

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons
dated 19 June 1879;—for,

“ COPY of a MEMORANDUM drawn up by Sir *Frederick J. Halliday*; K.C.B.,
a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, upon the
PETITION presented to this House by Mr. *W. Tayler*.”

India Office, }
20 June 1879. }

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State.

(*Mr. Edward Stanhope.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
24 June 1879.

COPY of a MEMORANDUM drawn up by Sir *Frederick J. Halliday*, K.C.B., a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, upon the PETITION presented to this House by Mr. *W. Tayler*.

THE CASE OF MR. W. TAYLER.

MR. TAYLER, formerly Commissioner of Patna, has presented a petition to the House of Commons, praying for redress of wrongs which he alleges he suffered at my hands in 1857, regarding transactions as to which his views have, he affirms, been proved to have been right, and my views entirely and perilously wrong.

Sir John Eardley Wilmot has given notice that on the 16th instant he will call the attention of the House to this Petition, and it therefore seems proper that, as the case of Mr. Tayler has two sides, and, as yet, only one side has been presented to the public by Mr. Tayler, and by those who have adopted his statements, some account should be given of the other side of his case, which I proceed to do in the present Paper.

Mr. Tayler was appointed by me Commissioner of Patna in 1855. He was removed by me in August 1857 for the reasons assigned in the following extract from a Minute of that date :—

“ The proceedings of Mr. W. Tayler, the Commissioner of Patna, have long been a source of much embarrassment and anxiety to me.

“ This was the case even while the duties devolving on him were the ordinary duties of a Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit in quiet times.

“ In more than one instance complaints had been made by the Board of Revenue of the unsatisfactory mode in which Mr. Tayler conducted the duties of his office, and their dissatisfaction had at length become so great as to induce them to represent to Government their inability to carry on work with him, unless his conduct towards themselves were seriously noticed.

“ In matters not falling within the Board's jurisdiction, I had myself serious cause for distrusting the judgment and discretion of Mr. Tayler. In connection more especially with a scheme which he had set on foot for establishing an Industrial Institution in Behar, his conduct had been such as to give rise to much remark throughout the districts of his Division, and to make it necessary for me to institute an inquiry. Mr. Tayler's extremely injudicious behaviour, and the unbecoming tone of his correspondence while this inquiry has been going on, made it very difficult for me to avoid anticipating the result, which I have for some time foreseen would be his removal from the appointment of Commissioner of Patna. I was very anxious, however, that Mr. Tayler should have every opportunity of explaining what had been alleged to his disparagement, and thus it happened that he was still Commissioner when the disturbances in the Upper Provinces commenced.

“ On the breaking out of these disturbances, my uneasiness and fears in regard to Mr. Tayler's fitness for the important post he occupied were greatly increased by the line of conduct he thought proper to pursue towards me, which I soon found to be that of concealing from me, as much as possible, alike his acts and his intentions; and he has since avowed that this was done wilfully and purposely, in order to carry out views of his own which he thought I should not approve of. But for the consideration that, at a critical period, when plots and conspiracies were represented to be rife at Patna, and an outbreak likely enough at any moment to occur, it was desirable, if possible, to avoid making a change in the office of the head executive authority of the Division, I should have been anxious to remove him at an earlier date. In many respects, also, Mr. Tayler possesses qualities which it appeared to me,

“ if well directed, might be turned to good account in this emergency. He is undoubtedly intelligent, active, and energetic, and has great local knowledge. I determined, therefore, to endeavour to bring about such a change in his manner of conducting his duties as would enable me to make good use of his services. I was in hopes that, by insisting on constant and frequent communications, and with the aid of the electric telegraph, I should be able to direct and control all that was done by the Commissioner. But in this expectation I have been disappointed. Mr. Tayler has lately been more communicative than he was at first, but frequent interruptions to the communication by telegraph have prevented my exercising that constant watch over his actions which I had proposed, and, moreover, I have discovered that Mr. Tayler has not hesitated to disobey my orders (and that, too, in a matter of life or death) when obedience has not happened to suit his purpose, or his own opinion of what was to be done.

“ I look upon Mr. Tayler's conduct, in the case here alluded to, in a very serious light. He had already, in the cases of 15 or 16 persons capitally convicted, largely mixed himself up with the operations of the police magistrate and public prosecutor, against persons whom he was afterwards to try, and did actually try, as a judge in the last resort. To prevent this indecorum, which might, perhaps, almost be called injustice, and which was occasioning public scandal and discontent, I gave him positive orders not to sit as judge in the case of anyone against whom he had been concerned in the previous examinations and inquiries, but to commit such persons for trial to the more impartial tribunal of the Sessions Judge. In the face of these orders, Mr. Tayler did not hesitate to try and condemn to death a trooper of Captain Rattray's Police Corps, in whose case he had been previously concerned in directing the operations of the police, and upon whose trial he could not possibly be considered impartial.

“ On the trial of the banker, Looft Ali Khan, acquitted by the Sessions Judge, who had pronounced the evidence altogether insufficient to furnish ground for having brought the man to trial, Mr. Tayler has evinced a most indecent anxiety for a conviction, and has not scrupled to assail the judge with private letters, urging him to condemn the prisoner, in a manner contrary to all usage and propriety and even humanity.

“ There can be no doubt that Mr. Tayler's hasty and indecorous proceedings in these and other instances have tended to irritate men's minds, and to produce a feeling of insecurity among the respectable portion of the inhabitants.

“ It was a most embarrassing circumstance, during the existing disturbances, that I could not trust Mr. Tayler to call on the zemindars with the authority he ought to have possessed, to assist in keeping the peace in their districts. For it was notorious that he had so aggrieved them by his collections for the industrial school as to excite no little discontent, and disincline them to listen to his applications.

“ But the last indiscretion committed by Mr. Tayler is one which renders it, in my opinion, absolutely dangerous to allow Mr. Tayler to remain any longer in the important position which he now occupies. It appears from a letter just received from Mr. Tayler that, while apparently under the influence of a panic, he has ordered the officials at all stations in his Division to abandon their posts and to fall back on Dinapore. Had it not been for the spirited and judicious conduct of Mr. A. Money, the Collector and magistrate of Behar, who, in spite of this order, and with only the sub-deputy opium agent, Mr. Hollings, to bear him company, determined on remaining at Gya, even after all the other residents and the troops had left the place, this act of Mr. Tayler's would have entailed, at that station alone, the certain loss of eight lacs of rupees in the Treasury, besides other public and private property, the release of many hundred determined convicts from the jail, and a risk of the whole town and district being thrown into anarchy and confusion.

“ What has happened elsewhere is unknown, but there is the strongest probability everywhere of disaster.

“ Under these circumstances, I have determined at once to remove Mr. Tayler from his appointment of Commissioner of Patna.

“ The emergency is a serious one. The whole division cannot but be in a state of disorganisation, and it will require the best exertions of the best man
“ available

“ available to restore order and confidence among the people ; and, at a time
 “ when a new general officer (Sir J. Outram), unacquainted with that part of the
 “ country is about to take command of the Division, it is especially necessary to
 “ have the chief civil authority in hands that can be fully trusted. At such a
 “ crisis, it will be politic to render the Commissioner independent of the Board,
 “ and place him in direct communication with Government on all subjects.

“ I believe there is no man in the service to whom this onerous and difficult
 “ task could be intrusted, with a better chance of its being successfully carried
 “ out, than to Mr. Samuells, who is at present nominally Commissioner of Cut-
 “ tack, but actually an officiating judge of the Sudder Court. I have accordingly
 “ selected Mr. Samuells for this duty, and directed him to proceed to join the
 “ appointment of Commissioner of Patna with as little delay as possible. His
 “ appointment will be understood to be temporary, and made on account of the
 “ peculiar condition of the country, and it will cease whenever its further con-
 “ tinuance may appear to the Government unnecessary for the objects now in
 “ view.”

Mr. Taylor had, before the Minute was written, not only omitted, as a rule, to inform me of his proceedings, but he had officially intimated to me that he wilfully and purposely kept me uninformed of his intentions and acts, because he thought I might disapprove of them.*

During this time, while intentionally deprived of official information, I had received intimation through a private hand, but from indubitable authority, that the Mahommedans of Patna were then very well disposed, but that if Mr. Tayler was not checked in his unnecessary and unjustifiable violence towards them, he would infallibly breed an insurrection.

One of these unjustifiable acts was at a later date reported by Mr. Tayler himself. He had apprehended one Waris Ali Jemadar on suspicion of treason, and on the 31st July 1857 he thus reported to the Lieutenant Governor what had been done with him :—

“ Para. 22. Waris Ali, whose arrest has been previously mentioned, was
 “ tried under the Commission on Monday, the 6th July, and capitally sen-
 “ tenced.

“ 23. He was executed the same day, and his last words were to ask whether
 “ no Mussulmen would assist him.

* * * * *

“ 25. I postponed his trial for two or three days after his arrival, and had
 “ several private interviews with him, in the hope of eliciting information. But
 “ he was evidently, I think, not in Ali Kureem’s secrets, as he was in such
 “ excessive alarm and despair, that I am convinced he would have done anything
 “ to save his life.

“ 26. When speaking in private with me, he implored me to tell him whether
 “ there was any way in which his life could be spared.

“ 27. I said ‘ Yes,’ and his eyes opened with unmistakeable delight ; and
 “ when he asked again what the way was, his countenance was a picture of
 “ anxiety, hope, and terror.

“ 28. I told him ‘ I will make a bargain with you ; give me three lives, and I
 “ will give you yours.’

“ 29. He then told me all the names that I already knew, but could disclose
 “ nothing further, at least with any proof in support.

“ 30. He was evidently not sufficiently clever to be Ali Kureem’s con-
 “ fidant.” †

Mr. Samuells, the able and experienced Judge of the Sudder (now the High) Court, who succeeded Mr. Tayler at Patna, went at length into this case, and reported his opinion regarding it “ that Waris Ali was guilty of no offence “ known to the law.” ‡

Before my determination regarding Mr. Tayler was carried into effect, the reasons for it were submitted for the consideration of Lord Canning, who replied that “ he entirely concurred in the view taken by the Lieutenant “ Governor of Bengal of Mr. Tayler’s conduct, in ordering the civil officers of
 “ the

* See Appendix A. Mr. Tayler’s letter to Government of Bengal, 17th July 1857, and reply from that Government 22nd idem.

† Mr. Tayler to Governor of Bengal, 31st July 1857.

‡ Mr. Samuells to the Governor of Bengal, 4th December 1858.

“the several districts of the Division to abandon their posts and fall back on Dinapore, and in the propriety of his removal.”

On receiving intimation of the decision of Lord Canning's Government in his case, Mr. Tayler solicited his Lordship to reconsider it as being unjust in itself, and founded on an inaccurate report of his proceedings. Accordingly, the whole question was reconsidered by the Governor General in Council, and the result communicated to Mr. Tayler on the 23rd December 1857, to the effect that, “after giving to Mr. Tayler the full benefit of his explanation in regard to abandoning the stations, the Governor General in Council is of opinion that the Lieutenant Governor was thoroughly justified in removing Mr. Tayler summarily from the office of Commissioner of the Patna Division, on the ground that, at so critical a period, the Division could not be left in his charge.”

Dissatisfied with this decision against him, Mr. Tayler appealed to the Government in England, stating his case in a very voluminous memorial. The Court of Directors gave their decision on this appeal on the 11th August 1858.

After giving Mr. Tayler due credit for much of his conduct under the circumstances, and accepting his assurance that he had not been actuated by panic, the Court's Despatch proceeded,—

“At the same time, we agree with you in the opinion that Mr. Tayler's instructions involved a very grave error of judgment, and were proved by subsequent occurrences at some of the stations, especially Gya and Mozufferpore, to have been uncalled for by any pressing emergency at the date of their issue, and not inaptly described by the Lieutenant Governor as a ‘flight nothing short of scandalous and disgraceful to the British name.’”

“Although,” the Despatch went on to say, “Mr. Tayler was guilty of nothing more than an error of judgment, we concur with you that the Lieutenant Governor was thoroughly justified in removing Mr. Tayler summarily from the office of Commissioner of the Patna Division, on the ground that, at so critical a period, the Division could not safely be left in his charge.”

In another part of the same Despatch the Court remarked, “Mr. Tayler has entered into an elaborate defence of his conduct in withholding from the Lieutenant Governor information of the measures which he proposed to adopt for the repression of disturbances in the city of Patna. He states that the Lieutenant Governor was ignorant of the real state of things at Patna, and he (Mr. Tayler) ‘felt his Honor, in this state of error, would in all probability decline, *a priori*, to sanction them.’ On this point, we have only to observe that the reason alleged by Mr. Tayler for withholding information at a very serious crisis from the Government to which he was subordinate is wholly inadmissible.

“In regard to the private letters on the subject of the trial of the banker, Lootf Ali Khan, Mr. Tayler now shows that the Session Judge wrote to him as well as he to the Session Judge, and adds, ‘all the blame that can possibly attach to your memorialist in the matter of this serious charge is, that he replied to the remarks of the Judge.’ This is not all the blame that attaches to Mr. Tayler in regard to this matter. It is not merely the fact, but also the nature of the correspondence, which is deserving of censure, and all that Mr. Tayler has now shown is that the part taken by the Session Judge in this correspondence is equally discreditable with that taken by himself.”

Still dissatisfied with this third judgment against him, Mr. Tayler solicited its reconsideration by the Home Government, which in the meantime had become the Government of the Crown. The Secretary of State did reconsider the matter in compliance with this request, and for the fourth time decided it against him. Lord Stanley remarked that Mr. Tayler, in urging his case on Her Majesty's Government, had charged the Lieutenant Governor with misrepresentation in a manner “altogether unwarranted,” adding, in regard to the other matters discussed by Mr. Tayler in his memorial now under consideration, “Her Majesty's Government concurs in the views expressed by the Court of Directors in their Despatch of 11th August 1858.*”

Mr.

* See Appendix B., Lord Stanley's Despatch.

Mr. Tayler's conduct in the case of the Patna Industrial Institution has been dwelt upon at great length in his printed statements as strongly illustrative of his merits.

The facts of this case, told very concisely, are the following :—

Mr. Tayler proposed to establish an Industrial-Education Institution by means of private subscriptions, to which, at first, unaware of Mr. Tayler's real intentions, I gave countenance and encouragement.

It was subsequently alleged that some of the Native gentlemen who had subscribed had acted unwillingly, in deference to Mr. Tayler's official position; and when this was represented to Mr. Tayler he very strongly and indignantly denied it as a false and malicious calumny and slander, put forth by his personal enemies by reason of envy. He also offered to make written inquiries, and to satisfy the Lieutenant-Governor by documentary evidence of the falsehood of the statement in question. It was eventually proved that the statement was true, and that Mr. Tayler, to support his contradiction of it, had sent in such evidence as told in favour of his own assertions, and had suppressed and withheld evidence that went the other way.

The whole of Mr. Tayler's proceedings in respect to the Patna Industrial Institution came under the review of the Governor General in Council; and, at a later date, under that of the Secretary of State in Council, and they were by both condemned.*

In communicating to the Government of India, on the 28th July 1859, his opinion on this part of Mr. Tayler's case, Lord Stanley found fault with the Lieutenant Governor for having at any time given countenance to Mr. Tayler's scheme, admitting, however, that, as soon as his doubts were excited, the Lieutenant Governor's action was prompt and his inquiries searching and full. "The fact was then," Lord Stanley goes on to say, "established, that the subscriptions were offered in deference to Mr. Tayler's official position and authority, and under an apprehension, on the part of the Native gentlemen appealed to, of incurring the Commissioner's displeasure if their assistance was withheld."

"Some excuse," the same Despatch proceeds, "may possibly be found for Mr. Tayler's mode of obtaining subscriptions to the Industrial Institution, on the supposition that in promoting an object of engrossing interest to himself, he failed to perceive the doubtful character of some of his proceedings in endeavouring to accomplish his object. But if, in withholding documents of direct bearing on the matter under inquiry for the reasons given in the above (Mr. Tayler's) reply, Mr. Tayler can be relieved of the charge of highly disingenuous conduct, and of practising a deception upon the Lieutenant Governor, it can only be by attributing to him a total ignorance of his position and duties in relation to the Government to which he was subordinate, and to which he was bound to afford all the information in his power in regard to proceedings which he was carrying on in his official capacity and supporting by means of his official authority."

Besides the foregoing, another reason assigned for my want of confidence in Mr. Tayler was, that on the trial of a man, accused by him of treason, but acquitted, "Mr. Tayler had evinced a most indecent anxiety for a conviction, and has not scrupled to assail the Judge with private letters, urging him to condemn the prisoner, in a manner contrary to all usage and propriety, and even humanity." Mr. Tayler, in his memorial to the Home Government, attempted to excuse this by showing that if he wrote private letters to the Judge on the subject, the Judge did so also to him. But the Home Government decided that Mr. Tayler had in no way cleared himself from the imputation in question, and had only succeeded in showing that the Judge's conduct was "as discreditable as his own."

Perhaps a word may be permitted as to what Mr. Tayler calls the cabal of his slanderous personal enemies, to whose malignant and envious calumnies he states himself to owe all his misfortunes. In sober earnestness, this cabal never existed out of Mr. Tayler's imagination; and the notion of it was due only to Mr. Tayler's habit of stigmatising with opprobrious names all who differed from him as to his measures or his statements. Upon this part of the subject

* Appendix C.

subject the Secretary of State, on the 1st June 1859, remarked to the Government of India as follows :—“ Since the time that exception was first taken to Mr. Tayler’s proceedings at Patna, he has carried on a correspondence of unnecessary length and of a very reprehensible character, to the great waste of public time, the detriment of the public service, and by no means to the credit of his own official character. It is to be regretted that you did not check Mr. Tayler when he entered upon this objectionable course, and that you did not at once visit with your marked disapproval the imputation by Mr. Tayler of unworthy motives to all who, in the discharge of a public duty, felt themselves called upon to express an opinion in any way adverse to Mr. Tayler’s proceedings.”

Mr. Tayler has, in his several printed statements, taken great pains to have it understood that he found it necessary to withhold information from me because of my “infatuation and blindness” regarding the state of things at Patna; and this, he says, is proved because, in a private letter addressed to him on the 13th of June 1857, I had said, in answer to a letter from him dated 8th June, but only received on the 13th, “I cannot satisfy myself that Patna is in any danger;” and again, “It is inconceivable that the sepoys at Dinapore should mutiny in the face of the European force there, and, until the sepoys mutiny, there can be little fear of a popular commotion in Patna.”

These and other things of a like kind, and with like strength of invective, had been urged against me in a pamphlet by Mr. Tayler in Calcutta. And in a Minute then written by me, for the information of Lord Canning’s Government and the Home authorities, I showed conclusively that these opinions, considered by Mr. Tayler to be so foolish and ignorant, were opinions exactly similar to those then expressed to me by himself, and formed upon his own representation of the facts, which was all I had to guide me. The same Minute disposed unanswerably of several other allegations of Mr. Tayler’s (all since repeated in his various papers), by which he had sought to prove that his valuable recommendations had been “slighted or ignored by me in opposition to reason, fact, and evidence, to the imminent danger of the whole Province.”

The whole Minute, which should be read before any judgment is formed on Mr. Tayler’s claim, will be found in the Appendix to this Paper.* It shows that Mr. Tayler’s statements are in many instances entirely without foundation.

The point on which most stress has, latterly, been laid by Mr. Tayler (in his earlier statements he scarcely alluded to it) is his apprehension of four persons in Patna of the Mahommedan sect called Wahabees.

His account of this transaction is that “it having been providentially given him to perceive, though dimly at the time, the danger of disaffection at Patna,” and having “obtained possession of several letters brought to him by a servant of some of the head men of the Wahabees, which, if genuine, indicated the existence of treasonable correspondence,” he, on the 20th June 1857, arrested four principal persons of that sect, who “lived in apparent respectability and harmlessness in the city of Patna,” † and committed them to the custody of the Seikli soldiers. That “the arrest of these Wahabees was viewed with marked disapprobation, and in pursuance of this disapprobation, and as if of purpose to cast discredit on me (Mr. Tayler) before the community, the Chief Moulvee Ahmedoollah, who was released immediately on my removal from the Commissionership, was received into special favour by my successor, and was from that time cherished by the Government and the local authorities with special distinctions.” He further designated the said Ahmedoollah as “the particular pet and protégé of the Government.” And again, “it was this act which was viewed with the disapprobation of the Lieutenant Governor, who not only embarrassed me by a vexatious call for proofs, at a time when no proofs were possible, and honoured them with the exceptional name of gentlemen, but also subsequently attributed the rising in the city to the fact of their apprehension.” ‡

On another occasion, Mr. Tayler stated that “one of the acts which at the
“ time

* See Appendix D.

† Mr. Tayler’s printed Narrative, dated 1867, pages 101--106.

‡ Pamphlet printed by Mr. Tayler in 1867.

“time excited the most serious disapprobation of the Lieutenant Governor was the arrest of Moulvee Ahmedoollah, and other leading members of the Wahabee sect, at the outset of the rebellion,” of whom he declared I was “the avowed champion, apologist, and advocate.”

Again, in an application to Sir Stafford Northcote, dated apparently about April 1868, Mr. Tayler describes the application of the Lieutenant Governor to be informed of the reasons for arresting the Wahabees as an “imputation that I did not report my intention of arresting the Wahabees *before I carried that intention into execution.*”^{*} This he repeats in an appendix to that application, and goes into some length to show that, as he had power to act, it was unjust of the Lieutenant Governor to “rebuke me for arresting the Wahabee Moulvees without asking permission.”

In another part of the same application to Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Tayler enumerated, among the Lieutenant Governor’s misdeeds, “his profession of ignorance as to the Wahabee character.” And, in his pamphlet of 1867, he affirmed that, “the arrest of the Wahabees was, with other acts of his, arrayed against him as crimes and misdemeanours.”

Seven years afterwards one of these men was tried and sentenced to penal servitude for a treasonable conspiracy, in no way connected with the events of 1857, and belonging to occurrences which took place many hundred miles from Patna. And this fact Mr. Tayler forthwith declared exposed “the distressing ignorance and infatuation” of the Lieutenant Governor,[†] and vindicated the measures taken in blind opposition to Mr. Tayler’s views.

This is Mr. Tayler’s account of the matter. The facts are as follows:—

Mr. Tayler arrested four Wahabee gentlemen on the 20th June 1857. He did not report this at the time, and the Lieutenant Governor first heard of it through a letter quoted below, from the magistrate of Patna.[‡] The Lieutenant Governor never expressed or suggested any disapprobation of the arrest of the men in question, nor did he countermand their arrest, or impute it to Mr. Tayler as a “crime,” or in any way interfere in the matter. He merely objected, and that more than once to being kept in ignorance, first of the arrest itself, and afterwards, and for some time, of the reasons for it. As Mr. Tayler, when he did report what he had done, said he had done it *because of his having “obtained possession of important letters bearing on the guilt of the men in question,”* from a man whom he afterwards described as “evidently not one on whom to place reliance,” the Lieutenant Governor asked to see those letters (this is called by Mr. Tayler “embarrassing him with vexatious calls for proofs,”) but he could never obtain a sight of them. Mr. Tayler afterwards, when pressed to send the letters, said, “one of them appears to be genuine, the others may very probably be fabricated.”[§] But he never sent the letters for inspection, and they have never been forthcoming since. Mr. Tayler’s first statement showed that he intended to charge these men with treason. It was not till asked for further information that he said he had no evidence against them, and only arrested them as hostages. So far from these prisoners having been released by the Lieutenant Governor “in pursuance of his disapprobation,” “immediately on my removal from the Commissioner-ship,” they were released, one by Mr. Tayler himself, while he was still in office, and the other three upon his written recommendation soon after he was removed

* The italics are Mr. Tayler’s.

† Pamphlet of 1867, pages 123 and 260.

‡ “To the Junior Secretary, Government of Bengal, Fort William.

“Sir,

Patna, 20 June 1857.

“I have again to report that all appears quiet. There have been reports for the last few days of secret collections of arms, and the Commissioner, for reasons which he has, most likely, made known to Government, ordered the houses of the principal Wahabees to be searched, but nothing has been found. Four of the Wahabees are in the custody of Captain Rattray. As the seizure only took place to-day, there has not been sufficient time to see the effect on the mass of the people.

“My own personal observations, even in the worst parts of the city, lead me to think, from the respect with which I am received, and the general quiet prevailing, that there is nothing to fear from Patna at present. The Bengali portion of the population, and also several of the Europeans, alarmed at the accounts from Goruckpore, are sending away their families. There is, however, no general panic, and business proceeds as usual. The jail is quiet, as also the district.

“I have, &c.

“(signed) J. M. Lewis, Magistrate.”

§ Mr. Tayler to Government of Bengal, 11th July 1857.

removed from office.* Further the Lieutenant Governor did not "endorse an opinion of the inoffensiveness" of any one of the Wahabees, and gave no opinion of his own as to the Wahabees or the Wahabee character, or on any part of the subject. Lastly, he did not in any manner "cherish," "pet," "protect," "distinguish," "champion," "apologise for," or become the "advocate for" any of the Wahabee prisoners before or after their imprisonment, as affirmed by Mr. Tayler, and never had an opportunity of seeing or personally knowing, or having any sort of communication with them or with any of their connections, at any period of his administration.

It must not be omitted, as bearing strongly on the assertion of Mr. Tayler that the arrest of these Wahabees saved Patna from an outbreak, that while they were under arrest as "hostages to prevent insurrection," a serious outbreak took place in Patna, attended with loss of life. This outbreak, the only breach of the peace which occurred there, was, by Mr. Tayler, attributed to the Wahabees. After they were released, as before their arrest,† Patna remained perfectly quiet.

The recorded correspondence on the whole subject may be referred to in proof of the accuracy of these statements.‡

It is hardly necessary to notice the indignation expressed in Mr. Tayler's various writings because of the term "*gentlemen*" applied to these Wahabees in the Lieutenant Governor's official correspondence. Mr. Tayler does not say they were not gentlemen, indeed, he describes them as persons of respectability, and he calls them *moulvees*, which is a somewhat higher title than gentleman. But he apparently thinks the term ought not to have been applied to "these fanatic and most ungentlemanly moulvees,"§ who were "implacable and inveterate traitors."||

But Mr. Tayler has himself said, that he never had any evidence on which to charge them with treason, and that he did not charge them with treason, but only arrested them as "hostages" to prevent mischief. In writing of the arch-rebel and traitor, Koowur Singh, even after he was actually in arms against us, Mr. Tayler always called him *baboo*, which means "*gentleman*," neither more nor less. And, after all, Mr. Tayler himself, in an official letter to Government, dated 19th July 1857, expressly called these very Wahabee prisoners "*elderly gentlemen*." Further comment on this insignificant matter is needless.

Those who had personal knowledge of the events in India of 1857-58 are aware how great was the difficulty experienced by Lord Canning in restraining the tendency to violence and indiscriminate bloodshed which was but too evidently displayed by some of our countrymen, and especially by many ill-informed and highly excited and alarmed unofficial persons in Calcutta and elsewhere.

"If," said a very high living authority,¶ in commenting on these events, "Lord Canning had yielded to these natural impulses of anger and of fear, the mutiny must have become that which it never was—a war between race and race, with wounds that could never be healed. It was given to him to resist this temper, with invincible moral courage and a love of justice which will ever be dear to the memory of India and of England. The complaints and accusations made against him at the time are an immortal monument of his fame."

"We will take an instance. Throughout the mutiny Lord Canning persevered in showing his confidence in the Native races whenever and wherever he had an opportunity of doing so. The employment of Natives in civil office,

* See Mr. Tayler's own statements in the letters to the Bengal Government, dated 24th July and 20th August 1857.

† Letter to Government from Mr. Lewis, Magistrate of Patna, dated 20th June 1857, already quoted.

‡ The expressions which Mr. Tayler has used in his publications would lead unwary readers to suppose (1) that all Wahabees are traitors; (2) that the particular Wahabees whom he arrested were all afterwards convicted of treason. Both suppositions would be incorrect. Dr. Hunter, whom Mr. Tayler quotes as an authority, says, on the first point, "I should be sorry if I were supposed to use the term Wahabi as a synonym for traitor." And, as to the second point, only one of Mr. Tayler's prisoners was tried and convicted. The others were never charged with treason, or any other crime.

