tattar.	On the night of 30th-31st May, 1900, some thieves carried off complainant's bullocks, worth Rs. 30.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 15 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*50	31st May, 1900 ...	Girni, Thana Gomal	1. Azim Khan, } 2. Fateh Mir, } Marzyanis.	On 31st May, 1900, some thieves attacked complainants' cattle and carried off 54, out of which 37 were recovered.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 255 will be proposed when the case is proved.
51	29th June, 1900...	Zaranioba	Assim Khan, son of Rustam Khan, Kaur-ud-din, and Moosa, footman badragga.	On 29th June, 1900, complainant was going with Moosa Khan, badragga, to Khajuri Kaoh on his way to Zarranni, when some riders attacked him and carried off Rs. 2 in cash and clothes worth Rs. 10-13-6, and also robbed of badragga's property as follows:— Rs. A. P. Knife 3 0 0 Kabull. Government belt 2 8 0 British.	Do.	Nil	Compensation of about Rs. 30 will be proposed when the case is proved.

*52	21st June, 1900 ...	Jutt	Dyala Ram, son of Nawal Ram, Kathuria, and Gulla, son of Bahadur, Makkar, &c.	Some six raiders attacked complainants on their way to Gomal and carried off four bags of sugar which was loaded in complainant's rehries, and took Rs. 5 in cash.	Do	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 65 will be proposed when the case is proved.
*53	1st-2nd July, 1900	Military Po-t, Tank	Sahara, son of Shera, caste Uchara, and Mosalma, son of Gama.	Some raiders stole two camels, worth Rs. 100, of complainants on 1st-2nd July, 1900.	Nil	Nil	Compensation of Rs. 100 will be proposed when the case is proved.

				Rs.	A.	P.
Total due	=	23,259	1 0 British.
+ 2,600-0-0	Kabuli	=	1,300	0 0 British.
Total		<u>24,559</u>	<u>1 0</u>

S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana.

Note.—The cases marked * were committed in the Derā Ismail Khan District. Had the offenders been caught, they would have received substantial sentences of imprisonment in addition to fines. I consider, therefore, that fines should be imposed in addition to the compensation proposed in these cases.

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

STATEMENT B.

Statement of Offences committed by Mahsuds in Protected Area against Persons not British Subjects.

Serial No.	Date of Occurrence.	Place of Occurrence.	Names and Detail of Complainants.	Nature of Offences, briefly.	Detail of Offenders, briefly.	What Reparation made or Punishment inflicted.	Amount of Compensation Due, also Fine Due or Proposed.
1	20th April, 1900	Spin	1. Sahib Khan, } Miani 2. Torak Khan, } Powindahs	On the night of 20th April, 1900, the complainants' 11 camels worth Rs. 550 were carried off by thieves.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 550 will be proposed if the case is proved.
2	2nd April, 1900...	Wana	Bahadar, Kari Khel... ..	Complainant's brother Juma Khan was detained by the defendant in Khaisara and kept in custody.	1. Adilmiri, } Mahsuds, of 2. Isagai, } Khaisara.	Nil	Nil. Fine of Rs. 50 will be imposed on the appearance of the parties.
3	18th May, 1900...	Jandola	Surkamand, Sarah, Bhit-tanni of Jandola.	On May 18th four cows worth Rs. 60 were carried off by thieves from the complainants.	Gunge Khan, Shingi	Nil	Nil. Compensation Rs. 60 will be proposed provided that the case is proved.
4	8th May, 1900 ...	Kirri Suhbatti Kach	Rozi Khan, Bhitanni	On the night of 7th May, 1900, about 25 Mahsud thieves attacked the complainant and carried off 40 camels worth Rs. 603 forcibly.	Unknown	Nil	Nil. Compensation Rs. 600 will be proposed on proof.
5	21st May, 1900 ...	Crazing-ground of China Khah.	Warukai, son of Khan Shah, Ji Khel Zilli Khel.	On May 21st four thieves carried off two sheep and 13 cows worth Rs. 204.	Do.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 200 will be proposed when the case is proved.
6	26th May, 1900...	Jandola	1. Kabir Khan, } Bhit- 2. Dinak Khan, } tannis.	On the night of 26th May, 1900, some thieves burnt the complainants' 60 maunds of wheat.	Do.	Nil	Nil. A compensation of Rs. 180 will be proposed when the case is proved.
7	27th May, 1900...	Wucha Khurra	Nawar Khan, Khojal Khel...	On May 27th a Khojal Khel Bahir returning from Gurgura to Wana with bullocks laden with wood was attacked by several badmashes and robbed of their bullocks. A Khojal Khel Chigha turned out and succeeded in recovering the animals, but one of the chigha party named Gul Muhammad was shot dead by the raiders.	1. Suleman, son of Khushal Khan, Michi Khel. 2. Sarwar, } 3. Kundai, } Michi 4. Shahi Khan, } Khels. 5. Mokhabbat, } Abdurrahman Khel.	Nil	A compensation of Rs. 360 and a fine of Rs. 100 will be proposed when the case is decided. Rupees 360 will be the blood-money and Rs. 100 will be the Government fine.
8	17th May, 1900...	Azrab	Muhammad Afzal, Dotani...	Complainant was robbed of his sword and shield by some raiders, of whom two were recognized.	1. Boshe Khan, son of Bare Khan, Pash. 2. Mohabbat Khan, brother of Sakin, Pash, with some others of Khaisara.	Nil	A compensation amounting to Rs. 15, the value of sword, &c., will be proposed when the case is proved.
9	6th July, 1900 ...	Pasta Khulla in Spin	Piyo Shah, Yargul Khel, &c.	The complainants' cattle were out grazing at Pasta Khulla when nine cows out of them were carried off.	Unknown	Nil	A compensation of Rs. 185 will be proposed when the case is proved.
							Total due Rs. 2,250.

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S. WATERFIELD,
Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan.

Enclosure 13 in No. 2.

Letter from Sir William Cuninghame, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 1st October, 1900.

In reply to your letter, dated the 17th of August, 1900, I am directed to acquaint you with the decision at which the Government of India have arrived after perusal of the correspondence and discussion of Mahsud affairs, at two Conferences held at Viceregal Lodge, Simla, on the 4th and 8th of September, in both of which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab took part.

2. The first question in order of urgency and importance, is that of demanding from the Mahsuds a settlement in full of all fines and claims for compensation outstanding against the tribe, and of enforcing the demand in such a manner that it may speedily be satisfied, and that the Mahsuds may receive a lesson likely to deter them in future from disloyal and disorderly conduct. The Government of India regret to observe that the settlement with the tribe, effected by Mr. Anderson in March, 1900, was little better than a nominal one; and that not only were a number of pending cases left out of consideration altogether, but, in some of those taken up and decided, the punitive fines imposed, or the sums awarded in compensation, were totally inadequate. The Government of India consider that it is impossible to re-open cases which were really disposed of, however unsatisfactorily, in Mr. Anderson's settlement; but that all cases which, though pending before or at the time of that settlement, were not specifically included in it, should now be referred back to the Mahsuds, along with any others that there may be of later occurrence. It is important that all claims whatever against the Mahsuds, including those of an inter-tribal nature of which the settlement has already been undertaken by the Political Officer, should on this occasion be brought to a decision in order that the tribe, after giving satisfaction, should resume its relations to the British Government with a clear balance-sheet. The only exception made should be in respect of any claims which may possibly be brought hereafter by the Afghan Government on account of raids into Afghanistan committed since the demarcation of the frontier. As agreed by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the Commissioner of the Derajat should, as early as possible in November, having regard to the probable duration of the proceedings, and the time required for completing the military preparations in support of a blockade, bring to the notice of the Mahsuds, in jirga assembled, the details and total amount of the claims against them, and, after announcing to the jirga the future policy of Government towards the tribe, allow a certain interval to elapse within which they will have an opportunity of making arrangements for the prompt and complete discharge of their liabilities. Should the Mahsuds refuse to settle, or should they temporise in such manner as to show an evident intention of evading settlement, the Commissioner should present them with a specific demand fixing a period within which they must, upon pain of blockade, comply. On expiration of the period of grace, without submission and compliance on the part of the tribe, the blockade should be declared as soon as the military preparations are ready, and it will be maintained with all possible rigour until further orders. The military preparations which are being made in order to support the civil power in blockading the Mahsuds will be separately communicated for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor. Mr. Merk should submit provisionally without delay such of his proposals for working the blockade as may involve increased political expenditure or the issue of orders by the Government of India.

3. The cases which are to be brought before the jirga of the Mahsud tribe will include claims on account of many and serious offences committed in the Baluchistan Agency Territories. I am to suggest that, with His Honour's permission, the Commissioner of the Derajat might place himself

in communication with the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan, with a view to the Agency being represented at the jirga by a British officer who will be in a position to safeguard the interests of claimants belonging to that part of the frontier.

4. The next point is the suggested change of policy in our future dealings with the Mahsuds, for the introduction of which it is suggested that the Government should utilise the opportunity now afforded of making a general settlement with the tribe. The Government of India agree that the system, hitherto in force, of dealing with the tribe through Maliks who have, to a large extent, been nominated and selected by British officers, has not been a success, and should be abandoned. They agree that the Maliks so selected should no longer be regarded and treated with as the representatives of the tribe, and that negotiations should in future be so conducted that in the case either of the whole tribe or of a section of the tribe there may be reasonable certainty that the views put forward will really represent the popular feeling. The way to ensure that the tribe shall be committed as a whole is to deal in important matters with the jirga of the tribe, and also, when accepting the spokesmanship of any individual, to be certain that he is accepted by the clan which he represents. The tribal subsidies also should be paid to the jirga of the tribe or section for division. The practice of paying to selected individuals should cease, unless the jirga itself makes the selection and desires that the payment be so made. A portion of the subsidy might, however, be reserved for distribution to individuals whose interests it would not be good policy to neglect, but which might suffer in a division of the allowances on an entirely popular or tribal basis. The Government of India also approve of the proposal that time should not hereafter be wasted in unavailing attempts to detect and bring to punishment individual criminals belonging to the tribe. There can be no doubt that adherence to a rigid system of individual and graded responsibility has been productive in the past of great delay in the settlement of cases, and has, therefore, contributed largely to bring about the present situation. The Government of India are convinced, therefore, of the necessity of relaxing this system and of permitting immediate resort, at the discretion of the local political authorities, to tribal or sectional responsibility. At the same time they desire that favourable opportunities of bringing actual offenders to justice should not be neglected, and that punishment should be inflicted on such persons, where this can be conveniently done, either instead of, or in addition to, the penalty upon the tribe.

5. These are the general outlines of the policy which the Government of India are prepared to sanction. As decided at the Conference of September 4th, it is desirable that the Commissioner should himself be responsible for the actual words employed; and there is no wish to fetter his discretion in the matter. Inasmuch, however, as the point now reached may be described as a parting of the ways in our relations with the Mahsuds, and as the Government of India will be bound in the immediate future by whatever is now said, it is important that considerable care should be devoted to its composition, and that a sketch or outline of the manner in which the Commissioner would propose to discharge his task should be submitted in advance to the Lieutenant-Governor and with his approval to the Government of India. I am to request that instructions may be issued to this effect to Mr. Merk.

6. It is further proposed that Mahsuds settled on land in British India should be turned out and sent over the border during the progress of the blockade, and that like treatment should be accorded to the Mahsuds who have enlisted in the Waziristan Militia, a promise being given that, subject to their not participating in actual hostilities, they will be taken back again at its termination.

No. 3.

Letter from Government of India, in the Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Fort William, the 30th January, 1902. Received 17th February, 1902.

IN our despatch, dated the 18th October, 1900, we forwarded papers regarding our relations with the Mahsud tribe, who for a long period of time had committed a series of violent depredations and attacks upon British territory or British protected tribes, which patience and conciliatoriness had proved equally powerless to check or to compose. We informed Your Lordship that the situation was such as to give ground for much anxiety, that the tribal jirga were to be interviewed by Mr. Merk in the following month, with the view of expounding to them the intentions of Government, which, even then, were entirely compatible with a pacific solution; but that, if this attempt proved abortive, and if the tribe declined to accept the proffered settlement and to discharge their liabilities, a strict blockade would be enforced against them until complete submission had been obtained.

2. We now have the honour to enclose papers on the same subject up to the end of the year 1901. In October, 1900, the total sum payable by the Mahsuds on account of all offences, exclusive of those really disposed of by Mr. Anderson's settlement in the preceding March, amounted to Rs. 1,87,000. Recognising that it was hopeless to expect the payment, with any promptitude, of so large a sum from a tribe of the limited resources of the Mahsuds, we decided, at the instance of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to demand a lump sum of a lakh of rupees on account of all offences up to the date of announcement. Even while we were considering this proposal, the Mahsuds added one more to the long list of crimes outstanding against them by attacking and looting, on the 22nd October, the Border Military Police post at Nasran. Two men of the Police were shot dead, several rifles and carbines were carried off, and Lieutenant Hennessey, who commanded a pursuit party, was killed.

3. Mr. Merk received a representative tribal jirga at Tank on the 8th November, 1900, explained to them the intention of Government to demand

Enclosure No. 10. a lakh of rupees in complete settlement, and told them that if within fifteen days they had not paid half of this sum, a blockade would be established, and that it would not be removed until the final instalment had been paid. He also informed them of the determination to abandon the system of dealing with the tribe through Maliks, who had, to a large extent, been selected by British officers, and to adopt a system under which negotiations in important matters would be carried on with the tribal jirga. The intention of Government to relax the principle of individual responsibility which had in the past been productive of great delay in the settlement of cases, and to permit resort to sectional or tribal responsibility, was also announced. The jirga withdrew to discuss the proposals made to them, but at the end of the fortnight they asked for two months' grace, and as there was no prospect of the early payment of the half lakh, the blockade was proclaimed from the 1st December, and came into operation on that date.

4. At first it appeared that the Mahsuds were in earnest in their intention to pay the exceedingly lenient fine which had been imposed upon them. For a time raiding on British territory stopped, small sums in cash were handed in, and larger payments in rifles and cattle were made. Contributions, however, ceased in about the middle of January, 1901, and during the fortnight ending on the 15th of that month, some half dozen offences against Government servants and property were reported. These crimes were considered by Mr. Merk to have been deliberately instigated by the Maliks, in the hope of forcing Government into an expedition, in which

case they looked to being protected as friendlies, while the trouble would fall on the tribesmen and the Maliks' political adversary, the Mullah Powindah.

5. During February and March the situation improved; but in April tension between the different political factions within the tribe increased, Mahsud raids, chiefly on Powindahs and Darwesh Khels, recommenced, and in one bold raid into Zhob, a gang ambuscaded the baggage of the Commandant of the Zhob Levy Corps, killing two men and two camels, and carrying off two Snider carbines. On the 12th May, a ration party of the Southern Waziristan Militia was taken at disadvantage by Mahsud raiders between Kajuri Kach and Kashmir Kar; one sepoy was killed, four wounded and seven rifles were carried off. Early in May, Mr. Merk held a protracted discussion with a Mahsud jirga numbering over 1,500 persons, at which it was agreed that two-thirds of the fine should be paid in cash or breech-loaders, and not more than one-third in cattle. Up to the 8th May, only Rs. 4,000 had been received in money, while Rs. 28,600 represented the value of rifles and revolvers and Rs. 24,100 the value of animals given up. By the 15th May, the total payments had reached Rs. 67,500. Difficulties having arisen in regard to accepting payment in live stock, it was decided by the Government of India that the balance of the fine still outstanding must be paid in cash. We agreed, however, to rifles being taken as security for cash payments, subject to the condition that they must be redeemed before any allowances could be distributed to the tribe after a final settlement had been come to with them. The Commissioner dismissed the jirga on the 28th May, after having made it clear to them that the blockade would not be removed nor any allowances distributed until the last rupee of the fine had been paid, and that any offences committed meanwhile would be sharply punished.

6. At this time Mr. Merk, in reporting on the effects of the blockade, stated that luxuries were unobtainable in the Mahsud country, but that food existed in sufficient quantities, and that it would require another eighteen months of blockade to produce an actual condition of famine in the country. An interesting account of the system of enforcing the blockade will be found in Mr. Merk's letter, dated the 18th May, 1901, to the Government of the Punjab.

Enclosure No. 52.

7. During June and July small contributions towards the fine continued to be paid, but numerous fresh outrages by the Mahsud tribesmen were reported. Chief among these may be cited an attack on the village of Hassu Khel in Lower Dawar, when three villagers were killed and three wounded; an attack on the regimental grazing guard of the 45th Sikhs at Jandola, when three sepoys were killed; a raid on the Border Military Police post at Baran in the Bannu district, when fourteen rifles and a quantity of ammunition were carried off; a raid on the Charweshkai post in the Sheranni country, when three Levy sowars were killed, the Post officer wounded, and their arms carried off; and an attack on some Militia sepoys near Tiarza, when one non-commissioned officer was killed and two men were wounded. These were followed by a still more serious offence. On the 6th August, in broad daylight, the Militia post at Kashmir Kar was attacked by a band of Mahsuds estimated to be 200 strong. The thirty men of the garrison were surprised, a Havildar, three sepoys, and three labourers were killed, the Native Officer commanding the post and three men were wounded, and thirty rifles, with a large quantity of ammunition and property, were carried off. Papers regarding this occurrence have been furnished to Your Lordship with our despatches marked in the margin.

Dated the 29th November, 1901, and the 23rd January, 1902 (not printed).

8. Up to this time, the troops employed in the blockade had acted on the defensive, retaliation as a general rule not being undertaken, although the troops were in positions which must have afforded frequent opportunities for inflicting summary punishment on the offenders. But from the account

that we have given it will be recognised that the position was rapidly becoming intolerable, and that the account against the Mahsuds for offences committed since the blockade began was rapidly mounting up to a sum not much less than the fine originally demanded.

Enclosure No. 65.

Accordingly, in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 5th August, 1901, we pointed out to the Punjab Government that we had never initiated, ordered or sanctioned any prohibition of counter-raids, and that, so long as these did not develop into expeditions, and were short and swift in their operation, there appeared to be no objection to their being undertaken. We pointed out that it was our desire not only to bring the Mahsuds to complete submission as a punishment for their former offences, but also that they should meet with severe and prompt retribution for any fresh raids; otherwise there would be no finality in the operations, and the position at the close of the blockade would be no better than at the beginning. Therefore, whenever an opportunity offered, and it did not appear possible to effect the desired object by means of a passive blockade alone, we saw no reason why more drastic measures should not be adopted. On these suggestions we called for a report from the Commissioner, and invited the opinion and advice of the Lieutenant-Governor.

9. Both Sir Mackworth Young and Mr. Merk considered that no active operations should be undertaken until the cold weather, and we accepted this opinion. During September and October the Mahsuds were comparatively quiet, being occupied in fighting out a dispute of long standing with the Darwesh Khel, in regard to the Badar lands in the unprotected area. This did not, however, prevent them from committing several minor offences, and one of much more serious character. The latter occurred on the 23rd September, when a band of about 50 Mahsuds armed with rifles marched 25 miles into the Bannu district, and attacked a village, killing seven persons. All payments towards the fine had now ceased. After ten months' rigorous enforcement of the blockade, we had only collected some three-fourths of the original fine, and the account for fresh offences had reached a figure which there was little prospect of our being able to realise from the tribesmen by passive measures only.

10. In our telegram of the 19th October, we informed Your Lordship that the blockade alone appeared unlikely to bring the Mahsuds to their knees. There were two alternatives before us; (i.) to continue the blockade throughout the winter and then to send an expedition through the country in the spring: this course had the support of Sir Mackworth Young:—(ii.) to continue the blockade, but to vary it by a succession of sharp sallies or raids of three or four days' duration, from different quarters of the blockade cordon, for the destruction of crops and the capture of cattle and men. It was contemplated that these operations would be conducted by columns of from 1,000 to 2,000 men each, and that the first would start from Wana and Sarwekai during the last week in November. This plan was recommended by His Excellency the Viceroy, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Edmond Elles, General C. C. Egerton, and substantially by Colonel Deane and Mr. Merk. We supported this latter course, because we believed that in it would be found the only means of bringing the Mahsuds to subjection without the usual expedition, which it had been our aim from the first to avoid. Your Lordship approved* the second alternative.

* Telegram, dated the 1st November, 1901 — enclosure No. 85.

11. Two more grave offences remain to be recorded. On the 2nd November, a picket of the 9th Bombay Infantry was ambuscaded by Mahsuds at Nili Kach and three men killed. On the afternoon of the 3rd November, a party of 32 rifles of the 17th Bengal Infantry, under the command of a Subadar, forming part of the escort furnished for the survey of the Murtaza-Sarwekai road, was ambushed by Mahsuds about two miles from the Khuzma Khulla post. The Subadar, 23 rank and file and six other persons were killed, and two sepoy and four other persons were wounded.

12. The season had now arrived when it was possible for us to carry out the contemplated retaliatory measures against the Mahsuds. On the night of the 23rd November, a punitive column advanced from the Tochi, and on the night of the 24th, similar columns advanced from Wana, Sarwekai, and Jandola. These columns had all returned within less than five days, having completed the operations entrusted to them. Their labours were usefully supplemented by the recently constituted Southern Waziristan Militia under Major Harman, who, by a well directed succession of movements, effected a very large capture of cattle and flocks. During the course of the combined operations, a number of Mahsud villages, forts and towers were destroyed, 201 prisoners were taken, and a total of 4,000 animals—including cattle, goats, sheep, horses, camels and donkeys—were captured. In places considerable resistance was encountered, and the Jandola column had nine hours' continuous fighting. The casualties amounted, on the Mahsud side, to approximately 60 killed, and to 5 killed and 41 wounded in the British columns. The operations were throughout successful, and proved that it was possible to surprise the Mahsuds and to inflict upon them severe punishment without incurring undue military risk.

13. Feeling that a sharp and swift repetition of these blows was the most effective method of reducing the tribe, the local civil officers proposed an early renewal of the attack. The idea was entertained of forming an entrenched camp at Ahmedwam, to act as the base of a series of raids into the neighbouring valleys, but was abandoned owing to the lack of water. Between the 4th and 8th of December, however, General Dening's force effected considerable damage in the region north of Jandola. It was frequently engaged, but succeeded in inflicting serious losses upon the enemy, several of whose villages and towers were destroyed, with much grain and fodder.

14. In pursuit of the same policy and with the object of avoiding any measures which might involve a more than transient occupation of the Mahsud country, and might insensibly develop into an expedition, we next, in communication with General Egerton and Colonel Deane, arranged for a third series of operations which would have the effect of tightening the cordon of the blockade and of dealing further blows at the Mahsuds from an unexpected direction in the large grazing grounds lying between the

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Khaisara valley and Tank. These operations commenced on the 1st January, when three columns started from Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel to converge on the north-eastern portion of the Mahsud territory. The operations were entirely successful, but were unfortunately marred by the regrettable death of Captain Down, Political Officer in the Tochi, who was dangerously wounded in an attack on a Mahsud tower. The total casualties on the Mahsud side amounted to about 40 killed and 80 or 90 wounded; on the British side 3 were killed and 20 wounded; 20 Mahsud prisoners, and more than 4,000 head of sheep and cattle, were taken. We have not yet received a full report of these proceedings.

15. We invite Your Lordship's attention to the communication cited in the margin, in which Colonel Deane submitted

Dated the 2nd January, 1902 a report by Mr. Merk on the operations which were carried out between the 24th and 28th November, 1901. Colonel Deane was of opinion

that similar punitive measures must be continued until the Mahsuds make unconditional submission. As the foregoing narrative shows, this is the course that we have followed with a success that has so far more than answered our expectations. Whether the full submission of the tribe will be obtained, it is as yet too early to predict, but, according to our latest information, which has been telegraphed to Your Lordship, the Mahsud jirga have now sued for terms, and have accepted the preliminary conditions imposed by the Commissioner, viz., that the balance of the fine of one lakh shall be paid in cash, and that all rifles taken during the blockade shall be returned. Meanwhile, we have already seized or destroyed property which

is probably of sufficient value not only to cover the balance of the original fine, but also to compensate for the offences committed since the commencement of the blockade, and we have inflicted on the tribe, in addition, punishment of the severest kind, without having recourse to the delay and the much greater expense that attend a regular expedition. It is satisfactory to record that, since the commencement of these retaliatory measures, no raids of any importance have been committed by the Mahsuds in British territory or in the protected area.

We have, &c.,

(Signed).	CURZON.
"	C. M. RIVAZ.
"	T. RALEIGH.
"	E. F.-G. LAW.
"	E. R. ELLES.
"	A. T. ARUNDEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, 17th October, 1900.

In my letter, dated 26th July, Sir Mackworth Young promised to address the Government of India again on the subject of the settlement with the Mahsuds made last March after the receipt of an explanation from Mr. H. A. Anderson regarding some of the defects in his proceedings which came to light after he left India. The orders contained, in the second paragraph of your letter, dated 1st October, make it unnecessary to discuss

Letter, dated 25th July, this matter so fully as would otherwise have from Chief Secretary to been necessary, but I am to submit, for the in- Government, Punjab. formation of the Government of India, a copy

Letter, dated 20th August, of the correspondence noted in the margin, and from H. A. Anderson, Esq., to convey the following remarks. C.S.I.

2. The errors in the settlement will be dealt with in the order in which they are stated in the fifth paragraph of my letter of the 25th July. The worst feature of the case—the very inadequate recompense assessed in some important cases—is not dealt with in these papers, and indeed it admits of no satisfactory explanation. Nor is any real explanation possible of the miscalculation by which the demand against the tribe on account of cases settled before or at the Tank jirga was put at Rs. 3,201 below the proper figure. The under-estimate of the amounts due in the Zhob and Tochi cases argues a laxity of procedure. The records of cases against the Mahsuds would appear not to have been kept before the settlement in such a way that a list of cases and the probable amount of compensation due could be rapidly compiled in the Commissioner's office.

3. The omission of Rs. 9,000 on account of cases which it was held ought to have been included in the settlement admits of a partial explanation. These are the cases referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr. Watson's letter of 1st May, which forms one of the enclosures of my letter, dated 21st May. The amount claimed in the cases was Rs. 13,203, but Mr. Watson calculated that this might be reduced to Rs. 9,000 when they were actually decided. The jirga took place on 18th March. Some of the cases, as appears from the statement appended to Mr. Watson's letter, occurred after that date, and these should obviously be excluded from the account. It will be fair, indeed, to exclude all cases which took place after 1st March, for some time must be allowed for the report and registration of cases. At the same time, Mr. Anderson should not have committed himself to the rash statement that no case against the Mahsuds was pending. Of the cases the compensation for which, as originally estimated, amounted to Rs. 13,203, 17 occurred

before 1st March, and for these the compensation amounted to Rs. 4,200. If we omit nine Zhob cases, for which Mr. Anderson only professed to make an estimate (see paragraph 8 of his letter, dated 30th March), the deficiency is reduced to Rs. 1,900. There are altogether 10 Zhob cases in Mr. Watson's list, but one of these, the compensation for which is put at Rs. 1,223, took place after the jirga. The omission of case 2 in Mr. Watson's list of B cases and of four old Shirani cases belonging to the years 1897, 1898 and 1899 indicates regrettable laxity.

4. The failure to take up the Bannu cases, the compensation for which is put at Rs. 4,800, was due in the first instance to loose procedure in the Bannu District Office, but it must be admitted that Mr. Anderson was very rash in accepting the composition for Rs. 35,000 without having got any assurance from Bannu as to the state of the account against the Mahsuds there.

5. It is not possible to argue that the agreement was not intended to be a complete settlement as regards all Zhob and Tochi cases reported to the Political Officers up to 18th March, as well as all cases which had occurred in British territory or in Southern Waziristan. But the misconduct of the tribe has been so flagrant since last March, and the agreement, such as it was, has so completely failed of its object, that there need be no hesitation, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, in demanding the settlement of cases not mentioned specifically or considered at the time. This is understood to be the conclusion of the Government of India, as expressed in paragraph 2 of your letter, dated 1st October, 1900, and accordingly, subject to any orders which the Government of India may issue, the following items will be included in the new demand, which will be announced by Mr. Merk in November:—

	Rs.
(a) Cases referred to in paragraph 3, less Rs. 2,300 for Zhob cases which occurred before 18th March	=10,903
(b) Bannu cases pending in March not included in the settlement	= 4,800

In addition to these, of course, all new cases, which have occurred since the settlement of March, will be considered in the new account, as well as all cases expressly excluded from the March settlement. The Lieutenant-Governor understands, from paragraph 2 of your letter above quoted that we are to undertake the settlement of all inter-tribal cases (called C and D in the correspondence) of which the settlement has been undertaken by the Political Officers, but it is probably not intended that any inter-tribal cases should be included in the new account which have not been in any way undertaken by the Political Officers, and which, in ordinary course, they would not undertake.

6. In conclusion I am to express the Lieutenant-Governor's extreme regret at the incompleteness of Mr. Anderson's proceedings. As the Government of India are aware, the Lieutenant-Governor was very anxious that the Mahsuds should be forced either to accept or definitely refuse a proper settlement of our claims against them before Mr. Anderson left the Derajat. It is clear that, in his anxiety to make a settlement in the time at his disposal, Mr. Anderson overstepped the bounds of prudence in giving to the extent which he did finality to his proceedings. This was his principal mistake, and it is the more regrettable, because he had not taken the precaution to make a searching enquiry from all his subordinates as to the total outstanding claims. There was also laxity of procedure before the settlement in getting together and registering claims against the Mahsuds, and, in consequence, great difficulty was experienced in making out a complete account. The faults in the general system of tribal management, which were largely responsible for these delays, have now been fully reported to the Government of India; and proposals for introducing a speedier and more effective method of settling cases have been accepted.

Annexure 1.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to H. A. Anderson, Esq., dated Simla, the 25th July, 1900.

Since you went on furlough, there has been a good deal of discussion about the settlement which you made with the Mahsuds at Tank last March, and before finally disposing of the case, His Honour thinks you ought to have an opportunity of explaining certain apparent defects in the arrangement and of stating your own view of the scope of its terms. I therefore enclose, for your perusal, the papers, of which a list is appended to this letter.

2. It was unfortunate that this task fell to you just as we were leaving, and that you had to work against time. It was to be expected that, after you left, matters would arise requiring explanation, and, as already noted, such has been the case. Matters have been made more difficult by the fact that Watson soon followed you to England. The result is that Sir Mackworth Young is compelled to trouble you with the case, for no satisfactory conclusion can be reached regarding several of the questions involved without obtaining a statement of your views.

3. The proceedings at Tank comprised—

- (1) The framing of an estimate of all pending claims against the Mahsuds except the inter-tribal and miscellaneous cases.
- (2) The communication of this estimate to the assembled Maliks with a view to their making arrangements for its liquidation.
- (3) A petition of the Maliks, dated 24th March, accepting the liability and stipulating that the amount, Rs. 35,000, should be paid in a certain way.

4. In the course of the petition the following statement occurs: "You have examined all the files pending against the tribe in which the offence was committed in British territory or Zhob or against Government on British subjects in the Gomal Pass, Shahur, Wana or Tochi." Your remark on the transaction is: "The settlement which has been made leaves no case pending anywhere against the Mahsuds, except the inter-tribal cases, which will be disposed of as opportunities offer." You call it a "friendly settlement," and say that the Maliks, "in return for the sympathetic treatment accorded to them in the past, readily acquiesced in my wishes that they should use all their power and influence in the tribe to induce it to pay up the fines due and make a friendly settlement."

5. It appears that besides the inter-tribal cases your settlement did not include or take account of—

No.	—	Rupees.	—
1	Certain errors in demand on account of cases previously settled.	3,201	This is difference between Rs. 36,055 (Rs. 19,113 + Rs. 16,942) and Rs. 32,854 shown in paragraph 8 of your No. 287, dated 30th March.
2	Under-estimate of demand on account of Zhob and Tochi cases decided since March, but which were then pending.	1,394	You estimated that Rs. 2,146 would cover demand on account of pending Zhob and Tochi cases. The principal Zhob case and most of the Tochi cases have since been decided, and the demand works out at Rs. 3,540 (see paragraph 4 of Watson's No. 429, dated 13th May).
3	Zhob and Tochi cases not yet decided.	1,605	Zhob cases Rs. 914 (see paragraph 4 of Watson's No. 729, dated 13th May). Rupees 691 may be added for the Tochi cases referred to in Doland's No. 851, dated 23rd June, though perhaps this may turn out to be an under-estimate.
4	Cases pending last March, but not included in calculation on which Rs. 3,500 were accepted as a composition from Mahsuds.	9,000	See paragraph 3 of my No. 648, dated 2nd June.
5	Cases pending in Bannu last March, but not included in settlement.	4,800	See paragraph 2 of Merk's No. 202-C., dated 28th June.
	Total	20,000	

There ought properly to be another head on account of certain miscellaneous cases of the A and B Classes which were pending in March. It is not clear why these should have been excluded from the settlement.

6. His Honour will feel obliged if you will record your opinion in regard to each of the above heads, whether the amounts shown can now be demanded from the Mahsuds, or whether the tribe can be called upon to take action against the section or individuals concerned in the offences. You will also, no doubt, wish to explain how it happened that these cases were omitted from the settlement, and how far it was your intention that the composition should be accepted as wiping out all scores, whether reported or pending with you or pending with the local officers, or only pending in the sense that offences had been committed, but not investigated.

7. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes you will reply to this letter at a very early date so as to enable him to dispose finally of the case in September.

Annexure 2.

Letter from H. A. Anderson, Esq., to J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Hunstanton, the 29th August, 1900.

I submit now my reply to your letter, dated 25th July, 1900, regarding the settlement made with the Mahsuds at Tank last March, and asking for an explanation of certain apparent defects in that settlement and for an expression of my views on the scope of its terms.

2. In paragraph 5 of your letter you detail five items, with reference to which you ask for explanation and opinion. I take first the largest of those items, namely, Rs. 9,000, on account of cases pending last March, but not included in the calculation on which Rs. 35,000 were accepted as a composition from the Mahsuds.

3. The existence of these cases comes as a surprise to me. Had I known of them at the time the settlement was planned, I should not have recommended that we should accept the composition of Rs. 35,000, nor should I have reported the settlement of all pending cases against the Mahsuds.

4. On referring to the statement regarding pending cases of Classes A and B appended to Watson's letter, dated 1st May, 1900, I find that the cases included in the item of Rs. 9,000 are divisible into three classes:—

- (i.) Cases which occurred after the settlement, and which therefore call for no explanation.
- (ii.) Cases which occurred before the 1st March, 1900.
- (iii.) Cases which occurred during March, 1900, in which month the settlement was made.

As regards class (ii.), it is difficult to give an explanation without referring to the files, registers and papers connected with the settlement. I do not know why the cases were not included in the statement of cases for which the composition of Rs. 35,000 was accepted, but think that the omission is probably due to incorrect registration at the time of their occurrence.

As regards class (iii.) also, I experience difficulty in giving any explanation, but I think it probable that, as the cases were of very recent occurrence, they had not been made into files and entered into the registers. Reports had been received of their occurrence, but were pending enquiry and orders, and the Political Officer's staff had no leisure to post them to date. Even in ordinary times delay occurs in posting and registering political cases, but during the whole of March last a great strain was placed

on that staff, which was crippled by illness, absence on leave and other causes. From an early date in March onwards the staff was busily employed in bringing files into order, working out balances, &c., and at Tank in work connected with the settlement, which kept all hands hard at work all day and part of the night. The whole settlement, its preliminaries and details were carried through at high pressure. We were all working against time, and probably to these causes may be attributed the fact that cases occurring at the time were omitted. Now, of course, that the information regarding these cases has been collected, sifted and arranged, it seems surprising that they escaped notice, but I know that, even as regards cases which had been made into files or decided, we had great difficulty in finding out the correct balances and in bringing up to date the accounts which were extremely puzzling and voluminous. The preliminary work of the settlement was very heavy—the time was limited—and although my own staff and that of the Political Officer were employed on the work, I think that my conjecture is probably correct, that the cases occurring during March inadvertently escaped attention.

5. I am greatly concerned regarding the miscalculation referred to in items 1, 2 and 3 of paragraph 5 of your letter, as I took pains to arrive at a correct estimate of what was due in the cases examined, but of course it must be borne in mind that this examination and all the work of the settlement were performed in a limited number of days and under pressure of other work. I had the assistance of my own office and the office of the Political Officer, Wana. For several days before I went, on the 18th March, to Tank, the statements of cases in my own office and the registers of the office of the Political Officer, Wana, were examined at my head-quarters, with the assistance of the clerks who keep them. The accounts were complicated, but I thought that I had arrived at a satisfactory understanding of them when I went to Tank. Then all the pending files forthcoming were examined by the combined staffs; and in framing estimates I also made use of the leading Frontier headmen, who are accustomed to dispose of criminal and political case work in jirgas. The detailed results were brought before me for my orders in a statement which I checked. The estimate in each case was put before me, and in the larger cases I personally considered the facts and made the final estimates, while I generally checked and amended where necessary the estimates in the smaller cases. I made my estimate of Rs. 35,000 deliberately, and I thought that this sum would practically meet all requirements. I can only express my great regret that the actual results of the cases have, after final decision, exceeded my estimate.

6. There remains the item of Rs. 4,800, being an estimate of fines and compensation payable on account of cases pending in Bannu last March, but not included in the settlement. The oldest of these cases actually dates back to 1896. These cases were, so Mr. Grant suggests, never reported to the Political Officer, Wana, and were not even properly registered in the Bannu District. Nothing was known about these cases at the Tank settlement. The reason why these Bannu cases were not brought into account as regards the Mahsud tribe as a whole is probably that the Deputy Commissioner intended to settle them himself with the individual sections concerned, Shabi Khels and other similar sections who live close to the Bannu border and at a distance from Wana and the Tank border. This was the old procedure, and it was effective, as the Shabi Khels have considerable lands in the Bannu District and they and their neighbouring sections trade with Edwardesabad and Lakki, the trading towns of the Bannu District.

7. I am asked for my opinion in regard to each of the heads specified in paragraph 5 of your letter, whether the amounts can now be demanded from the Mahsuds, or whether the tribe can be called upon to take action against the sections or individuals concerned in the offences. As regards the action to be taken, I think that the first three heads should be treated alike. It is unfortunate, but the cases included under these three heads were, without doubt, disposed of in the March settlement, which it would be

neither fair nor expedient to set aside in connection with these cases. I would not demand the deficit under these heads from the Mahsuds, and it is not open, in my opinion, to take action against the sections or individuals concerned in the offences, and it would certainly be impolitic to take any such action.

8. The item of Rs. 9,000 (head 4) stands, however, in a different category. The cases under this head escaped notice altogether in the settlement made in March, though they are covered by the terms of the settlement, as reduced to writing. The important points to consider in connection with these cases are that in the first place the March agreement is supplementary to the main agreement under which the Mahsud tribe draws its allowances on certain conditions—one being the good behaviour of the tribe, and, secondly, that the tribe has misbehaved and has not complied with this condition since March last. The March agreement not only provides for the settlement of outstanding demands for offences committed, but, taken with the main agreement, it carries with it the implication that the tribe will behave well in the future. Under the circumstances, it would be open to us to cancel the March agreement entirely, but I do not consider that this would be a wise course to take. I think, however, that it is perfectly open to us to reconsider the position and to press now a demand unintentionally omitted in the March agreement for offences actually committed by the Mahsud tribe and for which we have, in fact, obtained no reparation. I would demand the Rs. 9,000 from the Mahsuds, explaining the grounds for making this claim which I have stated above. I do not think that this course of action is open to any suspicion of bad faith. It is unfortunate that we should have to depart from the letter of the March agreement, but the subsequent misbehaviour of the tribe is the justification.

9. Similar action may be taken with regard to the item of Rs. 4,800 (head 5) if it is thought desirable to make one complete demand against the tribe. Otherwise the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu should be instructed to settle these cases direct with the Mahsud sections concerned and with the Darwesh Khel and Bhattanni sections responsible for the passes used by the offenders or through whose territories the offenders passed.

10. I think I have disposed of all the questions referred for my opinion and for explanation, and I have, in my reply, strictly kept to the points specified in your letter. There are, of course, other points in the correspondence which offer material for criticism and explanation, but I hesitate to express opinions or furnish explanations on matters which have not been expressly referred to me. I think, however, that the Government might be seriously misled if I did not correct one error of statement. This is contained in an extract from a letter of Mr. Waterfield's given at the end of paragraph 13 of Mr. Merk's letter, dated 28th June, 1900. The extract is as follows: "that in making the settlement in March last they (the Mahsud Maliks) were induced by the master, namely, Tej Bhan, late Head Clerk to the Commissioner, Derajat, to agree to the proposals put forward by Mr. Anderson. They declare that at the time they pointed out to the Commissioner that this settlement would have no good effect, but would rather incite Mahsud raiders to further crime." With reference to the last portion of this extract, I have to state that the Mahsud Maliks made no such declaration to me. With reference to the first portion of the extract, I quote paragraph 4 of my letter, dated 30th March, 1900:—

"I proceeded to Tank on the 18th instant, and first interviewed the leading Maliks. I explained to them the gravity of the position, and impressed on them the desirability of making some arrangements to clear the tribe. I explained that I was shortly going on leave, and that I desired to bring about a settlement in the interest of the tribe as well as of Government, and this was the last opportunity I would have of effecting such a settlement.

"The Maliks promptly expressed their readiness to fall in with my wishes, and asked me to have an estimate made out of the fines which would have to be paid on account of all pending cases."

Mr. Tej Bhan, who is now officiating as an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Delhi, rendered me every assistance in bringing my persuasions and warnings home to the Maliks; but when the Maliks allege that while they warned me they yielded to the persuasion of Mr. Tej Bhan, they are obviously attempting to set up an excuse and to cast off responsibility and blame from their own shoulders. It is necessary to be very careful in accepting explanations and excuses tendered by the Mahsud Maliks, as they are adept at intrigue and cunning of speech.

11. I have to thank His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for his appreciation conveyed in paragraph 2 of your letter of certain difficulties which I had to face in making the Tank settlement, and have now to face in submitting explanations. I shall be glad to render any assistance I can in explaining what was done, and in clearing up any remaining difficulties.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 19th October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

The detailed and thorough enquiry, mentioned in paragraph 2 of my letter of 9th instant, discloses that the grand total now payable by the Mahsuds for all offences exclusive of those really disposed of at the March settlement amounts to one hundred and seventy thousand rupees in round numbers, out of which ninety-nine thousand rupees appear to be due for offences committed prior to March settlement and therefore pending then. Add to the above grand total the sum of seventeen thousand rupees still unpaid on the March settlement, and the total liabilities of the Mahsuds amount, therefore, now to one hundred and eighty-seven thousand rupees. Out of this a sum of eighty-one thousand rupees is on account of offences against Government servants or Government property or British subjects and their property, including Zhob and Sheranni cases, and it includes an item of thirteen thousand rupees on account of fines for recent outrages sanctioned by Government. To this eighty-one thousand rupees must be added the seventeen thousand rupees still unpaid on account of the March settlement, as that settlement was almost wholly confined to offences relating to Government or to British subjects—see paragraph 5 of Mr. Anderson's letter of 30th March. The total, therefore, due under heads of Government and British subjects, including Zhob and Sheranni comes to ninety-eight thousand rupees. The balance of eighty-nine thousand rupees represents compensation due in inter-tribal cases, out of which forty-two thousand are due for Tochi inter-tribal cases. It is, I consider, hopeless, to expect to get out of the Mahsuds anything like the total sum due by any coercive process, whether blockade or expedition. What I, therefore, suggest is that we recover from the Mahsuds two-thirds of the compensation and fines due to Government and British subjects, namely, a sum of sixty-five thousand rupees and one-third of the compensation due on inter-tribal cases, namely, a sum of thirty thousand rupees. This makes a total of ninety-five thousand rupees. I am doubtful if even this reduced demand will be satisfied, but it is more likely to be complied with after pressure than the other demand about which I have no doubt at all. The Maliks are endeavouring to temporise and put off Waterfield's enquiry. I have gone through the lists of cases with him, and have satisfied myself that now at last nothing has been omitted. I think now that a peaceable settlement is out of the question. Nevertheless, I will do my best to arrange it. I now ask for orders what total demand I should put to the tribe. I venture to suggest that it may place us in an awkward position to call upon the tribe to pay more than we are reasonably likely to get by pressure, and I therefore suggest the reduced demand of ninety-five thousand rupees. These figures will show what a curse the Mahsuds have been to their neighbours. In passing orders on my letter, it may be convenient to give me instructions also on this telegram. Addressed Punjab; repeated Foreign.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 20th October, 1900.

With reference to your letter, dated 1st October, on the subject of Mahsud affairs, I am directed to submit a copy of a letter, dated 9th October, from the Commissioner of the Derajat, and to convey the following remarks.

2. A copy of my letter, dated 17th instant, to your address is being communicated to Mr. Merk. This will show him what cases must, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, be considered as disposed of finally by the settlement made at Tank last March.

3. It will be observed that Mr. Merk has taken measures to carry out the wishes of the Government of India as to the presence at the Mahsud jirga of an officer of the Baluchistan Agency.

4. He asks that he may be informed of the military scheme in preparation for the blockade. The separate communication regarding this, promised in the 2nd paragraph of your letter under reply, has not been received.

5. Sir Mackworth Young supports the request of the Commissioner that a sum of Rs. 1,500 may be put at his disposal for civil expenditure in connection with the blockade. A full account of the disbursements made will be submitted hereafter. The proposals regarding the building of posts will be separately reported.

6. The arming of the Bhattannis in the manner suggested by Mr. Merk is, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, a necessary measure under existing circumstances. The Inspector-General of Ordnance might be instructed to comply with indents received direct from the Commissioner for arms for the Bhattannis and Border Military Police up to a maximum to be fixed in each case. The proposition statements for the revision of the establishments of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Border Military Police will reach the Government of India shortly.

7. Arrangements have been, and are being, made for the reinforcement of civil staff in the Derajat Division. It is for the Government of India to decide whether Mr. Lorimer's services can be spared for employment as special blockade officer.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor supports Mr. Merk's proposals for the improvement of the means of telegraphic communication, and will be obliged if the Government of India will issue orders direct to the Director-General of Telegraphs.

9. The Mahsuds settled in the Dera Ismail Khan district are being notified that they will be required to leave in the event of a blockade becoming necessary.

10. In the 9th paragraph of his letter Mr. Merk has given an outline of the announcement of the views of Government which he proposes to make to the Mahsuds assembled in jirga. The only part of this which seems to require modification is his proposed statement with reference to the annexation of their country and the permanent confiscation of their allowances. The threat which, in Sir Mackworth Young's opinion, should be held out as the penalty of non-compliance with our demands, is that of a rigorous blockade, and this view is in accordance with the orders contained in the 2nd paragraph of your letter. While Mr. Merk should be at perfect liberty to say that, if the blockade is established, Government will take such measures as it thinks fit to make it fully effective, and also any further measures which prove necessary to bring the tribe to submission, it will be unnecessary to state definitely what the further consequences of recusancy will be. In other respects Mr. Merk's proposed line of argument with the tribe appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be judicious.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Deraiat Division, to J. M. Dowie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th October, 1900.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd instant, giving cover to Foreign Department letter, dated the 1st instant, which conveys the decision of the Government of India on Mahsud affairs.

2. So far as I was able to do so, in anticipation of orders, I set matters in train last month. I requested the Political Officer to prepare a complete list of all offences whatsoever pending against the Mahsuds, and to summon all the Mahsud Maliks as well as the parties to the cases from the Tochi valley, the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, the Sheranni tract and Zhob, for a full enquiry into these cases at Tank, the enquiry to commence on the 8th instant. This enquiry he has been directed to finish by the 1st of November, when we shall be able to draw up the final bill of all fines and compensations that are fairly and reasonably chargeable to the Mahsuds, on account of all offences whatever which are pending, except those really disposed of at the March settlement and those committed in Afghanistan since the demarcation of the frontier. A subsidiary object in beginning this enquiry early in October was to remind the Mahsud tribe of its own liabilities and perils, just at the time when the Madda Khel were to be punished, which would probably make the Mahsuds disinclined to help them.