It must be borne in mind that a Wahabee is merely a member of a very strict sect of Mahommedans,—a kind of Mahommedan Puritan. They are of all classes, high and low, and of all professions. They are very numerous, and are amongst the most industrious and useful of our subjects.

§ Pamphlet of 1867, page 107.

|| *Ibid.*, pages 122 and 151.

¶ "India under Dalhousie and Canning," by the Duke of Argyll.

“ office, long urged upon the Government of India, had been increasing during recent years. It is perfectly true that, amongst the Natives so employed, there were some instances of treachery during the height of the mutiny. But Lord Canning did not allow this fact to reverse a course of policy on which so much depends.

“ The European inhabitants of Calcutta, in the petition which they signed for Lord Canning’s recall, record it as one of the high crimes and misdemeanours of the Governor General, ‘ that he had lately sanctioned the appointment of a Mahommedan to be Deputy Commissioner of Patna; and also the appointment of other Mahommedans to places of trust, to the great offence,’ they are pleased to add, ‘ and discouragement of the Christian population of the Presidency.’ To this and to some other similar accusations from the same quarter, Lord Canning’s reply was, ‘ The Governor General in Council has felt it an imperative duty to discourage, and as far as possible to repress that feeling of indiscriminate revenge which would confound the innocent with the guilty, and hold every Mahommedan and Hindoo in India responsible for the crimes committed by a comparatively small number of them.’ We bow with profound emotion before the memory of a man who could hold this language at such a time.”

In the difficult task which thus fell to Lord Canning, it was my duty to assist him. I did it to the best of my power, and I had my humble share in the obloquy which was cast upon him at the moment of greatest trial, when he needed all the support which his countrymen could afford him. For this I received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. But no higher reward could have been bestowed on me than the designation of “ *the right hand of the Government of India,*” which, after our troubles had ceased, Lord Canning officially gave me, and of which, to the end my life, I shall ever feel justly proud.

To this panic and consequent thirst for hasty and reckless bloodshed Mr. Tayler unfortunately lent himself. While other servants of the Government, each in his several station, faced the crisis with calmness and courage, and did their utmost to reassure those about them who, mainly from want of knowledge, were, with honourable exceptions, wild with anger and fear, Mr. Tayler so spoke and wrote and acted as to aggravate the alarm and intensify the excitement. He it was who in pamphlets and repeated newspaper articles, proclaimed what he called “ the undying antagonism of the Mahommedan,” and vehemently urged that they should never be trusted, rarely employed, and always treated as “ a conquered, but rebellious people.”* And it was he who first inveighed against “ the great offence of appointing a Mahommedan to be Deputy Commissioner of Patna,” and eagerly fomented the Calcutta agitation on this subject, which caused a panic-stricken crew to petition for Lord Canning’s recall.†

As for Mr. Tayler’s “ saving Patna,” which he loudly claims to have accomplished by means of measures condemned by his ignorant official superiors, I assert, absolutely, that Patna was never in any danger at all, except from Mr. Tayler’s violent and unwise proceedings. In other parts of his jurisdiction he directed the abandonment of European districts, none of which were in danger, and of which one station, at least, was immediately taken in hand and successfully administered by the Native inhabitants, astonished and ashamed to find themselves abandoned by their English chiefs, and left to manage for themselves as best they might, with a treasury full of money and a jail full of prisoners. Had it rested with Mr. Tayler, Arrah would have been lost, for at the very crisis of its danger, when Eyre was advancing to its relief, he wrote officially and advised him not to advance.‡ Fortunately Eyre neglected this advice, if, indeed it ever reached him.

Mr. Samuells, the very competent officer who succeeded Mr. Tayler in the office

* See especially pages 20, 21, of his pamphlet, widely circulated in Bengal in 1857-58.

† Mr. Tayler’s pamphlet. Appendix E.

‡ In reporting this to Government, Mr. Tayler used stronger language. He said,—“ I, myself, and the General, in concurrence with the military authorities, wrote officially to order him not to advance.” Letter to Government of Bengal, 22nd August 1857.

office of Commissioner, and who, for his conduct in that office, received the honour of a C. B. ship on Lord Canning's recommendation, examined, with some minuteness, Mr. Tayler's claims to have "saved Patna," and very emphatically rejected it. Mr. Tayler's first pamphlet, and Mr. Samuel's report on its statement,* will both be found among the Appendices to this paper, and any inquirer who will compare one with the other will have no difficulty in arriving at the truth. Persons who have been content to accept Mr. Tayler's assertions without even suspecting that there could be any other version of the story, and a *soi-disant* historian who, from the same material, constructed a history without even seeking to examine the records of the period, may incautiously have committed themselves to vouch for Mr. Tayler's unrequited merits. But a very different opinion is and always was held by those who had real opportunities of knowledge.

I will only add, since Mr. Tayler bitterly complains of my treatment of him after his removal from Patna, that I gave him the best appointment then in my gift, little less valuable than that from which he had been removed; only delaying it until I should receive the decision of Lord Canning's Government on his appeal and claim to be reinstated at Patna.†

After receiving the appointment in question, he continued to attack me in the newspapers with indecent and incessant invective, of which, however, I took no notice, so far as he was concerned, until I received from the Government of India a letter, dated the 21st January 1859, in which, after severe comment upon Mr. Tayler's "insufferably offensive" conduct, I was informed that "the Lieutenant Governor would not act up to the requirements of his position if he did not now suspend Mr. Tayler from office, and intimate to him that he could not be re-employed until after giving assurance that he would in future conduct himself with becoming respect to the Government under which he is placed."

On this Mr. Tayler was suspended; and this was expressly approved by the Secretary of State.

His suspension took place on the 26th January 1859. On the 29th March following he resigned the service.

5 May 1879.

(signed) *Fred. Jas. Halliday.*

* Appendix F.

† Salary of Commissioner, 2,916 rupees per mensem; salary of district Judge, 2,500 rupees per mensem.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

EXTRACT from Mr. *Taylor's* Letter to the Government of Bengal,
dated 17th July 1857.

I HAVE been blamed for not having sent in earlier reports and fuller information of what I was doing and intended to do.

I may, perhaps, be pardoned, at a crisis like the present, for stating that when I had made up my mind to act thus decisively, I purposely put my plan into execution without asking for authority, because I deemed it possible that the Lieutenant Governor, judging from a distance, might not possibly have approved of measures which to some extent undoubtedly are beyond the law, but which I, on the spot, *felt* to be *essential* for the safety of Patna.

I was further confirmed in this, from the fact that at the commencement, his Honour appeared to consider it inconceivable that there should be any rising or rebellion at Patna, and it was therefore naturally to be expected that, under such a view of the case, his Honour might not be inclined to sanction *à priori* any informal proceedings, though he might approve them if successfully carried out, when the result was shown to be advantageous.

EXTRACT LETTER from the Government of Bengal to Mr. *Taylor*,
dated 22nd July 1857.

THE only part of this letter which appears to the Lieutenant Governor to call for immediate notice, is what is stated in paras. 6 to 9, in which you avow that you *wilfully* and *purposely* kept the Government uninformed of your intentions, acts, and measures. This conduct you persevered in not only up to the time of carrying out the measures referred to, but for some time afterwards, and indeed until you were compelled, by repeated and strong censures, to adopt a different course. In doing this, I am to observe you committed a grave and very reprehensible error, and you cannot but be sensible that the knowledge that it is in your opinion justifiable in an officer to conceal his official acts and purposes from the head of the Government he serves, if he has reason to suppose that they will not be approved, must make it impossible for the Lieutenant Governor to place implicit confidence in you.

APPENDIX B.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the Secretary of State to the Governor General in
Council, dated 1st June 1859.

2. MR. TAYLER solicits a reconsideration of the following points, regarding which the Court of Directors have expressed their opinion in their Despatch, No. 120, dated 11th August 1858 :—

1st. The omission to write with sufficient fulness to the honourable the Lieutenant Governor.

2nd. Trying persons in direct opposition to the Lieutenant Governor's express orders.

3rd. Printing his defence.

4th. Corresponding privately with the sessions judge.

3. Having remarked upon these several matters, Mr. Taylor then enters into a further explanation of the circumstances under which he issued the order for the withdrawal of the civil officers from their stations, which led to his suspension, and requests that he may be restored to the office of Commissioner, and that his pecuniary losses, consequent on his suspension, may be made good to him.

4. In regard to the second of the points above noticed, Mr. Taylor asserts " that there is no foundation whatever for the statement of the Lieutenant Governor, that the express order

“order is altogether imaginary, that he is altogether guiltless of this serious offence, that no such prohibition as Mr. Halliday has described ever was issued, and could not therefore be disobeyed, and such being the case he charges his immediate superior with misrepresentation.”

5. In common with other officers who had been appointed Commissioners under Act XIV., 1857, Mr. Tayler received a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 11th July 1857, in which it was directed “that when two or more officers, specially empowered under this Act, happen to be present at the same station, the sessions judge, should he be one of them, will try prisoners committed under the Act in question. If the sessions judge be not present, then the Commissioner of Circuit will try the cases.” Mr. Tayler admits having received that letter. After its receipt he tried and executed a trooper of Captain Rattray’s corps, the sessions judge, then present at the station, being at that time vested with power to hold trials under Act XIV., 1857, under an order of the Lieutenant Governor, which had appeared in the official Gazette. Mr. Tayler was called upon by a letter of the Government of Bengal, dated 5th August 1857, to submit an immediate explanation of his reasons for acting in opposition to the orders of the 11th July, and on the 29th of the same month replied, “that he was not aware the sessions judge of Patna was empowered to try cases under Act XIV. of 1857, nor had any intimation been received by him to that effect.”

6. The true explanation, then, of this apparent violation of orders on the part of Mr. Tayler is to be found in the statement made by him that he overlooked the appointment in the Gazette (a copy of which was regularly furnished to him for the purpose of giving him information on such matters) of the sessions judge to be a Commissioner under Act XIV. of 1857. While, therefore, Mr. Tayler may not have knowingly violated orders in the case of the trooper of Captain Rattray’s corps, he is altogether unwarranted in bringing an accusation of misrepresentation against the Lieutenant Governor, for making a statement on the 5th August 1857 (the date of his Minute*) for the correctness of which the Lieutenant Governor had evidence in a report of the sessions judge, dated 25th July preceding.

7. In regard to the other matters discussed by Mr. Tayler in his memorial now under consideration, Her Majesty’s Government concur in the views expressed by the Court of Directors in their Despatch of the 11th August 1858.

8. Since the time that exception was first taken to Mr. Tayler’s proceedings at Patna, he has carried on a correspondence of an unnecessary length, and of a very reprehensible character, to the great waste of public time, the detriment of the public service, and by no means to the credit of his own official character. It is to be regretted that you did not check Mr. Tayler when he entered upon this objectionable course, and that you did not at once visit with your marked disapproval the imputation by Mr. Tayler of unworthy motives to all who, in the discharge of a public duty, felt themselves called upon to express an opinion in any way adverse to Mr. Tayler’s proceedings.

9. It is chiefly owing to your omission to take timely and effective notice of Mr. Tayler’s conduct, especially in its relation to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, that the proceedings are now before Her Majesty’s Government in an unusual and unsatisfactory form. In your letter of the 23rd December 1857, you severely censured Mr. Tayler for an elaborate and disrespectful attack upon the public conduct of the Lieutenant Governor. That censure seems to have had little effect, for in a letter of the 29th July 1858, addressed to the Government of Bengal, referring to a statement made by the Lieutenant Governor, which was shown to have been inaccurate, but the inaccuracy of which, as observed by you, originated with Mr. Taylor himself in his own several reports of the occurrence in question, that gentleman charged the Lieutenant Governor with making a deliberate misrepresentation, with the express purpose of proving a charge against him which he declares to have been unfounded. The correspondence having been forwarded to you, you informed the Lieutenant Governor that you refrained from taking notice of the style and substance of Mr. Tayler’s letters, feeling that to do so would be an interference with the proper functions of the Lieutenant Governor.

10. On the receipt of your communication, the Lieutenant Governor recorded and transmitted to you a Minute, dated 18th September 1858, in which he stated at length the reasons which prevented his exercising his own authority for the punishment of his subordinate officer for a personal attack upon himself. Mr. Grant then proposed to deal with the matter, to call upon Mr. Tayler for an explanation, and to visit him with censure or suspension according to the nature of his reply. Mr. Grant, however, was overruled by his colleague, the Lieutenant Governor was again left to deal with the matter, and Mr. Tayler’s reprehensible conduct remained without notice.

11. On receiving from Mr. Tayler the memorial now submitted, the Lieutenant Governor raised the question—“Whether the memorial forwarded to me by Mr. Tayler is not worded in a manner so studiously disrespectful and offensive towards me as to
“render

* Printed correspondence in Mr. Tayler’s case, p. 124.

“render it unfit to be received by me from a subordinate officer, and whether a subordinate officer, who, having once been censured by the Government of India for similar improprieties of expression, has again ventured on a repetition of them, ought not to be punished for his conduct, and, if so, by what authority.” The Lieutenant Governor forwarded the memorial, and solicited your instructions.

12. Three of the Members of the Council were, in the first instance, for suspending Mr. Tayler from office. This measure, however, was departed from on the advice of Mr. Peacock, for reasons concurred in by the majority of the Council, and it was determined to leave every part of the case for the final decision of the Secretary of State for India, the Lieutenant Governor being informed that it was too late to inflict punishment for the language made use of in the letter of the 29th July 1858, and that it was “not advisable to punish Mr. Tayler, or to refuse to forward his present memorial on account of the objectionable language which is contained in many parts of it.”

13. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, on the receipt of the Lieutenant Governor's Minute of the 18th September 1858, you ought to have interfered to uphold the authority of the Lieutenant Governor in a matter in which he felt himself deprived by personal considerations of all liberty of action, and to have checked the persevering and offensive insubordination of Mr. Tayler. They are further of opinion that the proceedings ought not to have been submitted to the Home Government without any suggestion or recommendation as to the course which, in your judgment, it is now expedient to adopt in regard to that gentleman.

14. In coming to a decision upon this painful case, it is due to Mr. Tayler that Her Majesty's Government should take into consideration the circumstances to which you refer in your letter, No. 4, of the 10th January last. Mr. Tayler had printed and circulated an attack upon the Lieutenant Governor, for which he was censured by your Government. The Lieutenant Governor then communicated to the press the papers in Mr. Tayler's case, containing, among other documents, a letter from Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler in the Patna Commissionership, commenting, in terms of great severity, upon Mr. Tayler's proceedings. Her Majesty's Government concur with you that, in taking this step, the Lieutenant Governor committed a serious mistake, and that in communicating the correspondence to the press, he furnished Mr. Tayler with a pretext for the license of which he has so freely availed himself, in using language towards the Lieutenant Governor, for which, however, even the publicity given to the proceedings by the Lieutenant Governor affords no justification.

15. Under all the circumstances of the case, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that you would have been fully justified in removing Mr. Tayler from public employ; but, as you have not done so, Her Majesty's Government will abstain from visiting that officer now with the punishment to which his offensive and insubordinate conduct has exposed him. Should there, however, be any repetition of such unbecoming language in characterising the proceedings of the Local Government, you will at once suspend him from official employ.

16. The disposal of your reference in regard Mr. Tayler's dispute with Mr. Samuells, and to his proceedings in connection with the Industrial Institution at Patna, is deferred until the receipt of the further papers in those cases.

17. You are requested to furnish Mr. Tayler with a copy of this Despatch.

18. Since the foregoing paragraphs of this Despatch were written, your letter dated 22nd January (No. 16) has been received. From the papers which accompany your communication, it appears that Mr. Tayler, having “been permitted to make public in any way he chose the whole of the Despatch of the Court of Directors passing judgment on his case, commenced the publication from time to time of such extracts as suited his purpose, accompanied with his own remarks, in which he passes unmeasured strictures on the conduct of his Government, and indulges in offensive language in relation to the Lieutenant Governor and other officers.”

Under these circumstances, you have communicated to the Lieutenant Governor your opinion that he would not act up to the requirements of his position if he did not now suspend Mr. Tayler from office, and intimate to him that he could not be re-employed until after giving assurance that he would in future conduct himself with becoming respect, and in proper subordination to the Government under which he is placed.

19. The conduct of Mr. Tayler in publishing in a newspaper the most offensive insubordinate language towards the Lieutenant Governor admits of no justification, and Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your decision in directing the suspension of Mr. Tayler until he gives the assurance required of him.

APPENDIX C.

EXTRACT from DESPATCH from the Secretary of State to the Governor General in Council, dated 28th July 1859.

2. Desirous of establishing an Industrial Institution at Patna on an extensive scale, Mr. Tayler applied for the necessary means to the landholders of the districts comprised within his division, and succeeded in obtaining a subscription list to the amount of 1,66,780 rupees (besides monthly subscriptions), of which 87,778 rupees had been paid when the institution was brought to an end in consequence of the disapproval by Government of the mode in which the subscriptions had been procured; the stock belonging to the institution was sold, and the cash balance (amounting to 60,800 rupees) restored to the subscribers.

3. Her Majesty's Government concur with you in considering it to be clearly shown that "Mr. Tayler exercised all the influence which, as Commissioner of the district, he possessed to induce the wealthy landowners to subscribe to the institution which he had established, and he accepted subscriptions from persons who he knew were not in affluent circumstances, or in a condition to subscribe the large sums which they agreed to pay."

4. Her Majesty's Government deeply regret that on the outset of his proceedings Mr. Tayler should have received any countenance or encouragement from the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. They are of opinion that, instead of considering as "very satisfactory" a list containing sums of 30,000, 20,000, and 10,000 rupees, subscribed by large landholders to a scheme set on foot by the Commissioner of the Division in which their estates were comprised, the Lieutenant Governor should at once have made inquiry into the circumstances under which those subscriptions were obtained.

5. When, however, doubts were raised as to the voluntary character of the contributions the inquiry instituted by the Lieutenant Governor was prompt and full. The fact was then established that the subscriptions were offered in deference to Mr. Tayler's official position and authority, and under an apprehension, on the part of the native gentlemen appealed to, of incurring the Commissioner's displeasure if their assistance was withheld.

6. In pursuance of this inquiry Mr. Tayler was called upon by the Lieutenant Governor to explain by what means the subscriptions had been obtained, and especially whether the Rajah, of Durbhunga (whose name was down for 30,000 rupees, and who was willing to borrow a lac of rupees from the funds of the institution at 10 or 12 per cent.) had been asked to subscribe.

Mr. Tayler was at the same time desired to submit a copy of any correspondence that had taken place with the rajah regarding the subscription and the proposed loan. In his elaborate reply Mr. Tayler made it appear that the rajah's subscription was entirely voluntary. With his letter to the Lieutenant Governor he transmitted numerous enclosures, but he failed to transmit a communication from the rajah, then in his (Mr. Tayler's) possession, in which the writer stated that he had given 10,000 rupees willingly, but that, hearing a subscription to that amount would cause dissatisfaction to the Government and its officers, he had promised the additional sum of 20,000 rupees payable by assignments on his rent collections.

7. Neither did Mr. Tayler make any allusion to a letter, also then in his possession, which he had received from the Honourable R. Forbes, judge of Tirhoot, in which the following passage occurs: "In writing to you when here, I said that I thought it impossible for any well-wisher of the people of India to read the prospectus of an institution holding out the promise of such advantages to them and to their country without heartily wishing it success. Referring, however, to all that has since occurred, I think it is much to be regretted that an altogether different plan was not adopted in seeking for the institution the pecuniary support of the natives in the different districts, which would have prevented the unfavourable impression, assuredly created here, that all considered wealthy were to be required to contribute very largely whether they liked it or not, and that, in fact, they must not dare to refuse. For myself, I must say that, considering the dissatisfied feeling which was certainly excited in this district, the unreserved manner in which the natives openly spoke their sentiments of disapproval, coupled with what appeared in the newspapers, I was not surprised at the Lieutenant Governor's anxiety to disabuse the public mind of the prevailing idea that the Government was lending its sanction to extorted contributions or forced taxation."

8. Called upon by the Lieutenant Governor to explain why he had not forwarded, together with many other documents favourable to his own views, Mr. Forbes' letter of an opposite character, Mr. Tayler replied,—

"Several gentlemen, of whom I well know Mr. Forbes was one, brought a sort of charge against me, and either themselves, or through their friends, conveyed these charges to the Lieutenant Governor.

"When

“When I had private and demi-official information of this, I sent up sundry other private or demi-private notes for his Honor’s perusal, to show that there were two sides to a question, and that these gentlemen’s statements were not of gospel or oracular accuracy.

“I sent up such notes or letters as I thought would show this. Was I to supply charges or opinions against myself? Was not I to be at liberty to send what notes I chose, and keep back what I chose?

“It was a voluntary and optional matter to send any. I was not entrusted with an inquiry, and directed to hand up letters and statements on both sides. My accusers were active enough to supply the charges. My object was to defend myself from them.”

9. Some excuse may possibly be found for Mr. Tayler’s mode of obtaining subscriptions to the Industrial Institution, in the supposition that, in promoting an object of engrossing interest to himself, he failed to perceive the doubtful character of some of his proceedings in endeavouring to accomplish his object; but if, in withholding documents of direct bearing on the matter under inquiry for the reasons given in the above reply, Mr. Tayler can be relieved of the charge of highly disingenuous conduct, and of practising a deception upon the Lieutenant Governor, it can only be by attributing to him a total ignorance of his position and duties in relation to the Government to which he was subordinate, and to which he was bound to afford all the information in his power, in regard to proceedings which he was carrying on in his official capacity, and supporting by means of his official authority.

10. Mr. Tayler has declined to avail himself of the permission accorded to him to address the Home Government on the subject of the Lieutenant Governor’s decision in the matter of the Industrial Institution at Patna. His explanation, however, of the entire transaction is on record in his several communications on the subject to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal; and on a careful consideration of these, Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that Mr. Tayler’s proceedings in the matter were such as fully to justify the censure which you have passed upon his conduct.

APPENDIX D.

MINUTE by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, on Mr. Tayler’s Pamphlet, entitled “Brief Narrative of Events connected with the Removal of W. Tayler from the Commissionership of Patna.”

MY attention was first drawn to Mr. Tayler’s pamphlet, with the title above quoted, by the censure pronounced upon it by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, but supposing it to be a mere private statement of his case drawn up for his friends, and not being disposed to attach much importance to such productions, I paid no attention to it, and did not even take an opportunity of reading it until a recent date; nor, after I had once read it, did I think it worthy of any particular notice until I found that a considerable number of copies had been exposed at the shop of Messrs. Thacker, Spink, & Co., for public distribution, and that the pamphlet had thus got into wide circulation. I have found, too, that the subject, connected as it is with events belonging to the recent revolt and disturbances, has excited in the public mind an interest beyond its intrinsic merits, and that for want of general information as to the actual facts of the case, the representations of Mr. Tayler, especially those by which he has sought to identify himself with the popular policy of the day, have received much more credit than they deserve, and have occasioned much misunderstanding of the real conduct and motives of the Government. Moreover, I have quite recently become aware of a later pamphlet published by Mr. Tayler, and called “Addenda to the Correspondence relative to the removal of Mr. W. Tayler,” in which I find printed a Memorandum, said to have been “submitted to the Governor General in Council,” which contains, with additions, some important portions of the mis-statements which I have observed in the earlier pamphlet, and this Memorandum having been addressed to the Government of India, has probably been brought into the records of that Government, and perhaps transmitted to the honourable court. Looking, therefore, to these circumstances, and to the very remarkable errors abounding in the statements in question, I have thought it due to the authorities under whom I serve to submit to them the following observations on Mr. Tayler’s pamphlets, comprising a defence of my conduct, therein violently and unjustly attacked on account of a necessary act of public duty forced upon me by Mr. Tayler’s misconduct, and entirely approved and supported by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.

2. I shall endeavour to do this with as much brevity as possible, for I feel that the subject deserves no further consideration than is necessary to separate fact from error, and place in a true light occurrences which, in the pamphlet before me, have been very inaccurately represented.

3. If I understand Mr. Tayler's pamphlet aright, its object is to show—First, and chiefly, that he was unjustly removed from the Commissionership of Patna, when he deserved reward instead of disgrace. Secondly, that this removal was occasioned not by any erroneous or improper conduct on Mr. Tayler's part, but because of the personal disfavour with which I had for several months regarded him in consequence of an honest remonstrance which he had made against my proceedings in the matter of the Patna Industrial Institution, which proceedings were occasioned by a cabal, headed by my brother-in-law. Thirdly, that previous to Mr. Tayler's removal, I had been guilty of great and dangerous errors connected with Mr. Tayler's measures and the safety of Patna, which were very embarrassing to that gentleman, and obliged him to act on his own responsibility in opposition to my views. Fourthly, that after Mr. Tayler's removal, I have lent myself to discreditable arrangements, which have been very generally and justly condemned.

4. With regard to the first of these allegations* it is needless for me to say anything. The question has been decided by the highest authority in this country, namely, the Governor General in Council, to whom Mr. Tayler appealed against my act, and who has declared "that the Lieutenant Governor was thoroughly justified in removing Mr. Tayler " summarily from the office of Commissioner of the Patna Division, on the ground that, " at so critical a period, the division could not safely be left in his charge."

5. The second allegation† is merely one of those ordinary manifestations of chagrin which are apt to be displayed on similar occasions. Except among the higher order of spirits, everyone who is rebuked or punished for misdoings has always his little tale to tell of personal or political hostility, of prejudice and disfavour, of anything, in short, rather than the simple and obvious demerit for which he has been condemned. Mr. Tayler is no exception to this very ordinary rule. He has been censured and removed, and his removal has been, for publicly declared reasons, upheld and approved by the highest authorities in India. Forthwith, he has his small string of private reasons for this mischance, all attributing it to the basest motives of personal spite and malignity, and all, as usual on such occasions, utterly without existence, except in the imagination of Mr. Tayler himself.

6. Mr. Tayler's own reasons for imagining these motives will be found in the first six pages of his " Brief Narrative"; but the correspondence on the subject of the Patna Industrial School has now been published, and may be referred to by those who desired a more accurate account of the circumstances alluded to by Mr. Tayler than it is possible to obtain from a perusal of his pamphlet.

7. My own remarks on the correspondence in question shall be as brief as possible. The correspondence itself being available, any lengthened commentary is unnecessary.

8. In August 1856, Mr. Tayler devised a scheme of an Industrial Vernacular School at Patna,‡ and proposed to apply towards its foundation a sum of 20,000 rupees, which the Rajah of Bettiah had, at the time of his investiture, spontaneously presented to Government to be used for the public good. Of this scheme I approved, advocating a small beginning, and modesty and moderation in its gradual development.

9. Mr. Tayler proceeded to canvass the native gentry of the Province of Behar for subscriptions to this institution, in a manner of which I was not then aware, and by the end of February 1857 he had an unusually large list of donations and subscriptions,§ amounting to 1,60,759 rupees, of which 76,750 were actually paid, and the rest promised.

10. But during January, or very early in February, Mr. Tayler heard at Mozufferpore|| from the judge of that district, and subsequently, *i. e.*, on the 9th March, from the judge of Patna, " that some of the contributors to the Behar Industrial Institution had contributed unwillingly, or against their real wishes, and that others in this place are in a " state of alarm lest they should be called upon or compelled to do likewise." On this, he states, " I immediately wrote (to Mr. Forbes¶) and begged him to take every opportunity of contradicting the rumour, and of assuring all concerned that *I wished for no " contributions but such as were cheerfully and freely given.* I also published a notice to " *the same effect,* and took occasion to repeat the same personally to every native gentleman who called on me."

11. In the meantime the same reports which had reached Mr. Tayler had also reached me, though at a somewhat later date; and on the 26th February I addressed him a few words

* That he was unjustly removed from the Commissionership of Patna, when he deserved reward instead of disgrace.

† That this removal was occasioned, not by any erroneous or improper conduct on Mr. Tayler's part, but because of the personal disfavour with which I had for several months regarded him in consequence of an honest remonstrance which he made against my proceedings in the matter of the Patna Industrial Institution, which proceedings were occasioned by a cabal headed by my brother-in-law.