3. I have summoned the great jirga of the Mahsuds to meet me at Tank on the 7th November.

4. The Political Agent at Zhob was at Fort Munro last month, and I arranged with him to send his complainants and witnesses to Mr. Waterfield at Tank as indicated above. Captain Macdonald himself will probably be present at the jirga fixed for the 7th proximo, and will therefore be fully posted as to what will happen.

5. I have asked Mulla Powindah to meet me next week at Tank. I do not at all expect that he will come. If he does come now, and there is trouble for the Mahsuds after the jirga of the next month, his friends will blame him for not preventing it or devising some means of escaping it, and his enemies will say he concurred in it. Either way he will be in a dilemma. Most probably he will foresee this, and will send a couple of trusted agents in his place. To them I shall hint that a change in the system of payment of allowances and in the basis of political management is coming, and that I should have been glad to have had a talk with the Mulla in consequence. This will be enough to bring all the Mulla's party in the tribe—the democratic cave of Adullam which is opposed to the oligarchy of Maliks—to the jirga of next month, without my having to specially send for them and to show anxiety to get them in, which is what is wanted.

If, however, the Mulla does come, I shall have to see how far I can take him into my confidence.

6. By the 11th November probably I shall know whether the jirga will end with a settlement or with a blockade. If the Mahsuds show an honest intention of making a settlement, and this intention is unanimous, or is the resolution of such a majority as to make its execution reasonably probable, I propose to give them till the 25th November to pay in the first instalment of the money due to us, say, one-half of the whole sum. But if there is no prospect of a settlement, I propose to dismiss the jirga as soon as this is clear and as soon as the jirga has thoroughly grasped—first, that reparation will be fully enforced, and secondly, that, when friendly relations have been re-established, the change of policy indicated in the 4th paragraph of the Government of India letter will be adopted. I then propose to give them till the 25th November to think matters over and to discuss them at their homes. On that day they would have to let me know definitely whether they will do us justice or not, and, if the former, they will have to

bring in on that date one-half of the money payable as a guarantee of their good faith. On the 26th November, accordingly, it will be definitely known whether there will be a blockade or not. The military and civil arrangements should, therefore, be such that on receipt of a telegram on the evening of 26th November the blockade can commence on the 1st December.

The civil arrangements I will see to. Troops should (starting from Dera Ismail Khan on the 27th November and Bannu on the 28th November) reach Tank and Jani Khel on the 1st or 2nd December. I understand it is intended to hold Murtaza with troops and to strengthen Sarwekai; there will be no harm if this is done by the 3rd and 4th December. The troops, therefore, should be ready to start on the 27th November. I should be glad if the military scheme is communicated to me as early as convenient.

7. As regards the scheme for the civil portion of the blockade, I asked the Political Officers and Deputy Commissioners concerned, some time ago, to send me their views by the 15th of this month. From these views and my own ideas I shall prepare a comprehensive scheme which will be discussed and settled at a conference of the Political Officers, Deputy Commissioners and Officers Commanding Militias at Dera Ismail Khan on the 31st instant. I may have to submit additional proposals for orders besides those below, but I doubt it. Anyhow I am able to suggest now in this letter the more important proposals that require orders:—

- (1) *Funds*.—I do not think much money will be required; I am arranging for some Darwesh Khel to remain in Shawal, if necessary, during the winter, and thus to close that back door to the Mahsuds. Of course we shall have to pay this Darwesh Khel tribal post, say 50 men each on Rs. 10 per mensem; its cost will come to Rs. 3,000 for the six winter months. It may be necessary to build temporary towers here and there; to entertain Bhattanni tribal posts for the time; to give rewards on the spot for specially good service, &c., &c. I would ask for a grant till the 1st April, 1901, of Rs. 15,000 to my political allotment, out of which I can spend money either myself or through Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, without further reference for orders. Accounts will, of course, be kept and duly furnished with vouchers hereafter. But it will materially conduce to the efficient working of a blockade (when measures have often to be taken at a moment's notice) if money is available to be spent promptly without correspondence. Government may rest assured that every care will be taken to keep expenditure at a minimum.
- (2) *Posts*.—With my letter, dated the 2nd instant, I submitted proposals for the posts of the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias. If there is a blockade, the following new posts will be urgently required for the closure of principal raiding routes and for the protection of the country:—

<i>Northern Waziristan—</i>	<i>Southern Waziristan—</i>
Tutnarai.	Tiarza.
Lakkanarai.	Karab Kot.
Shinkai.	Dargai Obo.
Mirzail.	Khuzma Sar.
	Paste Khwaja.
	Urmana Khwar.
	Toi Khula.

If Government accept the proposals, I would ask that the construction of these posts be started at once. Whether there is a blockade or not, they are really required; and, if so, to build them now at once makes no difference.

- (3) *Protection of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts and enforcement of the blockade on their borders*.—With my letter,

dated the 20th ultimo, I submitted a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Border Military Police. If it meets with approval I would ask for very early orders. If the new corps can begin to be raised by the 1st November, they will be tolerably efficient in three months for blockade purposes, and an addition of 500 fairly armed and drilled men of the country will be of the greatest value in blockading. Here also, as in the case of the militia posts, if the proposals are acceptable, they may as well be set in hand forthwith.

- (4) *Arms and ammunition.*—By the recent orders of Government, the border villages of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan will be armed before the 1st December. It may, and probably will, be necessary to temporarily arm the Bhattannis, upon whose cordial and efficient co-operation the stringency of the blockade

* M.L. rifles.

W. MERK.

will greatly depend. I do not delay this letter to enclose an indent for 800 Enfield,* 16,000 rounds of ammunition and 32,000 percussion caps; the formal indent will follow. But I would ask that the question of arming the Bhattannis be now considered and disposed of, and that the Inspector-General of Ordnance be now authorised (if my suggestion is sanctioned) to promptly issue, up to the maximum given above, of rifles, ammunition and caps on receipt of an indent from me direct. The Bhattannis are at enmity with the Mahsuds; they are a poor and weak tribe; they are practically British subjects; full security would, of course, be taken for the arms; they would only be issued to reliable men. I do not think there is any risk in giving the arms, or any likelihood of trouble in our getting them back when we want them from the Bhattannis. If there is a prospect of the scheme for Border Military Police reorganisation being approved, I would ask for intimation by telegram, so that indents for arms (Sniders), ammunition and accoutrements can be sent in as soon as possible. I would also ask that the Inspector-General of Ordnance be authorised to comply with such indents sent direct to him by me. They will be on the same scale as for the Waziristan Militias, and such scrutiny as may, under the circumstances, be thought necessary might, if there is no objection, be conducted on the post-audit system in your office and in the offices of the Government of India.

- (5) *Staff.*—I should be glad of the services of Mr. Lorimer, I.C.S., if they can be spared as special blockade officer, working in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts under the Deputy Commissioners and, beyond the administrative border, under me direct. If there is a blockade, it may be possible for him to hold himself in readiness to join at Tank on the 26th November. I suggest that Lieutenant Bowring, Assistant Commissioner, whom I believe to be well qualified, be attached temporarily as the Assistant to the Political Officer, Wana, upon whom much work will fall. Mr. French, Assistant Commissioner, who has been holding temporary charge of the Tank Sub-Division and has acquired a knowledge of this tract, might, I think, remain as General Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner on the Tank border when Mr. Pison returns from leave. Lieutenant Bigg-Wither is commanding the Border Military Police of Dera Ismail Khan, and will be in charge of all the Border Military Police arrangements and work. There will be less to do in Bannu, but the Deputy Commissioner should be provided with a military assistant; this is essential if a new corps of Border Military Police is

raised there. The Tochi requires no special staff. The bulk of the work will fall on the Southern Waziristan and Dera Ismail Khan authorities.

- (6) *Telegraph*.—I recommend that from the 7th November the telegraph office at Tank be raised temporarily to the 1st class, viz., be open day and night. Tank is the central point for blockade operations. I propose to make it my head-quarters for the time. The transfer of the telegraph office from Jatta to Murtaza has been sanctioned. A temporary field office should be opened at Jani Khel from Bannu (if there is a blockade); it may be necessary later on to carry the line to Khairu Khel via Tajori; also (if there is a blockade), a field office will be required at Mullazai from Tank; it may be found advisable subsequently to protract this line via the Bain Pass post to Khairu Khel. But for the present two field lines to Jani Khel and Mullazai will be enough. These short light lines will cost little, nor will the expense be much if they are joined up via the Bain post.

8. I shall next week ask all officers concerned to warn every Mahsud whatsoever within their charges that he may be required to return to his hills, with his family and moveable property, at 12 hours' notice, next month. The news of this warning will, of course, reach the tribe, and will be a sign to them that business is meant.

9. As regards the manner in which I propose to communicate the decision and orders of Government to the jirga, I would, with the permission of Government, take the following line: I would commence with a history of the relations of the Mahsuds with the British Government, from annexation of the Punjab to the present day, dwelling with emphasis and at length upon the various occasions on which, in consequence of misconduct, the Mahsuds came into collision with us, and how little they gained thereby. The fathers and grandfathers of men who will be listening to this have suffered at different times, and point will be given to my remarks by recalling their names and fate. Then I would bring home to the Mahsuds how helpless they are; we surround them on three sides, on the fourth are their hereditary enemies and beyond these are Afghanistan and its ruler, whose subjects they have been liberally harrying in Khost and elsewhere. Then, and on this point, I would specially ask for the instructions of Government. I propose to tell them that they must see for themselves, unless some stable arrangement is arrived at, whereby offences shall cease in future, that Government, for the sake of its subjects and of those who live under its protection, who are and have been constantly murdered and plundered by Mahsuds, may (?) or will (?) have no other course open but to occupy their country and put down this intolerable condition of affairs for ever by force; and that, if this should happen, if this should be forced upon Government by the misbehaviour of the Mahsuds, not only will a signal retribution be dealt out to all, but there will also be no allowances for anyone whatever. This last sentence is intended to cut the ground from under the Maliks, who flatter themselves that, if Government should occupy the Mahsud country, they will draw allowances in comfort, and who have been working to this end.

The object of the whole of the above is to sober the Mahsuds, to let them see how they stand. Since the last thing that the tribe, as a whole, wishes is the occupation of their country, the blunt statement that they may drive Government to take it will not be without deep effect. It will probably take me a whole day to finish this prologue with hillmen, as, with the mass of uneducated people at home, *e.g.*, many rural constituencies, the bulk of an audience—some 90 per cent.—are quite incapable of following the points of a speech or of taking in its drift, unless the same thing and the same point is repeated over and over again, and every head is explained patiently at great length. Thus, for instance, if I were simply to say in so many words what I have marked at A above, not one Mahsud in a thousand

would be in the least moved by it, or realise what it implies. I shall have to go through the leading offences, give names and details, paint each outrage in a lurid light, fully impress them with the grossness of their conduct on one hand, and the kindness with which we treat them within our limits on the other hand, before they will perceive clearly what they have been doing and how deep is their offence. The next day, after they have had time to reflect, I would approach business and explain how the existing system has collapsed; we have paid much money and obtained nothing to speak of in the way of cessation of offences in return; how the Maliks failed in their engagements and how they have thus themselves broken the pact entered into in 1895. This again will call for a mass of detailed illustration, and will involve considerable debate, since the leading Maliks will no doubt constantly interrupt and endeavour to argue their side of the case. And to avoid the feeling that they have been finally condemned unheard, to prevent that resentment which every Oriental cherishes whose petition has not been patiently listened to (whether it is successful or not is to his mind quite another matter; the order on the petition is fate, but to listen to it is within the power of the "Hakim"), a considerable margin of explanation and discussion will have to be allowed to the Maliks if they wish to avail themselves of it. It is quite possible that they may feel their case to be hopeless, and may take in silence what I shall tell the jirga. But, if not, if they want to speak, my experience is that it is never a mistake to listen in reason to what men have to say in jirga. Then I would explain that, exclusive of Rs. 7,000 a year, which the Political Officer will retain in his own hands, to give to whomsoever and howsoever he pleases, Government are prepared to grant a subsidy of Rs. 54,000 to the whole Mahsud tribe, to be distributed as the tribe arranges. The total comes to Rs. 61,000, the sum mentioned in paragraph 16 of my note of the 24th July, 1900, and referred to in paragraph 14 of your letter, No. 1137, dated the 17th August, 1900, to the Government of India. I have suggested Rs. 54,000 for the whole tribe, because quite possibly the Mahsuds will arrange to divide in the first instance in three equal shares according to the three primary divisions of the tribe—the Bahlolzai, the Shaman Khel and the Alizai; and a sum divisible by three is therefore convenient.

This grant, I would continue to say to them, is contingent upon good conduct, loyalty and upon full or sectional tribal responsibility, as we choose, and coupled, if we like, with the punishment of individual offenders. I shall explain very fully to them that the rule we shall adopt will be literally their own Pathan custom; the custom is this: the injured party, if he can lay hands on the actual culprits (whether by capture or by surrender), punishes them. If he cannot do this, he does not waste time, but proceeds against their section or the clan containing the section, or the tribe containing the clan, as he thinks best. To this procedure no Pathan can possibly object. The first thought that will then occur to the Mahsuds, of course, is to complain that Rs. 54,000 is by no means enough. To which the obvious answer is—"There it is; you can take it or leave it." Then I think the moment will have come for pointing out that, before any further step can take place in the way of distribution of the allowances, prompt reparation must first be made to Government. This will, no doubt, come as a shock, but the greater the shock the more keen is the reaction likely to be. By opening up the prospect of genuinely tribal allowances, the "Ulus," viz., the body of the tribe and those sections that have hitherto received nothing or less than their proper share, will have been attracted. Mulla Powindah's party, who are against the Maliki "ring" and are all for a popular system, will at the jirga have heard what I say and will have welcomed the change of policy in our future dealings with the Mahsuds; they will be committed to it, and to that extent will feel themselves bound to promote the settlement of the Mahsud account that will hasten the introduction of the change of system. The Rs. 7,000 kept in the hand of the Political Officer will be a lever for working on really influential Maliks; if they do good service in bringing about a peaceable settlement, they are certainly worth their salt; lastly, however wild and savage Pathan clans

may be, they are by no means devoid of the sense of justice; and if they feel that they are reasonably and fairly dealt with, I have often found that they are quite prepared to act justly in return.

I do not in the least hope for or expect a peaceable settlement, but I venture to think that the course I have suggested and the sequence of steps I have sketched are as likely to bring about a peaceful composition of the Mahsud question as any other. At the same time, seeing that the chances are so greatly against a smooth settlement, every preparation for a blockade must be made, and I shall not permit the jirga to temporise or to put off their decision in any manner. By the 11th or 12th November, in all likelihood, the matter will practically be settled, one way or the other.

10. I much regret that I am unable to submit a draft sketch of what I intend to say. But in the case of a jirga like this, it is impossible to do so. Proceedings more resemble a lively debate than a speaker addressing an audience. One goes into a jirga with a fixed purpose, but the actual words used depend upon what one feels and perceives at the time being is the temper and are the thoughts of those present, upon their arguments and objections, upon the divisions of opinion that arise at the moment, in short, upon a set of conditions and circumstances that originate mostly at the sittings themselves. Moreover, the debates and proceedings are most lengthy, as all savage councils are, and from the nature of things must be, where not to hear a man out, or to overlook a point, may, and in most cases does, mean certain bloodshed thereafter. In 1896, when I had to take over the Mohmands, a simpler matter than will be the jirga of next month, I had to hold a speech or rather debate of six hours each for two days in order to hammer into their heads what was wanted, followed by 12 days' jirga work of eight hours daily before the distribution of the allowances was finally determined and accepted all round.

11. I do not think there are any minor points that have been omitted; such native establishment (Mohurrirs, &c.) as may be required for the blockade, I think I can provide out of local establishments, or, if sufficient men cannot be spared, I can entertain temporary writers, &c., with the Rs. 15,000 for which I have applied.

Probably some 2,500, perhaps 3,000, Mahsuds will come to the jirga. My object is, of course, to get as many down as possible. They will be disarmed at the border posts. But as the jirga may break up on strained terms, and as a mob of 3,000 hillmen is capable of some mischief, even when disarmed, I will arrange with the General Officer Commanding, Derajat, to have 200 sepoy at Tank. I mention this by way of explanation of the movement of these troops early in November.

P.S.—With reference to paragraph 2 of this letter, I have just received a telegram from the Political Officer to the effect that only a few Maliks have appeared at Tank, and that the Maliks generally have asked for a month's grace, owing, they say, to the harvesting of crops, to which I have replied with a message that three months' past allowance of every Malik will be confiscated who does not present himself in Tank by the 16th instant, and that meanwhile the Political Officer should enquire into the cases and satisfy himself of their truth. We cannot afford to wait on the pleasure of the Maliks.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 23rd October, 1900.

In continuation of correspondence regarding Mahsud affairs, ending with my letter, dated 21st October, I am directed to address you, with reference to a telegram, dated 19th October, from the Commissioner of the

Derajat, a copy of which Mr. Merk has sent to you direct. I am at the same time to submit copies of the telegrams noted in the margin. Mr. Merk has been asked by letter to give a detail of the cases for which Rs. 99,000 are due, which were pending when the March settlement was made, but were not then decided. His reply will be communicated to you when received.

From Punjab Government to Commissioner, Derajat, dated the 20th October.

From Commissioner, Derajat, to Punjab Government, dated the 21st October.

2. The position is that the amount due from the Mahsuds is more than they can possibly pay. In reducing the amount of our demand, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks there is no particular object in saying that we will take two-thirds of our full claim in cases against our own subjects and one-third in inter-tribal cases. It will be better simply to state the total amount of compensation which the tribe must pay in order to avert the blockade, and this, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, might be put at one lakh of rupees on account of all offences up to the date of announcement. Mr. Merk might fix the instalments in which the money must be paid, and inform the tribe that failure to pay any instalment when due will result in a blockade being at once imposed. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that he should further tell the Mahsuds that all Maliki allowances are withdrawn till the whole of the money has been paid, and that their amount will be treated as finally forfeited to Government and not credited against the fine of one lakh. He should add that, if the instalments are punctually paid, it is the intention of Government, after the last instalment has been received, to start the new system of tribal allowances, provided that the tribe has behaved well in the meantime and has not run up a fresh bill.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, dated the 20th October, 1900.

Yours, dated 19th. Of eighty-nine thousand rupees due on account of inter-tribal cases, what amounts, respectively, fall under classes C and D? By D cases we understand inter-tribal cases, which occurred outside the protected area.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st October, 1900.

Out of the eighty-nine thousand rupees, two thousand seven hundred rupees are on account of cases outside the protected area, leaving eighty-six thousand three hundred rupees for C cases. If outrage between Boya and Kanirogha, reported in telegram 495 of Political Officer, Tochi, is work of Mahsuds, an item of three thousand rupees will have to be added to the thirteen thousand rupees for fines in my 500-C., making total liability one hundred ninety thousand rupees.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 23rd October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Nasran Border Military post, eleven miles from here, surprised last night by gang of Mahsuds. Two Border Military Police shot dead; eight Snider rifles, two Snider carbines, about twelve hundred rounds ammunition

carried off. Circumstances show gross laxity on part of Border Military Police garrison. Trust Border Military Police Regulation will soon be passed into law.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 23rd October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Early this morning Officer Commanding, Jandola, took out party to intercept Nasran raiders. Succeeded in doing so. Regret to report that news just received that Officer Commanding killed, also one raider, whose body left behind by other raiders, who escaped. Am sending Lieutenant Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia, to be at Jandola till British officer arrives there to command.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 24th October, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Raid had undoubtedly been carefully planned some time ago, but precise moment of execution was most probably chosen to embarrass the Maliks assembled here for examination of cases against Mahsuds. Suspicion at present is against Jalal Khels and Shingis, who are discontented with their Maliks, but it is quite possible that raid was committed at Mulla Powindah's instance to discredit the Maliks generally, who declare this to be the case. After full reflection, I do not advocate a change in the programme for next month after what has happened yesterday, because, both for future stable arrangements with Mahsud tribe and for purpose of making them comply sooner than would otherwise be the case with the demand of Government for redress, it is essential to have a meeting with the governing body of the tribes and fully inform them of future policy of Government. If I were to tell only the Maliks what is future policy of Government, they would, of course, misrepresent it to the tribes. Written communications and explanations addressed to the tribe are quite useless, and would reach no one. And after coercive measures, it is almost impossible to get together a full jirga in a reasonable time. It is, therefore, I think, best not to enforce the blockade at once, but that I should see the full jirga on the 7th November. The only changes I propose are that, in view of recent occurrences, the announcement of the views of Government suggested in paragraph 9 of my letter 748 of 9th October be clear and exhaustive, but much more peremptory than was contemplated, and that demand on tribe be now fixed at one lakh. Kindly communicate orders to me on these points.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, dated the 25th October, 1900.

Merk's telegram, 24th October. The Government of India agree to the demand being one lakh as already recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor, and, subject to any contrary advice which His Honour may wish

to give, they see no reason for interfering with the preparations and plan for dealing with the Mahsuds which had been formed prior to the occurrence of this raid.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 29th October, 1900.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the marginally noted communications regarding Mahsud affairs. The Lieutenant-Governor has already been informed by telegram, dated the 25th October, 1900, that the Government of India agree to the demand on the Mahsuds being fixed at one lakh, as recommended by His Honour in your letter of the 23rd October, and that, subject to any contrary advice which Sir Mackworth Young may wish to give, the Governor-General in Council sees no reason for interfering with the preparations and plans for dealing with the tribe which had been formed prior to the occurrence of the raid reported in Mr. Merk's last message. Mr. Merk will no doubt state the total amount of the "bill" to the jirga, and will then announce that one lakh is demanded instead of the total. It is, of course, desirable to provide that the demand of the round figure of one lakh shall not cause the more ignorant Mahsuds or other frontier tribes to suppose mistakenly that the sum has been arbitrarily fixed.

2. Mr. Merk's sketch of what he means to say to the jirga is necessarily in general terms. It is approved by the Government of India, subject to the reservation, that Mr. Merk must be careful not to make anything in the nature of a specific threat of annexation. All that he should say is that contumacy and opposition, if persisted in, can only in the long run lead to one result, that result being the loss by the Mahsuds of their autonomy and the occupation of the Mahsud country. This is a consequence that the Government have the strongest desire to avoid. The feelings and interests of the tribe must be equally in the same direction; and it rests with them to remove all necessity for the consideration of so painful an alternative.

3. With reference to the concluding sentences of your letter, dated the 23rd October, I am to observe that, under the original scheme, it was contemplated that, if half the full demand were not paid by the Mahsuds, as an earnest of good faith, by a fixed date, the blockade would be formed forthwith, and would be maintained until a settlement was arrived at. The Government of India consider it preferable to adhere to this design, and that no question of payment by instalments should be raised or entertained at the present stage. If the Mahsuds should ask that the Maliki allowances may be credited against the demand, this request should be refused; but in other respects it appears undesirable to go beyond the terms of Mr. Merk's proposed communication to the jirga, as accepted by the Government of India.

4. Mr. Merk has no doubt taken the steps which he contemplated for warning all Mahsuds who are settled on land in British India that they may be required next month to return to their hills, with their families and movable property, at 12 hours' notice. It may be left to the Commissioner to deal with the Mahsuds in the Militia, provided, as the Lieutenant-Governor is understood to recommend, that those who are unwilling to go to their country and undergo the blockade are not on the one hand forced to do so, but are not, on the other hand, left in a position where they will be

open to temptation or able to thwart operations by communicating with the blockaded Mahsuds. They must, in other words, be brought to a safe distance from the blockading cordon.

5. Mr. Lorimer's services will be replaced temporarily at the disposal of the Punjab Government in time to enable him to join Mr. Merk not later than the 26th November. A special grant of Rs. 15,000 is placed at Mr. Merk's disposal for political expenditure up to the end of the current financial year. The detailed bills for disbursement from this sum should be sent in due course to the Accountant-General, Punjab. Indents for arms, &c., for the Bhattanis, up to the limit of 800 M. L. Enfield rifles, with 16,000 rounds of ball ammunition and 32,000 percussion caps, will be duly complied with if sent direct to the arsenal at Rawalpindi. Steps are being taken to carry out Mr. Merk's proposals in respect to telegraphic arrangements at Tank, &c.

Enclosure 10 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Dera'at Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

I interviewed to-day the Mahsud jirga, which, owing to recent occurrences, was small, not more than five hundred men, but all sections fully represented, tribesmen as well as Maliks. The Maliks said the time had passed for beating about the bush, and openly and explicitly stated that they had not the power to control the tribe, and that, although they, the Maliks themselves, wished us to take the country, and asked us to do so, this request of theirs was in direct opposition to the wishes of the Mahsuds. In reply to my enquiry what were their proposals to ensure the future good conduct of the tribe, they said they could suggest nothing and had no plan, and virtually abdicate, leaving it to Government to act as Government pleases. This was before I disclosed the change of policy in dealing with the tribes. I then addressed the jirga as authorised by Government. The change of policy came as a complete surprise to the jirga. It seemed to me that the bulk of the Maliks were relieved at the prospect of being extricated from a position which had become impossible. I then put the terms, one lakh of rupees or a blockade, with any other measures Government might think fit to adopt. The Mahsuds say that a blockade will hit them harder than an expedition. The jirga then asked permission to discuss matters to-night, see me to-morrow, and then talk over matters with the tribe. I have, of course, agreed to this, but told them at the time that fifteen days' grace was the utmost I could allow them, and that matters must be determined one way or the other on the 25th November.

Enclosure 11 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My telegram of yesterday. Jirga to-day said they wished to consult tribe, also Mulla Powindah, whose attitude, they said, they could not predict. The jirga said they would make every effort to collect the money, and would give me an answer on or before the 25th instant. I told them to consult together very carefully, also that blockade would commence, as already announced, unless they paid half a lakh within fifteen days, when question of further instalments would be referred to Government for orders; but that blockade, if established, could not be removed till final instalment

had been paid, also that payments in kind would be accepted at prices current in Tank Bazar, also that, if they remained quiet during blockade, they need not fear reprisals, but that, if any Mahsuds committed any offences during the blockade, we should then hold ourselves free to act as we pleased, also that the internal distribution of the fine was a private affair with which we had no concern, and in which we declined to interfere, also that we positively refused to deal separately with any section, though it might be ready to pay its share of the fine, and we should deal only with the Mahsud tribe as a whole, thus avoiding the dangers resulting from splitting up the tribe by dealing with small portions of it, also that the whole tribe would be blockaded or otherwise dealt with till the whole tribe had settled with Government. I then dismissed the jirga. I hear they are genuinely anxious to pay, but eventual result depends, of course, upon consultation in the hills. The jirga was deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation, as is shown by their not even hinting to me that the forfeited allowances should be credited towards the fine, a course which I should have been quite unable to suggest to Government for adoption. I forgot to mention yesterday that they said neither the Maliks nor the tribe had the power of compelling the surrender of the various offenders for punishment. This is, of course, true, else they would not face a fine of a lakh with the consequences of failure in payment. They fully realise that the sooner they pay the more quickly will their troubles cease, and the payment of the tribal allowance commence. And the rigid enforcement of the blockade exactly upon the date fixed with the preparations now being made convince them that, as a number of them said in jirga yesterday, the time has passed for tricks and temporising. As there is no prospect of half a lakh being paid before the 25th instant, the blockade will begin on the 1st December, and I have in hand all the necessary preparations for the civil arrangements of the blockade.

Enclosure 12 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My telegram of yesterday. The Mahsuds will probably hold a great tribal jirga at Kram on 15th or 16th, which Mulla Powindah will be invited to attend. The leading men will there try to force his hand and make him declare his attitude. They will also get the Ulus to say what it proposes to do. If all agree to payment of lakh, it will soon be paid. Either way prospect of blockade and of the change in policy, of which the body of the tribe will hear to-morrow, will clear the situation. It is not likely that half a lakh will be paid by the 25th, but the consequent declaration of the blockade will materially accelerate payment if the tribe makes up its mind to pay.

Enclosure 13 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 16th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga is assembled at Kram. Mahsuds are begging Mulla Powindah, who is there, to help in collecting the fine. The Abdur Rahman Khel hold aloof, and a large gang of this clan is reported to have started to loot the Darwesh Khel of Shakai. This stupid act, of course, plays into our hands, as it will incense the Darwesh Khel and further induce them to join in enforcing the blockade which they were already prepared to do.

Enclosure 14 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Bannu, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga reported to have decided that fine be paid according to tribal shares and tribal custom, but not known yet when amount will be collected and paid in.

Enclosure 15 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, the 22nd November, 1900.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated 23rd October, 1900, which was repeated to the Government of

Commissioner, Derajat's endorsement, dated 30th October, 1900, and enclosures.

Commissioner, Derajat's letter, dated 31st October, 1900, and enclosures.

India, I am directed to submit, for information, a copy of the letters marginally noted containing further details of the attack made on the Kot Nasran Post by a gang of Mahsuds on the 23rd ultimo, and a report regarding the conduct of the Border Military Police in charge of the post during the attack.

Annexure 1.

Letter from S. S. Waterfield, Esq., Political Officer, Wana, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 26th October, 1900.

I have the honour to report that on the night of 23rd October, between 2 and 3 a.m., I received a report that the Border Military post at Kot Nasran had been attacked by a gang of Mahsuds, who had killed two Border Military Police sepoy, and had looted the post, taking away with them eight Snider rifles, two Snider carbines, a revolver and a large number of Snider cartridges.

I at once telegraphed the news to Jandola and Sarwekai, hoping that the gang might possibly be intercepted on the road back into Mahsud country.

On receipt of my telegram at Jandola, the Naib Tahsildar, Ata Muhammad, reported the news to Lieutenant Hennessey, 45th Sikhs, commanding the Jandola Post, who at once ordered out 10 sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and 35 sepoy of the 45th Sikhs in pursuit of the raiding party. Lieutenant Hennessey himself went with the troops, and took with him a number of Bhattanni Levies.

The troops took the road leading to the meeting place of the Shuza and Khaisora Valleys. The Cavalry sowars pushed on ahead of the infantry and, on arriving at Pir Tangi, came across the gang of raiders, who were resting there for the purpose, apparently, of dividing the loot obtained from the Nasran Post. The Cavalry fired upon the raiders and wounded one man of the gang, and the rest of the raiders fled up the side of the hill. The news that the troops were in touch with the raiders reached me between 2 and 3 p.m. from Jandola, Lieutenant Hennessey having sent back to the post for reinforcements. The next news I received was conveyed in a telegram from Jandola, stating, I regret to say, that Lieutenant Hennessey had been shot dead and one Bhattanni Levy wounded, and that one of the

raiders had been killed. According to your orders, Lieutenant Knox, Adjutant of the Southern Waziristan Militia, was ordered to proceed on the morning of the 24th to Jandola to enquire into the case. I also ordered Naib Tahsildar, Muhammad Azim Khan, to accompany Lieutenant Knox and to take with him some Mahsud Maliks, out of the jirga now assembled here, for the purpose of identifying the body of the raider. On the 24th I received news that these Maliks had professed their inability to identify the body. I at once ordered that the body should be sent down to Tank for the purpose of identification by the Mahsud Maliks and their followers assembled here.

The body arrived on the night of the 24th instant, and on the 25th every Mahsud Malik was given an opportunity of identifying it; one and all, however, expressed their inability to identify it. The Mahsud Maliks unanimously declare that this raid has been committed at the instigation of the Mulla Powindah, and that the members of the gang are the Mulla's followers.

On the 25th instant I received news from Lieutenant Knox that through the enquiry instituted by Naib Tahsildar, Muhammad Azim Khan, it is believed that the deceased raider is one Sangai, a Malikshahi of Toda China near Makin. It has been ascertained that no Shingi nor Jalal Khel was concerned in this case. From the enquiries made up to the present suspicion is strong against Shahi Khel, Malikshahi, and other Sheikhs of the Mulla Powindah. It has been ascertained that on the day before the raid on the Nasran Post the gang of raiders were fed by Asaltai, Nehzamai and Pashai, Abdullais, brothers of Tarakaii, a Mahsud hostage. These men have been summoned, and should arrive here on the 27th, and will be able to give evidence as to the members of the gang.

It has also been ascertained that on the day that the raiding gang came down the Shuza with the intention of attacking the Nasran Post the following "Kirris" were encamped in the Shuza, and members of these Kirris must have noticed this gang:—

- (a) The Kirri of Siman Khan, Shahi Khel Malik; he himself was in Tank.
- (b) The shepherds, Shaman Khel section.
- (c) The Kirri of Sarang Khel Shingis.
- (d) The shepherds of Abdullais and Malikshahis.
- (e) Kirri Waruki Dhanna Bhattannis.
- (f) Kirri of Badzai Bhattannis Malik Katai.
- (g) Kirri of Ahmad Khan, Niamat Khel Bhattanni.

All the above have been called on for an explanation as to why they made no attempt to stop the raiders nor made any report as to the arrival of this gang in the Shuza.

I attach a copy of the report sent to me by Lieutenant Knox regarding the manner in which Lieutenant Hennessey met with his death.

Lieutenant Hennessey's body has been sent in to Dera Ismail Khan for burial.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Lieutenant A. W. F. Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated Jandola, the 24th October, 1900.

I have the honour to report as follows on the affair of yesterday, in which Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, 45th Sikhs, was killed.

The Post Officer here, Ata Muhammad, received a telegram from you about 4 a.m. yesterday, the 23rd, to the effect that the Border Military Police post, Nasran, had been looted by raiders on the preceding night.

Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, Officer Commanding Jandola, was at once informed. He started about 5 a.m. for the junction of the Shuza and Khaisora nullahs, north-east of Jandola, and distant 13 miles. He sent on in front 10 sowars of the detachment, 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Daffadar Minhaj-ud-din, who was accompanied by three Bhattanni and four Mahsud Levy sowars and had under his immediate command Jamadar Sundar Singh, of the 45th Sikhs, and 35 rifles, besides seven Bhattanni and three Mahsud Levies.

Of the 35 rifles, 45th Sikhs, ten men under a Havildar were posted in the Tarazda nullah, to cover the Bigori path which debouches some 7 miles from Jandola. Second-Lieutenant Hennessey hurried on to the Shuza with the remainder. Meanwhile the Cavalry scouts had discovered the raiders, in number about 20, resting in the shade, on the north side of the hill, south of the junction of the Khaisora and Shuza. The Daffadar, in order to block their probable line of retirement, took his men a detour to the left and finally galloped up and dismounted in some trees between the two nullahs and north of their junction. He was then about 700 yards from the raiders, who, taking alarm, began to climb rapidly to the top of the hill. As he dismounted they opened fire, which he returned, wounding one man in the shin of the right leg. This happened about 7.30 a.m.

The infantry were now close, and Second-Lieutenant Hennessey, hearing firing, hurried them on at the "double," and formed them to the right under a hill to the north-west of that on which the raiders were. He then advanced against the hill in open order, but finding the enemy's fire too heavy to admit of further progress finally turned to the left and joined the Cavalry. A Bhattanni Levy sepoy, Kasim, was now sent back, to the Havildar in the Tarazda to order him to bring his party of ten men to bear on the left rear of the raiders operating from the south-west. At the same time Lieutenant Hennessey seems to have recognised the smallness of his force for the work in hand, and sent back a note to Jandola as follows:—

"Send 15 rifles at once. Am in touch with raiders. Rifles to proceed from the cemetery on to the road to Shuza Darah, to Khaisora Darah by the Bigori road, not along the lower Tarazda road, but over the hills to where Khaisora and Shuza Darahs meet."

The Sikh Native Officer left in command at Jandola complied with this note at once, but the reinforcement only met the troops returning. Probably knowing that these men would arrive too late, Second-Lieutenant Hennessey divided his infantry and attempted to surround the raiders. Taking twelve rifles he himself approached the hill from the south-east, Jamadar Sundar Singh also with twelve rifles was sent against it from the east, and the Cavalry were told to operate from the north on the enemy's front.

Before, however, this general movement was commenced, the enemy's fire slackened, and they had retired to the south-east towards Pir Tangi, probably there crossing the Shuza and effecting their escape into the hills to the north-east. As they retired, the wounded raider lying in a small nullah on the northern face of the hill was loud in complaint, calling out: "I am wounded, carry me away." The Mahsuds, however, were overburdened with rifles and ammunition, and deserted him. He continued for a time to fire on the advancing troops, and prevented them from suspecting the retirement that had taken place. As the infantry drew near, he lay down flat hoping to escape notice. The troops now became aware that only one of the raiders remained, but could not exactly locate him. Jamadar Sundar Singh's party had veered to the right owing to the steepness of the hill. Lieutenant Hennessey working from east to west round the northern face of the hill with his twelve men in extended order suddenly came upon him. Thinking himself discovered, the man rose and fired his pistol at the nearest sepoy, missing him. Lieutenant Hennessey ordered Havildar Narain Singh, who was with him, to take most of the men to the top of the hill to fire upon the wounded man till he surrendered. He himself remained

with three sepoy and a couple of Levies. For a time he waited, then crept on, his helmet in his left hand and revolver in the right. He misjudged the position of the wounded man and took too downward a direction on the hill. The Mahsud remained quiet till he had almost passed and then shot him through the spine from behind, at a distance of five yards, the bullet coming out under the right arm. Death was almost instantaneous; he had only time to call out twice to the sepoy near him to send Havildar Narain Singh. As the Mahsud fired on all men who attempted to recover the corpse, he was finally despatched by a bullet from the top of the hill, which struck him under the right eye. Till then he continued to return the fire.

Meanwhile the Bhattanni Levy, Kasim, was returning, having delivered his message to the Havildar in the Tarazda. He was fired on by mistake and slightly wounded in the fleshy part of the right calf by the Cavalry.

As dols were then heard beating, Jamadar Sundar Singh ordered a general retirement, carrying with him the body of Lieutenant Hennessey and that of the Mahsud raider. The wounded Bhattanni's village was close at hand, and he was handed over to his brother's care. The party reached Jandola at 6 p.m. Lieutenant Hennessey was killed at 2 p.m. The following arms, &c., were found with the dead raider and were forwarded with his body to you to-day for identification:—

One Snider rifle (stolen from Nasran).	Forty-three rounds Snider ball.
One muzzle-loader.	Three rounds Snider buckshot.
One sword.	Eight rounds Snider ball, empty.
One revolver.	One rezai.
One waist belt.	

The Maliks I brought with me from Tank professed themselves unable to identify the corpse, but there seems to be a general consensus of opinion that he was a Malikshahi of Makin or a Shabi Khel.

A Shingi Levy Aikhel sent out yesterday for information reports that he has only heard of two raiding parties being out, one under Azad Khan, Shingi, the other under Asal Khan, Guri Khel, and that both of them have gone towards Zhob. This man's information has been found generally trustworthy. A second Levy sepoy, Saki, a Shabi Khel, reports that on the

21st he heard from another Mahsud that the latter had on that day seen 10 or 12 Mahsuds lurking in the Shuza with two long bullies, likely materials for a ladder such as was used in the attack on Nasran. I shall endeavour to get this man in. Marwat, the Shaman Khel Malik, states that he saw the dead raider on two occasions in the Mulla Powindah's following, but the last occasion was two years ago.

Jamadar Nekamal, Langar Khel, states that the revolver found on the dead man was once in the possession of Sheikh Salim, Langar Khel.

A Levy has been sent to call this man in.

A third Levy sepoy, Gulanam, has brought in information that the raiders were fed last night by three brothers, Asti, Nizami and Pushi, Abdullais (brothers of Tarkhai, hostage at Dera Ismail Khan). These three men who live seven miles from here north of Fattah Khan Kot will be called in.

I shall inform you of any further information as obtained.

I have just heard that Makin, Shabi Khel, after seeing the corpse, has gone off to his home. Not having a horse he came with my infantry guard, which arrived after I had despatched the body from here. He saw it on the road. Dinak, also Bibizan, Shabi Khel, is in Tank; also Mauladad and Maula Khan of the same section.

Annexure 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 30th October, 1900.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, for information.

Enclosure 16 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The Mahsud jirga at Kram agreed to pay by tribal shares, but the difficulty now is who is to collect the money and how. The Mahsuds want us to collect from each section. At the jirga they also agreed to control their bad characters by tribal force and to divide the allowances tribally. They have asked for two months' grace, and that, meanwhile, blockade be not imposed. They are very anxious that traffic with Mahsud country be not stopped for next two months. They are said to greatly fear that payment of the lakh will be followed up by an expedition. They are now waiting to see what we shall do. As the Mahsud requests are clearly impossible, I shall proclaim blockade this evening. I am telegraphing separately about this to you and to Military Authorities.

Enclosure 17 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference last sentence of my telegram of 9th instant. As half lakh has not been paid, the blockade will commence on 1st December, on which date troops ought to be in their position or as soon after as possible. Mahsuds are being sent back to their country, and blockade proclamation being issued.

Enclosure 18 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 28th November, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Have received letter from Mulla Powindah :—*Begins.* Mahsud jirga agrees to pay and obey. I am personally glad that bad characters are being punished. I ask that value of payments in kind be assessed in presence of my nominee. I ask you the order that fine be levied per family, and not by tribal shares. I ask for further grace, as the tribe is collecting the money; lastly, that allowances of Maliks may be credited towards fine. *Ends.* To which I have replied :—*Begins.* The sooner the Mahsuds pay in full, the sooner will blockade cease; secondly, payments in kind, such as I accept, will be sold and proceeds credited towards fine; thirdly, mode of collection of fine is one for tribe to determine, with which we have no concern; fourthly, Maliks' allowances cannot be credited towards fine; fifthly, no further grace can be given. *Ends.*

Enclosure 19 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 2nd December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Applications have been received from various Mahsud sections, asking permission to pay in their shares of fine, to which reply has been made that all payments will be received, but that the fine is a collective one on the whole Mahsud tribe, and that, till it is paid in full, the blockade will be maintained against all Mahsuds. Mullah Powindah writes asking that payment of fine be ordered according to tribal shares as fixed by recent jirga at Kram; also that payment of future allowances be ordered according to such shares, also that sections that decline to pay fine be coerced by us. Reply given that assessment and payment of fine and future distribution of allowances are matters of tribal concern, and settlement in which we do not interfere.

Enclosure 20 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 4th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Prices are rising in Mahsud Hills. News from various quarters, including Tochi and Sarwekai, confirms the report that Mahsuds are engaged in collecting the fine. Several Mahsud Maliks have been enquiring whether arms will be accepted in payment. I have already told the Mahsuds that payments in kind will be accepted, and property so brought will be sold and proceeds credited towards payment of fine. But arms cannot be sold in British districts. I do not advise their being sold to residents of the protected areas or to others, and lastly they are of no use to us. The arms which would be brought would, in most instances, be pistols, knives, swords and muzzle-loading guns, all of native patterns. I do not advise that these be taken, but, if breech-loading rifles are brought in that they be accepted, the market values being assessed by a Committee. Does His Honour agree?

Enclosure 21 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 8th December, 1900. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Lieutenant-Governor agrees that breech-loading rifles of English manufacture may be taken at assessed value in part payment of fine.

Enclosure 22 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

First payments in cash and in kind towards fine have been made at Jandola and Sarwekai. Mahsuds at present seem really resolved to pay, and Mulla Powindah is actively assisting in collection. By common consent

raiding on Government territory has been stopped for the present, but large raid reported to have been committed by Mahsuds on Afghan territory in Sarafza about 3rd instant, raiders slipping through Shawal. I shall endeavour to tighten Darwesh Khel closure of Shawal, as, if raiders get through, traders may contrive to do the same.

Enclosure 23 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 11th December, 1900. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Mahsuds now press for payments in kind to be accepted at a valuation. They hope, no doubt, that their cattle, &c., may be over-valued and fine thus reduced. To this I have replied that I have no objection to taking payments in kind at a valuation, provided Mahsuds make good any differences between the proceeds of sales and the valuations, if the latter prove to exceed the former. I have added that, if they do not accept this, I will permit Mahsud owners of payments in kind to be present at the sales, and arrange to have the property brought down from Jandola and sold, and that, if neither course suits them, they have still the option of paying in cash. It is quite possible that this Mahsud manoeuvre thus to evade full payment of fine may check satisfactory development of situation, but I think it would be fatal both in regard to effect of present punishment, and in regard to success of future management of tribe, if I were to do anything that would introduce a nominal element into the matter of the fine. I trust His Honour approves action taken.

Enclosure 24 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp, Khanewal, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 12th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Yours, dated 11th December. Lieutenant-Governor entirely approves action taken regarding payments in kind by Mahsuds.

Enclosure 25 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Tank, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th December, 1900. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Attitude and temper of Mahsuds reported the same as in my telegram of 10th instant, but payments have ceased, and Mahsuds are considering what to do, since their wish to have payments in kind accepted at what they expected high valuations has been declined, and since they have been informed that only cash proceeds of sales of payments in kind will be credited to the fine. Mulla Powindah writes that, unless valuation system is permitted, he can assist no further in collection of fine. Complete cessation of raids, robberies and thefts along borders of Tochi, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Wana, charges, viz., a line 200 miles in length, since the 7th November last up to date proves, firstly, that the Mahsuds alone were

the disturbers of the peace; and, secondly, that the tribe is perfectly capable of combining for a common purpose and of controlling its bad characters if it chooses.

Enclosure 26 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 31st December, 1900.

The Mahsuds have dropped the request for acceptance of payments in kind at a valuation. They now ask that they may be allowed to sell cattle, timber, &c., in Tank, and pay in the proceeds on the spot, subject to necessary precautions on our part that blockade is not broken by goods being taken back to their country. Apparently they do not trust each other, nor do they trust our native subordinates to sell their property. I have replied that their request is reasonable, and that, subject to the necessary measures to prevent smuggling, they will be allowed to come to Tank to sell what they bring, to pay in the money and to go back to their country. All accounts agree in representing Mulla Powindah as urging the tribe to pay, and as he seems to be the only business man in the tribe, and the only man who has some influence with all the sections, this is so far satisfactory. His letters to me during this month tend to confirm the reports that he is genuinely anxious for a payment of the fine. The Mahsuds naturally try to make the best terms for themselves, and finding now that a full payment is insisted upon, possibly they may make up their minds to comply. Mulla Powindah has convened a jirga to consider matters. I have directed Political Officer, Wana, to see that my letters to the tribe and to Mullah Powindah of the 26th instant, accepting Mahsuds' sales at Tank, reach before the jirga meets, and I hope this will take place, especially as the present rains are probably delaying assembly of the jirga.

Enclosure 27 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Miran Shah, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 6th January, 1901.

Payments have recommenced, and the Mahsuds appear inclined to avail themselves of the permission to sell and pay mentioned in my telegram 528 of 31st December, but till after the Id it is unlikely that a decided move will be made. Large Mahsud flock and herds have in last few days been grazing near Sarwekai, Haidari Kach and Jandola, which looks as if confidence had been restored. Tribe remains perfectly quiet and no offences have occurred.

Enclosure 28 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 14th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Payments towards fine continued till 8th instant, when they ceased. Reasons assigned for stoppage are, first, that some Mahsuds consider that, if they hold out for some time without paying, Government may get tired of the blockade and relax terms; second, that it has not yet been settled

whether assessments of fine shall be by tribal shares or by families; third, that the headmen are apathetic, and that Mulla Powindah, who has hitherto been energetic, is drawing back in order not to diminish his influence by appearing to be the sole or the principal mover in furthering the wishes of Government. As regards the second reason, till the tribe has settled mode of assessment, little progress can be expected. The principal obstacle towards an unanimous settlement of assessment is the Shaman Khel, who are numerically the smallest of the three great divisions of the Mahsuds, and therefore naturally wish for assessment *per capita*, whereas the other two divisions desire assessment *per stirpes*, both sides apparently overlooking the bearing that the assessment of loss now will have upon the assessment of profit hereafter when tribe comes to distribution of allowances. Colour is lent to the third reason by a letter I have recently received from Mulla Powindah, begging me to urge the headmen to co-operate vigorously in payment of fine. When they saw him energetically advocating payment, they drew back. Moreover, although they know that further relations with the Mahsuds will be direct and not through a system of selected Maliks, they are trying to stave off the day, hoping that something may meanwhile occur to alter what they know is the future policy of Government. The situation may clear itself or advance a step one way or the other after the Id. Up to date one thousand five hundred and eighty rupees have been paid in.

Enclosure 29 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 16th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

On 14th afternoon a mail runner was killed near Nili Kach. Yesterday morning a sepoy of the 23rd Pioneers was shot on picket near Muliza and in the evening mail was looted near Sarwekai. Circumstances of these offences point to their having been committed by a former Mahsud Jamadar of mail runners who was discharged when blockade commenced, but this is only surmise as yet, and exact facts are being ascertained. The mails have not been sufficiently escorted, and have been allowed, it appears, to travel after sunset.

Enclosure 30 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan Quetta, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 16th January, 1901.

Following telegram, dated 15th, from Political, Zhob:—*Begins.* Following from S. D. O., Telegraphs, Dera Ghazi Khan:—*Begins.* Telegraph lines between Moghalkot and Kajuri Kach wrecked to-day by Waziris, breaking eight insulators, cutting wire in eleven places and carrying away two spans of wire somewhere within seven miles of Moghalkot. *Ends.* Following from Officer Commanding, Mirali Khel:—*Begins.* Officer Commanding, Moghalkot, wires Zarmelan post entered by party of thirteen Waziri raiders last night midnight. Two rifles belonging to Powindah Chowkidars taken. *Ends. Telegrams end.* Zarmelan is a Punjab post.

Enclosure 31 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 17th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Yesterday night rifle thieves, probably same gang as that mentioned in my telegram of yesterday, attacked picket of 23rd Pioneers at Khushma Khula between Murtaza and Nili Kach. Two sepoy wounded, one rifle lost.

Enclosure 32 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 26th January, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The offences committed last week by the Mahsuds were, I consider, political in their tendency and purpose. The situation is this: there are three political parties in the tribe—the Maliks, the tribesmen and Mulla Powindah, the third being the agent and leader of the second against the first mentioned party. An expedition would, the Maliks argue, fall principally upon the tribesmen and upon Mulla Powindah, who, as a Mulla, is bound to fight whether he likes or not, and who will, of course, be crushed if there is an expedition. The Maliks, on the other hand, recalling their experiences of 1894 and 1895, expect that, if there is an expedition again, they, their friends and property, will, as before, be protected as friendlies, and that the close of the expedition will be followed by increased allowances as in 1895, besides which their political adversary, Mulla Powindah, will be ruined. I am inclined to think that the offences were deliberately instigated with a view to worrying Government into an expedition. It is significant that the customary gathering of Mahsuds on the day of the *Id* at Makin, when some two thousand five hundred men are said to have assembled, was not attended by the leading headmen, whereas Mulla Powindah was present and upbraided the Mahsuds for the recent offences, and exhorted them to pay the fine. I have sent for the leading headmen, and shall particularly impress upon them the decision of Government in respect of the blockade and of future allowances, also the danger they incur by intrigue which will be useless. The difficulty is to get these Waziris to realise that what is said is meant; for instance, had the Mada Khel realised in May last that there is no whittling of terms, they would have saved their autumn crop. A month ago some Ghilzais of Afghan territory arrived at Kaniguram with a demand for two and a half lakhs as compensation, on account of Mahsud raids on Afghan subjects. They were told to return after the *Id* and were present at the Makin gathering, and it is said brought a letter from Gul Muhammad Khan, Governor of Urghun, offering permission to the Mahsuds to trade with Afghan territory, and an asylum to Mulla Powindah, who is reported to have said that he would wait to see how things went. If a demand for redress was made by the Ghilzais, it is possible that this letter may, in part, be intended as giving some consideration for the redress desired.

Enclosure 33 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 3rd February, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

After jirga with leading and really influential headmen for three days, they have finally committed themselves in writing and by oath on the koran in my presence, to realise and pay in the fine as soon as possible; and to

unite for this purpose in the forcible coercion of any recusants in the tribe. They made sensible and reasonable suggestions for despatch of this business of liquidation, and the Shaman Khel (see my telegram 17 of 14th ultimo) agreed to accept assessment of fine by ancestral shares. It was also settled that offences committed last month shall be dealt with by whole tribe independently of payment of fine. The situation is better than it was ten days ago, but I cannot say whether internal dissensions of Mulla Powindah, out of antipathy to the leading headmen, may not impede settlement. Mulla Powindah is, however, so openly and explicitly committed to payment of fine that he could only act indirectly; and to make matters more secure, I have sent him a letter which ought to keep him straight. Further, the two parties now clearly understand that, if by their intrigues Government is driven to extreme measures, both parties will be destroyed, and that it is, therefore, to the interest of neither to try to cut the throat of the other at our expense. The information obtained during these discussions confirms correctness of political diagnosis in my telegram of 26th ultimo. The headmen have now gone off to arrange details of assessment and payment. I mention, for what it is worth, the fact that three breech-loading rifles and two revolvers were at this jirga produced in payment of shares of fine due by the owners.

Enclosure 34 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 12th February, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Political Officer, Wana:—*Begins.* State of affairs in Mahsud country during last week much more hopeful. Since meeting and interviewing of Mahsud Maliks by Commissioner at Jandola, the general demeanour of tribe has improved. Maliks are no longer sulky, and reports say that Mulla highly approves of action taken. All Maliks, since leaving Jandola, have called up their sections, and have arranged for the collection of fine. All arrangements for the realisation of the fine are ready at Sarwekai, Jandola and Tank. No offences have been committed by the Mahsuds during the past week. Bahirs are coming in as arranged at Sarwekai and Jandola. Badshah Khan, one of the chief Maliks, has personally paid in 755 rupees. *Ends.* The situation is more promising now than it has been since the blockade commenced.

Enclosure 35 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 12th March, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference Foreign letter of 20th February, paragraph 3. Owing to scarcity of cash among Mahsuds, it was settled at the Jandola jirga that animals produced by Mahsuds should be made over to complainants in cases of robbery of animals after the animals produced had been accepted by Political Officer as being in every respect equivalent to animals carried off. Mahsuds are bringing in numbers of animals, and these are being made over to complainants according to scale of distribution sanctioned in your telegram of 9th January. Up to 9th instant six thousand five hundred rupees worth of cash thus had been disposed of. Please telegraph if reconsideration of scale of distribution will take place, and under what circumstances. Animals brought in by Mahsuds cannot be kept by us pending

such reconsideration without considerable expense and some risk of animals dying or deteriorating. Nor would it seem advisable to check process of payment of fine by telling Mahsuds that they must keep the animals for the present pending reconsideration. Matter is urgent, because this method of settlement facilitates liquidation of fine without prejudice to the claimants.

Enclosure 36 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 23rd March, 1901.

Commissioner, Derajat, wires:—*Begins.* Following telegrams repeated for orders. Political Officer, Wana's:—*Begins.* Your question regarding fire-arms handed in by Mahsuds as payment of fine. Up to date 30 Martini-Henri rifles, 11 Martini carbines, 16 Snider rifles, 13 Snider carbines, 11 sporting rifles, 1 Kohat sporting rifle and 63 revolvers have been handed in. Twenty-seven Martini rifles, 4 Martini carbines, are Kohat made, all others are of European manufacture. Total value of fire-arms, as settled by Committees, amounts to Rs. 27,022. Mahsud Maliks are averse to handing in rifles as security for cash later on. Regret delay, but information only received at 11 p.m. *Ends.* My 148:—*Begins.* Your 221. See my letters of 10th December and of 5th January. Kohat-made arms should not have been taken. Unless you can justify their retention, they must be returned. Telegraph reply also what is value of arms received, exclusive of Kohat-made rifles and carbines. *Ends.* His 175:—*Begins.* Your 148. I understand breech-loading rifles of European make to mean Martini-Henri rifles, Sniders and sporting rifles, similar to those made in Europe, and which are equally serviceable. Of the 37 rifles and 4 carbines of Martini-Henri pattern received from Mahsuds and which have been designated as Kohat-made, all, without exception, have been put together from component parts made in Europe. All are sound, serviceable weapons, and to the Mahsuds are worth the money which Committees assessed on the rifles. At Jandola a sum of Rs. 15,002 has been realised up to date by valuation of fire-arms; of this amount Rs. 5,720 is the value assessed on the 28 rifles designed Kohat-made. All rifles collected at Sarwekai are being brought here. On arrival will send required information regarding them. Only two rifles out of 28 collected at Sarwekai are designated Kohat-made. Officer Commanding has informed me that, in his opinion, the values assessed on rifles are very fair. I would strongly recommend that the rifles be retained. Until further orders from you on subject, I have stopped taking over fire-arms from Mahsuds. *Ends.* My 156:—*Begins.* Your 175. You can take another Rs. 2,000 worth of arms. By that time we shall have orders of Government. *Ends.* Under circumstances reported I think Kohat-made arms may be retained. Question now is as follows:—Value of arms brought in is nearly equal to totals of lists 1, 7 and 9 of statements with my 936-C. of 8th December, plus Rs. 5,000 for Kot-Nasran case. Mahsuds, I understand, are willing to bring in more arms. It is policy of Government to obtain breech-loaders from tribes, and payment of arms of course facilitates termination of blockade. On other hand, if arms are brought in beyond arms of value already received which represents Government share of the lakh, we shall be short of money or animals to give as compensation to complainants in proportion to arms accepted after date, unless Government authorise assessed cash value of such arms to be paid to complainants. Kindly telegraph orders on this point. *Ends.* *Second telegram begins:—*105-C. My 155. I have now seen all the arms; they are in very good condition; the so-called Kohat-made arms are rifles of English barrels untouched and English locks, but fitted with country-made stocks. I believe the Mahsuds are prepared to bring in an additional fifteen to twenty thousand rupees worth of arms. If convenient, kindly telegraph

orders soon. *Ends.* Following reply sent:—*Begins.* No. A. Your telegrams 155, dated 18th, and 105-C., dated 21st. So long as great care is taken that Kohat-made rifles are not over-valued, Lieutenant-Governor doubts whether our accepting them will have any bad effect. He thinks we should continue to take rifles, such as those described in your second telegram, from Mahsuds. Value them in cash and pay complainants compensation according to scale laid down in your letter, dated 8th December, 1900. *Ends.*

Enclosure 37 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Miram Shah, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st April, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Up to date fifty-five thousand rupees have been realised from Mahsuds. Tension between different political parties within the tribe has again increased, with consequence that payments are more slack, and that raiding, chiefly on Powindahs and Darwesh Khel, has recommenced.

Enclosure 38 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 7th May, 1901.

Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, April 21st. Government of India would be glad to receive report from Mr. Merk as to present position of affairs in Waziristan, and the manner in which blockade is being conducted. It is hoped that blockade arrangements are being maintained with unabated vigour, and that there will be no relaxation in its conditions, as, in the opinion of the Government of India, this is the only method of bringing the Waziris to complete submission. Hereafter and until termination of blockade, it would be convenient if brief fortnightly progress report could be sent by letter, copy being despatched direct by Commissioner to Government of India, in addition to any intermediate telegrams thought necessary.

Enclosure 39 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 8th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

My letter of 22nd ultimo. After protracted discussion with large Mahsud jirga, numbering over fifteen hundred persons, the difficulties in way of payment of balance of fine have, I hope, been removed. It has been arranged that Mahsuds must pay two-thirds of fine in cash or breech-loaders, concession of payment by animals being withdrawn after one-third of fine has been so paid. Details of payments up to date are as follows:—By cash, four thousand rupees; by breech-loading rifles and revolvers, twenty-eight thousand six hundred rupees; by animals, twenty-four thousand one hundred rupees. It appears that some Mahsuds will not, and others cannot, pay their shares of fine. The jirga asks that, if members of the tribes pay for defaulters, those so paying may be helped to recover their debts after

blockade is finished, as follows:—First, by transfer to creditors of defaulters' shares of future allowances till debts are satisfied; second, by arrest of defaulters if found, at instance of creditors, in British districts or within protected areas of Tochi and Wana. Jirga explains that second provision may not be used much, and is meant more to induce those now hanging back to pay. I see no objection to accepting these arrangements regarding which please telegraph orders, for which I am keeping jirga waiting. As cash is scarce in Mahsud country, jirga asked permission to pawn breech-loaders as security for cash payments apart from rifles paid as part of the fine. I agreed on conditions that, if not redeemed within eight months from date of pawning, the rifles would be forfeited to Government in payment of fine.

Enclosure 40 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 9th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Reference your telegram, repeating Foreign telegram. Present position regarding Mahsuds is reported in my telegram of yesterday on which I await orders. Blockade continues with unabated vigour, and there has been no relaxation in its conditions. Brief fortnightly reports, as desired, will be submitted. Present position regarding Mahsud-Darwesh Khel quarrel over Badar has been reported in my telegrams of to-day.

Enclosure 41 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 9th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Yours of 8th May. Acceptance of breech-loaders, as security for cash payments on condition mentioned, is quite right. Acceptance of payments by tribe on account of defaulters, subject to conditions mentioned, is open to following objections:—If we promise to arrest defaulters found in British districts or protected areas, we shall take upon ourselves that coercion of recalcitrants, which should be done by the tribe itself, as one of the essentials to a satisfactory settlement, and the restoration of allowances. The basis of the new method of dealing with the tribe approved by Government, India, consists in the tribe being brought to put forward a thoroughly representative jirga capable of enforcing its own will against such recusants as those who are now said to be unwilling to pay, and, if we agree to do any part of this work for them, the objects of the blockade will not have been completely gained, and, as in the case of the Khyber, a portion of the fine will probably have to be condoned. The acceptance of payments from willing members of the tribe on condition of recovery from allowances of defaulters hereafter does not involve the risk of having to condone any part of the fine, but it, too, is open to the objection that, when we restore the allowances, the tribe will not have worked out the basis of settlement above mentioned, and the elements of further trouble will remain. Lieutenant-Governor is, therefore, of opinion that no promise of assistance to realise any portion of the fine either by transfer of prospective allowances or any other means should be made, but that the whole fine should be rigidly enforced, before the blockade is removed. The position which we shall thus establish is well worth the delay in settlement.

Enclosure 42 in No. 3.

Endorsed by Punjab Government, dated the 8th May, 1901.

A copy of the following letter is submitted, by direction of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, for the information of the Government of India, Foreign Department, with reference to telegram, dated the 21st of April, 1901, from the Commissioner, Derajat:—

From the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, No. 66-C., dated the 22nd April, 1901, and enclosure.

Annexure 1.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 22nd April, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a copy of my telegram of to-day to the Political Officer, Wana, which explains the present situation and its difficulties in connection with the Mahsuds.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 22nd April, 1901.

I take the present situation to be as follows:—The leading Maliks promised last month at Jandola to accelerate payment of the fine and were at the time, I think, sincere. Upon this the Mulla determined to put in his oar in order to have a voice in the final settlement and to preserve his prestige in the tribe, with also an eye to the future allowances. Therefore he thwarted the efforts of the Maliks towards payments, and they dare and cannot carry into effect their promises of forcibly coercing sections that are slow in paying. In return for this, the Maliks thwart his efforts to contrive a settlement of the fine and termination of the blockade. The situation is, therefore, approaching the deadlock which existed in January last, and which was then solved at the Jandola jirga. It is possible that the Maliks may now, as then, think of forcing on an expedition in order to ruin the Mulla. As to this we can now, as then, paralyse this intention by pointing out that, if there is an expedition, they themselves will be ruined as well as the Mulla, and we have now the further powerful means of influencing them and the tribe by making them realise that, in the event of an expedition, the fifty-five thousand rupees already paid will be irretrievably lost. The point now is, will it be better for me to see the Mahsuds now or wait a fortnight or three weeks, and let the blockade, which you say is hitting the Mahsuds hard, do further work? Of this you on the spot can form an opinion, which please telegraph to me on the 24th instant to Baunu. The more the blockade acts upon the Mahsuds, the more likely is the tribe, and are the rival parties, to listen to reason and to pay. The doubt is whether, if I wait three weeks, the Maliks or the Mulla may not meanwhile do something unfortunate in supposed furtherance of their private aims and enmities. The course that payments are taking, as well as the information you are receiving, will enable you to judge and telegraph how matters seem likely to go. From Bannu I can come straight to Jandola. If, on the other hand, it appears better to wait three weeks, and let the blockade do more of its work, I shall march to Mianwali, then rail to Dera Ghazi and Muzaffargarh, and then come to Jandola and Sarwekai.

Enclosure 43 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 10th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram. No doubt the tribe should coerce the defaulters, and, if the Mahsuds had for the past ten years been treated in a manner conducive to the preservation of internal tribal authority in the way that the northern tribes have been, I should have nothing to say, and should have refused to lay the petition of the Mahsuds before Government. A reference to paragraphs 19 to 25 of my note of the 24th July, 1900, and subsequent correspondence will show that the blockade was not intended as a means of re-establishing that tribal authority which the Maliks' system has been shattering for ten years, but was intended as a punitive measure to compel redress. After the blockade is over, the various measures discussed in that note are meant to build up what has been during the past in process of being pulled down, but this will obviously require years of patient work unswervingly directed to the end in view. If the blockade could last for years, a thoroughly representative jirga, capable of enforcing its own will against recusants, would, no doubt, in the course of time arise, but, as I have repeatedly reported, the leading men are torn by many feuds, the tribe is exploited by two great parties headed by the leading Maliks and by Mulla Powindah, who balance each other, and who, though powerless for good, are powerful for evil, and under the circumstances we must to some extent back up judiciously those that comply with our demands against those that hang back. It is out of the question to hope that a jirga, such as exists in northern tribes, and as exists till recent times among the Mahsuds, can come into life under the above conditions in six months or a year. There is no risk of any condonation, for the blockade will not be removed till the last penny has been paid, and creditors know that they must take their chance hereafter of recovery by arrest of debtors. It was thoroughly understood by the jirga when it made its petition that Government would be responsible for nothing but the arrest of the debtors when pointed out. The basis of settlement has practically been worked out already, and one object of the great jirga I have just held has been to reconcile assessment of payments with basis of prospective settlement. The recusants and defaulters are not whole sections and clans, but families, individuals, and small sub-sections. The Mahsuds do not live each clan collected within its ring fence as do Afridis, Mohmands and others; but the clans, sub-sections and smaller divisions live intermixed in an extraordinary way. It is, therefore, not easy for clans to coerce individuals, even if there were not the essential difficulties in the way of concerted action which I have mentioned above. His Honour is aware that for years I have consistently advocated the re-establishment of tribal authority among the Mahsuds, and I should not propose anything that would combat this line of policy. After ten years of the Maliks' system, the Mahsud political constitution is weak in comparison with that of tribes which has not been subjected to a process of disintegration, and we cannot, I submit, put on it a greater strain than it can just at present bear. Payments have been again coming in freely since Wednesday. If the petition is refused, those that have paid or that are prepared to pay will certainly feel disheartened; they will sulk in silence; the discontented will be proportionately encouraged. The blockade is severely felt in this way that salt, tobacco, cloth, gur are practically unobtainable, but food of some sort still exists in sufficient quantities. Nothing short of positive famine will produce at short notice that tribal authority which, I suggest, we build up gradually by patient and steady work. It will take, I think, another eighteen months of the blockade to produce a famine in the Mahsud country. Please telegraph orders early.

Enclosure 44 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 12th May, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Party of Southern Waziristan Militia attacked to-day on road between Khajuri Kach and Kashmir Kar which is post on Sherani border, three men killed, two wounded, rifles and ammunition carried off. Offenders not yet known, probably Mahsuds. Parties of Militia gone in pursuit.

Enclosure 45 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Further news shews only Militia sepoy killed, four wounded, none fatally.

Enclosure 46 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901.

Reference telegrams about Waziri blockade ending with Merk's telegram of 10th instant. Views of Government of India are: First, acceptance of rifles as security for cash payments is unobjectionable, provided rifles are redeemed by cash before any allowances are distributed. This qualification is essential; otherwise rifles may be redeemed and fine be partly paid out of allowances. Secondly, provided blockade is not raised and no allowances are paid till full amount of fine is realised, there is no objection to accepting tribal proposal for subsequent distribution of allowances, so as to exclude defaulters temporarily or permanently. Thirdly, after fine is paid and blockade is raised, we should certainly assist to enforce the tribal authority over individuals by arresting, at instance of the tribe, men found in our territory who have defied that authority. The tribe cannot touch such men in our limits, and we ought not to allow bad characters to defy tribal pressure exerted on our behalf, and then to take refuge under our protection.

Enclosure 47 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lahore, dated the 13th May, 1901.

My telegram of to-day, and your telegram of 23rd March. Governor-General in Council feels strong objection to arms being accepted in part payment of fine at fictitious value, or, indeed, at any price which cannot be readily realised in cash. Compare my telegram in Chamkani case, 1008-F., dated 26th April, 1899. It appears Kohat rifles are being accepted as equivalent to about Rs. 200 each. This may be the value to the tribesmen, though this is doubtful, but it is not their value to Government if the rifles are left on our hands.

That these and other rifles are not being redeemed seems to show that they are being accepted at too high a valuation. Commissioner should report values at which arms of European make have been accepted, and what it

is proposed to do with arms received. The chief object of Government is to realise fine of one lakh in full. Payment in stock is therefore acceptable, provided we realise by sale full value at which they are accepted. But this is impossible in case of arms, unless Government sells them to trans-border tribesmen. If rifles are accepted, it would appear that they should be taken only at such valuation as will tempt their owners to redeem them in cash. And this redemption should take place before allowances are begun; otherwise it will be paid out of allowances, that is by Government.

Enclosure 48 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 18th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

On informing the jirga of the orders conveyed in Foreign telegram of 13th May, they state that they are able and willing to pay a further nineteen thousand rupees promptly, making total eighty-seven thousand rupees, but that there is a deadlock about the remaining thirteen thousand rupees as follows:—The Shaman Khel, who are the smallest of the three sections of the tribe and the best behaved, only about eight hundred rupees being due by them out of the two lakhs liabilities incurred by the whole tribe, object to paying one-third of the fine, but claim one-third of the future allowances. The Mahsuds apparently felt the Shaman Khel case to be strong, for it seems that it was at first arranged by the tribe that the Shaman Khel should pay only twenty thousand, and the question of the thirteen thousand was left over and not decided. Subsequently, the leading men of all three sections appear to have settled among themselves that the Shaman Khel should pay five thousand out of the thirteen thousand, and the other two sections, viz., Alizai and Bahlolzai, four thousand each. This settlement appears to have been made after the tribesmen had assessed the fine among themselves on the basis that the Shaman Khel should pay twenty thousand and the Alizai and Bahlolzai thirty-three thousand each. This is an instance of crooked ways of Maliks. The body of the three sections was no party to this new arrangement by the leading men, and declines to give effect to it by a fresh assessment. On the other hand, the Shaman Khel are resolute in not paying more than twenty-five thousand altogether, urging that their joint tribal responsibility will be fully vindicated by paying one-fourth of the fine, though they are practically quite innocent of offences. The only way the jirga can suggest out of this difficulty is, first, that on the security of the new allowances, they may be allowed to borrow from non-Mahsuds, probably British subjects, the thirteen thousand rupees after the eighty-seven thousand rupees have been paid, the loan being repaid by us in one instalment from the allowances; second, that the thirteen thousand rupees be deducted in a lump sum from the new allowances in the shares given above, in the first case the blockade being removed when the eighty-seven thousand *plus* the thirteen thousand have been paid, or in the second case, when the eighty-seven thousand have been realised. There is no doubt that the blockade is being severely felt, and that all are anxious for its removal, and but for the following considerations I should not have hesitated to recommend refusal of the petition. The considerations are these: the tribe is so disunited, and there is such a want of internal authority, that it will take a long period of further pressure before the Mahsuds will be driven into concerted action with a view to solving the deadlock, and there is, besides, the difficulty that Mulla Powindah thwarts what the leading men do and *vice versa*. Meanwhile it is probable that further offences will be committed, and that the account for the offences during the blockade will run up so high as to be difficult of liquidation. If Government decide to take no notice of offences committed during the blockade, then I recommend that the petition be refused, and that the tribe be told to pay up in full. This would not be for some

time. If, however, it is considered that a payment of eighty-seven thousand rupees down, *plus* losses in other ways which I calculate to be about eighty thousand rupees in addition, is sufficient punishment, then one or other of the jirga's petitions may be acceptable to Government. Kindly telegraph orders urgently. I think there is no prospect of further payments till the question of the thirteen thousand rupees is settled.

Enclosure 49 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 19th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram of yesterday, repeating Foreign telegram of 13th May. Arms are not accepted in part payment of fine at fictitious values, but at values according to quality of rifle, average price being below current market rates, as reported in Political Officers, Tochi and Wana's quarterly statements of prices current of arms among tribes in and near Southern Waziristan. A new Henry-Martini is worth to the local tribes about five hundred rupees: to Government it is worth thirty-one rupees eight annas. A worn Henry-Martini fetches in the local hills about four hundred rupees, and to Government it is worth its price as old iron. Of the so-called Kohat rifles which have been accepted here at current market prices, all but a few are not rifles of native manufacture, nor are they composed of many small pieces of condemned rifles welded together like the rifles which made their appearance in the spring of 1898. They consist of rifles cast in arsenals on the old system when the barrel used to be either not cut at all or else cut clean into three pieces, and the lock-plates used to be bent or broken. Such rifles are easily put together again or repaired, and are dangerous weapons in the hands of tribesmen. Only such of the so-called Kohat rifles have been taken here, and one-half of them have barrels that have not been cut at all. Waterfield knows something of the trans-frontier arms market, and I consider we can trust him in this matter. I and other officers have also seen the rifles that have been taken. They are good and serviceable, and have not been over-priced. If information has reached the Government of India which tends to show that fictitious values have been assigned, I ask the favour of being referred to it. No rifles have as yet been given in or accepted as pledges, and, therefore, none have been redeemed. The only thing we can do with the arms received is to destroy them, unless Government are prepared to sell them in India. A statement showing for each rifle the value assessed follows, and in this connection please see statement of trans-frontier prices for rifles printed at pages 209 and 210 of this week's Police blue abstract of intelligence. Live-stock to value of about thirty-one thousand five hundred rupees has up to date been accepted, and made over to complainants whose claims, except those of the Zhob complainants and a few Bannu and Tochi men, who have not yet appeared, have been satisfied. Zhob complainants live far away, and I propose to compensate them in cash. Moreover, Zhob list contains twenty-four thousand three hundred rupees worth of Government cases, which have by mistake not been entered as a separate list of Zhob Government cases. The Mahsuds would very much prefer to pay live-stock rather than arms or cash. In order to make the punishment more telling, I declined to take more than one-third of the fine in live-stock. Now that few complainants remain to be satisfied, the difficulties in the way of accepting live-stock in payment of the thirty-two thousand rupees still due are these: it is impossible for us to keep about fifteen hundred head, which this money represents; there is no great cattle market anywhere near, nor is this the season for buying; to throw so many animals on the small local markets would glut them completely, and we should not get one-fourth of the real value of the stock. Pending orders, I have stopped taking rifles, and solicit early

instructions. I think there is no doubt that cash is scarce among some of the Mahsuds, but to what extent and how far the tribe generally is without cash, it is impossible to say. I shall keep the jirga here till orders are received on this telegram, as well as on my 296 of yesterday.

Enclosure 50 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Lahore, the 20th May, 1901.

With reference to Mr. Merk's telegram, dated 18th May, a copy of which has been sent to you direct, I am instructed to address you as follows.

2. The telegram shows that the tribe from the first only made arrangements for paying Rs. 86,666 out of the Rs. 1,00,000 fixed by Government, viz. :—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	20,000
Alizai, one-third	33,333
Bahlolzai, one-third	33,333
Total	86,666

leaving Rs. 13,333 undistributed.

The leading Maliks of the three sections then appear to have stepped in with a view to making up the full amount, and to have distributed the balance of Rs. 13,333 as follows:—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	5,000
Alizai	4,000
Bahlolzai	4,000
Total	13,000

If Rs. 333 were to be divided in the same proportions, the three sections would under this arrangement have been made responsible for the following amounts:—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	25,128
Alizai	37,436
Bahlolzai	37,436
Total	1,00,000

But while the Shaman Khel appear to agree to pay Rs. 25,000, the other two sections refuse to advance on their Rs. 33,333.

3. Mr. Merk says this is an instance of the crooked ways of the Maliks. But the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it is a genuine attempt of the Maliks to get the tribe at large to accept responsibility for the whole lakh, instead of for only Rs. 86,666; and that what it shows is that the tribe as a whole is not subdued by the blockade to such an extent as to lead the tribesmen to sink their sectional differences and meet the Government demand, reduced as it is to the lowest possible amount.

4. In addition to this, we have the fact that during the blockade offences have been committed, the amount due for which is not stated.

5. The jirga with which Mr. Merk has been holding communications is probably a representative jirga of the tribe, so far as such a jirga can be got together, and this jirga seems to accept the distribution of the Maliks in respect of the Rs. 13,000, because it recommends in its second alternative that this amount should be deducted from the new allowances in the shares given above, viz. :—

	Rs.
Shaman Khel	5,000
Alizai	4,000
Bahlolzai	4,000

and in the first alternative it would fall upon Government to make the distribution, deducting the share due from each of the three sections from the allowances.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor is strongly of opinion that the tribe needs further coercion, and that, if a settlement is patched up on the lines sketched by Mr. Merk, we shall only have to do the whole business over again. We are told that the blockade is being severely felt, and Sir Mackworth Young recommends that it be maintained until the whole lakh is actually paid by the tribe, and that we should not attempt to meet their difficulty by in any way pledging the future allowances. As regards offences committed during the blockade, he has already made enquiry, and will be prepared to give an opinion later.

Enclosure 51 in No. 3.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 23rd May, 1901.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 20th May, 1901, regarding the outstanding balance of the fine due from the Mahsud Waziris.

2. The Governor-General in Council entirely agrees with the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as expressed in the 6th paragraph of your letter, and Mr. Merk should be instructed to at once make it clear to the tribe that the blockade will continue to be enforced with the utmost rigour until every rupee of the fine has been paid, and that no arrangement will be accepted by the Government which commits them directly or indirectly to the recovery of any portion of the fine from the future allowances. The tribe should clearly understand that neither will the blockade be removed nor the allowances be distributed until the fine is fully realised, and that any offences committed meanwhile will be sharply punished by immediate reprisals on any section of the tribe within reach.

3. With regard to the Commissioner's telegram, dated the 19th May, 1901, the Government of India accept his assurances that rifles have not been taken at a valuation higher than that at which they are saleable among the tribesmen themselves, and will await the receipt of the statement promised before passing orders as to the disposal of the arms already in our possession. But they are of opinion that no more rifles should be taken in payment of the fine except as security for cash, and on the distinct condition that they must be redeemed in cash before the blockade is raised. It is clear from the Commissioner's telegram that no more live-stock should be taken in payment of the fine. It therefore follows from these instructions that the balance of the fine still due must be paid in cash, and that, till it is so paid, the blockade will continue.

Enclosure 52 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Jandola, the 18th May, 1901.

In compliance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram, dated the 9th instant, which repeated Foreign Department telegram, I have the honour to submit the report on the situation in Waziristan and the manner in which the blockade is being conducted.

2. I will take the latter subject first, and commence by saying that there has been no relaxation whatever in the stringency of the blockade. It is being maintained with unabated vigour. In fact, so far as it is possible to do this without alienating the sympathy of the people from us, which at present is on our side, an extra turn to the screw was given in the arrangements last month when the reaping of the plentiful spring crop rendered smuggling more likely, and, with the fall of prices in British territory, more profitable. It must be remembered that, for the success of a blockade which extends over 300 miles of country, we must depend very much upon the active co-operation and upon the good-will of the people. At present both are fully with us, for the Mahsud was feared and hated all round. Blockade operations involve much restriction upon the freedom of movement and liberty of trade of the frontier population in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and of the inhabitants of the Wana and Tochi charges; they imply and demand a close supervision by a native staff whom it is impossible to control with a few officers over an enormous area; and the more minute and exacting rules are, the greater opportunity is afforded thereby for malpractices by this staff. If the people were discontented with the blockade, we could do relatively little in the way of shutting up supplies compared with now when the people generally are with us. The question has been repeatedly discussed by me with the blockade officer and local officers, and we have always come to the conclusion that, having regard to the feelings of the local people, we could not make the arrangements more strict. At first, indeed, in December and January, they were in a few instances too strict, and we had to relax them so as to attain the happy mean.

3. The manner in which the blockade is being conducted will appear from the attached extract of general instructions which I issued a month before the blockade commenced. The detailed rules and arrangements, based upon the general lines there laid down, have been very excellently worked out by the Blockade Officer with the respective Deputy Commissioners, District Superintendents of Police and Political Officers concerned. With these details I do not propose to trouble Government. The general rules may be of use in future blockades.

4. The whole control of trade, all the blockade patrolling and all the measures for the prevention and detection of smuggling and contraband traffic are conducted by the civil authorities and their establishments, viz., Militia, Police, Border Military Police and armed villagers. The troops on blockade duty are employed only in the purely military functions of holding forts, supplying convoy guards and the pursuit of raiders. There is no need to ask them to undertake the harassing duty of patrolling for blockade purposes.

5. Prices in the Mahsud country are the best index to the working of the blockade machine. They are reported to me weekly by the Blockade Officer and the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana. Coming, as these reports do, from places many miles apart and through different agencies, it is probable that the average rates represent almost exactly the condition of prices. I attach a statement showing how prices have moved since December last. The table tells its own tale, which is corroborated by the ragged clothes and sickly faces of the Mahsuds. The British Medical Officer here informs me that, when the great jirgas come in, nearly every man appears to be suffering from dyspepsia, probably due to the want of salt and change in their diet generally. "None" in the statement does not mean that there is absolutely no salt, &c., but that there is none for sale.

Whoever has a stock of such articles, keeps it for himself, and will not part with it. Wheat has lately been going down in price, owing to the reaping of the crops within the lower Mahsud hills.

6. Judging from the movements of prices and from what one hears, I conclude that the want of all luxuries and of some necessaries, viz., salt and cloth, is most severely felt (some Mahsuds begged me the other day for leave to buy only two annas worth of salt each), but that there is sufficient food, chiefly Indian corn, left to carry the Mahsuds on to the gathering of the autumn harvest. Scarcity approaching to famine would not be produced unless the blockade lasts till this time next year, and actual famine probably not till September, 1902.

7. The effect of the blockade has up to now been good. The suddenness and completeness of the impenetrable ring-fence which surrounded the Mahsuds have very much depressed them for a time at least. In no other way can I account for the tribe having paid Rs. 68,000 up to date. This is a larger amount than any frontier tribe has paid without an expedition since the annexation of the Punjab. They have up to now given in 98 breech-loading rifles and 68 modern revolvers. Revolvers are taken because they are the favourite weapon of Mahsud burglars in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts. If these rifles and revolvers were in bad condition or had been over-valued, one could understand it, but they are all of European make, in serviceable condition, and have undoubtedly been valued at the market rates current in the Mahsud hills. I cannot account for this except on the hypothesis that cash is really scarce, and that the tribe is driven to part with what most Pathans value more than cash. It seems odd that cash should be scarce, but we know from reports at the time that after 1897-98 much of the spare cash of the Mahsuds was invested in rifles bought from the Afridis, and we are told now that men club together to give a rifle, their subscriptions being paid in cattle, sheep, goats and grain. Apart from the fine, the Mahsuds are suffering heavy losses from the cutting off of trade, of labour (the harvests in Marwat and Tank are cut usually by Mahsud labourers, and they work a good deal during winter on our roads and in the villages much as Ghilzais do in Peshawar), of the pay of the Mahsuds in the Militia, and of the former allowances. From all sources, I take it, the aggregate loss to the Mahsuds cannot be less than Rs. 13,000 per mensem during the six winter months, and Rs. 9,000 per mensem during the remainder of the year, *exclusive of the fine*. The resources of the tribe are being slowly but surely worn down.

8. Considering the discomfort and stress to the tribe, it is surprising that there have not been more raids. Some of these, as I have explained, have been due to political manoeuvres; the others have been carried out partly for loot and partly for supplies by the bad characters, of whom the Mahsuds have more than the normal share of a frontier tribe, and over whom a control can be, in the course of time, established only by the reconstruction of internal tribal authority. This cannot be done in a day, and if the blockade proves a success and terminates with full payment of the fine, it would still be sanguine to expect no more offences.

At the same time, I am convinced that the Mahsuds are "dogs with a very bad name." If the police or informers are at a loss to discover offenders, the case is put down to Mahsuds. In many instances, especially in the Tochi and along the Bhattanni border, offences are committed by members of tribes living near our territory who take care to have some Mahsud confederates with them in order to provide a safe and distant place of receipt for the stolen property and to be able to charge Mahsuds. These live far away, and do not care what is ascribed to them. I have given instructions to enforce territorial responsibility in the Tochi and elsewhere rigidly, and trust this will check such raids as are committed jointly by Mahsuds and by clans living along the borders of our country.

9. As regards the political situation, I am convinced that the bulk of the tribe is sincerely anxious to stand well with us and to pay. But the more one deals with them, the more is the political paralysis within the

tribe brought home to one. Even twenty years ago "Chalweshtis" were not unknown. Now, at these jirgas, the Mahsuds talk much of employing "Chalweshtis" to coerce defaulters and recusants and to accelerate payment of the fine, but it is nothing more than empty sound. They dare not start "Chalweshtis." They are even unable to convene a general jirga. Under the first shock of the announcements at Tank in November last, a kind of general jirga assembled, but it broke up *re infecta*. Unless we ourselves summon the jirga, it is unable to come together; this has been admitted to me by Mahsuds. The hand of each leading man is against his neighbour. The other day they went home from a jirga, and I asked a clansman what they, the leading men, would do. "Do," he said, "what can they do? They shut themselves up in their houses, and cannot stir without fifteen men to their backs." The body of the clansmen has so long been dissociated from political business that it cannot take the initiative. And if the leading men should by any chance combine, the influence of Mulla Powindah is sufficient to neutralise them, but is not sufficient to carry the Mahsuds against them. The two, Mulla and Maliks, just balance each other. I do not think we find this phenomenon anywhere else on the frontier; two political parties of about equal strength, and a tribe now leaning to one, now to the other. The recent events in Badar have deepened the ill-feeling between the two leading elements of the situation. Fortunately Mulla Powindah has everything to lose and nothing to gain from an expedition, so that *quâ* the blockade he is heartily on our side, which again at times reacts in lessening the efforts of the leading men to bring about the payment of the fine.

10. The inability of the tribe to convene a jirga explains the frequency with which I have to send for it. The political parties and the private feuds and quarrels with which the Mahsuds are seething, the great difficulty experienced by a people that cannot read and write and is innocent of all accounts, in the apportionment of a huge fine, explain the checks that from time to time occur, and the necessity for our composing differences and making up accounts.

11. A copy of this report has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat, with reference to my telegram, dated the 14th instant. As I have received no reply to it, I have assumed that there is no objection to this being done.

AVERAGE PRICES IN BRITISH SEERS PER BRITISH RUPEE IN MAHSUD COUNTRY.								AVERAGE PRICES IN BRITISH SEERS PER BRITISH RUPEE IN BRITISH TERRITORY.							
Date.	Salt.	Tobacco.	Gur.	Indian-corn.	Wheat.	Rice.	Longcloth in Yards.	Date.	Salt.	Tobacco.	Gur.	Indian-corn.	Wheat.	Rice.	Longcloth in Yards.
1900.								1900.							
24th December ...	8½	2	4	15	8	7½	7	24th December ...	17	4	9	16	9½	8	13½
1901.								1901.							
12th January ...	7	1½	3	15	7½	7	3	12th January ...	16	5	9	17	9½	7½	6½
26th January ...	5	1	3	15	7	7	3	26th January ...	16	4	8½	16	10	7	6
9th February ...	4½	None	2½	15	7	6	2½	26th January ...	16	4	8½	16½	10	6½	6½
24th February ...	4	"	2½	13	6½	6	2½	24th February ...	16	4	8½	16½	10	7	7
9th March ...	2½	"	1½	9½	5½	5½	2	9th March ...	17	4	8½	16½	9½	6½	6
23rd March ...	1½	"	1	9	5½	5	1½	23rd March ...	17	4½	8½	15	10	6½	6
6th April ...	None	"	None	9	5	5	None	6th April ...	17	4½	9	15	10	6½	6½
20th April ...	"	"	"	9	3	3½	"	20th April ...	15½	4	9	15½	13	6½	7½
4th May ...	"	"	"	9	4½	3½	"	4th May ...	16	4	9½	16½	16	7½	8

W. R. H. MERK.

Annexure 1.

MAHSUD BLOCKADE.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

The blockade of the Mahsuds is meant to prevent any person whatever in the Mahsud country from having any dealings with the outer world while the blockade lasts.

The Mahsuds may resent this. We have also to keep ourselves informed as to whether the blockade is really effective or if there is a leakage anywhere.

The measures for carrying out the blockade, therefore, fall under three heads—

- A.—Establishment and conduct of the blockade.
- B.—Protection.
- C.—Information.

A.

The blockade may be proclaimed any time between the 15th November and the 1st December. The exact date depends upon the final reply of the tribe.

1. But on the 7th November the export of grain from British territory to the Mahsud country should be quietly stopped by the Deputy Commissioners of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and no Mahsuds should be allowed to proceed in search of work beyond Tank, Lakki and Bannu.

2. Lists of all traders with, and associates of, Mahsuds in the four charges (Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Wana and Tochi) should be prepared and ready by the 15th November; also lists of men in the Mahsud country known to trade with our people and their agents here.

On the proclamation of the blockade, sufficient security must at once be taken everywhere from the persons in these lists, including the agents here of the Mahsuds, not to send, or help in sending, anything whatever into the Mahsud country or to assist the Mahsuds in any way. Similar security must be taken in a collective form from the headmen of all border villages, from such Bhattannis and from such Darwesh Khel as officers think fit. The prohibition under section 23, Frontier Crimes Regulation, should be widely and fully circulated along the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan borders, and men disobeying it be dealt with under the Penal Code for disobeying the lawful order of a public servant.

Villages that are guilty as a body can be fined.

3. All Mahsuds whatsoever will have to be sent over the border into the Mahsud country on declaration of the blockade. The preliminary notice asking officers to warn them to be ready will issue on the 7th November. If it is proposed to exempt any Mahsud, special application, giving names and reasons for the application should be made to me. Few, if any, exemptions, however, will be made. This expulsion will include all the Mahsuds settled in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts, and all Hamsayahs at present in the Tochi, or that come down with the Gurbuz. I will write to the Officers Commanding Bombay Regiments that have enlisted Mahsuds, and ask them, when the leave season comes, to settle matters with me.

4. After declaration of the blockade, Rs. 20 will (for the present) be paid for every Mahsud who comes into our country to earn his livelihood or to trade and is caught there. Such Mahsuds should at once be sent back into their hills, and all their property, except the clothes they wear, be confiscated. To imprison them will play into their hands.

5. No Mahsud should be permitted to come in across the blockade line, without the written order of the Blockade Officer or Political Officer.

6. Contraband goods and animals should be confiscated and sold, or otherwise disposed of.

7. The border villages of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts should be divided into groups; police should be told off to each such group, who are to live in it, and to be responsible that all blockade arrangements are properly carried out in that group. The Deputy Commissioners of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu should send indents for additional police without delay. An Inspector of Police should be specially told off in each district to supervise, and be responsible for the police working in connection with the blockade. The additional police indented for should be placed in Thanas, and the Thana police into the groups of villages.

8. The Political Officer, Tochi, and Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, must arrange so as to regulate Darwesh Khel Bahirs that there is no contraband traffic; similarly the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, and Political Officer, Wana, as regards Bhattanni and Darwesh Khel trade.

9. The traffic on all dangerous roads must be regulated.

B.

1. The Enfield rifles for villages sanctioned by Government should be issued as soon as received in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

2. All Border Military Police posts on the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan border should be strengthened and the frontier roads put in good repair.

3. Deputy Commissioners should take up the question of irregular levies that are required, and be ready with schemes by the 19th November. I may be in a position to issue Enfields for such levies.

4. The Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia must be ready to occupy such posts and situations as are obligatory as soon as the blockade is proclaimed.

By "situations" are meant the sites of posts not yet built. Here the men will be temporarily in tents, till the posts are constructed. Such camps must be "sangared" the very first day they are pitched; a rough five feet wall of dry stones is enough, with two towers for sentries diagonally placed. The towers can be rough mud or stone platforms five feet to ten feet high with a sangar round them. Commanding Officers will settle details, the main point is to "sangar" at once.

5. Patrolling must be carefully done, never less than six men at a time, on the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan border.

6. All British officers must never travel or patrol before sunrise; they must invariably reach a post or camp with their escorts one hour before sunset.

7. The list showing disposition of the troops has been already communicated to officers.

8. The responsibility for, and direction of, military operations carried out by troops rests with the Officers Commanding the troops. We can offer advice, and should always give all the information in our power, but on no account can we assume the responsibility for, or the direction of, military operations. Blockades are very trying to every one, and it materially eases and expedites matters if friction is resolutely avoided.

C.

1. Information here will be of two kinds: (a) general information as to what the Mahsuds are saying and debating; what from time to time

is the feeling in the tribe; what conclusions they are coming to; and what is the effect of the blockade; (b) special information as to raids and attacks, and specific evasions of the blockade. Care must be taken that spies and informers do not help the Mahsuds.

2. As to (a), the best plan is to make the duty over to one particularly good and sound native officer, and let him make his own arrangements for getting information. Every Saturday afternoon officers should telegraph briefly to me what is the news; a report at greater length should be sent by post the same day, noting what are the prices of Mahsud products in their respective charges, and what they hear are the prices of wheat, barley, Indian corn, jowar, cotton cloth, tobacco, salt and gur, in the Mahsud hills. These prices will soon show how far the blockade is telling both ways.

3. As to (b), every Post Officer must make his own arrangements regarding news of raids and attacks; and the Blockade Officers and Inspectors of Police ditto about evasions of the blockade in the two districts.

4. One officer will be in charge of all the blockade arrangements in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, reporting, where necessary, to the Deputy Commissioners. Everything connected with the blockade should be placed under his orders by the Deputy Commissioners.

5. It should be impressed on the people, high and low, that this is the time for service; that as they work and co-operate so will they be rewarded; and that loyal and thorough service will meet with generous recognition. They will be enthusiastic at first, but a blockade is a wearisome business, and natives are seldom capable of sustained effort. We shall have to keep the thing going and to show them that, however irksome and trying the thing is, we are not going to be beaten in tenacity and doggedness.

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner, Derajat Division.

Dera Ismail Khan,
The 31st October, 1900.