‡ Page 7 of the Collection of Papers regarding the Patna Industrial Institution.

§ See page 58 of the Collection.

|| Page 41 of the Collection of Papers.

¶ Judge of Tirhoot.

words of caution on the subject.* I also repeated this caution in a public letter of the 9th March,† and having in the meanwhile seen strong reason to believe that Mr. Tayler had been conducting himself so indiscreetly, that unless I should speedily interpose the Government would become seriously compromised (which afterwards proved to be the case), I requested Mr. Tayler himself, in his department, and the judicial officers of the province in theirs, to give the widest possible circulation to an authoritative declaration that the Government, “while it views with satisfaction the spontaneous liberality of its subjects in the prosecution of objects of public utility, is always strongly opposed to receiving any contribution, or encouraging any undertaking, which does not arise from the real and willing munificence and public spirit of the contributors.”‡

12. Mr. Tayler, who had already declared himself exclusively in favour of such contributions only “as were cheerfully and freely given,” and had issued, so early as the 3rd of February, a public notification to the same effect, could not disapprove of the principle I now laid down, and indeed he had given in his entire adhesion to it in his reply§ to my letter of the 9th March, in which he expressed his entire assent to the principle which I had urged on his attention, that subscriptions, to be acceptable, must be really and wholly spontaneous.

13. The notification issued by Mr. Tayler will be found in the original Hindoostanee at page 48 of the printed collection, and the following is a literal translation of it:—

“It has been publicly stated that certain mischief makers have reported that, for the sake of establishing the great industrial institution, which is being founded for the benefit of the people in the city of Patna, money will be collected from rajahs and chiefs, gentry and merchants, and others, without their free will and consent. This is a gross falsehood, and has absolutely no connection with truth. Whatever any one, whether nobleman or merchant, or zemindar or other, out of magnanimity and nobility, and liberality and munificence, with a view to good works and the benefit of his species, of his full free will may offer, will be taken. And it is never approved or acceptable that money, or books, or goods, should be taken from any one against his will for the establishment of the Industrial Institution. Therefore, for general information, this notification is published, that every one being acquainted with it may be at ease in his mind, and not take any notice of the false groundless tales of mischief makers.”

14. No one, I think, could read this notification, together with Mr. Tayler’s declaration in exclusive favour of *cheerful and willing contributions*, and his adoption of the principle of *wholly spontaneous gifts*, and not be much surprised to find the following considerations assigned, at page 5 of his present pamphlet, as his reasons for now disapproving of my letters above quoted:—

“I could not conscientiously and . . . I would not feign to believe that the subscriptions had been disinterested and spontaneous, when I knew, as all others know, that such words are scarcely to be found in the Native vocabulary.”

It is surely not unreasonable to inquire how, with such sentiments as these in reserve, Mr. Tayler could issue his notification above quoted, and how he could have given in his full adhesion to the “wholly spontaneous” principle, believing all the time that such a principle was altogether unintelligible to the Native mind.

15. No intimation of this reserved opinion regarding the possibility of spontaneous donations escaped from Mr. Tayler at this time, nor until after he had learnt my opinion. On the contrary, he gave me the strongest assurances that he had “used no influence whatever beyond explaining to the wealthy Natives the scope and purport of the scheme, and the benefits likely to be derived from it when fully developed,” and that he “full and sincerely believed that the sums given had been given freely and willingly.” Moreover, he declared that all rumours to the contrary were “absurd, idle, and malicious calumnies,” and “contemptible scandals,” spread abroad by “the ignorant or the envious,” and partly owing to the bitter personal animosity “of an individual at Mozufferpore.” And he added|| that he had circulated to the subscribers a request that they would state without scruple if they had subscribed willingly or unwillingly, and that he *would take care to inform me of the result*.

16. This he afterwards did, or professed to do, sending me every reply that expressed willingness to subscribe, and every letter that gave any laudation to his scheme and to the means he had used for its establishment. But there was one reply which Mr. Tayler did not send for my perusal, and the case of that reply was as follows:—

17. In a letter to Mr. Tayler, dated 2nd April 1857 (pages 67, 68, and 69 of the Collection),

* “I hope that in your zeal for the Industrial Institution you have not laid yourself open to any fair imputation of *pressing* for subscriptions, because that is a thing to which I have such strong objections that, much as I admire your scheme, and greatly as I hope to see it succeed, I should in that case disown and disavow the whole thing in a moment.

† “I will not conceal from you that it is *said* of you that you are levying almost a forced contribution. This I do not believe. But I know your warmth of zeal, and think you will not take it ill that I caution you against any excess.”—Extract from a demi-official letter to Mr. Tayler, dated 26th February 1857.

‡ Page 36 of the Collection.

§ See the whole letter at pages 37 and 38 of the Collection.

|| Page 48 of the Collection.

|| Pages 41 to 45 and 48 of the Collection.

Collection), several particular questions were put regarding the affairs of the Institution, and, among the rest, the following:—

“ In the list of subscriptions, there is one item which has attracted the Lieutenant Governor's particular notice. It is the subscription of the Rajah of Durbhunga, amounting to 30,000 rupees, *not yet paid*. This Rajah is the improvident and practically needy zemindar in whose favour you recently applied for sanction to a loan of one lac of rupees out of the subscriptions to the institution; so that, if such a loan had been sanctioned, it would seem that the Rajah would have paid his subscription to the institution from the money borrowed by him from the institution. The Lieutenant Governor desires to be informed specially whether the Rajah of Durbhunga was asked to subscribe, and also how it came to your knowledge that he was willing to borrow a lac of rupees from the funds of the Institution at 10 or 12 per cent. interest. *You will have the goodness to submit a copy of any correspondence that has taken place with the Rajah regarding his subscription and the proposed loan.*”

18. Mr. Tayler's reply* was in the following words:—

“ Before detailing the circumstances connected with the Durbhunga Rajah's subscription, I would beg to observe that *his contributions* and my proposal to lend him one lac of rupees from the funds of the institution are two separate matters, and I will, therefore, treat them separately; and first with respect to his subscription. The amount is entered in the list at 30,000 rupees, to gratify the self-esteem, perhaps the vanity, of the Rajah, by thus preventing Modenarain's donation from topping it.

“ But, in fact, 10,000 rupees is all he has promised to pay in cash, and for 20,000 rupees he proposes to give an assignment on the rent of an estate to be paid gradually in the course of some years.

“ This latter sum is, therefore, more in the nature of an annual subscription than a donation.

“ The communication held with the Rajah was on this wise.

“ I have before informed the Lieutenant Governor that Mr. Forbes acquainted me of the rumour that had been circulated at Mozufferpore, that I wrote to Mr. Forbes to beg him to contradict it, that I discovered the origin of the idea to have been the officiousness of an absurd man, who, without license or authority, had drawn out a list with imaginary sums appended to the names according to the wild imagining of an irregular brain.

“ I have also shown how this ridiculous rumour, having this origin, was circulated by the ill-feeling of one individual, and thus, *instead of being stifled as it might have been*, acquired intensity.

“ It was a day or two after this that the Rajah's principal mooktear and manager, Mohun Doobey, a man, as report says, as rich as his master, came to see me. I mentioned this report, told him that I had begged Mr. Forbes to contradict it, that I had heard the Rajah's name had been put down in this spectre list at the imaginary figure of 50,000 rupees, that I had no wish for the Rajah to give a farthing more than he was willing and ready to give, but that the work was one in which he, as all other zemindars, was directly interested, and one worthy of his support.

“ Mohun Doobey expressed his perfect conviction of the absurdity of the rumour, said that the Rajah had heard of the scheme, highly approved it, and was most anxious to aid in carrying it out.

“ I was then asked to say what I thought the Rajah ought to give, and on this I was pressed to give my sentiments.

“ I replied that there was no ‘ought’ in the case, but that having regard to the wide-spread and important results that all expected to be derived from the work, to the great expenditure indispensable for its success, and to the rank and position of the Rajah, my idea had always been that 20,000 rupees or 25,000 would be a liberal, but by no means too liberal a donation.

“ The reply was eager and emphatic, repeated again and again: *Maharajah bahoot khooshee se denge nehayut khooshee se, &c., &c., &c.*†

“ I then asked him if he were authorised to say this positively, because I reported all new subscriptions at intervals to Government, and it was desirable to be sure.

“ He again and again said that he was vested with full authority, that the Rajah would be delighted to give that sum, that he was the Sudder Rajah, and always had assisted in such works, and so on at great length and with much volubility.

“ There the scene closed; I put the Rajah's name down in my memorandum, and thought him a very liberal fellow.

“ I returned to Patna to meet Mr. W. Gordon Young, and my prescribed visit not having been completed at Tirhoot, I again went there on the 1st ultimo.

“ On this occasion the Rajah himself came to visit me, but before he came to me the judge sent for him, and, I believe, advised him not to give more than that some specified sum.

“ This was told me by the Rajah himself, who said he *was most anxious to give liberally, that he did not fancy the idea of any one giving more than himself*, but that he did not like to run counter to the judge's wishes.

“ I replied

* Dated 29th April, page 77 of the printed Collection.

† *I.e.*, “The Rajah will give it with great pleasure and willingness.”—F. J. H.

"I replied that he was quite at liberty to give nothing if he chose, but that his mook-tear had assured me he was authorised to put his name down for 25,000 rupees, and I had mentioned this to several people, which was a dilemma.

"He again said, 'Yes, I wish it, my soul wishes it, but the judge advises me not; he is the Hakim here; what shall I do?'

"He then requested to see Dewan Moula Buksh, who had obtained leave for two or three days, and had come over on purpose to aid me in disabusing people's minds of the misconception, and explaining the real purport and objects of the scheme.

"After a short conversation with the Dewan, the Rajah again asked to see me, and said that he was extremely unwilling to deviate from his word conveyed through his agent, but, to satisfy the judge, he thought it better to give only 10,000 rupees as a donation, and the assignment, as above mentioned, for 20,000 rupees to be paid yearly. I told him he was master of his own actions and his own money, that I quite understood his feelings, wished him to do what he thought proper, and was thankful to him for his liberality in so good a cause.

"The next day he brought the *Urzee*, translate of which is appended, and he told me that he had informed the judge, who fully approved of what he had done.

"Here closed the scene."

19. More fully to establish the entire willingness of the Rajah thus carefully insisted upon, and in apparent obedience to that part of my instructions which directed him to "submit a copy of any correspondence that has taken place with the Rajah regarding his subscriptions," Mr. Tayler appended a translation of an *urzee*, or letter from the Rajah, dated 5th March, in which he professed to offer, of his own free will, 10,000 rupees in cash, and an assignment for a future sum of 20,000 rupees.

20. It is, however, a lamentable fact, that at the very time Mr. Tayler was drawing up the foregoing elaborate narration to assure me of the Rajah's willingness, and while he was professing to send me his "correspondence with the Rajah regarding his subscription," he had for some days been in possession of a letter from the Rajah which he did not send, or even notice, and in which the Rajah distinctly retracted his agreement to subscribe 20,000 rupees out of the 30,000 rupees standing against his name, and declared that he had made it out of fear of the Commissioner's displeasure and that of the Government. The following is a translation of his letter; the original Oordoo will be found at pages 43A. and 97A. of the printed Collection:—

"After compliments, I have received your honoured letter inquiring of me regarding the money I promised to pay now and hereafter to the Patna Industrial Institution, whether it was with my full consent and free will, or against my will. As you direct me to state the truth without concealment or hesitation, I proceed to say that, when I heard of the commencement of the institution, I willingly desired to subscribe up to 10,000 rupees. But afterwards when I showed a willingness to give a further sum by assignment on certain collections, it was in this belief, that if I only gave 10,000 it would cause dissatisfaction to the Government and its officers; but now that I have been made aware by the Lieutenant Governor's notification that this assessment is not by the pleasure of the Government, and that neither by giving less I shall incur its displeasure, nor by giving more its peculiar good will, I certainly wish to obey the behests of Government, and to join in a good work only to the extent of my means and resources."

21. Mr. Tayler was asked on the 20th of May, why he had omitted to notice this letter while he was assuring the Lieutenant Governor of the entire willingness of the Durbhunga Rajah to give 30,000 rupees; but he sent in no reply till October, two months after he had been removed from the Commissionership, and then made answer to the question in the following words: "Simply because I detained it until I received and could send "in my reply to the Mozufferpore reports, of which, as in the case of Behar and Shahabad, "it forms an appendage."*

22. Upon this reply I think it unnecessary to make any comment.

23. It will be seen that Mr. Tayler in his letter of the 9th March,† while strenuously denying the truth of the reports regarding the alleged unwillingness of some of the subscribers, and assuring me that he had used none but legitimate influence to procure subscriptions, solicited me very urgently to decide distinctly and finally whether he had pursued a right course or a wrong one in the matter, so that he might govern his future conduct accordingly.

24. But inasmuch as very discrepant and contradictory opinions were before me regarding the light in which the collection of money for the industrial school was viewed by the native gentry of the Behar Province, some stating that it was reported to have occasioned discontent, anxiety, and alarm, and Mr. Tayler, on the other hand, declaring in the strongest terms that there had been no discontent, or anxiety, or dissatisfaction of any kind in consequence of the subscriptions, I thought myself obliged to make full investigation as to the real facts, in the only way that was open to me, by directing the judges
of

* See page 95A. of the printed Collection, para. 51.

† Page 41 of the Collection.

of the several Zillahs and the Commissioner of Bhaugulpore to inquire into the subject, each within his own jurisdiction, and to report the result. And this seemed to me the more just and necessary, because Mr. Tayler was disposed to heap the severest reproaches on all who differed from him on this point, and was apt to ascribe all opinions other than his own to nothing short of envy, malice, and wickedness.

25. Accordingly, on the 7th April 1857 (page 168 of the Collection) I called on Mr. Yule, Commissioner of Bhaugulpore, and on the judges of the several Zillahs of the Behar Province, to report, after sufficient inquiry, whether, as far as each might be able to ascertain, the proceedings regarding the collection of subscriptions for the Patna Institution had created any dissatisfaction or anxiety in the minds of the Native gentry or not.

26. Having issued these orders, I took no further steps regarding the question at issue (except by putting a few unavoidable questions to Mr. Tayler), and I expressed no opinion regarding the matter until the whole of the reports had been received. On the contrary, I was careful to assure Mr. Tayler, at the time of putting certain necessary questions to him, that I was giving no opinion as to the manner in which his influence had been used, but was merely inquiring into facts.

27. But Mr. Tayler set up a loud complaint of the course I had pursued, assuming and asserting without any reason that I already believed in the truth of the rumours as to which I was making inquiry,* and representing himself as an object of grievous and undeserved censure from the Government, in the face of the fact that not one word of blame had yet been directed against him.

28. He did not at that time state specifically the nature of his objections to the inquiry I had ordered to be made, further than that the mere inquiry was a disgrace to him (as if I could decide without inquiry). But at a later date† he produced the following reason for deeming the inquiry unfair and objectionable, viz., that “two, out of the five judges “entrusted with the due investigation in this case had committed themselves to a written “opinion, conveyed, I apprehend, to the Lieutenant Governor.” And again, “It was “from the statements and reports of these gentlemen, and Mr. Garrett *principally*, or “others in their immediate confidence, that the Lieutenant Governor was first im- “pressed with the belief which led to the inquiry;” and still further, “thus it may be “said that in several instances the plaintiffs have been constituted the judges of their own “case, a proceeding not very usual nor particularly fair.”

29. The only authority or foundation for this statement of which I am aware consists in a private letter written by Mr. Farquharson to Mr. Tayler himself in the month of March, a copy of which was sent by the former to Mr. Buckland in that month, and was shown to me. The names of the judges concerned are given in a note.‡ There were, with Mr. Yule, eight, instead of five. With the exception above mentioned, I have had no communication with any of them on the subject of the subscription previous to or subsequent to the order to investigate, save and except their public reports on the investigation printed in the Collection. There is an end, therefore, to Mr. Tayler's declared reasons for objecting to the investigators. And I am not aware of any other objection to them that has been made by Mr. Tayler, or that could possibly be made by him, with any show of reason.

30. It would seem, however, from several expressions used by Mr. Tayler in finding fault with what he calls “the mode and principle of the inquiry,” and especially from his complaining that it was ordered “without heeding the repeated assurances made on my “(Mr. Tayler's) responsibility as Commissioner of the Division,” that, in his opinion, I ought to have made no inquiry at all, but should have rested satisfied with his simple assurances.§

31. I wish heartily that I could have done in this matter as Mr. Tayler thinks I ought to have done, and could have contented myself securely with adopting his repeated assurances. But experience has but too clearly shown that this would have been unwise. Had I relied only on Mr. Tayler, it is, to say the least of it, extremely doubtful whether I should have ever been told of the written declaration of the Rajah of Durbhunga that he had subscribed three times as much as he wished for fear of the displeasure of the Government and its officers; and it is perfectly certain that Mr. Tayler would have concealed from me the following most important opinion and information received by him from the Honourable Robert Forbes, Judge of Tirhoot, in a letter addressed to him on the 1st April 1857:—

“In writing to you when here, I said that I thought it impossible for any well-wisher
of

* Pages 90, 132, 208, and 56A of the Collection regarding the Patna Institution.

† Page 67A of the Collection; Mr. Tayler's letter, though dated July 1857, was not sent in till 4th October.

‡ The Honourable Robert Forbes, Judge of Tirhoot; R. Farquharson, Esq., Judge of Patna; T. C. Trotter, Esq., Judge of Behar; A. Littledale, Esq., Acting Judge of Shahabad; G. Martin, Esq., Acting Judge of Chuppra; T. Sandys, Esq., Acting Judge of Bhaugulpore; D. Cunliffe, Esq., Acting Judge of Purneah, and G. Yule, Esq., Commissioner of Bhaugulpore.

§ See para 46 of Mr. Tayler's letter to Government at page 54A of the printed Collection.

|| See page 117 of the printed Collection.

of the people of India to read the prospectus of an institution holding out the promise of such advantages to them and to their country, without heartily wishing it success. Referring, however, to all that has since occurred, I think it is much to be regretted that an altogether different plan was not adopted in seeking for the institution the pecuniary support of the Natives in the different districts, which would have prevented the unfavourable impression assuredly created here, that all considered wealthy were to be required to contribute very largely, whether they liked it or not, and that in fact they must not dare to refuse. For myself, I must say that, considering the dissatisfied feeling which was certainly excited in this district, the unreserved manner which the Natives openly spoke those sentiments of disapproval, coupled with what appeared in the papers, I was not surprised at the Lieutenant Governor's anxiety to disabuse the public mind of the prevailing idea that the Government was lending its sanction to extorted contributions or forced taxation."

32. Now, I say, it is perfectly certain that Mr. Tayler would have concealed this from me, while he was professing, "on his responsibility as Commissioner," to give me the most ample information and assurances as to the whole facts of the case, not only because he *did* conceal it till it was brought to light by Mr. Forbes himself, but because he was asked by me, on the 20th May, why he had withheld so important a communication,* he made (but did not send in till October) the following astonishing reply:—

"The Lieutenant Governor asks why I did not send for his perusal Mr. Forbes's letter, which Mr. Forbes has quoted, though I have sent many others on the opposite side of the question. I really think the supposition implied by the question is a little hard upon me.

"Several gentlemen, of whom I well know Mr. Forbes was one, brought a sort of charge against me, and either themselves, or through their friends, conveyed these charges to the Lieutenant Governor.

"When I had private and demi-official intimation of this, I sent up sundry other private or demi-private notes for his Honor's perusal, to show that *there were two sides to a question*, and that these gentlemen's *statements were not of gospel or oracular accuracy*.

"I sent up such notes or letters as I thought would show *this*. Was I to supply charges or opinions against myself? Was not I to be at liberty to send what notes *I chose*, and keep back what I chose?

"It was a voluntary and optional matter to send any. I was not entrusted with an inquiry, and directed to send up letters and statements on both sides. My accusers were active enough to supply the charges. My object was to defend myself from them."

33. Upon this I will merely remark, first, that Mr. Forbes never made any charges against Mr. Tayler, and never had any communication with me, directly or indirectly, concerning Mr. Tayler's proceedings, except such as is printed in the Collection, and bears date subsequent to the date of the letter which Mr. Tayler suppressed; and Mr. Tayler had at no time any ground or reason whatever for asserting the contrary. Secondly, that when Mr. Tayler suppressed Mr. Forbes's important letter he was in no sense under trial, for the investigation of which Mr. Tayler afterwards complained so much was not ordered by me till the 7th April, and could not have been known to him till the middle of that month, or about a fortnight after his receipt of Mr. Forbes's letter. Meantime he was, as the Commissioner of the Division, bound to supply me with full and complete information as to all his proceedings, and as to the real state of the Native mind throughout his division, and was actually professing to do so, and endeavouring to induce me to accept his assurances untested, when, in fact, as it now appears, he was only giving me such information as supported his own views, and wilfully withholding everything on the other side. But not only did Mr. Tayler avoid sending me this letter of Mr. Forbes's at the time it should have been sent, but he ignored it entirely in a subsequent communication in which the matter to which it refers is expressly alluded to. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Tayler, having Mr. Forbes's moderate yet impressive statement of the 1st April in his hand, could have justified it to himself to write to me, as he did on the 8th April (*see* page 47 of the Collection), without making any allusion to it, although his letter had express reference to the earlier warning given him by Mr. Forbes in the month of February. I cannot think that any one who reads this statement will blame me for not having implicitly relied on Mr. Tayler's assurances, and for having deemed it necessary to inquire further before adopting his representations as the foundation of my decision in the case.

34. To proceed. The several judges and the Commissioner of Bhaugulpore had all sent in their reports by the middle of May, and these were forwarded to Mr. Tayler for his perusal, and for such observations as he might wish to make regarding them.

35. To

* "You have submitted to Government letters from apparently every person who wrote to you in favour of your measures, in order to prove that they were open to no objection, and it seems strange, therefore, to the Lieutenant Governor that you should never have given his Honor any account of so important a letter as that from the Judge of Tirhoot, which furnished such a weighty opinion on the other side."—Extract from Mr. Buckland's letter to Mr. Tayler, dated 20th May, *see* page 40a of printed Collection.

35. To the reports of the Commissioner of Bhargulpore and the Judges of Bhargulpore, Purneah, Shahabad, Tirhoot, and Behar, Mr. Tayler replied on the 15th May. His remarks on the reports of the Judges of Patna, Tirhoot, and Sarun, together with a separate paper of remarks in reply to the late Mr. Garrett's observations, were not sent in till October, though professing to bear date in June.

36. The question on which the judges were to report was, whether the collection of subscriptions for the Patna Industrial Institution by Mr. Tayler had "created any dissatisfaction or anxiety in the minds of the Native gentry or not."

37. Mr. Cunliffe, of Purneah, reported* that it was considered doubtful if the subscriptions were voluntary, especially in the case of the Rajah of Durbhunga, who was obliged to negotiate loans at large interest to pay his revenue to Government in the Purneah District.

38. Mr. Commissioner Yule reported† that the subscribing was not considered optional, and that he believed "that dissatisfaction had been caused in these districts" (the districts of his Division), by the manner in which subscriptions were said to be "obtained."

39. Mr. Littledale, of Shahabad, reported‡ that no dissatisfaction or alarm had come to his knowledge, nor did he believe them to exist.

40. Mr. Trotter, of Gya (Behar), reported§ that alarm and dissatisfaction certainly existed previous to the publication of the Lieutenant Governor's notice, but that it had since subsided.

41. The Honourable Robert Forbes, of Tirhoot, reported|| there had been considerable anxiety, dissatisfaction, and excitement before the publication of the Lieutenant Governor's Proclamation, but that these feelings were allayed when that was published and understood.

42. The Judge of Sarun reported¶ that there was reason to suppose that, previous to the dissemination of the Government Proclamation, there was a prevalent belief that not to subscribe would be to incur the displeasure of the Commissioner; and this feeling created a serious degree of uneasiness, if not dissatisfaction. Also, that Mr. Tayler's proceedings were not approved by the covenanted officers of Government attached to the Zillah.

43. Mr. Farquharson, of Patna,** reported that there was loud discontent and dissatisfaction at the large amount of the sums levied, and the mode adopted to induce consent on the part of the subscribers.

44. In order to arrive at a satisfactory opinion on the point at issue, it is necessary, of course, to read the whole of the judges' letters, with their enclosures, and all Mr. Tayler's replies. Those who are interested in the question, or are obliged by public duty to enter into it, will of course do this, and will arrive at such conclusions as they may think fairly deducible from the papers before them. I have done this, and I am entirely satisfied that Mr. Tayler's proceedings in regard to these collections, while they were distinguished by great unfairness and insincerity towards me, were also marked by serious indiscretion as regards the people, and were abundantly fitted to cause, and did cause, alarm, anxiety, and discontent in the minds of the Native gentry of the Province of Behar.

45. Acting on this conviction, and finding also that there was no probability that the scheme of the Industrial Institution, even if practicable on Mr. Tayler's developed scale, could be carried out without a much larger expenditure than I was able to recommend, I adopted the advice of the present Commissioner, and closed the concern, causing a *pro rata* repayment to subscribers of the balance of subscriptions in the Treasury, amounting to Rs. 57,048. 1 a. 7 p.

46. This is the whole of the case of the Industrial School, as far as it concerns me to enter into it for the purpose of replying to Mr. Tayler's pamphlet. Mr. Tayler has, however, in several of his letters printed in the Collection, darkened and confused the case by long dissertations on the previously approved practice of Government officers regarding Native subscriptions, which does not, as I view the matter, affect in the least the real question which was at issue before me.

47. I have, for my own part, a clear and distinct opinion as to the course which the Government ought to follow in the encouragement of public beneficence on the part of its wealthy Native subjects, which, to be meritorious, should surely be spontaneous; and neither forced by urgent solicitation, nor bargained for by promises of titles. I have always deemed it my duty to acknowledge readily and handsomely all instances of free public beneficence; nor have I hesitated, on the occasion of public assemblies, or other

* Page 169 of the Collection.

† Page 170 of the Collection.

‡ Page 171 of the Collection.

§ Page 174 of the Collection.

|| Page 177 and 31A of the Collection.

¶ Page 193 of the Collection.

** Page 1A of the Collection.

other suitable seasons, to inculcate openly the duties belonging to wealth and station, and to commend, in the hearing of their neighbours and dependents, the known merits of good landlords and good citizens. It has been my object, in the selection of wealthy Natives for honours, titles, or special marks of consideration, to prefer those who have distinguished themselves by liberality and public spirit, as well as by humanity and fairness towards their tenantry and ryots; and to this end I have made it my business to ascertain in the different districts the names and characters of all deserving zemindars. My conduct in this respect can assuredly, by no fair interpretation, be made to bear the smallest appearance of inconsistency. But it is, of course, very possible to give it an unfair interpretation. For instance, in May 1856, Mr. Tayler, writing confidentially, as every Commissioner is bound to do on such a subject, informs me that Baboo Modenarain Rai (since deceased) is anxious for a title. I reply in the same tone of confidence by asking what public service the Baboo has ever done. This Mr. Tayler does not scruple to call "*a hint*,"* and accordingly quotes it as his authority for telling the Baboo, more than a year afterwards, that he would assist him to a title, if he would subscribe largely to the Industrial Institution! At the close of the letter (of the 30th March 1857),† in which this notable fact is related by Mr. Tayler himself, he adds, for the same obvious purpose of impugning my consistency, "The Lieutenant Governor will probably remember that the Shewhur Baboo's application for a title was rejected on the ground that he had not rendered assistance in the work of enlightenment and education." This, however, turns out to be something more than mere unfairness of interpretation. For the truth is, that the Baboo's request was rejected on Mr. Tayler's own report that he was not the son of the late Rajah, and that "neither the circumstances nor the character of the individual were such as to afford any reasonable ground of expectation that he will prove himself deserving of the distinction he desires."‡ There is not a word about "assistance in the work of enlightenment and education" either in the reasons assigned by Mr. Tayler for not recommending the title or in those declared by the Government for not giving it.

48. It may be readily conceded to Mr. Tayler that the exhibition on the part of Government and its officers, of a steady preference for honours and distinctions of public benefactors rather than others is, *in a certain sense*, an offering of inducements to liberality and a suggestion of motives other than those of pure beneficence. But the difference between this method of influencing the public spirit of our zemindars and the method of actual previous solicitation must be obvious to all, and constitutes in fact the whole distinction between a legitimate use of official influence and an unfair straining of that influence.

It may be conceded, also, that even under the fairest exertion of personal or official influence, cases will arise requiring tact and delicacy, and susceptible of different and doubtful interpretations, according to the difference of views entertained as to the right conduct to be followed on such occasions. For the opinions of official men have undoubtedly differed to some extent upon these points; and though all have agreed that there is a line to be drawn so as to separate the use of official influence from its abuse, there has not been an universal consent as to the precise place at which that line should be drawn, although there has seldom been any difference of opinion, in cases where a man has been found very much on one side of the line, or very much on the other.

49. It is nothing, therefore, for Mr. Tayler to contend that, according to a fair interpretation of precedents, he is blameless for the legitimate employment of his official influence, because, in fact, nobody has blamed him for this. The question in discussion has always been, whether Mr. Tayler's employment of his official influence had been legitimate or not; whether, in short, he was or was not so clearly on the wrong side of the line as to give just cause for alarm and dissatisfaction, and to be liable to grave censure on that account. And when we find him, not only canvassing native gentlemen himself, but sending out three Mahomedan delegates, two of them his own official subordinates, with authority to persuade all who had the means to come forward in aid of his scheme,§ we can have no rational doubt of his position on the wrong side of the line in question; still less so, when we find him directly soliciting Baboo Modenarain for money, and promising to forward his wishes for a title if he would subscribe largely to the Industrial Institution; or suppressing written evidence of dissatisfaction and retractation, as in the instance of Mr. Forbes and of the Raja of Durbhunga. Whatever Mr. Tayler may have thought of the rule, these cases were assuredly beyond it. Wherever he would have placed the line of distinction, he, unquestionably, was very far on the side of abuse, and fully exposed to condemnation for that part of his conduct.

50. Considering, indeed, the highly trusted and confidential position in relation to the Government, which is held by a divisional Commissioner, it will not be thought strange that

* Page 54A of the printed Collection.

† Page 74 of the printed Collection.

‡ See the dates of all the correspondence given in page 76 of the printed Collection.

§ This is affirmed by Mr. Farquharson, and not denied by Mr. Tayler in his commentary on Mr. Farquharson's report.

that I should have now begun to wish for a more reliable person than Mr. Tayler in the important Commissionership of the Patna Division. But Mr. Tayler thinks it necessary to assign other and very different reasons for this wish in the following passages quoted from pages 5 and 6 of his pamphlet:—

“Some months ago he was desirous of removing me from the Patna to the Burdwan Commissionership, and had actually made arrangements for so doing. The object of this was, I believe, to save his brother-in-law, the leader of the cabal against me, from the consequences of a scandalous letter which that gentleman had written, in which he served up, without stint or measure, all the calumnies, idle gossip, and malicious reports that he and his followers had succeeded in accumulating.

“The manifest malice and the manifest falsehood of these wretched tales placed Mr. Garrett and Mr. Halliday in an embarrassing position, and, had not a higher hand than that of an earthly Governor removed the former from the scene, I have little doubt that I should have been made the scapegoat at all hazards.

“As it was, the moment I heard of the premeditated transfer, I wrote to the Home Secretary of the Government of India, begging I might be removed *at once*, or else that the report might be authoritatively contradicted, as I was not disposed to enter upon the serious responsibilities of so grave a crisis with a weakened prestige, and the threat of removal suspended over me.

“The answer was that the idea had been *abandoned*, that it would be mischievous to remove high officers at such a crisis, and *in my case especially so*. I remained to bear the heat and burden of the day, to *save Patna*, and then to be *dismissed!*

“Thus prevented, against his inclination, from doing me at any time the injury he meditated, for an *injury*, and a serious one, he knew it would be, Mr. Halliday's subsequent treatment of me has shown how ill this compulsory reprieve was tolerated by him, and how little, in fact, he had abandoned his purpose.”

51. The whole of this statement is contrary to fact.

52. It certainly could be no reason for removing Mr. Tayler from Patna to Burdwan, early in June,* that I was aware that the late Mr. Garrett had written what Mr. Tayler chooses to call a “scandalous letter” regarding him. For Mr. Tayler has all along accused me of believing these scandals, *i.e.*, of not considering them to be scandals at all, and even supposing, as perhaps Mr. Tayler does suppose, that this belief of mine must necessarily have been dissipated by his reply to Mr. Garrett, yet that reply, though dated in June, was not sent in till long after Mr. Garrett's death, not, in fact, until October 1857, two months after Mr. Tayler had been removed from the Commissionership, and four months after the transaction in June, of which it is suggested as the cause.

53. Neither could the mere exchange of Mr. Tayler from one office to another of equal profit and position have, by any possibility, saved Mr. Garrett from any consequences of a scandalous letter, if he had been proved to have written such. For any such scandalous letter would assuredly have been attacked and exposed by Mr. Tayler, to the utmost of his ability, just as much at Burdwan as at Patna, and with just as complete an effect.

54. Nor even supposing that Mr. Tayler had in his reply conclusively proved “malice and falsehood” in Mr. Garrett's representations, could that proof, coming in October, have “placed Mr. Garrett and Mr. Halliday in an embarrassing position” in June.

55. In short, the entire story is unreal, nor is it necessary to seek any other reason for my having desired, early in June, to have some other officer than Mr. Tayler at Patna, beyond that which is to be found in Mr. Tayler's own conduct regarding the Industrial School subscriptions, wherein it was plainly shown that he was an officer on whom it was unsafe to rely.

56. The purport of that part of the story in Mr. Tayler's pamphlet, which mentions a correspondence with “the Home Secretary of the Government of India”† is obviously to show that I was compulsorily prevented from removing Mr. Tayler to Burdwan in June by the interposition of the Governor General in Council, whereby it comes to be unavoidably inferred that Mr. Tayler's proposed removal was disapproved by the Governor General in Council. And as the narrative is designedly so framed as to lead to that understanding, I suppose Mr. Tayler has contrived to believe it himself.

57. The matter is a very small one, yet as part of a string of misrepresentations, all avowedly put forth for the purpose of depreciating my character, I am constrained to notice it among the rest, and to say that the fact was not as the pamphlet purports to describe it, nor, looking to the correspondence which actually took place on the subject

between

* It was in June that I contemplated exchanging Mr. Tayler to Burdwan. Mr. Tayler heard of it immediately, and his correspondence with Mr. Beadon regarding it took place, as will be seen, in that month.

† Page 6 of the Pamphlet.

between Mr. Tayler and Mr. Beadon, is it intelligible how Mr. Tayler could have to come to believe in the representation he has made.*

58. I have now dealt with all that Mr. Tayler has had to say in support of his second allegation,† and dismissing it as refuted, I may pass now to the third topic,‡ pausing merely to observe that there is not the shadow of a pretence in any part of the correspondence for the statement in page 6 of the pamphlet that Mr. Tayler was "assailed" by invitation of the Lieutenant Governor" (which is Mr. Tayler's method of representing the unavoidable reference to the Judges for inquiry and report), or for the assertion that the magistrate was "encouraged to oppose his views and thwart his orders." The rest of the paragraph, in which these two mis-statements occur, professes to represent Mr. Tayler's "position at the outset of the insurrection," and has been shown to be entirely without foundation.

59. Mr. Tayler then advances from the history of the Industrial Institution to what he calls the saving of Patna; and at pages 7 and 8 he gives a rapid and extremely exaggerated account of the position of affairs there in June 1857, the difficulties he had to encounter, and the measures which he considers to have been "crowned with complete success."

60. It is at present no part of my business to investigate the real merits of Mr. Tayler's proceedings on the occasion in question,—all I have now to deal with being the accuracy or inaccuracy of his statements regarding myself. And it is the less necessary to touch upon this part of the subject, because the extreme shallowness of Mr. Tayler's pretensions under this head has been thoroughly and unanswerably detected and exposed by Mr. Samuells in paragraphs 60 to 73 of his letter of the 29th January last, printed at the end of the collection of papers regarding Mr. Tayler's removal.

61. Limiting myself, then, to the immediate purpose of this paper, I have in this place to inquire upon what grounds Mr. Tayler has made the following assertion:—

"I affirm that, in several instances, of more or less importance, recommendations made by me were either disregarded or disapproved, with no good or sufficient reason, to the manifest detriment of the public service, and the imminent danger of the whole province, that the dangers which existed, and which subsequent events *proved to be real*, were *slighted and ignored by Mr. Halliday, in opposition to reason, fact, and evidence.*"

62. Having made this statement, I find that Mr. Tayler proceeds to illustrate it in the following manner:—

63. He asserts§ that if he had been allowed to raise "a local force for future purposes" great and incalculable service must have been done by it, and much mischief prevented, but that I prevented him from asking the zemindars for assistance towards raising such a force merely to preserve my own consistency, and Mr. Tayler was therefore obliged to give up the plan, and the public good was thus sacrificed in order to support an illusory and unfortunate proclamation.

64. To this, I answer that it is quite true that Mr. Tayler was prohibited from asking the zemindars to raise men at their expense for the public service; nor will it be thought surprising, after the specimen I had seen of his proceedings, that I should have objected to let him loose a second time among the Behar zemindars to canvass them for subscriptions.

65. But, whatever may be thought of this, it is quite certain that Mr. Tayler was not thereby prevented from raising a local force if he had chosen to do so, because such bodies were raised by other civil officers, and, to a certain extent by himself, without making any calls for assistance on the zemindars. He was, in fact, encouraged and directed to raise such a force, and might undoubtedly have done so if he had thought fit. Nor did it follow that the zemindars would not assist unless asked; because the Rajahs of Bettiah and Hutwah did actually raise forces and guarded the ghauts to good effect, besides similar service on a smaller scale by other zemindars.

66. So

* On the 17th June Mr. Tayler wrote privately to Mr. Beadon, that he had heard he was to be changed to Burdwan; complained much of it, and asked Mr. Beadon to get it "settled," either "openly" or "in some other way." He told Mr. Beadon to deal with his letter as he might think best. Mr. Beadon sent me the letter for perusal, without any remark. I returned it on the 21st June, with these words,—“I don't think it possible for him to *remain* at Patna. But it would not do to change him *just now*.” This was, of course, in allusion to the altered circumstances at Patna in consequence of the mutinies. This was, I presume, communicated to Mr. Tayler, and is the authority on which he has introduced the Government of India into his narrative, and my being prevented from removing him against my inclination, and his compulsory reprieve, and so on.

† *Vide supra*, para. 3.

‡ That previous to Mr. Tayler's removal, I had been guilty of great and dangerous errors connected with Mr. Tayler's measures and the safety of Patna, which were very embarrassing to Mr. Tayler, and obliged him to act on his own responsibility in opposition to my views, to the manifest detriment of the public service and hazard of the whole Province saved from ruin on by Mr. Tayler's wisdom and promptitude.

§ Pages 9 and 10.

66. So that, although it was a thing to be regretted that Mr. Tayler, by his previous improprieties of conduct should have weakened his means of useful influence with the zemindars of his division, and rendered me distrustful of his communications with them, it is manifestly not the fact that the prohibition to canvass the zemindars for aid was necessarily productive of any such evil consequences as Mr. Tayler describes in his pamphlet. And nothing further need be said as to this first instance in proof of Mr. Tayler's assertion, at pages 8 and 9, regarding detriment to the public service.

67. The next proof of detriment arising from errors is the case of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, as follows:—

"The next instance I shall mention of disregard to my recommendations, followed by serious consequences, is with respect to the 5th Cavalry.

"I wrote demi-officially to the Lieutenant Governor, telling him I *knew* that the 5th Cavalry were in a state of mutiny, prepared to rise when opportunity suited them, begged that they might be disarmed without delay, and offered if intimation were sent to me, to have the detachments at Churpah and Dinapore knocked off their horses at the same time.

"The answer was that some other officers *trusted* them, and Government could not afford to lose anything in the shape of cavalry until their *absence* was *proved* to be preferable to their *presence!*—*as if such proof is ever given until the remedy is too late.*"

"Shortly afterwards the 5th Cavalry rose, attacked Gya, defeated the Seikhs under Captain Rattray, dashed into the town, liberated the prisoners, subsequently ravaged the district, and went off in triumph to join Kooer Singh.

"Common judgment and decision, especially after the information I gave, might have obviated all these disastrous consequences."

68. To this, stated as an instance of evil occasioned by my fault, it is a conclusive answer to say, that the whole question of the disarming of the 5th Cavalry was, as might have been expected from first to last, in the hands of the Commander in Chief, in direct communication with the Government of India, and in correspondence with the Commanding Officer at Bhaugulpore, and that I had nothing whatever to do with it.

69. And if it be said that Mr. Tayler did not know this, I reply that he might at all events have known it before he wrote his pamphlet, and ought to have made himself acquainted with the facts before attempting to found upon them an attack on my public conduct, and an imputation of gross dereliction of duty on my part which in truth never occurred.

70. But supposing I had been able, as Mr. Tayler assumes, to cause, if I had chosen, the disarming of the 5th Cavalry, the facts would still prove to have been misrepresented by Mr. Tayler.

71. The demi-official letter he quotes from, at page 10 of his pamphlet, was dated 11th July. It was addressed to Mr. Secretary Young, and was by him submitted to me for my orders. My orders, written on the face of the letter, were dated 15th July in these words. (It will be remembered that, excepting two insignificant detachments, the cavalry in question were not in Mr. Tayler's division, but in that of Mr. Yule, an officer of tried judgment, vigilance, and capacity, and they were chiefly at Mr. Yule's own station):—

"Tell him in reply to communicate with Yule regarding the 5th.

"Yule has no belief in the rumours against the 5th.

"But at all events to communicate with Yule before making a public communication on this subject."

72. I have no reason to doubt that this was substantially communicated to Mr. Tayler by Mr. Young, and, on the other hand, I have not been able to ascertain that this perfectly reasonable and unobjectionable order of mine, given just one month before the regiment mutinied,† was ever obeyed by Mr. Tayler; certainly, if he did consult or communicate with Mr. Yule, he made no public communication on the subject; and if, after consulting with Mr. Yule, he had still been of the same opinion as before, as to the necessity of the measure he had suggested, there was ample time for him to have done so before the mutiny broke out.

73. I will merely add, in order to show how Mr. Tayler has mis-stated every part of this case, that on the 30th July orders were actually issued (by telegraph) by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to the officer commanding at Bhaugulpore to disarm and dismount the 5th Cavalry, but were recalled by the same authority in consequence of a strong remonstrance against them by Mr. Yule.

74. Mr. Yule's reasons were stated with his accustomed force and precision, and are on record to be judged of by the Honourable Court at the fit time; but whatever opinion may be given regarding them, there can never be any question that Mr. Tayler
has

* The *italics* are Mr. Tayler's.

† Mr. Tayler's expression is, "shortly afterwards the 5th Cavalry rose." The real interval was as stated in the text. The regiment mutinied on the 14th August.

has utterly failed to connect me with any of the mischiefs arising out of the mutiny of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, and that his attempt to do so is only another instance of complete misrepresentation.

75. Mr. Tayler's third instance of hazard of public detriment incurred by my "slighting or ignoring" his suggestions, is stated by him to be a "still more serious instance of wrong judgment" than the two which have just been disposed of. It amounted, he says, "almost to infatuation,—a judgment, indeed, so *mischievously wrong* that had I not entirely set it aside, and acted in direct opposition to the view which Mr. Halliday entertained, Patna, if not the whole province, would have been ruined."*

Let us see in what this consisted, and how the case is made out.

76. The statement is too long to be extracted, but it may be read at pages 11 to 14 of the pamphlet; and will be found to imply obviously and intentionally the following meaning:—

That on the 7th of June Mr. Tayler had authoritative intimation of an intended mutiny of the regiments at Dinapore, and an expected disturbance at Patna; and that important measures were thereupon taken by him to meet the emergency.

That "then it was that he determined to adopt a series of coercive measures, on his own sole responsibility, without the permission or knowledge of Mr. Halliday."

That the reason why this was so done was because Mr. Halliday, "in the full light of the fact known to every man, woman, and child in Behar, that a mutiny had been planned on the 7th of June and only accidentally averted," did nevertheless write that he could not satisfy himself that Patna was in any danger, and that it was inconceivable that the Native regiments should mutiny in the face of the European troops.

That the evil of this declaration was not in "its extraordinary want of knowledge and foresight" only, but in its effect on Mr. Tayler's measures.

That had he adopted Mr. Halliday's views there would have been a dreadful tragedy at Patna.

That the safety of Patna "was secured by the measures taken by me (Mr. Tayler) in opposition to Mr. Halliday's views.†"

And lastly, that though Mr. Tayler cannot divine whether the omission, by the Governor General in Council, to disarm the Dinapore regiments was in any respect caused by Mr. Halliday's wrong view in this matter, yet when the dreadful results of the mutiny of those regiments are considered, then they will be appreciated as the results of Mr. Halliday's views. The confusion of logic is in this last place so startling that I must in my own defence quote Mr. Tayler's own words. If they do not mean what I suppose, they mean nothing.

"How far this strange disregard of reason and experience affected the councils of the Empire, and prevented the Governor General from issuing decided instructions for disarming the Dinapore regiments, I cannot divine. But when the fearful results of that triumphant mutiny are considered, the ravages, the loss of life, the disorganisation of the country, the slaughter of brave troops, the death of our countrymen—when these things are pondered, then the importance of this question will be duly seen, and the grounds and consequences of Mr. Halliday's dictum be duly appreciated."

77. When Mr. Tayler says that he secured the safety of Patna by taking measures on his own responsibility in opposition to my views, he does not mean that I suggested one kind of measures and he adopted another, or that he adopted measures of which I had already disapproved. It is true that this is the meaning of the expressions he employs, and that those expressions would assuredly be so interpreted by nineteen-twentieths of his readers. Yet Mr. Tayler certainly cannot mean what he might seem to say, because he has elsewhere stated that he suggested no measures for my approval or disapproval, but adopted them without my knowledge. And he has nowhere said, what indeed he could not say consistently with fact, that any measures were suggested to him by me contrary or opposed to those he adopted.

78. What Mr. Tayler then does mean to say, can only be this—that whereas I at one time thought Patna in no danger, and he at the same time thought it in great danger, therefore the measures which he took at that time to avert the danger were different from those which I at the same time was likely to have recommended (but did not).

79. This statement differs exceedingly from that which by ordinary interpretation would seem to have been implied in Mr. Tayler's words, it being of course one thing to act in opposition to measures actually suggested, and quite another thing to act in opposition to measures which the actor thinks might have been suggested (but were not), and the latter is what Mr. Tayler means to say he did, and not the former.

80. But even this modified statement is wholly illusory, as may easily be seen on appeal to facts and dates, to which Mr. Tayler is imprudently inattentive.

81. On the 24th May, Mr. Tayler wrote to me a letter containing the following paragraphs:—

"All

* Page 11 of the Pamphlet. The italics are Mr. Tayler's.

† The italics are Mr. Tayler's.

"All remains quiet, and the only thing that ever was to be apprehended, viz., a dash from the Sepoys,* becomes more and more improbable every hour.

"In the town and among the people here (Patna) there has never been a symptom of disloyalty or disaffection."

On the 30th May he wrote:—

"All is quiet. The Dinapore troops in excellent order."

On the 6th June:—†

"At the same time there can be no doubt that many people entertain apprehensions of some rising or disturbance in the town of Patna. I myself do not apprehend anything of the kind, and I am in constant communication with those who are best informed of the state of feeling amongst the people."

82. The above was on the 6th June. It was on the next day, Mr. Tayler tells us in his pamphlet,‡ that a rise of the Dinapore regiments was planned; disturbance was expected, all the Christians were assembled at his house, preparations for defence were made, and "then it was" that he resolved on certain measures to be taken in opposition to my views, about which it will be hereafter perceived he then knew nothing.

On that very day (7th June) Mr. Tayler wrote to me again.

Did he tell me of what is now narrated in his pamphlet? Not a word. These are his expressions, which, as compared with the statements at page 11 of the pamphlet, cannot, even after some experience of Mr. Tayler's habitual inaccuracy, be read without astonishment:—

"All remains quiet. Much gossip and some little intrigue in the city. That the Mahomedans are on the *qui vive* there can be no doubt, and if there were to be a mutiny at Dinapore,§ we should have something to do."

83. On the day following, 8th June, he announced the following vague truism, which was assuredly no correction of the favourable reports he had continued to send to me up to that time:—

"Though the Dinapore regiments have not yet broken out, they may at any moment."

84. Now, it was in answer to the letters of the 7th and 8th of June, and after perusal of those of the 24th and 30th May and 6th June, that I, on the 13th June, wrote to Mr. Tayler the sentence quoted and italicised in page 12 of his pamphlet, which turns out to have been a mere echo of his own statements, and to have been an opinion exactly similar to his own, and formed upon his own representation of the facts, which was all I had to guide me. And it is upon this, and this alone, that Mr. Tayler has founded the whole of this violent attack, and upon which alone depends the value or the worthlessness of the allegations so strongly insisted upon against me of having "ignored danger in opposition to reason, fact, and evidence," and of having evinced a judgment so "mischievously wrong" as, if Mr. Taylor had not interposed, to have hazarded the security of a Province, if indeed it did not, as he confusedly insinuates, cause in some mysterious way the mutiny of the Dinapore regiments and all the slaughter and ravages arising therefrom!

85. Mr. Tayler may say, and indeed does say, that though the view which he entertained up to the 6th of June was the same as mine|| (it was, in fact, the cause and foundation of my opinion), he changed it afterwards.

86. If so, why did he not tell me of it? Having led me wrong up to that date, he was surely bound to set me right without delay when he had found out his own mistake.

87. He says he changed his mind after the 6th. If he had told me this in his letters of the 7th and 8th, my letter of the 13th, which was written in answer to those letters, on which he founds all his vituperation, would certainly never have been penned. This he was quite aware of, for he says in his letter of 24th July,¶ with reference to this very subject, "I never for a moment thought that the Lieutenant Governor would withhold his support and sanction to my measures, when fully convinced of the grounds on which they were adopted." Why, then, did he not inform me regarding them? There was plenty

* By "Sepoys" Mr. Tayler certainly meant the Dinapore Sepoys, and this shows it to have been his opinion that there was no danger of disturbance in Patna unless the Dinapore Sepoys should rise, an opinion which, when it was afterwards repeated by me, on his authority, Mr. Tayler called (page 13 of the Pamphlet) "this extraordinary opinion."

† Page 81 of Collection of Papers.

‡ Page 11.

§ Again showing that Mr. Tayler held the "extraordinary opinion" that disturbance at Patna was dependent on mutiny at Dinapore.

|| I know not if Mr. Tayler intends to lay any particular stress on my use of the word "*inconceivable*." If so, he is welcome to find fault with it. It was not a good word to use even in a private letter, and would have been quite wrong in a public letter. "Very unlikely" would have been the more correct expression.

¶ After all, however, my meaning was obvious, and not likely to be misunderstood. Moreover, it did not express more than was in Mr. Tayler's own mind, for he says, speaking of this very expression in his letters of 24th and 25th July (pages 37 and 82 of the printed Collection), that prior to the 7th June he "entertained opinions similar to those of the Lieutenant Governor."

¶ Page 37 of the Collection of Papers regarding Mr. Tayler's removal.

plenty of time for it. For although the matter is so represented in Mr. Tayler's pamphlet as to make it appear that his "measures" were resolved upon on the spur of the moment—on the 7th June—as soon as he heard of the intended disturbance, it is nevertheless the fact that he did nothing till the 20th June;* and he could easily have received from me an answer before that time, if he had thought fit to inform me of his changed opinions, and convince me, by a sufficient statement, of the fitness of his proposed measures.

88. So that all Mr. Tayler has written about the effect of my† opinion on his measures, and the sad consequences which would have followed if he had folded his hands according to my views, and all about the tragedy at Patna being prevented by his acting in opposition to my views, and a great deal more of the same kind contained in his pamphlet, is absolutely without any kind of foundation.

89. Of the same worthless character is the statement (repeated in the subsequent pamphlet called "Addenda") that "Mr. Halliday, writing in the full light of the fact known to every man, woman, and child in Behar, that a mutiny had been planned on the 7th June, and only accidentally averted," said that he did not think Patna in danger. For it is now manifest, and might have been remembered by Mr. Tayler if he had any care for accuracy, that when I wrote the above opinion I was so far from being in the "full light" of the fact referred to, that I was in utter ignorance of it, by reason of the misconduct of Mr. Tayler himself, who, though in daily correspondence with me at the very time, had wilfully and carefully concealed from me his change of opinion, the facts on which it was founded, and the measures he proposed to adopt in consequence of that change.

90. Thus the whole of this "serious instance," so much relied on by Mr. Tayler, comes (when stated in the fewest words) to this undeniable result, that Mr. Tayler concealed from me what he was bound to report, and then reproached me in the most indecent manner for not knowing it!

91. I may now proceed to Mr. Tayler's fourth instance of "recommendations (made by him) slighted or ignored by me to the imminent danger of the whole Province." And the case he now produces is that of Kooer Singh, introducing it as "no unimportant or trivial matter."

92. For the manner of narrating this, which has all Mr. Tayler's peculiarities of off-handed and inconsiderate misrepresentation, I would refer to the pamphlet itself.‡ The essence of the tale thus told may be accurately condensed as follows:

93. Kooer Singh's estates were under the management of the Government for the liquidation of his debts, he having undertaken to obtain a loan for the purpose, about which he was busily, but not yet quite successfully engaged, when "suddenly, *about a month before the Dinapore mutiny,*" the Board of Revenue caused the Commissioner to insist on his procuring the loan in a month, or they would recommend Government to drop his affairs.

94. Mr. Tayler was obliged to tell this to Kooer Singh, but he "*lost no time*" in writing to the Lieutenant Governor to beg his interposition in favour of Kooer Singh.

"In reply to this," says Mr. Tayler, "*after some time,* a doubtful answer of the stereotype character, came to say that inquiries would be made from the Board, &c., and the Lieutenant Governor would see what could be done," or words to that effect.

95. Thus, instead of prompt action, in presence of danger pointed out, and at a critical time, a dilatory routine was followed, and therefore, as might be expected, "*ten days afterwards Kooer Singh was at the head of 10,000 rebels.*"

96. These statements are entirely opposed to fact.

97. Not "*about a month before the Dinapore mutiny, when, as all knew, Kooer Singh was being anxiously sought for by the Dinapore sepoys,*" but on the 6th May, before even the first outbreak of mutiny at Meerut, and when not the most far-sighted had a dream of mutiny at Dinapore, still less of Kooer Singh being sought for as a leader, the Board wrote the letter to Mr. Tayler to which he now alludes as "*ill-timed,*" and likely to make Kooer Singh "*altogether desperate.*"

98. Mr. Tayler received it on the 11th May, two months and 14 days before the mutiny at Dinapore, and mischievous as he says he considered it, he nevertheless made no sort of remonstrance about it, either to the Board or to the Government, for more than two months. Meantime, he sent a copy of it to Kooer Singh, and received Kooer Singh's answer on the 8th of June. Although this was the exact time when, as he tells us on page 11 of his pamphlet, his eyes had opened to the likelihood of mutiny by the Dinapore sepoys, and he was revolving in his mind the measures for the safety

* Page 20 of the printed Collection regarding Mr. Tayler's removal,—"*This morning, the 20th, the first move was made,*" &c.

† Page 13 of the Pamphlet.

‡ Page 14.

of Patna, he was so far from taking that prompt action in the matter, for the want of which he now reproaches the Government, that he kept Kooer Singh's reply quietly by him till the 30th, and then sent it down to the Board with a very tame letter* from himself, in which he said not a word about the "ill-timed" and very dangerous nature of the Board's communication, or of his firm conviction of the "dangers of routine and delay at such a crisis in a matter of the utmost urgency," or of "the remorse likely to arise from having added one inducement to his revolt," or anything else of the deep matters which, if his present statement have any sort of reality, he must at that time have been anxiously musing upon for more than a month.