Enclosure 53 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram says that the tribe should clearly understand that any offences committed, pending termination of the blockade, will be sharply punished by immediate reprisals on any section of tribe within reach. Owing to hot weather, great majority of Mahsuds, within striking distance of Jandola and Sarwekai, have removed to higher hills beyond reach, and announcement that those still within reach will be punished if offences occur will lead to these also going off. With approval of Government, therefore, I suggest that tribe be simply told that offences will be severely punished. Sudden reprisals can only be made in winter with much effect. Next point is this: Foreign telegram 1129 says that rifles may be taken as security, provided they are redeemed by cash before any allowances are distributed, but your present telegram says they must be redeemed in cash before the blockade is raised. Which announcement should be made to the jirga? As they have repeatedly represented that they have no cash, it would appear that former course will be easier for jirga to carry out, as it will give tribe time and opportunity to procure cash after blockade is raised. This course was, I believe, recently followed in case of Aka Khel blockade. We would take rifles in pledge at half market values only. Kindly telegraph early orders both regarding reprisals and redemption.

Enclosure 54 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 23rd May, 1901.

In continuation of correspondence ending with my letter, dated 20th May, on the subject of the taking of rifles in part payment of the Mahsud fine, I am directed to submit a copy of a telegram, dated 21st May, from the Commissioner of the Derajat. Mr. Merk has sent to you direct a copy of his telegram, dated 19th May.

2. The Government of India have been kept informed of all that has been done in regard to the acceptance of rifles. The Lieutenant-Governor did not overlook the orders of the Government of India in the Chamkanni case, to which reference is made in your telegram, No. 1130-F., dated 13th May. But the point in that case was that we wanted to obtain the surrender of particular rifles, and the rifles which we ultimately accepted were not what we wanted or even of the same kind. Sir Mackworth Young thinks there is much to be said in favour of taking serviceable rifles of any kind from the Mahsuds so long as they are properly valued, *i.e.*, so long as the burden of the fine is not diminished.

3. I am to solicit the favour of early orders on this reference.

 Annexure.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 21st May, 1901.

Reference Foreign telegram of 13th instant to you. Question of arms being received at market values was, I understood, settled by Government long ago. Please see my telegram of 4th December to you and Foreign, also your letter of 31st December to Foreign, also your telegram of 23rd March to Foreign. If convenient, could orders on my telegrams of 18th instant and of 19th instant be telegraphed to me soon, as heat of weather and suspense are telling on the jirga?

 Enclosure 55 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division Jandola, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 28th May, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The orders of Government were to-day communicated in writing to the jirga, who have been dismissed to their homes. They thoroughly realise that the blockade will not be relaxed or removed till the last rupee of the fine has been paid. They said very emphatically that there was no hostility between them and us, and that they would see about payment. The attitude of the jirga was satisfactory, but it remains to be seen what course the tribes will take after discussion in their homes.

 Enclosure 56 in No. 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated Camp Jandola, the 27th May, 1901.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Secretary to Government, India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Jandola, the 27th May, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 18th May, I have the honour to submit the second fortnightly report on the blockade. It is being continued without any relaxation. Prices in the Mahsud country are much the same as last reported, except that wheat has fallen to six and a-half seers per rupee, and Indian corn appears to have risen to about eight and a-half to eight seers.

Several robberies of cloth, attributed to Mahsuds, were lately reported by Powindahs from the Gomal. As it seemed odd that Mahsud thieves should be able to locate exactly at night where cloth was kept in the kirris, measures were taken to shadow suspected kirris, on which the robberies stopped.

2. The total sum realised up to date on account of the fine is Rs. 69,056-1-0, viz., by cash Rs. 4,039-10-6, by value of arms Rs. 31,657, by value of live-stock Rs. 33,359-5-7.

3. When payment commenced to be made in earnest, I specially directed the Political Officer, Wana, to see that arms were not over-valued, and that the proceedings in connection with the receipt of live-stock and the making it over to complainants, in compensation for live-stock carried off, were fair to all concerned, viz., Government, the complainants and the Mahsuds. From my report, which has been separately submitted, Government are aware that in respect of arms Mr. Waterfield carried out his instructions satisfactorily. I think it well to place before Government the full facts relating to live-stock also. In this matter, too, the Political Officer has taken care to execute the orders he received.

4. The attached statement shows that 1,639 head of live-stock have been paid in. I myself saw a good many of them; the Political Officer saw them all, and rejected such animals as were in bad condition or from any reason were unfit for acceptance. The animals taken were fair average specimens of their classes. The procedure in awarding compensation was as follows:—

Complainants were allowed to select any animals they fancied out of those daily brought in by the Mahsuds. If a complainant did not suit himself one day, he waited to the next or as long as he liked. The animals selected by the complainant were then taken by him and the Mahsud owners before a valuing committee of three, composed of one of the complainants, of a Mahsud and of a third, independent, individual who was a Darwesh Khel, or Bhattanni, or resident of Tank or Bannu, as the case might be. This committee then valued the animals; if the complainant and the owners accepted the valuation, and it covered the compensation due, the complainant took off the animals, giving a receipt, and our officials gave a receipt to the Mahsud owners. If either side objected to the valuation, the complainant could select fresh animals, and the Mahsud owners had to wait for fresh complainants. From the averages of the valuations it is clear that, if anything, low prices have been assessed, the Political Officer seeing that the live-stock was of fair average quality. I am fully satisfied that the way in which Mr. Waterfield carried out the difficult task of disposing of the live-stock in a manner which was fair to all concerned.

5. A copy of this report has been sent to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

*Statement showing Valuation of Live-stock taken in payment of one-third of the
Fine of one lakh on the Mahsuds.*

					Rs.	A.	P.
82	Camels valued at	5,580	13	4
44	Horses and mares valued at	4,262	9	0
1	Mule	80	0	0
48	Donkeys	392	14	0
2	Buffaloes	100	0	0
1,193	Cattle	21,912	2	7
247	Goats	933	15	8
22	Sheep	96	12	8
1,639 head.					Total 33,359 3 3		

The average valuation per head was—

					Rs.	A.	P.
Camel	68	0	11
Horse or mare	96	14	0
Mule	80	0	0
Donkey	8	2	11
Buffalo	50	0	0
Cattle	18	5	10
Sheep	4	6	5
Goat	3	12	6

Enclosure 57 in No. 3.

*Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to the
Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the
Punjab, dated the 23rd May, 1901.*

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 13th instant, in connection with the attack upon Southern Waziristan Militia, near Kashmir Kar, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin. On the night of the 10th instant the Militia at Tormanda reported having shot two Mahsuds as marauders, who, it subsequently appeared, were men employed by the Deputy Inspector of Police at Gomal to obtain information for the Blockade Officer, and who had therefore been specially exempted from the blockade rules. This information came by post simultaneously with the news of the attack upon the Militia, which was telegraphed. As there were suspicious circumstances attaching to the death of the two Mahsuds, I requested the Blockade Officer to proceed to Murtaza on Mr. Waterfield's return, and hold an enquiry into the case. Meanwhile this telegram of the Officer Commanding has come. I have directed the Political Officer, Wana, to try the accused for murder or culpable homicide, as the case may be, under the *quasi-judicial* powers conferred upon him by the Supreme Government. If it is established that the Mahsuds were killed for no fault of theirs, blood-money will be paid to their relatives. There can be very little doubt now that, as stated in the last diary of the Political Officer, the attack upon the Militia was in revenge for the death of the two Mahsuds. Although this is an explanation of, it is no excuse for, the attack, which will be dealt with as soon as the blockade is over. The death of the two Mahsuds is an unfortunate occurrence. Major Harman has taken the proper course both in regard to his own corps and to their position respecting the Mahsuds.

Endorsement, dated the 23rd instant, from Political Officer, and enclosure.

My reply of to-day.

Enclosure 58 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 13th June, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated 5th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an endorsement and enclosures, dated 28th ultimo, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, containing details of the attack on a guard of seven rifles of the Southern Waziristan Militia in the Manzai Algad on the 12th May, 1901.

Annexure 1.

Endorsement by Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Jandola, the 28th May, 1901.


Copy of the foregoing forwarded to J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, Simla, in continuation of this office letter, dated the 23rd instant.

Annexure 2.

Copy of a report, dated 14th May, 1901, made by Lieutenant A. W. F. Knox, Adjutant, Southern Waziristan Militia.

I have the honour to report as follows concerning the guard of seven rifles of the Southern Waziristan Militia, which was attacked in the Manzai Algad on Sunday, 12th.

This guard was sent by Subadar Baluch Khan in command of Kashmir Kar Post to Nili by my order on that date, in order to escort ration from Nili to Kashmir Kar on the 13th. At a point in the Manzai Algad about three miles from where that Algad joins the main Kajuri-Nili Kach road, the party stopped to drink water. When they started again and the scouts had not had time to get the proper distance ahead, they were fired on from the left front at a distance of about 20 paces only by a party hidden in the nala. The guard were marching as follows:—



This first volley knocked over two men. The remainder took cover and commenced returning the fire. They were now, however, fired on from their right rear by a party of the enemy above on the cliff, and three more men were hit. Two men, viz., sepoy Nazam Shah and Umar Khan, were untouched, and they state that, together with the less severely wounded, they continued to return the fire until suddenly seized by men, who had

crept up behind; they were robbed of rifle and bandolier. The raiders swarmed down and robbed the party of the following Government property:—

- 7 Rifles, Snider, 63, *viz.*, Nos. 21, 25, 27, 16, 409, 397, 247.
- 4 Bayonets, Snider, Nos. 21, 16, 409, 397.
- 4 Belts, Nos. 21, 16, 409, 397.
- 7 Bandoliers.

As many of 280 rounds Snider ball ammunition as had not been used in the skirmish, probably about 250.

Nazam Khan states that the man who took his rifle said, as he snatched off his bandolier and tore his coat open—"The Feringis have said they are going to settle us; there, that's our answer." Lance Naik Kabir Khan sent the unwounded men and those of the wounded who were able to walk to Nili to telegraph what had happened. These men met on the road Havildar Khwajagai (Urmur) who was marching to Nili with 20 rifles to bring in rations. The attack must have taken place at about 11 a.m.; news was brought to Khwajagai (as he states himself) at about 2 p.m., and he reached the scene of action at 4 or 4.30. Kabir Khan had then died; he had been hit in the thigh and bled to death. Amir Khan was very badly wounded. Khwajagai decided that it was too late to follow the gang up. After tracing the blood for some little distance on the line, they had retired; he carried the wounded back and handed them over to a Powindah Killi, who brought them in here on morning of 13th. Havildar Khwajagai should undoubtedly have followed the raiders up, as his party of 15 rifles was well able to take care of itself. I can only account for his action by the supposition that, while willing to give all information and to recover stolen camels where no risk is involved, he is afraid of the feuds which would result from a fight with raiders who would not give up their rifles as easily as camels. He excuses himself half-heartedly by saying all the men said that the raiders numbered 40, and every man had a rifle, but acknowledges they must exaggerate, and that there were probably not more than 12 or 14. On receipt of news by wire from Nili at 4 p.m., on 12th, Sarwekai was warned and Moghal Kot was asked by wire to order Kuchmina to close roads between Kuchmina and Zarmelan. Four sowars were despatched to Karkan Obah ordering Non-Commissioned Officer in command to picquet mouth of Sui nightly till further orders. Three sowars galloped on to Toi Khulla, and warned the Subadar in Command to picquet the hills between Gomal and Karkani. Four sowars warned Zarmelan to picquet nightly likely roads from hills to the Gomal, and ten men despatched to Kashmir Kar ordering the Subadar in Command to move out all available men from the post and search the hills to north-east day and night. Spinkai Kach and Khuzma Khulla were told to close possible roads north of Nili by picquets night and day and send 20 rifles across the river next day to search hills towards the Sharan Nala. The Officer Commanding Khajuri Kach sent 30 rifles to picquet Adam Kak night and day for 48 hours. Two parties, 20 rifles each, of the Southern Waziristan Militia, were despatched at nightfall into hills, the first under Havildar Mohibulla to claim Wuch Sar (south of Gwaleri), to remain there in observation next day; the second under Havildar Pir Muhammad to close roads over the Manzai Kotal. The 27th Punjab Infantry and Pir Muhammad's party returned after 48 hours, having seen nothing. On the 13th, two days' rations were sent out to Havildar Mohibulla carried by four men in goat's skins, and he was ordered to move down towards Ruma Khulla, as a Powindah killed had been attacked near there that morning by a gang estimated at from 70 to 100 Mahsuds.

There is no doubt that the party attacked were marching along carelessly and contrary to orders. Once they fell into the trap, they appear, however, to have behaved well. Kabir Khan took up a position giving good cover from first attack. They were overwhelmed by the second attack from their right rear. They state that three of the enemy were wounded

and a party of mounted infantry on the 13th traced three distinct blood trails on line of enemy's retreat. It is hard to see what the survivors could have done. They were outnumbered, and could get no cover from the fire which came from two sides; they were also fighting a gang better armed, for the raiders are stated to have had several Martinis, and two at least of the wounds were by Martini-Henris. As these Mahsud "Chapans" always arrange for a fire from two and sometimes three sides, the best thing a party once surprised could do would be to double either straight back or straight ahead for 100 yards and look for cover there. This attack took place in country which is really covered by Nili Kach. Had the garrison of Nili been Militia, it would have been easier for us to have followed the raiders up, for the gang is skulking in the country between Nili and Manji, if it has not already escaped. That the party first warned of the disaster was under Havildar Khwajagai was another misfortune. I regret it seems clearly proved that at present Mahsuds, unless under British officers on the spot, cannot be trusted to take energetic and prominent action against their fellow tribesmen. I am convinced that the reason of this is not disloyalty to the regiment, but fear of the after consequences to themselves

This will come in time.

W. MERK.

in their own country. I trust that, as you hope, it will be possible to make tribal arrangements by which it will be understood that the killing of Mahsud raiders by Mahsud sepoy will not lead to after feuds.

The following is a list of the casualties in our guard on the 12th:—

Killed.

Lance-Naik, E—74, Kabir Khan Marwat.

Wounded.

Sepoy, A—362, Amir Khan, Mia Khel (dangerously), gun-shot from right hip through bowels.

Sepoy, A—348, Mihr Dad, gun-shot, left forearm and chest (severe).

Sepoy, E—8, Hayatullah, gun-shot, right shoulder (severe).

Sepoy, A—352, Salim Khan, gun-shot, inside right hand, grazed back (slight).

Enclosure 59 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 17th June, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the third fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Prices of wheat and barley are easier in consequence of the spring crops in the lower-lying portion of the Mahsud country having been reaped. A little cloth, at 2 to 3 yards the rupee, has been sold in Kaniguram and Makin, the produce of the pseudo-robberies mentioned in my last report. But as a rule, cloth, tobacco, salt and gur are not for sale.

3. During the fortnight under report attention has been paid to closing Shawal for contraband trade. Up to date all reports show that there has been no smuggling there, but, as it was unlikely that this would continue, I again put strong pressure on the Jani Khel and Bakka Khel (Utmanzai), Darwesh Waziris, whose territory Shawal is, and they are sending up a hundred men to patrol the valley under leaders specially selected by us, who will be responsible for the blockade line in Shawal and will send reports of what goes on. A Government post in Shawal would be out of the question; this step would cause alarm and excitement among the Mahsuds, which would, in all probability, end in an attack. No trade is now permitted with Urgun or Birmal direct. Carriers and merchants bringing up

goods from Bannu and elsewhere have to strike off at Miram Shah for Khost, whence they can reach Birmal. This deflection makes the cost of the transport prohibitive as regards smuggling from Birmal into the Mahsud country through Shawal. As there is a prospect of the continuation of the blockade, the regulations for the control of supplies imported into Northern and Southern Waziristan by banias at posts have been tightened; the temptation of 1,600 per cent. or 800 per cent. profit on salt or cloth, as the case may be, is very great; and a sharp eye is kept on the regimental, political and militia banias. The same profits explain the pseudo-robberies; the Powindah or other owner of contraband sells at a large profit and then rushes in with a story of a theft or raid; whether he has sold the animals or not which are said to have been carried off, does not matter to him; he expects to obtain compensation through Government from the Mahsuds. They, on the other hand, do not mind a little risk, and the game being played of a reported raid, a pursuit and perhaps the rescue of the animals and part of the goods; the profit on the rest covers all losses. Where no personal violence has been offered to the owners, I think not only that no compensation should be paid to them for losses of cloth, salt, gur or tobacco, but also that they should be fined as well. They have certainly sold the things if they have not been wounded by the alleged robbers. To prevent this sort of thing, the Powindahs next October will all have to come down by the Chuhar Khel Dhana Pass and not through the Gomal. During the fortnight a smart capture of seven camels laden with cloth, salt and tobacco, on their way to the Mahsud hills, was effected by the Bannu Border Military Police. The men with the camels were Ali Khels of the Turi Khel Darwesh Waziris. They resisted the seizure of the camels; one Ali Khel was killed and another wounded. Latest reports from the Tochi say that the Mahsuds have asked the Turi Khel and Mohmit Khel of Razmak for aid in obtaining supplies, but, as the traffic of these latter clans is itself under strict supervision, they will not gain much by their appeal.

4. There appears to be an impression that the Mahsuds have been raiding worse during the blockade than before it. If it had been so, there would have been no reason for surprise. A blockade is not a friendly operation; the discomfort, stress and loss of income are trying to the temper and self-control of reckless men who are singularly wanting in both, and who, when the tribe was on a friendly footing, showed little self-restraint in respect of marauding propensities. As a matter of fact, the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts have been almost entirely free from offences, and for five months there was peace in the Tochi. A list of cases charged against the Mahsuds since the blockade commenced has been prepared, and will shortly be submitted to Government when I have received some further information from the Political Officers. It shows that, excepting some political offences, viz., attacks made much on the same grounds that a community in Europe calls indignation meetings or passes votes of no confidence in political opponents, the great bulk of the raids and thefts have been directed against the Darwesh Khel and Bhattannis of Southern Waziristan (whom the Mahsuds have been raiding steadily with little check or notice taken from 1895 till November last year) and against Powindahs in the Gomal. Some other offences cannot be assigned to either category; and are the work of the irresponsible scoundrels and criminals of whom specimens are to be found in the best regulated tracts of India, or of Europe too for the matter of that. A certain quantity of crime there must always be among all human beings; the only thing one can do is to strive to reduce it to the possible minimum. The policy of arming the border villages and Bhattannis has produced excellent results. It has put heart into the men, and, greatly to their astonishment, Mahsud raiders now come off second best. Within the past three weeks, two gangs have lost three men each, on the last occasion at the hands of the hitherto despised Damanis (or villagers) of the Tank Tahsil.

5. Since the 28th May all payments towards the fine have stopped. But the Shabi Khel (the section to which Mulla Powindah belongs are at the present moment engaged in borrowing Rs. 3,409, which is the amount

still due from them on account of the fine according to tribal shares, they reckoning as one-half of the Alizai clan. This does not look as if they had cash themselves, or they would not be obliged to borrow. I believe they will pay it next week. No jirga has yet been held as to how the remaining Rs. 27,000 are to be produced in cash. The jirga may assemble by the end of this month.

6. A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department direct, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 60 in No. 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 1st July, 1901.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 1st July, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fourth fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Wheat and barley have still further declined in price; as regards other commodities, I would refer to the remarks in the last report.

3. Smugglers are constantly trying new ways of evading the blockade. The latest rumour is that Khojal Khel carriers have conveyed some salt to the Mahsuds from the Bahadur Khel mine by taking it across to Kaitu, thence on to the Khost-Tochi border, and crossing the Upper Tochi somewhere by night. The enormous profits to be made on salt would make even this immense detour pay. At the same time, if smugglers have been obliged to take this route, it shows that the arrangements on the Mahsud frontier are working well. The Blockade Officer is about to visit Bahadur Khel in connection with this rumour. The contingent to hold Shawal has arrived there.

4. Rupees 73,073, annas 4 and pies 9 have been realised up to date, including the Rs. 3,409 due from the Shabi Khel mentioned in the last report. The account of each main section stands as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Alizai, paid	30,247	11	4
Bahlolzai, paid	27,771	2	7
Shaman Khel, paid	15,054	6	10

Mulla Powindah is reported to be constantly exhorting the Mahsuds to pay the balance, whereas the Maliks are said, with a few exceptions, to be doing nothing—no doubt to spite the Mulla. This is the difficulty, whatever one party does, that the other party counteracts, and neither party is strong enough to destroy its opponent. The Mulla's Sheikhs have recently been collecting alms from the Shahman Khel, who paid willingly; this looks as if the Mulla's influence were again rising in the tribe. He recently visited Badar.

5. There has been a cessation of Mahsud raids during the fortnight under report.

6. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 61 in No. 3.

Letter from the Officer Commanding at Jandola, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Derajat District, dated the 11th July, 1901.

I have the honour to submit the following report in continuation of my telegrams of yesterday's date.

At about 8.30 a.m. on the morning of the 10th instant the Regimental Grazing Guard, consisting of three armed and two unarmed sepoy of 45th Sikhs, proceeded about 800 yards up a nullah south-west of the post for the purpose of grazing their goats. The goats were in the nullah and three of the escort were ascending the hill on their right flank, the other two having gone back towards the post to drive in some goats which had strayed, and were out of sight. These three men, one of whom was unarmed, on ascending the side of the nullah, which at this point is very steep, were suddenly fired on from a natural "Sangar" made by the peculiar formation of the crest of the hill. The spot from which the Mahsuds fired was hidden from view of the post by an intervening knoll, but a sentry from No. 2 picquet, immediately on hearing the shots, saw the men fall. Two fell first, one being wounded and trying to get away, but at the second volley he and the remaining sepoy were shot down. The distance at which the shots were fired is about 20 yards, and evidence of the steepness is given by the fact of medical officer's statement that nearly all bullets have taken a downward course. The sentry of No. 2 picquet immediately raised the alarm, and the inlying picquet was quickly on the spot, and, following the direction of the wounded man, went on in pursuit of the murderers. Near the scene was picked up a packet of M.-H. ball ammunition and a bayonet. I immediately sent Jemadar Teja Singh with 50 rifles to support the small party in pursuit, Jemadar Nur Shah, 5th Punjab Cavalry, with sixteen sowars up the Shapur valley to close the nullah leading into the Shapur Jongi, and Subadar Bhangra Singh to place a picquet at the meeting of the Shapur and Takhihan rivers. The Political Officer issued orders for the Bhattanni Chiga to go out, and, getting behind Sirni Sar, drive the gang, if possible, towards my picquet. Jemadar Jefa Singh recovered a belt with pouches containing 49 rounds of ball ammunition and bayonet about three miles out, which had evidently been discarded by the Mahsud, thinking himself closely pursued. None of the party saw a Mahsud the whole time, so having gone about five miles and reached a perpendicular hill up which there seemed no possibility of the enemy having gone, he called a halt. Then making a short detour he retired towards the post carefully searching the ground. However, when he had arrived back, I sent out a fresh party under Subadar Bhangra Singh, who had returned after placing the picquet up a nullah south-west of the post beyond the one taken by the first party with the hope that perhaps the Bhattannis might drive the Mahsuds towards them. This party searched the ground for about seven miles on a broad front, but with no result, and retired about 6 p.m.

At the time of sending out this second party, I strengthened the picquet at the meeting of the Jakhi Zam and Shahur by an additional non-commissioned officer and ten men, and sent orders to Jemadar Nur Shah to proceed to the Rastong Jangi in case the gang should try to escape by this route behind the Charkuadi. I regret to say that none of these parties saw anyone, and it is my opinion that the Mahsuds, having got a quarter of an hour's start, lay hidden during the day in caves or recesses in nullahs and got away at night. My opinion, which is confirmed by the Political Officer, is that this was a deliberately planned revenge on the garrison for having wounded severely a noted raider of the Shingi Khel, Assad Khan by name,

on the 22nd of last month, when he was tampering with (or attempting to do so) the iron posts of the wire entanglement round the post enclosure. The gang of Mahsuds is estimated at about 30 or 40, of whom about 12 formed the party who shot these sepoy. I much regret to have to report that the wounded man, 4241 Sepoy Ralla Singh, succumbed to his wounds shortly afterwards. I do not think this unfortunate occurrence was due to any carelessness on the part of the escort, but think rather that they were the unlucky victims of revenge. The goats had all huddled together on hearing the shots, and started off at a run up the nullah, but these were evidently not the object of the Mahsuds' desire, as they were left alone and were all driven back here later complete in numbers.

Casualties.

No. 3358 Sepoy Wadawa Singh (killed).
 No. 4087 „ Uttam Singh (killed).
 No. 4241 „ Ralla Singh (died of wounds).

Remarks.

Sepoy Wadawa Singh, 9 bullet wounds.
 „ Uttam „ 5 „ „
 „ Ralla „ 5 „ „

Taken by Mahsuds.

2 M.-H. Rifles.
 140 rounds M.-H. ball ammunition.
 2 Bayonets.
 2 Belts, braces, and oil bottles.
 6 Ammunition pouches.

Recovered during pursuit.

69 (sixty-nine) rounds M.-H. ball ammunition.
 2 Bayonets.
 1 Belt, braces, and oil bottles.
 3 Pouches.

Government property lost.

Of which description is attached. (This description has also been furnished to the Political Officer.)

2 M.-H. rifles, Nos. 456, 468.
 1 Belt with braces and oil bottle.
 71 rounds M.-H. ball ammunition.
 3 Ammunition pouches.

Memorandum from the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier District, dated the 15th July, 1901.

Forwarded.

Enclosure 62 in No. 3.

Letter from J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Simla, 13th July, 1901.

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 7th July, 1901, from the Commissioner and

Superintendent, Derajat Division, and enclosures, being copies of correspondence between Mulla Powindah and Mr. Merk in regard to the payment of the balance of the fine due by the Mahsuds.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to J. M. Douie, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated Shekh Budin, 7th July, 1901.

With reference to the remarks in paragraph 4 of my letter, dated the 1st instant, I have the honour to enclose a copy of correspondence with Mulla Powindah which to some extent explains itself.

2. We have, I think, reached another critical stage in the history of the blockade. The difficulty which the Mahsuds experience at present in producing cash and in settling the internal distribution of the fine has presented another opportunity to the Mulla for coming forward as the only business man in the tribe, the one individual to help the Mahsuds out of their trouble. In a way, too, according to his light, he is, I think, what we would call a patriot. He has promptly availed himself of the opportunity, and has undoubtedly been doing his best during the last month to bring about a payment of the fine and the termination of the blockade. This of itself has been quite enough to set the Maliks against him; they are sulking in their homes; the latest report I have is that the ill-feeling between them and the Mulla is more bitter than ever. After a cessation of three weeks, raiding has recommenced; numerous gangs have been out, and last night the village of Assu Khel in the Tochi was attacked, three Dauris and one Mahsud raider being killed. There can be no doubt whatever that, as last January, this raiding is, if not started, at any rate deliberately encouraged, by the Maliks to spoil the Mulla's game. The note of fear in the Mulla's letter confirms the belief that some mischief is on foot. We must, I think, be prepared for offences, but this has been contemplated all along, from before the commencement of the blockade.

3. It is a descent in pride and dignity that the Mulla should show anxiety to borrow money from Darwesh Waziris and from Marwats. At the same time one may infer that there is not much cash in the country or he would not wish to borrow in this fashion. His recent change of front respecting the Badar dispute explains why he does not hesitate to ask for permission to deal with Darwesh Waziris in order to obtain their aid in his plans. There is, of course, not the least chance without a Government guarantee of repayment that any of the men whom he mentions would trust him or any other Mahsud with money, unless the Mahsuds pledge either land or arms with the creditors, to the full value of the debt. The creditors would, of course, ask for Mahsud lands in British territory; land mortgaged in the Mahsud hills would not be accepted by them.

4. As regards the Afghan communications, I am informed that Khalifa Nur Muhammad, the Afghan Governor of Birmal, recently advised the Mulla to send some of his Sheikhs to Kabul, and that no message or letter from the Amir has reached the Mulla as yet. The Afghan Governor has, of course, heard of the present difficulty of the Mahsuds, and thinks it would please the Amir if he (the Khalifa) could induce the Mahsuds in their straits to turn to the Amir for help. The Mulla naturally takes advantage of the Khalifa's advances to exaggerate and thereby to bluff us into giving easier terms or relaxing the conditions which have been fixed by Government. My reference to past history reminds the Mulla of his visit to Kabul, which produced no benefit (or indeed any result, even no present worth having) to himself or to his tribe.

Annexure 2.

Translation of a letter from Mulla Powindah to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division. 6109 5019

After compliments,—In the beginning I had a council at Kanigoram about the fine. The fine was divided into three shares,—one was allotted to the Bahlolzai, the other to the Shaman Khel, and the third to the Alizai section. The amount due from a section* was divided into two shares (kaum do hissa shuda),—one share was allotted to Shabi Khel and the other to Manzai.

* He refers here to the division of the Alizai share,
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

Secondly, I wrote to you in the beginning that the fine had been divided into three shares; each section should be called upon to pay its own (share of the) fine.

What was the cause of this (viz. division)? The cause was that they have enjoyed benefit according to three shares. The Sarkar may now kindly recover from the Shaman Khel their share of the fine. The Government has itself caused the delay regarding the fine. The Sarkar has given satisfaction to the Shaman Khel and does not demand the fine from them. The Mahsuds have shown disapproval of this. Be it known to you that you should tell the Shaman Khel that either they should not demand allowances in future or they should at once pay their share of the Mahsud fine. Whatever delay has been done is on account of the Shaman Khel,

* This is incorrect as regards the past.
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

because they do not pay their share of the Government fine and have enjoyed one-third of the allowances* from the Government. I request that the Government may not be hostile towards me, nor censure me, because I have enjoyed

no benefit or allowance.

The other people† who enjoyed allowances are stubborn and perhaps may be severely treated by Government. You may now kindly have Jallandhar Shah, son of Najib Khan, Mani Khan, Sperkai and Daurana Khan or Saurana Khan, Marwat, and Nezam Khan, Taji Khel, sent soon to Jandola so that

† I presume he refers to the Maliks.
W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

I may take a loan of this money from them and pay to the Government. These four men may be given assurances so that they may gladly come up. The Government may kindly give me assistance in this way that the creditors may be repaid from the allowances of the Mahsuds. You are the King. This agreement will be accepted on your security. You may please do the kindness so that hostility and reproach may be removed, and the fine paid off. This arrangement is advantageous to you, and will give you a good name. This is good and will remove mischief.

Annexure 3.

Translation of a letter from Mulla Powindah to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

After compliments,—Letters have come from the Amir asking me to tell him what I and the Mahsud tribe want? Whether to be allowed to go towards Kabul or towards Sarkar (British territory). I have given you a promise. For the sake of the genuineness of the promise and of securing peace I request that either the fine may be recovered from the Shaman Khel, or the four men (Jallandhar Shah, Mani Khan, Daurana Khan and Nezam Khan) may be made to appear at Jandola so as to make a business-like arrangement for Government. I may kindly be given a reply to this, because I have a "khidmat" (order) of the Amir to comply with. First I will do your service (khidmat) then that of the Amir. Reply to this may kindly be sent soon. This letter is sent by the hand of Sheikh Faujdar.

Annexure 4.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to Mullah Powindah, dated Shekh Budin, 7th July, 1901.

*After compliments,—*I have to-day received your two friendly letters relating to the payment of the fine and to messages which you have received from the Afghan Governor of Birmal. My friend, no special kindness has been shown to the Shaman Khel in the matter of the fine or in any matter. All Mahsuds have been treated exactly alike, and I have always told the Mahsuds that it is for them to settle in what shares the fine should be paid. That it is their affair, not mine. If the Shaman Khel do not pay what the Mahsuds think is their proper share, why do not the Mahsuds take out Chalweshtis as their fathers used to do and compel the Shaman Khel to pay? My friend, I have no objection of course to the Mahsuds borrowing the cash if they have not got it themselves, but the security of payment from the new allowances which Government in its kindness has promised refers only to Mahsud creditors; Jalandbar Shah, Mani Khan and Nezam Khan are Darwesh Waziris, and Daurana Khan and his brother Saurana Khan are Marwats; therefore the security does not apply to them.

The orders of Government are very strict, only Mahsud creditors are to be repaid out of the new allowances. But if any one who is not a Mahsud lends the Mahsuds money without the intervention of Government and without Government being directly or indirectly responsible in any way for the repayment, I have no objection. And if the Mahsuds wish to see any one on these terms they will have every facility to go to Jandola. I am glad to see that you are exerting yourself in inducing the Mahsuds to pay the fine; it is the act of a wise man, and of one who has the good of his tribe at heart. If you and the Mahsud jirga succeed in effecting an arrangement for paying of the balance it will be well. For the rest, I thank you for your courtesy in informing me of the Afghan communications you have received. As to these it is sufficient that I should remind you of what happened seven or eight years ago. I desire your welfare.

Enclosure 63 in No. 3.

Endorsed by the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated Camp Simla, the 19th July, 1901.

Copy of the following submitted to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Simla, the 19th July, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 1st instant, I have the honour to submit the fifth fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Prices are stationary; salt, cloth, tobacco and gur are stated to be very rare, practically not procurable; and the Political Officer, Tochi, reports that, owing to the lack of salt, a great many Mahsud cattle are suffering from disease, and some goats belonging to the tribe found in the hills to the west of the Upper Tochi were in a very bad state. The frequent rumours that Mahsuds were gathering in force to loot village bazaars of cloth and salt in the Tank Tahsil have not been verified by actual occurrences, but they show that plans to this end must have been widely discussed among the Mahsuds, a symptom of the pressure of the blockade. In fact, the tug-of-war is now coming, and it is simply a question of who can hold out longest, Government or the tribe. If we hold out longer, it is plain that the tribe must give in. Under the peculiar conditions of Mahsud society, the payment of cash (as with the Afridis of Tirah, who in the spring of 1892

had to borrow cash, notwithstanding the heavy punishment they had received, and the enormous sum, about three lakhs, which one way or the other they had been drawing annually direct from us in the shape of allowances and savings of Afridis in Government service) is a matter of great difficulty, and, if the Mahsuds are eventually driven to pay cash, it is reasonable to conclude that they will have been thoroughly brought to their bearings. All accounts agree in estimating the amount of cash in the Mahsud country at about half a lakh; up to date Rs. 8,300 have been realised in cash; Rs. 27,000 remain due; when this is paid, therefore, there will, if the estimates are correct, only remain some Rs. 15,000 in cash among a tribe of 10,000 fighting men, or Rs. 1-8 per head, which is not much. This will explain why further steady pressure is necessary before we can extract the cash.

The rumour that Khojal Khel had been carrying salt from the Bahadur Khel mine *via* Khost to the Mahsuds, mentioned in my last report, is unfounded. Shawal continues to be firmly held.

3. Owing to the reports that numerous gangs of raiders had started or were about to start at the beginning of this month, the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, at my instance, issued a warning to all military posts in Northern and Southern Waziristan and along the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu border to be especially careful and on the alert during July, August, and September. As a matter of fact, only three offences are reported; an attack upon a Dawar village in the Lower Tochi (probably with the intention of stealing salt and grain), in which three villagers were killed, two wounded, one Mahsud killed and several wounded; the second offence is the looting of a small Darwesh Khel hamlet four miles from Wana, called Gulkot; and the third is the attack upon a grazing guard of 45th Sikhs at Jandola, in which three sepoy were killed. This offence was committed by only seven Mahsuds; it does not appear to be a tribal act at all, but to be the outcome of feelings of personal revenge and ill-will on the part of a notorious scoundrel, Assad Khan, Shingi. Had the watch tower to the west of Jandola been picketed, it is doubtful if the Mahsuds could have got at the grazing guard. I have suggested to the General Officer Commanding the issue of fresh orders to all military posts enjoining the utmost vigilance and unremitting strictness in taking all precautions, and have given similar orders to the officers in charge of Militias, Border Military Police, ordinary police, and levies. This sort of annoyances must be expected during a blockade; they increase in frequency, as is natural, in proportion to the increased severity of its effect, and, though regrettable in themselves, are not unsatisfactory evidence of the discomfort of the tribe. The only way to meet them, at any rate at present, for till the cold weather comes nothing really appreciable can be done in the way of reprisals, is to be constantly on the guard, to hit raiders as heavily as can be done, and never to give them a chance of bringing home their attacks. A blockade is in its nature essentially a semi-defensive operation, and to conduct it with a series of constant attacks upon the tribe would alter its whole character and bring about a state of things that must inevitably drift into an expedition. I do not suggest that we should not hit back, but obviously the blow, when delivered, should be a heavy one, and this is not the season when such a blow can be struck. Moreover, it can only be struck *once*, thereafter the Mahsuds will be on their guard. Small attacks on the Mahsuds are a policy of pin-pricks, seeing that one has to deal with a large powerful tribe. These are the reasons, I submit, for remaining on a semi-defensive attitude for the present.

4. As regards the general political position, I have already reported in my letter, dated the 7th instant, to which I would refer. The Mulla Powindah has summoned a tribal jirga to meet him to-day. There is no doubt that he is doing his best to bring about a settlement of the account and termination of the blockade. In a way he is what we should call a patriot, and then, if he does succeed in extricating the Mahsuds from their present position, he has scored over his enemies, the former Maliks. Naturally these do their utmost to thwart him. The coquetting of the Afghan

Governor of Birmal with the Mulla, and through him with the Mahsuds, may be explained as due either to his thinking that the Mahsuds mean to break with us (but of this there are no signs), or to his impression that the Mahsuds are in straits, and to his belief that he can, therefore, induce them to turn to the Amir for aid or mediation, which appeal, he thinks, will please his master. If the latter explanation is correct, then it is another favourable symptom. What the upshot of the jirga will be I cannot, of course, tell, but up to date the position is that the Mahsuds mean to pay and will do so when they have settled upon a mode of getting hold of the cash among them. That is the difficulty which the blockade is pressing them to solve.

5. A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, and has been also communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 64 in No. 3.

Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., dated 27th July, regarding the Mahsud Blockade.

As I understand the present position, it is that the tribe have paid up Rs. 73,000 of the fine imposed on them, and that matters are now at a deadlock. The deadlock seems to be due to tribal factions—the one with the Maliks, the other with the Mulla Powindah—each playing for their own pockets; and, as each side helps with us or succeeds in drawing us into direct relations, the other sulks and adds to difficulties by encouraging raiding. Each raid that is committed helps to add up another account to be settled when the fine for which the tribe is blockaded is paid up. I do not know what that account amounts to now. But judging from the raids reported in the papers, it must be something considerable. The question is, if this present position continues, when can Government hope that the blockade will be over? Unless the tribe, when they have paid up the original fine, are allowed to compound for offences committed during the blockade out of their allowances, they will have to be blockaded again for recovery of another fine. I wish to urge for consideration that the first point to avoid in connection with the present blockade is the running up of another account for raids committed during its progress, and this can only be done by prompt retaliation on the tribe. We shall have an interminable business, if we wait to take up all these cases as regards individuals with the jirga when they choose to come in. His Excellency wishes and intends that the blockade shall, if possible, be successful and save the necessity for a punitive expedition. I believe this can only be done by taking every active and offensive step that we can against every member of the tribe that we can get at. If our troops and levies merely sit still in their posts, we shall not gain the desired end. I am not speaking without knowledge or experience of a blockade. I had experience in running the Buner Blockade, 1885—1887. We only got real pressure to bear on the tribe by making it unsafe for them to come or to bring their cattle near the border. I do not ignore the fact that the Mahsud blockade is a far more difficult business. But the same principle of making matters as uncomfortable for the Mahsuds as possible applies. If our men are ready to raid, take every opportunity of raiding; the Mahsuds will never know what to expect, and it will keep them much more in bounds in looking after themselves and make them think more about doing this than raiding on our people. If when we get in a fine of a lakh, we find that we have another account of half a lakh or more to claim as redress for offences committed during the blockade, our position is not very much improved. It is when we succeed in pressing the Mahsuds back from their own border on the defensive, when, in addition to depriving them of necessaries of life, we can keep them in a state of uneasiness and anxiety in not knowing what to expect next, that we shall drive the "Ulus" to force the Maliks and the Mulla to drop the factional game they are playing, and to act together in the interests of the tribe. Raids on our

part should be made by the troops wherever possible, and the troops could any way render it unsafe for a Mahsud to show himself anywhere within range of ground that troops can comfortably cover during the day; levies and our own subjects could do a great deal, it seems to me, in making things uncomfortable for the Mahsuds, and why not let them have a free hand to do all the damage they can? Judging by what I understand to be the present position of the business, it seems to me the only possible way of avoiding Government being driven eventually into an expedition, and of giving His Excellency's policy of forcing the tribe to submission by means of a blockade a really fair chance of success.

Enclosure 65 in No. 3.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 5th August, 1901.

I am directed to forward, for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of a memorandum* which has been received from Lieutenant-Colonel

* Dated the 27th July.
Deane regarding the Mahsud blockade.

2. A large number of offences have already been, and continue to be, committed by the Mahsuds during the progress of the blockade, and, unless some steps in the way of retaliation are adopted in the interim, it will be necessary, when the fine of one lakh has been finally paid, to consider in what way reparation for these later offences is to be obtained. But a second blockade, for the purpose of punishing the tribe for these misdeeds or of exacting a further fine, will inevitably result in a further list of offences, and in further arrears of the sum demanded; while the position at the end of the second blockade would, in all probability, be no better than at the close of the first. The Government of India are, therefore, inclined to agree with Colonel Deane that it is very desirable, if possible, to avoid the accumulation of another account for raids committed since the present blockade began; and that the only way to effect this object is to retaliate promptly on the tribe for every offence.

3. It is understood that such retaliation is not, as a general rule, at present allowed, although the troops are in positions which must afford frequent opportunities for inflicting summary punishment on the offenders. I am to point out, however, that the Government of India have never initiated, ordered or sanctioned any prohibition of counter-raids, and so long as these do not develop into expeditions, and are short and swift in their operation, there does not appear to be any objection to their being undertaken. It is the wish of the Government of India, both that the Mahsuds should be reduced to subjection as a punishment for their former offences, and also that they should meet with severe and prompt retribution for any fresh raids; and, accordingly, whenever and wherever an opportunity offers, and it does not appear possible to effect the desired object by means of a passive blockade alone, they see no reason why more drastic measures should not be adopted. The permission thus accorded must not be interpreted as conveying sanction to dangerous military marches, or to prolonged incursions into tribal territory. It must obviously be subject to reasonable conditions as to scope, number of troops employed, and distance.

4. I am to request that Mr. Merk may be called upon at an early date to report upon these suggestions, and that the Government of India may also be favoured with the advice and opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

Enclosure 66 in No. 3.

Endorsed by Commissioner of the Derajat Division, dated the 16th August, 1901.

Copy of the following, with copy of enclosures, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, in continuation of endorsement of yesterday:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 16th August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter of yesterday, I have the honour to submit, for the confidential information of Government, a copy of my letter of today to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, with a copy of its enclosure. A copy has also been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

 Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District, dated the 16th August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated yesterday, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a plan of operations for an attack or attacks on the Mahsuds, embodying political and such other suggestions as offer themselves. It is the first blow that will count in the way of seizures of men and animals. Therefore the utmost secrecy should be observed regarding this first blow. Thereafter the Mahsuds will be on the alert, and the more they are kept on the *qui vive* and harassed by alarms and attacks the better.

 Annexure 2.

(Confidential.)

Plan of Operations.

1. Conditions that determine raids and attacks upon the Mahsuds—
 - (i) Except a few settlements near Jandola and Sarwekai, the Mahsuds live more than one day's march, there and back, from our posts, taken from Wana round by Tank and Bannu to Datta Khel.
 - (ii) The lower Mahsud hills are so hot and waterless that well into October they are impracticable for troops that have to march far or swiftly.
 - (iii) But till the middle of November the Mahsuds with their flocks and herds are scattered over the hills, especially the upper ones. The further you penetrate into their country, the greater difficulty in retirement. After the middle of November the cold on the high ranges drives the Mahsuds down and makes matters very difficult for them if they are driven up.
 - (iv) After the beginning, certainly the end, of December, it is hardly possible for them to escape in bulk with their animals across Shawal into Afghan territory, where we cannot follow them.
 - (v) The Mahsud country is difficult, the men are active, bold and plucky, intelligent and with plenty of breech-loaders; but beyond, say, 400 yards, they are not good shots as compared with the Afridis.

- (vi) The Mahsuds love night attacks in force. Operations should be during full moon and the first few days of a waning moon, for obvious reasons.
- (vii) As to numbers that can collect: their being able to operate on interior lines gives them a great advantage; say, 1,000 men could collect in 24 hours, 2,000 to 3,000 in 48, but it depends almost entirely upon the suddenness of the attack and rapidity of movement of the troops, and the distance to which they penetrate into the Mahsud country, of which the tract from Kaniguram to Makin is the heart and centre.
- (viii) A feeble reprisal or an operation which results in heavy loss on retirement, though it may have been successful in its primary object, is worse than no reprisal at all.
- (ix) Cavalry are no use in the hills, and I doubt if mountain guns are necessary for these sudden raids.

2. Conditions (ii) and (iii) practically settle the time when the first attack can take place, as, about the 26th November on which day it is full moon, a very important detail, noted by General Denning. There is a full moon on the 27th October, but by that time the Mahsuds will not be properly down yet, and the troops will not have shaken off the effects of autumnal fevers.

3. On the 22nd November, I would make a strong feint with all available troops and Militia from the Tochi, viz., Datta Khel and Miram Shah on the Mahsud country, in order to draw the Mahsuds in that direction. The news will travel all over their hills during the 24th, and by the 25th the fighting men will be moving towards their Tochi boundary. On the 26th the Tochi force, having made such captures and done such damage as it safely can, might withdraw.

4. On the 25th November, I would move 300 troops and 200 Militia from Wana to Tiarza, where they would be joined by 400 Pioneers from Karab Kot—900 men in all, to halt there that night. The same afternoon the Zam troops, 600 men, would move to Jandola picking up such men as can be spared from the garrisons of Girmi, Khirgi and Jandola itself. Early on the 26th November the (1) Wana column (900 men), the (2) Sarwekai column (400 men) and the (3) Zam column (700 men), or 2,000 men in all, would move into the Mahsud country, on objectives arranged at the time, do all they can, staying two or three nights, and come out as the Military Authorities settle. Columns (1) and (2) might join hands in the evening of the 26th November, and all three columns might unite on the 27th or 28th, but this is a matter for military consideration.

5. On return, column (1) might revert to its stations; column (2) would naturally stay at Sarwekai; and column (3) should remain at Jandola, ready for further work.

6. Then, in a fortnight or three weeks, we might repeat the operations, striking if possible this time from the Tochi and feinting from the south. On the third occasion we might strike simultaneously from both sides. If these operations are repeated at uncertain intervals, the strict blockade continuing the whole time, the effect must be very severe upon the Mahsuds. They will be jammed up into the higher tracts where the cold is great, pasture will be scarce, the tribe will be constantly harassed, it is to be expected that the troops will do much damage. Repeated attacks by strong bodies of troops during a blockade is a new feature in frontier management, and if properly worked coupled with the blockade itself ought to reduce the Mahsuds to full submission by the end of winter. If not, they will not have much power of resistance left in them in April next.

7. The troops for columns (1) and (2) are on the spot. The movable column at Suleiman Khel in the Bannu district is useless there. I would move it down to Zam by the end of September, Zam is healthier than Tank

and nearer Jandola. If the Mahsuds think anything at all about this move, they will think it is the old Zam movable column being re-established. Anyhow by the 26th November their suspicions will have died away.

8. Supplies might quietly be massed at Tank during September. The less said about what we intend doing the better, or numbers of Mahsuds may bolt through Shawal—it is impossible to guard a long valley against a rush—into Afghan territory which *pro tanto* will baffle us. Anyhow the whole tribe will be on its guard.

Enclosure 67 in No. 3.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 21st August, 1901.

I am directed to refer to the letter from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, dated the 16th August, 1901, submitting a plan of operations which it is proposed to undertake against the Mahsud tribe in November, 1901.