99. Mr. Tayler says, however, that he "lost no time" in writing to the Lieutenant Governor on the subject of the "ill-timed" order of the Board; but this, I am sorry to say, is as inaccurate as the rest of the story. He did, indeed, write to me, but it was not till nearly three weeks after he had answered the Board's letter, and, therefore, within a day or two of ten weeks after he had received that important missive, and just one week before the Dinapore mutiny actually occurred. He wrote to Mr. Secretary Young, on

"My dear Young,
"I don't want to put this on record, so I send it in this form for the Lieutenant Governor's perusal, and hope he will approve of the course adopted.

"It is rather unfortunate that just at this time the Board should have threatened to recommend the withdrawal of Government aid from the Baboo, unless the loan be obtained from *Banda*, which is now impossible, and that the Baboo should have lost his case in the Sudder Court against the people who have so robbed and bullied him.

"If anything would make the old man and his adherents desperate, it would be the hopelessness caused by these combined disasters, but I am positively afraid of advocating his cause as warmly and heartily as I used, because I am misunderstood and misrepresented.

"It is a serious question now, however, and well worth consideration, whether Government should not at once and for all agree to hold the management, let the loan come from *wherever* it may.

"This is all that is necessary, and if it could now be done without it being for a moment supposed that the kindness has any connection with fear, it would be a wise and politic stroke. Wake is strongly impressed with the belief that the Baboo means mischief; others believe it too; he *could* do much, no doubt, and the 40th Regiment would follow next, to be followed by the others.

"Pray lay this before the Lieutenant Governor for consideration.

Yours sincerely,

W. Tayler."

July 18th.
the 18th July, the letter quoted in the margin, to which, "after some time," he says, "came the fatal answer which caused all the mischief," and then, "*ten days afterwards*" (*i.e.*, after the receipt of the letter which came "after some time"), "Kooer Singh was at the head of 10,000 rebels."

100. Now it takes in the rainy season four days for a letter to come here from Patna, and four days to return. Mr. Tayler's letter of the 18th reached Calcutta on the 21st July, and if the answer had been sent immediately, as I believe it was, it could not have reached him till the 24th. On the 25th the Dinapore regiments mutinied, in concert, as it has since appeared, with Kooer Singh. They went straight to Arrah (only 30 miles off), and there Kooer Singh at once put himself at their head. If this correspondence had any connection with the rebellion of Kooer Singh, was it the fault of the Lieutenant Governor, who answered a tardily-written letter in the only way it could be answered† the moment he received it, or that of Mr. Tayler, who being, by his own statement, overwhelmingly impressed with the urgency of the crisis, the importance of the case, and the danger of delay, kept the matter pent up within his breast for no less than 68 days,‡ and then represented his views to the Government exactly when it was impossible that any answer could arrive in time to do any good.

101. "Thus," says Mr. Tayler, at page 15 of his pamphlet, commenting on these transactions, "in a matter of the utmost urgency, and at a most critical time, notwithstanding that I, the Commissioner of the Division, had pointed out the danger, the same routine course of dilatory procedure was to be pursued as when there was neither danger nor crisis at all!"

102. But if Mr. Tayler, whether on the 11th May or on the 8th June, really thought Kooer Singh so dangerous and nearly desperate a character, "known by all" to be the sought-for leader of the Dinapore sepoys, how was it that he not only shrouded this opinion in the profoundest secrecy, but even took pains to express quite different sentiments regarding him, not only before and up to, but even *after* his declared rebellion?

103. In a letter dated Patna, 14th June 1857, addressed to the Secretary to Government

* From the Commissioner of Revenue, Patna Division, to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue.

Sir,

Fort William, dated 30th June 1857.

In reply to your letter, No. 106, of the 6th instant,* I have the honour to forward, in original, a letter, dated the 22nd May last, from the Collector of Shahabad, with its enclosures (English and vernacular), for the favourable consideration of the Board, and to recommend that the present arrangements be allowed to remain undisturbed, under the circumstances represented by the Baboo Kooer Singh.

I have, &c.
(signed) W. Tayler, Commissioner of Revenue.

* [A mistake for "*ultimo*."]]

† Mr. Tayler's letter complained of certain orders of the Board. My endorsement thereon, no doubt, duly acted upon and communicated to Mr. Tayler, was,—"Approve his measures; ask the Board to send up all their recent correspondence on this subject in original." This was dated 21st June.

What else could I have said or done? Was I, on Mr. Tayler's statement, to interfere with the Board without even looking to see if he had correctly represented what they had done?

‡ From 11th May to 18th July.

ment* (more than a month after he had received the peremptory order from the Board, and when the time was really critical), he writes, paragraphs 9 and 10:—

“Many people have sent me letters imputing disloyalty and disaffection to several of the zemindars, especially Baboo Kooer Singh.

“My personal friendship for him, and the attachment he has always shown me, enables me confidently to contradict the report.”

104. Again, on the 23rd of July, five days after the private letter to Mr. Young, which has been commented on above, he writes officially:—†

“Letters, anonymous and authenticated, have frequently reached me, charging Baboo Kooer Singh with disaffection and conspiracy, and some have cast the same imputation on the Rajah of Doomraon.

“The magistrate himself entertained apprehensions that the former was in communication with the sepoy at Dinapore, especially with the 40th Regiment, and that it was not improbable he would lead or encourage a rising in the district.

“I never have been able to participate in these apprehensions; my own knowledge of the Baboo’s honourable and straightforward character, of his loyalty to towards the State, and his feelings of personal friendship for myself (a friendship which, unlike most natives, he never professes when he does not feel it), forbid the supposition; and although, in the present eventful days, the wisest calculations have been baffled, and the firmest confidence betrayed, so that no absolute trust can be placed on any but Christians, I am strongly confident of Kooer Singh’s fealty and good faith.”

105. On the 26th July,‡ the day after the mutiny at Dinapore, in reply to a letter from Major General Lloyd, telling him that he had been informed that Kooer Singh, of Jugdishpore, was coming at the head of the Dinapore mutineers, and from 10,000 to 20,000 Bhojpoorias besides, Mr. Tayler replies,—

“With reference to your remarks regarding Kooer Singh advancing with 10,000 or 20,000 men, I think it my duty, without loss of time, to inform you that, although it might be unwise at the present moment to express *confident trust* in any Native, I do not believe that Kooer Singh meditates any such adventure; but have, on the contrary, reason to hope that he will come down to stay at Patna, and thereby prove his loyalty.”

106. Again July 28th, when Kooer Singh was in actual rebellion, though yet unknown to Mr. Tayler, he writes to General Lloyd:—

“It is impossible, I have always said, to trust *any body* at the present time. Kooer Singh may, in spite of himself, be compelled to join, and he *may*, of course, be tempted by the successes of the rebels.”§

107. Lastly, in a letter as late as July 30th, to Mr. Young, when there was no longer any doubt that Kooer Singh was “at the head of 10,000 rebels” at Arrah, he says “Kooer Singh was with them by compulsion, I suspect.” And again, “Kooer Singh “had evidently made no *preparations*, and, I have little doubt, has been forced into the “thing.”||

108. So that officially and demi-officially, as late as the 30th July, nay even up to the 4th August,¶ he still expresses his conviction that if Kooer Singh has joined the mutiny at all, he has been forced into it, not by the Board of Revenue or the Lieutenant Governor, but by his own rebellious subjects.

109. And yet, in spite of all this, Mr. Tayler is bold enough to write, at page 16 of his pamphlet:—

“Had my entreaty regarding Kooer Singh been promptly acted upon, I cannot absolutely say that he would never have joined the rebels, but the Government would at all events have been spared the remorse of thinking that they had themselves added at least one inducement to his revolt.”

110. Further words on this “instance” are assuredly quite uncalled for.

111. There is no need for me to trouble myself about the fifth instance, which “concerns “the magistrates of Patna.”

112. It is brought forward as a proof of my slighting or ignoring Mr. Tayler’s suggestions; but the simple fact is that when Mr. Tayler recommended, without any good reason, that the magistrate should be removed, his recommendation was not adopted. When, subsequently, a really good reason for it appeared, quite unconnected with that which had previously been rejected, the magistrate was removed.

113. It is nevertheless quite true that Mr. Tayler had shown the strongest and most unjustifiable

* Page 2 of the printed Collection.
† Page 92 of the printed Collection.
‡ Printed Collection, pages 111, 112.

§ Printed Collection, page 112.
|| Printed Collection, page 113.
¶ See page 153 of the printed Collection.

unjustifiable bias against Mr. Lewis* who, in strict duty, had been one of the first to inform me of the excitement caused by Mr. Tayler's method of obtaining subscriptions for his Industrial Institution.

114. Having now gone through all the instances adduced to prove the third charge, and shown them to be all worthless and groundless, I come to the fourth and last charge,† regarding which it appears‡ that what Mr. Tayler meant by discreditable arrangements in page 9 was the thoroughly threadbare case of the appointment of Ameer Ali.

115. Into the political expediency or in expediency of that appointment I am not now to enter. My reasons for it have been laid before my superiors, and have not been disapproved. The very able officer, Mr. Samuells, under whom Ameer Ali was employed, has testified to the successful results of his employment, and the zealous, useful, and meritorious nature of his services, as well as to the utter groundlessness of the clamour raised against the appointment by the press, actuated by a blind and indiscriminate hatred to Mahomedans, loyal or disloyal.

116. To that unthinking hatred Mr. Tayler has in this pamphlet very unwisely and ungenerously lent himself, although it is notorious, and is proved indeed by many passages of his public correspondence, that there is no one officer of Government who has trusted and favoured Mahomedans more than he has, up to the very date of his removal, or who, by his own acknowledgments, has been more indebted to them for active and zealous assistance in all his measures.

117. It is, indeed, a fact which no temporary clamour will deter me from acknowledging, that, with few exceptions, our native subjects in the town and division of Patna, and generally in the Province of Behar, Mahomedan as well as Hindoo, have evinced, during the recent troubles, nothing but the most loyal attachment to our rule; and the Mahomedans in proportion to their wealth and numbers not less, but more so, than the Hindoos. Not, indeed, to acknowledge such loyalty in times like these, and still more to treat loyal and disloyal alike, and to involve all Mahomedans in one loud and common execration, although in the provinces with which Mr. Tayler was concerned they have not merely abstained from hostility against us, but have actually in many instances given us their hearty and zealous assistance, even to the sacrifice of life in our cause, would be as impolitic as it is manifestly unjust, even in the most sincere declaimer.

118. I fear, however, that I cannot acquit Mr. Tayler of having adopted this new and sudden tone of anti-Mahomedan zeal, so contrary to his known practice and principles, for the purpose of chiming in with the prevalent cry of the moment, and of representing himself, at a time of much popular error and excitement, as a martyr, at the hands of an un-English Government, to the purity and patriotism of his principles.

119. For, in order to give any consistency and coherence to the lecture upon the nature of the present revolt, and the manner in which it ought to be dealt with, with which he concludes his pamphlet, he is obliged to abandon every declaration with which he set out, and to adopt a theory regarding the cause of his removal from office quite different from that for which he at first so strongly contended. And whereas, at the commencement of his pamphlet, he undertook to prove that his removal was occasioned, not by any of the grounds publicly assigned for it, but by his "honest and straightforward remonstrance" in the matter of the Industrial Institution, he now towards the close of the pamphlet fairly gives up that reason, and announces, with much appearance of solemnity, that he was removed because of the antagonism between his policy and the policy of the Government; his policy being "to carry matters with a high hand against traitors," and "enforce the respect and submission due to the English name," and the policy of the Government being in "direct and unmistakeable opposition to this," a "timid and patch-work pacification," "hazardous to the safety of India and the honour of England."

120. To which I desire to reply, in the plainest and most unqualified terms, that the statement is contrary to the fact. There never has been in any part of the transactions relating to Patna any timidity or irresolution on the part of the Government, or any departure from the high-handed and determined policy required by the occasion; nor can there be found, in all the correspondence which has been printed on the subject one act, or order, or sentiment which gives, or could possibly give, any colour to Mr. Tayler's misrepresentation.

121. On the contrary, it may be seen at every page of the correspondence, that the Government was always anxious to support Mr. Tayler in his measures, so far as it could gain any knowledge of them; that it did in every possible case support, applaud, and encourage him; blamed him only for withholding information which it was his bounden duty to supply; and, finally, only removed him when, instead of meeting boldly the difficulties of the moment, he weakly and needlessly caused the abandonment of a number of important stations, and even interfered to prevent the relief of Arrah, which, so far from being succoured

* See an example at page 148 and 149 *et seq.* of the Collection regarding the Industrial Institution.

† That after Mr. Tayler's removal I have lent myself to discreditable arrangements which have been very generally and justly condemned.

‡ Page 17 of the pamphlet.

succoured by the gallant Eyre and his comrades, would assuredly, if Mr. Tayler's advice had been followed, have been left, with its noble and devoted garrison, to a fate as horrible as that of Cawnpore.

122. With this simple statement of fact, I close my notice of Mr. Tayler's pamphlet. He has crowded into the latter pages a great number of assertions regarding Ameer Ali and Looft Ali and their transactions at Patna and at Calcutta.* Of these, such as relate to Patna and are connected with himself have been amply exposed by Mr. Samuells, whose comments it is not necessary for me to repeat. With regard to those parts of the statements in question which relate to transactions in Calcutta, and are connected with myself, I shall say, shortly, that they are entirely without foundation.

123. Having now concluded my review of this very unjustifiable production, I think it necessary to make a few observations on the subject of Mr. Tayler's recent appointment to officiate as Judge of Mymensing. For, looking at the amount of mis-representation comprised in his pamphlet, of the full extent of which I was not even myself aware until I came to examine it carefully, I am bound to confess that the propriety of the appointment in question appears to me very doubtful.

When, however, I received the orders of the Supreme Government upon Mr. Tayler's appeal in the matter of his removal from Patna, it seemed to me that the concluding paragraphs of Mr. Beadon's letter scarcely left me an option as to his re-employment. In the 11th paragraph of that letter there was a clearly expressed opinion on the part of the Governor General in Council in favour of Mr. Tayler's re-employment in high office, so far as ability and previous good service were concerned, and then the following paragraph placed Mr. Tayler, as it were, at my mercy, in consequence of his personal attack upon myself. It can hardly be thought unnatural that, in such a case, I should rather feel bound by the expression favourable to Mr. Tayler's re-employment, than that I should hold myself free to refuse him employment on the special ground of his disrespect towards myself. I freely own, however, that the responsibility for the appointment must rest with me. For the Governor General in Council, though he had read Mr. Tayler's pamphlet, had not before him any explanation regarding it, and doubtless, therefore, did not perceive how greatly opposed to fact its statements really were. The matter was, nevertheless, one which admitted of some doubt, and it was one on which I could not feel assured that I was likely to be a perfectly impartial judge. But if I have erred in making the appointment, I have at all events not erred on the side of harshness and over severity.

Allipore, 17 March 1858.

Fred. Jas. Halliday.

APPENDIX E.

BRIEF NARRATIVE of Events connected with the Removal of *W. Tayler* from the Commissionership of Patna.

MY sudden and abrupt dismissal from the high post which I held at Patna, just at the time when my measures had been crowned with success, and my administration was quoted as a triumph, is an incident of such peculiar character, so unintelligible to the world, and so injurious to my reputation, that I feel myself imperatively called upon to give, at least to my friends, some explanation of the circumstances under which it has taken place.

I have already laid an appeal before the highest local tribunal, in the hope and expectation of receiving justice, but, in that appeal, I have limited myself, as is usual, to the circumstances immediately connected with the case, and have not travelled beyond the record, or attempted to illustrate the subject by the detail of past occurrences, the exposure of covert motives, or the indirect connection of collateral incidents.

Further reflection, however, on the whole subject, leads me to the conclusion that I should be wanting to myself, to my public duty, and to the many interests connected with the subject of my policy and my removal, if I failed to bring forward, unreservedly, the whole chain of circumstances, of which my summary ejection forms but the last link.

In

* 1. Ameer Ali is an attorney of low extraction, and the friend of Mr. Halliday.

2. He is connected with some of the worst characters in Patna.

3. He is the paid servant of many in the district.

4. He is the intimate friend and confidential adviser of Looft Ali.

5. Looft Ali is a man of notoriously bad character.

6. Two of Looft Ali's household servants were found to have been concerned in the murder of Dr. Lyell, and hanged in consequence.

7. Ameer Ali having received large sums from Looft Ali, was admitted to personal interviews with the Lieutenant Governor, in which he urged the release of Looft Ali and the dissatisfaction of the people.

8. It had been referred to the Lieutenant Governor whether Looft Ali, having been acquitted of the charges brought against him, should not again be proceeded against, because two of his servants had been hanged for outbreak and murder. Before this was disposed of the Lieutenant Governor sent up Looft Ali's great friend and purchased partisan as Assistant Commissioner.

In adopting this course, I may, perhaps, be deviating from established custom, and possibly infringe the technical restrictions of official observance; but as all the "weightier" matters of law, truth, justice, and courtesy, have been rudely dispensed with in my case, as I have been turned out of a high official post at the very zenith of a successful administration, as summarily and with as little ceremony as a beadle might eject a vagrant gamin from forbidden ground, I shall perhaps be pardoned the "anise and cummin," of small improprieties, in consideration of the important object which I contemplate, and the serious task which is before me.

I have been summarily dealt with by Mr. Halliday as if I were a malefactor, while all competent witnesses *hail me, with united voice, as the protector of Patna.*

As a reason for the special and accumulated insults that have been cast upon me, Mr. Halliday said it was not *safe* to leave the appointment in my hands, while *the whole province say that the safety of everything is due to me.*

Under such unexampled injuries, I cannot consent to restrain myself within the forms of conventional propriety. I had rather the truth should be known, and my character vindicated without delay, though I should be personally rebuked for informality or presumption, than, while paying obedience to the forms of etiquette, allow my actions to be misrepresented, and my name insulted.

My purpose now is to disclose the entire train of incidents that have occurred within the last six months; to show that Mr. Halliday's antagonism and disfavour, which have now led to this violent blow against me, are the result of previous circumstances, that his disfavour was originally incurred by me, not in consequence of any error or dereliction of duty, but of an honest and straightforward remonstrance which I made, both publicly and privately, against certain of his proceedings in another matter. That these proceedings, again, were the consequence of a contemptible cabal, got up by a small clique of men, headed by Mr. Halliday's brother-in-law, and that, consequently, I have good reason to believe that prejudice and hostility have been allowed to influence Mr. Halliday's feelings against me in no common degree.

I shall then show that, even in the time of our greatest peril and disaster, when I was diligently labouring for the public good, I was subjected to harsh and mortifying treatment; that the erroneous judgment and grave misculation of events and probabilities advanced by Mr. Halliday were so embarrassing, that I was occasionally placed in very serious dilemmas, and compelled to act on my own responsibility in opposition to his views; and finally, that the whole course of policy pursued by me at Patna, and which has now been universally acknowledged to have been eminently successful, was so clearly opposed to the policy pursued and advocated by the Lieutenant Governor, that I had no alternative but either to disregard his instructions and act as God and my conscience might direct, or sacrifice the lives in my keeping, and lose the province.

It will be clearly seen that there are no light issues between Mr. Halliday and myself involved in this statement; but, as I shall advance nothing which I cannot substantiate, and, as I feel I have truth, rectitude of purpose, and a legitimate object before me, I do not hesitate to record them, and am, of course, prepared to stand by the consequences.

I have been treated like a criminal, and turned, it may be said, into the streets, at the very time at which acknowledgment and reward might justly have been tendered me, and I am resolved that my rulers, my friends, and the world, shall at least have full means of judging how far I have deserved the disgrace.

The circumstances which first brought me into disfavour with Mr. Halliday occurred some five months ago, and will here be very briefly described. In another place they will be more fully narrated.

With the recorded approbation, and, under the favouring auspices of Mr. Halliday himself, I projected, last year, a novel scheme of national education, which has since received the admiration and approval of the most able men in India.

The scheme was one of industrial education of a practical kind, and the details of the plan will be found briefly set forth in the accompanying pamphlet.

I intend, if permitted, to publish hereafter, for general information, the history of the rise and fall of this institution under the petty attacks of a clique. Suffice it here to say that, while I was enthusiastically absorbed in organising the scheme, and obtaining for its maintenance the support and contributions of the wealthy, a small knot of gentlemen at Patna, led on by Mr. Halliday's brother-in-law, concocted an opposition to all my plans, not openly, but in secret, and behind my back.

Private misrepresentations, it appears, were made to Mr. Halliday and to others, charging me with exercising some sort of *compulsion* upon rajahs and zemindars to induce them to subscribe to the establishment, and Mr. Garrett,* whose duties rendered it necessary for him to make a tour of districts constituted himself the itinerant apostle of the clique, dogged my footsteps, and exhausted all the eloquence and all the energy he possessed in misrepresenting my motives and abusing myself.

These covert machinations went on for some time without the slightest suspicion on my part, the machinators keeping up all the time the semblance of friendship and good-will; but suddenly the storm burst; anonymous letters appeared in the papers; whisperings

* I regret the necessity of mentioning the name of a gentleman who has since died, but, as his letters are on record and will be quoted against me, it is unavoidable.

whisperings and rumours crept over the station; "good-natured friends" were not wanting to repeat the slanders under the plausible guise of professed friendship and, shortly afterwards, a letter arrived from Mr. Halliday, saying he had received accounts from several quarters that a sort of *forced taxation*, or compulsory tribute, was being levied by me, and that there was much "alarm and dissatisfaction" in the minds of the Natives.

Before my answer contemptuously repudiating this absurd charge could reach Mr. Halliday, he seems to have been moved by more missives, and to have been convinced by, I suppose, the earnestness of my slanderers. Then, in his anxiety as it seems, to save himself all contamination from the ill-savor of my wicked doings, he issued a notice for publication throughout the districts, in which he set forth his views in regard to subscriptions for public objects.

The cream of this notice was, that unless the subscriptions were *entirely spontaneous and disinterested, and given without reference to the wishes of Government, or any other interested motive*, they were not acceptable.

I objected to this procedure.

I objected to the views set forth in the proclamation, because, to use plain words, I did not consider them to be either ingenuous, consistent, or true.

I protested against it publicly; I protested against it, in the strongest and most unreserved terms, privately, as I considered it my duty to do.

I told Mr. Halliday that my friends had always warned me he would "throw me over" the moment it suited his purpose; that I perceived he was about to fulfil these predictions; that, in consideration of former kindness shown to me, I could not refrain from entreating him, before it was too late, for his own sake, to withdraw or modify the terms of this unfortunate notice, because it was entirely inconsistent with things done, said, approved, and applauded by him again and again.

Thus began the disagreement which laid me under the ban of Mr. Halliday's displeasure.

I could not conscientiously, and therefore I would not, yield the point; I could not feign to believe that the subscriptions had been *disinterested and spontaneous*, when I knew, as all others know, that such words are scarcely to be found in the Native vocabulary.

It would be tedious to detail the subsequent incidents. I will only here say, that I considered Mr. Halliday's proceedings so unfair and so inconsistent that I prepared a public and formal protest against them, to be laid before the Governor General in Council, which I annex to this statement.*

From that day Mr. Halliday has, I believe, regarded me with intense political, perhaps personal, dislike.

Some months ago he was desirous of removing me from the Patna to the Burdwan Commissionership, and had actually made arrangements for so doing. The object of this was, I believe, to save his brother-in-law, the leader of the cabal against me, from the consequences of a scandalous letter which that gentleman had written, in which he had served up, without stint or measure, all the calumnies, idle gossip, and malicious reports that he and his followers had succeeded in accumulating.

The manifest malice and the manifest falsehood of these wretched tales placed Mr. Garrett and Mr. Halliday in an embarrassing position, and, had not a higher hand than that of any earthly governor removed the former from the scene, I have little doubt that I should have been the scape-goat at all hazards.

As it was, the moment I heard of the premeditated transfer, I wrote to the Home Secretary of the Government of India, begging I might be removed *at once*, or else that the report might be authoritatively contradicted, as I was not disposed to enter upon the serious responsibilities of so grave a crisis with a weakened prestige, and the threat of removal hanging over me.

The answer was that the idea had been *abandoned*; that it would be mischievous to remove high officers at such a crisis, and *in my case especially so*. I remained, to bear the heat and burden of the day, to *save Patna*, and then to be *dismissed*.

Thus prevented, against his inclination, from doing me at that time the injury he meditated, for an *injury*, and a serious one, he knew it would be, Mr. Halliday's subsequent treatment of me has shown how ill this compulsory reprieve was tolerated by him, and how little, in fact, he had abandoned his purpose; and this brings me to the period of the late disturbances.†

This, then, was my position at the outset of the insurrection; the Lieutenant Governor exasperated against me, because I protested, and continued to protest, against what I held to be untrue; his brother-in-law, on the spot, heading a small but compact body of not over scrupulous opponents, who assailed me, by invitation of the Lieutenant Governor, with all manner of petty scandal, sarcasm, and abuse; the magistrate, my subordinate, encouraged to oppose my views and thwart my orders; a threatened *transfer*, only just warded off by the intervention of others; my own heart indignant at the unjust and ungenerous treatment I had received; Mr. Halliday, as I well knew, ready to take advantage of the slightest mistake.

Such

* This protest was written in June, but its transmission was delayed in consequence of the disturbances.

† A separate and full history of the "Industrial Institution," which I mean to compile, will give all who are curious on the subject a more intimate and exact understanding of the matter.

Such was the combination of circumstances under which I entered upon the great crisis in which we were involved, and against such various and disheartening difficulties had I to deal with the dangers around us.

Patna, as is notorious, has for many years been regarded as the principal seat of disloyalty and intrigue. Ten years ago a deep-laid plot was discovered in the city, which included many of the influential people. The town contains an immense Mahomedan population, many of them old and respectable families, many impoverished in consequence of the resumption of their lands.

When first the Mutiny broke out at Delhi and Meerut the most serious alarm was entertained for Patna.

The opium agent, Mr. Garrett, and the lamented Dr. Lyell, made strong and frequent representations to the Government and the general commanding the division on the subject.

Mr. Farquharson, the judge, at the first outbreak of the Mutiny in May, wrote to propose that we should be prepared to leave the place on the first real alarm, and put ourselves under the protection of the guns and English soldiers at Dinapore.

The general commanding the division would not give a single soldier for the protection of Patna; we had for some time no other troops, the local battalion were of little use, even if trusted, and were more likely to turn their rusty firelocks against us than use them in our favour if any real disturbance took place.

Every letter I received spoke of the danger apprehended at Patna; all believed that, if Patna went, the whole province would follow; anonymous letters and petitions came to me every day, speaking of plots, conspiracies, and traitors; no one knew whom to trust, or whom to fear; the great sect of the Wahabees, numbering some thousands between Patna and Dinapore, were observed to be unusually busy; private meetings were held at night at mosques and in private houses; *all* was uncertainty, suspicion, and fear. The inward consciousness of danger, not the less alarming because not distinctly understood, pervaded all hearts. A great city, a large Christian population, and a noble province, were in my hands to save or to lose.

In the face of all these difficulties, by God's blessing, my measures were crowned with complete success.

The city was disarmed, the dangerous and disaffected were rendered powerless, the people were compelled to keep in their houses after nine o'clock at night; conspiracies were detected and baffled, an attempt to raise the city failed, the chief criminals were hanged or imprisoned, the villains of the town fled in terror, and peace and security, such as had never been known before, were established throughout the neighbourhood, so that during the two months of June and July scarcely a case occurred within the precincts of the town, and when the day of the Mutiny arrived, *which it was intended should be the signal of a concerted outbreak, the entire city of Patna was unmoved, except by fear.*

Such, summarily touched upon, was the RESULT of my administration. I now propose to show what were Mr. Halliday's views in this important crisis; what counsel and aid I received from his wisdom and experience, and what was his treatment of me individually.

It is impossible to deny, and useless to conceal, that, in vindicating my own character, I have matters of grave and momentous import to lay to Mr. Halliday's charge, and it may become a question of serious inquiry if I, a subordinate officer, have been thrust out of my appointment, disgraced before the world, and kept for months without any salary, for *(at the worst) one single error of judgment*; what fate would, by parity of justice, await Mr. Halliday, if, at least, his exalted office does not relieve him from all responsibility.

The matters I allude to are these:—

I affirm that in several instances, of more or less importance, recommendations made by me were either disregarded or disapproved, with no good or sufficient reason, to the manifest detriment of the public service, and the imminent danger of the whole province; that the dangers which existed, and which subsequent events *proved to be real*, were *slighted or ignored by Mr. Halliday, in opposition to reason, fact, and evidence*; and, lastly, that he has, at the time of my removal, lent himself to arrangements which have roused a spirit of indignation among the English, and dissatisfaction among the respectable Natives, which have been generally condemned by the civil and military services, and which are calculated at this crisis to bring discredit, if not contempt, upon the English name.

These are not light assertions, but I believe them true, and I proceed to illustrate them.

When the intelligence of the mutinies in the north-west was received, one of the first measures I proposed was to raise a local force *for future purposes*, foreseeing, as I immediately did, that in consequence of the paucity of regular troops, there would be a crying necessity for some trustworthy irregulars in the different districts.

I proposed to apply to all the respectable landholders to provide a quota of men, to be approved by me, and to be entertained on the *guarantee of the zemindars* who supplied them.

I might have raised a valuable and efficient force by these means, which would have done good service, and prevented, in a great measure, the disorganisation of districts.

But Mr. Halliday objected to my *asking* the zemindars for any assistance, stating that, with reference to a late correspondence (regarding the institution), such "*asking*" might

might be misunderstood; he added, that I might *receive* aid and thank the zemindars for it, *if given*, but that I *must not ask!*

The meaning of this evidently was, that, having declared in the Proclamation regarding the Industrial Institution, which I have referred to above, that no assistance on the part of Native landowners, unless *spontaneous and disinterested*, was acceptable, Mr. Halliday did not like to involve himself in the inconsistency of *asking* for such assistance immediately afterwards.

Now this distinction appeared to me so palpably a distinction without a difference; it would have been so complete a piece of hypocrisy in me to tell a zemindar that I could not *ask* him for aid, but I would *thank* him if he *gave* it; that I could not lend myself to what appeared a mere subterfuge and a sham, and the plan was abandoned.

The value of a body such as I contemplated raising, and could, by the mode proposed, have raised, would, at this time, have been incalculable.

As an auxiliary force they might have been employed in any district, they might have prevented the necessity of abandoning at least some of the stations, they might have prevented the defeat of the Seikhs by the 5th Cavalry at Gya, and performed numberless other services, and, by the cold weather, could have been available for whatever duties were required.

This appears to me to be an instance in which the public good was sacrificed apparently for the sole purpose for keeping up the illusion of *disinterested generosity* set forth in Mr. Halliday's unfortunate Proclamation. Had Mr. Halliday disapproved of the measure *in itself*, it would not be for me to raise this objection; but no other reason for its rejection was given but the reluctance to *ask*, while permission was given to do what would have been *the same thing as asking* under another name and semblance.

The next instance I shall mention of disregard to my recommendations, followed by serious consequences, is with respect to the 5th Cavalry.

I wrote demi-officially to the Lieutenant Governor, telling him I *knew* that the 5th Cavalry were in a state of mutiny, prepared to rise when opportunity suited them, begged that they might be disarmed without delay, and offered, if intimation were sent to me, to have the detachments at Chuprah and Dinapore knocked off their horses at the same time.

The answer was that some other officers *trusted* them, and Government "could not afford to lose anything in the shape of cavalry, until their *absence* was *proved* to be preferable to their *presence*," *as if such proof is ever given till the remedy is too late.*

Shortly afterwards the 5th Cavalry rose, attacked Gya, defeated the Seikhs under Captain Rattray, dashed into the town, liberated the prisoners, subsequently ravaged the district, and went off in triumph to join Kooer Singh.

Common judgment and decision, especially after the information I gave, might have obviated all these disastrous consequences.

The next is a still more serious instance of wrong judgment, amounting, as it appears to me, almost to infatuation; a judgment, indeed, so *mischievously wrong*, that had I not *entirely set it aside, and acted in direct opposition to the view which Mr. Halliday entertained, Patna, if not the whole province, would have been ruined.*

When the intelligence of the distant mutinies was first received, I myself for a short time *hoped* it might prove to be a merely partial and military revolt, and that the contagion might not spread to the people or citizens of Patna; and I expressed at the outset this hope to the Lieutenant Governor.

But circumstances very shortly afterwards occurred, which induced me to alter my opinion.

On the 7th of June, a rise of the three Native regiments at Dinapore was planned, and intimation was sent to me, by the military authorities, that a disturbance was expected.

All the Christians assembled at my house, and preparations were made for defence.

While we were thus congregated, two letters from the regiments were intercepted, addressed to the men of the Police Local Battalion, telling them that all had agreed that they were coming down towards Patna, and begging the Nujeebs to take the treasure and meet them.

The design having been discovered at Dinapore, and great efforts having been made by the officers, the mutiny was staved off, apparently by a hair's breadth, and Rattray's Seikhs, to whom I had sent several expresses, marched into Patna at about four in the morning.

From this time my eyes were opened, the fact of a communication having been carried on between the regiments and the Nujeeb Guard was palpable. I soon found that constant intercourse was kept up between the two stations, Patna and Dinapore, and I plainly perceived, after some secret observation and inquiry, that serious mischief was brewing under an unruffled surface.

Then it was that, after carefully pondering the several sources of danger, after weighing and comparing the information brought to me from various sources, I resolved to adopt a series of coercive measures, which would anticipate and nullify any movement that might be contemplated, and draw the teeth of the disloyal before they had opportunity to bite.

The danger appeared so me to threaten us from three separate quarters:—

First. From the numerous and united sect of the Wahabee fanatics.

Secondly. From the immigrants, visitors, and settlers from Lucknow.

Thirdly. From the budmashes, or scoundrels of the city, who are ready to take advantage of disturbance, and who, if united with the prisoners, would form a large and formidable body.

Against these three parties my blows were aimed, and all were struck effectually; all my measures were quietly and successfully executed, and have been productive of precisely the result contemplated.

All was done on my own sole responsibility, without the *permission or knowledge* of Mr. Halliday, and the reason why this was so, brings me to the point of my present charge.

It will perhaps scarcely be believed that in spite of all that had occurred at other stations, with the tragedies at Meerut and Delhi fresh on his mind, notwithstanding that every man, woman, and child in Behar knew that a mutiny had been planned on the 7th of June, and only accidentally averted, Mr. Halliday, in the full light of these established facts, writing demi-officially, though dictatorially to me, some days after the night of the 7th, said,—

"I cannot satisfy myself that Patna is in any danger. It is inconceivable that the Native regiments at Dinapore should mutiny in the face of the European troops."

Mr. Halliday had before this rebuked me for saying "Please God we shall weather the storm," on the ground that there was "no storm at Patna," and on this occasion, when uttering this extraordinary opinion, he added "there can be no disturbance at Patna, unless the regiments do mutiny."

It is not with the utter inaccuracy of this judgment, and the extraordinary want of knowledge and foresight which it displayed, that I here wish to deal, but with the effect that this tone and handling of the crisis and its probabilities, necessarily had on my measures.

On the one hand I, in common with the whole province, was *convinced* that the regiments were bent on mutiny, and only waited their opportunity.

Mr. Halliday held it to be *inconceivable* they should.

At Patna, the treasure, amounting to 20 lakhs, the opium, estimated at some crores of rupees, the entire Christian population, with all that was dear to them, my own wife and children, the safety of all, was in my hands, and all depended, under God, on my measures.

Had I adopted Mr. Halliday's view, making nought of the danger and slighting past experience, I should have folded my hands, satisfied with the report from the magistrate and the police, and that "all was well." The plots of Ali Kureem, Peer Ali Khan, and other conspirators, would have been matured; the co-operation of the disaffected town-folk and the Nujeebs would have been obtained; the people would have kept their arms, and enjoyed unrestricted liberty at night; time would have been allowed for the sepoys and the citizens to adjust their difference of opinion as to *the particular day of the week on which we were all to be murdered,** and when the day of mutiny came, Cawnpore, Jhansi, and Shahjehanpore might have been out-rivalled by the tragedy of Patna.

I am thankful that I dared to act on my own conviction of what was right, and the universal testimony borne by all the residents of the province, that the safety of Patna was secured by the measures taken by me, in opposition to Mr. Halliday's views, is an ample reward for all I have endured, and a full compensation as far as my feelings are concerned, for Mr. Halliday's displeasure.

How far this strange disregard of reason and experience affected the councils of the Empire, and prevented the Governor General from issuing decided instructions for disarming the Dinapore regiments, I cannot divine. But when the fearful results of that triumphant mutiny are considered, the ravages, the loss of life, the disorganisation of the country, the slaughter of brave troops, the death of our countrymen; when these things are pondered, *then* the question will be duly seen, and the grounds and consequences of Mr. Halliday's dictum be duly appreciated.

The next incident I will mention is in respect to Kooer Singh, and this again is no unimportant or trivial matter.

It may may not, perhaps, be generally known, that about two years prior to these occurrences, Government, at the recommendation of the Commissioner of Patna, Mr. Dampier, and of the Sudder Board, had taken over charge of Kooer Singh's estates, with a view to the adjustment of his affairs, Kooer Singh himself engaging to obtain an advance of money for the purpose of paying his debts, which were to be liquidated from the proceeds of the estates, through the collector.

The loan (13 lakhs) had not been finally negotiated, but sums had been intermediately raised from other parties, several very advantageous compromises had been made, and the capitalists who offered the large loan, had distinctly promised to remit it.

Suddenly, about a month before the Dinapore mutiny, the Sudder Board of Revenue sent, through me, as Commissioner, a peremptory message to Kooer Singh, that, unless he obtained the entire loan within a month (which was impossible), they would recommend the Government to withdraw all interference with his affairs, and abandon the management of his estates.

Anything

* This is a fact, confessed to me by several of the conspirators. The town-folk wished to *show clear us out* on a Friday, the sepoys on a Sunday.

Anything more ill-advised or ill-timed can scarcely be conceived. The effect of such a measure would have been to throw him, bound hand and foot, into the power of his creditors, and make him altogether desperate, and this just at the moment when, as all knew, he was being anxiously *sought for* as a leader by the Dinapore sepoys.

The message was necessarily communicated; but I lost no time in writing to the Lieutenant Governor, pointing out the imprudence of such a step at this critical time, and begging him to authorise me to assure the old Baboo from himself that he should *not* be thus thrown over.

In reply to this, after some time, a doubtful answer, of the stereotype character, came to say that inquiries would be made from the Board, &c., and the Lieutenant Governor would see what could be done, or words to that effect.

This is, in a matter of the utmost urgency, and at a most critical time, notwithstanding that I, as Commissioner of the Division, had pointed out the danger, the same routine course of dilatory procedure was to be pursued, as when there was neither danger nor crisis at all!

Ten days after, Kooer Singh was at the head of 10,000 rebels!

The next case is that which concerns the magistrate of Patna. This gentleman had been carried away by the anti-institution cabal, and, under the influence of ill advice from certain members of it, had persisted in placing himself in wilful opposition to me, his immediate superior, for some months before, in spite of every attempt that I could make to conciliate him by kindness, forbearance, and friendly overture. Even in ordinary times, a want of unanimity between a commissioner and magistrate is mischievous, and Mr. ——— has not much to thank the friends for who encouraged him in such a course. But when we entered on the late perilous crisis, and want of unanimity became *positively dangerous*; when I saw that, in spite of all my efforts, the magistrate persisted in a vexatious and unreasonable opposition, I then found it necessary, for the great interests at stake, to recommend his transfer to an appointment of equal emoluments at another and neighbouring station.

Mr. Halliday *refused to comply*, because, as he said, I had shown a *bias* against Mr. ———.

Thus charged, it became my imperative duty to refute the unfair imputation, and to show that Mr. ——— was not equal to the important post he held, which I had already stated some months before in my Annual Police Report.

A few days after Mr. Halliday had *declined to transfer* him at my earnest recommendation, made solely for the public good, he was *compelled*, by other circumstances, to *remove him altogether*!

It appears to me that the public have just cause to complain that their safety and interests were not consulted in the first instance, when, on the responsibility of my office, I represented the danger to all of a want of union, which weakened my authority, encouraged the intriguing and disaffected, and imperilled the city.

Such, then, are the serious oversights; such the mistaken judgment and the dangerous errors which have emanated from Mr. Halliday.

If I had been allowed frankly to ask for aid from the great landholders at the outset, there might now have been an efficient armed body, foot and horse, ready to co-operate with the English or Seikh detachments, and *perfectly reliable*, because guaranteed by those who have everything to lose.

If the 5th Cavalry had been disarmed, as I entreated they might be, the defeat of the Seikhs, the second liberation of the Gya prisoners, the plunder of property, the disorganisation of the district, all might have been spared.

Had Mr. Halliday not blindly disregarded the lesson of established facts, more decided and vigorous measures would doubtless have been adopted in regard to the Dinapore regiments, and the dark array of disasters which has followed their "inconceivable" mutiny, the destruction of Arrah, the defeat and slaughter of English troops and officers, the devastation of the country, might have been avoided.

Had my entreaty regarding Kooer Singh been promptly acted upon, I cannot absolutely say that he would never have joined the rebels; but the Government would, at all events, have been spared the remorse of thinking that they had themselves *added* at least *one inducement to his revolt*.

If these things are true, and they defy contradiction, may I now fairly ask, whether Mr. Halliday, who has so often and so seriously erred, and the consequence of whose errors has been so disastrous, whether he is the person to visit my single *alleged* want of judgment with such a merciless and severe penalty as dismissal and disgrace?

If that dismissal be viewed in the light of the present revelation; if the antecedent feeling of Mr. Halliday be observed, and the tale of the institution carefully considered; if the purpose of removing me three months before, because of these unfortunate occurrences, be borne in mind; if the serious errors committed by Mr. Halliday himself, and exposed by me, be duly weighed, and it be seen that the vigorous and determined measures adopted, and the signal success achieved by me, were adopted and achieved on my own responsibility, *and in opposition to Mr. Halliday's views*; when all these things are considered, I am much mistaken if the sentence which so took the whole of India by surprise, and is at the present day an enigma to the uninitiated, and a puzzle to the world, be not clearly understood.

I will now make some observations on what has occurred *since* my removal from office.

The appointment of Ameer Ali has met with such marked, such universal condemnation

from all classes; the policy which dictated it has caused such profound dissatisfaction that it will, doubtless, receive in itself a sufficient share of discussion and inquiry.

The subject quite deserves a separate history, and will probably obtain it from the pens of others, if not of myself. But I cannot refrain from here pointing out, what is not generally known, viz., that this Ameer Ali is the intimate friend and confidential adviser of one Looft Ali, a wealthy banker at Patna, a man of notoriously *bad character*, who was arrested and tried on a charge of harbouring a mutineer, and *two of whose household servants* were proved to have been actively concerned in the brutal murder of Dr. Lyell, and were hanged by me in consequence.

Further, that a reference was before the Lieutenant Governor as to whether criminal proceedings should not be taken against Looft Ali on the latter grounds, *at the very time his great friend Ameer Ali was sent as Assistant Commissioner to Patna.*

Thus, whatever were the object of the appointment, Ameer Ali is looked upon as the partisan of his friend Looft Ali, who is known to have sent large sums to Calcutta during his imprisonment.

Since his arrival at Patna, Looft Ali has become a leading character, and is described as exercising no little influence. He has been admitted to the house of the Commissioner; he has, in conjunction with other questionable characters, presented a petition of congratulation and loyalty, and received acknowledgment and thanks from the Lieutenant Governor, and is said openly to boast that he has procured my dismissal.

These are matters that must be sifted, and doubtless will, when the time comes.

I have written this narrative, for the satisfaction especially of my friends; of those who have so warmly testified to my services, and sympathised in my feelings, and for such other of my acquaintances and the public as are interested in the matter of my removal.

But I have another motive, quite irrespective of all personal considerations, for giving record and circulation to these remarks. It is that I feel convinced, and the conviction is, I apprehend, very generally shared by all who have carefully marked the course of late event—I feel convinced that the ground of my removal, though to a certain extent connected with other matters, and undoubtedly according with the foregone conclusion of Mr. Halliday's mind, the *real ground* is the obvious, if not the avowed, antagonism between my policy and the policy of the Government, in dealing with the events of the present crisis.

It is on this account, as well as for the vindication of my own name, because I feel that the actual question involved in this struggle between the Lieutenant Governor and myself is a question fraught with consequences of deep import to the future destiny of India, that I venture to place myself in an attitude of opposition to the Government less formal and ceremonious than in ordinary times I should consider becoming or well-judged.

Were the matter of discussion between Mr. Halliday and myself a matter of common routine, of minor importance, or passing interest, I would cheerfully yield my views and opinions to the voice of authority and the principles of subordination; but, feeling as I do, that the safety of India, and the honour of England, are alike bound up in the dispute which in fact lies at the root of the present controversy, I conceive it to be my duty as an Englishman and a Christian to waive the conventional rules of official decorum, if thereby I can force this great question, without delay, before the highest authority here and in England.

Whatever victories which may be achieved in the field by the strength of our bayonets, the strategy of our leaders, or the indomitable valour of our brave soldiers, there is a greater victory and more permanent triumph to be looked for, without which the gain of a battle, or the defeat of a foe, however brilliant or decisive, will be of little use—a triumph with which the whole future of this great country, the true interests both of India and England, are indissolubly united.

For the achievement of that victory, it is, above all things, necessary that we should, *first*, see the truth, and then manfully meet and grapple with it; that all our measures should be conducted on principles *ruled* and directed by *that truth*, and that, in the light of it, as of a sure guide, we should deal with the nation under our rule resolutely and righteously, as in the fear of God, trusting to *Him* for the issue.

What this truth is, I may, I think, venture to say, is patent to all thinking men who have eyes to see and ears to hear, and may thus be briefly stated:—

Firstly,—That the present outbreak is no *military revolt alone*, no *soldier mutiny*, no *mere rising of an army*. It is the issue of a long-meditated and deeply-laid scheme, the deliberate purpose of which was the *extermination of the whole Christian race*, the *overthrow of the British Government*, and the *re-establishment of Moslem rule*.

Secondly,—That the *army*, bought over by bribes and promises, and moved by the fears and fanaticism of the sepoys on religious points, has been the *instrument used* for the accomplishment of this large purpose of treachery and extermination. All the reasons so frequently assigned for its revolt—the paucity of officers, relaxation of discipline, and such like matters—are merely secondary causes, which, though important in themselves, as rendering the *seduction* of the regiments more *easy*, have yet *nothing* to do with the origin or purpose of the insurrection.

Thirdly,—That the Mahomedans are those who, as a body, have *originated* the scheme, have brought it to maturity, and have secretly, and with marvellous cunning and consummate adroitness, pulled the strings and set the puppets in motion.

These

These I conceive to be the *main facts* of this great truth—facts which, if I mistake not, are daily becoming more patent, at least, to the observing few.

The lessons to be derived from them as to our own dealings appear to me to be (stated briefly and in outline) these,—

That the English should everywhere assert and maintain with stern, though discriminating, rigour, that superiority which God has given them.

That with a people which has shown that, while feeding on our bounty and fawning on our persons, they can deliberately plan and mercilessly carry on schemes of unparalleled atrocity, we should hold no paltry hesitating parley, no cowardly half-hearted compromise.

A blood-thirsty and traitorous race, after a century of unwilling subjugation, impelled by personal hatred, national antagonism, the impulses of fanaticism, and the direct precepts of their religion, has now thrown down the gauntlet to us, Englishmen and Christians; they have murdered our children and dishonoured our women; they would have swept us from the face of the earth.

Let us, Christians and Englishmen, take the gauntlet up and repay these foul deeds; not with unmanly bestial acts like theirs—not with the murder of the feeble, the aged, or the stripling—not with *savage or indiscriminating vengeance*, which our religion forbids, but with hard and honest blows now, unflinching, though righteous, dominancy for all future time.

Let us recognise and accept the great lesson which has now been taught us amidst tears and blood, and deal with it as *wise and fearless men*, instead of shutting our eyes to the truth, and satisfying ourselves with a semblance of security, in which to slumber on until we are again awakened by another, perhaps a more successful revolution.

This is the victory which will be the permanent safeguard of an Empire which God has ordered for great purposes of righteousness.

Where individual loyalty has been shown, and individual service unquestionably rendered, let us frankly accept it, and honour it as it deserves, but let it be *as an exception clearly proved*.

With the nation at large our rule and our dominion must be the rule and the dominion of a superior race, the dominion of conquerors over a conquered but rebellious people, the dominion of a nation, sustained by the favour of the Almighty, over a nation yet lying in the darkness of Satan's sovereignty.

It was in this spirit, and with this assurance on my mind, that in the face of the dangers around us, and in opposition to the advice and exhortation of others, when we had no soldiers for our protection, and when reports of plots and conspiracies were rife around us, I refused to leave my house, or send away my wife and children from Patna.

It was in this assurance that, when the fact of conspiracies being devised against us became more clearly known, I took initiative measures against those whom I believed to be disaffected, or who had influence for harm, thus bringing the great city of Patna to my feet, and dealing with them as I willed, *with what success let the whole province testify*.

It is in direct and unmistakeable opposition to this course of policy that, since my removal, all has been, under the special superintendence of the Government, reversed.

A Mahomedan attorney, a man himself of low extraction, and only known as an astute pleader in Calcutta, and the friend of Mr. Halliday, connected, though not by blood, to some of the worst characters in Patna, the paid servant of many in the district, the close ally and confidential adviser of the well known Looft Ali Khan, whose position and character I have referred to above, this Mahomedan attorney, Ameer Ali by name, has been sent up with the new Commissioner as his special assistant, counsellor, and coadjutor, need I say to the astonishment and indignation of all India!

Everything that I had done was, as far as possible, undone; the suspected Mahomedans were invited to the house of my successor; the gallows was removed out of sight as offensive to their feelings; Looft Ali Khan was received at the house of the Judge who had acquitted him, and addressed with gracious words, and has since been allowed to present petitions of so-called loyalty to the Government!*

My order for keeping the townspeople within their houses after 9 o'clock was rescinded, and most of the prisoners under surveillance were released; timidity, under the guise of benevolence, gave assurance to traitors; disgust and pain to all true-hearted Englishmen.

Happily for us all, even the Mahomedan Commissioner could not restore to life the securities I had hanged, or bring back those I had transported; more fortunately still, English soldiers, guns, and fortifications (which we never had before, even in our greatest danger) neutralised the immediate effects of these pitiful and unmanly proceedings.

But the mischief of this timid course, this patchwork pacification, which Natives will ever ascribe to weakness and to fear, will not easily be remedied.

The appointment of Ameer Ali, and the removal of myself, are but the symbols of a system. The ostensible ground of my removal is seen, if not admitted, to be but a pretext, and the feeling is almost universal that it was *not* because I prudently withdrew a small detachment, and a handful of officials with the public treasure from the irresistible attack of an overwhelming force, which was only averted by a victory that was as wonderful as unexpected, but because I dared to carry matters with a high hand against the traitors,

who

* *N.B.*—Since then it is confidently stated that Looft Ali has been honoured by a written invitation from the Commissioner to a picnic party on board the steam ferry boat at Patna! given by Mr. Farquharson, who tried him for harbouring a mutineer, and refused to postpone the trial for two days on my official requisition, to admit of further evidence being adduced.

who would have murdered us if they could; because I boldly asserted and fearlessly maintained the authority of the English, and enforced the respect and submission due to the English name, because, when I found the Lieutenant Governor ignored all danger at Patna, held the mutiny of the regiments at Dinapore to be "inconceivable," blinded himself to facts, and warned me against nothing but informality and vigour, because, when I found this, I acted on my own responsibility, and determined on saving the lives of my fellow Christians, even though my acts might be irregular, and my measures beyond the law, the feeling, I say, and the conviction is universal, that this is the cause of my summary dismissal, and the indignity which Mr. Halliday has endeavoured to heap upon me.

On this issue I willingly take my stand; whatever be the official decision of our rulers in the case, whether justice be denied or vouchsafed, and whether I am doomed to further incivility, insult, and oppression for the service I have rendered and the truths I have told, to the unanimous voice of all classes in the Province of Behar, so cordially recorded in my favour, and only rendered more remarkable by the exceptional dissent of two or three men of commonplace calibre (known to have been previously opposed to me, and jealous of my success), to the general feeling of all impartial Englishmen in India, to the verdict of the great English public, and to the matured experience and sagacity of all Indian statesmen worthy of the name, I confidently submit the arbitration of this great question.

At all events, I have striven only for the truth, in whose omnipotence I place implicit faith, sincerely believing that, by the honest exposure of all that is tortuous or untrue, and the fearless exposition of all that is real, manly, and straightforward, I am (whether I benefit or prejudice myself), undoubtedly serving the best interests of the Government and my country at this eventful crisis.

(signed) *W. Tayler.*

APPENDIX F.

LETTER from the Commissioner of the Patna Division to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated Patna, 29th January 1858.

Sir,

A FEW days ago I learnt that Mr. W. Tayler had published a pamphlet, which he was circulating amongst his friends, and which contained severe reflections on my administration of the affairs of this province. I immediately wrote to Mr. Tayler, and requested he would send me a copy, informing him at the same time that I should hold myself at liberty to deal with it after perusal as I should think fit. I received from him in reply the accompanying pamphlet, which I submit for the consideration and orders of the Lieutenant Governor, and ultimately, should the Lieutenant Governor see fit, of the Governor General in Council.

2: In this pamphlet Mr. Tayler appeals from the sober judgment of the Government to the passions of the public, and, while expressing ostentatiously his reliance on the omnipotence of truth and his detestation of all that is tortuous and untrue, strings together a series of libels, every one of which, to a greater or less extent, is based upon fiction or misrepresentation.

3. Mr. Tayler, after having given much dissatisfaction to the Government and the Board of Revenue by his general management of the duties of his office, was removed from this Commissionership because, at a most critical period in the history of the Province, when the native population were in a ferment in consequence of the successful mutiny of the sepoys at Dinapore, when one district was already lost to us, and the utmost firmness was necessary to secure the remainder, he adopted the extraordinary resolution of abandoning the districts of Gya, Tirhoot, and Chumparun, and proceeded to do this in the most precipitate manner, without furnishing the district officers with one word of instruction for their guidance, or making any arrangements for the safety of life and property in the deserted districts. His excuse that one of these districts was in danger of an attack from an overwhelming force, and that the lives of the officers there stationed might have been sacrificed, would have justified the abandonment, in turn, of every district between this and Calcutta, and was accordingly disallowed by Government.* It is only necessary to glance at the position of this province on the map to be aware that the abandonment of those districts was an error of judgment which, but for the providential victory of Major Eyre, would undoubtedly have been attended with the most disastrous results. All this, however, Mr. Tayler finds it convenient to touch upon in his pamphlet as lightly as possible. He affects to consider the real cause of his removal, a false pretext on the part of the Government, and after a fashion much in vogue with the native

* Had Kooer Singh really come across the Soane, as Mr. Tayler says he supposed he would, Mr. Tayler's order, instead of saving the lives of the Gya civilians, would have been their death-warrant, as the road from Gya to Patna runs parallel, or nearly so, to the Soane, and the march, even without treasure, occupied five days.

native litigants, but now for the first time, as I think, resorted to by a civilian, attributes his suspension to enmity on the part of the Lieutenant Governor, which enmity, he alleges, was excited by a difference of opinion relative to the propriety of his proceedings in procuring large sums of money from the zemindars of his division for the establishment of an industrial school.

4. He then proceeds, in a style of self-laudation which has probably few parallels even in the annals of pamphleteering, to praise his own conduct and proceedings up to the time of his removal, and, in order to heighten the effect of the picture which he draws of himself, he daubs freely, with the blackest colours, his immediate superior, the Lieutenant Governor, and his two successors, Mr. Farquharson and myself, the former by name, the two latter by implication. Everything that Mr. Tayler did or proposed was most wise, prudent, and heroic, while the acts of everyone else were "infatuated," "pitiful," and "unmanly." The former resulted in a success acknowledged by all "competent witnesses," the latter ought to have been crowned with disaster, though, unfortunately for the completeness of Mr. Tayler's tableau, this consummation is as yet delayed.