2. I am to request that the Government of India may be furnished with an early expression of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on Mr. Merk's proposal.

3. The Government of India would also be glad to know whether, pending the arrival of the time for reprisals, it is not possible to arrange that all Mahsuds found within reach of our posts shall be arrested and imprisoned. It may be that action of this kind is taken already, but, if so, the Government of India have not heard of it, and it is evident from the Kashmir Kar incident that considerable parties of tribesmen are able to pass through our line of posts and to attack a distant outpost without molestation.

Enclosure 68 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Dowie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 21st August, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated 19th August, 1901, I am directed to submit a letter, dated 15th August, 1901, from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, regarding the action to be taken against the Mahsuds on account of recent outrages.

2. In his letter, dated 19th July, written some time before the attack on the Kashmir Kar post, Mr. Merk gave it as his opinion that till the cold weather no effective blow could be struck at the Mahsuds in retaliation for the less serious outrages of which they had up to that date been guilty. This view is repeated in his present letter, and the reasons advanced appear to the Lieutenant-Governor to be convincing. I am, therefore, to say that he agrees throughout with the advice given by the Commissioner.

3. It is understood that the Government of India have received a copy of Mr. Merk's letter, dated 15th August, 1901.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 15th August, 1901.

In reply to your letter, dated the 10th instant, enclosing a copy of the papers noted in the margin, I have the honour to refer you to my letter of to-day's date.

Letter from the Government of India, dated the 5th instant, and memorandum by Colonel Deane.

2. The action which I advocate now and advocated in my telegram of the 7th instant is, I find, independently proposed by Colonel Deane. But in taking this action, local conditions have to be considered. I do not mean to advise anything that may lead to a disaster; small parties of troops operating about in the Mahsud hills will go in, but certainly will never come back.

3. The Mahsuds are a bold, plucky race, as active over the hills as Afridis, and next to them they are all round the best armed large tribe on the frontier. I have not been in Tirah, but those who have and who have seen the Mahsud country, military men, inform me that the Mahsud country, especially that within reach of our posts, is more difficult than Tirah. To the south and east it is girt by a belt of uninhabited, generally waterless, mass of the most tangled and intricate hills and ravines, which have to be seen to be realised. To the north a zone of Darwesh Khel territory, not less than twenty miles in width, hilly and difficult, separates the Mahsuds from the Tochi. To the west lies Shawal. The Mahsuds are far better armed than our subjects, and in their own hills are more than a match for any tribe and race whatsoever surrounding them. Moreover, as a look at the map will show, they have the opportunity of moving on inner lines. To this they owe their immense advantage apart from arms and personal characteristics over the surrounding populations. Our subjects and the Darwesh Khels and Bhattannis can and do cope with small Mahsud gangs who come out of their country into neighbouring tracts. But they cannot possibly cope with Mahsuds within Mahsud country; we cannot supply our subjects, the villagers are the Bhattannis, with breech-loaders, and that being so, it is perfectly useless to send them into Mahsud country to harass the Mahsuds, of whom 20 men with Sniders could hold up a whole lashkar of villagers or Bhattannis. The Darwesh Khel who live to the north, west and east of the Mahsuds are too weak to do much; they have been expressly prohibited from combining against the Mahsuds in a tribal quarrel, and they show no desire to combine against them in our cause. The conditions and circumstances of this blockade are totally dissimilar to those of the Buner Blockade.

4. I entirely agree with the principle of Colonel Deane (a blockade with harassing attacks), but the application of that principle must obviously be determined by local conditions. The application cannot be the same everywhere. There is no prohibition whatever regarding the pursuit of raiders, but this, like everything else, is governed by the local conditions of the place and time. When I say that troops against Mahsuds in Mahsud country are like British Infantry against the Boers among the kopjes, the need for caution will be understood. Counter-raids were unnecessary before the 1st of June. The tribe till then was paying up satisfactorily, no abnormal offences had been committed, and to have made counter-raids would have broken all such friendly relations as existed, and would have greatly impaired the chances of a complete success of the blockade, and of the execution of His Excellency's policy. After the offences that have recently been committed, since the 1st June, that has to be undertaken what will undoubtedly imperil the prospect of a complete success of the blockade, but what is now inevitable by the force of circumstances. Counter-raids will not stop offences at first. The Mahsuds will hit back, and will not cease till the tribe is worn down by the blockade and by heavy blows struck during the winter. This may, and probably will, save an expedition. Action for

reasons which I have repeatedly represented, cannot be commenced till November, but, if accepted by Government, will be unremittingly carried out during the winter. The General Officer Commanding the Derajat District and I will, in the course of a day or two, submit proposals for this action, but it will not be by small bodies of troops, however swiftly they may move; to send small bodies of men into the Mahsud hills more than ten miles away from our post is simply to court disaster, and our posts have been so placed years ago that not much can be done against the Mahsuds within ten miles of them.

Enclosure 69 in No. 3.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Resident in Kashmir, dated Simla, the 23rd August, 1901.

With reference to your memorandum, dated the 27th July, 1901, I am directed to forward a copy of a letter* from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, submitting a plan of operations which it is proposed to undertake against the Mahsud tribe in November, 1901.

*Dated the 16th August, 1901, addressed to the Government of the Punjab.

2. I am to request you to favour the Government of India with your opinion on Mr. Merk's proposal.

Enclosure 70 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Sheikhbuddin, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 22nd August, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Political Officer, Wana, reports that Mahsuds are hard pressed, and that increasing lawlessness is partly due to instigation of some leading Maliks, notably Badshah Khan, who, it will be remembered, was recently turned out of Badar by Mulla Powindah. The Mahsuds recently tried to get grain from Shakai, but Shakaiwals refused from fear of Government. Rates of food-grains are rising in Mahsud country.

Enclosure 71 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner, Derajat, Sheikhbuddin, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 27th August, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Officer Commanding, Murtaza:—*Begins.* About eight to-night special tonga conveying Post Office Inspector Simpson and two European signallers and Tahsildar of Sarwekai was ambuscaded and fired on by band of some 20 Waziris half-way between Jatta and Murtaza. Tahsildar slightly wounded in arm; Inspector Simpson slightly wounded by splinter in leg. Fire returned, but result unknown. *Ends.* The tonga went against orders strictly forbidding travelling after sunset on Tank-Murtaza road. Explanation has been called for.

Enclosure 72 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 26th August, 1901.

With reference to your letter, dated the 15th of August, 1901, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a preliminary report received from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on the raid committed on the Border Military Police Post at Baran in the Bannu District on the 18th of June last.

Commissioner, Derajat's
letter, dated 8th August, 1901,
and enclosures.

and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on the raid committed on the Border Military Police Post at Baran in the Bannu District on the 18th

2. From enquiries made, the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu believes the raiders consisted of a mixed band of Mahsuds and Tori Khel Darwesh Khels, who must have come down the Baran pass the night before the raid. The Muhammad Khel, a section of the Darwesh Khel tribe, who are responsible for this pass, have been fined Rs. 700, and the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana have been called upon for proposals as to the punishment to be inflicted on the Tori Khels and Mahsuds, respectively. The Deputy Commissioner of Bannu estimates the total value of the Government property looted at Rs. 1,268-2-0, of which Rs. 825-10-6 will be recovered from the Silladars of the garrison of the post; but Mr. Merk is making further enquiries on this point, as he estimates the value of the eight Sniders and two Enfields taken away at Rs. 2,600. From the Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated 19th June last (which was repeated to the Government of India), it appears Mr. Merk has also ordered the dismissal of the members of the Border Military Police who formed the garrison of the Baran post, the confiscation of the Silladari fees of their Silladars, and the recovery of the value of the rifles lost from their sureties.

Annexure 1.

Letter from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 2nd August, 1901.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a report of the raid on the Baran Border Military Post which took place on the morning of the 18th June, 1901.

1. The case has worked out neither quickly nor easily, nor is there any considerable quantity of evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to go upon, and I have had, to a very large extent, to frame this report on a consideration of the information received from various quarters; the chief reason of credibility is their unanimity and the opposing interests of their sources.

2. It appears that a mixed band of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, to whose personnel I shall allude later, came down the Khaisora, crossed the Tochi into Tori Khel territory, and probably on the night of the 17th June, 1901, came down the Baran and had before dawn concealed themselves in a ravine in independent territory some half mile from the post. Such a place, lying off the beaten track and well away from any hamlet, affords excellent cover for a small party, and there is no reason to suppose that anyone was aware of their presence there. Whether their original intention was to attack the post is doubtful, and it is rather more probable that they proposed to lie in wait for the cattle of the Muhammad Khels. However, about 10 or 11 they sent a man to spy out the condition of the post. This man entered the fort ostensibly as a wayfarer who had come to beg a drink of water. He was able to report everything in a state favourable for

attack, and about an hour later the entire body moved down. There was no sentry on the watch tower, and the raiders were enabled to walk right up to the gate.

3. The garrison of the post at the time consisted of 22 men and a dafadar, of whom 11 men were absent, either on duty, without leave or in gaol, leaving 11 men and the dafadar in the post. The whole of these men appear to have displayed the most contemptible negligence and cowardice; and their statements as to what occurred are so tinctured with puerile exaggeration and desire to save themselves as to be practically worthless. Finding the wicket gate open, the raiders rushed in and surprised the entire guard, either asleep or engaged in music. These men allowed themselves to be overpowered without a shot being fired or even a loud cry being raised. The raiders then took from the dafadar his keys and proceeded to collect the garrison. During the confusion the dafadar managed to slip out of the gate and get away. Had he gone straight to the nearest village, much

Probably hid himself in a ravine till the gang were well away. might have been done, but he seems to have been mad with fear and to have rushed blindly over the country, finally arriving at Islam Chauki after the news had reached that post.

W. R. H. MERK,
Commissioner.

4. The rest of the garrison were collected by the raiders and driven into a room in the post, the door of which was padlocked. The raiders then cleared out the magazine, in which they found eight Sniders, six Enfields, one Enfield revolver, 429 Snider rounds, 119 Enfield rounds, 180 caps, seven bayonets and Rs. 33-9-0 in cash, as well as a small amount of uniform. With this booty they made off up the Baran.

5. The first assistance seems to have come from an unexpected quarter. Jan, the Gummatti outlaw, who is himself a Muhammad Khel, had come into that neighbourhood with Piao Dad, another outlaw, to settle a family matter. These two were, of course, armed, and opened fire on the raiders from a considerable distance. They succeeded in killing one and in causing them to drop four of the Enfields. It might naturally be asked whether the facts are not really the other way, and Jan himself among the raiders, but the evidence leaves little doubt in my mind that on this occasion he played the part of the ally of Government.

6. In the meanwhile, the garrison immured in the post, once satisfied that the raiders had gone, made their escape through the ventilator above the door and sent off three horsemen to raise the Kurramgarhi and Islam Chauki posts and the Muhammad Khel villages.

The news was sent into Bannu, and a considerable force started to Kurramgarhi. The Political Officer, Tochi, and Commandant, North Waziristan Militia, who happened to be both in Bannu, made arrangements to have parties out in the Tochi in the hopes of intercepting the offenders; should they prove to be Mahsuds.

We ourselves, Lieutenant Coldstream and I, rode straight up the Baran and met a considerable portion of the pursuit party returning carrying a wounded man. We found that the first person to turn out had been two Muhammad Khels—Muhammad Alim and Paria Din Malik.

These were joined up the Baran by a few sowars belonging to the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and Border Military Police, and followed the raiders up at a considerable distance. The bulk of the Muhammad Khel pursuit party turned out somewhat later and followed up behind. When the raiders had reached the first low range of the hills separating the Baran from the Sheratalla plain, Paria Din ran forward, and in the interchange of shots received a bullet through the fleshy part of his thigh. His wound was dressed later by the Civil Surgeon who had accompanied us, and it is expected that no permanent effect will be left. The advance party then waited for the main body, and the raiders made good their escape across these hills. When we came up, the Muhammad Khels had turned out in force and were holding these lower hills, but they had not seen fit to carry the pursuit any further.

As the latter had then got a full start, and evening was approaching, the party returned. I had parties of the various tribesmen out in case the raiders should try to double back through British territory, but this they do not appear to have done.

7. I examined the garrison of the fort, but their statements, for the reasons already given, were absolutely worthless as tending to identify the raiders. The Muhammad Khels professed entire ignorance as to the personality of these raiders. I told them that, as the pass responsibility was theirs, so also was the duty of bringing home the crime to some one, and that, if they failed to do so, I should hold them responsible as if it had been committed by themselves.

8. The first information was obtained from the finding, several days later, about a mile from the post, of the corpse of the man to whom I have alluded as having been killed by Jan. This corpse was found in a ravine to the west of the ordinary track, which accounts for its being left so long undiscovered. Owing to decomposition and the action of wild animals, this corpse was little better than a mass of bones and putrefaction, rendering identification impossible. However, certain articles of clothing led to a suspicion of the dead man having been a Mahsud.

9. On the 6th July, 1901, the Muhammad Khels handed in a list of names whom their emissaries declared to be concerned in the raid. This list gave the names of 13 men, two Shingi and three Abdullai Mahsuds, and five Tori Khel and three Mohmit Khel Waziris. Copies of this were sent to the Political Officers, Tochi and Wana, and from their reports there is no doubt as to the complicity of the Abdullais under Amardin and the Tori Khels under Kandar Khushali. The whole gang appears to have been some 80 in number, consisting, as the Political Officer, Wana, says, of Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, while the personnel of the latter, according to the Political Officer, Tochi, appears to have been made up chiefly of Tori Khels. The majority of this gang, however, remained in the hills, and the actual raiders numbered about twenty under Amardin and Kandar.

10. With these tribes I have no concern, and any proposal for imposition of fines cannot come from me. It only remains to deal with the question of pass responsibility and of the complicity of the Muhammad Khels. As regards the last question, I am perfectly convinced that neither did the Muhammad Khel as a tribe aid in or connive at the raid. It was perfectly possible for the party to have come down and made the attack as described without their knowledge, and this, I am assured, was the case. At the same time, I will not go the length of saying that there were no Muhammad Khels in the affair. It is possible that one or two bad characters with no stake in the tribe, Kuzi Khels for choice, allied themselves to this enterprise, as they would to any wickedness that was going. But of this there is no proof. The raid, as it occurred, required no local knowledge which the Tori Khels could not have provided. I therefore do not think that I have any grounds to make the Muhammad Khels liable on the ground of complicity, and propose to base their liability solely on their responsibility for the Baran Pass. It may be noted that the ground on which the post stands lies just outside Muhammad Khel territory, and is the property of the Bakka Khels. But the former tribe have no hamlets nearer than two miles, while the matter has all along been considered as one affecting the Muhammad Khels only, so that it would be neither just nor politic to bring the Bakka Khels into the affair. The Muhammad Khels themselves argue that they have done their best, that they have killed one raider, recovered four rifles, and had one of their Maliks wounded. To whatever extent these arguments may result in mitigating the penalty imposed, they cannot affect the general principle that a tribe is absolutely responsible for the maintenance of its passes, and that if it does not choose to patrol and watch these passes so as to effectually safeguard against any raid like the present, it must take the consequences of its own security.

11. The total value of the Government property taken and not recovered is Rs. 1,268-2-0; of this by your order, Rs. 825-10-6 will be or has

been recovered from the Silladars of the garrison of the post. There remain Rs. 442-7-6, the value of the property in charge of Government employées absent on duty, and this, I think, cannot in fairness be recovered from their Silladars.

12. In recommending the fine on the Muhammad Khels I have been guided by the fines levied by you on the Bizan Khels and Hathi Khels in the case of the raid on the Domel Thana, which took place almost exactly a year before. In that case you recommended, in the event of no Hathi Khel complicity being shown, a fine of Rs. 400 on each tribe, in all Rs. 800, on the ground of pass and tribal responsibility. That case was, to my mind; more serious than the present case. A police station, fully three miles inside the border, surrounded by Hathi Khel villages, was raided by a party which had been actually met by Bazin Khels in the pass for which the latter are responsible, and which must have passed through several Hathi Khel villages. In the present case, the Baran post lies just on the border, and there are no Muhammad Khel villages in the further direction. The Muhammad Khels certainly turned out as fast as could be expected; they killed one man and had one of their Maliks wounded. In addition to this, the behaviour of the tribe has during the last year been excellent. Under these circumstances, I would not press for a heavy fine, but rather for one sufficient to bring home a realisation of pass responsibility. I would, therefore, recommend a fine of Rs. 700 on the Muhammad Khel tribe, that is, Rs. 100 on each of its sections.

13. In conclusion, I should like to point out the difficulties with which, in the present constitution of the force, the Commandant has to contend in his efforts to bring an untrained and undisciplined body of men into a state of efficiency. Lieutenant Coldstream, Commandant, in his report on this raid, says: "This disgraceful affair is due primarily to the negligence of the sentry in leaving his post, and, secondly, to the pusillanimity of the dafadar and the remainder of the garrison, and the only punishment to which they are liable is dismissal from the force and forfeiture of the securities for the stolen rifles. I regret to say that the absence of a sentry from his post is only too common. I have, on several occasions, when visiting a post, found the sentry absent from his beat. Until these men know that they will be heavily punished for such conduct, they will not do their duty. Without fear of punishment, there will be no discipline, and without discipline such incidents as the Baran raid are bound to occur."

Enclosure 73 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 2nd September, 1901.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, dated the 21st of August, 1901, on the subject of Mahsud affairs, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 27th August, 1901, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, from which it will be seen that all Mahsuds found outside the line of posts are arrested and imprisoned. For the reasons given by Mr. Merk, the Lieutenant-Governor agrees with him in thinking that reprisals within the line should only be carried out systematically.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of your letter under reference, I am to say that His Honour is still awaiting an expression of General Egerton's views, on receipt of which he will submit his opinion to the Government of India on Mr. Merk's plan of operations against the Mahsuds in November next.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 27th August, 1901.

In reply to your endorsement, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to submit the report on paragraph 3 of Government of India letter, dated the 21st instant.

2. If by "all Mahsuds found within reach of our posts" are meant Mahsuds residing in their settlements beyond the area occupied by Government, but within reach of Sarwekai and Jandola, then the troops moving out of these posts might, if lucky, seize by surprise some fifty, perhaps a hundred Mahsuds. On a tribe computed to number nine to ten thousand fighting men this would have no particular effect. Thereafter a surprise will be out of the question. The Mahsuds are intelligent men. When the blockade commenced, they posted men on the hill tops for two months, who day and night watched Sarwekai, Jandola and the Tiarza. These sentries are specially selected for their keen sight and activity. Men of this stamp accompany every considerable raiding gang, and make it a profession to be what are called "chirgs," viz., cocks. It is their business to be constantly on the look-out and to warn the raiders either of their prey or of their enemies. If it is intended to do anything hereafter on a scale sufficient to be an appreciable blow to the tribe, it would be fatal to put the Mahsuds on their guard now.

3. Mahsuds who steal across the blockade line for peaceful purposes, viz., to purchase supplies, to work for wages, &c., are at once arrested and imprisoned. Many instances of this have occurred. Rupees 20 are paid for every Mahsud so caught.

4. Raiding gangs are attacked and shot out of hand, *when found*. But, as I have already explained, the country surrounding the Mahsud limits, especially on the south and east, is a mass of low hills and ravines, an uninhabited desert. In this desert our posts lie dotted at intervals of from ten to fifteen miles. When Mahsuds have ventured into inhabited country, they have suffered—witness the two gangs that were cut up by villagers and levies, for which in one case the Government of India have sanctioned a reward. But in the uninhabited desert it is not easy to find gangs. They move much faster than our troops and even our Militia. They slip through the chain of posts during the night, and lie up during the day; the country is such that one might pass 200 men lying up within a stone's throw and be no wiser. The Pezu pass near Sheikhbuddin is a fair illustration of the kind of terrain we have to deal with. But whereas the rugged hills through which the Pezu pass leads are only four to six miles in width, the desert belt south and east of the Mahsud country varies from 50 to 20 miles in width, and is about 100 miles long, curving from Wana round to the Bannu district. In such terrain all we can do is to hold safe the lines of communication, to see that posts are not rushed, to obtain early news of gangs who start to raid, and to do our best when after them to come across them in the desert hills. If one were to station a man every fifty yards between the posts, it would be impossible to prevent gangs from slipping through at night, or to find them afterwards in the desert wilderness of hills south of the Gomal. It is on similar lines with the case in South Africa; all our enormous forces there cannot prevent small parties of Boers from slipping through at times, and from holding up a block-house or derailing a train; the only final remedies there and here are to wear down the enemy, taking the chances of an occasional mishap meanwhile. In the case of Kashmir Kar, the full facts will soon be laid before Government, and I trust a thing like that will not recur. In that instance the gang had 18 hours' start after the post had been taken [Kashmir Kar was captured at 2 p.m., the news reached Kajuri Kach at 8 p.m., and troops are not permitted (wisely, I think) by the Military Authorities to go out till sunrise],

and were back without molestation in the Mahsud country before any action could be taken. In 18 hours a gang can and does sometimes cover 40 miles. The Government of India may rest assured that all that can be done is and will be done on the civil and military sides. But with the terrain and people that we have to deal with, in my humble judgment no more can be accomplished with any degree of certainty than what I have indicated. Owing to the excessive heat, the troops have necessarily been confined to their posts, but after the middle of next month the General Officer Commanding will take steps to frequently move detachments of sufficient strengths about to places calculated to intercept raiders where troops would not be expected by them.

Enclosure 74 in No. 3.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gulmarg, the 29th August, 1901.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 23rd August, 1901, with reference to proposed operations against the Mahsud Waziris, and to offer the following remarks.

2. The general plan proposed seems to me more elaborate than is necessary, and I think it would be exceedingly difficult of execution, owing to the great probabilities of information leaking out. The plan that I should feel most inclined to propose is that flying columns at Jandola and Sarwekai should co-operate with a flying column from Wana. The troops would be there *en evidence*. The Mahsud country on the line from Jandola to Wana is that from which apparently the Mahsuds mostly raid, and it is important that our troops should clear this country and should destroy all settlements, crops, grass and wood within their reach. The manner of execution must be left for the Military Authorities to decide, but all individual Commanders should be instructed to lose no opportunity which presents itself of inflicting loss on the Mahsuds. It is to systematic working of this sort, the Mahsuds seeing our troops ready to assume the offensive on every occasion which presents itself and constantly on the move, that I think we must look for pressure on the Mahsuds rather than to the troops occasionally turning out. Is it not possible for the troops to reach and destroy the Mahsud settlements on the Tank-Zam line or the (Mahsud) Jalal Khel settlements in Shaktu from Suleiman Khel? The flying columns in Tochi could also presumably inflict a certain amount of damage.

3. Another point which I suggest is that there must be enterprising Native Officers in the Militia, who, with 40 or 50 men, could raid the country near them, probably capturing cattle, but any way destroying grass which must be of considerable value to the Mahsuds. It may be urged that this would involve risk and possible loss of life and rifles. But Pathans will generally take very good care of themselves, and it is better to risk the loss of a rifle in this manner than in having them taken wholesale from our posts.

4. If the troops move out, I should advise guns being taken wherever practicable. At the same time, I would not advise the Militia being mixed up with the troops. The Militia, if given a free hand to inflict loss, could act far better independently.

5. With regard to any idea of the Mahsuds collecting against our troops, there is the view that this would give the best opportunity of dealing with them. As to their going off to Afghan territory, they will not be welcome there, and a considerable check can be kept on them by the maintenance, and, if necessary, the strengthening of the Darwesh Khel picquets on the Datta Khel-Wana line. Their moving off to Afghan territory will not relieve them of hardship, and from our point of view it is better for them to be uncomfortable in Afghan territory than amusing themselves with raiding at our expense.

6. The question whether Militia being associated with the Darwesh Khel picquets in order to keep the Mahsuds uneasy on the Datta Khel-Wana line seems also worth considering. Active steps which may be possible taken now will make the Mahsuds fearful as to their winter settlements, and may have a good effect in forcing them to submission.

7. I would recommend an account being kept of damage done, whether in capturing cattle which are afterwards killed or in any other way. This will put Government into a position to judge how far the discussion with the Waziris of compensation for offences committed during the blockade can be dispensed with. The main point is to cause as much loss as possible to the Mahsuds. I would urge, on the other hand, that Government should not postpone the settlement of the blockade by such a restriction as that the fine imposed must be paid in cash. The Mahsuds probably are unable to find cash, and payment in kind is reasonable in Government interests as in theirs. If any Mahsuds should be captured, a reasonable manner of dealing with them is to allow them to ransom themselves, the amount of ransom being credited to the fine.

Enclosure 75 in No. 3.

Endorsed by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 5th September, 1901.

Copy of the following submitted to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla:—

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Sheikhbuddin, the 5th September, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. The prices of food-grains continue to rise slowly. Conflicting reports are received regarding the state of the Mahsud autumn crop. According to some accounts it is above the average, according to others it is suffering from drought. This latter report tallies with the condition of the unirrigated crops in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and with the report of the Meteorological Office that the monsoon rainfall of the "Dry North-West area" which includes Waziristan is 46 per cent. below the average. Some Bhattannis beyond the border are charged with having sold small quantities of grain to Mahsuds, and are being dealt with. During the past fortnight 26 Mahsuds, chiefly women and children, who had stolen across the blockade line for food, were seized. The men are arrested and imprisoned, but it is difficult to know what to do with the women and children. They are sent back, but there is no guarantee against their returning.

3. The total sum realised up to date is Rs. 73,761, or Rs. 761 since the 30th June. This small item is derived from the "bahir" tax of 50 per cent. on proceeds of the timber and matting brought by Mahsud caravans (under proper restrictions to prevent evasions of the blockade) for sale to Tank. This bahir system is still permitted, not because it helps towards liquidation of the fine, but because it is a valuable index towards tribal feeling. If a general hostile combination of all Mahsuds were forming, bahirs would naturally stop at once. But, at present anyhow, there are no symptoms of such a combination: the frontier generally is perfectly quiet, the Mulla element with Mulla Powindah at their head are undoubtedly sincere in their desire for a peaceful solution of the situation, and the bulk of the Mahsuds have given security for good behaviour to the extent of Rs. 73,761. Still, with the inconsequence peculiar to Pathans, they may at any moment change, and the Political Officers of Southern and Northern Waziristan keep a vigilant watch for any symptoms of a general movement:

4. Since the capture of Kashmir Kar on the 6th August, regarding which a full report has been submitted to Government, there has been a sudden cessation of offences; during the past month only two cases against Government have occurred, one is firing on the tonga, which, against orders, was travelling after sunset between Tank and Murtaza; and the other is the shooting of a Zhob Levy sowar on the 30th ultimo and the robbery of his rifle. The first offence was the sudden thought of a small thieving gang who did little harm; a report on the matter has been submitted to Government, and those to blame in it are being dealt with. The second offence is probably the work of one particular set of rifle thieves who select the southern bank of the Gomal river west of Toi Khula for their operations, and every six months or so shoot Zhob Levy sowars and walk off with their rifles. Offences like those that have occurred since the 6th August are more the acts of "blackguards in the shrubbery," to quote an Irish saying, than tribal acts, still the tribe is responsible for all its blackguards. In the British districts, and latterly in the Tochi also, the Mahsuds have had the tables turned on them in their attempts to loot and do harm. The villagers and levies of the Dera Ismail Khan district have cut up two gangs, the Bannu Waziris have held their own beyond the border; at Hassan Khel in the Tochi the Mahsuds fared badly two months ago, and now on the 30th ultimo the Tochi Militia and villagers killed two Mahsuds of a gang that attempted to lift village cattle. In Southern Waziristan alone of late have the Mahsuds been successful, but here also I hope there will be a change for the better soon. Special arrangements are being made for the regulation and protection of the Powindah migration through the Gomal, which commences next week. During the past fortnight three Mahsud raiders and thieves (names given) are reported on different occasions to have died of sunstroke and heat in the low dry hills.

5. There is no doubt that the Kashmir Kar affair caused great consternation among the Mahsuds. Mulla Powindah and the Malik met in jirga to arrange for the restoration of the rifles and ammunition, and excellent resolutions were passed, but nothing has been done. The Mahsuds are in much anxiety as to what Government will do, an anxiety which will not be allayed by my last letter breaking off all negotiations and all dealings with the tribe till the balance of Rs. 26,400 has been paid. The anxiety may keep them on their good behaviour for some time.

6. A copy of this report has been submitted direct to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Enclosure 76 in No. 3.

Letter from A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 11th September, 1901.

In reply to your letter, dated 21st August, 1901, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters marginally noted, and to convey the following views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the plan of operations which Mr. Merk proposes to undertake against the Mahsuds in November next.

From Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, dated the 29th August, 1901, and enclosure.

From Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, dated the 3rd September, 1901.

2. Mr. Merk's plan is for a baramta on a large scale. A baramta on a small scale will not, in his opinion,* affect the present situation, but will only annoy the tribe and lead them to commit more offences. He proposes that, after a feint has been made in the Tochi, which he thinks will divert the attention of the Mahsuds, three small columns from

* *Vide* Commissioner, Derajat's telegram, dated the 16th August, 1901, submitted to Government of India with Punjab Government letter, dated the 19th August, 1901.

Wana, Sarwekai and Zam composed of 900, 400 and 700 native infantry, without cavalry or artillery, should enter Mahsud territory, presumably penetrating as far as Kaniguram and Makin, respectively, 16 and 28 miles from Khaisara, stay there two or three nights and then retire to their quarters; and repeat this operation at intervals. The object, he explains, would not be so much the destruction of crops as to effect the capture of Mahsuds with their flocks and herds, and keep the tribe in a state of alarm.

3. General Egerton considers the force proposed by Mr. Merk insufficient for the measures designed by him, and would only be prepared, even with a force of 3,800 strong, to operate in the Khaisara, the Shahur and the Tank-Zam, that is to say, on the outskirts of the Mahsud country.

4. In view of General Egerton's opinion, the Lieutenant-Governor feels that Mr. Merk's plan for a surprise in the heart of the Mahsud country must be abandoned, and it remains to consider General Egerton's modified proposal. General Egerton says our first object should be to prevent the Mahsuds harvesting their autumn crops or sowing their spring crops. His Honour does not see how this object can be attained without a prolonged occupation. The only objects which can be attained by sharp reprisals not amounting to an expedition are (a) a baramta or the seizure of men and cattle, and (b) damage to property. A small column operating for a few days cannot destroy standing crops to any extent, or restrain the tribe from agricultural operations so as to affect their harvest. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it very doubtful if we should secure any of the fighting men by the movement of a flying column, however skilfully and secretly devised, and the seizure of women and children and a few stray cattle will not help us much. On the other hand, if the object is damage to property, then, as Mr. Merk points out, the best time to choose is after the crops have been harvested. Combined with this form of damage, the destruction of towers and even of villages presents an effectual method of punishing the tribe. And this is, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, at once the easiest and most decisive form of punishment which it is open to us to inflict. The time for doing so, as shown by Mr. Merk, is about the end of November.

5. With the force proposed by General Egerton, there can be little doubt that operations of the character above indicated can be carried out in the Khaisara, Shahur and Tank-Zam villages, and, if the Government of India decide to undertake these operations, Sir Mackworth Young sees no very strong objection. But he thinks that the ultimate object of our present dealings with the tribe, viz., their absolute submission, if not secured by the blockade, will be more surely gained by an expedition into the heart of the Mahsud country and the occupation of that country with a sufficient force so long as it suits our purpose. If a force,* such as that sent to Kaniguram and Makin in 1860 and 1881, is despatched when the crops have been harvested to penetrate into the heart of the country, eat up and destroy the harvested grain, and destroy towers and fortified villages, the object will probably be attained more speedily than by partial measures. The Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, advises that a plan of campaign on a somewhat more extended scale be worked out and put into execution as soon as it is established that the tribe will not or cannot conform to our reasonable demands for their submission.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Lieutenant-General C. C. Egerton, A.-D.-C., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Forces, Punjab, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Murree, the 29th August, 1901.

With reference to your letter, dated 28th instant, I have the honour to forward herein, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my views on the proposals of the Commissioner, Derajat, for the coercion of the Mahsud Waziris.

2. I regret the delay which has occurred in submitting these views which were asked for by the Punjab Government on the 21st instant, but, by some unaccountable mistake in the office, the telegram asking me for my views on the question was not submitted to me until yesterday, and in the meantime copies of Mr. Merk's letters had reached me addressed to me by name and apparently sent for information only.

3. I am entirely in accord, and have been since the institution of the blockade, with Mr. Merk's proposed policy of counter-raiding on the Mahsuds, while maintaining the blockade against them rigorously. It was with this object in view, as well as to reinforce threatened points—as may be seen from my original proposals on the subject—that I originally recommended the establishment of movable columns at Sarwekai, Zam and in the Bannu district. I did not contemplate, however, that these small columns should at any time operate to such a distance as would preclude their returning to their own base by nightfall, but I asked that the officer in charge of blockade operations should be empowered to draw upon the troops in Dera Ismail Khan, in case any more serious operation necessitating the troops being absent for a night or more should be sanctioned by superior authority.

4. Mr. Merk's scheme contemplates the absence of comparatively small columns from their base for several days in succession at a time of the year when the villages are at their fullest, and when, harvesting operations being over and spring crops sown, the people would be most at liberty to assemble and make common cause against our troops, and it provides nothing to fall back upon in case of one of the columns suffering a reverse.

5. Mr. Merk relies upon suddenness and celerity of movement in various directions to baffle the tribesmen, and no doubt this is an essential feature of any scheme that falls short of an actual expedition, but, at the same time, if the columns are to remain several nights in the country, I doubt if the strength advocated by Mr. Merk is sufficient.

6. The feint from the Tochi does not altogether commend itself to me. The only direction in which it could take place would be towards Razmak *via* the Loargi pass and through the intervening Darwesh Khel country. The Razmak Kotal is a difficult one, and there is no village or settlement of any importance until Makin is reached, and I am further of opinion that, although a feint in this direction would no doubt have the effect of drawing the tribesmen of Makin and the immediate neighbourhood to oppose it, it is doubtful if the Khaisara and Kaniguram would be much affected thereby. Moreover, it is certain that the inevitable retirement would be promptly followed up, and both Razmak and the Loargi Narai are unpleasant places to retire through in the face of superior numbers, so I fear the result which Mr. Merk so strongly deprecates in paragraph 8 of his plan of operations would be attained, *viz.*, considerable loss to ourselves and a minimum of damage to the Mahsud. A small column largely composed of Militia and quite unsupported could not hope to reach Makin itself, and until that was reached—except, perhaps, the capture of a few stray cattle—little or nothing could be effected in the way of damage to the enemy. If a demonstration be made from the Tochi, I do not think it should attempt more than an advance to Razanai, and possibly a reconnaissance of the Kotal, though even the latter might involve us in serious fighting.

7. The vulnerable parts of the Mahsud country seem to be the Khaisara, Shahur and the Tank-Zam, as far as the Barari Tangi, and I think columns might operate in those directions very successfully, but I would deprecate their being too weak. I should prefer to see the Tiarza column at least 1,200 strong, the Sarwekai column (which would join hands with the Tiarza column at Kundiwam) to be 600 strong, and the Jandola column about 1,000. I think these numbers might very easily be obtained by the employment of the 17th Bengal Infantry from Dera Ismail Khan, and turning the movement of the troops marching in relief to Dera Ismail Khan; *viz.*, wing 27th Punjab Infantry from Bannu, and 1st Punjab Infantry (?) from Kohat, so as to arrive at Tank by the date fixed for the operations.

8. With reference to that date, Mr. Merk is, of course, in a better position than I am to speak with authority, but I cannot but think that by the end of October (not November) the bulk of the tribesmen will be engaged in harvesting operations, though their cattle may remain in the upper grazing lands with a few attendants until later on. It should be our first object to prevent their harvesting their autumn crop or sowing their spring crops, and I think that the time of the operations should be subordinated to this consideration rather than to the phases of the moon, though, of course, moonlight nights are an enormous advantage in dealing with tribesmen given to night attacks. Still, it is not everything, and the disadvantages of dark nights may, at any rate, be partially obviated by extra vigilance and precaution, the careful selection of sites for bivouacs and effective sangaring.

9. I recommend, therefore, before Mr. Merk's suggestions are adopted: that it should be ascertained more exactly between what dates harvesting operations are most likely to be in progress, and our operations timed accordingly.

MEMORANDUM by the Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

Forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, with reference to Punjab Government telegram, dated 20th instant.

Annexure 2.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 3rd September, 1901.

With reference to paragraph 9 of letter, dated the 29th August, 1901, from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, to the Adjutant-General in India, a copy of which has been sent to you under cover of his endorsement of the same date, I have the honour to say that it is better not to try to either prevent the harvesting of autumn crops or destroy them as they stand. The first means a prolonged occupation of the area growing the crops, for in harvesting it does not matter much whether you cut ten days earlier or ten days later. The second is very difficult to accomplish, as our experience last year in the Madda Khel country shows. It takes an immense time to destroy any quantity of standing Indian corn or jowar, the staple Mahsud autumn crops. This again means prolonged occupation. Next, to prevent sowing spring crops means a prolonged occupation, because it does not matter within a margin of two months when the rabi crop is sown. Lastly, the cultivated areas of the Mahsud country lie at different altitudes, ranging from 2,000 to 7,000 feet. It is clear, therefore, that whichever crop we take, spring or autumn, it must always be at different stages of growth, cultivation and ripeness. All this would mean what would virtually be an expedition on a large scale.

2. The object of the attack in November and of the subsequent attacks is not so much the destruction of crops as at the first onset to capture as many Mahsuds with their flocks and herds as possible, and thereafter to keep the tribe in a state of alarm and anxiety, to jam them up into the high country round Kaniguram and Makin, where it is cold and where they will be crowded together, instead of spreading as they do over the lower hills for comfort and pasture, and so, with the blockade continuing in full force, to wear them out. If at the first attack we can succeed in seizing a large number of Mahsuds, it is probable that the tribe will promptly give in and the whole thing be over. But this demands absolute secrecy and a surprise. I am afraid the employment of reliefs as proposed will give

people (natives) an idea of what is intended, and will leak through to the Mahsuds. So far as I can judge, I think the forces I propose are sufficient, and no unreasonable risk is incurred. Crops, &c., would, of course, be destroyed *en passant*. But by the end of November, the autumn crop everywhere is cut, *is dry and stacked*, and a box of matches will then in half an hour do more damage than 500 men working all day could effect with standing maize or jowar. Grain itself is easily carried off by troops and consumed, but grain in ear is difficult to eat or to remove or destroy.

3. For these reasons, I adhere to my view that it will be better to make the first attack towards the end of November. There is this too that in December it is not easy, owing to the great cold, for Mahsud families to escape *viâ* Shawal, but, if we attack in October, it is probable that large numbers of the Mahsuds will, after the first attack, instantly go off to spend the winter in Birmal with their families, and we shall be *pro tanto* baffled: The Darwesh Khel contingent that holds Shawal for blockade purposes is not strong enough to resist a large and determined rush of Mahsud families and fighting men anxious to escape a hard time. If I increase this contingent to a strength sufficient to stop a rush, the Mahsuds, who are by no means deficient in intellect, will at once suspect what is coming and will act accordingly.

4. As regards the Tochi operations, I proposed a *feint*, and not fighting. I did not suggest reaching Makin. The Mahsuds are at present and will remain in a highly nervous condition, and the mere appearance of half a regiment in the vicinity of the Razmak Kotal or Spina Punga Narai will send them hurrying in that direction. This will divide Mahsud forces; by the time the Makin men are back, the southern troops will be out of the country. The Tochi troops could retire, if necessary, before the Mahsuds arrived.

5. A copy of this letter has been communicated to Generals Egerton and Dening.

Enclosure 77 in No. 3.

Letter from H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Simla, the 18th September, 1901.

I am directed to invite attention to paragraph 3 of Mr. Merk's letter, dated the 5th September, 1901, submitting his fortnightly report on the progress of the Mahsud blockade.

2. In Mr. Merk's telegram, dated the 31st December, 1900, it was stated that he had agreed to the tribesmen coming in to Tank to sell cattle, timber, &c., and to pay the proceeds on the spot towards the fine. The Mahsuds had requested that this might be allowed on the rejection of their proposal to make payments in kind. The present arrangement, as now detailed, appears to differ from the former one, inasmuch as the tribesmen are allowed to return to their homes with half the proceeds of their sales, the other half being taken by Government in the shape of a tax and credited to the outstanding fine. In the opinion of the Government of India, this arrangement appears to be open to much objection. Mr. Merk states that the caravans are admitted under proper restrictions to prevent evasion of the blockade. Their admission is, however, in itself a primary evasion of the blockade, there is no evidence that the "bahirs" have ever furnished any information of real value, and the supplies which they take back with them must tend to prolong the resistance of the tribesmen and the duration of the blockade. Subject, therefore, to any further explanation which may be forthcoming, the Government of India consider that, while the blockade is proceeding, all caravans from the Mahsud country should be absolutely prohibited, and it appears doubtful whether the sums already received from the "bahir" tax should be credited in reduction of the fine.

Enclosure 78 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Camp Bannu, the 18th September, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 5th instant, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Average prices are reported to be as follows in the Mahsud country; in seers per rupee—

Maize	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	} These are practically nominal prices, as these four articles are generally not in the market at all.
Wheat	5 $\frac{1}{8}$	
Barley	7 $\frac{1}{8}$	
Rice	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Salt	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	
Tobacco	2 $\frac{1}{16}$	
Native cloth	3 yards	
European cloth	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ „	

The price of maize will fall when the kharif harvest is gathered next month. The crop is poor in the lower tracts to the south and east, but average in the higher valleys to the north and west. There are indications of an early and possibly severe winter; snow fell on Shuidar last week. The real stress of the blockade will come in January and February when the produce of the autumn crop will have been consumed, and the harvest of the spring crop be still distant.

It is reported that those Mahsuds who usually came to the plains in winter for labour intend this year to steal across the Madda Khel country or the Tochi (which they can easily do by night), and make for the Kohat and Peshawar districts and Kurram, there to take work. I am arranging to post men, who know a Mahsud when they see him, at Thal, Hangu, Kohat and Khushalgarh to recognise such Mahsuds, who will be arrested and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The fine on the Tori Khel Darwesh Khel Waziris, who are more than suspected of complicity in Mahsud raids on the Tochi, has had an excellent effect. The Tori Khel are now almost under blockade themselves, so strict are the rules under which they may obtain supplies, cloth, salt and tobacco from Bannu and the Tochi. This is necessary since several cases of smuggling have been brought home to them. As prices rise in the Mahsud country, blockade running becomes proportionately more profitable, and our precautions and regulations are correspondingly tightened. Several small smuggling parties have been captured and dealt with.

3. The total sum realised up to date on account of the fine of one lakh is Rs. 73,897-10-2.

4. Since the date of the last report, no offences appear to have been committed in the Tochi, Gomal, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts. In the Sheranni country 30 cows were lifted in the hills near Drazinda, and some Mahsud robbers attacked travellers between Domandi and Draband, killing one and wounding another; the pursuit party report having wounded a Mahsud. The lower Sheranni hills are empty at present, which facilitates the operations of small gangs from the Mahsud country as far south as the Zhob road by the Chuhar Khel Dhana pass; the low hills are just now an uninhabited desert. Later on, when the Sherannis, Zalli Khel and Powindabs come down from their summer quarters, a part of these hills will be more occupied, but the Gomal country remains empty all the year round. Some Bhattanni flocks were lifted by Mahsuds from beyond the Tank border; the Bhattanni pursuit parties in return lifted Mahsud flocks.

5. The general political situation is unchanged, and the Mahsuds continue anxious as to what is going to happen to them.

6. A copy of this report has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department direct, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 79 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 8th October, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. The prices of rice, Indian corn, and millet have slightly fallen in view of the autumn crop. Other prices remain stationary, except salt and cloth, which have risen so far as rates which are virtually nominal can be said to vary at all.

3. During the past fortnight the attention of the Mahsuds has been concentrated on their struggle over Badar with the Darwesh Khel Waziris, at whose hands they suffered an ugly reverse which they are now gradually retrieving. Mulla Powindah endeavoured unsuccessfully to intervene. He is now biding his time, and will no doubt step in when both sides are tired of fighting, and want an excuse to leave off.

4. The offences of the period under report have been several petty raids on Powindahs along the Dera Ismail Khan border: the largest of these was the lifting of 50 camels from almost under the walls of the Zarkanni Border Military Police post. The Native Officer in command at the time has been dismissed. The Tochi has been free of raids, and the Tori Khel, who have been well fined for giving passage to, and combining with, Mahsud raiders, are paying up. A singularly daring dacoity was committed in the Bannu district by a band of Mahsuds and Tori Khel and Wali Khel outlaws, who were collected by one Nabi Bakhsh (a desperate bad character and religious fanatic to boot, who fled to the Mahsuds last March after murdering a Deputy Inspector of Police) and brought down to attack the village of Attar Shah Sing, a prominent Hindu with whom Nabi Bakhsh had been long at feud. The gang, helped by the undoubted sympathy of the neighbouring villages, who will suffer for it, succeeded in killing Attar Shah Sing and six others. But on their retirement, the dacoits were attacked by the Bakka Khel and Shogi Khel (Tori Khel); Sheikh Amardin, a most notorious scoundrel and leading follower and employée of Mulla Powindah; and Kandar, Tori Khel, a prominent leader of raids, were killed, and the gang retired in confusion to the Mahsud hills where the deaths of Amardin and Kandar made a great sensation. The Bakka Khel and Shogis have been suitably rewarded. The Tochi Militia recovered some 1,000 sheep which were being driven off by Mahsud thieves near Saidgi.

5. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has also been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 80 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 11th October, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Following from Political Officer, Wana, repeated for information:—
Begins. Jirga of principal Mahsud Maliks and representative tribesmen met on 9th at Kaniguram, and passed excellent resolutions regarding prompt payment of balance of one lakh due to Government and restitution of Kashmir Kar rifles. It remains to be seen what action, if any, will follow. Difficulty with Government was one cause of Mahsuds letting Darwesh Khels at Badar off as easily as they did. Mulla Powindah returned home without taking part in yesterday's jirga. Settlement of Badar question entirely in favour of Mahsuds without his assistance, if not in spite of his opposition, has affected his position prejudicially. *Ends.*

Enclosure 81 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Political Officer, Wana, dated the 11th October, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours reports that Maliks and Mahsuds in jirga assembled at Kaniguram on 9th instant resolved to pay balance of lakh and restore Kashmir Kar rifles. When Mulla Powindah lately was endeavouring to finance the tribe and had got the Maliks to join him, the party opposed to him arranged the Kashmir Kar attack. It is now on the cards that the Mulla will retaliate, especially as he was not present at the jirga, and is angry about the way Badar has been taken. His retaliation may be at our expense, and, till we know what turn internal affairs take with the Mahsuds, extra vigilance is necessary. If he means mischief, it will be by a band of eighty or a hundred raiders, and not by a gathering in force.