5. Towards the close of the pamphlet Mr. Tayler, forgetting apparently that he has at the outset attributed his removal to Mr. Halliday's enmity, catches at the newspaper clamour against the appointment of Ameer Ali, and turning it adroitly to his own purposes, winds up by declaring that he was removed because "he dared to carry matters with a high hand against traitors," because "he boldly asserted the authority of the English, and enforced respect to the English name," and because he determined "on saving the lives of his fellow Christians on his own responsibility,"—from all which he manifestly intends it to be inferred that the Government were inclined to truckle to traitors, that they neither wished to assert their authority nor to enforce respect to Englishmen, and that they were indifferent to the lives of their Christian subjects.

6. What Mr. Tayler wishes it to be understood that his own policy was, or what policy it is, antagonistic to his own, which he charges upon the Government and myself, it is not easy, from the frothy phrases in which he indulges, to comprehend; so much I gather, however, that Mr. Tayler, with a view to secure the popular voice, proclaims his own policy to have been fearless and uncompromising, and that of the Government and myself to be one of conciliation and compromise.

7. With Mr. Tayler's policy I will deal hereafter. With regard to the policy that he attributes to me, if Mr. Tayler means it to be implied that I have entered into any compromise with or shown any tenderness for rebels or disaffected persons, I meet the calumny with a flat denial, and challenge him to the proof of it. If he simply means that I have declined to bully the peaceable subjects of the Government, or to make no distinction between those who have rebelled and those who have not, I fully admit the fact. I do not believe, with Mr. Tayler, that an Englishman shows "that superiority which God has given him" by trampling on innocent and unresisting men, nor do I recognise the wisdom of that policy of "rigour" which leads yet quiet subjects to consider whether they would not be better off in the hands of the rebels than in those of the British Government.

8. I would rather my right arm should wither from the shoulder, than I would spare one man who had been art or part in any of the atrocities which have been recently perpetrated on our unfortunate friends and relatives in this land, but on the other hand, I should regard myself as on a level with the miscreant sepoys themselves if I sent innocent men to the gallows, or punished any one of whose guilt I was not fully assured. A strict and watchful rule, no doubt, is and always will be necessary in this country, but Mr. Tayler does not appear to understand that watchfulness and strictness are not incompatible with an absence of fuss and parade, and that nothing would so effectually weaken our hold on the country as needless violence and a system of petty annoyance which presses indiscriminately on all classes, and generates a wide-spread hatred of the Government which resorts to it.

9. Mr. Tayler says that Ameer Ali's appointment and the removal of himself are but the symbols of a system. I deny this most emphatically. I have already narrated at some length, in a letter which the Lieutenant Governor has made public, the circumstances of Ameer Ali's appointment, and I need not go over them again. It is necessary, however, with reference to Mr. Tayler's present insinuations, that I should state a few additional facts, for the correctness of which the Lieutenant Governor himself, and other members of the Government I am addressing, can vouch.

10. When Mr. Tayler's removal was determined on, I was sent for by the Lieutenant Governor, and informed that he wished me to occupy the vacant post, and that I must be prepared to start with Sir James Outram and Mr. Grant in two days' time. The appointment, it may be necessary to mention, was inferior in rank to the one I held, and would have been inferior in point of emolument also, but that the Governor General was pleased, without any solicitation on my part, to allow me to retain the allowances which I drew as an officiating judge of the Sudder Court. It was the exchange of a post of ease and dignity for one of arduous toil, great anxiety, and, as all in Calcutta then believed, of no inconsiderable danger. Family reasons made it inconvenient for me to

leave Calcutta. With Mr. Tayler himself I had always been on friendly terms, and sympathised with his misfortunes, believing him at the time to have acted, in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, with energy and vigour. I had no motive, therefore, for desiring this appointment; but the moment was critical, and it was sufficient for me that the Government thought my services could be of use. I accepted the appointment, therefore, without hesitation; but had it been offered to me on the terms on which Mr. Tayler would imply that it was, had I been asked to become the agent of any system of compromise with traitors, or of weak half-hearted measures, I would have peremptorily declined it.

11. No such terms, however, were likely to be proposed to me, for it was well known to all my friends, and most probably to the Lieutenant Governor himself, that while setting my face against the senseless cry of indiscriminate proscription, which recognised no difference between the Bengalee baboo and the up-country sepoy, I had throughout been an advocate for the most vigorous measures, and was opposed *in toto* to everything in the shape of compromise with the rebels, or conciliation towards them.

12. I can, moreover, honestly affirm that in the course of the two interviews which I had with the Lieutenant Governor previous to my departure, I did not hear one word from his lips which gave me the idea that he was the advocate of any such policy as that charged against him by Mr. Tayler, nor in the various letters which I have since received from him is there a syllable which would warrant such an imputation.

13. No course of policy whatever was laid down for me by the Lieutenant Governor. He was pleased to say that he had confidence in me, and he merely stipulated that he should be kept regularly informed of my proceedings. He informed me of the causes of complaint (independent of the crowning act of the abandonment of the out-stations) which the Government had against Mr. Tayler (not one of which, I may observe, Mr. Tayler has touched upon), and though he expressed his fear from what he heard that Mr. Tayler had punished many innocent men, yet nothing fell from him which could lead me to suppose that he disapproved of vigorous measures, either for the repression or prevention of disturbances, or the punishment of rebels.

14. As to the appointment of Ameer Ali, of so little importance was it considered at the time that, to the best of my recollection, it was not even alluded to either by Mr. Halliday or myself. That appointment, as the Lieutenant Governor and you, Sir, are well aware, had no reference to any policy, conciliatory or otherwise, whatsoever. The services of Ameer Ali were accepted, because from his intimate knowledge of the people of the province to which I was going, it was supposed he might be useful to me. His functions were simply those of the Meer Moonshee of a political agency, but as he very reasonably stipulated for an honourable title, that of Assistant Commissioner, the lowest grade in the ranks of the Covenanted Service was conferred on him by the Lieutenant Governor, with the addition, which every Deputy Collector and Principal Sudder Ameen is entitled to, of Khan Bahadoor. No powers whatever were entrusted to him. Had I not brought Ameer Ali up to Patna, I must have looked for the secretary's duties which he performed either to my serishtadar, who, like three-fourths of the officials in this province, is a Mahomedan, or to some one of the other Mahomedans who were honoured with Mr. Tayler's confidence.

15. Of the real character of Moonshee Ameer Ali, the certificates I annex, which are culled from numerous flattering testimonials granted to him by the different officers with whom he has come into official contact, will enable the Government to judge. It will be seen that throughout his career the strongest testimony has been borne by those who knew him best to his integrity, ability, and gentlemanly bearing. Suppose Ameer Ali, however, to have been all that his enemies have endeavoured (though with signal ill success) to make him out, what certainty was there, I would ask, that I should have got a better man at Patna? The probability obviously was, that I should not find a native officer at that place so free from local influences, or so much above pecuniary temptation.

16. Mr. Tayler, judging I must suppose from himself, chooses to insinuate that Moonshee Ameer Ali exercised some influence over me, and that to him are due various measures with which he finds fault, and which I shall presently notice. There is not the slightest ground for this insinuation. Had I been the veriest fool in the world, the clamour which was raised against the appointment, and which reached me before I set foot in Patna, would have rendered me very cautious how I acted upon the advice of Ameer Ali, but I may say without vanity that I never yet have been accused of being either a fool or a man who surrendered his judgment to native influences, and there was no measure of any importance adopted by me which was not adopted from considerations of its propriety, altogether independent of any advice tendered by Ameer Ali, nor is there one for which clear and satisfactory grounds cannot be assigned.

17. Had the nature of Ameer Ali's appointment and its emoluments been understood, the public would have taken no more interest in the appointment than they do in the nomination of any of the ordinary umlah of a Commissioner. That they were misled is in a great measure owing to Mr. Tayler himself, who, seeing in the popular feeling which was exhibited on this subject the means of making a little political capital, and drawing off attention from the real cause of his disgrace, has busied himself in keeping up the popular

popular delusion, and now reproduces and endorses all the fables regarding Ameer Ali which have hitherto been published in an anonymous form.

18. With these fables I now proceed to deal. They will be found at the bottom of the 21st page of the pamphlet.

First. Mr. Tayler, willing to enlist in his favour the vulgar prejudice against attorneys, sets out by terming Ameer Ali a Mahomedan attorney. This is a dishonest artifice which was first resorted to by the editor of the "Friend of India," from whom Mr. Tayler has not been ashamed to copy it. The distinction between a barrister or vakeel, and an attorney or mooktear, is just as sharply drawn in this country as it is in England, and Mr. Tayler was perfectly well aware, when he penned this statement, that Moonshee Ameer Ali was not an attorney. He is a vakeel or barrister of some 20 or 25 years' standing, who has worked his way by industry and ability to the topmost rank of his profession, and is now employed in most of the leading cases in the Sudder Court. It may be conceived what is the nature of Mr. Tayler's case when he does not scruple to resort to such a miserable perversion of fact in order to support it.

Second. Mr. Tayler says that Ameer Ali is a man of low extraction. If this were true, then Moonshee Ameer Ali would be entitled to all the greater credit for having raised himself by his own exertions to his present position, in an honourable profession, but it is a piece of pure slander. Moonshee Ameer Ali is a Sheikh by the father's side, and is related by intermarriages to various families of Syuds. His family have held lakheraj grants and zemindaree lands for many generations, and are connected with a very large number of most respectable people in this province. His father, as I mentioned in a former letter, was at one time Moonshee to Lord Lake; he was subsequently a first grade tulseeldar under Mr. Leycester at Bareilly. He was then placed in charge of Lakhawur, the forfeited Jagheer of the Nowab Erich Khan, and was afterwards made Tulseeldar of Gyaaspore, which appointment he held until old age compelled him to resign. Moonshee Ameer Ali is in truth a man of highly respectable family, and Mr. Tayler ought to be ashamed, for more reasons than one, of having attempted to cast upon him the reproach of low birth.

Third. He is alleged to be the friend of Mr. Halliday, in order to convey the insinuation that the latter was influenced by private motive in making the appointment. I believe I am correct in stating that Ameer Ali is no otherwise the friend of the Lieutenant Governor than that Mr. Halliday has long been acquainted with him, and receives his visits as he does those of all other respectable native gentlemen in Calcutta.

Fourth. In the copies of this pamphlet which Mr. Tayler has circulated to his friends, Ameer Ali is declared to be "connected *by blood* to some of the worst characters in "Patna." Aware that he could not support this calumny, Mr. Tayler inserts, in the margin of the copy he has sent to me, the words "though not" before the words "by blood," which renders the accusation safely vague and indefinite. Even in this form, however, the statement is just as destitute of truth as it was before; there is no foundation for it whatever.

Fifth. He is said to be "the paid servant of many in the district," which is also untrue, unless in the sense that a barrister is the paid servant of his client.

Sixth. The next calumny relates to Ameer Ali's connection with Lootf Ali Khan, and will be found fully stated at page 17 of the pamphlet. Moonshee Ameer Ali is said to be "the intimate friend and confidential adviser" of Lootf Ali Khan, who is described as "a man of notoriously bad character" (an expression which is put in *italics* to give it more force), "who was arrested and tried on a charge of harbouring a mutineer, and two of whose household servants were proved to have been actively concerned in the brutal murder of Dr. Lyell, and were hanged by me (Mr. Tayler) in consequence."

19. I have before had occasion in my letter, No. 1446, of the 1st November last, to expose fully the proceedings of Mr. Tayler in the case of Lootf Ali Khan. I trust that the Lieutenant Governor will publish this case, together with the notes addressed to the Judge by Mr. Tayler during the course of the trial, in order that people may be enabled to form their own judgment respecting it. I will here only briefly refer to a few facts in connection with it, to show how entirely without foundation Mr. Tayler's assertions with regard to Lootf Ali are.

20. Mr. Tayler's statement that Lootf Ali Khan was a man of notoriously bad character is wholly untrue, and I challenge him to produce one *fact* in support of it. Lootf Ali Khan has always been received by the different Commissioners and other civilians at the station on the same terms as other respectable members of the Native community, and I am informed by the oldest residents here, and those best acquainted with the native gentry of Patna, that they never heard a word against Lootf Ali Khan's character. On the occasion of his trial Mr. Tayler endeavoured by every means in his power to prove him a bad character, yet the only evidence (so called) which he could adduce was a gossiping letter from a gentleman in Tirhoot, who said he had always heard from the natives that if there was any conspiracy in Behar, Meer Abdoolah's family were likely

to be at the bottom of it,—an opinion which, if worth anything, would tell quite as much against Vilayat Ali Khan, Mr. Tayler's friend, as Looft Ali Khan.

21. In 1853 Looft Ali Khan was nominated a member of the Local Committee of Public Instruction, which the Lieutenant Governor is aware is a distinction conferred on no natives except influential gentlemen of good character. His nomination proves positively that he was considered in 1853 one of the most respectable men in the city of Patna, and as he remained on the Committee up the time of Mr. Tayler's departure, it is to be presumed that no valid ground for his removal was known to exist.

22. On Mr. Tayler's assumption of office as Commissioner, he was equally blind with everyone else to the bad qualities he has now discovered in Looft Ali Khan. The nephew of Looft Ali Khan, by name Vilayat Ali Khan, a man who affects a certain English bluntness of manner, and is altogether a very plausible person, was particularly singled out by Mr. Tayler as a friend, and was constantly to be seen in Mr. Tayler's house. The uncle and nephew had quarrelled, partly on account of some domestic arrangements of Vilayat Ali Khan which his uncle considered to be scandalous, and partly on account of their respective shares in the inheritance of Meer Abdoollah, the father of Looft Ali, and grandfather of Vilayat Ali Khan. Mr. Tayler voluntarily undertook the office of arbitrator between the two. Either then he, being the Commissioner of the Province, undertook the friendly office of arbitrator for a man whom he believed to be of notoriously bad character, or his statement that Looft Ali was a bad character falls to the ground. Mr. Tayler may choose which of the horns of the dilemma he pleases. The arbitration proceeded and was at length brought to a close by a decision which Looft Ali declared to be so partial and unfair that he refused to abide by it. Vilayat Ali endeavoured to enforce the arbitration decree at law, but both the Zillah and the Sudder courts declared it to be improper and invalid, and refused to recognise it.

23. From that period it was that Mr. Tayler discovered Looft Ali to be an objectionable person, and refused to see him. I defy Mr. Tayler to point out any other cause for his exclusion. Shortly afterwards the mutinies commenced. Vilayat Ali Khan took a house in the neighbourhood of Bankipore, in order that he might be constantly with Mr. Tayler, and Moula Buksh, the deputy magistrate of the city and close ally of Vilayat Ali, took up his abode in Mr. Tayler's compound, and was entrusted with the conduct of all political cases.

24. A few days after the outbreak in the city, in which Dr. Lyell was killed, Imamoo-deen, one of the murderers who had been cut down on the spot by the police, named one Ghuseeta, who he said was the servant of Peer Ali Khan, the principal conspirator, as his accomplice. The man was arrested. He had formerly been in the service of Looft Ali Khan, but had left, it was said, three months previously, on pretence of sickness. Another Ghuseeta was also arrested, who was the son of an ayah in the employ of Looft Ali's mother.* These two men were condemned by Mr. Tayler and hung. Owing to the mode in which the trials were conducted, which will be more particularly adverted to hereafter, it must be a matter of conjecture whether they were guilty or not.

25. Shortly afterwards Looft Ali himself was arrested and thrown into gaol, on a charge of harbouring a mutineer. Had Mr. Tayler tried him there is little doubt from what he has since written on the subject, that he would have convicted him also. Fortunately for Looft Ali, and for the interests of justice, the Commissioner had been previously prohibited from exercising judicial powers when there was a judge present in the station, and the trial was held before the sessions judge upon Mr. Tayler's commitment.

26. The first defect apparent in this commitment was that Mr. Tayler had forgotten to ascertain whether the man whom he had charged Looft Ali with harbouring was really a mutineer or not. Reference was made by the judge to the head-quarters of the man's regiment at Benares, and this little omission was rectified. The man being proved to be a mutineer, it then remained to show that Looft Ali had harboured him. On this point and Mr. Tayler's further proceedings in the case I cannot do better than quote what I said on this subject in my letter, No. 1446, of the 1st November last, when remarking on an attack which Mr. Tayler had made on Mr. Farquharson regarding this case. It will be seen that Mr. Tayler, having first forgot to prove the man who was said to have been harboured to be a mutineer, had next omitted to prove the harbouring.

27. "The evidence against him (Looft Ali) was that of a near relative of Vilayat Ali Khan, the notorious enemy of the prisoner, and several servants and dependants of this relative. Except the principal witness, not one deposed to the sepoy ever having been within Looft Ali's doors; their evidence was entirely hearsay, and the testimony of the principal witness to his having seen the sepoy twice at Looft Ali's was so vague and inconsistent that it was entirely disbelieved by the court. Of the specific offence of harbouring charged against the prisoner, which implies a knowledge of the fugitive's crime and an intent to screen him from the pursuit of justice, no proof was ever attempted. Previous to the

* Vilayat Ali's grandmother.

the trial, and during it, Mr. Tayler attempted to influence the judge against the prisoner, by notes, copies of which were forwarded to you by Mr. Farquarson in submitting his judgment. When he found that the judge was inclined to acquit the prisoner, he sent in a supplementary calendar with witnesses to prove,—

“*First.* That one Ghuseeta Khulleefa, who had been hanged on a charge of rebellion, was a servant of the prisoner.

“*Second.* That another Ghuseeta Khan, who had been similarly executed (both, as I think, on very doubtful evidence), was the son of a woman who was the ayah of the mother of Lootf Ali; and *third,* that Lootf Ali had given out that he had heard from the judge that armed sepoy were coming to attack Patna. The last charge, supported by three intimate friends of Vilayut Ali Khan's, was fully disproved; the second was denied by the prisoner, and was immaterial if true. With regard to the first, it was not denied that Ghuseeta had been the servant of Lootf Ali, but evidence was adduced to show that he had absented himself on the ground of sickness for some time before the disturbance in the city of Patna, for complicity in which he was hanged, broke out. The judge dismissed the case, recording his opinion that the incarceration and commitment of the prisoner was alike improper and unjustifiable.” I think I am amply borne out in saying that this is a case to which Mr. Tayler, if he has any proper feeling, should be ashamed to allude.

28. It will be seen that the statement in the pamphlet, that two of Lootf Ali's household servants were executed, is wholly incorrect. One of the men was never said to have been in Lootf Ali's service; the other, it was admitted, had at one time been his servant, but had left it some time before the outbreak. Yet Mr. Tayler did not hesitate, in a communication to the judge, to apply to Lootf Ali, in reference to his servant's crime, the legal maxim “*Qui facit per alium facit per se,*” from which we must infer, that if some *ci-devant* servant of Mr. Tayler's steals my spoons, Mr. Tayler would consider it quite right and proper that he himself should be convicted of theft and sent to jail.

29. Mr. Tayler having, notwithstanding Lootf Ali's acquittal, endeavoured again to fix on him the stigma of guilt, proceeds to accuse Ameer Ali of being his intimate friend and confidential adviser. As Lootf Ali is not a bad character, and there is no ground for imputing guilt to him, it is evident that it is a matter of indifference whether Ameer Ali is his friend or not, but the fact I understand to be, that the sole relation that subsists between Lootf Ali and Ameer Ali is that of pleader and client.

30. Next follows an accusation against the Lieutenant Governor of having appointed Ameer Ali, the friend of Lootf Ali, Assistant Commissioner, at the very time that a reference was before the Lieutenant Governor as to whether criminal proceedings should not be taken against Lootf Ali on account of his servants having been concerned in Dr. Lyell's murder. Mr. Tayler made this charge on a former occasion, and in my reply. No. 1446, of the 1st November last, I showed that it was entirely without foundation, the Supreme Government having pointed out to Mr. Tayler, several days before his suspension, or Ameer Ali's appointment, that the facts he stated did not justify any proceedings against Lootf Ali Khan.

31. An insinuation is next thrown out that Ameer Ali received large sums of money from Lootf Ali during the imprisonment of the latter. It is really painful to see a man in Mr. Tayler's position voluntarily making himself the vehicle of the lies and calumnies of a parcel of worthless intriguers. Mr. Farquarson pointed out in his letter, in answer to Mr. Tayler, which was forwarded with mine of the 1st November, that it was physically impossible Lootf Ali could have sent money to Calcutta at the time stated, as his arrest was sudden and unexpected, and his confinement by Mr. Tayler's order was so rigorous that he was unable during the whole time to communicate with any member of his family.

32. It may be said, however, that his family sent the money. If so, the records of the banking house will prove it, and as Vilayut Ali Khan, who has undoubtedly given birth to this calumny, is a member of the banking house, it is in his power to produce the proof. Lootf Ali Khan, I understand, affirms that not one single rupee was sent to Calcutta during his confinement, or at any other time, for purposes connected with his arrest, and he challenges Mr. Tayler and his friend, Vilayut Ali Khan, to prove their assertion.

33. Lootf Ali Khan, it is asserted, “has become a leading character, and is described as exercising no little influence. He has been admitted to the house of the commissioner. He has, in conjunction with other questionable characters, presented a petition of congratulation,” &c., &c. The facts are, that I have very rarely seen Lootf Ali Khan. His visits, which have not been nearly so frequent as those of Vilayut Ali Khan, have been mere visits of ceremony. He is a man of a quiet unobtrusive character, and neither pretends to nor exercises any influence over any one. He joined in one of the petitions of congratulation which were presented after the Mohurrum, and no one had more cause for doing so. These petitions were signed by most of the respectable people

in Patna, the Nawab Jaffer Hossein Khan, Koonwar Sookraj Bahadoor, grandson of Rajah Pearee Lal (whom some of Mr. Tayler's friends declared in their letters to the papers to be a Bunnea, whom the Government had addressed by mistake!), the Nawab Sohrab Jung, and some seventy others, all men of high respectability.

34. Ameer Ali, it is said, at page 22, was sent up as my "counsellor and coadjutor," which I need not say is a simple piece of impertinence on Mr. Tayler's part, and wholly untrue.

35. Let us see now what is the mischief which is said to have been done under the guidance of Ameer Ali. The first assertion under this head is veiled, as is usual with Mr. Tayler, in convenient obscurity. "Everything that I had done was as far as possible undone." It is necessary to see what the everything comprises, and it turns out that it comprises five things: 1st, the Mahomedans Mr. Tayler suspected were received by his successor; 2nd, the gallows was removed out of sight; 3rd, Looft Ali was received by the judge; 4th, Mr. Tayler's order for keeping people in their houses after 9 p.m. was rescinded; and 5th, most of the prisoners under surveillance were released.

36. Now in answer to this I have only to state, as I have stated more at length in my letter of the 1st November, that no person was received in my house against whom there was any valid ground of suspicion whatever, that no prisoner was released whom there was any good ground for subjecting to further restraint, that in respect to neither of these acts did Moonshee Ameer Ali exercise any influence whatever, and that the other acts complained of all took place prior to my arrival at Patna.

37. The gallows had been put up by Mr. Tayler, not where the Mahomedans congregated, as he fain would have the public believe, not where it could act as a terror or a warning to the native community, but some four miles from the city, in the English station of Bankipore, on the spot where the English ladies of Patna were in the habit of taking their evening drive.

38. A more indecent and purposeless act than that of putting up a gallows in such a place, I cannot conceive. Mr. Farquharson, on taking charge of the Commissioner's office, removed the gallows to its ordinary position near the jail, and every person of proper feeling will consider that he acted right in doing so.

39. The order for keeping the people in their houses after 9 o'clock had manifestly failed in its object, for the insurrection of Peer Ali Khan took place notwithstanding. It was one of those orders which young and inexperienced magistrates are apt to give at the instigation of their police, to whom it furnishes an ample harvest. It has a show of vigour, and looks well on paper; in reality it is worthless. Many years ago, when I first became a magistrate, it was usual not merely to prohibit people from going out at night, but to compel all suspected persons to sleep at the nearest police station. This was a much more promising plan than Mr. Tayler's, but it failed notoriously, first, owing to the corruption of the police, and, secondly, to the fact that the most dangerous villains, whether thieves or conspirators, are those who are least affected by such rules.

40. When Mr. Farquharson took charge, all the most respectable people in the city, and especially the trading community, begged that the order might be rescinded, pointing out that it was useless against the budmashes and the evil-disposed, who could always evade it, and that it was only annoying to them. Mr. Farquharson, being satisfied of the correctness of this representation, withdrew the order, and subsequently, when it was proposed to me to reimpose the restriction, I refused to do so.

41. Against a body of armed men entering the city for the purpose of creating an insurrection, it was manifestly useless, as nine-tenths of the police, it was well known, would fly the moment such an event occurred. It could not prevent disaffected individuals from gathering or consulting, for that they might do before 9 o'clock, or outside the city, and it was well known that it was only operative against those who could not pay, or who knew too little of the city and the waste grounds about it, to evade the chowkeedars.

42. This was the only order of Mr. Tayler's which, so far as I know, was reversed after his removal, and this reversal, as well as the orders for the release of such persons as were released, were given upon conviction of their justice and propriety. There was nothing in any of these orders which could be, or was, ascribed by the people either to weakness or fear, and when Mr. Tayler, in his anxiety to catch the popular ear, talks of these proceedings as being "pitiful and unmanly," of "a timid course" and "patchwork pacification," he simply talks nonsense.

43. Mr. Tayler insinuates, at page 22 of his pamphlet, that, but for the presence of English soldiers and guns, the policy pursued here since his removal would have produced disastrous results. I defy Mr. Tayler to name any one fact which supports what I may well call this "pitiful" insinuation. It is wholly without foundation. So also is the statement which, in order to contrast the effect of his own policy, he immediately introduces, that he had neither soldiers nor entrenchments here himself. So far from this being the case,

case, he had Captain Rattray's corps of Seikhs, had fortified his own house (out of the funds of the Industrial Institution), and with the exception of the senior civilians, who refused to go, had all the gentlemen of the station to keep guard at his house at night. The Seikhs were much more useful for the suppression of disturbances in the town than the Europeans, because they could be, and were, employed in clearing the streets; whereas it was distinctly intimated that when the European soldiers were sent here, that in the event of a disturbance they were not to be allowed to enter the streets of the town, but were to be kept outside.

44. With Mr. Tayler's declamatory assertions, his theory of the rebellion, which he states to be patent to "the observing few," though it seems to be taken at second-hand from the Calcutta papers, or the policy he would pursue, which again is a *réchauffé* of the articles on the dominancy of race in the "Friend of India," it is not necessary that I should deal. I will merely remark that if Mr. Tayler really did believe, while he was Commissioner of Patna, that this mutiny originated in a gigantic Mahomedan plot, he is bound to account to the Government for having patronised Mahomedans, and confided in them, to the extent he did up to the time of his removal. Either (which I suspect is the truth) he did not believe in any such plot, and has merely adopted the theory now because it is a popular one, or he stands self-convicted of a dereliction of duty in employing and associating with a class of men who he believed were conspiring against the State.

45. It is not my province to deal with the insulting attacks which Mr. Tayler has made upon the Lieutenant Governor, but I cannot help adverting to some of the instances of disregard of his recommendations which Mr. Tayler charges as crimes on Mr. Halliday, because I have the best means, from my position, of knowing their utter absurdity.

46. Mr. Tayler says that, at the commencement of the outbreak, he proposed to raise a local force of infantry and cavalry, on the guarantee of the zemindars, and that this force would have prevented the defeat of the Seikhs at Gya,* the necessity of abandoning some of the stations, &c., but that the Lieutenant Governor weakly refused his sanction. This recommendation, if made at all, must have been made in a private form, for it does not appear upon the books of the Office. Sanction was at a later period, however, accorded to Mr. Tayler to raise a force of the description mentioned, and he had collected a wretched looking troop of about 40 or 50 men and horses before his removal, though no guarantee from their zemindars was, I believe, obtained in the case of any of them. Indeed, the zemindars have since informed the Commandant of the new cavalry levy, plainly, that they would not answer, after what has occurred, for their own brothers, if they entered the Government service. A small party of these men was taken out when Captain Rattray attacked the 5th Irregulars; some joined the enemy, and the rest, I believe, fled.

47. As to any number of horsemen raised from zemindarees in this neighbourhood, and drilled for two or three months, opposing themselves to the 5th Irregular Cavalry, the idea is simply ridiculous. If Mr. Tayler had succeeded in raising the corps he mentions at the commencement of the mutiny, it would only have furnished a cavalry force for the Dinapore mutineers, for, with the high opinion Mr. Tayler had of Kooer Singh's loyalty, it is certain that he would have got most of the men from his estates; indeed, Shahabad is the only district in this division which furnishes fighting men in any numbers. Why Mr. Tayler should suppose that the zemindars here, even if they were all well affected, must have more control over their men than Scindia and Holkar had over theirs, it is not easy to conceive.

48. The next attack on the Lieutenant Governor is with reference to the disarmament of the 5th Irregular Cavalry. Mr. Tayler says he offered to have the detachments at Chuprah and Dinapore knocked off their horses, but Mr. Halliday would not listen to his advice, and to Mr. Halliday is accordingly attributed the subsequent mutiny of the 5th, and the mischief therefrom arising. This recommendation, like the former, never appears to have been made in an official form, as there is no trace of it in the Office.

49. It gives a great idea of Mr. Tayler's energy and courage to read that he volunteered to knock a whole body of sowars off their horses! A more silly piece of rhodomontade, however, there could not be. There was only a small detachment of the 5th Irregulars in this division doing duty at Dinapore, and they could have been, and afterwards were, disarmed by the military at Dinapore without trouble or difficulty, but the position of the head quarters and detachments of the regiments in the Bhaugulpore district was very different. There were no European troops in their neighbourhood, and in the opinion of the officers on the spot, civil and military, none could be sent to disarm them without their being aware of it. They ultimately indeed, went off on the night on which I arrived at Bhaugulpore, from a suspicion that European soldiers

* The Seikhs were not defeated at Gya, as it happens.

soldiers were concealed in the flat attached to the steamer, and had been sent to disarm them.

50. Mr. Tayler, therefore, it will be seen, has no ground for stating that the 5th Irregulars could have been disarmed as he proposed, and his attack on the Lieutenant Governor is particularly dishonest in this, that he leads the public to believe that the Lieutenant Governor had authority to disarm the Irregular Cavalry, whereas, as Mr. Tayler very well knew, he had nothing of the kind, such power being vested exclusively in the Governor General in Council.

51. The rebellion of Baboo Kooer Sing is attributed by Mr. Tayler to the Board of Revenue having threatened to throw up the management of the Baboo's estates unless he raised money within one month to pay off his debts, and to the Lieutenant Governor's neglect of his (Mr. Tayler's) urgent remonstrances against this order. "Anything more 'ill-timed'" Mr. Tayler "cannot conceive," for the order arrived "about a month" before the Dinapore mutiny, when every one knew that Kooer Sing was being "anxiously sought for as a leader by the Dinapore sepoys." Mr. Tayler, with that decision and foresight which characterises him, "lost no time in writing to the Lieutenant Governor soliciting his interference," but "a doubtful answer of the stereotype 'character' came, and 'ten days afterwards Kooer Sing was at the head of 10,000 'rebels'!! There is one quality which I must give Mr. Tayler every credit for, and that is the possession of the most perfect audacity. One would think that when a subordinate officer brought grave charges, in a printed pamphlet, against the head of the Government, he would be very careful to make sure of his facts. Mr. Tayler, however, is above such petty considerations. He has made up his mind to win public applause at the expense of the Lieutenant Governor, and the facts and dates are manufactured, without scruple, for the purpose.

52. The *facts* of this little episode, taken from the official documents which are lying before me, are these. In April 1855, Government agreed to a proposal of the former Commissioner, Mr. Dampier, that in order to enable Kooer Sing to raise money from certain parties to pay off his liabilities, the Government should take the management of his estates. The parties to whom Kooer Sing principally looked for pecuniary aid in this matter were the now notorious heirs of the Peishwa, who were to have lent him 13 lacs of rupees. At the close of two years the Board found, from Mr. Tayler's report, that the negotiation regarding this loan was still dragging on. They, therefore, desired Mr. Tayler to intimate to the Baboo that, if the negotiation was not brought to a satisfactory issue within one month, they would be compelled to report that the arrangement had failed in its object, and to recommend the Lieutenant Governor to relinquish the management of the estates.

53. Now, at what time was this letter written? Was it, as Mr. Tayler says, an "ill-timed" production, written about a month before the Dinapore mutiny, when the Empire was reeling under our feet? Not so. It was written on the 6th of May, when everything in Behar was perfectly quiet, and only the first mutterings of the storm had been heard in other places.

54. Mr. Tayler received it on the 11th. Did he withhold it, or remonstrate with the Board or with Government; or endeavour to soften the blow to Kooer Sing? Nothing of the kind! He passed it on without a remark to the deputy collector at Arrah for communication to Kooer Sing. On the 22nd the deputy Collector forwarded an English petition from Kooer Sing, praying that the existing arrangement might be allowed to continue, mentioning that he had now no occasion for 13 lacs, as he had arranged with his creditors for a large portion of his debt, and had borrowed 3,14,000 rupees on bonds endorsed by the Collector, and stating that if the Government would now advance him four or five lacs of rupees at moderate interest his difficulties would be at an end.

55. Was Mr. Tayler so much impressed with the "danger of the crisis," or the importance of settling this matter, that he flung aside "the course of dilatory procedure" customary in his office, and rushed up to the Board or to Government with this petition, backed by an energetic appeal from himself? By no means! Mr. Tayler took the matter very coolly. He received the petition with the recommendations of the Collector and deputy Collector on the 8th of June, and allowed it to lie on his desk till the 30th of the same month, when he dispatched it with a few formal words recommending it to the favourable consideration of the Board.

56. What private communication Mr. Tayler may, after this period, have made to the Lieutenant Governor I am not aware, but he wrote nothing further publicly either to the Lieutenant Governor or the Board, and it is quite evident from the whole course of his public correspondence and proceedings, that he did not then view the case as one of any urgency, or involving any danger. On the 17th of July, the Board, in reference to Mr. Tayler's communication of the 30th ultimo, and to the Baboo's petition, called on Mr. Tayler to explain why he had authorised Kooer Sing to raise loans, and the Collector to endorse bonds, contrary to their instructions; and informed him that they did not admit such endorsements could bind the Government. This letter was received by Mr. Tayler on the 25th of July, the very day of the Dinapore mutiny, and has never been

been answered to the present hour. This is the whole correspondence which has taken place on the subject Mr. Tayler has brought so prominently forward, and the Government will judge in what light it places the strong assertions which are to be found on the 14th and 15th pages of Mr. Tayler's pamphlet. It will be seen that, whatever Mr. Tayler's private communications with Mr. Halliday may have been, his statements in the pamphlet are quite irreconcilable either with facts or dates.

57. Looking to Kooer Sing's negotiations with the Peishwa's family, and his relations with the Bhojepore sepoys, of whom a large portion were drawn from his estates, it is very probable Kooer Sing had been meditating rebellion for some time before the outbreak at Dinapore, but the consummation was undoubtedly hastened, not by the orders of the Board (which it is evident from his petition and the support it received from the local authorities he did not suppose would be carried out), but by the conduct of Mr. Tayler himself. About a fortnight before the Dinapore mutiny, Mr. Tayler wrote and invited Kooer Sing to Patna. He had previously invited the Wahabees to his house, and had arrested them when they obeyed the invitation. Kooer Sing, whose conscience, it is probable, was not very clear, obviously feared a similar act of treachery, and put Mr. Tayler off with excuses. The deputy Collector was sent to him to tell him that he *must* come, and he promised, but rebelled instead. After the victory at Jugdeespore, it was ascertained that he had sent a message round to his tenantry to say that the authorities intended to hang him, but that if each village would lend only three or four men it would save him, a rajpoot, and an old man, from dying by the hands of a Dome. If any Government officer, then, is to be blamed for the rebellion of Kooer Sing, the facts point to Mr. Tayler himself, and to Mr. Tayler alone.

58. I have now replied to all the attacks which Mr. Tayler has made in this pamphlet on the policy which has been pursued, whether by the Government or myself, in this province, and have shown them, I think, conclusively to be deserving of no other name than that of a pack of impudent and unprincipled libels.

59. I wish I could stop here, but the course which Mr. Tayler has pursued in exalting himself at my expense, and affirming that nothing but a policy which he declares to be antagonistic to that of the Government and myself could have saved Patna, that I am forced upon an examination of Mr. Tayler's claims to the extravagant praise which he bestows upon himself. "All competent witnesses hail me with united voice as the protector of Patna." "The whole province say that the safety of everything is due to me." "By God's blessing my measures were crowned with complete success." "If I had not acted in direct opposition to the view which Mr. Halliday entertained, Patna, if not the whole province, would have been ruined." "All my measures have been productive of precisely the results contemplated." "The safety of Patna was secured by the measures taken by me, in opposition to Mr. Halliday's views." Such are the few, and but a few, of the notes which Mr. Tayler loudly sounds upon his trumpet. He will prove, I fear, but another exemplification of the adage that "true merit is never noisy."

60. When I leave the vague grandiloquisms of which Mr. Tayler is so fond, and inquire on what facts he founds his boast that he saved Patna, I find that they may be reduced within a very small compass. Mr. Tayler specifies five measures by which he conceives he secured the safety of the city of Patna. First, he compelled all the inhabitants to remain within doors after 9 o'clock at night. I have already shown what a very useless measure this was. Secondly, he disarmed the city. Thirdly, he detected and baffled conspiracies. Fourthly, he arrested the Wahabees. Fifthly, he hung or imprisoned the chief criminals.

61. I have no fault to find with the disarmament of the city, on the contrary I think it was a most prudent step; but to say, as Mr. Tayler does, that it rendered the dangerous and disaffected powerless, is simply nonsense. The disarmament was not carried far enough for that. There was a mere order to deliver up arms; 4,000 or thereabouts of all sorts were collected from a population of 400,000, of whom nearly every man has a sword, and all men of consequence number their weapons by the score. The peaceable and timid gave them up; men who possessed arms which they intended to use against the State, of course, hid them where they could find them again when they were wanted. The country around, where most of the budmashes resided, was not disarmed. Arms also could be introduced at any moment from the river, which flows along the entire face of the city, and the simple proof that the disaffected were not rendered powerless is that disarmament took place in June and Peer Ali's insurrection in July.

62. Mr. Tayler says that "conspiracies were detected and baffled." Now I deny that any conspiracies were detected and baffled by Mr. Tayler's means, and I challenge him to the proof. Mr. Tayler was called upon, the Lieutenant Governor will recollect, more than once to state explicitly what those plots and conspiracies were to which he was always alluding with vague mystery, but nothing explicit could be learnt from him. In a subsequent part of his pamphlet, Mr. Tayler claims credit for having defeated the plots of Ali Kureem and Peer Ali, which, with singular audacity, he says would have been matured had he adopted Mr. Halliday's views. These, therefore, must be taken to be the

conspiracies alluded to; indeed, no other conspiracies ever existed. Now the fact with regard to the first of these two cases is, that Mr. Tayler remained in utter ignorance of the plot until it was discovered by the magistrate of Tirhoot, entirely without communication with Mr. Tayler, and none of Mr. Tayler's measures were in any way connected, however remotely, with the discovery of this plot. In like manner, the plot of Peer Ali was fully matured under Mr. Tayler's nose, and exploded under his feet, without his having an inkling of it from any of the men in whom he trusted, or taking a single step to defeat it. That it was defeated was owing partly to the disappointment of the insurgents in finding that they were not joined by the townspeople, and partly to the cowardice of the people actually engaged in the disturbance, who fled on the approach of the Seikhs, terrified at their own act in murdering Dr. Lyell, and at the resistance they had already met with from two of the police (both their own co-religionists), who had killed one of them, and severely wounded another. The measure of calling out the Seikhs was Dr. Lyell's own act, and the reinforcements dispatched from this were taken down to the city by Mr. Lewis, and not by Mr. Tayler. Mr. Tayler neither detected this plot nor had anything whatsoever to do with its defeat.

63. I have said Mr. Tayler had no warning of this plot from any of the men in whom he trusted, but he had warning from the very men that he *distrusted*. About a fortnight or more before the outbreak, Moulvee Aoli Ali, one of the principal Wahabees in this neighbourhood, mentioned to Mr. Tayler that he had heard from his sons, who are hakeems (physicians) in the city, that there was danger of a disturbance, though in what quarter they had not learnt. Mr. Tayler, however, informed him that the arrangements of the Sircar (meaning myself) were so good that any disturbance was impossible. A few days afterwards the principal Wahabees, who are bitterly disliked by the Mahomedans, who were Mr. Tayler's friends and counsellors, were all seized at a conference to which they had been invited, and placed under arrest; Aoli Ali was amongst the number. Further information could not therefore be furnished by him. One of the oldest men of the sect, however, had been permitted on account of his age and infirmity to remain at large, and the day before the outbreak he gave notice to Mr. Tayler of Peer Ali's intentions. Mr. Tayler sent the man who brought the message over to Mr. Lewis, the magistrate, with a note in which he expressed an opinion the informer was a "sham." Mr. Lewis, a young and inexperienced officer, was naturally influenced by the opinion of his superior, thought little of the matter, and after questioning the messenger and taking down his statement, sent him back to Mr. Tayler with a verbal message which does not appear to have been delivered. Mr. Tayler, supposing, as he says, that the information had proved untrue, allowed the man to depart without further inquiry, and the outbreak accordingly took place. Mr. Tayler, therefore, it will be seen, not only did not detect or baffle this plot, as he alleges he did, but neglected the means of doing so which were proffered to him.

64. He takes credit, however, for his energy after the outbreak. He "hanged or imprisoned the chief criminals." That I presume every judicial officer would do, if the guilt of the prisoners sent before him for trial was established. Mr. Tayler either means therefore that he did this, in which case it is not easy to see in what his merit consists, or that he hung and transported people whom other judges would have acquitted. This last hypothesis, lamentable as it is, is probably not far from the truth.

65. The general belief amongst the respectable in the town always has been that the majority of the men executed for complicity in Dr. Lyell's murder were innocent; and the approvers, on whose evidence chiefly they were condemned, deposed not long ago, as you will recollect, before Mr. Fergusson, the magistrate of Alipore, that they had been compelled by Moola Bux, the deputy magistrate, to give false evidence against particular parties, on a threat of being hung themselves if they refused. It is impossible to say what truth there may be in this, but it is certain that Mr. Tayler placed himself entirely in the hands of the deputy magistrate, Moola Bux, in regard to these trials.

66. When the murderers fled on the occasion of Dr. Lyell's murder, they left behind them on the ground two men; one had been shot dead by the Darogah, Syudoodeen, and was recognised; another had been severely wounded by a sowar, and was conveyed to the Seikh Hospital. When first questioned by the magistrate, as he lay on the ground, he said he was the servant of a Lucknow Begum, but he was subsequently found to be a man of the name of Imamoodeen, who had been formerly engaged in the book trade in Patna, but had left that city some six months previously. When questioned at the hospital by the magistrate, he admitted having been engaged in the disturbance, and named the Deputy Magistrate, Moola Bux, and Vilayut Ali Khan, Mr. Tayler's particular friends, as the instigators of the outbreak. Mr. Lewis also was informed in the city, at the time of the outbreak, that some of Moola Bux's servants had been recognised amongst the rioters, though this was not afterwards corroborated.

67. The deposition and the information were very probably alike false; but any one who reads the diatribes in which Mr. Tayler, in his anxiety to conciliate popular favour, has indulged against the Mahomedans, and his deliberate avowal that he and "an observ-

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"ing few" are convinced that we owe this mutiny to a Mahomedan plot, will not be a little astonished to learn, that, notwithstanding the charge brought by the wounded prisoner against Moula Bux, the whole investigation of this case was committed to his hands. He arrested whom he pleased, and released whom he pleased; the evidence of the witnesses was taken by him, and on this evidence, without any fresh examination of the witnesses in the presence of the accused, some 14 men were condemned to death and executed.

68. This Moula Bux is a man who has resided long in Patna, and has numerous friendships, enmities, and business transactions in the place. The outbreak was clearly the work of Mahomedans, for in front of the rioters was carried a banner on which was inscribed a verse of the Koran. To select a Mahomedan then to conduct the investigation into this case, one, moreover, who had himself been named as the instigator of the affair, and to trust so implicitly in this man as to send men to death upon the evidence which he chose to put upon record, does appear to me, to say the least of it, a very singular instance of want of judgment. Nor can it be a matter of astonishment that, under these circumstances, people doubt very much whether, with one or two exceptions any person concerned in Dr. Lyell's murder has really been apprehended and punished.

69. A very striking fact is, that although several of the men apprehended made *quasi* confessions, the real origin of the conspiracy, its ramifications, and the mode in which it was managed, are all still matters of conjecture. Efforts were of course made to implicate Looft Ali Khan, the enemy of Vilayut Ali, but they entirely failed, and it is at the present day quite uncertain who the real instigators of the plot were, and whether it originated in Patna or Lucknow, though the probability seems to be in favour of the latter hypothesis. This would hardly have been the case if all those who were apprehended and confessed to this charge had been really guilty. It is matter of grave doubt, therefore, whether Mr. Tayler's exultant exclamation, that "even the Mahomedan Commissioner could not restore to life the scoundrels he had hanged," ought not to be converted into a sincere wish, for Mr. Tayler's sake, that he had possessed this power. Certainly in no point of view can Mr. Tayler's conduct after the outbreak be said to have justified the extravagant eulogium which he himself has passed on it.

70. With regard to the arrest of the Wahabees (or rather the people called Wahabees, for they repudiate the title, and their tenets differ, in many respects, from those of the Arab Wahabees), it is only necessary to say that there is not the slightest proof that any danger was to be apprehended from this sect, the members of which are principally dirzees, bleestees, and industrious people of that class. They are detested by the orthodox Mahomedans, and have always been remarkable for their peaceful demeanour. The manner in which some of the most respectable men amongst them were arrested, when attending at the Commissioner's house on an apparently friendly invitation, was ill calculated to give a favourable impression of English good faith; and had the Wahabees been inclined to rise, this act would in all probability have had the effect of hastening the movement. Mr. Tayler indeed talks of the men he arrested, as the Wahabee leaders, but they were mere book men, and had the sect been inclined to fight they would assuredly have selected other leaders.

71. There is no doubt Mr. Tayler was incited to the arrest of the Wahabees by the counsels of Moula Bux Vilayut Ali Khan, and the other Mahomedans of the orthodox sects who had his ear. These men, although employing spies of their own persuasion (who were never paid and who consequently lived upon the people), and although possessing ample means of knowing what was passing in the city, never gave Mr. Tayler any hint of the conspiracy which was in progress; and this is the more remarkable, because for a considerable time prior to the outbreak Peer Ali had been making a daily allowance to a considerable number of men, who had promised to join in the disturbance. The Wahabees did give information. There is no pretence that any Wahabees joined in the insurrection. The rioters apprehended were all orthodox Mahomedans. Without positively affirming the fact therefore, which must be matter of conjecture, I confess a doubt has often occurred to me as to whether there may not have been some truth in Imamooddeen's first confession, and whether Mr. Tayler was not worked upon to arrest the Wahabees, simply in order to get out of the way men who were likely to interfere with the plans of the conspirators. There is at least, it will be seen, some ground for this hypothesis. There is none for attributing seditious designs to the Wahabees. Amongst the letters found in Peer Ali's house, is one in which the writer says, that they must conciliate all men, "even the Wahabees," showing that they had not hitherto succeeded in doing so, and in another, he mentions that he had written one of the Wahabees a letter which, though ambiguous, a wise man would understand; but there is no trace of any letters from or communications with the Wahabees, nor is it anywhere hinted that their assistance had been secured.

72. Mr. Tayler pretends, in order to justify *ex post facto* his apprehensions of the Wahabees, that the old man I have mentioned would not have given information if his relations had not been imprisoned, and relates a dramatic scene between himself and the Wahabees, in which he told the old man and his sons that their lives were in each other's hands. I need not say this is all pure romance. Natives who have resided all

their lives at a large Sudder station, in familiar intercourse with Englishmen, know perfectly well that we do not indulge in vicarious punishments. The families of Ali Kurcem, Nishan Sing, and other rebels, not only reside in these districts without fear, though the heads of their respective families are in rebellion against us, but appear in Court, and contest the confiscation of their estates, without a thought that they are endangering either their lives or their liberties by so doing.

73. On the whole, therefore, the measures of which Mr. Tayler boasts do not seem very well adapted for the salvation of Patna. Some of them are of trifling importance, others are imaginary, and the rest were much more likely to create a disturbance than to allay one.

74. Mr. Tayler's assertions, that he was "removed in the very zenith of a successful administration," that "his measures were crowned with complete success," &c., simply prove that Mr. Tayler's notions of a successful administration are widely different from those of other people. What was the state of affairs when the order for Mr. Tayler's removal issued? Four districts, out of the six entrusted to his care, abandoned to any one that might choose to occupy them, one in the hands of the rebels, and Patna itself so insecure that when the fugitives from Gya arrived they found that Mr. Tayler had packed up his property preparatory to flight, and taken a house at Dinapore to which he had sent his family, the respectable inhabitants of the city of Patna irritated and discontented, their women sent off, their jewels buried, all trade stopped: this is what, it seems, Mr. Tayler understands as the zenith of a successful administration! Had it not been for the providential victory of Major Eyre, which event took place after his removal, but before the order reached him, for the unexpected good conduct of the people in Tirhoot, Chuprah, and Chumparun, and the prompt reversal of his orders by the Government in Calcutta, Mr. Tayler's administration would have closed as disastrously as any in our Indian annals.

75. But Mr. Tayler says that his success is testified to by the whole province, that the unanimous voice of all classes in Behar is in his favour, and that his success is certified by all competent witnesses. This is another of those flowers of rhetoric which tumble to pieces when they are handled. Who are competent witnesses to the manner in which a Commissioner performs his duty? Except the Government which he serves and the officers in immediate official contact with him, it is certain, that owing to the manner in which business is conducted in this country, and to the fact that the general European community know nothing of official proceedings except what they are told by officials themselves, or learn through Natives, who almost invariably suit their opinions to their audience, few indeed can tell what a Commissioner's measures really are, or to what extent he is exerting himself. No better exemplification of this fact can be found than the effect which the pamphlet published by Mr. Tayler at the time of his removal appears, from the letters appended to it, to have produced on many gentlemen of undoubted respectability. Most of these letters, it is true, were private notes not intended for the public eye, and the writers of several of them have been much annoyed that conventional expressions of sympathy or regret called forth by Mr. Tayler's own letters, and not intended for any other eye than his, should have been published to the world without their authority as proofs of their approval of his general policy, but still, making every allowance for this, sufficient remains to show that many gentlemen resident in his neighbourhood considered Mr. Tayler's defence a good one, and believed all that he stated of his own measures and his own policy to be unanswerable. The Government did not. The senior civilians at the station did not. What was the cause of this difference of opinion? Why, simply that the Government and Mr. Tayler's fellow civilians saw the omissions and the glosses which were employed to make a good case out of a bad one, while those who were not behind the scenes very naturally took Mr. Tayler's facts as they stood.

76. While the latter were applauding Mr. Tayler to the echo, a retired civilian who had known Patna for some 40 years and had property in the station, as he stated, of the value of two lacs of rupees at stake, laid before the Government of India a memorandum of the causes of the dangers which at the time menaced this city, in which he traced these dangers, principally to Mr. Tayler's ill-judged measures. Which was the most competent witness, this gentleman of acknowledged ability, thoroughly acquainted with the character of every man of any mark in Patna, and able from long official experience to judge of the effect of Mr. Tayler's measures, or the military men, clergymen, and others, residing at distances of from seven to fifty miles, and without access to authentic sources of information, whose favourable opinions Mr. Tayler has been at the pains to collect and publish?

77. There is no doubt that Mr. Tayler will be able to furnish abundance of testimony similar to this last in favour of his present pamphlet, and from precisely the same causes. What stranger is there who reads the stories in this pamphlet about Kooer Sing, the 5th Cavalry, Mr. Tayler's detection and suppression of plots, &c., &c., that would not rise from its perusal with the impression that in wisdom, courage, and energy, Mr. Tayler was a perfect Bayard, who was being hunted to death by a weak unworthy Government, jealous of his great success. Those who are in a position to test the value of these stories, and to know what Mr. Tayler really did, are apt to regard him, on the contrary, simply

as a man of inordinate vanity, singularly bad judgment, and utterly unscrupulous, venting his spleen on every one around him who is not inclined to take him at his own estimate, or who interferes in any way with the spurious claims he sets up to the saviourship of Behar.

78. The public believe Mr. Tayler to be the stern foe of the Mahomedan race, and imagine that the Government, in appointing a Mahomedan as Assistant to the Commissioner of Patna, were desirous of marking their disapproval of the conduct which Mr. Tayler had pursued towards the followers of the Prophet. This is natural enough, for Mr. Tayler himself had done his best to keep up the delusion, and no one has felt sufficiently interested in the matter to take the trouble of setting forth the truth. Those who know anything of Mr. Tayler's official life are well aware that he is, probably without exception, the most noted patron of Mahomedans in the whole Civil Service. Nujee-moodeen, whom he persuaded the Bettiah Rajah to employ as Dewan, and Nujee-moodeen's whole family; Vilayut Ali Khan, the nephew of Looft Ali, who took a house to enable him to be in constant attendance on Mr. Tayler during these disturbances; Moula Buksh, who resided in Mr. Tayler's compound, to whom he entrusted the entire preparation of the political cases, and on the faith of whose proceedings he condemned men to death; Altaf Hossein, Reza Hossein, and some half-a-dozen other Mahomedans were the favoured *protégés* of Mr. Tayler, and the persons whom he most strongly recommended both to the Government and myself.

79. Then, again, the public no doubt put faith in the statements of the Patna correspondents of the newspapers; imagined these correspondents, probably, to be independent gentlemen who had peculiar means of information. Those who are better informed know that the persons who worked the press from this place, on Mr. Tayler's behalf, were men in a position of life which gave them little other command of information than what the common bazaar gossip supplied to them. I do not recollect to have seen a single fact correctly stated by one of those men, and many of their stories were pure inventions.

80. When a clever man, in a prominent situation, such as that which Mr. Tayler occupied, condescends, cap in hand, to seek the suffrages of the public, and supports his claims by the wholesale misrepresentation and barefaced clap-trap which characterise this pamphlet, he will no doubt succeed with ease in deceiving many for a time, but the day soon comes when the rottenness of a reputation so acquired becomes patent to every one; the hero of the hour is transformed into the charlatan, and his humiliation becomes all the more painful from his temporary elevation. That such will be the fate of Mr. Tayler I have no doubt. But in the meantime I ask the Government if this officer is to be permitted to deal with impunity in the misrepresentations and mis-statements regarding official transactions which I have exposed. I think that I do not demand too much, when I submit that in justice to me, and in justice to the Government itself, he should be compelled to withdraw every copy of this pamphlet from circulation, to retract the mis-statements it contains, and to apologise for having written it.

81. If it be thought that my strictures on Mr. Tayler's proceedings, and my remarks on his statements, are too severe, I trust it will be remembered that for six months past I have been compelled to submit, in silence, to anonymous calumnies and misrepresentations similar to those which Mr. Tayler has now been so incautious as to publish under his own name, and that I owe the attacks which have been made upon me during that time chiefly to the misrepresentations of Mr. Tayler and his partisans. Those who recollect the manner in which I have been assailed will not be surprised, that when Mr. Tayler himself steps forward in person, and picks up the dishonourable weapons of his anonymous friends, I have not thought it necessary to measure my blows or to treat him with a courtesy which I feel that he does not deserve.

I have, &c.

E. A. Samuells,

Commissioner of Revenue.

EAST INDIA (MR. W. TAYLER'S PETITION)

COPY of a MEMORANDUM drawn up by
Frederick J. Halliday, K.C.B., a Member of
Council of the Secretary of State for
upon the PETITION presented to this House
by *Mr. W. Tayler*.

(*Mr. Edward Stanhope*.)

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