Enclosure 82 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 16th October, 1901.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, dated the 24th of September, 1901, which was repeated to the Government of India, I am directed to submit, for information, a copy of the letters noted in the margin, from the Commissioner, Derajat Division, containing particulars of the raid committed by a band of Mahsuds headed by a notorious outlaw named Nabi Bakhsh on Attar Shah Singh's village in the Bannu district.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to A. H. Diack, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated the 25th September, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram, dated yesterday, I have the honour to submit a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin. Nabi Bakhsh was a Malik and a notorious bad character in the Bannu district. Last March he was arrested by the Deputy Inspector of Police of Ghoriwala, and, while being taken to the thana, he shot the Deputy Inspector and escaped across the border to the Mahsuds, going to live, it is said, with Mulla Powindah. His land was confiscated and sold, and Attar Shah Singh, a prominent Hindu living near Ghoriwala, I believe, bought some of it. About two months ago Attar Shah Singh's house was attacked by a few armed men, but the dakaites were beaten off without loss to Attar Shah Singh's people, and it was reported at the time that Nabi Bakhsh had been present at the affair and had been badly wounded. Action was, I understood, being taken by the Deputy Commissioner against the neighbouring villages, who were suspected of sympathy with Nabi Bakhsh. If he lived with Mulla Powindah, he possibly took advantage of the Mulla's absence at Badar to carry out his revenge, or the Mulla's absence is a convenient excuse for the Mulla should Nabi Bakhsh have been living with him, which I think was certainly true some time ago, if not now. This case will, of course, be taken up with the other offences charged to the Mahsuds since the commencement of the blockade.

Annexure 2.

Telegram from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 24th September, 1901.

My telegram of to-day. Report just received confirms death of Attar Shah Singh and six others killed by raiders headed by Nabi Bakhsh, outlawed murderer of Deputy Inspector. Raiders reported to be Mahsuds with whom Nabi Bakhsh has been living. Raiders reported to have entered district along the bed of Kurram river, but it is not known yet by what route they entered. One man wounded in addition to seven killed. Raiders went away apparently unharmed. Motive of raid apparently personal grudges against Attar Shah Singh, who had wounded Nabi Bakhsh two months ago in an attack on his village. Will telegraph further particulars as to territorial or tribal responsibility, if any, as soon as I know more about facts.

Annexure 3.

Telegram from F. W. Johnston, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 25th September, 1901.

My two telegrams of yesterday. Slingsby, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and I returned late last night from pursuit of raiders who entered Khaisara pass. We just missed them as we blocked passes leading up to Shaktu, and raiders slipped by the Burji post, which was deserted when we came up with the cavalry at 4 a.m. We turned out pursuit parties from Michan and Bakka Khel Waziris. Some of the latter came up with raiders and fight ensued. One Mahsud killed; his head and Martini rifle brought in. One of the pursuit party killed. Raid organised and carried out by Nabi Bakhsh, murderer, said to be residing with Mulla Powindah. It seems time that

some retributive or other measures were taken to prevent, if possible, these recurring and successful onslaughts on our posts and villages. Pursuit party recovered three horses looted from Attar Shah Singh, whose eldest son and granddaughter were among the slain. Some of the neighbouring villages through which raiders went appear to have behaved badly.

Annexure 4.

POLICE DEPARTMENT, BANNU DISTRICT.

Special Report of an Offence (No. ²⁹ Part II. of September, 1901), dated the 25th September, 1901.

Description of Offence and Section of Law Offended against; also Distance and Direction of Place from Police Station and Name of Deputy Inspector in Charge.	NUMBER OF PERSONS		VALUE OF PROPERTY		Statement of the Case. Conduct of the Police. Steps taken by them.
	Supposed to have been concerned.	Arrested.	Taken.	Re-covered.	
Murder and Dakaiti—Section 396, Indian Penal Code; seven miles south-east of Police Station Ghoriwala. Third grade Deputy Inspector Muhammad Umar Khan.	About 40	—	Rs. A. P.	—	Date of occurrence— 23rd September, 1901. Date of report to Police—the 23rd September, 1901.
			7,696 12 0		
			350 6 0		
			2,300 0 0		
		Total ...	10,347 2 0		

Annexure 5.

Charge Registers Nos. 89 and 90, Sections 396 and 395, Indian Penal Code, Police Station, Ghoriwala.

About six o'clock on the evening of the 23rd September, 1901, a body of men alleged to be 200 Mahsuds, but probably not exceeding 40 or 50 persons, armed with rifles and led by a notorious outlaw Nabi Bakhsh, Sadozai, made an attack on the house of Attar Shah Singh in the village of that name.

Attah Shah Singh was a wealthy money-lender who had gradually absorbed into his possession a good deal of land in the neighbourhood, including the whole of the land which belonged to Nabi Bakhsh and his brothers, and it will be remembered that in July last Nabi Bakhsh, with a party of Mahsuds, Shinkai and a few other outlaws, made an unsuccessful raid and attempt on the life of Attar Shah Singh (*vide* special report No. 24, Part II., dated the 14th of July, 1901).

On that occasion the assailants were driven off, and it was stated that Nabi Bakhsh and one of the Mahsuds had been wounded. This time Nabi Bakhsh has been only too successful. The raiders entered the Bannu district at a spot as yet unknown, but probably somewhere near the Gummatti pass and travelled along the Kurram river. They must have remained hidden somewhere during the daytime, on the 23rd September, and in the afternoon marched to Attar Shah Singh, surrounded the house and opened a hot fire on the inhabitants, who returned it from the roof, where they had retired for safety, on seeing the raiders approach.

Attar Shah Singh himself was the first to fall shot dead. His son, daughter and three others were then shot down and his nephew wounded.

Meanwhile a chigah came up and one of the party was shot, making in all seven victims killed and one wounded. Nabi Bakhsh and his men then looted the premises, carrying away (it is stated) cash, jewellery, clothes, one rifle, two guns, four swords, two revolvers and two horses (altogether

valued at Rs. 7,696-12-0). Some of the raiders at the same time looted the shop and house of a neighbouring "bania" of cash and jewellery valued at Rs. 350-6-0. The bania's name was Tikaya Ram, and he was amongst the victims shot on the roof of Attar Shah Singh's house, where he happened to be at the time of the raid. The raiders then proceeded to village Nar Bachcha Khan, situated some two miles distant, where the children (a boy and two girls) of Nabi Bakhsh were living in the house of a man called Nasrat Khan. Nabi Bakhsh carried off his children, and it is stated also looted the house of Nasrat Khan of jewellery and cash valued at Rs. 2,300, but this theft is not admitted by the police who have reason to believe the statement has been made to show the family had no dealings with Nabi Bakhsh, whereas it is common knowledge that they are strong sympathisers, if not active abettors, of Nabi Bakhsh, Nasrat Khan himself and his son, Asot, both being in jail and awaiting trial for having aided Nabi Bakhsh in his former raid on Attar Shah Singh in July last. The raiders then departed in the direction of Jani Khel followed by a strong chigah party.

News of the dakaiti reached Police Station Ghoriwala at nine o'clock on the 23rd, and the Deputy Inspector immediately proceeded to the spot with all the policemen he could collect, and he is now in pursuit with chigah party.

Information reached Bannu at 11.30, and Inspector Kazi Amin Jan immediately proceeded to inform Mr. Donald, District Magistrate, who telegraphed at once to Jani Khel to guard the passes and proceeded in that direction himself with some sowars obtained from the cavalry and sent Inspector Kazi Amin Jan to the spot with 30 sowars.

The District Superintendent of Police was on tour in the district, and heard of the raid on arrival at Lakki yesterday morning (24th September). He immediately rode on to Attar Shah Singh, where he met the Inspector of Police and made an examination of the spot. The bodies had already been despatched to Bannu, but the whole premises were in an indescribable state of confusion. Blood was lying all over the place and the numerous bullet marks in the walls showed that the firing must have been heavy. The floors of various rooms had been dug up in the search after money and valuables.

It is undoubted that the raiders were Mahsuds, led by Nabi Bakhsh, who is living with the tribe and known to be befriended by the Mulla Powindah. A few of the party may have been outlaws and Waziris. Nothing further is known at present. The matter is under investigation, and particulars will be reported in due course after District Superintendent of Police has met the District Magistrate.

A raid of this magnitude is unknown within the memory of the present generation, and it is no exaggeration to say the whole countryside is

* Four of the gang have been killed, including Amar-din, Abdullai and Kandar, Tori Khel, two notorious scoundrels. But there is no doubt that the countryside sympathised with Nabi Bakhsh.

W. R. H. MERK. terrified and appalled at the knowledge that it is possible for such a large body of armed trans-border men to march 25 miles into a British district and commit raids of this nature with (apparent) impunity.* Nabi Bakhsh, Sadozai, is a ruffian of the most desperate type. He is fanatical and half mad, and he led the attack on Attar Shah Singh bareheaded, flourishing a sword and calling on "Allah" for success.

He has given out publicly his intention of paying off old scores and looting the ilaka, and it is imperative that something be done to save the people from this ruffian's depredations.

At present a feeling of insecurity prevails throughout the ilaka, and a growing belief that Government is unable to protect its subjects.

Camp Nowrang,
The 24th September, 1901.

A. C. STEWART,
District Superintendent of Police.

Annexure 6.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner of the Bannu District, dated the 26th September, 1901.

Copy forwarded to W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, in continuation of my telegrams, dated 25th and 26th instant, respectively. The facts, so far as known at present, are fully given in the District Superintendent of Police's report, and I have no remarks to add to it just now, except that the death of Amardin, the Mulla's right hand man, at the hands of the pursuit party, supports the District Superintendent of Police's theory that Nabi Bakhsh is being befriended by Mulla Powindah, and further trouble may be expected; in fact, the countryside is apprehensive of this. It is also astonishing that such a large body of trans-border armed men should have advanced

so far into the district without being seen by any one who was willing to give information, and that no assistance was given by the neighbouring villages except Mamma Khel, which lost one man shot dead. Enquiries are being made as to the cause of delay in reporting the attack to the District Magistrate.

They will be punished.
W. R. H. MERK.

Endorsed by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, dated the 30th September, 1901.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to A. H. Diack, Esq., C.S., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Enclosure 83 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, dated the 19th October, 1901.

The blockade alone of the Mahsuds appears unlikely to bring tribe to their knees. There are two alternatives—(1) To continue blockade throughout winter and then to march through country with expedition in spring. This is recommended by Lieutenant-Governor. (2) To continue blockade, but to vary it by succession of sharp sallies or raids of three or four days' duration from different quarters of cordon for destruction of crops and capture of cattle and men. These operations would be conducted by columns of 1,000-2,000 men, and the first would start from Wana and Sarwekai in last week of November. This plan is recommended by Commander-in-Chief, Military Member, General Egerton and myself, and, substantially, by Colonel Deane and Merk. I should have issued orders at once did not affairs in Afghanistan seem to render it desirable that you should be consulted before any blow is struck on frontier. My own belief is that blockade alone will not reduce Mahsuds, that blockade plus harassing may, and that this is the only way to avoid ultimate expedition. I do not think that area of fighting will spread or that tribes other than Mahsuds will be affected. Will you kindly telegraph as soon as possible your views on the matter?

Enclosure 84 in No. 3.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, to the Honourable Mr. J. M. Douie, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 25th October, 1901.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to submit the fortnightly report on the Mahsud blockade.

2. Average prices of the main staples in the Mahsud country appear at present to be as follows:—

Maize	8 $\frac{1}{4}$ seers per rupee.	
Wheat	5 do. do.	
Barley	8 $\frac{5}{6}$ do. do.	
Rice	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do. do.	
Tobacco	2 $\frac{1}{8}$ do. do.	} When procurable.
Salt	2 $\frac{1}{4}$ do. do.	
Cloth	3 yards do.	

These are what we should call famine rates in India. Maize has, of course, fallen, in consequence of the autumn harvest.

3. Till the 9th instant, the whole tribe was fully occupied with the struggle over Badar, from which they have, at any rate temporarily, ousted the Darwesh Khel, whose garrison was permitted to depart with the honours of war. Mulla Powindah endeavoured, in vain, to intervene on behalf of the Darwesh Khel, and his prestige has undoubtedly suffered in consequence. After the conquest of Badar, a great jirga was held at Kaniguram, and good resolutions were again passed to pay the balance of the fine and restore the Kashmir Kar rifles and ammunition, but up to date without result. It is reported that Mulla Powindah has secretly thwarted the resolutions of the jirga which was held by his political opponents, and at which he was not present, and has persuaded the Shaman Khel and others to stand aloof from the arrangements of the jirga. It will be remembered that the difficulty put forward by the Shaman Khel is that although they are sharers to one-third in profit and loss according to tribal custom, yet, owing to their numerical weakness, as compared with the other two main sections, the Alizai and Bahlolzai, and owing to their not having misbehaved at all, they ought not to pay a full one-third share of the fine; still they claim one-third of the future allowances.

4. The Tochi and Bannu have been entirely free of raids. From the Dera Ismail Khan border petty thefts of grain are reported, in the course of which one band of thieves was pursued by villagers; two Mahsuds were wounded and one was captured; he will be tried by the Sessions Court. On the Wana side, Mahsud gangs have fallen on evil days. On the 18th and again on the 20th instant, the 5th Punjab Cavalry at Spin pursued gangs from whom they rescued 1,542 sheep and captured one raider, who will be tried by the Political Officer for the offence described in Section 395, Penal Code, and punishable with transportation for life. The cavalry report killing four and wounding five raiders. The Darwesh Khel have lifted large numbers of Mahsud cattle and sheep; and on the 21st instant, they came across a gang north of Wana on the way to the Upper Gomal to raid Powindahs. The Darwesh Khel attacked the Mahsuds and shot Raza, a leading Sheikh of Mulla Powindah, the gang retiring to the Mahsud hills. Following so closely on Amardin's death, this is another blow to the Mulla. The Powindah migration down the Gomal is progressing quietly up to the present.

5. Up to date Rs. 74,283 have been paid towards the fine. The Tank bahirs have been stopped. A few trivial cases of blockade running have been heard of and are under investigation. Now that the Darwesh Khel and Bhattannis are coming down from the upper hills, it will be easier to keep an eye on them. The Shawal contingent has been withdrawn, as the Darwesh clans have migrated to the plains. Shawal is empty, and it is not safe to leave the contingents there. The Political Officer, Tochi, reports that the cold on the high passes into Shawal from the Mahsud settlements and from Shawal into Birmal is prohibitive of smuggling now.

6. A copy of this letter has been submitted direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and a copy has been communicated to the General Officer Commanding, Derajat District.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Enclosure 85 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla, dated the 1st November, 1901.

Your telegram of 19th October. Mahsud. I agree to the course 2, a succession of sharp sallies.

Enclosure 86 in No. 3.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Sialkot, the 30th October, 1901.

With reference to the question of active operations in order to press the blockade of the Mahsuds, and, if possible, to bring the Mahsuds to submission by means of the blockade, I have the honour to inform you that I have personally discussed the whole matter with Mr. Merk, C.S.I.

2. If any operations are undertaken, it is essential that they should be vigorous, and that the Mahsuds should be repeatedly and continuously pressed in every possible manner in order that as much loss as can be may be caused to them, and that they be prevented from occupying their winter settlements and sowing their next crop.

3. Mr. Merk's idea is that relatively small columns should be constantly on the move, and that the levies and tribesmen on our own side of the line also be made use of.

4. I understand from Mr. Merk that the operations so far contemplated do not include any movement from the Tochi. Mr. Merk and I are both most strongly of opinion that, even if but little damage can be effected from the Tochi side, movements on our part from that quarter should be made simultaneously with those from the south to secure the usual effect which can best be produced by hemming the Mahsuds in on all sides. I think this is most essential to the success of the proposed pressure to be put on the tribe during the winter. It will be a distinct advantage in my opinion if matters are left as much as possible to the discretion of the local officers and authorities.

5. I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Merk, and consider that, if carried out vigorously, they will give Government the only chance of avoiding what they desire to avert, viz., the necessity for a regular expedition into the Mahsud country.

Enclosure 87 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 31st October, 1901.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Officer Commanding Southern Waziristan Militia, wires from Khajuri:—*Begins.* On 28th both telegraph lines between this and Kashmir Kar and Toikhulla were cut in several places. Wire repaired yesterday. On 29th rear guard of Militia party from here were fired on by gang, 20 Mahsuds, seven miles from Kashmir Kar; one man, Militia, wounded. Gang fled. One of them was wounded. *Ends. Ends.*

Enclosure 88 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 2nd November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Political Officer, Wana, wires:—*Begins.* Officer Commanding, Nili Kach, wires:—*Begins.* Mahsuds, number unknown, ambuscaded picquet five men this morning, killed three, captured two rifles. News reached Nili Kach 1.30 p.m. Have just returned from unsuccessful pursuit. *Ends.*

Enclosure 89 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Chief Secretary, Punjab, dated the 3rd November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Report just received that party of 32 rifles, 17th Bengal Infantry, forming part of escort of 75 men furnished for survey of Murtaza-Sarwekai road was ambushed this afternoon. No clear details yet received, but fourteen sepoy said to have been killed and some of Mahsuds captured. Captain Argles, 17th Bengal Infantry, in command, has not yet returned from scene. I do not suggest that this incident make any difference in policy of deliberately wearing down the tribe this winter.

Enclosure 90 in No. 3.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 4th November, 1901.

My telegram of last night. Following from Political Officer, Wana, repeated for information:—*Begins.* Captain Jacob, Southern Waziristan Militia, wires:—*Begins.* Your wire. Captain Argles reports that survey escort, consisting of one Subedar and 32 men was returning from work to Khuzma Khulla. About 4 p.m. shots were heard at Khuzma Khulla post. Captain Argles turned out with available men, 17th Bengal Infantry, and Militia, and proceeded up Khuzma nulla. About 1½ miles up nulla he was fired on by a party of Mahsuds; these were quickly driven off, and half mile further up found overseer and one Havildar badly wounded and two coolies killed. A little further on about 16 bodies of sepoy of survey escort were found and two wounded. Ground was searched until dark for remainder when Captain Argles returned bringing in wounded. From survivors' story it appears that escort was ambushed as last picquet was retiring and shot down at close quarters, only seven escaping. Am proceeding with 50 Militia; 40, 9th Bombay Infantry; and 20, 17th Bengal Infantry, at daylight to-morrow to scene of attack. So far as can be ascertained at present, casualties are as follows: 16 sepoy, 1 overseer, 2 coolies, 1 bhisti, 1 muleteer, killed; 2 sepoy, 1 overseer and 2 coolies, wounded; 1 Subedar and 7 sepoy reported missing, may possibly have escaped. *Ends. Ends.*

Enclosure 91 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Dera Ismail Khan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 4th November, 1901.

Discussed everything with Dening and Merk, and have also received copy of Deane's letter 71, dated 30th October, to Foreign Secretary, which has doubtless reached Your Excellency by this date. I agree with local officers and Deane.

1st.—That action is necessary.

2nd.—That action should be taken simultaneously from Tochi, where a suitable force is available, and from Sarwekai-Wana line.

3rd.—That proposals of the local officers for mobile column are sound.

4th.—That all details should be left to the local officers.

5th.—That operations should be repeated at discretion of local officers.

Merk has arranged for tribal attacks from the north, east and south to follow on heels of our first attack, and I agree with the local officers that our second attack should follow upon these tribal attacks and be delivered about the 15th December. As a reserve, I think, it would be a good thing to move a battalion to Bannu and another to Tank in addition to force at present contemplated. The move not to take place till the secret is out. Proposal for the selection of these two battalions will follow, if Your Excellency approves of principle.

Enclosure 92 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding at Nili Kach, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 2nd November, 1901.

Picquets five men, 9th Bombay Infantry, were stalked by Mahsuds 1.10 p.m. yesterday. Two were killed. Two rifles captured. Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command, Assistant Adjutant-General, Derajat, already informed.

Endorsed by Military Department, dated Simla, the 5th November, 1901.

Copy of the above forwarded to the Foreign Department, for information.

Enclosure 93 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Dera Ismail Khan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th November, 1901.

Continuation of my telegram of 4th November. May I represent to Your Excellency that, if you decide upon action, we must begin on the 22nd November, and time is running short for necessary preliminary arrangements? There are indications that the Mahsud tribe as a whole is changing its attitude to one of tribal hostility, and there is considerable uneasiness along the frontier. On military grounds it appears very desirable to keep the initiative in our hands. If we lose it, the result may become grave.

Enclosure 94 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th November, 1901.

Following telegram sent to Sir Bindon Blood:—*Begins*. Viceroy repeated your telegram regarding action against Mahsuds. Please in wiring anything to Viceroy send, with His Excellency's permission, after to-morrow to me and to Military. I do not concur with your 3rd, 4th and 5th. As regards operations, nothing, in addition to what has been already approved, should be undertaken which entails troops remaining out of their posts after nightfall. There is no objection to a demonstration being made from the Tochi Pass on similar lines to, and simultaneous with, the demonstration from Jandola, returning at night. Please, after communication with General Egerton, submit any proposals for troops in addition to those already arranged.

Enclosure 95 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, dated the 8th November, 1901.

Your instructions to Blood approved. I have told him to repeat all telegrams to you and to Military. Sanction of Secretary of State to proposals contained in my telegram of 19th October was received on 1st November. Please inform Blood.

Enclosure 96 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 8th November, 1901.

Your telegram. Survey party were laying out line of direct rail from Murtaza to Sarwekai mentioned in your letter of 27th May, 1901. Escort was provided of 75 men under British officer, who received personally instructions here from Military Authorities. He, however, apparently remained himself with 43 men at Khuzma Khulla Militia post and sent out 32 men under Subedar with Survey party. On return the escort appears to have neglected order of march and precautions expressly prescribed by General Officer Commanding, and must have been shot down in a lump in narrow ravine at very close quarters, as clothing of some of sepoy is described as having been burnt by shots. Matter is being dealt with by Military Authorities. Mahsuds probably numbered less than fifty.

Enclosure 97 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Murtaza, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 12th November, 1901, and repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Have just seen military programme as sanctioned. Tochi and Jandola columns may not stop out one night. Since Datta Khel and Jandola are some distance from inhabited Mahsud country, these day marches will not even be demonstrative, and will be inoperative, since they will not reach any objective at all. I must point out that, if an expedition is to be avoided, it is absolutely necessary to deliver a very telling stroke at the outset. Jandola column will be eleven hundred infantry alone, and Tochi column nine

hundred infantry, which can be raised to one thousand, besides three hundred militia. Further, the Sarwekai and Wana columns will be two thousand six hundred infantry, and altogether four thousand six hundred infantry alone can operate simultaneously. Unless a crushing blow as possible is struck at the beginning, the desired effect may not be attained. I, therefore, urge that Jandola and Tochi columns be permitted to be more active factors in this business.

Enclosure 98 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 14th November, 1901.

Reference Merk's telegram, dated 12th November. I have to-day talked over the matter with Sir Bindon Blood and General Egerton, and we are all agreed on certain modifications which Sir Bindon Blood will telegraph to Commander-in-Chief, and which, we hope, Government will approve.

Enclosure 99 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Nahan, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 16th November, 1901.

Reference Sir Bindon Blood, November 14th. I have sanctioned adoption of modified programme unless Your Excellency wires to him differently. The original further action proposed could be taken late if desired.

Enclosure 100 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 17th November, 1901.

I have never received Blood's of 14th November, and, therefore, do not know what modified programme is. If, however, as I understand, Blood, Deane and Egerton agree, and if you approve, I gladly sanction action decided upon. Please repeat to me Blood's telegram, but action need not be delayed.

Enclosure 101 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, Rawalpindi, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 18th November, 1901.

Following is copy of telegram sent to Commander-in-Chief and to Military Department, 14th November, which I have been ordered to repeat to Your Excellency:—*Begins.* Deane, Egerton and I met this morning and agreed to recommend to Your Excellency the following modifications of original Waziri programme:—1stly, the Datta Khel column to move to Loargi Kotal afternoon of 23rd November and to vicinity of Razmak Pass 24th November as a demonstration and support to operations of levies and Darwesh Khels to be arranged by Political Officer; 2nd, the Jandola column, after moving to Shingikot and back on 25th November, may be used near Barwand as required. In the absence of any information regarding route.

we do not like to suggest moving of Jandola column on Splitoi from Shingikot with a view to junction with combined Sarwekai and Wana columns; 3rd, Wana and Sarwekai columns, after junction, to retire *viâ* Barwand if that route is preferred by General Officer Commanding when the time comes; 4th, we would prefer that artillery should accompany all the columns, but would leave proportion of these arms of the service to General Officer Commanding. If General Officer Commanding, Derajat, gets Your Excellency's order by the 18th November, he will be able to carry out original or modified programme without difficulty. *Ends.*

Enclosure 102 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Wana, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 26th November, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

The present operations only singe the beard of the Mahsuds, and retirements of columns may be misunderstood by them unless followed up by continued offensive operations. If we were now to demand reparation for offences committed during blockade, the account, exclusive of any fine, would be nearly two lakhs. I mention this to show that the tribe must be thoroughly broken this winter if a lengthy occupation of their country is to be avoided. An expedition is useless, for within four years of the 1894 expedition the condition of the Mahsuds was worse than ever. They must be thoroughly hammered if we are to have a permanent peace. In order to strike before whole tribe can combine and while the iron is hot, and before the winter rains and cold in the higher hills prove a serious obstacle to bivouacking, we propose that next week the joint Wana and Sarwekai columns in a compact body of two thousand five hundred infantry push to Ahmedwam, the Jandola column, a thousand strong with four guns, meanwhile bringing up supplies and tents to Ahmedwam, and that the three columns united with the two extra regiments, the desirability for which has already been discussed with the Lieutenant-General Commanding, go into an entrenched standing camp there. Total force in camp would thus be three thousand five hundred infantry, four guns, besides eight hundred Tochi and Wana Militia, which I can provide. This force, if not considered sufficient, could be augmented by five hundred infantry, if the two regiments mentioned above are brought up, the remainder of these two regiments being utilised to strengthen blockade posts, the garrisons of which have been reduced to a minimum, to permit of present operations. Ahmedwam is three easy marches from Tank, and from Ahmedwam we can raid with ease and safety in every direction and make the lower half of the Mahsuds' country absolutely untenable for tribe, depriving it thereby of its winter pastures and of its spring crops, which is grown in this lower country. Two months of this will, I think, bring the tribe completely to its senses. If these proposals commend themselves, I suggest that all details be left to us, and that orders be issued to us immediately, because delay will give heart to the Mahsuds and will lose us the advantage of retiring the initiative (*sic*) the benefit of the moon. Moreover, the weather will soon be cold. While we are at Ahmedwam, movements would continue to be made from time to time from the Tochi.

Enclosure 103 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Wana, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 27th November, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, we suggest that it be left open to us either to move joint Wana and Sarwekai columns direct on

Ahmedwam or, if it seems preferable owing to weather or other reasons, to move them *viâ* Haidari Kach to Jandola and thence all three columns to move up together to Ahmedwam.

Enclosure 104 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 27th November, 1901.

Telegram from Commissioner, Special Duty. I entirely agree with Merk and strongly recommend that authority be given at once for continuance of operations and movements as he and General Officer Commanding may see will be effective. I think all are to be congratulated on success of late movements. While operations last, I would advise strengthening of Jandola column.

Enclosure 105 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 27th November, 1901.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day. Urgency for early orders for further movements proposed is necessity for another blow to be struck before Mahsuds have time to remove grain and fodder to the hills and to hold jirgas to arrange concerted action.

Enclosure 106 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, Malakand, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 27th November, 1901.

General Dening wires:—On 1st or 2nd proximo I suggest my moving to Kundiwam and raiding from there with the force at my disposal, viz., 3,500 infantry from the three columns, four guns and 50 sabres. I have sufficient transport to take (on) tents, bedding, and supplies can be arranged for. Now would be opportune if two battalions available to send both to Tank. If we are constantly on offensive, then they will be obliged to give in. Also General Dening's. My telegram of to-day—for Kundiwam please read "Ahmedwam," which is three marches from Tank. See routes in Waziristan, Nos. 47 and 50. I went fully at Dera Ismail and Peshawar into proposals now made by Dening, with which I fully and entirely concur. You, of course, see Dening's reason for change from Kundiwam to Ahmedwam. I recommend sanction being given me as under:—

Firstly.—To contract the cordon of blockade by moving a post or posts forward where possible.

Secondly.—To continue raiding from new posts and from posts as may be suitable.

Thirdly.—In (view) of effectually carrying out firstly and secondly, to move two fresh battalions to Tank at once.

I am now beginning to see my way to bringing the Waziris to their senses without an expedition. But to do so we must give the local people a free hand. I am obtaining further details of his proposals from Dening, which I will send you when received, but meanwhile I hope my three points as above will be approved at once.

Endorsed by Military Department, dated Simla, the 29th November, 1901.

Copy forwarded to the Foreign Department, for information.

Enclosure 107 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, Maymyo, to the Commander-in-Chief, Bikaner, dated the 30th November, 1901.

Viceroy approves proposals, which seem to him legitimate extension of recent successful operations rather than expedition, and he begs you to issue immediate orders.

Enclosure 108 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 3rd December, 1901. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Three Maliks arrived this morning to ask what terms would be given to the Mahsuds. I simply told them that the orders of Government, when received, would be communicated to the tribe and sent them away.

Enclosure 109 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Dera Ismail Khan, to Foreign Secretary, dated the 3rd December, 1901.

Reference Commissioner, Special Duty's telegram. I agree with Merk, and think we should make a great mistake to enter into any discussion about terms with Mahsuds at present. The blockade should be pressed, to settle the question, if possible, so as to ensure future peace. If we discuss the matter now, we shall have the same trouble again six months hence.

Enclosure 110 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Camp, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 7th December, 1901.

*Clear the line. Egerton's telegram begins:—*6th December. Following scheme for tightening blockade of cordon, in case Dening's operations for Ahmedwam should not be sufficiently effective, the later phases of which have been repeated to Foreign Department by Lieutenant-General, Punjab, has been drawn up after personal interviews with Deane and Merk. General principle being to continue to deal severe blows from unexpected direction,

consider, therefore, that so-called reserve brigade should be actively employed, and not kept concentrated at Tank. Dening's operations can only be effectual in the southern portion of Mabsud territory; it will then be necessary to act in an area bounded on the north by the Khaisora valley, west and south by the Tank, and east by the Bhattanni country. This tract is a vast grazing ground. To give effect to this, the following are my proposals:—One battalion to move to Datta Khel, two battalions with two guns to Khagan Zuo at mouth of Shaktu, the fourth battalion to reinforce Sarwekai and Wana column of 1,000 to 1,200 troops, and any Militia available to move *via* Loargai next to Mamirogha, thence *via* Khaisora and Dosalli to Waladin in the Shaktu. Karkunwam column to Mundawam in the Shaktu, there linked up with Datta Khel column. Jandola column, about 1,000 strong, to Shuza Tangi. A column from Ahmedwam, 1,200 to 1,500 strong, to the Upper Shuza. These four converging columns would thoroughly search neighbourhood in from two to three days, and then return to their respective starting points. *Ends.*

This is considerable improvement of Dening-Merk original proposal, which would almost amount to expedition. Mahsuds will receive sharper lesson than from expedition, and it constitutes legitimate extension of recent successful operations. I therefore strongly recommend that sanction be given to Egerton's proposal.

Enclosure 111 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Edwardesabad, to the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 8th December, 1901.

I have seen trans-border jirgas here who are delighted with hope that Mahsuds may now be thoroughly crushed. Neither here nor at Dera Ismail Khan have I found a man with a good word for them. The only fear all express is that Mahsuds will come forward at once with customary submission and break out again as soon as accepted. Losses of Mahsuds, exclusive of Dening's last operations, are reported by Bhattannis and Waziris as 80 killed. Dening's operations have had great effect.

Enclosure 112 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 8th December, 1901. Repeated to Foreign Secretary.

Following is connected accounts of operations just concluded. On fourth instant force marched over twenty miles from here to Dwe Shinkai, which is within twelve miles of Kaniguram, and camped at Dwe Shinkai for the night; the advance was unexpected by the Mahsuds. During the night of fourth the news spread over Mahsud country, and leading men and others assembled at Karanima, six miles above the camp, Mulla Powindah receiving the news at his home, where he at once collected his personal adherents. On morning of fifth troops destroyed some villages and towers two miles above the camp, and returned towards Guri Khel, being followed up by Mahsuds who came to close quarters in rear guard action. That night the Mulla with his following had reached to about three miles from the camp, and is reported to have sent message to Mahsuds in southern and eastern lower hills to move up with their families and flocks towards the higher country, as Government was evidently in earnest. This migration is just what is wanted, as concentration of Mahsuds in high and cold country

will be severely felt by them. On the sixth the troops halted at Guri Khel; there was sniping during the day, but not at night; Mulla Powindah and his following keeping parallel to the troops at some miles distance. On the seventh the troops retired slowly to Marghaband, destroying villages. The Mahsuds followed up as far as Kot Shingi, charging to close quarters once, and being repulsed with much loss. To-day part of the force returned direct to Jandola, the other part moved up the Shai Tak as far as Zeriwam, destroying villages without opposition, the Mahsuds having disappeared; the whole column is now back in Jandola. Our total casualties have been one British officer wounded; native ranks thirteen killed, seventeen wounded. Mahsud losses not yet accurately known, but following men of note known to have been killed: Jan Khan, son of Badshah Khan, who is the principal Mahsud Malik; also Asal Khan, Guri Khel, a most notorious raider, who took a prominent part in the Khuzmah attack on 17th Bengal Infantry; also Shadamir, Gererai, and his brother, and Isad Khan, Shingi, well-known raiders. Fifteen villages and six towers destroyed, and much grain and fodder. On the body of Jan Khan were found a revolver marked "made for Fracis, Times & Co., London," also Henry-Martini cartridges marked F.T.C. with double-headed eagle, also other solid drawn Henry-Martini cartridges of different non-Government patterns. I have seen similar F.T.C. cartridges in possession of Darwesh Khel this year; and the Commandant, Border Military Police, Dera Ismail Khan, reports that among the arms deposited as usual by the Powindahs at Tank this year are fifteen Henry-Martini rifles, evidently imported from Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 113 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Gwalior, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, dated the 11th December, 1901.

Egerton proposes to carry out the operation specified in his telegram repeated in my telegram of 7th December, as soon as additional troops now *en route* reach him, and to commence the following minor intermediate operations about the 14th December:—One thousand men and four guns in two columns co-operating for three days from Jandola and Sarwekai in the Trebran of the Shinaki Algad, and after returning to Jandola and revictualling again operate as far as Kharwanan and again retire on Jandola. Egerton expects by these tactics to draw attack from strong gathering from Kaniguram and Makin, as it is in these retirements that the greatest loss is inflicted on the Mahsuds, and he is confident of success with the selected troops employed. He states that Dening and Merk fully concur. I think that all concerned may be permitted to carry out these proposals, which I propose sanctioning, unless Your Excellency objects.

Enclosure 114 in No. 3.

Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Gwalior, dated the 12th December, 1901.*

Your telegram 11th. If Egerton is confident of success, and does not fear difficulties on retirement, Military Member and I are willing to sanction proposed intermediate operations. But if your telegram means that columns should only be 500 men and two guns each, we think this too small. Probably, however, you mean 1,000 men and four guns in each column. Pre-

* NOTE.—The further operations referred to in this telegram were finally sanctioned at a conference in Calcutta on 18th December.

parations can be made for further operations proposed in your telegram of 7th December. But it does not seem necessary to issue orders for their actual execution until I have returned to Calcutta.

Enclosure 115 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Dera Ismail Khan, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 1st January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

This morning three columns started from Jandola, Jani Khel, and Datta Khel, to converge on north-eastern portion of Mahsuds' country. If the operations are successful, they should result in large captures of cattle and sheep, besides dealing with Mahsuds' villages in the Shaktu valley. Addressed Chief Commissioner.

Enclosure 116 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 2nd January, 1902.

I have the honour to forward the enclosed report from Mr. W. Merk, C.S.I., on Special Duty in connection with the Mahsud-Waziri Blockade, on the recent operations undertaken with a view to render the blockade more effective, and to prevent the Mahsuds from continuing their raids into British territory and on British posts.

2. That steps of the nature taken were necessary is shown by the fact that in certain tracts the blockade had not affected the Mahsuds to any great extent; that they possessed considerable stores of grain and fodder, and that they were comfortably settled in the lower and warmer valleys of their country, whence their raids into British territory were carried out with great impunity.

3. During my late tour on the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu borders I was much struck by the system of Mahsud terrorism under which that frontier has suffered for some time past, described and complained of by the Chiefs and British subjects as well as Bhattannis and Waziris. The state of affairs has been such that it is absolutely necessary that steps be taken such as will settle the Mahsud question for some years to come, if not once and for all.

4. In the case of the Mahsuds the policy adopted by the Government of India in determining to avoid a regular expedition, and, instead of this, to coerce the tribe, if possible, by an active blockade, has been more than justified by the results attained and now reported by Mr. Merk. Government are not only relieved of the expense of extensive operations, but the system followed avoids the spending of money in the Mahsud country for the benefit of the Mahsuds, and more real loss has apparently been already inflicted on the Mahsuds than in any of the former expeditions against them.

5. The operations have been very successful, and Colonel Tonnochy's move on to Makin and back was a very brilliant performance. A very satisfactory feature has been the manner in which the Southern Waziristan Militia in particular carried out their part. It is good proof of the value

of militia in the hands of competent officers and supported by troops. Mr. Merk and all the officers concerned are to be congratulated on the success of the plans they drew up.

6. I think it not improbable that these late operations will drive the Mahsuds into submission to Government. The native opinion on the border is definitely that the Mahsuds will submit and will later again break out; that the tribe cannot be reformed and induced to relinquish their old ingrained habits of murdering, raiding and thieving by anything short of permanent occupation of the country. This is a point which may some day be forced on to Government, but meanwhile the line now taken may well be given a fair chance, and the knowledge that Government can coerce them by means of a blockade and can reach them with their troops without moving in force into their country and putting money into the pockets of the people in purchase of supplies and making of roads, may, it is hoped, have some effect in keeping them quiet in future. Until the Mahsuds do submit, I consider that operations should be continued, and, in my opinion, it is essential that Government should leave the tribe to sue for peace. Any hasty submission or calling in of the jirgas to discuss terms would put us back into the old position.

When the time comes, we should first satisfy ourselves as to what terms *can* be enforced, and those terms should be dictated to the tribe by Government and then enforced in full.

Annexure 1.

Letter from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner on Special Duty, to the Honourable Colonel H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 15th December, 1901.

I have the honour to enclose, for the information of Government, copies of reports by the officers on Political duty and by the Commandants of the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias, relating to operations from the 24th to the 28th ultimo, against the Mahsuds.

2. I do not propose to trouble Government with similar reports on each operation. I submit these reports because the surprises (except in the case of the Jandola Column) came off successfully, though this was contrary to general expectation; because the reports of the Commandants of Militias are gratifying testimony to the efficiency and marching powers of their corps, and because subsequent operations of the now offensive blockade will, the element of surprise excluded, be conducted much on the lines indicated in the report.

3. During the discussions preceding the action that was taken, the secret must have leaked out; where, I do not know; but on the 13th November there was a strong rumour in the Bannu Bazaar that four columns were going to attack the Mahsuds in the last week of November; and across the Indus the matter seems to have been known to several whose position did not imply an official knowledge of confidential matters. The report of a pending attack by Mahsuds on us, which I carefully communicated to every post in Bannu, Northern and Southern Waziristan and Dera Ismail Khan, served to confuse men's minds: some believed one thing, some another; and though the Mahsuds had a shrewd suspicion that something was coming, they had no idea (except at Jandola) that it would be so soon or so sudden. At Jandola an incident which, at first sight seems trifling, aroused their suspicions, the troops coming up ostensibly as reliefs marched in with bands playing; to trans-border men this means action.

4. I assess the damage done to the Mahsuds to be Rs. 95,000 worth at a moderate estimate; moreover, 201 prisoners were taken. Of these,

about 20, who were either old and infirm or else young boys, were released, and of the remainder a part have already reached the Dera Ismail Khan Jail and a part are on their way there.

5. Leaving aside the blow struck at the Mahsuds, the surprises are of immense value as demonstrating to them (and to other tribes) that even distant quarters (such as Makin, destroyed in the brilliant moves of Colonel Tonnochy) are not safe from our sudden attack, while the subsequent march of General Dening has shown them that Kaniguram can be easily reached in two marches from Jandola. This knowledge of helplessness tends more to keep tribes on their good behaviour than anything else.

Annexure 2.

Copy of a letter dated Jandola, the 27th November, 1901, from Lieutenant J. B. BOWRING, Assistant Commissioner, S. W. M. Column, to the Commissioner on Special Duty.

With reference to the operations of the S. W. M. Column against the Mahsud Wazirs on the 24th—27th instant, which I accompanied as Political Officer, I have the honour to make the following report:—

The force moved out from Jandola at 11 p.m. on 24th.

2. The force reached Zhokkai at 3 a.m., the tower was blown up and houses destroyed, the place, however, was empty, as a warning shot had been fired from the ridge 2 miles from Jandola, when the column reached there. Further on, a mill was blown up.

From the Narai between Zhokkai and Mandana large fires were seen
 * Also called Kot Shingi. at Kot Kai,* and on arriving within two miles,
 W. MERK, the continuous shouting of the inhabitants
 Commissioner on showed that they were aware of our approach.
 Special Duty.

3. Kot Kai, a very strong position of caves and morchas at the point of the ridge where the Tuzar runs in the Shi Tak, was attacked about 4.30 a.m., and carried after a strenuous defence. After the capture the Shingis kept up a continuous sniping, and some Malikshais from Isappara came down to assist. Owing to the number of men wounded the Officer Commanding Column decided to return to Jandola at 8 a.m. Asad Khan Shingi's tower was not blown up,† owing to the Engineer party being employed in the destruction of the Amal Khel tower, which having been set fire to caused great delay.

† It was blown up on the 8th instant.

W. MERK,
 Commissioner on
 Special Duty.

4. In the retirement, the force was closely followed up, and Asal Khan, with Guri Khels and others from the neighbourhood of Shahmazai, came down to assist the Shingis, but by the time they had arrived the troops had reached Mandana Kach, having burnt much fodder *en route*. At Mandana a Subadar of the 1st Punjab Infantry was shot and Fateh Khan's house was set alight and considerable damage done.

The force had 1 Subadar, 2 men, and 1 follower killed, and Lieutenant Peile, I.M.S., slightly and 16 men wounded.

The following names of Mahsuds killed and wounded have been ascertained:—

Shujak, brother of Baramat, Aimal Khel Bahadur Khan, Mian Khan, Shingi, Raza Khan Shingi, killed, and Brahum Gul, Sarang Amir Shah, Khan Zaman, Middi Khan, Shingis, wounded.

There were, doubtless, more casualties. No prisoners were taken, nor cattle looted. S. Asad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, Jandola, rendered valuable assistance, and the guides behaved excellently, especially Fateh Khan, who deserves special mention.

The cattle were removed from Kot Kai the day the troops reached Jandola, a day or two before the attack, and it is reported that a Bhattanni, resident of Kot Kai, gave information on the 24th to the Shingis that something was up and put them on their guard.

The force remained in Jandola the 26th, and on 27th reconnoitred towards the Shuza to strengthen the Bhattanni Lashkar, but this move was abortive, because the Jalal Khel against whom it was directed had driven their animals to distant hills.

I estimate the total damage to the Mahsuds at Rs. 2,500.

Annexure 3.

POLITICAL OFFICER'S REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SARWEKAI MILITARY COLUMN.

The column started at 4.15 a.m. on the 25th November. The Political staff consisted of the Political Officer, Tahsildar Muhammad Azim Khan, Officiating Naib Tahsildar Kuli Khan, and about 20 Mahsud spies and guides. Naib Tahsildar Ahmad Khan remained in Political charge of the Sarwekai post.

By a fortunate chance the inhabitants of the nearer villages in the beat of the Sarwekai Column had sent Tale, Michi Khel, Malik of Dania Khel, to Sarwekai on the morning of the 24th to find out the intentions of Government and give them timely warning if any movement seemed to be intended. Tale was placed under supervision on his arrival at Sarwekai, and the people of the Tangai, Waspas, &c., not having received any message from him, remained in fancied security, and were taken completely by surprise on the morning of the 25th.

Before reaching Barwand, a column under Captain Rice, 35th Sikhs, was detached to make straight for the upper part of the Waspas Algad *via* the Ezhghozh Narai and surprise the village of Waspas. Officiating Naib Tahsildar Kuli Khan accompanied this column.

The Political Officer and Tahsildar remained with the main column which reached the first villages in the Tangai shortly after sunrise. The ground was unfavourable for the capture of live stock, and though the flocks and herds had only a very short start, they mostly succeeded in getting away* by the small side nullahs which came down from the Splitoi direction.

* These were captured subsequently by the Southern Waziristan Militia, whom I sent out to raid the northern slopes of Kundighar.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

The village of Hassan Kelai, a small but strong Kot without a tower belonging to Abdurrahman Khels, was destroyed by a Pioneer party with explosives, and the cave villages of Ghazo and Khak were burned, the former contained a large quantity of grain. The movements of the main column ended with the occupation of the village of Espara Raghzai in the afternoon.

Meanwhile Captain Rice had surrounded the village of Waspas, four or five miles to the west of Espara Raghzai, and had shut in a number of the inhabitants and their cattle, Shah Salim,† the Malik of the place, surrendered, and was made prisoner; but a tower which commanded the whole village and the approaches to it was held by several men with breech-loaders, and it did not appear that the village could be entered without loss disproportionate to the object to be gained. Captain Rice accordingly turned his attention to the neighbouring village of Abas Khel in the Tangai; it likewise contained a tower, and was held by a few breech-loaders, but it was not so difficult of entrance as

† A mischievous, double-dealing old man.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

Waspas, and the inhabitants abandoned it without resistance. A brother of Samandar, one of the Maliks, being taken prisoner. The tower was blown up and the village burned. Shortly before dark the Political Officer with two additional companies joined Captain Rice, and the party returned to Waspas, but it was then too late to make arrangements for surrounding the village, besides which the cattle and most of the people had escaped during Captain Rice's absence at Abas Khel. Waspas was entered without opposition the next morning, and the tower and village destroyed along with the grain which they contained.

While this destruction was taking place at Waspas on the morning of the 26th November a column had been sent out from Espara Raghzai to the village of Badshah Khan on the Nano Narai, which was found deserted. The Tahsildar accompanied this column. Badshah Khan was somewhere in the neighbourhood and attempted to gain time by holding out hopes to Major Drew, in Command of the Column, that he would give himself up; but he did not do so, and after destroying two large towers and the whole village the column withdrew. It was followed up by a few men during its retirement. After the return of Captain Rice from Waspas, and before the return of Major Drew from Badshah Khan, a strong tower belonging to Sadda Gul between Espara Raghzai and Abas Khel was destroyed and the cave villages of Gaji Khel and Masti Khel in the same direction were looted by detachments of the 35th Sikhs and 29th Punjab Infantry, the last-named two villages yielded a large proportion of the prisoners and cattle brought in by the column.

On the night of the 26th the whole force bivouacked at Espara Raghzai, and the next morning it retired *via* Barwand to Sarwekai, which was reached about 2 p.m. The Mahsuds unsuccessfully attempted to harass the first stage of the retirement.

A few houses belonging to Tale, Michi Khel Malik, were spared in consideration of the services rendered by him with the column, and also as an incentive to him to continue furnishing political information at Sarwekai and as a convenience to spies sent out from Sarwekai in the Tangai direction who cannot well work without a friendly *pied-à-terre* there. In Ghazas village one cave belonging to a spy was spared. These were the only exemptions. Unquestionably the chief results attained by the Sarwekai Military Column were the destruction of Badshah Khan's and Shah Salim's villages and the capture of Shah Salim. These incidents cannot fail to impress the lesser Maliks throughout the Mahsud country. The losses in grain, cattle and prisoners to the inhabitants of the lower Tangai at large have also been serious; the exact numbers of prisoners and live stock brought in have already been reported. The prisoners include besides Shah Salim, Ghazo, a Thaman Khel Malik, and Daulat Khan, brother of Samandar, Abas Khel Malik. There is still some doubt as to the exact number of casualties sustained by the Mahsuds in killed and wounded, but Khojagai, Abdurrahman Khel headman of Hassan Kelai and a relative and harbourer of Mianji Khan, the celebrated badmash, was certainly among the killed. The successful retirement on Barwand will be depressing to the Mahsuds, as it proves them incapable of following up troops, which are well handled, with any success. Badshah Khan, Adam Khan and their sons personally took part in the unsuccessful chigha.

The only village left unvisited and undestroyed in the beat of the Sarwekai Column were two or three in the Tangai above Abas Khel and those in the Gurgurra and Nazhwar Algads which come down from the direction of Kaniguram. These could easily have been disposed of on the 27th, had not want of rations obliged the force to return to Sarwekai on that day.

J. G. LORIMER.

Political Officer, Wana, Southern Waziristan.

Sarwekai,
The 30th November, 1901.

Annexure 4.

COPY OF A REPORT BY MAJOR HARMAN, D.S.O., COMMLANDANT S. W. MILITIA,
DATED SARWEKAI, THE 1ST DECEMBER, 1901.

On Tuesday, 19th November, at 4 p.m., I received your orders to concentrate 250 or 300 Militia at Sarwekai. As I was debarred from using the wire, I sent orders to Captain Knox, whom I expected to reach Kajuri on the 20th, by a Darwesh Khel sowar. The orders reached Captain Knox at 3 p.m. I sent down Jemadar Ayub Khan with 15 Niazis to free the Afridis there. In accordance with orders, I recalled all the Mahsuds from the posts. The last of them reached Wana on Friday, the 22nd, including the two ex-levies in my employ at Spinkai Kach. I reduced all my posts except Kashmir Kar, which I considered too isolated to weaken, to a minimum, and gave orders that the diminished garrisons were merely to protect the posts and were not to patrol.

I marched to Ngandi on the 22nd with 2 Native Officers and 74 rifles, and was met by 1 Native Officer and 41 rifles from Toi Khulla and 1 Native Officer and 51 rifles from Kajuri.

I marched to Sarwekai on the 23rd, taking 7 rifles from Dargai Oba, and was joined by Captain Knox, with 4 Native Officers and 86 rifles, who marched over the Khuzma, giving a total of 2 British Officers, 8 Native Officers and 259 rifles. Subedar Saidulla from Toi Khulla brought me 18 Powindah coolies, some of them armed, and Malik Gulrang reached Sarwekai late on the 24th bringing in 25 more from Kajuri Kach. In order to carry out the destruction of the Lower Shaman Khel villages I started at midnight with Captain Knox, the Subedar-Major and 6 Native Officers and 200 rifles and marched across the low hills between the Danaot and Wach Shahur Valleys and reached the Tangi below the mouth of the Sarela at 5.30 a.m.

From Sarwekai I detached Subedar Shahdad with 40 Eusufzais to hold the mouth of the Sheranna Nullah with orders to remain concealed until the cattle of Badrakai should come out at dawn.

On my arrival at the Sarela Tangi I picquetted the hills on each side with the Gandapurs and Merwats, sent on the Darwesh Khel to picquet above Moghal Shah's village and halted the remainder till dawn. This latter picquet alarmed the dogs of Moghal Shah's village, and some of the cattle of this village and some of Haidrai Killi were driven off before we attacked.

At the first streak of dawn I sent Captain Knox with Bhattannis and Sherannis against Moghal Shah's Kirri, the Subedar-Major with the Khat-taks against Haidrai, and went with the Afridis to Fattehroz Killi; firing broke out at once at Moghal Shah's Kirri. The Subedar-Major pushed on to Haidrai and was followed by Captain Knox, who first attacked the two villages near him. Within a very short time we were in possession of all the villages. Firing meanwhile had been general. When I saw that fighting was meant I sent up a picquet of Bhattannis on to the high ridge above my early morning picquets. This picquet proved very useful later in the day, as a considerable party tried to get on our flanks and rear, and would have succeeded except for the good work done by this picquet.

I then started off the cattle up the Shahur and went on to Haidrai. A heavy fire was heard from near Badrakai's villages, and it proved that Subedar Shahdad had carried out his orders splendidly and seized all the flocks and cattle, the men of the towers* bolting into the hills.

* All these towers were subsequently blown up on the 10th instant, and three more prisoners taken by troops marching from Jandola to Sarwekai.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

When I reached Haidrai I found we had one man wounded. Captain Knox was out recalling a small party who had pursued the Haidrai cattle into the hills. I

left him with the rear guard, and sent Subedar-Major Mir Hassan with the Khattaks to take and retire along the high hill on the right bank of the Danaot. As soon as we retired we were persistently fired on, and a fresh party joined the enemy and climbed the high hill on the left bank. We retired slowly, burning all we could, and capturing all the cattle in the valley. Subedar Saidulla, Afridi, saw some cattle trying to get away and at once sent Jemadar Ghani Khan with his merwats after them. Ghani Khan rounded them up and pushing on picquets got in touch with Subedar Shahdad. The Subedar-Major had a skirmish on his hill and had two casualties getting off the hill and rejoined us at Badrakai's towers. Subedar Makhham and his Bhattannis having successfully opposed the men in front of him, got off his hill without loss and joined us. I had halted the cattle at Badrakai's spinney, as the men were suffering from want of water. Captain Knox, who had managed the rear guard splendidly, had here to halt his rear guard. Excellent positions had been taken up, and most of the opposition gave up here. Captain Knox, after letting the cattle get well on, brought off every one without loss. Two men followed on sniping the rear guard, one of our men who tried to *chupao* these two picked up one Lee-Metford cartridge and one Martini cartridge at a place from which they had just left. We arrived at Sarvekai at 4 p.m. with seven prisoners (another died on the road).

2,044 Sheep and goats.
 19 Donkeys.
 315 Cows and calves.
 6 Camels.
 3 Horses.
 Total cattle, 2,387.

The conduct of the Militia in this their first fight was excellent. The men worked at a great pace, were excellent, and were well able to look after themselves. Had any of our picquets failed us, we must have had considerable losses. Several picquets declared they inflicted losses on the Mahsuds during the retirement and some were killed at our first onslaught. As the Mahsuds showed no anxiety to press home any attack, though Kalu and his gang were present, I feel sure they had losses.

Captain Knox was admirable in his handling of the rear guard. He was always with the rear party and showed excellent judgment throughout.

On the evening of the 26th orders were received to start as early as I liked for the top of Kundighar and search the northern slopes for cattle. As there were no coolies for the troops, I took up 24 mules with me carrying one day's rations. I marched off at 6.30 a.m. As I did not know the ground, I preferred to have daylight to work in as I knew the ground to be difficult—1 blanket per man and 8 boxes ammunition.

The forces consisted of—

* Major Harman and Captain Knox. 2 British Officers,* 7 Native Officers and 196 rifles Militia.

† Lieutenant Coates, 29th Punjab Infantry. 1 British Officer,† 2 Native Officers and 70 rifles of the 29th Punjab Infantry and 35th Sikhs.

No opposition was met with during the ascent. A spring was found on the way up two miles from the Marg near the top of the hill. There was sufficient water for the men, but not enough for the mules. On the advance guard reaching the crest beyond the Marg, cattle and sheep were seen grazing below and beyond us on the far slopes of and near the head of the Waspas Nullah. I decided to drop "gadda" coats and select our best hill-men, and sent them on under Captain Knox to round these up. I selected 70 men, and Captain Knox went off at a great pace with these. I picquetted the crest, keeping everyone out of sight of the Waspas Nullah.

The distance to be got over proved much longer than I anticipated. The slopes are cut into deep ravines and some of the ground proved very

difficult. When Captain Knox reached the hills overlooking the column connecting the Shin Algad and the Waspas Algad, he dropped two picquets on to the column, and recognizing that it would be impossible to get the cattle up the road he had gone down by, he brilliantly decided to detach 24 rifles under the command of Havildar (1st grade) Mohibulla, an Adam Khel Afridi. These he sent straight at the cattle with orders to hustle them over the Waspas, a very deep nullah, and with orders to drive them up the spur which ran down below the site of our bivouac. He took on the rest of the men along the hill on the left bank of the Waspas and moved down till he immediately overlooked the Abbas Khel villages. Unfortunately before the movement was complete the sheep and goats had turned and were grazing back towards their villages. As Captain Knox got down over the hill he encountered opposition, and the alarm was given, and the sheep and goats were driven right away down the hill. Captain Knox

* These will be taken up presently.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

found there were eight villages below him which had not been touched* by the Sarwekai Column. I was greatly relieved to see that he did not attempt to go on down after the sheep and goats. He maintained his position until Havildar Mohibulla had got the cattle well over the stream, and nearly up the big spur running down from our bivouac. In crossing the Nullah, Havildar Mohibulla's party was fired on, and he returned the fire freely. He states he killed four men here. Captain Knox then drew off his men, getting back to his picquets with only one man very slightly wounded. He was followed up until he reached the hills overlooking the column. He then drew off the picquets and reached the bivouac about 4.30 p.m.

Captain Knox showed great dash and judgment in this affair. He was always on in front, and as my men told me tired out some of the best of our hillmen. The want of water distressed the men much, but they all got back without assistance. When Captain Knox started to raid the cattle I brought on more men and remained on the hills overlooking the column I mention above.

As soon as I saw the course of events, I sent back to camp with orders to push out available Sikhs well down the spur across and up which Mohibulla was driving the cattle. As soon as I saw that Captain Knox was getting well back from his advanced position, I left the picquets and went back to the bivouac. I had previously left orders for the Subedar-Major to, as soon as he got in (he was on rear guard) select a bivouac, make defences and to send down for water. He had been told there was always water on the top of the hill, but found that the two tanks on the Marg were dry, and that no cattle had been on the hill for about a month.

When I got back to the bivouac, a distance of some two miles, I found Mohibulla, judging that the hill was too steep for the cattle to get up to bivouac, had crossed the spur and was driving them fast down another spur trending towards Sarwekai. The Subedar-Major with 30 Sikhs had reached a marked under feature above the path Mohibulla had crossed by. He was instrumental in driving back a small Chiga that had come up from Waspas. He waited till Mohibulla had got well down the spur, and brought his men back up the hill. I was fortunately able before the sun sunk below the hill to helio into Sarwekai. The force had no water; it came up by 4.30 p.m., and the men were very done up, so I had to trust to Mohibulla pulling through, though I expected he would be followed up. He had sent me up one of his men to explain to me why he had gone down and to report that his party was well able to look after themselves and the cattle. He reported next day that 40 or 50 men came after him with 2 or 3 breech-loaders. He drove the cattle on with six men hugging the hill, and extended his 17 others (all good men) as a rear guard, and succeeded in preventing the pursuing party closing on the cattle. The Officer Commanding Sarwekai sent out parties to the edge of the Rogzha who lit fires, and I was delighted to get a helio next morning that all the cattle had got in by 7 p.m., and that we had no casualties.

Havildar Mohibulla reported that he certainly shot some of the men who followed him up, and showed me that they followed up to about 400 yards from the line of fires.

Had I known the ground, I doubt if I should have attempted to seize the cattle that day. A reference to the map will show the great distance covered by the men. However, everything came off, and our sole casualty was one man slightly wounded. I am informed that we killed Ghazo, a leading Abbas Khel, and wounded Shah Salim's brother.

The number of cattle brought in was as follows:—

Camels	3
Cattle	240
Goats	24
Sheep	49
							<hr/>
						Total ...	316
							<hr/>

One very fine camel which refused to be driven was shot by our men.

The force on the hill had barely enough water that evening and many of the men were very done up. The night, which was very cold, passed quietly. At dawn—I did not think it safe to attempt sending a party through the ilex forest at night—a strong party went down to the spring for water. They reached us about 9.30 a.m. The men were then able to cook food. Meanwhile we watched Kundiwam and the Khaisara burning, and satisfied ourselves that no cattle or fugitives made for the Shin Algad.

Shortly before noon I sent the Khattak Company under Subedar-Major Mir Hassan to the top of Kundighar with orders to search Madijan with glasses, directed the Sikhs to hold and descend down the crest of the northerly spur, and after unsuccessfully trying to communicate with the Wana column by helio, retired down the nullah we came up by. Captain Knox, after his tremendous exertions of the day before, want of water and a cold night, got a severe attack of fever. He was able to walk down to the spring, but after that, had to be carried down the hill. He recovered sufficiently to ride in when we met our horses at the bottom of the nullah. Nothing occurred during our retirement. The Subedar-Major reported that nothing was to be seen on Madijan or the western slopes of the hill. Lieutenant Coates with his Sikhs took the mules up and down the hill over bad ground, finding his own road. He worked this very well without delaying us at all.

The conduct of my men and their endurance pleased me immensely. In spite of the scarcity of water after an exceptionally hard day, all were cheerful, and all of them got down the hill fit and well next day. Sarwekai was reached by 5 p.m.

Of Captain Knox's services I cannot speak too highly, and I shall be glad if the Commissioner will think fit to bring them to the notice of the Military Authorities. In all that he did he showed great dash, endurance, and judgment, and always worked to carry out the objects I had in view. He was invaluable throughout. I similarly wish to bring to notice the valuable services of Subedar-Major Mir Hassan, who has now got 29 years' service. For a man of his age his endurance and energy are wonderful. He is a splendid man on service, very cool, with lots of dash, and is greatly looked up to by all ranks of the Militia.

My Hospital Assistant Abdulla Khan is worthy of notice. He never spared himself, was always where he was wanted, whether under fire or not, and was always cool and quick over his work. He proved himself an excellent man and able to undergo great fatigue without breaking down. I was greatly pleased with the go and dash and cheerfulness of all ranks.

The results of these affairs has shown that the pick of my men, excluding Mahsuds, are:—

(I take the companies in numerical order.)

The Darwesh Khels.

The Bhattannis.

The Afridis.

The Sherannis.

I have excellent men among—

The Gandapurs.

The Eusafzais.

The Merwats.

The Khattaks.

I am in hopes that this opportunity will give the necessary fillip to recruiting, and that in a few months the whole of the corps will be up to the standard of the selected men chosen for this affair. I wish lastly to

* He will be rewarded.

W. MERK,
Commissioner on
Special Duty.

bring to your notice the name of Malik Gulrang,* a Dotanni Powinda, who brought me coolies from his own Kirris near Kajuri. His men have behaved excellently throughout and were of great assistance.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The tactics employed were, as nearly as possible, Mahsud tactics. The fastest and best men raided, the rest were used for picquets. I was impressed of the necessity of picqueting thoroughly, and on the top of hills within reach. A Mahsud will not come up a hill against a picquet, and events proved that he takes great care of his own skin. They proved themselves adepts at taking advantage of grounds.

I was surprised at the long distances men can cover, and if allowed to go the pace the hill men can cover ground.

The Militia had no collective training. The constant picqueting and patrolling from our posts stood us in good stead. The men were accustomed to rely on themselves in small parties. Most of them looked on the skirmishing as a huge joke.

If any raid is again intended on Tangai, a force should certainly be sent up Kundighar to descend on to the head of the villages. There would be then no escape for the villages if simultaneously a force dashed up from Barwand. Pace and picquets are everything.

Annexure 5.

BRIEF REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS WITH THE WANA COLUMN.

Late on the afternoon of the 24th November, I met a jirga of the Ahmadzais and dismissed them just before the gates of the fort closed after communicating to them the orders of the Commissioner on Special Duty that they were now at liberty to raid the Mahsuds to any extent they pleased. They departed expressing their intention of sending out gangs as soon as possible and this they seem to have done, as I have had news of gangs being out in all directions. These do not appear to have done very much damage so far, though I have received news that the Shakaiwals lifted several score of cattle which had escaped from the Khaisara, and more damage may have been done which has not yet been reported, but there can be no doubt that these gangs serve a useful purpose in distracting the attention of the Mahsuds.

The column left Wana at about 9 p.m. on the evening of the 24th November and marched straight to just above the Naraioba Levy post,

where a few hours' halt was made. It then proceeded through Shakai down the Sperhailand. At this point I sent the Shakaiwal Maliks, whom I had brought with me, back to their homes with strict injunctions to mass their tribesmen and prevent any force from Kaniguram coming down on our rear. Before proceeding further a short description of the country may serve to elucidate this report. The Khaisara in an exaggerated form represents the letter Z, the Tiarza post lying to the left of it and Shakai to the top. Commencing from the top the first village is Torwam and down that arm are built eight kots or separate habitations, mostly strongly guarded with towers. However, it should be noticed that enumeration by kots can give no very clear idea of the situation, as one kot may be merely a barn with a tower, while another may be a large collection of houses. Again, one kot may be counted occasionally as one or more, according to the ideas of the enumerator, owing to the superposition of the building. The valley is one of very extreme fertility, to my mind quite superior to any I have seen in South Waziristan. The arable soil in the bed of the Khaisara is large in extent and appears exceptionally good and is irrigated entirely by canals. The jowar crop had been just got in, and the roof of every building was very thickly covered with jowar straw, while many heaps of buried grain of considerable extent were unearthed and doubtless there are many more. The theory that the Mahsud country cannot support itself is certainly false so far as the Khaisara is concerned.

To return to the column, shortly after eight Torwam was sighted. Our raid appears to have been a complete surprise. The people emerging from their houses with cries that the troops had come, commenced to drive off their cattle. As we were then well over a mile distant, all attempts at pursuit with infantry proved futile, and the Mahsuds were successful in getting most of their cattle into the hills behind where pursuit was practically impossible. The only cattle captured were a few which were left behind in the haste of flight. The troops then spread down the upper arm lighting the fodder on the tops of the roofs. This caught excellently and in almost every case the fire burnt down into the rafters of the roof itself and the whole came down. In a very short time the Upper Khaisara was in a blaze, opposition then began from Kot Maisara and Juma and Daurani Kot, which villages contain most of the bad characters of the Khaisara as well as a considerable proportion of the Kashmir Kar rifles. These men were, however, firing from a very safe distance and did no harm. Colonel Bunbury, thinking the first firing of the houses had been done too hurriedly so that the Engineers had no chance, and to rest his men and return to complete his work more thoroughly, drew off first to a low hill about half a mile in the direction of Wana, and then to a distance of another mile, where, after a short halt, he moved his column down through the Wucha Tiarza to the plain by the Tiarza Militia post, where he bivouacked for the night. During the day the cavalry had been creating a diversion at the lower end of the Khaisara. The next day the troops moved out about 9 a.m., accompanied this time by the cavalry and artillery, and taking the route of the Tanda Tiarza. The cavalry going on ahead managed again to effect a complete surprise. This, I think, must be put down to the idea of the Mahsuds that the attack was only a day's raid and to their distraction on hearing of the operations of the other columns. On this occasion the cavalry, pushing far ahead, brought in 120 prisoners and about 350 cattle, sheep and goats. The infantry succeeded in killing Maisara, a well known bad character, while the whole of the lower part of the middle arm of the Khaisara was set ablaze and two towers belonging to the Michi Khels blown up. The troops again bivouacked on the plain by the Tiarza post.

The next day the troops rested till three in the afternoon when they moved up and bivouacked on the Tiarza Narai, reaching there just at dark.

Starting next morning before dawn the cavalry moved on Kundiwam and with the aid of the 23rd Pioneers burned eight kots on the lower arm down to the Tangi, while the main body turned its attention to the nest of bad characters round Juma Kot. The tower of Maisara, which practically

commands the valley, was blown up as well as the two towers of Juma Kot and the two towers of Daurani. These villages were fired by Captain Sherwood and are practically razed to the ground. The owners of these are all Nekzan Khel, Nana Khels, and are the very worst characters in the Khaisara, and, indeed, take a place of honour in the whole Mahsud clan.

The 23rd Pioneers then came up the valley driving cattle which had been again brought back to their houses and completing any small burnings that had been overlooked. Then the troops returned to Wana. To sum up the proceedings, the troops have killed over 20 Mahsuds, wounded several more, taken 120 prisoners and about 250 cattle and 350 sheep and goats. Seven towers have been blown up and the entire valley, numbering 29 kots from Torwam to the Tangi, fired and mostly roofless, while every particle of fodder stored has been destroyed. This loss falls on the Michi Khels and Nana Khels, who own the valley in about equal shares, and on the Shabi Khels who own a small share. There can be no doubt that on the first day the advent of troops came as a perfect surprise, and that the secret of the preparations had been well kept. The whole extent of the damage, if put into actual figures, is probably about Rs. 50,000, but we have to reckon in addition the enormous discomforts caused by the loss of fodder, the capture of the prisoners and the unroofing of the houses at this season of the year. While we have demonstrated to the Khaisara Mahsuds how well they are within striking distance of Wana and with what ease this raid can be repeated at any day.

F. W. JOHNSTON,
Political Officer.

Camp Sarwekai,
The 1st December, 1901.

Annexure 6.

Copy of a letter, dated the 4th December, 1901, from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner on Special Duty.

I have the honour to submit my political report on the late operations against Mahsuds in directions of Spinkamar and Makin.

The force, consisting of 1,000 men and 2 guns, moved from Datta Khel at 9.20 p.m. on 23rd. After a very trying night, Shuidar Narai, distant 13 miles, was reached about 10 a.m. on 24th, the troops having halted for three hours on the northern slopes of Shuidar. A start was made over the wooded slopes south-west of Shuidar at 12 noon in direction of Spinkamar. In the afternoon the Abdullai village of Dod Gul, with two towers, was sighted at the bottom of a deep nullah, running down from Spin Narai. The force descended on this, being probably seen for the first time as they went down the nullah side. The villagers had cleared off with most of their animals by the time the village was reached, leaving only two men, who came out with a sheep as the troops approached. They were taken prisoners and the village occupied. Further down the nullah two more hamlets were seen, and a party went out ahead to capture any men or animals there might be in them. Here a few shots were exchanged. Five prisoners were brought in, all Abdullais.

The night passed quietly. In the early morning the two towers in Dod Gul were blown up and the village thoroughly burnt. The troops then marched down the valley, a few shots being fired here and there, destroying and blowing up as they went. In this way, the tower of Mohabbat, a very fine one, and two hamlets were destroyed. Then a tower and hamlet belonging to the Pushon (blacksmiths). Next a tower and hamlet of Abdulla Khan, a tower and hamlet of Nazar, a tower and hamlet of

Amazdar, a tower and two hamlets, owners unknown, then a tower and hamlet of Tin, then another hamlet. This brought us to the Shuran Algad where there was a cultivated "Kachi" on which Kandar, the Khushali Tori Khel outlaw, who was killed a few weeks ago, had built his tower and village. After his death, the village was occupied by Kandar's brother and one Mir Alam, member of his gang. This tower and village were also destroyed, as well as a mill belonging to them. At this point a certain amount of firing took place, the enemy being among the wooded slopes to the southwest. Captain Forster, 2nd Punjab Infantry, was shot through the calf, there being no other casualties. Some shots being fired from the vicinity of a Datta Khel Tori Khel village near by and this hamlet was also burnt. The troops then retired over the Razmak plain, a wide open grassy down, intersected here and there with nullahs, to the village of Bitt, Malikshahi Mahsud, which was reached about 5 p.m., and found to have been just evacuated. This village is that marked "Mahsud" in the map, south of the Narai called Razmak Narai, but of which the real name is Solanarai. The night was passed in peace.

The force halted at Bitt's village to rest. A party of 200 men was taken out by the Political Officer to the Wuzi
 26th November. Khel Mohmit Khel villages of Zargar Khel and Razoni at the head of the Khaisara. These villages have been noted all along for assisting Mahsuds in the way of supplies. There was also a fine outstanding against them, so the opportunity for a baramta could not be neglected. The villages were completely surprised, and a certain number of goats and sheep and a quantity of ghi were brought away for the troops. Their chief men were also arrested and brought along.

Colonel Tonnochy carried out a reconnaissance during the day to the Nawal Narai above the camp, from which some Tori Khel and Mahsud villages on the head waters of the Shaktu could be seen. The force was unmolested during the day.

Leaving about 200 men in camp to look after the sick, the remainder of the force started at 6 a.m. towards Makin;
 27th November. with the exception of a few shots fired from the hills on the left at our flanking parties in the early dawn, and some fired probably by exasperated homeless men from Spinkamar on the right, none of which did any damage, the ridge overlooking and commanding Makin was reached without opposition. The place was practically evacuated, a few persons being seen in the villages on the far side of the bay of cultivation, round which the hamlets are placed. Picquets having been posted on the covering knolls the work of destruction commenced. Three towers were blown up and all the hamlets lying on the northern slopes utterly burnt out. The inhabitants had themselves, to save their name, set fire to a certain amount of brushwood, &c., round their houses, and this helped us materially. Only three of the Makin hamlets were unvisited. A good many animals which had been left behind were also destroyed. The retirement commenced about 1.30 p.m., and the force was followed up for four miles, sustaining then and in the firing during the day a loss of one man killed and three wounded. Bitt's village was reached at 5 p.m.

Shortly after dark some sniping took place, and one man, 3rd Sikhs, was hit in the groin. He has subsequently died at Datta Khel. During the night a man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was also dangerously wounded on picquet.

The force left Bitt's village at 7.30 a.m., the village being thoroughly burnt, during which process a man of the 3rd
 28th November. Sikhs was shot in the foot by men concealed in the trees on the hill side. For the first eight miles as far as Zargar Khel village the force was followed up and rear guard fighting took place in which one man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was killed

and two or three wounded. One of the Wuzi Khel men, who had been arrested the day before, was also shot in the leg. Reports received subsequently relate that Mulla Powindah himself came up to Bitt's village in the morning with some of his "talibs." These he sent on to Razmak Narai to ascertain if the force was going to halt at Razoni, in which case a lashkar would have come to attack. In the rear guard fighting that ensued one of these talibs was killed, and the remainder returned to the Mulla who went back. I had heard the night before that during the burning of Makin he had been at Kaniguram.

The pursuit ceased at Zargar Khel and the force arrived at Mamirogha about 2 p.m., resting there for an hour and then going on to Datta Khel which was reached at 7 p.m., after a march of 22 or 23 miles.

The actual casualties during the five days were two men killed, eight severely wounded (including one officer) one of whom has since died and eight slightly wounded, mostly grazes. Damage done to Mahsuds was 13 towers blown up, some of which were very fine ones, fourteen hamlets destroyed. Two-thirds Makin burnt utterly. All fodder and corn, wherever found, the former in very large quantities, burnt. A considerable number of cows, bullocks, sheep and goats killed. Owing to the nature of the operations cattle could not be driven off, and no large flocks or herds were seen. Several Mahsuds, all Abdullai, captured.

Four Mahsuds killed and probably more, but this again owing to the fighting being all of a rear guard nature, could not be ascertained. In addition to the above the moral effect of a small force of 800 men and 2 guns having reached and burnt Makin must have been very great.

The operations would seem to have come as a complete surprise to the Mahsuds. Prisoners told me that they had no idea of anything of the kind, until they saw us descending the hill side to Dod Gul's village. Neither do I think that the Makin men had much idea that we should pay them a visit. On our arrival there the houses had only shortly been evacuated, and I was told that a Native Officer saw the hill sides above the villages on the west covered with flocks, herds and people. I put down the slight opposition experienced to the fact that most of the men knowing of our near proximity on the north, and probably also of the Wana Column on the south, were removing their families on the day we arrived.

Maize in fair quantity was found in most houses and small bits of salt* here and there, but in no quantity. I saw no tobacco anywhere or cloth, and only here and there a little lump of gur. Compared with the houses of the Wuzi Khel of the Khaisara those of the Mahsuds were very empty of all luxuries and necessaries. Of course a great deal may have been taken away, but this could not have been the case in the first village we visited, which was similarly poverty stricken. I should say that the blockade has been hitting them hard.

In addition to the force from Datta Khel, a party of nearly 200 Militia, under Captain Ferguson Davie, accompanied by Captain Finnis and Lieutenant Godwin went from Miramshah on night of 23rd to the Shaktu at Baramand. The Commandant's full report on this operation has been forwarded to you.

Annexure 7.

Copy of a letter, dated the 4th December, 1901, from the Political Officer, Tochi, to the Commissioner on Special Duty.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a report received by me from the Commandant, Northern Waziristan Militia, on his recent operations. A small force such as he had under his command could not have done more than it did. By making their presence felt on the Shaktu the object desired

was attained and Militia deserve very great credit for the fine march they made in difficult country, doing as they did a distance of over 60 miles in under the 48 hours. That a force of recently raised Militia were able to accomplish this reflect the greatest credit on Captain Ferguson Davie and his officers.

Annexure 8.

Copy of a letter, dated the 26th November, 1901, from the Officer Commanding Northern Waziristan Militia, to the Political Officer, Tochi.

I have the honour to report that I left Miramshah at 7.30 p.m. on the 23rd instant with 172 rifles and 20 Mounted Infantry of the Militia and proceeded in the direction of the Shaktu valley, intending, if possible, to raid any Mahsud villages I might be able to surprise. Captain Finnis, second in command, and Lieutenant Godwin also accompanied the force.

Proceeding *viâ* Tal and Kam Sarobi we crossed the Khaisora undiscovered at 1 a.m. on the 24th, just above the village of Guland and below the village of Badiki. From this point the path led upwards as far as the Gurgurai Kotal due south and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles (2 hours' march) from the bed of the Khaisara. On the Kotal, which we reached at 3.30 a.m., we halted for half an hour continuing our march till 5.30 a.m., when we arrived at the Khanaki Kotal. As the men were too tired to proceed further I decided to lie up for the day in the Khanaki Nullah to let them rest, and proceed, if possible, to Shaktu during the night of the 24th. We left the Khanaki Nullah at 6 p.m. on the 24th, and proceeded *viâ* the Shaid Ziarat to the Dakki Algad, which we crossed at 8 p.m. From the Dakki Algad the path led up to the plateau of Kam Sham, which was reached at 9.30 p.m. On the advice of the Tori Khel Maliks accompanying us I halted in a Ziarat at the north end of the plateau till 4 a.m. on the 25th, and then proceeded as quickly as possible due south across the plain along the Ziande Nullah to the Shaktu, at the junction of the Ziande Nullah with the Shaktu we turned due west and proceeded along its left bank, halting finally at 6.15 a.m. at a Ziarat about half mile above Baramand. The Maliks, who up to this point had been most confident regarding the success of the raid, here showed signs of uneasiness regarding the lateness of the hour of our arrival, and as they were unable to point out the positions of any Mahsud villages, or give any accurate information regarding probable numbers of men or houses, I considered it advisable to retire at once. The men were too tired to have carried out a retirement if pressed, and there was every reason to expect that the country through which we should have to retire would be as difficult as that through which we had advanced.

I retired on Idak over the Kemali and Khazhamlas Narais to the village of Khanir in the Khaisara and thence *viâ* Katira. The force halted one hour at Khanir, half an hour at Katira and arrived at Idak at 6 p.m., having been marching continuously with the exception of these two halts for 14 hours. I think the raid would have been successful if I could have got anything like accurate information regarding the position of any Mahsud village and if, instead of having halted at the north of the Sham plateau during the night of the 24th, we had proceeded to its southern end, and we should have there been within an hour's march of the Ziarat, where we finally halted, and arrangements to surprise the villages could have been carried out before dawn. I think the force was discovered while halted in the Khanki Nullah; during the daytime several small parties of men were seen by our look-out men close to the spot where we were lying, our tracks anyhow must have been seen, and again while halted on the Kam Sham plateau a gang of raiders passed within 300 yards of us. Not wishing to disclose ourselves, I gave orders not to fire on them and tried to capture them: a horse neighed and the gang bolted to the hills. Two other parties of men also

approached our position, but returned towards the Shaktu, and I think though they did not know who we were that they gave information regarding our presence, and the Mahsuds were ready for us. From the Ziarat above Baramand, where we finally halted, a fire, and what looked like a signal fire too, was visible in the hills above, where a Mahsud village was said to be. It was disheartening to all ranks to have to retire without doing anything, when so close to our goal, but I think, taking everything into consideration, it was the only course to pursue. At the time I did not know it, but on our return march a well known Tori Khel badmash informed us that Mulla Powindah was with the Jalal Khels some four miles from where we halted, and he would most probably have joined in if there had been any firing.

I should like to say a word in praise of the way the men of the Militia worked, they were as keen and cheerful as possible, and the fact that they covered over 60 miles of bad country carrying 60 rounds of ammunition, two days' food and a cape speaks for itself. The cold while halted at Kam Sham was intense, and sleep was out of the question; fires could not be lighted for fear that Mahsuds would see them, and all ranks had to remain prepared for every eventuality.

Of the 172 rifles that left Miramshah on the 23rd only 19 did not complete the whole march, and 13 of these reached Katira, only six miles distant from home.

As requested by you, the Maliks of the villages of Musakki and Asad Khel in the Khaisora were arrested on our return journey, and have been sent into Miramshah.

Copy of a letter, dated the 9th December, 1901, from Captain C. P. Down, Political Officer, Tochi Valley, to W. R. H. MERK, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Commissioner on Special Duty.

In reply to your telegram I have the honour to state that I put down the damage done to Mahsuds by the Tochi Column as under:—

	Rs.
13 Towers at Rs. 200 each	2,600
14 Hamlets burnt at Rs. 300 each average	4,200
Grain, forage, &c., destroyed	2,000
Animals killed	500
Total	9,300

Enclosure 117 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, North-West Frontier, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 16th January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsuds having sent in letters of full submission asking for terms, also a deputation of Saiyids, I have replied that I am prepared to see the jirga and discuss terms, provided, as preliminary condition, that jirga brings balance in cash of fine of one lakh and all rifles taken during the blockade. I have given the jirga till the 21st instant to send me a letter in reply to mine. I hear that the jirga meets to-day or to-morrow.

Enclosure 118 in No. 3.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, North-West Frontier, to the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 22nd January, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Mahsud jirga having notified by letter and deputation that they accept of preliminary conditions, I have given them till the 1st Zilkad, corresponding to the 9th February, to comply. The deputation suggested permission to borrow the cash in British territory, which I refused. As the troops require a rest, and as we must in any case wait for the heavy winter snows which have not yet fallen, the delay is convenient on other grounds. Proposals for final settlements will be despatched to-morrow.

No. 4.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th January, 1902.

Foreign. Mahsud jirga has sent in letters of submission asking for terms. Merk has replied that he is prepared to see jirga and discuss terms, provided, as preliminary condition, jirga brings in balance of fine and all rifles taken during blockade. He has given them till 21st January to reply.

No. 5.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd January, 1902.

Foreign. My telegram of 18th of January. Mahsud jirga have notified acceptance of preliminary conditions, and Merk has given them to 9th of February to comply.

No. 6.

Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th February, 1902.

It is expected that the preliminary conditions referred to in my telegram of 23rd January will be complied with by the 9th February. The Mahsuds are trying hard to fulfil them. When they have complied with these terms that before the blockade is raised they must surrender certain named outlaws and must restore all animals looted during the blockade: This done, the accounts against them would be regarded as closed. As to our future relations with the tribes the matter will have subsequently to be discussed. Unless the tribes can show satisfactory proof that they are able and determined to perform their obligations, the former allowances to them will not be renewed.

No. 7.

Telegram from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 6th February, 1902.

To insist before blockade has been raised on all Merk's conditions, may possibly commit us to further military operations. What we require, so far as the raising of the blockade is concerned, is the full performance of our original demand, plus reasonable reparation for offences committed during blockade, due allowance being made for the damage that we have recently inflicted. Any further demands from Mahsuds will, preferably, be a matter of bargain, in connection with the grant of allowances to the tribe. Applying these principles, the Government of India consider that, in addition to the preliminary conditions accepted by the Mahsuds, namely, payment of balance of fine in cash and restoration of rifles taken during blockade, Merk should demand surrender of outlaws, and restoration of animals carried off during blockade up to the end of November, 1901. The jirga can be told that when these four conditions are accepted, and fulfilled, the blockade will be raised, and the account against the Mahsuds will be regarded as closed. When blockade has been raised our future relations with tribe will be settled. On this point Merk should tell jirga they must supply us with clear proof of their sincerity, and of their ability and determination to enforce order before any allowances are fixed.

No. 8.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 6th February, 1902.

I have the honour to submit, for information, a copy of a note written by Mr. Pipon, Assistant Commissioner, who was for two years in charge of the Tank Sub-division. At Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, as already reported in my No. 9 P., dated the 2nd January, 1902, I heard complaints of Mahsud terrorism on all sides, and later in talking over the subject with Mr. Pipon, I asked him to give me a note of what he knew of it by his own experience. His note gives some idea of the intolerable state of affairs which existed on the Dera Ismail Khan border.

Annexure.

Note by P. Pipon, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, dated the 1st February, 1902.

I have been asked to illustrate the attitude of the Mahsuds during 1899 and 1900, while I was Assistant Commissioner at Tank. During those years, until the commencement of the blockade, the terrorism systematically created by the Mahsuds was marked. Apart from the unprecedented number of raids and outrages, this terrorism penetrated to the ordinary avocations of not only the zamindars of the border, but also to the Border Military Police, the Police, and even higher Government officials. There are plenty of statistics dealing with raids. The other effects were less definite, more insidious, and could naturally be observed only by those on the spot. I will try to recollect as many illustrations as possible, but these are perforce only scattered instances dependent on memory.

It would of course be an exaggeration to say that the Mahsuds ever attempted directly to intimidate British officers: they were far too clever for this. But they actually did intimidate superior native officials. Bhanju Lal,

Tahsildar, told me that on one occasion, during the hearing of a case in his Court, a Mahsud deputation had commenced with petitions and proceeded to direct threats regarding his decision of the case. Karimdad, the Naib Tahsildar, who was deputed to superintend the demolition of a tower illegally erected by Fattah Khan, Shingi, near Musalli, went long afterwards in fear of Fattah Khan's revenge. Similarly, the police treated the Mahsuds entirely differently from other offenders. A notorious raider, Tuman, Chuhand Khel, was got in; I was away at Sheikhbuddin at the time, and Deputy Inspector, Thana Ram, let him go rather than remand him to custody. Mr. Grant will recollect the same official, during the Shingi baramta, demurring to the handcuffing of arrested Maliks. Yet Thana Ram was a most excellent police officer generally; I have seldom met a better. In the Gumal Thana, I have reason to believe, bands of armed Mahsuds used consequently to stroll round the Miani lands, looting crops as they pleased. The Mianis would not report these at the time, but send in belated petitions in the hopes of getting some monetary compensation out of Government when tribal cases were settled. Neither the police nor the Border Police did anything to check this. Practically no cases under the Arms Act were ever sent up from the Gumal Thana. Notwithstanding this, I believe armed Mahsuds were everywhere.

I was confirmed in this view by an incident in November, 1899, when I happened to be riding to Murtaza at a time when tongas do not ordinarily pass. I met a Mahsud carrying a gun down the high road in broad daylight. He was arrested, proved to be a well-known badmash, and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. I do not believe for a moment that, had the police in any way attempted to enforce the Act against Mahsuds, such an occurrence would be possible. Indeed, before the beginning of 1899, the Arms Act seems not to have been enforced at all against Mahsuds. When I accompanied Mr. Grant in the Shingi baramta (7th February, 1899, so far as I remember), any number of valuable rifles were found in the Mahsud houses. These must have been "carried." It was shortly after this that attention was directed to the stringent enforcement of the Act against Mahsuds. The orders then issued were always alluded to by the police as the "new orders about Mahsud arms."

The Border Military Police again were useless from fear. During these two years, so far as I know, not one Mahsud was ever killed or even wounded by the Border Military Police, and this in spite of the Zam massacre, the shooting of four Border Military Police sepoy at Wana, and the many rifle thefts. It was well known that no Border Military Police sepoy would ever shoot a Mahsud. He would fire, but be careful to miss.

It was generally a recognised fact that the Mahsuds had become more and more dangerous of late years. I have had many conversations with our own Maliks on the subject, and they attributed the fact to their receiving large allowances with which to buy rifles, to the disarmament of British subjects, to the invariable consideration shown to Mahsuds of all classes in British territory, and to the Mahsud colony. The last-named scheme gave every Mahsud "badmash" an explanation for his presence; it afforded a perfect rendezvous for raiding gangs, and a handy repository for arms and stolen property. Beyond Dabra the road was almost as unsafe as beyond Murtaza. Besides this there is no doubt the colony had the worst influence

* K. S. Haji Kalandar Khan, on surrounding clans. It was, as a Gundapur Khan* dryly described it, a "school of badmashi opened by Government for the instruction of our young men."

It was of course when a large jirga was in, that the Mahsuds' conduct was the most overbearing. Thefts were then rife, but the jirgas had to be conciliated. My kitchen was broken into and a man stabbed within 20 yards of my bungalow. Mr. Gee's horse clothing was looted, the serais were broken into, and the shops in Tank bazar pilfered just as the Mahsuds pleased. Two cases were brought before me in which the Hindu shop-keepers had rushed off to the police, but on being confronted with the Mahsud prisoner in Court, refused to open their mouths against them, evidently in abject fear. As the jirga discussions were over, I had both the Mahsuds flogged. But

shortly before this the Commissioner had instructed me not to take up a case against a Mahsud under the Arms Act, owing to the jirga. This was in March, 1900.

I remember two instances showing how very largely even prominent men were affected. I had appointed Choka Ram, our only Hindu Lumbaradar of the Sub-division, upon a committee to assess the value of improvements made by Mahsud tenants in the Utar Colony; he implored me, in the most abject way, to excuse him, admitting he was too much frightened. Choka Ram is a most respected man, an ex-Kanungo, and very often referred to for an expert opinion on valuing crops, &c.

A far more striking instance was an occasion when, to my intense astonishment, Ghulam Muhammad of Chaddar came up to give security for a Mahsud badmash under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code. Ghulam Muhammad had the best reputation in the sub-division and was a man who was trusted in criminal jirgas to stand out against the most influential interest and intimidation. I can remember now his bitter shame and humiliation when I asked him if he was giving the security willingly, and he replied, "do you really *believe* I should ever do it willingly?"

I attribute the assistance given in raids to Mahsuds by border villages almost entirely to fear and disarmament. In one case I arrested some of the Koti Sheikhs who had seen the Mahsuds firing on Girni post. Though they were told they would be imprisoned till they disclosed the names of the offenders, they preferred any imprisonment to the consequences of informing against Mahsuds. Their position was, it is fair to say, peculiarly exposed.

I have mentioned the tendency of Mahsud Maliks to constitute themselves a final Court of Appeal. On one occasion they gave me a petition, demanding that I should decide a civil land case between Mianis in favour of one side. On another occasion a telegraph chaprassie applied for the settlement of a case under section 10, Frontier Crimes Regulation. The Deputy Commissioner definitely refused this. After the order was delivered, an application from the Mahsuds appeared demanding that the case should proceed on the ground that the man was their "hamsaya." Personally, I found the only way to stop this practice was to tear up the petition publicly and put the original litigant on security; but this was regarded as an innovation; and I have heard a petition of this sort on behalf of an outsider convicted under British law listened to in jirga, and hopes held out that something might be done to propitiate the jirga.

I think the attitude of our own subjects towards the Mahsuds was due not only to fear of the tribe but also to fear of Government action. Rightly or wrongly, there was a prevalent idea that all Mahsuds were privileged persons, to offend whom would be to offend the authorities. They were exempted from all annoyances, stamp duty on petitions, begar and all other burdens. Even in the case of the joint irrigation labour performed by all villages irrigating from the Gumal dams, the Mahsuds Colonists were exempt and their share performed by British subjects. Mr. Gee mitigated this subsequently by helping the zamindars with a grant from the Colony savings, but it was never expected that the Mahsuds should do any work. The whole feeling as to Mahsud privileges is difficult to describe and illustrate. When I first came to Tank, even the chaprassies used to announce that a Mahsud was waiting, in a manner that showed all other work, however important, was to be thrown to the winds. When I refused to let Mahsuds interrupt the Court on all occasions, they complained on the subject to the Political Officer.

Another extraordinary privilege allowed to the Mahsuds was that of carrying arms (of all kinds) along the eight miles of road from the Zam pass to Tank. Consequently the road was utterly unsafe and dakaitis were common. I remember several cases now. The ridiculous feature of the system was a Hindu shop-keeper carrying a dagger on that road was tried under the Arms Act, while a Mahsud badmash carried his dagger freely.

This was subsequently put a stop to.

P. PIPON.

Muhammad Afsul, the Gidi Khel Malik, once told me (quite politely) that I was mistaken in thinking Mahsuds in British territory were to be treated like other persons; he went on to say that he quite realised the power of Government, but was aware that Government did not want the expense of opposing Mahsuds, and found it better to propitiate them. These remarks related to an offence committed by a Mahsud in British territory, and I believe they were sincerely believed by the speaker.

No. 9.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Tank, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 9th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

An enormous jirga, reported 5,000 strong, being said to be on its way to-day to Jandola. I sent the Political Officer, Wana, there this morning to stop it four miles from Jandola, and to ascertain if it had fulfilled the preliminary conditions. He telegraphs that no exact information can be obtained, as the cash has not been pooled in one fund or even three funds, but that the people not trusting each other have all brought their own quota, and that any attempt at making them put in the cash in a lump sum will lead to a break up of the jirga and wreck the settlement. I have, therefore, instructed him to take the cash and rifles as they are brought, which will require two or three days by which time we shall know if preliminary conditions have been complied with, so that I can see the jirga. A number of women's ornaments have been brought, and I have had to send up a silversmith to Jandola to value them. Political Officer reports jirga is really desirous of peace, but cannot help itself in arranging to pool the cash.

No. 10.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 23rd February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

By this evening the whole fine and 60 rifles have been received. A number of Mahsuds anxious to enlist in the Militia appeared to-day under the impression that the blockade was over. They were told to wait.

No. 11.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 24th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The account stands as follows:—Of the fine, Rs. 12,750 have been paid in cash and ornaments, and for the balance of Rs. 12,250, I hold breech-loaders, value Rs. 14,050, of which the redemption is already commencing. Of the 70 rifles which we charge the Mahsuds as having taken during the blockade, they admit 65. Out of these, up to date 31 identical rifles have been surrendered, plus 30 substituted, or 61 in all. Substitutes have been given, because some rifles have been sold out of Mahsud country, others have

been taken to Birmal by the fugitives, and others again, although known to be somewhere in the Mahsud country, have not been traced to individuals, those who are charged with having them denying the accusation and charging others. These substitutes are all Government rifles, and are given Snider for Snider, Martini for Martini. All these substitutes have been passed by the regimental armourer and regimental officers here, and are as good as, and in some instances better than, the missing rifles. Under the circumstances, I see no particular object in insisting upon the surrender of identical rifles which would cause great delay. The substitutes being equal to the missing rifles, one rifle is as good as another, and as regards the bad characters, the tribe will recoup itself at its own time and in its own way, so that the bad characters will not benefit by our taking substitutes. As regards the five rifles not admitted by the Mahsuds, they were stolen generally at night in and near the Gomal, where Powindahs and Darwesh Khel are not above getting hold of rifles. These five rifles have not been seen in Mahsud possession, and we have nothing more to go upon than the reports of informers, who, in the cases of two rifles, were unable to give any names of thieves. These five rifles must be considered doubtful, and in their case, I think, the best plan is to take security now for their surrender if hereafter the tribe is found guilty, and to strike them off if, on further enquiry, the jirga clears the tribe by oaths or by proof. If above is approved, I will see the jirga as soon as 65 rifles have been put in and security given for the doubtful five rifles. Addressed Chief Commissioner; repeated Foreign.

No. 12.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 26th February, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

The preliminary conditions are now fulfilled as indicated in my previous telegrams. The jirga have just sent me a message begging for the blockade to be taken off, and promising to carry out any further terms there may be. I have not yet of course mentioned what further terms there are. The jirga adds that, if it fulfils further terms after the blockade is now raised, the tribes and bad characters will realise that the jirga is active of its own motion, and not under pressure. If the blockade is now taken off, I cannot say how far the jirga can and will fulfil terms, but the restoration of livestock carried off during the blockade is relatively a small business and can be clinched by taking hostages for the purpose. The matter of the British outlaws is more serious. There is this that, if the jirga act of their own motion about the outlaws, it will naturally have a deeper and more lasting effect than if the jirga acts under compulsion. As regards the Mahsud raiders who have fled to Birmal, there are indications that the jirga seem to have secretly passed sentence on them should they return to Mahsud country and come into the hands of the Mahsuds. This, at any rate, is the present frame of mind of the jirga about these fugitives. But I cannot, of course, guarantee that, if the blockade is now raised, the British outlaws will be given up. Hostages to this effect could be taken, but the Mahsuds know that it is against our principles to ill-treat hostages in event of failure to keep promises for which the hostages are sureties. Quite possible request of jirga is prompted by desire to raise its status and importance by showing tribe that its petitions are acceded to by Government. Anything that gives the jirga greater weight is a gain, but the point is, if the blockade is now raised, will they stick to what they say now; or, if they do stick to it, can they effect what they wish? On this point I cannot speak with confidence. Addressed Chief Commissioner; repeated Foreign.

No. 13.

Telegram, No. 602 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 28th February, 1902.

Proposals in Merk's telegram, February 24th, are approved, and security, but not hostages, may be taken for five rifles which are not definitely brought home to Mahsuds. With reference to Merk's telegram 519 B. of 26th February, Government of India ordered in my telegram 383 F., February 6th, that four conditions must be accepted and fulfilled before blockade would be raised. Only the two preliminary conditions have as yet been complied with; the other two, namely, restoration of animals taken during blockade and surrender of outlaws, must be fulfilled before Government of India can agree to withdraw blockade. Merk should now see jirga and explain position.

No. 14.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 2nd March, 1902.

In face of Government of India's orders received in your No. 602 F., the best course seems to be for Merk to announce the fourth term with others, and, should it prove incapable of fulfilment by the absconding of individuals from Mahsud country, it must rest with jirga to prove to satisfaction of Government their inability to prevent this, and to give guarantee of arresting and handing them over should they return. This would have the effect of ridding Mahsud country of class referred to, which is important and would save a deadlock.

No. 15.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd March, 1902.

Mahsuds have now complied with preliminary terms, and Merk has been instructed to see jirga and tell them the further conditions we require before blockade will be withdrawn. Please see our telegram 6th February.

No. 16.

Telegram, No. 647 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 4th March, 1902.

Your telegram, dated 2nd March. The terms prescribed by Government preliminary to raising blockade are those that you proposed, and are considerably less onerous than those that Merk suggested. Government have no wish to impose impossible conditions, and your proposed instructions to Merk in your telegram above quoted are approved. The sooner Merk can see the jirga now the better. We wish to know what they have to say, not only in

regard to performance of conditions preliminary to raising blockade, but in regard to general settlement and guarantees for future good conduct. Addressed to Agent, Governor-General, Peshawar, and repeated to Mr. Merk.

No. 17.

Telegram, No. 458 B., from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 5th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

Have seen jirga. Rumours were started, it seems, by neighbouring tribes hostile to Mahsuds, in order to break up the jirga and bring them to grief. After I had announced the terms, the jirga at once asked about such outlaws as had bolted, to which I replied as authorised. They then said that they had been told at the outset, November, 1900, and again last May, that on payment of the fine the blockade would be taken off, and now the fine and rifles as well had been put in and there were further terms; how could they be sure that, when these had been fulfilled, there would not be more terms again. To these I replied with the whole history of the blockade, showing how Government had kept faith, but the Mahsuds had not, and how especially they had broken their promise of the 28th May to pay and not to raid. They begged most earnestly that the blockade might now be taken off, promising security for fulfilment of the terms to-day announced. It seems clear that they do mean to stand well with Government, and there can be no doubt that almost their only thought is for the raising of the blockade for which they are intensely impatient. The Maliks observed reasonably enough that, even if the security they offered failed, it would still be easy to enforce the terms by a baramta of Mahsuds and of their animals in British territory, which, it is true, could be done any day if the blockade is raised. They gave spontaneously satisfactory assurances about Mahsud bad characters for whom the whole tribe would be responsible in future and whom they would punish as regards the past. Their first object is to get the Mahsud fugitives back from Birmal in order to obtain the stolen rifles with them, for which they have given substitutes to us. After this they will deal with them in their own way. I really think, if the jirga gives us a sufficient number of jirga prisoners as security for fulfilment of the terms, that there will be no danger of non-fulfilment. We have plenty of other security as well in the ease with which a baramta could be made. The past three weeks have shown that jirga prisoners constitute a very efficient security. If we have good security, there seems no object in prolonging the blockade. The jirga consult together to-day, and will give an answer to-morrow.

No. 18.

Telegram, No. 184, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, dated the 6th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your 458 B. regarding security. If Mahsuds give tangible security, such as rifles, which would be tantamount to returns of live-stock and satisfy us as regards surrender of outlaws, I shall be prepared to recommend Government to remove blockade, which would have advantages for Government as well as Mahsuds. Otherwise, I do not think we should as yet remove pressure of blockade, for it is important that Mahsuds should realise that, though Government do not desire to be unduly hard on them, our future policy will

be a firm one. As to assurance given by jirga regarding tribal bad characters, the opportunity is a good one for impressing on them that practical proof of these assurances in form of definite action now against some such character and in finally breaking up the gang of bad characters and outlaws who have hitherto taken shelter with the Mulla Powindah will be the best recommendation that can be made to Government on their behalf. When the question of tribal allowances comes to be considered, jirga must be reminded that, after their past misbehaviour, Government will naturally require some such guarantee besides verbal assurance.

No. 19.

Telegram, No. 673 B., from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 6th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary.

I have to-day again seen the jirga. Yesterday the jirga despatched 200 chalweshti for arrest of outlaws and their belongings. They have settled to punish with a fine of Rs. 800 any Mahsud guilty of connivance at escape of these outlaws from the country. There are no outlaws from Tochi, Wana, Dera Ismail districts. Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, has given me the names of seven men, of whom Nabi Baksh, the worst, went off to Birmal in December. As regards animals to be restored, the jirga offer jirga prisoners in sufficient numbers, which is good security. There is a great difference between hostages demanded by us and jirga prisoners put in voluntarily of their own motion by the jirga. In the first case, a tribe selects men of as little consequence as it can, and when pestered by the relatives of the hostages, shifts the responsibility on to us. In the second case, the jirga knowing very well whom to seize, selects the proper men, and is directly and solely responsible to their friends for their detention. The seizure of jirga prisoners had a surprising effect upon the recusant Shaman Khel and Shabi Khel last month. The value of the animals to be restored is about Rs. 15,000, and it will take about a month to get them in. If I were to demand 50 rifles as security, it would take a month to get them. The security being good, it seems needless expense to prolong the blockade for a month. The jirga represented very respectfully but firmly that, although they accepted and would fulfil the terms announced yesterday as far as they could, in their opinion the tribe was being asked to do more than they had been led to expect. They said that they had been told all along that, if they paid the fine, the blockade would be removed, and if they misbehaved during the blockade, we should make reprisals. Now they had paid the fine and besides 65 rifles, and in addition as good as paid the animals carried off, and further had been severely punished for their misbehaviour during the blockade, and that they, having now, as it were, completed more than their share of the matter, it was just and fair that we, on our part, should now complete our share by raising the blockade. This is their view and there is force in it, although we have at no time said we did not reserve liberty of action. Your telegram, 184, of to-day. The Mahsuds make no allusion to themselves as to further want of firmness in dealing with them. They have suffered more now than in the three expeditions of 1861, 1881 and 1894 together; but, as I have previously represented, punishment alone will not keep them straight in future. The redistribution of allowance according to true political power in the tribe, its management by and through the whole jirga, ignoring individuals, whether they be Maliks or Mulla Powindah, the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Militia and the army and their employment on the Wana road and other works, combined with the memory of the blockade and its measures, will give a reasonable hope of reforming the tribe. The leading tribal bad characters are in Birmal, and so long as they are there, the jirga can do no more about them than give

every assurances. Mulla Powindah sent a letter yesterday which was delivered in jirga, and in which he asked if he were wanted, evidently wishing to be summoned and the jirga to be postponed till his arrival. Also he sent a message that, if not wanted, he would go to Birmal. To this I replied to the satisfaction of the jirga that I refused to deal with any Mahsud except in open jirga, which any Mahsud was at liberty to attend, if he chose to come in time for the jirga meetings. To-day a Shabi Khel Sheikh of his tried in my presence to introduce discord into the jirga, but was put down by it. The less we notice him, the less important in our eyes will he seem to himself and to the tribe, and the sooner will he find his proper level. It seems to me perhaps risky to say much at present about the tribal bad characters and the Mulla to the jirga, or the tribe may gain the power to which allusion is made in Foreign telegram 383 F. of the 5th ultimo. The great anxiety of the Mahsuds for the removal of the blockade cuts two ways; delay in removing may serve as a lever for the execution of conditions; it may also induce impatient hot-headed fools, or give chances for men who wish to discredit the jirga, to commit some outrage which will throw everything back and may have far-reaching consequences. At this stage this would be deplorable. For all these reasons, I ask for permission to raise the blockade the day after tomorrow, if to-morrow the jirga give good and sufficient jirga prisoners as security for the animals.

No. 20.

Telegram, No. 192, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 8th March, 1902.

Following correspondence with Merk repeated for orders. Chief Commissioner's No. 186:—*Begins.* Your 673 B. How are we to be satisfied regarding action of chalweshtis regarding outlaws? If jirga genuinely mean to act up to terms, why cannot they hand in 25 good rifles as security? This would suffice accordingly to valuation of animals. We could only treat jirga prisoners as hostages. Is not delay now in raising blockade preferable to risk of further trouble in Government having possibly to make baramta later? If 25 good rifles are given in, I shall be ready to advise Government to raise blockade. *Ends.* Commissioner on Special Duty, No. 674 B.:—*Begins.* Your 186. We must trust the jirga in this matter, and if they do not get hold of the outlaws, at any rate the outlaws will have to clear out, which, as you say in your 173 of 2nd instant, is important, and the jirga have already promised to exclude them permanently if they should get away. It is no good hanging up the whole business and incurring risk of further grave complications on account of six miserable outlaws. 50 rifles represent the value of the animals, not 25. The animals have to be given up by the people who took them, and it takes time to compel men to pledge their rifles for others. One Mahsud will naturally not pledge his rifle for another Mahsud without getting tangible security from the latter, and all this involves great discussions, many transactions, and delays as great as getting in the animals themselves. It does not matter how we treat the prisoners. They are not given as hostages, but as prisoners to be kept in prison, and you have seen what effect is produced by the jirga seizing men. No baramta can be required if we have these prisoners. The fact is that the situation has now come to a stage when we shall drive the Mahsuds too hard by insisting upon relatively unimportant details. I can see this from my conversations with the jirga. The bulk of the tribe undoubtedly expected that payment of the fine, plus undergoing our reprisals for their misbehaviour, would terminate the blockade. It came as a shock to the tribesmen that more was wanted by us. Had the immense pressure been available, which was in my mind when I made my proposals about terms, the feelings of the Mahsuds would not have mattered sixpence; but now they do matter very much: that is the crux

of the whole position. I must tell you that there is danger. The jirga has been at it now since the 9th January, and they are sick and exhausted. I believe them to be perfectly honest in their promises to give up the cattle and in the security they offer. If we make things too difficult now for them, they and the tribe will get it into their heads that we mean one way or the other to have a rupture, which is being industriously drummed into them from all sides. If they once think this, then there is an end of a peaceful settlement. We have got a great deal and there is no use in throwing it away for a little. I repeat that delay is very dangerous. If matters go now so that hostilities break out again, the power of the jirga, which we painfully have re-established, will be destroyed, and, what is worse, the Mahsuds will not treat with us again. *Ends.* With reference to the latter. No. 674. Accepting Merk's view that the tribe is honest in submission, I recommend Government to receive jirga prisoners as security for restoration of animals, the collection of which must necessarily take time, and to raise blockade. Despatch of chalweshtis to arrest outlaws may be accepted as proof of good faith of jirga, and will have effect of clearing country of troublesome class. I do not in the least understand Merk's allusion to withdrawal of immense pressure as affecting terms, unless he means that new imposition of his originally proposed terms has weakened our position. The political position has only changed in that we are in a more advanced stage and no military pressure has been withdrawn. If Government accept these proposals for raising blockade, I propose going to Jandola to take opportunity of interviewing jirga before they are finally dismissed.

No. 21.

Telegram, No. 699 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 8th March, 1902.

Your telegram 192 of 8th. The Government of India agree to your proposals, viz., that prisoners should be accepted as security for restoration of cattle and that blockade should now be raised. But, when you see the jirga, it is advisable to stipulate that the cattle should be restored within a reasonable period, failing which Government reserve right to seize cattle in their place. You should also explain to them that, although relying on their good faith Government will now raise the blockade, the Government reserves the right to make reprisals when and where it pleases, if the outlaws are in the country and are not arrested, or if, having left the country, they are allowed to return.

You might take the opportunity of your interview with the jirga to discuss the question of allowances and the consideration which the jirga are prepared to offer in return, and inform Government of the result.

No. 22.

Telegram, No. 685 B., from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 10th March, 1902. Repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

I have fully explained to the jirga the contents of your 197 of 8th with Foreign 699. They understand thoroughly. As regards British outlaws, if they are not arrested, they have promised to exclude them permanently from Mahsud territory, and in future not to harbour any outlaws whatever from

British territory or the protectorates. They have accepted full tribal or sectional or individual responsibility for offences in future as we choose; also that it is the business of the tribe to control its members. They further engage not to give passage through Mahsud territory to such bad characters, whether Mahsuds or British outlaws, as remain in Birmal. They earnestly begged for some means of livelihood to be provided for them, to which I replied that their country held plenty of grain and live-stock, but that Government would permit enlistment in the South Waziristan Militia, and, when the complement there was full, also in the Army, and that Mahsuds would be permitted to work on the Wana road and other works. They asked for land, to which I said no land was at present available; but, if the Pabarpur-Dera Ismail Khan canal were made, the question might possibly be considered by Government, if land were available and their behaviour good; but that I could not guarantee or promise anything about land. I pointed out to them how other frontier tribes benefited by entering the service of Government and by good conduct, giving Afridis and Mohmands and Yusufzais as instances, which was corroborated by members of these tribes serving in the 1st Punjab Infantry and present as my escort. The jirga have given in 93 good prisoners for the restoration of the cattle within a month. The jirga after the Id reassembles at Tank on the 24th instant to settle distribution of allowances, and any time after that will suit for your meeting with it whenever convenient to you. The blockade will be raised this evening. I sincerely hope that future relations with the Mahsuds will be more stable and happier than they have been in the past.

No. 23.

Telegram from the Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 10th March, 1902.

With permission of Government the blockade is raised to-day, and all restrictions upon our people and the Mahsuds in connection with the blockade are withdrawn. Addressed to all concerned.

No. 24.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th March, 1902.

Our telegram in the Foreign Department, dated 3rd March. Mahsud blockade was withdrawn on 10th, jirga having given security for restoration within a month of cattle looted during blockade and for arrest of outlaws. Jirga promised to permanently exclude from Mahsud territory any British outlaws who may escape immediate arrest by flight beyond tribal limits.

No. 25.

Telegram, No. 758 F., from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated the 13th March, 1902.

I am to ask you to communicate to Mr. Merk His Excellency the Viceroy's appreciation of the energy and ability with which he has conducted the Mahsud blockade, and His Excellency's congratulations on its successful termination.

No. 26.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 14th March, 1902.

Your 699 F. Mahsud jirga, whom Merk was obliged to permit to go to their homes as they had been a long time with him, reassemble on the 24th instant with reference to allowances. Allowances were already promised to jirga before blockade—*vide* correspondence paragraph 9 of Merk's letter No. 748 of 9th October, 1900; paragraph 2, your letter No. 2621 of 29th October, 1900; and Merk's telegram No. 550 C., dated 8th November, 1900. Regarding the considerations now to be given by tribe in return for allowances, Merk's telegram No. 685 B. of 10th instant describes what the jirga have agreed to. It is difficult to see what more can be expected from them. This, of course, will be reduced in writing and signed by the jirga, and is as much as we can obtain in the way of guarantee. If Government agree to this view, it remains only to announce definitely the grant of their allowances when the jirga reassembles and discuss the matter of distribution.

No. 27.

Telegram from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 15th March, 1902.

Your 758 F. Merk wires kindly convey to His Excellency my grateful thanks for his most kind message which I value deeply.

No. 28.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 27th March, 1902.

I have the honour to offer the following remarks on Mr. Merk's letter No. 817 B. of 20th March, a copy of which has been submitted direct to the Government of India.

2. I fully share Mr. Merk's satisfaction at the success which has been obtained. This success may be summarised as the realisation from the tribe of the fine for which the blockade was imposed, the wiping off by retaliation of the account run up since the blockade began, the restitution of rifles and cattle stolen during the blockade, and finally the compulsory representation of the tribe, in face of internal feuds and factions, for the purpose of dealing with Government.

3. It must not, however, be lost sight of that the passive blockade from December, 1900, to November, 1901, failed in its object. For, while during this period some Rs. 75,000 were paid in cash and kind by the tribe, the new penalties incurred by the tribe during that period greatly exceeded the amount paid in: and by July, 1901, there was obviously no further intention on the part of the tribe of paying any further sum, and matters had reached a political deadlock.

4. This position entailed the blockading troops being employed in active operations against the tribe. These operations consisted in the simultaneous movement of small columns from several directions for a few days at a time and without warning. While eminently successful in their object, namely, the punishment of the tribe, they had the additional advantage of entailing no expenditure in the country itself for supplies or the making of roads, and kept the Mahsuds uncertain from day to day as to what the next move would be. It may be here noted, however, that this particular method of coercing the Mahsuds was due greatly to their peculiar geographical position in relation to the points held by us, in the Tochi, on the border of the District of Bannu, at Jandola, in the Gumal and at Wana, which enabled us to strike from three sides at the same time, while the fourth side was held by a tribe inimical to the Mahsuds and during winter presented physical difficulties against retreat into Afghanistan. Having regard to these special conditions it is perhaps unnecessary to remark that this system of coercion, successfully applied on the present occasion, must not be accepted as one which can necessarily be employed with equal success against all the tribes on the frontier. Ordinarily speaking, the punitive expedition remains and will remain as the best resource for enforcing peace on the frontier. In the case of the Mahsuds any further operations must have assumed the form of an organised expedition or series of small expeditions moving into the country and out again after inflicting such damage as was possible on the tribe.

5. Without being over-sanguine as to the future, the present settlement with the Mahsuds is a genuine one, and on this ground Government may have fair hopes that amicable relations with the tribe as a whole may be maintained any way for some time to come.

It is hopeless to expect that there should be no trouble with a tribe whose record from all time has been one of thieving and raiding and who for years past have terrorised their neighbours, and it may be that restless and turbulent spirits in the tribe may again prevail.

The main point now to be seen is how far the establishment of a political reform in the internal administration of the tribe, which has been forced on them for the time being by stress of circumstances, may prove to be real and permanent. This can only be ascertained by actual experience. Doubtless a great deal depends on whether we can assist the tribe to a distribution of the allowances sanctioned by Government which will be satisfactory to a strong majority who will then find it worth their while to maintain tribal discipline which will result not only in a check on the commission of offences but also in the prompt settlement of such as may occur.

6. Turning to the individual work of officers and men engaged on the blockade, I can heartily endorse all that Mr. Merk has said of the services of Mr. Lorimer, the late Captain Down, Mr. Johnston, Captain Bowring and others mentioned by him. I must take this opportunity of recording my sense of the loyal, energetic and capable manner in which Mr. Merk himself, who remained on Special Duty after the formation of the North-West Frontier Province to carry through the blockade, has discharged his arduous and responsible duties. All credit is due to him for the direction of the blockade to a successful issue.

7. I strongly support Mr. Merk's suggestion as to the grant of one month's blockade leave.

8. As to native titles I am submitting my recommendations separately.

9. As regards the khilats and rewards proposed by Mr. Merk, I think, considering that the services for which it is proposed to grant them have extended over a period of 15 months under trying conditions, the proposals are by no means immoderate, and I therefore ask that they be sanctioned.

Enclosure in No. 28.

From W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner on Special Duty, to the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province. No. 817 B., Dated Dera Ismail Khan, the 20th March, 1902.

I have now the honour to submit the final report on the Mahsud blockade, which commenced on the 1st December, 1900, and terminated on the 11th March, 1902.

2. The blockade has been completely successful in the attainment of the two objects for which it was instituted. These objects were: firstly, reparation and punishment on account of offences committed before (also during) the blockade; and, secondly, the establishment of a political reform in the internal administration of the tribe; the governing organ, hitherto composed of Maliks selected and paid by us, being replaced by the old tribal jirga which, in a democratic republic, like that of the Mahsud community, is the natural, and indeed the only possible, governing agency.

3. The first object could no doubt have been attained by an expedition. The second object no expedition could have brought about; the process of reform takes time; discordant and mutually repellent elements are not readily compressed into a living whole; the leading men and the mass of the tribe require leisure to reflect, to consult and combine; the more thoroughly they have opportunity to consider the situation, the more likely is their conclusion to be deliberate and lasting. A short expedition would have swept through the country and gone out, leaving political matters much as they were. A prolonged stay of the troops in the Mahsud hills would have broken up Mahsud society, each man would have tried to make peace for himself, and the constant inevitable collisions between the troops and them would have distracted the Mahsuds and deprived the jirga of a fair chance of formation, and of growth in power and in the consciousness of power. Moreover, the presence of troops would have been a powerful incentive for those who desire a permanent occupation to endeavour to contrive it.

On all grounds, therefore, a blockade was preferable to an expedition, as a means both of penal coercion and of the rehabilitation of that paramount internal authority in the tribe without which the necessity for the annexation of the Mahsud country will be merely a question of a few years.

4. As a punitive measure, the effects of the blockade have been severe; the Mahsuds have paid a fine of one lakh (the largest fine ever paid by a frontier tribe); they have lost their allowances* for 15 months; also profits of trade and wages of labour and the pay of 250 Mahsuds in the Militia, or, at the rate under these heads of Rs. 10,000 per mensem, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000; they have surrendered 65 rifles taken during the blockade, worth at least Rs. 24,000; they are restoring animals taken during the blockade, worth Rs. 15,000; the property and live-stock lost by them during the active operations were worth about 2½ lakhs; their total pecuniary losses have been about Rs. 5,39,000. Besides, they have lost about 130 Mahsuds killed and some 250 wounded. They have accepted full tribal responsibility; they have agreed to arrest, or, failing arrest, to permanently expel, all British outlaws and never to harbour them again. And it has been brought well home to them that the centre of their hills can be suddenly reached by troops from north, east and south, without the hope of successful resistance on their part.

5. It is interesting and instructive to observe the course and progress of the reform which was the second object of the blockade. For some time before the 1st December, 1900, I may say for years, there had been a deadlock of parties, our Maliks *versus* Mulla Powindah with the bulk of the tribesmen hungering for allowances at his back. Each side fought the other at our expense, and matters reached a stage at which it became imperative for Government to arrive at definite conclusions with the Mahsuds. I was accordingly directed to summon the jirga; and, in default of some reparation

to Government, viz., the payment of a fine of one lakh of rupees, to declare a blockade, with the warning of reprisals if offences were committed during it. Simultaneously, I was authorised to announce that after the blockade we should deal alone with the whole jirga and not with individuals, and that the allowances would be granted to the whole tribe (to be distributed by the tribe for the tribe) and contingent upon loyalty, good conduct and the acceptance of full tribal, or sectional, or individual, responsibility, as we chose.

The jirga was held on the 8th November, 1900, and was signalled by the complete, public and unqualified admission of the Maliks that the maliki system had broken down. In short, they abdicated.

6. The first step taken by the Maliks, after this jirga, was to consult Mulla Powindah, whom, to their disgust, they saw anxious to pay the fine. That they went to consult him is significant in view of the subsequent events that have occurred during the past two months. Nothing, however, came of their conference, and on the 1st December, 1900, the blockade was proclaimed.

7. For a couple of months the leading men hung back; there were difficulties in apportioning the incidence of the fine; there was a good deal of manœuvring between the political parties in the tribe; and some dodging by the Mahsuds to get the fine virtually reduced, while ostensibly paying it in full. Finding that petitions with this view were not listened to, and discovering that the blockade was very seriously meant and was enforced with great stringency, the jirga met me at Jandola in February, 1901, and payments commenced in earnest. By the end of May, Rs. 69,000 had been paid, including 98 rifles, 68 revolvers and 1,639 head of live-stock. I wish to note here that Mr. S. Waterfield, then Political Officer in charge of Southern Waziristan, who was entrusted with the duty of valuing the arms and live-stock, scrupulously carried out my instructions that the valuations were to be fair to Government and to the Mahsuds alike; also to complainants to whom live-stock was made over in compensation.

8. By the end of June, 1901, the sum of Rs. 73,000 had been paid, to which, in the course of the next three months, small sums, aggregating Rs. 2,000, were added intermittently. But generally speaking, payments ceased early in July, 1901. The political parties in the tribe were still at a deadlock; the jirga had not yet arisen on the ruins of the "maliki" system; and there was no central authority as yet apparent which was capable, on the one hand, of restraining bad characters and the growing impatience of the tribesmen at the increasing pressure of the blockade; and, on the other hand, of authoritatively deciding the knotty questions over the assessment of the fine that existed, especially in connection with the Shaman Khel. The Maliks, as they have since confessed, sat sulking in their homes; Mulla Powindah played his own game; in short, there was no general control. It is true that several jirgas were held among the Mahsuds during this period, but the general jirga was not yet ripe for action. Several serious offences occurred, and in August, 1901, the retaliatory measures, of which the Mahsuds had been warned before the blockade commenced, were considered. It was decided to begin with sudden attacks, and on the 25th November, 1901, and the three following days, surprise raids were carried out with the fullest success, except from Jandola. The Mahsuds were completely taken aback, and the heart for any organised general resistance, then or thereafter, was knocked out of them.

9. The blockade had now passed from the defensive into its second, or offensive, phase. This was of short duration—only 45 days. During December, several raids were effected by simultaneous small columns to which the Mahsuds opposed a resistance steadily declining in vigour and intelligence. To military students of the art of frontier warfare, the system followed on these occasions (commencing with the surprise of November) will prove a new departure, as compared with the time-honoured methods of cumbrous expeditions.

10. The pressure of the offensive blockade rapidly matured what had been silently growing—the authoritative tribal jirga. On the 9th January,

1902, the leading men and others met at Kaniguram and sent letters of full submission. In reply they were informed that, before I could see the jirga, it would have to pay in Rs. 25,000 in cash, and the breech-loaders taken from us during the blockade, 70 in number (of which, however, five are doubtful cases). On receipt of my reply, the jirga immediately set to work. In May, 1901, I reported that I had in vain urged the jirga to call out the "Chalweshtis." This is a peculiarly Mahsud institution. Chalweshtis are tribal police appointed by the jirga to carry out its orders: while doing so the Chalweshtis are inviolable, and should they cause death in the execution of their duties, the blood-feud does not lie. For many years the system had fallen into abeyance so far as Government business with the Mahsuds was concerned; and, as I say, last May the jirga would not or could not revive it. There was now no hesitation about calling them out; nor was there, as in November, 1900, any question of consulting Mulla Powindah. On pain of personal violence, he was compelled to give up rifles in his possession and in that of bad characters under his wing; the principal bad characters (whom he helped by tricking the jirga) fled to Afghanistan; and the Chalweshtis patrolled the tribe collecting the fine. On the 9th February the jirga came, 3,000 strong, to Jandola, with a considerable portion of the fine and rifles, and the balance of both was paid in by the 26th February. The Shaman Khel and Shabi Khel had been making difficulties, but both sections were coerced at Jandola with astonishing vigour and celerity by the jirga, which acted with equal resolution when it came to giving guarantees for the restoration of the cattle carried off during the blockade. With these, and the giving of satisfactory engagements in regard to tribal responsibility and the British outlaws, the conditions determining the closure of the blockade were fulfilled, and the blockade was raised on the morning of the 11th instant.

11. We have now the jirga in full strength and successfully at work in its task of controlling the tribe. Upon the existence and maintenance of this supreme internal authority depends the success of our future relations with the Mahsuds. There are no two ways about it. Given a tribe without a sufficient internal government, and it will assuredly embroil itself with its neighbour, just as any European State in anarchy becomes intolerable. The first and cardinal principle, therefore, in dealing with the Mahsuds is, I submit, the maintenance of the jirga in its present position. With a democracy of this kind, it is fatal to deal with individuals, however powerful they be. In the power and will to raid, every Mahsud possesses the *liberum veto* of Poland, and under these circumstances everything must be done by, with, and through the whole tribal jirga, if the Mahsud country is to escape the fate of Poland. This naturally involves and demands the distribution of allowances in conformity with the political power in the tribe, viz., both to the democracy and to its leaders.

12. The memory of the heavy punishment they have received, though effective, will not suffice to ensure future satisfactory relations with the Mahsuds. The traces of every flogging wear off after a time. The punishment will of course not be soon forgotten; still less likely are the Mahsuds to cease to remember how helpless they are against attack all round their country; and should it ever become necessary hereafter to resort to military pressure, probably the mere arrival of troops at Wana, Jandola, Jani Khel and Datta Khel will bring them to their senses. But it is better to avoid that necessity. Subject to the application of the cardinal principle which I have mentioned above, I believe that the enlistment of Mahsuds in the Militia and in the Army, employment for them on public works in the neighbourhood of their country (they are excellent labourers, as good as Hazaras), frequent and close touch of the Political Officer with the jirga, and a system of short accounts in connection with offences, will give a very reasonable hope that our relations with the tribe will be more stable and happier than they have been in the past. It would be idle to expect that there will be no offences, as idle as to anticipate that burglary will ever be extinct in London. But there is a wide difference between the normal crime of a border tribe and those offences and that temper that have a political motive or are dictated by hostility to Government. As regards normal crime, the system hitherto

in force on the Derajat frontier has been one of long accounts which have made very short friends. If my proposal (about to be made) is accepted, that the tribal allowances shall be paid quarterly, there will be every opportunity for short accounts. And in all respects I strongly recommend that the Mahsuds be treated as the northern tribes are treated that draw allowances from us, viz., the Orakzais, Afridis, Mohmands, Black Mountain clans, &c.

13. The Mahsud country is certainly self-supporting as a whole in respect of grain and live-stock. But, as everywhere among large tribal communities, certain sections are worse off than others, and to these it may be possible to make grants of land on the new Paharpur-Dera Ismail Khan canal, should that project be carried out. If so, some arrangement will have to be made permitting the families of Mahsud cultivators to go to the hills in summer, as Mahsuds generally are intolerant of the hot weather.

14. In dealing with the Mahsuds, it must be remembered that from Wana to Tank, from Tank to Bannu, and from Bannu to Datta Khel, or for a distance of over 200 miles, our territory is open to Mahsud depredations. This is precisely as if the country from Thal to Kohat, thence to Peshawar and round by the Malakand to Buner, this frontier, lay exposed to the action of one single tribe. Taking the normal border crime to which I have alluded, as a standard, the account along 200 miles may appear enormous as against one single tribe; and yet be no more than that of eight or ten tribes taken together; therefore I submit that the proper way to judge it is by comparison with the volume of similar crime upon an equally extended stretch of the frontier elsewhere. On the Thal-Kohat-Peshawar-Malakand line, the account is split up among some eight or ten tribes, and as against each of these the quantity is comparatively small; whereas against one tribe alone the whole account would loom enormous and would be of course intrinsically large, though not relatively so. But it does not necessarily follow that the one single tribe is, therefore, behaving worse than the eight or ten tribes taken together. No doubt from Tank to Bannu and thence to Datta Khel, the Bhattannis and Darwesh Khel act as buffers between us and the Mahsuds, and the rigid future enforcement of their territorial responsibility, which I have established, will do much to stop Mahsuds from traversing their territories. But these buffer clans are weak, the country is extraordinarily difficult and intricate, and in the hot weather much of it is entirely deserted. I am not making excuses for the Mahsuds. I mention these facts only to explain why the territorial responsibility of the buffer clans is insufficient.

Then again, it must be borne in mind that, whereas for the protection of 23 miles of the Khyber Pass (Jamrud to Landi Khana) we pay over Rs. 80,000 a year allowances, *ad hoc*, to the Afridis and maintain a force of 1,200 Khyber Rifles, the Khyber itself being invulnerable in parts, for the Gomal Pass from Murtaza to Wana, 60 miles in length and open everywhere to Mahsud attack, we have only 800 Militia and (by implication only, for the safety of the Gomal was *not* a specific condition of the 1895 agreement with the Mahsuds) paid Rs. 61,000 to the Mahsuds. The safety of the Gomal will of course be made a specific condition of the new allowances. Traffic through the Gomal should, I consider, be regulated and protected as in the Khyber, and special arrangements should always be made to protect the semi-annual Powindah migrations. Formerly traffic went through the Gomal as it pleased; it is better not to give avoidable temptation to a tribe which from time immemorial has looked upon the Gomal as its rightful hunting-ground.

15. I am happy to say, as far as I can judge, the blockade has left no rancour. I think the Mahsuds themselves, and certainly the surrounding population, looked upon the measure as an act of temperate, patient justice and of legitimate retribution. I conclude this from the facts that there was no fanaticism whatever apparent at any time in the matter, not a soul stirred across the border or in Afghanistan to help the Mahsuds, before the blockade had been raised numbers of Mahsuds presented themselves for enlistment in the Militia and for work on the Wana road; and it is a remarkable incident that the man who pre-eminently among all others exerted himself to form the jirga and to combine the Mahsuds for compliance with the terms of

Government, is Badshah Khan, the head of the leading family in the tribe, whose grandfather was killed by us in 1861, whose father died in our prison in 1884, and whose eldest son was killed now in fighting us in December, 1901.

16. The blockade was as stringent as any blockade could have been under the circumstances. No blockade that ever was, but could be run, especially when profits ranging from Rs. 800 to 1,200 per cent. were to be made by successful blockade runners. It would be absurd to expect that any blockade, even of block-houses and barbed wire, will be unbreakable. Here we had, in winter 200 miles, in summer 300 miles, of unusually difficult country to tackle. But there can be no manner of doubt that the blockade was, as a matter of fact, as stringent as it could be. Proofs are, firstly, that the defensive blockade alone brought in Rs. 73,000 in five months, or more than any frontier tribe has ever paid, with or without military operations; secondly, the intense anxiety of the Mahsuds for the termination of the blockade, about which anxiety there could be no mistake; and, thirdly, the prices of salt, cloth, gur, tobacco, as reported steadily for 15 months from four different quarters by British officers (each 60 miles distant from the next, thus giving a fair guarantee of independent sources of information); showing conclusively that the supplies of these articles (which, except salt, are easily portable), were practically quite cut off. Nor were any of these articles found in the Mahsud villages. As I have said, in the matter of grain and live-stock, the Mahsud country is, as a whole, self-supporting. It has been publicly alleged in a newspaper that the blockading troops themselves evaded and broke the blockade. I am glad to state that there is no truth whatever in this. The troops behaved admirably in every respect.

17. There now remains for me the pleasant duty of bringing to the notice of Government the services of those engaged on blockade work. The list is somewhat long, but then the operations extended over a large area and were protracted over 15 months. I could not have had a better staff, one and all worked with zeal and loyalty towards the common end under trying conditions, in a bad climate, and a most unattractive and inhospitable country. There was naturally no leave for them during the 15 months. Under the circumstances, I would ask the indulgence of Government, on behalf of all, in the shape of one month's special privilege leave in addition to any privilege leave that may be due (as in the case of the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1884). I suggest this for all those who were engaged more than six months continuously on blockade work. This would include officers like myself, the Political Officers of the Tochi and Wana, the Militias and the Commandants of Border Military Police, Native officers and men of the Border Military Police and regular Police, and others who, in addition to their ordinary duties, performed blockade work, as well as officers and men specifically entertained on the blockade alone, like the Blockade Officer and the Special Blockade Police.

18. The brunt of the executive work in connection with the blockade fell upon Mr. Lorimer, I.C.S., who most fully justified his selection as Special Blockade Officer. The blockade over 200 miles of country demanded a mass of intricate, minute and detailed arrangements, rules and provisions, the preparation, execution and supervision of which called for the closest personal supervision and incessant guidance and care. The task was admirably done by Mr. Lorimer; he worked indefatigably and most zealously, often under conditions of great exposure and failing health. That the blockade was really stringent, without alienating the good-will of our own people who had to put up with restrictions and restraints, was in great measure due to him and to the manner in which he carried with him those with whom he had to work, and his subordinates. As Political Officer, temporarily in Southern and then in Northern Waziristan, he fulfilled all expectations; he has shown remarkable qualifications, and has added greatly to an already deservedly high reputation. I venture to commend him for a special mark of the recognition by Government of his most valuable services.

I should have submitted the same recommendation for the late Captain Down. His loss has dimmed the success of the offensive blockade. In him

we have been deprived of the best of friends and comrades, and Government of the most promising officer on the frontier, of his standing. Gifted with a cool judgment, clear perception, rapid determination, devoted to his work and to the people in his charge, if he had been spared, he would have risen to a conspicuous place in the distinguished roll of the officers of the marches.

Captain Bowring, Commandant of the Dera Ismail Khan Border Military Police, has done excellent work both in his substantive capacity and as Assistant Blockade Officer. It fell to him to organise the protection of the Dera Ismail Khan border; this he did so well that not only was the border free from annoyances, but also in several instances Mahsud gangs were cut up by the villagers who had hitherto been before Mahsuds as sheep in the presence of wolves. His influence upon the Bhattannis was marked, and entirely ensured the stout stand they made against the Mahsuds. He did not spare himself in carrying out and perfecting the blockade arrangements, at which he was constantly working without regard to his health or to the appalling heat of the Tank border. He is a very promising, active and energetic officer, with a good judgment and much personal influence, and deserves high credit for his services.

Lieutenant Coldstream, Commandant of the Bannu Border Military Police, and Assistant Blockade Officer, performed his duties with great zeal, devotion and success, though much hampered by bad health, which, however, in no way deterred him from arduous work.

Mr. Bosworth Smith, I.C.S., acted for some months as Assistant Blockade Officer, and, though unacquainted with the frontier, performed his duties satisfactorily.

Mr. S. Waterfield, while Political Officer in Southern Waziristan, had exceedingly heavy work, first, in connection with matters preparatory to the blockade, and afterwards with the receipts of the fine paid in kind by the Mahsuds. He carried out his duties with thoroughness, single-mindedness and care, in spite of constant attacks of fever, which to many would have been a sufficient reason for going on sick leave.

Such work as fell to his share in connection with the blockade was very satisfactorily performed by Mr. Johnston, now Political Officer in Southern Waziristan. He has already acquired a good knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the Mahsuds; he has personal influence, he has shown judgment and tact, and will, I anticipate, discharge well the somewhat difficult business of conducting our relations with them in future till matters have settled down to the routine which now obtains with the northern tribes.

I have to cordially acknowledge the willing help of the Deputy Commissioners, past and present, of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan—Messrs. Donald, Kettlewell, Captain Fox-Strangways and the late Mr. Gee. They have been forward in placing their establishments and the resources of their districts at the disposal of the blockade, which they have aided in every way in their power, and the success of which has been considerably due to their influence and co-operation.

Mr. Gregson, Assistant District Superintendent of Police, acted as Assistant Blockade Officer from the 9th December, 1901, to the close of the blockade. He showed commendable energy, tact and devotion to his duty, and I have been thoroughly satisfied with his work.

19. In Southern Waziristan, Muhammad Azim Khan, Officiating Tahsildar, stands foremost for the very valuable services rendered by him. His knowledge of, and influence over, the Mahsuds are great, and were ever readily and honestly at our disposal; his information was always full, accurate and early—many points in the game—and he was of the greatest assistance to Messrs. Waterfield, Lorimer and Johnston, Political Officers at Wana. I consider he has done best of all the Native officials connected with the blockade, and I venture to recommend him for the title of Khan Bahadur and confirmation as Tahsildar.

Subadar Sultan Asad Jan is a very promising officer, willing, hard-working, and popular with the troops. He was of special assistance to Mr. Waterfield in connection with the payments in kind. I would recommend him for the title of Khan Sahib.

Musa Khan, Naib Tahsildar at Wana, has done very well and deserves a khilat of Rs. 200.

Kalla Khan, Alizai, and Guldad, Abdur Rahman Khel, Mahsuds, acted as deputations on our part during the past two months; it was greatly owing to their straightforward reports to the Mahsuds of what we said, and their equally honest reports to us, that an understanding was rapidly arrived at. They have done good service. Kalla Khan, moreover, with Malik Bannuchi Khan, Darwesh Khel, of Wana, were the valuers of payments in kind, and, as such, did heavy work for several months, honestly and truthfully. I propose khilats of Rs. 400 each for Kalla Khan and Guldad; and one of Rs. 200 for Malik Bannuchi Khan.

20. In the Dera Ismail Khan district, the Bhattannis, Subadar-Major Muhammad Akbar Khan of the Border Military Police; Officiating Inspector of Police, Thana Ram; Deputy Inspectors Mir Badshah of the Gomal Thana, Arbab Muhammad Yakub Khan of Mullazai, Muhammad Hyat Khan and the Nawab of Tank, deserve special commendation.

Subadar-Major Muhammad Akbar Khan, an officer of long and approved good service, was Captain Bowering's right-hand man in the border arrangements, which, as I have said, were completely successful. Akbar Khan himself organised an effective Bhattanni counter-raid. I recommend him for a khilat of Rs. 500 and the title of Khan Sahib.

Thana Ram, who has been some 25 years in Tank and knows the Mahsuds and the Tank border better than anyone else, admirably supervised and managed the blockade arrangements and merits a khilat of Rs. 500.

Deputy-Inspector Mir Badshah had an exceedingly troublesome charge in the Gomal Thana, which swarms with relatives and friends of Mahsuds. It was the most dangerous portion of the Tank border. He frustrated several attempts to loot the Gomal bazaar. I recommend for him a khilat of Rs. 350.

Deputy-Inspectors Muhammad Hyat and Arbab Muhammad Yakub were exceedingly active and zealous in supervising the blockade police and visiting villages, keeping everyone up to mark. They deserve khilats each of Rs. 200.

I recommend commendatory certificates for Zarif Khan, Alam Khan and Ghulam Hussain, Sergeants of blockade police.

Nawab Ghulam Kasim Khan, Nawab of Tank, maintained the whole time, at his own expense, ten sowars and twelve footmen for blockade duty, which they did well. As a large and opulent jagirdar, he is of course bound to render service, which, indeed, he volunteered to do and offered money as well towards the expenses of the blockade. At the same time, though service was his duty, I suggest that an appropriate acknowledgment of the proper fulfilment of that duty would not be out of place. Considering his rank, wealth and the title he already holds, I am inclined to think that a special khilat in the shape of a gold watch with a suitable inscription would meet the case.

The following yeomen and village headmen have done good service on the Tank border:—Khushal Khan of Jatta, Shahnawaz Khan of Ali Khel, Nasrat of Kirri Haidar and Malik Talibdin of Mullazai. For each of these I suggest a khilat of Rs. 100, with, in the case of Malik Talibdin, the grant of a chair when visiting British officers. The Bhattannis of the Dera Ismail Khan district have done exceedingly well. They have more than held their own against the Mahsuds; they have thoroughly fulfilled their pass and general border obligations and responsibilities, and they decidedly merit the favour of Government. By a curious arrangement of old-standing, these Bhattannis pay their land revenue by one-third of the crop harvested being taken and the value appraised. Out of this one-third a quarter is returned to

the Bhattannis as their inam (called the "chaharum") and is shared equally between the Maliks and the tribe. The simplest and adequate way, I think, of rewarding them would be on account of this spring crop to double the "chaharum," *i.e.*, to let them have $\frac{1}{2}$ instead of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Government one-third share of the crop. This means a grant of about Rs. 200 which among so many is not much. There are besides some individual Bhattannis, 20 in number, especially mentioned by name in Captain Bowring's report, seven of whom share in the chaharum, while the rest do not. For these he proposes money rewards aggregating Rs. 880, which I suggest that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan be empowered to grant.

21. In Bannu, Khan Bahadur Haknewaz Khan, Superintendent of Irrigation, was in charge of the blockade check and pass arrangements, a difficult duty which he performed tactfully and very successfully. I propose for him a khilat of Rs. 300.

Malik Khudadad Khan, formerly Commanding the Border Military Police, and now Inspector of Police at Peshawar, efficiently worked the border arrangements, and I recommend him for a khilat of Rs. 350.

Inspector of blockade police Nur Khan worked very well and merits a khilat of Rs. 200. Subadar-Major Nur Muhammad Khan, and Subadars Matiulla Khan and Said Hassan Khan of the Border Military Police are highly spoken of in connection with blockade duty. I propose for the first a khilat of Rs. 150, and for the latter each a khilat of Rs. 100.

Sergeant Ata Muhammad Khan of the blockade police merits a commendatory certificate.

22. In the Tochi, Officiating Tahsildar Ahmad Din did excellent work in supervising blockade arrangements and obtaining information. I recommend that he be confirmed as Tahsildar and receive a khilat of Rs. 400.

Naib Tahsildar Hyat Khan is highly commended, and I propose for him a khilat of Rs. 200.

23. Numbers of jagirdars, mafidars, village headmen and notables were asked to produce levies for blockade duty. These levies were of course paid; Rs. 15 per mensem a horseman and Rs. 5 a month per man on foot. Still the native gentlemen in question did service in producing them, and would be highly gratified by the grant of commendatory sanads of the usual type. There are in all 71 such in the two districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu; and, with your approval, I will separately furnish lists of names with the quota of horse or foot, or both, supplied by each.

24. Should His Excellency be pleased to confer, in the Darbar at Peshawar, such khilats and titles as are approved, their value will be immensely enhanced in the eyes of the recipients. I would suggest that each khilat be accompanied with a complimentary sanad.

25. The certificates for subordinate members of the blockade police might issue from your office through the Inspector-General of Police; and, if you approve of commendatory sanads for the suppliers of levies, they might issue from your office and be presented by the Deputy Commissioners concerned.

26. An especially gratifying feature of this winter has been the reliability and efficiency shown by both Militias. They have done exceedingly well, as well as old and seasoned troops, while preserving the irregular character, mobility and elasticity of Militias. We could not ask for more. I especially commend the Officers Commanding the Militias and their Seconds-in-Command and Adjutants to the favourable notice of Government for their hard, self-denying and most successful work. It has been a pleasure to see the Militias developing into the fine corps they now are. The results have justified the experiment and augur well for the future.

As regards the non-commissioned officers and men, I attach a copy of a telegram, No. 72, dated the 18th instant, from the Officer Commanding Northern Waziristan Militia, and will forward Major Harman's proposals

and recommendations when received. I think that gratuities taking the shape of from one month's to three months' pay may be appropriate to meet the cases of such as are specially mentioned. I am unable to say whether the rules of the Order of British India permit of its grant to those of the army that are serving in a Militia.

27. In conclusion I should like to record my gratitude to Generals Hill, Denning and General Egerton for the sympathy, advice and most ready co-operation which I have had the good fortune to enjoy at their hands. It has been throughout a case of military and civil officers working together in the interests of the State, and without this combination on part of both authorities on the spot, it would have been impossible to have reached a successful end.

28. To save time a copy of this letter has been submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

No. 29.

Telegram from W. R. H. Merk, Esq., Commissioner on Special Duty, Jandola, to Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province. No. 803 B. Dated 6th April, 1902.

Distribution of allowances settled and agreement signed by Jirga, which is dismissed to-day.

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